Military Collector & Historian Volume 72 No. 4; Winter 2020

Military Collector & Historian Journal of the Company of Military Historians

Fenian Infantryman, 1870 Vol. 72, No.4

Winter 2020

Military Collector & Historian Vol. 72, No. 4

Winter 2020

Washington, DC

The purpose of the Journal is to disseminate information on the material culture, history, and traditions of members of the Armed Forces of the United States worldwide and other nations serving in the Western Hemisphere.

COMPANY OF MILITARY HISTORIANS®

Board of Governors Steven M. Baule, Ed.D., Ph.D. Lt. Col. Charles H. Cureton, USMCR (Ret.) Stephen M. Henry Gordon Jones, Ph.D. Robert Kotchian Marc Sammis Sam Small John Thillmann President Craig D. Bell Vice President for Administration Alejandro M. de Quesada Vice President for Publications Myers Brown Secretary Gerald Roxbury Treasurer John F. De Pue Administrator and Assistant Treasurer David M. Sullivan Assistant Administrator Angie Brown MILITARY COLLECTOR & HISTORIAN Editor David M. Sullivan Graphics and Layout Editor Chuck Veit Assistant Editors D. Franklin Arey III Michael Rosen, Ph.D., M.D. Marc Sammis MILITARY UNIFORMS IN AMERICA Editor René Chartrand COMPANY WEB SITE: http://www.military-historians.org Electronic Editor Steven M. Baule, Ed.D., Ph.D.

IN THIS ISSUE Two Flags from the Battle of Fort Donelson, by Mark Kasal.................................. 290 Federal Soldier Modifications of Civil War Issue Uniforms, Part 2: Is the Federal Issue Infantry Uniform Jacket a Civil War Myth?

by Michael R. Cunningham, Ph.D.........................................................................291 A Deserter of the 7th U.S. Infantry, by Donald McConnell and Gustav Person......314 The Court-Martial of George Moule, by Donald McConnell and Gustav Person... 317 Dimensions of a Continental Army Haversack, submitted by William Reynolds... 319 The Springfield Musketoon Was the Gun That Almost Lost the West,

by William Gorenfeld and John Gorenfeld.......................................................... 320 A Marine’s Account of the Assassination of President Abraham Lincoln,

by David M. Sullivan............................................................................................. 328 Sword Presentation, submitted by Anthony Gero................................................... 330 Marine Corps Justice in the Civil War, Part 1: Enlisted Marines,

by David M. Sullivan..............................................................................................331 An Army Tropical Coat Worn in Vietnam, circa 1968,

by W. Sammis and William K. Emerson...............................................................361 Old Four O’Clock: Sumner Takes Command of the Mounted Rifles,

by Tim Kimball...................................................................................................... 362 A Rare Wooden Pattern Set for Creating an 1872 Army Buckle,

by Dr. Zachary Leiner........................................................................................... 363 An 1812 Newspaper Account of Live Artillery Firing by the New York State Artillery, New York Harbor, by Anthony F. Gero................................................. 364 Indian War WOCOKA: Pontiac’s Siege at Fort Detroit, by Rick Ashbacker.............365 The Montgomery Guard, by David M. Sullivan........................................................379 “A Most Extraordinary Circumstance,” The Capture of British Brig. Gen. Richard Prescott, July 1777, by Ronald M. Westphal..............381 “The Man Who Swam the Appomattox River,” Sergeant Major Edwin Wallace, Confederate States Marine Corps, by Ron Field................................................... 384 MILITARY UNIFORMS IN AMERICA 998: New York Provincial Regiment, officer, 1758

by Patrice Courcelle and René Chartrand........................................................354 999: French Infantry Grenadier officers, Saint-Domingue, late 1803,

by Charles Hamilton Smith and René Chartrand............................................... 356 1000: U.S. Marine Corps, Uniform Dress, 1839–1859,

by Trevor Denholm and Lt. Col. Charkes H. Cureton, USMCR (Ret.)................ 358 FEATURES On Our Covers ...........................................................................................................312 The Message Center: From the President..................................................................352 Company of Military Historians Benefactor Program...............................................353 The Last Post and New Members, Winter 2020....................................................... 360

Military Collector & Historian (ISSN-0026-3966) is published quarterly by the Company of Military Historians. © 2020 Company of Military Historians, Company of Military Historians®, and the Rifleman logo are registered trademarks of the Company of Military Historians. All rights reserved including the right to reproduce this Journal in any form whatsoever.

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Address all editorial correspondence to the Editor, David M. Sullivan, 84A Pleasantdale Road, P.O. Box 238, Rutland, MA 01543-0238; e–mail dsulli7875@aol.com Address all MUIA correspondence to the MUIA Editor, René Chartrand, 316 du Jockey, Gatineau, QC J9H 0J4 Canada; e–mail plumee@videotron.ca Address all publications seeking Company sponsorship to: David M. Sullivan, The Company of Military Historians, P.O. Box 910, Rutland, MA 01543–0910.

290 Military Collector & Historian

Two Flags from the Battle of Fort Donelson Mark Kasal

T

he family of 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry soldier John Rank has protected a great mystery for over a hundred years. Rank was an adventurer and enlisted as a private in Company F, 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry at Springfield, Illinois, in April 1861. His regiment was shipped off to Cairo, Illinois, where it joined Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant’s forces. Being under the command of General Grant, the 9th Illinois would see some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war, participating in over 110 battles. At Fort Donelson, Private Rank was wounded. He recovered and rejoined his unit. In 1864 he was captured at Snake Creek Gap, Georgia, sometime between 7 and 13 May 1864, and sent to Andersonville, where he spent the rest of the war.

The battle for Fort Donelson was fought over the five days of 11-16 February 1862. Sometime during the battle Rank came into the possession of an unusual Confederate flag (FIG 1). The red, white, and blue silk Confederate flag measures 33 inches by 24 inches. The canton was dark blue. There are eight stripes alternating white, blue, white, red, white, blue, white, and red in the field. The fringe was pink.1 In 1994 former Cody Firearms Museum curator, National Civil War Museum, and vexillogist, Howard Michael Madaus, studied the flag and sent a letter to Company member Ed Cote explaining that similar flags were adopted by the states of Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana.

In his letter, Madaus stated the flag must have been carried by one of the four Alabama units at Fort Donelson, as there were no units from Louisiana or Florida in the battle. These units were Captain Hubbard’s and Captain Houston’s cavalry and two companies of the 3d Alabama Infantry. In a subsequent telephone discussion with Cote, Madaus concluded the flag was indeed carried by one of the two cavalry units. Unfortunately, Madaus passed away in 2007, before he completed his three-volume work on the flags of the Confederacy.2 The other flags that figured into Private Rank’s Civil War service were the regiment’s colors. After he was released from the Confederate prison, he found his way back to the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry. When the unit was mustered out, the unit’s colors were cut up and pieces were distributed to the members of the regiment. John Rank was awarded one of the stars from the field (FIG 2).

My thanks have to go to Company members, Ed and Patty Cote for allowing me to gain access to this information on these two remarkable flags and their owner.

Notes 1. Howard Madaus to Edward Cote, 2 March 1994.

2. Available from www.confederate-flags.org.

FIG. 1 Fort Donelson flag.

FIG 2. Star from the 9th Illinois Regimental flag.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 291

Federal Soldier Modifications of Civil War Issue Uniforms, Part 2: Is the Federal Issue Infantry Uniform Jacket a Civil War Myth?

Michael R. Cunningham, Ph.D.

I

mmediately after Fort Sumter, the majority of the first Union troops to take the field were members of local militia units who wore their company-designated uniforms into federal service. The second wave of Union volunteers came directly from civilian life, and were outfitted in either gray or blue uniforms supplied by the states, often cut in the form of a waist length or slightly longer jacket. These jackets differed in their details but generally displayed a stand-up collar, a front that was closed with seven to nine buttons, and sometimes shoulder tabs and belt loops.

James M. Hume, for example, enlisted in the 1st Battalion of Yates’ Sharp Shooters (later known as the 64th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry) on 13 December 1861 and was issued an early model of the Illinois state jacket (FIG 38).

The Yates Sharp Shooters (YSS) also were issued M1841 rifles, which they exchanged for private purchase Henry rifles from 1863 through the close of the war. Although not as well known as Berdan’s 1st and 2d U.S. Sharp Shooters or Birge’s Western Sharp Shooters (66th Illinois), the soldiers of the 64th Illinois distinguished themselves at the Battles of Corinth, Kennesaw, Peach Tree Creek, Atlanta, and Bentonville.

Many of the loyal states bought uniform jackets from New York, which issued uniform jackets to its troops throughout the war. Many New Yorkers found the

state-issue jackets to be highly satisfactory. In a letter from Rappahannock Station to Quartermaster General Montgomery Cunningham Meigs dated 17 August 1863, Capt. Jesse H. Jones of the 60th New York Volunteers argued for the production of an infantry uniform jacket as a substitute for other federal issue uniforms for foot troops (FIG 39):

FIG 38. James Hume, 64th Illinois wearing state issue jacket.

FIG 39. Jesse H. Jones 60th NY. Courtesy Historical Data Systems.

… Dress coats should no longer be furnished to Infantry soldiers in the field. They are well enough for soldiers in barracks. A fatigue jacket (perhaps something patterned after the NYS jacket) should be the uniform for the campaigning soldier. The reasons are weighty. The dress coat costs much more. New York furnishes its jacket at $5.45. The dress coat costs $7.21. The jacket wears one half longer. Two years’ experience has satisfied me of this. The jacket is much more easily kept clean. It does not catch so much dirt. It is easier washed. The jacket is handier. The tails of the dress coat are always in the way on a campaign. Most men look more trim, neat & soldier-like in a jacket than a dress coat.

Hence the jacket is the universal favorite with the soldiers. A jacket of the exact pattern of the Artillery jacket except that the collar should be but one inch high & there should be no braid trimmings would be unexceptional. The jacket is far preferable to the blouse after the first of Sept. It is always far neater & more trim in appearance, it is warmer & so fitter for fall, winter & spring ….37

292 Military Collector & Historian

Captain Jones enlisted on 24 September 1861, and had substantial field experience when he made his recommendation to General Meigs. In apparent fulfilment of Jones’ suggestion, there are many photographs of federal troops wearing what looks like a variant on the standard federal issue artillery and cavalry uniform jacket, with a front that closes with small buttons (called vest or cuff buttons by collectors), a short stand-up collar, and the absence of colored trim. This includes the sergeant and the private on both ends of the back row in a group of eight Signal Corps soldiers photographed in April 1865 at the Central Signal Station (17th and E Streets NW) in Washington City (FIG 40).

FIG 40. Signal Corps men wearing a variety of jackets. Library of Congress Photo LC B817-7683.

with hook & eye; no epaulettes or piping; plain functional two button cuff; eleven button front (all cuff-sized general issue) with corded keyhole buttonholes; one interior pocket, and a quilted lining made out of checked cotton cloth38 (FIG 41).

The McDonald assertion that Schuylkill Arsenal produced infantry shell jackets is not an isolated suggestion. Further details on the Byam jacket mentioned by McDonald will be provided later (FIGs 67-69) but Don Troiani provided similar commentary on the uniform jacket of Sgt. George H. Snell of the 121st New York Volunteers (FIG 42), stating in 2002: “The Federal government furnished several hundred thousand of these during the latter part of the war. They were also worn by the men of the Signal Corps.”39

FIG 41. Schuylkill Arsenal jacket worn by D.P. Byam, Signal Corps.

Twenty years earlier, in 1982, however, Company Fellow Noticing photographs of soldiers wearing such jackets, Michael McAfee offered a more tentative analysis: K. C. McDonald claimed they were federally manufactured The eleven-button jacket … is an enigma. I think it might have and distributed to the infantry, as well as to the Signal been manufactured by Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia, for Corps: I owned just such a jacket in the 1960s, complete with the ... national uniform jackets, intended for general infantry issue, were made in quantity at the Schuylkill arsenal...

Schuylkill products were probably the most widespread of Federal infantry shell jackets, issued to all Federal states and probably often mistaken for “state issue” jackets. At present, however, specific information from surviving jackets is scarce. The best-described example belonged to Private D. M. Byam of the Federal Signal Corps and resides today in the Gettysburg NPS museum. Because of this fact … this type is often incorrectly referred to as the “Signal Corps Jacket.”

In point of fact, however, it was often issued to the infantry branch. The Byam jacket is completely hand-sewn with dark blue thread and features: a low, square-cut collar, fastened

“SA” depot stamp in the sleeve lining. I have no idea why they were made this way or how they were distributed, but my original jacket supposedly had been worn by a member of the 7th New Hampshire infantry.40

Prior to the start of the Civil War, Schuylkill Arsenal was the primary maker of Army uniforms, the government employees cut cloth to pattern, and then provided that cut cloth, plus thread, trim tape, welting, buttons, and hooks and eyes to the seamstresses of Philadelphia. Preference was given to wives and widows of soldiers, who were paid on a piece-work basis to hand-sew the components together to produce uniforms. Each uniform was examined

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 293

FIG 42. Infantry jacket worn by Sgt. George Snell, 121st NY, made

by G.W. Harkness. Courtesy Don Troiani.

by an Inspector before receiving a size mark of 1 to 4, and the “SA” stamp.41 A size 3 Schuylkill Arsenal infantry-style jacket was offered for sale from the Steve Saathoff estate in 2014 by Heritage Auctions (FIG 43). It carried this description: Rare Government Contract Infantry Shell Jacket … Bearing the “SA” markings of the famed Schuylkill Arsenal in the sleeve, this short shell jacket, sometimes called the “infantry uniform jacket” became popular with the Union soldier from about the close of 1863 through to the end of the war and the government ordered hundreds of thousands of them. This example conforms to those seen in many period photographs, particularly images of the Signal Corps taken in 1864-65.

The jacket is without piping, has a low collar and is closed with 11 small eagle “staff” buttons, two buttons at each cuff and single buttons on each side of the collar. The body has a padded coarse cotton lining with interior pocket at the left breast ... . Well liked by the Civil War soldier, it is a difficult uniform to find today.42

FIG 43. Schuylkill Arsenal Size 3 infantry style jacket. Courtesy of Heritage Auction.

apparent in many segments of the Civil War collecting fraternity. Wambaugh and White, makers of high-quality Civil War reproduction uniforms, reflect the contemporary collector and reenactor belief in Schuylkill Arsenal’s central role in the manufacture of infantry and Signal Corps uniform jackets in a statement on their website: … many Federal soldiers desired or were issued jackets of a dizzying variety. Untrimmed mounted jackets, state issue jackets, and even modified fatigue blouses and dress coats were seen in all armies throughout the war. But by far the most common of these jackets were those produced by the Schuylkill Arsenal, several hundred thousand of which were produced. These jackets were issued east and west, and were very popular and highly desired by the men in the ranks.44

Types of Civil War Jackets Stimulated by the statement that “several hundred thousand” such uniforms were produced, a research project was initiated to document the time line for the The Heritage Auction photograph of this size 3 Schuylkill official approval, manufacture, issuance of, and variations Arsenal jacket contains general service eagle buttons in the federal infantry uniform jacket. Civil War books, and not general staff buttons. The partially erroneous auction catalogues, and websites were searched for description appears to have been recycled from the 2008 photographic examples of surviving specimens. Excluding Heritage auction description of a J. T. Martin jacket, pre-war militia uniforms, 1861 state-issue gray jackets,45 discussed later (FIG 52). Nonetheless, with this listing and collarless and vested zouave jackets, six major types and a photograph, McAfee identified it as the one that he and twelve distinctive styles of Northern uniform jackets owned in the 1960s and discussed in 1982.43 The Schuylkill were identified: Arsenal jacket once owned by McAfee will be examined State-Produced Type 1 jackets were issued by the later in this article (FIG 65-66). loyal states, rather than the federal government. They As the foregoing description suggests, McAfee’s cautious were produced with eight or nine coat-size buttons in agnosticism about the authorization, production, and front, generally with unadorned cuffs but sometimes with distribution of the infantry uniform jacket is no longer a chevron similar to the Infantry uniform coat. The cuffs

294 Military Collector & Historian

having no top stitching on the collar, but otherwise looking similar. A surviving Type 1A jacket surfaced in Ohio with nine infantry “I� large buttons in front, a general service small button on each of the two collar tabs, plus two belt loops with buttons and empty slits for three missing small buttons on each cuff (which have been restored, FIG 45).

The collar is one inch tall.

Type 1B: State produced jacket with colored trim.

Some state-produced jackets have colored piping on the collar and shoulder tabs, like the surviving example made for New York (FIG 46). New York issued plain blue Type 1A jackets, as well as Type 1B jackets with several variations of colors, styles of piping, and pockets during war, so additional subtypes are conceivable but are outside of the scope of this report.46

FIG 44. Levi D Smith, 64th Illinois.

may be functional or non-functional, with two or three buttons, and the wool quality varies from coarse to fine.

Type 1A: State produced jacket with shoulder tabs. Many state-produced jackets have shoulder tabs to secure equipment straps, and also may have belt loops to hold a waist belt. Some had an external pocket on the chest or waist. The Type 1A state jacket worn by Levi Smith of YSS (FIG 44) differed from the jacket worn by his comrade-in-arms James Hume, shown earlier (FIG 38), in

FIG 45. Type 1A State Issue Jacket.

FIG 46. Type 1B NY State jacket worn by Sgt. Roland Truesdale 27th NY Vol. Infantry. Courtesy Don Troiani.

Type 1C State produced plain jacket. The Type 1C jacket lacks any adornments, such as shoulder tabs or collar piping. A Type 1C Illinois state jacket was worn

by Lafayette Sampson of the 64th Illinois when he had his photograph made by G. W. Armistead of Corinth, Mississippi (FIG 47). The YSS visited Corinth both at the end of May and in October 1862, so precise dating is not possible. Nonetheless, an album of members of Company A of the 64th Illinois contains fourteen enlisted men who had their likenesses taken in Corinth, showing the appearance of an elite Midwestern regiment in the second year of the war. Of the fourteen sharp shooters, nine (6 percent, including Sampson) were wearing a Type 1C jacket and one (Levi Smith, FIG 44), was wearing a Type 1A jacket. An additional four soldiers from the YSS were wearing infantry uniform coats and one was wearing a fatigue blouse. Although a small sample, such

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 295

FIG 47. Lafayette W. Sampson, 64th Illinois.

data indicate that state-issue uniform jackets were quite popular with those Midwestern troops in mid to late 1862.

Privately-purchased Type 2 jackets were bought from a retail tailor or a regimental sutler. They were produced with 7 to 12 buttons in front, made of fine quality wool and lining material, and often had 3 buttons on each cuff. The three-button cuffs made them regulation for officers rather than enlisted men, but many regimental commanders were tolerant of such deviations. Type 2 jackets also tended to have sleeves made out of a single piece of cloth, with no upper seam along the length, and with stylishly flaring sleeves (8½ inches wide across the elbows, or more).

Type 2A: Privately-purchased Jacket with coat buttons. Such jackets are adorned with 7 to 9 large coat buttons, like the one worn by Martin Broderick of YSS (FIG 48).

Type 2B: Privately-purchased Jacket with vest buttons. These jackets have 9 to 12 small buttons down the front, such as the example worn by William E. Ferguson of the YSS (FIG 49).

A surviving Type 2B example with a twelve-button front surfaced in Illinois (FIG 50). It contained small eagle-I vest or cuff buttons down the front, suggesting that it was intended for an infantry officer, but careful inspection revealed no trace of officer’s shoulder straps or rank insignia. A continuous length of machine stitching that started at the base of the left collar, ran down the lapel along the button side and turned the corner, and continued along the bottom hem indicated that this was not a cut-down frock coat. This also was not the finest quality jacket, in that the cuffs were not functional and

FIG 48. Martin F. Broderick, 64th Illinois.

FIG 49. William Ferguson, 64th Illinois.

296 Military Collector & Historian

FIG 50. Type 2B Private purchase Infantry jacket.

the collar was not lined in velvet. But the jacket includes such elegant features as 8¾ inches wide sleeves, a quilted and padded chest, and machine top-stitching on the 1 inch tall stand-up collar. The dirty and worn sleeve linings, however, indicate that the jacket saw some hard campaigning, likely on a gallant federal enlisted man.

Federally-manufactured Type 3 Jackets were produced and issued by the government, and have markings in the sleeve lining from Schuylkill Arsenal (SA), another quartermaster depot such as Cincinnati or St. Louis, or a federal contractor, such as John T. Martin.

Such jackets were generally produced with twelve small buttons in front, although some made with eleven-button fronts are known. They were made of sturdy wool and conservatively cut sleeves (less than 8½ inches at the elbow). They do not have shoulder tabs or belt loops.

Type 3A: Federally produced Uniform Jacket for the Mounted Services. Federal uniform jackets were produced and issued to cavalry and artillery units with yellow and red trim, respectively. A few federal jackets with pre-war rifleman green and dragoon orange trim probably saw service in 1861, but such stocks were likely used up by 1862. Some cavalry and artillery jackets had additional trim tape on the chest to designate musicians, but the underlying jacket was identical. The Type 3A jacket may have had its collar or other features lowered by the soldier who wore it, but the distinguishing feature is that the branch of service trim remains visible (see Clark/8th US Colored Heavy Artillery (USCHA) jacket described below, FIGs 63-64).

FIG 51. Type 3B jacket with removed trim attributed to Michael Cline, 17th Indiana. Courtesy of Cowan’s Auctions.

Type 3B: Federally produced Uniform Jacket, Converted. This is an infantry or Signal Corps jacket that was constructed from a mounted services jacket that had its colored trim removed by a soldier or a company tailor.

Such jackets generally had their collars shortened and their belt-support bolsters removed, as well. A surviving example was attributed in 2005 to Michael Cline of the 17th Indiana Infantry of Wilder’s Brigade, and still showed impressions of the original colored trim47(FIG 51).

Type 3C: Federally produced Infantry Uniform Jacket. This is a jacket that was made by a federal facility or contractor with a low collar and an absence of colored trim. In 2008, Heritage Auction described the J. T. Martin jacket (FIG 52) from late Company member John Henry Kurtz’s estate as such, using language that anticipated their 2014 description of the size 3 Schuylkill Arsenal jacket (FIG 43): Rare Government Contract Waist Length Shell Jacket.

Bearing the markings of the famed “JOHN T MARTIN / NEW YORK” in the sleeve, this short shell jacket, sometimes called the “infantry uniform jacket” became popular with the Union soldier from about the close of 1863 through to the end of the war and the government ordered hundreds of thousands of them. This example conforms to those seen in many period photographs, particularly images of the Signal Corps taken in 1864-65. The jacket is without piping, has a low collar and is closed with 11 small eagle “staff” buttons. The body has a padded green cotton lining with interior pockets at both sides of the chest ... .48

Further discussion of the J.T. Martin jacket will be presented below.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 297

FIG 52. Purported Type 3C Jacket made by T.J. Martin. Courtesy of Heritage Auction.

Type 4: Federally Produced Uniform Coat, Converted to Jacket. Type 4 jackets were produced as an 1858 Pattern infantry uniform coat (aka frock) but were converted by removing most of the skirts and refinishing the upper 2-3 inches of the skirts as the bottom hem. The result is a jacket with nine coat buttons in front, made of sturdy wool and conservatively cut sleeves (7 to 7½ inches wide elbows). Type 4 jackets generally retain the contrasting piping at the base and top of the collar and chevrons on the cuffs that are distinctive of 1858 uniform coats. Such jackets are also likely to retain contractor’s stamps and U.S. inspector marks in the upper sleeve lining. The example worn by Sgt. Henry Stone of the 11th Massachusetts (FIG 53) was said to have been worn at Gettysburg, and was altered to have a pointed tail, like the jacket for mounted services.49 Type 4 jackets worn in the service are extremely rare. Several examples were observed of uniform coats that were converted to jackets during or after passing through the hands of a theatrical

FIG 53. Type 4 Modified Infantry uniform coat of Sgt. Henry Stone, 11th Massachusetts Infantry. Courtesy of The Horse Soldier.

costume shop; those jackets had distinctly postwar workmanship and details, sometimes including thread that fluoresces under ultraviolet light.

Type 5: Federally Produced Fatigue Blouse, Converted to Jacket. Type 5 jackets were 1857 Pattern fatigue blouses that were converted to jackets. Such jackets were known to have been worn by some members of the 31st Illinois Infantry (FIG 54).50 The jackets have a turned down collar, 3 or 4 coat buttons in front, a body and sleeves made of light-weight twilled flannel wool, and a waist band like a World War II Eisenhower jacket. If the Type 5 style jacket was made from a lined fatigue blouse, it will have government or contractor marks in the sleeve lining. If it was made from an unlined sack coat, it will have flat felled seams, no sleeve linings, and show no such markings. No surviving examples were located, although the Chicago Historical Society has a fatigue blouse with the lower hem turned under and stitched, thereby shortening it by three inches.

Type 6: Federally Purchased or Produced Chasseur Jackets. In essence, a frock coat is a jacket with a long skirt attached below the waist-line. In the 1850s, French light infantry uniforms reduced the skirt to 5 to 6 inches long. This fashion influenced the 1861 uniforms issued by the states, including the gray jackets issued to the 4th Massachusetts and the blue jackets with built-in vest distributed to the 14th Brooklyn.51 Chasseur

FIG 54. Type 5 Modified sack coat. Courtesy of Richard Tibbals and Military Images.

298 Military Collector & Historian

jackets are similar to frock coats and sack coats in having a bottom hem that is four inches or more below the waistbelt, but not quite as long as the sleeves, making them shorter than the unaltered fatigue blouse.

Type 6A: French and French-style Chasseur Jacket with Separate Skirt. In the fall of 1861, Gen. George McClellan ordered ten thousand sets of uniforms and equipage from France to equip several federal regiments. Following a drill competition in the Army of the Potomac, some of those items were issued to the 18th Massachusetts, 62d Pennsylvania, and 83d Pennsylvania.

The nine-button example shown is based on the French light infantry uniform and includes the chasseur skirt, but carries pewter buttons intended for the United States as made in France. This example was worn by Corp. James A. Weeks of the 18th Massachusetts and carries the silver French chevron on the cuff to designate a corporal (FIG 55).

FIG 56. Type 6b Invalid Corps jacket worn by George Bartow Bartow 19th VRC.

W. Bartow who was wounded on 20 July 1864 by a shell at Petersburg while serving with the 15th New Jersey, and after six months’ recovery was transferred to the 19th VRC to guard Confederate prisoners at Elmira, New York. Bartow’s VRC jacket shows no maker or size marks, but was inspected by William Phillips in New York, and has comparable shoulder proportions to size 2 marked Schuylkill Arsenal jackets.

Discerning jackets in period photographs Differentiating among the twelve types of jackets can be difficult. This table is presented as a quick guide.

The Type 3 jackets can be distinguished from the Type 1 Type 6B: Chasseur Jacket with Long Waist, no Separate Skirt. The Invalid Corps jacket was developed jackets by the presence of 11-12 small vest or cuff buttons to employ the services of wounded or otherwise disabled on the front of the Type 3, rather than 8-9 large coat soldiers who could perform light duty. To promote esprit buttons on the front of the Type 1. The Type 3B & 3C de corps, a special uniform was designed for them using jackets also tended to have slightly shorter collars than the sky-blue color of the Mexican War jacket but cut in the Type 1 jackets. the chasseur style. The prototype Invalid Corps uniform If three small buttons are visible on a sleeve, then the in the Smithsonian Institution collection and has a nine- jacket is more likely to be Type 2 private purchase jacket button front and a chasseur-style short skirt, similar to than a Federally-produced Type 3, although some Type 1 the Type 6A.52 The jacket that was produced and issued to state issue jackets had three-button cuffs. A bright sheen the Invalid Corps in 1863 and its renamed successor the to the cloth, which is a characteristic of finer wool, and Veteran’s Reserve Corps (VRC) in 1864 and 1865, however, wide sleeves at the elbows also is indicative of the Type 2. had used 11 to 12 small buttons in front, and a long waist The Type 4 converted frock coat can be distinguished and side slits, but not a separate skirt. The Type 6B VRC from Types 1 through 3 by the presence of colored welts jacket specified in the 1865 quartermaster manual to be on the collar and cuff. The Type 6A may look similar to about an inch longer than the Type 3A uniform jacket. The the Type 4 but will have a skirt with a slit on the side. The example shown is 20¼ inches tall along the front lapel, Type 6B will be of comparable length, with a slit on the 23¾ inches tall along the back seam, with a 2½ inches tall side, but without a separate skirt. The Type 5 converted collar (FIG 56). The jacket shown was worn by George fatigue blouse will generally retain a lay-down rounded FIG 55. Type 6A French chasseur jacket worn by Corp. James Weeks, 18th Massachusetts Infantry.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 299

Type 1A

State-Produced Uniform Jacket

8 or 9 large buttons Has shoulder tabs, may have Collar 1-1½ inches tall in front belt tabs, pocket No color trim

Type 1B

State-Produced Uniform Jacket

8 or 9 large buttons Has shoulder tabs with Collars 1- 1½ inches tall in front colored trim, which is also on collar, maybe on cuffs

Type 1C

State-Produced Uniform Jacket

8 or 9 large buttons No shoulder tabs or belt in front tabs. No color trim

Collar 1- ½ inch tall

Type 2A

Privately Purchased Uniform Jacket

8 or 9 large buttons Fine wool, flared sleeves, no in front, may have shoulder tabs 3 button cuffs

Collar 1- ½ inch tall

Type 2B

Privately Purchased Uniform Jacket

9 to 12 small buttons in front, may have 3 button cuffs

Fine wool, flared sleeves, no shoulder tabs

Collar 1” to 1½ inches tall

Type 3A

Federally Produced 1854 Pattern Uniform Jacket for Mounted Services

11 or 12 small buttons in front, may be shortened to 10; 2 button cuffs

Yellow or red trim retained on collar, cuffs, and back

Collar 2-2½ inches tall, may be shortened to 1

Type 3B

Federally produced 1854 Pattern Uniform Jacket, Converted

11 or 12 small buttons in front

Colored trim removed from collar, cuffs and back

Collar lowered to 1 inch or less, belt support bolsters removed

Type 3C

Federally produced Infantry Uniform Jacket, no pattern date located

11 or 12 small buttons in front.

Schuylkill Arsenal markings.

Made without colored trim.

Collar made ~1 inch tall

Type 4

Federally produced 1858 Pattern uniform coat converted

9 large buttons in front

Blue or red trim welts retained on collar and cuffs.

Skirt severely truncated

Collar 2 inches tall, may be lowered

Type 5

Federally produced 1857 Pattern fatigue blouse, converted

3 or 4 large buttons No trim. Bottom hem raised, in front may create appearance of belt

Roll over collar. Hook and eye may be added to create stand-up collar

Type 6A

French-Style Chasseur jacket with separate skirt

9 large buttons in front

Has side slits. May have collar, lapel, and cuff trim.

May have shoulder and waist tabs

Stand up collar 1¾ inches tall

Type 6B

Federally produced 1863 Pattern Chasseur jacket with no separate skirt

12 small buttons in front

Has side slits. May have contrasting trim on the shoulder tabs, collar, lapel, hem, and side slit

Stand up collar 2½ inches tall

collar and small notches on the non-functional cuffs.

The Type 3B and Type 3C are visually identical and only differ in whether colored trim and belt-support bolsters were once present and removed and whether the collar was lowered after manufacture. Such determinations require careful inspection of the collar seams and other construction details. McDonald described the jacket worn

by T. J. Gates of the 99th Illinois in a manner suggesting it was produced as a 3C jacket (FIG 57) but there is no way to truly know without a first-hand examination, as

discussed below.

Returning to the Signal Corps photo at the beginning of this article (FIG 40), careful inspection reveals four of the jackets worn by enlisted men have large buttons rather than small buttons in front, so they are precluded from being the federal Type 3 style. One jacket has two pockets in front and another has three buttons on the cuff, so those are most likely privately purchased Type 2A jackets.

The sergeant on the viewer’s far left is wearing a jacket with eleven small buttons in front. But the sleeve elbows

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FIG 57. T. W. Gates, 99th Illinois Infantry. Cred. McDonald.

are flared and there are three buttons on the cuff, so it is a Type 2B. The soldier on the viewer’s far right is wearing a jacket with small buttons in front and the sleeves are relatively tight at the elbows, which is consistent with federal production. The number of buttons on the cuffs is not visible, but there are just ten buttons down the front.

If that jacket started its life as a federal issue jacket, it must have been shortened by the soldier or his company tailor before the photograph was made, making it a Type 3B jacket, rather than a Type 3C.53 National Archives Documents on the Type 3C Infantry Uniform Jacket A multi-day visit was made in 2019 to the National Archives and Records Administration facility at 700 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., to locate documentation on the Federal authorization, production, and distribution of the Type 3C infantry uniform jacket.

Locating such information proved to be unexpectedly daunting. For example, Captain Jones’ letter to General Meigs did not carry any endorsements or routing information and no indication of a response could be located. The correspondence sent by the Office of the Quartermaster General in August and September 1863 does not record a reply or even an acknowledgement of receipt.54 The Jones letter also was neither recorded as received by Schuylkill Arsenal in 1863 or 186455 nor is it the subject of quartermaster officers’ letters sent.56

In “Letters Received by the Office of the Quartermaster, the Office of Clothing and Equipage (No. 101 East Third Street) Cincinnati, August 18, 1862,” there is a request for proposals for: “Uniform Jackets, consisting of Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry, Zouave & Knit … .” 57 Yet, while many proposals and many contract awards were examined in the Consolidated Correspondence File boxes, no contracts for an infantry uniform jacket were located.

The National Archives’ boxes of period contracts for W. R. Harkness, whose name is stamped in the FIG 42 uniform jacket, and T. J. Martin, whose name was stamped in the FIG 52 uniform jacket, provide no indication that either manufacturer had a contract to make the infantry jackets for the U.S. Quartermaster Department.58 Surviving contract documents for production of jackets for the cavalry and artillery were located, but nothing was found in the federal records authorizing the production of jackets with low collars and the absence of branch-of-service trim. By contrast, there was substantial documentation of the 1863 pattern sky-blue Invalid Corps jackets (later renamed the VRC), with shoulder tabs, chasseur skirt, and dark blue trim.

The volumes of letters sent by Schuylkill Arsenal for the years 1862-65 contained correspondence issued by quartermaster officers Col. George H. Crosman, Col. David H. Vinton, Capt. John H. Dickerson, and others.

There were mentions of the production of green uniforms for Berdan’s Sharp Shooters, zouave uniforms for various New York and Pennsylvania regiments, and customtailored uniforms for soldiers who were too tall to fit in the standard sizes. But no mention of the infantry uniform jacket, or modifications of cavalry or artillery jackets for use by other service branches, were seen.59 Company member and Vietnam veteran Capt. Robert Anderson echoed the sentiments of Capt. Jesse H. Jones in observing that a jacket intended for the infantry or Signal Corps that was to be made with no branch of service trim, a low collar, and no collar buttons would have cost less to manufacture than the regulation cavalry and artillery uniform jackets. Schuylkill Arsenal would have paid less to seamstresses and the quartermaster general would have paid less to federal contractors to produce such jackets. Soldiers would have been charged less for such jackets against their annual clothing allowances. Captain Anderson observed it is impossible for an infantry and Signal Corps uniform jacket to have been authorized, produced, and distributed without leaving a significant accounting paper trail,60 but such a paper trail could not be found.

Because there are known infantry uniform jackets bearing Signal Corps insignia, archive records for that branch of service for the years 1862-1865 were searched.

No correspondence between Signal Corps commander Gen. Albert J. Myer or other Signal Corps officers and any quartermaster officers like Meigs, Crosman, or Dickerson was located, let alone a requisition for a low collar, untrimmed jacket.61

Inconsistent Information in the Quartermaster General’s Report of 1865 The Report of the Quartermaster General of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the Year Ending June 30, 1865 is a valuable secondary source of information for the actions and operations of that office.

Unfortunately, that report also made a number of highly inconsistent references to the infantry uniform jacket.

For example, the Exhibit 5 table of, “Monthly statement of clothing reported on hand at the various clothing depots for July 1, 1864” reports 11,977 infantry jackets on hand. But no infantry uniform jackets were reported in 17 of 25 depots, including the large facilities in Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. Infantry uniform jackets could be found only at the depots in New York (quantity 914), Fort Monroe (3,613), Indianapolis (5,426), Quincy (1,161), Pittsburg (202), Louisville (230), Chicago (119), and Cairo (313).62 Yet, because Fort Monroe distributed Massachusetts-produced uniforms to that state’s troops in 1861; because New York produced state-issue infantry jackets throughout the war; and because Midwestern states produced infantry jackets at the beginning of the war and some states may have continued that practice; it is not clear if the reported 11,977 infantry jackets represented state-produced jackets, 1832 Pattern infantry jackets left over from the Mexican War and the Utah Expedition, or new federally-produced infantry uniform jackets. There are no grounds to favor the latter interpretation of the ambiguous entry.

The quartermaster general’s, “Statement of number of articles of clothing and equipage purchased and manufactured at the various depots during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864” offers tallies for cavalry, light artillery, VRC, and zouave jackets at each facility. But that table does not have a reporting line for the infantry jacket, implying that such a uniform was not made or bought during 1863-1864.63 Consistent with that impression the, “Statement of clothing, camp and garrison equipage from February 27, 1865 to June 30, 1865 at the Philadelphia depot” has entries for cavalry, light artillery, VRC, knit, and irregular jackets (for issue to prisoners), but not infantry uniform jackets. This again suggested that such jackets were not produced.64 Contrary to the foregoing is the Exhibit 53, “Statement of clothing, camp and garrison equipage on hand July 1, 1864, purchased, manufactured, captured, gained, taken up, sold, lost, expended and remaining on hand in the Quartermaster’s department during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865.” Exhibit 53 reports 67,699 infantry uniform jackets were on hand as of 1 July 1864.

The report further states 15,301 infantry uniform jackets were purchased during the fiscal year; whereas 7,655 were manufactured; and 447 infantry jackets were captured for a total of 91,112. From that total, 461 were lost or destroyed and 78,568 remained on hand on 30 June 1865.

While the numbers stated for infantry uniform jackets are

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 301

small compared to the 359,154 cavalry jackets and 143,757 artillery jackets also listed, they are far from negligible.65 The Exhibit 53 entry in the Quartermaster General’s Report of 1865 might seem like conclusive evidence for the federal production of the infantry uniform jacket.

Unfortunately, that table is suspect because its report of the infantry jackets on hand on 1 July 1864 list 55,722 more such jackets than the Exhibit 5 tally for that same date, which reported 11,977 infantry uniform jackets. The 30 June 1865 table also fails to account for the 32,645 VRC jackets that Exhibit 5 reported as present on 1 July 1864, or the VRC jackets that were produced in 1864-1865. It is likely most of the uniforms counted as infantry uniform jackets in Exhibit 53 were VRC jackets, and others were left-over state issue jackets.

