PUBLIC O P I N I O N I N LASSWELL'S FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE1 BY JAMES A . R O B I N S O N This review article is adapted from comments made at a book symposium at the Nineteenth Annual Conference of AAPOR, Excelsior Springs, blissouri, May 8, 1964. The author is Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University.
E NEED not pause long to praise this book; only significant volumes are honored by symposia. T h a t this is not the first occasion for this book (another was held at the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association) is a further mark of the respect Harold Lasswell's work has received from his colleagues. My inclination is to comment on the book's implications for the specialized study of political science in American universities, now and in the immediate future. However, the fact that the audience is not primarily one of political scientists, nor perhaps even of university professors, suggests that other considerations might be more appropriate. Therefore, my remarks are aimed, first, at explicating some of the ways in which "public opinion analysis" and "public opinion as a variable" fit into Professor Lasswell's schema for the analysis of the social process. Second, I shall turn to a brief discussion of alternative institutional settings for the systematic study of public opinion, political science, and related subjects. Lasswell's schema may be outlined by reference to four key terms or phrases: ( 1 ) contextuality, (2) problem solving, (3) value institution analysis, and (4) the decision process. Contextuality refers to the placement of a datum in its relationship to other relevant data. T h e context is characterized by five tasks of problem-solving activity-goal clarification, trend analysis, conditional analysis, projection of future trends under varying conditions, and the invention of policy alternatives; one or more of eight values-power, respect, rectitude, affection, wealth, enlightenment, skill, and well-being; and seven stages of decision-intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal, and termination. Students of public opinion contribute primarily to the trend and 1
H. D. Lasswell, T h e Future of Political Science, New York, Atherton, 1963.
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condition analysis tasks of social problem solving. They identify patterns in the distribution of attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and values among populations and their subsets over periods of time. In addition to describing trends, they analyze causes of or conditions for the distribution of opinion at selected points in time and space. T h e objects of trend and conditional or causal analyses may be conveniently categorized by the comprehensive check list of values and institutions that shape and share or monopolize values of deferencepower, respect, affection, and rectitude-and welfare-wealth, enlightenment, skill, and well-being. Lasswell proposes a continuing series of Basic Data Surveys. These surveys, by which is meant more than the usual sample survey of public opinion, would be conducted at every conceivable level of government-local, national, and global. They would cover each stage of the decision process, from the earliest stage of intelligence gathering to the final stage of terminating the policy. And for each stage, extensive data would be collected on who participates, with what perspectives, in which arenas, using which base values, employing what strategies, producing what outcomes, and culminating in what effects. Students of public opinion can contribute especially to the continual surveying of perspectives of participants at every stage of the decision process. T h e term "perspectives" refers to values, expectations, and identifications. In the interest of efficient allocation of research resources, as well as of relevance to public policy, the analysis of political opinions usefully centers on elites and on participants in authoritative decision-making roles. Nevertheless, the "publics" outside official agencies of government are not necessarily uninfluential, even if they are two steps removed, as it were, from the point of authoritative decision. For one thing, unofficial elites are the source from which official decision makers are recruited. For another, many officials "identify with" or "refer to" opinion groups outside government. Reference and identification groups often provide the boundaries or outer limits of policy alternatives. Dawson's study of the impact of public opinion on United States policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1930's illustrates this point.2 Dawson demonstrated that President Roosevelt was first constrained in diplomatic recognition of Russia and later in extending Lend Lease to Russia by what he and his advisers assumed (sometimes inaccurately) was the public's probable response to projected policy initiatives vis-8-vis the Soviet Union. Not only do analysts of public opinion contribute to the problemsolving tasks of crend and condition analyses, but they may participate 2 Raymond H. Dawson, The Decision to Aid Russia, rgqr, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1959.
