Political Reflection Vol. 2 | No. 3

Libya: Human Security Challenges

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

By Prof. Alan Hunter

The Mistral Warship Deal: What’s in for France and Russia?

By Dr. Richard Rousseau

Rebuilding a ‘New’ Libya & Implications for International Politics

By Dr. Ayla Göl

ISSN 2042-888X

Post-Gaddafi Reconstruction in Libya

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POLITICAL REFLECTION

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Contributors

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Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

4

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September-October-November 2011

POLITICAL REFLECTION

Contents World Stories

7

Notable Quotes

9

22

Africa Review Post-Gaddafi: Reconstruction of Libya

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

12

Libya: Human Security Challenges

By Prof. Alan Hunter

18

Rebuilding a „New‟ Libya & Implications for International Politics

22

By Dr. Ayla Göl

23

Interview Interview with José-María Siles

By Ali Onur Özçelik

27

Eurasia Review Bhutan Cements Its Democracy

By Dr. Paul Richardson

33

27

Afghanistan after a Decade: Progress and Challenges Ahead

36

By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay "Waves" of the Russia's Presidential Reforms Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks"

41

By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

Commentary A New War on Terror?

By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

51

33

September-October-November 2011

POLITICAL REFLECTION

Contents Commentary The Mistral Warship Deal:

53

59

What’s in for France and Russia?

By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

65

Caucasus Review 60

Russia-Georgia Relations: Among Illusions and Visions

By Zaur Shiriyev

China Review Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’: Lessons from

39

65

62

the Dene peoples and the Arctic Conflict?

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

72

The Missing Leader

By Nicholas Miller

Interview 75

Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis

By K. Kaan Renda

83

75

Global City Analysis 83

NAIROBI: “needs to feel the positive effects of globalisation…”

By Fatih Eren

Film Review 89

What is so Good About The Sopranos?

71

By Enes Erbay

92

Recent Books

75

WORLD STORIES | By Aksel Ersoy

Egypt

United Kingdom A number of British cities were hit by rioting and looting. The trouble started in an area of north London, when a peaceful protest over the shooting by police of a black suspect turned violent. Gangs of youths took advantage of the situation to commit severe looting and arson throughout London. The lawlessness soon spread to other cities. After police were criticised for yielding control of the streets to thugs, David Cameron returned from his holiday and promised a robust response. (13.08.2011)

The trial of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt‘s former president, began in Cairo.

Charged with corruption and ordering the killing of protesters, he was carried into court at a police academy on a stretcher—and pleaded not guilty.

Mr Mubarak‘s sons, Alaa and Gamal, a former interior minister and six officials of the former regime are all on trial at the same time. (07.08.2011)

Argentina Mauricio Macri, a conservative, was re-elected as mayor of Buenos Aires, winning 64% of the vote to 36% for his opponent, a supporter of Argentina‘s president, Cristina Fernández. Mr Macri‘s victory followed a similar defeat for the president‘s candidate in Sante Fé province, arousing hopes among the opposition that Ms Fernández may find it harder than it seemed to win a second term in October‘s presidential election. (05.08.2011)

Horn of Africa The UN‘s World Food Programme sent food to Somalia‘s capital, Mogadishu, in an effort to save the lives of people hit by drought in the Horn of Africa. Aid agencies estimate that 3.7m people in Somalia and millions of others in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya are close to starvation. At a meeting in Rome officials said the UN had received about $1 billion for emergency relief since November but needed $1 billion more by the end of the year.

(25.07.2011)

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7

Norway Norway suffered its worst peacetime atrocity. Anders Behring Breivik, a farright extremist, shot dead at least 68 people at a political youth camp run by the ruling Labour Party and set off a car bomb in central Oslo that killed at least eight others. He was arrested and admitted to the killings. A long document that he posted on the internet hours before the massacre suggested he had been motivated by anti -Muslim hatred and the establishment‘s liberal stance on immigration.

(28.07.2011)

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

WORLD STORIES | By Aksel Ersoy

Somalia

United Kingdom

The UN declared a famine in two regions of Somalia, the first for 19 years. Tens of thousands of refugees are attempting to flee to neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia in search of help. The UN secretarygeneral, Ban Ki-moon, appealed to donor countries for $300m in aid over the next two months. An estimated 11m people are affected by the worst droughts in east Africa in several decades. (18.07.2011)

There were more casualties in the phone-hacking scandal in Britain. Rebekah Brooks, chief executive of News International and Les Hinton, a close aide to Rupert Murdoch, both resigned; Mrs Brooks was later arrested.

As attention turned to the Metropolitan Police‘s bungled handling of the affair, two of its most senior officers quit. On July 19th Mr Murdoch, his son James and Mrs Brooks faced questioning from a parliamentary committee. They batted away their gentle interrogators, for the most part, but Mr Murdoch (senior) was less lucky when an interloper attacked him with a plateful of shaving foam.

Canada After five years of minority government, the Conservative Party won a parliamentary majority in Canada‘s federal election. The centrist Liberals lost more than half their seats, and were replaced as the official opposition by the leftist New Democrats. Quebec‘s separatist Bloc Quebecois lost 90% of its seats and was nearly eliminated from Parliament.

(05.05.2011)

(20.07.2011)

Italy Silvio Berlusconi‘s ruling People of Freedom party took a drubbing in local elections in some of Italy‘s cities.

The biggest blow was the failure of Letizia Moratti, the major of Milan, Italy‘s financial capital and Mr Berlusconi‘s native city, to secure re-election.

(16.05.2011)

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

8

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Compiled by Aksel Ersoy from Different World News Sources

Palestine At least 14 protesters were shot when Palestinians sought to cross Israel‘s borders with Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza. The demonstrators were marking the day of the naqba, or catastrophe, the term Palestinians use for Israel‘s birth in 1948. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel‘s prime minister, said his country‘s sovereignty had to be defended. (20.05.2011)

Quotes Notable

“We do not see the Syria issue as a foreign problem. The Syria issue is our internal problem because we have an 850-kilometer-long border with Syria; we have family and historical and cultural bonds with Syria. Therefore, the incidents there do not allow us to simply stand by.

We have to listen to the voices coming from there and have to do something about it. … Our patience is reaching its limit, and for that I am sending the foreign minister to Syria on Tuesday.

He will conduct the necessary talks there. Our determined messages will be clearly conveyed to them. What happens after that will be shaped according to their response and actions."

By Rahman Dağ

- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said before Davutoglu‘s trip to Damascus.

“British officials should stop meddling in other people's affairs and instead worry about their own. Instead of interfering in others' affairs in Afghanistan, Iraq and attacking Libya, they should deal with their own people."

-After the riots experienced in several significant cities in the UK, the president of Iran Mr. Mahmud Ahmadinejad said.

“We learned that the United States received a downgrade by one of the credit rating agencies — not so much because they doubt our ability to pay our debt if we make good decisions, but because after witnessing a month of wrangling over raising the debt ceiling, they doubted our political system’s ability to act. The markets, on the other hand, continue to believe our credit status is AAA.” - One of the ratings agency, the Standard & Poor‘s reduced the credit rating of the United States from AAA to AA+. On this issue, the president of the United States made a statement and said that.

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9

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Quotes Notable

What do you want? Do you want me to sell the Peloponnese?

By Rahman DaÄ&#x;

- Papandreou's statement at eurozone

- Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has publis-

summit .

hed a statement calling for US forces to return home and said: "Know that we will resist and struggle firmly and strongly as before, until you leave our land, even as you would resist and struggle if your country were exposed to invasion."

- In an interview with the Izvestia newspaper Russia's NATO envoy, Dmitry Rogozin said: “NATO is planning a military campaign against Syria to help overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad with a long-reaching goal of preparing a beachhead for an attack on Iran....

The noose around Iran is tightening. Military planning against Iran is underway. And we are certainly concerned about an escalation of a large-scale war in this huge region"

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

10

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JOURNAL OF

GLOBAL ANALYSIS Interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed academic journal

by CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis) www.cesran.org/jga

Abstracting/Indexing

ISSN: 2041-1944



Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)



Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)



EBSCO Publishing Inc.



EconPapers



IDEAS



Index Islamicus



International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Schorlarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)



International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)



International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)



International Relations and Security Network (ISN)

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Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature

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Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)

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Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)



Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory

AFRICA REVIEW AFRICA REVIEW

Post-Gaddafi Reconstruction of Libya

By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem*

O

n 19 August 2011, Abdel Hafiz Ghoga,

fighting over them again. Nevertheless, as of 24 Au-

Vice-Chairman of National Transition

gust, the NTC forces are already in Tripoli and Gadda-

Council (NTC), the rebel group fighting

fi‘s Bab al-Aziziya compound was overrun by the re-

against the Colonel Gaddafi regime in

bels. On the other hand, Gaddafi vowed ‗death or

Libya announced that ‗The zero hour has started. The

victory‘ in his fight against NTC and he is believed to

rebels in Tripoli have risen up.‘ This was followed by

be somewhere in Libya [2]. Is this the end of Gaddafi?

important gains made by the rebels in the second

Jonathan Marcus, BBC Diplomatic and Defence Cor-

part of August, taking control of strategically impor-

respondent, questioning the latest NTC gains around

tant coastal cities of Zlitan and Zawiya. However, re-

Tripoli as a possible beginning of the end for the Lib-

ferring to the rebels in the capital, Tripoli, ‗Those rats

yan conflict, adopts a cautious position by pointing

were attacked by the masses tonight and we elimina-

out that ‗up to now the rebel fighters have often

ted them‘, Gaddafi said [1]. The civil uprising in Libya

shown little military momentum, their advances eva-

against the government forces have been struggling

porating almost as quickly as they are made. [3]‘

to make a decisive impact for a victory since February, even though it has been enjoying the military

The importance of being cautious about the outcome

support of NATO since 19 March 2011. The last five

of the Libya conflict is something that the author of

months were in fact, an environment of a total mili-

this article knows only too well, as I claimed and in

tary stalemate between the Gaddafi regime and NTC.

fact, hoped that Gaddafi would follow the footsteps

With the aerial support of NATO against Gaddafi for-

of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Muba-

ces, the rebels have been fighting over key coastal

rak of Egypt in one of my previous Political Reflection

cities between their ‗capital‘ city of Benghazi in the

articles. It was still the early days of ‗Arab Spring‘ then,

east and Tripoli in the west, taking control of them,

and I wrote: ‗Gaddafi was still clinging to power, but

but then losing them to Gaddafi forces, and then

probably not for very long before that he is consig-

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

12

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Post-Gaddafi | By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

ned to the bloody pages of history as the third dictator in North Africa, who was removed from power in February 2011. [4]‘ Five months later, Gaddafi is not in power but his fight is still not over either, and therefore adopting a more cautious line of prediction this time, I would bear in mind a number of other possibilities such as further prolonging of the conflict or the

How the conflict comes to an end and who would be the ‘victor’ of the conflict, with what terms and agreements, would also be another key issue, defining the boundaries of a future postconflict reconstruction process.

“

”

rebels being forced to reach a political settlement with Gaddafi. Nevertheless, as the title of this article

its strong economic ties with the Libyan regime and

suggests, to elaborate the future reconstruction chal-

more significantly, because of a large number of Tur-

lenges in Libya, a post-Gaddafi scenario will be taken

kish citizens who live in Libya. In fact, it was the lar-

as the most likely scenario.

gest evacuation operation Turkey has ever undertaken. Around 25,000 of its citizens and thousands of

The objective here is also not to outline specific as-

other nationals were rescued by deploying civilian

pects of post-conflict reconstruction in Libya, as this

ferries and the Turkish navy [6]. However, when Tur-

would largely depend on a number of factors such as

key realized that a UNSCR to allow a military interven-

how much longer the fighting would continue and

tion became inevitable it switched sides and decided

consequently, the level, type and scope of damage

to take part in the NATO-led operation, knowing that

and destruction incurred by the country‘s infrastruc-

those who take part in the military intervention

ture, economy and societal structures. How the

would also be the ones deciding on the future of the

conflict comes to an end and who would be the

country, as was the case in Iraq.

‗victor‘ of the conflict, with what terms and agreements, would also be another key issue, defining the

With these general characteristics in mind and based

boundaries of a future post-conflict reconstruction

on recent reconstruction experiences in Kosovo, Ti-

process. In terms of actors, bearing in mind the NA-

mor Leste, Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be possible

TO‘s current military involvement and Libya‘s oil and

to list a number of challenges and dilemmas that

natural gas wealth (the

9h

largest proven oil reserves

might also arise in the context of Libya. First, articula-

in the world), it would be safe to claim that there

ting a vision for the future that is shared by all or

would be a significant involvement of the internatio-

most stakeholders can be crucial to the success of

nal community [5]. However, a victory by NTC would

post-conflict reconstruction, as it can mobilise popu-

mean a much greater involvement by the internatio-

lations to contribute to the process effectively. Even if

nal community in the re-structuring of Libya‘s gover-

it is a NTC victory that brings the conflict to an end in

nance, security and economic structures. Leading

Libya, the task of reconstruction would require the

NATO countries such as the US, UK, France and Tur-

development of collaborative structures of governan-

key as well as a number of Gulf countries such as

ce with the participation of actors from all aspects of

Qatar and United Arab Emirates with their strong alli-

societal and political structures of the country, inclu-

ance with NTC are likely to play a prominent role in

ding those who are currently supporting Gaddafi. The

such a process. In fact, in the formation of the NATO

‗victor‘s peace‘ may seem to be easy to implement,

alliance for the military intervention and decision on

but if it is purely for the purpose of a regime change,

the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973

as was the case in Iraq through the de-Ba‘athification

which paved the way for such an intervention, such

policy, it can result in new devastating conflict dyna-

calculations for post-conflict Libya seemed to have

mics. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq

played a key role. For example, Turkey‘s response was

started the de-Ba‘athification programme in May

much more hesitant in showing its solidarity to the

2003, two months after the US led ‗victory‘ against

popular uprising at the beginning and it was much

Saddam Hussein, and the goal was to eradicate the

conciliatory towards the Gaddafi regime and trying to

Ba‘ath Party from the Iraqi political system. This invol-

distance itself from the NTC. This was largely due to

ved the removal of thousands of civil servants, acade-

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

13

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Post-Gaddafi | By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

mics, politicians, police officers and army personnel from their posts. This was considered to be an essential cornerstone for the ‗democratisation‘ of Iraq but instead it has created a fertile recruiting ground for the Iraqi insurgency groups, as only with the demobilisation of the Iraqi military, around half a million soldiers and officers started to roam the streets of Baghdad - angry, frustrated and unemployed without pensions [7].

It is very likely that a vast range of large and expensive reconstruction projects for destroyed infrastructure, housing and services and the re-structuring of security forces might mean the risk of the process turning into a „contract grabbing‟ exercise among the leading NATO countries. Differently from post-

Differently from post-conflict environments such as Afghanistan, Timor Leste or Sierra Leone, Libya has actually got the means to pay for its own reconstruction. Therefore, the risk of turning the reconstruction process into a lucrative exercise for awarding contracts to the international private contractors without adequate participation of national and local authorities is very much there and this could result in programme failures, long delays in responding to urgent needs, the waste of scarce resources, and, most dangerously, renewed violence.

“

”

conflict environments such as Afghanistan, Timor Leste or Sierra Leone, Libya has actually got the

ratus of the country quickly and gain the trust of peo-

means to pay for its own reconstruction. Therefore,

ple, as this would be the only way they could protect

the risk of turning the reconstruction process into a

their new regime. Nevertheless, with or without

lucrative exercise for awarding contracts to the inter-

troops, the international community is likely to exert

national private contractors without adequate partici-

pressure on NTC for a key role in the reconstruction

pation of national and local authorities is very much

of the country. As experience with the contemporary

there and this could result in programme failures,

practice of establishing a vision for reconstruction

long delays in responding to urgent needs, the waste

shows, such an external role often means leaving too

of scarce resources, and, most dangerously, renewed

little space for the inclusion of the views of internal

violence. This would be particularly important for the

actors about what they wish to see the reconstruction

NTC and its allies to have a strong legitimacy in the

process doing, and how it should take place.

eyes of Libyans. The NTC would need to prove that they are representing the interests of people but not

The second key issue with the reconstruction of Libya

the international community. Without earning such

would be with the nature, speed and scope of trans-

legitimacy, the new regime will not be able to devel-

formation and reform that the political, economic

op and sustain an effective governance system in the

and security realms of the country would be expec-

country. The Iraq reconstruction experience is full of

ted to go through by the new regime and its interna-

appropriate lessons for the importance of national

tional allies. It is likely that there might be different

legitimacy and differently from Iraq the advantage of

national and international dynamics with this and as

NTC in Libya is that it has been fighting its own popu-

the situation would be changing quickly, frequently

lar uprising rather than being installed there by the

and drastically, it would be difficult to make sensible

international community on the day after the

projections at this stage. However, the most likely

„victory‟. Again differently from Iraq, the NATO‟s mili-

scenario would be the way the international commu-

tary intervention was through aerial bombing and

nity is likely to be using its liberal peace agenda for

therefore, there are no foreign troops in Libya. This

the re-structuring of the Libyan state. This would in-

would be an advantage for the NTC and the way they

volve its standard programme packages such as

could establish their own legitimacy, as it is less likely

‗democratisation‘, ‗economic liberalisation and priva-

that they would be seen as collaborators of a foreign

tisation‘, ‗good governance and decentralisation‘ and

invasion. However, this would also mean that they

‗security sector reform‘. For example, in order to

need to take the control of the existing security appa-

strengthen the legitimacy of NTC there is likely to be

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

14

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Post-Gaddafi | By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

a general election soon after the ‗victory‘ without

also important to consider that there might be cer-

having a proper opportunity for the establishment of

tain elements of ‗peace-spoilers‘ in the post-conflict

other requirements of a well functioning democracy

environment. There can be two effective ways of dea-

such as political parties (they have been banned by

ling with this possible challenge. First, the victor‘s

the 1972 Prohibition of Party Politics Act Number 71);

peace should not turn into a humiliation exercise for

a free media (according to the Freedom of Press In-

Gaddafi supporters within the bureaucracy, security

dex, Libya had the most censored media in the Mid-

apparatuses and other governance units. Second, a

dle East and North Africa); systems of checks and bal-

peaceful settlement with Gaddafi himself and his

ances; a strong and resourceful civil society engage-

support base in terms of different tribes and other

ment (only a small number of NGOs exist but no

loyal population groups would be the best guarantee

trade unions); and ensuring rule of law and legislative

for the sustainability of peace in the country. The

guarantees for the protection of human rights. The

2002 Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan was a victor‘s

international community has tried to „democratise‟

reconstruction plan, which excluded the Taliban and

many war-torn countries through its liberal peace

consequently, now almost 10 years later, the war aga-

statebuilding approach before and the result has of-

inst the Taliban continues.

ten been a fragile democracy trying to deal with the challenge of insufficient legitimacy. Therefore, it is

Thanks to its high oil revenues, under the Gaddafi

important that the reconstruction process itself is

regime Libya had one of the highest GDP per capita

seen as an opportunity for gaining such legitimacy

(approx. $11,300) among North African countries and

and for that reconstruction has to be „process-based‟

more importantly, its small population of around 6.5

rather than „goal-based‟.

million enjoyed an extensive social security system, particularly in housing and education (Libya has the

The new regime has a responsibility to show that the

highest literacy rate in North Africa – 88.3%) [8]. As a

Libyans are treated like citizens who have not only

result of the state social policies the prevalence of

duties and responsibilities but also rights. To em-

poverty in the country is much lower than in its ne-

power them and give them a chance to remove

ighbours and in fact, such direct benefits from the

themselves from the paternalistic and authoritarian

state was one of the reasons Gaddafi sustained a

days of Gaddafi, the reconstruction process would

strong support base for his regime. Therefore, it is

need to question how to deliver and when, as well as

important that the reconstruction process is not per-

what to deliver. For example, the security sector re-

ceived as taking such state benefits from the popula-

form is likely to be seen as a priority in order to deal

tion as the liberalisation of the economy may de-

with the Gaddafi-loyal elements of the military and

mand cuts in welfare systems. Such economic trans-

police service. After the disastrous Iraqi experience,

formation processes with heavy handed structural

there would be no excuse, if the international com-

adjustment programmes led by the Bretton Woods

munity comes up with a ‗de-Gaddafication‘ program-

institutions have meant the worsening of economic

me, as this would mean an invitation to a protracted

prospects for war-affected communities around the

insurgency problem or high levels of crime in the

world such as Uganda, El Salvador and Cambodia. In

country. After a civil war of six months, one of the first

former-Soviet countries and some of former Yugoslav

peace dividends the people of Libya would naturally expect is the establishment of security and stability.

Seeing Libya like a blank sheet for reform in all aspects of governance, judiciary, economy and security would likely to be counter-productive. Whatever reform is necessary should be undertaken in a gradual way and a possible ‗de-Gaddafication‘ policy should be the last thing to consider in Libya. In order to maintain an environment of security and stability, it is

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

15

The international community has tried to „democratise‟ many wartorn countries through its liberal peace statebuilding approach before and the result has often been a fragile democracy trying to deal with the challenge of insufficient legitimacy.

“

”

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Post-Gaddafi | By Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem

...with the NTC’s ‘victory’ against the Gaddafi regime, the ‘Arab Spring’ will be opening a new chapter. It is clear that what has been happening in Libya over the last six months will have serious ramifications not only in the Middle East and North Africa but also around the world.

country. Even small mistakes can have serious im-

republics highly valuable state assets such as key in-

Notes:

dustrial facilities and access to natural resources such

* Alpaslan Özerdem is Professor of Peacebuilding at Coventry University.

“

pacts in fragile environments, and the regime change experience taking place in Libya could now turn into something devastating for the entire population.

Therefore, the post-Gaddafi reconstruction of Libya would need to be handled with upmost care and effectiveness by bearing in mind the key issues of legitimacy, joined-up vision, national ownership, partici-

”

pation, reform agenda, empowerment and distribution of wealth.

as mines, oil and natural gas reserves were ended up in the hands of a few individuals who had strong links with the ruling political establishment. In Lebanon, the reconstruction of the Beirut Central District through a shareholder private company created a heavy debt burden for the entire population. Overall, the risk with the reconstruction process is that if it is not guided with well-adjusted economic policies according to socio-economic realities of the country, the experience in Libya could be manipulated for the benefit of powerful elites within the new regime and their international supporters. This would be highly damaging both for the legitimacy of NTC and the prospects of long-term stability in the country. What Libya should avoid is the creation of a gap between ‗haves‘ and ‗have nots‘ through its reconstruction experience, which could provide suitable conditions for a possible insurgency risk against the new regime.

Finally, with the NTC‘s ‗victory‘ against the Gaddafi regime, the ‗Arab Spring‘ will be opening a new chapter. It is clear that what has been happening in Libya over the last six months will have serious ramifications not only in the Middle East and North Africa but also around the world. The population paid a heavy price with a death toll of 20,000 people, but the Gaddafi‘s totalitarian regime is now almost over. This would likely to have a strong resonance in other countries under similar totalitarian regimes! I would probably be focussing on the reconstruction of Syria in my next Political Reflection article. However, the real challenge for NTC is actually starting just now because all decisions to be made over the next few months will have huge bearings in the future of the

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

16

1)BBC, 2011. ‗Libya conflict: Gaddafi says Tripoli attackers quashed‘,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-

14606081 2)BBC, 2011a. ‗Defiant Gaddafi ‗Vows to fight‘‘, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14641572 3)Marcus, Jonathan. 2011. ‗Libyan conflict: Beginning of

the

end?‘,

BBC

News

Africa,

http://

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14560983 4)Özerdem, Alpaslan. 2011. ‗Turkey‘s Role in the New Middle East: CPRS Turkey Research Initiative‘, Political Reflection, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp: 26-28. http:// cesran.org/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=1185&Itemid= 224&lang=en 5)Exclusive Economy. 2011. ‗The World‘s Largest 15 Oil

Reserves‘.

http://

exclusiveeconomy.com/2011/03/top-15-world-oilreserves/ 6)Yanatma, Servet. 2011. ‗Turkey Demonstrates Successful Evacuation Operations in Libya‘, Today’s Zaman,

27

February

2011.

http://

www.todayszaman.com/ newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=236774 7)Ferguson, Charles. 2008. No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos. New York: Public Affairs.

8)OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011. http://

www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/ media/downloads/publications/ASB2010_2011.pdf; UNDP, Human Development Index 2010 Libya. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ LBY.html

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

JOURNAL OF

GLOBAL ANALYSIS Editor-in-Chief: Ozgur TUFEKCI King’s College London, UK Managing Editor: Husrev TABAK University College London, UK Book Review Editor: Kadri Kaan RENDA King’s College London, UK Associate Editors: Emel AKCALI, Dr. Central European University, Hungary Mitat CELIKPALA, Assoc.Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey Bayram GUNGOR, Prof. Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey Editorial Board: Sener AKTURK, Dr. Harvard University, USA | William BAIN, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK |Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. University of Queensland, Australia | Richard BELLAMY, Prof. University College London, UK | Andreas BIELER, Prof. University of Nottingham, UK | Pınar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. Bilkent University, Turkey | Ken BOOTH, Prof. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stephen CHAN, Prof. SOAS, University of London, UK | Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John M. DUNN, Prof. University of Cambridge, UK | Kevin DUNN, Prof. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA | Mine EDER, Prof. Bogazici University, Turkey | Ertan EFEGIL, Assoc. Prof. Sakarya University, Turkey | Ayla GOL, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK | Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. Uppsala Universitet, Sweden | Elif Ince HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. Carnegie Mellon University, USA | David HELD, Prof. London School of Economics, LSE, UK | Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Naim KAPUCU, Assoc.

