CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series Number 28 April 2018
Analyzing the Evolution of the Renewable Portfolio Standard in the United States Kyle Butler, University of Michigan
This paper is available online at http://closup.umich.edu Papers in the CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series are written by students at the University of Michigan. This paper was submitted as part of the Winter 2018 course PubPol 495 Energy and Environmental Policy Research, that is part of the CLOSUP in the Classroom Initiative. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy or any sponsoring agency
Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan
Analyzing the Evolution of the Renewable Portfolio Standard in the United States Kyle Butler Abstract Due to a lack of concerted federal action to promote renewable energy, understanding and evaluating the rigors of state-level energy policies such as renewable portfolio standards is of great importance. The literature on state renewable policies suggests that policy design and stringency has meaningful implications on effectiveness; this project seeks to identify how renewable portfolio standards have changed over time by creating an inventory tracking each policy from initial enactment to most recent revision. This inventory shows that states do not tend to become more ambitious when revising policies, and high liberalism states tend to increase their ambition through revisions while low liberalism states decrease ambition. This research illustrates the need for future research on renewable portfolio standard design that considers how RPS policies evolve over time and provides policymakers with a comprehensive, comparable list of RPS policies in the United States.
Introduction In recent years, interest in renewable energy has increased significantly across the world. Furthermore, increased interest in “going green� and technological advances that decrease costs and increase effectiveness of renewable energy sources means that clean energy policies often find themselves on the policy agenda (Foehringer Merchant, 2018; Gillis and Harvey, 2018). These efforts have manifested quite visibly in international agreements such as the Paris climate accords (Ellis, 2017).
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In the United States, most activity in the renewable energy space takes place at the state level, where each state can flexibly create their own policies to fit their unique situation and needs. While economists boast of market-based approaches such as carbon taxes or cap-andtrade policies, the most prevalent renewable energy policy in the United States is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). An RPS is a command-and-control regulation that sets targets for renewable energy deployment and a timeline to reach the goal. Each is designed with different thresholds and timelines, and some contain carve-outs that specify sub-targets for the deployment of a specific type of renewable energy. This flexibility in targets and implementation allow states to suit their policies to their needs and may be a reason for their widespread appeal. The first RPS was adopted by Iowa in 1983, and according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 37 states have adopted an RPS policy as of August 2017 (Durkay, 2017). Because the timelines of RPS policies vary widely and adoption does not occur simultaneously across states, some states have already passed goals and have revised their RPS. These second- and third-generation RPS policies can provide useful insight into how renewable energy is valued state-by-state. Furthermore, analyzing how RPS policies change over time can inform policymakers and the public on the efforts taken to increase renewable energy deployment. In an age of little federal involvement in renewable energy policy and lofty international climate goals, an increased awareness of the policy designs of RPS’s may lead to their diffusion into other states, particularly in the South where RPS policies have not taken hold. This paper aims to compare first-generation RPS policies to their most recent peers. I begin by reviewing the literature on RPS policy design and adoption. The following sections present the methodological approach and discuss the findings, as well as important trends across states. The goal of this study is to create a comparable inventory of the RPS policies deployed by
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states, including background variables (a state’s governmental and citizen liberalism and affluence) and policy variables (goals, timelines, and ambition).
Literature Review Research on RPS policies is rather robust and can be divided into two main categories: evaluations of policy adoption and design, and evaluations of effectiveness.