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also in the clarification of goals for a society. Political decision makers spend large amounts of their time choosing among alternative policies for given objectives or problems for decision; they also spend part of their time selecting objectives and choosing problems for decision. Each objective or problem fits one or more of the eight major values. A politician must decide what values, among several in which he has an interest or stake, he can most effectively influence. His effectiveness is likely to turn, in part, on his timing, that is, on his sensitivity to finding an appropriate opportunity to put a matter on the agenda of government. Knowledge of the values and value implications that are most salient to publics presumably would aid officials (and opposition parties) in implementing public preferences more effectively. For example, I wonder whether the current controversy over what we call "civil rights," which is in other terms a crisis about the shaping and sharing of respect, might have been structured differently if political elites had had more reliable information about the development and distribution of attitudes toward values of respect, power, and wealth among certain American citizens. I do not, of course, mean to argue for a simple political doctrine of direct representation through polls rather than through legislators. T h e choice is not as simple as some quotations from Edmund Burke imply; Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson have demonstrated the several roles legislators may play in goal selection and policy determination.3 I want to introduce the distinction between the representation of values and the representation of opinions. For this purpose, we may define value as an enduring orientation toward an object or preference; we may regard opinion as a more transitory view about a much more specific alternative or mode of procedure toward a value or policy objective. Because opinions are likely to be about matters of means to ends, they will contain much more empirical, or potentially empirical, premises than will preferences about values. Legislators, with their greater access to detailed information about policy, may be expected to have more informed and effective judgments about opinions than their constituents. On the other hand, as to questions of value, legislators may rightly be expected to subordinate their views to those of their constituents, providing they have information about which values are most salient among their constituents. I t is precisely in the clarification of values and the preferences among values that analysts of opinion can contribute to this task of the problem-solving process. 3 John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, T h e Legislative System: Explorations i n Legislative Behavior, New York, Wiley, 1962.
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Our comments so far have merely specified a few of the ways in which students of public opinion may contribute to the social problemsolving process. Let us now turn to considering more directly how the distribution of opinions or attitudes in a population contributes to the context of the decision process of governments. Almond, Katz and Lazarsfeld, and many others have documented the existence of several "publics," not a single public with opinions about all issues or value institutions.4 By conceiving the decision process in several stages, Lasswell points to the not-always-obvious observation that the opinions of some publics may be more influential at one or more points in the making of a decision than at others. For example, certain interest groups may have more impact in communicating their demands in the relatively open and public stages of intelligence or recommendation than in the more closed and behind-scenes stages of invocation and application. Other groups, have participants recruited from classes and interests similar to those of elite decision makers, may more effectively channel their perspectives and expectations into the later and relatively closed stages of a decision. Not only does the influence of opinion vary with the stage of the process, but the relevance of opinion depends i n part on personal characteristics of key decision makers. President Wilson, for example, felt little need to follow editorials or other evidence of public opinions; he believed he knew what the public thought about any given issue.6 President Truman, during the first week of the Korean crisis of June 1950, rebuked a prominent adviser who sought to inject considerations of public opinion and partisan response to the use of the United States troops in South Korea. Mr. Truman preferred to consider such questions personally and not in c o ~ n c i l . ~ I n contrast, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have seemed quite sensitive to opinions and comments of both elites and non-elites. T h e latter is reported to wear an alarm on his wrist watch to signal the next news broadcast. Variations in the attentiveness of key decision makers to public opinion surely make a difference for the influence of opinions in the decision process. In addition to the personal perspectives of decision makers, the organizational apparatus for sampling and reporting 4 Gabriel Almond, T h e American People and Foreign Policy, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950; Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal InfEuence, Glencoe, T h e Free Press, 1955. 6 Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, New York, John Day, 1956. 6 Glenn D. Paige, "The Korean Decision (June 24-30, 1950): A Reconstruction of Decision-making Events," Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University, 1959, Ph.D. dissertation.