Prof. University of Central Florida, USA | Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA | Abdulhamit KIRMIZI, Dr. SOAS, University of London, UK | Cécile LABORDE, Prof. University College London, UK | Ziya ONIS, Prof. Koc University, Turkey | Alp OZERDEM, Prof. Coventry University, UK | Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Ian TAYLOR, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Murat TUMAY, Dr. Selcuk University, Turkey | Talat ULUSSEVER, Assist. Prof. King Fahd University, Saudi Arabia | Ali WATSON, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK | Stefan WOLFF, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assist. Prof. Temple University, USA | International Advisory Board: Yasemin AKBABA, Assist. Prof. Gettysburg College, USA | Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey | Ian BACHE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Mark BASSIN, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Mehmet DEMIRBAG, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Can ERBIL, Assist. Prof. Brandeis University, USA | Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA | John GLASSFORD, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Bulent GOKAY, Prof. Keele University, UK | Burak GURBUZ, Assoc. Prof. Galatasaray University, Turkey | Tony HERON, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | John M. HOBSON, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Jamal HUSEIN, Assist. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Murat S. KARA, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA | Michael KENNY, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | Gamze G. KONA, Dr. Foreign Policy Analyst, Turkey | Scott LUCAS, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK | Christoph MEYER, Dr. King’s College London, UK | Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof. University of Oxford, UK | Bill PARK, Mr. King’s College London, UK | Jenik RADON, Prof. Columbia University, USA | Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof. Regent’s College London, UK | Claire THOMAS, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK | Brian WHITE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK | M. Hakan YAVUZ, Assoc. Prof. University of Utah, USA | Birol YESILADA, Prof. Portland State University, USA |

AFRICA REVIEW AFRICA REVIEW

Libya:

Human Security Challenges

By Prof. Alan Hunter*

H

uman

Security

conceptualisation

nature of violent conflict, with more evident militari-

analyses the interface between secu-

zed intra-state, ethnic and religious conflicts. In the

rity, development and intervention.

past two decades it became increasingly apparent

Traditionally, ‗security‘ mostly refer-

that communities are also threatened by environ-

red to the security of nation-states in the context of

mental destruction – induced both by climate chan-

military conflicts with foreign powers. Traditional

ge and direct human impacts - forced migration, epi-

concepts of security, protection of national borders,

demics including HIV/AIDS, and other issues.

are certainly still relevant and legally enforceable, but more sophisticated concepts are needed to res-

In the 1990s, institutions and researchers began to

pond to security dilemmas in today‘s globalised

propose alternatives to the conventional security

world. Global events and trends, particularly since

agenda. In 1994, the UNDP extended policy debate

the late 1980s, have to a great extent transformed

using the then new concept of Human Security. The

the security agenda. One impetus was the changing

report set out a broad definition of Human Security,

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

18

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Libya | By Prof. Alan Hunter

including seven core values: economic security, food

three: threats to national existence, which most likely

security, health security, environmental security, per-

emanate from hostile foreign countries, typically ne-

sonal security (freedom from fear of violence, crime

ighbouring ones, who threaten invasion, occupation

and drugs), community security (freedom to partici-

or annexation; threats to the regime (a change of

pate in family life and cultural activities) and political

government) or to the political system (for example a

security (freedom to exercise one‘s basic human

communist insurgency against a pluralist market

rights) (United Nations Development Programme

economy); and threats to the well-being of the popu-

1990-). The main benefit from the conceptualisation

lation especially vulnerable sectors. The emerging

should be that by considering these various aspects

political apparatus in post-Gaddafi Libya will face all

in a coherent way, as interactive and synergistic, in-

these challenges, and they are closely related to each

terventions would be more effective than dealing

other. The new Libya needs to survive in a ‗tough

with security on an issue-by-issue basis. Hopefully

neighbourhood‘ where there is always potential for

new leaders in Libya will be able to address many of

cross-border military action; the new regime may

these security dimensions: this paper highlights so-

face internal challenges for example from Islamists;

me of the challenges they will face.

and it needs to deliver welfare improvements to its population. Moreover, it needs to construct a new

In the 2011 conflict in Libya, many security dilemmas

constitutional and human rights framework, and to

were apparent: the protection of Libyan civilians, the

rapidly expand the technical skills and knowledge

security of the regime, whether and how the UN or

base of its population. Evidently the various aspects

NATO should intervene, how to protect or evacuate

of security are synergistic: a population which sup-

foreign citizens and refugees, how to protect food

ports the political system and which has a relatively

and medical supplies in the midst of armed conflict.

high level of education and health is better able to

The was became one of those ‗complex emergen-

contribute to regime stability and national security.

cies‘ which often raise legal, military and humanitarian issues simultaneously.

International law and

Relations between Western powers and the Gaddafi

practice do not provide clear guidelines on such situ-

regime were on a roller-coaster for decades. For

ations, and responses can be random, contingent on

many years Gaddafi was demonized and ostracised,

a variety of factors.

mainly because of his alleged support for a wide range of terrorist networks including the IRA, ETA, and

Political elites are faced with many challenges, but

others including those responsible for famous Loc-

from the above brief discussion we can highlight

kerbie incident. From 2004, however, British Prime Minister Blair started a process of rapprochement with the regime and facilitated oil investments and

“

For many years Gaddafi

weapons sales, including Foreign Office approval for

was demonized and ost-

ban on the sale of such weapons that could be used

sale of armoured cars and water cannon, despite a for internal repression.

racised, mainly because of his alleged support for a wide

From a human security perspective, Gaddafi‘s Libya

range of terrorist networks inclu-

was in fact a relatively successful state in many res-

ding the IRA, ETA, and others

pects. In 2009, Libya enjoyed the third highest Gross

including

development index in Africa. In the UNDP Human

ponsible

those for

famous

Lockerbie incident.

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

National Income per capita and the highest human

res-

”

Development Index it ranked in the ‗High‘ category, alongside countries like Argentina and Malaysia (and interestingly close to another demonized country,

19

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Libya | By Prof. Alan Hunter

“ holding

Libya

looked

attractive

for

resource

acquisition,

an

estimated

ces, inequalities, corruption and tyranny: a human

very

rights crisis perhaps, rather than a human security

future

one.

A factor contributing to the complexity of governan-

ninth

ce and modernisation is the prevalence of clan loyal-

highest oil reserves in the world

ties, which are often stronger than civil society or

and the second highest natural

state institutions. These may also overlap with the patron-client networks typical of the bureaucratic

gas reserves in Africa. Only aro-

economy. One of the largest tribes, the Warfallah,

und 25% of the country’s surface

dominate West Libya, while Gaddafi‘s own tribe the Qaddahfa, although small, hold the high positions in

area has been explored, meaning that huge potential for growth.

security and military units. Much of southern Libya is

”

controlled by Tuareg Berbers who until now have helped transfer mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa to protect the regime.

Yet another factor to consider is the confirmed pre-

Cuba); and far better than its neighbours Morocco

sence in Libya of Islamist fundamentalists, appa-

and Algeria. This position was achieved, somewhat

rently including many jihadis who fought against the

as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, by an extensive social

Western military in Iraq and Afghanistan. There have

welfare system and other public goods paid for by oil

in fact been allegations that the CIA funded Al-Qaeda

revenues. Partly no doubt as a consequence of the

to destabilise the Gaddafi regime, and that now the-

rapprochement, it was also experiencing a reasonab-

re are significant numbers of jihadist groups who will

le GDP growth rate of some 7%. It had also announ-

be looking for space in the new order. We may presu-

ced a plan to reform its higher education and scien-

me they represent different points on the spectrum

tific research systems through a US$9 billion, five-

from those who want a global jihad; those who want

year investment programme in collaboration with

sharia law in Libya; and those who want an democra-

the UK and France.

tic polity but one which explicitly recognises Islam as the national religion.

Foreign investment did face some restrictions, but two new major players – China and Turkey – invested

In terms of business, the market was completely do-

heavily in Libya, especially in the construction sector

minated by state-owned enterprises, who were noto-

for large infrastructure projects. Libya looked very

rious for providing jobs for cronies, and out-sourcing

attractive for future resource acquisition, holding an

major infrastructure work to foreign companies.

estimated ninth highest oil reserves in the world and

There was little opportunity for Libyan private com-

the second highest natural gas reserves in Africa.

panies to get access to finance, contracts, or permits.

Only around 25% of the country‘s surface area has

Jobs usually went to foreign migrant workers: it was

been explored, meaning that huge potential for

estimated that while the population of Libya was

growth.

only around 6.5 million, the country was host to some 2.5 million foreign workers, of whom 1.5 million

In short, the Human Security challenges facing the

were from Sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile Libyan

regime and the population were not those typical of

youth received some basic education but few profes-

desperate poverty. The state provided free health

sional skills, and were largely excluded from employ-

care and education, though quality was often low.

ment. They evidently formed a large body of frustra-

Rather, the population was acutely aware of injusti-

ted talent with serious hostility towards the regime.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

20

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Libya | By Prof. Alan Hunter

avoid the kind of chaos that devastated Iraq the urgent priorities are:

Libya needs to have credible, legitimate and responsible military capa-



Stabilization, transitional government and demilitarization

city to deter adventures from potential aggressors; it needs to establish a political system that can cope



Care for victims of conflict and refugees



Implementation of a new constitution, including human and democratic rights

with challenges from fundamenta-



Negotiation with religious interests

list groups, i.e. one that can accom-



Rebuilding an investment and trade apparatus

modate the religion of Islam as an asset for social harmony and well-

If these can be achieved somewhat successfully,

being, without it becoming hijacked

it seems to me there will be four crucial longer-term human security priorities. Libya needs to have

by extremist agendas; it needs to

credible,

establish a credible anti-corruption

legitimate

and

responsible

military

capacity to deter adventures from potential

regime; and perhaps most impor-

aggressors; it needs to establish a political system

tantly needs to address the issues

that can cope with challenges from fundamentalist groups, i.e. one that can accommodate the religion

of youth and female unemployment.

of Islam as an asset for social harmony and well-being, without it becoming hijacked by extremist agendas; it needs to establish a credible

Parallel issues were the lack of opportunities for wo-

anti-corruption regime; and perhaps most impor-

men, and disregard for environmental protection.

tantly needs to address the

Most obviously, there was absolutely no space for

and female unemployment. Given its huge resour-

political opposition, nor any prospect of reform un-

ces, and the enthusiasm of many foreign players –

der the Gaddafi family dictatorship.

China, Turkey, EU, USA and others - for resource

issues of youth

acquisition, all these are in theory affordable.

In tandem with clan dominance and state-owned

Unless there are serious, unforeseeable geo-

enterprise, corruption was a pervasive feature of life,

political shifts in North Africa, they could also be

with Libya ranking 130 in the global index for cor-

politically achievable. So much seems to depend on

ruption compiled by Transparency International in

a

2009. This suggests that Libya was far worse than its

of armed conflict, and the formation of a viable

peer countries in the Human Development Index,

political system including a security regime. The

and closer to those which have chronic severe un-

Libyan Interim National Council‘s document: A

der-development.

Vision for a Democratic Libya in fact embodies the

successful

reconciliation

in

the

aftermath

aspiration to address many of the issues raised Can Human Security conceptualisation contribute

above. Yet it is a huge challenge for a population

anything to understanding the issues to be faced by

that has never before enjoyed political or human

the new regime? As we have seen, unlike the vast

rights.

majority of post-conflict countries, Libya has the natural resources and hence potential finance to

Notes:

construct a well-developed nation. However, it will

* Prof. Alan Hunter is Director of Centre for Peace &

need extremely careful management, dynamic and

Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University.

responsible leadership from the new regime. To

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

21

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

AFRICA REVIEW AFRICA REVIEW

New‟ Libya

Rebuilding a „

&

Implications for International Politics Dr. Ayla Göl*

We [the NTC] request from the international community to fulfil its obligations to protect the Libyan people from any further genocide and crimes against humanity without any direct military intervention on Libya soil [1].

O

n 1 September 1969, exactly 42 years

dictatorship, a ‗people‘s revolution‘ was declared and

ago, the Libyan ‗revolution‘ was launc-

the official name of the state was changed from the

hed by a coup d’état against King Idris

‗Libyan Arab Republic‘ to the ‗Great Socialist People's

under the leadership of a young mili-

Libyan Arab al-Jamahiriyah‘ in 1977 [3].

tary officer, Muammer Gaddafi. Nobody could predict that Gaddafi would stay in power as a ‗secular‘

However, the Libyan state was neither great nor soci-

dictator until a true Libyan revolution. On 1 Septem-

alist. During four decades, there were very strong

ber 2011, the hunt for Gaddafi is on, despite his offer

signs of the regime‘s failure under the ‗whimsical

to discuss a ‗transition of power‘ and there is a £1

leadership around Gaddafi‘: no constitutional sys-

million reward for his capture ‗dead or alive‘ [2]. How

tem, no human rights, no opposition, no civil society,

did Libya reach this point in history? Under Gaddafi‘s

no free media but arbitrary arrest, disappearance,

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

22

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Rebuilding a ‘New’ Libya | By Dr. Ayla Göl

detention, and torture. Moreover, it is clear that des-

se that the Libyan people rose up for their freedom

pite all the rhetoric about ‗revolution‘ and the ‗state

under the influence of the Arab Spring. Gaddafi foo-

of the masses‘ Gaddafi has abused the oil wealth for

lishly portrayed himself as a ‗martyr‘, a victim of Wes-

personal and family interests [4]. He created a ‗rentier’

tern colonialism and stated that he would fight for

state, of which oil revenues were exploited by the

his cause until the end.

regime to serve his family, loyalists and international powers‘ vested interests.

One might wonder why it took four decades to rebel against Gaddafi‘s brutal rule but there is no doubt

In the international arena, Gaddafi‘s secular outlook

that they are not a bunch of ‗rebels‘ without a

and his hatred of Islamic fundamentalists brought

cause. After toppling the regime, anti-Gaddafi

him into alliance with the West. It was back in the

forces established the National Transitional Council

1970s that Gaddafi did not hesitate to hang the

of Libya (NTC) – also referred to as the Transitional

members of Hizb-ut Tahrir and it would not be too

National Council – and issued a statement on

difficult for him to rhetorically support the Bush-Blair

5 March 2011, in which it declared itself as the

war against Al-Qaeda in 2000 [5]. After 9/11, the in-

legitimate authority of Libya [9]. Their aim has been

ternational community speculated about political

to ‗liberate Libya from the hands of the tyrant‘

changes in Libya when the Gaddafi regime rhetori-

and then their challenging task is to rebuild a

cally condemned the use of state terrorism and ag-

new Libya based on national and international legiti-

reed to abandon its effort to develop weapons of

macy [10].

mass destruction in December 2003 [6]. While Gaddafi seemed to be altering the foreign and security

To gain national legitimacy, the protection of state-

policies of Libya, he hardly introduced significant

hood and nationhood through the establishment of

political reforms domestically, especially not for the

the Libyan National Assembly is crucial. Despite

progress of human rights, good governance and the

historically-rooted tribal divisions and tensions, the

freedom of the people. The continuing annual re-

national unity of Libya is vital for the future of

ports of Amnesty International and Human Rights

the country. The NTC has stressed that the new Libya

Watch highlighted the systemic abuse of human

will be pluralist and multicultural, and it ‗will guide

rights whereby Libyans ‗who oppose the ideology of

the country to free elections and the establishment

the

Law

of a constitution for Libya‘ [11]. Moreover, a new

71, be arrested and even executed‘ [7]. It is no surpri-

government must be inclusive and based on

Gaddafi

revolution

may,

under

democratic

principles

that allow all minorities and political groups to participate,

‗including

former government offici-

Source: The Economist, 2009 [8]

als and other people who served Gaddafi and his family in the past, so long as they were not involved in illegal activities. A new Parliament

should

be

elected through a fair process

that

includes

everyone who wants to run‘ [12]. Therefore, every effort must be made to

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

23

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Rebuilding a ‘New’ Libya | By Dr. Ayla Göl

Source: BBC - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14726292

avoid driving former Gaddafi supporters into

the threat of the ‗Iraqization‘ of Libya in the near

violent opposition but not to hesitate to bring secret

future [14]. In order to strengthen international

police and others with innocent blood on their

legitimacy, the possibilities of deploying any kind of

hands to justice. Of course, this is easier said

international military force and/or peacekeepers

than done. ‗Reconciliation, as the Council has

on the ground - the UN or others – should be

called for, is a highly desirable aim, but not all the

avoided in Libya [15]. These possibilities have already

militias agree and revenge killings have already

been rejected by the Libya‘s interim government

taken place in the Jabal, sometimes on a tribal basis.

[16]. The existence of international ground forces can

[13]‘ In order to establish security and maintain

easily

stability on a national basis, current state institutions,

feelings, as experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq,

in particular the army and the police, must be

which will harm the legitimacy of international sup-

retained. It is important to note that, aside from the

port for the Libyan people. The encouraging deve-

most hated compounds of Gaddafi and his family

lopment for continuing international support is that

members, there has been little looting of national

the NTC is widely recognised as the ‗legitimate repre-

treasures.

sentatives‘ of the Libyan people by over 70 countries.

trigger

anti-Western

and

anti-American

On 27 August, the Arab League became the latest With regard to international legitimacy, the role of

international organisation to recognise the NTC,

NATO air strikes in support of the rebels was signifi-

which also confirms its regional legitimacy in the

cant in shifting the power balance against Gaddafi

Arab World [17].

and his loyalists. It seems that the international community drew lessons from past mistakes in Afghanis-

So far, so good: the Libyan Revolution carried the

tan and Iraq. This time, the Libyan intervention was

fading Arab spring into an important historical junc-

authorized by the UN Security Council and legitimi-

ture for the future of the Middle East and North Afri-

sed by international law. However, the legacy of the

ca. However, there are three major dilemmas that the

US-led invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation is

NTC and international community will face at the

still with us. It raises the questions, what kind of new

outset. One is that the international community will

Libya will emerge and what can be done to prevent

insist that ‗democracy‘ is the only game in town in

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

24

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Rebuilding a ‘New’ Libya | By Dr. Ayla Göl

order to prevent the rise of any Islamist group,

not an easy task and it is not about having

especially the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

regular elections and a functioning parliament in

The second dilemma is that democratisation will

the short run.

require economic growth and stability. As a rentier

and long process with ups and down along the way.

state, the Libyan economy relies overwhelmingly on

For the second one, the push for economic

oil and gas revenues. While oil prices rocketed after

growth cannot be sustained by oil exports alone

the US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent

and, hence, economic diversification must be

international economic crisis, Libya‘s oil and gas re-

encouraged by international companies. For the

sources had not been exploited as heavily as other

third dilemma, the rush for oil, the production

Arab oil producers, due to the years of UN sanctions.

and distribution of oil resources must be used for

The third dilemma, therefore, will present itself as

the national cause and economy without allocating

prioritising the production and distribution of oil to

privileges to any group or community. Hence,

international markets over other issues, such as sol-

Libya should not be pushed into premature

ving the urgent national problems of paying salaries

elections by the international community – in

of state officials, supplying water, energy and sanita-

particular, US and EU – but must be given time

tion. While the new Libyan leaders are busy freeing

and resources to organise and mature its mullti-

themselves from the shadow of Gaddafi, internatio-

party system, civil society and public opinion.

nal leaders must help them by avoiding the above

This

mentioned dilemmas, namely premature democrati-

political and social fabric of the new Libya.

sation, the push for economic growth, and the rush

Pushing for elections too soon can give too much

for oil.

credence and undue power to marginilised tribal

will

Democratisation is a complex

actively

strengthen

the

economic,

factions and Islamic militant groups, especially In relation to the first dilemma, i.e. the promotion of

LIFG, which is ‗the only likely group to be able to

premature democratisation,

garner loyalty in the immature Libyan political

the experience of

landscape. [18]‘

Source: http://www.acus.org/content/libyan-man-walks-pastgraffiti-eastern-city-ajdabiya-may-6-2011

Afghanistan and Iraq prove that democratization is

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

25

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Rebuilding a ‘New’ Libya | By Dr. Ayla Göl

There are hopeful signs that ‗the TNC can sustain

6) Halliday, op.cit.

Libyan unity and commit itself to the building of a

7) Ibid.

democratic constitutional order and an equitable

8) ‗Libya and Muammer Gaddafi‘ 40 years on: how

economy step by step. It will not be easy, because

to squander a nation‘s potential,‘ The Economist,

Libya has no constitutional experience with citizen

20 August, 2009, http://www.economist.com/

participation, an independent judiciary, or the rule of

node/14270103?story_id=14270103

law. [19]‘ Once all the conditions are met to establish the Libyan National Assembly and a constitutional

9) The Libyan Interim National Council – Official Web-

order, the promotion of democracy and economic

site, http://www.ntclibya.org/english/

growth is likely to contribute towards freedom, nati-

10) Ibid.

onal unity and the social peace that the Libyan peop-

11) Introducing the Council, http://www.ntclibya.org/

le demanded. Based on national and international

english/about/

legitimacy, the Libyan Revolution has been achieved by the Libyan people and the political landscape of

12) ‗Turkey to Libya: don‘t destroy the country,‘ Hurri-

their country can only be cultivated by them too. It is

yet

not easy but it is neither too little, nor too late.

www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-to-

Daily

News,

24

August

2011,

http://

new-libya-don8217t-destroy-country-2011-08-24 Notes: * Director, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV); Lecturer in International Politics of the Middle East and Islamic Studies; Department of International Politics; Aberystwyth University.

13) George Joffe, ‗Libya: what now?,‘ Al Jazeera English, 30 August 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/ indepth/ opinion/2011/08/201182862920434157.html 14) After the US-led invasion of Iraq a negative phrase to ‗Iraqize‘ or `arqana‘ was included in Arabic,

1) Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional National Council,

which is also used as ‗Iraqization‘ in English social

http://www.ntclibya.org/english/

media. Juan Cole, ‗How to avoid Bush‘s mistake in

founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-

Libya,‘

national-council/

www.darkpolitricks.com/2011/08/how-to-avoid-

24

August

2011,

Politrikcs,

http://

bush‘s-iraq-mistakes-in-libya/

2) ‗£1m for Gaddafi ―dead or alive‖,‘ The Independent,

Dark

http://

15) ‗Libya‘s interim leaders reject UN military person-

www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/1m-

nel,‘

for-gaddafi-dead-or-alive-2343032.html

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14726292

3) ‗Timeline:

Libya,‘

BBC

News,

http://

BBC

News,

31

August

2011,

http://

16) Ibid.

news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1398437.stm

17) Libya regains Arab League seat, Al Jazeera English,

4) Fred Halliday, ‗Libya‘s regime at 40: a state of

27

August

2011,

http://english.aljazeera.net/

kleptocracy,‘ Open Democracy, 7 March 2011,

news/

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/libya-s-

africa/2011/08/2011827223817990105.html

regime-at-40-a-state-of-kleptocracy

18) Alon Ben-Meir, ‗Elections in Libya should be de-

5) Mark Almond, ‗More make-up (and hair dye) than

ferred,‘ Middle East Online, 31 August 2011, http://

his 40 virgin bodyguards, but Libyan leader Gad-

www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47865

dafi is still a murderous menace,‘ Daily Mail, 12

19) Richard Falk, ‗In Libya, decoding an uncertain fu-

June 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/

ture,‘ Al Jazeera English, 31 August 2011, http://

article-1192494/More-make-hair-dye-40-virgin-

english.aljazeera.net/indepth/

bodyguards-Gaddafi-murderous-menace.html#

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

opinion/2011/08/201182885646839710.html

26

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

AFRICA REVIEW INTERVIEW

Interview with

José-María Siles

By Ali Onur Özçelik*

Although he was born in the heart of Andalusia, Spain, those who know him are quick to point out that his perfectionism in work seems more Swiss than Spanish. Some would argue that his teutonic work ethic has something to do with the fact that he spent long periods of time in Germany as a foreign correspondent for the Spanish National Television (TVE). Spending time as a foreign correspondent in Berlin (covering the fall of the Wall), Rabat, Sarajevo (during the siege), Madrid, Portau-Prince, Kinshasa, New York, Washington and finally Brussels, José-María may have had to acclimatize to local cultures, but that has never meant adapting to local working hours. He likes to define himself as a fighter, never giving up and always going beyond (and behind) the news, looking for new ways to understand reality.

And it is a great opportunity that Mr. Siles will discuss his approaches to issues from the Greek crisis to Euroscepticism.

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

27

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Interview with José-María Siles | By Ali Onur Özçelik

So Mr. Siles, given the fact that Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland have received massive structural funds from the EU, why do you think all cohesion countries are struggling with an economic crisis? What is the main reason behind the economic crisis in those countries?

I don‘t think both things are related. In terms of the funds, some countries (like Spain) have used them well, in a transparent and efficient way; others (like Greece) have not been as efficient at using the money and apparently the level of fraud has been high. The main cause of the crisis in these peripheral countries is the high level of public spending, which far exceeds national income. In other words, such states have spent more than they have produced. They have lived in a bubble of well-being that has exceeded their means and now they have to pay for what they didn‘t have. And continue lacking. But because they‘re in the Eurozone their liquidity problems affect the others.

The Greek crisis has led to fears that this is only the beginning of a deeper sovereign debt crisis that could ultimately destabilise the Eurozone. Are these fears exaggerated? How to deal with these problems?