Policy Adoption and Design Studies on the policy design and adoption stages of RPS formation have found that many factors one might think would influence RPS adoption have very little or no effect. Contrary to expectations grounded in politics and economics, Matisoff (2008) finds that the presence of a strong fossil fuel industry in a state does not influence its adoption of climate change policies. The coal and natural gas industries specifically are proven to be non-factors, while information on oil is not included. Furthermore, Lyon and Yin (2010) find that common talking points used by those supporting renewable energy investment have no effect on the likelihood of a state’s adoption of an RPS policy. Factors such as job creation from increased investment in renewable energy sources do not influence a state’s decision to adopt an RPS, and environmental benefits have similar minimal effects. On the other hand, research is very consistent in its findings on the factors that do influence RPS adoption. The most common finding is that a state’s ideological liberalism has a strong effect on the adoption of both climate change policies and RPS policies (Carley and Miller, 2012; Chandler, 2009; Lyon and Yin, 2010; Matisoff, 2008). Ideological liberalism has been measured in multiple ways, and all have found to be important for policy adoption. For
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example, Lyon and Yin (2010) use a variable that denotes the number of seats held by Democrats in the state legislature to measure liberalism, while Carley and Miller (2012) analyze both congressional and citizen liberalism, or a measure of the liberalism of a state’s citizenry. Carley and Miller (2012) find that high citizen liberalism encourages the adoption of weak RPS policies, while high state government liberalism encourages the adoption of more stringent RPS policies. Another important and consistent finding is that a state’s affluence as measured by gross state product (GSP) per capita has a positive effect on adoption of climate change policies (Chandler, 2009; Matisoff, 2008; Wiener and Koontz, 2010). Finally, Lyon and Yin (2010) find a laundry list of positive influences that have not been identified by other researchers, such as renewable potential, a restructured electricity market, a small share of natural gas in the electricity mix, and organized renewable energy interest groups.
RPS Effectiveness It should be noted that studies of the impacts of RPS policies raise questions about their effectiveness in promoting renewable energy development. Carley (2009) analyzes the connection between adoption and implementation of an RPS policy and the percentage or renewable energy electricity generation in a state and finds that RPS policies are not a significant predictor of renewable energy generation. However, Carley (2009) does find that time is crucial, saying that for each additional year that an RPS is active in a state, the total amount of renewable energy generation rises. A very similar study of effectiveness by Delmas and and Montes-Sancho (2011) explores the impact of RPS on investment in the renewable energy market. In this study, RPS are found to have a negative effect on renewable energy investment, but separating analysis
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into public and investor-owned utilities finds that investor-owned utilities respond more to RPS policies than public utilities. Turning to policy design and its impact on effectiveness, an interesting study by Fischlein and Smith (2013) analyzes different designs of RPS and finds that RPS policies in the United States are extremely diverse, suggesting that different design elements have important impacts on how RPS policies are implemented and whether a state meets its RPS goal. For example, the presence of loopholes reduces the stringency of an RPS policy, watering it down and decreasing the likelihood that a state will meet its target goals. Furthermore, design elements such as rules around compliance pathways and the stringency of the penalty regime have large impacts on how the RPS is received and implemented. Another study of effectiveness by Langniss and Wiser (2003) performs a preliminary case study of Texas’ RPS, a state with great wind energy potential that experienced a boom in renewable energy development. The authors identify multiple factors that lead to the policy’s low cost and maximum impact, including strong political support, flexibility for utilities (yearly compliance windows with some tradeable renewable energy certificates), and scaling goals (starting with low targets that increase over time, driving renewable energy development). Langniss and Wiser (2003) conclude that the RPS’ design is crucial in its success, claiming several states and European RPS policies are either vague, too rigid, or lack public support and are doomed to fail. These governments can learn from the Texas experiment, then, and should seek clear, flexible RPS policies that garner strong public and legislative support. In all, studies find that RPS policies overall have not been overly effective in the United States at increasing the share of renewables in RPS states’ energy mix. However, since research indicates policy design is crucial for evaluating effectiveness, it is important to understand the
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current design of RPS policies and how they have evolved over time. Despite the importance of understanding the policy design of RPS policies, no RPS inventories have focused specifically on changes from first-generation RPS policies to today’s RPS. Since many RPS’s were adopted in the early 2000’s, many have undergone significant revisions, and research on RPS evolution is lacking and of great importance. This inventory seeks to identify trends in RPS design with specific attention given to governmental liberalism, citizen liberalism, state affluence, and target ambition with the goal of developing knowledge of how recent revisions of RPS policies compare to their first-generation peers.
