The Claremont Journal of International Relations, Fall 2013

Volume II Issue I

the

CLAREMONT Journal of International Relations

Fall 2013

Editors-in-Chief

Lily Lousada PZ ‘14 Kyle Roland PZ ‘14

Senior Editors

Sophia Baldwin PZ ‘14 Nicholas Sundback PO ‘14

Staff Editors

Robby Figueroa PO ‘16 Forrest Fulgenzi PZ ‘17 Molly Hickey PZ ‘17 Kate Kennelly PO ‘14 Jack Shaked PZ ‘14 Kevin Jay Tidmarsh PO ‘16

staff

Communications Designer

Hope Kamer PZ ‘14 Jaya Williams PZ ‘14

Dear Reader, The Claremont Journal of International Relations is a student run publication that strives to promote discourse and engagement on world affairs. The aim of this forum is to offer diverse opinions and perspectives on numerous aspects of international affairs related issues through the publication of academic articles regarding political theories, foreign policy and global events. We hope to foster open discussion to bridge our academic studies with personal learning outside of the classroom.

Each article in the Claremont Journal of International Relations reflects the opinion of its author(s) and does not represent the Claremont Journal of International Relations, its editors, its staff, or the Claremont Colleges.

Sincerely, &

Kyle Roland and Lily Lousada Co-Editors-in-Chief

Claremont Journal of International Relations If you have questions, comments, concerns, or want to get involved, please contact claremontjir@gmail.com.

Sponsored by Pitzer College Student Senate

page 32 Rachel Kessler | PZ ‘14 Nepal: A Photo Essay

page 22 Kate Kennelly | PO ‘14 A Quasi-Supranational State: the EU in Evolution

page 46 John Wiley Hunt | PO ‘14 The Great Game of Influence

page 18 Gabe Meier | PZ ‘14 Comparative Analysis: Bahrain and Qatar

page 6 Benjamin Cohen | PO ‘16 The Politicization of Genocide Recognition

page 36 Sanggeet Manirajah | SC ‘14 Legislations and Policies Surrounding Foreign Domestic Workers in Malaysia Punish, or Protect?

6

The Politicization of Genocide Recognition: The Ghost of Armenia in the International Relations of the United States and Israel Benjamin Cohen | Pomona ‘16

I: Introduction

Genocide, in which a force or body of forces systematically attempts to erase part or all of a civilization, thereby reducing victims to a subhuman level, must be acknowledged by the perpetrator and international community in order to restore the humanity of the victims, administer justice for the perpetrators, and combat campaigns of denial. The absence of proper recognition of genocide and the failure to label genocidal killings as genocide, serves to justify future genocidal actors and validate claims of denial, which has been identified as the last stage of genocide.1 Adolf Hitler, perhaps the most notorious perpetrator of genocide of the modern era said just a week before invading Poland, “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”2 Such a startling quote from Hitler reaffirms the notion that “absolving the perpetrators of past genocides from responsibility for their actions and by obscuring genocide as a…state policy in the modern world, denial may increase Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

the risk of future outbreaks of genocidal killing.”3 In the case of the Armen ian genocide, which has been substantially supported as genocide by ample political evidence and witness testimonial, recognition on an international level is increasingly needed to acknowledge committed atrocities. A massive campaign of denial constructed by the Turkish government surrounds it and the persistence of genocidal activity in its wake have left millions dead including victims of the Holocaust and of genocides in Rwanda, Cambodia, Sudan, the Balkans, and the Congo, among others.

The Armenian genocide occurred at the hands of the Ottoman Turks during World War I, with the most heightened action occurring in 1915. During the genocide and ever since, Turkey has vehemently denied that the mass killings and deportations of the Armenians can be characterized as genocide. In response to international recognition, Turkey is quick to sever diplomatic, military, and economic ties with countries who employ the word genocide to

7 describe Turkish actions and has spent millions upon millions of dollars in efforts to reduce the influence of genocide scholarship on government action and in efforts to lobby against Armenian interests. While Turkish pressure and denial campaigns are central features of the failure of states to recognize the genocide, international politics play a leading role as well.

Turkey’s geopolitical position has historically been a major factor in how countries approach the issue of the genocide because acknowledgement easily affects foreign policy decisions that could endanger political cooperation in crucial areas such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and, historically, the Soviet Union. In the cases of American and Israeli foreign policy, the perceived necessity of a healthy relationship with Turkey has been a main reason behind stalled attempts to grant Armenians the justice of legally acknowledging the genocide. The United States relies on Turkey for use of an air base for military operations in Iraq in addition to a strong NATO partnership whereas Israel relies on Turkey as a political and military ally in a region that is often pitted against Israel’s existence. The United States has raised the issue of genocide recognition in congress multiple times but legislation has not passed because of fear of rupturing relations with Turkey. On the contrary, Israel has raised the issue only once and it came at a time of major fallout in Turkish-Israeli relations, which supports the reasoning that the Knesset, or Israeli parliament, had not before approached the subject due to their wish to preserve healthy ties with Ankara. Therefore, recognition of the Armenian genocide by the United States and Israel is largely

founded in political decision-making that either reflects a desire to maintain beneficial relationships with Turkey in the case of the US, or demonstrates a willingness to recognize the genocide when Turkish retribution cannot greatly harm already frayed relations in the case of Israel. This supports genocide denial by placating the perpetrator and, in turn, distorts history and memorialization efforts by underrating recognition, which minimizes historical truths and prevents two potentially influential voices against genocide denial from taking effective action against denial campaigns.

II: The United States

During the Armenian genocide, members of authority in American government attempted to sound alarms that genocide was occurring. Henry Morgenthau, then the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire attempted to be as outspoken as possible with regard to violence against Armenians by writing frequently to President Wilson in Washington, pleading with him to dispatch relief missions. Practices of denial were already underway and “letters [to Washington] began to be censored” signifying that “events were unfolding that the Ottoman government was trying to conceal.”4 Correspondences from American authorities took longer than normal to reach the US and though diplomatic relations remained in place, Turkey began what is now a continued history of manipulating the Turkish-American relationship.

Nevertheless, Morgenthau persisted and the newly created American Committee on Armenian Atrocities worked hard to raise money and reignite relief efforts that the US had successfully engaged in before, including the famous Red Cross

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8 Mission in 1896 headed by Clara Barton after a series of brutal anti-Armenian attacks. The media actively reported on the killings and the relief effort, in the words of Calvin Coolidge, encompassed “’all classes of our people, religious bodies of all creeds, fraternal organizations of whatever name and purpose…with a single spirit and purpose.”5 After the genocide and the peace negotiations following World War I, however, the issue of Armenia slowly began to fade away and foreign policy realignment overshadowed the horrors that had so captivated the United States.

American complacency in ignoring the fate of the Armenians came after the Lausanne Conference for reconciliation with Turkey in 1923. The treaty was defeated in Senate deliberations and much ado was made over the exclusion of any clause about Armenia. On the other hand, however, the discovery of oil fields in Mosul (in now present-day Iraq which ironically continues to fuel the debate over genocide recognition in the US) reinstated interest in opening relations with Turkey. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes pushed the administration for active involvement in the treaty for the purpose of economic exploits in Turkey and, in effect, “’the Department of State became a concession-hunting agency for the Standard Oil Company.”6 Steadfast opposition to the Treaty of Lausanne would hold for only four years, however, after which formal diplomatic relations were opened with Turkey and an official relationship marked by manipulation of geopolitical advantage took hold.

The first major event in which the United States government bent to Turkish pressure to stop genocide recognition was Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

actually in response to a non-political move. The film The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, originally a novel by Franz Werfel that recounted the horrors of the Armenian genocide, created a serious stir in Turkey when MGM began working on its production. The Turkish government petitioned Washington and “after a series of exchanges between the two governments, the State Department yielded to Turkey’s demand and got MGM to drop the project.”7 This scenario proved that a foreign government, and in this case a world power, could be taken advantage of in order to subscribe to an agenda of denial. While the United States did not explicitly “deny” the genocide by stopping film production, the government contributed to the suppression of acknowledgement and scholarship that is necessary of recognition. Discussion of genocide recognition, memorialization, and scholarship would not surface again until at least 1965, when on the fiftieth anniversary of the April 24 massacres of Armenian intellectuals, the Armenian diaspora protested a lack of widespread commemoration and in Yerevan, Armenia, demands were made to erect a memorial.8

The United States’ reliance on Turkey in the standoff with the Soviet Union, however, defined American foreign policy of the time and genocide commemoration would not come until 1975 in the form of a watered-down condemnation of acts of mass-murder. The American policy of containment against Soviet forces and the 1947 Truman doctrine bound Turkey and the United States together. The US helped Turkey fend off internal communist forces and Turkey, after joining NATO seven years prior, “allowed the United States to station fifteen nucleararmed Jupiter missiles on its territory

9 in 1959,” an issue that would come to a head during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.9 Hysteria related to communism and the Soviet Union therefore directed policy in the region and Armenia’s position as a Soviet satellite republic did not improve the case for recognizing the genocide. Finally, in 1975, for the seventieth anniversary, congress passed House Joint Resolution 148, which acknowledged April 24 as “National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man” and called for remembrance of all victims of genocide, “especially those in Armenia” but failed to mention involvement of any perpetrator.10

In a more modern context, relations between Turkey and the United States have shifted to focus on the NATO partnership and American foreign security influenced by operations involving Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria. Through yet another refocusing of the relationship with Turkey in context of foreign policy, the United States has continued to fail at passing a resolution defining the Armenian genocide as such and Turkey continues to press denial and threaten consequences for acknowledgement. On the site for the US Department of State, a webpage devoted to Turkish-American relations clearly states, “The U.S.-Turkey partnership is based on mutual interests and mutual respect and is focused on areas such as regional security and stability, economic cooperation, and human rights progress. Turkey has allowed the United States to utilize its Incirlik Air Base for the transport of non-lethal logistical support for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.”11 Emphasis on Turkey’s importance largely rests on the open usage of this air base and support on the Iraq issue, which stems not only from the

2003 invasion but also Turkish assistance in fighting down Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War of 1991.12 Characterizing the atrocities against Armenians as genocide, however, would provoke tension in relations between the United States and Turkey, which have been maintained through a close military partnership.

On the same subject, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, “As NATO allies, Turkey and the U.S., carry out their bilateral relations on the basis of universal values, including democracy, freedoms, respect for human rights, rule of law and free-market economy.”13 Interestingly, however, this statement assumes that the United States and Turkey are on the same page in terms of policy regarding human rights when Turkey cannot even acknowledge their role in the genocide of the Armenians and instead insist on vast campaigns of denial.

While one may assume that a great democratic power such as the United States that trumps human rights as a central part of its ideology would inherently go against these efforts put forth by Turkey, “the close US-Turkish relationship means that Turkish studies in the United States is well funded, not only through Turkish government source, but thanks to the large number of contractors…who do business with Turkey.”14 Turkish studies therefore include pseudo-scholarship, which distorts the realities of the historical truths behind the Armenian genocide. This issue came to a scandalous head with the Lowry affair when Princeton appointed an unqualified “scholar” of Turkish studies to a department chair after having worked for the Turkish government in an open effort to prevent dissemination of literature that identified Turkish actions as genocide.15 As evi-

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10 denced by the Lowry affair, it is clear that the United States has failed to confront genocide deniers and join a growing international community that formally recognizes the Armenian genocide. As a result, the United States has actually contributed to the perpetration of inaccurate genocide denial on a public and private front. Despite its ambiguous position, it would be unfair to say that the United States has not made an attempt to pass congressional resolutions about the matter, but not one has been signed into law and commemoration statements avoid using the words ‘genocide’ and ‘Turkey’ altogether.16 This misidentifies the historical events and fails to adequately assign responsibility for a crime that has largely gone unpunished. However, it appears that the threat of Turkish retribution in response to US acknowledgment of the genocide is too great a cost in the eyes of the American government.

In recent years, the United States has come closer to passing legislation that would declare the events that occurred against the Armenians as genocide.

Each motion, however, has swiftly been met with disapproval, which has resulted in American complicity in Turkish denial. This has therefore made the United States an accomplice to denial policy due to foreign policy concerns by failing to effectively counteract it on the federal level. The issue has been raised in Congress numerous times in the last two decades with one notable bill reaching the floor for a vote in 2000. George Radanovich, a representative from California whose district contained a large portion of the Armenian diaspora in California, authored resolution 596 which stated,

Just as the bill was going up for a vote, however, Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert “withdrew the resolution citing President Clinton’s warnings that a vote could harm national security and hurt relations with Turkey, a NATO ally.”18 Similar bills have been met with similar results in recent years as well but resolution 596 is an excellent example of how politics have interfered directly with intervention.

American interest in appeasing Turkey is clear and forthright but the presence of the Turkish lobby, as well as open threats of altering the state of Turkish-American relations are also factors. In response to resolution 252, which was brought to the congressional floor in 2010, the response

by Turkey was quite similar to that of resolution 596 but the stakes were higher in a post 9/11 policy sphere. Turkey recalled its ambassador for one month (which it also did in 2007) and the US was warned that relations would be “downgraded to entry-level” if the resolution were passed.

This was perceived to mean that passage would lead to “temporarily or permanently curtailing access to Turkish bases and territory that it uses to transport nonlethal cargo to military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.”19 Anything that could act as an obstacle to initiatives in Iraq or Afghanistan and could jeopardize the key alliance with Turkey was and continues to be put, at the very most, on the back burner.

The House of Representatives calls upon the Presi-

The effect of Turkish influence, however,

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dent to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the consequences of the failure to enforce the judgments of the Turkish courts against the responsible officials.

11 only ostensibly goes so far as to remind Washington that they are watching and listening for references to Armenia that they may find unfavorable. The American president consistently commemorates the Armenian genocide every April 24 but without using the word genocide or Turkey, which therefore fails to correctly identity the crime in question and the perpetrator of that crime. This minimizes the weight of the tragedy that befell the Armenian people and in so doing, takes a stance of denial. In his commemoration of the genocide in April 2012, President Barack Obama stated, “Today, we commemorate the Meds Yeghern, one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century. In doing so, we honor the memory of the 1.5 million Armenians who were brutally massacred or marched to their deaths in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire.”20 Turkey responded with a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and remarked,

Issued under the influence of domestic political considerations and interpreting controversial historical events on the basis of one-sided information and with a selective sense of justice, such statements damage Turkish-American relations…

It should also be known that the pain experienced during the World War I is a shared one and the memory of that period is as sensitive for the Turkish people as it is for the Armenians.­21

While Turkey does not openly threat sanctions against the United States by drafting such a statement, they openly raise the issue of potential harm to political relations and continue spreading ideology of denial by contradicting Obama’s statement and claiming that the suffering of the time period affected both sides in the conflict, which is inherently untrue. Furthermore, such statements are not encouraged by direct in-

fluence from Turkey and are generated in order to fit a certain policy framework, which in this case, is placation of the Turks. Such behavior was also exhibited when the Department of State removed John Marshall Evans, the ambassador to Armenia, after referring to the events of 1915 as genocide in a speech he delivered in California in 2005.22 Regardless of whether or not a Turkish lobby was involved in this action, it is clear that due to foreign policy concerns that rely on the cooperation of the Turkish and American governments, the Armenian genocide has not been recognized in the way that it needs to be in order to fight its denial. Even more surprising perhaps is the response of Israel who, despite being established in the wake of genocide, has failed to formally acknowledge the Armenian genocide out of foreign policy concerns. Thus, one nation as leader of the free world and another as a state that has risen out of the ashes of genocide have acted as obstacles to condemning genocide denial instead of working against it to bring justice to the international community and prevent future genocides from occurring.

