India in the Asia–Pacific

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India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China

To cite this Article: Pant, Harsh V. , 'India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China', Asia-Pacific Review, 14:1, 54 - 71 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13439000701330577 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439000701330577

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Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007

India in the Asia – Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China HARSH V. PANT

It is almost a conventional wisdom now that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted from Europe to the Asia – Pacific in recent years with the rise of China and India, gradual assertion by Japan of its military profile, and a significant shift in the US global force posture in favour of Asia – Pacific.

The debate now is whether Asia –Pacific will witness rising tensions and conflicts in the coming years with various powers jockeying for influence in the region or whether the forces of economic globalization and multilateralism will lead to peace and stability. Some have asked the question more directly: Will Asia’s future resemble Europe’s past?1 It is, of course, difficult to answer this question as of now when major powers in Asia – Pacific such as China, India and Japan are still rising and grappling with a plethora of issues that confront any rising power in the international system. But what is clear is that all major powers are now re-evaluating their policy options vis-a`-vis the Pacific.

This paper examines India’s foreign policy in the Pacific as it has emerged on the last few years. First, the emerging balance of power in Asia – Pacific will be examined in light of the theoretical debate on the issue followed by a broad assessment of the role that India envisages for itself in the region.

Subsequently, India’s relationship with the three major powers in Asia – Pacific—China, Japan, and the US is analysed. Finally, some observations will be made about the future trajectory of Indian foreign policy in the region.

Emerging balance of power in the Asia– Pacific he debate about the nature of the post-Cold War international system has been going on for more than a decade now and still shows no signs of abating.

Though scholars by and large accept that the US is the dominant power in the world today, there are differences with regard to how far ahead the US is relative

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ISSN 1343-9006 print; 1469-2937 online/07/010054–18 Routledge Publishing, Taylor and Francis ,http//www.tandf.co.uk/. # Institute for International Policy Studies ,http://www.iips.org/.

DOI: 10.1080/13439000701330577

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to the other states and how long will this dominance last. Also, some question whether the US is clearly ahead in all dimensions of power.

Christopher Layne has argued that the victory of the US in the Cold War gave the world a “unipolar moment” and even though the US might try to maintain its hegemony through benevolence rather than coercion, states will eventually balance against it.2 Taking issue with this proposition, William Wohlforth has claimed that not only the international system is unambiguously unipolar but also that it is more peaceful and durable. This is because no state exists today which can seriously challenge the US in any domain of power—military, economic, technological, and cultural—and because of its special geographical position other states will find it difficult to counterbalance the US.3 Underlying this argument, is the claim of the US being the only “comprehensive global superpower” a` la Brzezinski.4 A slightly different position is taken by Joseph Nye who argues that it is the transformation in the nature of power, from hard power to soft power, that gives the US unique advantages in the present international system. With political leadership and strategic vision, he claims, the US can maintain its hegemony in world politics.5 For Huntington, it is a “uni-multiploar” system, where a single superpower, the US, exists with several major powers and this system will lead to a clearly multipolar system in the coming years.6 Despite these differing perspectives, it is clear that as of today the US remains the dominant power in the system. The current war on terror and the surprisingly swift defeat of the Iraqi army has also driven home the fact that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any nation to challenge the military might of the US in the near future. As has been argued, “the larger lesson,” of this war “and one stupefying to the Russian and Chinese military, worrying to the Indians, and disturbing to proponents of a common European Defense Policy, is that in military terms there is only one player on the field that counts.”7 But the Iraq war and its aftermath have also made clear the limits of US power and its unilateral approach in international affairs.

The US penchant for unilateral actions has also been clear for quite some time now to the other states, especially after the US air strikes in Iraq in 1998 and the US-led NATO air strikes on former Yugoslavia in 1999. And for many nations this tendency has got aggravated under the current US Administration with its emphasis on pre-emptive strategies and a distinct lack of respect for even its closest allies. The recent dispute over Iraq has also demonstrated that most of the major global powers do not share American perspectives on major problems in the international system and the appropriate means for resolving them. Many countries see a need to balance the US might in the global system but there is little that they are capable of doing given the enormous differentials in capabilities.