Methods To analyze RPS evolution over time, this paper inventories RPS policies in both their first adoption and their most recent revision. In all, 29 states have adopted RPS policies, including targets, timelines, and penalties for utility companies who do not meet renewable energy standards. Additionally, eight states have adopted voluntary renewable energy goals. These policies are similar to RPS in that they specify targets for renewable energy generation and a timeline to the goal, but these policies lack penalties for utilities that do not meet the set standards. Both mandatory and voluntary RPS policies are included in this inventory since understanding voluntary standards can be useful as they could lead a state to adopt mandatory standards in the future, though no state has yet revised a voluntary RPS to make it mandatory. More attention is paid, then, to mandatory standards because these policies represent a stronger effort at changing electricity generation in a specific state. The primary focus of this inventory is a state’s renewable energy generation target and its target year. This data is collected primarily from states’ legislation, and final targets in a specific
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piece of legislation are used (if a state’s standard ratchets up over time, only its final target is coded). To allow for comparability, multiple background variables are included for each state. Since the literature identifies liberalism (Carley and Miller, 2012; Chandler, 2009; Lyon and Yin, 2010; Matisoff, 2008) and affluence (Chandler, 2009; Matisoff, 2008; Wiener and Koontz, 2010) as key influences on RPS and renewable energy policy design and adoption, variables on each of these factors are included for each state. For each background variable, the measure was taken in the year that the RPS was last revised. For governmental liberalism, the percentage of the state legislature held by Democrats is used. Past studies (Rabe, 2007) have used a dummy variable of either Democrat or Republican, but using the percentage of legislature seats allows for comparability between states with the same party in the majority. For citizen liberalism, the party of the governor at time of revision is used. Since gubernatorial elections occur statewide, the governor’s party identification can serve as a proxy for the political preferences of the state as a whole. Finally, for affluence, data from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis on gross state product (GSP) per capita is used, and each figure is given in terms of real 2009 dollars (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017). GSP per capita is a standard economic figure used to explain the relative wealth of specific regions. Because states adopt policies in different years with heterogeneous targets and timelines, it is difficult to make direct comparisons of RPS policies. These comparisons are crucial for understanding different revision strategies by states as well as comparing initial and revised RPS designs. In order to create a standardized and comparable measure for each state, “ambition” calculations are included. An RPS’s ambition is the percentage increase in renewable energy generation required per year- that is, if a state’s policy mandates 5% of electricity from
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renewables in five years, its ambition score will be one. Due to this study’s limited resources and time frame, ambition calculations assume a state generates no electricity from renewables at the time of adoption. Furthermore, revised policies’ ambition scores illustrate percentage increase per year using the initial policy as a baseline. Finally, each state’s change in ambition is calculated as revision ambition score less initial ambition score. For example, Arizona’s initial policy was adopted in 2001 and targeted 1.1% of its energy from renewables by 2007. Arizona’s 1.1
initial ambition score would be 2007−2001 = 0.1833. Arizona’s revision was enacted in 2006 and 15−1.1
targeted 15% from renewables by 2025, so its revised ambition score is 2025−2006 = 0.7316.
