FINEST HOUR First Quarter 1994 Number 82
Journal of the International Churchill Societies • Australia • Canada • New Zealand • UK • USA
could re-enter government burdened with that tactless propensity. Attlee's Labour Government in 1945 were not in a hurry to single him out to assist them. But the postwar years brought him honour after honour and rewarding company and public corporation work. In the field of Commonwealth and Empire telecommunications and development he was preeminent. Intractable to the end, he refused to let the sunshine of praise dissipate his innate gloom. His theme was that Churchill had ruined him — demonstrably untrue. Reith's misfor-
tune was that a cankerworm of hate deep within him destroyed his peace of mind. It is appropriate to cite by contrast what Sir John Colville has stressed. Churchill told him during the Second World War: "I hate nobody except Hitler — and that is professional." Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary, 1905 to 1916) declared that Churchill was a genius whose faults would be forgotten in his achievements. Let us hope Reith's achievements will not be forgotten in his faults. It is a hope Churchill, in his infinitely generous heart, would surely have shared. 1$
A Patient Shrug: The Art of Churchill's Correspondence With Stalin Churchill, whom revisionists call an egotist, wrote letters to Stalin with a selflessness of which lesser men would not have been capable. BY DOUGLAS PEINE
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not the least of literary genres mastered by Churchill is the letter. Had the man not written histories or biographies, it is unlikely, to borrow Churchill's own phrase from The World Crisis, that "students of today and tomorrow would be; 1 over different history books and different maps"; although impoverished, certainly, the world in its aspect would likely remain otherwise unchanged. Yet had he not been a skilled practitioner of the epistolary arts, particularly as they were put to use in forging and sustaining a difficult alliance among self-interested nations, there persists the very real historical possibility that the defeat of the Nazis would have been, to whatever degree, a more close-run affair. It is a subject worthy of a book-length study. For example, what part did the expression of vigor, capability, and confidence in Churchill's letters to Roosevelt play in FDR's fateful conclusion that support for Britain was in fact not futile? It was the nation as exemplified by the man to which Roosevelt responded — and the great artistic achievement of Churchill's corresERTAINLY
Mr. Peine is an attorney practicing in St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. Letter references are from The Second World War, American Edition, Woods A123(a). 24 / FINEST HOUR 82
pondence to Roosevelt is its irresistible expression of the hopes and fears of both. Perhaps even more interesting than his wartime letters to FDR, and for entirely different reasons, are those Churchill wrote to Stalin: the allied head of government whose fundamental philosophies of life and politics, let alone civility, could hardly have been more inimical. Yet common ground had not only to be located but shared for several years. Here was a challenge for the written word, and it is this surface of the Churchill correspondence that this article will scratch. This undertaking is not simply academic. For anyone who must rely on the letter to pursuade or to mollify — the lawyer tusseling with hard-bitten opposing counsel, the disgruntled consumer seeking satisfaction from the imperious corporation, the business executive or soldier struggling to dissuade an obtuse superior, the college student wondering how best to break the news to his parents that he flunked physics — a study of Churchill's letters to Stalin can be an enlightening exercise. It puts the petty, transitory disputes of one's own daily commerce into some perspective: the miscommunication of the business executive, banker or attorney may well result in unwelcome exchange of
money, but for Churchill there was at stake a portion of the civilized world. It is an angle on life that helps ease our own burdens, while at the same time enhancing our respect for Churchill's stalwart assumption of his. But there are also specific techniques to be learned from a look at Churchill's correspondence with the Hard Case of the Twentieth Century.
"A Little 'Swing' Music in the Kremlin," by Zel in the Daily Mirror, 11 October 1944. Churchill visited Moscow that month for conferences with Stalin, who was singing in harmony at the time, thanks to WSC's ministrations. KNOW YOUR FACTS A N D STATE THEM WELL
It is an elementary — but no less grudgingly admitted — notion that to argue matters in dispute competently requires knowing what one is talking about. Homework, preparation and the resulting mastery of the facts, although tedious and time-consuming, brook no shortcut. Has any political leader of history known so much as Churchill — historical, political, geographical, economic, military — and then, on top of it all, been so capable when giving written expression to that knowledge? The measure of his skill at marshalling and synthesizing the detail of a subject so vast as world war rests in the fact that even the grand champion grumbler, Stalin, was on occasion compelled to concede Churchill a complex, disputed point. Churchill's letter of 11 March 1943 is an example. Stalin had carped once more about what he perceived to be the unjustifiably slow progress of British and American troops in North Africa, as well as the delay