This desire to balance the US and an opposition to so complete a US dominance of ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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the international system is shared by major global powers such as France, Russia, China and India, though perhaps to different degrees. But what is interesting about the present international environment is that we do not see these major powers making any serious effort in trying to counterbalance the US dominance. While it is possible that balancing tendencies may already be taking place and that it is only a matter of time before other major powers found a serious balancing coalition,8 so far major powers have refrained from posing any serious challenge to the US. There is, as of now, no theoretical consensus among scholars as to whether balancing is taking place at all vis-a`-vis US preponderance and if it is occurring what form it is taking.9 This debate has gained additional momentum after the demonstration of US military supremacy in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years and the seemingly unilateral foreign policy pursued by the Bush Administration. But one reality that confronts US foreign policy is the rise of China and all that it implies for global peace and stability. While realizing fully well that it would take China decades to seriously compete with the US for global hegemony, China has focused its strategic energies on Asia. Its foreign policy is aimed at enhancing its economic and military prowess to achieve regional hegemony in Asia. China’s recent emphasis on projecting its rise as peaceful is merely aimed at allaying the concerns of its neighbors lest they try to counterbalance its growing influence.10 China’s readiness to negotiate with other regional states and to be an economically “responsible” power is also a signal to other states that there are greater benefits in band-wagoning to China’s growing regional weight rather than opposing its rise in any manner. China realizes that it has thrived because it devotes itself to economic development while letting the US police the region and the world. Even as it decries American hegemony, its leaders envision Pax Americana extending well into the 21st century, at least until China becomes a middle-class society and, if present trends continue, the world’s largest economy.

However, while declaring that it will be focusing on internal socio-economic development for the next decade or so, China has actively pursued policies of preventing the rise of other regional powers such as India and Japan, or at least to limit their development relative to itself.

While the US still remains the predominant power in Asia –Pacific, the rise of China and India can no longer be ignored in the region. Japan is also getting back on track and also seems ready to shed its military reticence. In many ways, while the international system remains largely unipolar, in Asia– Pacific a multipolar regional order is gradually taking shape. According to a realist understanding of global politics, multipolar systems are inherently unstable because they generate uncertainty and make it difficult for states to draw lines between allies and adversaries, thereby often causing miscalculations.11 Any conflict between two of the 56

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powers in the system is more likely to escalate to general war as the other powers might be tempted to join in. Minor powers are also more likely to play great powers against each other. Power imbalances are more common in a multipolar world and tougher to predict.

Closely related to the realist approach to explaining war and peace that focuses less on the number of great powers in the system and more on the shifting amount of power between those states is known as the power transition theory.12 According to one version of this approach, the largest wars result when a rising power is surpassing, or threatening to surpass, the most powerful state. While some argue that war results from the dominant power attempting to arrest its deteriorating position while others argue that the rising power is more likely to initiate war as it seeks to gain the influence and prestige it feels it deserves because of its increased capabilities.

Whatever the case may be, all these scenarios are plausible if one looks at the Asia– Pacific today. It is a multipolar region where the US remains the predominant power. However, its primacy is increasingly being challenged by China so this makes the region very susceptible to future instability. China’s future conduct is the great regional uncertainty and at the same time the most important factor affecting regional security.

It is in this broader global and regional strategic context that India is trying to fashion its foreign policy towards the Pacific.

India and the Pacific While India is still a long way from becoming a true global power, it is a major player in the Asia– Pacific regional balance of power along with the US, China, and Japan. According to the United States National Intelligence Council Report titled “Mapping the Global Future,” by 2020, international community will have to confront the military, political and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India.13 This report likened the emergence of China and India in the early 21st century to the rise of Germany in the 19th and America in the 20th, with impacts potentially as dramatic. The CIA has labelled India the key “swing state” in international politics and predicts that by 2015 India will emerge as the fourth most important power in the international system. According to the assessment of Goldman Sachs, by 2040, the four largest economies will be China, the US, India and Japan.14 India will overtake the G-6 economies faster than earlier expected and India’s GDP, in all likelihood, will surpass that of the US before 2050, making it the second largest economy after China. After decades of marginalization imposed by the structural realities of the Cold War, its pursuit of an economic paradigm that retarded its growth potential significantly, and its obsession with Pakistan that made sure that India was viewed primarily ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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through the prism of Indo-Pak rivalry, India is finally coming into its own with a self-confidence that comes with growing capabilities. Its global and regional ambitions are rising and it is showing an aggressiveness in its foreign policy that had not been its forte before. As a consequence, its security policy towards the Pacific is also becoming more proactive.

India and China: underlying competition The most important relationship for the future of Asia –Pacific will probably be Sino– India ties. Bilateral relations between India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have indeed come a long way after they touched their nadir in the immediate aftermath of India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. However, some nine years later, the relations between the two countries seem to be on an upswing.

