CIF Warwick - China Review 2014 by CIF2013/4

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US-CHINA RELATIONS: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN TWO GREAT POWERS MEET MICHIEL FOULON

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AFRICA: EPICENTRE OF GEOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY JAMES CHAN - LEE

PROSPECTS AND REALITIES FOR NGOS IN CHINA DR HASMATH & PROF. HSU

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Message from the President !

President

Warwick's China in Focus society aims to provide an unbiased platform for discussion of all Chinese related topics, exploring a diverse range of topics such as economic, political and Gary Wong social issues. This year's China Forum, our flagship event has successfully touched upon a plethora of issues, including the growing role of the constitution in China and the controversial situation of Tibet. On top of the forum, we also arranged a series of seminars, in which an expert of the topic will give a presentation, followed by questions and answers and further discussion, essentially allowing students a more involved experience. Coupled with less academic topics such as an introduction to Chinese medicine and the role of non-governmental organisations in China, these seminars attracted students who may be intimidated by the more academic topics but nonetheless interested in China. This review includes a selection of articles written by students and academics, providing yet another platform for different views and opinions on once again a variety of topics.! I would like to thank everyone who contributed to this journal and our sponsors, the Economics department and Politics and International Studies department of the University of Warwick.!

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CIF Team 2013/14 ! ! ! ! ! Vice President - Julian Chan

! Events Executive - Tenzin Yangki

! Treasurer - Solomon Lin

! Speakers Executive - Kerstin Schopohl

! Marketing Executive - Felix Lee

! Marketing Executive - Ruihai Liu Youngblood

The China in Focus 2013/14 Team would like to take this opportunity to thank the University of Warwick, the University of Warwick Student Union, all society members, the China Public Affairs and Social Services Society and any other individual, society or organisation who has supported us through this academic year.

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A Short Personal Essay on China by: Gordon Fu

I was born in the year of l947

which period should belong to KMT(or KMD) party`s sovereignty in China then known as Republic of China aDer collapse of Qing dynasty. I am Chinese. I love my country no maHer how her name would be changed from one dictator to another dictator but it does mean that I love or respect the ruling dictator who only care about his ruling power without respecIng his people`s dignity and life.

that Mao did not like criIcs on his bad administraIon, he launched the famous Cultural RevoluIon. Again, our people were the vicIms of Mao’s crazy revoluIon. At that Ime more people were wrongly punished or killed. Mao`s internaIonal famous and bloody game was known as 1967 Cultural RevoluIon. The dream of stable life became a nightmare for everyone.

ADer the WWII, the then leader Chiang Kaishek resumed power in l945. However, due to corrupIon and unlawful business and invasion by Japan, a man called Mao Zedong, being a secret member of USSR communist party, established a branch organizaIon in China in the hope that the benefits of the USSR communist party in China and in Far East Asia would be protected. Mao Zedong also wanted to fulfil his ambiIon to rule over the whole China and started recruiIng army to revolt the then KMT (Chiang Kaishek)`s power. While the KMT troops was fighIng with invading Japanese army, Mao made use of the weapons (originally fiHed to fight Japanese army) to expend his area of power. Eventually in l949 when people wanted to have a new stable life, Mao got the power and ruled the whole China and chose the name for China as People’s Republic of China. To further Mao`s ambiIon and to show off his power in China, he sent about 500,000 soldiers to help North Korea to conquer South Korea. Of course, our people sacrificed their lives to please Mao’s ambiIon. ADer that, Mao wanted to strengthen his power and fame, established a special squad to eliminate opposing parIes by way of death punishment. Again our people became the vicIms of Mao`s poliIcal game. And aDer that, Mao made wrong decisions for food harvest. Again, our people died of hunger due to his wrong administraIon. And aDer

Portrait of Mao Zedong (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org)

And aDer Mao`s death, Deng got the power and introduced an Open Policy in China, the people under great pressure then grasped the open policy chance and became too open-‐minded but with less morality and did anything at their own wills such as making poisoned food in the hope that they should get more money in compensaIon for all grieves suffered by their fathers and grandfathers who had been fooled by the crazy Mao , a dictator snatching power from people but instead bullying their people. Even now, negaIve news and records telling us that there are sIll corrupted officials abusing their powers bullying the peoples of China are frequently seen or heard. More corrupted officials are sIll employed in the states while the naIonal or state reserves decreased a lot. The vow for good by Mao seemed never come true nor fulfilled. The Open Policy by Deng trigger the non-‐ educated people to do bad or immoral things or products to hurt or harm people because !3

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Mao did not educate the people in good manner but to struggle for Mao’s good by hook or by crook mainly for Mao’s beneﬁts, fame ,power or internaIonal status. I do hope my next generaIons will not face the same disasters as Mao brought us since l949. However, will there be a real person represenIng a good leader in China? God knows.

!! !

A billboard showing Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen, a Special Economic Zone. Source: http://zh.wikipedia.org

U.S. - China Relations: What happens when two great powers meet?

Is outright conﬂict between the U.S. and China inevitable? This is currently o n e o f t h e i m p o r ta nt q u e sI o n s i n internaIonal poliIcs. Considering China’s development to date, poliIcians, academics, and business leaders ask themselves how the bilateral relaIonship between the U.S. and China will evolve. The paramount ques/on remains whether the two superpowers of our /me will get along through the 21st Century. The stakes are high since the China-‐ U.S. relaIonship is seen by many to be key to securing peace and prosperity in the years ahead. At the same Ime, those with a pessimisIc view of the world only see trouble; from Pyongyang’s nuclear ambiIons and mariIme tensions in the East and South China Sea, to Cyber warfare through to currency disputes. But does this mean that relaIons between the two major powers in today’s world will inevitably lead to conﬂict? Two views dominate this debate, namely the more opImist liberal and the more pessimist realist arguments.

F r o m t h e l i b e r a l v i e w, e c o n o m i c interdependence and the creaIon of bilateral dialogues and insItuIons will restrict military rivalry. This is oDen substanIated by the fact

that in 2013, U.S. imports from China rose to 440 billion USD and Foreign Direct Investment from China in the U.S. has more than doubled over the past three years. In addiIon to this economic interdependence argument, debates oDen expand to ‘complex interdependence’ between the U.S. and China, encompassing a wider web of connecIons including migraIon. Simply consider the large numbers of Chinese students in the U.S. including Xi Mingze, President Xi Jinping’s daughter who enrolled at Harvard in 2010. Any military conﬂict between U.S. and China would obviously jeopardise both states’ interests at a great variety of levels. Furthermore, both countries established bilateral dialogues such as the U.S. – China Strategic and Economic Dialogue aimed at easing tensions over poliIcal, economic, security and strategic issues. Thus, for those who examine the relaIonship from a l i b e r a l v i e w , b e i t e c o n o m i c interdependence, complex interdependence or liberal insItuIonalism, there are plenty of factors that reduce the likelihood for outright military conﬂict.

“China-U.S. relationship… key to securing peace and

Others however disagree with this view. First, although the liberal argument seems perfunctorily plausible, the astonishing

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mutual dependence in both the economic and poliIcal domain of the U.S. – China relaIonship since the 1990s did not reduce but rather aggravated the constant wariness and low levels of mutual trust between the two naIons. For example, U.S. business investment in China’s biotechnology sectors creates fear that the Chinese could gain access to informaIon that harms the U.S.' c o m p e I I v e e c o n o m i c p o s i I o n a n d jeopardises U.S. naIonal interests. Second, the liberal argument does not guarantee peaceful relaIons between the two superpowers as it merely purports that these liberal forces foster good relaIonships and, at best, reduce the likelihood of conﬂict. In these debates, people oDen refer to Norman Angell who famously discussed this argument in 1909, merely ﬁve years before the outbreak of World War I: ‘the economic interdependence of the countries in the world is so great that waging war would be fu/le, prohibiIvely costly and would ruin everyone.’ Furthermore, it is not a secret that both the Pentagon and China’s Central Military Commission have conIngency plans, “just in case”. Therefore, the rash and opImisIc conclusion drawn from the liberal argument raises a number of quesIons and for many observers this points to the more pessimisIc ‘realist’ view of China – U.S. relaIons for the years ahead.