III: Israel

Israel’s views on recognizing the Armenian genocide create a confounding situation. The role of international politics and a complex surrounding the wish to preserve the uniqueness of the Holocaust seemingly bar a country built on the ashes of genocide from recognizing the genocide of another people. The state of Israel was established in 1948 and a formal diplomatic relationship was established with Turkey just two years later. Indeed, this relationship has proven to take on complicated dynamics through

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12 the upgrading and downgrading of diplomatic relations by Turkey in response to Israel’s policies in Palestine and in condemning other military actions including the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967. More recently, continued action against Palestine, differing views on Syria and Iran, and the intensely explosive flotilla incident in 2010 have opened a major rift in their relationship.

While the two have historically relied on each other for military and political cooperation, Israel’s governing body, the Knesset, did not open up discussion on Armenian genocide recognition until 2011 when relations between the two countries were at a serious low point. As contrasted with the United States, which has continuously reviewed the issue without success despite an ongoing cooperation with Turkey, Israel has only taken on the issue in times of political strain.

This indicates that decisions of foreign policy continued to dictate the decision to even discuss recognition by observing that the issue was only brought to the Knesset floor as a stance against Turkish ire. In countering the argument that Israel’s failure to recognize isn’t political, trying to preserve the uniqueness of the Holocaust is one such issue that arises but Israel has spoken out against other genocides while largely ignoring the Armenian issue. Thus, recognition of the Armenian genocide in Israel rests on political decision-making, which takes away from the human, moral component of acknowledging genocide and leads to acceptance of denial.

One widely supported claim to explain Israel’s silence on the issue is that it wishes to not overshadow the Holocaust by using similar terminology in describing atrocities that occurred in Armenia.

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This is certainly a disturbing trend and has come up in many actions and statements from the Israeli government. For example, the Israeli Embassy supported a motion to exclude a piece on the Armenian genocide from the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.23 Such action while on one hand is seen as trying to centralize the Holocaust as the focal point of the museum, fails to address the issue of “never again” by failing to appropriately synthesize an accurate history of world genocides. Furthermore, in April 2001, the Israeli foreign minister and current president Shimon Peres declared on the eve of a foreign visit to Ankara, “We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegations. Nothing similar to the Holocaust occurred. It is a tragedy what the Armenians went through but not a genocide.”24 While such a strong statement from a person in a position of high authority can be interpreted as denying Armenia the categorization of the Armenian genocide as being equal to that of the Holocaust, it does not refute the argument that such statements are political. Reviewing the Israeli reaction to another genocide of massive proportion, which destroyed upwards of 800,000 lives in Rwanda in 1994, shows that Israel is very responsive to genocide under the premise of empathy from its own history when politics do not play a role. Israel acknowledged their obligation to denounce the Rwandan genocide, which noticeably occurred in a part of the world where Israel does not exude much influence and where acknowledgement and action would not threaten its position back at home. This therefore hints that there are other political factors at play with regard to establishing a stance on Armenia.

13 Israel’s response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 contradicts their policy of non-recognition with regard to the Armenian genocide on account of it potentially overshadowing the Holocaust. The Israeli government declared on May 22, 1994 that “The government of Israel is shocked by the genocide taking place in Rwanda…the Jewish people, which has experienced the most bitter event of the Nazi holocaust, and its state, the State of Israel, cannot be indifferent to the horrors of Rwanda.”25 Moreover, Israel swiftly established a military hospital in the Congo, just over the border from Rwanda under Operation Interns for Hope to provide medical assistance to refugees.26 Of course, the fact that Israel was able to intervene on behalf of Rwanda and not in Armenia must be considered. It is accepted historical fact, however, that the Armenian genocide occurred and yet Israel has not commemorated it or acknowledged it in the way that it did for Rwanda. Furthermore, the country is contradicting itself by necessitating intervention in Rwanda under the principle of “never again” in terms of post-Holocaust thought, and not acknowledging the Armenian genocide. Though it occurred before the Holocaust and before Israel became a state, their obligation to condemn the Armenian genocide, stemming from the commonality of their struggle and Israel’s outward attempts to support genocide scholarship and memorialization, has not been fulfilled. Thus, it can be inferred that failure to recognize the Armenian genocide and dialogue on the subject rests on other motives, which can be identified as political.

Analyzing Israel’s approach to the Armenian genocide can rest solely on recognition rather than intervention as con-

trasted to the American-Armenian story and their physical response to Rwanda because it was not yet a nation when the genocide in Armenia occurred. After the establishment of Israel, however, Israeli government officials treaded carefully in avoiding recognition and commemoration ceremonies by “claiming that [the genocide] is commemorated privately inside the community.”27 This is largely attributable to Israel’s “rationale in …as to why it should yield to Turkish pressure… to keep relations with the only Muslim country willing to do so.”28 Furthermore, the general consensus among politicians was that “a little state surrounded by enemies has ‘no choice’ and must, therefore, cooperate with non-democratic regimes.”29 In a modern context, however, when other countries like the United States that do not formally recognize the genocide but still commemorate the annual international day of remembrance on April 24, Israel remains silent.

Turning now to the more intricate issue of Israeli-Turkish relations, their relationship has seen mutually beneficial exchanges and a series of intense clashes over controversial issues. For Turkey, cooperation with Israel has been fundamental in building up its military by capitalizing on their alliance to purchase advanced military technology, an area in which Israel is largely recognized as a world leader. In 2009, the Turkish government signed a $141 million contract with Israel to import an aerial intelligence system and contracts of similar magnitude and purpose had been signed in the past.30 In addition, Turkey has participated in many military exercises with Israel and has cooperated in many different intelligence-gathering and counter-terrorism operations.31 As a secular

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14 state, Turkey evidently would wish to block the same Islamist extremism that threatens the Israeli state. This is one of the most fundamental and key concerns of their mutual relationship. As a country that borders Syria and Iran, Israel looks to Turkey as a major balancing power that regionally aligns with the West in order to maintain geopolitical stability to the highest possible degree. In so doing, Israel has developed a history of “leap-frog” foreign policy and in past decades aligned with Iran and Ethiopia to help build an outer ring of allies outside the sphere of hostile neighbor countries like Egypt and Syria.32 Due to significant regime changes in these countries, however, Israel has had to look elsewhere and thus, their relationship with Turkey has been cemented as the new go-to “Lilli pad” in the leap frog method. Turkey has corroborated this policy and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that, “Turkey has taken initiatives in order to ensure Israel’s peaceful co-existence with its neighbors.”33 In 1999, Israel sent large amounts of humanitarian aid to Turkey in the wake of a devastating earthquake, thereby committing their relationship to a level that could perhaps be seen as going beyond military cooperation. On the other hand, this operation would certainly have helped maintain their formal, strategic partnership. One New York Times columnist remarked, “it took the earthquake to show that [their relationship] has become more than political -and has clearly taken deep root among ordinary people.”34 Nevertheless, ten years later, the picture would be quite different and the Armenian genocide would take on a role in Israel that had never been seen before.

From 1948 until 2011, however, recogniFall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

tion of the Armenian genocide was not once brought to the government level as a debate on legislation. When this did occur in 2011, however, significant changes had occurred between Turkey and Israel that led to a fraying of their relations and as a result, allowed Israel to debate the issue without fear of serious retribution. Their relations had already significantly fallen apart. A resolution never passed, however, and the timing of the debate only furthers the argument that recognition for the Armenian genocide in a country built on another genocide was determined by political means. This minimizes the significance of genocide recognition and the genocide itself by failing to address the positive morality of calling out the Turks as perpetrators. This is then an inherent failure to assign proper responsibility to a crime, thereby perpetuating Turkey’s ability to push its denial.

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s overt frustration with Israel on Palestinian policy and the Gaza flotilla incident of 2010 provided the impetus for a significant downgrading of Israeli-Turkish relations and it was in this setting that the first ever debate over Armenian genocide recognition was able to occur. In late 2008 into early 2009, Israel launched a major offensive in Gaza in response to repeated rocket fire striking southern Israel, reportedly caused by the militant group Hamas. Later that year, Prime Minister Erdogan stormed out of a panel discussion on Palestine at the World Economic Forum in Davos because he felt he was not given adequate time to respond to remarks by Shimon Peres which incensed Erdogan due to his strong backing of the Palestinian cause.35 Tensions began to run at an all time high, however, after the

15 highly publicized flotilla incident of May 31, 2010. A ship from Turkey was sending humanitarian relief to Gaza, which was under a strict sea, land, and air blockade by the Israeli military. The Israeli military stormed the ship and nine Turkish citizens were killed which immediately incited a rapid response from Ankara.

The ambassador was recalled immediately and after a year of impasse with regard to the reaching a resolution on the matter, “diplomatic relations were downgraded to a minimum level in 2011, all military agreements were suspended and all ongoing projects were interrupted.”36 With Turkish and Israeli relations at an all time low, the Armenian genocide was finally brought to discussion in the Knesset.

When Turkey drew down relations to a bare minimum, it was then and only then that the issue of the Armenian genocide was raised on a governmental level. Both the political and moral implications are quite clear. The moral standpoint is certainly a strong factor for Israel, considering its history. It could be argued that Israel was too politically compromised to raise the morality of the issue and that it did not view the issue of the Armenian genocide as important enough considering its alliance with Turkey. It is this very history, however, that makes Israel’s recognition of the genocide so critical in a similar vein of the significance of the US as a world democracy in recognizing the genocide in combatting the denial campaign. Peter Balakian, a foremost scholar on Armenian genocide denial, wrote,

Given Turkey’s relentless campaign to deny the Armenian Genocide and insinuate its own extreme national narrative into democratic societies around the world, Israel’s call for the genocide’s proper and long overdue recognition would have

important ethical meaning. It would, among other things, be a redress to genocide denial in general.37

Nevertheless, the Knesset was unable to come to any conclusion on the issue and the discussion died over political issues just as it had been raised. There were serious divides among members of the Knesset over whether or not the issue should take on a political climate.

Otniel Schneller, a legislator in the Knesset declared that, “This is the time when we must rehabilitate our relations with Turkey because this is an existential issue for us…Sometimes our desire to be right and moral overcomes our desire to exist, which is in the interest of the entire country.”38 In other words, it would be healthier for Israel politically to ignore the Armenian issue. The speaker of the parliament, Reuven Rivlin countered this by saying, “As a people and as a country we stand and face the whole world with the highest moral demand that Holocaust denial is something human history cannot accept…. we cannot deny the tragedy of others.”39 Unfortunately, however, the session ended inconclusively and was not brought to the floor again. In March and April of 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry has moved to repair ties with Israel and Turkey, a relationship that is crucial for American interests in the region, and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally apologized to Turkey for the flotilla incident.40 As the two countries move to improve relations and normalize their ties, it is ­unlikely that the Armenian genocide will be recognized by Israel in the near future. Furthermore, as the crisis in Syria continues to heat up, Turkey as Syria’s neighbor is becoming more and more important for both Israel and the United States. Politics are continuing to win the fight for geno-

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16 cide recognition, which allows Turkey to continue to deny the genocide.

IV: Conclusion In examining the responses of the United States and Israel to the Armenian genocide in the context of state level genocide recognition, it is clear that foreign policy with Turkey has dictated their respective courses of action, or lack thereof. This is especially alarming because these two countries could make a major difference with regard to the way the world views the Armenian genocide and in combatting denial. The United States is a major voice of democracy and justice and recognition by a world power such as the US would take a major stance against the denial campaign. Israel is a country that achieved statehood in the shadow of the Holocaust, perhaps the world’s best-known and most destructive genocide to date. Recognizing the Armenian genocide could help fight off denial by using the educational tools employed for the Holocaust and applying them toward the Armenian genocide. Denial validates and, to a degree, provides justification for future genocides. Harsh international recognition of atrocities would prevent the acceptance of such events and serve to reduce the likelihood of more occurring such as the Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda. Nevertheless, denial by Turkey forges onward and political and military alliances between Ankara, the US, and Israel have prevented the recognition of the Armenian genocide as such. This has proven that politics and international relations often conflict with the moral obligation to recognize, educate, and help prevent genocide. While the United States and Israel continue to defer to their relationship with Turkey, Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

however, the Armenian genocide will not receive the recognition and justice that it deserves in this world. As long as genocide denial exists on the basis of furthering political ties, atrocities will continue to be shamefully unrecognized which begs the question of whether or not the global community is equipped to confront genocide and stop mass killing in the future.

17 References Jones, Adam. Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction. Second Edition. New York, N.Y., United States: Routledge, 2011.

2 Balakian, Peter. Burning Tigris. New York, N.Y., United States: Harper Collins, 2003.

3 Jones, 2011.

4 Balakian, 2003.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Gordon, Philip H., and Omer Taspinar. Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.

10 “U.S. House of Representatives Joint Resolution 148.”

Armenian National Institute, April 9, 1975. http://www. armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.157/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html.

11 Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Public Affairs. “Turkey.” Press Release|Fact Sheet. U.S. Department of State, January 7, 2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm.

12 Zanotti, Jim. Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges. DIANE Publishing, n.d.

13 “Relations Between Turkey and the United States of America.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Accessed May 3, 2013. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relationsbetween-turkey-and-the-united-states-of-america.en.mfa.

14 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction.

15 Balakian, 2003.

16 Ibid.

17 Radanovich, George. “H.RES.596.IH -- Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution.” Library of Congress, September 27, 2000. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c106:100:./ temp/~mdbsZag8MZ:: 18 Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction.

19 Zanotti.

20 Embassy, U. S. “Statements by U.S. Officials: Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance Day.” http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_042412. html, March 21, 2013. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_042412.html.

21 “No: 119, 24 April 2013, Press Release Regarding the Statement of US President Barack Obama on the Occasion of 24 April.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2013. http://www.mfa.gov. tr/no_-119_-24-april-2013_-press-release-regarding-thestatement-of-us-president-barack-obama-on-the-occasion-of-24-april.en.mfa.

22 Welch, Matt. “The Diplomat Who Cracked.” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2007. http://www.latimes.com/news/ opinion/la-oew-welch24apr24,0,2351310.story?coll=lapromo-opinion%7Centire.

23 Auron, Yair. The Banality of Denial: Israel and the Armenian Genocide. New Brunswick, N.J., USA: Transaction Publishers, 2005.

