Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy

Policy Brief NO. 25 February 2013

Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy1 James Manicom Key Points • To rebuild its reputation in the region, Canada should support its East Asian reengagement efforts through maritime defence and cooperation endeavours, which would improve the region’s strategic stability and foster economic growth.

• Canada should strengthen maritime exchanges in East Asia, including joint exercises with Chinese and other regional navies, and partner with East Asian states to build coast guard capacity through tabletop exercises, personnel exchanges and training exercises.

• Drawing on its own diplomatic experiences, Canada should foster dialogue in the East Asian region on cooperative living and non-living resource management in disputed waters.

Introduction After a decade of neglect, the Canadian government is prepared to re-engage East Asia, particularly China. Adding a maritime component to Canada’s reengagement efforts would help mitigate threats to the strategic stability that James Manicom

makes economic growth possible and build Canada’s prestige in the region.

James Manicom is a research fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the development of the Global Security Program.

Previously, he held fellowships at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His current research explores Arctic governance, East Asian security and China’s role in ocean governance.

Recognizing that re-engagement must go beyond bilateral economic issues, Canadian policy makers are seeking to deepen Canada’s regional diplomacy.

Canada has signalled its support for regional institutions by acceding to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (Job, 2010). In an effort to reverse early missteps in Canada’s relationship with China, Canadian Minister of Foreign 1 This policy brief draws on research conducted by the author for “Canadian Debates about China’s Rise: Whither the China Threat?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 3, no. 3 (September 2012): 287–300.

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The Centre for International Governance Innovation Affairs John Baird declared in 2011 that “my government gets it” before departing for a visit to China and to attend the ASEAN ministerial conference in Bali (Perkins and Hoffman, 2011). At the 9th ASEAN-Canada Dialogue in June 2012, Baird pledged CDN$10 million to fund various ASEAN initiatives.

Nevertheless, the region still perceives Canada as a fair-weather Asia-Pacific country that only seeks to establish the basic elements of trade and investment relations to diversify its trading partners. According to then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, Canada’s admission to the region’s leading economic and defence forums — the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) — remain out of reach until Southeast Asian states are convinced of the durability of Canada’s re-engagement (Clark, 2012). As it is widely accepted that “process matters in an Asia Pacific context...contributing as well as receiving is important,” Canada should round out its economic re-engagement strategy with contributions to regional peace and security (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2012: 12).

Maritime diplomacy contributes to regional peace and stability by addressing urgent problems, such as those affecting trade and fishing in East Asian waters. The

Copyright © 2013 by The Centre for International Governance Innovation.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors.

region relies heavily on these sectors for growth, but is afflicted with numerous maritime and territorial disputes that are negatively impacting them. By adding maritime diplomacy to its economically oriented regional re-engagement strategy, Canada signals its determined return to the region, building the reputation that it requires for membership to East Asia’s premier institutions. This could, in turn, pave the way for closer

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www.cigionline.org Policy Brief No. 25 February 2013

economic ties with East Asia. As Canada has no military forces permanently deployed to the region, no formal treaty allies and limited bilateral trade relationships,

Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy

3

maritime diplomacy is the optimal means to convey

Amid this strategic uncertainty, China has asserted its

its long-term commitment to the region. Above all,

maritime claims in the East, and the South China Sea

Canada’s strategy must transcend the electoral cycle;

in particular, with unprecedented vigour. Chinese coast

relationships are built in East Asia over the long term.

guard vessels patrol disputed waters more frequently and have enforced China’s claimed jurisdictional rights

Maritime Problems in a Maritime Region Canada’s return to East Asia is occurring during a strategic transition in the region. After 60 years of stability that underwrote unprecedented economic prosperity, East Asia is undergoing a strategic shift, as the United States re-evaluates its global strategic commitments at a time when China seems prepared to assert itself.