ParIcularly, at the dawn of the Centennial it has become popular to compare 2014 with 1914, as Oxford Historian Professor Margaret MacMillan most recently argued in her Brookings Paper: ‘history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes’. Some experts even go as far to argue that relaIons in the East Asian region today are heading towards a third World War. Yet, by emphasising such historical comparisons from the pessimisIc realist view, part of the danger lies in believing that conﬂict is inevitable whilst it may be avoidable. First, the quesIon at stake is not ‘what do we expect China to do given certain historical parallels and contemporary internaIonal anarchical condiIons?’, but rather what can China do. It is oDen expected that China’s economic growth paHern will inevitably conInue, that it will grow into an ag gressive superpower and become entangled in a great power conﬂict. Yet many

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Source: www.bluecollarmuse.com

of its domesIc challenges may halt its rise in the years ahead including environmental degradaIon, a reduced labour force due to the one-‐child policy (though a relaxaIon of this policy was announced in 2013), high local government debt, a looming middle income trap, reliance on exports and credit-‐ led growth, and so forth. All of these domesIc challenges have gained of geo-‐ economic and geostrategic importance and will slow and potenIally even halt the PRC’s future growth. Indeed, China is oDen discussed as if it were already the hyper power and threat to the internaIonal order it perhaps may never be. Furthermore the U.S. rhetoric about the ‘China threat’ emerged in the early 1990s, when in 1995 China’s economy was only 10 % of that of the U.S., a mere 12 % by 2000 and less than 20 % by 2005. It was only by 2010 that China’s economy amounted to 40 % of that of the U.S. and became the number one challenger to the United States. A significant shiD in the material distribuIon of power did not take place unIl the late 2000s, but the U.S. nevertheless perceived China as a potenIal great power threat in the future as early as the 1990s. Warwick Professor Shaun Breslin referred to this as ‘imaginary China’, and others as a sheer fantasy: imagining a future China that may never materialise. Building on this, one might argue that scenarios about conflict devised today are based on such fantasies. As a result, the predicIon of China as an aggressive superpower and of the inevitability of conflict seems premature.

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Next, there is the popular rhetoric that U.S. – China relaIons will become a new ‘Cold War’. Both historical eras cannot be fully compared, and if compared at all, then for some the lesson might as well have been that the Cold War was more like a ‘Long Peace’ where the major powers operated as a deterrent for great power conﬂict. Likewise, the Chinese challenge the noIon that U.S. hegemony in its unipolar moment will be stabilising in their bilateral relaIonship and for peace and prosperity in the world. This view holds that a bipolar order between DC and Beijing creates a balance of power and a more stable internaIonal order. Therefore, it is possible, and for some even likely, that the two superpowers of our Ime will refrain from outright military conﬂict and maintain decades of ‘enduring peace’.

have probably been reluctant to agree during their meeIng six weeks ago. The idea of a ‘new type of great power relaIonship’ to avoid the repeat of a great power conﬂict remains more of a slogan rather than a concrete plan. Therefore, the important next step for the leadership is to deepen the noIon of that new type of relaIonship.

First, The White House should involve China

“Therefore, it is possible … that the two powers … maintain decades of “enduring peace”.” as an acIve player in the emerging strategic internaIonal framework. It should not be all too surprising that given U.S. military presence surrounding China, and the Trans-‐ Paciﬁc Partnership, which does not include the People’s Republic, that the Chinese feel somewhat imprisoned. Second, leadership in both countries will have to establish and recognise their commonaliIes of interests. As their poliIcal and economic strategies become more and more intertwined, their agenda of communal interests is ever widening. Finally, both countries need to establish agreement on how they can manage their major power relaIonship and potenIal miscalculaIons in a bipolar order that will be much more murky to read than the current unipolar order.

Finally, even if China will develop into the next superpower, and even if all domesIc and internaIonal condiIons that point towards a path of conflict are present, the leaders in both China and the U.S. are likely to use history as a mirror since both governments aim to build a construc/ve rela/onship. During his visit to Washington DC in February 2013 President Xi Jinping called for “a new type of relaIonship between major countries in the 21st century”. Likewise, Hillary Clinton, potenIally the next DemocraIc nominee for the 2016 U.S. PresidenIal elecIon, also reflected this idea in her Secretary of State farewell speech in January 2013, staIng that “we are trying to write a new answer to the age-‐old quesIon of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet”. None of this discourse excludes military opIons, but at the very least it allows us to quesIon the alleged inevitability of great power conflict between the U.S. and China and the pessimisIc view about peace and prosperity in the 21st century.

If both countries are serious about finding a new answer to the age-‐old quesIon of the transiIon of hegemonies, avoiding repeaIng the old paHern of perpetual war, outright military conflict and a return to the part of InternaIonal PoliIcs that is indeed “nasty, bruIsh and short”, then much work remains to be done. Plenty of security concerns will remain for the foreseeable future, and probably even exacerbate in the years ahead, but outright military conflict is not inevitable.

Does this mean a return to the opImist liberal view and that U.S. – China relaIons are looking rosy and will be smooth in the years ahead? U.S. Army Chief of Staﬀ General Ray Odierno and Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission Fan Changlong

!Michiel Foulon is Doctoral Researcher in

International Relations at The University of Warwick (m.w.b.foulon@warwick.ac.uk).

! !6

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An Essay: Africa Epicentre of Geopolitical conflicts in the 21st Century  by James Howard Chan-Lee, Sciences-Po Paris 15/2/14

! !

Since the late 1990s, Africa and especially the sub-Saharan part of the continent has become a key strategic target for the United States and China. Each proposes a very different mode of operation. Who will win the battle?

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s inﬂuence in Africa has grown exponenIally, parIcular in the sub-‐Sahara (1). Over the past dozen years, trade and ﬁnance with Africa has increased 15 fold and China has become the major player in building the conInent’s infrastructure.

Pax Americana in the Third World  At the end of the Second World War, a third of the world’s populaIon lived under the implicit control and umbrella of Pax Americana (2) and this became even more evident aDer the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of communist hegemony. But, the near-‐death ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 was a criIcal turning point in American inﬂuence. Although its monopoly over “hard power” (2) remains indisputable, the USA has experienced intractable problems in redressing its economy onto a path of high durable growth (soD power) (2). Perhaps these are the consequences of the “arrogance and corrupIon of absolute power”?

In fact, history demonstrates that undisputed power, fed by human egoism is highly toxic for moral values. And, if one adds the disengagement of modern urban ciIzens and the paralysis of democracies faced with adversity, we quickly find the main causes of moral decay and the West’s financial bankruptcy (3). In reality, the world has no leader today (4) !   Hence, the geopoliIcal stakes in the 21st century in Africa will probably be won by the power that finds an appropriate form for peaceful co-‐evoluIon of Pax Sino-‐Americana. But first, a compromise between two different visions of the world must be found: i.e., “DemocraIc-‐Liberal Capitalism” versus “Authoritarian, State-‐dominated Capitalism”. The main challenge is that each vision assumes that its naIonal values are unique and of a kind to which all other peoples naturally aspire (5).

Moreover, the USA’s proclivity is missionary. They believe that they have a moral obligaIon to spread their universal values (of democracy and freedom) to all parts of the globe; regardless of circumstances. By contrast, China’s proclivity is cultural. She does not proselyIse; and has no pretensions to impose the relevance of her insItuIons on other countries. Hence, China’s primary moIve for its presence in Africa is to ensure the security of supply for its life-‐line of raw materials and energy.

Hence, an ideological conﬂict between State capitalism and ultra-‐liberal capitalism seems inevitable in the face of an explosion of Sino-‐African trade links and poliIcal cooperaIon.

The United States in Africa, free trade and subsidies   For more than 60 years, the essenIal allies of the United States have been Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, South Korea and Mexico (6). Hence, the priority to help raise sub-‐Saharan African states out of poverty was nil, unIl quite recently. Thus, most of Foreign Aid sent to Africa was poliIcally moIvated or military.   In 2000, the United States shiDed its policies by allowing a selecIon of exports from sub-‐Saharan African states to enter duty-‐free into its markets, to encourage economic growth via the A.G.O.A (2). Following this, to promote the beHer use of humanitarian aid, the ﬁght against corrupIon and the development of human rights and democracy, the USA launched the Millennium Challenge Accounts (M.C.A.). !7

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Since 2004, an annual budget of about 600 million dollars has been aHributed to 25 countries: among them, 12 in sub-‐Saharan Africa in 2012. The success of this aid policy is uncertain. Its defenders cite the advancement in such criteria as good governance, transparency and the rule of law in several States. But, its detractors point to the fact that the most deprived and corrupt countries (The D.R. of Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Angola) do not meet the criteria to receive M.C.A. aid Moreover, the sample of eligible countries is limited and the criteria far too narrow to objecIvely judge the quality of the results achieved (7). Finally, the M.C.A. is oDen perceived by recipients as being paternalisIc and imposed by the USA on recipient countries.