The Indian Prime Minster visited China in June 2003, the first by an Indian Premier in a decade. The joint declaration signed during this visit expressed the view that China was not a threat to India.15 The two states appointed special representatives in order to impart momentum to border negotiations that have lasted now for more than 20 years, with the Prime Minister’s principal secretary becoming India’s political-level negotiator, replacing the India – China JWG. India and China also decided to hold their first joint naval exercise later in the year and discussions on a joint air exercise are also continuing. India also acknowledged China’s sovereignty over Tibet and pledged not to allow “antiChina” political activities in India. On its part, China has acknowledged India’s 1975 annexation of the former monarchy of Sikkim by agreeing to open a trading post along the border with the former kingdom and later by rectifying its official maps to include Sikkim as part of India.16 It is at the international level, however, that India and China have found some real convergence of interests. Both share similar concerns about the growing international dominance of the US, the threat of fundamentalist religious and ethnic movements in the form of terrorism and the need to accord primacy to economic development. India and China have both expressed concern about the US’ use of military power around the world and both were publicly opposed to the war in Iraq. This was merely a continuation of the desire of both states to oppose the US hyperpuissance ever since the end of the Cold War. The attempt on the part of India and China in recent years has been to build their bilateral relationship on the basis of their larger worldview of international politics. As they have found a distinct convergence of their interests on the world stage, they have used it to strengthen their bilateral relations. They have established and maintained regular reciprocal high-level visits between political leaders. There has been a sincere attempt to improve trade relations and to compartmentalize intractable issues that make it difficult for their bilateral relationship to move forward.

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India and China have strengthened their bilateral relationship in areas as distinct as cultural and educational exchanges, military exchanges, and science and technology cooperation. In fact, the two nations are working towards raising the level of bilateral relationship with the hope of creating larger stakes in each other’s economic future. Bilateral trade has recorded rapid growth from a trade volume of US$265 million in 1991 to al all-time high of $13.6 billion in 2004, with both sides aiming at about $25– 30 billion in the next five years.17 The two nations are even evaluating the possibility of signing a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement and a free trade agreement by the end of this year, thereby building on strong complementarities between the two. Given the complementary nature of their economies and the size of their markets (nearly 2.2 billion people in total), this nascent Sino– Indian cooperation holds the potential to dramatically alter the world trade balance. There is general recognition of a division of labor within the information technology (IT) sector, with China manufacturing chips and electronic components and India excelling in writing the software.

Mindful of the fact that both nations are rapidly growing economies heavily dependent on oil imports, India and China have also decided to go in for joint bidding in international energy projects, especially in third countries.18 Both nations are increasingly looking beyond the existing trade and trying to identify new milestones that can help intensify the growing economic ties between the two, including greater exchange in scientific research and technology.

Both states are also taking steps to upgrade their military-related cooperation, leading to greater understanding on the bilateral military front, something that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. As a first step in this direction, the Chinese and Indian navies carried out joint search and rescue operations off the Shanghai coast in November 2003. Military exchanges have maintained a positive momentum with the visit of the Chinese Chief of General Staff, training delegations and a joint naval exercise off Kochi in 2005. India also sent observers to the China– Russia joint exercises in October 2005 at the invitation of China.

Both states are also seeking to cooperate on the nuclear front with China planning to import heavy water from India to be utilized in the pressurized heavy water reactors near Shanghai19 and the recent visit of the Chinese President to India saw the two nations agreeing to cooperate on civilian nuclear energy.

All this reflects on India continuing to build its relations with China on the convergence of interests that the two nations have achieved in recent years. One can even go to the extent of arguing that this is probably the best period of bilateral relations between the two Asian giants in their history. But there are enormous obstacles that confront this bilateral relationship. What is of enormous significance for India is the fact that China’s economic transformation has given it the capability to become a major military power with China spending as much as $65 billion a year on its military. Beijing announced a 10 percent increase in its ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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defense budget in 2006, continuing years of double-digit growth that have made it the largest military spender in the world after the US.19 This $35.4 billion budget does not include the cost of new weapon purchases, research or other big-ticket items for China’s highly secretive military and as a result, the real figure may be much higher than the revealed amount. China’s military may or may not be able to take on the US in the next few years but it will surely become the most dominant force in Asia. According to authoritative sources, China is set to overtake Japan in the next decade to become Asia’s major regional military power.20 The US involvement in the global war on terror has put the “containment” of China on the backburner and China has seized on this much needed space to strengthen its armed forces further. China’s enhanced military prowess will lead, as is inevitable, to an assertion of its interests more forcefully, more often than not, adversely affecting Indian interests.