American primacy in East Asia is being questioned as a function of its domestic financial woes and the legacy of fighting two wars in the Middle East. Despite China’s positive contributions to East Asian regionalism and free trade, concerns abound over its ambitions for disputed maritime areas, coupled with the lack of transparency in its military spending. Although US President Barack Obama announced an unambiguous foreign policy shift from the Middle East to Asia in November 2011, there is no doubt that the American presence in the region will be different than it has been (Obama, 2011; US Department of Defense, 2012). All signs point to a United States that leans more heavily on its allies to share the burden of military responsibility.

At the 11th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta pledged to keep 60 percent of the US Navy forward deployed in the region, the most clear outline of US forces structure “rebalancing” in East Asia (2012). This amounts to an effort to reassure

against civilian and military vessels from Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. This has resulted in a number of dangerous armed confrontations at sea. Lurking in the background is the increasingly capable and active People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. Recent Chinese behaviour is widely viewed with apprehension, and threatens to divide East Asia. Indonesia, which is not a party to a maritime boundary dispute with China, lodged reservations with the United Nations in response to ambiguous Chinese claims to the South China Sea. Japan, which has typically avoided comment on Southeast Asian maritime security concerns for fear of alarming both local and Chinese sensibilities, has reversed course and moved to support Southeast Asian states that are party to disputes with China, such as the Philippines. Furthermore, regional meetings have become staging grounds for diplomatic confrontations over Chinese activities at sea. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reminded the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features” (2010). Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reacted angrily, calling the remarks an “attack on China” (“Foreign Minister Yang,” 2010). Most recently, Cambodia, which occupied the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2012, was pressured by China not to include any mention of maritime tensions in the final communiqués of ASEAN-centred meetings.

regional states of the credibility of the US presence in

As a state that seeks to capitalize on East Asia’s economic

the region.

dynamism, Canada should concern itself with these challenges to regional peace and security because they threaten to undermine the economic dynamism

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upon which its regional interests are predicated. This

State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell

strategy, however, needs to be carefully calibrated to

has suggested, “These institutions, these regular

avoid alienating China, with whom Canada has only

meetings, tend to drive the process inside government”

recently resuscitated relations. Furthermore, maritime

(Campbell, 2012). Similarly, Canadian Minister of

diplomacy will fail if China perceives Canada to be an

National Defence Peter MacKay attended the 2012 IISS

extension of the United States.

Shangri-La Dialogue to support Canada’s bid for an invitation to the ADMM Plus; a more active regional

The Case for Maritime Diplomacy Maritime diplomacy is the best way forward for Canada because it is instrumental to Canada’s broader regional strategy. It builds on Canada’s long-standing track record in the region and it adopts a role familiar to regional states. Building confidence is Canada’s legacy in East Asia. Canada has a long and quite successful

engagement strategy could open doors to the region’s primary institutions. By leveraging its credentials as a maritime state as a member of the ARF’s Maritime Security Working Group, Canada increases its standing in East Asia. This could, in turn, create momentum for Canadian participation at the next ADMM Plus meeting, which has its own maritime security working group.

track record of Track-Two diplomacy on non-traditional

Maritime

security issues in East Asia (Evans, 2009), through

engagement bring closer political ties and, over time,

efforts such as the Canadian International Development

improved relations to support Canada’s regional

Agency’s support of the Indonesian-hosted South China

economic objectives. Canada has been long-time

Sea dialogues in the early 1990s. These were important

supporter of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

confidence-building measures, representing the only

(APEC) forum and is pursuing membership in the

set of meetings where all claimants were present,

related Trans-Pacific Partnership. ASEAN-centred

particularly at a time of escalating tension (Djalal and

trade liberalization has long existed alongside APEC

Townsend-Gault, 1999). Canada’s role as an honest

initiatives, but has historically excluded non-Asian

broker in the proceedings is evidenced by the fact that

states (Stubbs, 2002). By paving the way for membership

the Chinese were on record as preferring Canadian

in institutions like the EAS, Canada gains a window

funding to US- or Japanese-funded workshops (Snyder,

into the ASEAN-centred process of regional trade

Glosserman and Cossa, 2001: 2; 13). Conversations

liberalization including trade, finance and regulatory

in the region reveal an expectation that Canada’s re-

discussions. This also supports its efforts to pursue

engagement will carry some of these elements with it.

bilateral trade agreements with East Asian economies.