China in Africa  By contrast, the goals of China in Africa have varied sharply from period to period. Between 1949 and 1977, under Mao Tse Toung’s (8) regime, China exported the concept of revoluIon. Hence, its priorites were technical training, agriculture techniques (irrigaIon, improvement in seed types), educaIon and health. This period, notably, saw the creaIon of the Movement of “Non-‐aligned” States (2) and the construcIon of the iconic TANZAM railroad (2). ADer Mao's death, between 1978 and 1992, Deng Ziao Ping (9) and China entered into a long period of consolidaIon and pragmaIsm; while keeping a low proﬁle towards foreign countries. Hence, China’s rush to Africa really began towards the end of 1990s with the government’s encouragement for large Chinese companies to Go Global.

China’s State capitalism model in Africa   A parIcular feature of China’s State capitalism model is its philosophical approach to reach final objecIves. First, the sovereignty of host countries is always respected. Africa and China share a common sombre history of colonialism and this affinity greatly facilitates mutual aid: from South to South, equal to equal, to win – win agreements. Moreover, China does not give lessons to others. She explains the success and failures of her strategy and encourages host countries to adapt their approach by taking into account their culture and capacity for implementaIon. Finally, every project is accompanied before, during and aDer its implementaIon, by a team of technical advisers assisted by its dynamic Diaspora (10). In fact, for Anglo Saxons the noIon of State-‐capitalism is an oxymoron (11). This view is certainly true for agriculture and small enterprises, but the case of large enterprises is more ambiguous in an era of globalisaIon, where economies of scale and access to credit is criIcal (12). China’s approach here is pragmaIc: there are a range of possible choices, depending on circumstances. In this instance, ownership is a red herring; the criIcal issues are efficiency and aHaining objecIves (13).

Since 1978, China has taken a hosIle stance vis-‐à-‐vis monopoly. Hence, all its markets are open to public and private enterprises and/or foreign companies. Thus, compeIIon is China’s ‘safety net’; it is also the driver of innovaIon and investment in research and development, and the under-‐recognized key to its success.

CorrupBon, the cancer of Africa A big obstacle to development is rampant theD of Africa’s huge wealth of natural resources by a corrupt elite (notably in the D.R. of Congo, Nigeria and Zaire); while the general populaIon lives in poverty. Angola is an interesIng example: from 1975 to 2002, following a bloody civil war which led to 1,5 million deaths, the country was heavily indebted; but its plenIful oil reserves were a promise for its future. In 2004, the IMF and the Paris Club (2) insisted on deep structural reforms, the eliminaIon of corrupIon, and an internaIonal audit of the accounts for its huge petro revenues. In exchange, the IMF promised to commit badly needed funding. Without any other possibiliIes, Angola in 2005 was ready to accept these harsh condiIons; but at the last moment, China proposed an uncondiIonal 2 billion dollar loan! This oﬀer triggered an avalanche of Western criIcisms denouncing Chinese duplicity and the dangers of Neo Colonialism, as well as underscoring China’s cosy relaIons with bloody dictators, blatant record on human rights, corrupIon, democracy and the environment.

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But strangely, aDer China’s loan was granted, a wave of Western banks also unblocked loans to keep their markets ! Even more fascinaIng, the corrupt Angolan elites never saw a cent of the 2 billion dollars! All the funds were held in blocked accounts at the China Development Bank, and released as infrastructure projects were approved by the Angolans, and built by Chinese companies. In short, thanks to what the World Bank called the “Angola Mode”, hospitals, schools, roads, sewers, irrigaIon and water purificaIon systems were reconstructed aDer forty years of neglect. In short, ordinary Angolans finally benefiHed from their country’s wealth. Moreover, in 2007, Angola paid off all of its debts to the Paris Club and implemented all the reforms demanded by the IMF unilaterally (14).

Is the Angolan mode perfect? No, but since 2000, Angola is among the ten fastest growing countries in the world. In fact, what do Africans think about China? Opinion polls, notably taken by the US Pew Research Centre (15) of the intellectual elites in nine African countries, showed that China is more highly regarded as a development partner than the USA (16). Hence, acIons seems to be more eloquent than words.

The West’s legacy to Africa  To grasp China’s impact on Africa, it is essenIal to remember that in 1950, sub-‐Saharan Africa states had a GDP per person 50 % higher than East Asia’s; but in 2012, Asia’s was eight Imes richer! This huge gap was due to industrializaIon and globalizaIon. ADer almost 60 years of independence, 3 to 4 everyday commodiIes (coffee, cocoa, rubber and especially minerals and oil) sIll represent approximately 2/3 rds of sub-‐Saharan exports, which mostly benefits the elites. Hence, mostAfricans remain very poor and vulnerable to wildly fluctuaIng commodity prices ; subject to persistent falls relaIve to manufactured goods over the past 50 -‐ 60 years. Worse, minerals and energy wealth severely undermines the natural development of basic industries, infrastructure (roads, factories, machines) educaIon policy and public health.

The western media oDen criIcises the rapid growth of Africa’s imports from China as a plague for local industry. This is pure hypocrisy. African local industry has rarely existed (except in South Africa). And, one should not forget the enormous beneﬁts to low income consumers, coming from access to simple durable goods (washing machine, telephones, television, radio) at highly compeIIve prices.

In truth, the goals of colonialism were never to develop indigenous industry or to establish sustainable growth, but to exploit the host countries. Moreover, industrializaIon sIll remains blocked by the colonialist legacy of large numbesr of small, heterogeneous States, with limited accessibility owing to primiIve or non-‐existent infrastructure (roads or rail).

The Shenzen model In a conInent as complex as Africa, China does not propose a model, but rather an entry Icket into a strategy of development called “the flying geese paHern” (17). Hence, the first step was the construcIon of a funcIoning infrastructure network. The second was the successful launch of Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (2) in MauriIus, Nigeria, Zambia, Egypt and Ethiopia, based on the successful Shenzen SEZ model (2). These SEZs have raised great interest because African SEZs (government managed) were failures. Why did the Chinese succeed? There are several reasons: private management, efficiency due to compeIIon arising from the need to export to Chinese and Asian markets, and a long-‐term strategy with mutual benefits.

In sum, China brought management skills, finances, state subsidies and assured access to its enormous market, while the host country also benefited from higher employment, beHer technical skills, human capital and an industrial base. Thus, despite big poliIcal, economic and social obstacles, China’s policy in Africa is a process “of learning by doing” with a real potenIal for the future – despite inevitable ongoing difficulIes.

The future of Africa

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Since the year 2000, 6 of the 10 fastest growing countries in the world are African (Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda). Faced with a conInent that the West considered as “hopeless”, 40 years ago, this is a radical change! The reasons? The integraIon of Africa into the world economy and rapid growth of trade with Asia and China.

How can one judge the impact of China or the United States on Africa? This is very difficult. First, the amounts of aid and foreign investments are difficulty comparable. Hence, foreign trade may be the most reliable indicator of influence of major powers. In 2000, total trade (exports and imports) amounted to 10,6 billion dollars for China and 38,6 billion dollars for the United States. But by 2012, US -‐ African trade had tripled to 99,8 billion dollars. But, at the same Ime, China-‐African trade mulIplied nineteen fold, to almost two hundred billion dollars! American aid to sub-‐Saharan Africa rose from $1,4 billion in 2001, to $9,2 billion in 2012. Chinese figures are not comparable, but do not seem to be very far behind (18). Finally, figures concerning Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa (factories, companies) are hotly disputed, but China again seems to be catching up quickly to the United States.

In conclusion, in 2009 China became Africa’s first trading partner ahead of the United States. In 2011 she became the world’s biggest exporter. This trend is only the beginning of a long-‐term strategic partnership between China and Africa, if we judge from the current take-‐off in FDI, technology transfers; and cultural and scienIfic exchange.

