The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements in the U.S. and China

CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series Number 35 April 2018

The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements in the U.S. and China Lydia Murray, University of Michigan

This paper is available online at http://closup.umich.edu Papers in the CLOSUP Student Working Paper Series are written by students at the University of Michigan.

This paper was submitted as part of the Winter 2018 course PubPol 495 Energy and Environmental Policy Research, that is part of the CLOSUP in the Classroom Initiative.

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy or any sponsoring agency

Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy University of Michigan

The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements in the U.S. and China Lydia Murray Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy

The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements

Abstract Since the 1980’s international climate negotiations have occurred more frequently and with increasing importance. Research on international climate agreements has largely been limited to their effectiveness, with very few considering the formation of such agreements, and in particular the impact that public opinion has on agreement formation.. This paper seeks to begin to fill that research gap by analyzing how public opinion, official statements, and the final outcomes of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris agreement are correlated in the United States and China. This is done by looking at polling data and other proxies for public opinion in both countries prior to the negotiations of each agreement and the official statements and documents of each country, which are then compared to the commitments made by each country in the final agreements. The paper finds that in both countries, public opinion appears to follow the stances made by the ruling government party, rather than the other way around. In China, this takes the form of increased support for climate change action while in the U.S. this is seen through a growing partisan divide.

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Introduction Since the first United Nations Climate Change Conference in Berlin in 1995, international environmental negotiations have been a regular aspect of international diplomacy. At each round of negotiations, the goal has been the same: to curtail the impacts of human action of climate change.

However, these efforts have seen varying levels of success in terms of the impact they have on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Despite more than twenty years of UN climate conferences, emissions and average temperatures are still on the rise, and communities are beginning to see the impacts of climate change in the form of major storms, droughts, floods, and other extreme weather (Bullard, 2015). Part of the limitations of these agreements stem from the need for domestic policy in each country to act on the goals agreed upon in the international agreements, and with these domestic policies, countries are held more accountable to the public than on the international stage. The amount of literature and data available on public opinion on climate change has increased significantly since the 1990s, as the salience of the issue has increased in international agreements, popular press, and public awareness (UN Chronicle, 2007).

However, since international agreements thus far have not significantly curtailed carbon emissions, the issue of climate change and the need for continued international climate negotiations is likely to persist into the foreseeable future. With that in mind, it is important to understand how in certain key countries public opinion impacts these negotiations. To date, only limited research on the connection between public opinion and international environmental agreements exist. This paper aims to narrow that gap.

The purpose of this research paper is to look at the Kyoto Protocol and Paris agreement — two of the highest-profile climate accords — and compare the two cases by looking at the public opinion and official statements by the United States and China at the time of both agreements in relation to the goals outlined in both agreements. This research builds off work looking at the effectiveness of international environmental agreements and studies on public opinion surrounding climate change. It utilizes data on

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public opinion, official governmental statements, and goals as outlined in the final Kyoto and Paris agreements for the United States and China.

Review of Literature Much of the research concerning international environment agreements relate to their effectiveness after they are signed rather than considering what factors influence their formation. One example of such a paper looking at effectiveness comes from Ronald B. Mitchell (2003). Mitchell creates a general definition of what constitutes an effective treaty while also detailing different types of agreements and characteristics which appear to make some more successful than others. Mitchell creates a generalized system given the data available for different categories of environmental agreements. His database allows for analysis of timing, content and other factors which influence the text of the different international agreements as well as creating a framework for analyzing their effectiveness.

Moving more towards the formation and signatory process for international environmental agreements, Alexandre Sauquet (2014) looks at negotiation and other interactions among countries in the writing and ratification of international environmental agreements. Sauquet considers specifically at the case of Kyoto Protocol and interactions within it among three peer types: geographical location, trading relationships, and green investment project collaboration. The study considers data from 164 countries over 11 years by administering endogenous variables into its model. The study concludes that there is evidence that a country’s decisions on ratification are based on strategic substitutes but they can be changed to strategic complements when focusing certain relationships as discussed above. Understanding these sorts of strategic variables in a country’s actions in international climate negotiations is important, but this paper ignores public opinion as a variable, which could likely have consequences in a country’s decision to ratify an agreement, and what the agreement consists of prior to ratification.