24 “Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’ Statement on So-Called Armenian Genocide.” Republic of Turkey Min1

istry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 26, 2013. http:// www.mfa.gov.tr/israeli-foreign-minister-shimon-peres_statement-on-so-called-armenian-genocide.en.mfa.

25 Auron, 2005.

26 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affiars. “Israeli Medical Aid for Rwandan Refugees in Zaire.” Accessed May 2, 2013.

27 Auron, 2005.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Kershner, Isabel. “Israel Cancels Military Contract With Turkey to Supply Aerial System.” The New York Times, December 23, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/world/middleeast/ israel-cancels-military-contract-with-turkey.html.

31 Auron, 2005.

32 Ibid.

33 “Relations between Turkey and Israel.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed May 7, 2013. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-andisrael .en.mfa.

34 Kinzer, Stephen. “Quake Relief Shows Israel Feels Deeply For Turkey - New York Times.” New York Times, August 28, 1999. http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/28/ world/quake-relief-shows-israel-feels-deeply-for-turkey. html.

35 Bennhold, Katrin. “Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel.” The New York Times, January 30, 2009, sec. International / Europe. http://www.nytimes. com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html.

36 “Relations between Turkey and Israel.”

37 Balakian, 2003.

38 Bronner, Ethan. “Israel Risks Turkish Anger on Issue of Armenian Genocide.” The New York Times, December 26, 2011, sec. World / Middle East. http://www.nytimes. com/2011/12/27/world/middleeast/israel-risks-turkishire-with-recognition-of-armenian-genocide.html.

39 Ibid.

40 “Relations between Turkey and Israel.”

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18

Comparative Analysis: Bahrain and Qatar Gabe Meier | Pitzer ‘14

On October 30, 2013, a statue of a great Muslim leader fell in the capitol city of a Gulf state after widespread public protests. Exactly one year earlier, the government of another Gulf state banned all protests and demonstrations, citing “recent episodes of violence.” Without any further information, a discerning intellectual might figure that both respective countries are in, or were in, the throws of a populist democracy swell, likely a symptom of the Arab Spring movement that began in Tunisia on December 17, 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi set fire to his own body in protest of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime.

The first occurrence was, in fact, the removal of a statue depicting French soccer hero Zinedine Zidane’s infamous head butt of Italian soccer player Marco Materazzi in the World Cup 2006 final.1 The statue stood on Doha, Qatar’s corniche and was a part of the emirate’s preparations for the 2022 World Cup, a competition that the country of just over 2 million people will improbably hold after outbidding the likes of Japan, South Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

Korea, Australia and the United States.2 The fickle nature of this specific protest could be interpreted as a willingness on the part of the Qatari people to take to the streets, but in reality, it represents how calm the Qatari “street” actually is.

The latter occurrence was the culmination of two years of protests and subsequent crackdowns in Bahrain, located just 25 miles away from Qatar in the Persian Gulf. With the help of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Saudi Arabian military, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s regime managed to stifle widespread protests through a battery of violence, coercion and propaganda.3 It would be unfair to say that the Bahraini opposition movement failed, but the efficacy of Al Khalifa’s suppression methods cannot be questioned.

At first glance, Bahrain and Qatar are not all that different. They are both small states in the Persian Gulf with tiny populations. Single respective families have ruled both for centuries and both gained independence from Britain in 1971. Both

19 are monarchies and both have strong military ties to the United States. Both are, or were in Bahrain’s case, oil and natural gas based economies. Both employ an astonishing amount of immigrant labor with a majority of each country’s respective population made up of non-natives.

With so many similarities, what domestic factors led to a massive, populist uprising in Bahrain? And on the other hand, why has the Qatari street not risen up?

Complex comparative questions like this cannot be answered quickly or easily so for the sake of clarity, this analysis will narrow down three domestic causes behind the general unrest in Bahrain and relative lack of unrest in Qatar. The first cause is wealth. Pure and simple, Qatar is one of the richest countries in the world.

With the largest non-associated natural gas field in the world under their control, Qatar is consistently ranked number one or two in GDP per capita rankings and distributes wealth through public sector employment, land grants and subsidized goods and services.4 While Bahrain is not a poor country by any means (ranked 34 to 42 in GDP per capita rankings), the economic policies propogated by the Al-Khalifa regime and their Sunni allies have left much of the 65-75% Shia majority marginalized and underemployed.

The second factor is the two respective country’s history of protests and relative lack thereof. In short, Bahrain has been in an almost constant state of upheaval for the past three decades while Qatar has remained largely peaceful. This is inextricably linked to wealth, but it is not the only factor. While it is true that Bahrainis protest on economic matters, human rights, migrant policies and sectarian strife are also in play. Regardless

of whether Qataris have grievances or not, the fact that there is a long history of street-level protests in Bahrain makes the current uprising more explainable.

The final factor regards key political mistakes made by the Al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain. Ever since 73 purported members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain were arrested after a coup attempt in 1981 (the same year Bahrain joined the Gulf Cooperation Council), the Al-Khalifa regime has taken a hardline stance against Shia political organization, often combating the main opposition party Al-Wefaq with intimidation, the gerrymandering of districts and the naturalization of Sunnis from neighboring states for election purposes.5 This has effectively radicalized the opposition movement, given a voice to extreme factions and moved the movement from parliament to the streets. In contrast, former Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani retained good will since taking over from his father in a bloodless coup in 1995, even going so far as to call for elections in 2011 and to voluntarily transfer power to his son in June of this year.6,7 Oil was first found in Bahrain in 1931, funding the then British protectorate and later the State and then Kingdom of Bahrain. In recent years though, oil has essentially dried up with Bahrain’s economy trending towards international banking and tourism. As a result, Bahrain’s Shia population is facing a growing wealth-gap, startling youth unemployment numbers, while the country as a whole faces crumbling infrastructure.8 It would be foolhardy to position this as a sectarian conflict, but it is impossible not to see the Shia vs. Sunni contours of Bahrain’s economic inequality.

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20 Furthermore, the Al-Khalifa regime has employed hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from South Asia and elsewhere in the Gulf, many of whom work in security positions, effectively handing jobs that could be filled by Shiites to foreign nationals. With the monarchy simultaneously strengthening their Sunni base and denying jobs to young Shias, tensions were dangerously high before the Arab Spring and the events in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere ended up being the spark that led to mass protest.

25 miles south of Bahrain, Qataris do not have many economic grievances to speak of. With a per capita GDP of approximately $83 thousand, most native Qataris live a fairly lavish life, surrounded by culture (the I.M. Pei designed Museum of Islamic Art), high education (Qatar University) and athletic achievement (as noted above, the 2022 World Cup will take place in Qatar). Qatar is safe and stable and passes on undesirable jobs (taxi drivers, janitors) to immigrants, while subsidizing everything from petrol (a liter of petrol costs less than a liter of soda) to food.9 Qatar’s economic subsidies and relative stability allow Qataris to essentially be apolitical and ignore, or at least tolerate the occasional human rights violation. There is, of course, still small-scale opposition, but it is generally tempered by rational governance. In short, Qataris do not feel the need to take to the streets and call for democracy.

In the mid-1990s, the protest movement in Bahrain flared up, beginning in 1994 with the arrest of a Shia cleric and coming to a head in 1996 with a series of bomb explosions in Manama and an attempted coup. The Al-Khalifa regime framed the events as an Iranian plot to destabilize Bahrain and stepped down hard on Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

the protesters, but small-scale conflicts raged throughout the late-1990s. Time and time again, young Shiites would take to the streets in small numbers and time and time again, Al-Khalifa’s security apparatus would crush them. Like in Egypt, Bahrain’s youth grew up with protesting in their veins, whether that meant taking to the streets to oppose an election, an arrest or economic inequality.10 Contrary to the Al-Khalifa regime’s portrayal of them, Bahrain’s most prominent opposition party, Al Wefaq, is deeply communal and moderate. Since abstaining from elections from 2002 to 2006, the party has made a genuine effort to sit down at the table, no matter how broken it may be, with the monarchy.11 Even after the more extreme Al Wefaq members split away and created the Haq movement, Al-Khalifa’s regime refused to negotiate with the party, a decision that would be key to the eventual crisis of 2011-12. Handed the opportunity to broaden its legitimacy among more moderate Shias, the monarchy instead doubled down on its hard-line stance, continuing its election manipulation tactics, effectively barring an Al Wefaq majority in the elected lower house.12 With an ineffectual Al Wefaq party in the lower house, populist support for the grassroots Haq party began to grow, resulting in a war of attrition waged on the streets of Bahrain’s cities. Instead of taking up matters through diplomatic means like their Al Wefaq counterparts might, Haq utilized a mixture of civil disobedience and human rights activism to combat the monarchy, garnering more and more support with every new injustice perpetrated by the security apparatus. This political mis-maneuver on the

21 part of Al-Khalifa’s reactionary regime turned out to be one of the key factors in the surge of protests in 2011 and could have even lead to regime change if the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Saudi Arabian military had not stepped in to assist the monarchy.

The analog between the removal of a Zinedine Zidane statue and the barring of all political parties might seem theatrical at first glace, especially when considering the geographical proximity of Qatar and Bahrain, but when you consider the country’s respective wealth, opposition history and past political decisions, the disparity between the two situations comes into focus. Of course, Qatar is not immune to protest and the World Cup has become a flashpoint of debate, but the above evidence points to a minimal chance of a populist uprising occurring. Similarly, with the right political maneuvering, the Al-Khalifa regime could appease and later reconcile with the Shia majority, but that is also unlikely (at least in the foreseeable future).

Another more abstract (and more difficult to quantify) factor to ponder is the relationship between the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bahrain. Many assert that Bahrain is essentially a pawn in a chess game between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional dominance (watched over by the United States). It is difficult to gauge Iran’s influence in Bahrain, but considering Saudi Arabia’s military intervention, it is clear that they value the country for geopolitical purposes. The future is uncertain for Bahrain and while currently stable, one only has to look to the United Arab Emirates to see how an energy-based economy in the Gulf can quickly falter.

References Mackey, Robert. “Qatar Removes Statue of Zidane’s Head Butt After Complaints.” Los Angeles Times 30 10 2013, n. pag. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/qatar-removes-statue-of-zidaneshead-butt-after-complaints/>.

2 Jackson, Jamie. “Qatar win 2022 World Cup bid.” The Guardian 2 12 2010, n. pag. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http:// www.theguardian.com/football/2010/dec/02/qatar-win2022-world-cup-bid>.

3 Fahim, Kareem. “Citing Violence, Bahrain Bans All Protests in New Crackdown.” The New York Times [Cairo] 30 10 2012, n. pag. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http://www.nytimes. com/2012/10/31/world/middleeast/bahrain-bans-allprotests-in-new-crackdown.html?_r=0I>.

4 Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. “Qatar and the Arab Spring.”

Open Democracy. (2012): n. page. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen/qatar-and-arab-spring>.

5 Diwan, Kristin Smith. “Bahrain’s Shia Question: What the United States Gets Wrong About Sectarianism.”

Trans. Array The New Arab Revolt. Council on Foreign Relations, 2011. 187-192. Print.

6 Hamid, Shadi. “There Aren.” The Atlantic. 1 11 2011: n. page. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/there-arent-protests-in-qatarso-why-did-the-emir-just-announce-elections/247661/>.

7 Nordland, Rob. “In Surprise, Emir of Qatar Plans to Abdicate, Handing Power to Son.” The New York Times [Doha] 24 6 2013, n. pag. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http://www. nytimes.com/2013/06/25/world/middleeast/qatar-transfer-of-power.html>.

8 Bahrain: Shouting in the dark. 2012. Film. 21 Nov 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programm es/2011/08/201184144547798162.html>.

6 Khatri, Shabina. “Qatar: Why Protests Won’t Happen Here.” Huffington Post 7 3 2011, n. pag. Web. 21 Nov. 2013. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shabina-s-khatri/qatarwhy-protests-wont-h_b_830129.html>.

9 Khatri 10 Bahrain 11 Diwan 12 Diwan 1

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22

A Quasi-Supranational State: the EU in Evolution Kate Kennelly | Pomona ‘14

Despite wide-ranging definitions for the EU, almost all scholars have noted how extensively the EU has evolved. With the process of integration becoming more complicated with successive enlargements, many believe that the EU has evolved in ways that were not anticipated by its leaders. One such scholar is Rifkin, who considers the European Union to be a successful form of transnational governance. Riftkin is overflowing in his praise for the EU, saying that its dynamic combination of free trade areas, regulatory institutions, and federalist constitution has made it the new “city upon a hill” in a globalized world. Whereas the United States had failed with the Articles of Confederation, Europe has achieved a balanced vision of union and constituency, a form of governance between nationalism and federalism. As Rifkin writes, “Rather than becoming a super-state or a mechanism to represent the enlightened national self-interests, the EU has metamorphosed into a third form. It has become a discursive forum whose function is to referee relationships and help coordinate activity among a range of players, Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

of which the nation state is only one. The EU’s primary role has become orchestral.”1 Rifkin sees the EU as a postmodern form of informal governance that has evolved beyond structure, beyond hierarchy, beyond the centrality of the nation state, and beyond the federalist v. intergovernmental debate.

The actual structure of EU governance, however, should indicate that this is far from true. Rifkin’s definition is perfect for emphasizing just how far the EU is from achieving anything of the sort. If anything, the EU is a quasi-supranational government that is still evolving and may never reach the end point of its evolution, that is, a full-fledged sovereign European government. Contrary to everything Rifkin said about the EU transcending conventional governance, the EU is still sorting through its structural complexities: it remains bogged down in bureaucracy, its governance is still exerted hierarchically but far from effectively, its primary (and problematic) actor continues to be the nation state, and the federalist v. inter-governmental debate con-

23 tinues to dominate the question of the EU’s future as a political union.

Whereas Rifkin attributes the EU’s complexity to its novel form of governance, a complexity that defies structure, most scholars would say that EU governance is complex precisely because of its structure. As Reid writes, “If a camel is a horse designed by a committee, as the old joke goes, then the ridiculously complicated structure of the European Union councils, commissions, courts, committees, and Parliament scattered around various European cities makes up a huge camel of a government.”2 First of all, there is the Council of Ministers, a group of the 27 leaders elected from each member state, although these elected officials change depending on what policy the Council has convened to discuss. The Council of Ministers is not to be confused with the European Council, which consists of the heads of government of the 27 member states, who meet at least four times a year, and, according to the Maastricht treaty of 1992, are invested with the role of “providing the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defining the general political guidelines thereof.”3

However, the European Commission plays an equally, if not more powerful role, in the political fate of the EU. As Gallagher writes, “The Commission president can make a big difference to the development of the EU.”4 The Commission is the only branch where legislation is initiated, and officials are appointed rather than elected as party representatives, making them less accountable to national governments, although they still carry national biases. They are appointed by the European Parliament, the

most democratic part of the EU, but one that still suffers from a democracy deficit and that has proven the weakest despite its control over the EU budget and its veto power over Commission proposals.