Contributing to regional peace and security will build

diplomacy

and

deeper

institutional

Canada’s regional prestige, which supports the deeper

Policy Recommendations

institutional engagement that Ottawa is pursuing.

Maritime diplomacy deliberately goes beyond Canada’s

Although the East Asian diplomatic calendar can be

Track-Two legacy; East Asian states have mastered the

burdensome, these meetings drive regional decision-

“habits of dialogue” (Dewitt, 1994). In an era of growing

making processes. As then US Assistant Secretary of

naval spending and numerous maritime flashpoints,

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Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy

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the region is in need of inclusive security cooperation

advance of China’s participation in the 2014 Rim of the

that builds transparency between navies and coast

Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. The ideal geographic focus

guards. Canada is already deepening military ties with

of this engagement would be the western Pacific Ocean,

the region, through, for example, its discussions with

but a more economical alternative is the Indian Ocean

Japan towards an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing

where many of these potential partners are engaged in

Agreement, and is negotiating access to military

anti-piracy missions.

facilities in Singapore. These will support Canada’s proven record of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) within the region, evidenced in Sri Lanka in 2004, and offered to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The proposals outlined below are deliberately ambitious and are designed to spark debate about their suitability and feasibility in the context of strained budgets.

Given Canada’s previous track record as a trusted bridge builder between China and other states, naval engagement could be one component of maritime diplomacy (Adams, 2012). China’s efforts at defence diplomacy have increased in the past decade, creating opportunities for more frequent and in-depth SinoCanadian defence exchanges. Both countries participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Given that direct military exercises between the United States and China are banned by US law, there may be an opportunity for Canada to conduct its own bilateral exercises with China; Australia has already done so. In September 2010, the Royal Australian Navy conducted an exercise with the PLA Navy in the Yellow Sea, which included live fire drills, search and rescue (SAR) operations and joint helicopter missions. The Australian Defence Force has also conducted a HADR exercise with the PLA. More ambitiously, Canada and Australia could work together to foster regular naval interaction with China, and bring in new partners over time. This effort would build on the steady stream of Canadian naval port visits to the region since 1995, and build ties in

Frigate HMCS Ottawa (FFH 341) at RIMPAC 2012. Source: Royal Canadian Navy.

If deeper naval links are too politically sensitive, coast guard cooperation is an alternative avenue that is valued in East Asia. For instance, despite their often acrimonious relationship, Chinese and Japanese coast guards have conducted three SAR exercises together in an effort to build confidence (Shen and Chen, 2011).

Canada, China, Japan and South Korea are members of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF), which coordinates efforts among members to address maritime security challenges. Canada could reach out to other nations, such as South Korea and Japan, who are interested in conducting joint exercises, exchanges or tabletop exercises with Chinese coast guards.

Canada already has close working relations with both the South Korean and Japanese coast guards through its membership in the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, which promotes conservation of anadromous fish stocks in the North Pacific. Like Canada, East Asian states confront the challenge of

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policing a large exclusive economic zone with limited resources, thus Canadian expertise and lessons learned are likely to be appreciated.