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opinions to decision makers is also important. If Presidential mail is systematically sampled, if the Department of State has reliable means of assessing likely public and Congressional responses to projected policies, or if any decision-making unit has organized opinion-reporting services, we may expect different uses of opinion than would otherwise be the case. In addition to personal characteristics of decision makers and organizational services for them, we must cite also the decision situation, or the occasion for decision, as an important variable affecting the influence of public opinion in a decision or a decision process. We may hypothesize a curvilinear relation between the influence of opinion and the level of crisis. Lasswell defines crisis in terms of the likelihood of violent action. We may think of crisis also as one end of a continuum of occasions for decision; crisis is characterized by a threat to a decision maker's or an organization's or a society's goals that is (1) unanticipated and (2) major (whether violent or otherwise), and (3) allows short time for response. Relatively noncrisis decisions will have low salience except for the most specialized publics; consequently, a limited range of opinion will be brought to bear on such decisions. Illustrations from foreign policy making include United States participation in some of the minor international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Development Association, and other specialized organizat i o n ~ In . ~ decisions affecting these institutions, little public attention is observed; only a few bankers and representatives of other specialized interests express themselves. As crisis level increases, however, and especially as threat to goals increases, more perspectives are likely to be considered. As examples of national decisions, I have in mind the development of the Marshall Plan or the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.8 In such cases, more groups are consulted, and consequently more interesa are considered. A wider range of public opinion is, therefore, relevant at several stages in the decision process. Yet, beyond some point, as crisis continues to increase, and especially as the time for decision shortens and the amount of preparation for an unanticipated decision declines, the considerations extended to varying opinions decline. In the Korean crisis of June 1950 and in the Cuban crisis of October 1962, time did not permit search for public opinion 7 James A. Robinson, T h e Monroney Resolution: Congressional Initiative i n Foreign Policy-making, New York, Holt, 1959; Congress and Foreign Policy-making, Homewood, Ill., Dorsey, 1962, Chap. 3. 8 Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)~New York, Viking, 1955; Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, Congress at Work, New York, Holt, 1952, pp. 383-387.
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and, in any case, the opinion of the publics may yet have been unformed. Accordingly, opinion is less influential in such situations, or, if it is influential, it represents the decision maker's antcipation of what opinion will be when it has been formed. Lasswell's book, and its references to the study and role of public opinion in the social process, is not confined to outlining ideas for research. I t includes also a critique of the organizations principally concerned with shaping and sharing enlightenment. Professor Lasswell is not sanguine about universities as centers of innovation or of intellectual integration. That universities have often been legitimators rather than initiators of ideas and inventions seems to me borne out by various histories and commentaries on higher education, from Hastings Rashdall to Clark Kerr.9 Since universities emerged in the medieval period, they have been oriented to clients with practical interests in immediate applications. T h e trivium and quadrivium were as practical for the law, theology, and medicine of Paris and Bologne in the Middle Ages as the modern multiversity curricula in police science, political science, and poultry science for the Big T e n states. Moreover, when universities are the sites for new intellectual and institutional forms, they often effect "restriction by partial incorporation," to borrow a Lasswellian concept. Members of AAPOR need not be reminded of the lengthy probationary period required of research agencies, bureaus, and centers by universities. These research organizations exist on the periphery of universities, outside established departments, with nontenure appointments for several years. Then, if successful, they are "legitimated" by the universities. Not only does the practical orientation of universities make them conservative, but their decentralized organizational decision making is a further barrier to innovative leadership. Clark Kerr has argued persuasively that we can expect few college and university presidents to do more than mediate among entrenched deans, professors, schools, and departments. In addition, Professor Lasswell cites the great growth in size of universities, their physical dispersion across many miles and even in different towns, and their high degree of specialization. All these factors have fractionalized modern universities and have hindered their effectiveness in promoting contextuality. Indeed, the large size, decentralization, and bargaining characteristic of universities reminds one of modern legislatures, such as Congress. These political bodies have declined in influence and innovation since approximately the 9 Hastings Rashdall, T h e Universities of Eurofie i n the Middle Ages, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936; Clark Kerr, T h e Uses of the University, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.