Symbolically, the hegemony of Pax Americana, and the inevitable triumph of ultra-‐liberal capitalism and the democracy, is being deeply challenged by a model that is more ‘StaIst’, fair, pragmaIc and holisIc (19). If the Third World countries is aHracted to the Chinese model it is for the eventual aHainment of sustained economic growth and an escape from poverty : with the promise of keeping sovereignty over their desIny. But the baHle between China and the United States has just begun. To establish a real alternaIve, China must implement real and deep social reforms ; radically change its social and environmental policies, and improve its dismal record on Human Rights. Paradoxically, the best way of realising “ The Chinese Dream” proposed by President Xi Jinping (20) would be to follow the ancient tradiIon of Confucian virtues.

! !

NOTES

(1) Sub-‐Saharan Africa is situated south of the Sahara desert. (2) See glossary of geopoliIcal terms (3) In 2011, interests on the naIonal debt amounted to 452 billion dollars, represenIng 66 % of military expenditures (682 billion dollar of military expenditures). Hence, the United States can hardly play the role of gendarme of the world because its main creditor is China. (4) ADer the Second World War, there was a G-‐2 (an informal group of discussion and economic partnership between the United States and Soviet Union) which was then transformed into the G7 (group seven) and then to the G-‐20 (group twenty). ADer the economic crisis of 2008, the United States could no longer play the role of world leader and China refuses this role. (5) See, “On China”, by Henry Kissinger, Ed. Penguin Press New York, 2011., pp. 2-‐3. (6) These prioriIes explain America’s huge military aid to Israel, Iraq, Egypt and Afghanistan. (7) The classic example of misleading indicators is the percentage of children registered in schools or paIents treated in hospitals, without increasing the number of professors or doctors (or necessary text books, etc.), to maintain the standards used by these indicators. These indicators are precise, but the diﬃculty is realizing qualitaIve objecIves, in spite of quanItaIve criteria. (8) Chinese military Leader and founder of the People's Republic of China (1893-‐1976). (9) Deputy General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and de facto leader of the People's Republic of China (1904-‐1997) aDer Mao Tse Tung. (10) The failures of western projects are oDen due to their inadaptability to local condiIons and to weak technical follow-‐up. During the construcIon of the Tanzam railroad, Chinese engineers shared painful living condiIons in the bush with African workers. On the other hand, unIl recently, western !1 0

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cadres were accommodated in luxury hotels in Africa and transported to construcIon sites by helicopter! (11) According to this vision a public/private hybrid is condemned to failure -‐ because the free market is always a beHer judge of profitability of a project than bureaucrats. (12) Ultra-‐liberal capitalism is criIcized for its narrow vision of short-‐term profitability, which favours speculaIon to the detriment of the environment, long-‐term profitability, investment in human resources, research and development and the neglect of social and civic responsibiliIes. The same weaknesses exist in State capitalism, but can be solved more quickly if there is poliIcal will. (13) In fact, large American companies have thousand of shareholders, but are oDen controlled by a handful of minority investors that hold less than 10 % of common shares. (14) See, BrauIgam, D. (2009), “ The Dragon's GiD: the real story”, Oxford University Press (15) A big American polling agency that analyses and supplies informaIon on a{tudes and trends which influence the United States and the world (16) Sautman B., and Hairong Y. (2009), African PerspecBves on China-‐Africa Links in China Quarterly special issue, China and Africa : Emerging PaJerns in GlobalizaBon and Development, Strauss and Saavedra, Ed. Cambridge. (17) The “Flying geese paHern” is an Asian paradigm to catch up to the West based on a regional hierarchy where the producIon of simple consumer goods (texIles and footwear) conInually moves from more advanced to the least developed countries. An example is the successive migraIon of Nike factories, whenever labour becomes too expensive. Thus, underdeveloped countries in a region are aligned successively behind advanced industrial countries, in the order of their stages of development, as in “ a flying geese paHern”. The lead goose is Japan and the second Ier consists of industrialized countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong); followed by the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. Finally, there are the big least developed states in the region: China , Vietnam ... at the rear, although some sectors of Chinese industry now rival those in second ranked countries. (18) UnIl recently, foreign aid data was a State secret. Chinese aid includes direct aid. In 2012, loans at low rates or no interest totalled $ 15 billion, the cancellaIon of old debts $ 3.8 billion. Infrastructure construcIon, easily measurable materials and free services represent 40% of the assistance provided by China. Through these projects, China Development Bank has become the world’s leading lender ahead of the World Bank. In 2012, China doubled its credit lines to create infrastructure in Africa, to 20 billion dollars. It has expanded the entry of duty-‐free exports, created an investment fund of $ 5 billion for agriculture , infrastructure and natural resources; with a commitment to diversify trade and accelerate technology transfer. (19) In 1989, Francis Fukuyama (born in 1952) , philosopher, economist and researcher in American poliIcal science, argued that the world would inevitably evolve towards democracy and freee market capitalism. But 2013, was the 7th consecuIve year of decline in democracy (Freedom House). Hence, despite strong growth in Africa since 2000, the advancement of democracy has stalled or declined. See “The End of History and the Last Man”, Francis Fukuyama, 1989, published in The NaBonal Interest. (20) Xi Jinping (born in 1953) President of the People's Republic of China since 2013 , Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

Glossary of socio-‐poli/cal Terms used in the Essay

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Act established in 2000 by the U.S. Congress to support the economy of African countries by facilitaIng their access to U.S. markets if they follow the principles of a liberal economy. In sub-‐Saharan Africa, this act has allowed the export of 6000 African products, duty free.

Tanzam Railroad: a railway built between Tanzania and Zambia in the 1970s, of about 1,860 km, to open up in Zambia, a landlocked country and to create an alternaIve to a railroad through Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, two apartheid regimes boycoHed by most independent African countries. This project, was iniIally rejected by the BriIsh and the World Bank as impossible to build and unproﬁtable; it was built between 1970 and 1976 by China under extremely diﬃcult condiIons, and !1 1

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was China’s largest aid programme in its history, equivalent to 5 % of GDP, when China was sIll a very poor country.

The Paris Club was established in 1956. This informal group of official creditors (19 developed countries) coordinates and finds sustainable soluIons for the difficulIes of highly indebted countries. They give debt relief (debt rescheduling, and reducIons in debt service) for defined periods to help restore financial stability. The Paris Club has made 429 agreements with 90 countries for 573 billion dollars.

Hard power and soK power: geopoliIcal terms introduced by Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr. , U.S. geopoliIcal scienIst, specialist in InternaIonal RelaIons and Chairman of the North American group within the Trilateral Commission, since 2009 (a private organizaIon comprising 300 to 400 decision-‐makers, including the most influenIal economic, poliIcal and intellectuals of Western Europe, North America and Asia Pacific to promote and build economic cooperaIon between the world’s three key areas). He is author of “Understanding InternaBonal Conflicts”, published by Public Affairs in New York in 2002.  On “hard power”: this is the ability to influence the behaviour of others through duress, coercion and the possible use of military force. On “soK power”: this is the power to influence and persuade behaviour by economic, ideological and cultural means.

Millennium Challenge Accounts: a bilateral development fund created by President G. W. Bush in January 2004, to help countries that have achieved prescribed performance targets in three areas: good governance, the management of public affairs, and creaIng a favourable environment for private iniIaIve and the state’s commitment to make significant investments in civil society. The goal of this partnership is to reduce poverty through economic growth. To qualify for this programme, countries must meet 17 specific indicators.

Movement of Non-‐Aligned Countries: The Bandung DeclaraIon in1956 created a “non-‐aligned” internaIonal organizaIon during the Cold War; in 2012, 120 States deﬁned themselves as being aligned while being neither for or against any major world power, to give a voice to the states of the Third World.

Pax Americana : “American Peace” refers to the hegemony of the United States in the world and its role as a watchdog of democracy.

Shenzhen is sub-‐ provincial city in Guangdong Province, located on the edges of Hong Kong. In 1979, a part of its territory acquired the status of Special Economic Zone. It has experienced dramaIc economic and populaIon growth. In 2010, its populaIon reached 10 million and it is one of the richest municipaliIes in China. By extension, Shenzhen denotes an economic model that China has replicated in other ciIes, and abroad.

Special economic zone ( SEZ): geographical area that does not apply taxes on imports of raw materials, machinery and equipment and whose economic laws are more liberal (including exempIon from taxes on companies and the award of long-‐term subsidies) to aHract foreign investment.