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Table 1: Policy and Background Variables for All States, Alphabetized
Background Data, Year of Most Recent Revision GSP per Year Most Recent Percentage of Legislature Governor Partisanship capita Enacted Revision Held by Democrats State Arizona 2001 2006 45.6 D $44,086 California 2002 2015 65.0 D $57,328 Colorado 2004 45.0 R $50,083 Connecticut 1999 2006 65.8 R $67,458 Delaware 2005 2010 64.5 D $62,837 Hawaii 2004 2015 89.5 D $50,320 Illinois 2007 2016 62.1 R $54,091 Indiana* 2011 35.3 R $43,058 Iowa 1983 58.7 R $11,608 Kansas** 2009 2015 21.2 R $46,890 Maine 1999 2006 50.5 D $39,288 Maryland 2004 2017 66.0 R $55,404 Massachusettes 1999 2008 88.0 D $60,723 Michigan 2008 2016 39.2 R $43,372 Minnesota 2007 2013 55.7 D $51,999 Missouri 2008 42.6 R $43,118 Montana 2005 51.3 D $36,120 Nevada 1997 2009 63.5 R $44,774 New Hampshire 2007 59.7 D $48,618 New Jersey 1999 2015 60.0 R $56,472 New Mexico 2002 2015 50.9 R $41,577 New York 2004 2016 61.0 D $64,579 North Carolina 2007 58.2 D $45,440 North Dakota* 2008 38.3 R $48,379 Ohio 2008 2014 37.1 R $46,385 Oklahoma* 2010 40.9 D $38,303 Oregon 2007 2016 58.9 D $50,582 Pennsylvania 2004 51.4 D $44,585 Rhode Island 2004 2016 83.2 D $47,639 South Carolina* 2014 37.6 R $36,295 South Dakota* 2008 33.3 R $45,516 Texas 1999 2005 42.0 R $45,966 Utah* 2008 26.9 R $43,375 Vermont 2015 65.6 D $43,495 Virginia* 2007 40.0 D $52,657 Washington 2006 55.1 D $52,900 Wisconsin 1998 2006 40.2 D $45,515
Revised 15% by 2025 50% by 2030 27% by 2020 25% by 2025-2026 100% by 2045 25% by 2025
20% by 2020 40% by 2017 25% by 2020 15% by 2020 15% by 2021 10% by 2030
25% by 2025 20.38% by 2020-2021 20% by 2020 50% by 2030
12.5% by 2026 50% by 2040 38.5% by 2035
5880 MW by 2015
10% by 2015
0.00
2.78 0.00 1.79
1.50
-0.35
-0.78
2.28 -1.11 -0.99
0.50
-0.18 1.79 1.42 -1.39
1.04
0.87
1.00 2.50 2.67 0.00
1.87
1.11
-1.82 -29.09 0.56 0.52 -0.43 -2.27
1.11
0.00 0.91 1.67 0.92 1.00 -0.88
Revised Change 0.73 0.55 2.00 0.67
Ambition Score
Initial 0.18 1.33 1.88 1.18 0.71 1.25 1.39 0.71
1.82 30.00 1.11 0.40 1.43 1.39 1.15 1.50 1.00 1.40 0.50 1.11 2.78 0.89 1.43 0.78 3.00 1.39 1.13 1.00 0.29 1.43
1.18 4.41
1.07 0.00
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RPS Target Initial 1.1% by 2007 20% by 2017 30% by 2020 13% by 2009 10% by 2019-2020 20% by 2020 25% by 2025 10% by 2025 105 MW 20% by 2020 30% by 2000 20% by 2022 4% by 2009 10% by 2015 25% by 2025 15% by 2021 15% by 2015 1% by 1998 25.2% by 2025 6.5% by 2012 20% by 2020 25% by 2013 12.5% by 2021 10% by 2015 12.5% by 2024 15% by 2015 25% by 2025 18% by 2020 3% by 2007 2% by 2021 10% by 2015 2880 MW by 2009 20% by 2025 75% by 2032 15% of 2007 sales by 2025 15% by 2020 50 MW per supplier by 2000
*Voluntary Standard. Kansas’ RPS is mandatory in 2009 but voluntary in 2015.
Results Table 1 displays the results of the inventory, including all background characteristics and each RPS target and timeline. In all, 37 states are included with 29 mandatory RPS and eight voluntary RPS. Of these states, 20 states have revised their targets at least once. Only four states reached their RPS target date and did not revise their policies, and three of these states had voluntary RPS policies initially. There are a few notes that are important for calculations of increased and decreased ambition states. Wisconsin’s initial target of fifty MW per utility supplier was quite low and will be considered to just be zero for ambition calculations. Virginia, Texas, and Iowa identify targets without using percentages of total electricity generation, and therefore their policies are difficult to compare. Furthermore, Maine’s initial policy was overly ambitious as it asked for a 30% increase in renewable energy generation in one year. For these reasons, Virginia, Texas, Iowa, and Maine will be excluded from increased and decreased ambition calculations and analyses, while Wisconsin is included with its initial target as zero. In terms of background data, the average state had 52.7% of its legislature seats held by Democrats. Governor partisanship was split nearly dead even, with nineteen Democratic governors and eighteen Republicans at the time of most recent policy change. Finally, average GSP per capita was $47,590, more than the US average of $45,939 from 1990-2016. Ambition scores remain relatively consistent across states. The average initial ambition score (excluding Maine’s 30.0) was about 1.28, and the average revised ambition score was 1.13. The average change in ambition for states who revised their targets (again excluding Maine) was 0.05. Therefore, it seems that states tend to marginally increase standards when revising.