In a paper more focused on public opinion and how it relates to the outcomes of international environmental policy, Steven R. Brechin (2003) analyzes public opinion data from a variety of nations

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surrounding the years of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The paper mainly seeks to compare the United States’ position — in light of the decision of President George Bush to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol — and its public opinion data to that of other nations. Brechin found that people in the United States were generally more likely to support Bush’s decision to withdraw than other developed nations he considered in Europe.

Another research paper focused on public opinion on climate change comes from Anthony Leiserowitz (2007), who looks at polling data’s effect on climate change in a variety of countries. The paper summarizes what was known about climate change opinions in the United States and across the globe at the time of publication. The paper concludes that while a large majority of the global public is aware of climate change as an issue, there is still a rural population who does not understand the risks associated with climate change, as understood by modern science. It also finds that there is greater concern for climate change in the European Union than in other major countries such as the United States and China.

Public opinion is also considered by Endre Tvinnereim, Erick Lachappelle, and Christopher Borick (2017) in a paper which weighs the importance of cooperation of large emitters like China in the consideration of unilateral climate action. The paper analyzes the results of survey experiments in which they ask if a country should commit to emission reductions given suggestions that China may or may not cooperate, or with no mention of China at all. The paper finds that respondents in smaller Scandinavian countries are more likely to change their answers reliant on the information about China’s actions.

However North American countries, specifically the U.S., do not consider the information about China the same way, as respondents did not vary their responses based on the information about China’s actions.

This allows them to conclude that country size is more important than national tradition when predicting support for international climate action (Tvinnereim, Endre, Borick, 2017).

In a paper much more closely related to the topic I will discuss in this paper, Andrew Hodgson (2011) looks at the changing role China had in international environmental agreements, specifically

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analyzing its actions during the Kyoto, Montreal, Copenhagen negotiations. Hodgson seeks to answer why China’s level of participation changes across the negotiations, as it moves from a position of opposition to commitment to emission reductions, to a greater leadership role in the Paris negotiations.

Hodgson looks at both leadership and public opinion in consideration of China’s changing priorities for combating climate change, but his results are inconclusive. Additionally, Hodgson wrote his paper prior to the 2015 Paris negotiations, in which China played an important role and saw a larger shift in priorities than in the cases considered by Hodgson.

This paper attempts to go further in the question of public opinion and international climate agreements. Like Hodgson, I consider public opinion in China, but also address the issue in the U.S. Additionally, Hodgson relies mostly on public opinion surveys rather than considering the importance of the lack of data from the 1990s and the influence of popular and state controlled media in China. In my paper I attempt to close these research gaps in the consideration of public opinion and international environmental agreements in China and the U.S. More broadly in consideration of all the literature presented, despite a handful of papers on public opinion on climate change, there is a gap in research correlations between public opinion and the outcomes of cliamte negotiations. In this paper, I hope to begin to answer the question of how public opinion and the negotiating positions of different countries in international environmental agreement negotiations impact the agreements. More specifically, this paper analyzes to what extent the differences in reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement reflect differences in negotiator and public opinion stances in key countries.

Methods In order to understand how public opinion and negotiator stances influence the outcomes of the two international environmental agreements, I compare the two time periods by looking at two key countries’ public opinion data and public statements by the countries’ negotiating officials. This section

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details the rationale behind the selection of the agreements and the other factors, and details the process for data collection and analysis.

Rationale for Selection Of the many international environmental agreements, the United Nations Conference of Parties negotiations stand out as the most significant, as they involve the largest number of actors and have the potential for the greatest impact. Of the COP negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris agreement are the most relevant, as they resulted in carbon emission reduction targets in written documents.

Regardless of the results or success of the agreements after the negotiation periods (Jones, 2001; BBC 2016), the Kyoto Protocol and Paris agreement are representative of the largest number of countries during the two separate time periods (1997 and 2015, respectively). The COP system consists of a series of negotiation rounds, and while most rounds produced some sort of new rule or technical planning, only the Kyoto and Paris rounds produced comprehensive agreements with greenhouse gas reduction goals.

Kyoto consisted of a binding agreement with different commitments based on country classification, determined mainly by amount of emissions and economy size (Kyoto Protocol, 1998). However, the agreement went largely unfulfilled after the United States failed to ratify the agreement. In contrast, the Paris agreement was non-binding and relied mainly on individually submitted reduction plans for each country. Since the agreement was non-binding President Barack Obama was able to sign it as an executive agreement without Congressional ratification. However, since the agreement was not codified into law by Congress, President Donald Trump was able to withdraw from the agreement on his own (BBC, 2016).