Conclusion While maritime diplomacy is an ambitious reengagement

strategy

for

Canada,

two

potent

Canada could also contribute to coast guard capacity

counterpoints are worth considering. Because Canada is

building in Southeast Asia. Japan trains a number

familiar with European security issues and pan-Atlantic

of Philippine and Indonesian officers at its Coast

security institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty

Guard Academy. Canada could partner with ASEAN

Organization, it could be argued that it is ill-equipped

states to assist these capacity-building efforts, which

to involve itself in matters of East Asian security. East

could involve Canadian vessels in theatre or simply

Asia is home to a different set of multilateral structures

educational exchanges. Canada could also explore

that operate under different rules. In this view, the

regional interest in the establishment of a Southeast

proposals herein risk alienating important economic

Asian equivalent of the NPCGF. The United States,

partners, such as China. Canada should, therefore, limit

China and Japan have all used maritime security

its East Asian engagement to economic issues while

capacity building as part of their efforts to contribute to

leaving strategic questions to those countries directly

regional security in Southeast Asia.

affected. For instance, taking a stand on Chinese threats

Finally, Canada could foster dialogue on cooperative resource exploitation in disputed areas. Although the

to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea risks alienating China for little strategic gain (Manicom, 2012).

marginal utility of Track-Two dialogues in East Asia is

An alternative perspective advocates adopting a

on the decline due to their proliferation and a reduction

“whole-of-country approach” to re-engagement that

in earnest participation by Chinese participants, they

seems out of touch with Canada’s history, ongoing

are not entirely without value. Canada could lead

priorities and capacity (Asia Pacific Foundation of

discussions toward a regional fisheries management

Canada, 2012: 13). Australia, often cited as a model for

organization for Southeast Asian waters. Similarly,

Canada’s Asia policy, has doubled-down on the Asian

Canada could share its experience in maritime

Century by pledging to strengthen its Asian literacy

boundary delimitation and resource development in

(Government of Australia, 2012). However, Canada is

disputed waters. All East Asian claimant states have

not Australia and will always have important links with

rhetorically committed to this idea, but have been

the Americas and with Europe.

unwilling to share jurisdiction in contested areas. In

By contrast, maritime diplomacy offers a more modest,

one attempt, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking

if ambitious, route by building on Canada’s past

agreement, Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine oil

contributions to regional security and leveraging its

companies collaborated in exploration activities in a

capacity to contribute to stability in East Asia, which

disputed area of the South China Sea. Although the

supports its regional economic aspirations.

agreement collapsed due to domestic opposition in the Philippines, this initiative was the deepest cooperation witnessed among the South China Sea claimants, and merits resuscitation with Canadian support.

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Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy

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Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2012). Securing Canada’s Place in Asia: Means, Institutions and Mechanisms. Vancouver: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

Campbell, Kurt (2012). “The South China Sea and Asia Pacific in Transition.” Speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 26.

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Clark, Campbell (2012). “Canada Denied Seat at East Asia Summit.” The Globe and Mail, September 20.

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Dewitt, David (1994). “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security.” The Pacific Review 7, no. 1: 1–15.

“Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the South China Sea Issue.” (2010). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 26. Available at: www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t719460.htm.

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Job, Brian (2010). “Revitalizing Canada-Southeast Asia Relations: The TAC Gives Us a Ticket...But Do We Have a Destination? Canada-Asia Agenda 11 (August). Available at: www.asiapacific.ca/sites/ default/files/filefield/CAASouthEastAsia.pdf.

Manicom, James (2012). “Canada and the South China Sea Disputes: Challenges for Re-Engagement in East Asia.” Canada-Asia Agenda 26.

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office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obamaaustralian-parliament.

Panetta, Leon (2012). “The US Rebalance Towards the

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Perkins, Tara and Andy Hoffman (2011). “Tories Shift Toward Much Stronger Trade Ties with China.”

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Stubbs, Richard (2002). “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey 43, no. 2: 440–455.

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Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

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Canada’s Return to East Asia: Re-engagement through Maritime Diplomacy

Advancing Policy Ideas and Debate Through its publications program, CIGI informs decision makers, fosters dialogue and debate on policy-relevant ideas and strengthens multilateral responses to the most pressing international governance issues.

