TRUMP 2.0: THE END GAME IN UKRAINE & THE WAY FORWARD FOR NATO
CHACR COMMENTARY // NOVEMBER 2024
BY: Major Rocco P. Santurri III, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
WHEN American historians sift through the chaotic times of the 2020s and attempt to identify the events culminating in a drastically altered world order, they may point to the 5th November 2024 as a critical marker. In what has been termed an historic comeback, Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United States, became the first President since 1893 to earn a non-consecutive second term. Trump brushed aside multiple investigations, a felony conviction and two assassination attempts to storm back to the White House with a victory compared to the Ronald Reagan-inspired ‘Red Wave’ of 1984. Trump’s boast of a convincing mandate is difficult to deny; Republicans also flipped the Senate and – at the time of writing – are closing in on a majority in the House of Representatives. A ‘unified government’ is significant but not uncommon; the US has seen 58 since 1857. Nevertheless, Trump and his supporters could not dream of a better election outcome, even without a majority in
the House of Representatives. Speculation about his policies have reached a fever pitch. What might Trump 2.0 mean for the fate of Ukraine and American membership in NATO?
“The period was so far like the present period that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”– A Tale of Two Cities, Charles Dickens
The geopolitical environment Trump inherits possesses plenty of carry-over from his first term, but with added complexity that makes some miss the comparatively simple structure of the Cold War. The illconceived and executed US exit from Afghanistan, the conflicts between Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, and the introduction of North Korean military forces in Ukraine join an already crowded world stage brimming with hotspots in competition, crisis or conflict. Collectively, overarching themes point to the inability of the US to decisively influence geopolitical events and prevent a fragmenting rules-based
“ADD AN INCOMING PRESIDENT DESCRIBED AS A ‘MEGALOMANIAC’ MORE EAGER TO GLAD-HAND WITH PUTIN, ORBAN AND KIM THAN COOPERATE WITH STARMER, MACRON, AND ZELENSKY, AND THE RESULT COULD BE AN EXPLOSIVE MIXTURE CAPABLE OF FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERING THE GEOPOLITICAL WORLD AS WE KNOW IT”
international order. American ‘red lines’ simply aren’t what they used to be. A growing chorus sounding the alarm on a declining American Empire buttresses these sentiments. Add an incoming President described as a “megalomaniac” more eager to glad-hand with Putin, Orban and Kim than cooperate with Starmer, Macron, and Zelensky, and the result could be an explosive mixture capable of fundamentally altering the geopolitical world as we know it. While competition is stiff, the first continental war in Europe since 1945 remains the seminal event of our time.
Concerned parties throughout Europe now cast a nervous gaze at Washington in anticipation of US foreign policy toward the Ukraine conflict and NATO.
For better or worse, Trump 2.0 is upon us. While difficult to predict, signs are emerging that hint towards Trump’s policies when he occupies the Oval Office on the 20th January.
“That is a war that’s dying to be settled. I will get it settled before I even become President.” – Donald J. Trump on the war in Ukraine
DONALD J. TRUMP: THE CANDIDATE AND PRESIDENT-ELECT
Trump’s first term and his campaign provide some clues that should make the international audience more capable of separating Trumpian rants from Trumpian policy. Trump employs well-versed sales tactics that should ring familiar during his second term as the world readjusts to his negotiating strategy. He uses a varying, parry-and-thrust approach that often keeps enemies and occasionally friends off-balance. He makes demands he knows are unreasonable but that provide value in creating negotiation leverage and space. In some capacity, all applicable parties should be at least somewhat further along when dealing with Trump than they were in 2016.
“THERE REMAIN MORE THAN 70 MILLION VOTERS WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR TRUMP AFTER A VITRIOLIC CAMPAIGN THAT FURTHER EXPOSED THE DEEP DIVISIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY”
considered by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis as a grave threat to national security. Such a challenge could rob US foreign policy of one of its most effective tools, the ability to sanction, and might also limit the ability of the US government to fund its commitments domestically and abroad.
First and foremost, Trump often follows through on campaign promises; he is a rare American politician in that he adheres to his agenda upon assuming office. During the campaign, he claimed he could end the conflict in Ukraine quickly and seems poised to revisit his first-term criticisms of NATO. Trump insisted that the US incurs a disproportionate financial burden and has criticised NATO allies for not pulling their economic weight in support of the Alliance and Ukraine. He threatened to pull the US out of NATO during his first presidency and in the run-up to the recent election. NATO should not dismiss these threats as hollow. But it does follow a familiar Trumpian tactic of aggressive negotiations to win a better deal for the US; in this application it involves NATO countries footing a more significant percentage of the bill in support of the war effort in Ukraine and the Alliance.