Of the hundreds of nations involved in the two agreements, this paper focuses on the United States and China. The U.S. was selected due to its global dominance in leadership and economics, which was maintained across the 20-year time frame (Wike, 2015). The economic and political leadership from the U.S. allows it to dominate the negotiation process, not just in environmental agreements but also in

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other international organizations as well. Additionally, the U.S. is an important country to consider given the national level controversy on the issue that is not seen in the same degree in other countries (Funk, Cary, and Brian Kennedy, 2016). The U.S. is also one of the world’s greatest greenhouse gas emitters and has been for years, so its participation in international climate action is almost essential to the success of any negotiation (World Bank, 2018).

I also focus on China in this paper. China’s global influence and economic power changed significantly between the two agreements. In 1997 China’s GDP was $961.6 billion, but has since grown to more than $11 trillion (World Bank, 2018), allowing it to challenge the United States in economic and political power. Additionally, China’s perspective on climate change has altered in this time frame. It currently sits as the largest greenhouse gas emitter. However, China has recently begun trying to move away from its dependence on fossil fuels and look to renewable energy sources (Buckley, 2017).

Analysis Framework Overview My analysis of the public opinion data, official stances, and agreement outcomes follow a specific format as detailed here. Within each country (first the U.S. then China), first I look at the public opinion of each country. This data comes from a variety of sources depending on the availability of reliable information for each country, and includes polling data and information from the popular press. With this public opinion data I analyze not only at belief in climate change, but also reflections on the severity of the issue as it relates to individuals in the country and self assessed knowledge level of the issue. Next, I consider the public statements put forth by the countries’ officials at the time of the negotiations of each agreement. These statements include official releases from the governments of each country, and statements given to the popular press at the time. Finally, I first look at each country’s carbon emission reduction targets, as detailed in the Kyoto Protocol and Paris agreement or in supplementary information produced by the country in relation to the agreement.

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In my analysis, I describe any connections between how public opinion influences the negotiating positions the countries take as reflected in their public statements. I then look to see if or how these change throughout the negotiation process, and what the final commitments are for each country and if they reflect the public’s original preferences, as seen through public opinion data.

Results and Analysis United States, Kyoto protocol Public Opinion: Starting with the first United Nations Climate Change Conference in Berlin in 1995, international concern about climate change first began to garner significant. At this time, public opinion data and official responses to the issue became more frequent. This section will begin to look at these.

In an October 1997 Gallup Survey, 24 percent of Americans were concerned a “great deal� about global warming and 26 percent a fair amount. Meanwhile, the same data showed that 29 percent only a little, and 17 percent not at all, with the remaining reporting no opinion (Brechin, 2003). Other data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from the years 1993-1996, suggested that the majority of the public accepted the scientific consensus that humans actively contribute to global warming, with 59 percent of respondents reporting that use of coal, oil or gas at least probably contributes to the greenhouse effect (though only 15 percent of respondents answered more confidently that this statement was definitely true) (Smith, Hout, Marsden, 2012).

The 1990s GSS also suggested that 37 percent of Americans believed that global warming was very or extremely dangerous to themselves and their families or the environment, and an additional 34 percent thought that global warming was somewhat dangerous to themselves or the environment (Smith, Hout, & Marsden, 2012). In totality, these data suggest that leading up the Kyoto protocol, the American public was generally informed on the basic science behind climate change, and was concerned about its impacts on the environment on a global and individual scale. It is also important to note that during this time period, there was no clear ideological divide among the public on the issue of climate change. Gallup data shows that in 1997, nearly identical percentages of Republicans and Democrats (48 and 52 percent,

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respectively) indicated that they believed global warming was happening (Dunlap, McCright, 2009).

Additionally, data from the 1995-1998 World Values Survey suggests that Americans prioritize protecting the environment over economic growth with 48 percent of respondents selecting “protecting the environment should be given priority even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs” compared to 39 percent responding “economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority even if the environment suffer to some extent” (World Values Survey, 1998).