Policy Briefs Policy Brief no. 24 noveMber 2012

Canada-US arCtiC Marine CorridorS and reSoUrCe developMent1 John higginbotham, andrea Charron and James maniCom Key pointS John higginbothaM John Higginbotham is a senior distinguished fellow at Carleton University. In his previous roles with the federal government, he coordinated Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative at Transport Canada, was an assistant deputy minister in three departments and served abroad in senior positions in Washington, Hong Kong and Beijing.

andrea Charron Andrea Charron is assistant professor in political studies at the University of Manitoba. She is also a research associate at Carleton University’s Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), where she was a postdoctoral fellow.

• The Arctic region stands at the cusp of tremendous economic development. Efficient, secure, environmentally sensitive marine transportation systems and smart public infrastructure could facilitate offshore and onshore energy, mineral, ecotourism and local community development.

• Current Canadian and American government policies, regulations and investment in support of Arctic maritime infrastructure and resource development are inadequate.

There is an urgent need for strengthened, comprehensive and innovative national Arctic economic development policies, and Canada-US federal, regional and corporate cooperation in the Arctic.

introdUCtion The shrinking Arctic ice cap is creating unprecedented geophysical change in the circumpolar region, a trend that is very likely to continue. Together, this “great melt” and the delineation of extended national economic zones afford increased investment, diplomatic, legal, scientific and academic sectors abound in the new Arctic, but the region’s long-term significance is only gradually penetrating North American public consciousness. Media reports such as the recent, virtually icefree trans-polar transit of a Chinese icebreaker through the Russian Northern Sea Route, or the transit of the Northwest Passage by a large cruise ship, are only the tip of the proverbial economic iceberg. In preparing for the commercialization 1 This policy brief is drawn in large part from discussions at the Arctic Marine Corridors and Resource Development Round Table. The event was held in a House of Commons facility in Ottawa, June 2012.

Policy Brief no. 2 ocTober 2012

Zero: The SurpriSing and unambiguouS policy relevance of The cuban miSSile criSiS James G. BliGht and janet m. lanG None of the nuclear-weapon states “has an employee, let alone an inter-agency group, JameS g. blighT and janeT m. lang

tasked full time with figuring out what would be required to verifiably decommission all its nuclear weapons.”

— Jessica T. Matthews, Preface to Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Where black is the color, where none is the number.

janet M. Lang is research professor at the BSIA and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo.

Blight and Lang are the authors or co-authors of six previous books on the Cuban missile crisis. Their newest book, The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy/Khrushchev/Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis, was published in September 2012 by Rowman & Littlefield.

For information about the project, see:

In preparing for the commercialization of the Arctic Ocean, Canada and the United States face enormous opportunities in protecting economic and environmental interests; however, a number of challenges impede the fulfillment of this vision.

Zero: The Surprising and Unambiguous Policy Relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis James G. Blight and janet M. Lang

• The threat of nuclear war is more multi-dimensional than ever, requiring sustained attention by the world’s leaders and citizens. Nuclear weapons must be abolished. Zero is the right number of weapons in the world.

• A robust, deep and sustained appreciation of the Cuban missile crisis — a nuclear war that came within an eyelash of happening — is the prerequisite for energizing movement toward nuclear abolition. Focusing on the nearness to doomsday can provide an engine for paralyzed mechanisms of global governance that are already, at least on paper, committed to zero nuclear weapons.

• The existing global governance mechanisms for reducing nuclear threats are more than adequate to reach zero nuclear weapons if empowered to do so by the international community. These include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive

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Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

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Policy Brief NO. 1 JULy 2012

Andrew S. Thompson is adjunct assistant professor of political science at the University of Waterloo, and the program officer for the global governance programs at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA). He is a specialist in the fields of international human rights, civil society movements and fragile states, and has written extensively on these issues.

no. 13 — February 2013

Strengthening international Financial inStitutionS to Promote eFFective international cooPeration Thomas a. bernes

The current global financial crisis resulted from the failure of major economies and global institutions to address emerging fault lines in global financial markets and global institutions. No single country has the ability or resources to fix things on its own — a near-unprecedented degree of collective action is required.