It is in this context that China’s assistance to Burma in constructing and improving port facilities on two islands in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea is significant as this can be used as a listening post to gather intelligence on Indian naval operations and as a forward base for future Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean. China’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean is of great strategic consequence for India even as India’s traditional geographic advantages in the Indian Ocean are also increasingly at risk with deepening Chinese involvement in Burma.

China’s contribution of technical assistance and about 80 percent of funding for the Gwadar port in Baluchistan, Pakistan would lead not only to Gwadar emerging as a transit terminal for oil imports but also as a pretext for China’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan has already indicated that it would be ready to provide base facilities to the Chinese Navy in the Gwadar port, thereby enabling China to “monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future US – Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.”21 China remains the only major power in the world that refuses to discuss nuclear issues with India for fear that this might imply a de facto recognition of India’s status as a nuclear power. China has done its best to maintain a rough balance of power in South Asia by preventing India from gaining an upper hand over Pakistan. China has consistently assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs to counterbalance India’s development of new weapons systems to a point where, according to the US National Intelligence Council estimates, Pakistan has developed an edge over India in strategic delivery systems. India’s preoccupation with Pakistan reduces India to the level of a regional power while China can claim the status of an Asian and world power.

China’s use of India’s neighbors to curtail Indian influence has not been restricted to Pakistan. China has also announced its intention to develop “comprehensive and cooperative partnership” with Bangladesh, even offering assistance in the peaceful 60

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uses of nuclear energy.22 Be it in Nepal, Bangladesh or Burma, China has actively sought to contain India all around its periphery.

Even as China has solved most of its border disputes with other countries, it is reluctant to move ahead with India on border issues. The entire 4057-km Sino – Indian frontier is in dispute, with India and China the only known neighbors not to be separated even by a mutually defined Line of Control. In contrast to China’s well-laid out policy vis-a`-vis India, India has from time to time oscillated from overreaction to China to a sort of defeatist acquiescence. India’s lack of direction in its China policy is clearly revealed by the manner in which it has dealt with China in the past few years. While Sino –Indian bilateral relations have apparently improved, it is not clear if India has any idea as to what ends it wants to harness this improvement and what its strategic objectives with respect to China are. This has resulted in foreign policy flip-flops doing much damage to India’s regional and global diplomatic stature.

India and China are two major powers in Asia with global aspirations and some significant conflicting interests. As a result, some amount of friction in their bilateral relationship is inevitable. The geopolitical reality of Asia makes sure that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Hindi-Chini to be bhai-bhai (brothers) in the foreseeable future.23 If India and China continue to rise in the next few years, a security competition between the two regional giants will be all but inevitable. And, if India is serious about its desire to emerge as a major global power, then it will have to tackle the challenge of China’s rise. It is to tackle this challenge that Indian foreign policy is gearing up with its new approach towards the US and Japan.

India and the US: from estrangement to engagement India is now charting a new course in its foreign policy by getting closer to the US in recent years. If India is indeed a “swing state” in the international system, then it seems to have swung considerably towards the US. The demise of the Soviet Union liberated Indian and US attitudes towards each other from the structural confines of Cold War realities. As India pursued economic reforms and moved towards global integration, it was clear that the US and India will have to find a modus vivendi for a deeper engagement with each other. As Indian foreign policy priorities changed, US – India cooperation increased on a range of issues areas. India needed US support for its economic regeneration and the Clinton Administration viewed India as an emerging success story of globalization. Yet, the relations could only go so far in the absence of US reconciliation to India’s nuclear status and the inability of the US to move beyond the India– Pakistan hyphenated relationship in South Asia.

The Indian nuclear tests of 1998, while removing ambiguity about India’s nuclear status, further complicated US – India bilateral relations. The Clinton ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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Administration was in a fix as it wanted to improve its relations with India and yet did not want to compromise on the goal of non-proliferation. This difficulty was clearly palpable in the protracted negotiations between the Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission and later the Foreign Minister of India, Jaswant Singh and the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott.24 While in concrete terms these negotiations achieved little, they set in motion a process that saw US – India bilateral engagement take on a new meaning. Mutual trust developed in the US and Indian foreign policy bureaucracies that is so crucial to sustaining high-level political engagements. The visit of President Clinton to India in 1999, and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership which was announced during the former Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to the US in 2001, also laid the foundation for a dramatic upswing in Indo– US ties.

