Social housing conditionality & required reform
190219855 TRP6211 Issues in Housing Word Count: 2998
Contents: Introduction................................ - 2 Housing Conditionality ............... - 3 Issues Surrounding Housing Conditionality ............................. - 3 Policy Aims and Objectives ......... - 7 Policy Options ............................. - 8 Conclusion ................................ - 10 References ................................ - 11 -
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Introduction In England, approximately 3.9 million household live in the social housing rented sector. This comprises properties which are available to rent at below average prices, typically 50-60% of average prices, or purchasable through shared ownership (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2017).
Figure 1 Household type by tenure in England, 2017 (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2017)
Social housing in England is provided by both the local authority and housing associations. Since the 1980s, housing associations have been responsible for the management and building of most social rented properties. This has arisen as a result of local authorities transferring ownership to associations, due to lack of funding (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2017).
Figure 2 Social housing stock by authority/association 1991-2017 (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2017)
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The use of conditions in order to allow people to gain a tenancy, has been a long standing practise in the UK. Housing conditions fall under three sections; conduct, circumstances and category. These groups give local authorities and housing associations the ability to implement conditions of varying severity dependent on the case’s individual circumstances. If these conditions are not met, they can be increased, or given sanctions. The aim is to make the housing benefit system fairer, reduce the universal credit bill and to encourage claimants into employment. Many of these conditions were introduced as a result of the 2011 England riots, under the Localism Act 2011 (Welfare Conditionality, 2014). This Green Paper has been published with the purpose of outlining the issues faced as a result of housing conditionality. The paper will discuss current issues, policy aims and objectives, and policy options for future implementation, with the aim to eradicate issues caused by housing conditionality. The purpose of Green Papers is to provide consultation documents which are produced by the Government. Green Papers provide members of parliament and the public the information needed in order to give educated feedback on suggested policies and legislative proposals, thus creating debate to influence future policy (Parliament.uk, 2020).
Housing Conditionality Conditional agreements require people to behave in a specified way or fall into certain categories in order to gain aids such as cash benefits, housing or support services. Consequently, social renting should be seen as a temporary measure to help individuals or families and not be used as a permanent ‘safety net’ (Preece, Hickman, & Pattison, 2019). Housing conditions can also be used in order to best-place residents. For example, the individual’s culture and connection to the local area. Examples of tenure conditions can be seen below. Tenure Condition Social - Prioritisation Renting - Demographic - Income - Citizenship - Culture - Engagement in employment - Connection to the local area - Compulsory volunteering Figure 3 Tenure conditions (Author's own)
Behavioural conditions can be implemented by local authorities and housing associations through informal, semi-formal and formal standards which are outlined as a part of the tenancy with the aim of reducing crime and anti-social behaviour (Lund, 2017). Examples can be seen in figure 4 below. Category Condition Informal - Rewards and incentives in Family Intervention Projects - Anti-social behaviour shaming techniques Semi- Acceptable behaviour Formal contracts - Good neighbour agreements -3-
Formal
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Tenant reward schemes Anti-social behaviour orders Housing benefits sanctions Eviction
Figure 4 Examples of conditions implemented (Author's own)
Failure to abide by conditions during a tenancy would lead to sanctions, set out under ‘formal’ conditions. For example, failure to show engagement in searching for employment could lead to housing benefit sanctions. Continual failure to follow conditions would cause eviction. “The ‘punishment’ of non-compliers helps to influence claimants’ behaviour by incentivising them to actively seek work and move off benefits” (Watts, Fitzpatrick, Bramley, & Watkins, 2014).
Issues Surrounding Housing Conditionality It is argued that conditionality, allowing individuals or households to face sanctions or eviction, will help them to engage more with the labour market and to become more productive citizens. Whilst there is much evidence to support housing conditionality, such as the success of the ‘Poplar HARCA’ employment scheme in East London, there are still issues which surround conditionality, both in terms of employment and behaviour (Rallings, 2014).