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Prospects and Reali/es for NGOs in China

Jennifer YJ Hsu, University of Alberta Reza Hasmath, University of Oxford

Non-‐governmental organisa/ons (NGOs) in China face an uphill baHle. A NGO operaIng in the naIon today must deal with a number of challenges simultaneously: manoeuvre around state control, navigate state regulaIons, improve the state and public’s trust in their organisaIon, and crucially, secure funding for its future survival. Despite these challenges, Chinese NGOs have grown ostensibly over the last decade. The Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs – the department responsible for managing NGOs – esImated that there were 462,000 registered social organisaIons by the end of 2011, an increase of 3.7 per cent from the year prior. This ﬁgure can be as high as 3 million when esImates of unregistered social organisaIons, and those registered with the Industry and Commerce Bureau, are factored.

! The Regulatory Framework and ‘Space’ to Operate !

Despite the overall numerical growth of Chinese NGOs, the sector is sIll marked by complex and strict regulaIons. For instance, for NGOs to obtain legal status they must register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and have a sponsoring government agency. These procedures are cumbersome and difficult to complete, notably the requirement of finding a sponsoring agency. For NGOs who seek to by-‐pass this process, they tend to register with the Industry and Commerce Bureau as a business, which has its own inherent difficulIes notably when it comes to securing external funding.

The central state has sought to amend the legal framework that govern NGOs, and has worked with NGOs and local governments alike on pilot projects that will inform the naIonal policy on the “social management” of NGOs. Since the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-‐2015), the Communist Party-‐state has called upon greater collaboraIon between state and non-‐ state actors to improve social service delivery, and related social policies, under the rubric of enhancing social governance.

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Source: www.unitedplanet.org

While there is consensus amongst China’s top leaders with respect to the need for social reform and for NGOs to parIcipate in this process, we should not expect greater liberalisaIon for NGOs to pursue non-‐ social welfare or service delivery acIviIes. Given the nascent nature of most Chinese NGOs, paired with the strength of the corporaIst state, NGOs are unlikely to deviate from the ‘space’ set out for them by the state.

From the view of the Chinese state, NGOs are considered to be in aid the state through the delivery of social services. Put diﬀerently, NGOs are seen as gap ﬁllers due to the decreasing ability and capacity of the local state to provide social welfare provisions. Consequently, the state’s interests in NGOs are more aHuned to how these organisaIons can complement the role of the state, rather than take an interest in the values or epistemic capital these organisaIons promote. For the most part, Chinese NGOs do not see their role as advocaIng for macro-‐structural changes, let alone direct overt poliIcal change.

! AcBviBes and Challenges !

InteresIngly, major disasters have invigorated the NGO sector to become more acIve in dealing with societal crisis and meeIng the day-‐to-‐day needs of certain marginalised segments of society. For instance, the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 provided !1 3

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room for NGOs to mobilise resources to conduct relief efforts. Not only were NGOs involved in relief efforts, but a range of state and non-‐state actors, from government officials to the media, were drawn into their orbit. The diversity of actors involved in the e a r t h q u a ke effo r t s f u r t h e r m e a nt g re ate r opportuniIes for NGOs to engage with other NGOs to build social networks for future acIviIes. Arguably, t h i s “ h o r i zo n t a l n e t w o r k i n g ” h a s l e d t o unprecedented changes for NGOs operaIng in China, and more deliberaIons at the highest levels over the Party-‐state’s management of NGOs. Yet, the internal challenges for Chinese NGOs (registered or unregistered) range from a lack of transparency to accountability issues. Major headline scandals involving the misappropriaIon of funds by employees, such as the Chinese Red Cross in 2011, and the China Youth Development Fund in 2004 (although strictly government-‐organised chariIes), do not help the public confidence and percepIon of NGOs. Moreover, NGOs are far from operaIng on simple altruism. QuesIons about founder’s moIves, and more inclusive governing structures of individual organisaIons, are serious issues to consider.

! Future Prospects !

Notwithstanding state investment to the tune of 200 million RMB (US $32 million) to fund social service provisions by NGOs, the move to contracIng NGOs to deliver social services can further demarcate the boundaries of acceptability for NGOs in the eyes of

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the Party-‐state. Under such model, we can expect apparatuses of the Party-‐state, such as government-‐ organised NGOs (GONGOs), to become more acIve. The state across all levels are already shaping the parameters of NGOs’ work, not only through regulaIons, but subtly through designaIng “model” type NGOs and by giving awards to well-‐performing ones. It is through such measures that we see a discernible shiD in the behaviour of NGOs, insofar as NGOs shiD towards similar work or project areas given it has been deemed “poliIcally safe”. As the Chinese state moves towards a contracIng model of social services, whereby the state is the principal and the NGO becomes the agent of the state, we can anIcipate more NGOs operaIng in China moulding or establishing themselves based on successful NGOs that have received state contracts.

By demarcaIng the ‘space’ for NGOs to operate, through regulaIons, awards and designaIons, offering contracts to a small percentage of NGOs, these factors will only further determine the boundaries of NGOs acIviIes in China. Moreover, with the Party-‐state leading and guiding the social management innovaIon process we can expect that the Party-‐state will strengthen its verIcal managerial funcIons; and, by collaboraIng with NGOs it will forIfy the state’s access and hold on the grassroots of society. Suffice to say, we should not be misled to think that the state is loosening its hold on NGOs, rather it may very well be that the state is seeking to establish more effecIve control mechanisms in the governance of NGOs.

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Dr Reza Hasmath and Professor Jennifer Hsu during a Panel Session with China in Focus. Held at the University of Warwick

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China: Export king? On the contrary, sustaining growth is not simply a matter of boosting consumption by: Michael Yip

Academic and media discourse mostly point to the same thing: China must conInue to rebalance its investment-‐and-‐export led economy towards services and domesIc consumpIon if it is to sustain economic growth. This is quite true.

There is only so much a country can invest in a

reducing invesIng for investments’ sake, as inﬂaIon will also rise and returns on investment will fall far below expectaIons.

As for the producIon of exports, the picture is much less clear. InsItuIons and individuals hold deep, vested interests in maintaining industrial output and levels of exports for

Source: China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social

given Ime period, and China is reaching that limit. Over-‐investment has resulted in newly-‐ constructed-‐yet-‐disused shopping malls, empty theme parks and modern ghost towns all over China-‐ for which there has been no tangible demand. These planned ameniIes are now overgrown wastelands. China should conInue

ﬁnancial gain, if only in the short term. It is unlikely that they view economic rebalancing with much favour, if at all.

Most of China’s factories are located along the eastern seaboard, where major ﬁnancial hubs are located and where there is also easy access

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to the trade ports. They are in fact clustered around Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen.

Whereas these factories were once located amongst massive pools of cheap, young labour (which could be readily tapped or, indeed, exploited), these urban areas have now become aﬄuent. Increased costs of living, standards of living and wage expectaIons push the cost of labour higher.

Indeed, the current Five-‐Year Plan (2011-‐15) forecasts an average naIonwide increase of 13% per year; this figure is likely to be conservaIve in comparison to the eastern seaboard. Furthermore, labourers are not only demanding higher wages-‐ but also beHer working condiIons, benefits and rights. Employers are acquiescing, and all of this erodes at China’s raw producIve efficiency and, in turn, the compeIIve advantage of its exports.

In addiIon, thanks to Mao’s One-‐child policy, lower birth rates conﬁdently project fewer people entering the workforce in the future. This has unduly distorted the current workforce. According to China's NaIonal Bureau of StaIsIcs, the number of people theoreIcally able to enter the Chinese workforce in 2012 (individuals aged 15 to 59), shrank slightly to 937.27 million people, a decrease of 3.45 million from 2011. This is a trend, and the One-‐child policy has, for the next generaIon up unIl 2030 at least, irreversibly diminished the size of the producIve workforce.

With an ever-‐expensive and ever-‐shrinking workforce, exports become dearer. This is especially in comparison with compeIng Southeast Asian and BRIC economies that do not face the same socioeconomic or demographic problems. As global demand for

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Chinese exports wanes, economic growth will slow. Is this the end of China’s export reign?

Not necessarily. Basic, low-‐value manufacturing and assembly-‐ which is what China does best-‐ could move further inland. Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang are opIons. The central government could oﬀer incenIves for state-‐owned enterprises and foreign mulInaIonals to relocate their factories to rural areas; not only closer to a ‘preferable’ labour force, but also domesIc sources of raw materials. Firms would need not compromise on supply chains and infrastructure (both of which must be reliable) should they stay in China. (Oﬃces and headquarters should remain in the ciIes, enmeshed with poliIcal and economic networks.)