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Analysis Initial findings on RPS changes over time reveal a few trends in terms of ambition and background data. However, since one-third of RPS policies will expire in the next ten years, follow-up studies will be necessary to evaluate if state-level approaches to renewable energy policy revisions change in the coming decade.
Overall Ambition Results for the ambition scores of all states are displayed in Table 2. Overall, states tend to have positive ambition scores and seem to be attempting to increase their renewable energy generation. The average current policy ambition score of all states is 1.30 with a standard deviation of 1.01, and only Minnesota had a negative ambition score due to a decrease in its goal during revision. Vermont achieved the highest current policy ambition score with an RPS targeting 75% from renewables by 2032, and its score of 4.41 is 3.08 standard deviations above the mean ambition score. On the other hand, Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, and Ohio all have current policy ambition scores of zero. These low scores are the result of revised policies that change the RPS target date without changing the target year or a revision that changed substantive policy variables not recorded by this study. For example, Ohio’s initial 2008 policy targeted 12.5% from renewables by 2024, and its revised 2014 policy targeted 12.5% from renewables by 2026. Presumably, this is a shortcoming of the ambition calculations as used in this study, since Ohio likely increased its electricity generation from renewables between 2008 and 2014 as a result of its mandatory RPS, and therefore its revision is likely a less stringent and ambitious policy. If
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this study could have compared policy targets to current renewable electricity generation, ambition scores for states with current policy ambition scores of zero may have been different. Finally, states with voluntary RPS policies tend to have slightly less ambitious policies. While Oklahoma’s 3.00 current policy ambition score is the second highest in this study, the mean ambition score of voluntary RPS states is 1.15 with a standard deviation of 0.99. Therefore, on average, voluntary RPS policies as currently implemented represent a much weaker attempt at developing renewable energy than mandatory RPS policies due to lower and unenforced targets.
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Table 2: Current Policy Ambition Scores of All States, sorted by Current Policy Ambition Score Background Data, Year of Most Recent Revision State Vermont Oklahoma* New Jersey Hawaii Delaware California Colorado Rhode Island New York Maryland Montana Nevada North Dakota* South Dakota* New Hampshire Utah* Missouri Pennsylvania Wisconsin Washington Oregon Connecticut Michigan Massachusetts Maine North Carolina Arizona Indiana* South Carolina* Illinois Kansas** New Mexico Ohio Minnesota Iowa Texas Virginia*
Governor Partisanship
Percentage of Legislature Held by Democrats D D R D D D R D D R D R R R D R R D D D D R R D D D D R R R R R R D R R D
65.6 40.9 60.0 89.5 64.5 65.0 45.0 83.2 61.0 66.0 51.3 63.5 38.3 33.3 59.7 26.9 42.6 51.4 40.2 55.1 58.9 65.8 39.2 88.0 50.5 58.2 45.6 35.3 37.6 62.1 21.2 50.9 37.1 55.7 58.7 42.0 40.0
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GSP per capita $43,495 $38,303 $56,472 $50,320 $62,837 $57,328 $50,083 $47,639 $64,579 $55,404 $36,120 $44,774 $48,379 $45,516 $48,618 $43,375 $43,118 $44,585 $45,515 $52,900 $50,582 $67,458 $43,372 $60,723 $39,288 $45,440 $44,086 $43,058 $36,295 $54,091 $46,890 $41,577 $46,385 $51,999 $11,608 $45,966 $52,657
Ambition, Current Policy 4.41 3.00 2.78 2.67 2.50 2.00 1.88 1.87 1.79 1.67 1.50 1.50 1.43 1.43 1.40 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.73 0.71 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.88
Overall Ambition Changes Since previous research (Carley, 2009; Langniss and Wiser, 2003) identifies that policy stringency can be important in the effectiveness of RPS policies at increasing the share of renewables in a state’s energy mix, states should ratchet up ambition as they continue to revise policies as increased effort to reduce emissions and increase renewable energy use will be necessary to meet domestic and international climate goals in the coming decades. However, it is not clear that states increase ambition as they revise RPS policies. Table 3 shows that of the twenty states who have made revisions, ten decreased their ambition and ten increased their ambition. On average, states did increase ambition by more than they decreased ambition, as evidenced by an average change in ambition of 0.05 with outliers excluded. However, this relative change is small, and a stronger effort by states to improve policy stringency and ambition is crucial to ensure the effectiveness of future RPS policies.