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beginning of the twentieth century, and they have surrendered innovation to the more hierarchical and efficiently organized executive branches of government. They also are decentralized, conservative, largely non-innovative, and they are mostly legitimators of other institutions' initiatives. Just as political innovation has been transferred from the once proud and dominant legislatures to other agencies of government, so indeed new institutions of enlightenment may emerge that will be more innovative than the old order of universities. What form shall such institutions take? Lasswell argues for vitalizing the professional association of political scientists, that is, the American Political Science Association. H e also urges the creation of centers of advanced political science, which might revive something of the old idea of universitiesthat is, the search for unity in context, or the performance of the function of intellectual integration. I regret to say that I am even less hopeful of vitalizing professional associations of scholars than of revitalizing some departments and centers within universities. If universities are large, dispersed, and specialized, voluntary associations of scholars are even more so. T h e constituency of political scientists, not to mention the other social sciences, runs into the thousands and approaches the size of a small university. Moreover, the membership is dispersed, not widely over a single campus, but across many campuses and indeed across international boundaries. And if university departments and their particular subjects seem fractionalized, political scientists, and I suppose other social scientists, are also specialized and individualistic. Furthermore, voluntary professional associations suffer from the absence of both sanctions and rewards, a few of which universities still retain. I would say that only one or two of the professional associations of scientists have had an outstanding record of organizational service to their profession. I would think that the American Psychological Association should be credited for the effectiveness with which it has served its members by professionalizing the field, assisting in the circulation of information about positions and appointments, and publishing a varied series of journals and symposia. I n addition, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a much larger organization, possesses a splendid record in the promotion of science and in relating institutions of enlightenment to the intelligence and appraisal stages of national decision making. With these two exceptions, professional organizations resemble honorary societies. T h e chances of giving them organizational viability seem to me slight, and any tendency to divert from the norm would be difficult to institutionalize. Rather than taking hope from the success of APA and
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AAAS, we should be warned against expecting too much from professional associations by the fact that they are exceptions to the rule. What of centers for advanced study of political science? Lasswell proposes the creation of a new institution to perform the function of intellectual integration. Political science, because of its wide-ranging concerns, including both normative theory and empirical theory, is the last social science to hold a glimpse of the older ideas of order and unity. New centers might try to cut through the increasing specialization of knowledge by concentrating on the five tasks of any problemsolving process-goal clarification, trend analysis, and so on. No brief r4sumC can indicate adequately the excitement and scope that such centers might generate. Yet the very scope and ambition set for such new institutions raises the familiar question of cost-not only cost to donors but also indirect costs to other institutions that may be deprived of participants by the new institution. As for dollar costs, the prospects are discouraging for finding the immediate source of funds to establish any single center, much less several. T h e major foundations, to whom academics seem to look as a very present help in time of financial trouble, are unlikely to finance such centers, given their recent practices and pronouncements about policy problems. In certain respects, the foundations have become more conservative than the universities; they seem interested primarily in immediate problems of application rather than in planning through research on forthcoming problems about which some advance social action might be even more feasible than contemporary, but delayed, action on present problems. In addition, for the most quantitative studies, one cannot expect agencies of government to finance projects and research through the new centers. And even in the cases of some quantitative studies, such as those of a particular governmental institution (e.g. Congress and public opinion), government agencies not involved will be reluctant to offer support. Finally, one can hardly expect the national government to found such a new institution. Accordingly, for the foreseeable future the creation of such centers will have to occur within universities. In spite of my reluctance to come to this conclusion, I think one could argue for it as a practicable policy for the next decade or two. Part of the argument for practicability is that, just as universities are so decentralized that they cannot remake their total structure, their decentralization also offers freedom and room for relatively sovereign subgroups. Further, the establishment of many new colleges and universities in the most rapidly growing states and metropolises increases the probability of the invention of new forms of academic institutions, in which such centers might be located. Finally, the current fashion among universities to decry the
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relative imbalance in support for various fields may provide an argument and an opportunity for convincing university administrators that empirical political science is a strong candidate for internal support as opposed to sole reliance on external sources of research funds. The establishment of such centers might be one of the most likely opportunities for a university or several universities to break through the crust of conservatism and make a creative effort to contribute originally to the development of reliable, specialized, but comprehensive knowledge about political and social processes.