In any case, this rural labour force has the following comparaIve advantages: most i m p o r t a n t l y, t h e y h a v e l o w e r w a g e expectaIons (as the costs and standard of living are lower). They are much more likely to accept the prevailing wage, thus keeping labour costs down. Life expectancy is lower in rural areas than in the well-‐developed ciIes: the pool from which labour is employed is comparaIvely younger. This cheaper, manufacturing workforce could, quite plausibly, sustain China’s export crown.

There are less obvious benefits, too. RelocaIon would reduce the adverse effects of mass urban migraIon that ciIes suffer from. Coastal ciIes would be exposed to less polluIon, which is a serious problem.

AlternaIvely, China could innovate and move up the ‘value chain’ towards the producIon of high-‐quality capital and luxury goods. This would depress the emphasis on lower value goods, but would sIll retain the strength of producIon in the economy and export compeIIveness. RelocaIng producIon !1 6

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faciliIes would not be necessary, either, because a skilled and experienced workforce is required. Such a workforce already exists in ciIes; this parIcular strategy complements that urban demographic.

AutomaIon is another popular idea. Regardless, re-‐adapIng the industrial sector and workforce, whilst concurrently rebalancing the economy, would be healthy for this ailing king.

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This arBcle was contributed by Michael Yip from the University of Warwick (UoW). His interests include, East Asian Security and China’s role in the internaBonal poliBcal economy. He is currently Vice-‐President of the Warwick InternaBonal RelaBons Society and Head of the Think Tank at CPASS (UoW). He hopes to widen the discussion about China amongst students at UoW, bringing the Chinese and non-‐Chinese communiBes closer together.

Personal Review on Luxun’s 《野草》 by: Virginia Koek Shin

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“I dream of myself…“ – Seeing the realisIc world from the dreams in Lu Xun’s “Wild Grass” Lu Xun has described many dreams in his prose-‐and-‐poem collecIon of “Wild Grass” (野草). Notably several pieces of work start with the line “I dream of myself…”. These work pieces are “Dead Fire” (死火), “The Dog’s Retort” (狗的駁詰), “The Lost Good Hell” ( 失掉的好地獄 ), “ The Epitaph” (墓碣文), “Tremors of DegradaIon” (頹敗線的顫動), “On Expressing an Opinion” (立論), “ADer Death” (死後) respecIvely. In the scenes and events emerged in these respecIve dreams, some are ludicrous, some are not realisIc, and some are about Ime and space travel, just like the dreams of ordinary people. Although these prose depict dreams not realisIc but elusive, in fact all the “dreams” reﬂect the reality in the world, and

have never deviated from this theme throughout.

! Dreams: a reﬂec/on of the most real and cruelest reality !

Dream is actually not realisIc. It exists only in the imaginary world of people’s mind. However, the dreams illustrated by Lu Xun make use of the imaginary space to show the realism and cruelty of the reality with strong contrast.

“The Dog’s Retort” directly unveils the human’s avarice and lust for power. People prioriIze everything. Even humans are demarcated as “Oﬃcials and CiIzens” and

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“Masters and Servants”, diﬀering in ranking.       People admire more about the upward level, while always despise and dislike people and things of a lower level. Since this conclusion is told by a dog, it illustrates that people are even worse than dogs, devoid of recogniIon to vanity. While feeling hilarious about this part, one can also feel deeply about the sarcasm to human nature.

“Tremors of DegradaIon” elucidates a mother who sacriﬁced herself but was abandoned. At the end, this mother could only express her sorrow and anger through silent complaint and “wordless speech”, which is also a sense of helplessness to the cruel reality.

“On Expressing an Opinion” also expresses the patheIc sides of human. That is, people are only willing to listen to those lies favourable to them, and not willing to admit the cruel truth. They prefer living in a world of lies rather than acknowledging the facts. The last laughter “HaHa! Hehe! He, hehehehe!” seems like not only the eloquence of the teacher, but also the lugubrious jeer to human kind.

L a s t l y, “ T h e L o s t G o o d H e l l ” accentuates that in the real world, striving and struggling may at Imes bring about deeper agony. The demons’ “rebellion to Hell” engenders human “to possess the great power to rule Hell”, therefore brings about renaissance to the original lethargic and wonderful Hell, and demons were burned. The demons later gradually forgot the mirth of the original Hell, “mourning similarly, euphemizing similarly”, hence revealing the human’s forge~ul nature of wallowing in their own ruts.

Though using imaginary space and facIIous plots, Lu Xun sIll uncovers the cruelty of reality, undergoes an analysis on human, and reveals the most real depicIon of the conversion of dreams into the actual world.

Dreams: conveying the true Lu Xun and the eﬀects of the real world to him

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Lu Xun displays his real self in these imaginary dreams, imparIng his view towards life. In “Death Fire”, at the moment of being ran down and killed by a large rock car, he laughed with pride “Haha! You can never meet Dead Fire again!”. The ending of “ADer Death” has similarity. ADer death and put into the coffin, strange enough Lu Xun thought he was happy and almost cried in joy, because he “died like a shadow, not even knowing his enemies, not proffering them a tad of unsolicited joy without cost. ” To this a{tude towards death, ordinary people should not understand, nor agree, but this is what Lu Xun thinks about death. To him, comparing with living splendidly under the spotlights of others, he would rather die silently, as he does not want to become an object solely for saIsfying others’ curiosity and leisure. Because the large rock car that killed him had also fallen down the ice valley, no one knew the existence of “Dead Fire”, and his death would not be deemed as mysterious; since he died on an obscure path, no one knew his background, his death will not be pleasing his enemies, nor becoming their backtalk aDer dinner. The final choice of Lu Xun was to die secretly, as he was not willing to become a subject for others’ ”inspecIon”. The adamant a{tude shown by him was the same as the repulsion towards the spectators in “Revenge”. Even at the point of death, he would not give them any benefit.

At the ending of “ADer Death”, Lu Xun mulled inside the coffin and believed that he had “always not preferring to live his life averagely without demise even if he was not content”. This way of living was meaningless to him. When facing a difficult choice between two things, Lu Xun always believes one should make a choice proacIvely rather than passively situated as middleman. By the same token, in “Dead Fire”, he conveys his persistence through the dialogues of Dead Fire. In face of the choices of “being frozen off” and “burn out”, Dead Fire said valiantly “Then I would prefer to burn out!”, which expresses a will to proacIvely confront the foreseeable demise.

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On another aspect, “The Epitaph” reveals that Lu Xun wish to understand about his desires inside him. He wishes to “eat his heart and know its taste”. But the process of aHempIng to know one’s heart was nonetheless conflicIve. As soon as he dug his heart out to eat, he could not feel its taste because of excruciaIng pain. Later the pain subsided, but the heart had gone old, and the original taste couldn’t be felt. From this, we can see that in order to know one’s heart, one should endure some struggles. This is the same as that in “A Madman’s Diary”, in which the Madman felt a struggle in his heart as he wanted to know if he had tried human flesh before. When we wish to know our innermost self, at the same Ime we feel scared. That is why Lu Xun eventually “ran off” and “didn’t dare to look back”, and fled the graveyard. Through these dreams, Lu Xun displayed the world and thoughts from his inner self. But in the mean Ime, he also disclosed the external environment that had shaped these thoughts of his. The choice and a{tude towards death of Lu Xun were, in fact, quite pessimisIc and passive, but this was largely aHributed by the society at that Ime. To Lu Xun, the society then had too many ciIzens who were indurate in thoughts and ignorant. They lacked self-‐recogniIon, and oDen went with the flow in the sea of external environment. Therefore, on the novel things deemed by everyone, they would be the spectators. When making a choice, they will be neutral, unable to express their stance. It was the reality in the society that prompted Lu Xun to have such outlook towards life and a{tude.

Be that as it may, why did Lu Xun express his view towards life mainly by dreams, but not by direct elucidaIon? Maybe this unveils another truth of the society – that is, people were unable to make their own decisions in their living. The reality had too many restraints, so people could be the most real self only in imaginary dreams. In the dreams, Lu Xun had the power to proacIvely make a choice, but he might not be in reality. He abided by his mother’s words, and married Ms. Zhu An without the premise of love. Later, he had a fall-‐oﬀ with

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his younger brother Zhou Zuo-ren, and did not resolve their conﬂicts at the end. Even for the accomplishment of “Wild Grass”, Lu Xun had once menIoned that he “wrote it aDer encountering lots of failures.” We could see that in the life of Lu Xun there was a lot of helplessness brought by the real world. Even if he would like to control his fate proacIvely, at Imes it would be hard to do that.