Official stances: This background of public opinion then suggests support for President Bill Clinton entering the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol in late 1997. Ahead of the conference in July 1997, the Clinton administration submitted a draft of goals for the United States’ emissions reductions, which included binding targets to reach year 1990 emissions levels by 2008-2012 and reductions below 1990 levels in the five-year period that follows. The White House described these goals as realistic and achievable at the time of the submission (U.S. Department of State, 1997). With this proposal, the Clinton administration also emphasized a need for participation in reductions by developing countries. The proposal recognized the role of the U.S. as a leader in the endeavor of combating global warming but suggested that the U.S. would not commit to a binding agreement without the participation of developing countries. The U.S. also suggested a provision for a market based, tradable permit system (referred to as a cap-and-trade system), which would allow larger emitters like the U.S. to purchase emission permits from less emission heavy countries (U.S. Department of State, 1997).

In a statement just prior to the start of the conference, Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, highlighted the role of the United States as a leader on this issue and emphasized the importance of reaching an agreement to the Clinton administration. “This issue is a top priority for the President and Vice President and we will go to Kyoto and make an all-out effort to win support for our proposal and to negotiate the best agreement possible. Nevertheless, our approach to this conference is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but realistic. We must remember that

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nations remain today quite far apart in their positions, and achieving success in Kyoto will be an extremely difficult challenge,” Eizenstat said (Eizenstat Kyoto Interview, 1997).

However, despite the appearance of a strong commitment of the United States, this view was only representative of half of the U.S. government. Following the conclusion of the Kyoto negotiations, many Senate Republicans indicated that they would not support the Kyoto protocol (which would require Senate approval for ratification given its binding nature) calling it “dead on arrival.” Idaho Senator Larry E. Craig, head of the Republican Policy Committee, told reporters that the treaty was "designed to give some nations a free ride, it is designed to raise energy prices in the United States and it is designed to perpetuate a new U.N. bureaucracy to manage global resource allocation." It was also criticized for threatening U.S. agricultural production and undermining recent Congressional farm programs (Dewar, Sullivan, 1997). This lack of support from legislative Republicans shows the beginning of a partisan divide, which had yet to appear in public opinion.

Final agreement: The final Kyoto agreement, as concluded on December 11, 1997, did not greatly differ for the U.S. from the proposal submitted by the Clinton administration. The binding agreement stipulated that for Annex 1 countries (which included most developed countries like the U.S.) their overall emissions of greenhouse gases must be reduced by at least 5 percent below their 1990 levels by 20082012 (Kyoto, 1998). This target was more ambitious than the U.S.’s original proposal which called to be at 1990 levels in the same time period rather than below. In remarks at the conclusion of the conference, Secretary Ezienstat said, “We agreed to move well beyond our proposal to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by the years 2008 to 2012. In fact, we've committed to reduce our emissions by 7 percent by 2010, below 1990 levels, while the EU and Japan have reduced theirs by 8 and 6 percent, respectively” (Ezienstat Kyoto Press Conference, 1997) The U.S.’s desire for increased action by developing countries was not achieved to the extent the U.S. had desired, as many developing countries, including China and India, were exempted from the binding commitment.

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These new commitments (or lack thereof for developing countries) suggests that the U.S. faced a more ambitious agreement than it had intended to commit to entering negotiations. Regardless, in a speech at the conclusion of the conference, President Clinton said he was pleased with the agreement calling it “environmentally strong and economically sound” while reaffirming his position saying, “No nation is more committed to this effort than the United States” (Clinton, 1997) However, despite this iteration of commitment by President Clinton, the U.S. failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol under President George W. Bush in 2001. This withdrawal under a Republican president suggests an increased emphasis on the partisan divide on climate change. Additionally at the time of withdrawal a majority of the public opposed Bush’s decision, but that majority was slim. A July 2001 Gallup poll showed 51 percent of Americans disapproved of the administration's decision to withdraw support from the treaty, while 32 percent approved and 17 percent had no opinion (Jones, 2001).

United States, Paris agreement Public opinion: In the most recent round of climate negotiations public awareness and support for action to curb global warming appears to have increased slightly since the 1990s. A March 2015 Washington Post/ABC poll showed that 59 percent of responders wanted the next president to favor government action to address climate change, with 31 percent of those who favor action on climate change responding that it is “extremely important” to elect a president who favors government action on climate change and 37 percent saying it is “very important,” and 27 percent responding “somewhat important” (Washington Post, 2015) However at this time there was also a significant increase in the partisan divide among the public on climate change. A March 2015 Gallup poll showed 32 percent of Americans surveyed said they “personally worry” a “great deal” about global warming. But within that, 52 percent of those identifying

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as Democrats said they worry a “great deal” about climate change, while 13 percent of respondents identifying as Republicans said they worry a “great deal” about climate change (Jones, 2015).