But it was the Bush Administration that redefined the parameters of US– India bilateral engagement. That India would figure prominently in Bush Administration’s global strategic calculus was made clear by Condoleezza Rice in her Foreign Affairs article before the 2000 Presidential elections in which she had argued that “there is a strong tendency to conceptually (in America) to connect India with Pakistan and to think of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states.”25 She made it clear that India has the potential to become a great power and US foreign policy would do well to take that into account. The Bush Administration, from the very beginning, had refused to look at India through the prism of non-proliferation and had viewed India as a natural and strategic ally.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent dramatic changes in US foreign policy prevented the Bush Administration from following through their new approach towards India though US-India engagement continued to evolve.

It was only when Rice became Secretary of State in 2005 that the US started evolving a coherent approach in building its ties with India. Rice visited India in March 2005 as part of her Asia tour and put forth “an unprecedented framework for cooperation with India,” something that took the Indian government by surprise.26 Rice transformed the terms of the debate completely by revealing that the Bush Administration was willing to consider civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. And a few days later, the State Department announced the Administration’s new India policy that declared its goal “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century.”27 And the first step in that direction was removing the age-old distrust that has engendered between the two states on the nuclear issue. It was clear to both the US and India that the road to a healthy strategic partnership between the two democracies goes through nuclear energy cooperation. The result is the recently signed US– India civilian nuclear energy cooperation deal that has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India’s credentials as a responsible 62

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nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order and by creating a major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that doesn’t accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities.

US – India relations have been steadily strengthening in the last few years with their interests converging on a range of issues. But the nuclear technology denial regime with its larger restrictive implication across the entire technology spectrum has been a fundamental irritant in this relationship. It was made clear to the US Congress that its failure to approve the deal would not only set back the clock on US– India relations but would also revive the anti-US sections of the Indian elite. In her testimonies before the House and Senate Committees, Condoleezza Rice described India as “a rising global power that could be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia,” and argued that the nuclear agreement was critical to forging a full-scale partnership between the world’s two largest democracies.28 Aside from the fact that the US is India’ largest trading and investment partner, US–India cooperation has been quietly growing across a broad spectrum of issues.

India is one of the biggest aid donors to the Afghan government, with its aid reaching $600 million this year. It contributed to $20 million in response to the UN Secretary General’s appeal for help in Iraq, followed by another $10 million at the donor’s conference in Madrid. A global democracy fund initiated by the UN Secretary General has seen India contributing $10 million. Indian and US navies are jointly patrolling the Malacca Straits and India’s rapid reaction to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 won accolades from the Pentagon.29 India and the US also signed a ten-year military agreement intended to provide for numerous advances in the relationship, including joint weapons production, greater sharing of technology and intelligence as well as an increased trade in arms. The agreement paves the way for increased joint military exercises and aims for more “opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and development” and expanded collaboration on missile defense. The defense relationship intends to support, and be an element of, the broader US–India strategic partnership.

The US sees India as a close partner in enhancing security cooperation against maritime threats in the Indian Ocean area, preventing piracy, carrying out search and rescue operations, responding to natural disasters, and enhancing cooperative capabilities, including through logistical support. The Indian navy is expected to assume a substantive role in this joint effort to ensure security of the Indian Ocean.

Since protection of the sea-lanes is of vital importance to countries such as Japan, Australia, Singapore and Indonesia, it may well become a six-nation cooperative effort. The annual Indo– US bilateral naval exercises are continuing apace with the aircraft carriers from the India and the US Navy operating together in 2005. The air forces of the US and India also conducted a joint exercise in 2005 which saw the participation of F-16 fighters from the US side and of Su-30, Mirage-2000, MiG-29, MiG-27 and Bison aircrafts. As part of the ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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ongoing Indo – US defence Cooperation, a South Asia Peacekeeping Operations, Command Post Exercise was co-hosted by India with the Indian Army in 2005 at Hawaii, with the next exercise planned for 2007. India is playing a lead role in this exercise which is being attended by officers from the US, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

As a response to the rising prowess of China in the Pacific, the US has started adjusting its defence strategy and force posture to deal with the rising dragon in Asia. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) specifically calls for boosting the number of naval ships in the Pacific Ocean. It would put six of the US Navy’s 12 aircraft carriers and 60 percent of its submarine forces in the Pacific at all times to support engagement, presence, and deterrence.30 The Pentagon is considering buying new classes of weapons suited to a 21st century battle in the Pacific that would feature cyber-warfare, space weapons, satellite-guided missiles, shipborne anti-missile defences, unmanned bombers launched from carrier decks and small, sub-hunting warships. The US is also actively expanding, diversifying and bolstering its bases in Asia so as to move them closer to China while at the same time reducing their vulnerability to attack. The US Navy has accelerated its schedule for building its next generation of cruisers by seven years and is considering more small, anti-submarine vessels.