! Dreams: hardly escape the real world !

Dreams are only a ﬂeeIng space of illusion. At the end people will wake up, and sIll cannot escape the reality. The dreams of Lu Xun can also illustrate this point. In “The Dog’s Retort”, “Tremors of DegradaIon” and “ADer Death”, Lu Xun ulImately woke up from the dreams, and returned to reality. On the other hand, in “Tremors of DegradaIon”, Lu Xun was more aware that he was having a nightmare. He “mustered all his might in the dream” in a bid to push up the bulky hand on his chest. His “bulky hand” was like the burden of the reality. Even when dreaming he could clearly know its existence, and he had to deal with it aDer waking up. We can see that Lu Xun obviously, from Ime to Ime, knows that dreams cannot help a person escape from the real world.

Beside the end of the dreams shown in content, Lu Xun constructed the “epilogue” of the dreams through effects of vision and audio. In “The Dog’s Retort” and “On Expressing an Opinion”, there was uIlizaIon of sound effect. Under the dog’s “loud persuasion to stay”, Lu Xun walked out of the dream, and the dog’s sound gradually died away. In “On Expressing an Opinion”, it ended in an echoing of laughter, similar to the weakening of film sounds. In “Death Fire”, “The Lost Good Hell” and “The Epitaph”, there was employment of visual effects. At the point of being ran over and killed by a large rock car, there showed a picture of Lu Xun’s last laugh before death. ADer talking with the demons, there was the back shadow of the demons leaving the stage. In “The Epitaph”, the corpse sat to talk with Lu Xun, when Lu Xun “ran off” and disappeared g r a d u a l l y w i t h o u t a t r a c e . T h e s e manifestaIons of “epilogue” undoubtedly

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A Thesis:

reﬂect the transience of dreams, and prove that dreams can never be escapism for human.

To what extent does the Chinese pension system achieve the construction of a harmonic society?

Overall, the ostensibly unreal “dreams” in Lu Xun’s “Wild Grass” can actually reflect the most real world. Although the dreams were originally an imaginary space, the contents endowed to it could nonetheless reflect the many observaIons and musings of Lu Xun towards the real world. Among the dreams, some even exhibit his thoughts and view towards life, and through those allow people to beHer understand the real world in his life. Lastly, the shortness and terminaIon of the respecIve dreams also signify that dreams can never bring people out of the reality. The reality must be faced. “I dream of myself…” I think Lu Xun not only dreamed of himself, but what’s more is the reflecIon of a miniature of the whole real world.

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Translated by: Gary Wong, a graduate in Economics at the University of Warwick (United Kingdom).

Background It has been increasingly important to construct a comprehensive pension system due to the growing problems of a rapidly ageing society. It is therefore crucial to determine whether the current Chinese pension system can achieve the goal of construcIng a harmonious society.

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Lu Xun，鲁迅, is a leading figure in modern Chinese Literature. (Picture and information from hJp://en.wikipedia.org)

Article was written by Virginia Koek Shin. Virginia is a Chinese Language and Literature Undergraduate at Peking University. This review was submitted as an assignment for Modern Chinese Literature.

This article was originally written in Chinese. It was translated by Herman Ho Nam Fu. He studies Translation with Business in Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong.

Written by: Low Sieu Ping for GCE A Levels for China Studies in Chinese, at Dunman High School (Singapore).

!! !! !! !! !! !!

Purpose 1. By the end of 2008, the number of Chinese ciIzens above the age of 60 reaches 159.89M, comprising 12% of the total populaIon. As the working populaIon as a proporIon of total p o p u l a I o n i s e x p e c t e d t o conInuously decrease, the burden of supporIng elderly ciIzens gets heavier by the day.

2. The pension system is subject to great changes, including the funding issues brought on by the ageing populaIon. The pension system has aHracted criIcisms from academics and therefore it is important to determine whether the changes to the pension system is conducive to t h e g o a l o f c o n s t r u c I n g a harmonious society, announced in 2004 by the central government.

3. A harmonious society is an integral part of the socialist society with Chinese characterisIcs, a goal of utmost importance to the central government. The purpose of the !2 0

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topic is to determine whether the central government can maintain the construcIon of socialism with Chinese characterisIcs while also aHending to the needs of the pension system, in order to achieve the goal of a harmonious society.

! Methodology and Scope  !

The central government announced the goal of a harmonious society in the fourth plenary session of the sixteenth central commiHee in 2004. I will pursue the topic from the start of 2004 to the end of 2008. Research will be qualitaIve through the research of previous papers.

Literary Review 1. The pension system should embody contents of a harmonious society

The pension system should embody the principles of universality and eﬀecIve coverage. Furthermore, the pension system should act as a basis for the construcIon of a harmonious society, assisIng the relief of conﬂicts in society, facilitaIng a fair society and contribuIng to socioeconomic development. The pension system should also follow the compulsory principle, embodying contents of a harmonious society by soundly protecIng livelihoods of members of society.

2.2 Merit of the pension system Through reforms, the Chinese pension s y s t e m h a s m a d e p r o m i s i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s i n s y s t e m a I c management and standardising the system. Speciﬁcally in managing funds, eﬀorts to collect funds are increased and a reserve is being set up; enlarging the coverage of social security, increasing the sources of funding; adapIng to the needs of socioeconomic development; adding new protecIon management items such as the minimum livelihood subsistence protecIon; increasing the level of management service for protected individuals; enhancing the legalisaIon of t h e m o n i t o r a n d m a n a g e m e n t mechanism. Similarly, the reforms of the

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Chinese pension system does achieve the merging of eﬃciency and fairness, the b a l a n c e b e t w e e n r i g h t s a n d responsibiliIes.

2.3 Problems of the pension system Nonetheless, with regards to the needs of establishing a socialist market e c o n o m y , m o d e r n i s a I o n a n d construcIng a well-‐off society, the Chinese pension system is sIll lacking in areas of management, such as mainly managed by the state and highly centralised, adversely affecIng the efficient uIlisaIon of resources and improving management efficiency.

Apart from this, problems also include difficulIes in collecIng funds and company arrears which affects the system’s sustainability and its mandatory nature, highlighIng efficiency, fairness and redistribuIon problems. At the same Ime, legislaIon of the pension system is sIll lagging, even with reforms enacted recently. This doesn’t match the needs and goals of social security development. It is specifically unsuccessful for rural pension development as the system is sIll unable to meet the iniIal intenIons of resolving the problems of supporIng rural populaIon and thus resulIng in large proporIon of rural populaIon not being able protected.

In conclusion, through reforms the pension system has been improved in some areas but some fundamental problems remain.

Most academics have conducted research through a macroeconomic viewpoint, analysing the pension system through capital markets. This has realisIc i m p l i c a I o n s f o r t h e e c o n o m i c development of the Chinese economy as a whole and also explains the inevitable problems of the pension scheme.

ADer establishing harmonious society as a goal, it yields more value to analyse the policies, coverage and government ﬁnances and also to explore the

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relaIonship between the system and the construcIon of a harmonious society.

3. Data Analysis 3.1 Using the pension system to facilitate a harmonious society In general, developed countries have basically achieved universal coverage while developing countries aim for coverage for the working populaIon. As a developing country, China’s State Council promulgated the “The People’s Republic of China’s Insurance for the working populaIon Ordinance” in 1951, providing pension cover for company employees. In 1987, the “Decision to create an integrated pension system for company employees” was issued, which marked the beginning of a new pension system which combines social planning and individual accounts.

In 2004, hierarchical and social reforms were introduced to mulIple areas of the Chinese pension system, including the basic pension scheme for urbanites. According to the arIcle from the press oﬃce of China’s State Council, the government issued and enforced the following outlines and plans: “China’s work on the elderly 7 year development outline”, “China’s development in issues of the elderly “15” plan”, “China’s development in issues of the elderly “the 15th 5 year” plan”. From the 1980s, there were three populaIon censuses, providing important data for scienIﬁc decision making in issues of the elderly.

In June of 2008, new rules were again e n a c t e d , w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t announcing that a new type of rural pension scheme will be tested in 10% of the total counIes.