In fact, the Eurozone has already become destabilised. The Greek problem became everyone‘s problem, just like the Irish, Portuguese, Spanish or Italian problems. When things become difficult, politicians blame markets, but no one takes responsibility nor shows leadership. The sovereign debt crisis has exposed the lack of leadership qualities, courage and vision of European lea-

“

ders. Every time that they act they do so late and timidly. The measures adop-

When things

ted at the last euro summit, on 21 June, should have been adopted a year earlier. Let us not forget that the first thing that European leaders did as soon

become difficult,

as Athens‘ real debt and deficit were known was to announce that Europe

politicians blame

would not help Greece. In the last 18 months we have continually seen how

markets, but no

rection vis-à-vis an earlier policy decision.

one takes responsibility nor shows leadership. The

every single measure that has had to be adopted has implied a U-turn or cor-

What needs to be done to rescue the Greek economy? Is it even possible to rescue the Greek economy?

sovereign debt crisis has exposed the lack of

I believe that what is being done is the only thing that can be done to save

leadership qualities,

even though both the first and second phases have not provided sufficient

courage and vision of European leaders.

the Greek economy and the euro. There was no alternative to the bailout, funds to this end. However much Greece tightens its belt I cannot see them viably reducing debt to the levels foreseen in the plan, much less if we consider that the austerity measures undermine the possibility of economic

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

28

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Interview with José-María Siles | By Ali Onur Özçelik

growth, putting the public purse under even greater strain. In those countries in which an outside intervention has been necessary to reduce public debt and excessive deficits, economic recovery has been a longer and more painful process.

Is there any room for Greek government to stabilize its economy in the near future? Or is there worse ahead for Greece?

The problem of the peripheral Eurozone countries is that they have lived for over a decade beyond their means, in a bubble of the nouveau riche that, when it burst, has revealed the structural weaknesses of their economies.

When there was prosperity they did not undertake the necessary economic reforms and now that they in trouble they are being forced to adopt them.

In the case of Greece, with an especially reduced capacity for wealthgeneration currently, I foresee many years of difficulty. I don‘t think that it will leave the Eurozone because that would imply a huge political failure on the European stage. However, the Germans, who feel that they have done their homework, are increasingly reticent to pay for those who have not met their obligations and have spent what they didn‘t have in the first place.

There are some expectations that the crisis in Greece can spread to the rest of Europe. What do you make of this?

What are the possible consequences of such a crisis for the future of European Integration? Do you think a renewed wave of Euroscepticism is likely?

European leaders agree on the fact that the failure of the euro would mean the end of European integration, even the end of the European Union. I think they are exaggerating. No one believes that they are going to allow the euro to collapse. If we look back, European integration has advanced slowly, with much hesitation, but never has even one iota of progress ever been seriously questioned. Well, it has to be said that maybe the current revision of the Schengen Agreement, in the face of rising xenophobia in a few European countries and the generalised fear of a massive influx of foreigners, bears the seed of a historic step backwards in the process of integration. But I feel that Schengen will stay in place and that European borders, once opened, will only be subsequently closed through war. And war is something unthinkable in Europe precisely because what we have built in the past 50 years is the best vaccine against nationalism and hatred amongst

“

European leaders agree on the fact that the failure of the euro would

mean the end of

the peoples of Europe.

European integration,

What steps do EU leaders need to take to prevent another crisis in the eurozone? Do you think that the EU should be

even the end of the

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

29

European Union.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Interview with José-María Siles | By Ali Onur Özçelik

given more power and responsibility to manage the European economy?

There is increasingly talk of a European economic government that would see Member States relinquish further national sovereignty. This sort of control from Brussels would have prevented the Greek crisis. Well, a real form of control would have. But there were already rules of the game to the Eurozone which were supervised from Brussels and which the Member States have not respected. In terms of the rules on deficit spending not even Germany, which was on the verge of being punished by Brussels, respected the 3% rule. Greece manipulated its statistics to be able to join the euro because its debt already far exceeded the 60% threshold by the beginning of the 1990s. As a result, it has to be said that the first thing that states need to do is stick to their commitments while mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that those who do not do so are punished. That is what the Eurozone leaders are working on at the moment. Spain‘s economic policy, for instance, is now set in Brussels, not just that of countries having already received a bailout. So yes, I think we have already begun acting, timidly, as though there was a European economic government. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, called for a ―ministry of Finances for the Union‖. I think it is real nonsense. I wonder how has a ―de facto‖ European foreign minister helped to give more weight to Europe. The next step, once we overcome the taboo that the ECB buy the sovereign debt of those countries in trouble, would be for the ECB to directly issue Eurobonds to cover the debt of the 17 Eurozone members. But it‘s not going to be an easy task. Rejecting the Eurobonds as the solution for the crisis, Mrs Merkel was backed by her finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, who said during this summer markets turmoil, that the Eurozone would become an ―inflation community‖ if countries opted to sell a joint bond without first unifying their fiscal policies.

“

Do Member States have to relinquish some national sovereignty? Will they be willing?

Greece manipulated its statistics

The extreme case within the European Union, could be the UK, which will never accept the euro as its currency and the growing (and inevitable) loss of

to be able to join

sovereignty that it would entail. At the other end of the spectrum are those

the euro because

peripheral countries, both those having received a bailout and those who

its debt already far

haven‘t, who see in the euro the best guarantee against bankruptcy. Germany, whose economy has benefitted the most from the establishment of

exceeded the 60%

the single currency, the issue of relinquishing national sovereignty has been

threshold by the

two major European economies, see more gains than losses from monetary

beginning of the 1990s.

a tricky one, but it always ends up being accepted. France and Italy, the other integration and they accept (and even request) more European economic

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

30

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Interview with José-María Siles | By Ali Onur Özçelik

governance. I strongly believe that if we don‘t move forward on the issue of relinquishing sovereignty this is because German public opinion is reluctant to pay for others‘ damage and does not want the fate of its public spending to be decided in Brussels.

The Cyprus Question has been a critical issue in EU-Turkey relations for quite some time. Do you think the normalisation of relations between Greece and Turkey during the enlargement process is threatened by the crisis?

I don‘t think so. We are basically talking about a political problem here. The recent announcement that Cyprus, also in the Eurozone, might need a bailout has not affected the sovereign debt crisis brought about by the Eurozone‘s peripheral members. In the face of fears that Spain and Italy might fall, the small size of the Cypriot economy renders it an anecdotal case.

Cyprus is a political issue, but not even the lack of agreement over its reunification could stop it from joining the European Union, to the surprise of some. In terms of relations between Greece and Turkey much the same can be said. I don‘t think the economic crisis can affect in any way this other, political crisis.

In light of Turkey’s high rate of economic growth and the economic crisis faced by the EU, do you think that joining the EU is no longer an economically attractive prospect for Turkey?

Turkey‘s entry into the European Union has more to do with psychology and history than with the economy or politics. It has to be said that Europe‘s political leaders would have to muster the courage to face up the choice of either admitting Turkey or rejecting outright its membership application. This is what they ended up doing with countries in Eastern Europe, which were allowed to join mainly for historical reasons (and as a result of

hip seriously, both in the EU and in Turkey there would be much to say

“

about.

it from joining the European

economic interests, particularly those of Germany) rather than because of their inherent merits or the ability of the EU to absorb them. Europe has to have a proper debate about this issue. Our leaders have prevented both those of us in favour and those of us against enlargement to properly discuss of the issue. In terms of the citizens of Turkey, I understand that they are tired of this game that has been played for far too long. That being said, I believe that if the day arrives where we talk about Turkish members-

issue, but not even the lack of agreement over

its reunification could stop Union, to the surprise of

Note: * Ali Onur Ozcelik is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Sheffield.

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Cyprus is a political

31

some.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS (JGA) CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Journal of Global Analysis endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of political science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

Journal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-journal, edited by a group of international scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The journal is published at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Journal of Global Analysis welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

Prospective authors should submit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Wordcompatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http:// www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Ozgur TUFEKCI - Editor-in-Chief - oztufekci@cesran.org Husrev TABAK - Managing Editor - husrevtabak@cesran.org K. Kaan RENDA - Book Review Editor - kkrenda@cesran.org

Publication Date:

Winter issue — January 01 Summer issue — July 01

AFRICA REVIEW EURASIA REVIEW

Bhutan Cements Its Democracy

By Dr. Paul Richardson*

A

t the end of June the picturesque Hima-

etings are vital to the democratic process. On the day

layan Kingdom of Bhutan held its first

itself voters could not cast their ballot without wea-

ever local elections. Over recent years

ring the national dress and every shop, restaurant,

this tiny country of around 700,000 has

bar and business were ordered shut down for the

been undergoing a remarkable political transition

day. The all powerful electoral commission also insis-

and these were only the third nation-wide polls since

ted that until voting had finished at 5pm it would be

Bhutan‘s revered Fourth King, Jigme Sengay Wanc-

a dry day.

huk, decreed in 2006 that Bhutan was to become a democratic state. Somewhat ironically, the majority

During the campaigning, the biggest difference to

of Bhutan‘s citizens were at first against the transi-

emerge between candidates seemed to be not po-

tion from absolute monarchy to democracy, yet, they

licy but education versus experience. Many former

have proved to be quick to adapt to the new reality.

representatives were up for re-election and were challenged by ex-monks or younger, well-educated

Prior to the elections on 27th June, candidates came

candidates. As the election results unfolded, both

to village meeting places across their district in order

new and old candidates had gained majorities and

to present their policies and field questions from lo-

this split reflects the changes taking place across

cal residents. With only a 60% literacy rate, these me-

Bhutanese society: the challenge of bringing Bhutan

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

33

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Bhutan Cements Its Democracy | By Paul Richardson

for violators of the new law), as well as the fact that virtually all major businesses are connected via family ties to the monarchy or through corporations to the state, present a somewhat striking contrast to the recent arrival of democracy. The country‘s significant community of Buddhist monks are also excluded from the democratic process and are barred from both standing and voting in these elections.

Nevertheless, the seriousness with which the eligible voters, candidates and the electoral commission conducted themselves last June represented an extraordinary moment in Bhutan‘s modern history.

Some observers thought that the arrival of elections was merely a ritual to appease foreign donors and a means for the monarchy to keep ruling in a different way. Instead, it seems that many Bhutanese are realising that how they vote can influence their destiny.

Although heavily influenced by its southern neighbour (India even provided electoral machines on polling day), Bhutan seems to be forging an electoral into the modern world through economic develop-

politics in its own mould. Guided by the monarchy,

ment while at the same time preserving cultural tra-

there are new rules to the game of politics in Bhutan

ditions.

and politicians and voters are quickly learning them.

When electricity, roads and sewerage are still far

To overcome this tension the idea of Gross National

from universal, political decisions can have an im-

Happiness (GNH) has become somewhat of a natio-

mense significance on everyday life.

nal ideology. GNH has been promoted by the Fourth King since the 1970s as an alternative to GNP and is a

As people get used to listening to political debates

kind of fusion of sustainable development, environ-

and questions on the radio, TV, or in the village mee-

mental protection and egalitarianism. Whether

ting place, what was promised during election cam-

experienced or inexperienced, virtually all candida-

paigns comes under serious scrutiny. In this quiet

tes sought to emphasise their loyalty to the GNH

corner of the world, sandwiched between India to

concept.

the south and China to the north, a genuine evolution towards some form of democracy is taking pla-

However, despite the fan-fare over GNH, Bhutan is

ce. It remains to be seen how much, and in what

not without its problems and behind its quaintness

ways, it will change the country but what seems as-

and the novelty of electoral politics, many of its pe-

sured is that in one of the world‘s most isolated sta-

ople live in extreme poverty. To the consternation of

tes the relationship between government, society

the government, just days before the polls opened,

and monarchy is being altered forever.

Bhutan was classified as a failed state by Foreign Policy Magazine, a journal published by the Ameri-

Note:

can Think Tank ‗Fund for Peace‘. The long shadow of

* Dr. Paul Richardson is currently on a Japanese

Nepalese refugees who fled persecution in the early

Society for the Promotion of Science Post-Doctoral

1990s, and more recently the banning of all tobacco

Fellowship, at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido

products (complete with punitive prison sentences

University.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

34

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

JOURNAL OF

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY Peer-reviewed Academic journal

By CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis) www.cesran.org/jcts

T

he Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the processes for managing change in a non-violent way to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. Security is un-

derstood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can be tackled by both „hard‟ and „soft‟ measures. Therefore, the Journal‟s scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance.

Editor-in-Chief Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem, Coventry University, UK Managing Editor Dr. Rebecca Roberts, Coventry University, UK Assistant Editors Mr. Richard Slade, Coventry University, UK | Mr. Husrev Tabak, UCL, UK Book Review Editor Dr Sung Yong Lee, Coventry University, UK Editorial Board Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar, University of York, UK | Prof. Bruce Baker, Coventry University, UK | Dr Richard Bowd, UNDP, Nepal | Prof. Ntuda Ebode, University of Yaounde II, Cameroon | Prof. Scott Gates, PRIO, Norway | Dr Antonio Giustozzi, London School of Economics, UK | Dr Cathy Gormley-Heenan, University of Ulster, UK | Prof. Paul Gready, University of York, UK | Prof. Fen Hampson, Carleton University, Canada | Prof. Mohammed Hamza, Lund University, Sweden | Prof. Alice Hills, University of Leeds | Dr Maria Holt, University of Westminster, UK | Prof. Alan Hunter , Coventry University, UK | Dr Tim Jacoby, University of Manchester, UK | Dr Khalid Khoser, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland | Dr William Lume, South Bank University, UK | Dr Roger Mac Ginty, St Andrews' University, UK | Mr Rae Mac Grath, Save the Children UK Somalia | Prof. Mansoob Murshed, ISS, The Netherlands | Dr Wale Osofisan, Help Age International, UK | Dr Mark Pelling, King's College, UK | Prof. Mike Pugh, University of Bradford, UK | Mr Gianni Rufini, Freelance Consultant, Italy | Dr Mark Sedra, Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada | Dr Emanuele Sommario, Scuola Superiore Sant‟Anna, Italy | Dr Hans Skotte, Trondheim University, Norway | Dr Arne Strand, CMI, Norway | Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, University of Po, France | Dr. Mandy Turner, University of Bradford, UK | Prof. Roger Zetter, University of Oxford, UK

AFRICA REVIEW EURASIA REVIEW

Afghanistan after a Decade:

Progress and Challenges Ahead

By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay*

I

t has been almost a decade since international community with mandate of United Nations has intervened in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime, dismantle the web of terror and above all to rebuild its economy, state institutions and polity. The consensus emerged in international community to fight the war against terrorism and also for providing assistance for post-war reconstruction and

and police. Speculations are rife whether international community, particularly the United States and European countries, is going to abandon the country again and flow of development assistance would gradually decline as their geo-strategic objectives are achieved.

Experts on Afghan affairs also call for exploring alternative security arrangement in case of withdrawal and diversifying domestic revenues for meeting the public

development of Afghanistan was unprecedented.

Currently more than 130,697 ISAF troops from 48 countries are deployed, and almost every major international development organization has been engaged in humanitarian and development activities in the country. According to Donor Financial Review 2009, Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan, the international community has pledged to provide $ 62 billion ($1241 per Afghan) in assistance to Afghanistan since 2001. Much water has flowed since fall of Taliban regime, and Afghanistan has witnessed numerous changes and development in its polity, society, economy and strategic, both regional and global, milieu over last ten years. After a decade long engagement, now deadline has been set to withdraw the international security force and formally transfer the responsibility of security of country to Afghan national army

expenditure and facilitating the reconstruction and development. In such a scenario, the article intends to take an account of progress made by Afghanistan in a decade and what are the major challenges the country would face in times to come.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

36

Progress So Far Building the effective, efficient and legitimate state institutions are central to maintaining durable peace and security as well as reconstruction and development process in Afghanistan. In 2001, Afghanistan was a classical case of state failure. Years of war and lawlessness had destroyed the entire country and state was unable to provide any welfare services to its citizens. Following September 11, 2001 and its subsequent events, intervention of international community was indispensable in Afghanistan not only for hu-

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Afghanistan after a Decade | By By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay

manitarian reasons but also for security of world community. International community led by the United States took the responsibility of security and peace, endeavored to build the state institutions and facilitate reconstruction and development process. It seems axiomatic today to say that the country has achieved considerable progress. A constitution based on the broad principles of constitutionalism has been adopted and a democratically elected government at the helm of the country. New constitution is broad

made possible by block grants that have already supplied more than $ 800 million to community-driven rural reconstruction and development. The NSP has laid the foundations for local governance in almost 361 districts and every province in the country. An Impact Evaluation Study conducted a group of researchers in villages finds that the programme is considerably successful in improving people perceptions of their economic conditions and of government representatives and officials and even some nongovern-

based and intends to incorporate interests of all sections of society and provisions of equal rights for men and women, individual liberty freedom of express and association, the right to vote and stand for office, property, and religious freedom. A political design and structure for establishing unified system of gov-

mental actors. Its observation on gender empowerment is encouraging. People participation particularly women participation has been significantly enhanced.

The NSP creates new village institutions for women,

ernance and facilitating unification of country has already in place. Institutions of professional national army and police have been established. According to Brooking Afghanistan Index, strength of Afghan na-

Establishing law and order and reaching out to people in rural and remote areas of Afghanistan was the formidable challenges for international community as well as national government in Kabul.

tional Army is 164,003 in April 2011 and Afghan National Police is around 1,22,000. Thus, combined strength of security forces would be 286,003. Started from the scratches, foundations of modern judiciary have already been laid down and judges had been trained and laws and infrastructure of modern judicial system has been gradually developing.

“

increases menâ€&#x;s openness to women participating in local governance and decision making, and improves

Establishing law and order and reaching out to people in rural and remote areas of Afghanistan was the for-

the responsiveness and accountability of local leaders to womenâ€&#x;s needs [1]. Such a change in attitude is

midable challenges for international community as well as national government in Kabul. To get the legitimacy for a uniform political structure from the people who historically known for autonomy and tribal loyalty is not only socio-political challenge but also is a security issue for Afghan government. The largest development and governance launched by the Afghan government so far, National Solidarity Programme (henceforth NSP) has been considerably successful in rural areas. According to Ministry of Rural

remarkable in Afghan society and governance at the grassroots level.

Rehabilitation and Development, Afghanistan, nearly 70 per cent of rural communities have mobilized, and more than 25,000 have elected local councils to represent themselves. These Community Development

ing countries. Now much has been changed for better. Though Afghanistan has not joined the league of developed nations, basic facilities, road, public health, education, etc has really improved. Report of Commit-

Councils (CDCs) are engaged in planning and implementing development projects at the local level of society and it is reported that over 55,000 subprojects

tee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan published on 8 June 2011, does not paint a gloomy picture of pro-

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

37

Considering scenario a decade before and fragile security environment, reconstruction and development appears to be a significant success. National economy was entirely ruined and only monoculture of opium production had flourished before 2001. Basic infrastructure even for survival of human being was negligible. War had rendered millions to flee in neighbor-

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Afghanistan after a Decade | By By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay

gress made by Afghanistan and states that the country has achieved „some real successes‟. Paul D. Miller, who was director for Afghanistan in the US National Security Council under President George W Bush and Barack Obama argues in his article, published in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, result of one of the largest interventions of international community for reconstruction and development, relief in the world, was „an unheralded and dramatic success‟. Afghanistan is one of the fastest growing economies in the

The New York Times report, 14 June 2010 estimated worth of these minerals gas and oil is more than $ 1 trillion and reports from the Pentagon says that unexpectedly vast deposits of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium can fundamentally transform the Afghan economy and have potential to develop a viable and vibrant mining industry in the country. For instance, lithium is of enormous significance because it is well suited to lightweight energy storage, thus it has been used in mo-

world averaging 13.5 per cent of annual growth; GDP growth was around 15 percent in 2003, around 16 per cent in 2005 and after a drought in 2008, it again reached to 20 per cent in 2009. Average growth of 8 per cent is forecasted for next two years. Total GDP has quadrupled since 2002. Share of opium in GDP

bile phone and laptop batteries as well as electric car batteries. As the threat of climate change looms large and emphasis has been given for clean energy technologies, lithium can be a critical element for the energy efficient equipment too. Afghanistan is also endowed with natural gas and oil. United States‟ Geological Survey estimates up to 36.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the northern region of Afghanistan and oil up to 3.6 billion barrels. Due to wars and political instability, the country remains still unexplored,

“

United States‟ Geological Survey estimates up to 36.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the northern region of Afghanistan and oil up to 3.6 billion barrels.

though no one denies hidden deposits of natural resources.

got squeezed as opium production substantially declined by half and 20 of 34 provinces are poppy free.

Beyond any doubt, these minerals and petroleum are sources of massive revenues to generate viable statehood for Afghanistan and have the potential to attract investment on a large scale. The Afghan government begins to seek foreign direct investment in the sectors

After 10 years, there has been a sevenfold increase in

and its share in GDP was 9 per cent in 2009. Turkey is the largest investor so far, followed by USA, China and

the number of children attending school and significant improvement in health care. By 2008, 80 per cent of the population had access to basic health services and Afghan children were immunized against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus at the same rate as children in the rest of the world. The infant mortality rate deceased by a third and life expectancy moved upward. Today one third of roads in the country were paved by 2008 against 13.3 per cent in 2001. Uses of telecom services have spectacularly risen, around

UAE. United States, the largest donor of development assistance, will be the major source of investment in minerals and natural gas in the future, as these discoveries definitely prompt USA to think beyond the geopolitical interest in the country. Chinese, European and some major Indian companies are also inclined to invest in the mining and natural gas sectors of the economy. China has agreed to invest around $ 3 billion in copper mines and major Indian steel companies have been shortlisted for the iron ore industries.

three quarters of population have access to telecom services in 2009. Access to water is more than doubled; and electricity & sanitation also has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime [2].

For evaluating the impacts and assess psyche of the nation, surveys conducted by news agencies and nongovernmental organization such ABC news, BBC, ARD

Discovery of huge sources of minerals, natural gas and oil rekindles new hope for this war-ravaged country.

and the Asia Foundation show the rise of people faith in government system and on going political process.

ABC news and BBC‟s survey shows that 70 percent

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

38

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Afghanistan after a Decade | By By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay

people believe that the country is on the right path of progress and only 21 per cent people think the country is going in wrong direction. People opinion appears to be positive on the reconstruction and development process. 69 per cent of respondents see improvement in schools, 50 per cent in health clinic, 56 per cent in road and 46 per cent in police. People opinion mentioned in Human Development Report 2007 of Afghanistan shows 85 per cent of respondents agree on whether they have access to state

2010) [3]. In many parts of the country, a sense of insecurity among people is rife. It has often been reported that the insurgents still kill children, put poison in the food of school girls, throw acid in the face of school girls, and burn schools. Taliban still holds sway in remote areas of the country and runs their parallel security and judicial system. Security forces got bigger, still their performance has not reached to at the level to adequately manage the law and order. High level of corruption, illiteracy, violence of human rights,

courts (41 per cent strongly agree and 44 somehow agree). Last year survey of Center for International Private Enterprise and Charney Research (CIPE) 2010, points out that three-forth of respondents were hopeful about economic growth of country and more than half felt that economy was better than previous year.

drug abuse, etc has been regularly reported. A sense of professionalism and virtues of modern bureaucracy are still missing. Afghan police, which is more significant than army for maintaining law and order and internal security is low paid and ill-equipped. Current government system of Afghanistan is riddled with

This positive opinion reflects the positive changes happened in the country. Once Afghans were deemed as lawless tribes living in Paleolithic ages of civilization and democratic values and good modern institutions of governance are not considered to be compatible with their nature and society. Despite system lacunas, their responses to democratic process were tremendous. These favorable opinions would provide not only political legitimacy to democratic process but also impetus to social unification and nation building. Contrary to conventional wisdom on Afghan national psyche against presence of foreign powers

“

Contrary to conventional wisdom on Afghan national psyche against presence of foreign powers on their soils, presence of ISAF is well tolerated and people believe that they are here to stabilize our country.

on their soils, presence of ISAF is well tolerated and people believe that they are here to stabilize our

corruption and malpractices. Afghanistan ranks 176, third from the bottom on the Transparency Interna-

country.

tional Corruption Perceptions Index, 2010. Kleptocratic elites are fulcrum of graft and greed and controls international contracts across the country.

Challenges Ahead As discussed above, Afghanistan has made measurable progress in state-building, setting up a democratic polity, human development and building basic infrastructure since 2002. Today country is on the march of progress. There are still a number of challenges that impinge on economic development, state-building and human development. Afghanistan remains one of

Here it is worth to be discussed that excess reliance on international development assistance has wider and long term implications for state-building process. According to the World Bank, an estimated 97 per cent of Afghanistanâ€&#x;s GDP is derived from spending related to the international military and donor community

poorest and most volatile countries in the world. Security is still prime concern for the government and international community. The security situation has continued to deteriorate in many parts of the country,

presence. Afghanistan could suffer a severe economic depression when foreign troops leave in 2014. These trends would undermine extractive power of the state and its independent role in international community.

the overall number of security incidents having increased by 69 per cent in 2010 compared to previous year (Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, 15th November

In addition, warlords, feudal culture and corruption are severe impediments to nascent democracy and democratic process.

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39

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Afghanistan after a Decade | By By Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy and also provides employment and livelihood to 80 per cent of population. But, only 12 per cent of land is arable and 6 per cent is irrigated. Discovery of minerals offers some hope of revenues generation and development industries in the country, but hostile security environment and regional politics are conducive for investment.

“

Geostrategic location of Afghanistan has proved a

complete withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014. Now much of onus lies with national government and leaders to strengthen governance and democracy, thus dividends of development can reach to common man.

It is not expected from a foreign power to unify a socially fragmented country, rather is primary task of national leadership and government to bring back all sections of the society in nation-building and development process. Impacts of development assistance ought not to be evaluated in isolation. International

bane for it so far. Great powers and later super powers rivalries and regional strategic dynamics immensely contributed to state failure and social and political fragmentation throughout its history. Current international system is qualitatively different from the Cold War, but regional

development assistance yield positive results in fragile countries if prerequisites like institutional set up, socio -political stability and good governance, coordination, active participation of civil society organizations and transparency exist there. International community and Afghan government need to infuse advance in-

powers could not reconcile their diverging interests to constructively con-

formation and communication technologies to strengthen governance and provide basic services to people in rural areas. Common wisdom on development says poverty, deprivation and underdevelop-

tribute to a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. The region has immense potential to develop intra regional trade and as Afghanistan, is at the pivot, would be

ment exist due to not only lack of resources but also lack of good and effective institutions of governance.