In contrast, the ECJ has evolved to become the most effective governing arm, with its established supremacy over the national court system, and the power to check EU institutions, to resolve disputes between institutions and member states, and to mandate national compliance with EU law.

Having described the different governing arms of the EU, Rifkin’s claim that the EU, as a fluid form of governance, has gone beyond structure has been thoroughly discredited. One can see that the EU has become hyper-structural. And it is clear from Gallagher’s article that the EU’s structural complexity has baffled its political objectives. He repeats the words lack of purpose numerous times in his descriptions of the different EU branches of government: “ . . . the Commission has no clear overall goal or program and can appear to lack a sense of purpose . . . the lack of clarity about the real purpose of the European Parliament . . .”5 Rather than fostering political dynamism, the EU’s coordination among such a diverse range of actors often dissipates into bureaucratic inefficiency and stagnation: “As if it weren’t difficult enough to design a government for a new kind of supranational state unlike any other political entity on the planet, the EU has to do all its governing in a cacophony of different languages.”6

Alesina also views the EU’s attempts at coordination as overextended (rather than inclusive as Rifkin would have it), a problem that has prompted an obses-

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24 sion with more policymaking and more bureaucracy as the only solutions: “The impression given is that policy-makers know how to fix things, so it is only a matter of doing more planning and coordinating, devising procedures, more rules, and more latitude for public intervention and more white papers. Intellectual logic is what’s missing.”7 Far from being a governing entity that follows a post-structural logic, the logic of the EU has become lost in its complex structure, which is part of the reason why it remains stuck in its evolution of becoming a fullfledged supranational institution.

Rifkin also writes that the EU, in its “unexpected evolution,” has overcome the traditional hierarchical form of politics and adopted the role of a mediator in a political field where no one player can dominate. While this may be true in a certain sense, with Gallagher acknowledging that the Commission “may act more as a mediator or broker between different interests groups than as an independent initiator,”8 it is not in another sense, with the ECJ having concentrated power in its own hands and with an overall trend in other EU branches towards a more topdown approach. A strategic concentration of power in the hands of EU elites has evolved furthest in the ECJ, to the strong objection of national courts. The two major steps taken by the ECJ to secure its preeminence were the doctrine of direct effect, which allowed citizens to appeal over the heads of national politicians to ECJ jurisdiction and thereby creating a sort of alliance with European citizens that circumvented and undermined national sovereignty, and the doctrine of supremacy, a far more brazen step which flatly declared that national courts must enforce European law over national law.9 Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

The reason why the ECJ has become arguably the most successful branch of the EU is that, rather than acting as a neutral referee, it became a political player in its own right. By creatively interpreting the Treaty of Rome to assume powers that it had not been explicitly given (but from which it had not been explicitly barred either), the ECJ took on a unique role in forging the path to further integration by arbitrarily forcing national courts to relinquish their sovereignty for the collective benefit of the Union. According to Alter, what happened was “nothing short of a legal revolution,”10 whose bold and controversial steps produced an adversarial politics, but one in which the ECJ came out as the ultimate judicial authority, able to implement and enforce its decisions.

Moreover, what undermines Rifkin’s argument about the EU’s strong suit being its lack of adversarial politics is that the area where EU governance has proven most effective, the ECJ, has seen the rise of adversarial politics, with lower courts using the ECJ to ensure that higher courts will not overturn their decisions, so that what Rifkin calls a ‘mediating’ role actually allows the ECJ to manipulate relations between national courts.

While the ECJ has transformed into a fairly effective supranational entity, the same cannot be said for the rest of the EU, which lags behind in developing a clear sense of authority in relation to national governments. The trend has been arguably similar to the ECJ’s, moving towards a top-down approach and a deliberate centralization of power in the hands of elites. Alesina writes that one often sees the EU issuing blanket directives with an arbitrary lack of regard for regional or cultural differences, and argues that this

25 increasingly dirigiste approach is likely intentional: “The need for coordination of policies is vastly overemphasized, perhaps strategically, by EU officials since they will be the ones involved and empowered by the super-national coordination itself.”11 Gallagher, too, notes that the supranational (vertical) structures have become relatively stronger than the intergovernmental (horizontal) structures within the EU: “Over time, the supranational organizations have grown stronger . . . . the EU has moved closer to becoming a genuinely supranational polity than any entity before it.”12

Gallagher, however, makes it clear that, while this has been a trend, it has proceeded slowly and problematically because the Commission’s leadership role remains unclearly defined and unable to completely transcend its national makeup: “The question of whether the Commission should be a principal- an independent actor with its own agendaor merely an agent of other actors, such as the Council or national governments, was left unspecified from the start.”13 The ECJ became a principal, casting off its role as a mere arbiter that was unable to enforce its prerogative, and actively seeking an expansion of its power as an independent actor. But with the Commission’s role still unclear, or rather with its role being a hybrid of actor and facilitator, the Commission has been unable to assert itself, as the ECJ has, as the ultimate authority. The best explanation for the EU’s inability to achieve full independence as a supranational entity, is, of course, linked to the issue of national sovereignty. While the ECJ achieved its power grab by forcing national courts to hand over their sovereignty, such a step taken in the judicial realm is not so easily

replicated in the political one, especially given that the Commission is made up of the heads of national governments.

Muddled by its own inter-governmental composition, it is clear that EU governance has not escaped the nation-state container as Rifkin claims. The nation state is not “one of many actors” in a fluid form of EU governance, but rather the primary actor. National interests continue to permeate all branches of the EU. Writing about the Commission, Gallagher explains, “It is tacitly accepted that commissioners do not suddenly slough off their national identities the moment they are appointed and become transformed into “Euromen” or “Eurowomen” . . . Moreover, any commissioner who hopes to be reappointed has an incentive not to alienate the government that has the nomination in its control . . . undoubtedly governments do expect their commissioner to advise them as to how to maximize benefits for the country.”14 National governments also maintain a lot of autonomy because even though Commission legislation imposes obligations on them, it is “grossly understaffed” and suffers from an implementation deficit, “unable to monitor Union-wide policy implementation in anything like a comprehensive fashion.”15

Within the other three branches, the presence of the nation state is even stronger.

Within the European Council, the heads of government have sought to maximize their benefits by undermining the potential influence of the council’s rotating presidency. As Gallagher writes, “Low profile selections gave the impression that the heads of government were keen to ensure that the appointees would pose no threat to their dominance.” Nation

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26 states also maintain a good deal of influence in the Council of Ministers, since, in spite of adopting treaties that allowed for majority voting, it still prefers to operate on the basis of consensus, afraid that it will lose its legitimacy if it deviates too much from consensual governance.

Therefore, “if a country, or group of countries has strong objections to a proposal, the majority will try to find a way of accommodating the objections rather than railroad the proposal through.”16 Even in the Parliament, where there are continent-wide parties, national ties still play a big role, since MEP’s from each national party “maintain a separate existence within the EP groups” and “when crosspressured, are three times more likely to vote with their national group than with their political group.”17 To an even greater degree than the commissioners, MEP’s are “unconstrained by any incentive to be loyal to the executive” so as not to jeopardize promotion prospects that reside in their national bases.

Besides their strong presence within the EU, the other reason why national actors remain powerful is the EU’s failure to forge a direct link with European citizens. As a political entity apart from the nation state, the EU currently holds little relevance for Europeans. Even its most democratic branch, the European Parliament, suffers from what scholars have termed a democracy deficit: “The EP has become more powerful but voters still accord it relatively little importance.” 18 As Gallagher writes, since there is such low voter turnout in EP elections, the only part of the system that is, at this point, potentially democratic, these elections “must be adjudged a failure in terms of providing democratic legitimacy to the EU decision making process.”19 Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

Rifkin makes it sound as if the binary relationship of “the governors and the governed”20 belonged to a different age, but it still exists, only the gap between the two has grown, with Europeans feeling divorced from the EU. This is both because of its complexity, whereby “civil society actors simply find themselves ‘lost’ in the new system and unable to take advantage of the opportunities the EU has to offer,” and because of its irrelevance, or a lack of any demos embodying European values to which Europeans can commit themselves. As Gallagher writes, “The objectives of the EP are unclear and there really are no ‘European issues,’ the consequence of which is that the performance of the current national government becomes the issue in each individual state.” Rifkin claims that EU governance has witnessed the receding presence of the nation state, yet as Gallagher points out, the nation state, is, in some ways, the only real link between the EU and European citizens: “Were it not for the heads of member states belonging to the Council, the EU would be far less relevant to Europeans.”21

The struggle to formulate a European demos is mirrored in a similar struggle to define a European culture that transcends nationality, and this too, only leads to the conclusion that the nation state remains an intractable part of EU governance.

With her article on “sin tourism,” Kurzer introduces the idea of a convergence of European cultures brought about by the movement of agents who adopt institutional norms created by elites and then spread them across a borderless Europe: “Free movement of capital reduces the autonomy of decision-makers to pursue deviant national policy strategies . . . Political agreements to create a borderless

27 Europe supplied people with a new language to challenge the cultural meanings at home.”22 She argues that while culture has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the nation state, this idea of a borderless Europe (the same one Rifkin describes) has led to an institutional norm-based rule by the EU, whereby “member states are in fact being recast along a European model.”23 Ultimately, however, Kurzer is forced to admit that this homogenization has proceeded to a very limited extent: “All in all, it must be noted that the actual pace of change described in this study is quite modest . . . national institutions package reforms in such a fashion that adjustments are ultimately modest and perhaps inconsistent with what prevails in the rest of Europe . . . The same people who want to exercise their rights as European consumers expect their governments to act in congruence with national sensibilities and thus call on national leaders to protect national institutions from Europeanization.”24

Clearly, with the goal of integration and the sovereignty of nation states coming head to head in EU governance, the inter-governmentalist v. federalist debate is still extremely relevant. It is not, as Rifkin claims, just a contention among elites who fail to see that EU governance has slipped out from underneath them: “While the powers that be continue to jostle back and forth between federalism and confederalism, the very technological, economic, and social realities that gave rise to the European Community and that continue to push it along its journey to union have created a political dynamic of a different sort.”25 However, while Rifkin describes this political dynamic as something other than a superstate or a confederation of nation states,

the truth is that the EU has evolved into a hybrid of both, or a quasi-super-state.

Gallagher explains that the EU contains elements of both an intergovernmental organization and a supranational organization: “As of now, the Council is intergovernmental whereas the Parliament and Commission are more federalist in nature. The trend has been towards a supranational bent, but not to the point where the EU has evolved to become fully supranational . . . The EU still remains strongly intergovernmental because, if the 27 heads of government do not want a certain policy to be passed, it almost certainly won’t be.”26

This “integrationist inclination” is not just divided along institutional lines, but also along national ones: “Some countries are traditionally communautaire; in the forefront of the integrationists are Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Spain.

The countries that have generally led the resistance towards greater unity are Britain, Denmark, and Sweden.” Given the differences, both among countries and among EU elites, what Rifkin said about the EU reaching a post-modern phase that eludes the parameters of the federalist v. confederalist debate is clearly untrue. If anything, the federalist/confederalist tension is inherent to the EU because, as Gallagher points out, it was built into its conception: “Ever since the first of the three Communities, the ECSC, was founded in the early 1950’s, there have been those who have hoped, and others who have feared, that the existing Union framework would become the vehicle for a process generally termed European integration, ending in a federal European state, similar in its political structure to the United States of America.”27

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28 While Rifkin argues that the EU’s indeterminacy has been its greatest strength, I would argue that it has also been its greatest weakness because it has allowed the EU to put off the inevitable question of integration for so long, to the point where this decision has become more difficult to make and yet also more inevitable. Each successive wave of enlargement has made the drive to integration more problematic: “In principle, we would expect enlargement and integration to be inversely related. The wider the range of countries and cultural traditions brought within the Union, the harder it will be to create a shared identity. . .One writer does indeed argue that each wave of accessions has led to a decline in the coherence of the system and speaks of the ‘Austro-Hungarianization’ of the EU, a ‘story of steady progress backwards.’”28 Alesina notes how EU centralization and regional diversity are coming head to head, with the EU’s increasing adoption of a dirigiste policy simply revealing the near absurdity of trying to impose uniform policies on 27 different regions, a task that he says has been “severely underestimated.”29

Another reason why the decision is now more difficult to make is that, in spite of the forces of globalization, the tradition of nation state politics has remained dominant at all levels of government since the EU’s conception. It remains strong at the domestic level, since allowing the question of integration to linger has enabled it to become a major focus of national elections, where populist politicians have made ample use of opposition to integration in order to promote themselves. As Bale writes, “European integration is itself becoming an issue- if not always a central one, at least for mainFall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

stream parties- in national elections.

‘Europe’ is now a potentially potent war cry- and some would argue even a new political cleavage, not just in the UK and Scandinavia, where it has played a part in partisan competition for some time, but in elections all over the continent.”30

It also remains strong at the transnational level, where, over time, European leaders have developed attitudes of suspicion towards European legislation, “seeing it more as a product of a government they object to than as a result of the hard work of their Euro-colleagues.”

Also, since the Council’s informal establishment in 1974, “there have been very few major changes in party practices to allow those colleagues a greater say in the running of national parties . . . and the shift in resources and control from the national to the multinational level has hardly been huge.”31 A system has persisted where there is not enough of an incentive, political or economic, for nation states to commit themselves to a transnational platform, since they are constrained by national interests and by their own resources, not having nearly enough that they can devote to international relations, transnational relations, or EP party groups. Few structural changes having taken place, the commitment to the nation state has taken on a certain incalcitrance at the EU level, so that when leaders convene in the Council, they have already developed the habit of pushing their national interests above everything else.

The traditions of sovereignty and consensual governance are also obstacles to EU federal rule that have, in some ways, grown stronger since political leaders flirted with a vision of political union

29 just after WWII. Sovereignty has been a deeply rooted tradition in Western Europe for several centuries, remaining deeply embedded in the mindsets of European leaders, especially among the French and British, who see their cultures as superior to the rest of Europe; but just as importantly, the effects of sovereignty have only recently been felt by Eastern European countries, and with national sovereignty as the driving force behind their liberation from the Soviet Union, central and eastern European countries will hardly want to relinquish it to another potentially great power: the EU. National sovereignty is seen as a hard won right by Eastern European countries, and with this wave of national self-determination having occurred so recently, this is almost certainly a step back in the quest for integration. Similar to sovereignty, consensual governance contains strong overtones of justness and legitimacy that Europeans are hardly apt to relinquish in the quest for further integration.

Yet, in order for the EU to function effectively as a supranational entity, its governance would in all likelihood have to become less consensual, since achieving agreement among 27 different countries, where inter-country differences are far greater, is simply not a workable system. The consensual governance model, which has done quite well at the national level, has failed to be replicated at the supranational level. Moreover, there has been an incremental but definite trend towards federalism, with several major steps, including the formation of the EC in 1978, the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and then the adoption of the Euro in 1999, narrowing the path to political union, and making it increasingly likely, in spite of all the forces that have made it more

difficult since its conception: enlargement, the persistence of national interests, the recently won self-determination of Eastern European countries, the extreme importance of sovereignty overall, and finally, a modern political experience that is rooted in consensual governance, which is more conducive to an EU based on an inter-governmental model than the federal one that is slowly and laboriously taking shape. The EU’s ‘indeterminacy,’ therefore masks a certain inevitability of political union.

