FEATURED ASSESSMENT SYRIA’S NORMALIZATION RISKS

By RANE Worldview by Stratfor, Ryan Bohl Syria’s Normalization Risks Continuing the Cycle of Conflict and Authoritarianism in the Middle East

A growing number of Arab countries have recently begun rekindling relations with the Syrian government after a decade of civil conflict and failed attempts to oust President Bashar al Assad’s regime.

As Damascus slowly emerges from isolation, other undemocratic regimes and actors in the Middle East and North Africa risk seeing al Assad’s success as proof that force is a very valid option to quell threats to their control — and while it may spur a bloody and destructive war, it’s a war that can, with the right allies, be won. Indeed, in a region plagued with long-standing economic inequality,

sectarian conflict, authoritarian regimes, deep corruption and ineffective governance, it’s only a matter of time before another state or actor uses the Syrian civil war not as a warning but as a model for when facing the next inevitable public rebellion.

What Was at Stake

Of all the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2011, Syria’s appeared most poised to change how the region governs itself. Different from other countries that saw major antigovernment protests during the time (like Egypt and Tunisia), Syria was the sublime Arab security state, governed through its Mukhabarat (secret police). Damascus was widely seen as “coup proof” after decades of internal reorganization and loyalty tests devised by the al Assad ruling clan. The regime’s primary arms supplier, Russia, had little interest in human rights, nor did its key regional ally, Iran. The Syrian government thus appeared immune to popular pressure, let alone a rebellion, since it could use force as much as it wanted.

Had that conventional wisdom been overturned by a successful Arab Spring uprising, it would have discredited not just Syria’s police state, but regional authoritarianism in general. After all, if al Assad couldn’t quash an armed rebellion with his chemical weapons, seemingly fanatical soldiers, and support from Russia and Iran, what chance did less hard-line governments with more human rights-interested allies (like the United States and France) have?

Syria’s Arab Spring unrest, however, instead turned into years of armed conflict and civil war. And as Russian airpower and Iranianbacked militias began changing the military tide toward al Assad’s favor after 2015, a new lesson appeared to emerge: one might still win such a brute civil war and still lose the peace; hard-line approaches to unrest could still produce a victory, albeit costly. Syria’s epic reconstruction bill of at least $500 billion (over eight times the country’s pre-war GDP of $60 billion in 2010) suggested the Syrian regime would need immense amounts of aid to rebuild the shattered country.

But U.S. and European sanctions, anchored by the 2019 U.S. Syrian Civilian Caesar Protection Act, looked like they would forever block reconstruction — leaving the al Assad regime to preside over a blackened landscape, where damaged cities are doomed to only a few hours of electricity a day and where even its loyalists are scraping by to get fuel and medicine.

However, even that assumption now appears in doubt, as the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt and Bahrain have all begun either actively or passively normalizing ties with Syria in recent weeks, despite the United States’ strong human rights-oriented sanctions law. The Emiratis have taken the lead in this push, pledging to build a solar power plan in Syria shortly after sending its foreign minister to Damascus on Nov. 9. Jordan also reopened its border with Syria in September, and in December, Bahrain reappointed its ambassador in Damascus after a decade without out. Egypt, meanwhile, has also been actively lobbying for Syria to re-enter the Arab League following its 2011 suspension from the regional organization.

All of these countries are close U.S. allies and are typically wary of triggering Washington’s ire and sanctions. But they seemed to have calculated that the United States does not want to create a rift with its regional partners over Syria — a country where Washington has little interest in improving overall governance and is instead primarily focused on security threats in the northeast.

And this calculation has so far held up, as the United States has yet to signal any intent to impose

U.S. sanctions could weaken enough to allow trickles of aid and reconstruction investments to slip in — and that trickle might, with enough time and U.S. disinterest, become a flood.

sanctions in response to the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt and Bahrain’s outreach to Damascus. Indeed, even Washington appears to be finding exemptions to its isolation strategy in Syria, with the United States now seeking to restart the long-shuttered Arab Gas Pipeline that runs from the Egyptian city of Arish to the Syrian city of Homs.

While it may be a while before the United States overtly drops objections to Syria’s full re-entry to the global economy and diplomatic space, the path is clear enough. And in the future, U.S. sanctions could weaken enough to allow trickles of aid and reconstruction investments to slip in — and that trickle might, with enough time and U.S. disinterest, become a flood.

Bloody Precedent(s)

The thawing of Syria’s isolation is hardly the first time force has been rewarded in the region. But it is one of the most widescale examples and adds to a trend in which governance in the Middle East and North Africa will remain by the sword. For leaders in the region, al Assad’s success in retaining power over the past decade also sets a model for how to survive even the worst-case scenario of an all-out popular uprising.

Both state and non-state actors will likely see something in the Syria example that may be useful to them in the future. In Lebanon, for instance, Hezbollah has held off from using its considerable forces to reshape politics in its favor, wary of a return to civil war. But as Syria’s conflict emerges not as a warning but as a potential model, Hezbollah may deem using force as a more worthwhile gamble to secure its domestic power and legitimacy amid Lebanon’s ongoing economic and social crises. This is likely to manifest as more overt violence against Lebanese protesters, activists and even government institutions. And in the use of such force, Hezbollah might miscalculate, killing the wrong person or conducting violence in too public of a way, reigniting a dreaded sectarian conflict.

In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias will be emboldened to maintain, and potentially even escalate, the violent tactics they’ve already used to break up protests directed at them — pointing to Syria as a validation for their approach. During future security or political crises, these militias may also be tempted to resort back to ethnic cleansing last seen in Iraq during the height of sectarian conflict in Iraq in 200607, after viewing the success al In Iraq, Iranianbacked militias will be emboldened to maintain, and potentially even escalate, the violent tactics they’ve already used to break up protests directed at them — pointing to Syria as a validation for their approach.

Assad had in using such tactics to maintain his place in power and edge on the battleground in Syria.

Iran itself also faces recurrent unrest, often from its Arab minority but occasionally from wide spectrums of Iran’s population as well. The country saw some of the largest nationwide protests in 201920. Iran has typically used force to suppress these uprisings. But with the Syria example in mind, Tehran might be willing to resort to more scorched-earth tactics, especially against its Arab population, to firmly suppress challenges to its rule. Additionally, Syria’s civil war will validate Iran’s hawkish foreign policy, portending more military interventions abroad on behalf of Tehran’s ideological allies.

But even U.S. allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia will see lessons worth taking away from Syria. For one, U.S. values and U.S. policies remain as distant as ever, despite repeated campaign pledges by presidents and various laws designed to change that. So long as they are of strategic value to the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies can also be rest assured that Washington will take limited, and likely ineffective, action against them should they engage in widespread oppression of popular dissent. This could feed into the end of the post-Cold War uncertainty created by the United States’ emphasis on having allies adhere to its human rights standards, enabling countries to return to repressive tactics without placing their ties with Washington in jeopardy. And if U.S. allies are slapped with sanctions for such domestic behavior, they will also look to Syria as proof that if they can wait out the initial blow, the enforcement of those sanctions will eventually wane.

Back to the Strongmen

Yet regardless of what these actors do, what is certain is that authoritarianism in the Middle East has emerged from the Arab Spring triumphant. Syria’s slow normalization heralds a return to old governance patterns and a continued cycle of war by leaving the core causes of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa unaddressed.

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