Additionally, the World Value Survey 6th Wave from 2010-2014 showed a decrease in support for protecting the environment in favor of economic growth. In this wave only 37 percent of respondents said they would prefer “protecting the environment should be given priority even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs” while 60 percent responded “economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority even if the environment suffer to some extent” (World Values Survey, 2014). This information suggests that since the negotiations of the Kyoto, belief in climate change and public support for action to combat its effects had become increasingly partisan among the public.

Official stances: Entering the Paris negotiations, Democratic President Barack Obama appeared to reflect similar sentiments on U.S. leadership and commitment to combating climate change as President Clinton had before him. In the administration’s submission to the U.N. prior to the conference, the U.S. proposed to reduce emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce by 28 percent. This target would roughly double the pace of carbon pollution reduction in the United States from 1.2 percent per year on average during the 2005-2020 period to 2.3-2.8 percent per year on average between 2020 and 2025 (The White House, 2015). In a speech at the start of the Paris conference, President Obama noted his personal commitment to the agreement saying, “I’ve come here personally, as the leader of the world’s largest economy and the second-largest emitter, to say that the United States of America not only recognizes our role in creating this problem, we embrace our responsibility to do something about it” (Obama, 2015). Secretary of State John Kerry prior to the negotiations highlighted the potential for economic growth within the budding clean energy sector. In a New York Times interview he said, “This is the most extraordinary market opportunity in the history of mankind … I think there are millions of jobs to be created in this” (Times, 2015). Statements and goals entering the negotiation suggested the Obama administration saw the Paris agreement as a opportunity for U.S. to be a

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global leader on climate action and as an economic opportunity as the world moves away from carbon based energy.

However, at the same time as Democrats touted the need for a new comprehensive climate agreement, Republicans continuously undermined the U.S. position. In December 2015, Senate Republicans voted to block regulations on power plants put into place by the Obama administration as a key cornerstone of their plan to meet the goals proposed for the Paris agreement. While President Obama vetoed the bill, the move signaled Republican opposition to the Paris agreement and climate action more broadly. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said at the time of the vote, “Governments currently engaged in this round of climate talks will want to know that there is more than just an Executive Branch in our system of government,” he added that the climate agenda “may not even survive much longer anyway” (Foran, 2015). Therefore, while the Obama administration entered the Paris negotiations committed to a new international agreement to combat climate change, this view only represented half of the U.S. government at the time, as Republicans controlled the legislative branch of government.

However, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris agreement was intended to be non-binding and relied on individual commitments by the different countries. This meant the agreement would not have to be ratified by Congress to be effective, rather it would only require the President’s signature, but this also meant the next President could unilaterally decide to withdraw from the agreement, which President Donald Trump later did.

Final agreement: As noted previously, the Paris agreement is not a binding agreement with enforcement measures, but is instead based on individual commitments submitted by each country. Therefore during the course of negotiations, disagreements among countries were not based on the specificities of the amount of reduction each country would have to commit to, but rather about general warming targets and assistance to developing countries. In part due to this change in structure, the U.S. did not change much from its initial proposal to its final commitment.

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The debate throughout negotiations in Paris focused on whether the target for the containment of warming should be limited to 1.5 or 2-degrees Celsius, with many island nations advocating for the 1.5 degree figure and larger emitters defending the 2-degree target. The final agreement decided upon a 2degree upper limit on warming with 1.5-degrees as its more ambitious target (Mooney, Warrick, 2015) The other debate over the commitments of and aid to developing countries impacted the final commitments of the U.S. more significantly. This discussion centered on the idea that developing countries would need assistance in decreasing their emissions and that it was unfair that developed countries had no limitations on their emissions during periods of growth and development. In the final agreement, the U.S. committed to up to $3 billion in aid for poorer countries with this goal by 2020. The U.S. also maintained its proposed pledge to cut domestic greenhouse gas emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 (Paris Agreement, 2015) .

As a whole, the U.S. did not alter its commitment much in the final agreement in comparison to its submitted proposal, outside of the new commitment to provide aid to developing countries (Plumer, 2017).