Dividends of democracy and development must be percolated to bottom level of the society, only then „hearts and mindsâ€&#x; of Afghan people can be won and peace would be durable and development would be inclusive.

greatly benefitted.

Notes: * Currently pursuing PhD in International Relations at the Center for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and also working as Research Analyst at Integrated Research and Action for Development, IRADe, New Delhi.

Common wisdom on development says poverty, deprivation and underdevelopment exist due to not only lack of resources but also lack of good and effective institutions of governance.

Concluding Remarks: Prospects for Future To sum up, hope to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan has not despaired yet. Afghanistan figures still high on the strategic priorities of the United States and the major European countries. Security strategy of United States or European security strategy explicitly recognizes the threats emanating from failed or fragile states pose serious implications for their society and national security and spillover effects of socio-political instability and underdevelopment have been felt beyond national boundaries, therefore, call for to take comprehensive measures both security and development to quell these threats. It is evidently possible that they would avoid heavy military engagement but supply of development assistance would not be stop in future. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization indicated that there would not be a

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

40

1) National Solidarity Programme: Randomized Impact Evaluation, URL: http://www.nsp-ie.org/ 2) Data has been taken from article of Paul Miller, Report of Senate Committee (2011) and World Development Indicators (2010), Donor Financial Review (2009), Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan 3) Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, School of International Studies , Simon Fraser University, Accessed on 5 November 2010, (Online: web) URL: http:// www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/ incidents.html#docs1

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

AFRICA REVIEW EURASIA REVIEW

"Waves" of Russia's Presidential Reforms

the Break About Premier's "Energy-Rocks"

By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze*

Story about the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative to change the make-up of the boards of state-owned firms, especially energy companies.

In late March of this year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev demanded that high-ranking officials – namely, deputy prime ministers and cabinet-level ministers that co-ordinate state policy in the same sectors in which those companies are active – step down from their seats on the boards of state-run energy companies by July 1. He also said that October 1 would be the deadline for replacing these civil servants with independent directors.

The deadline has now passed, but Medvedev‟s bid to diminish the government‟s influence in the energy sector has run into roadblocks. Most of the high-level government officials who have stepped down are being replaced not by independent managers, but by directors from other state companies in the same sector. Russia‟s state-owned oil and gas companies have not been quick to replace directors who also hold high-ranking government posts, despite orders from President Dmitry Medvedev. High-ranking Russian officials have made a show of following President Medvedev‟s order to leave the boards of state-run energy companies, but government influence over the sector remains strong.

This indicates that the political will needed for the presidential administration to push economic reforms forward may be inadequate.

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Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

At the end of March in Magnitogorsk, Russian Presi-

State involvement

dent Dmitry Medvedev announced plans for remov-

The high number of government representatives on

ing high-level civil servants from the boards of state-

the boards of state-run companies stems from the

owned energy-companies. So far, though, the gov-

fact that the Russian state has a high level of direct

ernment has not fully executed this order, particular-

involvement in many sectors of the economy.

ly with respect to companies active in the energy sector.

In other words, the Russian economy has yet to be extensively liberalised. Although more than a decade

Medvedev has justified his decision by pointing out

has passed since the so-called “Chubais” wave of

that government officials who are responsible for

post-Soviet privatisation (a reference to former First

setting policy in a certain area – for example, energy

Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais), Russia is still

– are serving as directors of competitive companies

home to many state-owned enterprises, not least in

active in that same area. This causes conflicts of

the oil and gas sectors.

interest, he said, and leads to discord between the government, with its reformist agenda, and mem-

After a period of consolidation of state interests un-

bers of parliament, who are influenced by energy

der former President Vladimir Putin, now serving as

lobbyists.

prime minister, the push for reform took on renewed urgency because of the world economic slowdown

“

the

government

that erupted in 2008.

has

upped its interest in the

In 2009-2010, the government of the Russian Federation again began actively considering serious re-

Russian oil pipeline monopoly Transneft by 3.5%.

forms. However, the tortuous recovery from the crisis

”

and the return of high oil prices have stymied Moscow‟s efforts to move in this direction.

The president has officially charged the government

Moreover, the state has even raised its stake in some

with executing his initiative in several stages. By

companies. This year, for example, the government

July 1, state-owned companies must discharge all

has upped its interest in the Russian oil pipeline mo-

deputy prime ministers and cabinet-level ministers

nopoly Transneft by 3.5%.

that co-ordinate state policy in the same sectors in which those companies are active and replace them

Sechin’s moves

with independent directors at their shareholder

Now, though, Medvedev is pushing for a change. He

meetings.

won his first victory in April, when Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin agreed to leave his post as chairman

By October 1, state-owned companies involved in

of the board of directors of Rosneft, the state-owned

the energy sector, as well as some state-run military-

oil company.It should be noted that Sechin is still in a

industrial firms, must elect supervisory board chair-

position to influence Rosneft, as his departure coin-

men who are not civil servants.

cided with the promotion of another board member who is completely loyal to him – Sergei Shishin, the

October 1 has also been designated as the deadline

vice president of state-owned VTB Bank. According

for finalising the replacement of all high-level civil

to a source close to the oil company‟s board, Shishin

servants with independent directors. (Board seats

has “good relations with both Igor Sechin and with

will still be open to officials at the level of deputy

the directorate of the FSB [Russia‟s Federal Security

minister and departmental director, as these are not

Service, the successor to the KGB] – in particular, with

considered to have independent political influence.)

[FSB director] Alexander Bortnikov. [1]”

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

42

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Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

Sechin had intended that Shishin would succeed him

Gazprom’s board

as chairman, but his hopes were not realised. Rather,

This is not the only type of horse-trading to have oc-

an independent director – Alexander Nekipelov, the

curred. On June 2, for example, it became known

vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences –

that Gazprom, the state-run natural gas monopoly,

has been appointed acting chairman.

would no longer count Economic Development Minister Elvira Nabiullina or Energy Minister Sergei

However, this move is widely viewed as problematic

Shmatko as members of its board of directors. How-

in light of Sechin‟s history as a strong advocate of

ever, First Deputy Premier Victor Zubkov, who al-

Rosneft‟s interests within the government. Even

ready serves as chairman of the board, will keep his

Nekipelov, who had been Medvedev‟s preferred can-

seat.

didate, said at Rosneft‟s shareholders meeting on June 10 that the deputy premier‟s departure posed

According to the Russian press, the Kremlin has yet

“certain risks. [2]”

to find a replacement that satisfies both the government and Gazprom. As such, it is not beyond the

Nepotism

realm of possibility that Zubkov will keep his post as

Sechin‟s bid to raise Shishin‟s profile within Rosneft

chairman, at least until October, 1.

has found echoes at other companies. In recent months, some of the officials who serve on the boards of state-owned companies have tried to appoint their own children to take their places.

In

early

May,

for

example,

the

presidential

administration spoke out in opposition to the proposed appointment of the son of Deputy Premier Sergei

Ivanov

as

the

board

chairman

of

Rosselkhozbank. (The younger Ivanov, also named Sergei, is already serving as the general director

“

Sechin‟s bid to raise Shishin‟s profile within Rosneft has found echoes at other companies. In recent months, some of the officials who serve on the boards of state-owned companies have tried to appoint their own children to take their places.

of the energy-insurance company SoGaz.) As a source in the Kremlin noted, Ivanov would have replaced another fortunate son – namely,

Gazprom shareholders are due to elect board mem-

the son of Dmitry Patrushev, the secretary of

bers at an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) on

Russia‟s

headed

June 30, immediately following the regular annual

Rosselkhozbank since May 2010. Movement in the

general meeting (AGM). In total, the Russian govern-

direction of reducing the influence of government

ment has nominated six candidates for seats on the

officials, most of them Putin‟s favourites, from com-

board. Besides Zubkov, it has put forward the names

pany boards is seen by some as positive and as evi-

of Alexei Miller, Gazprom‟s executive director; Vladi-

dence of reform [3].

mir Mau, the rector of the Russian academy of na-

Security

Council,

who

has

tional economy and civil service; current board memSince February 1, moreover, Denis Bortnikov, the

bers Igor Yusufov and Farit Gazizullin, and also An-

son of FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov, has been

drei Akimov, the head of Gazprombank. The list of

appointed as chairman of the board at VTB Bank-

candidates has already presented to shareholders for

Northwest. Meanwhile, the new vice president of

approval.

Vnesheconombank,

Russia‟s foreign

trade and

investment bank, is Pyotr Fradkov, the son of Mikhail

The gas giant‟s board may also include Timur Kuliba-

Fradkov, the director Russia‟s Foreign Intelligence

yev, the chairman of the Kazakhstan‟s state welfare

Service (SVR) [4].

fund Samruk-Kazyna. Kulibayev has held a number of

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43

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

high-ranking posts at Kazakhstan‟s state-owned oil

On the other hand, some have pointed out that state

and gas companies – Kazakhoil, Kaztransoil and

-owned energy companies‟ boards will continue to

KazMunaiGaz. He is also the son-in-law of Kazakh-

include civil servants (again, many of them Putin ap-

stani President Nursultan Nazarbayev and one of the

pointees), even if they hold lower ranks, as inde-

richest businessmen in the Central Asian contry.

pendent directors. These board members, they say,

(Forbes has estimated his assets at US$1.3 billion) [5].

still represent interests closely connected with the government.

Meanwhile, the Russian government is reportedly talking about inviting former German chancellor Ger-

This lays the groundwork for future disputes, and

hard Schroeder to join Gazprom‟s board as a replace-

there are already signs of movement in that direc-

ment for Shmatko or Nabiullina. According to media

tion.

reports, no final decision on this plan has been made yet. Schroeder is currently serving as the head of the

Arkady Dvorkovich, the top economic advisor

committee of shareholders at Nord Stream AG, the

to President Medvedev, recently declared that

consortium set up to build and operate the Nord

the Kremlin had “serious doubts” about a number

Stream gas pipeline [6].

of

board

confirmed

“

nominees

who

by

1.

July

were He

due

said

to

that

be the

presidential administration probably would not

Arkady Dvorkovich, the top economic advisor to President Medvedev, recently declared that the Kremlin had “serious doubts” about a number of board nominees who were due to be confirmed by July 1.

approve the candidates who are believed to be on “Sechin‟s list. [7]” The deputy premier had earlier suggested the appointment of Sergei Chemezov at Inter RAO UES, an electricity trading company, and Andrei Akimov at Rosneftegaz, the parent company of Rosneft.

He also put forward the names of Tokarev, the head of Transneft, and Mathias Warnig, a German national, for board seats at Transneft and Rosneft.

As for other state-owned companies, it was an-

(Warnig, who served in the East German state securi-

nounced in early June that Transneft President Niko-

ty agency, known as the Stasi, is one of Putin‟s old

lai Tokarev would head the board at Zarubezhneft, a

colleagues; he now serves as managing director at

Russian state-owned firm that carries out foreign oil

Nord Stream AG.) In early June, it was reported that

projects. RusHydro will be headed by Vladimir Tatsy,

Akimov and Chemezov had been accepted as

the first vice president of Gazprombank, while Ilya

nominees.

Yuzhanov, the former anti-monopoly policy minister, will take over at Svyazinvest. Prince Alexander

According to the Russian media, eliminating Cheme-

Trubetskoi, the co-manager of a Russian-French trad-

zov and Tokarev could pose certain problems for

ing company, is to become the board chairman of

President Medvedev. Specifically, some observers

Alrosa.

view the dismissal of experienced government officials from state-run companies‟ boards as negative

Doubts

for the investment climate.

These changes have had a mixed reception. On one hand, movement in the direction of reducing the

Some have also pointed out that efforts to diminish

influence of government officials, most of them

the influence of Putin and his circle, which includes

Putin‟s favourites, from company boards is seen by

Sechin and Chemezov, may have deleterious eco-

some as positive and as evidence of reform.

nomic effects

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

44

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Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

Political ties

24, the electricity trader‟s majority shareholder is

Under Medvedev‟s decree, the main changes envi-

Rosatom, the state nuclear concern. The latter com-

sioned have to do with the formal mechanisms of

pany, which is 100% owned by the government,

state control over so-called strategic assets.

holds a 57.3% stake in Inter RAO UES.

Since 1999, the current president‟s predecessor –

The trader‟s supervisory board includes many high-

Vladimir Putin, now serving as prime minister – has

level officials, including Shmatko as well as three

appointed loyal government officials to the boards

presidential advisors (Larisa Brycheva,

of large state-owned companies active in the energy,

Dvorkovich and Sergei Prikhodko). Its chairman is

transport, military-industrial and air transport sec-

Igor Shuvalov, a first deputy prime minister.

Anatoly

tors.

As such, even though two high-ranking civil servants Many of these appointees were close allies of Putin,

are stepping down at Inter RAO UES, the govern-

who of course got his start in the KGB. However,

ment will still retain strong influence at the company

even liberal members of the government fall into this

through its control of Rosatom. Moreover, Shmatko‟s

category.

seat on the Rosatom board indicates that very little change is likely.

For example, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has served as chairman of Alrosa, Russia‟s national diamond-mining company, and VTB Bank, the stateowned foreign trade bank. Medvedev himself, when serving as first deputy prime minister before the presidential election in 2008, was chairman of the board of directors at Gazprom, the biggest stateowned company in Russia.

Following instructions

“

Since 1999, the current president‟s predecessor – Vladimir Putin, now serving as prime minister – has appointed loyal government officials to the boards of large state-owned companies active in the energy, transport, militaryindustrial and air transport sectors.

On the surface, high-level officials have been fairly quick to follow the president‟s instructions. For ex-

Holding off

ample, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who over-

There are other signs that Moscow is losing the polit-

sees the fuel and energy complex, didn‟t wait for the

ical will needed for pushing ahead with economic

July 1 deadline. Rather, he stepped down as chair-

reforms.

man of the board at Rosneft on April 11, setting an example to other officials.

For example, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development had earlier announced plans to sell an 8%

Additionally, Sechin, along with Energy Minister Ser-

stake in RusHydro, 50% minus one share in

gei Shmatko, has said he will leave the boards of sev-

Rosagroleasing and 100% of Rosinteragroservice

eral other state-owned companies – Rosneftegaz

(RIAS), the state grain company, by 2013. The minis-

(the largest shareholder in Rosneft), RusHydro (the

try also said that between 2013 and 2015, the state

national hydropower concern) and Inter RAO UES (an

share in Sovkomflot, the shipping company that has

electricity trader) – by August 31.

teamed up with Transneft for the second Baltic Pipeline System (BPS-2) project, would be decreased to

The deputy premier and the energy minister an-

50% plus 1 share and that a stake in Russian Railways

nounced plans to step down from their board seats

(RZhD) of 25% minus one share would be sold. The

at Inter RAO UES in June. It is worth noting, however,

Russian government also actively discussed pro-

that while Sechin left his post as chairman on June

posals for the privatisation of the Sheremetyevo in-

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45

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

ternational airport, which is, like the other companies

2010 to wait until 2014-2015 to sell part of the

listed above, fully state-owned.

state‟s stake in VTB, and until 2016 for Rosneft.

The officials also decided to defer a decision on

However, the Kremlin has backtracked, apparently as

the RusHydro stake, saying that a sale was only

a result of an influx of oil revenues – that is,

possible if a “reliable investor” came forward before-

petrodollars – into the economy in 2010-2011. The

hand.

size of the stakes being offered in some state-owned companies has gone down; for example, Moscow

These moves were endorsed by Putin, who has not

now intends to sell 7.6% of Sberbank, the state

always seen eye to eye with Medvedev on matters of

savings bank, rather than 9.3% as previously

economic reform. By contrast, Dvorkovich, who

announced.

serves as the top economic advisor to the president, has said that Moscow may revise its plans for the sale

Meanwhile, plans for the sale of the Sheremetyevo

of a stake in Rosneft.

airport have simply been postponed. (They may be shelved altogether, given that the government is

Conflicts

now talking about consolidating it with Vnukovo,

Following these delays, a commission set up

another airport near Moscow, and then possibly join-

by Medvedev approached the Russian government

ing both to Domodedovo, the third airport serving

with a proposal for completely eliminating state

the capital.)

ownership of several companies – namely, VTB, Rosneft, Rosselkhozbank and RusHydro. The presi-

“

dent has responded positively, and his administra-

Aeroflot – the country‟s biggest airline, which is 51.17 % stateowned – has not even been considered for privatisation.

tion has said it will not rule out a full exit from VTB and Rosneft.

This, along with the push to remove high-ranking civil servants from the boards of state-run firms, indicates

that among

liberalisation the

and

remain

which is 51.17% state-owned – has not even been

However,

considered for privatisation. Nor have Svyazinvest,

influence dwindle as a result of these campaigns

the national telecommunications company, or the

are likely to fight back. If they do, the boards of

Agency of Housing and Mortgage Lending (AIZhK).

these

officials

state-run

president‟s

privatisation

Meanwhile, Aeroflot – the country‟s biggest airline,

who

top

would

companies

may

priorities. see

their

become

battlefields between the Kremlin and the White As for Transneft, the state oil pipeline operator,

House.

and Zarubezhneft, a state-owned company that is mostly active in foreign projects, no plans have

For example, in mid-June, it became known that

been made to sell major stakes that might give an

Medvedev had blocked the government‟s move to

outsider investor significant control. The same path

nominate Yuri Kudimov, the general director of VEB

is

Rosneft,

Capital, to the board of Sheremetyevo airport. In-

Rosselkhozbank (the national agricultural bank), VTB

being

followed

with

respect

to

stead, the president put forward Yuri Medvedev, the

and RusHydro.

deputy director of the Gazoturbinconstruction Salute company.

Moreover, Moscow appears to be putting off making decisions on the fate of state-owned companies

According to press reports, this was at odds with the

for as long as possible. For example, it was decided

government‟s plan, which called for Kudimov to be

at a government meeting led by Putin in October

replaced by Anatoly Tikhonov, the first vice president

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

46

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Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

of Vnesheconombank, VEB Capital‟s parent organisa-

influence over the boards of public sector energy

tion.

firms. In the republics of Tatarstan and Chechnya, for example, the president‟s decree calling for high-level

The presidential administration apparently did not

officials to leave their board posts has not been ac-

co-ordinate its choice of nominees with the govern-

cepted.

ment because it feared that this would allow VEB to play a more prominent role in the process of amal-

The presidential order was issued in late March of

gamating the airport‟s terminals.

this year. The following month, though, the president of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhanov, declared

The presidential administration explained its deci-

that high-ranking officials would not have to step

sion to nominate the Gazoturbinconstruction Salute

down from their seats on the boards of state-owned

chief by describing the nominee as “a skilled manag-

companies in Tatarstan [8].

er with a very good reputation.” It also noted that Yuri Medvedev, as the deputy director of Rosimush-

As for Chechnya, high-level officials continue to hold

chestvo (Russia‟s State Property fund), had never

prominent posts in local energy companies. For ex-

been involved up in any scandals or conflicts.

However, there may have been horse-trading involved here too.

The decision to nominate Yuri Medvedev was made by Dvorkovich, the president‟s top economic advisor. Meanwhile, Dvorkovich‟s wife, Zumrud Rustamova, is a member of the Sheremetyevo airport‟s board of directors. In the past, Rustamova was also

one

of

Yuri

Medvedev‟s

colleagues

at

Rosimushchestvo.

“

The decision to nominate Yuri Medvedev was made by Dvorkovich, the president‟s top economic advisor. Meanwhile, Dvorkovich‟s wife, Zumrud Rustamova, is a member of the Sheremetyevo airport‟s board of directors. In the past, Rustamova was also one of Yuri Medvedev‟s colleagues at Rosimushchestvo.

So once again, board members at a state-owned

ample, Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya‟s president,

company are being replaced by directors with ties to

serves as chairman at Grozneftegaz.

the government. The difference is that this time, state-owned companies are not swapping one high-

Tatarstan

level civil servant for another but for the directors of

In late May, the Tatneftekhiminvest holding con-

another state-owned company active in the same

vened its annual general meeting (AGM) under the

sector of the economy.

chairmanship of Minnikhanov.

These trends are not conducive to improving the

The shareholders present at the gathering elected a

image of the Russian economy in the eyes of foreign

new board of directors nearly identical to the one

investors, as they increase the likelihood of clashes

already in place – with the Tatarstani president stay-

between the different factions represented on com-

ing on as chairman, in violation of Medvedev‟s order.

pany boards. Disputes of this type, especially in Rus-

In total, shareholders appointed 22 persons to Tat-

sia‟s regions, have already made many investors skit-

neftekhiminvest‟s board. (Previously, the board had

tish in the past.

21 members.) Along with President Minnikhanov,

President Dmitry Medvedev is confronting a difficult

several other high-ranking republican officials kept

situation in some regions of the Russian Federation

their places on the board: Prime Minister Ildar Hali-

with respect to his push to reduce the government‟s

kov; First Deputy Prime Minister Ravil Muratov; In-

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47

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

dustry and Trade Minister Ravil Zaripov; Renat Sabi-

The first company is involved in the extraction and

rov, an assistant to the president, and Renat Mus-

transportation of Chechnya‟s oil resources. A minori-

limov, the president‟s advisor on oil and gas issues.

ty 49% share in the company belongs to the government of the Chechen republic, while the remaining

Meanwhile, new board members included the re-

51% is in the hands of Rosneft, a company owned by

public‟s minister of energy, Ilshat Fardiyev (who is,

the Russian government.

incidentally, the nephew of Tatarstan‟s former President Mintimer Shaimiyev); Economy Minister Midhat

In 2001, Akhmad Kadyrov, then serving as Chech-

Shagiakhmetov, and the prime minister‟s assistant

nya‟s president, was appointed chairman of Groz-

for energy, natural gas and chemical issues, Almaz

neftegaz‟s board of directors. Currently, his son, Ram-

Galeyev. Overall, almost all members of the holding‟s

zan Kadyrov, who has succeeded his father as presi-

board are politicians.

dent, is serving as chairman. Musa Eskerkhanov, the company‟s general director, is a close relative of Pres-

The matter does not end there. Tatneftekhiminvest is

ident Kadyrov.

the main shareholder in Tatneft, the republic‟s oil company. Immediately after its AGM in Almetyevsk

The second company was originally founded as an

on June 23, Tatneft‟s board met in its new configura-

affiliate of Grozneft, which was established during

tion and elected Minnikhanov as its chairman, even

the Soviet period. It was included in the privatisation programme of 2004, but so far it remains under the

“

control of Russia‟s federal government. In 2004, Chechenneftekhimprom‟s general director was ar-

...members of the republic‟s cabinet of ministers also hold board seats at Tatarstan‟s other large energy enterprises – Nizhnekamskneftekhim and Kazanorgsintez.

rested and replaced by a member of Kadyrov‟s inner circle.

At present, Grozneftegaz has no title to any energy production and transportation facilities in Chechnya, while Chechenneftekhimprom‟s property rights exist only on paper. All licences and titles are under the control of the company‟s majority shareholder, Ros-

though he was already serving in the same capacity

neft.

at the oil company‟s parent organisation.

More than six years ago, Chechenneftekhimprom‟s Meanwhile, members of the republic‟s cabinet of

oil-producing assets were transferred to Rosneft on

ministers also hold board seats at Tatarstan‟s other

the basis of a lease agreement. Since then, the lead-

large energy enterprises – Nizhnekamskneftekhim

ers of the Chechen republic have sought repeatedly

and Kazanorgsintez.

to regain control over this oil. In fact, the first attempts to revise the lease agreement were made by

Chechnya

Akhmad Kadyrov, the father of the current president,

The presidential decree will also be difficult to exe-

who informed his inner circle one week before his

cute in other regions of the Russian Federation. In

murder that he intended to hold serious talks on the

Chechnya, for example, republican officials are still

matter with Vladimir Putin, then serving as Russia‟s

determined to maintain control over the revenue

president.

streams coming in from the oil and gas sector.

The republic‟s main fuel and energy enterprises are

Money matters

Grozneftegaz and Chechenneftekhimprom. Both

The Chechen leadership is motivated by money. Ac-

were registered in 2001.

cording to official data from Rosneft, Grozneftegaz

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

48

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

extracted around 1.9 million tonnes (38,000 barrels

served as chairman of Rosneft before Medvedev

per day) of oil in 2008 and 1.6 million tonnes (32,000

launched his initiative, over the matter of manage-

bpd) in 2009. Assuming a price of US$90 per barrel,

ment of oil revenues.

this oil is worth around US$1.1-1.2 billion per year.

Another player is Vakha Agayev, the founder and Officials in Grozny have complained that all of the

board chairman of the Yugnefteproduct holding,

crude is exported and that none of the proceeds

which was previously controlled by offshore compa-

remain in the republic. These complaints are likely to

nies. The firm had strong links to Tuapsenefte-

be renewed if, as predicted, oil prices continue to

product and the Tuapse refinery before they came

rise – even though Chechnya receives more than

under Rosneft‟s control. Agayev is considered to be

US$1 billion per year in direct subsidies from the

a close friend to Ramzan Kadyrov. His son has served

Russian government.

as chairman of the Krasnodar refinery, formerly state -owned but now under the management of Russ-

The true disposition of Chechen oil revenues is not

Neft, a private company. Another prominent name is

so clear-cut, however, and official Russian statistics

that of Nikolai Bukhantsov, a former Russian Energy

offer no clarity.

“

Crude is currently exported from the republic by pipeline and rail and loaded onto tankers for delivery, with much of it being sold to offshore companies registered in Cyprus, the Seychelles or elsewhere.