Another Fine Mess: repAiring the governAnce oF internAtionAl FinAnciAl regulAtion PIerre sIklos

RESPONDING TO DISASTER: NEGLECTED DIMENSIONS OF PREPAREDNESS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES KEy POINTS • Disaster responders must develop communications strategies that clearly identify both what is and is not known in a timely way, and provide, if at all possible, a basis for risk assessment by individuals, communities, national authorities and international contributors.

• Responders must search for ways to provide urgently needed public goods without undermining public authority.

• Responders must address the psychological as well as the physical needs of victims.

Drawing on a quarter century of research on the Cuban missile crisis, this policy brief offers takeaways and recommendations for moving towards zero nuclear weapons.

Responding to Disaster: Neglected Dimensions of Preparedness and Their Consequences Andrew S. Thompson and David A. Welch

Leadership in a Turbulent Age Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker

CIGI PaPers

Leadership in a TurbuLenT age

Sound economic policies, which are in short supply in most key nations of the world, are fundamental to national security and international leadership. The United States must work alongside others — and accept that others will sometimes work together without it — to deal with a wide range of persistent and emerging global problems and issues.

Fen osler HamPson and Paul HeInbeCker

Sustainable Development and Financing Critical Global Public Goods Barry Carin

• Greater steps must be taken to improve global and regional disaster preparedness.

CIGI PaPers

INTRODUCTION The international community has become adept at responding to disasters.

When a disaster hits — whether natural or as the consequence of human activity — humanitarian relief can be on the ground almost anywhere in the David A. Welch is CIGI chair of global security at the BSIA and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo. An awardwinning author and scholar, David is an expert in foreign policy decision making and international security.

He also hosts CIGI’s podcast series Inside the Issues.

world in less than 24 hours. The international community has developed an elaborate network to respond to catastrophes involving the collaboration of international agencies, humanitarian relief organizations, national governments and concerned individuals. The collective ability to help save lives quickly is unprecedented in human history; the problem remains, however, that one never knows in advance where disaster will strike, what the immediate needs of those affected will be or what conditions the first responders will confront. Given these uncertainties, how can disaster-response planners best position themselves to take action?

It is natural, inevitable and desirable to look to past disasters in order to improve responses to future ones, but lesson-drawing, in such cases, is rarely systematic, as responses to disasters are, by their very nature, typically ad hoc.

Policy Brief no. 23 JUne 2012

Unleashing the nUclear Watchdog: strengthening and reform of the iaea Key Points • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the nucleus of the global nuclear governance system.

• Since its establishment in 1957, the IAEA has evolved deftly, shedding unrealizable goals and adding new roles when requested, while coping with and learning from catastrophes and alarming non-compliance cases — Chernobyl, Iraq, North Korea, Iran — and adapting to tectonic international changes such as the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks.

Through a comparison of responses to the recent disasters in Haiti and Japan, this policy brief identifies neglected dimensions of disaster response preparedness and offers suggestions for improvement.

Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA Trevor Findlay

• Today, it fulfills irreplaceable functions in the areas of nuclear safeguards, nuclear safety and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and is steadily developing a role in nuclear security.

• The Agency has maintained a reputation for technical proficiency and effectiveness, despite (or perhaps because of) zero real growth imposed on it for much of the past 27 years.

• The IAEA can thus be regarded as a “bargain” for international peace and security; if it did not exist it would have to be invented.

• Nonetheless, the Agency is in need of both strengthening overall and reform in some areas.

• In recent years, the Agency has suffered increasing politicization of its governing bodies, become embroiled in a protracted compliance dispute with Iran and faltered in its response to the Fukushima disaster.

• In addition, like any 55-year-old entity, the Agency faces “legacy” issues — notably in its management and administration, use of technology, financing and “public diplomacy.”