The EU’s indeterminacy and inevitability are, paradoxically, two sides of the same coin. With this said, however, Rifkin has a point that the EU’s indeterminacy can play to its strength. The EU has proven itself remarkably capable of metamorphosing over time, incorporating new members, taking on far more than just an economic role, and developing a surprisingly powerful judicial branch. Thus, while Europe is far from achieving a federal union in the near or even medium future, federal union as a long-term prospect is not impossible.

After all, it took the United States about 150 years to develop its central government: the first colonies sprung up in the early to mid-1600’s and a federal union and constitution were not achieved until 1776. Even after that, civil war broke out, with some states seceding and endangering the existence of a young union that had been so precariously won in the battle between federalists and confederalists. With this said, it is important to remember that the EU, contrary to Rifkin’s description of an evolved postmodern entity, is a nascent entity, still in the process of emerging and attaining definite shape even 50 some years after the creation of the ECSC.

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30 Changes are able to take place on several fronts, which could bring about greater Europeanization that would make the EU more apt to bend to full political unification. Bale describes, for instance, the possibility of a Europeanization of parties and party systems, writing, “We should remember that parties are highly adaptive organizations.” Parties that contend in national elections are not just national bodies, but multilevel organizations, constituting themselves in both subnational and transnational arenas. Bale explains that this transnational activity could lead to coordinated campaigning at EP elections, and that this sort of dynamic was seen in the 1980’s, “when social democratic parties began to reorient themselves towards a more ‘pro-European’ position as they recognized that coordinated continental action might make more sense and that the national level is no longer clearly demarcated from the transnational level anyway.”32 One could also argue that national actors, faced with a weakening party system at home, will soon realize that the real power lies elsewhere: that is, in EU institutions.

To a much greater degree than parties, interest groups have become more inclined to operate on a transnational level, a trend that reinforces the Europeanization of national politics. Bale writes, “Traditionally, the activity of pressure groups in Europe went on at or below the level of the state. With the increasing importance of the EU, however, the activity of some groups has taken on an additional ‘European’ dimension. Business interests are increasingly subject to European rather than simply domestic rules.”33 The liberalization of business sectors brought about by the Single European Act has prompted businesses to operFall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

ate at an EU level that is more well-resourced, and those governments whose businesses have made the transition to a transnational market have fared much better: “The UK’s larger, more fluid, more fragmented, horizontally integrated policy networks do much better at promoting domestic interests in the multi-polar, competitive decision-making structure of the EU than, for example, France’s smaller, tighter, more cohesive, vertical, statedominated structure.”34 With the importance of being able to compete through their policy networks, governments may begin to see the advantages of shifting away from a national focus and adopting a more flexible posture towards the EU. Interest groups, too, who perform well within the EU’s globalized context, could also bring about a ‘Europeanization’ of attitudes within governments, who need the support of these groups and would respond to such pressures.

Therefore, what Rifkin writes about a flattening hierarchy has taken place to a certain extent, with political players fluctuating between different levels of government; but it has definitely not reached the point of rendering the EU a ‘fluid’ entity, of reducing national government to “one of many players,” or of nullifying the confederalist v. federalist debate. While a flattening of hierarchy may have turned the EU into a more competitive forum for businesses and commercial interests, it is far from turning the EU into a ‘neutral referee’ among political players. This can be seen from the experience of the ECJ, whose appeal to citizens over the heads of national courts, seemingly a ‘flattening of hierarchy,’ was strategically used to undermine national courts and assert its power. The same can be said for a flattening hierarchy among parties and interest

31 groups, which has the paradoxical effect of concentrating more power in the EU (rather than dispersing it among a wide range of players, as Rifkin states) by narrowing the gap between the national and transnational levels and propelling politics to the EU level. This turns the EU not into a referee, but into a political player itself, would then be in a better position to federalize its political agenda.

The EU is in the early stages of an evolution that may never be achieved, a quasisupranational entity that is a long way from ever becoming the unhampered form of transnational governance described by Rifkin. Far from transcending its nationalist-federalist tensions, it remains problematically caught between its drive to unity and its tendency to fragment into competing national interests.

Rather than the continuous and conciliatory give-and-take between confederalists and federalists that Rifkin sees, there has always been an inherent conflict between the two, built into a system that thwarts its own goal of integration. And the problem is not just one of structure, but also one of conviction among its actors. Rifkin describes the EU as if it were a self-regulating mechanism, an analysis that leads him to completely neglect the importance of decision-makers who will prove crucial in the political fate of the European Union. As of now, it seems that EU politicians have arrived at an impasse, knowing that further integration is the only way forward and yet reluctant to commit to it.

References Rifkin, Jeremy. The European Dream. “Government Without A Center,” 215 2 Reid, T. R. The United States of Europe. “Inside the Belgeway: the Governing Structure of the European Union,” 272.

3 Gallagher, Michael. Representative Government in Modern Europe. “The EU and Representative Government,” 135.

4 Gallagher, 122.

5 Gallagher, 124, 127.

6 Reid, 285.

7 Alesina and Giavazzi. The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline. “The Rhetoric of Dirigisme and Coordination,” 140.

8 Gallagher, 124.

9 Alter, Karen. Europe Today. “The Making of Supranational Law: The Battle for Supremacy,” 310.

10 Alter, 306.

11 Alesina and Giavazzi, 142.

12 Gallagher, 151.

13 Ibid, 124.

14 Ibid, 123.

15 Ibid, 124.

16 Ibid, 135.

17 Bale, Tim. European Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Ch. 5, p. 162.

18 Bale, 191.

19 Gallagher, “Representative Government and the Democracy Deficit,” 157.

20 Rifkin, 217.

21 Gallagher, “Representative Government and the Democracy Deficit,” 156.

22 Kurzer, Paulette. Markets and Moral Regulation: Cultural Change in the European Union. “Markets v.

Morality,” 23.

23 Kurzer, Paulette. “The Emergence of a European Morality,” 172.

24 Ibid, 184-185.

25 Rifkin, “Government Without a Center,” 215 26 Gallagher. “The EU: Intergovernmental or Supranational Organization?” 147.

27 Gallagher, “EU Integration,” 152.

28 Ibid, 152.

29 Alesina, 142.

30 Bale, 164.

31 Ibid, 163.

32 Ibid, 163.

33 Ibid, 263.

34 Bale, Tim. Ch. 8, p. 263.

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Nepal: A Photo Essay Rachel Kessler | Pitzer â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;14

As a result of westernization, Nepal exists largely as a remission payment-based economy. This phenomenon has had widespread effects on men and women of Nepal, impacting generational structures and gender roles, as well as affecting families from Kathmandu to more rural parts of the country. For rural Tang Ting, the majority of the communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s young men have been forced to move to larger cities or abroad to look for work. This leaves women and girls to fulfill the communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s needs of working the fields, feeding their families and providing both formal and informal education to the children of Tang Ting.

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Legislations and Policies Surrounding Foreign Domestic Workers in Malaysiaâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Punish or Protect?

Sanggeet Manirajah | Scripps â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;14

Nirmala Bonat, Nurjanah Matyak, Ruminah Atem, Kursiah Manijan.1,2 These are a few of the many women who have made it to the headlines of local and international media for the wrong reasons of having suffered severe physical abuse and torture by their respective Malaysian employers. The past decade has seen an increase in the number of reported cases of human rights violations and abuses committed against foreign domestic workers in Malaysia. Between 2004 and 2007, Tenaganita3 rescued 148 abused Indonesian maids with the help of the Malaysian police after the organization received over 200 calls through its Domestic Workers Action Line. Around 1050 violations of human rights have been recorded, such as the non-payment of wages and sexual and physical abuse.4 On average, each domestic worker suffered 6-7 rights violations during the duration of their employment.5 Such statistics have made Malaysia infamous for being endemic to workers and human rights problem, and has put the country under the spotlight and scrutiny of different human rights advocacy bodies locally Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

and internationally for not protecting the rights of female domestic workers. This paper aims to discover why Malaysia has had many cases of abuse against domestic workers in Malaysia. The first part of the essay will look at the employment laws (or lack thereof) and immigration policies surrounding foreign domestic workers in Malaysia as they exist currently, and how they situate foreign domestic workers living and working in Malaysia in a position of vulnerability and potential abuse by various actors. The second part of the essay will then look at recommendations, in light of these laws and policies, on what should be done to protect foreign domestic workers in Malaysia. Recommendations put forth here are drawn from the recently established Convention for Domestic Workers 2011, which outline the preliminary steps Malaysia could take to have a more robust and strong legal and social structure for its domestic workers.

There are two types of policies and legislation that inform the lived experience of foreign domestic workers in Malaysia.

37 These legislations are laws regarding work, which are employment laws, and laws and policies regarding a worker’s immigration status, namely immigration laws specific to migrant workers. The Malaysian government has allowed for the formal recruitment of Filipina and Indonesian domestic workers since the 1970s, when it embarked on an export-oriented industrialization model of development.6 Despite this, the state has yet to provide a constitutional framework within its legislation that establishes parameters for domestic work that ensure the protection of these workers from exploitation. The Employment Act 1955 (Revised 1981), which extends to all workers in Malaysia including most categories of migrant workers, does not extend to foreign domestic workers.7 Though the act does define what constitutes domestic work, the people who perform this form of intimate labor are conveniently “absent from the Employment Act’s categories of female workers who are given such rights as definite work hours per day, and maternity and benefits leave.”8 In addition, domestic workers are also excluded from other key labor legislation that surround worker benefits and rights, such as the Employee Provident Fund Ordinance 1951, the Employee Social Security Ordinance 1969 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1952.9 What this means is that there is no formal structure that stipulates the specific job descriptions, working conditions, number of working hours, and other details that workers, in any industry, are rightfully entitled to.

fect of transferring the responsibility of determining work relations and boundaries to employers and domestic workers.”10 Because there is no law requiring employers of domestic workers to abide by certain standards (hours, decent living conditions, enough food and sustenance, enough rest time, days off, etc.), employers technically are not required by law to provide for these for their workers. A subtler, more insidious consequence is that this lack of structure for domestic work creates and reinforces a power asymmetry between employer and worker at the workplace, which is the employer’s house.

The domestic worker, who is already disadvantaged because of language and cultural difference, lack of understanding, and fear, is forced to negotiate her terms of work in an environment that is dominated by the “wage-paying party”, namely the employer’s home where the worker also happens to be living in.11 It is “[this] absence of a more structured work environment delineated and protected by labor legislation that [has been] the key issue in employer-employee contestations.”12 At the same time, this “unlegislated live-in domestic service perpetuates the perception that employers should have near absolute control over their employees.”13 Hence, the legislation (or lack thereof) has inadvertently created an environment with an asymmetrical power dynamic between the employer and the domestic worker, thus usurping the worker’s bargaining power to advocate and negotiate for a reasonable working environment for herself.

In her book In Service and Servitude: Foreign Female Domestic Workers and the Malaysian ‘Modernity’ Project, Christine Chin argues that “the state’s refusal to legislate domestic service has had the ef-

While there are no laws that regulate working conditions of domestic workers, there are some laws in place that have been enacted to prevent employer abuse of the worker. While this is the supposed

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38 aim of these laws, ironically, these regulations that do exist are biased towards the employer and seek to protect the employer rather than the worker. For example, the laws that exist posit the domestic worker as an individual who is incapable of taking care of herself, therefore needing to be under the constant supervision of her employer.14 Such rules serve to limit domestic workers’ appearance in public spaces, and this leads to the second manner in which the state perceives domestic workers; it sees domestic workers as being potential criminal elements in society, responsible for creating social ills.15 Therefore, to prevent these women from engaging in so-called “criminal tendencies” such as being involved in sex work, theft, and other activities, the state conducts its surveillance through the employers.16 In other words, the employers are indirectly, through the law, sought to monitor the behavior and activities of their workers. This is made easier through the requirement that foreign domestic workers must live in her employer’s home.17 Also, employers are penalized financially, through the confiscation of their deposit of bond money if their foreign domestic worker is detained for criminal activities, or if the woman runs away from her workplace.18 This penalty has encouraged many employers to maintain strict supervision of their workers’ mobility, and is used to justify not letting them out of the house or taking days off during the weekend.19 Also, the annual levy, paid by either the employer or the worker, is forfeited should either party decide on an early termination of the work contract.20 While this perhaps prevents employers from dismissing their domestic workers at their whim and fancy, this is a disincentive for workers who are unhappy with their working Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

conditions and want to exit and end their contract with their employer.

These measures were introduced to supposedly hinder employer abuse of workers. However, as discussed, it is glaringly apparent that the legislation regarding domestic work tries to moralize domestic workers by preventing them from potentially being involved in illegal activities. They also create a lot of room for the violation of workers’ rights. The Malaysian state makes matters worse for these workers by not providing a framework or support network for domestic workers to submit complaints about their employers and their work conditions. In fact, laws and legislations as they currently function, make it unreasonably difficult for domestic workers to file complaints and bring offenders to court. For example, foreign domestic workers have to apply for a ‘special pass’ that costs US$ 26.31 per month to reside in the country while cases regarding employer abuse are being processed.21 To make matters worse, domestic workers are prohibited from seeking other types of employment while on this special pass.22 This is tied to another rule that is related to immigration laws of the country, which stipulates that if a domestic worker leaves her employer, she loses her legal status in the country, which is a criminal offense under Malaysian immigration laws.23 The fact that a domestic worker’s legal status in the country is hinged on her employer, the worker cannot leave her employer for any reason, for she by definition becomes illegal and hence can face deportation.24 This ruling has, over the years, allowed some employers to psychologically intimidate their workers by threatening to strip them of their legal immigration status to “keep [their maids] in line.”25

39 This notion of illegality and threat of deportation undoubtedly influences and taints the lived experience of both legal and illegal domestic workers in Malaysia. This section will analyze how the Immigration laws pertinent to foreign domestic workers in Malaysia render them vulnerable to further abuse by both their employers and the law. However, there is a need to first establish a working definition of the term “illegal” or “illegality”.

In her analysis, titled Legal Production of Illegality in a Comparative Perspective.

The cases of Malaysia and Spain, Garcés-Mascareñas posits “illegal” not as an “essentialised, generic and singular object, but rather as a legal and political produce of particular historical and national contexts.”26 The production of illegality differs from country to country, but ultimately entails a space where a certain group of people are excluded, subjugated, repressed and made invisible. An imperative component of this illegality is that it is a space that is “determined by the palpable sense of deportability; what defines it is not deportation, but the possibility of deportation [and this], reproduces the physical borders of nationstates in the migrants’ everyday life and, by doing so, constructs a spatialised and racialised social condition that [sustains] the vulnerability and tractability of illegal migrants as workers.”27 This spectrum of definitions helps one understand the ways in which illegality is approached, particularly in Malaysia. One approach “portrays the law as a force that bars illegal entry and sojourn rather than as a process that defines who and what is illegal [and] focuses on how policies can stem illegal migration.”28 It sees illegal migration as a result of laws that are powerless and have no teeth, and

deems that if illegal migration continues to occur, it is because the rules are not strict and tight enough to keep migrants out.29 This approach is one that holds true in the case of Malaysia; instead of enforcing stricter border policies, the Malaysian immigration laws are more focused on expulsion and deportation.