Unfortunately, the quartermaster general’s report contained a number of other demonstrable errors on this topic. As a consequence, its small number of mentions of infantry uniform jackets in its tables cannot be taken to mean that the garment was actually authorized or produced by a federal depot or contractor.66 Further indicating a lack of authorization for the infantry jacket, such a uniform was neither mentioned in the U.S. Army Revised Regulations for 1861 with changes up to 25 June 1863,67 nor is it the subject of a known general or special order. The infantry uniform jacket also was conspicuous by its absence in the Quartermaster Manual of 1865, which was intended to provide definitive guidance to all quartermaster depots and contractor manufacturing facilities.68 Finally, no infantry or Signal Corps uniform jacket was shown in the series of quartermaster photographs commissioned by General Meigs and taken

by Oliver H. Willard in 1866, in contrast with plates illustrating less important items, like the stable frock and the poncho.69 Removal of Trim and Shortening of Hems If the quartermaster general and his deputies did not authorize Schuylkill Arsenal or contract with T. J. Martin or W. R. Harkness to make infantry uniform jackets, what was the source of the jackets shown being worn by infantry and Signal Corps troops in period photographs and of the surviving specimens? The most likely answer is most of them are Type 3B jackets that infantry and Signal Corps soldiers converted from mounted jackets intended for the cavalry and artillery branches of service.

Mounted jackets likely were preferred for conversion over infantry uniform coats because the mounted jacket involved a smaller charge against the soldier’s annual clothing allowance. Mounted jackets also required fewer steps to convert, making them less costly for the company tailor to alter to a Type 3B than it was to produce a Type

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4 jacket. Mounted jackets also offered a more stylish and more durable garment than the Type 5 jacket made from the light weight sack coat.

It is not clear how the practice began of modifying cavalry or artillery jackets for wear by members of the infantry or Signal Corps, but one nominee for the innovation are the soldiers in the 17th and 73d Indiana and the 98th and 123d Illinois Infantry of Col. John T. Wilder’s “Lightning Brigade.” This brigade was assigned to Maj. Gen. Joseph Reynolds’ division of Maj. Gen. George Thomas’ XIV Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, and they served throughout the Western campaigns. Mounted on horses after a vote of each regiment in February and March 1863, the men of the Lightning Brigade drew new uniforms, but signaled their unique status by changing the appearance of those uniforms. Regimental historian of the 72d Indiana, Sgt. B. F. McGee, recounted the occasion: For a few days, we were occupied in details necessary to the great change which had taken place in our military mode of locomotion. We drew cavalry uniforms, but cut off the yellow stripe from the legs of the pants and jackets so that we might not be taken for regular cavalry. We were a new branch of the service; simply mounted infantry.70

Wilder’s Mounted Infantry were soon armed with the Spencer seven-shot repeating rifle, and performed gallantly at both the Battles of Hoover’s Gap on 24 June and Chickamauga on 19-20 September, including William Thieme of the 72d Indiana (FIG 58).

The 72d Indiana regimental history mentioned when the process of converting mounted jackets began, but there was no mention of when it ended. If the men of Wilder’s Brigade began to be issued jackets with low collars and no branch of service trim at some point, that would have relieved them of labor and could have been seen as official accommodation to their status as mounted infantry. Yet, no record of the receipt of manufactured infantry jackets was found in the regimental histories, or the available letters and diaries from Wilder’s Brigade.

FIG 58. Type 3B jacket worn by William Thieme, 72nd Indiana.

The Lightning Brigade’s visibility and success may have caused other federal infantry units to imitate their appearance by removing the colored trim from cavalry and artillery jackets that they were able to draw. Because the Signal Corps was also a mounted arm, but not cavalry, it may have followed the same logic as Wilder’s men, when Maj. Albert J. Myer was authorized to staff the Signal Corps in March of 1863.

When infantry and Signal Corps troops modified mounted service jackets, they often did not stop with removing the colored trim but also removed the beltsupport bolsters and lowered the collar. Surviving Type 3B examples show collars with height measurements in the front ranging from ⅝ to 1⅛ inches and all show hand sewing there. The Type 2B private purchase examples do not show such tailor modification.

A number of surviving Type 3B infantry and Signal Corps uniform jackets show eleven-button fronts. Some of these may be based on St. Louis depot-style uniform jackets that were produced with an eleven-button front,71 like the Wing/9th Iowa Cavalry jacket shown in the previous article in this series. In most cases, however, the pronounced V of the issue jacket, which made it longer in the front and back than over the hip, was found to be irksome by foot troops, and caused soldiers to have the jacket shortened in the fore, aft, or both. This was documented in a ten-button cavalry jacket also displayed in the previous article.72 In fact, low collar uniform jackets with ten-button fronts seem at least as common as those with eleven-button fronts. A photograph labelled, “Signal Corps camp near Georgetown” was said to have been taken in August 1865 and shows approximately sixty-four soldiers. Of these, approximately twenty-six appear to be wearing low collar jackets.73 The largest concentration occurs between the fifth and sixth of the eighteen barracks porch columns, where 10 of 12 men are wearing such jackets (FIG 59).

At least four of those ten jackets show ten small buttons in front, making them the individually modified Type 3B jackets. Two additional jackets have three buttons on the cuff, making them private purchase Type 2B. Thus, there was superficial similarity among the uniforms worn by Signal Corps troops, but not similarity in the details.

FIG 59. Signal Corps men, August 1865. LC-B817. 7730 detail.

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FIG 61. Collar of Type 3B Schuylkill Size 2 jacket.

FIG 60. Type 3B Schuylkill Size 2 Infantry style jacket.

Close Analysis of a Schuylkill Arsenal Infantry-style Uniform Jacket First publicly presented by George Lower, “The Gettysburg Sutler” in spring 1974, a Civil War infantrystyle uniform jacket was acquired from Heritage Auction in June 2019 and studied in detail.74 With forty-five years of provenance that includes highly respected dealers and collectors, the chances that the observed modifications were made 100 years after the Civil War were extremely low. Nonetheless, the infantry uniform jacket was examined under magnification and ultraviolet light and there was no indication of modern thread or fabric.

This jacket has the “S A” markings of Schuylkill Arsenal in the unbleached cotton left sleeve lining, along with the numeral 2 and two large dots, both of which were intended to convey the size. Two large dots were also in the right sleeve lining. The body lining is made from two different patterns of plaid wool-cotton blend dress material of brown, ochre, russet, and mauve. The vertical slit pocket in the left breast is lined with plaid cotton of blue, white, and ochre (FIG 60).

Typical of Schuylkill Arsenal uniforms assembled by local seamstresses, this jacket is completely hand sewn.

That fact can make it difficult to discern on first glance what was an original feature of the uniform and what was a modification made by a soldier or company tailor.

A careful comparison of the color, texture, spacing, and placement of the stitching threads, however, yields much of the story.

To modify the collar on this jacket, the buttons and trim tape were removed, the top of the collar was cut off to a height of approximately 1 inch, then ⅜ of an inch from both the outside and inside pieces of the collar were tucked inward and then sewn closed along the top seam, producing a collar height of ¾ of an inch in the right front, ⅞ of an inch in the rear, and ⅝ of an inch in the

FIG 62. Hem of Type 3B Schuylkill Size 2 Infantry style jacket.

left front. The slight variation in the height and some tell-tale puckering along the top seam discloses the postproduction modification. There is no trace of the original hook and eye closure (FIG 61).

Apart from the removal of the trim tape, the front panels of the jacket were left intact, as were most of the two side panels. The six-inch hem of the rear two panels in the jacket, however, were taken up to remove the V shaped tail of the jacket, with the work extending 1½ inches into both side panels to produce a straight line (FIG 62). The result is the center of the back hangs 1¼ inches shorter than the center of the front. This is not apparent in the vertical measurements, due to the curvature of the neck opening. The front label is 19¾ inches tall and the center rear seam is 21¼ inches. The curving vertical lines of colored trim tape that follows the seam where the side and back panels meet were removed, as were the belt-support bolsters.

A horizontal basting stitch follows the hem line on both sides of the tail truncation area to the front. It seems more likely stitching was put in when the garment was made, and before the trim was applied, rather than added during the modification work, because the basting stitch does not include the area where the back hem was straightened. A similar basting line extend vertically long the closing edge of the jacket, beside the button holes, where the trim tape once was positioned. Such basting is not apparent at the

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base of the collar or along the curving lines of the rear panels, which also once had trim tape. Those areas were interior seam lines, however, whereas the basting is on the outer edges of the jacket body.

Apart from the basting stitches that would have been hidden by the trim, there are extremely few signs that the coat ever had colored trim tape representing the soldier’s branch of service. There are no creases or dents in the body fabric from such tape, and only one or two broken threads were left behind. That is not surprising, because wool is flexible and springy, expanding and contracting with variations in heat and moisture. Indeed, a uniform jacket that still shows deep impressions from trim tape that was purportedly removed 155 years earlier should be viewed with extreme suspicion by a collector or historian.

With respect to the present jacket, except for tell-tale signs of work on the collar and the back hem, there were few clues that this was a modified uniform. Especially when compared to uniforms that recently had their trim removed, jackets such as this one could support the belief that infantry jackets with short collars and no trim tape were made at Schuylkill Arsenal, but that would be a misperception.

FIG 63. Type 3A Schuylkill Arsenal jacket size 2 worn by John Clark, 8th USCAR.

Comparison with Schuylkill Arsenal Artillery Jacket The Type 3B infantry-style Schuylkill Arsenal size 2 jacket (FIG 60) was closely compared to an unmodified Type 3A artillery Schuylkill Arsenal size 2 jacket. The artillery jacket has a period stencil marking in the lining and a family letter identifying it to John B. Clark (FIG 63).

Clark was born in Fredrick, Maryland, and was a twentyseven-year-old blacksmith when he enlisted on 30 August 1864 at Paducah, Kentucky. He was immediately mustered in to serve as a private in Company A of the 1st Regiment, Kentucky Heavy Artillery, African Descent. That unit was later renamed the 7th U.S. Colored Field Artillery and then became the 8th USCHA. The unit performed garrison duty at Paducah, Kentucky, and engaged in operations against Bedford Forest there from 16 March to 14 April 1864. It saw action at Fort Anderson, Paducah, 25 March 1864 and conducted an expedition from Paducah to Haddix Ferry 26-27 July 1864 and engaged in a skirmish 27 August 1864. In April 1865, the regiment was transferred to Texas for occupational duty. Clark became ill in Indianola, Texas, on 5 July 1865. He was a patient at the Corps D’ Afrique U.S. General Hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana, where he died of scurvy on 23 July 1865. He is buried in the Chalmette National Cemetery, which was established in May 1864, adjacent to Battle of New Orleans site, in Sec. 119-Grave 9762.75 The Clark artillery jacket was completely hand sewn and retains its full array of red trim tape. The body of the Clark artillery jacket is made from a slightly lighter shade of dark blue wool than the Type 3B infantry-style Schuylkill Arsenal size 2 jacket. The height of the front left label from hem to top corner is 19¾ inches and the height of the collar is 2 inches. The Type 3A’s body lining also is an unbleached blend of wool and cotton, similar to the lining in the Type 3B size 3 Schuylkill Arsenal jacket (FIG 43).

The Clark artillery jacket retains the point on the bottom of the rear hem (FIG 64), measuring 22¾ inches from

FIG 64. Clark jacket hem detail.

the base of the collar to that point, or 1½ inches longer than the size 2 infantry-style jacket. Thus, the cut and proportions of the Type 2A and Type 2B size 2 Schuylkill Arsenal jackets are identical, except for the modifications to the infantry jackets collar and tail on the latter, plus minor difference in the cuffs.

The Clark artillery jacket had its lowest cuff buttons positioned ⅞ of an inch from the bottom of the sleeve, and the second buttons were spaced 1½ inches above them. By contrast, the Type 2B infantry-style jacket had its lowest cuff button positioned ⅝ of an inch from the bottom of the sleeve, and the second button positioned 2 inches above them. Such seamstress variations were common in Civil War uniforms.

Thus, when compared to an unmodified Schuylkill Arsenal mounted jacket, the alterations made to create the infantry-style jackets stand out. There can be little doubt that the Schuylkill Arsenal size 2 infantry-style jacket received post-production modifications to attain its current appearance.

Comparison of Schuylkill Arsenal Infantry-style Jackets Two other Schuylkill Arsenal jackets with short collars and no trim are known and have eleven-button fronts.

These include the size 3 Schuylkill Arsenal jacket (FIG 43) and the Byam Signal Corps jacket (FIG 41) shown earlier.

As previously mentioned, the size 3 SA jacket was in the collection of Michael McAfee in the 1960s and was offered

by George Lower “The Gettysburg Sutler” in his fall 1974 and spring 1975 catalogs.76 That uniform is currently displayed in the Museum section of George Susat’s Civil War Antiques website, who graciously provided photographs.77 The size 3 Schuylkill infantry-style jacket appears to have always included small buttons on either side of the ¾ of an inch tall collar. Those buttons, and the hook and eye neck closure, are likely hold-overs from the uniform’s original configuration as a cavalry or artillery jacket. The collar stitching is competent, but does not compare in workmanship to the vertical row of stitching adjacent to the button shanks. The looseness of the stitching on the top of the collar is consistent with the collar being reduced in height after original production (FIG 65). Similarly, the stitching on the bottom of the hem is looser and more puckered than the stitching along the vertical edge of the lapel. In addition, the hem pieces overlap, rather than fitting neatly together (FIG 66). Such signs suggest the Schuylkill size 3 jacket was reduced in length from a 12- to an 11-button configuration after issue.

The size 2 and size 3 infantry-style jackets and the Clark artillery jacket all have wool hem linings that have a point in the rear on top, but only the Clark artillery jacket has the parallel point at the bottom of the hem itself, making it as long in the back as it is in the front. In addition, the wool facing of the bottom of the lapel makes a smooth transition to the facing on the bottom of the hem on the

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FIG 65. Collar of Type 3B Schuylkill Arsenal size 3 jacket.

FIG 66. Hem of Type 3B Schuylkill Arsenal size 3 jacket.

Clark coat, whereas the wool facing pieces overlap in the two infantry-style jackets, indicative of reworking.

Gettysburg National Military Park Museum Curator Gregory Goodell graciously provided the collection’s description of Daniel P. Byam’s Signal Corps jacket, as well as photographs of it (FIGs 67-69). Daniel P. Byam was a twenty-year-old farmer from Chelmsford, Massachusetts, when he enrolled in the 6th Massachusetts Infantry on 30 August 1862. He was mustered out on 3 June 1863, and reportedly joined the Signal Corps soon thereafter.

The following is an excerpt from the museum catalog’s description of Byam’s jacket: GETT 28212 - Non-regulation navy blue wool shell jacket; jacket has a plain 4-piece padded stand-up collar that measures 1” high at the back-center and tapers to 3/4” high at the front, stitching along the top of the collar is crudely done; the bodice is of 6-piece construction - two front panels and four back panels, the jacket has 11 brass buttons down the front arranged in a single row, … the hem at the backcenter forms a lesser point, the jacket is fully lined with an off-white wool, … both sleeve linings are marked with three

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large blackish-brown dots arranged in a triangle at the shoulders; the front of the jacket measures 20” long from the space between the collar to the pointed hem, the back measures 20¾” long from the top of the collar to the hem; … jacket was worn by Private (2d Class) Daniel P. Byam of the US Signal Corps. 78

Several points from the museum’s description of the Byam jacket are noteworthy. First, the jacket is not actually marked with the Schuylkill Arsenal “SA” stamp. The use of three dots to indicate size 3 was used by that facility, but it was also used by some Federal contractors, who were not required to stamp their products with their name until mid-war. Thus, the attribution of the jacket to Schuylkill Arsenal is reasonable but not a certainty. Second, the jacket is not lined with “checked cotton cloth” as stated by McDonald; it is lined with “off-white wool.” That makes the Baym jacket similar to the Clark artillery jacket, which does not hurt the Schuylkill Arsenal attribution, but shows that claims need verification. Third, and also contrary to McDonald’s account, neither the Park Service description of the Byam jacket nor the photographs of it show a hook and eye at the collar. Fourth, the museum’s characterization of the Byam collar as “crudely done” is consistent with it being a Type 3B jacket, converted by Byam or his company tailor from a high collar jacket for mounted troops to its current configuration (FIG 68).

FIG 67. Byam jacket GETT_28212.. Courtesy GNMP.

FIG 68. Byam collar GETT_28212.. Courtesy GNMP.

FIG 69. Byam hem GETT_28212. Courtesy GNMP.

The museum description of the Byam jacket does not mention the nature of the stitching on the inside of the hem, but its photograph shows puckering that is typical with restitching, as well as the overlap of the inner hem piece with the inner lapel piece (FIG 69). That feature was seen on both the size 2 (FIG 62) and size 3 (FIG 66) Schuylkill Arsenal infantry-style jackets but not on the untouched Clark artillery jacket (FIG 64). The Byam jacket may well have been shortened from the regulation twelvebutton front by raising the hem to create the present eleven-button configuration. In that respect, the Byam jacket is similar to the size 3 Schuylkill Arsenal jacket.

Thus, both the size 2 and size 3 Schuylkill jackets show work on the back hem to reduce the tail point, and the Byam and size 3 SA jacket shows evidence of shortening the front from 12 to 11 buttons. Given that no documentation was found authorizing a deviation from the regulation’s specification of twelve-button fronts for uniform jackets, it seems unlikely either the size 3 jacket or the Byam jacket would have passed the Schuylkill Arsenal inspectors. It also is noteworthy the size 2, size 3, and Byam Schuylkill Arsenal jackets differ slightly from one another in terms of their collar height. Each of these facts strongly indicates each low-collar jacket represents a Type 3B modification of a mounted service jacket, rather than having been produced in their current forms as Type 3C jackets.

Details of other Infantry and Signal Corps uniform jackets The two known infantry-style uniform jackets with contractor markings differ from each other. The J. T. Martin jacket (FIG 52), with its officer’s quality, fine wool body, thin green lining, two interior pockets, and staff officer’s buttons, gives every appearance of being a Type 2B private purchase jacket. Although it is possible it was produced under one of Martin’s many federal contracts, the full set of general staff small buttons are inappropriate for an enlisted man’s jacket. Consequently, the jacket must have received some customization, precluding its acceptance as a Type 3C. The jacket worn by Sgt. George H. Snell of the 121st New York, made by contractor W. R. Harkness (FIG 42), formerly in Company member Don Troiani’s collection, has a collar similar to Schuylkill Arsenal infantry-style jackets in showing puckering and other hints that it was reduced in height and resewn (FIG 70). It also has a rounded edge to the bottom corner of the right side of the eleven-button front, suggesting that the front was modified, as well. Unfortunately, the rear hem details were inaccessible at the time of this study.

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FIG 71. Type 3B or C jacket formerly in the collection of Richard Tibbals. Courtesy of Cowan’s Auction.

FIG 70. Collar of the Type 3B Harkness contract jacket.

The infantry-style uniform jacket from the late Company member Richard K. Tibbal’s collection (FIG 71) differs from other examples by having a collar that is over 1 inch tall, and by having top stitching along the front vertical lapel edge, adjacent to the eleven button holes. When offered at auction in 2005, it was billed as a, “Rare Civil War Enlisted Signal Corps Fatigue Jacket.” The interior details, including any makers or inspector marks, were not provided in the auction listing and, regrettably, are unknown at this time.79 The late Company member Denis E. Reen’s collection included an infantry-style uniform jacket, which was lined in a wool-cotton brown and russet checked cloth (FIG 72). The sleeves are lined with cotton sheeting that bears a likely mill-mark on right inside sleeve lining,

FIG 72. Type 3B or C by unknown maker. Courtesy of Skinner’s Auction.

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which says LANCA before being cut off to fit, probably signifying Lancaster Mill. The jacket also shows the unique feature of having twelve buttons in front and eleven button holes to mate with them. Perhaps due to that anomaly, the jacket carries a large X in the upper sleeve lining, rather than an inspector’s stamp, perhaps signifying that it failed inspection. It also is possible it was in the process of being modified from a twelve-button to an eleven-button coat when the war ended and it was packed away. The 2015 auction description characterized the jacket as “in unissued condition.”80 Unfortunately, it was unavailable for this study, so it is impossible to draw further conclusions about it.

The Gettysburg National Military Park Museum collection includes a second Signal Corps jacket (FIG 73).

Excerpts from that description are as follows: GETT 46264 - Non-regulation Union navy blue wool shell jacket; jacket has a plain stand-up collar that measures 1” high at the back-center and tapers to ¾” high at the front, stitching along the top of the collar is crudely done; the jacket has 9 brass buttons down the front arranged in a single row (space for 11, but top two near the collar are missing)… sleeves are 7” wide and of 2-piece construction with an inner and outer seam, each cuff has a 3½” long placket on the outer seam with 3 additional brass eagle buttons attached (same size and pattern as the front)…; interior body of this uniform jacket is lined with its original, off-white cotton cloth material…inner sleeves are lined with white cotton or muslin material; lining has been lightly quilted... both sleeve linings are marked with the mark “C.oo” at the shoulders (unknown size mark); the front of the jacket measures 19” long from the space between the collar to the pointed hem…left sleeve contains a signalman’s patch sewn directly to a 2½” square piece of navy blue uniform cloth that was hand-stitched to the jacket sleeve…used by the army Signal Corps is similar to the types worn by Federal cavalry and proved to a tough, light and comfortable garment.

FIG 73. Signal Corps jacket GETT_046264. Courtesy GNMP.

FIG 74. Signal Corps trousers.

Horse Soldier for Stamatelos’ estate. Details indicating the trousers were privately purchased include the fine It is noteworthy the Gettysburg Park Service Museum wool material of the trousers (which is substantial but referred to both of the Signal Corps jackets in their lighter and softer than kersey), the trousers’ dog ear collection as “non-regulation,” consistent with that style pockets with decorative top stitching, and the larger-thannot being authorized by the Quartermaster General. The regulation saddling on the seat. That is consistent with the Gettysburg Park Service’s second Signal Corps jacket was attribution of that Signal Corps jacket as being privately discovered in Maine by late Company member James purchased.

Stamatelos. The combination of fine wool body, three Conclusions button cuffs, and absence of contractor or inspector From 1862 onward, federal troops served the Union markings are indicative of a Type 2B private purchase while wearing at least nine primary types of jackets. The uniform. The NPS description conveys the impression existence of a tenth style, the Type 3C jacket purportedly that the collar was modified after production, which is made by the federal government for infantry and Signal unusual for a privately purchased item.

Corps troops, is questionable. No primary source evidence When discovered, the Maine jacket was accompanied could be located in the records of the quartermaster by a pair of sky-blue mounted trousers (FIG 74). The department that government facilities or contractors ever Gettysburg National Park Service elected not to purchase produced infantry or Signal Corps uniform jackets with those trousers when the ensemble was marketed by The a short collar, an 11 or 12 button front, and an absence

of colored trim tape. Similarly, the majority of the information presented in the quartermaster general’s report covering 1864-1865 does not indicate such jackets were produced, whereas a few tables suggesting that possibility appear to contain multiple errors, which undermines their conclusiveness.

The size 2 (FIGs 60-62) and size 3 (FIGs 43, 65-66) infantry uniform-style jackets bearing the Schuylkill Arsenal stamp, plus the Byam Signal Corps jacket (FIGs 41, 67-69) differ from one another in the height of the collar and the number of buttons in front. In addition, all three of these uniforms, which were touted as evidence of Schuylkill Arsenal manufacture of the infantry-style jacket, show substantial evidence of post-production modification. Contractor-marked infantry uniformstyle jackets and unmarked jackets also differ from one another in their collar configurations and number of front button configurations. Such non-uniformity is contrary to the quartermaster inspection system that was in high gear by the latter half of the war. Although the details of some known infantry-style jackets were unavailable, all arsenal and contractor marked infantry and Signal Corps uniform jackets that were closely examined showed signs of alterations, making them Type 3B rather than Type 3C jackets.

As the previous article in this series indicated, soldier and company tailor modifications were common in Civil War uniforms that are identified to individual soldiers or show honest field wear.81 Anyone skeptical that company tailors and private purchases could have produced the large number of low collar jackets seen in photographs of federal infantry and Signal Corps soldiers in 1864-1865 should consider the comparable number of privately purchased caps, hats, and boots shown being worn by those same troops. Of the nineteen Signal Corps enlisted men shown in FIGs 40 and 59, for example, only one is wearing an issue forage cap and two may be wearing issue Hardee hats but without the regulation trimmings. Nine Signal Corpsmen are wearing private purchase caps and seven are wearing non-regulation slouch hats. Clearly, the Union soldier was able to satisfy his clothing needs through a variety of means. Indeed, it is possible that infantry and Signal Corps units made such demands for mounted jackets that they stimulated the quartermaster department to overproduce such uniforms, leading to the relatively high levels of surplus cavalry and artillery jackets that are still seen in today’s militaria collecting marketplace.

The present negative conclusions about federal production of the Type 3C infantry and Signal Corps uniform jacket have largely focused on the Office of the Quartermaster General and the Schuylkill Arsenal, and the close examination of the small number of known surviving specimens. It is conceivable documentation about federally-produced infantry and Signal Corps jackets could exist in the records of the St. Louis, Cincinnati, or

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 309

other Midwestern depots; such regional records need to be examined. In addition, despite the general federal assumption of responsibility for clothing and equipping the volunteer forces in 1862, New York contracted for infantry uniform jackets throughout the war; other states may have done so, as well. Research on Civil War jacket contracts is needed in the archives of the loyal states, as well as in the records of uniforms issued to individual regiments and soldiers.

Finally, conclusive artifacts may exist in closet collections. Perhaps there is a uniform jacket with federal arsenal markings, a low collar, and no colored trim that shows absolutely no signs of individual alteration. If such a uniform exists, possibly with an eleven-button front and Signal Corp insignia, its owner is encouraged to offer close-up photographs or an examination opportunity.

It is a principle of logic and science that it is impossible to prove that something does not exist, whether it be Confederate gold, ghosts on the Gettysburg battlefield, or a federally manufactured Civil War infantry uniform jacket. The reason is it takes only one solid piece of evidence to overturn the null hypothesis. For example, there is no VRC jacket shown in the thirty-eight plates produced under the direction of Col. George Crosman in 1866 to document uniforms made for the enlisted men of the Army.82 That might cause an impulsive researcher to conclude the uniform was never officially authorized.

But a more experienced researcher could demonstrate the VRC jacket is the subject of official quartermaster correspondence in the National Archives was described in the 1865 Quartermaster General’s Manual.83 Similarly, the possibility cannot be excluded that quartermaster documents stored in Schuylkill Arsenal, the clothing returns of a Western regiment, or an original uniform resting silently in an old attic could still surface and add new light to this story.

That said, when a diligent, good-faith effort to find evidence for the federal production and distribution of a Type 3C jacket failed to obtain any solid documentation or unambiguous examples and instead found the opposite, the grounds of discussion must shift.84 Now, those who wish to assert that an infantry and Signal Corps uniform jacket was federally produced and widely issued are obligated to go beyond equivocal period images and the inconsistent Quartermaster General’s Report to establish the credibility of their argument. Instead, proponents of the federal issue infantry and Signal Corps jacket must provide primary documents such as quartermaster letters, specifications and contracts, and offer surviving uniforms that show no evidence of post-production modification, in order to support their case.

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Based on the foregoing, arsenal or contractor marked jackets with short collars and 10-, 11-, or 12-button fronts should be regarded as Type 3B soldier modified jackets until conclusive detailed examination demonstrates them to be examples of the elusive Type 3C uniform. Until then, based on all currently available information, the Type 3C federal issue infantry uniform jacket should be treated like the belief among Civil War reenactors in the 1970s that federal uniforms were sewn with “brown thread”:85 a Civil War myth.

Dedicated to the late Michael McAfee, whose 1982 comment that these jackets are “an enigma” created a long-term fascination and whose help and inspiration on this topic continued into his final weeks. Thanks to R. Gregory Goodell, Museum Curator, Gettysburg National Military Park for his help on the uniforms in that collection and Company Fellows Fred Gaede and Jerry Coates, and to Members Robert Anderson, Dan Binder, Jan Gordon, Ron Maness, Larry Strayer and Brian White for their valuable input and feedback.

Notes 37. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 92, entry 225, Clothing & Equipage, Box 1170.

38. K.C. McDonald, “Forgotten Federal ‘Generic’ Garments: Part 1, the Federal Infantry Uniform Jacket & State Issue Shell Jackets,” retrieved 1 March 2020 from: https://www.researchgate. net/publication/265410725_Forgotten_Federal_’Generic’_ Garments_Part_1_the_Federal_Infantry_Uniform_Jacket_ State_Issue_Shell_Jackets.

39. D. Troiani, E. J. Coates, M. J. McAfee, Don Troiani’s Regiments & Uniforms of the Civil War (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 163.

40. Michael McAfee, “U.S. Army Uniforms of the Civil War, Part IV: The Jacket,” Military Images, 4, no. 6 (1982).

41. Neal Thomas Hurst, “Tailoring for an Army: The Schuylkill Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1861,” MC&H, 64, no. 4 (Winter, 2012).

42 Heritage Auctions, The Stephen Saathoff Collection of Civil War & Militaria, Signature Auction #6124, 13 December 2014, Lot #381053.

43. Michael McAfee, email to the author, 14 July 2019. Photographs of FIG 43 were sent to Mr. McAfee, who responded that same evening: “Thanks - yes, that was mine.” Further details in footnote 46.

44. Dan Wambaugh & Brian White, “Schuylkill Arsenal Jackets,” retrieved 13 July 2019 from http://wwandcompany.com/ schuylkill-arsenal-jackets.

45. Ron Field, Rally Round the Flag—Uniforms of the Union Volunteers of 1861: The New England States (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing., Ltd. 2015); Ron Field, Uniforms of the Union Volunteers of 1861: The Mid-Atlantic States (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing., Ltd., 2018).

46. Michael McAfee & John P. Langellier, Billy Yank: The Uniform of the Union Army, 1861-1865 (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), 2735.

47. “Trim-Stripped Shell Jacket Attributed to Sgt. Michael Cline, 17th Indiana,” Cowan’s Auction, 16 Nov. 2005, lot 302, retrieved 1 March 2020 from cowanauctions.com/lot/trim-stripped-shelljacket-attributed-to-sgt-michael-cline-17th-indiana-30472.

48. “Rare Government Contract Waist Length Shell Jacket,” Heritage Auction #6015, November 2008, Lot #57508, retrieved on 1 March 2020 from historical.ha.com/itm/military-and-patriotic/ rare-government-contract-waist-length-shell-jacket/a/601557508.s?ic4=GalleryView-Thumbnail-071515.

49. Michael J. Winey, Union Army Uniforms at Gettysburg (Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1998).

50. Richard K. Tibbals, “What’s Wrong With This Picture?” Military Images, 10, no. 2 (September-October 1988): 10-13.

51. Field, Rally, 28 and Middle-Atlantic States,104; Don Troiani, “French Uniforms, Cloth & Equipage in the Union Army, Part 1,” North-South Trader’s Civil War, 26, no. 2 (1999): 38-50; Don Troiani, “French Uniforms, Cloth & Equipage in the Union Army, Part 2,” North-South Trader’s Civil War, 26, no. 3 (1999): 24-32.

52. John B. Roberts & Kenneth S. Roberts, Smithsonian Institution Federal Enlisted Uniforms of the Civil War (Washington, DC: Roberts Video Publishing, Inc. 1990).

53. In Library of Congress photo LC-B817-7727, “Signal Corps camp quarters near Georgetown” said to have been taken “1862 August,” seven enlisted Signal Corps men are wearing fatigue blouses and three are wearing jackets. One jacket has is a Type 2B with three buttons on the sleeve; one appears to have a 10-button front, suggest Type 3B, but the soldier’s movement and his saber belt straps make it difficult to be certain; and a third jacket is largely blocked by an officer seated in front of the soldier. Retrieved on 1 March 2020 from www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2018667077/.

Similarly, J. P. Langellier’s Army Blue: The Uniform of Uncle Sam’s Regulars 1848-1873 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1998),173, presents a photo from Michael McAfee’s collection of Signalman Hamilton Clark wearing a jacket with a ten-button front. Under close examination, it is clear his belt buckle hid only one and not two buttons. Whether Hamilton Clark’s jacket left Schuylkill with twelve buttons or left St. Louis with eleven buttons, it seems clear the jacket was modified after production.

54. National Archives Microfilm Publication M745, Correspondence of the Office of the Quartermaster General (OQG), RG92, Roll # 43, Vol 70, June 26-August 7, 1863; Vol 71 August 7-September 19, 1863.

55. Entry 1004, Schuylkill Arsenal, Book of Letters Received, 18631864, OQG, RG 92, NARA. 56. Entry 999, OQG, Letters Sent, 1863-1865, RG 92, NARA. 57. Letter received by the OQG, the Office of Clothing and Equipage (No. 101 East Third Street) Cincinnati, 18 August 1862, entry 1004, RG 92, NARA. 58. Entry 1246, Executed Contracts, OQG, RG 92, NARA. 59. Books of Letters Sent, 1862-1865, volumes 19-25, Schuylkill Arsenal, entry 999, OQG, RG 92, NARA. 60. Robert Anderson, email to the author, 24 July 2019.

61. Entry 3, letters received Vol. 1-4 for 1862 through 1865, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, RG111, NARA. 62. Montgomery C. Meigs, Report of the Quartermaster General of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the Year Ending June 30, 1865 (Washington: GPO, 1865).

63. Exhibit 5, 62-64, retrieved 1 March 2020 from books.google.com.

64. Ibid., Exhibit B, 715-719.

65. Ibid., Exhibit 53, 207-211.

66. C. J. Daley’s website presents, “Excerpts from the Quartermaster General’s annual report for the year ending June 30, 1864” and includes a table of material “Received at the depot of clothing and equipage, Philadelphia, Pa., during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864.” That table states, “Uniform coats. 50,540” and, “Uniform jackets, infantry. 196,074.” But the latter designation is suspected to be an error because the Philadelphia depot fails to report

any entries for artillery, cavalry or VRC jackets, which is highly unlikely.

67. War Department, Revised United States Army Regulations of 1861 with an Appendix Continuing the Changes and Laws Affecting Army Regulation and Articles of War to June 25, 1863 (Washington: GPO, 1863), Section 1483, 463.

68. George H. Crossman, Earl J. Coates, and Frederick Gaede, 1865 Quartermaster’s Manual: For the Use of Officers of The Quartermaster’s Department, Containing Specifications for All Purchases and Contracts They May Be Required to Make for The United States Army. Chapter 8, Clothing (Gettysburg, PA: Arbor House Publishing, 2013), 167-169.

69. Ibid., 325-363.

70. B. F. Magee, History of the 72nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry of the Mounted Lightning Brigade (Lafayette, IN: S. Vater & Co, 1882), 109.

71. Richard K. Tibbals, “A Variant Government-Made Artillery Jacket,” MC&H, 34, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 33-34.

72. Michael R. Cunningham, “Federal Soldier Modifications of Civil War Issue Uniforms, Part 1: Jackets, Coats, Trousers and Headgear,” MC&H, 71, no. 3 (Fall 2020).

73. Washington, District of Columbia, Signal Corps camp near Georgetown, Library of Congress LC-B817- 7730 [P&P] LOT 4162-E. Retrieved 1 March 2020 from www.loc.gov/pictures/ item/2018672053/ 74. George Lower, The Gettysburg Sutler, Catalog 18 (privately published, Spring 1974), item C02. Jan Gordon, personal communication at the Gettysburg Civil War show, 29 June 2019.

75. John Clark, Military Service Records, Records, Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s-1917, RG 94, NARA, retrieved through Fold 3.

76. George Lower, The Gettysburg Sutler, Catalog 19 (privately published, Fall, 1974) item C04 and, Catalog 20 (privately published, Spring, 1975) and item C08.

77. Susat Civil War Antiques. display of Schuylkill Arsenal Jacket with caption: “These jackets are sometimes called signal corps jackets.

They were popular. They were made from late 1863 on and were issued in both the east and west … .” Retrieved 1 March 2020 from susatcivilwarantiques.com/products/schuylkill-arsenal-jacket.

78. EMail to the author, Gettysburg National Military Park Curator Gregory Goodell, 24 July 2018.

79. Cowan’s Auction Historic Americana, Rare Civil War Enlisted Signal Corps Fatigue Jacket. Richard K. Tibbals Collection, 16 November 2005. Retrieved 1 March 2020 from www. cowanauctions.com/lot/rare-civil-war-enlisted-signal-corpsfatigue-jacket-28129.

80. Skinner Historic Arms & Militaria Auction, 30 October 2015, Federal Infantry Uniform Jacket, “Description: Federal Infantry Uniform Jacket, c. 1861-65, dark blue kersey body, all handsewn with the exception of a line of topstitching on the top of the collar … ,” retrieved 1 March 2020 from www.skinnerinc.com/ auctions/2856M/lots/189.

81. Cunningham, “Federal Soldier Modifications of Civil War Issue Uniforms, Part 1.”

82. Edgar M. Howell, “Redating the Quartermaster Civil War Uniform Photographs,” MC&H, 14, no. 3 (Fall, 1962).

83. Crossman, et al., 1865 Quartermaster’s Manual, 168.

84. Company Fellow Fred Gaede graciously checked his notes for NARA RG 92, reporting in a personal email of 9 July 2019, none of the following National Archive sources mentioned the production of infantry uniform jackets: E 393, analysis of decisions on the Internal Revenue Laws and a digest of Congressional acts relating to the quartermaster department; E 999, Letters Sent, OQG, Office of Clothing & Equipage; E 1084, OQG, Notes on inspections; E 2195, OQG, Letters Sent concerning Orders, Purchases and

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 311

Contracts. Books 3 to 11.

E 236, 2d Comptroller’s Office, Quartermaster Contracts, Records of the Accounting Officers of the Department of the Treasury, RG 217; Notes on Cincinnati Depot, Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, RG 393.

Similarly, Company Fellow Jerry Coates, who did extensive research on Civil War uniforms in the National Archives, especially while preparing the 1865 Quartermaster Manual for publication, was consulted. He reported having seen no documents pertaining to the design or manufacture of an infantry or Signal Corps uniform jacket and believes if such a jacket had been authorized, it would have been described in the 1865 Quartermaster Manual. Phone conversation,7 July 2019.