in opening the western front. While Churchill was recovering from illness Roosevelt sent his own brief response, seeking to pacify Stalin by vague assurances that "every possible step" is being taken and that "we are making a maximum effort." Despite Roosevelt's letter, Churchill, when he had regained his strength, "thought it right" not to rely on Roosevelt's perfunctory note but to "present our whole case in my own words." The result is a magnificent ordering of complex facts in simple sentences. Whereas FDR required Stalin to trust in his "assurances," Churchill sought to convey the "details of the story." (IV-748) Harsh weather conditions, terrain impediments, logistical problems and daunting enemy numbers are woven into a persuasive explanation of, among other things, why the "attempt to get Tunis and Bizerta at a run was abandoned in December." Notice that even Churchill's definition of the task — to take the ground "at a run" — itself implies its difficulty and its unwisdom, yet at the same time conveys the confidence that it will be taken in the future. (IV-747) Similarly effective are, for example, his detailed letters of 30 March and 6 April 1943, giving Stalin the bad news of the postponement of monthly convoys due to the inability to provide them adequate protection. As Churchill himself observed, "My full explanations and accounts were not wholly unrewarded. The answer was more friendly than usual." (IV-757) If nothing else, Churchill's frankness and thoroughness bought for him a credibility with Stalin that subdued some of the Soviet leader's demons of distrust. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOMETIMES SILENCE IS MORE EXPRESSIVE
After Stalin, in his letter of 23 July 1942 (IV-270), virtually accused the British Government both of perfidy for failing to send convoys through impossible seas, as well as cowardice for not immediately opening up a second front in France, Churchill chose to "let Stalin's bitter message pass without any specific rejoinder." (IV-272) The matter ended there without further escalation of tensions. It was a technique Churchill was to use effectively on several occasions. Stalin's letter of 8 November 1941 was not only "bitter" but, also in Churchill's word, "chilling." In light of Britain's practical reluctance to declare war on Finland, Rumania and Hungary, the Russian leader unloosed a petulant indictment of Britain's "war aims," its "plans for the post-war organization," its insufficient "military assistance against Hitler in Europe." Neither was he in the least abashed about complaining that Britain's generous and risk-laden supply convoys to the Soviet FINEST HOUR 82/25
"are arriving inefficiently packed, that sometimes parts of the same vehicle are loaded in different ships, [and] that planes, because of the imperfect packing, reach us broken." (111-529-30) To such "hysteria" Churchill again would not respond. "The silence," he observed in The Grand Alliance, "was expressive." (III-530) It was also effective. Twelve days later the Soviet Ambassador requested a meeting with Foreign Minister Eden at which he assured Eden that it "certainly had not been M. Stalin's intention to cause any offence to any members of the Government, and least of all to the Prime Minister." (III-530) Churchill added variations to the theme in October of 1943. Again in dispute was the suspension of the British convoys to Russia because of the U-boat menace. Molotov went to the British Embassy in Moscow and "'insisted' upon the urgent resumption of the convoys, and expected His Majesty's Government to take all necessary measures within the next few days." (V261) To such breathtaking presumptuousness Churchill again chose not to respond. But this time he informed Stalin of the fact: I have received your request for the reopening of the convoys to North Russia. I and all my colleagues are most anxious to help you and the valiant armies you lead to the utmost of our ability. I do not therefore reply to various controversial points made in M. Molotov's communication. (V-263) But Stalin had seen this trick before, and this time he wasn't going to succumb. "Concerning your mention of controversial points allegedly contained in the statement of M. Molotov," he telegraphed to Churchill, "I have to say that I do not find any foundation for such a remark." (V-268) Indeed, insisted Stalin, piling impudence atop Molotov's presumptuousness, the voluntary convoys by Britain "cannot be considered otherwise than as an obligation." (V-267) In his turn Churchill simply gave the telegram back to Soviet Ambassador Gousev in London: I said very briefly that I did not think this message would help the situation, that it had caused me a good deal of pain, that I feared any reply which I could send would only make things worse. ... I then handed it back to the Ambassador an envelope. Gousev opened the envelope to see what was inside it, and, recognising the message, said he had been instructed to deliver it to me. I then said, "I am not prepared to receive it, and got up to indicate in a friendly manner that our conversation was at an end. (V-272) It was, as Churchill admitted, "an unusual diplomatic incident, and, as I learnt later, it impressed the Soviet Government." The next day a contrite Molotov 26 / FINEST HOUR 82
"Whereas FDR required Stalin to trust in his 'assurances,' Churchill sought to convey 'the details of the story.'"