Theatre-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly high-power microwave devices have been identified by the US Congress as some of the major elements of China’s military modernization that have potential implications for the future of US naval capabilities. The primary focus of China’s military modernization is to be able to deploy a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an anti-access force to deter US intervention or delay the arrival of US naval and air forces. But the broader agenda is to attain Chinese military’s dominance in Asia– Pacific and to replace the US as the regional hegemon. Today, the Chinese armed forces are already considered strong enough to delay and punish the US Navy in any confrontation over Taiwan.

The US National Intelligence Council has made it clear that “China will overtake Russia and others as the second-largest defence spender after the United States over the next two decades and will be, by any measure, a first-rate military power.”

The latest QDR makes a very strong statement of India’s importance for the US in the emerging global security architecture. While a concern with China’s rising military power is palpable throughout the defence review, it is instructive to note the importance that the QDR has attached to India’s rising global profile. India is described as an emerging great power and a key strategic partner of the US. Shared values such as the two states being long-standing multi-ethnic democracies are underlined as providing the foundation for increased 64

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strategic cooperation. This stands in marked contrast to the unease that has been expressed with the centralization of power in Russia and lack of transparency in security affairs in China. It is also significant that India is mentioned along with America’s traditional allies such as the NATO countries, Japan and Australia.

The QDR goes on to say very categorically that close cooperation with these partners (including India) in the war on terrorism as well in efforts to counter WMD proliferation and other non-traditional threats ensures not only the continuing need for these alliances but also for improving their capabilities.

For the US, India is now a crucial player in the emerging balance of power in the Pacific. It would like a strong US– India alliance to act as a bulwark against the arc of Islamic instability running from the Middle East to Asia and to create much greater balance in Asia. How far India would be willing to go would, in many ways, be determined by the domestic political dynamic in India.

India and Japan: newfound intimacy With an eye on China, India is also getting closer to Japan. The Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has made his desire to spread values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Asian region and India is a natural partner for Japan in this endeavour. India’s growing closeness to the US is also making Japan take India seriously and both are well aware of the Chinese strategy to contain the rise of its two most-likely challengers in the region.

Despite significant economic and trade ties between China and Japan, political tensions have increased in recent years, especially over the differing interpretations of history by the two nations. There was a public outcry in China two years back when Japan’s education ministry approved history textbooks that were said to whitewash Japan’s militarism in Asia during the first half of the last century. It is argued that about 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese were killed during the Japanese occupation of Nanjing that began in 1937 and the new Japanese textbooks refer to this as the “Nanjing incident.” China asked Japan to take responsibility for the unrest in Chinese cities because it had continued to rewrite the history of its World War II era occupation of China. Unrest erupted in various Chinese cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Guangzhou with some subtle manipulation by China’s political establishment.31 Japan, meanwhile, asked for an apology of its own from China for violent attacks against Japanese government offices and businesses in China. It also did not help when Tokyo’s High Court rejected an appeal for compensation by Chinese survivors of biological-warfare experiments conducted by Japan during the Second World War. But it would be a mistake to view these Sino–Japanese tensions merely through the prism of history. It is also about the future of Asian balance of power. Both Japan and China are competing for pre-eminence in the Asian political and strategic ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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landscape and this is producing some inevitable tensions. The recent spat over Japan’s historical behavior is just one of the manifestations of this dynamic.

At its foundation, what is fuelling these Sino– Japanese tensions is a burgeoning sense of strategic rivalry as China’s power expands across Asia and Japan redefines its regional military role in close cooperation with the United States.

Japan has made it clear that it considers China a potential military threat that would have to be faced and countered in the coming years. This was followed

by Japan’s announcement that a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is a strategic objective that it shares with the United States, signalling to China that it might help America defend Taiwan in the event of a war. It is against this backdrop that burgeoning India – Japan ties assume new significance.

India’s ties with Japan have travelled a long way since May 1998 when a chill had set in after India’s nuclear tests with Japan imposing sanctions and suspending its Overseas Development Assistance. Since then, however, the changing strategic environment in Asia –Pacific has brought the two countries together so much so that the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Japan resulted in the unfolding of a roadmap to transform a low-key relationship into a major strategic partnership. According to the Japanese Prime Minister, “the India – Japan relationship will be the most important bilateral relationship (for Japan) in the world.”32 The rise of China is a major factor in the evolution of Indo–Japanese ties as is the US attempt to build India into a major balancer in the region. Both India and Japan are well aware of China’s not so subtle attempts at preventing their rise. It is most clearly reflected in China’s opposition to the expansion of the United Nations Security Council to include India and Japan as permanent members.