Finally, West Point museum curator Michael McAfee was briefed on the current findings and replied by e-mail on 14 July 2019, stating: “That all makes sense. Before I retired, I noticed that the 6th PA Cavalry jacket in the collection started its life as a regulation issue cavalry uniform jacket. In the right light, one could see the original “V” stitch marks under the changed cuff trim. Years ago, I had an 11-button jacket with shortened collar with one eagle button each side. I would wager that if closely examined signs of alteration could be found - no idea where it is now of course.” Photographs of FIG 6 were sent to Mr. McAfee, who responded that same evening: “Thanks - yes, that was mine. I had lost track of it years ago. I have a detailed sketch sheet of it somewhere. The attribution came from its purchase with an identified infantry uniform coat of a 7th NH soldier. I purchased them together in the 1960s but suspect they were just put together.”

85. E. J. Coates, “Brown Thread, a Civil War Myth,” North-South Trader’s Civil War, 5, no. 5, (July 1978).

A U.S. Navy PBM Mariner flying boat of Fleet Air Wing 6 is hoisted aboard the U.S. Navy seaplane tender USS Curtiss (AV-4) after returning from a mine-hunting patrol off North Korea during the Korean War. Naval Historical Center photo 94616.

312 Military Collector & Historian

On Our Covers René Chartrand Fenian infantryman, 1870 he Fenians Raids of 1866 and 1870 upon Canada that originated in the United States were a somewhat forceful expression of expatriate Irish-Americans towards anything British, allied with the rather optimistic objective of conquering Canada and exchanging it for Ireland’s independence. The 1866 raid failed, but the Fenians planned to invade Canada again. The American authorities let them plan their aggression on Canada while they were in the United States. Thousands of interested volunteers signed up, money flowed into their organizations, and they contracted for weapons and uniforms. In 1867, they claimed to have twenty regiments of over eleven thousand men.

It was said that many were American Civil War veterans.

They also had spies in their midst who reported directly to the Canadian prime minister’s office in Ottawa.

The Fenian’s Irish Republican Army was certainly the best-armed and best-uniformed para-military force ever raised in the United States. Green being the national color of Ireland, it was the obvious hue for the uniforms of the Irish Republican Army that sought to invade Canada.

Thousands of dark green jackets, whose cut was inspired by the U.S. cavalry jacket of the time, trimmed with yellow lace edging and brass buttons bearing the letters “I.R.A.,” sky blue trousers, dark blue cap with white piping and a dark green band edged with red were obtained as well as for “20,000 fatigue caps of blue cloth United States pattern, with narrow green bands.” The 1870 invasion attempts also failed. U.S. authorities eventually intervened to disarm the invaders. The jacket and cap shown on the cover plate are from original items captured at Eccles Hill (Québec, near the Vermont border) on 25 May 1870 and presented to Prince Arthur, one of Queen Victoria’s sons, who was then serving in Canada. Other items captured included surplus U.S. Army fatigue caps and accouterments. The plate by Ron Volstad reproduced by the kind courtesy of the History and Heritage Directorate, Department of National Defence, Ottawa.

René Chartrand

T

Sources: 7 January, 16 March and 20 December 1867 reports to prime minister, MG26, A, vol. 59, Library and Archives Canada. See also Wayne Colwell (text) and Francis Back (plate), “Irish Republican Army (Fenian Brotherhood), Vermont/Quebec Border, May 1870,” MC&H, 1988. MUIA Plate No. 619. The Volunteer Review, 15 May 1871. The jacket “taken from a Fenian made prisoner during the raid made into Canada” is now in the collection of National Historic Sites, Parks Canada. One of the author’s finer moments as a curator was being instrumental in its return to Canada, with thanks to the Royal Artillery Institute and its museum at Woolwich, UK. The cap that was originally with it in 1871 was sketched by National Army Museum curator William Y. Carman in the mid-twentieth century, but has since vanished.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 313

General George Patton’s Customized Jeep, Northwest Europe, 1945 eneral Patton’s style of command emphasized his remaining highly visible to his soldiers. Among the vehicles he used in Europe were customized jeeps. Their most notable features were airhorns adapted from trombones and, later, extended wheel wells to provide better protection from mud. Other customized features included a reinforced windshield and comfortable seating for the General and his aide. Our cover shows one of General Patton’s jeeps, used toward the end of the Second World War and during the months immediately following its end in Europe. Following Patton’s accidental death, this same jeep was sent to the Quartermaster Department Depot in Richmond, Virginia, and later transferred to the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum in Fort Lee. It was photographed there by the author with profuse thanks to the staff of the museum, who most kindly greeted members of the Company during the Annual Meeting at Richmond.

The panel located at the back of the exhibit displays a number of quotations which typify the very colorful General Patton:

G

“If I could only steal some gas I could win this war.”

“At the present time my chief difficulty is not the Germans, but gasoline. If they could give me enough gas, I could go anywhere I want.”

René Chartrand

314 Military Collector & Historian

A Deserter of the 7th U.S. Infantry Donald McConnell and Gustav Person

F

ollowing the Secession Crisis in the winter of 18601861, Army units throughout Texas and the Southwest sought to evade capture by a speedy return to the North. A number were successful, while other units were captured or surrendered in toto. In his posthumously published The Military Policy of the United States, Emory Upton identified twenty-six servicemen of the 7th U.S. Infantry who deserted to Confederate forces after their capture in July 1861 in the New Mexico Territory. There were many more desertions from the Regular Army during this period, but that is another story. This article will describe the experience of one of those 7th Infantry deserters and his ultimate fate three years later.1 The Regiment at the War’s Outbreak After distinguished service in the Mexican War (184648) and the Utah Expedition (1858), the 7th Infantry was ordered to take station in New Mexico, arriving in Santa Fe in August 1860, from where it was sent to various posts in the Territory. With the outbreak of the Civil War in the spring of 1861, the regiment was ordered consolidated and directed to march south to the lower Rio Grande River along the Texas border. In early July, the Headquarters and Companies A, B, D, E, G, I, and K had assembled at Fort Fillmore awaiting the expected arrival of Companies C and F from Fort Craig, New Mexico, and Company H at Fort Buchanan in the Arizona Territory. Fort Fillmore had been named after President Millard Fillmore when it was organized in September 1851.2 Scouting parties from Fort Bliss, Texas, where the Confederates were gathering, had ventured within twenty miles of Fort Fillmore where Maj. Isaac Lynde (USMA class of 1827) was in command.3 Here, all was anxiety and doubt. No authentic information of the intended policy of the government in Washington had been received.

The only news brought by courier revealed the continued secession of the Southern States and the general inability of the government to take effective action.

On 23 July, Major Lynde, hearing that the enemy was about to advance upon Fort Fillmore, immediately called in any outlying detachments.

The Confederates, meeting with no resistance in their advance, entered the town of Mesilla, across the Rio Grande and about two miles from the post. On the night of 24-25 July, the Confederates intended to surprise the garrison by a coup de main and capture the entire force, but a Confederate deserter alerted the Unionists of the peril and the attack was aborted.4 The body of Confederate troops, numbering around 250, were under the command of Lieutenant Col. John Baylor, C.S.A. Later on the afternoon of 25 July, Major Lynde sent an envoy to negotiate with the Confederates who

immediately demanded his surrender. Lynde declined to submit and ordered the abandonment of the post and the destruction of all the Federal property. About 0100 on the twenty-seventh, the troops took up the march for Fort Stanton. By daylight, the command had arrived in the vicinity of San Augustine Springs. The day being extremely hot, and there being no water, many of the men dropped out almost dead from fatigue and thirst. The Confederates had pursued the troops as soon as possible but were initially deflected by a company of the Regiment of Mounted Rifles which was deployed as a rear guard.5 The enemy advanced within 300 yards of the command, when Major Lynde sent out a flag of truce and at once commenced negotiations for surrendering his command which was accomplished in a very short time. Various regimental officers attempted to oppose this move, to no avail. The colors of the regiment were cut from the staffs, torn into pieces, and distributed among the soldiers. It was at this point that soldiers began to desert to take up service with the Confederates.6 On 29 July, the troops left San Augustine Springs as prisoners of war, arriving in Las Cruces the same night where they were paroled on the thitieth and thirtyfirst. They departed Las Cruces on 3 August en route to Fort Union, arriving at Fort Craig on the tenth where they were greeted by the men of Company F who had not been involved in the surrender. Major Lynde was later summarily dismissed from the service by order of President Lincoln, and then restored to duty to date from 28 July 1866 when he immediately retired.7 The seven surrendered companies remained at Fort Union until 18 August when they were ordered to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri; arriving there in November. The following month, the army headquarters ordered them to garrison stations on the Great Lakes. On 30 September 1862, these companies were declared released from parole and in October were ordered to join the regular brigade in the Army of the Potomac.8 Pvt. Barney Gibbons Barney Gibbons (AKA Gibbins) was born in 1836 in Hamilton, Madison County, New York. His father died when he was nine years old and his mother when he was thirteen. On 1 December 1858, he enlisted in the U.S. Army at Toledo, Ohio for a period of five years. Gibbons listed his occupation as a teamster. He had grey eyes, dark brown hair, and fair complexion. He stood five feet, five and one-half inches tall. According to 1st Sgt. Richard C. Day, who testified at his court-martial, Gibbons joined Company A, 7th U.S. Infantry at Camp Floyd, Utah Territory with a batch of new recruits from Newport Barracks, near Louisville, Kentucky. In late July 1861,

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 315

The New Mexico Territory, 1861. Map Courtesy of Mark Jefferies.

Company A found itself isolated at San Augustine Springs, New Mexico Territory.9 Gibbons later admitted deserting with eighteen other soldiers. He stated that he did not desert with the intention of joining the Rebels. His company had marched all night; he was exhausted and worn out and fell out of the ranks. He laid down on the ground and went to sleep. While asleep, the Rebels captured him. He claimed the Confederates deceived him and induced him to join their ranks. First Sergeant Day testified he was serving in the rear guard on 27 July 1861. He described Gibbons as falling to the rear to obtain water with a number of comrades. He later saw Gibbons about 0400 that morning, and then about three days later, he observed Gibbons riding a black horse in company with the Confederates. Following his conviction, Gibbons later described being enlisted by Confederate Capt. Trevanion T. Teel into Light Company B, 1st Regiment, CS Artillery, Texas Volunteers. This unit was later redesignated the 2d Texas Field Battery. He claimed to have served at the battles of Valverde, Apache Canyon, Johnson’s Ranch, and Albuquerque. This unit was later transferred as marines to the CSS Sachem which had previously served in the Union Navy. He later became dissatisfied with that service and deserted at the first

opportunity by stealing the captain’s gig (carriage) and escaping to the USS Princess Royal on blockade duty. He disembarked at New Orleans and drove a quartermaster’s wagon until May 1864 when he arrived at St. Louis. He joined the workers on the Pacific Railroad to cut ties in Missouri but returned to that city the following month.10 First Sergeant Day testified that in June 1864, he served as an employee of the Quartermaster’s Department at St. Louis. One early morning, he went to get breakfast at the Military Boarding House on Broadway when he noticed a man standing outside. As he passed the man, he noticed him turn pale and something about his stance brought back an old memory. He realized that the man was Barney Gibbons, a former deserter and member of his company.

Day immediately arrested him without incident.11 Maj. Gen. William C. Rosecrans ordered the convening of a general court-martial which was held in the office of Col. William Myers at St. Louis, on 13 July 1864.

Members of the court included Col. William A. Barstow, 3d Wisconsin Cavalry; Lt. Col. C. W. Marsh, A.A.G., Missouri State Militia; Lt. Col. T. H. Dodd, 2d Colorado Cavalry; Lt. Col. D. J. Hynes, 17th Illinois Cavalry; Maj. P. E. Fisher, 17th Illinois Cavalry; Capt. Alexander McLean, 7th Enrolled Missouri Militia; Capt. W. S. Johnson, 1st Arkansas Cavalry; and 1st Lt. Clifford Thomas, 1st New York Cavalry, as the Judge Advocate of the court.12 There was one Specification as follows: In this, that he, Barney Gibbons, a private of Company A, Seventh Regiment United States Infantry, duly enlisted in the service of the United States on or about the 27th day of July, A.D. 1861, at or near San Augustine Springs in the Territory of New Mexico, did absent himself from and desert said service and go over to and join with rebel forces in arms against the government of the United States.13

First Sergeant Day was the principle and only witness.

He described Gibbon’s desertion in some detail, and his own later arrest of the accused.

The hapless Barney Gibbons made an extensive statement to the court, defending his plea of innocent.

“All I have to say is the charges against me is [sic] false.”

He claimed never to have served in the U.S. Army. He described another man, his brother, who went by the name of Barney Gibbons who did belong to the company.

He claimed to be in Texas at that time in a light artillery battery. His brother allegedly told him that he was not treated well and left the Federal service to join Gibbon’s own unit. He went to great efforts to claim that their resemblance was very great. He identified himself as Benjamin Gray, and repeated vigorously that he had never served in the U.S. Infantry.

First Sergeant Day was recalled and challenged about his

316 Military Collector & Historian

identification of Gibbons. He refuted the possibility of a mistaken identity. He stated: He [Gibbons] has a cut upon his lip, and a peculiar manner of walking. Captain Jones of our company was always on him because he never could walk like a soldier. He would throw his head forward and his arms to the rear. He always walked with his hands open and fingers apart even when he had gloves on.

Day further testified that Gibbons received the cut lip from the kick of a horse.

The court deliberated and found Gibbons guilty of desertion: “And the Court does therefore sentence him, the said Barney Gibbons, a private of Co. A, Seventh United States Infantry, to be shot to death with musketry at such time and place as the commanding General may designate. Two-thirds of the court concurring in the above sentence.”14 The execution date was set for 13 August 1864. A unique aspect of Gibbon’s execution was that it was the first military execution of a Union soldier to take place in St. Louis. The military establishment wanted to make a spectacle of it, and to impress the Union soldiers with the seriousness of desertion. Maj. R. D. Nash, Superintendent of Military Prisons and Colonel Baker, Post Commandant, arranged the details.

The day before his execution, Gibbons provided more information on his behavior. He fully admitted deserting with eighteen other soldiers of the 7th Infantry and serving with the Confederate army as First Sergeant Day had testified.

The Execution Gibbon’s execution received extensive coverage by a reporter of the St. Louis Democrat. The troops, numbering at least 700, were formed in a hollow square on the west side of Fort No. 4, with an open face on the east facing the earthen wall. A squad of sixty soldiers of the 10th15 Kansas Volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant Wood, formed the escort as the prisoner was conducted from the Myrtle Street Prison to the place of execution.

Gibbon was carried in a black covered wagon, belonging to Smithers, the undertaker. He sat on his coffin by the side of the officiating priest, Rev. Father Santois of the St. Louis University who had visited him in prison and converted him to Catholicism.

Upon arrival, the priest and prisoner disembarked from the wagon and knelt on the ground in front of the post which had been emplaced before the embankment.

Rising up, Gibbons stepped forward to the post and an attached seat. The coffin was placed on the ground nearby and the attendants brought forward the rope and a white cap. Fifteen feet from the post stood the firing party of six soldiers of the 10th Kansas; and just behind them were

four more reserve men of the same regiment. The rifles of the first six were all loaded with ball and cartridge, except one, so that neither of them could say with certainty that he had caused the prisoner’s death. It was not known which one carried the rifle loaded with a blank cartridge.

The prisoner stood up, facing the firing party. He appeared calm and unmoved, as though determined to meet his doom with manly courage. He was twenty-eightyears old, compactly built, with broad shoulders. He was dressed in his shirt sleeves with his pantaloons turned up at the bottom, and with coarse heavy boots. Seeing the attendants with the rope, he preferred not to be tied, and then sat down against the post. Waving his hands, he exclaimed, “Farewell, farewell.”

Major Nash came forward and read the findings and sentence of the court-martial, after which he asked the prisoner if he had anything to say. Gibbons replied in a calm, firm voice: “I have, but I wish to ask if the President of the United States signed that?” Nash replied in the affirmative, and Gibbons made his statement. He did not deny that he had deserted. He described the events of those days in July 1861, repeating that the Confederates had deceived him into enlisting. He also asked if First Sergeant Day was standing among the spectators, but Major Nash told him that Day was not present. Gibbons thanked Father Santois for his kindness. Santois shook him by the hand and enjoined him to die like a soldier and a Christian.

When the white cap was drawn over his head, he attempted to make one more statement, but no notice was taken of his request. He waved his hand as if satisfied and then his arms were pinioned to the post. Lieutenant Wood then gave the orders: “Make Ready – Aim - Fire!”

Simultaneously, the six rifles were discharged, four bullets entering his body near the stomach and one striking the earth behind him. Gibbons cried out in anguish, “Oh! – too low!” Lieutenant Wood immediately ordered the reserves to fire, and their aim being more accurate, the prisoner’s frame relaxed, his head drooped on his shoulder, and his chest heaved convulsively.

Surgeons Dudley and Youngblood examined the body and declared that life was extinct. The body was placed in the coffin with the hands crossed. While the military band played a solemn dirge, the whole column was marched slowly by, each soldier casting a sorrowful look upon the lifeless face. After the procession had passed, Smithers took possession of the body. The lid was screwed down and the remains were interred in the cemetery at Jefferson Barracks. His grave in the National Cemetery is located in Section 20, Site 4599. The headstone indicates his name and “Confederate States Army, Civil War.” The date of death and interment is actually listed as 12 August 1864.16 How many total Union deserters to the Confederate service received similar punishment remains to be researched. Obviously, Barney Gibbons unfortunately found himself in the wrong place at the wrong time, believing himself immune to capture and prosecution after three intervening years.

Notes 1. Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), 239.

See also William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (Ashton, MD: Eric Lundberg, 1964), 248-50.

2. Lieutenant A. B. Johnson, 7th U.S. Infantry, “The Seventh Regiment of Infantry,” in The Army of the United States, eds.

Theo. F. Rodenbough & William L. Haskin (New York: Argonaut Press LTD, 1966), 501; George T. Ness, Jr., The Regular Army on the Eve of the Civil War (Baltimore, MD: Toomey Press, 1990), 152.

3. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (Washington DC: GPO, 1903), I:649.

4. Johnson, “The Seventh Infantry,” 501.

5. Ibid., 502.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 503; Heitman, Historical Register, I:649.

8. Johnson, “The 7th Infantry,” 503.

9. Ancestry.com U.S. Army Register of Enlistments, 1798-1914 [database on-line] Provo, UT: Ancestry.com Operations Inc., 2007, accessed 29 July 2019. Original Data: Register of Enlistments in the U.S. Army, 1798-1914, National Archives Microfilm Publication M233, 81 Rolls, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s-1917, Record Group 94, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 10. File No. LL 2210, Barney Gibbons, Proceedings of a General Court-Martial Held at St Louis, Missouri., July 13, 1864, NARA Microfilm M1523, Proceedings of U.S. Army Courts-Martial and Military Commissions of Union Soldiers Executed by U.S. Military Authorities, 1861-1866, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s-1917, Record Group 94, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. See also www.civilwarstlouis.com/Gratiot/ tenthkansas5.htm, accessed 19 August 2019.

11. Court-Martial Proceedings.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. “Military Execution,” St. Louis Democrat, 13 August 1864 See https://m.va.gov/gravelocator/index.cfm#N852, accessed 16 November 2019, for details on Gibbon’s headstone in Jefferson Barracks National Cemetery.

Women shipfitters working on board the USS Nereus at the U.S. Navy Yard in Mare Island, circa 1943. (Department of Defense)

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 317

The Court-Martial of George Moule

Donald McConnell and Gustav Person

A

mong the U.S. Army troops serving in Texas and the Southwest in the spring of 1861, the 8th U.S. Infantry occupied garrisons throughout western Texas. Beginning in January 1849, this regiment occupied forts and camps for the next twelve years. In mid-February 1861, the departmental commander, Bvt. Major General David Twiggs, issued an order directing all the Federal troops to leave the state by way of the coast as soon as possible. The attempt to comply with this order resulted in the capture of the entire regiment by the newly organized military forces of the Confederate States. The Regimental Headquarters, the Staff, and Company C entered captivity at San Antonio on 22 April 1861. Companies A and D were captured at Indianola on the Gulf coast on 24 April; and Companies B, E, F, H, I, and K were captured near San Lucas Springs, about twenty-two miles west of San Antonio, on 9 May. Company G had already been broken up and disbanded.1 The officers were held for about nine months when they were exchanged. The enlisted men were held until 25 February 1863. During this time, they were distributed to different posts on the frontiers of Texas. Deprived of sufficient food and clothing, they were also made to suffer military discipline. Confederate recruiting officers visited them almost daily, offering them commissions and large bounties to desert their flag. Meanwhile the regiment was re-constituted, starting on 1 May 1861 at Fort Wood, New York Harbor, where Company G was recruited. The other companies were re-organized at various recruiting stations in Kentucky and New York City. Once reformed, the regiment joined the Army of the Potomac in Virginia.2 The regiment compiled a creditable record during 1862 and 1863, mainly serving as the army headquarters provost guard. By that July, following the battle of Gettysburg, the 8th Infantry was dispatched along with other regular regiments to New York City to assist in putting down the Draft Riots. The regiment occupied posts in and around New York harbor until spring 1864.3 Pvt. George Moule Although research is not yet completed, records consulted thus far indicate over 550 soldiers deserted from regular units in Texas and New Mexico. At least 300 of those men were identified as having enlisted in Confederate units. Many of those who deserted to the Confederates later went over the hill from their Confederate units or were recaptured by Federal forces and swore allegiance to the Union for a second time. Very few appear to have been recognized or suffered any consequences for their desertion. Several actually received pensions for their

318 Military Collector & Historian

as he was appointed first sergeant of his company. Moule performed duty with this unit until he became ill later that year.6 There is one particular piece of the puzzle relating to Moule’s later experiences. How did Moule end up in New later participation in Federal service. Only two of these York City in 1863 at the completion of his service in the men were tried by court-martial for desertion to the 30th Massachusetts? The 30th Massachusetts was not enemy. Pvt. Barney Gibbons of the 7th Infantry was one. transferred to the Army of the Shenandoah in Virginia until The other was Pvt. George H. Moule of Company F, 8th July 1864. Having fallen ill, he may have been transferred Infantry (Capt. James J. van Horn, commanding). to a general hospital in New York for treatment; and then Private Moule (AKA Monte) was one of the members was identified as a deserter when he attempted to re-enlist of Company F who were captured by the Confederates in in his old unit. And since a number of his former comrades May 1861. A native of Herford, England, he was thirty-two- of the 8th Infantry were still on duty there, it would make years old when he was enlisted for five years by Lieutenant sense to have conducted the court-martial in New York.

Sweeney on 21 October 1859. He listed his occupation as We probably will never know for sure.7 a groom. He had gray eyes, brown hair, dark complexion, The Court-Martial and Thereafter and stood six-feet tall.4 Moule’s court-martial convened on 23 November 1863 at On 2 July 1861, Moule was enlisted at San Antonio by Fort Columbus in New York Harbor. The trial had already Capt. P. L. Buquor for one year. He was assigned to been delayed by the accused’s illness. Maj. Frederick Dent, Buquor’s Company, 1st Texas Infantry. He was paid as a 4th U.S. Infantry (incidentally Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant’s corporal from 1 August 1859 in that unit. The company brother-in-law), served as president of the Court. later received a redesignation as Company A, 3d Texas There was one specification: “On or about 10 June 1861 Infantry. Moule received a promotion to sergeant as of 5 at San Antonio, the prisoner did desert and treat Union April 1862; and then promptly deserted on 6 May 1862 at prisoners with unusual severity.”

Fort Brown, Texas.5 The accused pleaded Not Guilty.

At his court-martial, Moule testified he enlisted in Sgt. Christian Nagell, Co. F, 8th U.S. Infantry, testified the Confederate Army when a recruiting officer offered for the prosecution. He stated Moule deserted the Army him a $10 bounty. His company was later transferred at Camp Van Dorn in June 1861. He joined the rebel army to Brownsville on the Mexican border. He deserted the and became a guard over the Union prisoners at Camp Confederate Army in spring 1862 and escaped to Mexico. Verde, Texas. Moule, like other rebel guards, wore blue The American Consul in Matamoros sent him and two Union uniforms which were captured from the Union other deserters to the U.S. Navy Blockading Squadron off supply depot. Nagell also saw him six months later at San the coast. When he arrived in New Orleans, Headquarters, Antonio. Incredibly, Nagell further stated Moule tried to XIX Army Corps, Department of the Gulf, assigned him to rejoin the 8th Infantry in October 1863 at New York City.

Company D, 30th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry. With This may account for Moule’s identification and arrest as other volunteers, he participated in the storming party a deserter. at the siege of Port Hudson, Louisiana, in the late spring Pvt. Willian Hayes, Co. F, 8th U.S. Infantry, testified the and early summer 1863. He must have served honorably prisoner deserted from Co. F, and did Confederate duty as

Fort Columbus. National Park Service photo by Andrew Moore.

a guard. Hayes further stated Moule admitted to him he had deserted and was enlisted by a Confederate recruiting officer.

Pvt. William Kelly, Co. F, 8th U.S. Infantry, testified while serving as a guard, Moule treated the prisoners very well.

Moule took the stand to explain his conduct following his desertion. He emphatically stated his only intention in deserting the army was to try to get back to Union lines.

Moule was found guilty of desertion; except the words: “…did treat the Union prisoners with unusual severity.”

The court issued the following sentence: “…to be shot to death with musketry at such time and place as the proper authorities may direct; two-thirds of the members concurring therein.”

The proceedings and sentence were approved by Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, commanding the Department of the East. However, on 26 February 1864, Brig. Gen. George J. Stannard, commanding the Harbor District in New York City, “…commuted the sentence to hard labor at the Dry Tortugas [Fort Jefferson], Florida, during the remainder of his term of enlistment with the loss of all pay that is now or may become due him.”8 Moule’s service, however, soon ended. On 5 March 1864, he died of bronchitis at Fort Columbus, New York.9 Moule’s initial death sentence obviously stemmed from his desertion and service in the Confederate Army.

However, this was further mitigated by his later service in the 30th Massachusetts Volunteers, his meritorious conduct at the siege of Port Hudson, and his later attempt to rejoin his old regiment. It certainly creates a most unusual and compelling story.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 319

Dimensions of a Continental Army Haversack Submitted by William Reynolds

T

he U.S. Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Records include a ninety-page manuscript book titled Memorandum Book from the Year 1780 to 1783 that relates to the Continental Army’s Department of the Commissary General of Military Stores.1 Many of its memoranda appear to have been made by Samuel Hodgdon who was Commissary General of Military Stores for much of the period covered.2 Page 38 of the book includes the following entry, which was probably made between 5 July 1781 and 24 July 1781 based on adjacent entries: Memorandum of the dimensions of a haversack 15 inches high 6 inches in the bottom 7 inches in the flatt (sic)

all in one piece

16 inches Broad

With a belt 27 inches long and 3 Broad.

Notes 1. Miscellaneous Numbered Record 28686, U.S. Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Records (Manuscript File), 1775-1790s, Records Pertaining to Continental Army Staff Departments, Record Group 93, National Archives Publication M859, accessed via Ancestry. com on 15 January 2020.

2. Robert F. Smith, Manufacturing Independence: Industrial Innovation in the American Revolution (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2016), 42.

Notes 1. Lieutenant Richard H. Wilson, “The Eight Regiment of Infantry,” in The Army of the United States, ed., Theo. R. Rodenbough and William L. Haskin (New York: Argonaut Press LTD, 1966), 517-20.

2. Ibid, 520.

3. Ibid, 521.

4. Ancestry.com, U.S. Army Register of Enlistments, 1798-1914 [database on-line] Provo, UT, accessed 24 June 2015. Original Data: National Archives Microfilm Publication M223, 81 rolls, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s-1917, Record Group 94 National Archives and Records Administration, (NARA), Washington, D.C. 5. Fold3.com [database on-line] records digitized from NARA Records, accessed 24 June 2015. Original Source: NARA Catalog Title: Carded Records Showing Military Service of Soldiers who Fought in Confederate Organizations, compiled 1903-27, documenting the period 1861-65, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers who Served in Organizations from the State of Texas, NARA Catalogue ID: 586957, Record Group 109, Publication Number M323, Roll: 0277, Military Unit: Third Infantry (First Infantry, Luckett’s Regiment).

6. NARA, Civil War-era Court-Martial Records, RG 153, Case #NN1692, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C., accessed 22 July 2015. Indexes to the Carded Records of Soldiers who Served

in Volunteer Organizations During the Civil War, compiled 18991927, documenting the period 1861-66; Index to Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Union Soldiers Who Served in Organizations From The State of Massachusetts, RG 94, M554, Corporal, later Sergeant George H. Moule, 8th US Infantry, attached to Company D, 30th Massachusetts Infantry. National Park Service, U.S. Civil War Soldiers, 1861-65 [database on-line] Provo, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations Inc. 2007, accessed 24 June 2015.

Name: George H. Moule, 30th Regiment, Massachusetts Infantry, Company D, Rank: First Sergeant; Film No. M544 Roll 28. Moule is also mentioned in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies for duty at the siege of Port Hudson, Louisiana, 22 May – 9 July 1863 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1891), Series 1, Vol. XXVI, Chap. XXXVIII, 61.

7. c i v i l w a r i n t h e e a s t . c o m / u s - r e g i m e n t s - b a t t e r i e s / massachusetts/30th-massachusetts/, accessed 11/29/19.

8. Details of Moule’s court-martial are contained and cited above.

9. Ancestry.com U.S. Army Registers of Deaths in the Regular Army, 1860-1889 [database on-line], Provo, UT, accessed 24 June 2015. Original data: Registers of Deaths in the Regular Army, compiled 1860-1889, 18 Volumes, ARC ID: 1226156, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 94, NARA.

320 Military Collector & Historian

The Springfield Musketoon Was the Gun That Almost Lost the West William Gorenfeld and John Gorenfeld

A volunteer serving in the Oregon Rogue River War wrote the musketoon would “scarce … scare the wild raccoon hid in the apple tree.” R. C. Percial, “The Battle of Hungry Hill.”

–An unpublished poem, Huntington Library, San Marina, California.

2), Chief of Ordnance, recommended the manufacture of weapons “of the ordinary construction which are the simplest and easiest managed by the soldier.”3 The Ordnance Department decided to bring back the muzzleloading carbines of the dragoons.

Enter the Musketoon Beginning in 1847, the first of the musketoons were Introduction produced by the Springfield Armory, were 3 feet 5 inches From their creation, the nation’s two dragoon regiments long, and reportedly used musket barrels that had been had been armed with what was then the most advanced rejected initially by the armory for defects at the muzzle. carbine of the period. On the field of battle, whether in The armory produced three models of the musketoon— the steamy swamps of Florida of the Seminole War or cavalry, sapper, and artillery. The cavalry version was on the dusty plains of Buena Vista during the war with distinguished by its bright brass fittings, a sliding ring (so Mexico, the breech loading, percussion, .52 caliber Hall that the dragoon could readily secure the weapon to his carbine had done yeoman service in the U.S. Dragoon carbine sling when mounted), and an attached (and oft Regiments. Nevertheless, by the mid-1840s both officers broken) swivel ramrod for loading. Under the direction of these regiments as well as ordnance officials had of armory commandant Maj. James Wolfe Ripley (FIG become dissatisfied with their Hall carbines. In general, 3), Springfield would turn out almost seven thousand they objected to “a want of solidarity of the parts most cavalry musketoons by 1856. With its burnished metal exposed to action of the charge, the liability of moveable to barrel, brass fittings, and dark walnut stock, the cavalry become unserviceable by their getting fast by rust or dirt musketoon was visually pleasant. Firing it was not deposited at each discharge, and the escape of gas through pleasant. Weighing 7 pounds and 4 ounces (a reasonably the joints or junctions of the different parts.”1 Ordnance light weapon for the period), the musketoon used the officer Lt. Col. Henry Knox Craig (FIG 1) added—with use, same size powder charge and ball as did the considerably the opening between the receiver and barrel increases heavier Model 1842 musket. The resulting recoil meant “the stocks of Hall’s carbines that we now have in use are that firing the musketoon was decidedly painful for the continually splitting and flying in all directions.”2 Finally, shooter’s shoulder. there was the Ordnance Department’s fear—with greater The inner surfaces of the barrels of muskets and distances now, due to a growing nation in the West, the musketoons were smooth. The lead ball was slightly increased cost of supplying ammunition coupled with the smaller than the diameter of the barrel and could be fact that troopers, using breechloaders in battle, would rolled easily down the barrel during loading. Buckshot expend so much ammunition that the department would could also be fired by the weapon making it a sure killer be unable to maintain a steady supply of cartridges. With at close range. The conventional wisdom of the era was these factors in mind, Bvt. Brig. Gen. George Talcott (FIG smoothbore weapons were quicker to load than rifles and,

FIGs 1-3. Lt. Col. Henry Knox Craig; Bvt. Brig. Gen. George Talcott (goordnance.army.mil); Maj. James Wolfe Ripley (en.wikipedia.org).

therefore, had a greater rate of fire.

The cavalry version of the musketoon had one small, beaded sight at the front of its barrel. Common to all smoothbore weapons, it did not have a rear sight. Lack of accuracy did not concern the Ordnance Department officials. In their opinion, dragoons would not need to use their firearms at ranges greater than fifty yards.

They imagined dragoons would be used in the traditional manner of their European counterparts. Under the notions of Napoleonic warfare, dragoons would ride to the scene of a battle and then dismount to fight on foot. Massive volleys from their musketoons would be unleashed upon a thick column of enemy soldiers in close range and moving slowly. Such a tactic, in theory, did not require extremely accurate weapons.

The Army manual of the era prescribed the loading of the musketoon in ten distinct steps. At the command of load, the butt of the weapon was placed under the trooper’s right arm, the hammer halfcocked while the left hand took a percussion cap from the cap box. The brass percussion cap, measuring a quarter inch in diameter, was placed upon the nipple located under the hammer, and then pressed down. Next, the trooper took a cigar-shaped paper cartridge containing a round .69-caliber lead ball and a hefty 75-grain charge of black powder from the cartridge box and the trooper, using his teeth, tore it open. At the command of cast about, the musketoon was brought to vertical position and the content of the cartridge was poured into the barrel. The swiveled ramrod was drawn from its slot under the barrel and “smartly” used to push the powder and bullet down the barrel. The ramrod was returned to its slot under the barrel, the weapon was raised to a ready position awaiting the command to fire.4 When it was first introduced to troops serving out West, the musketoon was not popular in the field. Officers began to express their concerns as these new weapons reached the two dragoon regiments. Before long, Maj. Phillip St. George Cooke (FIG 4) of the 2d Dragoons gathered a number of such concerns and included them in a letter

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 321

directed to Col. Samuel Cooper (FIG 5), Adjutant General of the Army, dated 12 August 1851. These letters may be found Letters Received, Adjutant General, 1851, C320, and are included in the Appendix to this article.

Criticism of the Musketoon Intensifies When attempting to load a muzzle-loader under the confusing and terrifying conditions of combat, adhering to the ten-step loading routine was no easy task. Nervous and sweating fingers fumbled to draw a tiny percussion cap from the cap box, placing it on the nipple resulted in many dropped caps. A shaking right hand attempting to pour the powder and ball of the cartridge into a barrel held by a left trembling hand, without exposing the shooter to enemy fire, could also be daunting. Returning the swiveled rod under the barrel required a steady hand lest the swivel be broken and ramrod lost when an alarmed soldier madly attempted to return it.5 Col. Joseph K. Mansfield (FIG 6), Inspector General of the Army, observed—a dragoon armed with a musketoon would be apprehensive as “it takes so long to load; he loses his ramrod, or his load out; he gets disconcerted and will probably be whipped if hard pressed.”6 In order to fire the weapon, Army instructions of the era called for the dragoon to tear open the powder, ball and paper were loaded into the muzzle and then pushed down into the breech by means of the swiveled ramrod.

The dragoon placed a percussion cap primer on a cone on the side of the breech. At the command “ready,” the side hammer was fully cocked, and upon the command “fire,” the weapon was discharged.

Adding to the musketoon’s wild inaccuracy were several mechanical problems. Hard use in the field often dented the thin metal barrel, which would worsen the weapon’s aim and make it harder to load. Furthermore, the screw

FIGs 4-6. Maj. Phillip St. George Cooke (nps.gov); Adj. Gen. Samuel Cooper (moultrie.battlefieldsinmotion.com/); Brig. Gen. Joseph K. Mansfield (NARA photograph 528442).

322 Military Collector & Historian

that fastened the ramrod to its swivel arm had a tendency to snap, causing the ramrod to slide out of its housing and sometimes be lost. This problem was remedied in 1851 when the swivel arm was replaced by a chain attached to the ramrod.

Conventional military thinking did not translate well to the frontier, where mounted troops—because of their mobility—were vital and most often would not have the close support of infantry and artillery. At that time, the United States had three regiments of mounted troops.

Two of those regiments were classified as dragoons, and the third regiment was of mounted riflemen. In 1855, Congress would add two cavalry regiments. The dragoons, serving in company or two-sized garrisons, faced the task of pursuing and fighting Indians, who would not cooperate by forming neatly massed, slow-moving targets.

Inspector General Mansfield conducted a tour of the Western outposts in 1853 and reported the troops made many derogatory comments about the musketoons.

Dragoons told him that when the weapon was carried muzzle down by a mounted trooper, the ball would simply roll out of the musketoon’s barrel. His report stated “there is no probable certainty of hitting the object aimed at, and the recoil is too great to be fired with ease.” General Mansfield would come to conclude the gun was essentially “a worthless arm,” having “no advocates that I am aware of.” A veteran of frontier warfare, Maj. Gen. Zenas R. Bliss (FIG 7), seconded Mansfield’s opinion. In his memoirs, Bliss wrote “the most worthless of all arms with which we were supplied was the musketoon.” Lt. Col. W. G. Freeman also agreed. “There is but one opinion as to the worthlessness of this arm.”7

white attackers were, in the boastful words of the Sunday Oregonian newspaper … all young, vigorous, enthusiastic and daring, and formed the very best material for a war of the sort proposed. Their average age could not have been above 25, and their character is well expressed by a present survivor, who says, “A coward had no show among us.”

Unfortunately, many of them, including the dragoon detachment, were armed with the Springfield musketoons.9 The plan was for the troops to launch a two-pronged attack on the Indian village at daylight. Each of the two columns set out on foot at night and walked seven miles uphill to gain position to attack. Dragoon Lt. Ben Allston portrays what happened next: We reached the top ... just after daylight and we stopped to rest a little. By some oversight some of the men kindled a fire, they being cold and tired. As soon as the fire rose the Indians, who until that time were totally ignorant of our proximity or intentions, instantly took the alarm and made preparations for defense.10

Lt. August Kautz (FIG 8), later a Civil War major general, gave a remarkably candid account of the battle.

His report, which appeared in the New York Herald of 31 January 1856, and pointed out the confusion and slowness of the troops, poor leadership of volunteer and regular officers (including his commander), and over-reliance of some of them upon liquid courage. Kautz noted that the advance for a surprise attack initially began well enough.