While prospects seem bleak, NATO could take pre-emptive steps before Trump takes office. In a related matter, Trump has accused South Korea of being a “money
more for the US contingent on the Peninsula, as well as America’s extended nuclear deterrence that has kept nucleararmed North Korea at bay. The Biden Administration has proactively addressed this issue, recently signing a revised costsharing agreement with the South Korean government to “Trumpproof” the US presence on the Peninsula. Such efforts offer a blueprint for NATO. While time is short, there remains circa 70 days to put in place a safeguard that deters draconian actions by the incoming President.
“I do not know any country where, in general, less independence of mind and genuine freedom of discussion reign than in America.”
– Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville
DONALD J. TRUMP: THE PRESIDENT
A second-term Trump, armed with a strong mandate, will be a formidable force to friend and foe alike. But he assumes the presidency of an American Empire facing alarming foundational issues that hint at troubling times ahead. The internal division in America, a fixture of US politics in recent years, stands to increase during the next four years. One could offer that Trump is one of the most divisive figures in the history of American politics. While a historic Red Wave did indeed shock the pundits, there remain more than 70 million voters who did not vote for Trump after a vitriolic campaign
that further exposed the deep divisions in American society. The haunting prophecies of Alexander de Tocqueville, formed during his visit to America in the 1830s, seem closer to fruition than ever. Indeed, the diversity of the Great Experiment seems poised at times to rip apart the very fabric of the country, especially if fanned by an authoritarian-preferring president. De Tocqueville also warned of waning interest in elections and government in general. While one could point to a near-record turnout in the 2024 election, the fact remains that one out of every three eligible voters did not cast their ballot. In relative terms, 2024 was a sign of an engaged populace. In absolute terms, that positive sentiment is significantly diminished.
Additionally, while economic considerations paved the way for Trump’s return, near-term economic considerations could now derail his popular support. Trump is not immune to complications inherent to all US Presidents, including those with a strong mandate and a unified government. His proposed policies (tariffs) would likely increase inflation in the short-term. Trump’s charisma and personal appeal also face challenges in the long-term economic environment. The current US federal debt is nearly $36 trillion and could average $2 trillion annually from 2024 to 2033. Alarmed economists warn that several of Trump’s proposed policies will add trillions to the debt. These developments further open the door for the current BRICS challenges to the primacy of the US Dollar, a possibility
While Trump showed his ability while campaigning to relate to the working class through his cult of personality, these efforts, while effective against voters, fall flat in the face of the cold, uncaring and immutable laws of economics. At a minimum, the warning signs and consequences are ominous for those paying attention to those critical indicators. The Democrats learned the difficult way that voters vote with their wallet; ‘Homo Economicus’ prevailed over identity politics with a magnitude impossible to ignore. Trump most likely would address inflation first and foremost to preserve his unified government, despite foreign policy challenges with Ukraine and NATO. Regrettably for both, this might lead to significant cuts in funding.
Lastly, mid-term elections also loom two years into his presidency; history is usually on the opposition’s side during previous mid-term contests. If inflation remains high and the Senate flips again, the Democrats can employ delaying tactics to ride out the remainder of Trump’s presidency, a tried and tested formula frequently employed by minority parties in Congress.
“No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.” – Donald Trump, when asked about protecting NATO allies from Russian aggression
PRESIDENT TRUMP: THROUGH TO THE MIDTERMS
Considering these factors, what might the first two years
of Trump 2.0 look like within the prism of the conflict in Ukraine and the future USNATO relationship? In the near term, hints of Trump’s policy toward Ukraine are already being socialised and disseminated for media consumption. Ukrainian aspirations to regain its territory run headlong into Trumpian declarations that Crimea is “gone” and that President Zelensky must present a “realistic vision of peace” that might involve the ceding of the Donbas to Russia. With Trump’s stated concerns about funding the Ukraine war effort coupled with his relationship with President Putin, both Ukraine and NATO would be wise to measure expectations of robust US support lasting deep into 2025.