China’s status as a permanent member of the Security Council and as a nuclear weapon state is something that it would be loathe to share with any other state in Asia. As India and Japan are the two most likely contenders to challenge China’s regional predominance it has propelled China to prevent their rise. India and Japan have decided to invigorate all major aspects of their relationship ranging from investment, defence, science and technology to civilian cooperation in space and energy security. Even on the issue of civilian nuclear cooperation, Tokyo has agreed to play a constructive approach. India’s “Look East” policy of active engagement with ASEAN and East Asia is largely predicated upon Japanese support.

India’s participation in the East Asia Summit was facilitated by Japan and the East Asia Community proposed by Japan to counter China’s proposal of an East Asia Free Trade Area also includes India. While China has resisted the inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand in the ASEAN, Japan has strongly backed the entry of all three nations.

It is also instructive to note that India’s ties with Japan do not carry any historical baggage unlike most of Japanese neighbors who have historical disputes with Japan. As Japan moves ahead under a new generation of political leadership 66

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to emerge as a “normal” state with legitimate security interests and concomitant military capabilities, India is more than willing to lend Japan a helping hand.33 The two nations also see a huge potential for significant gain from the complementarities prevailing in both the economies in several areas. The Indian economy is now galloping at an average growth rate of 8 percent, and the Japanese economy has also finally come out of the decade-long recession. It is natural for the two states to strengthen their economic ties as the foundation for a much broader strategic partnership. India will be holding its first ever joint military exercise with Japan and the US in the South China Sea this year which is expected to focus on maritime security and involve rescue operations during major natural disasters as well as communications training.

India and Southeast Asia: deepening engagement India is also now actively engaging other countries in Southeast Asia. India’s relations with Southeast Asia got a boost when it enunciated its “Look East” policy in 1991, which in many ways was a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world. As a result of this policy, India’s trade with ASEAN reached a new high of $23 billion in 2005 as compared to $2.4 billion in 1990. An India – ASEAN Free Trade agreement is now in the pipeline to be completed by mid2007. The nations of Southeast Asia are also trying to come to terms with the rise of India in their vicinity. In the words of Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister, A. Jayakumar, “It is no longer possible to conceptualise East Asia just in terms of US– China– Japan relations or of the ASEAN relations with only these three major power centres. Increasingly Sino– India, India – Japan, and US –India relations will move to the centre of the South East Asia equation”.34 For most members of ASEAN, India is now a major balancer in the region as they are also hedging their bets vis-a`-vis China.

India is also pushing for a pan-Asian Free Trade agreement that can fully exploit the economic synergies in the region. Among India’s other regional initiatives, it has worked out a sub-regional agreement of economic cooperation with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand known as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. To promote greater transport connectivity in the region, India has entered into an agreement with Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam for the Mekong Ganges Cooperation Project. India is now hoping for a possible admission to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that bridges East Asia with the Americas and is gearing up to take a more active role in ensuring the security of air and sea lanes, especially in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. India’s ties with Australia are also becoming more substantive. As Australia proactively moves to engage emerging global players such as China and India, India–Australia ties are set to see an upward momentum and as a close strategic ASIA -PACIFIC REVIEW

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ally of the US, Australia is also thinking pragmatically about building its economic and political ties with India. India’s economic potential and strengths in information technology sector hold special promise in its engagement with Australia. Defencerelated cooperation between the two states have picked up after Australia withdrew its defense attache´ from New Delhi in May 1998 in light of India’s nuclear tests and now ranges from counter-terrorism to the safety of sea-lanes for trade and safe passage, and defense research and development.35 Australia has also softened its stance on changes in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines with regard to India after the US–India nuclear deal and has made it clear that any change in NSG guidelines would be a stand-alone matter, in effect acknowledging India’s status as a responsible nuclear power.36

Conclusion As the above discussion makes clear, India’s ambitions as a major player in the Pacific have increased in recent years in consonance with an increase in its economic and military capabilities. India’s foreign policy towards the Pacific is also shaping up in light of these factors. As China continues to be the main actor whose rise is shaking up the security dynamic in the Asia– Pacific, India, like most other states, is trying to calibrate its ties with China.

There is nothing really sinister about China’s attempts to expand its own influence and curtail India’s. China is a rising power in Asia and the world and as such will do its utmost to prevent the rise of other power centres around its periphery like India that might in the future prevent it from taking its rightful place as a global player. This is not much different than the stated US policy of preventing the rise of other powers that might threaten its position as a global hegemon. Just as the US is working towards achieving its strategic objective, China is pursuing its own strategic agenda. In many ways, it is natural for China to view India as a potential rival for foreign capital, export markets, political influence, and aspirations for regional leadership. There is also nothing extraordinarily benign in China’s attempts to improve its bilateral relations with India in recent times.