But by the time they reached the summit the troops were exhausted. In the early sunrise, Kautz urged the troops to pick up the pace but his superiors quickly vetoed this idea, as they worried that two of their officers, one of them young Allston, needed first to sober up.

Col. [John E.] Ross (Oregon politician and sometime soldier, commander of the Oregon volunteers) thought he had better wait until the other party had taken position on the west, and the Capt was anxious that the only two officers he had with him, who had indiscreetly filled their canteens with brandy instead of water, should get sober, and they delayed an hour and a half or two hours.11

Use of Musketoon in combat It was not long before service of the musketoon out West proved disastrous for dragoons in several battles.

The unnecessary delay gave the tribe time to evacuate At the defeat of the reinforced Company F, 1st Dragoons, their village of women and children and to deploy their at the battle of Cieneguilla, New Mexico Territory, 30 men for its defense. Kautz wrote of the series of mistakes March 1854, was a battle in which the dragoons suffered which ensued: nearly 100 per cent killed or wounded. Most frustrating The north side of the ridge was covered with heavy growth of to the troops at Cieneguilla were the Jicarilla archers fir timber and thick undergrowth, the south without trees but positioned beyond the range of the musketoons, who a dense brush of hawthorn, hazel and oak. This terrain was dispatched a “shower of arrows” down into the soldiers’ totally unfavorable for a charge, but the most desirable for defensive formation. George McGunnegle, a citizen who flanking. Some thirty or forty men succeeded in advancing ... accompanied the expedition, wrote of a Jicarilla attack, where we kept up a fire quite sharp for three hours or more...

“They commenced firing upon us, every shot taking effect The rest of the troops were behind and occasionally fired at either upon the horses or men. It was a sad sight to see so those of our men in front who had the courage to advance towards the Indians. Everything was “helter skelter.” 12 many men falling dead by my side.”8 During the Rogue River War of 1855, three hundred In the brush and from behind trees, the tribesmen now volunteers, dragoons, and artillerymen gathered near opened fire on the slowly advancing invaders, who foolishly attempted to charge. The dragoons were armed primarily Hungry Hill, Oregon Territory, for the battle. Against with smoothbore musketoons having an effective range of them were to be, perhaps, as few as seventy Indians. The

some fifty yards and the artillerymen’s muskets were deadly only up to seventy-five yards; in fatal contrast, the tribesmen, carrying rifles acquired from trading posts greatly outranged both classes of weapons carried by the regulars, allowed them shoot at the troops before the troops could return fire.

From here the situation turned from bad to worse as the wellhidden tribesmen picked off the attackers: “Concealed in this excellent cover and stripped for the fight, they checked our progress by their telling fire, which laid hors de combat a large number of the troops. Shelter and cover was speedily sought in the chaparral and the fight was continued ...The fire of the Indians told with great effect; wherever a man exposed himself he was dropped with unerring accuracy by an Indian rifle—hitting wherever was seen a head.13

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 323

shot by our own men. The Indian loss of course not known; I do not think that they could have more than four or five killed and wounded, but if we are to believe the statements of all those in the fight there is scarcely a man that cannot give the particulars of how he killed one Indian “certain, sure.”...I don’t believe that the Indians numbered over seventy warriors in all; the volunteers say however that there was three or four hundred; when I ask them where they came from, they cannot make over a hundred and fifty supposing that all the hostile Indians were there that are in the valley. [Kautz concluded that it was a sad day for the army and the volunteers]: The unpleasant truth is that the whites were cowards, that they were whipped out by one-fourth of their number of Diggers, and had it not been for thirty or forty good men the rest would have broke and run, and they would have caught h**l. As it was some did break and never stopped until they got through

Scrapping the Musketoon Despite the near-disasters in Oregon Territory and although there were many improved carbines available (including the Burnside, the Sharps, and the Merrill), the U.S. Army continued to furnish the fundamentally unsound musketoon to its dragoon regiments for most of the 1850s.

When Lt. Col. George Talcott, the Army’s Chief of Ordnance decided it was time to replace the Hall, he did not believe it to be an inferior weapon. Talcott had once written to the secretary of war “if my honor and life were at stake, and depended on the use of firearms, I would sooner take one of these (Hall) carbines than any other

the [Rogue River] canyon 25 miles distant the same day the attack commenced. [Emphasis in original].14

A year later, in the wilds of Big Meadows, Oregon Territory, Capt. Andrew Jackson Smith’s (FIG 9) detachment of 50 dragoons and 30 infantrymen awaited for the next attack. They were surrounded and few had slept the night of 25-26 May 1856. They feared the next firefight would fail to fend off the assault. The dragoons’ A stunning defeat befell the boys in blue and their Model 1847 musketoons—muzzle-loading smoothbore volunteer allies. Once the gunfire ceased, the Rogue River weapons, inaccurate at a range beyond fifty yards—had tribesmen were found to have suffered few casualties and been essentially useless in repelling attackers. A third of had defeated a force four times larger than their own. With Smith’s command had fallen that day. Smith’s troopers the retreat, the Regulars sped home to Fort Lane. Kautz’s were also short of ammunition and water. comprehensive report concludes that stupidity, sloth, The enemy now emerged from the shadows and advanced arrogance, and cowardice had caused a small number steadily toward the entrenched soldiers. Suddenly, as the of “Diggers”—his pejorative for tribesmen—to soundly besiegers gathered for a deadly finishing strike, a column defeat the hefty regular and volunteer force. Kautz stated of U.S. infantry appeared. Trapped between the gleaming the casualties, and suggests their cause: bayonets of the oncoming foot soldiers and the fortified We lost ten killed and twenty-seven wounded, several of dragoons, the warriors fled. Smith’s battered command these were killed and quite a number of the wounded were would live to fight another day.

FIGs 7-9. Maj. Gen. Zenas R. Bliss (geni.com); Lt. August Kautz (Pinterest); Capt. Andrew Jackson Smith (Library of Congress photo LOC_3b37298r);

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weapon.” In the 1850s he did not have to look very far for a suitable replacement for the musketoon. Christian Sharps had worked on the Hall carbine and then had perfected the design of his own breechloader.

Sharp’s rifled carbine fired at the revolutionary rate of 8 to 10 rounds per minute with accuracy. The Ordnance Board was favorably impressed. On 28 July 1854, it ordered two hundred carbines for field tests by the 1st Dragoons in New Mexico Territory.

The reports filed by dragoon officers in the field were generally favorable. Capt. John Davidson (FIG 10), disgraced at Cieneguilla but now in command of company B of the 1st Dragoons stationed at Fort Buchanan in New Mexico Territory, wrote in 1858 I am satisfied from trial and experience, that Sharps’ carbine is the best weapon yet known in our country for a cavalry soldier. Its range and accuracy are greater than those of the musketoon. It is a stronger arm; the soldier can make it last longer. The swivels and muzzles of the musketoon are constantly getting broken and battered.

Davidson continued: One argument I had almost omitted to mention in favor of the Sharps’ carbine is, that dragoon soldiers have more confidence in it than any other weapon I have ever seen put into their hands; and I have seen them use the musketoon, carbine pistol and Minie rifle. Give your soldiers but confidence in the effectiveness of their weapons, and they will give a better account of themselves than with those they can not trust.15

A few months later, Company B received orders to transfer its station to Fort Tejon, California. Before leaving New Mexico, the company reluctantly had to exchange its Sharps carbines for musketoons. Davidson hoped upon arriving in California, his troops would receive eighty-five

FIGs 10, 11. Capt. John Davidson (encyclopediaofarkansas.com); Gen. William Harney (Pinterest).

Sharps carbines. It was not to occur.

Institutional hostility against breechloaders still remained at the Ordnance Department, and that resistance prevented them from quickly reaching the dragoons.

From 1853 to 1858, the Army acquired more than three thousand Sharps carbines. The Ordnance Department deployed some of them for use by mounted troops, but most of the new Sharps sat unused in the arsenals. Such was generally the case in the Department of the Pacific.

In May 1857, Company A of the 1st Dragoons was ordered by Bvt. Brig. Gen. Newman Clarke, commander of the Department of the Pacific, to restore some order in the Pit River region of northeastern California. Before leaving the Benecia arsenal, the dragoons of Company A exchanged their musketoons for the highly accurate— albeit somewhat antiquated—Model 1841 “Mississippi” rifle and a dozen Company A troopers were issued Sharps carbines. As late as the spring of 1858, however, most of the 1st Dragoon troopers stationed on the Pacific Coast remained armed with the musketoon.

On 16 May 1858, a detachment of three companies of 1st Dragoons and twenty-five infantrymen, under the command of Lt. Col. Edward Steptoe, came under attack from a combined force of Coeur d’Alene, Spokane, and Palouse Indians while attempting to make a show of force in eastern Washington. Steptoe eventually ordered a retreat, detaching two companies of dragoons—armed principally with musketoons—to act as a rear guard.

Historian Robert Utley in his classic book Frontier Regulars, writes the harried dragoon companies became “unnerved by the death of two officers and by the inadequacy of their musketoons” and were soundly routed. The troops retreated pell-mell across the Spokane Plain. Steptoe dug in his troops on a hilltop and deployed his two mountain howitzers. The assailants formed a ring around the hill and began to snipe at the beleaguered force with their longer-range rifles. With men dying steadily and ammunition running low, Steptoe ordered his troops to slip away during the night. 16 Shortly after learning of the ill-fated Steptoe expedition, General Clarke demanded that the dragoons be supplied with more suitable arms. In July 1858, the Ordnance Department slowly began to recall the remaining musketoons from field duty and resupplied the dragoons with the Sharps carbine. On 14 September 1858, an impatient and early critic, Gen. William Harney (FIG 11), demanded Ordnance send an additional four thousand Sharps to his troops then serving in Oregon Territory.

Congress also got into the act, wanting to know why dragoons were still using the outmoded musketoon when the legislature, years ago, had appropriated sums that were to be used to purchase the Sharps weapons. In 1859, Secretary of War John B. Floyd assured Congress that Colonel Craig and the Ordnance Department were taking all reasonable steps to fill requisitions for Sharps carbines.

The only problem, Floyd said, was the Army’s inventory of

Sharps had been exhausted by the unexpected demand for the weapon.

In spring 1861, the northern states bought tens of thousands of firearms for use by their troops in the Civil War. By then the Sharps carbine had become the standard carbine for Union cavalry. Even the Hall breechloader was brought out of retirement to serve as an arm for many of the Union and Confederate cavalry units. Although a few volunteer regiments were armed with the musketoon, most musketoons continued to slumber in armories, awaiting a call to arms that never came.

APPENDIX Below is the content of letters sent to the adjutant general

by Lieutenant Colonel Cooke.

Hd. Qrs. Carlisle Barracks

Aug. 12, 1851

General, I return enclosed the several papers on the subject of the Musketoon, which you did me the honor to send to me for my remarks. …

I do not find the recoil of the Musketoon excessive; it was slight when I reduced the cartridge about one third: —leaving it I thought, large enough.

I had no pretension to accuracy of aim; —a condition which cannot be much insisted on, for an arm to be used by troops when mounted.

The most troublesome defect for mere garrison service I have found to be an excessive breakage of the ramrod devise. . . .

After all, it is an insolvable problem: —it is impossible to attain to an unobjectionable gun for our cavalry, because of the very peculiar duties required of them.—I mean their isolated service on the prairies & elsewhere; when combined with infantry. They often need the arm, or an approximation to the arm of the infantry; and while its adoption and use seriously determines their efficiency as Cavalry.

On 22 July 1851, Cooke stated in greater detail his primary concerns over this newly issued weapon: I have received your letter of the 16th inst. relative to the Musquetoon [sic].

A ramrod spring is necessary to secure the ramrod (if the button do not prevent its application).

A few swivel bar rings part, and the bars, also came out, or break loose at the screw.

The aim of this arm is necessarily very inaccurate and it is reported to me that there is a bad recoil (my experience is

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 325

that service cartridges are much too large.)

But the most troublesome defect of this arm is the weakness of the ramrod swivel; or its too severe test, caused by the ramrod being generally too short to touch the bottom of the bore. … Lieut [Richard] Anderson informs me he has of a cold mornings seen as many as three—in a company—broken by the simple act of drawing the ramrods.

I am told that in some of the guns there is not sufficient room for the play of the head of the ramrod (I mean the smallest end) in passing over into the Muzzle.

I was much disappointed in the Musketoon; I hope it would be shorter, much lighter, of a larger bore and browned.

It is my opinion, little superior to the [Hall] Carbine, —unfit for service.

Cooke included with his letter correspondence from concerned dragoon junior officers in the field. From Fort Worth, Texas, there was a note dated 18 May 1851, from Capt. R. A. Arnold, stating: 1st The Rammer is so improperly secured as to be continually sliding out, the screw of the rammer’s swivel breaks and the rammer is lost. The ring of the swivel bar frequently breaks and the Musketoon falls under the Horse’s feet.

2d The recoil of the Musketoon is as great, greater than that of a Musket, probably from the fact that the ball is as large as that of the Musket, while the weight of the Musketoon is less.

This is a serious objection, to the use of this arm by Cavalry Soldiers. Dragoons are expected to use their arms (frequently) on horseback. The left hand being used in managing their Horses, while their weapons are wielded with the right. Now this severe recoil of a Musketoon will sometimes unhorse a man, at any rate confuse him so much, as to cause him to lose the management of his horse, and probably throw the whole troop into confusion.

3d They shoot with no accuracy whatever.

Respectfully submitted for consideration of General Harney Commanding 2d Dragoons, with the additional remarks that about one third of the Musketoons furnished my Company are already out of order, having been broken at Drills, in the manner stated in objection 1st.

From his headquarters of the 2d Dragoons, located in Austin, Texas, Col. William H. Harney, on 12 June 1851, an experienced campaigner, did not mince words in his displeasure of the musketoon.

FIG 12. 1847 Springfield musketoon. www.cuauction.com

326 Military Collector & Historian

I earnestly recommend that the Musketoon be abandoned as an arm for Cavalry.

The enemy which the dragoons are required to meet in this Department render it necessary that they should be provided with firearms combining strength and durability of material and mechanisms, facility for loading on horseback, accuracy in firing, and as light as possible consistent with preceding conditions.

The Musketoon constantly does not possess any of these qualities, and is, hence, totally unfit for Cavalry services.

From long practical experience I have no hesitation in saying that Colt’s carbine is, beyond all comparison, the most suitable and effective species of firearm which can be placed in hands of Cavalry Soldiers. This is true when the applied to mounted troops when required to use their firearms when on foot or horseback, against an enemy, whether civilized or savage, beyond the range of the pistol; —but it is particularly true when applied to the dragoons operating against Indians in this Department. The latter use, perhaps, the most skillful equestrians on the continent, and use their arms with almost unconceivable adroitness on horseback. It is, hence, absolutely necessary to provide the trooper with a weapon not easily made unserviceable, which may be loaded and handled with facility, and fired with accuracy.

Colt’s carbine conforms more readily to this requisite than any firearm for cavalry with which I am acquainted.

Colonel Harney went one step further. He appointed a board to review firing range tests of the musketoon. It selected two of the best shots from each of the Companies A, B, C, and G, and procured a target eight feet long by 18 inches broad, in the center of which was an 18 inch ring, and a bulls eye. They found first off hand at distance of 50 yards and then at a distance of 90 yards. It found … of the 16 shots of Buck and Ball cartridge fired at a distance of 50 yards, 3 balls were inside the ring, and 3 outside the ring, and 5 buckshots inside the ring and 1 outside the ring.

Of the 16 shots of buckshot cartridges at 50 yards, 15 were inside the ring, and 10 outside the ring.

Of the 8 shots of ball and buckshot cartridges at a distance of 90 yards, one ball and buckshot were inside the ring and of the 8 shots buckshot cartridges at a distance of 90 yards not one was inside the ring and only one outside the ring.

Of all the buckshot which struck the board, about one half were partially buried, and the other half rebounding, and this board was yellow pine.

And to the above the Board found the construction of this arm is such, that when slung on duty, the ramrod slides out of the stock, strikes the ground, and breaks the pieces which attach it to the barrel, many Musketoons have been rendered unserviceable by the loss of ramrods in this manner.

Included with the Cooke packet of letters was this lengthy reply dated 12 July 1851, a response of Col. Henry K. Craig

of the Ordnance Department to Colonel Harney’s letter.

I have read and considered the letters of Bvt. Genl. Harney of the 12th June last with the enclosed papers, referred by you to this Department. General H. recommends the abandonment of the Musketoon as an arm for Cavalry and the arming of the Regiment with Colt’s Carbines. The subject of a proper fire-arm for Cavalry in addition to the pistol, is one which the views of experienced Officers have been taken and many experiments have been made. The results of these inquiries and experiments have been uniformly and invariably in condemnation of all breech-loading arms, including Colt’s Carbines. I quote on this subject from a report of the Ordnance Board in 1846: …

The letter went on to point out the many problems associated with breech-loading weapons, in particular the joints or junctions of different parts. The defects inherent to this method of loading have been such that, notwithstanding the repeated trials made with it for centuries, and the many ingenious contrivances offered at late years, of which those of Hall, Colt and Jencks, in this country, deserve mention, this method of loading has not been adapted for arming troops in any Country, except partially in this, nor has it been brought into general use for other purposes. …

Colonel Craig next gratuitously attached an old letter from Col. E. V. Sumner which detailed his past experiences with Colt and Jenck’s carbines.

In compliance with your letter of June 23rd last, I have made many experiments with Colt’s and Jenck’s Carbines. I have devoted a good deal of time and care to these trials and as I felt no bias for or against either of these guns at the beginning, I trust my report will be a perfectly fair one.

I am satisfied that Colt’s repeating Carbine will not do for Military purposes, it is too liable to get out of order, and too liable to accidents. If there is the slightest flaw in a ball (which would be very common in service) two or more charges would explode at once, which makes the use of them very dangerous.

This accident has repeatedly happened at this post, and there is nothing to counter balance that risk with for they cannot be fired than the gun with the single chamber except the first load which is of course fired in a few seconds, (if nothing goes wrong) and there is a long interval while filling the cylinder again.

I have cut off six inches from one of Jenck’s Carbines, and after many trials, I cannot perceive that it makes the least difference in accuracy or force. This makes the piece a very convenient weapon for horsemen, and if it was made with a whole barrel and a swivel for the rammer, it would be, by far, the best fire arm we have had.

You will perceive by the memorandum enclosed, that at no time of any consequence is time saved by loading at the breech, indeed, when the pieces become foul, the gun loading at the muzzle can be fired with more quickness, and it is infinitely better in all respects. I have never yet seen a gun loaded at the breech that was not more liable to accidents than the whole barrel and I am convinced that, evidently, those ‘broken back’ guns will be pronounced imperfect and discarded altogether.

The stocks of Hall’s Carbines that have been in use, are continually splitting and flying in all directions.

Colonel Craig continued with his defense of the

musketoon, claiming its defects to be minor the weapon is the best available: The facts and views that elicited led to the adoption of the present Cavalry Musketoon an arm, “with a whole barrel and a swivel for the rammer.” If it not be a suitable arm for the Cavalry I know not where to look for one that will answer.

There are some defects in it, which has been heretofore brought to the notice of this Department, when prompt measures were taken to correct them. The chief of these and that which caused the failure of a third of Musketoons of Major Arnold’s company was the want of a ramrod spring.

These springs are attached to all those arms now making and a supply of them has been sent to the Ordinance Officer at the War Department to be inserted in the arms of the troops in that Military Department. The breaking of the screw of the swivel I think may be attributed to carelessness in drawing the rammer and ramming the cartridge, or want of instruction in the proper mode of doing so. It requires some skill to do it right, which is, however, easily taught and acquired.

But if this screw and the swivel bar ring break frequently, the defect may be easily corrected by making them stronger.

As regards the excessive recoil, I cannot account for it, but on the supposition that the wrong cartridges may have been used or more than one inserted. The Musketoon, it is true, is lighter than the Musket by two pounds although of the same calibre—but it has a less charge of powder in proportion to the weight of its ball than any other arm—it being one fifth of that weight, while that of the Musket is one fourth and of the rifle and Carbine one third. As regards accuracy of fire, it is not suspected that Cavalry should be armed as Sharp Shooters or that they should use their fire arms at great distance.

Considering the size of the target the firing at 50 yards as reported was not bad.

In connection with this matter it may not be irrelevant to state that Col. Twiggs when commanding the 2d Dragoons protested in advance of their being remounted, against the use by his Regiment of any breech loading or patent arms of any kind whatsoever. The same change of views which has since taken place, may occur in a change of commanders and if attended to there will be no end to the variety of arms.

The Department is always desirous to be informed of any defects in the arms or munitions of the troops—to receive suggestions as to their improvement, and to adopt all such as appear really useful. But when things have been deliberately and maturely considered, examined and tried before adoption, it is not deemed advisable to abandon them without full and convincing proof of some decided advantage to result therefrom. Besides the steps, which have been taken to correct one of the defects pointed out, the others will be attended to likewise.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 327

Notes 1. Claud Fuller, The Breech-loader in the Service (Topeka, KS: Arms Reference Club of America, 1933), 4.

2. Ibid., 4. See also Carl Russell, Guns on the Early Frontiers, From Colonial Times to the Years of Western Fur Trade (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005), 172.

3. Talcott to William Wilkins, Secretary of War, Washington, 14 January 1845.

4. J. R. Poinsett, Cavalry Tactics, First Part: School of the Trooper— Of the Platoon and of the Squadron—Dismounted (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1856), 106.

5. Robert Frazer, Mansfield on the Condition of Western Forts, 1853-1854 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 66.

6. Ibid.

7. “Memoirs of Major General Zenas Bliss U.S.A., Soldier in Texas, 1854-55,” Journal of the Service Institution, 38 (JanuaryFebruary, 1906), 127; William Gorenfeld and John Gorenfeld, “The Springfield Musketoon was the Gun that almost lost the West,” Wild West (June, 1998).

8. Missouri Republican, 29 April 1854. Testimony of Sgt. Bronson, Cieneguilla Court of Inquiry, 78, Proceedings of Davidson Court of Inquiry convened at Santa Fe, New Mexico Territory, February 9th, 1856, Judge Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 153, HH751, National Archives, Washington, D.C. See also David Johnson and William Gorenfeld, “Battle of Cieneguilla,” in Battles and Massacres on the Southwestern Frontier: Historical and Archaeological Perspectives, ed., Ronald Wetherington, and Francis Levine (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014).

9. Sunday Oregonian, 20 April 1884.

10. Ben Allston to Adele Allston, 6 November 1855. According to Lieutenant Kautz, Captain Smith decided to leave behind his pack and under the command of Lieutenant Alston, as he was not yet sober. Kautz to Senator Joseph Lane, Port Orford, 1 December 1855; Joseph Lane Papers, Lily Library, Indiana University; a less bitter version of Kautz’s report appears in “Our California Correspondence,” New York Herald, 31 January 1856. August Kautz graduated from the Military Academy in 1852 and was promoted to the rank of brevet second lieutenant in the 4th Infantry on 1 July 1852. On 24 March 1853, he gained the permanent rank of second lieutenant. George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., from its Establishment, in 1802, to 1890… (New York: George Miller, 1879), II: 504.

11. Kautz to Lane, 1 December 1855.

12. Ibid.

13. Horatio Gates Gibson, Old John of the Rogue River: Sketch of Services of Graduates in Early Days (West Point: United States Military Academy, 1913), 1–4.

14. Kautz to Lane, 1 December 1855.

15. Captain Davidson became a supporter of the Sharps carbine and in 1858 he coauthored a proposed manual of instruction on the Sharps. Davidson to General Samuel Cooper, Fort Tejon, California, 15 November 1858, 194D,Letters Received, Adjutant General, (main series) 1822-1860 RG 94, National Archives, Washington, DC. 16. Robert Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), 201.

328 Military Collector & Historian

A Marine’s Account of the Assassination of President Abraham Lincoln

A

David M. Sullivan

mong the collections posted to www.flickr.com are several dealing with U.S. Marine Corps history. One is the brief diary of Pvt. Solomon Walter Hagerty, which deals with his personal experiences, observations, and rumors he heard over the period 14-19 April 1865, the confinement of the conspirators under Marine guard, and President Lincoln’s funeral procession in which the Marines took part.

Solomon W. Hagerty was born in New Jersey, 28 February 1842. At some point in time, his family moved to Pennsylvania, and bought a farm in Nockamixon, Bucks County. He was living in Durham, Bucks County, according to his 1863 draft registration. Apparently not wanting to be conscripted into the Army, Hagerty enlisted at the Marine Corps Recruiting Office in Philadelphia on 3 September 1864 and was sent to Marine Barracks, Washington. After being trained in the duties of a Marine, he was posted to the detachment stationed at the Washington Navy Yard. His Marine Corps service was uneventful until mid-April 1865. Here is his version of the events following the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln.

14 April: About quarter of eleven oclock PM, the startling intelligence arrived here of the assassination of the Pres. First a telegram was sent in & then as one after another of the Navy officers then came in. They reported the same widely differing in version that he was shot was confirmed. Some said the assassin immediately afterward shot himself. Others said he was arrested. Another report that the assassin was J. Wilkes Booth the dramatist & that he had escaped. The attempted assassination of the Sewards also came in about the same time. All hands were aroused & charged with preparation for duty in an emergency. All were excited & expressing vengeance on the head of the perpetrators.

15 April: We received the particulars of the case in substance about one oclock AM, vize that it had been announced publically & was generally known yester & before the Pres. & Lady, Vice Pres. & Gen. Grant would attend Ford’s Theatre last evening. Abrm. Lincoln & Wife went according to invitation & acceptance they occupied a private box in 2nd tier & were much delighted with the performance of (American Cousins) the drama. Just as they were into the most interesting part of this play so admirably conducted by Miss Laura Keene & Troop, the cry of murder! & at the instant a man jumped down on the stage from the Pres’ box & tore with him the American Flag that was hanging there. Reaching the stage he stumbled, but instantly rising flourished his long dagger & repeated defiantly in Latin Sic Semper Tyrranus & then made his exit by a back doorway through the theatre & out.

The dumb stricken audience could not summon their senses ere he had gone. The Pres. Was shot through the head near the ear, The tragical act was committed about 20 min. past ten oclock last night. At about the same time some villain entered Secy Seward’s house passing the servts under false plea & made attempt to take Seward’s life. Also after inflicting several severe blows upon the Secy & his sons Major Seward & Frederic he managed to make his escape but not before the

cry of alarm was spread.

At two oclock AM all hands were under arms. The greatest vigilance was maintained until morning nothing further occurred, At 7.22 this morning Pres. Lincoln breathed his last breath.

His life so nobly preserved till the National crisis has nearly subsided was taken by a base & cowardly villain, who not having courage enough to exhibit his principles on the battlefield was made them tool of this fool conspiracy against the life of our heads of Government. The whole [country] is instantly in mourning. Crepe is being hung in front of every building. Flags are at half mast periodical firing of guns.

The whole police detective & Military force in search for the villainous murderers.

16 April: Off duty from police. The stillness of death pervades every part of this City today Few persons are on the streets.

The cars stopped running. Every feature indicates the most profound respect for the departed Magistrate. We arranged the sables of grief around our main entrance inside & out, shrouding the clay Eagle on entrance in the folds of black. All is still as the breeze. But within the breasts of all loyal citizens this murderous act of rebel conspirator has imbedded the essence of undying aversion towards any known conspirator.

Hence, while there is apparent calm without, there are storms of vengeance within.

17 April: On duty at the gate.

In consequence of the effect produced by the awful tragedy of Friday evening, the whole community were paralyzed, Conflicting emotions, revenge, hatred, sorrow & mourning

FIG 1. Marine guarding Lewis Payne. http://4.bp.blogspot.com/

were mingled feelings dwelling in their bosoms. The gate was closed. Work was suspended in the Yard till after due respects were payed the remains of our honored President by a funeral procession which required the cessation of government works & assistance of employees to complete. During the day numbers of persons flock to the gate expecting ingress to the Yard, but none were allowed in. Some expressed surprise at not being allowed in. Groups of men were collected here & there through the city, conversing on the state of affairs.

Soldiers, Cavalrymen & detectives were riding to & fro with rapid pace in pursuit of conspirators. Various rumors as to w[h]ere suspicious characters were seen. About 4 oclock PM, an order came from Department to Yard requesting the Military to be in readiness to take charge of prisoners that would arrive in evening. Hence the guard was in readiness under arms. About 8½ PM, two were brought in and taken down the Yard. Some confusion in regulation of guard. Officer [of the] Day for. All that could be mustered were under arms.

A squad from Barracks came down for special guard duty.

18 April: On 2nd watch. Can [???] 1 AM. About half past two this morning another of the conspirators were brought in and duly guarded to the Wharf & placed in Confinement on board of the Monitor Saugus with others under Marine guard. About daylight a force of detective came riding very rapidly from Bridge & turning to go up 8th St. his horse slipped at Navy Yard gate, was bruised slightly, After washing away the blood, he resumed his way. Relieved as usual at 9 AM. No liberty. Having been up all night cared little about it. Nothing further occurred during the day.

At night another prisoner was brought in & consigned with the others on the Monitor, there being the safest in case of row or mob. Temporary prisoners in cell greatly frightened lest they be wrongly taken in case of a mob to kill the conspirators.

19 April: Being formally notified that we were to join in the procession to accompany the Pres’ remains from the Ex. Mansion to Capitol where it is to lie in state till Friday morning, we had our uniforms & accoutrements cleaned & ready. We were awakened by the Segt. of guard earlier than were accustomed to do & summoned to breakfast & then were ordered to be in full dress & ready to fall in at 8 oclock.

A detail for this purpose, as well as for guard. The order promptly obeyed, we marched to Barracks & there awaited there for the men to form battalion. Formed 9 AM. After drill for an hour nearly, At reverse arms &c we proceed headed by band to the Ex. Mansion, out Q St to 3d St E then up to Garrison St & around the Capital to Penn Ave on this direct to Mansion. On our way up crowds gathered along the sidewalks

FIG 2. Lincoln’s funeral procession. Jpreston.com.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 329

many of whom followed the battalion up the Ave. The music discoursed by our band attracted considerable attention. In places where the crowd on the sidewalks were very great it was necessary for a guard to go ahead of the battalion on each side to keep the way clear for the troops. Arrived at position in front of the Ex. Mansion about 10½ AM. Halted in line.

Band on right. The gaudy uniform of Marines attracted the Colored persons’ attention & they thronged around, closed in & almost fell in ranks to get near. It was necessary to place [a guard] around & in front to keep the front space & ranks free from human encumbrance. Major [George] Graham (FIG 3), Commdg. Battalion, found recourse with other officers to go to a restaurant close by and no doubt imbibe some of the stimulants. In his absence, Lieut [Albert B.] Young (FIG 4) was off[icer] in charge. The great demand was water. Several buckets full were served out to us by boys of the music (apprentices bound to learn music). Two men complained of being sick. Segt. Major reported the same to Off. Young, who replied that “those men should be taken to dispensary & make them take a fill [illegible] for medicines.” The Segt. M. told him this could not be done. He ordered them to fall out.

We afterwards found out they were too top heavy – drunk.

Gen. [Christopher C.] Auger reviewed the line as formed & at a little before two PM pronounced everything ready to move. The bier moved out at the western front gate attended properly by bearers escort &c & halted just without the gate.

The military began to form & at the time the hearse reached the front of the line the command to present arms was given by Maj. Gen. Auger. Companies formed into line & slowly moved off keeping time to the formal dirges discoursed by Music

FIG 3. 2d Lt. Albert B. Young, USMC. Courtesy of the Author.

330 Military Collector & Historian

Sword Presentation Submitted by Anthony Gero An undated news clipping from the New York Times, located

by Anthony Gero.

CITY ITEMS.

FIG 4. Maj. George R. Graham, USMC. Courtesy of the author.

Corps & bands. We were in rear of Veteran Reserve Corps & on the right, rather, band music in rear of us, we keeping time as well as we could under the circumstances. The music proved rather deficient. The Major, a little the worse for his draughts of Andy Johnson. We arrived at the top of Capital Hill no place in line for Marines. Our Battalion wheeled in the alley north of Capitol & there stood under the heat of the sun in ranks & no water. Could not get permission to fall out & hence we were in an awkward dilemma. For an hour & half we stood there with not opportunity of seeing what was going on. Finally we moved out, the line of procession being broken up & returned the same road we went back to barracks, Broke ranks. Navy Yard Guard fell out & came to yard tired, footsore & dusty, unhinged our uniforms, belts &c., took canteen & supper (dinner for us) with a relish & came to quarters. Many much dissatisfied with the Major & other officers.

After we returned news came that a suspicious boat had left Baltimore to go down the bay. Hence the dispatch boat King Philip with guard of Marines was ordered to go don & intercept & examine this boat. So it happened that many of those who had been out all day were detailed for duty again.

So ended this eventful day.1

Private Hagerty remained attached to the Marine Guard at the Washington Navy Yard until illness caused him to be confined to hospital toward the end of 1866. Restored to duty, he again fell ill and was hospitalized in January 1867. He did not recover and died on 2 February 1867.

Note: 1. www. https://www.flickr.com/photos/usmcarchives/ albums/72157627451927399, accessed 13 January 2020.

SWORD PRESENTATlON TO MAJOR ANDERSON. The citizens of Taunton, Mass., when they heard that Major Anderson Had left. Fort Moultrie for Sumter, in December last, conceived the purpose of presenting him with a sword as a testimonial of their admiration. The order was at once sent to Mr. Ames of Chicopee, Mass., and the sword made, but until Saturday last no opportunity of presenting it to the Major offered. On Saturday, Capt. Wm. C. Lovering, one of the military staff of the Governor of Massachusetts arrived at the Brevoort House bearing the sword, with a letter of presentation from ex-Gov. Marcus Morton of Massachusetts. The presentation was made in one of the parlors and was without ceremony, it being known that that would be the most in consonance with the Major’s feelings. When Major Anderson arrived, Senator Foote introduced Capt. Lovering, who said: Major Anderson: I have the honor to be the bearer to you of this sword with a letter of presentation from Gov. Marcus Morton on behalf of the citizens of Taunton, Mass, The gift, Sir, is a spontaneous offering of our citizens to you as an expression of their admiration for your courage, your loyalty, and devotion to the country.

Major Anderson, bowing, and taking Capt. Lovering’s hand, said: “I am most deeply grateful to the noble citizens of Taunton, Mass., for the beautiful gift. I accept it, as you desire, as a testimonial of the humble services which, by accident, or providentially, I have been called upon to perform. In receiving it, may I express the hope, the fervent hope, that it may never be drawn, except in defense of our country from a foreign foe; for I still hope that we may be saved from the dire alternative of civil war.” He then referred to the situation of his command during the bombardment of Fort Sumter, and said; “It is one of the most painful recollections of that event, that when our barracks were on fire, and the men were compelled to cover their faces with wet handkerchiefs, and lie with their faces upon the ground to avoid suffocation.

Instead of sending a white flag, with assistance to extinguish the flames then threatening us with destruction, they rapidly increased their fire upon us from every battery, in total disregard of every feeling of humanity.” He again thanked Captain Lovering and the patriotic citizens of Massachusetts for their gift. The weapon is a plain dress sword, with an elaborate gold scabbard and gold mountings. The head of Liberty, in solid gold, forms the end of the handle. The following are the Inscriptions: “Et Decus, Et Pretium, Recti.”

“The citizens of Taunton, Mass., to Major Robert Anderson, U.S.A. A tribute to his courage and his fidelity.” “Acquiret qui Tuetur.” On the scabbard was: “Deo Duce Ferro Comitante.”

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Marine Corps Justice in the Civil War, Part 1: Enlisted Marines David M. Sullivan

T

he system of justice that prevailed in the Marine Corps during the Civil War was anything but uniform.

Marines who fell afoul of the regulations of the Navy or the Corps faced punishments ranging from a mild rebuke to trial by court-martial. The consequences of violating regulations varied from post to post and ship to ship. The past record of the offending Marine might, or might not play a role in meting out punishment. The mood in the Navy Department, of the Commandant of the Corps, or the commanding officer of the accused frequently played a role in the judicial process. Examined from the vantage point of the present-day observer, the system was, to say the least, badly flawed.

During the wartime period, Marines, whether officer and enlisted, who violated the prevailing standards of conduct faced punishment at three levels. Ashore, lesser offenses were handled by the post commander and usually resulted in extra duty, loss of liberty, or confinement to quarters.

More serious offenses were referred to the Commandant of the Corps, who had the authority to meet out stiffer penalties, including the rapid transfer of the offender to sea duty. The most serious cases, those that merited trial by court-martial, required the sanction of the Navy Department. Marines serving afloat were subject to similar disciplinary actions. The detachment commander, with the approval of the ship’s commanding officer, handled minor infractions. Violations involving the security of the ship were dealt with by summary courtsmartial; the commanding officer of the vessel hearing the case, and meting out punishment. Offenses requiring trial

by Naval General Court-martial were referred to the Navy Department.

No compilation of minor offenses was made by the Corps during the war years. However, given the rapid influx of new men into the service and the resultant clash of civilian and military cultures, one might expect the numbers to be substantial. Records of summary and general courtsmartial are, on the other hand, fairly complete. The number of cases requiring these judicial processes was likely much lower than those involving naval personnel by percentage.

During the four years of war, enlisted Marines committed 269 infractions aboard ship resulting in summary courtsmartial. The penalties meted out usually had the desired effect, but there were repeat offenders. Eighteen Marines faced the ship’s commander twice. Two were hailed before the mast three times. Pvt. Daniel Bastibile, an incorrigible who served with the Marine Guard attached to USS Lancaster, was the only sea-going Marine to be brought before a summary court-martial four times.1 Of the approximately one thousand Naval General Courtsmartial held between April 1861 and April 1865, 8 Marine

officers and 134 enlisted men stood trial, a rather high percentage when the Corps represented slightly more than 6.5 percent of the naval service.2 Among this seemingly high number of disciplinary problems are found the names of a few Marines who, early in the conflict, were immersed in difficulties of one sort or another and later won favorable notice for heroism in battle. Sgt. Henry Meredith, commended for his conduct in action against the enemy while on picket duty from USS Mackinaw on 22 May 1864, endured twelve days of solitary confinement in double irons and a diet of bread and water for being drunk and fighting aboard USS Susquehanna in June 1861. He also lost his sergeant’s stripes and did two months extra police duty aboard ship.3 Sgt. Pinkerton R. Vaughn, whose heroism aboard USS Mississippi during the Battle of Port Hudson, 13–14 March 1863, made him the second Marine to be awarded the Medal of Honor, lost his stripes and one month’s pay on 18 July 1862 for an armed assault upon a shipmate.4 Sgt. Christopher Nugent, the third Marine to receive the Medal of Honor, had been briefly jailed in January 1862 for attempting to pass counterfeit currency.5 Although military justice is generally viewed in terms of improper conduct and resultant punishment, there is another perspective that deserves exploration.