This is manifested through the increase in punitive measures taken against bluecollared migrant workers to curb the number of illegal immigrants existing in the country. For example, The Immigration Act, which was amended in 1997 and 2002, has resulted in harsher penalties for immigration violations. “[Under this act], it has become a crime for foreign workers to work without a work permit or visa, and punitive measures, including caning of workers, was introduced.”30 In the past decade, the Malaysian Immigration Department and the police force have made numerous mass raids to expel irregular and illegal migrants, and these have hit Indonesian migrants the worst.31 In 2002, the government “expelled hundreds of thousands of undocumented workers after announcing an amended, stricter immigration law, which included provisions for the fining, whipping and imprisonment of illegal immigrants and their employers.”32 This deportation exercise was continued in 2003 when “42, 935 [more] were arrested under these laws […] and nine thousand of them were physically punished.”33 The amended immigration act reprimanded domestic workers as well, and included documented domestic workers who were detained in detention camps and lost their legal status in the country for running away from their employers, even if this was to escape abuse.34 By having these very strict, harsh, and

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40 punitive immigration legislations, the government attempts to, as GarcésMascareñas argues, stem illegal migration. Such actions are taken to intimidate and scare workers who are already in the country, and in regards to domestic workers, it is especially insidious as the simple act of leaving their employer renders them being labeled as an ‘illegal’ under the law. These laws are also in place to scare those abroad who are planning and hoping to enter the country through informal channels. While the Malaysian government has made it easier to enter the country legally, it has made it difficult to enter the country illegally, thus penalizing those who are in the country illegally.35 Moreover, once individuals are in the country, they, with ease, can slide between one extreme of the immigration scale to the other; from being a legal migrant worker to one that is illegal.36 This illustrates how ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’ in Malaysia, through its immigration policies, is an established, rigid dichotomy, rather than “a path or form of access to legality”, which is the case in countries such as Spain.37 In other words, foreign workers in Malaysia, especially those who are on a pas lawatan kerja sementara,38 from being a legal immigrant, can easily become an illegal immigrant.

Domestic workers are especially vulnerable; they cannot leave their employers and seek employment elsewhere without going through the legal procedures – doing so would result in a change in their legal status. The easiness at which workers can slide down the slippery slope of illegality is taken advantage of by different actors, and is linked to GarcésMascareñas’ third approach, which sees illegality as the manner in which “the law serves the interests of powerful ecoFall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

nomic and political groups, basically the need of capitalists and capitalism […] migration policy not analyzed in terms of how it can reduce illegal migration but rather in their function to place illegal migrants in a more exploitable position.”39 In essence, the illegality of many of these workers benefit different actors, and therefore this illegality is somewhat perpetuated so that these very actors to achieve their respective goals. For the Malaysian state, the presence of foreign migrant workers in Malaysia, whether illegal or legal, is to its own benefit. For example, from an economic vantage point, the Malaysian government has been encouraging the in-migration of foreign domestic workers as it “ensures ‘low reproductory costs’, since the state need not pay costs incurred in migrant labor subsistence prior to migration.”40 Additionally, the presence of domestic workers in middle-class and lower middleclass homes “underwrites working-class Malaysian women’s participation in the formal economy.”41 At the same time, the lack of constitutional protection for domestic workers and deportation-centric immigration laws also benefits employers and both formal and informal recruiters, as employers are able to purchase domestic service while recruiters make financial profits. These different actors function to “preserve and construct the migrants’ otherness [and it is this otherness] on which their condition as cheap and flexible labor force rests.”42 This is one of the core criticisms that Chin puts forth in her book, In Service and Servitude. Chin comments: In spite of reports that document abuse, laborsending states [and labor-receiving states] justify the continued migration of women [from some countries to others] on the grounds that such a

41 policy facilitates migrant women’s ability to be gainfully employed as it relieves the political, economic, and social pressures of restructuring national economies. In sum, labor out-migration [and in-migration] policies are expected to help peoples to pursue the good life as defined and promoted by neoliberalism.43

Her analysis has found that the laws, policies and mechanisms – both in receiving countries such as Malaysia, and sender countries such as Indonesia – that govern the migration of female workers dehumanize these women, and force them into a vicious cycle that continuously allows for possible violations of their rights as human beings by different parties. She argues that the language and the socially-constructed perceptions of domestic workers as commodities that is inherent in both the formal spheres of Malaysian governance, law and policymaking, and the informal sphere of Malaysian society are what “morally legitimize the demeaning ways in which [these] women are treated.”44 Her findings drive home the point that in addition to establishing policies and legislations that protect domestic workers, the underlying perception held by various parties needs to change; from one that views domestic workers as pawns to achieve economic growth and socio-political stability, to one that embraces and respects the humanity and agency of these women, and acknowledge their integral role in the formation of Malaysian society.

For such a paradigm shift to take place, the laws and policies concerning domestic workers that the Malaysian state should adopt, at the core, should be based on humanistic principles that first, acknowledge domestic work as real work, and second, acknowledge, respect and protect the humanity of the individuals

doing this work. The recent Convention for Domestic Workers 2011, which was established at the 100th Conference of the International Labor Organization in June 2011 is the first document of its kind that endorses domestic work as “decent work”, advocates for domestic workers to be protected legislatively, and that their human needs are acknowledged and met by members who ratify the convention. While Malaysia is one of the eight countries that abstained, it is imperative that the Malaysian state commences on restructuring the current existing frameworks that are inadequate at preserving the livelihoods of domestic workers, and that legislations are amended for the benefit not the detriment of domestic workers, to be able to ratify the convention in the near future. By setting up systems and legislations that value domestic work and workers, the negative, socially-constructed perceptions surrounding foreign domestic workers can be changed for the better.

The core issues that the Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers document addresses are the boundaries and conditions of domestic work. While it does not propose specific details, such as the exact number of hours a worker should work per day, it asks for member countries to set limited number of work hours per day which do not include night work and weekly rests for at least 24 consecutive hours to be incorporated in employment legislation and clearly stated to parties involved in each member country. The document also specifically addresses details concerning domestic worker’s living conditions. Every employer must provide for their worker: a separate room that is furnished and includes a proper

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42 place to sleep, with proper ventilation.

The room must be equipped with a lock to ensure that the worker’s privacy is respected and must have access to sanitary facilities. The employer should also provide the worker with proper and healthy meals of good quality. These terms must be included under the employment legislation in each member country, and in regards to Malaysia’s case specifically, the government should amend the Employment Act 1955 to include domestic workers, or propose a new law that stipulates these very parameters regarding domestic work which employers must abide by.

Also, in accordance with the convention, the Malaysian state should establish structures that protect workers from abuse, harassment, and violence by putting in place reliable and effective complaint mechanisms, so that workers have avenues to report such cases, and that these cases are investigated thoroughly by law enforcement officials. As it functions currently, domestic workers’ official channel for complaints is non-profit organizations that advocate for domestic workers rights, such as Tenaganita. Effective complaint mechanisms are not sufficient, however. The state must also provide domestic workers opportunities to pursue legal civil and criminal remedies to their cases, both before and after employment. Therefore, the special pass which workers must pay for while waiting for court proceedings to take place should be reevaluated and changed to allow workers to find employment while they are waiting for their court cases to proceed in the country. Such mechanisms would prevent workers from being fearful of reporting cases to the authorities and prevent the exploitation of workers by employers and recruiters.

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The policies in the recommendations supplementing the convention acknowledges domestic workers as human beings with wants, desires and needs outside of their work who should be allowed to enjoy a healthy work-life balance, and asks that member countries acknowledge this fact too. For example, the convention proposes that countries provide programs to encourage domestic workers to pursue development of other competencies and qualifications. Programs such as literacy training, basic computer skills, new language skills, and establishing associations by workers for workers could be programs that domestic workers can participate in outside of their work-time both for their leisure and for their own personal growth. This will not only empower the women in terms of future employment opportunities, but will also provide them with a positive sense of self-worth.

In addition to humanizing domestic workers, the recommendations acknowledges, respects and encourages the workers as individuals with agency, being able to make his/her own informed choices and decisions. The decision to be a domestic worker should be an informed decision on the worker’s part, and the respective actors, both the state and entities responsible for recruiting these workers must provide all relevant information pertaining to the work that the worker will be engaging in; a full job description, allocations for sick and personal leave, rate of pay, and details for accommodation, details that any individual would want to know prior to accepting any job.

While the ILO should be commended for providing a stepping-stone for coun-

43 tries to pursue a path towards a more just domestic workers rights framework, the convention lacks a key component that is important in ensuring the protection and safety of domestic workers in a country like Malaysia. The convention does not seem to highlight the issues faced by foreign domestic workers, specifically related to issues of legal status and immigration policies, like those that currently exist in Malaysia, which can relegate domestic workers into vulnerable and exploitable positions. Admittedly, the ILO as an organization does not necessarily have the jurisdiction to propose recommendations that relate to a member country’s immigration policies. Nonetheless, legal statuses and immigration policies, as in the case of Malaysia, do affect domestic workers severely, and therefore should be discussed and reevaluated in countries on a case-by-case basis. Malaysia, for example, should not tie a domestic worker’s visa to her employer and consequently strip the worker of her legal status for exiting her contract with her employer. Instead, workers should be given a more flexible contract that allows them to look for work with other employers within a reasonable time period, should their initial contract fail for some reason or another. This will not only hinder domestic workers from going ‘underground’ and being exploited for their illegality, but will also reduce the number of individuals the state deports every year. By having a more flexible policy that treats domestic workers like any other migrant worker, the number of human rights violations and abuse that occurs as a result of strict and inhumane immigration policies will be significantly limited.

the Convention for Decent Work for Domestic Workers push for ‘domestic work’ to be considered as real work. This consequently justifies the claims it makes on behalf of those doing domestic work as deserving equal rights, allocations, and privileges as any other worker. Member countries should acknowledge, and their laws and policies should protect these rights and privileges for all workers, including domestic workers. This is what is severely lacking in the current legislative structure in Malaysia, and it is something that the Malaysian state needs to address immediately. Domestic workers – and their labor – are not commodities that can be sold, bought and disposed of by the state, by recruiters and by employers, and the law should reprimand, not be complicit with those who participate in the commodification of domestic workers. Restructuring existing policies and frameworks to have provisions that acknowledge foreign domestic workers as human beings—with their own needs, desires, challenges and dreams – will be a positive first step towards nurturing a society that protects, respects and appreciates the role that domestic workers play in improving the development goals that Malaysia aspires towards.

The provisions and recommendations in Claremont Journal of International Relations | Fall 2013

44 References

Garcés-Mascareñas, 79 Chin, 109 41 Chin, 109 42 Garcés-Mascareñas, 79 43 Chin, 122 44 Chin, 122 39

40

Moniaga, Renita. 2008. “Indonesian Migrant Domestic Workers: A Case Study on Human Rights, Gender and Migration.” PhD. diss., The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs (GPIA).

2 Ariffin, Rohana. 2001. “Domestic Work and Servitude In Malaysia,” PhD. diss., Hawke Institute Working Paper Series. No. 14 3 A non-profit organization that advocates for migrant workers’ rights in Malaysia 4 Moniaga, 14 5 Moniaga, 14 6 Ariffin, 2 7 Chin, Christine B.N. 1998. In Service and Servitude: Foreign Domestic Workers and the Malaysian “Modernity” Project. New York: Columbia University Press.

8 Chin, 84 9 Chin, 84 10 Chin, 142 11 Chin, 142 12 Chin, 83 13 Chin, 112 14 Chin, 116-118 15 Chin, 146 16 Chin, 146 17 Chin, 142 18 Chin, 142 19 Chin, 110-111 20 Chin, 142 - Every domestic worker works on a two-year contract, with an additional one year for renewal should both parties want to renew the contract.

21 Moniaga, 16 22 Moniaga, 16 23 Moniaga, 16 24 Moniaga, 14-16 25 Chin, 146 26 Garcés-Mascareãs. 2010. “Legal Production of Illegality in a Comparative Perspective: The Cases of Malaysia and Spain.” PhD. diss., Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam.

27 Garcés-Mascareñas, 79 28 Garcés-Mascareñas, 78 29 Garcés-Mascareñas, 78 30 Kaur, Amarjit. 2008. “International Migration and Governance in Malaysia: Policy and Performance.” School of Business, Economics and Public Policy, University of New England.

31 Kaur, 14 - Indonesians make up the largest number of illegal migrants in Malaysia, due to the proximity of both countries and the relative easiness of entering the country by boat.

32 Kaur, 14 33 Kaur, 14 34 Kaur, 13 35 Kaur, 14 36 Garcés-Mascareñas, 84-86 37 Garcés-Mascareñas, 84 38 Temporary Employment Visit Pass is one that covers less and semi-skilled migrant workers whose income is below RM 2500 (USD$ 800) a month and who are employed in the manufacturing, construction, services and domestic worker sectors (Kaur, 8).

1

Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

Additional Sources Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD). “Know Your Rights, Claim Your Rights: Under the New ILO Convention on Domestic Workers”. 2011 Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants. 2011. http://www.apmigrants.org/. Accessed November 14th 2011.

Hangzo, Pau Khan Khup; Dumienski, Zbigniew and Cook, Alistair D.B., “Legal Protection for Southeast Asian Migrant Domestic Workers: Why It Matters.” Insight: A Monthly Publication by the Center for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies (May 2011).

International Labor Organization (ILO). “Convention on Domestic Workers 2011”, 16th June 2011.

International Labor Organization (ILO). “Recommendations Supplementing the Convention on Domestic Workers”, 16th June 2011.

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46

The Great Game of Influence John Wiley Hunt | Pomona ‘14

A contentious battle for influence is raging in Central Asia.1 As Russia’s once dominant role in the region wanes, two rising Asian powers, China and India, are boldly establishing their own presences in Central Asia and staking claims to its resources, creating a new “Great Game.”

Central Asia, though, is no stranger to bouts of rivalry between great powers. In the 19th century, Russia and Great Britain engaged in a vigorous competition to conquer territory in Central Asia in order to access the region’s resources and utilize its favorable geostrategic position to protect the security of their empires.2 This 19th century “Great Game” represents the classic manner in which imperial powers pursued competitions for power: through brutal force, great powers vied to conquer weaker states in order to reap the economic benefits of the territories and improve their geostrategic positions vis-à-vis other powers. In the new “Great Game,” though, forceful conquest is no longer a viable tactic. Rather than competing militarily, China, India, and Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

Russia are attempting to gain regional influence and resources by offering tantalizing aid and investment packages to the Central Asian countries. The tactics used in this new “Great Game” represent an increasingly emerging trend in international relations: economic incentives rather than brute force have become the main tools for establishing influence, especially in inter-state competitions.