After cutting India down to size in various ways, China would not like to see India coming close to the US in order to contain China.

As a consequence, India’s foreign policy in the Pacific is now aimed at curtailing the influence of China and establish itself as a major player. Towards this end, it has taken the help of the US and Japan with whom it shares many values and interests in the region. It has been suggested that India would like to prevent the mergence of another dominant power between Singapore and Aden.37 While it may be difficult for India to prevent the rise of China in the region, given its current capabilities, it certainly would like to make it difficult for China to have complete sway over the region. It makes sense for India to 68

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stress cooperation while working to narrow the power disparity with China and build greater stability in Asia through strategic ties with other democracies, including the US and Japan. The US and Japanese interests also converge with India on this count and it is this dynamic that will go a long way in shaping the security architecture in the Pacific in the coming years.

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See Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 147 –159.

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” International Security, Vol. 17/4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5– 51.

William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24/1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5 –41.

Zbignew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 24.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 173 –201.

Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78/2 (March/April 1999), pp. 35 – 49.

Paul Kennedy, “The Eagle Has Landed,” The Financial Times, London, February 2, 2002.

Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5– 41.

For a range of perspectives on this, see Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 109 –139; Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlworth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Fall 2005), pp. 72 – 108; Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7– 45; T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46 – 71; Harsh V. Pant, “The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi ‘Strategic Triangle’: An Idea Whose Time May Never Come Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 311 –328.

For a discussion of the various interpretations of China’s ‘peaceful rise,’ see Evan S. Medeiros, “China Debates Its ‘Peaceful Rise’ Strategy?” available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id ¼ 4118 On why multipolar systems are more unstable as compared to bipolar ones, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 161 – 193. Also see John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 138 –167.

A detailed explication of the Power Transition theory can be found in A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

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The report is available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020. html The report is available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/insight/ research/reports/99.pdf For details, see the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” available at <http://meaindia.nic.in/ jdhome.htm>.

Amit Baruah, “China keeps its word on Sikkim,” The Hindu, New Delhi, May 7, 2004.

“India-China bilateral trade touches $13.6 bn,” Press Trust of India, March 5, 2005.

“Iran, China key to India’s oil march,” Indian Express, New Delhi, February 20, 2005.

Edward Cody, “China Offers Glimpse of Rationale Behind Its Military Policies,” Washington Post, Deember 30, 2006.

See the report of an independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations on Chinese Military Power at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/ China_TF.pdf Sudha Ramachandran, “China’s Pearl in Pakistan’s Waters,” March 5, 2005, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html Haroon Habib, “Bangladesh, China sign nine agreements,” The Hindu, April 9, 2005.

“Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was a popular slogan during the 1950s, the heydays of Sino-Indian relationship, that became discredited after the 1962 Sino-Indian war.

For a detailed account of these talks, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, (January/February 2000), p. 56.

C. Raja Mohan, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006), p. 57.

The transcript of the Background Briefing by Administration Officials on US-South Asia Relations is available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2005/43853.htm The testimonies of US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice on the USIndia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 2006/64136.htm and before the House International Relations Committee is available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/ 64146.htm K.P. Nayar, “What’s in it for the US?” The Telegraph, March 8, 2006.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report is available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf Robert Marquand, “Anti-Japan protests jar an uneasy Asia,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2005.

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S.D. Naik, “India-Japan Ties—Moving to the Next Level,” The Hindu Business Line, January 2, 2007.

Tukoji R. Pandit, “Sun Shines on India-Japan Relations,” The Asian Tribune, December 29, 2006.

V. Jayanth, “India and ASEAN set to focus on East Asia,” The Hindu, January 12, 2007.

P.S Suryanarayana, “A Promise for Cooperative Diplomacy,” The Hindu, March 8, 2006.

“NSG Exception only for India: Australia,” Press Trust of India, February 1, 2007.

Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 157.

About the author Dr. Harsh V. Pant is a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. His current research is focused on nuclear proliferation and Asia-Pacific security issues. His recent publications include, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for Civil-Military Relations in India,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol.33, No.2 (January 2007); “Saudi Arabia Woos China and India,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006); “The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Much More Than Meets the Eye,” Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol.151, No.2 (April 2006); and “Trouble in Paradise: Nepal’s Tryst with Insurgency and Tyranny,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2006). The views expressed here are his own.

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