Counter-Productiveness It can be argued that the use of sanctions can in fact have the opposite impact that was originally intended, known as the ‘scar effect’ (Watts, Fitzpatrick, Bramley, & Watkins, 2014). Sanctions can leave the recipient feeling hostile towards authorities and initiate a negative outlook towards employment, thus moving them further away from the labour market. Many benefit system users face issues with mental health, homelessness, domestic violence, parenting and challenging home lives. Recipients argue that sanctions are often out of proportion to the offence, and the individual’s responsibilities and vulnerabilities are not taken into account. Therefore, the use of sanctions can have detrimental outcomes, again pushing people away from the benefit system and towards crime as a means of survival (Dwyer, 2016). Consequently, this counteracts the behavioural conditions set out in tenancies and more sanctions may be imposed, causing a negative cycle. The ‘House of Common Work and Pensions Committee’ outlines concern regarding sanctions and counterproductivity. They state that recipients who are disabled or in ill health are found to experience counterproductivity as a result of sanctions. Individuals are often given sanctions for attending a hospital appointment which was scheduled at the same time as an employment meeting, and it is argued that this punishment is ineffective. Again, this can cause hostility and move disabled residents away from the labour market (Work and Pensions Committee, 2018). Additionally, the pressure to find employment, in fear of receiving sanctions can result in residents applying for jobs which are not realistically within their
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capabilities. Therefore, guidelines for residents to apply for a certain number of positions per week can be seen as an ineffective way of gaining employment. This creates a culture of “counterproductive compliance” which should be replaced with a more successful programme to secure employment (Work and Pensions Committee, 2018). Matt Downie, director of policy and external affairs at ‘Crisis’ states: “We agree with the committee’s concerns that the current regime is harmful and counterproductive. In both our frontline work and our research, we’ve seen that sanctions both cause and exacerbate homelessness” (Scottish Housing News, 2018).
Homelessness Housing conditions can cause issues leading to homelessness as well as issues faced by homeless people trying to enter the benefit system. In a survey conducted by Sheffield Hallam University and ‘Crisis’, one third of 146 respondents had their allowance stopped after receiving a sanction. Housing benefits should not be affected by sanctions, only job seekers allowance. To be entitled to receive JSA, the individual must be actively seeking and available to start employment. When this is not the case, their JSA claim will be withdrawn and the sanction will be reinstated when they reclaim. Due to the interruption in the individual’s eligibility, all benefits including Housing Benefits will stop (McCarthy, et al., 2015). This consequently renders people unable to pay rent and bills and triggers homelessness. One respondent stated: “I lived in the Salvation Army hostel, that’s when I got my first sanction … I got evicted from the Salvation Army coz I couldn’t pay my rent” (McCarthy, et al., 2015).
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For homeless people trying to enter the benefit system, conditions are seen as difficult to meet. Based on a survey by the Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, it was found that claimants struggled to: § Have enough money to attend appointments; § Apply for the amount of jobs required per week; § Have access to the internet; § Book appointments that don’t coincide with hospital visits; § Receive letters by post (Reeve, 2017). Many homeless people suffer from mental health issues, are drug/alcohol dependent and have poor literacy skills. These factors make it difficult for individuals to meet the conditions required and fall into the following categories: § Impossible to comply; § Oversight and misunderstanding; § Conditions set beyond capabilities; § Making impossible choices between appointments (Reeve, 2017). Requirements need to be adjusted for specific needs and reflect the claimant’s circumstances. Homeless people who are migrants believe the benefit system to be racist. It has been described by migrants as unwelcoming, hostile and explicitly discriminatory. Migrant groups have stated that they avoid the system due to conditions being obstacles to engagement. However, it has been argued that the system is not racist, but that migrant cases have a higher workload with different conditions, causing them to take longer to pass through the system (Dwyer, 2019).
Anti-Social Behaviour For a long time it has been said that behavioural conditions are necessary to stop any negative impacts on other citizens and that they force individuals to engage with the system, causing an improvement in behaviour (Flint, 2014). However, this is not always the case. It is understood that there is often an underlying vulnerability which causes the individual to partake in anti-social behaviour. It can be argued that issuing sanctions for not adhering to housing conditions can in fact increase an individual’s vulnerability and reduce the likelihood of them successfully engaging with the benefit system. Furthermore, sanctions can also damage third parties such as children when housing benefits are cancelled (Flint, 2014). In addition to this, in a survey by ‘Welfare Conditionality’, it has been found that individuals do not react well to being forced to interact with support services as a result of receiving a sanction (Flint, Batty, & McNeill, 2016). Furthermore, it was found that individuals who had partaken in anti-social behaviour engaged more with intervention services if it happened on a voluntary basis, leading to a reward, rather than it being compulsory. Also, it was found that individuals are more inclined to work with an assigned Family Intervention worker to resolve any issues through accessing the relevant support services needed and gaining a mentor, rather than the standard routine of conditions and sanctions (Flint, Batty, & McNeill, 2016).
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A respondent stated: “I didn’t have to. That was voluntary; that was my choice. It was there, and I thought, well, you know what, if it’s there I’m going to take it … even now I’ll give Family Intervention worker a call if I’m having an issue” (Flint, Batty, & McNeill, 2016) Therefore, if a personal approach is taken to resolve underlying issues, the individual is more likely to engage with the system and meet the conditions to gain a social housing tenancy/refrain from being evicted.
