> CHTV FEATURE: Thompson vs. Gutekunst
So, let’s take a deep dive into both approaches, and see what is in store for the Packers of 2020 and beyond.
The Ted Thompson Approach:
eight productive seasons. Later in May, Thompson snagged Charles Woodson on a seven-year, $52 million contract that produced All-Pro seasons and the Defensive Player of the Year award in 2009.
Endless Jenga Ted Thompson’s approach to building a team was on immediate display in his first season in 2005. Despite fans’ clamoring for Thompson to immediately dip into free agency to upgrade the many holes left on the team by Sherman, Thompson only signed five free agents that first year, and none made it to 2006. “Tightwad Ted” was one of many names aimed at Thompson during this chaotic time, but the makings of his approach to building a team was going to become more evident as the seasons went on. Thompson’s approach was like Jenga: a slow, methodical, strategic game that challenges you to slowly build a tower by pulling a few pieces from the bottom and stacking them on top. 1. Build almost exclusively through the draft Thompson’s approach was simple: he analyzed the roster for not only what he needed right away, but what he could see coming up a season or two later. In 2006, Favre began openly petitioning for Thompson to sign erstwhile wide receiver Randy Moss as another weapon, an idea that gained some traction among the fanbase (not unlike the clamor today to add a superstar wide receiver to upgrade the corps). But Favre was spurned as Thompson stuck to his guns. Instead, he drafted Greg Jennings in the second round in 2006, James Jones in the third round in 2007 and Jordy Nelson and Jermichael Finley in the second and third rounds, respectively, in 2008. While Favre wasn’t around any longer to see this entire group come to fruition, Aaron Rodgers benefited from this group maturing in time for the 2010 Super Bowl season and beyond. 2. Free Agency is just to (very occasionally) fill out the roster Every March, Packers fans would salivate over the list of available unrestricted free agents, and every year, they were disappointed. By the start of training camp, the Packers’ free agent list could be divided into three categories: third-tier, undrafted and street. For the most part, none of Thompson’s free agent signings lasted more than a season. There were, of course, some rare exceptions that worked out very well for Thompson and the Packers. In 2006, Ryan Pickett was signed to a four-year, $14 million contract that turned into
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Those two players were really the only impact free agents for Thompson until 2014, when he signed Julius Peppers to a threeyear, $25 million contract that, in retrospect, was a bargain given many thought Peppers was past his prime at 32. Instead, he started 43 out of a possible 48 starts and piled up 29 sacks. But when it comes to high-impact, first-tier free agents under Thompson, that’s it. 3. When the system is working, you develop from within and stay ahead Thompson’s goal was to develop talent from the draft and keep costs manageable. He had a percentage of the players working under their rookie contracts, so it was important to hit on guys who could contribute in a year or two. You could see that over the years with players like Tramon Williams, an undrafted free agent in 2007. Working for negligible cap hit through 2009, Thompson used that 2010 season to evaluate Williams’ future in Green Bay, and in November of that year, renegotiated a four-year deal for $41 million. He had proven his worth, and Thompson pulled that rookie contract from the bottom of the Jenga pile and put it on the top, building the tower from within. Contrast that with the career of Eddie Lacy, drafted in the second round in the 2013 draft. Playing under a four-year deal of a rookie contract, Lacy’s cap hits were $616,000, $771,000, $925,000 and $1,079,000. After rushing for more than 1,000 yards in his first two seasons, he tailed off, starting only eight games in that time. In 2017, at the end of his rookie deal, he was not extended and left the team via free agency. Thompson, evaluating the likelihood of extending Lacy or not, had already built in his insurance plan, drafting two backs the previous offseason named Aaron Jones and Jamaal Williams. Not only was Lacy expendable, there were two players now working under their rookie contacts to replace him. This continued balance of selectively knowing which players to extend from their rookie deals and which ones to let walk and replace, maintained the cap moving forward year to year to year. It’s easy to see, when you look at it through this lens, why Thompson was so cautious of free agency: his cap was always appropriately distributed for the players he had drafted and/or developed. A free agent with a monsterous deal could be a wrecking ball in his carefully balanced tower.
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