Crude is currently exported from the republic by pipeline and rail and loaded onto tankers for delivery, with much of it being sold to offshore companies registered in Cyprus, the Seychelles or elsewhere. These buyers use offshore accounts in other countries such as Liechtenstein to make their payments, with some of the money going to Russia‟s state treasury and the rest going into a special account held by the Russian Energy Ministry.

Ministry official who was involved in the founding of Naftatrans, one of the main players in Chechen oil

However, the price for Chechen oil set by the Energy

exports. In 2002-2003, Bukhantsov served in the de-

Ministry does not take account of the volumes used

partments of the Energy Ministry where all data on

for blending with lower-quality Russian and Central

quotas, export transactions, shipments and produc-

Asian crude in Transneft‟s pipelines. In fact, the

tion are collected. During the same period, he also

amount of Chechen oil blended in this fashion and

acted as an advisor to former Energy Minister Igor

exported via the Novorossiisk and Tuapse terminals

Yusufov, who then headed the board of Rosneft.

is classified as a state secret.

Bukhantsov and Yusufov both lost their positions in 2004, when Sechin took up his position.

In practice, this allows the owners of the companies involved in the business to collect even larger

Meanwhile, the Magomadov brothers, the scions of

profits, while none of these firms‟ board members

an influential family in the Chechen republic, are

asks about the transparency of money transfers.

holding the reins at Chechenneftekhimprom. The elder brothers, Lema and Abdul-Khamid Magoma-

Who benefits?

dov, are members of Kadyrov‟s government, one

According to the Russian media, those in position to

serving as a deputy premier and the other as the

benefit include Chechnya‟s president, Ramzan

minister of economic development and trade.

Kadyrov. As noted above, Kadyrov serves as chairThe younger brothers, Yunus and Yusup Magomadov, worked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003-

man of Grozneftegaz. He has frequently clashed with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, who

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49

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Russia's Presidential Reforms | By Dr. Zurab Garakanidze

2004. They held posts in the department charged with ensuring the security of the republic‟s oil pipelines – that is, with protecting the infrastructure of Chechenneftekhimprom.

For his part, Adlan Magomadov served as plenipotentiary representative of the Chechen republic in Moscow until July 2004, and after personnel shifts, he became the head of the Impexproduct company. This firm, which had a central office in Moscow and branches in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, was until recently the main oil trading concern of RussNeft – which was, incidentally, founded by Mikhail Gutseriyev, a businessman from Ingushetia.

Another name in the mix is that of Pyotr Suslov, a for-

“

The examples of Tatarstan and Chechnya provide further evidence that Medvedev‟s effort to push government officials out of state-owned energy companies is at a dead end.

cow until July 2004, and after personnel shifts, he became the head of the Impexproduct company. This firm, which had a central office in Moscow and branches in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, was until recently the main oil trading concern of RussNeft – which was, incidentally, founded by Mikhail Gutseriyev, a businessman from Ingushetia.

Another name in the mix is that of Pyotr Suslov, a former officer in Russia‟s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), who has been an active participant in Russian oil, energy and construction projects. Suslov has at various times crossed paths with Sechin.

Dead end The examples of Tatarstan and Chechnya provide further evidence that Medvedev‟s effort to push government officials out of state-owned energy companies is at a dead end.

The president‟s campaign has not led to any appreciable growth in foreign investments and has not made these companies more transparent. Rather, government control over the companies mentioned in this series has not been reduced.

mer officer in Russia‟s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), who has been an active participant in Russian oil, energy and construction projects. Suslov has at various times crossed paths with Sechin.

Family ties Meanwhile, the Magomadov brothers, the scions of an influential family in the Chechen republic, are holding the reins at Chechenneftekhimprom. The elder brothers, Lema and Abdul-Khamid Magomadov, are members of Kadyrov‟s government, one serving as a deputy premier and the other as the minister of economic development and trade.

The younger brothers, Yunus and Yusup Magomadov,

Notes: * Dr. Zurab Garakanidze is an author in News Base Emagazine.

1) Татьяна Становая . ДИРЕКТОРА ИЗ СОВЕТОВ. http://www.politcom.ru/12097.html 2) Татьяна Становая . ДИРЕКТОРА ИЗ СОВЕТОВ. http://www.politcom.ru/12097.html 3) На места чиновников в советах директоров компаний придут единоросы. http:// neftegaz.ru/news/view/99064/ 4) Ibid.

5) В совет директоров Газпрома может войти Тимур Кулибаев. http://www.oilcapital.ru/ news/2011/05/231021_167842.shtml

worked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003-2004.

They held posts in the department charged with ensuring the security of the republic‟s oil pipelines – that is, with protecting the infrastructure of Chechenneftekhimprom.

6) Герхард Шредер стал претендентом на должность в Газпроме. http://www.oilcapital.ru/ news/2011/05/231022_167843.shtml 7) Татьяна Становая . ДИРЕКТОРА ИЗ

For his part, Adlan Magomadov served as plenipotentiary representative of the Chechen republic in Mos-

председателем совета директоров. http://

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

50

СОВЕТОВ. http://www.politcom.ru/12097.html 8) Президента Татарстана снова выбрали

www.regnum.ru/news/1407454.html

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

AFRICA REVIEW COMMENTARY

A New War on

Terror?

By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim*

J

ust when the threat of Islamist terrorism seemed to be successfully suppressed, the

His bombing of government buildings in Oslo that Friday, followed by the slaughter of around 86 young

actions of Breivik bring awareness of the evil engendered by other extremist ideo-

victims on an island adds a chilling new dimension to Western-Muslim relations. Breivik was not Muslim and

logies.

When a Muslim terrorist commits an act of violence, Muslims all over the world tend to be blamed. As soon as an outrage is reported, the media jump to the conclusion that it must be Muslim terrorism.

But when it turns out that a white Christian has committed an unspeakably violent act, then he is always a lone wolf. The recent horrific shootings in Norway prompted a rush to judgment by certain irresponsible commentators and bloggers that was soon contradicted by the facts. Like Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma, we have a new name to add to the list of lone, white extremist murderers of children -- the Norwegian, Anders Behring Breivik.

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

51

his victims were not Muslims and he did not bomb a mosque or a Muslim neighborhood. Fueled by his twisted Islamophobia, he chose instead as his target the "multicultural elites" who he believed were responsible for supporting Muslim immigration into Europe, accusing left-wing politicians in Europe of allowing Muslims to overrun the continent.

Calling himself a Christian conservative, patriot and nationalist, he said in his online manifesto that the "indigenous Europeans" responsible would be punished for their "treasonous acts." So with convoluted logic, Breivik bombed government buildings in Oslo where the leading Labor party was headquartered and he targeted young people gathered at an annual Labor Party summer retreat.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

A New War on Terror | By Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

Countries in the European Union are feeling particularly vulnerable to the latent and sometimes overt

What makes a sick thinker move from internet rambling to cold-blooded murder is going to be a subject

Islamophobia manifesting itself recently. Germany's leader, Angela Merkel acknowledged publicly that "multiculturalism has failed" and the rise of nationalist, racist movements in Britain are causing deep concern.

The European Union with its borderless inclusion of immigrants is currently under severe economic stress as the eurozone is on the brink of collapse. Any economic turmoil allows resentments to surface against

for long debate and endless speculation to come.

Breivik's situation can be described as something similar to "the banality of evil" or "normalizing the unthinkable", where doing things in an organized and systematic way, such as documenting it in detail in a diary, results in normalizing routine actions that normally would be degrading, murderous, unspeakable.

"People do great wrong, not because they are unawa-

the "other" -- usually hardworking immigrants whose relative success is due to working long hours under

re of what they are doing but because they consider it to be right." It will be interesting to see if the

difficult conditions, unlike the local unemployed white youth with their welfare entitlement mentality. It

Norwegian justice system allows him to testify in court so he can expound in public his extreme nationa-

can be an explosive situation, especially if the immigrants are of another race, language, religion and culture, and Norway has been welcoming in recent years to thousands of refugees from Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia. The Muslim population of Norway is only 1.8 percent, small compared with Germany and France's im-

list philosophy.

migrant populations, but obviously outstanding in a homogenous population such as Norway's.

to better policing and intelligence work. In 2009, only one out of 294 attacks in six European countries was

Once again, we are forced to try to understand the mentality of a violent extremist such as Breivik. As the prescient Molly Ivins said in 2001 about the Oklahoma bombing, "Exactly how a supposed code of honor could drive someone to murder 168 people is beyond me, but it is obviously not unique to McVeigh."

attributed to Islamists. Common perceptions about terrorism in Europe are misplaced and young Muslim activists are more likely to be concerned about poverty, unemployment and exclusion, just like their Western counterparts. According to a recent Pew Center Global Attitudes study, Muslim countries are just as concerned about Islamic extremism and violence in their own countries, and overall there is a notice-

Breivik's violent extremism based on his Islamophobia is particularly shocking when one considers the dramatic reduction in Islamic extremism in recent years.

Radical Islamist plots have almost disappeared, thanks

Breivik's 1,500 word online manifesto lacks any inner logic. He identifies with the Knights Templar, predicts a major European war to drive out Islamic influence by 2083, and quotes American Islamophobic bloggers

able thaw in Europe and the US in Muslim-Western relations since 2006.

and writers, such as Daniel Pipes and Robert Spencer who runs the Jihad Watch website. Some of the U.S. writers are quick to deny any responsibility for Breivik's actions, in spite of his numerous citations of their anti-Islamist views. Of course they must bear responsibility for motivating Breivik and giving a spurious legi-

be successfully contained and suppressed, the actions last Friday of the Norwegian white supremacist, Breivik, has brought about a horrified new awareness of the evil engendered by the continuation of the war on terror.

timacy and language for his inchoate views. Parts of the manifesto were taken almost word for word from the writings of "Unabomber" Ted Kaczynski, substituting the word "multiculturalism" for "leftism." Breivik's manifesto is a ragtag collection of other people's beliefs emerging as a garbage can of fringe and racist writings from the internet.

Note: * Dr Azeem Ibrahim is a Fellow and Member of the Board of Directors at the Institute of Social Policy and Understanding and a former Research Scholar at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and World Fellow at Yale.

More writings here: http://www.azeemibrahim.com

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

52

Just when the threat of Islamist terrorism seemed to

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

AFRICA REVIEW COMMENTARY

The Mistral Warship Deal: What‟s in for France and Russia?

By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau*

A

fter two years of negotiations, Russia

included a targeted infrastructure program designed

and France signed a treaty of military

to reinvigorate the Russian economy and to bring

cooperation on June 17, 2011 under

economic growth indicators back to 2000-2007 lev-

which two Mistral-class amphibious

els. In addition to supporting the usual energy and

assault ships, together with their full technological

raw material export activities, the plan, most im-

complement, will be sold to Russia. This deal marked

portantly, also stipulated that significant sums would

the largest transfer of sensitive military equipment

be spent on streamlining and modernizing the Rus-

from one country to another in history. The agree-

sian military [2].

ment is designed to stimulate each country‟s stagnating economy – slowed down by the world crisis –,

The details of these expenditures were disclosed on

revive Sarkozy‟s domestic support, appease the

February 24, 2011, when Deputy Defense Minister

French electorate‟s discontent and satisfy the French

Vladimir Popovkin announced a long-flagged rearm-

military lobby‟s demands. Russia is seeking to renew

ament plan, set to run through 2020. This ambitious

its outdated military and technological base in order

$650 billion weapons procurement program is de-

to restore the effectiveness of its military deterrence

signed to counter what is perceived as U.S. military

at the regional level. Meanwhile, France will take ad-

encroachment in what the Kremlin regards as its

vantage of this commercial windfall to expand into

“sphere of privileged interests.” Russia intends to

new arms markets and further boost its foreign poli-

simultaneously acquire and develop new technolo-

cy initiatives [1]

gies with both military and civilian applications, which will allow it to reduce the size of the armed

In March 2009, less than one year after the August

forces and turn them into professional organizations

2008 Russian-Georgian War over South Ossetia and

[3].

just a few months after the stock market crash in Moscow, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev an-

The program also includes a downsizing process

nounced a major economic recovery plan, which

within the Russian armed forces. Some 200,000 offic-

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53

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

which was particularly appreciated in Afghanistan

...by 2020 the Russian Navy will have at its disposal 35 corvettes, 15 frigates and 400 new ships. Air Force procurement will total 600 warplanes and 1,000 helicopters.

“

when it was used against Improvised Explosive Devices (IDEs), also known as roadside bombs.

The nuclear strategic forces, which will be cut by one third (33%) under the New START agreements (this

”

agreement supersedes the 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT)) signed with the United

ers will be sent on compulsory retirement and 200

States in April 2010, will be radically modernized –

General Officer positions will be abolished (the Rus-

especially missile launchers – to ensure the effective-

sian Armed Forces have some 1,100 General Officers

ness of nuclear deterrence. The Russian Ministry of

and 350,000 other officer positions). Meanwhile, the

Defense is also trying to quickly bring into operation

number of lieutenants will be increased from 50,000

the RSM-56 Bulava missile, a three-stage, solid-

to 60,000 in order to decentralize the decision-

fuelled, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

making process and more effectively delegate au-

capable of delivering a nuclear warhead launched

thority. The lion‟s share of the new spending will be

from submarines. However, the Bulava has a trou-

funneled towards Russia‟s nuclear submarine fleet

bled history. After years of failed tests, it was finally

(eight new ones are planned) and the next genera-

successfully test-launched in October 2010. There

tion of anti-missile defense (S-500) that will replace

are, however, still doubts about its operationaliza-

the already popular S-300 antimissile system. In addi-

tion, as a test launch from the Yurii Dolgorukii SSBN

tion, by 2020 the Russian Navy will have at its dispos-

submarine scheduled for December 2010 has been

al 35 corvettes, 15 frigates and 400 new ships. Air

postponed until mid-2011 [5].

Force procurement will total 600 warplanes and 1,000 helicopters. However, Russian Army insiders

While RSM-54 Sineva SBLM intercontinental ballistic

already play down these numbers and allude to the

missiles are already installed and operational on the

fact that the Ministry of Defense is already behind

Delta IV class submarines, the Russian submarine

schedule with this program [4]. They claim that insuf-

fleet will be further supplemented by six new Yasen/

ficient funds have been allocated from the budget to

Severodvinsk class nuclear submarines, considered

carry out the proposed changes. With the global eco-

the jewels of the Russian Navy, with its 120 meters in

nomic crisis potentially gaining momentum, such

length and capable of carrying 24 ballistic missiles

problems and recriminations are not likely to disap-

with a range of 5,000 kilometers. This submarine‟s

pear any time soon.

propulsion system is considered by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence as the quietest – or the least de-

The Russian armed forces will benefit from the adop-

tectable – submarine manufactured anywhere in the

tion of the new multi-role Mig-35 fighter jet and su-

world.

perior equipment, such as the new the Sukhoi Su-35, while a fifth-generation prototype stealth fighter, the

The Importance of the Mistral Warship for Russia

Twin-engine jet fighter Sukhoi PAK FA (“Prospective

The most important aspect of Russia‟s naval modern-

Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation”), is being

ization plan is, however, the purchase of the two

developed through tests. The production and updat-

French Mistral-class warships which will be delivered

ing of the Mil Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters, Mil Mi-

to Russia in 2014 and 2015 from the Saint-Nazaire-

24 gunship and attack helicopters, the two-seat Ka-

based STX shipyard located in the northwest of

mov Ka-52 “Alligator” and the Ka-60\60U\60R “Orca”

France. The two countries are continuing their nego-

series of medium transport multi-role helicopters are

tiations for two more Mistral class warships that

also accelerating. The army will also be equipped

would be build in Russia, this time under French li-

with the Italian light armored vehicle Iveco LMV M65,

censes.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

54

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

The agreement set up a joint venture between

In addition to providing a significant economic boost and substantial revenue, Medvedev‟s technological rearmament plan also aims to reconnect the government with the heavy industry lobby, the military establishment and those “siloviki” (former KGB men and military officers) who have complained about a lack of structural investment in defense and operational shortcomings that predominantly stem from the obsolescent military arsenal.

“

France‟s Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) and Russia‟s United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), two state owned companies, to construct four fully armed and operational Mistrals on the basis of the formula “2 +2,” i.e. two ships will be built at the Saint Nazaire shipyard and two at the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Both shipyards take their direction from the French and Russian governments respectively. Paris has given Moscow its assurances that the Sinik 9, a highly sophisticated control and communication system that is installed on the Charles de

”

Gaulle aircraft carrier, will be transferred to Russia as part of the deal. Negotiating this agreement was often a complex task because, at the insistence of Paris,

The Russian navy consists of outdated but still

clauses on the transfer of sensitive “know-how” had

popular vessels, such as the Sovremenny class

to be framed in precise and elaborate legal terms. In

missile destroyer, built in the mid-1980s by the Sovi-

addition, agreeing on a price for the two French war-

et Navy. Russian leaders, however, complain about

ships is a daunting task, so much so that it has not

grave weaknesses of these vessels, citing the slow

yet been established, though it will presumably fall

pace of naval movements during the war against

between $1.15 and 1.3 billion.

Georgia in August 2008 [6]. Each 21,300 ton Mistral-class ship is a BPC (Bâtiments de projection

In addition to providing a significant economic boost

et de commandement) capable of carrying 16 to 20

and substantial revenue, Medvedev‟s technological

heavy combat helicopters, four air-cushioned crafts

rearmament plan also aims to reconnect the govern-

for landing troops ashore, several dozen vehicles

ment with the heavy industry lobby, the military es-

(13 battle tanks and 60 armored vehicles) and

tablishment and those “siloviki” (former KGB men

from 450 to 900 combat ground troops carrying

and military officers) who have complained about a

their weapons for both long and short term

lack of structural investment in defense and opera-

deployment. It also can carry on board a floating

tional shortcomings that predominantly stem from

hospital and an operational command and control

the obsolescent military arsenal [7]. In mid-May 2011,

centre.

Alexander Postnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, stated in effect that it was

Negotiations between the French and Russian Minis-

cheaper to buy three modern German Leopard 2

tries of Defense began to intensify during a meeting

tanks than one Russian T-90.

at the shipbuilding hall in St. Petersburg in June 2009. They then laid the foundations for future coop-

The regeneration of the armed forces has been un-

eration. Negotiations over the Mistral really picked

dertaken in accordance with the new Russian Nation-

up steam the following year when the French com-

al Security Strategy made public on May 12, 2009 [8],

pany Thales signed an agreement with the Ural Opti-

which insisted on the need for military reforms and a

cal Mechanical Plant, located in Vologda, on the sup-

quick transfer of geostrategic focus from the global

ply of night vision technology to be installed in T-

to the regional arena, in particular to the Caucasus,

90U tanks. Finally, Franco-Russian cooperation was

Central Asia, and the Far East. The newly purchased

formalized on January 25, 2011, with the signing of

French hardware is designed to increase Russia‟s ca-

the Cooperation Treaty concerning the Mistral war-

pacity to intervene in short and medium range thea-

ships.

tres of conflict. It comes as no surprise, then, that the

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55

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

Kremlin has announced that the first two Mistral ships will be allocated to the Pacific Fleet, while the third and fourth will be deployed as part of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, respectively.

Sarkozy and the French Economic and Military Revival France, in keeping with tradition, has once again lived up to its reputation for being one of the most independent and flexible members of the North At-

“

The French industry has encountered rough waters in recent years. Many sectors have been faced with dire times, resulting in massive job losses, manufacturing output down across various sectors, and political and economic strife at home.

lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, its new strategic business partner, Russia, has a troublesome

in recent years. Many sectors have been faced with

military past and it is still in conflict with the West

dire times, resulting in massive job losses, manufac-

over NATO‟s expansion into Eastern Europe. Moreo-

turing output down across various sectors, and polit-

ver, the Unites States‟ insistence on moving forward

ical and economic strife at home. The downward

on the installation of an anti-missile defense system

economic spiral in the industrial sector started out

on the territory of former members of the Warsaw

with a 13% freefall in 2009. Almost two hundred

pact (now new NATO member countries) may have

thousand jobs vanished in that sector in a short peri-

unintended consequences on Russia‟s home front.

od of time, which totals 42% of all job losses. Moreo-

According to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Gen-

ver, France‟s share of exports in the euro zone

eral Secretary, the Mistral agreement should not be

dropped from 16% to 12.5% since 2000. The indica-

labeled as politically dangerous. If one considers that

tors of rough sailing ahead are reflected in most sec-

Russia is a reliable partner, then, it should be treated

tors of the French economy. There are major cracks

consistently in areas such as defense. NATO mem-

in infrastructure, frequent breakdowns in the rail

bers and Russia have worked together for decades to

transport system, drops in production of nuclear en-

maintain peace, stressed Rasmussen during a meet-

ergy due to ageing equipment, recurring power

ing of the NATO-Russia Council on June 8, 2011 in

shortages and grid failures in various regions of the

Brussels. Nevertheless, the General Secretary‟s argu-

country [11].

ments and reassurances have not changed the perception, especially in Central and Eastern Europe,

Tough times for international trade have been tied in

that the Franco-Russian deal, much to their dismay,

with these industrial setbacks in the last decade. For

will give Moscow more military and diplomatic clout

instance, Siemens‟ withdrew from a joint venture

in its relations with the former Soviet republics and

with Areva, a French public multinational conglom-

satellite countries [10].

erate and the world‟s largest manufacturer of nuclear reactors, which forced Avera to buy back shares in its

Nicolas Sarkozy gives a lot of consideration to the

own nuclear reactor for approximately 2 billion Euros

development of the French industrial sector, seeing

(US $3 billion) in January 2009. Then there was the

it not only as a driver of economic recovery but as a

Areva‟s reactor construction disaster in Finland in

means of restoring his own political standing. In ad-

September 2009. As part of the proverbial fallout the

dition, he thinks that an upgraded industrial sector

French state-owned nuclear power group had to

would provide France with an opportunity to regain

come up with billions of Euros in penalties to cover

its national pride. The Mistral deal is one step in that

the delays and cost overruns in a face saving effort.

direction. Economic and political expediency are joined up and play center stage to closer and mutu-

French industry‟s woes continued when it lost a con-

ally beneficial relations between France and Russia.

tract for four reactors to Abu Dhabi (South Korea

The French industry has encountered rough waters

won the contract). This failure was blamed on Presi-

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

56

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

dent Sarkozy, who had personally promoted the deal

economists and intellectuals, describe as the French

with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He had even

“déclinisme” (declinism). On March 4, 2010 Sarkozy

flown to Abu Dhabi to promote Areva‟s bid. France‟s

announced that the French government would take

failure to win the construction project for 42 high-

all necessary steps to support the French industrial

speed rail lines in China, and then a similar contract

and manufacturing sectors. The Mistral deal with

in Saudi Arabia, (the Medina-Mecca railway project),

Russia is reflective of this new emphasis on assisting

constituted disappointments of huge proportion in

French industrialists [13].

French political circles. Poland‟s decision in 2004 to award China a 49 kilometer highway project instead

Another contributing factor that impacts on the justi-

of France was also hard to swallow. The plethora of

fication for the Mistral sale is France‟s relative eco-

problems facing the French industrial sector is so

nomic slump in relation to Germany‟s vibrant econo-

serious that the respected French weekly magazine

my in the last decade. Germany has aggressively de-

Le Point, in its February 4, 2010 issue, ran an article

veloped closer economic cooperation with Russia.

entitled “Why We [France] Lose Mega Projects” [12]

Great strides have been made in German since the fall of the Soviet Union and the reunification of the

The French economy is tied to its industrial base. In

country in 1990. German industrialists are still in-

contrast to the British economy, service, financial and

creasing Germany‟s competitiveness and productivi-

construction sectors are not strong enough to sup-

ty, and much of this gain is attributed to the

plement the industrial production and achieve sus-

strengthening of the high-tech sector. France wants

tainable prosperity. In effect, it is estimated that for

to be able to compete with Germany on the Russian

each job created in the industrial sector between 6

market, at least in terms of finding a commercial

and 10 additional positions are generated in the ser-

niche in the arms trade in what is perceived to be a

vice sector. Two million jobs have been lost in the

booming market [14].

industrial sector in the last the decades and the current world economic turbulence is only accelerating

Germany is now able to gain a windfall from the up-

this trend. Highly industrialized economies of the

swing in emerging markets (47% of German exports

Euro zone – Great Britain, Germany and Holland

are to emerging markets, as compared to only 25%

come to mind here – are more diversified, forward

of total French exports). Berlin‟s effective employ-

thinking in R&D (research and development), and

ment policies have helped contain unemployment

more integrated into the global economy, achieving

(7.%, as against 9.7% in France in 2010). Germany has

by the same token greater productivity gains.

also run a lower structural budget deficit than France (3.5% in Germany versus 6% in France) and kept pub-

President Sarkozy wants to reverse the current nega-

lic spending to 45% of GDP, despite the $2 billion

tive trends in the French economy, which Jacques

spent on the reunification, whereas in France this

Attali and Nicolas Baverez, two prominent French

indicator is more than 50% of GDP.

“

Germany is now able to gain a windfall from the upswing in emerging markets (47% of German exports are to emerging markets, as compared to only 25% of total French exports). Berlin‟s effective employment policies have helped contain unemployment (7.%, as against 9.7% in France in 2010).

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

There are many reasons for Paris to be concerned about the ever-evolving German-Russian strategic partnership. In 2008, that is, before the global economic downturn, German-Russian foreign trade volume jumped by 19.8% to more than 68 billion Euros.

That made Russia Germany‟s top trading partner in Eastern Europe, ahead of Poland. That same year, German exports to Russia were worth 32.3 billion Euros, almost equal to its export volume to China (34 billion Euros). More than 6,000 German companies

57

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

are registered in Russia, with investments that had

ceived on the horizon by the Kremlin and Russian

reached $17.4 billion by the end of 2008. In reality,

army generals. Moreover, Russia is fully aware of Chi-

the investment volume may be significantly higher,

nese economic penetration and demographic reali-

as many German enterprises channel investments

ties, and sees these factors as threatening its inter-

through third countries, such as Austria or the Neth-

ests at home and in its “near abroad.”

erlands. Economic relations between Germany and Russia did slow in 2009 and 2010 but only slightly.