Policy Aims and Objectives In order to address the issues outlined above, new aims and objectives have been established. These are detailed below:
Counter-Productiveness §
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When sanctions are used, they should be given in proportion to the offence committed to reduce hostility towards the authorities. Vulnerabilities need to be taken in to account such as mental health issues, domestic abuse and challenging home lives. An individual’s proven ill health to be taken into account when conditions or sanctions are given. Employment scheme to only allow individuals to apply for jobs within capabilities, regardless of the requested total.
Homelessness §
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Housing Benefits shouldn’t be affected by the interruption of eligibility to claim Job Seekers Allowance. A more tailored approach for the homeless trying to join the benefit system: o More than one-hour internet access per day to apply for requested number of jobs; o Allowance to help with travel costs; o Literacy workshops to help with CV and Cover Letter writing; o Group mental health workshops; o Ability to change appointment times when proof of a medical appointment is given in advance;
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o Letter collection points to avoid not receiving them. Streamline the workload for migrant cases in order to lessen waiting time and avoid accusations of racism.
Anti-Social Behaviour §
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Target the underlying causes for individuals taking part in anti-social behaviour rather than immediately applying sanctions. If the family involved has any children under the age of 18, do not apply sanctions as the first form of action. Use a voluntary attendance scheme with rewards as the first action, with sanctions as a second option. The Family Intervention Programme to be continued past 2020 with a stronger emphasis from central government on local authorities to implement the scheme as the first option, then use sanctions thereafter.
Policy Options
Homelessness
Below are Policy Options set out in order to meet the Policy Aims and Objectives outlined above.
The ‘Homeless Reduction Act 2017’ began with the aim that local authorities provide “meaningful help” to anyone who is homeless or at risk of becoming homeless; and set out the following key changes:
Counter-Productiveness The use of sanctions when housing conditions are not met, causing counterproductiveness, acts as an overarching issue faced in housing conditionality. For example, the use of a sanction which would tip an individual into homelessness or would make an individual turn to crime, would be counterproductive. Therefore, there is no specific policy in place, or proposed, to directly exacerbate counterproductivity. Instead, this would be done through numerous changes to existing policy or new policies which would target underlying vulnerabilities. Similarly to a scheme in Salford, local authorities and housing associations must put in place training programmes for front line workers regarding sanctions regime (Salford Community and Voluntary Services, 2014). This would include basic skill screening, mental health awareness, money support services, vulnerabilities and anti-social behaviour reasonings. By doing so, frontline workers will become aware of the wider impacts that imposing a sanction could have and what alternatives are available. This, along with other policies, will help to put an end to housing conditionality causing counterproductivity. Whilst an up-front cost would be involved to train all staff, the economic benefits of stopping counterproductivity should counteract this.
Figure 5 Key changes set out by the HRA 2017 (Homeless Link, 2018)
However, since its introduction, homelessness has continued to rise, by 18% in London for example (Bogle, 2019). The Act includes a duty for local authorities or housing associations to provide information about housing, but not information about support services available to the homeless (Homeless Link, 2018). A reformed version of the HRA should see this also implemented as a compulsory duty and could incorporate services such as mental health groups, literacy groups or longer library services, whether internally or outsourced. Furthermore, the act states that persons using the service may be given assistance through small grant or loan (legislation.gov.uk, 2017). This could be used to improve accessibility. Under a
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reformed act this should be used, when decided necessary, to provide transportation for the homeless to services to avoid missed appointments. Finally, under a reformed act, the placing of a sanction on an individual’s Job Seeker’s Allowance claim should not interrupt eligibility for Housing Benefits, unless the individual does have other suitable accommodation options. A Department for Work and Pensions study found that the approach that ‘Jobcentre Plus’ took with ethnic minorities was vindictive to the point that many cancelled their application and lost their Job Seekers Allowance (Dwyer & Scullion, 2014). Whilst it is necessary for migrants to abide by more housing conditions due to not being a UK national, policy should be in place in order to stop any mistreatment.
Anti-Social Behaviour The ‘Troubled Families Programme’ scheme started in 2012 which is intended for families with numerous problems such as crime, anti-social behaviour, unemployment, and domestic abuse. £448million was initially given for 120,000 families in 2012 with a further £920million for 400,000 families in 2015 to last until 2020 (House of Commons, 2018). This should continue past 2020. Positively, it is said that the scheme has successfully ‘turned around’ 99% of the families enrolled whilst saving £1.2billion of public money. These families saw positive crime reduction, anti-social behaviour and education outcomes (House of Commons, 2018). During the programme, children entering care dropped by one third and the number of adults going to prison dropped by a quarter (Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2019).