Increased Ambition As shown in Table 3, ten states increased their ambition scores between initial and revised RPS design. These states tended to have above average governmental liberalism, with an average of 66.53% of legislature seats held by Democrats. These states had 13.83% higher Democratic representation in state legislatures than the average state with an RPS. These findings fit with the research of Carley and Miller (2012) who find that governmental liberalism encourages states to adopt more stringent, or ambitious, RPS policies. Additionally, states with positive ambition changes tended to have Democratic governors. Of the ten states with increased ambition scores, seven of ten (70%) had Democratic governors at the time of revision. This is
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greater than the study-wide average of about 50% Democratic governors, and there is therefore a correlation between citizen liberalism and ambition changes. Finally, these states also had higher affluence relative to other RPS states. Increased ambition states had an average GSP per capita of about $52,509 at time of most recent policy change, greater than the total average of $47,590. In all, states with increased ambition tended to have above average representation by Democrats in both the state legislature and governor’s seat, as well as above average affluence as measured by GSP per capita. Interestingly, increased ambition states initially had quite low ambition scores and high ambition scores after revisions. The mean initial policy ambition score for increased ambition states was 0.75, significantly lower than the initial average for all states of 1.28. Alternatively, after revisions, the mean ambition score for increased states was 1.77, and only three of ten increased ambition states still had below average ambition scores. Altogether, these changes imply that states with increased ambition scores are taking meaningful strides to increasing RPS stringency. As these states revise, they increased ambition by over a point on average. This is a large increase in ambition, especially considering the study-wide standard deviation of ambition scores is about 1.01. Through the revision process, these ten states tended to go from low to above average ambition scores and can be considered strong positive revisions to RPS policies.
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Table 3: Ambition Scores for States with Revisions, Sorted by Change in Ambition Score Background Data, Year of Most Recent Revision State
Percentage of Legislature Held by Democrats
Governor Partisanship
New Jersey Delaware Hawaii Wisconsin Rhode Island California Maryland Arizona Massachusetts Nevada Connecticut Oregon Michigan Ohio New York New Mexico Illinois Kansas** Minnesota Maine
R D D D D D R D D R R D R R D R R R D D
60.0 64.5 89.5 40.2 83.2 65.0 66.0 45.6 88.0 63.5 65.8 58.9 39.2 37.1 61.0 50.9 62.1 21.2 55.7 50.5
Ambition Score
GSP per capita $56,472 $62,837 $50,320 $45,515 $47,639 $57,328 $55,404 $44,086 $60,723 $44,774 $67,458 $50,582 $43,372 $46,385 $64,579 $41,577 $54,091 $46,890 $51,999 $39,288
Initial 0.50 0.71 1.25 0.00 1.00 1.33 1.11 0.18 0.40 1.00 1.18 1.39 1.43 0.78 2.78 1.11 1.39 1.82 1.39 30.00
Revised
Change
2.78 2.50 2.67 1.11 1.87 2.00 1.67 0.73 0.92 1.50 1.00 1.04 1.00 0.00 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.88 0.91
2.28 1.79 1.42 1.11 0.87 0.67 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.50 -0.18 -0.35 -0.43 -0.78 -0.99 -1.11 -1.39 -1.82 -2.27 -29.09
Decreased Ambition As shown in Table 3, ten states decreased their ambition between initial and revised RPS policies. However, only nine states are included in this analysis since Maine is an outlier. These nine decreased ambition states tended to have slightly lower Democratic representation in their state legislatures than average, though these states did still average a Democratic majority. Decreased ambition states averaged 50.22% of the state legislature held by Democrats as opposed to the total average of 52.70%. States with decreased ambition also tended to have Republican governors. Six of nine (66.67%) had Republican governors at the time of revision, as opposed to the total average of 50% for each party. Finally, these states had a higher affluence 16