Cooperation with NATO remains important to Medvedev, especially if it helps to decrease the cur-

The Elysee in Paris fully is fully aware that the long-

rent technological gap between Russia and the

term sustained growth of German-Russian trade

West. For its part, France, while seeking to maintain

stands in sharp contrast to the dropping develop-

its competitive strength in military exports, also in-

ment of France-Germany or Germany-U.S. business

tends to further diversity and expand its presence in

relations. Consequently, France‟s new foreign policy

foreign markets. The current war in Libya provides

toward Russia and the Mistral sale are examples of

an excellent opportunity to showcase its military

Paris seeking to regain the capacity to affect on

hardware and standing as an international player.

global issues as a major player on the international scene.

Notes:

Finally, Sarkozy‟s record low popularity among

* Dr. Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and

French voters is perhaps one of the most pragmatic

Chairman of the Department of Political Science and

reasons of his intense efforts on pulling off a suc-

International Relations at Khazar University in Baku,

cessful big deal with Russia [15]. It is only one year

Azerbaijan and a contributor to Global Brief, World

until the next French presidential election, and as

Affairs in the 21st Century (www.globalbrief.ca) and

there have been many policy failures, it would be

The Jamestown Foundation.

Russian Roulette to refuse to conclude a contract with Russia that is worth a few billion euros and

1) Irina Titova, Russia buys 2 Mistral-class warships

which creates, or at least maintains, “real jobs” for

from France, Associated Press, June 17, 2011; Ed-

thousands of French workers. Any political leader

ward Cody, Russia to Buy Two Warships in Deal

facing such pressing economic pressures on the

with France, The Washington Post, December 25,

home front would easily be willing to turn a blind

2010; Russia to Buy 4 Mistral Class Warships from

eye to allegations that Russia is a military threat,

France – Sarkozy, Interfax, Military News Agency,

whether eminent or not, to French, European or

March 2, 2010; Russia Hopes to Build Mistral-Class

even NATO‟s interests. Any attempt to derail the

Warships on Its Own - Gen. Staff, Interfax. Russia

deal out of an alleged security threat would bring

& FSU General News, February 24, 2010;

French workers out onto the streets in mass and

Medvedev Confirms Russian Plan to Buy Mistral

their protests could turn violent.

Class Warships from France, Interfax. Russia & CIS Business & Financial Newswire, March 1, 2010;

For many observers and European leaders, the Rus-

Sarkozy: Russia, France Starting Talks on Russian

sia of today is not the bogeyman of yesterday. For

Purchase of 4 Mistral-Class Warships, Interfax.

Russia, this deal is multi-layered, not only on a geo-

Russia & CIS Business & Financial Newswire,

strategic level but in terms of how an efficient and

March 1, 2010.

modern military will serve as a powerful deterrent to

2) Russia's economy to reach pre-crisis level by late

what Russia considers hostile elements in countries

2012, RIA Novosti, December v16, 2009 http://

of the former Soviet Union, especially in the South

en.rian.ru/business/20091216/157255443.html

Caucasus and Central Asia. It is in some of these

Рейтинг – труба (Reiting truba), Kommersant,

newly independent states that real threats are per-

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

;

58

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Mistral Warship Deal | By Assoc. Prof. Richard Rousseau

December 9, 2008 http://www.kommersant.ru/

Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin,

doc.aspx?DocsID=1091360.http://

Problems of Post-Communism, Jul/Aug 2008, Vol.

www.kommersant.ru/doc/1091360 ; Matthews,

55 Issue 4, p. 42-51; Osborn, Andrew, Medvedev

Owen; Nemtsova, Anna, The Medvedev Doctrine,

Enters, but Putin Is Omnipresent, Wall Street Jour-

(cover story), Newsweek (Atlantic Edition), De-

nal - Eastern Edition, May 8, 2008, Vol. 251 Issue

cember 1, 2008, Vol. 152 Issue 22, p. 44-47.

108, p. A10.

3) Russia's $650B Arms Drive Misguided, Agence France

Press,

March

17,

2011.

http://

www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5986005

;

8) Richard Rousseau, „The “New” Russian Foreign Policy: A Time-Honored Russian Tradition,‟ Europe‟s

World,

May

24,

2010

http://

Russian Military To Be Fully Rearmed By 2020, RIA

www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/

Novosti November 24, 2008 http://en.rian.ru/

PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/1441/language/

russia/20081119/118402887.html

en-US/Default.aspx

4) Fred Weir, With Russia's $650 billion rearmament

9) Vladimir Socor, NATO Disinclined to Debate Mis-

plan, the bear sharpens its teeth, The Christian

tral Affair, The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia

Science Monitor, February 28, 2011 http://

Daily Monitor, December 9, 2010

www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0228/

www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/

With-Russia-s-650-billion-rearmament-plan-the-

ready to build Mistral for Russia in 2013 The

bear-sharpens-its-teeth; Russia announces rearm-

Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor,

ament plan, BBC, March 17, 2009 http://

October 29, 2010; Vladimir Socor, Russia Launch-

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7947824

es International Tender for Warship Procurement,

5) Sharon Squassoni, Jane Kaminski The New START Agreement, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 12, 2010 http://csis.org/ publication/new-start-agreement ; Senate must ratify new START agreement on nuclear arms, The Christian Science Monitor, November 15, 2011 http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-

;

France

The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 10, 2010; Vladimir Socor, US Embassy in Moscow Indicates Acceptance of Mistral Deal,The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 3, 2010.

10) Nicolas Baverez, L'industrie française victime du colbertisme, Le Point, February 25, 2010.

monitors-view/2010/1115/Senate-must-ratify-

11) Pourquoi les mégacontrats nous échappent, Le

new-START-agreement-on-nuclear-arms

Point, January 28, 2010 http://www.lepoint.fr/

6) Kanet, Roger E., Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; De Haas, Marcel, Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century, Putin, Medvedev and Beyond, Taylor & Francis, 2010.

archives/article.php/420510 12) Guisnel Jean, Le Mistral accueille des hélicoptères russes, Le Point.fr, January 12, 2009; Négociations exclusives entre la France et la Russie pour la vente de quatre navires Mistral, Le Point, January

7) Spechler, Dina Rome, Russian Foreign Policy During the Putin Presidency, Problems of PostCommunism, Sep/Oct 2010, Vol. 57 Issue 5, p. 3550; Hahn, Gordon M., Medvedev, Putin, and Perestroika 2.0, Demokratizatsiya, Summer 2010, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p. 228-259; March, Luke, Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the New 'Russian Idea', Conference Papers -- International Studies Association, 2009 Annual Meeting, p. 1-23; Markoff, Jeffrey, Russian

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

http://

59

3, 2010 13) Malgré la reprise, l'économie française ne devrait pas rattraper son retard, Agence France Press, June

18,

2010

http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/

malgre-la-reprise-l-economie-francaise-nedevrait-pas-rattraper-son-retard-18-06-2010467927_23.php 14) Sylvain Besson, Sarkozy se met en retrait, Le Temps (Genève), February 13, 2010.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

AFRICA REVIEW CAUCASUS REVIEW

Russia-Georgia Relations:

Among Illusions and Visions

By Zaur Shiriyev*

L

eaving public opinion aside, the leader-

Most local analysts believe that relations will improve

ship of all post-Soviet countries enjoy rea-

with new leadership, and have focused on the search

sonably amicable relations with Russia The

for short-term political parallels in the 2012 presiden-

exception is Georgia, whose ongoing con-

tial elections that will take place in both Russia and

flict with Russia is recognized as the most acute

Georgia: will Saakashvili use the “Putin Model”? If so,

across the entire post-Soviet territory. Following the

who will be the Georgian “Medvedev”? But there is

August War in 2008, Russia and Georgia are now offi-

no speculation that really illuminates Georgia‟s politi-

cially enemies: direct diplomatic relations between

cal trajectory and its future relations with Russia. Per-

the two countries has been cut. Relations between

haps the most striking issue is that personal relations

Moscow and Tbilisi have been seriously damaged by

at the highest level are extremely poor; the mutual

Russia‟s official recognition of Abkhazia and South

dislike between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir

Ossetia as “independent states”, or, in reality, Russian

Putin and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has

protectorates. In light of the worsening political rela-

in some ways come to define the current relationship

tions between Georgia and Russia, ordinary Geor-

between Russia and Georgia. The impact this clash

gians overwhelmingly desire a positive relationship

has had on relations between the two countries re-

with Russia. According to a poll undertaken by the

flects the intense role that personality plays in gov-

Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in August

ernments of the former Soviet states. The infor-

2009, 54% of Georgians continued to favor extremely

mation war between Russian and Georgia after the

close political cooperation with Russia [1]. But this

August War was based largely on the mutual accusa-

bilateral dispute is highly personal, with Russia‟s

tions of culpability between leaderships [2]. It seems

leadership saying it will not engage with President

that the problem is to do with the leadership; the

Saakashvili. And the dispute between these two

majority desire of Georgians for close cooperation

countries is not based on a misunderstanding; it is a

with Russia changes when the focus is placed on

power conflict rooted in specific choices made by

Moscow‟s current government. According to a Gal-

the political leaders of Russia and Georgia.

lup poll, Georgia is the country with the highest per-

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

60

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

Russia-Georgia Relations | By Zaur Shiriyev

centage of people who do not approve of Russia‟s

hortations to “change the present authorities

leadership (76%) [3].

through demonstrations”; now this seems to have lost its applicability, even though, arguably there

Tbilisi's choices

are autocratic elements in Saakashvili‟s ruling meth-

Saakashvili and his government face a dilemma with

ods. The Georgian public doesn‟t want to see pro-

regard to next year‘s parliament elections and af-

tests and demonstrations, which will likely have a

terwards presidential elections. Either they can try to

negative impact on Georgian statehood. This senti-

focus on the problems more important than regain-

ment is summed up in Alexander Kukhanidze‟s

ing the lost territories, or they can continue to dangle

words: “We know that Saakashvili is not ideal, but

the illusions of future EU and/or NATO membership.

he is the best choice [6]. The constitutional changes

Most Georgians – and this is true across the demo-

that will come into effect from 2013 were introduced

graphic - would be convinced by a short term gov-

in order to strengthen the position of Prime Minis-

ernment commitment to liberate Abkhazia and

ter, and have fueled speculation that President Saa-

South Ossetia and make them part of Georgia, and

kashvili is hoping to continue his political career as

moreover, few are willing to pay the costs associated

Prime Minister. Under these reforms, the powers of

with further military action, after the August War [4].

the president have been curtailed: the state‟s devel-

The net result is that Georgia can neither change the

opment will no longer depend quite so much on the

reality nor accept it. The Georgian government does not believe that there is any point in forming relationships with Sukhumi and Tshkinvali, official or otherwise, on the grounds that at this stage, the issue is Russian occupation. Thus for as long as that continues, there is nothing to be gained by engaging with these de facto authorities [5]. There are two pillars of the government‟s current policy: non-

“

“The Putin Model”, where the post of Prime Minister follows Presidency, will be tested next year in Tbilisi, and lies at the heart of the

political speculation in Georgia, and

recognition [of independence] and diplomatic en-

many other lines of speculation are con-

gagement. While both of these approaches entail

nected to this notion.

maintaining or establishing contact with the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they do not necessarily sit easily together. The Parliamentary Elections

presidential whim. The prime minister and parlia-

next year and Presidential elections in 2013 will be

ment will play a more significant role, and serve as a

politically decisive, and the current government‟s

serious check on the actions of the future head of

concrete planning is in tension with fear about a

state. However, the public supports the attitude of

change in government.

the current government, which is “if you want to change the leadership, the only way is through

Parliament and Presidential Elections: defining Georgia’s political future

elections”. President Saakashvili is neither denying

“The Putin Model”, where the post of Prime Minister

"No. Theoretically, there is such an opportunity. But

follows Presidency, will be tested next year in Tbilisi,

I'd like to repeat that this opportunity is useful for us

and lies at the heart of the political speculation in

[7]. With Saakashvili not actively denying this specu-

Georgia, and many other lines of speculation are

lation, many of the opposition parties and analysts in

connected to this notion. In the meantime, Saakash-

Tbilisi have no doubt that the president intends to

vili's constitutional reforms have strengthened the

become prime minister. Irakli Alasania, leader of Our

position of Prime Minister. Members of the Georgian

Georgia Free Democrats (OGFD) and a former Tbilisi

opposition before and after the August War, con-

mayoral candidate, has declared, "The proposed

nor confirming such speculation, saying simply:

nected powerfully with the population through ex-

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

61

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Russia-Georgia Relations | By Zaur Shiriyev

“

Moscow and Tbilisi, the new leaders will come from

Georgians are not happy to see political models named after Putin; they want to see their own model, which ideally should entail the continuation of the current government, less emphasis on the personality of the President, and improvements in Russian-Georgian relations.

current political ruling elites. If future relations continue to be pre-dominated by conflict resolution and the attitudes of leaders, the relationship will not develop beyond a dialogue of illusions. There is a crucial need to find areas of common ground as points for discussion, such as economic relations. The best example of this is the Enguri hydroelectric power plant, which is being used by both Abkhazia and Georgia. Enguri produces up to 40% of Georgia‟s winter electricity supply needs. The plant is located in Abkhazia, and the dam is located on undisputed

model is an attempt to tailor the new position per-

Georgian territory – and yet there have not been any

sonally for Saakashvili."

significant disruptions in transmission to undisputed Georgia since the 2008 conflict. The same principles

Arguably, Georgians are not happy to see political

could be applied more broadly to Russian-Georgian

models named after Putin; they want to see their

relations. For instance: if Georgia broke its embargo

own model, which ideally should entail the continua-

of Russian membership to the World Trade Union

tion of the current government, less emphasis on the

(WTO), Russia would end its embargo on Georgian

personality of the President, and improvements in

wine, mineral water and agricultural produce, be-

Russian-Georgian relations. Importantly, the first

cause such an embargo contravenes WTO rules. The

elections scheduled in Georgia will be the Parliament

golden rule is: improving economic relations will

Elections in October 2012, followed by the Presiden-

improve state relations at a political level.

tial Elections in January 2013. For this reason, the implementation of the “Putin Model” now seems out

Notes:

of the question. The outcome of the Russian Presi-

* Zaur Shiriyev is foreign policy analyst at the Center

dential election will refine the speculation about Saa-

for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan.

kashvili‟s future plans.

1) http://home.gwu.edu/~cwelt/ One thing that can be said about Saakashvili‟s Geor-

Russian_Analytical_Digest_68.pdf

gia in 2011 is that it is a very different environment to

2) Vladimir Putin 'wanted to hang Georgian Presi-

Putin‟s Russia in 2000. But for Saakashvili‟s legacy to

dent Saakashvili by the balls', The Sunday Times,

be one of a genuine reformer, he must personally

November 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/

endorse and demonstrate democratic reform in ac-

tol/news/world/europe/article5147422.ece

tion, and step down from power in 2013; it is clear

3) Russia's Leadership Not Popular Worldwide, Au-

that head of government will be elected by a majori-

gust 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/148862/

ty in parliament, where at the moment the Presi-

Russia-Leadership-Not-Popular-Worldwide.aspx

dent‟s United National Movement has an unchal-

4) Author‟s discussion with members of expert com-

lenged majority. There is no need to focus on personalities so much, because party policies are unlikely to change very much.

munity of Georgia, 14-23 August 2011 5) Interview with Professor Ghia Nodia, full text to be published in Second issue of “Caucasus International”

Conclusion

6) Author‟s discussion with Professor Alexander Ku-

The future relations between Russia and Georgia are strongly dependent upon these elections, upon who will be the future leader. One thing is clear: in both

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

62

khanidze, 17 August, 2011, Tbilisi, Georgia 7) Saakashvili

cannot

be

like

Putin,

http://

www.georgiatimes.info/en/articles/57595-1.html

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY (JCTS)

Call For Contributions

Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practitioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related issues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, international relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Editorial Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own website http:// www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences. Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged.

Prospective authors should submit 5.000-10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Wordcompatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to: Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - alpozerdem@cesran.org Publication date:

Spring issue — April Autumn issue — October

Advancing Diversity

POLITICAL REFLECTION “Quarterly news-Magazine”

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTION Published by CESRAN

Political Reflection welcomes contributions from scholars, students, and professionals in all aspects of international relations, politics, and political economy.



Articles submitted should be original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time.



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Submissions whether they are published or not are not returned.

AFRICA REVIEW CHINA REVIEW

Conflict in the

„SOUTH CHINA SEA‟ Lessons from the Dene peoples and the Arctic Conflict?

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon*

Foreword Before we engage this enthralling subject, I should like to point out an added detail to the works cited in this paper.

This is obviously not an original development, but it is a new attempt in my research. As can be seen, the evidence has been divided under third order subheadings that categorize different types of publications. This is done to explicitly detail the ‘weight’ of evidence and allow the reader to gain a greater grasp of the evidentiary bias that is present herein. A portion of this effort is to try to include ‘new media’ (such as blogs) as part of the traditional media drawn upon.

I

ntroduction

access to oil, natural gas and other minerals; access to

The dispute in the „South China Sea‟ is, as

lucrative fisheries; control over lucrative lanes of

widely known, a multistate affair. Cook (2011),

trade; defining national territorial waters versus iden-

in an interview with Ian Storey, showed that

tifying international waters; objections by China for

tensions have been escalating in this area since

the involvement of secondary actors in the dispute

around 2007 [1]. In majority, it is two sets of islands

(Anonymous, 2010; Buckley, 2011); the Beijing Con-

(atoll and reef chains), the Paracel‟s and Spratly‟s

sensus being used against China and the Washington

(including a number of submerged shallow islands)

Consensus using war-games to flex its muscles; Tai-

that are at the centre of this multinational dispute.

wanese sovereignty; and overall mixed signals from

Key players include China (the PRC mainland, Taiwan,

each key player (the PRC, for example, expressed

Hong Kong, Macau), Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia,

goodwill for the region yet also continued the devel-

and Brunei. Notable secondary actors include the

opment and deployment of blue water naval ships

USA, ASEAN, Indonesia, Thailand, the UN, EU and Sin-

and the offloading of materiel in the Spratly‟s).

gapore. These key players have, over the past 4 years, been escalating disputes over a number of key issues

There is something of a stew of growing nationalism

which are: a build-up of militarism and a lack of diplo-

at present (such as the Philippines renaming the

macy by all except Brunei (especially in the Spratly‟s);

„South China Sea‟ to the „West Philippine Sea‟: see

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

65

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’ | By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

Cheng 2011 for more). We see, in another example,

Li and Li (2003) demonstrate that we should also take

Vietnam passing a conscription bill which is in many

into consideration the famous “9 dotted line map” (I

ways worrying. However, I feel that the likelihood to

counted 13 lines) created by the PRC in 1947 [2] (see

this dispute mounting to serious violence to be an

Map 1). It is reasonable to agree with non-PRC posi-

exaggeration (an opinion that is widely shared in the

tions that argue this map to have no legal relevance. It

extant literature). What this rise in nationalism will do,

is obviously a map designed to maximize a freshly

rather, is hinder regional cooperation and collective

consolidated militaristic power and looks more like a

growth. Violence would do untold harm to China‟s

map of empire than of a socialist democracy as the

efforts for global goodwill and South-South relations

PRC supposedly considers itself to be. Nevertheless,

(i.e. trade, research and culture swaps) which it has

this map could serve to raise the eyebrows of several

been building over the past 20 years. Cheng (2011)

non-PRC powers in the region. Should we go further

adds to this reasoning as China has restated its com-

and tie in the growth of the People‟s Liberation Army

mitment to a non-violent resolution to the conflict

Navy (or PLAN) in the Sea, it is understandable why

(see also Anonymous, 2011). We also have to consider

tensions have been escalating. With a map like this

the diplomatic efforts that have been making inroads

and the means to enforce it, counter-measures should

through the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation, the Dec-

be taken even if such a goal for the PRC would be pre-

laration of Conduct and the „South China Sea‟ Work-

posterous [3].

shop as barriers to violence.

Map 1 – China’s ‘9 Dotted Line’ Map

Overall, it comes down to what many commentators have been saying for some time: focus on diplomacy, do not play to nationalist currents at the expense of other citizenries and the ASEAN+3 region, and work on a friendly and cooperative strategy for the betterment of the region. This paper will try and provide a small prescriptive measure for realistic progress to be made in that direction.

Origins & Evolution It would be a very difficult undertaking, although a greatly interesting one, to try and map the history of „South China Sea‟ disputes between states bordering that Sea. The focus here is rather on the last ten years. What exactly happened that sparked this renewed escalation of militarism, nationalism and international belligerence? One analyst (Nordhaug, 2011), argued that part of the reason could stem from the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). The ROC could use this dispute to its diplomatic advantage by lining up its interests with non-PRC claimants to try to limit the PRC‟s influence in the Sea. Thus, by acting-up about the PRC‟s growing presence and trying to disrupt the PRC‟s „sphere of influence‟ it might make matters easier for the ROC to increase its diplomatic recognition.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

*From Li and Li (2003:228)

66

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Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’ | By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

A speech by the Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary

But, as Emmers (in a presentation associated with his

sums up the situation better than I could have hoped

2009 monograph) convincingly argued, the PRC is not

to:

the only party to blame. In the following map (Map 2), Excellencies,

we can gain a sense (as of 1996) as to what the situation was like in the Spratly‟s. [4] Because of these dis-

In the interest of utilizing preventive diplomacy

puted zones, we saw ASEAN take a diplomatic lead

measures as a means of averting the escalation of

and establish the aforementioned agreements to

tensions into serious conflict, the Philippines would

forge a path for a peaceful and perhaps even logical

like to share our experience in the last five months in

resolution to this dilemma. This is probably the most

the West Philippine Sea, also known as the South Chi-

prevalent argument in the literature on the subject:

na Sea. The Philippines have suffered at least seven

that diplomacy is the key to successful resolution

(7) aggressive intrusions since late February into

(Swanström, Joyner, and Snyder offer papers arguing

where we maintain we have sovereign rights. These

similarly). Most, it appears, have however come to the

intrusions happened within eighty-five nautical miles

conclusion that ASEAN must formulate stronger mul-

from the nearest Philippine island of Palawan and

tilateral agreements with more robust recommenda-

nearly six hundred nautical miles from the nearest

tions that are capable of settling these disputes and

coast of China.

allowing the region to move forward.

Map 2 – 1996 Dispute of the Spratly Islands

When the Philippines protested these intrusions, the response was a denial that no such intrusions occurred because of China's 9-dash line claim over the entire South China Sea. The Philippines contends that the 9-dash claim of China has no validity under international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS. If Philippine sovereign rights can be denigrated by this baseless claim, many countries should begin to contemplate the potential threat to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The preventive diplomacy solution as advocated by ARF may be achieved in either of two ways: one, through a process of segregating the disputed features from the

In June, 2011, we saw an interesting turn of political

non-disputed waters which will have to be vetted by

events between the Philippines and the USA (see San-

the ASEAN maritime legal experts scheduled to meet

tolan, 2011, for more). The US Embassy in the Philip-

in September in Manila; two, in the alternative, the

pines stated that it would not take sides in regional

Parties may wish to consider subjecting the 9-dash

disputes (despite the Mutual Aid Treaty) which

line to validation in accordance with UNCLOS. The

prompted a response from President Benigno Aquino

Philippines believes that a rules-based approach is

attempting to encourage the US to live up to its

the only legitimate way in addressing disputes in the

agreement. From this reading, it appears that the US

South China Sea. (Rosario, 2011)

is perhaps being unwantedly drawn into backing anti-

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

67

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’ | By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

China positions. However, the US shortly thereafter

(although these distances are not legitimate as they

stated its support for the Philippines which is perhaps

were not democratically ratified through inter-

why the Philippino government is pushing forward

citizenry agreements at the international level). Per-

plans for oil extraction in the contested Spratly‟s

haps a „fairer‟ stake at national territorial waters in this

(Kate, 2011).

geopolitical zone should concern shallow plateaus (as indicated on Map 3) where most visible sea-life is

Finally, Zeliger (2011) argues that the „South China

based. Of course, this enters this discussion into long-

Sea‟ conflict has been ongoing for decades and that

standing disputes over what exactly (and who exactly)

what is presently happening is not an entirely new

designates

affair. With the rise of China, countries with a stake in

„international‟ waters (see the Convention on the Ter-

the sea are arguing that the PRC is trying to claim the

ritorial and the Contiguous Zone, 1958, for more)

entire Sea for itself (both an unpopular move at home

which is beyond the scope of this article.

„national‟

territorial

waters

over

as much as it is abroad). One voice in the Zeliger piece offered a good analogy. What China is supposedly

As can be seen on Map 3, these „shallow‟ plateaus are

trying to do is the same as if the USA claimed the en-

given different colours: Red, for China‟s flag colour

tire Atlantic for itself.