T h ro u g h c o n I n u o u s re fo r m a n d development, China gained knowledge on achieving a comprehensive pension system while pursuing to enlarge the coverage. This is closely related to the CPC’s goal of construcIng a harmonious society. Enlarging coverage is a response to the demand for maintaining jusIce and fairness in society, pension system as

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a country’s fundamental socioeconomic insItuIon must strive to cover all ciIzens, both urban and rural. Therefore, the pension system that has been carried out by the government for a long Ime has an inherent element of a harmonious society.

3.2 The true coverage of the pension system At the same Ime, data shows that the Chinese government is acIvely enlarging the coverage of the pension system and construcIng a harmonious society.

ADer the announcement of the goal “a harmonious society” in 2004 by the Chinese government, the number of people parIcipaIng in the pension scheme has grown annually by 5.3% ever since. The author believes that this can be aHributed to the government carrying out pilot projects in Liaoning in 2004, l a t e r e x t e n d i n g t h e p r o j e c t t o Heilongjiang and Jilin. In 2005 the State Council announced the “Decision regarding the perfecIon of pension scheme for company employees”; with the pilot scheme implemented in the Three Northeastern Provinces as a basis, the basic personal account pension scheme was being experimented in 8 provinces including Shanghai, Tianjin, Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, Hubei, Hunan and Xinjiang on the 6th of September 2006. During 2007 and 2008, a new type of rural cooperaIon project was started. These acIons illustrates the fact that aDer the government has established the goal and concept of a harmonious society, it followed up with allowing more people to parIcipate in the pension scheme, enlarging its coverage and therefore benefi{ng man more people. The government’s awareness of the need to enlarge coverage is deepened and this does not only correspond to the pension system’s own goals but also achieves the goal of construcIng a well-‐off society, benefiIng more than a one billion people.

H o w e v e r, w h e n c o m p a r i n g t h e parIcipaIon rate between rural and !2 2

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urban populaIons, the total number of urban residents parIcipaIng in the scheme grew faster than their rural c o u n t e r p a r t s s i n c e 2 0 0 4 . C i t y parIcipaIon rate grows by 6.77% annually while rural parIcipaIon rate only managed to grow by 0.81% annually. Furthermore, from 2003 to 2004 and 2006-‐2007, the number of rural ciIzens parIcipaIng in the scheme actually fell. From this it can be easily observed that the rural growth rate is signiﬁcantly lower than the urban growth rate. This exempliﬁes the fact that the rural urban dual structure causes imbalanced pension scheme developments in rural and urban areas.

60% of China’s elderly populaIon is located in rural areas but as menIoned above, not only is the number of rural ciIzens parIcipaIng in the pension scheme growing slower than their urban counterparts, the coverage for the rural populaIon also remains to be expanded. This undoubtedly illustrates how the rural pension scheme is sIll weak, unable to achieve the growth rate comparable to the urban growth rate. The author believes that this is due to the fact that the pension system is created under the structure in which rural and urban areas are segregated. This implies that urban ciIzens are able to enjoy a diﬀerent pension system, receiving a diﬀerent treatment. This undermines the pension system’s protecIve ability, causing rural parIcipaIon rate to grow more slowly and greatly hinders the path to achieving a harmonious society.

Therefore even though coverage is conInuously expanded, China’s rural urban dual structure creates a divergence between rural and urban growth rates. It can be said that the dual structured pension system exacerbated eﬃciency and fairness problems, violaIng the goal of construcIng a well-‐oﬀ society.

3.3 Subsidies for the pension system by the government The current pension system uses two modes: “social planning” and “personal

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accounts” and therefore a working individual will have to save for himself while also paying for someone else’s reIred life. Based on this, as the populaIon covered by the pension system ages, the economic burden brought on will be increasingly heavy, as an ageing populaIon also means rapidly increasing number of reIrees. Pension spending as a proporIon of social security spending will therefore increase signiﬁcantly.

There is an increasing trend in the government’s spending on social security. From 2004 onwards, social security spending increased by 16.23% annually. It can be expected that as the government increases spending on social security, ciIzens’ livelihoods will be under greater protecIon.

The significant rise in social security spending can be reflected by a rise in government subsidies. Government subsidies to the pension system increased by 26.81% on average annually from 2004 onwards, meaning that people can probably lead beHer reIred lives. From this angle, the rising trend in social s e c u r i t y s p e n d i n g r e fl e c t s t h e gove r n m e nt ’s d e s i re to i m p rove protecIon for the elderly in order to improve management and service quality, which are elements of the harmonious society goal.

However, it is important to note that, the most glaring problem of the Chinese pension system is the funding gap. 1 trillion RMB of deficit has already been accumulated, exacerbaIng the pressure on government to provide subsidies and also seriously hampering reforms. The funding gap is due to low levels of organisaIon, which reduced the regulaIng and adjusIng effects of the pension system. This meant low efficiency in the uIlisaIon of funds and most funds are only being used in the local city level or the provincial level.

Apart from this, diﬀerences in the level of development of each geographical area !2 3

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m e a n s d i ff e r e n t r a t e s o f f u n d accumul aIon. Urban areas have accumulated much more funding than rural areas. As the funding gaps cannot be fiulled in the short term, this means inefficient use of funding which aggravated the unfairness in the uIlisaIon of funding. From this point of view, the increasing trend in government subsidies actually reflects the growing funding gap. It is therefore doub~ul whether increased government subsidies can actually improve management and service quality.

4. Conclusion Overall speaking, the construcIon of China’s pension system is to acIvely pursue fairness in society and this is insItuIonally beneficial to Chinese ciIzens. In other words, the Chinese pension system actually already e m b o d i e s m a n y e l e m e n t s o f a harmonious society even before it was established as an official goal. This is reflected through the increasing number of people parIcipaIng in the scheme and the rising government subsidies.

However, the author discovered that w h i s t t h e s y s t e m i s i n h e r e n t l y “harmonious”, there are problems in the process of implemenIng it. These p ro b l e m s a re m u l I -‐ d i m e n s i o n a l , including slow growth in the number of actual parIcipants and the low level planning model which caused funding gaps.

On this point, implementaIon problems will affect China’s goal of construcIng a harmonious society. The author believes that the current pension system fails to achieve equality in benefits between parIcipants of the system, as rural and urban ciIzens are treated differently. Rural urban inequality in terms of levels of development and treatment will r e s t r i c t t h e s y s t e m ’s e ffi c i e n t development and thus affecIng the h a r m o n y o f s o c i e t y. A l s o , t h e government faces the problem of the growing demand for government subsidies.

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In conclusion, the Chinese pension system is a means that meets the needs of the goal of construcIng a harmonious society but there is sIll some distance from the complete realisaIon of the goal. ADer all, social equality issues will not be solved as implementaIon problems remain. In other words, the Chinese pension system will not be able to fulﬁl the needs of people across the country as there are inequaliIes between rural and urban areas. This means that the goal of construcIng a harmonious society and a people-‐oriented approach will be diﬃcult to realise. Therefore, despite the government’s dedicaIon to the construcIon of a harmonious society, with the vast inequaliIes between rural and urban areas, the pension system will to a large extent be unable to achieve such goal.

4.1 Recommenda/ons The purpose of analysing China’s pension system is to establish the government’s role and discover the missing elements in order to achieve fairness in society, which is a necessary condiIon for a harmonious society. Therefore, the author suggests:

4 . 1 . 1 T h e d i s / n c t r o l e o f t h e government Government departments should from the pension system’s perspecIve, rethink the role insItuIons should play in society and thus improving the insItuIons further. For example, this can include the construcIon of a strictly monitored s y s t e m t h a t c o m b i n e s s o u n d administraIon, judicial supervision and social supervision.

4.1.2 Advoca/ng the role of non-‐ governmental organisa/ons Non-‐governmental organisaIons are social organisaIons that are outside of the government organisaIon. The physical, ﬁnancial and human resources of these organisaIons should be uIlised to help solve the funding gap.

4.2 Contribu/on of this research

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From the author’s research, it can be found that the government’s idea of a people oriented and harmonious society is crucial but in the process of implemenIng the pension system, numerous problems are encountered. Therefore, the government should bear in mind the idea of being people-‐ oriented while designing policy reforms and also focus on removing the funding gap as this will play a key role in the future growth of the Chinese economy.

4.3 Limita/ons of this research The author is only able to collect data from websites that provide government staIsIcs and other related staIsIcs and data used by previous literatures.

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For reference articles, please see the following links: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/ content_5218639.htm ! http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/12/ content_5473205.htm

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