visited Eden in Moscow and "said that his Government greatly valued the convoys, and had sadly missed them." (V-272) DICTATE THE TONE OF THE CORRESPONDENCE
Churchill was always vigilant to grab the moral high ground when corresponding with Stalin and never, never to give it up. He understood two elusive facts: if you successfully maintain a civil tone, your correspondent, no matter how grudgingly, will sooner or later be forced to adopt civility himself; and, while a civil tone does not necessarily dictate friendly acts, incivility provides a ready excuse for unfriendly ones. One of the methods by which Churchill accomplished this was, again, silence in the face of Stalin's rudeness. But that was really no more than a refusal to play the game by his correspondent's rules. It did little to set his own moral tone. To that end, Churchill hardly let a cable or letter go by to Stalin, no matter now sharp the current tensions between them, without paying some tribute to his ally. Again and again, from 1941 all the way to the bitter end in 1945, he made repeated reference to the "bravery and tenacity of the soldiers and people" of Russia and their "splendid" or "grand" or "valiant" or "continued magnificent" or "continued marvelous" or "glorious" feats and heroisms. Particularly in 1941 such sentiments close Churchill's letters so frequently that sincerity gives way to ritual. The significance here is not the degree of spontaneity behind each expression in each missive but in the fact that Churchill was willing to make the dogged effort never to end discussions of their differences without a reaffirmation of their common interests. He was, in short, simply practicing civility, i.e., accentuating their commonalities while at the same time dissembling those other truths that might work as solvent on the social glue. On more occasions than one could have hoped for, Stalin's own letters in response began to sound (in tone if certainly not artistry) as though they could have been written by Churchill himself. The contrast between the typically tactless and demanding prose of Stalin's earlier communiques and his cable of 6 May 1942, approaches the comical:
I have a request of you. Some ninety steamers laded with various important war materials for the U.S.S.R. are bottled up at present in Iceland or in the approaches from America to Iceland. I understand there is a danger that the sailing of these ships may be delayed for a long time because of the difficulty to organize convoy escorted by the British naval forces. I am fully aware of the difficulties involved and of the sacrifices made by Great Britain in this matter. I feel however incumbent upon me to approach you with the request to take all possible measures in order to ensure the arrival of all the above-mentioned materials in the U.S.S.R. in the course of May, as this is extremely important for our front. Accept my sincere greetings and best wishes for success. (IV-260) "Incumbent upo n m e " indeed. As Churchill was himself to remark (IV-341), if properly stroked even Stalin could be made to "purr."
NEVER ALLOW YOUR PERSONAL FEELINGS TO DISTRACT YOU FROM YOUR ULTIMATE GOAL
Perhaps the most valuable lesson to be learned here — and the one that is the true measure of Churchill as statesman — was his absolute refusal in his correspondence to take his anger for a walk at the expense of long range aims. There is no question that Stalin's repeated disparaging of British war efforts and strategy, his astounding thanklessness, his arrogant blindness to the fact that until the Nazis invaded Russia he was more than willing to sell Britain up the Rhine — there is no question that these things rankled deeply. Anger still seethes from the pages of Churchill's commiserative letter to his long-suffering ambassador in Russia, Stafford Cripps: They certainly have no right to reproach us. They brought their own fate upon themselves when, by their pact with Ribbentrop, iheyi let Hitler loose on Poland and so started the war. ;\ ... We were left alone for a whole year while every Communist in England, under orders from Moscow, did his best to hamper our war effort. If we have been invaded and destroyed in July or August 1941, or starved out this year in the Battle of the Atlantic, they would have remained utterly indifferent. ... That a government with this record should accuse us of trying to make conquests in Africa or gain advantages in Persia at their expense or being willing to "fight to the last Russian soldier" leaves me quite cold. If they harbour suspicions of us, it is only because of the guilt and selfreproach in their own hearts. (III-472) Indeed, ten years later when he wrote his history of the period, pique could still be spotted pulsing beneath
the veil of sarcastic understatement: The Soviet Government had the impression they were conferring a great favour on us by fighting in their own country for their own lives. The more they fought, the heavier our debt became. This was not a balanced view. (III-388) But Churchill rigorously stifled his own fury in favor of the longterm goal. The alliance between Great Britain and Russia was indispensible if the war against Germany was to be won. Churchill was determined to keep it intact even if Stalin did everything he could to thwart the effort. There is no question but that Churchill knew what he was about: Two or three times in this long correspondence I had to protest in blunt language, but especially against the illusage of our sailors, who carried at so much peril the supplies to Murmansk and Archangel. Almost invariably however I bore hectoring and reproaches with "a patient shrug; for sufferance is the badge" of all who have to deal with the Kremlin. (III-388) It was the same wisdom he had recommended twenty-five years earlier to Sir John French when the Commander in Chief was at odds with War Minister Kitchener. "Above all, my dear friend," Churchill had written to French, "do not be vexed or discouraged. We are on the stage of history. Let us keep our anger for the common foe." (The World Crisis, 1916-1918, Pt. II, Ch. 3, pp. 505-06.) It is a remarkable achievement on Churchill's part that in the face of Stalin's provocation o.ver the long haul of World War II he succeeded in abiding unflaggingly by his own advice; Churchill's correspondence with Stalin does much to refute charges of egocentricity. That a man who could so successfully keep his own personal emotions and agenda in check could yet be perceived by so many of today's historians as essentially self-centered is irksome. In truth, Churchill's was a selfless effort which lesser men would not have been capable of making. Certainly it stands in pointed contrast to those world leaders who feel they must rattle swords, if not bury them in pulmonary cavities, to prove they are not wimps. Perhaps the greatest of lessons Churchill teaches the head of government, or anyone, for that matter, burdened with responsibility: first, to gain such scrupulous insight into one's own psyche that one is able to distinguish personal concern from duty; then, to make the oftentimes Herculean effort of self-control necessary to deny the former from ever compromising the latter. On "the stage of history" there are few who succeeded with more integrity, or artistry, than Winston Churchill. $ FINEST HOUR 82/27