(there is no sub-meaning with this choice of a sanguine colour); yellow for other ASEAN countries; and

Parallels with the Arctic

green for a zone between the PRC and Vietnam which

A natural geopolitical zone for comparison in this dis-

requires bi-lateral resolution. From Map 4, we can see

cussion is the Arctic Ocean and the dispute over min-

distances from the PRC‟s Hainan province to the Para-

erals therein. Canada, Russia, the USA, Denmark (via

cel Islands. Similar measurements with Vietnam show

Greenland), and Norway are all squabbling over who

that the distance is slightly greater which favours Chi-

gets what under that ocean. Rather than elaborate on

na‟s stake. However, these are measurements from

what, in many respects, are similar arguments be-

the „shallow‟ plateaus. Given that these islands (and

tween both international disputes, I should like to

other submerged elevations suitable for oil and min-

highlight an argument that came from a former indig-

eral exploitation/exploration) are in „blue waters‟, my

enous politician in Canada‟s Northwest Territory. Ste-

argument is that China and Vietnam should have a

phen Kakfwi, in a presentation [5] with John Raulston

mutual and shared stake concerning interests in and

Saul, argued that each country must come to view the

or around the Paracel islands. The same is argued

Arctic as a zone of commonwealth. It belongs to all

about the Spratly‟s and the Philippines, Brunei, Malay-

citizens and nations of the Arctic and should be ap-

sia and Vietnam.

proached in the same cooperative spirit. As will

Map 3 – Area of Conflict and Marked Shallow Plateaus

come to be seen below, this is the crux of the prescription I will make.

Prescriptions for Resolution & Conclusion Most, through a cursory glance at the geographically disputed islands, would come to an easy conclusion that the PRC is stretching its claims thin for the Spratly Islands (see Map 3). If anything, these islands are fair game for the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Where this cursory glance becomes useless is over the Paracel Islands (I include Pattle Island, Passu Keah and Woody Island under Paracel) [6]. These are within normative

distances

for

territorial

claims *Powered by Google Maps Earth Application

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

68

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Conflict in the ‘South China Sea’ | By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

Kakfwi‟s example of various indigenous nations work-

1)

The reader should, however, note that inter-

ing together in the Northwest Territory through the

national tensions have, for decades if not cen-

use of logical and fair rules is an important one to

turies, been present in this geopolitical arena.

transplant to the „South China Sea‟. Influence, and legitimate stake, of minerals and oil decreases from a country as the distance grows greater and increases

2)

Some, however, date this map at 1951.

3)

However, it appears that this map is being

as the distance grows nearer. Where, for example,

taken seriously by the PRC as it submitted the

there are areas that the distance is near for two par-

map to the UN on May 7, 2009 (Jamandre,

ties (see for example the waters between Vietnam‟s

2011). The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and

Lai Tao and China‟s Qiziwan in Hainan), numbers

Indonesia among others have all lodged for-

should dictate the split. In other words, measure the distance from coast to coast to coast, and divide that number equitably. That way chance dictates who gets

mal protests within the UN due to this action.

4)

ed on possible conflict triggers.

what and removes any use of violent conflict through the machines of war (the latter is an obscene stupidity

Should it be of interest, Cossa (1998) elaborat-

5)

These two talks on aboriginal sovereignty in

in my opinion). Should China‟s sought after minerals

the Arctic were hosted by the Canadian Inter-

fall into the hands of Vietnam (or vice versa), then

national Council and delivered on January 13,

trade for the bloody goods and increase the regions‟

2011, at 6:30 pm (Vivian and David Campbell

comparative advantage. Naturally, I would prefer if this entire process took a strong democratic approach and involved the citizenries of the key players in dia-

Conference Facility, University of Toronto).

6)

Other islands to consider in this dispute are the “Macclesfied Bank” and “Pratas.”

logue and decision making. That is unfortunately unrealistic. One, nevertheless, can dream.

Works Cited Notes:

Media

* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political the-

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Control of South China Sea Unlikely,” The China

Post.

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www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/worldissues/2011/06/23/307134/Armedconflict.htm> (accessed 7/19/2011).

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Available

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<http://

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pute,” ABS-CBN News. Available at: <http://www.abs-

Cook, Tim. 6/17/2011. “An Interview with Ian Storey:

cbnnews.com/nation/06/15/11/ph-welcomes-china-

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Jamandre, Tessa. 4/13/2011. “PH [Philippines] Pro-

(accessed 7/22/2011).

tests China‟s „9-Dash Line‟ Claim over Spratlys,” The Inbox. Available at: <http://ph.news.yahoo.com/

Cossa, Ralph A. 1998. “Security Implications of Con-

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flict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Trig-

-over-20110413-064347-870.html>

gers of Conflict.” Centre for Strategic and International

(accessed

7/22/2011).

Studies.

Kate, Daniel Ten. 7/24/2011. “Philippines to Test

Joyner, Christopher C. “The Spratly Islands Dispute

South China Sea Agreement with Push for Oil,”

in the South China Sea: Problems, Policies, and Pro-

Bloomberg.

spects for Diplomatic Accommodation,” South-

Available

at:

<http://

www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-24/clinton-

chinasea.org.

calls-for-global-response-to-rising-s-china-sea-

www.southchinasea.org/docs/Joyner,%20Spratly%

risks.html > (accessed 7/27/2011).

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Nugroho, Bambamg Hartadi. 7/17/2011. “Engaging

Nordhaug, Kristen. 2011. “Taiwan and the South Chi-

China in the South China Sea Conflict,” Jakarta Post.

na Sea Conflict: The China <<Connection>> Revisit-

Available

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at:

<http://thestar.com.my/news/

Available

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Available

<http://

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<http://

story.asp?file=/2011/7/17/asia/9105222&sec=asia>

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(accessed 7/22/2011).

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Philippine Daily Inquirer. Available at: <http://

Institute of Peace. Available at: <http://www.usip.org/

ph.news.yahoo.com/chinas-9-dash-claim-over-entire

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-west-philippine-110002489.html>

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(accessed

7/27/2011).

Swanström, Niklas. “Conflict Management and Ne-

Santolan, Joseph. 6/15/2011. “South China Sea Dis-

gotiations in the South China Sea: The ASEAN Way?”

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Website. Available

www.southchinasea.org/docs/Swanstrom.pdf>

at:

<

http://www.wsws.org/

articles/2011/jun2011/scse-j15.shtml>

(accessed

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at:

<http://

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at:

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70

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AFRICA REVIEW CHINA REVIEW

The Missing

Leader

By Nicholas Miller*

W

ing of the rumors about Jiang Zemin was the China‟s micro-blogging site Weibo, On July 6th, Weibo users stated that the roads of Beijing‟s premier military hoshere is Jiang?

pitals, Hospital 301, were blocked off and a series of

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was celebrat90th

ing its anniversary on July 1, 2011 one of the key things that fixated China Watchers was that former

black Mercedes-Benzes were seen driving into the hospital. Mercedes-Benz is the vehicle of choice for the elites within the CCP.

Communist Party Secretary and China President Jiang Zemin was not present during the ceremonies. Two

There is no evidence that the roads to Hospital 301

of Jiang‟s former senior cadre members- Premier Li Peng and Zhu Rongji were at the celebration but

were closed or that the roads were closed for Jiang Zemin or that Jiang has even died. The speculation of

their boss was mysteriously absent. The Party gave no

Jiang‟s illness or death were only heightened by the

official reason as to why Jiang was absent from the

government‟s censoring of twenty words such as

event or even acknowledged that he was not in at-

“Jiang”, which means river, and “301”. It was only until

tendance. While there were rumors within China that

July 7th that the state media, Xinhua News, released

he had died Hong Kong Asia TV Limited News was

the first official statement regarding the rumors say-

the first and only Mainland news source to report that

ing that Jiang Zemin‟s ill health were just rumors and

Jiang had died. They later retracted and apologized

that he is currently just resting in his home [2]. China

for the story. In addition to the Hong Kong media the

Watchers need to take the information gleaned from

Japanese and Korean media announced Jiang‟s death

Weibo carefully as the content is still screened inter-

while Western new sources reported that the possible

nally to ensure subversive ideas are not disseminated

reason for Jiang not attending the event was ill health because of his age [1]. For China Watchers one of the

and the messages can be difficult to verify. Despite the uncertainty faced in verifying the accuracy from

main sources that were used to monitor the spread-

Weibo it is sometimes one of the few sources that

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

72

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

The Missing Leader | By Nicholas Miller

allow China Watchers a chance to see things that the Party does not want outsiders to see or know.

Traditionally the health of senior or retired Party officials is considered a state secret. When an official does die it usually announced within one to two days of their death.

It should be noted that

this was not the first time that there has been speculation on Jiang‟s health. He did not appear at the funeral of former Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua in December 2010, which lead to

Chi-

na Watchers questions whether he had taken ill or died.

“

Jiang Zemin was one of the key members of the Third Generation of Chinese leaders, and served as the General Secretary of the CCP from 1989-2002, President of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) from 1993-2003, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) from 1989-2002.

Who is Jiang Zemin?

Jiang Zemin was one of the key members of the Third

resents, into the Party Constitution. Jiang also insti-

Generation of Chinese leaders, and served as the

tuted the policy of mandatory retirement of Party

General Secretary of the CCP from 1989-2002, Presi-

members once they reach the age of 70, which was to

dent of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) from

begin with the 14th Party Congress in 1992. Jiang ex-

1993-2003, and Chairman of the Central Military

empted himself from this policy initiative as he

Commission (CMC) from 1989-2002. Jiang rose to

turned 71 at the 15th Party Congress and was 76 when

prominence in 1989 after Zhao Ziyang, then CPC General Secretary, was purged after his involvement

he retired in 2002 [3]. Next, he had all the top leadership positions – General Secretary, President, Chair of

in Tiananmen. Jiang was chosen by Deng Xiaoping to

the Standing Committee of the NPC, and Premier to

succeed Zhao Ziyang as a compromise between the

be limited to a maximum of two terms.

Party elders and younger leaders to prevent further political fracturing within the CCP. Initially when

Jiang‟s core elite faction under him was known as the

Jiang took over as President in 1992 China Watchers

Shanghai Clique, who were some of the chief power

were uncertain whether he would be able to manage

players within Chinese politics in the 1990s. The

the various factions and his tenure would be similar

members of the Shanghai Clique were elites that

to Hua Guofeng, who was anointed by Mao to be his

were advanced through Jiang Zemin. Jiang solidified

successor on his deathbed in 1976 and was eventual-

his position by launching a series of anti-corruption

ly ousted by Deng Xiaoping and his allies losing all his

probes to remove his political rivals, such as Beijing

major positions by 1981. Jiang‟s ability to consolidate his power amongst the various factions during the

Party Boss Chen Xitong in 1995. He promoted his protégés into high-ranking positions such as - Zheng

1990s proved the initial doubts against him wrong.

Qinghong to running the General Office of the Central Committee, Yu Xigui to direct the Central Body-

During Jiang‟s tenure he weathered the PRC through

guard Bureau, and Wu Bangguo, the current NPC

collapse of the USSR and its satellites throughout

Chairman, who was previously the Party Secretary of

Eastern Europe and the hand over of Hong Kong from

Shanghai to a full membership within the Politburo.

the United Kingdom to the PRC. Jiang is credited with

These promotions lead to a backlash within the elites

carrying out Deng‟s goal to further spread the economic liberalization throughout the country along a

who began to block his appointments to various positions.

gradual path rather then the shock treatments that

During the leadership transition between Jiang and

occurred in Russia during the 1990s and the develop-

Hu in at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 many China

ment of his own political philosophy, the Three Rep-

analysts wondering how much power Jiang and the

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

73

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

The Missing Leader | By Nicholas Miller

Shanghai Clique would have during the Hu Jintao‟s

want any event that could destabilize the transition

tenure as General Secretary as Jiang left power with

process or show to the outside world that there are

two thirds of the nine-member Politburo Standing

any signs of infighting within the elites. Guessing the

Committee loyal to him and Jiang still retained

influence of retired political leaders is difficult but

his position as Chairman of the CMC. It was not until

within the current political system top leaders now

2008 that Hu was able to dismantle most of the Shanghai Clique‟s influence throughout the CCP.

have to rely upon consensus building amongst a variety of elites and factions rather than a leader being

One area that will need to be watched in the future is

able to designate a successor and the Party going

when Jiang does die whether it will have any bearing

along with this ruling like what happened during the

on how the succession of the Chief Executive of Hong

Mao era.

Kong in 2012 will turn out. Henry Tang Ying Yen, has strong ties to the Shanghai Clique and is considered

To outsiders it may look like the CCP is overreacting

the frontrunner to win the election. However, the

by censoring the Internet searches for Jiang Zemin

Hong Kong race is still too uncertain to call it for Henry Tang Ying Yen but it is something China Watchers

but their reaction against these rumors stems from the fear that a death of a major political figure could

will have to observe along with the General Secretary

lead to instability throughout the country. While

elections at the 18th Party Congress in 2012.

Jiang Zemin‟s legacy is considered a mix one within China and in the Western world China analysts believe that when Jiang does die that it will be very un-

“

While it is far more likely that the rumors are false and Jiang is very much alive when Jiang does pass on he will leave behind the institutional checks and balances that will ensure a smooth transition for the upcoming leadership succession between Hu and Xi Jinping in 2012.

likely that widespread instability will occur. Jiang Zemin‟s influence has been steadily decreasing after the successful dismantling of the Shanghai Clique by Hu Jintao. While it is far more likely that the rumors are false and Jiang is very much alive when Jiang does pass on he will leave behind the institutional checks and balances that will ensure a smooth transition for the upcoming leadership succession between Hu and Xi Jinping in 2012.

Notes:

Potential Impact: Determining leadership succession accurately within

* Nicholas J.S. Miller is a PhD candidate at the Uni-

China and the possible impact that retired officials

versity of Sydney.

could have on the selection and election of new leaders is still an arcane process that relies upon Cold War

E-mail: nicholasjsmiller@gmail.com

kremlinological techniques to understand what could be going on within the Great Hall of the People. Chi-

1) “What will affect the bilateral relations of the pre-

na Watchers now have sift through message posts on sites like Weibo, state media releases, and analyzing

vious president Jiang Zemin‟s death,” Sankei Shimbun, 07/07/2011; Jamil Anderlini, “CCP birth-

the seating arrangements of elites during major

day gala: where‟s Jiang Zemin,” Financial Times,

events in order to ascertain whether a particular elite

01/07/2011

could be rising within the Party or have fallen from grace.

2) “Jiang Zemin‟s death „pure rumor‟,” Xinhua, 07/07/2011; “China‟s Jiang „resting at home‟ dur-

The process of choosing the next leadership is han-

3) J. Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China,

ing death rumors,” Reuters, 13/07/2011. dled behind closed doors and the Party does not

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

74

M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2001, p. 33.

www.cesran.org/politicalreflection

AFRICA REVIEW INTERVIEW

Interview with

Dr. Alexandros * Nafpliotis

By K. Kaan Renda**

M

any Greeks believe that the dichotomy between a Greek civil service, which is perceived as slow, wellpaid and overstretched and on the other hand of a private sector, which carries the costs of the existence of a big state is the reason for the current crisis. Who do you think is to blame for the Greek crisis?

First of all, I think it is essential to stress the multiple character of the current crisis. We live in a globalized economy now more than ever, and it is a truism that the effects of, for example, a credit crisis in the US could very much influence economic policies in the Eurozone and beyond. In contrast with other countries around the world, Greece has been particularly hit by the so-called Great Recession of the late-2000s, for a variety of reasons. Greeceâ&#x20AC;&#x;s current predicament could be summed up in the herculean task of dealing with its

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Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

sovereign debt crisis. This colossal public debt was mainly caused by spendthrift state policies during the previous three decades. Successive governments of Greece, whose economy is among the 30 largest in the world, and was one of the fastest growing in the Eurozone during the 2000s, based the country‟s entire social model on running large public deficits, predominantly in order to finance public sector jobs (thus creating a gigantic and unsustainable civil service), with an eye to gaining advantage over their political rivals. The somewhat nefarious ways of the credit rating agencies, in conjunction with the lack of a stentorian European answer to Greece‟s financial woes, has added poisonous elements to the already toxic mix. As far as the dichotomy mentioned in the question is concerned, I would like to make two observations. It is true that a large part of the Greek civil service is slow, well-paid and overstretched (I would also add inefficient and corrupt), and that the private sector is encumbered with all the negative consequences of a big state. However, I believe that it is the type and the function of the Greek economy (with the public sector accounting for about 40 percent of GDP), often characterized as „semi-soviet‟ due to the state‟s role and the predominance of vested interests (see, for instance, the existence of closed professions), that are the main culprits. One should not neglect the fact that a very large part of private sector activity (like construction, for example) is intertwined with the state, as it is mainly financed by it.

For the last two months, a new social movement (Desperates) continuously protests against the austerity measures. How does the political system see this movement/phenomenon?

The movement of Aganaktismenoi (Indignants) of Greece was modelled on that of the Indignados of Spain (its creation was actually sparked by protesters in Madrid). It now seems to have lost its, arguably significant, momentum. The originality of this social movement was owed to the fact that it was distinctively non-violent, and that it attracted people from across the

“

It is true that a large part of the Greek civil service is slow, wellpaid and overstretched (I would also add inefficient and corrupt), and that the private sector is encumbered with all the negative consequences of a big state.

political spectrum. Press and politicians alike initially discredited the movement thinking or hoping it would go away quickly. The perseverance of the demonsrators, however, forced the political system to pay increased attention to the movement. Unfortunately, though, this multifarious and far from monolithic phenomenon was once again exploited by politicians who wished to create the false impression that they were in touch with the people on the street. The protesters, on their part, did not manage to agree on anything more than their opposition to the austerity measures and the condemnation of MPs and the political system as a whole.

What are the benefits of staying in the Eurozone and the benefits of going back to the drachma?

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Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

I strongly believe that Greece cannot afford to leave the Eurozone. The benefits of going back to national currency (the rise of exports, for instance) would evaporate in a short amount of time and any real recovery would not be sustainable. Greece has a long tradition of strong ties with the EEC/EU, which is extremely important to it for historical, political and economic reasons.

Despite the fact that Athens has repeatedly failed to cultivate sincere relations with other Eurozone members, and despite some jingoistic talk about dropping the Euro for nationalistic reasons, most Greeks realise that their country could only flourish in close economic cooperation with its traditional European partners. Of course, there are some disadvantages as far as Greece‟s membership of the Eurozone is concerned; some analysts have long noted the inefficiencies of the economic system of the EU, as well as the inequalities it creates. These are issues, however, that need to be addressed on a European level, and certainly solutions that take into account not only major exporting countries like Germany and France, but also the countries of the South and the periphery, in general, should be reached. This is tied to the quintessential issue of political integration in the EU lagging behind economic integration.

In Greece, the labour unions have close connections with the political parties and for many they are historically controlled by PASOK. Do you think that this crisis can change this political relationship?

The way the socio-political system was created in Greece the last 30 years, has influenced all strata of society and all interest groups. Labour unions gained considerable power with the rise of PASOK, and the two seemed interconnected to a large degree. The symbiotic relationship between the unions and the socialist party has been on the wane since the death of Andreas Papandreou, and, more importantly (and somewhat ironically), since the premiership of his son, George. The terms described in the memoranda signed between the PASOK government and the troika (IMF, ECB, EU) are destined to frustrate and even infuriate labour unions and other pressure groups. Papandreou is now faced with the task of having to balance between the more liberal, progressive members of his party (and society, in general), on the one side, and the more conservative, populist members who belong to the old style PASOK of the profligate 1980s, on the other. It is my personal opinion that the prime minister will not be able to walk this tightrope without significant casualties on one of the two sides, and possibly on both. George Papandreou‟s transformation of the party that his father created, in conjunction with the painful decisions that he needs to take for the country‟s sake, will not leave PASOK‟s relationship with the unions unscathed.

Do you think that the programmatic statements of the opposition (right-party, Nea Democratia), which states that lower taxes are necessary for growth can be implemented?

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“

The symbiotic relationship between the unions and the socialist party has been on the wane since the death of Andreas Papandreou, and, more importantly (and somewhat ironically), since the premiership of his son, George.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

The question posed reveals a variety of different issues that all affect the current Greek crisis. First of all, there is the stance of the opposition. Nea Democratia, under its new leader Antonis Samaras, has chosen a quite precarious path in its approach to the country‟s financial woes. Although, traditionally, the party has struggled to promote liberal economic policies, placing great emphasis on Greece‟s involvement in the European integration process, Samaras has appeared adamant in his judgement of the memoranda signed by the Greek government as inefficient and conducive to further recession and troubles. However, and despite hopes from within and outside Greece, he has not succeeded in providing a credible alternative to the austerity measures taken by Papandreou in consultation with the troika. This has created serious friction within the European People‟s Party, the organization where Nea Democratia belongs; European conservative party leaders have expressed their dissatisfaction with Samaras‟ intransigence as far as consensus in Greek politics goes. Nevertheless, as time progresses, the measures do not seem to pay off and figures do not seem to pick up, Samaras is increasingly gaining support, both domestically and abroad. As far as taxes are concerned, everyone that has studied the Greek economy since the creation of the Greek state knows that there exists a huge problem, and that is collection.

It has been traditionally difficult to persuade Greek citizens to declare their income, be sincere about it, and pay the appropriate tax. Corruption in the sector is rife, thus making predictions of state profits irrelevant. Where Samaras is right, though, is in his insistence on demanding measures that would stimulate growth - see for example his recent fulmination against the government for not taking full advantage of EU funds provided in the form of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF). The austerity measures will certainly help ease the burden on the state‟s finances, but they have already affected gravely a significant part of the population. Therefore, in the longer term, Greek economy needs a boost in order to stand on its feet but also in order to pay back its debt, and that can only be achieved through growth. It is no wonder that OECD has urged Athens to „urgently‟ strengthen tax collection and boost privatization. In conclusion, I think that a policy of lowering taxes could work, but it would need a proper working, corruption-free tax collection mechanism (a major task in itself) as a prerequisite.

“

On the other hand, the left parties are against the austerity measures. What is their position about the future of the country and do they have a clear development proposal?

It has been traditionally difficult to persuade Greek citizens to declare their income, be sincere about it, and pay the appropriate tax.

Greek left parties have traditionally been against austerity measures, and in that sense they have been steady in their policies. However, they tend to ignore the harsh reality of the financial woes of the state‟s finances, and the dire need of reforms. They demand higher wages for everyone, discrediting any rationalization of the economy and the public sector, and thus appear unrealistic in their suggestions to resolving the crisis. As the situation in Greece rap-

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Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

idly deteriorates, their plans appear more and more chimerical. Notwithstanding that, it is only natural that a considerable part of those venting their rage at Syntagma and elsewhere will have political recourse (if briefly) to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and other parties of the left, as these represent the most vocal and militant opposition to the government and the troika.

What is the role of the media so far about the austerity measures, the performance of the government and about the rise of the new social movements?

The media‟s initial response to the austerity measures was numb; most outlets insisted on their necessity, as a guarantor of Greece‟s avoiding default. The majority of journalists followed the government‟s rhetoric about reaching the end of the abyss and tried to make the people understand that the measures were absolutely necessary for the country‟s „salvation‟. Lately, however, opposition to the measures imposed by the troika has become more vocal, since positive results are far from forthcoming and the people have started to feel the squeeze in their everyday life. This is greatly owed to the Aganaktismenoi of Syntagma square and elsewhere. The media at first dealt with the movement as another mass demonstration, like the hundreds that paralyse Athens every year. It was only after the demonstrators proved their worth by insisting and staying on for a considerable amount of time that the media decided to take the whole matter seriously and try to explain this new social movement.

Many commentators see new elections in September. Are these a realistic option? And what is the cost/benefit of this decision, given the fact that PASOK is only two years in power and the prime minister just reshuffled the cabinet?

After the recent deal concerning Greece, the voices of members of the government and PASOK that push in the direction of an early election in September have risen in number and determination. That is because these people believe that the best strategy to hold on to power is to go to the polls hot on the heels of the deal on the Greek debt that provides Athens with a significant breather, pushing away the specter of full and uncontrolled bankruptcy. Prime Minister Papandreou is tempted to succumb to this pressure in order to gain legitimacy for his choice to have recourse to the IMF and sign the memoranda proposed by the troika.

However, the next tranche of the loan to Greece is set for mid-September, and the last thing that Eurozone member countries want to see, after the recent rise in the Italian and Spanish cost of borrowing, is instability and troubles in the Greek capital. The prospect of fresh elections, less than two years after the ones that brought PASOK to power, and almost three

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“

The majority of journalists followed the government‟s rhetoric about reaching the end of the abyss and tried to make the people understand that the measures were absolutely necessary for the country‟s „salvation‟.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

months after a cabinet reshuffle, seems quite dismal, also given the current fluidity of the Greek socio-political system, and the reaction, even violent, (due to the mercurial nature of the Greek public) that an indecisive election result could cause.

Do you think that the Greek programme can succeed or do we need a global solution to tackle the debt crisis?

Most sober commentators have been clamoring, for years, for the reforms included in the rescue package for Greece to be implemented. The rationalization of public policy, the opening up of sectors of the economy to a wider part of society, the end of the public sector as a depository of inefficient and corrupt but well-connected employees, have been high up on the list of things that needed to be done yesterday if the Greek economy were to stand on its own feet and become sustainable. Nevertheless, as implied earlier, the debt crisis is a global problem, and as such, it calls for a solution that is global in scope. The actors that will struggle to procure such a solution cannot be limited to a group of people, a government, a country, or even a regional organization alone; much more than that is needed. It is a combination of local, regional and international policies that will manage to tackle the issue successfully, but that does not mean that Greece (and the other countries that are facing similar problems) should halt its new difficult course, navigating through its dire financial straits. Greece has its work cut out for it, but it could also function as an (extreme) case study of how things can go wrong and how to fix them.

The EU urges the Greek parties to concede with the new measures and be more realistic about the future of the country.

Do you think there is room for consensus in the near future, and which parties are more likely to move in that direction?

Consensus is an example of a word in the political dictionary that (unlike democracy) does not derive from ancient Greek (plebiscite is another fine example)- and for very good reason; consensus in Greek politics is a rare sight.

The opposition leader has clearly stated that he will not provide the government with any substantial form of agreement unless the terms dictat-

â&#x20AC;&#x153;

Greece has its work cut out for it, but it could also function as an (extreme) case study of how things can go wrong and how to fix them.

ed by the troika are re-negotiated. Samaras is a staunch critic of many of the austerity measures included in the 110-billion-euro deal agreed last year and he insists that Papandreou should admit that the memorandum has failed.