Marines, and sometimes their families, with a particular grievance or special request, had the right to petition the Commandant of the Corps for redress or favor.

In some cases, the favor was to remain in the Corps. One such case was that of William Hare who enlisted to escape an unpleasant family situation. When William Hare enlisted, he claimed to be a single man. After a month of reasonably contented service, Hare was embarrassed to learn his wife had tracked him to Marine Barracks, Washington. Mrs. Hare petitioned Col. John Harris (FIG 1), Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1859 to 1864, for her husband’s discharge on the grounds he had falsified his enlistment. After a lengthy interview with the shrewish woman, he decided Hare was better off in the service and declined her request. Her mission thwarted at the official level, Mrs. Hare then seduced her husband into deserting. However, once Hare had spent a few days in the unpleasant circumstances that compelled him to join the Corps in the first place he turned himself in at Marine Barracks, Philadelphia. Sensing Hare had suffered the tender mercies of a non-stop tongue-lashing from his wife during his six-day absence and that punishment enough, Harris ordered him restored him to duty.6 In other cases, the petition fell abysmally short of the desired result. When USS Susquehanna returned to the United States from the Mediterranean Station in June,

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Charles H. Allison, Edward W. Miller, Roland Maxley,and William H. Palmer were granted a day’s liberty from the ship. Once beyond the gate of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, the four headed straight for Marine Barracks, Washington, to lay their case before the Commandant. Harris; listened, and reported their complaints to the Navy Department;.

Head Quarters, Marine Corps Washington July 30, 1861

FIG 1. John Harris, Colonel Commandant, USMC. Courtesy of the author.

1861, her captain, executive officer, paymaster, four midshipmen, and four forward officers cast their lot with the Confederate States. It was a heart-rending blow to the crew and Marines to see Capt. George N. Hollins turn his back on the old flag. He was an extraordinarily fair man, and well-respected by all who served under him. In his place, the Navy Department sent Capt. John S. Chauncey.7 The crew and Marines viewed the arrival of Chauncey with trepidation. Pvt. Amos Burton wrote: Of our captain and executive officer, we know nothing, but it is said coming events cast their shadows before them. We are reminded, by the introduction of four new sweat-boxes, that a new mode of punishment is on hand for all victims falling under their displeasure.8

Chauncey added to the discomfort by assigning duties to the Marine Guard, traditionally the province of the sailors. Service under Chauncey’s command was not going to be a pleasant experience for the Marines. 1st Lt. Philip R. Fendall, Jr., Susquehanna’s Marine officer, began receiving requests for transfers from the ship.

Since requests of this nature went through the chain of command, Chauncey disapproved all of them. With Fendall powerless in the situation, four Marines took matters into their own hands. On 23 July 1861, Pvts.

Sir, A sense of duty compels me to report Captain Chauncey; for treating the Marine Guard of the Susquehanna unjustly by compelling them to perform duty that does not pertain to them as Marines. The Guard, under the previous commander, had an excellent character for subordination and efficiency and was happy and contented and are now so discontented they are all applying to leave the ship. Four of the best men of the Guard obtained leave on Tuesday, last, to go on shore, and instead of enjoying their liberty with their friends, they came directly to Head Quarters and begged they may not be sent back to the ship.

Captain Jones of the Marines who was on the Susquehanna on her last cruise, gives these four men an excellent character, and says the Guard generally were remarkable for their correct deportment and efficiency, so much so, that it was a rare thing for any one of them to be in trouble.

I think it hard men who do their duty correctly and cheerfully should be treated in such a way that they take no pleasure in the ship and ask to leave her although they have no desire to leave the service, and I hope the Department will take such action in the matter as will remove the causes of grievance.

I am Sir, Very Respectfully Your Ob’t Svt. Jno. Harris Colonel, Commandant The Honorable Gideon Welles (FIG 2).9

Harris also wrote to Lieutenant Fendall: While I am one of the last men of the Corps to countenance anything like insubordination, these men are spoken of

by Captain Jones; and Lieutenant Ramsay; as correct, subordinate and good soldiers. They have great objection to returning to the ship. I therefore have kept them here and send four men in their stead. You will be pleased to transfer their accounts, bags, etc., to Major [Jacob] Zeilen (FIG 3), who will send them to Head Quarters.10

Unfortunately, compassion stopped at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The exchange of Marines required Welles’ approval. He endorsed the Harris; to Fendall letter stating, “I am apprehensive that this action will tend to demoralization in the service. That the men have cause for their conduct may be true but discipline and order must be maintained.” The four Marines were returned to Susquehanna.

In the early days of the war, several Marines, whose talents were sought by the organizers of volunteer regiments, asked to be discharged so they might improve

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FIG 2. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles.

Center photograph.

Naval Historical

their military positions. Pvts. John Wilson and Guido Harder of the Marine Guard attached to USS Michigan requested special discharges; Wilson to become drillmaster of a Pennsylvania regiment and Harder to accept a commission with a Pennsylvania artillery company. The friends and family of Pvt. James McCabe asked he be discharged to accept a commission with the Pennsylvania volunteers. All were granted.11 Numerous letters from the parents and wives of enlisted Marines were received by Colonel Harris, asking compassionate discharges be granted. Pvt. John R. McGill’s mother was left destitute by his enlistment. Pvt. Thomas Fagan, a minor whose enlistment with the consent of his unemployed father left his mother without a source of income, asked he be released. Pvt. Patrick McNabb’s sister pleaded a similar case to the Commandant. Pvt. John Stewart enlisted, apparently unaware his monthly salary as a Marine would not support his wife and children, later regretted his action. He, too, asked to be discharged.

Maj. William R. Russell, forwarding Stewart’s letter to the Navy Department, stated the Corps’ position in cases of this nature: There are many men in the Corps who have families to support, and to grant the discharge of Stewart on this ground will be setting a precedent for others who would besiege the Department for a similar indulgence and with equal claims for favorable consideration.12

FIG 3. Maj. Jacob Zeilen. Courtesy of Phil Katcher.

Few Marines who claimed financial distress to their families as a result of their enlistments were discharged from the Corps.

Compassionate discharges were, however, granted when the applicant had a record of good service and his reasons for applying were satisfactory. On 25 April 1862, Cpl. Bernard Gaffney of the Marine Guard aboard USRS North Carolina requested a special discharge so he could return to his native Ireland to take care of his ailing mother.

Gaffney first enlisted in the Corps on 22 September 1855, reenlisted on 22 September 1859, and his six years’ record of service was unblemished. Harris, who knew Gaffney to be a truthful man, forwarded the request to the Navy Department with his endorsement. Gaffney was discharged on 28 April.13 He returned from Ireland and reenlisted in the Corps as a private on 26 July 1862. He reenlisted 26 July 1866 and was honorably discharged on 26 October 1868, having furnished a substitute.

During the Civil War, there was no provision for retirement as far as enlisted men were concerned.

However, Marines who had grown old and infirm in the service and otherwise incapable of earning a living by manual labor outside of the Corps were, upon application and by law, entitled to residence at the Philadelphia or

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Brooklyn Naval Asylums. Twenty years faithful service was the benchmark and, during the war, a number of enlisted Marines availed themselves of this benefit.14 Residence at the Naval Asylums was appropriate for single Marines or widowers with no dependent children.

However, for enlisted men who had wives and children and found themselves unable to perform their duties due to the infirmities of age, such arrangements were not possible. Further, their ailments made employment outside of the Corps a dubious proposition at best. Among the latter was Pvt. John Norris, slated for an unwilling separation from the Corps. He wrote Col. Jacob Zeilen (Commandant of the Marine Corps following Colonel Harris’ death in May 1864) on 18 August 1864, requesting a reprieve: Having been informed that my discharge on Certificate of Ordinary Disability had been applied for, and would be received in a few days, I would respectfully call your attention to the following facts. I have been over forty years in the United States Service, and have served faithfully. I have a wife (who is helpless) and two children to support, and I am not so prostrated but what I could do some light duty on shipboard.

Norris closed his plea with the hope Zeilen would countermand the order to discharge him. It was a forlorn hope. Norris was discharged from the Corps on 9 October 1864.15 When the entire Marine Guard attached to USS Minnesota, in an effort to gain relief from the malarial waters of Chesapeake Bay and Hampton Roads, requested a transfer from the flagship of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, only the petition of those who were aboard when she went into commission were forwarded to Headquarters, Marine Corps. Nevertheless, Capt. George Butler, commanding the Marines aboard Minnesota, gave his permission for those who were not with the ship when she was commissioned to send individual requests for transfer. Pvt. Daniel O’Neil took the opportunity to mail his request for a transfer to Colonel Zeilen on 17 July 1864. The requests of the old hands and late additions of Minnesota’s Marine Guard fell upon deaf ears, but a few months later, Minnesota left the disease-ridden waters of Virginia. Joining the Fort Fisher operation commanded by Rear-Adm. David D. Porter, Minnesota sent a contingent of one hundred men, including fifty-one Marines to take part in the 15 January 1865 assault on Fort Fisher. Two Marines were killed in the action; one of them was Pvt. Daniel O’Neil.

A transfer for Fifer Joseph McGonigal was the subject of a letter written by his mother to Zeilen on 19 November 1864. Explaining her husband died two months previously and it would be a comfort to her to have her

eldest son assigned to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Mrs. McGonigal asked for his transfer from the Store Ship New Hampshire, then at anchor at Port Royal, South Carolina.16 Although Zeilen must have felt sympathy for Mrs. McGonigal’s plight, there is no record of his response to the woman, and Fifer McGonigal was still attached to the New Hampshire when the war ended.

When examining the disciplinary actions taken between April 1861 and April 1865, almost all of the charges brought against Marines were no different than those breaches of conduct occurring prior to the war. However, the peculiar circumstances that brought on the conflict placed the matter of loyalty in the fore. Consequently, for the first time in its history, the Marine Corps was compelled to deal with men who refused to bear arms against family and friends.

When the rebellion was a war of words rather than bullets, Marine officers whose loyalties lay with the South were allowed to resign, or were dismissed from the service. Enlisted men who refused to subscribe to the oath of allegiance were given disgraceful discharges.

None were brought before a Naval General Court-martial to answer for their actions. Once blood began to flow on the battlefields, the situation changed.

The first and only case in which a Marine was tried for disloyalty was that of William Butler, who first enlisted in the Marine Corps on 26 December 1857, and re-enlisted on 5 December 1860, the day South Carolina seceded from the Union. Although a Tennessean by birth, he was unaffected by the political turmoil of the times. When Fort Sumter was bombarded, Butler witnessed the entire affair from the deck of USS Pocahontas. His subsequent performance of duty aboard that ship was exemplary, even after his native state joined the Confederacy and he was promoted to the rank of corporal on 25 September 1861. After serving with the Marine Battalion attached to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, October 1861– March 1862, Butler was assigned to the Marine Guard attached to USS Brandywine. On 11 September 1862, a letter from his mother came to hand, the first he had received from home since joining the Marine Corps. The contents of that communication caused Butler, albeit somewhat late in the war, to face his personal crisis of conscience.

Butler learned three of his brothers had enlisted in a Tennessee regiment in June 1861, and two of them had since been killed in action. The thought his duty might compel him to “put his bayonet against the breast of another brother” overcame him. It was, in his mind, wrong for him to do it and wrong for anyone to force him to do it. When called to his watch that evening, Corporal Butler refused to stand duty. He was placed under arrest and confined in double irons. When, after five days of solitary confinement, Butler was given the opportunity to return to duty, he refused, but emphatically stated his action was not a renunciation of his allegiance to the United States.

Butler was tried before a Naval General Court-martial convened aboard USS New Ironsides at Newport News, Virginia, 9 October 1862. He was found guilty of “disloyal and rebellious conduct,” “refusal to do duty,” and “violation of his oath of allegiance to the United States.”

Butler was disgracefully discharged from the service, sentenced to two years’ confinement at hard labor at the New York State Penitentiary at Sing Sing, loss of all pay and allowances, and rendered incapable of ever again serving the government of the United States.17 Strict and prompt obedience to orders and the ramifications of failing to do so has historically been the hallmark of the Marine Corps. Nevertheless, enlisted Marines of the Civil War seemed particularly susceptible to engaging their tongues before their brains.

After being relieved from guard duty on Folly Island on 31 October 1863, Pvt. Robert McKnight did not report himself with his detachment for inspection by the orderly sergeant as required by standing orders, instead going directly to his tent to shed his arms and accouterments.

When Sgt. Thomas Buckley called McKnight to fall in for the required inspection, there was no response. Buckley called a second time, and a third. Finally, McKnight emerged from his tent, and, in a loud voice, said, “What the bloody Hell is wanted now? This is a fucked up company anyhow, and always has been since the guard came on shore. To Hell with such a company and all connected with such a damned concern!” When McKnight took his place in the formation, he sarcastically remarked, “Here I am, sergeant.” Buckley retorted, “This is a pretty way of reporting when you come back from guard.” McKnight, already beyond the pale of insubordination, compounded his misconduct by replying, “This company is fooled with more than any other in the battalion. It won’t do for us to be fooled long enough at the guard tent, until we are fooled with on our company streets when we return.” Buckley ordered McKnight to be silent, and immediately reported the incident to 2d Lt. Louis E. Fagan. McKnight’s outburst was reported through the chain of command, and he was ultimately brought before battalion commander Lt. Col. John G. Reynolds. McKnight’s intemperate remarks earned him five days confinement on bread and water.

On 28 November 1863, McKnight was ultimately tried before a court-martial on charges of disobedience of orders and scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals. The court found him guilty of the first charge, but not guilty of the second, and sentenced him to sixty days solitary confinement in single irons aboard USS Wabash, one week of each month on bread and water, and the loss of two months’ pay.

When forwarding the findings of the court to Rear-Adm. John A. Dahlgren for approval, the members reported McKnight was among the bravest of the battalion, never hesitating to volunteer for the most hazardous duty during the operations against Battery Wagner. Although he was a surly man by nature, with a disagreeable manner and a

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tendency to grumble at everything, he was, according to his company commander, Capt. Edward McD. Reynolds, a good soldier. Dahlgren abated the punishment to the loss of one month’s pay.18 Other examples of insubordination reveal a much harsher attitude toward the offender. Cpl. John W. Winterbottom refused duty as corporal of the guard aboard USS San Jacinto on 8 December 1863, and was tried before a Naval General Court-martial for disobedience of orders. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment at hard labor. Pvt. Patrick Baker compounded his absence without leave from Marine Barracks, Cairo, on 1 December 1863, by being drunk and refusing to obey orders from 1st Lt. Richard S. Collum. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at Joliet State Penitentiary. Pvt. Edward McLaughlin’s refusal to assist in cooking rations aboard USS Wabash on 24 December 1863 brought him one year of imprisonment at hard labor. Four years’ imprisonment at hard labor was Pvt. Francis Carr’s reward for refusing to go on guard duty when ordered to do so by 1st Lt. Norval L. Nokes at Marine Barracks, Washington, on 8 January 1864. Pvt. Alexander McClure paid for refusing to take his post aboard USS Lancaster and his insubordinate comment, “I won’t do it and will not go on post for any damn man on this ship,” by serving three years in the California State Penitentiary.19 Not all cases of insubordination resulted in severe punishment. When Pvt. Michael Reed of the Marine Guard attached to USS Dacotah refused to obey Cdr. Albert G. Clary’s standing order the ship’s company bathe every Saturday, the crew was ordered to turn the fire hose on him. Thereafter, no Marine aboard Dacotah missed his Saturday wash.20 Demon rum was the source of misfortune for many enlisted Marines. Pvt. William Dulaney joined at Marine Barracks, Washington, from Philadelphia on 5 October 1861. On his first liberty, he was brought back to the barracks in a wheelbarrow, dead drunk. This episode earned him a lengthy restriction to the barracks. On 9 November Dulaney was released from his restriction on the promise he would, in future, behave properly. Permission was granted for him to be absent from the barracks until sundown, but Dulaney got drunk, and remained out all night. He was picked up by an Army provost guard the next morning, and thrown into the Central Guard House. Harris was quite certain Dulaney would be a constant problem and, on 11 November recommended the reprobate be given a disgraceful discharge from the service. Welles agreed, and Dulaney was thrown out of the Marine Corps on 12 November 1861.21 The Marines who were sent to the Norfolk Navy Yard in spring 1862 had no hope of getting transferred to sea

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FIG 4. Charles G. McCawley, shown here as Colonel Commandant, USMC. U.S. Navy Historical Center photograph.

duty. The detachment was a permanent occupation force.

None of the Marines were allowed to venture beyond the boundaries of the yard under any circumstances. Until Capt. Charles G. McCawley (FIG 4), commander of the Marine detachment, reversed his no-liberty policy, duty at Norfolk was only a notch above being in confinement.

Nevertheless, orders were hardly an obstacle to those among the detachment who were determined to have the comforts of women and whiskey, both commodities readily available just beyond the perimeter of the yard.

Unauthorized absences became an immediate and ongoing problem for McCawley.

During the morning of 4 July 1862, a group of Marines decided they would have their own Independence Day celebration in the city. Four of them managed to steal a boat from the navy yard, and rowed themselves to Norfolk City. The remaining four would-be celebrants scaled the wall. After a night of revelry, the four oarsmen took their pilfered boat, rowed back to the yard where they were promptly arrested by the sergeant of the guard and placed in confinement. It took longer for the four merry-makers who were afoot to get back to the navy yard. After making their way back, the four stood outside the gate, deeply perplexed, trying to think of a way to get back inside

without being caught. Several plans were put forward by the four drunken Marines, and each debated, all the while admonishing each other to keep their voices down.

In short order, the sergeant of the guard came down to the main gate to see what the commotion outside was all about and found the four besotted men still puzzling out their predicament.

The matter could have ended then and there, but the sergeant gave a stern dressing-down to the four inebriates as he placed them under guard. One of the four, Pvt. Samuel Rauthroff, took exception to the lecture and, egged on by his friends, began a verbal joust with the sergeant. The battle of words escalated and, when one of Rauthroff’s friends shouted out, “Smack him!” he punched the sergeant. The sergeant struck back and the fight was on. Although drunk, Rauthroff was still a formidable physical specimen. When the sergeant began to lose ground, other members of the guard joined in the fray.

Two, then four, and finally seven sentinels piled on before Rauthroff was subdued. In the confusion of the struggle, Rauthroff’s friends made good their escape through the now opened gate and left their comrade to face Captain McCawley’s wrath alone. Rauthroff was hauled before a court-martial, found guilty of desertion and resisting the guard, and sentenced to three months of police duty wearing a sixteen-pound ball attached to his leg by a chain.22 Having learned his lesson, Rauthroff served the remainder of his enlistment without getting into further difficulty and was honorably discharged on 15 June 1865.

During the night of 19 July 1862, Pvts. Michael Brogan and William Bennett scaled the wall for a night on the town. Brogan, quite drunk, was apprehended by the guard outside the gate shortly after midnight and, after a brief scuffle, was locked up. Bennett was caught coming back over the wall on the morning of the twentieth, and was also confined. Rather than leave well enough alone, and face merely charges of unauthorized absence, Bennett made matters worse by kicking the lock off the guard room cell, and making a break. He bolted through the guard room door with Sgt. Jeremiah Brett of the guard in hot pursuit. As the two dashed across the parade ground, Brett closed the distance between the two, and, just as he was within arm’s reach, another Marine suddenly intervened. The newcomer was lugging a camp stove.

With a mighty heave, the stove became airborne. Brett dodged the unwieldy missile, but in doing so, lost sight of his prisoner. Other members of the guard took up pursuit, and wrestled Bennett to the ground just short of the wall.23 Finding the task of keeping his own troops under control more than he bargained for, McCawley ultimately sought permission from Harris to abandon the restrictive liberty policy. Once liberty was allowed, the cases of unauthorized absences and associated riotous conduct diminished rapidly. The post at the Norfolk Navy Yard became one of tranquility.

Justice aboard ship, with the notable exception of Captain

Chauncey’s sweatboxes, was different than what Marines in barracks experienced. In the event a shipboard Marine was caught violating the regulations, he faced punishment of varying degrees, Pvt. John K. Murdock explained: Among the petty officers of the ship are the master at arms, better known as “Jimmy Legs,” and his assistant, the ship’s corporal. For any delinquency or breach of discipline, either of these officers can assist, so to speak, any man and take him to the mast, that is, to the quarterdeck where the officer of the deck is on duty. If the offense be a minor one, it is usually disposed of then and there by blacklisting for a certain number of days or weeks. To be blacklisted means more than you might imagine, for Jimmy Legs has always something at hand that needs to be done and when it is when the offender would otherwise be off duty that the black list is called upon to square accounts and it is a poor day when Jimmy cannot find a few hours work washing and cleaning to be done. Too, a blacklister cannot go ashore, should he belong to a boat’s crew. He remains in the boat while the others of his crew may be permitted to take the run for a certain length of time. For grave charges, the First Luff (Navy first lieutenant) is called and disposes of the case as may merit with so many days in the brig a certain time on the list. A man sent to the brig, or the place of confinement, may receive, while he is in there, the regular ration or may be compelled to diet on bread and water for ten, twenty or even thirty days. Then there are cases requiring a Court-martial, the court consisting of several of the officers of this ship. When the evidence is taken, as in court, and the sentence given.

Murdock went on to give an account of his own taste of shipboard justice: The Marines were so good they did not need punishing, that is, excepting your humble comrade has a faint recollection of doing a little of the 2 on, 2 off by himself, and then he is an exception to Marines in general and these were exceptional occasions. For instance, the choking of a corporal who had the impertinence to disturb his slumber at an unseemly hour of the night, that he might go on post. Instead of approaching me in a gentlemanly manner, tapping me on the shoulder and saying—Mr. Murdock, the time has arrived when your Country needs your services on the quarterdeck. Arise. Get inside your coat of blue, buckle on your sidearms, and report at once to your post, and do your duty. No, not he. It was not his way of putting it. He just simply took me by the arm, gave me a jerk, and said, “Get out of here!” and I got, as would any man sleeping in a hammock, but it was a surprise party for me, and in about 2 seconds time I had him by the neck and against the stanchion and but not for a comrade, would have committed myself still further The next morning, I had time on the quarterdeck, and, as at that time I was acting as Captain’s Orderly, my case was given over to him. I tried very hard to convince him that I’d get along just as well without punishing but he had been longer in the service than I had and was not willing that I should put my opinion against his and then informed me that I could dance 2 on and 2 off for 48 hours.24

Sleeping on post is one of the most serious breaches of military discipline and, as the war progressed, was punished with increasing severity. Pvt. Hugh McSorley was tried by summary court-martial aboard USS Lancaster for that offense on 1 May 1861, and was sentenced to the loss

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of two months’ pay and thirty days in solitary confinement.

A Naval General Court-martial was convened aboard USS Hartford on 14 July 1863 to hear the case of Pvt. Michael McLaughlin. He was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for one year, loss of all pay due him, and a dishonorable discharge. Pvt. David Pulver fell asleep while on duty aboard USS Minnesota on 24 August 1864, and spent eighteen months in prison. On 23 October 1864, the cases of Pvts. Daniel Sullivan and Andrew Libbett of the Marine Guard attached to USS Agawam were tried.

Libbett, who fell asleep while in charge of prisoners, was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor.

Sullivan was confined at hard labor for the duration of his enlistment.25 The case of Pvt. Thomas Burke who was found guilty of sleeping at his post while guarding prisoners at Marine Barracks, Boston, on 19 December 1863, had a unique outcome. After word of his sentence of three years and six months imprisonment at hard labor at the New York State Penitentiary at Sing Sing reached several Marine officers whose command he served under, the following letter was received at Headquarters, Marine Corps: Marine Barracks, Philadelphia 27 March 1864 Colonel John Harris Commandant, Marine Corps Sir; The undersigned officers of the Marine Battalion lately serving on Morris Island, South Carolina, respectfully request that you lay before the Honorable Secretary of the Navy the following petition in relation to Private Burke, also of the Battalion, who was recently convicted by a Court-martial for sleeping on post at Charlestown, Mass., and sentenced to confinement at hard labor at Sing Sing Prison, New York.

Private Burke was Acting Bugler for the Battalion, and as such, came frequently under our observation. He is quite a young man; an Irishman, and but a short time in this Country.

He is of excellent disposition, disposed to do his duty on all occasions, subordinate and respectful, and won, in his position, the interest and approval of all his superiors. On the present occasion when he committed himself whilst in charge of prisoners, the Court found it necessary to make an example of him as prisoners had escaped by negligence of sentries in charge. He immediately pled guilty when arraigned.

In consideration of the facts just stated, we respectfully present to the Honorable Secretary as a proper subject for his clemency, and hope he may be released from the balance of his sentence and be restored to duty.

Very respectfully, Your obedient Servants, (Signed) J. Zeilen, Major, USM Corps H. B. Lowry, 1st Lt., USMC Wm. Wallace, 2d Lt., USMC

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E. P. Meeker, 2d Lt., USMC Frederick T. Peet, 2d Lt., USMC The character of Private Burke while serving under my command in the Marine Battalion, Morris Island and Folly Island, was as seen as good and he possessed the confidence of his officers.

Jno. George Reynolds, Lt. Col., U. S. Marines C. G. McCawley, Capt., USMC L. L. Dawson, Capt., USMC John C. Harris, 2d Lt., U. S. Marines26

AM. I immediately aroused Sergt. Miller and searched the car, found the hand irons in the seat. I then went through the other cars and searched them. The train was shortly stopped and I searched about in the vicinity, but still couldn’t neither hear nor see any traces of the prisoners. About 3AM or later, a man named Barker told Sergt. Miller and subsequently repeated to me he had seen the last one of the two jump out of the window and he thought he must have maimed himself from the way he jumped. On examining the irons I found that I could readily unlock them with my thumb and forefinger.

On arriving at Trenton, N.J., I telegraphed to Major [George] Graham information of their escape but being unable to ascertain who the proper authorities to telegraph in Phila.

Were, I did not send the information then.

When the cars stopped we were in a little distance from a place called Tallytown Station, about 26 miles from Phila.

And about 4 miles from Trenton.

I beg sir, that you will be kind enough to take into consideration the facts that on Monday morning I was relieved from duty at 5.30 AM and Sunday night I had to visit the sentries after midnight, and will deal leniently with me. In this my offense which has learned me a sad lesson. During four years and eight months that I have been in the navy and Marine Corps I have never before had a single report made against me.

E.C. Gabaudan 2d Lt. U.S.M. Corps

The petition was endorsed by Harris, and forwarded to the Navy Department on 23 April 1864. Impressed by the fact no other Marine under sentence of court-martial had ever received the support of so many of his officers, Gideon Welles pardoned Burke, who was restored to duty at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, on 10 May 1864.27 Falling asleep on duty was not limited to the enlisted Marines. 2d Lt. Edward C. Gabaudon found himself in the same predicament while escorting three Marines guilty Colonel J. Zeilen of desertion from Marine Barracks, Washington, and Commandant U.S.M.C.28 one from the Receiving Ship Princeton at Philadelphia, The mix of Marines and alcohol has undoubtedly been to prison at Wethersfield, Connecticut. His letter to Col. a problem which has defied resolution since the first seaJacob Zeilen, Commandant, relating the circumstances soldiers, then called Epibatae, went aboard the Athenian follows: ships of war in the fifth century, B.C. Despite attempts to Sir; control intemperance in the United States Navy by issuing It is a sense of deep sense of mortification that I am called a daily ration of grog, and “splicing the main brace,” when upon to report to you the escape of two of the prisoners sent circumstances dictated an extra cup, smuggling liquor under my charge to the Connecticut State Prison. over the gangway persisted. The problem intensified when On Monday (18 July) at 4 PM, we arrived safely at the daily grog ration was eliminated in 1862. Marines on Philadelphia, but to prolonged delay in procuring the shore, in order to keep them from the temptations of hard prisoner (Boyer), whom I was ordered to take from the liquor, were allowed to purchase limited quantities of beer Receiving Ship Princeton. I was unable to take the 6:45PM train from Phila. To New York. I therefore remained in and ale from post sutlers. Nevertheless, the desire for two Barracks until 11PM, when I left to take the “one train” the or three fingers of strong spirits brought many Marines hour of departure of which, I found on my arrival at the depot into disciplinary difficulties. to have been changed to 1.45 AM. I therefore, in accordance Rumors an end to the grog ration was in the offing with my instructions, took this train and seated my prisoners presented opportunities to entrepreneurs such as Pvt. and guard as follows. Sergt. Sloan and Quinlan on the front John Carrigan of the Marine Guard aboard USRS North post, (prisoners) Carpenter and Connell in their rear, and Carolina. He was caught smuggling liquor aboard the Rany and Boyer on the next seat in their rear. Sergt. Miller and myself on the seat in line with Rany and Boyer, Sergt. receiving ship with the intent of selling it to the sailors Miller being in the seat next to the passage. About 2AM … in June 1862. The cloud of a disgraceful discharge hung being outside of Phila., and the train under full way (at 20- over the miscreant until an unusual communication was 30 miles per hour) Connell asked to have his irons loosened. received from Headquarters. In writing to Maj. Addison This request I granted as he had made the same complaint Garland, commanding Marine Barrack, Brooklyn, Harris several times before when in garrison and on the route. said of Carrigan: When Sergeant Miller had loosened the irons, I said to him, “Sergeant. Are you sure the irons are so that they cannot get them off?” To which he replied, they were. About 215AM I should judge I inadvertently closed my eyes; as my prisoners uppermost in my mind as soon as I caught myself napping, I started up and looking quickly around, I saw the seat occupied by Connell and Carpenter vacant – it was now 230

He is a hearty young man, and has served in the Corps before. As we are hard pressed for men, I can’t well afford to discharge him. You will, therefore, be pleased to receive him at the barracks and send a man on board the North Carolina 29 in his place.

The rather lenient treatment given Carrigan set a

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be greatly to the discredit of the Corps.30

FIG 5. Lt. Col. John George Reynolds. Courtesy of John D. Reynolds.

poor example for those among North Carolina’s guard who were bent on similar enterprises. The practice of smuggling liquor on board and selling it to the sailors not only continued, but increased to the point where discipline was significantly eroded. Finally, Capt. Richard W. Meade, USN, ordered a crackdown, and the entire ship was searched for contraband liquor. Lt Col. John G. Reynolds (FIG 5), commanding Marine Barracks, Brooklyn (having relieved Major Garland), reported the discouraging results to Headquarters: Smuggling liquor has been suspected for a long time, finally an overhaul of bags and other effects has had, where upwards of one hundred bottles of whiskey were found in the possession of the guard, one man as many as ten bottles.

As far as I can understand, the guard have regular liberty days. When returning on board, they are permitted to pass without being overhauled or searched. This time-honored custom being neglected, the men have taken advantage by entering regularly into the business of smuggling and selling to recruits at large profits, thereby neutralizing the object for which they were stationed.

Reynolds went on to castigate those responsible for their neglect of duty: If the practice of searching all returned liberty men is not exacted by the Commander of the Ship there can be no excuse for the Marine Officer of the guard in not requiring the custom kept up. At the Barracks, Marines returning off liberty are invariably searched. How much more important that a guard having charge of 2,000 or more recruits should undergo like scrutiny? Liquor to the quantity as before stated, amounting to twenty odd gallons, distributed among a class of undisciplined men such as generally on board Receiving Ships, might result in a serious disaster, and certainly would

Thirteen of the fifty-six enlisted Marines of the guard were arrested and confined at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, under various charges relating to the smuggling affair.31 Capt. John H. Higbee, commander of North Carolina’s Marine Guard, was relieved of his duties and transferred to Marine Barracks, Norfolk, replaced by 1st Lt. William B. Remey.

A Naval General Court-martial was convened at Marine Barracks Brooklyn, and heard the cases of the accused during the period 22–24 September 1864. During the course of the trials, it was revealed the Marines involved in the smuggling volunteered for duty on the dock and bought the liquor from the watchman. They brought it aboard when relieved by other Marines who were also party to the affair. Robert J. Alexander, orderly sergeant of the guard, acting on numerous complaints of drunkenness among the recruits and Marines, devised a plan to catch the culprits in the act. During the night of 27 July 1864, Alexander kept watch in his bare feet so as not to attract attention. At 0500, he observed Pvt. Daniel Meehan emptying a skin of whiskey into a tin pot held by another Marine. A third Marine was in the act of cautioning Meehan not to “ship it so fast,” when Alexander emerged from his place of concealment and said, “That is pretty work for you to be at.” After confining the three culprits, Alexander proceeded to search the trunks of the guard.

In the course of his search, Sergeant Alexander found two half-pint bottles of whiskey in Pvt. John Seymour’s trunk.

Seymour vehemently denied putting them there, but to no avail. As Alexander ordered Seymour to be locked up, Pvt. Patrick White stepped forward and admitted the bottles were his. Seymour was released and White was taken away.

Alexander continued his investigation, finding thirteen pint bottles of brandy in Pvt. William Eagney’s trunk.

Eagney was placed under arrest. The search continued, and more liquor was found and more Marines placed under arrest. Finally, Alexander came upon Pvt. Garrett Steiner, a veteran of the 21 July 1861 Battle of Bull Run and had been held prisoner of war for several months, sitting on his trunk. Steiner casually remarked, “I might as well take my turn,” and opened a small box that contained three half-pints of whiskey. When Alexander said it was rather a small quantity, Steiner replied, “You ain’t through with it yet, I have another trunk.” Seven more bottles were found in Steiner’s second trunk. As the sergeant was securing the liquor, Steiner directed him toward Cpl. Alexander Tilghman, who was hurrying past. “There goes another of our crowd. You better go and get him.” Alexander caught Tilghman in the act of transferring two bottles from his

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coat to his trunk. As Tilghman was being taken away, Alexander retrieved nine more bottles of whiskey from the trunk, all neatly wrapped in paper.

The court found ten of the accused guilty of violating the order of the secretary of the navy regarding the possession of liquor on board United States naval vessels, and were sentenced to thirty months at hard labor, shackled and chained, at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn. Further, all forfeited all pay and allowances then due or to become due.32 The matter, which seemed settled, was not yet resolved.

While the accused were awaiting trial, they were put to duty, and stood watch two hours on and four hours off, rather than the normal six hours on and eight hours off.

When a riot broke out aboard USS Savannah, they were among a contingent of Marines sent from North Carolina to quell the disturbance. Further, they all served five days at hard labor on the parade ground. Pvt. William Eagney, an old hand and skillful sea lawyer, brought the matter to the attention of the Navy Department, claiming the duty performed while awaiting trial constituted punishment for the crimes for which he had been accused. The sentence of the court-martial, in his opinion, was double jeopardy.

Welles agreed and ordered the remainder of Eagney’s sentence remitted and his restoration to duty.33 When Reynolds received the order to restore Eagney to duty, a sense of fair play compelled him to write RearAdm. Hiram Paulding, Commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, suggesting since Eagney’s sentence was remitted on technical grounds, the rest of the liquor smugglers should be released as well. Paulding forwarded the letter to Headquarters, Marine Corps, with his endorsement.

Colonel Zeilen approved the recommendations of Reynolds and Paulding, and, ultimately, Welles ordered the release of the nine remaining under the sentence of the court. They were restored to duty on 29 January 1865.34 While enlisted Marines were usually the perpetrators of alcohol-related infractions of regulations, senior non-commissioned officers were not immune from overindulgence and its consequences. Thomas A. Buckley, orderly sergeant at Marine Barracks, Washington, felt the wrath of the Commandant after a drinking spree in January 1863: Ordered: That for the disgraceful conduct of getting drunk at an important period when the officers were entertaining company in the garrison and the unsoldierlike monkey capers … , and his disagreeable manner to the non-commissioned officers and men, that Orderly Sergeant Buckley will be reduced to the ranks, and that he be confined to the cage until further orders.

Jno. Harris Colonel, Commandant Head Quarters, Marine Corps Washington, D. C. January 17, 186335

A primary function of Marines was to act as sentinels over naval prisoners under their charge. On the night of 26 November 1863, two sailors, confined to cells and under the surveillance of Marines in the guard house at the Boston Navy Yard, made their escape. When the escape was discovered, the entire guard, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 6 privates were arrested and charged with neglect of duty. A court of inquiry was convened to determine responsibility.

Testimony given at the inquiry showed the two seamen, John Lee and Thomas Stanton were sent to the guard house

by Commo. John B. Montgomery, USN, commandant of the Boston Navy Yard, with five others under sentence of court-martial. Having only five cells in which to confine the seven prisoners, Capt. George Butler (FIG 6), temporarily in command of Marine Barracks, Boston, placed Lee and Stanton in one cell, and so notified Montgomery. Butler also told Montgomery all the prisoners were secured in double irons. Montgomery, contrary to Butler’s orders, had the irons removed.

Butler ordered the officer of the day and the noncommissioned officers to make frequent personal inspections of all the prisoners, but Lee and Stanton, free of their restraints, managed to saw through several of the bars covering the window to their cell without detection.

Before they could complete the task, they were discovered

FIG 6. Capt. George Butler. Massachusetts Commandery, MOLLUS Collection, USAMHI.

and removed to another cell in the basement of the guard house and placed in double irons. Orders were issued the two were to be observed once an hour during the day and every half-hour during the night, but Butler placed no sentinel over them, feeling the cell quite secure. He was wrong.

During the night of 25–26 November, Lee and Stanton managed to unlock their irons, remove the screws from the grating to their cell door, and, after removing a grating in the cellar wall, escaped into the yard. The two concealed themselves under the hay in the stable loft and, when searchers failed to discover their hiding place, broke the lock to a window overlooking the street, lowered themselves down with a rope, and made good their escape.

Conflicting testimony was given by Butler and the noncommissioned officers in regard to whether or not his instructions were to only look through the grating at the prisoners at the assigned times. The noncommissioned officers all stated Butler had given orders to that effect, but he testified his orders were to visit the prisoners in their cells. Further, despite the fact he had given no direct order to the sergeant of the guard to search the prisoners, Butler argued it was standard operating procedure to search all prisoners at retreat and tattoo. Moreover, instructions to perform that duty were posted in the guard room.

The court agreed with Butler’s testimony, but blame was assigned to all concerned.

The court found the cell was not strong enough and, after making one escape attempt, should have been separated with a sentinel placed over them. The prisoners should have been searched as required by the posted orders, and simply looking through the grating in the door of the cell rather than entering to see the two were secured was neglectful.

The court assessed responsibility as follows: Capt. George Butler failed to place a sentry over the prisoners; Sgt. Robert Cooper should have searched the prisoners, visited the interior of the cells and passed those orders along to the corporals; Cpl. James Carr should have, by virtue of the Orders of the Post, visited the interior of the cells; Cpl. Thomas Maley was neglectful of the Post Order to visit the interior of the cell, nor did he carry out the order to look in at the prisoners.36

Maley was found to bear most of the responsibility for the escape and was tried by Naval General Court-martial on 15 January 1864. He was found guilty of neglect of duty and disobeying the lawful order of his superior officers in that he did not visit the interior of the cells in which Lee and Stanton were confined, thus allowing them to escape.