China, Kyoto protocol Public Opinion: Prior to 2006, there was little reporting in China on climate change issues. Media coverage on the issue was incredibly sparse, and any discussion was largely limited to a handful of academic papers. Additionally, the majority of news that the Chinese public received was filtered through government outlets like Xinhua, meaning the government had almost complete control over the information the public had on any subject. Analysis of popular press is China during the 1990s showed a scarcity of reporting on climate change leading up to the Kyoto negotiations (Li, Dan, 2017). This lack of information in the popular press suggests that the Chinese public was likely not well informed on climate change and its causes.

However, despite the lack of information on climate change public opinion in the 1990s, there is evidence that the Chinese public supported action to protect the environment more generally. In the 1995-

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1998 World Values Survey 76 percent of respondents indicated they would agree to an increase in taxes if the money went towards protecting the environment. The same survey also showed that 51 percent of respondents prefered protecting the environment over economic growth compared to 24 percent preferring economic growth at the expense of the environment (the remaining respondents did not know or did not answer) (World Values Survey, 1998). The responses to these survey questions suggest that the Chinese public generally supported action by the government to protect the environment, but it is unclear if this support extended to the issue of climate change given the lack of information on the topic within China at the time. In response to another World Values Survey question, 57 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that environmental issues can be solved without any international agreements to handle them (World Values Survey, 1998). This information further suggests that while the Chinese public supports environmental protections, this may not have correlated with support for the Kyoto Protocol or any international environmental commitments by China on climate change.

Official statements: Unlike the U.S., China’s status both as an economic power and as a large emitter changed dramatically over the almost 20 years between the Kyoto and Paris agreements. In 1997, China’s growth was just beginning to take off and had not reached its peak rates yet: its GDP was $961.6 billion in current USD and emitted 2.812 metric tons per capita (compared to $8.6 trillion and 19.69 metric tons per capita in the U.S. in the same year) (World Bank: China, 2018). With this profile, China was still among the block of developing countries entering the Kyoto negotiations, with relatively low emissions at the time, but with potential for high future emissions as they further developed.

Prior to the conference China published a white paper which emphasized the need for international action on environmental issues, but also noted that taking action was primarily the responsibility of developed countries and that developing countries should not have to compromise economic development or national sovereignty for environmental protection (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2008). During the Kyoto negotiations, China acted as a

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leader of the G77 block of developing countries and pushed strongly for the responsibility to curtail emissions to fall on Annex 1 countries. China also advocated for provisions for technology transfer and financial support to China and other developing countries to support emissions reductions and adaptation to climate change. China was strongly opposed to the binding nature of the agreement, as it did not want to have any binding commitments to emission reductions (Hodgson, 2011).

Final agreement: In the final treaty (which China ratified) China achieved many of its goals. As previously noted, the treaty required Annex 1 countries to meet specific emission reduction targets (China Daily, 2002). However, China and many other developing countries were exempted from any binding reduction targets. Though China did not see the financial support it had advocated for, it did meet its main goal of avoiding a binding reduction agreement. This lack of reduction goals on behalf of China set a very low benchmark for increasing its commitment to combating climate change in the future (Kyoto Protocol, 1998).

With this agreement, China appears to have prioritized its economic growth over environmental protection (as this was one of its main arguments during negotiations). In later development, China grew to be the largest greenhouse gas emitter and one of the largest economies, which was in part achievable due to the lack of limitations on its emissions. However, this prioritization of economic growth appears to run contrary to public opinion as noted in the World Values Survey, which suggests the Chinese government acted against public opinion in its negotiations in order to achieve a less ambitious climate agreement. Though if China truly acted directly against what the public prefered cannot be known with certainty due to the lack of information on climate change opinion in China at the time.

China, Paris agreement Public opinion: By 2015 there is a major shift both in public opinion on climate change and in the availability of information on climate change in China and related public opinion. Before understanding