PASOK is more likely to get some (qualified) support from smaller parties like Democratic Alliance- the one recently created by Dora Bakoyannis, who served as foreign minister under the previous conservative government. Even in that case, however, it seems that would not be enough for PASOK to remain in power, as its performance in opinion polls has been extremely poor lately.

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Interview with Dr. Alexandros Nafpliotis | By Kaan Renda

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoglu have been using a harsher rhetoric in terms of Cyprus issue. Do you think this tendency towards a more hawkish foreign policy has anything to do with the deep economic crisis in some European countries especially in Greece?

It is quite certain that, in such an international climate and given the importance of a country‟s financial clout today, Greece‟s bargaining position vis-à-vis its neighbours and other foreign partners is in constant decline.

A number of commentators have noted that, apparently, Greece will not have much room for maneuver in a number of unresolved geopolitically crucial issues, such as energy sources in the Aegean, the Cyprus issue, and, finally, Greek-Turkish relations, in general. To answer your question I believe that Ankara‟s choice to use harsher rhetoric has less to do with the sorry state of Greece‟s finances (granted, that has always been a strong incentive), and more with Turkey‟s resilience and the confidence that the country is enjoying at the moment. I think it would be a mistake to approach this one-sidedly and ignore the current socio-political realities of Turkey, as well.

In that respect, I would say that tells us more about the role the Turkish government wants to play in the region and beyond, than about the Greek crisis per se.

Notes: *Dr Alexandros Nafpliotis has a PhD and an MA from the LSE in International History and a BA from the University of Athens. He has recently presented his research at conferences and seminars at King's College London, Oxford University, NYU, Yale University, and the Centre for Contemporary British History, and he has won a dissertation prize from the London Hellenic Society. His most recent publication is "The 1971 Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Albania: Cooperation and Strategic Partnership within Cold War Bipolarity?", in Anastasakis, Bechev, Vrousalis, eds., Greece in the Balkans: Memory, Conflict and Exchange, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009. His research interests lie in the field of international history of the Balkans and the Mediterranean during the Cold War. His doctoral dissertation (to be published by I.B. Tauris) focused on British policy towards the Greek military dictatorship, 1967-1974, and analysed diplomatic, economic, cultural and defence relations between the two traditional allies, by using archival sources from both countries for the first time. He has taught on various aspects of twentieth century international history at the LSE for a number of years. ** Kaan Renda is a Doctoral Researcher at King‟s College London.

Kaan Renda would like to thank Christos Kourtelis for his help with preparing interview questions.

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It is quite certain that, in such an international climate and given the importance of a country‟s financial clout today, Greece‟s bargaining position vis-à-vis its neighbours and other foreign partners is in constant decline.

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

CESRAN Papers

CESRAN Papers | No: 5 | July 2011 COMPETITIVE REGULATION: Stepping Outside the Public /Private Policy Debate

By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

CESRAN Papers | No: 4 | May 2011 Turkey: The Elephant in the Room of Europe | By Hüseyin Selçuk Dönmez

CESRAN Papers | No: 3 | April 2011 "Whither Neoliberalism? Latin American Politics in the Twenty-first Century"

By Jewellord (Jojo) Nem Singh

CESRAN Papers | No: 2 | March 2011 "Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines" | By Richard Lim

CESRAN Papers | No: 01 | March 2011 "The Paradox of Turkish Civil Military Relations" By Richard Lim

AFRICA REVIEW GLOBAL CITY ANALYSIS

NAIROBI

“needs to feel the positive effects of globalisation…”

By Fatih Eren*

N

airobi, the capital city of Kenya, who

following the presidential elections, leaving more

hosts the world‘s biggest refugee

than 1,000 people killed and 300,000 people displa-

camps, has been examined in this volu-

ced from their homes. Happily, the violence stopped

me.

Kenya is the most developed and the most influential country in East Africa; and, Nairobi is the most populous and one of the most prominent cities politically and financially in this region. The Republic of Kenya became an independent country in 1963. After this date, the government of Kenya had followed a protectionist governmental and economic policy until the 1990s. The government then embraced a semiliberal economic policy in 1993. As a consequence of this decision, the social and economic connections of the country with the other countries has started to increase gradually. The year 2008 was a bad year for the country. In early 2008, violence erupted in Kenya

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83

National Coat of Arms of Kenya

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

Nairobi | By Fatih Eren

quickly. Kenya enjoys a political and economical sta-

memberships of Kenya to international unions and

bility for the last 3 years.

trade organizations (e.g. Africa Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern

Kenya is the gate of the East Africa region. This

and Southern Africa (COMESA), The Indian Ocean

unique position makes Nairobi, that is the leading

Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)

city of the country, a natural attraction centre for all

and so on).

global players who are closely interested in this region. More globalisation studies should be conduc-

Today, Nairobi is fighting against severe drought

ted on Nairobi because the city, as different from

which has started in 2008 and affected all Subsaharan Africa. Due to drought, migrations from the cityâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s rural areas, other cities and other countries to Nairobi increased significantly in the last 3 years.

Many people are now trying to survive in the refugee camps and in the slums of the city.

Egypt map

Therefore, the city is subject to an interest of international NGOs for help rather than international investors. The headquarters of more than 75 international NGOs are located in Nairobi right now and these NGOs conduct their aid activities (main aids are on food, health, environment and education) towards the East Africa from here. many other global cities in the same cathegory, connects to the world via specific and interesting

The impact of global concern for Nairobi: Analysis

channels. Nairobi became the top-ranked city

There are about 473,000 registered refugees in Ken-

among 25 global cities in the list which was

ya according to UNHRC April 2011 data. A 100,000 of

developed by the Globalization and World Cities Re-

these

search

Network

(GaWC)

using

NGO

refugees

are

accomodated

in

Nairobi

(Non-

(Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper 2010).

Governmental Organization) network connectivity

These refugees are living in refugee camps which are

indicators in 2004. In other words, Nairobi is the

spreaded all over the country (e.g. Dagahaley, Kaku-

most connected city to the world with respect to

ma and so on) or in Kenyan cities as urban refugees.

NGO activities; it connects to the world through in-

The current situation of the refugee camps is very

ternational NGOs.

problematic; they are all over-crowded and their resources (i.e. doctors, nurses, food, water, medicine,

The financial and commercial ties of the city with

volunteer staff and so on) are inefficient and poor.

other countries speeded up after 2005. Main reasons

The Government of Kenya is reluctant to open new

for this acceleration were the realisation of successful

refugee camps in the country not to encourage new

structural and economic reforms which were perfor-

migrations. Despite this, migrations are still going on

med by the Kenyan Parliement and the increasing

from neighbour countries to Kenya. For example,

Political Reflection | September-October-November 2011

84

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Nairobi | By Fatih Eren

15,000 people migrate every month from Somalia to

financial aid to the East Africa region to strengthen

Kenya according to United Nations data. It is a big

its

possibility that immigrants who are spreaded all over

Again, China and India are providing long-term cre-

the country will move to Nairobi to survive in the

dits for their international companies to promote

next years because all Kenyan youngs moved to Nai-

them to invest in infrastructural projects in the re-

robi in the last 10 years to survive and to make their

gion). Nairobi has benefited from these international

livings. The urban population rose about 1 million

aids a certain extent, of course. However, the city still

due to internal migrations between 1999 and 2008;

needs all type of infrastructural projects (i.e. buil-

the present spreaded immigrants may follow the

dings, transport, water and power supplies). Re-

same route. If it goes like that, the city‘s urban popu-

cently, some international property development

lation may rise to 10 million; 30 new slum districts

and investment companies (e.g. Renaissance, Garun

may be added to the city‘s fringes and so the 90% of

Real Estate Investment, Translakes Limited and so

the city population may be accomodated in the city‘s

on) have started some residential and commercial

slums in the next 5-10 years (there are already 66

property development projects in the city benefiting

slums in Nairobi (e.g. Kibera, Mathare Valley, Mukuru

from the long-term credit advantages of internatio-

Kwa Njenga and so on) and 60% of the city‘s popula-

nal banks and funds (e.g. Tatu City). Therefore, fore-

tion is living in slums, today).

ign capital inflows have speeded up property const-

highway, railway and harbour infrastructures.

ruction and development activities in Nairobi. It is The country is dependent on foreign financial credits

possible to see many construction sites in Central

and aids in terms of infrastructural investments

Nairobi at the moment. However, the land prices

(United Nations(UN) provided $284 million and Euro-

increased dramatically in Central Nairobi. 1 acre land

pean Union(EU) provided $145 million financial aid

whose price was less than $2,000 before 2008 rose to

to Kenya for infrastructural investments in 2011). The

$50,000 now due to new infrastructural investments

severe problems of East Africa ( i.e. drought, starva-

in Central Nairobi. For this reason, international

tion, waterlessness, sheltering and diseases) are in

property development and investment companies

the agenda of the world for a while so international

moved their new residential and commercial

financial aids are now flowing into Nairobi, which is

projects

the financial centre of the region. A significant share

and started to develop new gated communities

of these aids are spent for infrastructural investments

(safe and luxury neighbourhoods) for middle and

in the region (The World Bank provided $1.3 billion

higher income class in these towns (e.g. Nakuru,

to small towns near Central Nairobi

Drought in Nairobi

Nairobi | By Fatih Eren

Naivasha). This trend will continue increasingly in the

investors are now interested in the development of

next years.

affordable single family homes in the city. It would be a good idea to support and sustain this initiative

World Bank has just declared that 150,000 new social

considering the social and demographic structure of

housing units have to be developed and delivered

the city.

every year in the country to meet the demand.

However, World Bank 2011 report also states that

The government has set up a future vision for the

only 8% of Kenyans can afford a housing loan. It is

country, that is ‗to create a globally competitive and

clear that all prospective housing projects have to be

prosperous Kenya in 2030‘. In parallel to the state‘s

designed and developed as affordable housing units

2030 vision, Nairobi City Council has also set up a

in Nairobi because 90% of Nairobians, living and

new vision for the city, that is ‗to be recognized as

working in the city, belong to low-income class. I

one of the most attractive cities in the world‘. The

should say that the city needs long-termest internati-

governors of the city believes this basic principle:

onal property developers and investors who expect

‗Where there is activity, there is plentifulness and

to get the returns of their investments between 20

prosperity‘. When we look at the vision of all cities in

and 40 years. Keeping in mind that Nairobi is an im-

the world, we see that almost all cities are trying to

portant international centre in East Africa and its pro-

attract international human, capital and commodity

perty market has a potential to grow significantly in

flows into themselves in order to be a global city and

the future. Therefore, it is not so hard for local pro-

an international hub. This vision looks fine for a city if

perty professionals to find this type of international

we consider that city individually as separate from

investors who can invest in the development of af-

other cities. However, when we consider all cities

fordable houses in Nairobi.

collectively as an integrated system or network, this vision seems quite problematic. In the logic of

The Ministry of Lands wants to achieve a key objecti-

‗competition‘, the rise of some cities means the fall of

ve in the country: ‗equitable and efficient access to

some other cities. In other words, in a race, if there

land for Kenyans‘; so the government, who aims to

are some winners, there have to be some losers. In

solve the chronic housing problem of the city, may

this context, it is very very difficult for a city, for

provide free or cheap lands to local/international

example Nairobi, which starts this race as a loser

institutional/individual investors who wish to deve-

from the beginning, to win the race; it doesn‘t matter

lop affordable housing units in Nairobi in the near

how long does this race take, the result does not

future. The city has enough suitable land for new

change. Starting from this argument, perhaps, we

residential developments. International property

can talk about a competition between ‗states‘ but we

Slums of Nairobi

City of the Dead, Cairo

Nairobi | By Fatih Eren

should not talk about a competition between ‗cities‘. In stead of using the term ‗urban competition‘, it is better to discuss the terms ‗urban cooperation‘ or ‗urban solidarity‘ on global scale. In this way, we can distribute a city‘s accumulated value fairly to different localities via special channels (e.g. twin cities, sister cities, city-to-city cooperation, urban partnership programs and so on). Nairobi can survive only with the help and support of other strong global cities. In short, Nairobi needs a new future vision and strategy which strongly focus on the basic needs of the citypeople such as sheltering, food, water and security.

Everybody knows that the main reason for the experiencing problems in Nairobi is not only ‗drought‘ but also some developed countries‘ imperialist attempts which were made towards the city‘s (and the country‘s) resources over the past 150 years. Therefore, Nairobi no more wants to see short-termest investors who expect to take something from the city

Cairo’s rich architectural heritage

but the city wants to see long-

termest investors and charitable donors who want to give something to Nairobians and who try to develop this city a self-sufficient

International NGO’s Food Aids and Wells

independant locality in the world. In the last 3 years, deaths, which emerged as a result of drought, starvation, waterlessness and violance, mo-

from 45m. depth under the ground today. The cost

ved short-termest investors away from the city but

of opening a new well is about €2000). On one hand,

brought charitable donors close to the city.

some social buildings such as ‗imarethane‘, which provide and deliver free daily foods regularly and

In the last 3 years, many wells were opened by chari-

fairly to poor people, may rise in the urban area be-

table donors especially in the rural areas of the city to

cause all charities are now aware that future food

meet the Nairobians‘ clean water need. Again, many

aids have to be done regularly and in a systematic

NGOs provided food aids to the city people who are

way in the city. On the other hand, many children

living in both urban and rural areas. It is very difficult

were left orphan dependent on AIDS and HIV related

to establish a permanent clean water system in the

diseases, fatal migrations and violance in the co-

urban area in the short term due to unplanned

untry. It is estimated that there are more than 1 mil-

growth, uncontrolled slum developments and high

lion orphans in the whole country. In this context, in

investment costs. Therefore, many new wells may be

the next years, as different from other metropolitan

opened in the slum areas of the city in the next

cities, Nairobi may develop into a city with many so-

months (Nairobi was a famous city with its cool

cial nodes (small sub-centres) which include simple

waters in the history. Clean water can easily be found

commercial units, temples, schools as well as wells,

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Tea (left), Banana (middle) and Sugar Cane (right) Production in Nairobi imarethanes, orphanages and security units that are responsible for the organization, hygiene and security of food and water deliveries. Increasing food prices, increasing hunger and waterlessness and the initiatives of international NGOs are strenghtening the pos-

Indeed, Nairobians have to grow their own foods

sibility of the emergence of social nodes in the city.

governors should benefit from public-private part-

independently because of the overcrowded population of the city who are living on the hunger threshold and of the weakly established food transportation and delivery channels in the country. The city nerships to encourage agricultural productions in

One of the main problems of Nairobians is the incre-

the locality and to distribute agricultural products to

asing food prices. Some people may claim that the

internal and external markets in a fair and balanced

farmlands of the city is unproductive. However, it is

way.

possible to see some coffee, tea, banana and sugar cane farmlands which belong to some international

In conclusion, it is now time to see the positive ef-

companies and which use modern irrigation and

fects of globalisation in Nairobi. International com-

greenhouse systems in some parts of the city

panies which give a helping hand to Nairobians,

(Nakuru, the Abardare Ranges, Limuru, etc.). This

thinking long-termest and using on free loan, will be

situation is clear evidence that if Nairobians want

called as ‗real global companies‘, countries which

and if they have some resources, they can develop

give a helping hand to East Africa will be remembe-

the urban and rural land into productive farmlands.

red as ‗great states‘ in the future. After all, we would

The EU imports many agricultural products which

be a child who was born in Nairobi; we would be

were grown in Kenya without any custom in the con-

struggling against hunger and waterlessness and we

text of Cotonou Agreement, today. The level of agri-

would be expecting a help from other world people

cultural productions is low and even products do not

right now.

meet the demand for the home market. If European Development Programme (EDP) uses its money

Note:

(which was seperated for Kenya) to teach modern

*

farming techniques to Kenyans and to help Nairobi-

Department of Town and Regional Planning, Univer-

ans to own essential agricultural technological tools

sity of Sheffield.

and vehicles, many new greenhouses may rise in the

E-mail: trp07fe@sheffield.ac.uk

urban and rural areas of the city in the next years. In this way, in maximum 10 years, Nairobians may develop into farmers who meet their own food requirements and who also export their agricultural products to European Countries.

Nairobi‟s Greenshouses

Fatih

Eren

is

Doctoral

Researcher

in

AFRICA REVIEW FILM REVIEW

What is so Good About

The Sopranos?

By Enes Erbay*

The boundaries between television drama and cinema have blurred in recent years. Tim Van Patten, the director of The Sopranos, once said “This show [The Sopranos] is like making a feature in nine to twelve days”.

T

his review looks at what is quality television and what makes The Sopranos so successful. ―Quality Television‖ term has started to be used by critics and scholars after 1990s to describe a genre which contains the style, content and its subject. They use this

term to qualify the television show to higher than others. But what are those reasons making those shows better than others? Kristin Thompson's criteria for "quality television" programs are "...a quality pedigree, a large ensemble cast, a series memory, creation of a new genre through recombination of older ones, self-consciousness, and pronounced tendencies toward the controversial and the realistic". Also, US group Viewers For Quality Television describes Quality Television as "A quality show is something we anticipate, focuses more on relationships, explores character, it enlightens, challenges, involves and confronts the viewer; it provokes thought..."

Cinematic Television The elements that make the TV series more cinematic are

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Film Review | By Enes Erbay

good acting, good script and a big budget. In The Sopranos, each episode is polished like a feature film. They shoot it on 35mm film and 16:9 aspect ratio.

They keep the scenes a bit longer than usual. They focus on the characters more than the action. Each character has its own arc and personal inside problems. For example, in the season three, the episode seven, the audience watches Carmela Soprano is dealing with herself being a wife to a sinner and criminal husband. Or Vito‘s own story within few episodes in season 6, he is dealing with his mafia fellows finding out that he is a homosexual. As David Chase says, it is more visual than talking. Also during the shooting process having higher budgets gives them to work on the episode like it is a feature film.

What is so good about The Sopranos?

The creator of The Sopranos David Chase (David DeCesare), is a member of an Italian-American family in New Jersey. He says that it is impossible to grow up in New Jersey and not to envy mafia life style. His first intend was making a film called The Sopranos which is a story of his old neighbourhood in New Jersey. He wanted to add his family‘s stories and combining them with some mafia flavour. However, after some time, he realised that making this a TV show would be better. He set the main roof of the show within the idea of Tony Soprano seeing a psychiatrist and dealing with his mother‘s issues from his childhood.

The Sopranos has all the elements that make a TV series a Quality TV. Like big group of good actors, excellent script, shooting it on 35mm film, stories more about the characters, more visual style, 16:9 aspect ratio etc. All those elements make The Sopranos more cinematic and better series than the other ones.

In the show, most of the characters are Italian-American. Some of the actors had been in some projects together earlier from The Sopranos. David Chase had interviews with all the actors personally. One of the main criteria of choosing the right actors is the accent.

To be more specific, we should focus on to the characters inside the show.

First of all, we should focus on the head of the family, Tony Soprano (James Gandolfini). Tony is the 3 rd generation member of an Italian-American family.

His grand fathers came to America from Naples, Italy, as stone workers. They settled down in New Jersey. Later on, as a second generation, Tony‘s father got into illegal business and so Tony. So, as a mafia member, we can say that Tony is an anti-hero. These characters acts and do their duties as other protagonists successfully but their methods to do these tasks are different than typical protagonists. It is the same case with Tony Soprano who can be evaluated as a typical anti-hero. Anti -hero characters are mean, brutal, selfish, sarcastic, pessi-

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Film Review | By Enes Erbay

mistic, and they contempt the social values. So, anti-heroes act within a classical hero impulses but he also carries those weak characteristics with himself. Because of that, the audience cannot identify those characters with theirselves but they can‘t ignore them as well. We can see all these characteristics in Tony Soprano.

After the scripts of the last episodes, the audience have started to realise that he is not a typical mafia boss figure. The audience noticed his sick and repulsive actions and they accepted that he was a defected character as such. He has a lot of atypical characteristics than earlier mafia figures in cinema or literature. Such as his sense of humour, his psychological issues about his mother and talking about these issues to a psychiatrist, and usually being on medication (antidepressant). Thanks to the great acting of James Gandolfini, Tony Soprano became the most phenomenal character of television history.

He won over ten awards for his performance in The Sopranos. At the end of eight year, James Gandolfini says ―The character has been with me for so long, it‘s a relief to let him go.‖ All actors add a lot of quality to the show with their great performance.

One of them is a recognizable actor, Steve Buscemi. He joined The Sopranos in the fifth season. When David Chase confessed that he wanted him in the show from the minute he created it, the same confession came from Steve Buscemi who said that he wanted to be in the show from the minute he saw the show. However, until the season five, they had never mentioned it to each other. David Chase says ―We never talked about it because I was embarrassed to ask him to come on the show. He‘s Steve Buscemi, he's got a thriving feature career, and the TV life is very difficult for an actor‖.

Also, Steve Buscemi says ―It's something that I thought about sometimes but I was too shy to mention it‖. At the end, it happened and Steve Buscemi became a part of the Sopranos family. Apart from acting, he also directed one episode in the fifth season. After his great performance in that, he was nominated for the Best Supporting Actor and for the Best Directing for a Drama Series.

The end of The Sopranos caused a big conflict among its fans. Some fans were really happy about the ending but some of them did not like the ending. Steve Buscemi was one of the happy ones ―I loved it. I thought it was brilliant...

When it cut to black, I was shocked but I was relieved because I don‘t think I could have taken it if I had to witness anything happen to his family or to him.‖ Notes: * Enes Erbay is an M.A. Student in Directing: Film and Television at the University of Westminster. http://www.eneserbay.com/

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James Gandolfini

RECENT BOOKS Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalised World

By Bill Park This exciting new textbook provides a broad and comprehensive overview of contemporary Turkey. Placing the country and its people within the context of a rapidly globalizing world, the book covers a diverse range of themes such as politics, economics, international relations, the Turkic world, religion and recent historical background.

Tracing the evolution of Turkey‘s domestic political and economic systems, and its foreign policy, from the inception of the republic to the present day, the themes covered include:

The impact of globalization on Turkey‘s society, politics, economy and foreign policy

The role of the EU and the Turkish diaspora in the evolution of Turkish policies The main features and prominent role of Kemalism Turkish foreign policy, and the new challenges and opportunities brought by the end of the cold war The position of Turkey as a ‗bridge‘ between East and West, and the particular and unique dilemmas confronting a Muslim but economically developed, democratized state allied to the West

Kurdish identity The Fethullah Gulen movement and the Armenian ‗genocide‘ Situating the country as a ‗model‘ for the wider Muslim world, this sophisticated analysis of one of the largest and most important states in the Middle East will be an invaluable resource for scholars and officials interested in Turkish politics and US foreign and security policies, and for students of the Balkan, Middle Eastern, Caucasus and Central Asian regions.

Globalization, Labor Export and Resistance A Study of Filipino Migrant Domestic Workers in Global Cities

By Ligaya Lindio-McGovern Moving beyond polemical debates on globalization, this study considers complex intersections of gender, race, ethnicity, nationality and class within the field of globalized labor.

As a significant contribution to the on-going debate on the role of neoliberal states in reproducing gender-race-class inequality in the global political economy, the volume examines the aggressive implementation of neoliberal policies of globalization in the Philippines, and how labor export has become a contradictory feature of the country's international political economy while being contested from below. Lindio-McGovern presents theoretical and ethnographic insights from observational and interview data gathered during fieldwork in various global cities—Hong Kong, Taipei, Rome, Vancouver, Chicago and Metro-Manila. The result is a compelling weave of theory and experience of exploitation and resistance, an important development in discourses and literature on globalization and social movements seeking to influence regimes that exploit migrant women as cheap labor to sustain gendered global capitalism.

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RECENT BOOKS Small Arms, Crime and Conflict Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence Edited by Owen Greene, Nic Marsh This book focuses on the use of small arms in violence and attempts by the state to govern the use and acquisition of these weapons.

It is likely that hundreds of thousands of people are killed every year as a result of armed violence – in contexts ranging from war zones to domestic violence. This edited volume examines why these deaths occur, the role of guns and other weapons, and how governance can be used to reduce and prevent those deaths. Drawing on a variety of disciplines, ranging from anthropology through economics to peace and security studies, the book‘s main concern throughout is that of human security – the causes and means of prevention of armed violence.

The first part of the book concerns warfare, the second armed violence and crime, and the last governance of arms and their (mis)-use. The concluding chapter builds on the contributors‘ key findings and suggests priorities for future research, with the aim of forming a coherent narrative which examines what we know, why armed violence occurs, and what can be done to reduce it.

This book will be of much interest to students of small arms, security studies, global governance, peace and conflict studies, and IR.

Russia and Islam State, Society and Radicalism Edited by Roland Dannreuther, Luke March Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the Russian state and Russia's Muslim communities have struggled to find a new modus vivendi in a rapidly changing domestic and international socio-political context. At the same time as Islamic religious belief and practice have flourished, the state has become increasingly concerned about the security implications of this religious revival, reflecting and responding to a more general international concern over radicalised political Islam. This book examines contemporary developments in Russian politics, how they impact on Russia's Muslim communities, how these communities are helping to shape the Russian state, and what insights this provides to the nature and identity of the Russian state both in its inward and outward projection. The book provides an upto-date and broad-ranging analysis of the opportunities and challenges confronting contemporary Muslim communities in Russia that is not confined in scope to Chechnya or the North Caucasus, and which goes beyond simplistic characterisations of Muslims as a 'threat'. Instead, it engages with the role of political Islam in Russia in a nuanced way, sensitive to regional and confessional differences, highlighting Islam's impact on domestic and foreign policy and investigating sources of both radicalisation and de-radicalisation.

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