Maley was sentenced to eighteen months at hard labor at Sing Sing Penitentiary.37 Marines arrested by civil authorities for the crime of theft meant immediate disgraceful discharge.38 However, when a Marine was caught stealing from another Marine,

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the consequences were much more severe. When old offender Fifer James Carrigan returned from liberty to Marine Barracks, Cairo, on 6 November 1863, he was quite intoxicated, and very hungry. As he entered the barracks, he found a bag of eleven game birds Cpl. George W. Kline had shot. Carrigan stole the birds, cooked them up, and proceeded to have a fine feast. His drunkenness, however, made his escapade anything but secret and when Kline returned his friends told him what Carrigan had done. Carrigan was promptly arrested and charged with theft. Brought before a Naval General Court-martial for his offense, Carrigan was found guilty, sentenced to three years at hard labor, and given a dishonorable discharge.39 The innocent attempt by the wife of a Marine sergeant to improve her husband’s military position set off a chain of events that brought him to the brink of ruination.

Margaret Hancock, the wife of Charles Hancock, orderly sergeant of the Marine Guard attached to the Supply Ship Vermont, wrote to U.S. Senator Henry Wilson with a plea to obtain a discharge for her husband.40 Hancock’s friends in Massachusetts had the ear of the governor and were confident a commission in the volunteers was his if a discharge from the Marine Corps could be quickly arranged. Wilson forwarded Mrs. Hancock’s request to the Navy Department with his endorsement on 14 41 February 1863.

Hancock’s release from the Corps was quickly arranged.

On the condition he provide two substitutes to be enlisted in his place, Hancock would be discharged. Trusting the substitutes would be provided as promised, Harris ordered Hancock to be relieved from duty aboard Vermont, and sent north by the first vessel.42 Hancock was transferred from Vermont on 7 March, and arrived at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, on the thirteenth.

His friends, however, had failed to provide the two substitutes as promised, but Harris, in good faith, had Hancock’s discharge made out and forwarded it to Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, on 20 March. Five days later, Harris expressed his concern over the lack of activity in the matter of the substitutes. He told Major Zeilen, commander at Brooklyn, if they were not enlisted soon, he was prepared 43 to give Hancock orders to duty.

The situation took a decidedly ominous turn when a letter from 2d Lt. Alfred Devereaux (FIG 7), commanding the Marine Guard aboard Vermont, forwarded a letter to headquarters charging Hancock with theft. Devereux stated since Hancock’s departure, a number of enlisted men complained to him they had signed for articles of clothing they never received and further these articles of clothing were subsequently sold by Hancock or given away for favors. Devereaux further stated a number of

342 Military Collector & Historian

FIG 7. 2d Lt. Alfred Devereaux. Courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

Hancock’s mess mates had been aware of his actions for several months and, moreover, they had received articles of clothing from the sergeant they were not entitled to.

The mess cook reported Hancock had sold him a dozen pair of socks and he had seen him give a new watch coat in payment for his personal washing.44 Harris was properly outraged by Devereaux’s letter.

He immediately wrote Zeilen with orders to withhold the discharge from Hancock, suspend him from duty, and confine him in quarters. When, a few days later, he learned Zeilen had granted Hancock a leave of absence and failed to report back to Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, Harris told Zeilen to forward all material relative to the matter to Marine Barracks, Boston. In the meantime, should Hancock make an appearance, Zeilen was told to place him under arrest and send him to Headquarters.45 Hancock was arrested at Marine Barracks, Boston, on the night of 1 April 1863, and presented a copy of Devereaux’s letter of 19 March. Lt. Col. John G. Reynolds carefully observed Hancock’s demeanor as he read the document, and noted he did so “without trepidation or change of countenance.” After reading the letter, Hancock explained his position to each of Devereaux’s allegations in such a manner as to change Reynolds’ mind as to the way in which he was to be confined. Instead of locking him in one of the cells, Reynolds, satisfied with Hancock’s

apparent resolution of the matter, simply restricted him to the orderly room.46 Hancock wrote a lengthy explanation of the allegations made by Devereaux in a letter to Headquarters in which he stated all of the clothing supposedly given away from the stocks he was responsible for came from two bags of clothing salvaged from the wreck of USS Adirondack. This clothing had been given to him by the orderly sergeant of that vessel and Hancock had dispersed it among those of the guard aboard Vermont who had used up their clothing allowance and were in need of new issue which otherwise would be charged against their pay. He had, indeed, given a bundle of socks to the cook for his mess but they, too, came from the salvaged clothing from Adirondack. As for the watch coat, it had been his personal property, a gift from Pvt. Matthew McBride, clerk of the storeroom at Marine Barracks, Boston. Further, signatures of receipt by the men who had claimed they had not received certain articles of clothing proved they had, and thereby served as proof of no wrong doing on Hancock’s part.47 Harris deemed Hancock’s explanation to be unsatisfactory. He had no authority to dispose of the clothing salvaged from Adirondack. It was government property, and Hancock should have taken charge of it and preserved it accordingly. McBride’s “gift” to Hancock was so suspicious he recommended his immediate transfer to other duties. Expecting a communication from Devereaux with concrete evidence of Hancock’s guilt and that formal charges would then be brought against him, Harris told Reynolds to keep him under guard until further notice.48 Much to Harris’s disappointment, Devereaux was unable to gather sufficient evidence against Hancock to assure his conviction before a court-martial. The clothing receipt rolls bearing the signature of every man served as exculpatory evidence absolving Hancock of the theft of any clothing. Recognizing this alone would be sufficient to acquit him, Harris decided to wash his hands of the man, and, with the approval of the Navy Department, ordered his discharge without the two substitutes as previously agreed upon. Hancock was released from the Corps on 24 April 1863.49 Other cases of suspected theft were handled in the most expedient manner possible. Capt. Philip R. Fendall (FIG 8) reported he had three men in custody, certain they were responsible for breaking into the sutler’s store at Mare Island in January 1865. Although Fendall recommended they be brought before a court-martial with the hope they would be found guilty and dishonorably discharged from the Corps, Commandant Jacob Zeilen thought otherwise.

Reminding Fendall of the great expense a court-martial would entail, Zeilen concluded the best course of action would be to send the suspects to sea at the first opportunity.50 Marines have always been trained to be proficient fighters. Regrettably, some Marines did not confine their belligerence to the performance of their duties, and were

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 343

FIG 8. Capt. Philip R. Fendall, Jr. Courtesy of Michael J. McAfee.

prone to exercise their talents in ways contrary to good order and discipline.

On 6 August 1861, Pvt. Peter Kanava visited Washington with a group of friends while on leave. When asked by 2d Lt. William J. Worth, USA, to produce their passes, Kanava responded with disrespectful, profane, and insubordinate language. When Lt. Worth attempted to place the Marine under arrest, Kanava resisted, swinging his fists at the officer. Kanava’s verbal and physical outburst resulted in his conviction by a court-martial. He was sentenced to twenty days solitary confinement on bread and water, to be followed by six months hard labor. Upon completion of his sentence, Kanava was drummed out of the Marine Corps.51 An argument between Pvts. John McKnight and John Crowley at Marine Barracks Brooklyn, on 7 September 1861, got out of hand when McKnight reached for his bayonet. Crowley fell, seriously wounded by a stab wound in the chest. McKnight was court-martialed on a charge of scandalous conduct tending to the destruction of good morals and found guilty. Fortunately for McKnight, the sentence decided by the military court was relatively lenient compared to a civilian trial where the charge would probably have been far more serious and the punishment undoubtedly several months to years imprisonment.

McKnight was merely sentenced to sixty days extra police duty at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.52 Cpl. William Smith of the Marine Guard attached to USS Cumberland was equally fortunate to face military, rather than civilian justice. During a 16 August 1861 altercation with Cpl. Michael Koop, Smith seized a battle ax and opened Koop’s scalp to the bone. Smith was sentenced

to thirty days solitary confinement at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, and reduction to the ranks.53 Pvts. Frederick A. Davy and William Hare came to blows during a heated political argument aboard USS Pensacola on 8 October 1862. Davy, according to 2d Lt. John C. Harris, commander of the Marine Guard, was an Englishman and a well-known Southern sympathizer who was not afraid to debate the merits of the Confederate cause with anyone. On this particular day, Davy told Hare “he wished Jeff Davis would win all the battles,” and “would like to have the flag down to dance on it.” This was more than Hare could stand. A disparaging comment was passed by Hare to the effect Davy might not have to live under it. Davy reflexively grasped a vinegar bottle and struck Hare under the eye (upon regaining his senses, perhaps Private Hare wished he was back in the “comfort” of his overbearing wife). When Sgt. James Shaw came to break up the fight, Davy verbally abused him. Exchanging the vinegar bottle for a caulker’s mallet, Davy swung at Shaw, but missed. The blow struck an overhead beam, leaving a substantial dent in the wood. A second effort landed squarely on the sergeant’s forehead.54 Davy was brought to trial before a Naval General Court-martial on 19 October 1862 and found guilty of using treasonable language, fomenting a quarrel, and assaulting his superior officer. He was sentenced to two years confinement at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and a dishonorable discharge.55 Pvt. Charles Barry lost his temper on board USS Octorora on 6 May 1863, and punched Orderly Sgt. Gustavus Pfulf in the face. The outburst earned him six months in prison and loss of all pay but $20.00. As the result of assaulting the corporal of the guard aboard USS Sabine on 26 May 1863, Pvt. Michael Tobin was sentenced to six months at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, loss of one-half of his pay, and a dishonorable discharge. George Gassman, orderly sergeant of Marine Barracks, Pensacola got the worst end of an encounter with Pvt. Edward Harrington. Calling Gassman “a damned Dutch son of a bitch,” Harrington pulled out a portion of the sergeant’s beard by the roots, kicked, and continued to pummel him until the sergeant of the guard pulled him away. His victory cost him a year in prison, loss of all pay, and a dishonorable discharge.

Pvt. Francis Maher of the Marine Guard attached to USS Monongahela, received permission to go ashore at Pensacola on 10 May 1864 for a half-day’s liberty. Once ashore, Maher quickly got drunk and was taken back to the ship by the police. Foolishly, he took out his wrath on Thomas Fagan, the orderly sergeant of the guard. Maher punched the sergeant, choked him, and, after calling him “a damned son of a bitch,” threatened to kill him.

Maher’s imprudent eruption of temper brought him two

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years imprisonment, loss of all pay, and a dishonorable discharge.56 Sexual misconduct has never been tolerated in the Marine Corps. While no Marine was brought before a Naval General Court-martial, or otherwise accused and disciplined for the crime of rape—“violating the person of a woman,” several were punished for sodomy.

Sexual relationships between members of all-male military and naval services, consenting or otherwise, have existed since societies fostered the profession of arms. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps of the United States were no less affected than military services of other nations.57 Homosexuals, pedophiles, and pederasts once discovered were rapidly dealt with and invariably dismissed from the service in disgrace.

During the evening of 19 January 1862, Fifer Joseph P. B. Woodfield and Drummer Bernadine Hasson of the Marine Guard aboard USS Wabash were observed by several Marines to have been engaging in sordid conduct with Ship’s Boy Albert Lauer on the berth deck. The incident was immediately reported to Lt. Thomas Corbin, USN, executive officer of the ship. An unusual hearing took place the next day.

Rather than bring the offenders before a summary or general court-martial, Corbin designated a committee of Naval petty officers and Marine noncommissioned officers to investigate the charges and make a formal report with recommendations for any action to be taken in the matter.

The committee concluded Lauer, being promised fifteen cents to have sexual relations with the two musicians, allowed himself to be sodomized by Hasson. Although Woodfield initiated sexual contact with Lauer, he did not consummate the act. The committee found all three were equally guilty “of the most disgraceful conduct, such as to warrant their dismissal from the service.”58 The report was forwarded to the Navy Department, and, on 14 March 1862, all three were disgracefully discharged.

On 28 July 1862, Colonel Harris received a disturbing letter from Capt. Charles G. McCawley, commander of Marine Barracks, Norfolk, Virginia. Lance Cpl. Edward Maroney had previously earned the respect of McCawley but his reputation was shattered by his recent outrageous behavior. McCawley reported Maroney had slipped into the room of the sleeping Pvt. Frederick Mather during the previous night and woke him by “taking hold of his person in an indecent manner.” Mather drove Maroney off, calling out to the rest of the Marines in the room to witness the corporal’s conduct. After receiving Mather’s report, McCawley interrogated Maroney, who confessed his guilt. He also revealed he committed the same act while serving with the Marine Battalion at Bay Point,

but had not been reported for it. The case was forwarded to Secretary of the Navy Welles, who ordered Maroney disgracefully discharged from the Corps.59 During the night of 26 September 1862, Ship’s Boy Austin S. McCoy was assaulted and sodomized by Pvt. George W. Massey aboard USS Sabine. Two Marines witnessed the act and reported it to Capt. Charles Heywood, commander of the Marine Guard. Heywood promptly arrested Massey and sent a report of the incident to Headquarters. Secretary of the Navy Welles, after receiving recommendations from Lt. Col. James Edelin, acting commandant during the temporary absence of Colonel Harris, ordered Massey be tried before a court-martial. Recognizing the adverse publicity the case would bring upon the Navy and the Marine Corps, Welles was perplexed, and only grudgingly endorsed the request, writing, “I question whether this should be tried. Perhaps it cannot be avoided.” The Department was spared the embarrassment of a trial when Massey, confined at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn awaiting his trial, escaped from his cell on 26 November.60 Knowing that the punishment for committing sodomy was severe, Cpl. William Shuttleworth, a Marine attached to USS Portsmouth, was moved to try and settle a personal score with George W. Robbins, the orderly sergeant of the guard. On 26 June 1861, Shuttleworth tried to enlist Fifer John R. Lusky in a conspiracy to falsely accuse Robbins of attempting to commit sodomy. Shuttleworth was a poor judge of character. Lusky immediately reported the matter to Portsmouth’s commanding officer, Cdr. John Colhoun, USN. As a result, Shuttleworth was arrested and tried before a Naval General Court-martial held the next day.

Found guilty of the charge of “sedition,” Shuttleworth was reduced to the ranks, sentenced to two months of solitary confinement, forfeited one-half of the pay due him, and was discharged from the Corps as “worthless.”61 Desertion was the most frequent wartime infraction of naval regulations in the Marine Corps. There were, according to extant muster rolls of the Marine Corps during the period 12 April 1861 to 15 April 1865, 2,210 cases of desertion. Of that number, 573 deserters were apprehended or returned of their own accord.62 Fifty-eight Marines had the charge removed or reduced to “Absent Without Leave” by order of the Commandant of the Corps (or by other authority), and were usually given a few weeks extra duty or sent to sea with the next detachment bound for duty afloat as punishment.63 For the remainder of those who returned themselves to the Corps, disciplinary action ran a gamut of severity.

Prior to the war, Marines who deserted and subsequently surrendered themselves were generally discharged from the Corps in disgrace or as worthless. This practice continued until the Battle of Bull Run. In the aftermath of the engagement, twelve Marines deserted from Marine Barracks, Washington, and four were ultimately made to atone for their crime. Pvts. Andrew McQuade and Patrick McMenamin were arrested by the Philadelphia Police

Department, and returned to Washington on 24 August 1861. They were immediately tried by court-martial and found guilty of desertion. Both were sentenced to be “marked with the letter ‘D’ in India ink on both hips in the presence of the troops, and drummed out of the Marine Corps.” The sentences were executed at Marine Barracks, Washington on 26 August 1861.64 Pvt. Matthew Dallas surrendered himself at Marine Barracks, Philadelphia, on 1 August 1861. He was disgracefully discharged from the Corps on 31 August. Pvt. Dennis O’Brien surrendered at Philadelphia on 1 January 1862, possibly to escape punishment by civil authorities. If that was his intent, he was mistaken. He was disgracefully discharged from the Marine Corps on 15 January and turned over to the Philadelphia Police Department.65 Over the course of the next several months, the Marine Corps was so hard-pressed for men, deserters were once again treated with leniency. Deserters who surrendered themselves were admonished and restored to duty. Those who were apprehended by police had the expenses of their arrests deducted from their pay and they, too, were restored to duty. Men brought before Naval General Courts-martial were also treated leniently. Cpl. John Kelly, charged with desertion in time of war, served only twenty days solitary confinement in double irons, and was reduced to the ranks.66 Harris’ problems were summed up in a letter he wrote regarding Pvt. Jeremiah Murphy, a deserter from Marine Barracks, Boston:

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 345

drummed out of the Corps. He was also sentenced to one year at hard labor in Sing Sing.69 2d Lt. Henry C. Cochrane (FIG 9) was officer of the day when the expulsion of Coyle was executed. He wrote his father of the ceremony: After “reveille” (daylight), I went to the “cage,” a name we give our lock up, and caused the Sergeant-of-the-Guard, who has charge of all prisoners, to bring the beauties down to hear their sentences. They were in single irons and seemed intensely anxious to learn their fate, which I think was easier than they anticipated. I read them solemnly and deliberately, and when I had finished one of them remarked “they might have left the hair on a person’s head.” I thought to myself that he might thank God he wasn’t condemned to be shot. A barber was then procured, and his head half shaved on the left side. At 7 a.m., our own and the troops from the Navy Yard, were formed on the parade ground, and all being present, a guard and four musicians brought prisoners to the front. I was Acting Adjutant, and read the Secretary’s orders in their cases, and then marched Coyle, bareheaded, up and down the ranks, with irons on his hands and eight bayonets in his rear while the music played the Rogue’s March. It was a ludicrous but at the same time pitiful sight to see even a convict thus degraded. Our men were very much affected, and I have no doubt were benefited by the disgraceful punishment to which he was subjected.70

If we could afford it, I would like to make an example of such a fellow, but we are so pressed for men we can’t afford to give them discharges if they can do their duty.67

The case of Pvt. William Southwick, who deserted from Marine Barracks, Cairo, on 2 October 1863, was unique among the wartime records of the Marine Corps.

Indeed, the military and naval services of the United States were in such dire straits President Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation on 10 March 1863 giving amnesty to all deserters who turned themselves in before 1 April 1863. It is estimated upwards of fifteen thousand soldiers returned to the ranks as the result of the Presidential Amnesty. Of more than 560 Marines eligible for the benefit of Lincoln’s proclamation, only six returned to duty.68 Once the period of amnesty ended, punishments for desertion from the Marine Corps, despite the dearth of recruits, became increasingly severe. Pvt. Charles Murphy, who deserted on 25 April 1863 while en route from Marine Barracks, Washington, to Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, was ultimately arrested and brought to trial before a court-martial. Found guilty on 18 May 1863, Murphy was sentenced to one year at hard labor in the state penitentiary. Further, he was to bear the expenses of his apprehension by the police, forfeit half of his pay, and be discharged at the end of his confinement as worthless. Pvt. Mark Coyle was standing guard at Marine Barracks, Washington, when he deserted on 13 June 1863.

Arrested, he was brought to trial on 23 June. Found guilty of the crime, Coyle forfeited all pay and allowances and was dishonorably discharged from the Marine Corps.

Moreover, he was to have half his head shaved, and be

FIG 9. 2d Lt. Henry C. Cochrane. Marine Corps Historical Center Photograph.

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Southwick was arrested at Louisville and returned to Cairo on 26 October. When apprised of the matter, Rear-Adm. David D. Porter, commander of the Mississippi Squadron, suggested a court-martial be convened to try the offender.

Remarking he recently had a number of sailors tried for crime and the effect in reducing further desertions had been “capital,” Porter intimated Marine Barracks, Cairo, would likewise benefit if Southwick was brought before a court and if convicted be shot.71 Southwick was brought before a court-martial on 4 December 1863 and, after hearing the charge and specification against him read, he plead guilty to both, declining to call witnesses or make any defense. The sentence of the court was he forfeit all pay and allowances and, to be confined at the State Penitentiary, Joliet, Illinois, at hard labor for five years. Then, in a remarkable turn of events, the court reconvened the next day, and voted to reconsider the sentence. With two-thirds of the members voting in the affirmative, Southwick’s sentence was changed. Rather than be sent to prison, Southwick was to be “shot to death at a time and place specified by the Secretary of the Navy by a detachment of the command to which he was attached.”72 When the proceedings of the court were forwarded to the Navy Department Welles disapproved the sentence, restoring the original decree.73 The peculiar circumstances of, and the reversal of the sentence notwithstanding, Southwick was the only Marine sentenced to death during the Civil War. Pvt. Malcolm E. Waite deserted from Marine Barracks, Cairo on 12 October 1863, after becoming aware the promises made to him at the Chicago Recruiting Rendezvous would not be kept. Waite was enlisted by 2d Lt. Frank L. Church on 10 August 1862, under the impression he would receive an enlistment bounty and, more importantly, would be sent to sea. Waite had a special reason for sea duty. While a member of the 39th Illinois Infantry, he had been captured by the Confederates during a skirmish at Bath, Virginia, on 4 January 1862. After a few weeks at Libby Prison, Waite was paroled. The following April, Waite was discharged under orders paroled prisoners of war were ineligible for service. After two unsuccessful attempts to rejoin the colors with Illinois regiments due to his status as a paroled prisoner, Waite, feeling sea service would put him far away from being recaptured by the rebels and charged with violating his parole, enlisted in the Marine Corps.

Despite the promise of sea duty made by Church, Waite was immediately assigned to duty at Marine Barracks, Cairo. Convinced he had been deceived and fearing he would ultimately be assigned to duty aboard one of the

FIG 10. John Hammond, shown here as a private. Courtesy of James Stamatelos.

Mississippi River gunboats and exposed to the risk of recapture by the enemy, Waite fled to Rockvale, Illinois, where he was arrested on 18 December 1862.

Waite was tried by the same court that decided the fate of Private Southwick. As did Southwick, Waite pled guilty to the charge and specification, and the court sentenced him to the same five years hard labor at Joliet. Following the pattern of the Southwick case, the court reconvened the next day and voted to change the sentence to twenty years at hard labor. Unlike the Southwick decision, the reconsidered sentence in Waite’s case was upheld by the Navy Department and he was confined at Joliet on 8 January 1864.74 Not all deserters were subjected to harsh discipline. Two who returned of their own accord during this period were treated rather leniently. Sgt. John E. C. Hammond (FIG 10) deserted Marine Barracks, Boston on 12 February 1863. He surrendered himself on 20 May 1863. His three-month hiatus from duty cost him his stripes. Pvt. Augustus R. Case (FIG 11) deserted from Marine Barracks, Portsmouth on 24 February 1864, surrendering himself at Marine Barracks, Boston, on 4 March. Case was returned to Portsmouth on the twelfth, and confined until detached to duty aboard USS Agawam on 26 April.

Despite some instances of lenient treatment, harsh sentences for desertion continued to be given, particularly for those who were repeat offenders or were deemed to be bounty jumpers. Pvt. James Ford, who had deserted and been arrested three times within the space of four months, was convicted by court-martial and sentenced to fifteen years hard labor. Pvts. John Davis, George Courtney,75

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 347

FIG 11. Pvt. Augustus Case. George Menegaux collection.

and John Greene were, in addition to being found guilty of desertion, determined to have been bounty jumpers.

All were sentenced to ten years hard labor at Sing Sing (they were ultimately incarcerated at the Connecticut State Prison at Wethersfield). When another deserter, Pvt. John Carpenter, was apprehended and brought to Marine Barracks, Washington, the severity of the punishment he faced astonished Detective Marcus Bickford, the arresting officer. After 2d Lt. Edward C. Gabaudan (FIG 12) received the prisoner, the following exchange took place:

FIG 12. 2d Lt. Edward C. Gabaudan. Massachusetts Commandery, MOLLUS, USAMHI.

as previously related, Carpenter had the last laugh on Lieutenant Gaubaudan, having escaped from the train carrying him and three other prisoners to the Connecticut State Prison on 19 July 1864.

The harsh sentences had little effect upon the number Gabaudan: “You ran away from the Sergeant who took you of desertions. Discipline and fear of punishment were after wash clothes.” overwhelmed by the lure of high bounties being paid Carpenter: “Yes, Sir, I ran away from the Corporal.” for enlistments in the volunteer regiments. Aware of Gabaudan: “You heard Greene’s sentence before you left?” the monetary temptations that induced his Marines to Carpenter: “No, Sir, I did not. What was it?” desert, Lt. Col. John G. Reynolds, commanding Marine Gabaudan: “Lieutenant [Norval L.] Nokes this morning took Barracks, Brooklyn, was circumspect in granting liberty. him to the Penitentiary for ten years at hard labor.”

Convinced few of them would return to duty, none of the Bickford: “That is rather hard, isn’t it?”

Marines who were detached from USS Colorado to the Gabaudan: “Not half as hard as they deserve.” barracks on 17 February 1865 were granted the privilege.

Bickford: “That is rather hard; more than they give in the Complaints from the men made their way through the Regular Army, and you ought not to be harder.” chain of command, and on 11 March, Reynolds received Gabaudan: “The men were hired by the Government and are orders from Headquarters to allow Colorado’s Marines paid in advance and should be punished.” liberty. He did so grudgingly, telling Zeilen he expected Bickford: “I am sorry I brought this man in. He appeared the majority would not return. He was right. Of the thirtyso penitent and the punishment is so severe. If I had known five men given passes, eighteen deserted.77 it, I would not have brought him. Ten years is rather hard.

A second amnesty proclamation was issued by Lincoln Harder than they give in the Regular Army. I shall not stop on 11 March 1865. Under its terms, all those returning any more Marines as it is against my principles and feelings. to duty within sixty days would not face punishment for Your punishment is too severe.” absenting themselves. Zeilen outlined the policy, as he Carpenter was subsequently convicted of desertion understood it, on 24 March: and sentenced to ten years at hard labor.76 However,

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As regards deserters turning themselves in under the President’s Proclamation of amnesty, I would state as that proclamation grants all a full pardon who return within a specified time, they do not forfeit anything, but are entitled to all pay, clothing or bounty that was due them at the time of desertion.78

At the time the Presidential Amnesty was proclaimed, some two thousand enlisted men were listed on the rolls of the Marine Corps as deserters. During the sixty days between 11 March and 10 May 1865, thirteen Marines returned to the ranks who had been listed as deserters prior to the amnesty proclamation, three of them since fall 1862. During the sixty days the decree was in effect, 155 Marines deserted.

No account of desertions from the Marine Corps would be complete without relating the escapades of Sgt. Daniel L. Ely. After enlisting at Philadelphia on 12 August 1861, Ely, then a private, served with the Marine Battalion attached to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. He was promoted to corporal on 20 May 1862 and detached from Marine Barracks, Washington, to join the guard of the newly commissioned USS Housatonic at the Boston Navy Yard on 6 June. Housatonic was not ready to receive her company when the Marines of her guard arrived at Boston, so while the ship completed her outfitting, they were attached to the barracks. While the guard waited to be sent aboard ship, liberty was freely granted. Ely did not return from a pass for the weekend of 3–4 August and was posted as a deserter on the sixth.

Nothing more was heard of Ely until he was apprehended and returned to Marine Barracks, Washington, on 5 April 1864. Despite his prolonged absence and the severe punishments for his crime being meted out at that time, no disciplinary action appears to have been taken in his case. More surprisingly, he was promoted to sergeant on 19 August and transferred to the Marine Guard aboard USRS North Carolina.

Ely served without incident at his new post for several weeks. When he failed to return from a twenty-fourhour pass granted on 1 October, Ely was again posted as a deserter. He was apprehended on 7 January 1865, and brought to trial before a Naval General Court-martial on the thirtieth. Pleading not guilty, Ely presented an account of his actions from the day he left his ship that certainly made the saltiest of the officers sitting in judgment raise an eyebrow: On or about the 1st of October 1864, I received liberty for the purpose of getting married. On the day the ceremony was to take place, a difficulty occurred between myself and the lady’s mother, thereby causing the engagement to be broken off. This circumstance itself grieved me more than can be expressed on paper.

FIG 13. Cpl. Henry R. Paul deserted from USS Monongahela on 23 May 1864, and, despite the Presidential Amnesty, never returned to duty. Courtesy of Andrew H. Parker, Jr.

During the time I was doing duty in this ship, so many recruits being together, made it very difficult to do my duty properly, and in doing my duty, I made many dangerous enemies. To prove this statement, I have on several occasions, received anonymous letters stating my life would be taken if I should make my appearance in the city of Brooklyn. Also, I have been shot at several times. This statement can be proven by many friends. (Sgt. Thomas Sullivan testified during the trial he had been mistaken for Ely and attacked.) Eventually, I was advised by intimate friends, the best plan I could take was to leave for a short time until certain persons had left the neighborhood. Considering the depression of spirits, I was laboring under on account of my personal matters, also in danger of my life, I concluded to leave for a short time only, thereby causing the odious crime of desertion against me.

The first ten weeks of my absence, I opened an eating house and bowling saloon in Boston. On the receipt of a letter from my brother in Indianapolis, Indiana, wishing to see me, I left for that place, leaving the interest I had in the place of business in the hands of a partner Elmer Searle,79 giving him all should I not return. On arriving at Indianapolis, I found my brother had left for Nashville, Tennessee. Understanding he would soon return, I waited for him. On the third morning after my arrival at Indianapolis, I was accosted by a Detective and accused of being a substitute broker from Cincinnati.

I was taken before Col. Warner, the Provost Marshal of that Dist., and ordered to be confined in a Military Prison at Indianapolis until further developments. After the Col. receiving satisfactory proof that I was not the person, he released me after a detention of fifteen days. After being released, I received detective papers, constituting me as one of the detective force, in which capacity I filled for three weeks.

Thinking I had been long enough absent for all causes to be

removed that forced me to leave, I resigned my papers of the detective force, and returned to report for duty on board of the ship. I arrived in New York on the evening of the 6th of January 1865, immediately crossed over to Brooklyn to report for duty on the 7th. On the corner of Nassau and Flushing Avenue, I was accosted by Capt. Waugh (Gunner Edward J. Waugh), requesting me to go with him on board. I told Capt.

Waugh I was on my way there myself, so we both proceeded on board together. 80

In support of Ely’s claims as to his life being in danger, Sgt. Thomas Sullivan testified he had been mistaken for Ely and had been attacked. Additionally, his character as a soldier while aboard North Carolina was attested to by all concerned.

This fantastic tale, certainly among the most entertaining heard by the members of the court, perhaps earned Ely a measure of sympathy. As to the first specification of the charge of desertion, that he had deserted on 6 August 1862 and not brought back until 3 April 1864, the court determined, somewhat surprisingly, it had not been proved. However, as to the second specification, he had deserted on 1 October 1864 and not returned until 7 January 1865, the court found Ely guilty. Perhaps as a token of gratitude for the entertainment, the sentence handed down was remarkably lenient. Ely was sentenced to six months confinement—at night in solitary, and during the day to be employed at fatigue duty. He also forfeited six month’s pay, and was required to make up all lost time, including his absence from August 1862 to April 1864, after the expiration date of his original enlistment. He was also reduced to the ranks. Ely made up his lost time, was promoted to corporal, and honorably discharged on 13 February 1868.81 To be continued.

Notes 1. Entry 464, Subject Files, Subfile NJ, “Discipline, minor,” RG 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, National Archives, Washington, DC, (hereafter all Record Groups (RG) are entered with the National Archives numeric designation, only, National Archives assumed). Bastibile deserted from the Marine Corps on 15 June 1863.

2. Records of the Judge Advocate General (Navy) (JAGN), RG 215.

3. Entry 24.2.3, Muster roll for USS Susquehanna, June 1861, Muster Rolls (MR), Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, RG 24.

4. Entry 464, Subject File of the United States Navy. Subfile NJ, “Discipline, minor,” RG 45.

5. Garland to Harris, Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, New York, 18 January1862, Letters Received–GR, Records of the United States Marine Corps, RG 127 (Letters Received-GR). Garland believed Nugent the innocent victim of a swindle. Using his influence with the civil authorities, Garland managed to gain Nugent’s release.

6. Harris to Welles, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 5 September 1861, Records of the United States Marine Corps, Letters Sent-HD, RG 127.

7. John S. Chauncey (1800–1871). Appointed midshipman, 1 January 1812. Promoted through the grades to the rank of captain, 14 September 1855. Promoted commodore, and placed on the Retired List, 4 April 1869.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 349

8. Amos Burton, A Journal of the Cruise of the U.S. Ship Susquehanna During the Years 1860, 1861, 1862, and 1863 (New York: Edward O. Jenkins, 1863), 64.

9. Harris to Welles, 30 July 1861, Letters from Marine Officers, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Letters from Marine Officers (LFMO), 1798–1947, RG 80.

10. Ibid., Harris to Fendall, Headquarters, 31 July 1861.

11. Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 9 August, 6 September, and 4 October 1861. Letters Sent–HD, RG 127.

12. Russell to Welles, Headquarters, 25 November 1861. Letters Sent– GR, RG 127.

13. Gaffney to Harris, USS North Carolina, 23 April 1862, and Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 26 April 1862, LFMO, RG 80.

14. Russell to Welles, Headquarters, 30 November 1861, in the case of Pvt. Theodore Mussman (first enlisted 30 May 1837); Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 3 May 1862 in the case of Pvt. John Norris (first enlisted 18 March 1829); and Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 4 December 1863, in the case of Pvt. John McCabe (first enlisted 27 February 1828), LFMO, RG 80.

15. Norris to Zeilen, U.S. Naval Hospital, New York, 18 August 1864, Letters Received–HD, RG 127. Norris first enlisted in the Marine Corps on 13 July 1837. He had previously served four enlistments in the United States Army.

16. Elizabeth McGonigal to “Honored Sir,” Philadelphia, 19 November 1864, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

17. Case 3142, Cpl. William Butler, JAGN, RG 215. He was disgracefully discharged on 28 November 1862.

18. Ibid., Case 3401, Pvt. Robert McKnight. Prior to enlisting in the Marine Corps on 10 August 1861, McKnight had served as a private in Company E, 22d Pennsylvania Infantry from 23 April until discharged on 8 August 1861. The rest of his Marine Corps service was unmarred by disciplinary problems and he was honorably discharged on 16 August 1865. He died at the Philadelphia Naval Hospital on 10 May 1915.

19. Ibid., Case 3349, Cpl. John W. Winterbottom; Case 3419, Pvt. Patrick Baker; Case 3489, Pvt. Edward McLaughlin; Case 3477, Pvt. Francis Carr (who escaped while being transported to Sing Sing), and Case 3802, Pvt. Alexander McClure.

20. Clary to Zeilen, U.S. Gunboat Dacotah, off Wilmington, 16 July 1864, Letters Received–HD, RG 127.

21. Harris to Welles, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 11 November 1861, Letters Sent, RG 127.

22. Case 3130, Samuel Rauthroff, JAGN, RG 215.

23. McCawley to Harris, Marine Barracks, Gosport, 20 July 1862, Letters Received–HD, RG 127.

24. John K. Murdock Papers, DeWitt Historical Society of Tompkins County, Inc., Ithaca, New York.

25. Muster roll for USS Lancaster, May 1861, MR, RG 127. Little more than three months after being released from confinement, McSorley was arrested for theft and, after being found guilty, was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged from the service.

Marines aboard ship sentenced to bad conduct discharges such as McSorley were not, by the “Act to provide a more efficient discipline for the Navy,” approved 2 March 1855, allowed to have their sentences carried out in a foreign country. Case 3283, Pvt. Michael McLaughlin; Case 3689, Pvt. David Pulver; Case 3694, Pvt. Andrew Libbett, and Case 3699, Pvt. Daniel Sullivan. Not all punishments for sleeping on post were as severe as the preceding.

Pvt. Andrew Conkey of the Marine Guard aboard USS New Hampshire was tried by summary court-martial for this infraction on 1 November 1864. He was sentenced to a mere three days’ solitary confinement on bread and water. JAGN, RG 215.

26. LFMO, RG 80.

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27. Pvt. Thomas Burke was, in fact, the only enlisted Marine whose sentence resulted in a petition for clemency composed and signed by officers he had served under.

28. Gabaudan to Capt. George R. Graham, commanding Marine Barracks, Washington, 24 July 1864, Entry 57. Letters Received by the Adjutant and Inspector, 1835–49, 1851–99, RG 127. There is no record of any disciplinary action taken against Gabaudan.

29. Harrison to Garland, Headquarters, 24 June 1862, Letters Sent– GR, RG 127.

30. Reynolds to Zeilen, Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, 2 August 1864, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

31. Two of the thirteen, Pvts. Charles Cameron and John Neal, evaded prosecution by claiming their rights to discharge as having been illegally enlisted between the period July 1862 and August 1863.

32. Case 3565, Pvt. John A. Davis; Case 3657, Pvt. Patrick White; Case 3658, William L. Eagney; Case 3659, Pvt. Frederick L. Brown; Case 3660, Pvt. Garrett Steiner; Case 3661, Pvt. Alexander Tilghman; Case 3662, Pvt. Patrick Mohan; Case 3663, Pvt. John A. Gray; Case 3664, Pvt. John Lane; Case 3665, Pvt. James A. Day, and Case 3666, Pvt. Daniel Meehan. Meehan was found not guilty and restored to duty. JAGN, RG 215.

33. Welles to Zeilen, Navy Department, 14 January 1865, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

34. Reynolds to Paulding, Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, 19 January 1865, LFMO, RG 80; Zeilen to Welles, Headquarters, 26 January 1865, Letters Sent, RG 127; Welles to Zeilen, Navy Department, 28 January 1865, Letters Received–GR, RG 127; Zeilen to Reynolds, Headquarters, 29 January 1865, Letters Sent–GR, RG 127.

35. Letters Sent, RG 127, Private Buckley was transferred to Marine Barracks, Brooklyn on 20 January 1863 and shipped out the next day as a replacement for the Marine Guard attached to Supply Ship Vermont at Port Royal. When the position of orderly sergeant was vacated aboard USS Canandaigua, Buckley was transferred to the gunboat and promoted to his former rank on 19 February.

36. Case 3447, Court of inquiry into the matter of the escape of John Lee and Thomas Stanton from confinement of the Boston Barracks on 26 November 1863, JAGN, RG 215.

37. Ibid., Case 3478, Cpl. Thomas Maley. On 21 June 1865, Maley, having been released from prison forty days prior to the expiration of his sentence, reported at Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, and applied for his back pay and discharge. Lt. Col. John G. Reynolds, commanding Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, attempted to persuade higher authority to remit the terms of Maley’s sentence that mandated the dishonorable discharge, and be allowed to re-enlist.