Today’s powerful states have therefore begun to utilize strategic aid as the chief weapon in competitions for influence.

Theory For states, the attainment of influence is vital for gaining access to resources and protecting the national interest. Influence, as defined by International Relations scholar K.J. Holsti, is “essentially a means to an end” which states use “primarily for achieving or defending… goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances.”3 Gaining influence over another

47 country therefore gives states some degree of control over that state’s policies.

Traditionally, military force has been the main tool utilized by states to elicit desired behaviors from other states. However, while military force is still a viable and perhaps preferable option in dealing with direct invasion or dangerous rogue regimes, its costs are enormous: the Iraq war allegedly cost US$6 trillion4 and the first week of US bombings in Libya cost $600 million.5 Even for great powers, therefore, the costs of engaging in military conflict to protect national interests or compete with other powers are simply too high to make the option practical in most situations. Moreover, current international norms, which reject imperialistic behavior and place heavy importance on the inviolable nature of national sovereignty, disparage the use of military force as a means of gaining influence over small states. Thus, although nations may still use force in certain situations, the costs and negative perceptions of this tool limit its feasibility in the vast majority of modern competitions for influence. The imposition of sanctions, another method used by nations to alter the policies of others, is also largely ineffective as a tool of influence. According to a study conducted

by Robert Pape analyzing the efficacy of sanctions between 1914 and 1990, the use of economic sanctions only yielded successful concessions in a mere 5 out of 115 attempts.6 Moreover, for powers competing for influence with other nations, the use of sanctions can actually be counterproductive: the US’s imposition of sanctions on Iran has actually increased the influence of China, whom some view as a rival of the US, in the Iranian economy.7 Finally, the use of “soft power,” a concept promoted by scholar Joseph Nye

and defined as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in or to obtain preferred outcomes,”8 has similarly proven ineffective in creating real changes in the behavior of other states. Though nations may hold some appealing qualities that attract the admiration of others, they are seldom able to use this “soft power” to elicit actual changes of behavior. For example, though many Japanese cultural products are wildly popular in China and South Korea,9 this attraction has failed to change the attitudes of Seoul or Beijing in their respective disputes with Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima and Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands. The inability of states to convert “soft power” into actual influence, therefore, reduces the viability of this tool as a means to gain influence, rendering it largely useless in competitions with other powers.

Strategically directed aid, though, provides not only an effective means to establish influence but also a highly useful tool for competing powers. The use of strategic aid provides economic incentives to coerce the recipient country into behaving in a way that protects and advances the interests of the donor country.

Strategic aid may take several forms: direct payments, loans, military assistance, or projects and investments sponsored by foreign governments or foreign stateowned companies. Importantly, though, strategic aid is different from humanitarian aid. While strategic aid and humanitarian aid may take similar forms, the motivations behind strategic aid are based on a realistic calculation of the national interest of the donor country, rather than moralistic altruism. Such a distinction is important since donors of

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48 strategic aid are more concerned with how the foreign aid serves their own interest rather than how it betters the conditions of the recipient nation. Indeed, the difference in motivations behind strategic and humanitarian aid actually produces different results in the recipient country: a study conducted by scholars Bearce and Tirone found that that the economic growth in recipient nations as a result of foreign aid tends to be lower when the donor country has strategic goals.10 Moreover, while humanitarian aid is largely useful only for gaining unwieldy “soft power,” strategic aid makes an excellent tool in modern competitions between states. Not only are competing powers able to avoid costly military force or any other behavior that might reek of odious imperialism by using strategic aid, but also the very diversity in types of strategic aid allow competing countries to tailor aid packages based on their own capabilities and preferences. Thus, strategically directed aid provides a highly useful weapon in competitions for influence with other states.

For powerful states, the use of strategic aid has become one of the primary tools in competitions for power. Powerful states have recognized the importance of using strategic aid in international competitions for influence since the Cold War. Following the end of the second World War, the United States introduced the Marshall Plan, which, though ostensibly designed to rebuild the war-torn countries of Europe, also had the strategic goal of strengthening European resistance to the influence of the Soviet Union, the US’s main geopolitical rival.11 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union released its own strategic aid package, the Molotov Plan, which offered economic incenFall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

tives in return for larger Soviet control in the politics and economies of Eastern Europe.12 Throughout the Cold War the two superpowers heavily relied on strategic aid to compete for influence. While the US supplied funding to brutal, yet staunchly anti-communist regimes in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries,13 it also gave aid to sway several “neutral” countries like Brazil and Nigeria.14 Meanwhile, the USSR, in addition to supplying aid to communist allies like Cuba,15 used economic development programs to court “neutral” countries like India and Afghanistan.16 Today, strategic aid packages have become perhaps even more important in competitions between rival nations, as the importance of economics and resource access has reached new heights. In Africa, rising economic powers, especially India and China, are using strategic aid to challenge historical Western dominance of the continent and gain access to its valuable resources. Though rich Western countries and Japan have long been the chief donors in Africa,17 China and India are rapidly emerging as important players, undercutting Western dominance with alternative sources of aid. By not including “good governance” requirements, Chinese and Indian aid is often viewed more favorably by African nations, especially those with poor human rights records.18 These aid packages, though, directly benefit the Chinese and Indian economies by not only including requirements that aid be used to purchase goods from the donor countries,19 but also giving Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies access to the vast energy reserves and other natural resources in the recipient countries.20 Moreover, through the use of strategic aid in Africa, China and India are able to pursue other impor-

49 tant foreign policy goals: Chinese aid in Africa requires acceptance of the “One China Policy,” ensuring the support of African nations for China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan;21 similarly, Indian aid to Africa seeks to establish African support for a permanent Indian seat in the UN Security Council, an important position for the aspiring power.22 Thus, in Africa, strategic aid has provided the necessary means for the rising nations of China and India to challenge entrenched powers, a trend that is equally apparent in Central Asia.

Empirical Case: Central Asia In Central Asia, Russia, China, and India are using strategic aid to compete for influence in the Central Asian nations and advance their individual national interests. The situation in Central Asia is similar to that in Africa: two rising powers, China and India, are challenging the hegemony of a former imperial power, Russia, in order to access the region’s resources, especially its hydrocarbons, which present an attractive alternative to those from the more volatile Middle East.23 The need to control these hydrocarbons, in addition to other regional interests held by the three powers, has sparked an epic competition for influence, with strategic aid as the main weapon. While Russia is attempting to maintain its political and military hegemony as well as its control over the flow of the region’s hydrocarbons, China is using its massive economic weight to quickly establish itself as Central Asia’s main source of development aid in order to access its markets and energy resources. India, the newest entrant to the game, is similarly attempting to create its own sphere of influence through cooperative

development projects with Central Asian governments. A new “Great Game” has therefore emerged in Central Asia with Russia, China, and India all using strategic aid to compete to protect their regional interests.

Russia: The Fading Hegemon For Russia, a country whose self-image is that of a “regional superpower,”24 a strong presence in Central Asian is highly important for protecting its economic and security interests. Moscow long enjoyed a monopoly on the region: Central Asia formed an important part of both the Russian empire and the Soviet Union and was largely maintained within the Russian sphere of influence after the end of the Cold War through its incorporation into the Moscow-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).25 Although Russia still maintains a stronghold over much of Central Asian society, recently many aspects of its regional influence, especially its control over the routes of hydrocarbon exports, have come into challenge. In order to protect its role as a regional leader and maintain its command over the transport of Central Asia’s hydrocarbons in the face of new competitors, Russia has begun to rely heavily on the use strategic aid to Central Asian governments.

Russia is using economic aid programs to solidify its continued role as a regional leader. For Russia, the entrance of new powers, like China, has challenged its traditional stranglehold on influence over Central Asian governments. Russia has therefore enacted a variety of aid and development programs to maintain the dependence of Central Asian countries on Moscow. In 2005, following the “Tulip

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50 Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, Russia immediately provided 1.5 million tons of grain, $50 million in financial aid, and a promise of security assistance to the fledgling government.26 This aid package not only guaranteed loyalty from the new government, but even resulted in Kyrgyzstani leaders’ praising Russia as the “country’s main strategic partner.”27 In 2010, following the worldwide Great Financial Crisis, Russia contributed $7.5 billion to an anticrisis fund for members of the Eurasian Economic Community (which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan)28 and gave Tajikistan a $63 million grant.29 These efforts not only provided economic stability to the region, but also allowed Russia to reassert itself as an important financial partner for Central Asia, a status largely usurped

by China. More recently, Russia has begun helping Kyrgyzstan construct a hydroelectric dam to fulfill the impoverished country’s power needs.30 Through this project, Russia not only hopes to solidify its role as a regional leader for development, but also solve a long running regional water dispute: while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Central Asia’s two poorest nations, wish to build hydroelectric plants to create sources of cheap power, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who fear water shortages as a result of these dams, have virulently opposed these projects.31 In its agreement with Kyrgyzstan, therefore, Moscow includes the vital caveat that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will be involved in the administration of these projects.32 Should this project prove successful, Russia’s important leadership role in the region will be strengthened, allowing it to maintain at least some of its historic control over the Central Asian regimes despite the rapid self-establishment of China as a regional power. Thus, Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

Russia has sought to prove its regional leadership credentials and maintain influence through aid programs.

For Russia, strategic aid, in the form of investments by the Russian government or state-owned corporations, has also become the key to protecting its chief economic interest in the region, the continued flow of Central Asian hydrocarbons through Russian pipelines. The Russian economy is heavily dependent on energy exports, with oil and oil products accounting for more than 50% of total export revenues,33 and relies on the flow of hydrocarbons from Central Asia through Russian territory to fulfill export commitments to the European and Asian markets.34 For years, Russian pipelines have served as the main conduits for extraregional Central Asian oil exports,35 with more than three quarters of the total oil exports of Kazakhstan, the region’s largest producer, shipped through Russian territory.36 Recently, through, attempts by China and other powers to create alternative oil and natural gas pipelines have challenged Moscow’s exclusive control over the market.37 Moscow has therefore been forced to introduce incentives to entice Central Asian governments to continue to transport their fuel through Russian pipelines. Russia has not only assumed responsibility for the construction of several new pipelines in Central Asian countries (conveniently linking to existing Russian pipeline routes),38 but also sought in 2002 to create the Eurasian Gas Producers Alliance, an initiative that, while ostensibly shielding Central Asian gas producers from the brunt of poor markets and providing Russian assistance in developing new projects, would give Russia an enormous degree of control over transport of Central Asian

51 natural gas.39 Moreover, Russian stateowned oil companies, most notably Lukoil and Gazprom, have also invested billions of dollars in the Central Asian energy industries.40 Though Russia does not have the same monopoly over Central Asian hydrocarbons that it once enjoyed, its use of economic aid, especially in the form of investments, has allowed Moscow to guarantee the continued flow of a great deal of Central Asian hydrocarbons through Russian pipelines.

Moscow is also heavily utilizing strategic aid to maintain its military supremacy in the region, although this position is not currently challenged by either China or India. For Moscow, a strong military presence in Central Asia is important not only for preventing the region from becoming a source of terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime that could spill into Russia,41 but also for providing strategic first line of defense from an invasion launched from Iran, Afghanistan, or China.42 Russia therefore is determined to maintain its military influence in the region despite the entrance of new powers. First, Moscow offers significant aid packages to establish its military bases throughout the region: in 2012, Russia negotiated an agreement with Kyrgyzstan, forgiving $500 million dollars of debt in exchange for an extension on the lease of a Russian military base in the country,43 and reached a similar base agreement with Tajikistan, agreeing to favorable terms on remittances sent by Tajik workers living in Russia and providing aid to the Tajik government to combat drug trafficking.44 Moreover, Moscow uses military assistance to ensure its continued role as the prime military partner of Central Asian governments. Through the Collective Security

Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russiadominated organization establishing security cooperation between Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,45 Russia provides significant military aid to its partners, most notably agreeing to supply $1.3 billion in military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.46 Moscowâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts to remain the prime military power in Central Asia have borne fruit: in 2011, members of the CSTO effectively gave Moscow the power to veto the construction of any foreign military base in member countries.47 Though these attempts to maintain unchallenged military influence are not a result of direct competition with China or India (who lack any significant regional military presence, though India has a small base in Tajikistan48), they may be largely attributed to competition with the US, who has established and still holds a significant military presence in Central Asia in order to support its war in Afghanistan.49 Therefore, while not directly competing with China or India, Russia is still using strategic aid to maintain its important regional military influence.

China: The Rising Power

For China, establishing influence in Central Asia is highly important for its national security and economy. In terms of security, friendly relations with Central Asian governments is key for combating the violent East Turkestan Movement in Xinjiang province as well as for providing a â&#x20AC;&#x153;strategic stable rear,â&#x20AC;? allowing Beijing to focus the majority of its military planning to defending its sovereignty claims to Taiwan and the East and South China Seas.50 In terms of economics, China is thoroughly interested in exploiting Central Asian energy resources as well

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52 as gaining access to Central Asian markets. In order to break Russia’s regional stronghold, China has introduced a number of strategic aid packages designed to provide incentives to Central Asian governments to accept China’s influence and give the rising power access to the region’s hydrocarbon reserves.

Through its development programs, Beijing is attempting to establish itself as a regional partner and create infrastructure to facilitate China-Central Asia trade.

Unlike Russia, China lacks important historical ties with Central Asian governments and faces widespread suspicions of its intentions.51 To build support for Chinese endeavors, therefore, Beijing has announced its intentions to “build a new bridge of friendship and cooperation across the Eurasian continent”52 and has enacted a variety of aid programs designed to win the trust and cooperation of Central Asian governments, including the creation of an “economic cooperation fund” as well as an “agriculture cooperation fund.”53 China has also provided development assistance to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and established “Free Economic Zones” with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, aiding development while providing new markets for Chinese goods.54 Moreover, through its active role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (a regional group that consists of China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan55) China not only assures the support of Central Asian governments for its fight against the Uighurs in Xinjiang, but also is able to provide massive economic incentives to lure regional cooperation and temper Russia’s influence. In 2012, for example, China offered $10 billion in development assistance to SCO members, providing Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

yet another enticing motivation for Central Asian countries to accept Chinese influence.56 Finally, China has guaranteed its access to Central Asian markets through the construction of several new roads connecting China with Central Asia.57 These roads not only allow Chinese producers to more easily transport goods to Central Asian consumers, but also provide easy access to Central Asia’s raw materials, especially rare metals.58 Through this massive development assistance, China has established a preeminent economic presence in Central Asia, with its total trade with the region rising from $527 million in 1992 to $25.9 billion in 2009.59 China has therefore broken Russia’s economic monopoly on the region, allowing it to compete with Moscow for its most important regional economic interest: hydrocarbons.