However, other options exist. With a combined gross domestic product rivalling that of America, NATO countries could offset the loss of American aid. In effect, NATO support to Ukraine without American assistance could be a litmus test for NATO resolve and provide a template for the way forward free of political turmoil from across the pond. The task becomes more problematic with the arrival of North Korean soldiers in Kursk, which most likely lengthens the war. While NATO could argue to Trump that a secure and NATOfriendly Ukraine could provide the Alliance with a bulwark against Russia for years to come, such a rationale might be too much of a long-term perspective for a politician looking to make a short-term splash by achieving a campaign goal. However, NATO’s options are limited, and it may have to suffer what it must now, with the hope that drastic increases in non-US funding in the near term will prevent Ukrainian capitulation and cement long-term NATO solidarity and strength amongst its European members.
The overall US-NATO relationship outside the Ukraine question is also undoubtedly entering a turbulent period.
All signs point to the Trump administration driving a tough bargain with Brussels. The Alliance is beholden to America for its military might, especially its nuclear triad that provides an unmatched deterrence. It is a different Europe without the spectre of American conventional capacity and nuclear reach. What remains unknown is the extent to which Trump’s tough talk is for leverage or could facilitate the exit of the US from NATO as he has threatened. While the bluster has been alarming, ‘Trump the Transactionalist’ remains a salesman eager to strike a deal that demonstrates his business prowess and dominates the news cycle. In search of an agreement, NATO must also consider the extended nuclear deterrence America provides to the Alliance as immutable, even if NATO must make considerable concessions in the conventional realm. These factors point toward a rocky road ahead but an eventual agreement that preserves American membership. While a problematic position for NATO, second and third order effects, over time, might lead to a long-term scenario that benefits the Alliance and insulates it from further political vacillation in America.
“The end is inevitable, Maverick. Your kind is destined for extinction.” – Movie character Rear Admiral Chester Cain in Top Gun: Maverick
POST-TRUMP: THE END GAME
The sun is setting on the American Empire; limitations on its hegemony are visible. One could offer that America is further along in its ‘empire afterglow’ than many think. Thus, Trump 2.0 might eventually be a needed forcing mechanism that allows NATO to address a diminished America preemptively. In such a scenario, America and its military industrial complex, failing to heed the lessons of its Cold War victory over the Soviets, is drawn into a new Cold War with China that will see increasingly
exorbitant defence budgets, a stretched military footprint and an increasing number of allies and partners reliant upon American aid. In effect, the Americans will play the part of the Soviets in this latest incarnation of the Cold War. This development and a litany of domestic issues should reinforce in Brussels the need for NATO’s European members to be self-reliant, if not now, then in the future. It is better to embrace the inevitable and capitalise now on the momentum generated from NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In the near term, Brussels and Kyiv would be the wiser if they reviewed the lessons of Trump’s first presidency during an expected chaotic period in late January, punctuated by grandiose statements from Trump and a flurry of executive actions. It will be essential to let the dust settle; Trump has many critical issues to address, with Brussels and Kyiv being one of many, foreign and domestic. The ‘unified government’ might not be as unified as perceived; the fringes of the Republican Party can become a moderating force that tempers some of the more extreme policy views espoused by the President. While Brussels and Kyiv should heed Trump’s rhetoric, they should temper that with the tendency of Trump’s bark to be more ferocious than his bite. Trumpian pragmatism always lurks beneath the bluster, whether acted upon or not.
Knowing his transactional nature offers insight into his decisionmaking calculus and makes his unpredictability less jarring and more comprehensible.
Furthermore, while the American star is fading, so is the Russian one, which has taken a physical and reputational battering in Ukraine for the world to witness. Russia will also inevitably face
a leadership transition when Putin, either by the sword or the inevitable slow decay of time, is no longer its de facto dictator. That the Siloviki will have a candidate with the gravitas, revisionist dreams and unifying power of Putin seems unlikely. From the NATO perspective, the sending off of an implacable, personalitydriven foe might offset the diminishment of an indispensable ally. The sooner NATO embraces the concept of the Alliance without its most critical member, the wiser; the reality of current events and potential trajectories make a lack of preparation a fatal flaw. In the spirit of military preparedness, best to have wellrehearsed contingencies in place while hoping the day to employ them remains a troubling but unrealised reality. Perhaps sooner than expected, the time will come when America and Russia, beset by domestic issues and foreign over-extension, become aged and diminished heavyweight boxers, lurking but less ominous in the background, still capable of a knock-out nuclear punch but well aware their best days are behind them.