than the average RPS state. Decreased ambition states averaged a GSP per capita of $51,881 at time of revision, as opposed to the total average of $47,590. In all, decreased ambition states tended to have fewer seats held by Democrats, a greater representation by Republicans in the governor’s seat, and above average affluence as measured by GSP per capita. Interestingly, decreased ambition states tended to start with high ambition scores and revise to below average scores. The mean initial ambition score for decreased ambition states was 1.47, slightly higher than the initial mean of 1.28 for all states. After revisions, the average ambition score for decreased states was 0.44, significantly lower than the average current policy ambition score for all states of 1.3. Again, it should be noted that four of the states with decreased ambition scores received zeroes due to flaws in the ambition calculation, but even when these four are removed, the average current policy ambition score of these states is lower than the average for all states. In all, these nine states tended to go from slightly above average to far below average in terms of average ambition score.
Increased Ambition States versus Decreased Ambition States Table 4 shows a comparison of averages across background and policy variables for all classifications of states. States with high governmental and citizen liberalism, as measured by governor and legislative partisanship, tended to start with below average RPS ambition and revise to above average. Alternatively, the decreased ambition states tended to have low degrees of liberalism. Liberalism, then, may have an influence on the ambition of RPS policies in the adoption and revision stages. Furthermore, increased and decreased ambition states had very similar levels of affluence, so it is unlikely that affluence impacted the adoption of more or less ambitious RPS policies.
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Table 4: Average Background and Ambition Scores by Type of State Ambition Score Type Increased Ambition Decreased Ambition States with Revisions States without Revisions States Past Target without Revision All States
Governor Partisanship (Percentage Democrat)
Percentage of Legislature Held by Democrats
70.00 33.33 52.63 50.00 50.00 52.94
66.53 50.22 58.81 48.01 40.98 53.21
GSP per capita $52,510 $51,881 $52,212 $42,936 $42,079 $48,547
Initial
Current
0.75 1.47 1.09 1.41 1.84 1.28
Change
1.77 0.44 1.14 N/A N/A 1.3
1.02 -1.04 0.05 N/A N/A 0.02
These findings are quite interesting when compared with those of Carley and Miller (2012). In their study of RPS stringency, Carley and Miller (2012) find that high citizen liberalism encourages weak RPS adoption and high governmental liberalism encourages stringent RPS adoption. Comparatively, this study finds that high liberalism of all types encourages the adoption of less ambitious RPS policies, but over time high liberalism encourages states to ratchet up policies to be above average in terms of stringency. Taken together, this study and that of Carley and Miller (2012) show that separating RPS into initial and current stages can yield different results in terms of the influences of liberalism. Furthermore, these results imply that other background variables may have heterogeneous effects on RPS adoption and ambitiousness in the initial and revised stages. This study’s analysis, when compared with previous literature shows that evaluating RPS as living, ever-changing policies is important for their understanding.