China is shattering Russia’s grip on Central Asia’s energy resources through tantalizing development deals. A variety of factors peak China’s thirst for Central Asia’s energy resources. In conjunction with its explosion of economic production, China has developed a serious dependence on foreign energy resources, importing more than 50% of the petroleum used in the country in 2009.60 By 2030, the International Energy Agency even predicts that China will import some 77% of its energy.61 Moreover, Beijing’s desires to reduce its reliance on coal,62 diversify energy suppliers, and develop its energy-rich Northwest Province of Xinjiang by building pipelines to connect it to the Central Asian energy market also increase China’s interests in Central Asia’s hydrocarbons. China has therefore sought to use aid packages targeted specifically at Central Asia’s energy sector to facilitate the transfer of

53 Central Asian hydrocarbons into China.

Using its massive foreign currency reserves, Beijing is supplying low interest loans to improve energy infrastructure in the region in order to aid extraction projects and transport of hydrocarbon resources.63 Moreover, like their Russian counterparts, Chinese state-owned companies have invested billions of dollars in the Central Asian hydrocarbon industry, developing energy fields and building new pipelines to transport oil and natural gas directly into China.64 One of these projects, the China-Kazakhstan pipeline, which Kazakhstan itself enthusiastically initiated, will provide 10-20 million tons of oil annually, making Kazakhstan one of China’s largest energy suppliers.65 This influx of aid and investment has paid handsomely: not only are Chinese stateowned companies more successful than competing companies at winning energy contracts in Central Asia,66 but also some Central Asian countries have now come to prefer Chinese investment, viewing Chinese terms as more favorable than those of Russia.67 Thus, when Kyrgyzstan needed a partner for hydroelectric and oil refinery projects, Bishkek approached China rather than Russia.68 China has therefore effectively challenged Russia’s regional monopoly through its enticing loans and investments.

India: The New Player

Although India has several important regional interests, its entrance into the new “Great Game” is relatively recent. Despite the fact that India does not share a border with the region, the stability of Central Asia is still highly important to New Delhi since groups of Islamic extremists in Central Asia support terrorist groups within India, especially in the Kashmir

region.69 Moreover, the markets of Central Asia, as well as the region’s hydrocarbon resources, hold great value for the rapidly growing Indian economy. India, however, has only recently proclaimed its intentions to assume a larger regional role through the announcement of its “Connect Central Asia” Policy in June 2012. Although India denies any desire to play the new “Great Game,” claiming, “India wishes to eschew archaic concepts of Great Game and Grand Chessboard and, instead, be a partner for peace, stability and economic development in the region,”70 it has entered the competition and is using strategic aid as its weapon of choice.

India is attempting to establish its own regional influence in Central Asia through a combination of aid packages and enticing rhetoric. As a recent arrival to the new “Great Game,” India faces the imposing obstacle of establishing a regional presence in a region already contested by other powers. Although India, currently an observer country in the SCO, has expressed its desires to become a full member of the organization, China, wary of the new rival, has sought to slow New Delhi’s admission into the grouping.71 Fearing being overshadowed

by China, India therefore has sought to become a source of development aid in order to establish its regional influence.

In its “Connect Central Asia Policy,” India, referring to Central Asia as its “extended neighborhood,” announced it intentions to deepen relations and cooperation in political, economic, and cultural areas with the region.72 This new policy not only seeks to increase trade between India and Central Asia, currently valued at a mere $500 million, but also promises Indian aid to Central Asia in a number

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54 of sectors, including technology, medicine, education, and banking.73 Though the policy is not yet a year old, India has already established IT centers in all five Central Asian capitals and has undertaken a variety of regional developmental projects, from upgrading hydroelectric plants to assisting in the computerization of post offices.74 Moreover, in Tajikistan, India has already turned its aid programs into concrete advances of Indian interests. In Tajikistan, India provides infrastructural aid, including the recent upgrade of the Aini airport,75 as well as technological aid.76 In return, though, India has not only begun talks to access the region’s resources,77 but also was able to establish its first overseas military base in the country,78 providing India both an important geostrategic position to influence Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO and another military outpost from which India could launch an attack on Pakistan in the case of an armed conflict with its hostile neighbor.79 Though India’s efforts to establish its regional influence are still developing, New Delhi’s strategic aid programs have already found some success. In the competition for hydrocarbons, India is similarly struggling to catch up with its rivals.

Utilizing strategically directed aid and rhetoric of cooperation, India is attempting to gain access to Central Asia’s hydrocarbons. Like China, India recognizes the necessity of gaining access to the hydrocarbon reserves of the region.

With a colossal economic growth rate, India, the fifth largest energy consumer in 2005 with expectations of tripling its consumption by 2025,80 has begun to view Central Asia as a key source for fulfilling its energy needs. India, though, lacks both Russia’s historical presence Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

and China’s unlimited funds, forcing New Delhi to differentiate itself from the other two powers by concealing the strategic aims of its aid programs through rhetoric emphasizing its role as a fellow developing nation. In New Delhi’s “Connect Central Asia Policy,” for example, India claims to be a “partner, rather than a mere contender for the region’s vast oil and gas resources” and also expresses interest in helping the governments of the region to construct infrastructure to develop hydroelectric exports, an approach that “could differ from those seeking exclusively to pump out Central Asia’s riches.”81 Despite the continued denial of any desire to be a competitor in the clash for hydrocarbons, though, India has already begun to challenge China and Russia in the energy field through competing investment offers. In Kazakhstan, India is using attractive investment offers to gain its share of Kazakh energy resources.

Indian and Kazakh leaders have already negotiated agreements for energy-industrial cooperation, and Indian stateowned energy companies have made investments in Kazakh oil fields,82 even debating the construction of a KazakhIndia pipeline.83 India has also expressed interest in enhancing Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure by providing funds for gas processing and petro-chemical plants.84 India is making similar moves in Uzbekistan: by promising cooperation with Uzbekistan in a number of areas, including pharmaceuticals and information technology, India is seeking to gain access to the country’s natural gas and oil reserves.85 Though continuing its denial of its intentions to play the “Great Game,” India has quickly adopted strategic aid programs as a means to quench its thirst for energy.

55 Conclusion

Strategic aid has rapidly become one of the main tools utilized by competing powers in contests for political influence and economic resources. As the utility of force has declined, the use of tantalizing economic incentives has emerged as the primary method in which powers gain influence. Rising economic powers are especially eager to adopt these methods.

By using their newly gained wealth and knowledge of development, large developing powers, like China, India, and Brazil, are able to effectively challenge the established influence of historical regional hegemons or compete with other developing powers in order to access the resources of less developed regions.

The new “Great Game,” in which three regional powers, two rising and one waning, have begun a nonviolent, yet highly contentious competition for regional influence and access to hydrocarbon resources, provides an excellent example of this trend. As more new economic powers emerge, the use of strategic aid should only intensify. Though interstate wars of force are declining in frequency, international battles for influence and resources remain prevalent, and strategic aid is the primary weapon.

References 1 Though some scholars include various other contiguous countries, this work will define ìCentral Asiaî as the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

2 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

141-143 and Lawton, John.“The Great Game.” History Today, Vol. 59, N. 2, February 2009.

3 Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis.

New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972. 155.

4 Londoño, Ernesto. “Iraq, Afghan wars will cost to $4 trillion to $6 trillion, Harvard study says.” The Washington Post. 28 March 2013.

5 Dwyer, Devin and Martinez, Luis. “Cost of Libya Intervention $600 million for First Week, Pentagon says.” ABC News.

28 March 2011.

6 Pape, Robert A. “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work.” International Security, Vol. 23, N. 1, Summer 1998. 66.

7 Mousavian, Seyed Hossein. “Twelve Major Consequences of Sanctions on Iran.” Al-Monitor. 3 May 2013.

8 Nye, Joseph S. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. 21.

9 Otmazgin, Nissim Kadosh. “Contesting soft power: Japanese soft power in East and Southeast Asia.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, V.8, 2008. 92.

10 Bearce, David H. and Tirone, Daniel C. “Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Nations.” The Journal of Politics, V.72, N.3, July 2010. 840.

11 Nye, Joseph S. The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. 77.

12 Berger, Morroe. “How the Molotov Plan Works.” The Antioch Review, V.8, N.1, Spring 1948. 18.

13 Fleck, Robert K. and Kilby, Christopher. “Changing aid regimes? U.S. aid regimes from the Cold War to the War on Terror.” Journal of Development Economics, V. 91, N.2, 2010.

185.

14 Holsti 1972, 259.

15 Walters, Robert S. “Soviet Economic Aid to Cuba: 19591964.” International Affairs, V. 42, N.1, January 1966. 74.

16 Goldman, Marshall I. “A Balance Sheet of Soviet Foreign Aid.” Foreign Affairs, V.43, N.2, January 1965.

17 Brautigam, Deborah. “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?” In Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Jane Golley and Ligang Song, 203-223, Canberra: Australia National University Press, 2011. 211.

18 McCormick, Dorothy. “China & India as Africa’s New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development.” Review of African Political Economy, V. 35, N. 115, 2008. 85.

19 Ibid.

20 Six, Clemens. “The Rise of Postcolonial States as Donors: a challenge to the development paradigm?” Third World Quarterly, V. 39, N. 6, 2009.1114, 1116.

21 McCormick 2008, 85.

22 Bhowmick, Nilanjana. “India Pledges $5bn to help African states meet the MDG’s.” The Guardian. 25 May 2011.

23 Peimani, Hooman. “Energy Security in Central Asia in a Multi-polar World: An Overview.” Orient-Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Politik und Wirtschaft des Orients, V. 51, N. 4, 2010, 24 Hancock, Kathleen J. “Russia: Great Power Image Versus Economic Reality.” Asian Perspective, V.31, N. 4, 2007. 94.

25 MacHaffie, James. “China’s Role in Central Asia: Security Implications for Russia and the United States.” Comparative Strategy, V. 29, N. 4, 2010. 370.

26 Nixey, James. “The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.” Chatham House Briefing Paper, Russia and Eurasia Programme. June 2012. 9.

27 Ibid.

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56 28 “EurAsEC countries to set up anti-crisis fund.” Xinhua. 9 June 2010.

29 Provost, Claire. “The Rebirth of Russian Foreign Aid.” The Guardian. 25 May 2011.

30 Pederson, Ingrid. “Central Asia Could Go To War Over Water,” Business Insider, 15 September 2012.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Henderson, James. “The Future of Russian Oil Production and Exports.” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, November 2012. 5.

34 Pop, Irina Ionela. “China’s Energy Strategy in Central Asia: Interactions with Russia, India, and Japan.” UNISCI Discussion Papers, N. 24, October 2010. 210.

35 Peimani 2010.

36 Vatansever, Adnan. “Russian Oil Exports: Economic Rationale vs. Strategic Gains.” Energy and Climate Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2010. 19.

37 Yenikeyeff, Shamil Midkhatovich. “Energy Interests of the Great Powers in Central Asia: Cooperation or Conflict.” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, V. 46, N. 3, 2011. 61.

38 Pop 2010, 211.

39 Lelyveid, Michael. “Russia: Moscow Promoting CIS Integration through Gas Alliance.”Radio Free Europe. 21 June 2002.

40 Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects.” In Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, edited by Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, 75-131. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2008. 106-108.

41 Jun, Zhao. “Security Problems in Central Asia and Possibilities of Increased Cooperation Between China, Russia, and India.” Far Eastern Affairs, V.39, N. 3, 2011. 45.

42 Peimani 1998, 72.

43 Paxton, Robert. “Russia cuts Krgyz Debt for military, power deals,” CNBC. 26 September 2012.

44 Eremenko, Alexey. “Russia Keeps Tajik Base, Risking Taliban Face-Off.” RiaNovosti. 5 October 2012.

45 Karnes, Margaret P. and Mingst, Karen A. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010. 178.

46 Kucera, Joshua. “The Great Game in Central Asia after Afghanistan.” The Diplomat. 27 March 2013.

47 Radyuhin, Vladimir. “CSTO tightens foreign base norms.”

The Hindu. 22 December 2011.

48 “India Courts Tajikistan to swing Afghan endgame.” Hindustan Times. 31 August 2012.

49 Mankoff, Jeffrey. “The United States and Central Asia after 2014.” Russia and Eurasia Program, Council for Strategic and International Studies. January 2013. 3, 17.

50 Zhao, Huasheng. “Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy.” In Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, edited by Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao, 137-208. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2008. 154.

51 Ibid, 162.

52 “China Central Asia Co-op fund mulled.” China Daily. 3 September 2012.

53 Ibid.

54 Kassenova, Nargis. “China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.” Ifri, Russia/NIS Center, January 2009. 13,17.

55 Kalra and Saxena 2007, 96.

56 “China offers $10bn loan to SCO members.” The Hindu. 7 June 2012.

57 Kassenova , 12.

58 Ibid.

59 Wong, Edward. “China Quietly Extends Footprints in Central Asia.” The New York Times. 2 January 2011.

60 Pop, 200.

61 Ibid.

Fall 2013 | Claremont Journal of International Relations

MacHaffie, James. “China’s Role in Central Asia: Security Implications for Russia and the United States.” Comparative Strategy, V. 29, N. 4, 2010. 373 63 Pfeiffer, Stephanie. “China’s Fraught Investment in Central Asia.” CNN. 1 June 2011.

64 Pop, 207-208.

65 Zhao, 146, 154.

66 Pop, 216.

67 Smith, Myles G. “Kyrgyzstan Looking to China for Strategic Investments.” Eurasia Daily Monitor. 11 July 2012.

68 Ibid.

69 Blank, Stephen. “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia.”

Comparative Strategy, V.22, N.2, 2010. 143.

70 Ansari, Hamid. Inaugural Address at the National Seminar on “India and Central Asia: Perspectives on Bilateral and Regional Cooperation,” Chandigarh, India. 17 October 2012.

71 “China welcomes proposed accession of India in Shanghai Cooperation,” The Economic Times. 23 May 2012.

72 Ahamed, Shri E. “India’s ‘Connect Central Asia’ Policy.”

Presented at the First India-Central Asia Dialogue, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 12 June 2012.

73 Ibid.

74 Singh, Shri Sanjay. “Keynote Address.” Presented at a Seminar on “Enhancing India-Central Asia Engagement Prospects and Issues,” New Dehli, India, 18 March 2013.

75 Kundu, Nividita Das. “India-Tajikistan bilateral relationship.” Russia & India Report. 2 September 2011.

76 Kumar, Vijay. “India, Tajikistan Tackling Terrorism: Ansari.” The Hindu. 14 April 2013.

77 Ibid.

78 “India Courts” 2012.

79 Blank 2010, 150.

80 Pop 2010.

81 Ahamed 2012.

82 Cutler, Robert M. “India Checks the Neighbors.” Asia Times. 21 April 2011.

83 Singh 2013.

84 Singh, Shri Sanjay. “Keynote Address.” Presented at a Seminar on “Enhancing India-Central Asia Engagement Prospects and Issues,” New Dehli, India, 18 March 2013.

85 Cutler, Robert M. “India Raises Energy Profile in Central Asia.” Asia Times. 27 May 2011.

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