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the 2015 public opinion on climate change, it is worth noting how it had shifted over time. From approximately 2006-2010s there was a period of broad climate change denialism in the popular press and government backed press. Popular figures called climate change a hoax orchestrated by the West in order to prevent China’s growth. This period of denialism generally corresponded with other rounds of U.N. climate negotiations, which will not be considered in detail in this paper, but is worth noting for context of public opinion in 2015 China (Dembicki, 2017) Leading up to the Paris negotiations, the public opinion landscape in China was somewhat different. According to 2015 survey data by Pew Research Center, 51 percent of respondents were at least somewhat concerned about climate change with an additional 19 percent stating that they were very concerned. Additionally 57 percent of respondents indicated they believed climate change was a somewhat serious issue with 18 percent calling it a very serious issue. While these figures are notably below the global norm (Pew reported a median of 54 percent of respondents calling climate change a very serious issue) the public opinion data shows a shift away from both the lack of information on it in the 1990s and the denialism of the early-2000s. Additionally, 58 percent of respondents reported that they believed major changes would be necessary to combat global climate change and 71 percent of respondents stated support for the Paris agreement, prior to its negotiation (Wike, 2015). Looking back at the World Values Survey, China saw an increase in the percentage of respondents who said they would prioritize environmental protection over economic growth moving up to 57 percent of respondents from 51 percent in the survey from the 1990s (World Values Survey, 2014).

This change in public opinion in China suggests that Chinese citizens believed that climate change was a legitimate issue, but were less concerned about its immediate and individual effects (only 15 percent reported being very concerned about climate change harming them personally). However, entering the Paris negotiations, the Chinese government faced a public which was generally supportive of international action on climate change.

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Official statements: Leading up to the negotiations in Paris, the Chinese government also demonstrated a pivot towards increasing its role in fighting climate change. China’s economy had grown to $11.199 trillion GDP in current USD in 2015 and its emissions had grown to 7.544 metric tons per capita (World Bank, China, 2018). In November 2014, the U.S. and China announced a bilateral agreement on climate change in which they resolved to work together to combat climate change, as the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters. At this time they additionally announced their individual plans entering the Paris agreement (The White House, 2014).

In the emission reduction plan submitted by China, it intended to reach its peak of CO2 emissions around 2030 (with efforts to reach peak earlier) and proposed to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20 percent by 2030. In a joint statement between President Xi Jinping and President Obama ahead of the Paris conference, Xi emphasized the pressing need to combat climate change and the importance of China’s role in doing so. The statement also noted “that smart action on climate change now can drive innovation, strengthen economic growth and bring broad benefits – from sustainable development to increased energy security, improved public health and a better quality of life” (The White House, 2015). During a speech at the beginning of the Paris conference, Xi also emphasized the ability of the agreement to “boost global efforts to pursue sustainable development” (China Daily, 2015).

These statements and proposals by China prior to the Paris negotiations suggest a change from denialism and avoidance of responsibility on climate change to China taking on a greater leadership role in sustainable development. Xi’s statements also suggest that, like Kerry, he saw the potential for economic growth as it relates to new clean energy forms. It is again worth noting how China’s economic situation had changed since Kyoto.

Final agreement: Like the U.S., the final commitment China signed in Paris did not differ greatly from its submission prior to the negotiations, in part due to the non-binding and individualistic nature of the

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agreement. In its final plan China agreed to peaking carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 (making best efforts to peak earlier), lowering its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 60 to 65 percent from the 2005 level, and increasing the share of non-fossil (renewable and nuclear) energy sources in the energy mix to around 20 percent (Paris, 2015; Lin, 2016).

These targets are much more ambitious than those of previous agreements, given that China had not previously committed to any level of emission reduction. It also has a notable emphasis on the development of clean energy, but also allows China to continue increasing its carbon emissions until 2030 to account for additional economic growth.

This final agreement appears generally aligned with public opinion on climate change entering negotiations as it allows for China to take significantly more action on climate change than it had in previous rounds of negotiation, but its steps are not as immediate as more developed countries like the U.S., reflecting the lack of immediate concern the Chinese public held in their concern for climate change. This general correlation is also reflected in a 2017 survey released by the Chinese government which indicated that 96.3 percent of the public supported China’s participation in the Paris agreement (with 59.3 percent of those respondents indicating strong support and 37 percent indicating they “somewhat� support it) (Public, 2017).

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The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements

Figure 1: Timeline of Events

Analysis In both the U.S. and China, there does appear to be some level of correlation between public opinion and the final level of ambitiousness of the final targets of the Kyoto and Paris agreement.

However, across both agreements and countries the more important factor appears to be the stances of the ruling party in government, which in turn may have some effect on public opinion.