• The IAEA also faces significant external challenges: avoiding non-compliance surprises by exploiting new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities; preparing for the uncertain trajectory of nuclear energy post-Fukushima; gearing up for equally uncertain roles in verifying nuclear disarmament; meeting stakeholders’ expectations of improved transparency and accountability; and making ends meet in a period of international financial stringency.

• Above all, the Agency needs the renewed support of all its stakeholders, but especially its member states, in depoliticizing the Agency’s governing bodies; complying fully with their obligations; providing the organization with the necessary legal and other authorities; and contributing, in cash and kind, to all of the Agency’s activities.

trevor findlay A CIGI Senior Fellow since 2006, Trevor Findlay holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, where he is a professor and director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. He is a graduate of the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University, and a former Australian diplomat. For seven years he was Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in London, United Kingdom.

His previous project for CIGI, from 2006 to 2010, culminated in his four-volume report on The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030: Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation.

Professor Findlay is currently a joint fellow with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, where he is writing a book on the IAEA.

The conclusions of the June 2012 report on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Trevor Findlay are outlined in this policy brief, which contains recommendations for strengthening and reform of the IAEA.

Another Fine Mess: Repairing the Governance of International Financial Regulation Pierre Siklos

Five years after the onset of the global financial crisis, policy makers seemingly continue to believe that the severity of any crisis-led downturn can be divorced from its source. Credibility in new international regulatory frameworks must begin at home with a determination for monetary policies to work together.

no. 11 — January 2013

Key poinTS

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ANDREw S. THOMPSON AND DAvID A. wELCH

Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation Thomas A. Bernes

CIGI PaPers

no. 12 — January 2013

— Bob Dylan, “A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall”

James G. Blight is the CIGI chair in foreign policy development and professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA), and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo.

CIGI Papers

CIGI PaPers

• Public leadership and private investment, through the development of smart and strategic transportation infrastructure, is urgently needed in the North American Arctic to drive development and facilitate economic activity.

access to economic resources in the Arctic Ocean. Intense activities in commercial, JaMeS ManiCoM James Manicom is a research fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the development of the global security program. Previously, he held fellowships at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His current research explores Arctic governance, East Asian security and China’s role in ocean governance.

Canada-US Arctic Marine Corridors and Resource Development John Higginbotham, Andrea Charron and James Manicom

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no. 10 — January 2013

SuStainable Development anD Financing critical global public gooDS Barry CarIn

The idea of a “Green Super Fund” can be framed as a positive sum game, with a win-win-win allocation that would garner widespread global support and ultimately be accepted by all the major players.

CIGI PaPers

no. 9 — november 2012

A Policy MisMAtch: cAnAdA And the United stAtes in the AsiA-PAcific Region

A Policy Mismatch: Canada and the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region James Manicom

James manICom

The United States and Canada, two of the world’s closest allies, have reinvigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the Asia-Pacific region. On balance, however, Canada may not be an ideal Pacific partner for the United States.

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www.cigionline.org Policy Brief No. 25 February 2013

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The Centre for International Governance Innovation

About CIGI The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.

CIGI’s current research programs focus on four themes: the global economy; global security; the environment and energy; and global development.

CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.

Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry).

Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l’appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l’Ontario.

For more information, please visit www.cigionline.org.

CIGI Masthead Managing Editor, Publications

Carol Bonnett

Publications Editor

Jennifer Goyder

Publications Editor

Sonya Zikic

Assistant Publications Editor

Vivian Moser

Media Designer

Steve Cross

EXECUTIVE President

Rohinton Medhora

Vice President of Programs

David Dewitt

Vice President of Public Affairs

Fred Kuntz

COMMUNICATIONS Communications Specialist

Kevin Dias

kdias@cigionline.org (1 519 885 2444 x 7238)

Public Affairs Coordinator

Kelly Lorimer

klorimer@cigionline.org (1 519 885 2444 x 7265)

www.cigionline.org Policy Brief No. 25 February 2013

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