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However, permanent employment was not included in the statistic, with only 11,921 families having a member join the labour market (House of Commons, 2018). This needs to be improved moving forward. Whilst local authorities receive reward for succeeding with families, individuals should receive incentive for engaging with full time employment with the hope of increasing these statistics. Engagement with the programme needs to be consistent across the country. 70% of troubled families in North Yorkshire were on the scheme, but only 14% in Derby (House of Commons, 2018). However, getting all local authorities to work consistently with the scheme across the country may be difficult. This is where stronger emphasis or legal backing from central government is needed. Finally, ‘Troubled’ should be substituted from the title of the programme to avoid being derogatory and to stop families refusing to join due to humiliation. The strengthening of this scheme to help people meet housing conditions will allow for the underlying issues of anti-social behaviour to be targeted. The scheme gives both local authorities and families responsibilities, thus creating a mutualist approach to improving communities (Deacon, 2004). However, the continuation of this scheme and the implementation of incentives will come at a large cost to the government. This, alongside the significant economic downturn as a result of Covid-19, may pose difficulties with implementation and require reconsideration.
Conclusion Whilst housing conditionality is key to ensuring that the benefit system is as fair as possible, to reduce universal credit bills and to encourage the unemployed into work, the way in which these conditions are met needs reform. The use of sanctions is proven to have a counterproductive affect whilst also helping to cause, and sometimes worsening anti-social behaviour. The common theme is that sanctions do not help solve the underlying issues as to why people may not meet conditions. Outlined in the ‘policy aims and objectives’ and ‘policy options’ chapters is the need for a more tailored approach to individuals which give people more responsibility and therefore more engagement in the benefit system, thus improving the likelihood of meeting housing conditions.
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References Bogle, D. (2019, June 27). What impact has a year of the Housing Reduction Act had? Retrieved from Inside Housing: https://www.insidehousing.co.uk/ comment/comment/what-impacthas-a-year-of-the-homelessnessreduction-act-had-62000 Deacon, A. (2004). Justifying conditionality: the case of antisocial tenants. Leeds: Housing Studies. Dwyer, P. (2016). Evidence, Welfare Conditionality. Housing Quality Network. Dwyer, P. (2019). Dealing with Welfare Conditionality: Implementation and effects. Bristol: Policy Press. Dwyer, P., & Scullion, L. (2014). conditionality Briefing: Migrants. Welfare Conditionality. Flint, J. (2014). Conditionality Briefing: Anti-social Behaviour. Welfare Conditionality. Flint, J., Batty, E., & McNeill, J. (2016). First Wave Findings: Anti-Social Behaviour. Welfare Conditionality. Homeless Link. (2018). Implementing the Homeless Reduction Act. London: Homeless Link. House of Commons. (2018). The Troubled Families Programme (England). London: House of Commons. legislation.gov.uk. (2017). Homelessness Reduction Act 2017. Retrieved from legislation.gov.uk: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukp ga/2017/13/section/2/enacted Lund, B. (2017). Understanding Housing Policy. Bristol: Policy Press. McCarthy, L., Batty, E., Beatty, C., Casey, R., Foden, M., & Reeve, K. (2015). Homelss people's experiences of - 11 -
welfare conditionality and benefit sanctions. Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government. (2017). A new deal for social housing. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government. (2019). National evaluation of the Troubled Families Progrmme 2015-2020: Findings. London: Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government. Parliament.uk. (2020). Green Papers. Retrieved from Parliament.Uk: https://www.parliament.uk/siteinformation/glossary/greenpapers/ Preece, J., Hickman, P., & Pattison, B. (2019). The affordability of "affordable" housing in England: conditionality and exclusion in a context of welfare reform. Housing Studies. Rallings, M.-K. (2014). Approaches to tenancy management in the social housing sector: Exploring new models and changes in the tenantlandlord relationship. HACT. Reeve, K. (2017). Welfare conditionality, benefit sanctions and homelessness in the UK: ending the 'something for nothing culture' or punishing the poor? Journal of Poverty and Social Justice. Scottish Housing News. (2018, November 6). Benefit sanction regime 'harmful and counterproductive', says MPs. Retrieved from Scottish Housing News: https://www.scottishhousingnews. com/article/benefit-sanctionregime-harmful-andcounterproductive-say-mps Watts, B., Fitzpatrick, S., Bramley, G., & Watkins, D. (2014). Welfare
Sanctions and Conditionality in the UK. Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Welfare Conditionality. (2014, September 25). ‘Disciplining the poor?’: conditionality in social housing. Retrieved from Welfare Conditionality: http://www.welfareconditionality. ac.uk/2014/09/disciplining-thepoor-conditionality-in-socialhousing/ Work and Pensions Committee. (2018). Benefit Sanctions. London: House of Commons.
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