In the U.S., there was general support for U.S. involvement in the climate negotiations across both agreements, but both rounds of negotiation occurred under a Democratic president then was revoked under a Republican one. Additionally, at the time of Kyoto there was no clear partisan divide among

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The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements

public opinion on climate change, but there was a clear divide within government support, as reflected in Republican Senators stating their opposition to the agreement. Then looking in 2015, we see this partisan divide spread into public opinion, suggesting that public opinion followed party support rather than the other way around.

In consideration of the change in U.S. targets in the agreements themselves, the targets do appear to increase in the ambitiousness of their goals, as the percentage of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions increased from the Kyoto protocol to the Paris agreement. However, this is at least in part due to the agreement when moving from a binding treaty (which would require Senate approval) to a non-binding executive agreement. Because of this change, the Obama administration was able to negotiate without the concern of needing approval from a Republican-controlled legislature and was able to craft agreement that reflected Democratic party values and high levels of public support from Democrats.

In China, the impact of government stances on the final agreement and on public opinion can also been seen across the two agreements, especially given the government’s high level of control on the media and information available to the public. Prior to Kyoto there was little information in Chinese media on climate change or on public opinion on climate change action. The lack of commitment to a specific action plan by the Chinese government in the Kyoto agreement reflected China’s goals entering negotiations, as it did not want to commit to containing emissions in order to prioritize economic growth, which was reliant on fossil fuel use. However, prior to the Paris negotiations China’s stance had clearly changed as it had developed significantly and would not rely on fossil fuels to the same extent in future years and saw increased opportunity to economic growth in clean energy. With this change, China committed to targets and branded itself as a new global leader in combating climate change at the Paris conference.

Looking at public opinion in China prior to Paris, there is a clear increase in public awareness and concern about climate change, though these levels remained below the global average. However, by 2017, surveys indicated that public support for China’s commitments in the Paris agreement had increased

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The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements

substantially, which suggests that the movement of public opinion in China is rooted in the information provided and actions taken by the Chinese government.

These results differ from previous papers on similar topics mainly because those papers did not consider the element of official negotiating stances. The papers by Tvinnereim, Lachappelle, and Christopher Borick, Brechin, and Leiserowitz only consider the correlation between public opinion and the final outcomes of the agreements while ignoring the interactions between official government statements and public opinion. Meanwhile, Hodgson considered both public opinion and official stances in China, but his paper was written prior to the negotiations of the Paris agreement in which the major shift in public opinion in China was seen. Hodgson also despite using similar data, did not consider how government opinion influenced the public and instead focused on China’s changing involvement in international climate negotiations.

Conclusion This paper serves as an initial exploration into the connection between public opinion and international environmental agreements.While the results are not fully conclusive, there is strong evidence that in the U.S. and China public opinion followed the direction of controlling governmental parties around the Kyoto and Paris agreements. However, the scope of this paper was limited to two cases, and in consideration of both location and agreement, leaving open many questions for further research as detailed below.

In looking only at the China and the U.S. this study did not take into consideration many other actors in the Kyoto and Paris agreements. Further research could consider the implications of public opinion on the agreements in the context of other major players in the negotiations such as the European Union, small island nations (which were particularly vocal during the Paris conference), or developing nations who intend on relying on fossil fuels into the future for their economic growth. The evidence that public opinion follows the leading governmental opinions as found in this paper is limited only to the

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The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements

U.S. and China, so while the policy implications for this information may be important for these two countries, it is unclear what the international implications are since it is unknown if similar connections exist in other countries. The ability to conduct this additional research could be limited to an extent by the availability of public opinion data, which has not been tracked consistently in many countries.

Within the U.S. and China, policymakers should consider the implications of the evidence in this paper. If it is true that public opinion follows the actions of government, then policymakers — particularly those who face regular reelection requirements — should not fear the electoral or public opinion backlash from what may currently be an unpopular environmental policy when negotiating international environmental agreements. This logic applies most directly to the executive branches of the U.S. and China who should not shy away from pursuing more progressive environmental policies in the next round of U.N. climate negotiations because even if the policy is not fully supported by the public at the time of negotiations, the evidence in this study suggests that public opinion will move towards greater support after the conclusion of the negotiations.

Public opinion and its connections to international environmental agreements remain relevant to the continuing discussion of combating climate change, as most governments face a level of accountability to their public on the decisions they make in international negotiations. Expanding on this research can provide further insight into how public opinion impacts countries other than the U.S. and China on international climate negotiations.

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The Effect of Public Opinion on International Environmental Agreements

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