Reynolds stated Maley had always been a reliable soldier (he had served continuously in the Corps since 9 January 1849), and had he been in command at Boston when the incident occurred (he was then temporarily absent with the Marine Battalion on Folly Island, South Carolina), Maley would never have been brought to trial. Captain Butler and Sergeant Cooper, in his judgment, bore the responsibility for seeing that the orders relating to the prisoners were fully understood and carried out. He would have preferred charges against them and not Maley. See Reynolds to Zeilen, Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, 24 June 1865, LFMO, RG 80.

Although Zeilen supported Reynolds’ position, Welles denied the request.

38. Harris to Reynolds, Headquarters, 10 May 1861, Letters Sent, RG 127.

39. Case 3418, Fifer James Carrigan, JAGN, RG 125.

40. Henry Wilson (1812–1875) Massachusetts businessman, politician, and author. First elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives as a Whig, Wilson later changed his political affiliations to the American Know Nothing and Republican Parties.

Elected to the United States Senate in 1854, he served in that body until 1872, when, as running mate to Ulysses S. Grant, he became vice-president of the United States.

41. Margaret Hancock to “Dear Sir,” Roxbury, 31 January1863.

Letters Received–GR, RG 127. Charles Hancock enlisted in the Marine Corps on 22 August 1859, and had served as first sergeant at Marine Barracks, Boston from 9 February to 30 January 1862, when he was transferred to the Marine Guard of Vermont as orderly sergeant. He had applied for an appointment as second lieutenant of Marines with the recommendation of then Maj. John G. Reynolds on 5 August 1861, but was turned down for being over twenty-five years of age.

42. Harris to Isaac A. O. Barney, Esq., Headquarters, 19 February 1863, and Harris to 2d Lt. Alfred Devereux, Commanding Marines, USS Vermont, Headquarters, 19 February 1863, Letters Sent-RG 127.

43. Harris to Zeilen, Headquarters, 20 and 25 March 1863, Letters Sent, RG 127. After arriving at Brooklyn, Hancock persuaded Zeilen to grant him a leave of absence to procure the substitutes in Boston. Zeilen did grant the leave, but Hancock failed to return at its expiration. The muster roll for Marine Barracks, Brooklyn for the month of March 1863 bears the notation that Hancock was posted as “Absent Without Leave,” and that of April carries him as a “Deserter” from 21 March 1863.

44. Devereux to Harris, U.S.S. Vermont, Port Royal, 19 March 1863, Letters Received–GR, RG 127. Devereux also reported Hancock was prone to intemperance, and was a chronic troublemaker as a result of his drinking.

45. Harris to Zeilen, Headquarters, 26 and 28 March 1863, Letters Sent-GR, RG 127.

46. Reynolds to Harris, Marine Barracks, Boston, 2 April 1863, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

47. Hancock to Harris, Marine Barracks, Charlestown, Massachusetts, 2 April 1863, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

48. Harris to Reynolds, Headquarters, 4 April 1863, Letters Sent, RG 127.

49. Devereux to Harris, U.S. Ship Vermont, Port Royal Harbor, 11 April 1863, Letters Received RG 127; Harris to Reynolds, Headquarters, 22 April 1863, Letters Sent–HD, RG 127. The events surrounding Hancock’s departure from the Marine Corps must have soured Massachusetts Gov. John Andrew’s opinion of the man. There is no record of Hancock being commissioned as an officer of Massachusetts Volunteers.

50. Zeilen to the Commanding Officer, Mare Island, California, Headquarters, 20 February 1865, Letters Sent, RG 127, NARA. 51. Case 3082, Pvt. Peter Kanava, JAGN, RG 125.

52. Ibid., Case 3086, Pvt. John McKnight.

53. Ibid., Case 3091, Cpl. William Smith; Welles to Harris, Navy Department, 16 October 1861, LTMO, RG 80.

54. Harris to Capt. Melancton Smith, USS Pensacola, New Orleans, 13 October 1862, Letters Sent–GR, RG 127.

55. Case 3150, Pvt. Frederick A. Davy, JAGN, RG 215. He was ordered released from Sing Sing on 8 April 1864. Strangely, Pvt. John A. Davy was initially brought before the court to answer the charges he was accused of. Inexplicably, he pled guilty, but was saved from undeserved punishment when the court discovered the wrong man was being tried, and restored him to duty.

56. Case 3224, Pvt. Michael Tobin; Case 3232, Pvt. Charles Barry; Case 3528, Pvt. Edward Harrington; and Case 3547, Pvt. Francis Maher.

57. Barry R. Burg, An American Seafarer in the Age of Sail (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), provides an account of homosexuality and pederasty in the United States Navy and Marine Corps during the mid-nineteenth century. Van Buskirk, who enlisted in the Marine Corps as a “Boy Bound to Learn Music in 1846,” kept a series of diaries which detailed the sexual practices of sailors and Marines aboard ship. Perhaps with exaggeration, Van Buskirk claimed that a large portion of all the drummers and fifers assigned to Marine Guards aboard ship were the victims of pederasts. A brief account of the events surrounding the resignation

of Midn. Frederick Kellogg, USN, who was charged with the crime of sodomy aboard the U.S. Sloop-of-War Warren in March 1846 is given in The Journals of Marine Second Lieutenant Henry Bulls Watson, 1845–1848, ed., Charles R. Smith (Washington, DC: 1990), 89. Watson recorded Kellogg had been “charged with a most unnatural, and diabolical crime, the charge was Arson, or in nautical parlance it is called buggering. [The word “buggering” crossed out in the original.] Several instances of this unnatural connection of man and man are reported to have occurred in the squadron but with what truth I am unable to say.”

58. William Hughes, Captain of the Forecastle; William F. Redding, Signal Quartermaster; John Dugan, Quarter Gunner; Leonard Leitz, Sergeant, Marine Guard, and Patrick Cronin, Corporal, Marine Guard to Lt. Thomas G. Corbin, Flagship Wabash, Port Royal, South Carolina, 20 January 1862, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

59. McCawley to Harris, Marine Barracks, Norfolk, 26 July 1862, Letters received–HD, RG 127; Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 29 July 1862, LFMO, RG 80. Maroney was disgracefully discharged on August 6, 1862.

60. Heywood to Harris, U.S. Ship Sabine, New London, CT, 27 September 1862, Letters Received–GR, RG 127; Edelin to Welles, Headquarters, 30 September 1862, RG 80; MR, for the month of November 1862, RG 127.

61. Case 3078, Cpl. William Shuttleworth, JAGN, RG 125.

62. Muster rolls for April 1861 through April 1865, MR, RG 127. These figures were determined by actual count of the men marked as “deserters” on each muster roll and differs slightly from the figures arrived at in RG 127, Entry 88, Registers of Deserters.

63. Bvt. Brig. Gen. Archibald Henderson had the authority to erase the charge of desertion from the records of offending Marines on a case by case basis. Harris requested the same right from the Navy Department. Welles, however, thought the Department should make the decisions. Harris protested and Welles ultimately yielded the point. See Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 19 July 1861; Welles to Harris, Navy Department, 22 July 1861; Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 24 July 1861; and Welles to Harris, Navy Department, 27 1861, LFMO, RG 80.

64. Harris to Welles, Headquarters, 19 and 23 August 1861, Letters Sent-HD, RG 127; Cases 3083, Pvt. Andrew McQuade, and 3084, Pvt. Patrick McMenamin, JAGN, RG 125. Rewards to the arresting officers in both cases were paid in the amount of $15, and deducted from pay due the offenders. This practice was prevalent throughout the war with rewards ranging from $5 to $30 depending on the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the deserter.Muster rolls for August 1861 and January 1862, MR, RG 127.

65. Case 3112, Pvt. Dennis O’Brien, JAGN, RG 125.

66. Case 3172, Cpl. John Kelly, JAGN, RG 125.

67. Harris to Reynolds, Headquarters, 27 February 1863, Letters SentGR, RG 127.

68. One of those who turned himself in was Pvt. Horace Massey, who deserted Marine Barracks, Boston on 5 December 1861, and had since served in the 1st Massachusetts Volunteers and the United States Navy. After returning to duty, Massey quickly made friends with 1st Lt. William H. Cartter at Marine Barracks, Norfolk. Within days, Massey had so charmed Cartter that the latter wrote to his father, requesting him to use his influence at the Navy Department to obtain a Special Discharge for his new friend. The elder Cartter, a personal friend of President Lincoln, was gratified by Welles, and Massey was released from the Corps on 6 April 1863. See Cartter to “Dear Father,” 31 March and 2 April 1863. Cartter Family Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 69. Case 3227, Pvt. Charles Murphy and Case 3262, Pvt. Mark Coyle, JAGN, RG 125.

70. Cochrane to “Dear Father,” Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C., 1 July 1863, Henry Clay Cochrane Papers, National Museum of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA. 71. Porter to Harris, Flag Ship Black Hawk, Cairo, 29 October 1863, Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 351

72. Case 3417, Pvt. William Southwick, JAGN, RG 125.

73. Southwick was incarcerated at Joliet State Penitentiary on 8 January 1864. While imprisoned, his conduct was noted as exemplary. After being notified of Southwick’s declining health in February 1866, the Navy Department ordered that the remainder of his sentence be remitted, and he was released on 2 March 1866.

Returned to duty at Marine Barracks, Mound City, Southwick served out the remainder of his four-year enlistment, plus the twenty-three days lost to desertion, and was discharged on 1 September 1867. His plea for an honorable discharge, written 9 August 1867 and recommended by Bvt. Maj. William H. Parker, commanding Marine Barracks, Mound City, was granted. Letters Received–GR, RG 127.

74. Case 3452, Pvt. Malcolm E. Waite, JAGN, RG 125. The circumstances of the case were laid before President Andrew Johnson in a petition for a pardon signed by numerous prominent citizens of Rockvale, IL, on 28 October 1865. Waite was pardoned on 31 October and returned to duty at Marine Barracks, Mound City, on 6 November. He was honorably discharged on 24 October 1867. Waite was due pay up to the date of his sentence, but no pay from the date of his imprisonment.Ibid.

75. Case 3523, Pvt. James Ford (escaped from prison in November 1864); Case 3540, Pvt. John Davis; Case 3541, Pvt. John Greene, AKA Otis Triniar, deserter from the 9th Alabama Infantry; and Case 3550, Pvt. John Carpenter.

76. Reynolds to Zeilen, Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, 11 March 1865, Letters Sent-GR, RG 127.

77. Zeilen to Reynolds, Headquarters, 24 March 1865, Letters Sent, RG 127.

78. Muster rolls for March-May 1865, MR, RG 127. One applicant for amnesty was Pvt. Patrick Larkin, who was attached to the Marine Guard aboard USS Vermont. Larkin, who had deserted from the United States Army while stationed at the Washington Arsenal, tried to return to duty under the terms of the proclamation. He was, however, rebuffed when the Ordnance Department stated his services were no longer required. Larkin, the only Marine who attempted to leave the Corps under Lincoln’s amnesty of 1865, subsequently served out his Marine Corps enlistment. See, Larkin to “The Commanding Officer, Washington Arsenal,” United States Receiving Ship Vermont, Brooklyn Navy Yard, 14 March 1865, Letters Received–HD RG 127.

79. Remarkably, Searle was another deserter from the Marine Corps.

In a penitent letter to President Abraham Lincoln, Searle wrote he had deserted from USS North Carolina on 8 October 1864, and “since that time [he had] not seen one moments happiness.”

Searle offered to surrender himself if he had assurances he would not be shot for his crime. Searle to “President Lincoln,” Boston, 25 February 1865, Letters Received–GR, RG 127. Searle’s letter was passed to Headquarters Marine Corps, and, on 5 March 1865, Capt. John Schermerhorn, commanding Marine Barracks, Boston, sent a sergeant to Searle’s residence to arrest him. Searle was nowhere to be found.

80. Statement of Sgt. Daniel L. Ely, USS North Carolina, New York,10 January 1865, and read before the court in his defense, Letters received–GR, RG 127.

81. Case 3824, Sgt. Daniel L. Ely, JAGN, RG 125. The court failed to follow its usual procedure in punishing noncommissioned officers by reducing them to the ranks in Ely’s case. He was continued at the rank of sergeant under orders from Zeilen until the Navy Department authorized his reduction to the ranks on 12 February 1865. Ely was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps on 13 February 1868.

352 Military Collector & Historian

THE MESSAGE CENTER CMH HEADQUARTERS

FROM THE PRESIDENT

A

s calendar year 2020 comes to an end, your Company of Military Historians experienced a number of positive results despite the debilitating health restrictions imposed throughout the world as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

For the first time in a number of years, we have not been required to obtain funds from the Company’s Endowment Fund. This is great news and certainly remarkable in light of our declining membership levels. Despite the gyrations of the publicly traded securities market this year, your Company’s Investment Committee exercised sound oversight over our endowment’s securities portfolio. During 2019, with the assistance of our financial advisor, Sullivan Bruyette Speros & Blayney (SBSB), the investment committee rebalanced the funds. The results of these steps have borne fruit. I want to give a special thanks to the dedicated oversite provided by investment committee members William Emerson (Chairman), Fred Gaede, John Robertson, and Company Treasurer John DePue. Aiding the stronger financial position of the Company has been the successful roll out in 2020 of the Company Benefactor Program.

Designed to encourage a pattern of regular giving to the Company, the Benefactor Program received donations in excess of $16,000.

These funds reflect a commitment to financial support of the Company in support of our desire to be self-sustaining.

Please consider making a tax-deductible charitable contribution to the Company.

If during a calendar year your cumulative donations exceed $250, we will add your name to the program as a benefactor, published both in the Company Journal and on our

newly redesigned website. I would add that the revamped website also may accept charitable contributions electronically. This is a huge step forward. I want to thank Company Governor Steve Baule for his many months of toiling to get our Company website updated, more useful, and more efficient for our members.

I receive reports from a number of our Regional Chapters that the holding of virtual meetings and programs is flourishing through the “Zoom” video conference platform.

It is important for our members to be able to meet virtually until we are able to connect physically after the COVID pandemic subsides. With news of several pharmaceutical companies announcing highly successful vaccine test results, I look forward to hopefully being able to begin face-toface meetings at some point in 2021.

We rescheduled our Annual Meeting for the Princeton, New Jersey, area from 2020 to May 27-30, 2021. I am hopeful we will be able to hold our Annual Meeting live and in-person.

Obviously, whether my optimism is rewarded or dashed depends upon the pandemic conditions in the months leading up to the rescheduled meeting dates. Getting vaccines produced, distributed, and administered will likely determine our ability to meet in person. We are, however, planning to have virtual presentations via Zoom to make sure we are able to “meet” if the pandemic restrictions prevent a face-to-face meeting.

In closing, I want to thank Company Governor Steve Baule who concludes his third term as one of our governors on December 31, 2020. Steve has worked timelessly on getting our Company website to become a functional and working asset for the Company. Most of our databases and records were in obsolete or no longer

supported software packages. This was a tremendous undertaking, one which turned out to be overwhelming for various website engineer vendors.

Ultimately, Steve accomplished this work through his own efforts and funding. The Company is grateful for all of Steve’s hard and successful work.

On January 1, 2021, we have one Governor who begins his third term as Governor, Gordon Jones, and two new first-time governors, Col. (Ret. USAF) Chris Grazzini, of Triangle, Virginia, and Alan Boyd of Lorton, Virginia. Please join me in welcoming our new slate of governors. If you have an interest in becoming a governor, please email David Sullivan, Company Administrator.

Dave Sullivan will ask you to provide a description of your experience and to state what qualities you would bring to the board. We will have three openings at the end of 2021, with at least one governor who is not eligible for another term.

As always, I strongly encourage your participation in Company activities.

Take an active part in it. Be safe and well!

Craig D. Bell President

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 353

Company of Military Historians Benefactor Program Become a Benefactor!

Support the Company above your membership level and know that 100% of your contribution goes directly to support the Company and its drive to be self-sustaining.

The Company of Military Historians has creating a Benefactor Sponsor Program to recognize donors who, through monetary contributions, help make the Company a self-sustaining and financially strong nonprofit tax-exempt organization. Our purpose is to disseminate information and education on the material culture, history, and traditions of members of the Armed Forces of the United States worldwide and other nations serving in the Western Hemisphere.

In recognition of your support, all Benefactors will be featured in each issue of our Journal as well as listed on the Company’s website. As a publicly supported charity, your donations may also be eligible to be claimed as a charitable contribution on your income tax return if you claim itemized deductions.

The Benefactor Program is a special donor society or group designed for those persons, families, corporations, and foundations who wish to support the Company on an annual basis with a substantial donation. The program requires a cumulative donation of $250 (or more) in a calendar year. Giving levels including the following: Division Commander

($5,000 or more)

Craig Bell Brigade Commander

($4,000 - $4,999)

Battalion Commander

($3,000 - $3,999)

Bill Emerson Company Commander

($2,000 - $2,999)

Command Sergeant Major

($1,000 - $1,999)

Merle Cole, Marko Zlatich Platoon Leader

($500 - $999)

Dr. Gordon Jones, Dave Sullivan, John Thillmann, Charles Grondona, Lewis Leigh, Jr. Squad Leader

($250 - $499)

Anthony Gero The giving levels cover an entire calendar year so you do not have to make your entire gift at one time but can split it up over the year. As the cumulative amount of your donations during the year hit the threshold of the next giving level, we will move you up to the appropriate giving class for the amount of the cumulative donations received during the year and reflect the change in the next issue of the Journal and update the Company’s website.

Donate today! The Company was founded in 1949 and is seventy years old this year. Please join us to ensure the Company will continue to be a permanent long-term organization dedicated to our mission to educate and inform in the areas of military material culture. We believe we are the only organization with this mission dedicated to the material culture of the Armed Forces. Donations should be mailed to the Company of Military Historians’ Headquarters at Post Office Box 910, Rutland, MA 01543.

If you have any questions, please email the CMH Administrator at cmhhq@aol.com or the CMH President at cdbell@ mcguirewoods.com. Thank you!

354 Military Collector & Historian

New York Provincial Regiment, officer, 1758

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 355

New York Provincial Regiment, officer, 1758 Plate No. 998

D

uring the Seven Years War (or French and Indian War in North America), the Anglo-American colony of New York raised, from 1755, a single infantry regiment that had varying strength. As in other North American colonies, provincial regiments were raised yearly in the spring for a summer campaign and disbanded in the fall. In March 1758, the New York legislature authorized the regiment to be “raised, clothed and paid” at a total “of 2,680 effective men,” of which 2,557 were actually enlisted, divided into three battalions for an establishment nearly 900 per battalion. The regiment was commanded by Col. Oliver Delancey, brother of James Delancey who was at the time the lieutenant governor of the colony of New York.

Contingents from the three battalions were part of Gen. James Abercromby’s army whose attack on Ticonderoga was defeated by General Montcalm’s French forces on 8 July 1758. In early August, a detachment escorting supplies was attacked by “French and Indians” near Fort Edward, but was fortunately rescued by troops from the fort. In late August, the regiment provided most of the force that attacked Fort Frontenac on the northeastern shore of Lake Ontario, which capitulated on the twenty-seventh, the unit thus finally having some success in its 1758 campaign.1 The uniform of the regiment varied from year to year and, in 1758, it was green. In May, some 861 “Coats Common green” that were “faced with green,” which included 63 coats for sergeants, 870 “Leather Breeches,” 863 “Green Ind[ia]n Stockings” (which would have been leggings), 864 pairs of yarn stockings, 768 hats, 1740 shirts, 360 “Stripped” blankets, 870 canteens, and 145 camp kettles were shipped from New York City to Albany intended for the regiment’s 3d Battalion. This shipment was intended for the noncommissioned officers, corporals, and privates of the battalion.2 The uniform worn by officers in the British forces at that time were in the same colors as their men, but of better quality with, for instance, buttons and lace of silver or gold.

Fortunately, the officers’ dress of the New York Provincial Regiment has been recorded. Young Lieutenant Willet (who was “between seventeen and eighteen”) served in Capt. Thomas William’s company that had been raised on Long Island. As his son later related, Willet ... left the following description of the dress which, as a lieutenant, he wore this his youthful campaign. … It consisted of a green coat, trimmed with silver twist, white under clothes and black gaiters; also a cocked hat, with a large black cockade of silk ribbon, together with a silver button and loop.3

This can be interpreted in several ways and illustrators have generally followed the style of dress shown in this plate with silver lace, buttons, and aiguillette on the coat, the crimson sash denoting the status of a commissioned

officer, and high black “marching gaiters” that were then also widely worn. The hat is shown without lace edging the brim, which is not mentioned in the description and seems to have been somewhat of an option among American provincial officers. While the sword scabbard could have been carried from under the waistcoat, the leather waist belt shown was also worn.4 Art: Patrice Courcelle Text: René Chartrand 1. Treasury 1/388, Estimate of the Extraordinary Expenses incurred…

Colony of New York…[for] 1758 and A Return of the Number of Men raised by His Majesty’s Colonies in North America … 1758, 30 March 1759, The National Archives, Kew, UK ((henceforth TNA); William Marinus Willet, A Narrative of the Military Actions of Colonel Marinus Willet (New York: 1831), 14-24; René Chartrand, Ticonderoga 1758 (Oxford: Osprey, 2000), 29, 64-64; War Office 34/75, Report of John MacGee, Lake George, 6 August 1758, TNA,; Richard A. Preston and Léopold Lamontagne, Royal Fort Frontenac (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1958), 248-279.

2. Photocopy of the document titled: Shipped for Albany on board the Sloop Catharine, Corn[eliu[s Schermerhorn, Master, the following stores for the N[ew] York Reg[imen]t, New York, May 22, 1758, Todd Albums, Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library (Providence, RI); Gary Zaboly and John R. Elting, “3rd New York Battalion, 1758,” MC&H, 35, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 78 (MUIA pl.

541).

3. Willet, A Narrative of the Military Actions of Colonel Marinus Willet, 10-11.

4. The portrait of Col. George Washington of the Virginia Regiment shows an unlaced hat yet he specified “a silver-laced hat” of 5 October 1755 in the unit’s dress regulations as per his papers in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A fine example of a sword belt is that of Col. Richard Hazen of Concord, New Hampshire, circa 1735, preserved at the Boston Museum of Fine Art.

356 Military Collector & Historian

French Infantry Grenadier officers, Saint-Domingue, late 1803

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 357

French Infantry Grenadier officers, Saint-Domingue, late 1803 Plate No. 999

T

his plate is a sequel to MUIA plate No. 985 published last year. Acclaimed Belgian military artist Patrice Courcelle had reconstructed the peculiar infantry uniform worn by the French army sent by First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte during 1801-1802 to secure the island of Hispanolia. The French colony of Saint-Domingue occupied its western part and had been racked by revolution and foreign intervention, notably by British forces during 1790s, while its eastern part had been the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo since the days of Christopher Columbus until ceded to Napoleon’s France.

Nearly 60,000 troops landed in what would become Haiti for its western part in 1804 and the Dominican Republic later on for its eastern part. As is well known, the expedition was a disaster with tens of thousands of soldiers dying from epidemics while about 8,000 were lost in action. In later 1803, just over a thousand surviving troops managed to hold out in the town of Santo Domingo (capital of the former Spanish part) while about 10,000 others managed to leave for other islands or board British ships as prisoners of war and be evacuated to Jamaica.1 Our plate showed the infantry uniforms ordered worn from 18 May 1802 by General Leclerc, the expedition’s commander and Napoleon’s brother-in-law (who also perished), and the translated order was given in the text. It was quite distinct in its style and cut from what was worn in France and it was faithfully reconstructed except for a small error on our part, for which we apologise. The cuff flap, shown as blue on the plate like French line infantry in Europe, was ordered to be white in Gen. Leclerc’s order.

Once this was kindly brought to our attention, it brought to mind a watercolour by Charles Hamilton Smith, a British officer serving in Jamaica at the time, who is still recalled as a pioneer of studies in military uniforms. We have chosen to reproduce as a plate his rendering of two French officers seen at Spanish Town, Jamaica, on 27 December 1803.2 As can be seen, this watercolour shows several features on the uniforms shown that are quite different from the 18 May 1802 order. The official blue collar is shown as white for the main figure and red for the small one in the background showing the back of the uniform. The white lapels full length to the waist and both the white collar and lapels have thin red piping. The turn backs are red, as prescribed in the order, but are long rather than short going below the knees. The cuffs are red, but no cuff flaps are visible on the main figure while the other might have a blue one. White piping edges the cuffs, the turn backs, and the pocket flaps. The blue trousers are decorated with gold lace. While the order specified round hats, the main figure wears black a shako-like headdress that probably

has no visor, but has a gold plate, lace, and cords with a long red feather. The small figure holds a bicorn hat, which was the regulation headdress in France, shown with gold fastening cords and tassels and, more faintly but nevertheless visible, a red feather. The buttons are gold as are the fringed epaulet and the counter epaulet without fringes.

Red feathers and bearskin caps were the distinctions of grenadiers in France as well as red fringed epaulets for enlisted men. So, in Saint-Domingue, some units, or at least some grenadier officers obviously procured shakos that were the next best thing. In France, coat turn backs were long and white in the line infantry, but the grenadiers of the Consular Guard in Paris had these in red and the grenadiers in Saint-Domingue decided this was good for them too. The gold epaulets correspond to the rank of captain, one having fringes and the other plain.3 We are most grateful for the kind assistance given by the staff at the Library of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, United Kingdom, where many of the manuscript works by Charles Hamilton Smith are preserved including the original watercolour of this plate photographed by the author.

Art: Charles Hamilton Smith Text: René Chartrand 1. H. de Poyen, Histoire militaire de la revolution de Saint-Domingue (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1899), 86-466 (for 1801-1803); René Chartrand, “French Infantry in San Domingo, 1802 to circa 1809”, Military Collector & Historian, 71, no. 3, Winter 2019, 228-229 (MUIA no. 985). Leclerc was married to Napoleon’s sister Pauline, said to have been a great beauty and now mainly recalled for the masterpiece neo-classical statue that the great sculptor Canova did of her. She had accompanied her husband to Saint-Domingue, but fortunately survived the fevers and went back safely to France with her infant son.

2. We are grateful to Company member Michael Prevezer who spotted the cuff flap that no one saw before. We further adhere to a suggestion made by Col. John Elting many years ago to subscribers following a colouring discrepancy to simply overpaint the detail in question.

3. For details on the metropolitan infantry’s dress, see: H. Malibran, Guide à l’usage des artistes et costumiers contenant la description des uniforms de l’armée française de 1780 à 1848 (Paris: Combet, 1904), 165-204.

358 Military Collector & Historian

U.S. Marine Corps, Uniform Dress, 1839­–1859

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 359

U.S. Marine Corps, Uniform Dress, 1839–1859 Plate No. 1000

I

nitially established under the War Department, Marines received their first issues of clothing, weapons, and equipment from Army stores and, for the most part, Marine Corps dress and equipment would continue to correspond with Army patterns. Its firearms all came from Army arsenals. In 1834, the Marine Corps copied the Army’s 1832 uniform but in green instead of blue, in accordance with President Andrew Jackson’s insistence the Marine Corps return to its Revolutionary War colors.

The green dyes of the period quickly faded and, in 1839, the Marine Corps returned to its preferred colors of blue faced with red and ushered in the dress that is the precursor for all subsequent Marine uniform developments. The dress uniform shown here was also the service uniform worn on all occasions other than fatigue. As the primary uniform, its design, embellishments, and equipment combined to define every rank and position in the Corps.

Officers and enlisted men had distinctly different uniforms, but each was almost identical to the uniform and embellishments adopted by the Army in 1832. The uniform coat was made of navy blue cloth, double breasted with two rows of buttons, ten in each row, with a standing collar edged round with scarlet that closed in front with hooks and eyes, and rise no higher than to permit the free turning of the chin over it. The cuffs were plain, round, and the cuff flap indicated the officer’s rank group by the number of gold loops on the slashed flap on the sleeve–four gold loops signifying field grade rank, three loops designating captains, and two loops for lieutenants. The slashed flaps on the sleeves and skirt were edged with scarlet. Length of skirt was to the bend of the knee for field grade and about 3½ inches shorter for company grade officers. Turnbacks and linings were scarlet cloth or kerseymere with a gold embroidered shell and flame at the bottom of the skirt. A distinctive feature of Marine officer coats was that all lace was gold velum while Army officer coats tended to use a flat metallic lace.

Subalterns wore a bell crown cap of black beaver with patent leather top, side, and bottom with a red cock-feather plume similar to the plume then worn by artillery officers of the Army. Field grade officers and headquarters staff wore the Army-style chapeau and staff officers were further distinguished by a gold aiguillette on the right shoulder.

Rank was indicated by epaulets, with field officers having epaulets with bright gold bullion, half an inch in diameter, three and a half inches long, while captains had ¼ inch wide bullion, 2½ inches long, and lieutenants had smaller bullion. All officers wore the Mameluke sword but field grade officers carried theirs from slings and company grade officers from a sliding frog. The prescribed sword knot was a gold and scarlet mix cord with bullion tassels, but many preferred a gold cord knot with narrow loose fringe.

Shoulder belts were not used by Marine officers.

The Sergeant Major, Quarter Master Sergeant, Drum Major, and the Fife Major wore the same uniform as field

grade officers, notably the slashed flap with four loops.

What differentiated the staff noncommissioned officer uniform coat from the officers was the use of gold “Prussia binding” (a flat metallic lace) instead of the velum lace used on officer coats or the yellow worsted binding prescribed for enlisted men. Staff noncommissioned officers also had the same epaulets as those prescribed for lieutenants, excepting that a fringe of gold was substituted for bullion.

Staff noncommissioned officers were further distinguished by a yellow silk aiguillette on the left shoulder and all carried the Marine noncommissioned officers sword adopted in the late 1820s. Drum Major and Fife Major uniform coats were the same except scarlet instead of blue, however, the scarlet uniform coat was for concerts and both wore the blue uniform coat for daily wear.

All other noncommissioned officers and enlisted men wore a single breasted uniform coat with one row of nine buttons.

All trim was yellow worsted binding. While the skirts were even shorter than those of staff noncommissioned officers, it otherwise conformed to the pattern of the officers’ coat except that the cuff flap had three buttons and loops for sergeants, while all other enlisted men had two loops to the cuffs similar to lieutenants. Yellow worsted epaulets with thick worsted fringe was prescribed for sergeants while corporals had narrow fringe, and musician and privates had brass fringeless epaulets.

From October to the end of April, officers and noncommissioned officers wore sky blue trousers with a 1½ inch wide dark blue stripe edged scarlet. All other enlisted wore the same trousers but without the stripe.

During the summer months, officers and enlisted men wore trousers of white linen drilling without the stripe. In 1849, Headquarters Marine Corps changed officer trousers from light blue to dark blue and the trouser stripe from dark blue edged red to red.

Although Marine uniforms all used the distinct Marine eagle and anchor button, what most distinguished Marines was their unique headdress and equipment. The Army replaced its 1820s bell crown uniform caps with cylindrical caps in 1832, the Marine Corps not only continued the bell crown but acquired most of the Army’s now surplus bell crown caps. In 1845, the Marine Corps replaced the all leather bell crown with a different bell crown cap having a felt body with reinforced leather top, side straps, base, and visor. The belts and cartridge box were Army pattern, however, Marines used a plain brass rectangular plate for the waist belt and a plain oval breast plate instead of the Army’s circular eagle plate. The cartridge box was also plain without either the oval US plate or an embossed flap. Marines also continued carrying the bayonet from a shoulder belt.

Art: Trevor Denholm Text: Lt. Col. Charles H. Cureton, USMCR (Ret.)

360 Military Collector & Historian

Correction

THE LAST POST

v

Edwin “Ted” Gewirz, Fellow, DSA, Governor, and Past President

From the Editor

R

egrettably, the article “Army Military-Mountaineering, Ram’s Head, Skill Badge. “The Gods of the Valleys are Not the Gods of the Hills … .”Ethan Allen, that appeared in the Fall issue of the Journal was inadvertently credited to Michael Hammerson. The author was, in fact, Michael R. Gadue.

I apologize to member Gadue, to the members of the Company, and to our subscribers and readers for this error. Mr. Hammerson was made aware of this error and agrees with the following, I, Michael Hammerson agree and concur that the subject article has no connection with me, being an editorial error of author attribution, and I consent to the removal of my name from the article, replaced by the author in fact, Michael R. Gadue.

Louisville, Colorado

v Col. Richard Johnson, USA (Ret), Fellow Chicago, Illinois

v

Joe Letterese

Wycoff, New Jersey

v

Edwin “Ted” Gewirz 27 November 1927–31 August 2020

Patricia H. Thatcher Clifton, New York

v New Members, Winter 2020 Charles V. Rhodarmer, Jr. via CMH Online William Bartley by William O. Adams Phil Puckett via CMH Online Charles Merwin by David M. Sullivan Brian Gerring via CMH Online Chad Rogers by David M. Sullivan David Moshier via CMH Online Kerry Elliott by Jack Melton Jeremy Kolkin via CMH Online Dan Pomeroy by Myers Brown and Lisa Budreau Charlie W. Parker via CMH Online Jim Worrall via CMH Online George Goodchild by David M. Sullivan Richard Cain via CMH Online Travis Owens, reinstated via CMH Online LTC Donald L. Hansen, USA (Ret.) via CMH Online COL Myron C. Harrington, USMC (Ret.)

by David M. Sullivan

E

dwin “Ted” Gewirz passed away in Louisville, Colorado on 31 August.

Ted was born in Washington, D.C. Upon graduating from Roosevelt High School in 1944, he served in the U.S. Army. Upon returning from the Army he married the love of his life, Natalie Lidoff (1928-2015). Ted enjoyed travel, military history and spending time with family and friends. He was a founding member of the Potomac Arms Collectors Association as well as a member of the Company of Military Historians, Maryland Arms Collectors Association, and the American Society of Arms Collectors. Ted had friends all over the world and never went anywhere that he did not know someone.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 361

An Army Tropical Coat Worn in Vietnam, circa 1968 W. Sammis and William K. Emerson

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housands of soldiers who served in Vietnam wore combat clothing commonly called, “Jungle Fatigues.”

The Department of Defense nomenclature for Jungle Fatigue Trousers was, “Trousers, Man’s Combat, Tropical.” The outer garment soldiers called the Jungle Fatigue shirt was classified by the Army as a coat, as it was designed be worn with the bottom exposed and not tucked into the trousers. This longer garment allowed for large cargo pockets that started about the wearer’s waist, and was officially a, “Coat, Man’s Combat, Tropical.”

The U.S. Army Transportation Museum has in its collection a Jungle Fatigue shirt that was most likely worn in Vietnam. While the “U.S. ARMY” strip and the name tape have been removed, it carries a Vietnamese made shoulder patch for the 1st Logistical Command, and sergeant stripes on each sleeve. The label inside has, “COAT, MAN’S COTTON, WIND RESISTANT. / RIPSTOP POPLIN, OG-107, CLASS 1 / DSA 100-68-C-2485 100% COTTON / BURGESS MFG. INC. / COAT, MAN’S COMBAT, TROPICAL.” A front view is shown in FIG 1.

In the early years of the Vietnam War regulations called for enlisted personnel to wear their insignia or rank on their shirt and coat sleeves midway between the shoulder

and elbow. Initially many combat soldiers colored their chevrons a dark color or removed cloth chevrons and wore small metal versions of their insignia on a pocket flap. Other soldiers wore black and green cloth chevrons, some of which were issued by the Army, but many others were locally made.

FIG 2 shows one of the chevrons on the Transportation Museum’s shirt. The sergeant rank insignia is of a design not usually seen on Vietnamese-made chevrons. It is simply a single piece of black felt cut into an approximately proper overall shape, which is then divided into the three bars of a sergeant with wide green sewing machine stitching. It is then sewn onto the sleeve with green thread.

This attaching thread is different from the thread used to affix the 1st Logistics Command shoulder patch. This indicates the two insignia were not sewn to the uniform at the same time.

The original owner of the uniform is unknown. With the name strip removed, the only bit of information regarding the wearer is handwritten on the collar interior, “A-1381.”

At the time, this was an individual’s laundry mark that consisted of the first letter of the last name and the last four numbers of that individual’s service number.

FIG 1. Front view of the tropical combat coat sowing where name tape and U.S. Army tape were sewn. Both photos courtesy of the U.S. Army Transportation Museum collection.

FIG 2. Theater-made sergeant’s chevrons made from one piece of black felt with machined lines creating sergeant’s chevrons and theater-made 1st Logistical Command shoulder sleeve insignia.

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Old Four O’Clock: Sumner Takes Command of the Mounted Rifles Bezaleel Armstrong to John Love: Letter from Brazos Santiago, 1847 Tim Kimball

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his breezy communication was written by 2d Lt. Bezaleel Armstrong, USMA 1845. He had recently returned from the occupation of New Mexico with a small party of 1st Dragoons, arriving at Fort Leavenworth on 20 November 1846. Armstrong was one of several young officers transferred due to promotions. The dragoon return party was led by Maj. Edwin Vose Sumner, finally promoted after thirteen years as a captain. Armstrong’s letter was intended for his friend and recent traveling companion, 1st Lt. John Love, now in Dayton, Ohio, and assigned to recruit Company B, 1st Dragoons, to full strength, (it having been broken up on order from Brig. Gen. Steven Kearny and its privates distributed among Companies G and I, which remained in New Mexico).

Describing his own travels, reflecting on Major General Scott and the state of sea transportation, Armstrong also discussed Sumner’s assignment by Comd. Gen. Winfield Scott as acting commander of the new Regular Army Regiment of Mounted Rifles, in apparent preference over the amateurs assigned to its field grade ranks. Sumner, formally a major of the 2d Dragoons, would train, command, and lead the Regiment of Mounted Rifles to Mexico City, winning brevets of lieutenant colonel at Cerro Gordo and colonel at Churubusco.

Brazos Island, Texas

January 15, 1847

Dear John: Here I am on a sand bank without money, without a horse, a fairly considerably bad case of C…–entirely disgusted & anxious to get along from the “Greenwood” without being able to do it, on account of the wind blowing, the breakers running, and sand flying.

When I left you in Saint Louis, we got along very well on our way to New Orleans, until we got into the Mississippi below the mouth of the Ohio, when I (unlucky devil that I am) was taken with the Dysentery and came near going to Davy Jones before my time—we got into N. Orleans and there the Doctors took charge of me and after about ten days they put me on my legs again. I then commenced to look about me, for a vessel to go [to] Brazos [Brazos Santiago, the transshipment point for Taylor’s Army]. The doctor advised me not to go in the first vessel that left as I had not yet so far recovered as to [be] able to stand salt water to drink. So I waited until the Alabama went out, but in the mean time the great “Mogul,” Gen. [Winfield] Scott came and took all room there was on Board for horses. So I refused to go without my horse and waited until the Steamer [McKino?] was ready to go, but I was in no great hurry and she was considered rather a poor sea vessel so I waited a day or two for the next vessel, which was the “[Marcia Burt?]” the evening she was to go. I sent my horse on her, together with Major [Cary, former 2nd Lt., 3rd U.S. Inf.] Fry’s of Ky. Vol. (a cousin of Miss Gaphney’s [sic, Ellen Gwathmey]) and his nigger, but as she had no sails and we came to the conclusion that we could send our horses ahead and wait for the Massachusetts, we did so and arrived here days ago, but the Marcia Burt is not here, and nothing has been heard of her, so that my horse has gone in

search of shells at the bottom of the gulf—at least every one here has given her up as she has been out about fifteen days.