States with Revisions versus States without Revisions In terms of background data, states with and without revisions are quite similar. Table 4 shows similar governmental and citizen liberalism for both types of state. However, states with revisions tend to have higher affluence as measured by real GSP per capita at $52,212 while states without revisions had below average affluence at $42,936. Since this is the only significant
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background variable difference between states with and without revisions, it is reasonable to assume affluence may have an influence on a state’s decision to revise its RPS. However, one should be careful not to conclude that affluence has a strong influence. While it is true that 16 states have not revised their policies, only four of those states have reached their target year. The remaining twelve may simply be content with the progress of renewable energy development in their state and not feel the need to revise their policies. Furthermore, all background variables included in this study are simply a snapshot of a state’s current situation and do not consider changes over time. It could be that a state’s change in affluence influences changes in RPS ambition, but this study only considers a state’s affluence at the time of revision. Because of these caveats, future research on the revision decisions of states will be needed to determine the impact of liberalism and affluence on changes in ambition.
States Past Target Date with No Revision Only four states have surpassed their RPS target year without revision: Montana, South Dakota, Oklahoma, and North Dakota. All four had a target year of 2015. Interestingly, each of these states are largely rural and from the Great Plains region. These states had far less governmental liberalism with an average of only 40.98% of the state legislature held by Democrats. Two states had Democratic governors and two had Republicans, meaning states without revisions have the same split of citizen liberalism as the average of the whole inventory. These states also were less affluent with an average GSP per capita of $42,079. While it is tempting to conclude these stark differences in governmental liberalism and affluence influenced these states not to revise their RPS policies, it is also possible that timing played a large role. All four states’ RPS policies were set to expire in 2015, so outside factors not
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accounted for by this study may have also impacted these states’ decision not to revise. Outside time-specific factors, such as the prices of energy source competitors like natural gas, may have also influenced these states.
Conclusion If the United States is to be a global leader in renewable energy and climate policies, RPS policies can be a crucial step toward decreasing the United States’ dependence on fossil fuels and carbon emissions. Over half of all states have adopted mandatory RPS, and only 13 states have not adopted an RPS in either mandatory or voluntary form. Despite the relatively widespread adoption of RPS, this study finds that states overall are not being very ambitious in setting standards. This can be either positive or negative: because goals are set realistically, states are more likely to meet goals, but these less ambitious goals may not be challenging states to improve renewable energy generation as quickly as possible. However, when states with revisions are analyzed, the data from this study implies that both governmental and citizen liberalism affect a state’s RPS ambitiousness in the adoption and revision stages. High liberalism states tended to begin with less stringent RPS policies that became more ambitious after revision, and low liberalism states tended to revise their policies to decrease ambition. These results indicate the need for research on RPS adoption and effectiveness to consider RPS policies in both their initial and revised stages since a state’s RPS design does evolve over time. Follow-up research on RPS ambition, stringency, and effectiveness is crucial due to this study’s limitations. For one, this study was produced at a time when one third of RPS policies are set to expire in the next decade. With expirations looming, states may make efforts to revise and extend their RPS, meaning more data may be available in the near future that could alter the
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results in terms of ambition and effectiveness. Furthermore, because of this study’s broad inventorial scope, more nuanced research on RPS may find other trends in RPS evolution over time. This study examines correlations between liberalism, affluence, and policy ambition but does not attempt to calculate the causal effect of any variable. Future research can use these initial findings as a guide in identifying the causal effects of background variables on RPS adoption, design, and stringency. Finally, ambition score calculations as used in this paper are imperfect. Ideally, ambition scores would compare a state’s target increase of renewables per year to their current renewable production. Future studies with greater resources may be able to improve on this study’s preliminary calculations of ambition. This paper demonstrates that understanding RPS policies and comparing targets and goals is crucial for evaluation. As RPS policies evolve, policymakers can look to this inventory to compare targets with states with similar affluence, liberalism, or other characteristics. Additionally, the broad scope of this study may provide states without RPS policies with model designs of targets and timelines if they wish to create mandatory or voluntary standards. Overall, this inventory provides policymakers with a comprehensive, comparable list of RPS policies in the United States including changes over time and should be taken into account for future RPS and renewable energy policy design.
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