So I am broke as I stayed in New Orleans about twenty eight days, at an expense of at least $5 per day, but the hardest lick is that I have lost my horse, and he cannot be replaced in this country. Nearly all the horses of the Rifle Regiment have been lost in the gulf during the last gales. When we arrived in New Orleans, the rifles were running wild, and their Major [William Loring] confined to his room by sickness. So soon as Genl Scott arrived in New Orleans he assigned old “4 O’clock” [Major Sumner] to the command of the rifle Regiment, and he is now encamped at the mouth of the Rio Grande in command of the Rifle Regmt, 80 recruits of the 2nd Dragoons, about 200 of the 4th Infy, and a company of artillery.

I am ordered to the mouth to take charge of the recruits for my Regmt [2nd Drags] as they are now under a Bvt 2nd. So I cannot tell when I will reach Genl [Zachary] Taylor. Genl Scott & staff are here and will remain for about ten days, [who knows?] where they are going after that I cannot tell and “Tom Williams” [won’t?]. The fact the great “Captain” is very Mysterious, we have heard nothing from the Army as yet no battles has been fought as was expected.

Since I have been here we have heard that a detachment of the 2nd Drags has been attacked and six men killed, the Lieut in command has been arrested (so report says). It is supposed [1st Lt. Reuben] Campbell was the officer. I do not know the particulars. I hope you will recruit soon and come on. The Mexicans say they will have all [1st Lt. Phillip, Company F, 1st Dragoons] PKearny’s horses before a month. Give my love to Buckeye Gals and write me to mention how you are getting along.

Yours truly, [2nd Lt. Bezaleel] Armstrong. [2nd Dragoons]

Armstrong never fully recovered his health, surviving the war only to die at home in Ohio, “a skeleton,” 15 February 1849.

2d Lt. Bezaleel Armstrong. Pinterest.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 363

A Rare Wooden Pattern Set for Creating an 1872 Army Buckle Dr. Zachary Leiner

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here are two principal ways of creating decorative metals, whether for buttons, for cast iron stoves, sword hilts, or insignia. The typical way of creating brass buttons and other insignia since the late eighteenth century has been by using a steel die to stamp a buckle, hat plate, or other piece from a planchet made from softer metal.

However, this is not the only way to create insignia. Pieces can also be formed by casting, a process even more ancient than die stamping and well known in the ancient world. The survival of such tools is unusual. The process involves the creation of a pattern, whether of metal or of wood, which is then placed in a bed of a special casting sand. This pattern is them removed leaving its image in intaglio on the sand.

Molten metal is then poured into the cavity created when the pattern was removed. A few pieces of late nineteenth century insignia were created in this manner. Though the process itself is of great antiquity, the finished product is not as sharp as that created by a quick hard hammer blow forcing the planchet into the die.

As a collector of belts and buckles, I was surprised to find four wooden patterns used to create the Model 1872 U.S. buckle for sale on the internet. The patterns were obviously a single set but they were accompanied by no information as to how they were used or who created them. Such patterns at one point were fairly common within the brass industry.

However, the survival of this military set is to the best of my knowledge unique. The wooden pattern pieces depicted show extremely well-crafted wooden carvings used to create the different parts of the 1872 buckle. FIG 1 was used to make the mold for the buckle design itself. FIG 2 was used to gauge dimensions of the finished castings. FIG 3 would be employed to check the curvature of these castings, and FIG 4 is somewhat mysterious but was likely used to create the space on the reverse of the buckle clasp.

While thanks to the survival of a horde of early steel dies created for the anticipant companies to W. H. Horstmann of Philadelphia as well as subsequent pieces that were added to this horde. The survival of steel stamping dies recently casting patterns for pieces of sword, hilts, and scabbards has been found attributable to the Ames Sword Company,

the successor to the Ames Manufacturing Company from the 1880s to the early twentieth century. However, the wooden patterns depicted here are so far as is known the only survivors of what was once a standard technology and as such merit the attention of those interested in the technology of manufacturing military insignia.

There are four well carved wooden patterns used to create the sand molds which created the finished buckle.

While these patterns were once fairly common, there was no reason to retain them when the buckle was no longer produced. By the late nineteenth century most insignia was being produced by die stamping and the casting process became more unusual than ever in their production.

These patterns comprise the only set I have seen and as such merit publication in the hopes that others have seen additional tools of this sort can add to the description as to how they were used.

FIG 3. Used to check curvature of castings.

FIG 4. Used to form space on underside of clasp.

FIG 1. Wooden buckle used to FIG 2. Form used to check form mold. All photos, author. dimensions of castings.

364 Military Collector & Historian

An 1812 Newspaper Account of Live Artillery Firing by the New York State Artillery, New York Harbor Anthony F. Gero

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n order to defend the vital port of New York City a series of harbor defenses were in place by 1812 and then enlarged in the summer of 1814.1 Manning those fortifications during the War of 1812 was primarily assigned to the state’s militia artillery based in and around the city and harbor (FIG 1).2 Recently, an 1812 contemporary newspaper description of a live firing exercise by batteries of the New York State Artillery was discovered in The National Intelligencer (city of Washington) of 20 August 1812.3 It is published here in its entirety in this issue of Military Collector and Historian. As a primary source account, this newspaper’s article helps document the effective fire of land-based cannons on naval vessels and of the accuracy of New York’s militia artillery gunners: New-York, August 15 The hulk purchased by his excellency the governor, for the purpose of affording the artillery an opportunity of practicing in firing, was yesterday anchored in the bay, about 1000 yards from the shore, and equidistant from Castle Williams and the Battery. The firing was commenced from the right of general (sic) Morton’s brigade, about 2 o’clock, P.M. from 6, 9, 12 & 18 pounders. The number of shot fired by the brigade, was about 130, of which 3-4th entered the vessel, altho (sic) the object that presented was comparatively small, being the stern of the vessel only. The veteran corps, commanded by capt. (sic) Delamater, fired several shot from a long nine, which raked the hulk repeatedly.

The detachment from the brigade on duty in the West Battery, fired about 40 shot, nearly all of which damaged the hulk, and several passed directly through her. Several heavy shot from Castle Williams also bored her.

The firing continued about 2 hours, when the vessel was perceived to be on fire; occasioned, it is presumed, by the red-hot shot fired by col. (sic) Curtenius’ regiment, and which were heated in a traveling forge, attached to the brigade, or by the shot from Castle Williams.

After the firing had ceased, a number of officers and many citizens went on board, and on examination, it evidently appeared that almost every shot had done considerable injury, as there was not a place about the vessel 4 feet square which had not been struck or perforated with the shot. The mizen-mast was nearly cut through about two feet above the deck--the fore-mast and main-mast had received several balls (apparently six-pounders), & the pumps and bowsprit were much shattered.

This experiment was abundantly evinced the utility, judgment and practical knowledge of the artillery corps, and affords the most satisfactory proof that if any emergency calls for their services, they will be rendered in a manner which will reflect honor on themselves and prove eminently efficient in repelling the enemies of our county.4

FIG 1. Map of the Fortifications of New York City from Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of The War of 1812.

Notes: 1. For more information on New York City’s defenses see Rene’ Chartrand, Forts of the War of 1812 (UK: Osprey Publishing, 2012).

2. For more data on the New York State Militia Artillery see Anthony F. Gero, Illustrations by Alan Archambault, Eric Manders, Raymond Johnson, and Barry Thompson, Excelsior’s Citizen Soldiers: The Uniforms and Equipage of the New York State Militia 1787-1847 (Auburn, NY: Jacobs Press, 2016).

3. Found in 2018 at the website of: oldfultonpostcards.com.

4. The governor of New York State at that time was Daniel D. Tompkins. For further information on Castle Williams, the Battery, General Morton, Colonel Curtenius, and the Veteran Artillery Corps of New York City as mentioned in this 1812 account, see Chartrand’s Forts and Gero’s Excelsior’s Citizen Soldiers.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 365

Indian War WOCOKA: Pontiac’s Siege at Fort Detroit Rick Ashbacker Pontiac … removed from inside the blanket a wide belt of wampum, white on one side and green on the other… . The Ottawa war chief was holding the belt with the white side up, but the signal for attack was to be when he turned the green side up and raised his voice in the eerie death cry.

Pontiac now held the belt out, white side still up… raised the belt slightly and seemed about to flip it over… .1 –from Allan W. Eckert, The Conquerors: A Narrative.

FIG 1. Theater of Pontiac’s War, 1763. cmich.edu/library/clarke.

Preface The acronym WOCOKA represents six factors used primarily by the military to evaluate past, present, and future battlefields. It is a variation of the acronym OCOKA. In this article, the “W” is added to represent weather and climate. The individual letters stand for the FIG 2. Pontiac, War Chief of the Ottawa. From a drawing by J. L. following: Kraemer, the Detroit News.

W=Weather and Climate Background O=Observation and Fields of Fire uilt in 1701, primarily by French soldiers and civilians C=Cover and Concealment under Antoine de la Motte Cadillac, Fort PontcharO=Obstacles train, later Fort Detroit, was established to control the K=Key and Decisive Terrain rich Great Lakes fur trade and prevent British westward A=Avenues of Approach/Lines of Communication expansion. The area was called detroit, or “the strait,” in Writer’s Note French.2 The wooden-palisaded fort was situated on the Most of the tribes mentioned in this article were northwest bank of the Detroit River, just south of Lake members of the Algonquian linguistic group, including St. Clair and between Lakes Huron and Erie. Thus, Fort the Ottawa, Ojibwa (Chippewa), Potawatomi, Miami, Fox, Detroit controlled virtually all commerce and boat traffic Sauk, Delaware, and Shawnee. Meanwhile, the Seneca and on the Great Lakes west of Fort Niagara.

Huron, along with their relatives the Wyandots, belonged Fronting on a relatively narrow section of river slightly to the Iroquoian linguistic group. During the conflicts more than one-half mile wide, the fort had grown by 1760 for control of North America in the 1600s and 1700s, the into an approximately 600-foot by 400-foot rectangle Algonquians normally aligned with the French, while the with a strong, 15-foot high wooden palisade. Because of a Iroquoian tribes usually sided with the British; but not significant bend in the Detroit River, the fort faced southalways. By the 1760s, some Senecas were promoting war southeast. The fort had land gates on its east and west against the British, while most Hurons and Wyandots walls, along with a water gate on the south wall, facing the were associated with the Algonquians and their French river. Although the fort’s northern portion, away from the allies. water, was on somewhat higher ground and exposed to enemy fire and observation from across the river, the fort

B

366 Military Collector & Historian

was well-protected by a rampart scaffolding surrounding the palisade’s interior walls that allowed defenders to keep watch and move freely to repel attacks. At the corners along the palisade were blockhouse bastions, each with cannons and mortars.3 These blockhouses provided excellent lines of sight and fields of fire. In the relatively deep Detroit River nearby were two cannon-armed sailing ships, the schooner Huron and the sloop Michigan.

FIG 4. Indians laying siege to Fort Detroit. en.wikipedia.org.

FIG 3. Fort Detroit, en.wikipedia.org.

was thwarted primarily by Ottawas under a young war chief named Obwandiyag, later known as Pontiac.

Born around 1720, Pontiac grew up in the Detroit area with, according to most sources, an Ottawa father and Chippewa mother. Although details of Pontiac’s early life are limited, he became an aggressive and skilled hunter and warrior. Not only did he learn combat tactics during the second Fox War, he also went on various war parties against enemy tribes like the Cherokee to the south, and the Iroquois to the east. It was after a raid in 1746 that Pontiac returned home with seven Cherokee scalps and became a war chief.5 It is also very possible that Pontiac was with the war party of French and Indians who ambushed and defeated British Gen. Edward Braddock’s force near Fort Duquesne, later Fort Pitt, in 1755.6

A formidable structure, Fort Detroit was the center of French activity in the Great Lakes region for over sixty years. Not only did it house French soldiers, it provided security for the French civilians and fur traders who settled nearby. Also living near the fort were Indians from several tribes including bands of Ottawa, Ojibwa (Chippewa), Huron, Potawatomi, and others who passed through the area to hunt, fish, and trade. The tribes quickly became dependent upon the French for firearms, ammunition, clothing, and other goods.

While Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713) and King George’s War (1744-1748) raged further east between the French, British, and each side’s Indian allies, there was occasional Indian fighting around Detroit that tested the fort’s ability to withstand attacks. In 1706, the French repelled an Ottawa attack on the fort, and in 1712, the French and nowfriendly Ottawa and Huron warriors defeated a force of approximately 1,000 Fox, Sauk, and Mascouten warriors who had besieged the stockade. This started the first Fox War which lasted until 1716 and included many actions around Detroit. After several failed attempts at peace, the second Fox War occurred between 1728-1733 with the French and their Indian accomplices nearly wiping out the entire Fox nation. Again, much of the fighting took place around Fort Detroit.4 And in 1747, local Hurons launched a short-term resistance against the French that

FIG 5. Although no known portraits of Pontiac exist, he might have looked something like this. www.pinterest.com.

Throughout the French and Indian War, Pontiac, along with many of his Ottawa warriors, fought fiercely alongside their French friends and allies. Unlike the reserved British, French traders and voyageurs had lived with the Indians, often intermarrying with and raising their children among the tribes. During the war, Pontiac became a friend and admirer of the French General, the Marquis de Montcalm.

Devastated when Montcalm was killed in September 1759 on the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec City, Pontiac mourned the death of the one white man he ever really liked and respected. Shortly thereafter, Pontiac apparently vowed to the French partisan fighter Charles Langlade that he would never accept British control.

About a year later, however, in September 1760, the French surrendered Montreal and the rest of Canada to the British. The French and Indian War in North America was officially over. Although the Seven Year’s War between the British and the French still raged in Europe, British agents and soldiers started heading west into the Great Lakes region to seize control of the land and forts that had become so important to the Indians’ survival.

Military Situation Following the French capitulation, Gen. Sir Jeffery Amherst, commander of British forces in North America, decided to take control of the formerly French forts in the Great Lakes as soon as possible. Although Fort Detroit was the most strategic and of highest priority, there were at least seven other posts that eventually needed to be taken. Winter was approaching and Amherst needed a durable, resourceful leader to command this expedition into hostile, mostly unknown wilderness.

Instead of selecting a British Army officer, Amherst chose Maj. Robert Rogers, leader of the rugged and battle-tested Rogers’ Rangers, to force the French out.

Rogers was an America-born colonial officer, and though Amherst disliked Americans almost as much as he disliked Indians, Rogers and his men had fought Indians and the French for years and were legendary for completing missions under the worst conditions. If anybody could make it safely to Detroit and beyond, and then all the way back, it was Rogers. Amherst ordered Rogers to acquire “the relief of the garrisons of the French posts at Detroit, Michilimackinac, or any others in that district … bring away the French troops and arms,” and return only after having “reconnoitered and explored the country as much as you can.” He also ordered Rogers to get oaths of allegiance from the French citizens near the forts.7 Despite some rough weather and an unexpected tense, but peaceful, encounter with Ottawas, Rogers and his force of approximately 200 rangers, British regulars, and Royal American soldiers arrived at Detroit in late November 1760. Accompanying Rogers was British Capt.

Donald Campbell who took command of Detroit and its approximately 120 permanent soldiers on 29 November.

After securing Detroit, Rogers followed Amherst’s orders

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 367

FIG 6. French officers surrendering Fort Detroit to Rogers and the British, November 1760. www.pinterest.com.

FIG 7. Major Robert Rogers, leader of Rogers’ Rangers. www. nhgrand.com.

to seize other posts by sending small parties to take control of the French forts at Miami (now Ft. Wayne, Indiana) and Ouiatenon (now West Lafayette, Indiana). Rogers himself took a small party to secure Fort Michilimackinac (now Mackinaw City, Michigan), but bad weather forced him to turn back. Michilimackinac and the other four remaining Great Lakes posts would come under British possession later the following year. Rogers returned east with most of his men not knowing that he would see Detroit again in 1763.

Unfortunately for the British, the Great Lakes tribes were not pleased to see the French soldiers leave. Not only did the Indians miss their French friends who they had lived and fought with during many battles, but over the next two years, Amherst’s strict trade policies hurt

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the Indians’ ability to hunt by restricting the trade of guns, ammunition, powder, and other goods. Amherst wrote about the Indians, “When they deserve it they will be rewarded … and if they give any … complaint I am determined to punish them.”8 Amherst hated the practice of English traders giving presents to the Indians and thought that supplying the Indians with firearms and ammunition could lead to attacks against soldiers and settlers. He later wrote “keeping them (Indians) short of ammunition is … to be recommended. Nothing could be so impolitic as to furnish them with the means of accomplishing the evil which is so much dreaded … .”9 Amherst apparently didn’t care, or realize, that the Indians had grown dependent on hunting with muskets to feed their families, especially during the winter.

While the Indians and the eight hundred or so French civilians still in the Detroit area tried to adjust to the British, Fort Detroit got a new commander, Maj. Henry Gladwin, who took over in early August 1762. The thirtyfour-year-old Gladwin had been in the British Army for about ten years and was considered competent and reliable. No stranger to life on the North American frontier, Gladwin had been an officer with the British 48th Regiment of Foot in 1755 when Gen. Edward Braddock’s force had suffered that bloody and brutal defeat near what became Fort Pitt. Wounded in the arm during the battle, Gladwin recovered, continued his career, and was making plans to improve the garrison at Detroit.10 No slouch when it came to discipline, Gladwin was concerned about the isolated fort’s security. In early 1763, after an English trader was murdered, Gladwin had an Indian woman hanged who had been found guilty as an accomplice.11 In his village across the river and slightly upstream of Fort Detroit, Pontiac seethed with hatred for the British.

Not only did Pontiac feel their trade policies were unfair, he also detested how the British seemed to treat the Indians more like subjects than people to be respected. It was now early 1763, and over two years of British rule had done nothing to improve the Indians’ way of life. Now in his early forties, Pontiac the Ottawa war chief was a man of great influence. Of medium height, but strong, muscular build, Pontiac was still an aggressive, powerful warrior who showed little mercy in combat.12 He normally wore paint of some kind, and his body was covered in tattoos of various geometric shapes, along with a tattoo of an eagle’s head on his back, and another of the sun on his chest. A white, stone crescent hung from his nose.13 Although born and raised in the wilderness, Pontiac was a man of some vision. He knew the coming of the British was bad for all the Indians, not just the Ottawa. Over the past two years or so, there had been several attempts by

FIG 8. British Commander in North America, Sir Jeffery Amherst. www.wikipedia.org.

militant tribesmen like Kyashuta the Seneca, and Neolin the Delaware prophet to go among the tribes, convince them to rebel against the British, and return to the old ways with their French friends.14 Pontiac generally agreed with these ideas and hosted a secret council of tribal leaders in his village in June 1762, and another larger council the following September. At both councils, Pontiac urged tribal leaders from around the Great Lakes and beyond to join him in armed resistance against the British. He also implied the French were building a large army to retake their lost land and forts.

Over the winter of 1762-1763, Pontiac held other local councils and sent war belts of red and black wampum to many tribes, along with reminders that a grand council of chiefs would be held near Detroit in the spring. When a wampum belt was sent to summon a tribe to war, it was always red or black, while a peace belt was white.

Wampum usually consisted of beads and grains from small marine and freshwater shells. Of different sizes, shapes, and colors, the designs and figures on a wampum belt could be interpreted by the Indians like a written document of today.15 Distribution of the wampum belts was effective because on 27 April 1763, as many as 20,000 Indians gathered for the grand council on the Ecorse River, about six miles south of Detroit. Representatives from at least twentyseven tribes were on hand to hear Pontiac. Despite the council’s size, secrecy had been kept and the British at Detroit apparently had no idea that a huge council was being held.16 Yet unknown to anyone in the Great Lakes region, however, was the Treaty of Paris had been signed in February, ending the Seven Years’ War in Europe. By terms of the treaty, France had ceded to the British nearly all its remaining possessions east of the Mississippi River.

Thus, the fight against British rule that Pontiac was about

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 369

FIG 9. Pontiac speaking at the grand council. www.republiquelibre. org.

to launch became known as Pontiac’s War, not part of any other, wider conflict.

During the grand council, Pontiac used his considerable oratorial and theatrical skills to convince the tribes to join him in a plot to drive the British away forever. He denounced the British for their greed and lack of fairness in trade. Contrasting them with the more agreeable French, Pontiac pointed out the British land-grabbing policies and their denial of Indian rights to the land.17 He then told the Indians to return home, prepare to attack the British nearest them, and wait for word that Detroit had been struck. With that, they were to fall upon the British and kill them.

The Siege of Fort Detroit On 1 May, Pontiac and about forty Ottawas were allowed into Fort Detroit, apparently to dance and smoke the peace pipe. Major Gladwin was suspicious and hesitant but went along with it. Pontiac’s real objective for the visit was to acquire intelligence to be used in the forthcoming attack. Inside the fort for about an hour, Pontiac and his accomplices took in details not only of the fort’s layout, but also of the numbers of soldiers and positions of cannons.

Back in his village, Pontiac hosted a council of local chiefs and described how he and his warriors would enter Fort Detroit in two days, 7 May 1763, to destroy the British.

Instead of an actual attack, the plan called for trickery and deception. Small groups of men and women would enter the fort first, ostensibly to trade, but with weapons hidden under their garments. Then Pontiac and about sixty warriors, also with concealed weapons, would follow into the fort to talk peace. When Pontiac raised his voice in a death cry, the warriors and other men and women would grab their weapons and slaughter all the British.

Indian warfare in the eastern woodlands did not call for frontal assaults against established defenses, nor did it call for lengthy sieges. The Indians sought any advantage when conducting raids and ambushes. This included surprise attacks and treachery. They sought to inflict

injury and damage without suffering any of their own losses. There was no shame in deceiving an enemy and then killing him. Thus, Pontiac’s plan would be ideal for the Indians, if it worked.

Unfortunately for Pontiac and his warriors, Major Gladwin had gotten wind of the plan. Various sources suggest that an Indian lover of either Gladwin or another British soldier came forward. Other sources say the informer was an older Indian woman, or even one or more of the local French citizens. Although none of these possible informers has ever been substantiated, it is possible that more than one exposed Pontiac’s plan to Gladwin. Later, Gladwin simply noted, “I was luckily informed the night before.”18 When the Indians arrived at the fort on 7 May, the British were ready. Gladwin could have denied the Indians access, but he feared for the safety of any Englishmen outside the fort who might be left vulnerable to angry Indians. He also wanted to impress, and intimidate, the Indians with a show of strength.

As Pontiac and his party entered the fort, he immediately saw that his plot had been exposed. Armed British soldiers stood along the ramparts and there was a company of soldiers with muskets and bayonets on the parade ground. Other armed soldiers were posted along the streets. Pontiac and his group continued to the council house where Major Gladwin and other officers waited, armed with swords and pistols. After about an hour or so of talking, Pontiac rose and took out a wampum belt from underneath his blanket. Holding the belt with the white side up, he addressed Gladwin. The Indians knew when Pontiac turned the belt over to the green side and raised his cry, they were to attack. But Pontiac did not turn the belt over. He knew the British were ready to kill him and all his people. Instead, he left the council house, followed by his chiefs and warriors, and walked out of the fort.19 Infuriated and humiliated, Pontiac returned to his village to consider his next move. Two days later, 9 May, he and about 400 hundred Indians were denied entry into the fort by the vigilant Major Gladwin.20 With all possibility of a surprise attack lost, and not wanting to take large losses in an all-out assault, Pontiac decided to lay siege to the fort. One problem for Pontiac, however, was Indians typically fought better individually or in small units, not in the type of larger, coordinated force required to maintain a lengthy siege against a well-defended fort.

Pontiac knew the longer the siege continued, the more likely the warriors would drift away to hunt and spend time with their families.

To start his siege, Pontiac made several moves. He relocated his own Ottawa village across the Detroit River

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While the sparring around Fort Detroit continued through May and into June, the Indians achieved success elsewhere. On 16 May, about forty Wyandots overwhelmed the small garrison at Fort Sandusky (now Sandusky, Ohio). On 25 May, Fort St. Joseph (now Niles, Michigan), was taken by a Potawatomi war party. Two days later, 27 May, saw the fall of Fort Miami to a combined force FIG 10. of Miami and Ottawa warriors; and Fort Ouiatenon was Pontiac offering captured without bloodshed on 1 June, again by Miamis wampum, and Ottawas. Then, on 2 June, Fort Michilimackinac fell white side up, to Major Gladwin. to a force of Chippewa and Sauk warriors in a bloody act diggingdetroit.com. of treachery. As the two tribes played a form of lacrosse outside the main gate, one of the Indians threw the ball through the open gate. The Indians followed the ball into the fort, picking up knives and tomahawks from women posted nearby. Although accounts vary, at least twentyfour English soldiers and traders were killed during the fight or as prisoners afterward. Pontiac’s followers had now seized five British forts.22 They weren’t finished. On 13 June, Fort Venango, north of Fort Pitt, was taken by a war party of Senecas and Shawnees. Fort Presque Isle, further north on Lake Erie, fell to Seneca, Shawnee, Ottawa, and Chippewa warriors on 17 June, followed by the loss of nearby Fort Le Boeuf to Senecas the next day, 18 June. Two other forts had been abandoned by the British and four more, including Forts to the same side as the fort, but about two miles upstream. Detroit and Pitt were under attack. It is interesting to Now with a force of approximately 1,000 available note of the Iroquois’ Six Nations, only Senecas fought the warriors, Pontiac sent a party of Hurons (Wyandots) British during Pontiac’s War. Most warriors of the other south to intercept any British boats or soldiers coming up five tribes, Cayuga, Oneida, Tuscarora, Onondaga, and the Detroit River approach from the south. He also sent especially the Mohawks, stayed loyal to the British under smaller war parties to raid nearby English houses and the guidance of Sir William Johnson, Britain’s Northern farms. On 11 May, Pontiac ordered a force of approximately Superintendent of Indian Affairs.23 six hundred Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Huron Despite the Indians’ successes elsewhere, Fort Detroit warriors to assault the fort in several different attacks. was becoming a very irritating test for Pontiac and his Though unsuccessful, Pontiac offered surrender terms warriors. Major Gladwin was a bulldog, determined to hold to Major Gladwin, saying the British could leave the fort the fort to the last man or until rescued by a relief force. and take the two ships, Huron and Michigan, to safety.21 Expecting more attacks, he kept his 120-man garrison Gladwin refused the offer. busy and on alert. Although Pontiac had no plans to burn the fort and destroy its supplies, guns, ammunition, and the trade goods of French traders working inside, Gladwin did not know this. Fearing the potential destruction caused by Indians shooting fire-tipped arrows over the palisade, Gladwin had his men distribute and fill water tanks and barrels around the fort. To destroy some of the Indians’ cover and concealment, Gladwin ordered glowing-hot spikes fired from his cannon that burned down several nearby buildings. Also, Gladwin sent the sloop Michigan east to Fort Niagara to report the siege and collect supplies.

For Pontiac and his warriors, the beginning of the siege was not going well. A primary objective of any siege is to “starve out” the defenders, but the Indians never effectively cut off the fort’s supplies. Unknown to Pontiac, the British probably had about three weeks of food on hand at the FIG 11. Forts captured, besieged, or abandoned during Pontiac’s time of the first attacks. Although unsubstantiated, other War. www.emersonkent.com.

provisions were possibly provided secretly by some of the local French habitants who did not support Pontiac.

The greatest sources of provisions, however, were the two ships, Huron and Michigan, which made four trips to Fort Niagara to deliver messages and pick up supplies.

The Indians tried to stop the ships in various ways, most notably in July when fire rafts were sent downstream to run into and burn the Michigan, but the ship’s captain and crew steered away from the danger.24 Why the Indians did not seriously attack the ships and crews while they were offloading supplies at Fort Detroit is somewhat of a mystery. The Indians, not wanting to take heavy casualties, were probably discouraged by the firepower from the cannons on the ships and inside the fort, along with the Brown Bess muskets of the soldiers on the ramparts.

The Indians were more effective fighting on land than on the water. Not only were their combat tactics like surprise and ambush more refined on land, but their treachery and deception skills could be easier employed. On 10 May, the fort’s second-in-command, Capt. Donald Campbell, along with Lieutenant McDougall, were taken prisoner while negotiating in good faith with Pontiac outside the fort.25 When Campbell reported Major Gladwin would not surrender, the Indians took the two officers hostage to be used as bargaining chips and human shields later. In another act of treachery on 12 May, Wyandots captured a convoy of supply and gunpowder-laden bateaux (flatbottomed cargo boats) south of Detroit; then feigning drunkenness, tried to lure toward shore a British rescue party on the ship Michigan. Luckily for the ship and its crew, the wind came up and prevented the Michigan from landing, thus saving both ship and crew from almost certain destruction.

By late July, Pontiac and his warriors had made no significant progress after nearly three months of siege.

Major Gladwin and his soldiers, tired as they were, still firmly held Fort Detroit. The two ships Huron and Michigan still controlled the Detroit River and were making regular supply runs to Fort Niagara. Against Pontiac’s wishes, Chippewa chief Wasson had brutally murdered and dismembered the captive Captain Campbell on 4 July. Pontiac apparently considered negotiating peace with the British. He desperately needed some type of success to keep his coalition together.

On 29 July, approximately 260 British troops under Capt. James Dalyell and Ranger Maj. Robert Rogers arrived at Fort Detroit. They had come in 22 bateaux, 4 being gunboats with six-pound mortar “swivel guns.”

Near Sandusky, on the southern shore of Lake Erie, the force had burned a vacated Wyandot village, then fended off an attack by Hurons while ascending the Detroit River.26 Sent west by General Amherst, Dalyell wanted to fight Indians. Although reluctant, Major Gladwin finally approved Dalyell’s plan to attack Pontiac’s village, about two miles upstream on Parent’s Creek, on 31 July. The

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 371

FIG 12. British soldiers and rangers advancing toward Bloody Run, 31 July 1763. Source http://leatherfromthepast.blogspot.com, artwork by Gary Zaboly.

attacking British force consisted of approximately 247 soldiers, including 20 of Rogers’ Rangers.

Pontiac, however, had received intelligence about the assault plan, probably from a French civilian. Placing warriors along the River Road approach to his village, along with sending another group south to intercept any British retreat, Pontiac was ready to ambush and annihilate. In early morning darkness, as the British advance guard crossed the bridge over Parent’s Creek, the Indians cut loose with a devastating fire. Blood from the dead and wounded soldiers dripped into the creek which ultimately became known as Bloody Run. Supported by two of the bateaux with swivel-guns, Dalyell, Rogers, and their soldiers and rangers fought bravely but were forced to retreat. Dalyell was killed after leading a counterattack and receiving three wounds.27 Rogers rallied about thirty soldiers and rangers to provide a covering force for the retreat. For over two hours, Rogers and his men held off the Indians by firing from a house with bales of beaver pelts placed in front of the windows. The survivors finally reached the safety of Fort Detroit by around 0830.28 Dalyell’s mutilated body was found the next day; his heart had been removed, roasted, and eaten by the Indians.29 Rogers wrote later, “Pontiac, who is the Indian chief … declares he never will leave that ground till he has got possession of the fort.”30 Pontiac got the victory he needed at Bloody Run. His warriors had killed 23 soldiers and wounded about 40 more. Not only had the Indians beaten the British and saved Pontiac’s village, but Pontiac’s own prestige among the tribes was reestablished. One hundred Indians reinforced Pontiac in August. Major Gladwin worried

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about the possibility of a large buildup of Indians that would be difficult to defend against; but Gladwin still held Fort Detroit and the two ships, Huron and Michigan.

Although the Michigan ran aground in Lake Erie on 28 August, and the Huron barely survived an Indian attack on 4 September, the supply lines to Fort Niagara remained open.

While the siege at Detroit smoldered on, the eastern theater of Pontiac’s War heated up. Several attempts were made by Senecas to shut down the supply routes around Fort Niagara. Although this somewhat hindered the resupply lifeline between Niagara and Detroit, Fort Niagara itself was never taken, neither was Fort Pitt captured. Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, and Mingo (mostly Seneca) warriors tried to take it but were always repelled by the British defenders. It is possible the British gave the Indians smallpox-infested blankets, hoping to end the attacks.31 General Amherst said, “Could it not be contrived to send the smallpox among the … Indians?

We must … use every stratagem … to reduce them.”32 Concentrating their forces, however, the Indians attacked a British relief expedition headed to Fort Pitt on 5 August.

The resulting battle of Bushy Run ended as a British victory as the Indians ran low on gunpowder and ammunition.33 Even though the Treaty of Paris had been signed in February, official confirmation of the French capitulation only reached Pontiac in September 1763. Up to that time, the Indians hoped the French would return to defeat the English. Now that hope was gone; there was little reason to continue the siege of Fort Detroit. As Gregory E. Dowd wrote in his book War Under Heaven, “Without French help, Pontiac could not maintain the siege. The Indians lacked every necessary, particularly ammunition.

Between October 12 and November 1, the Ottawas and

FIG 13. The Battle of Bushy Run, near Fort Pitt. www.thehistorytree. com.

Gladwin negotiated what was essentially a truce ... Pontiac promised to ask all nations concerned in the war to bury the hatchet.”34 Pontiac and some of his Ottawas soon left the Detroit area, and although Pontiac’s War continued for the next year with raids in the east and the Illinois country, along with two British expeditions into Ohio, the siege of Fort Detroit was over.

WOCOKA Weather Although there are no official weather data available for 1763, historical temperature and precipitation averages are as follows for Detroit from May through October: 35 May June July August September October

High temperature

Precipitation

67° F 77° F 82° F 80° F 73° F 60° F

3.5 inches 2.8 inches 2.8 inches 2.9 inches 2.4 inches 2.6 inches

It is possible the average high temperatures were slightly lower in 1763, but the weather does not appear to have been a major factor during the ground operations around Fort Detroit. However, the wind and storms significantly affected naval operations in the Detroit River and Lake Erie. Lt. Jehu Hay, who kept a diary detailing much of the siege, often noted the weather, particularly how the wind might affect the bateaux and the ships Huron and Michigan, “Fresh at N.W,” “westerly,” blowing “fresh all the next day.” With this elementary weather intelligence, Hay made reasonably accurate predictions for when boats would reach Niagara and then return to Detroit.36 During the siege, there were several notable times when the wind proved critical. On 13 May, when the sloop Michigan attempted to rescue five supply bateaux from supposedly drunken Hurons, a sudden strong

FIG 14. This schooner is very similar to the Huron which resupplied Fort Detroit. www.pinterest.com.

wind prevented the sloop from getting close to shore.

The Hurons, however, were not drunk and were ready to ambush, firing at the ship as it drifted away. Thus, the wind saved the Michigan and its crew from disaster. On 28 August, however, high winds and a storm on Lake Erie caused the Michigan to run aground and break up after loading supplies near Fort Niagara. On 2 September, while anchored in the Detroit River, the schooner Huron was attacked at night by approximately 340 warriors under Pontiac. The ship’s captain was killed, but southerly (from the south) winds allowed the ship and its supplies to escape north to Fort Detroit.37 Then, on 7 November, a relief force of approximately 600 British soldiers and a flotilla of bateaux with provisions was wrecked by a Lake Erie storm. The force had to return to Niagara.

It is interesting to speculate what might have happened if Pontiac had continued the siege of Detroit through the winter of 1763-1764. Even though he heard the French would not return, he never totally accepted it. Not only would the Detroit River be frozen most of the winter, thus preventing resupply ships and bateaux from delivering food and other provisions, but Pontiac could also have prevented the local French citizens from resupplying the fort. With winter’s frozen river and cold weather, Major Gladwin and his soldiers might have been starved out.

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up wounded from the retreating force, then went back to the fort to deliver the wounded and pick up ammunition.

Returning to the battle, the boats fired grapeshot to slow the attacking Indians and cover the British retreat.38 The Detroit River, along with Lake St. Clair and the St. Clair River, was also a significant avenue of approach from the north. Although the land north of Detroit was wilderness inhabited almost totally by Indians and French traders, it was always possible that a large force of warriors in canoes could descend the river to attack the fort. After all, Indians had come south from Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior for over sixty years to trade beaver pelts for weapons. But that was when the French controlled the fort; now the British had to be vigilant to prevent surprise attacks from northern Ottawas and Chippewas.

On 6 May, one day before Pontiac first tried to overwhelm Fort Detroit, a small group of ten British soldiers and sailors was nearly massacred by Chippewas near the mouth of the St. Clair River, about thirty miles northeast of Detroit. Among the killed was Lt. Charles Robertson, who had overseen the construction of the ships Huron Avenues of Approach/Lines of Communication and Michigan two years before. Later in May, another Routes leading into a battlefield are avenues of approach. group of approximately twenty British returning from a They are often, but not always, established along roads or resupply mission to Fort Michilimackinac was captured trails. Lines of communication include these approaches near the same location along the St. Clair River. along with other roads, trails, railroads, and rivers. All For Pontiac and his warriors, however, the waterway did can facilitate communications between forces, along with not serve very well as an avenue of approach. Although supply and retreat. it was just above the Detroit River’s northwestern bank, Detroit River Approach: From both north and south, the Indians could not effectively attack Fort Detroit the primary avenue of approach around Fort Detroit was from the water. In their canoes, the Indians occasionally the Detroit River. Over one-half mile wide and relatively used the rivers to make raids, attack the two ships, and deep, the Detroit River was ideal for the maritime traffic intercept incoming bateaux, but with limited success. that supported commerce and communication before One success came in late May 1763, when a band of Pontiac’s War. Canoes, bateaux, and large sailing ships like Chippewa and Ottawa warriors sent by Pontiac ambushed the Huron and Michigan enjoyed easy, navigable passage. a ten-bateaux, ninety-seven-man convoy on the north During the siege, several bateaux convoys from Fort Niagara tried to resupply Detroit, but the most notable was the one led by Ranger Maj. Robert Rogers and Capt.

James Dalyell in late July. Loaded with approximately 260 soldiers and rangers, along with many provisions, the forty or so bateaux traveled from Fort Niagara and arrived at Detroit on 29 July. This force ascended the Detroit River from the south, fighting Indians along the way. Four of the boats featured six-pounder “swivel gun” mortars that fired devastating loads of grapeshot.

During Dalyell’s disastrous advance northeast toward Pontiac’s village on 31 July, two of the gunboats followed the ground force upriver. The boats were to support the assault if possible, transport wounded soldiers back to Fort Detroit if necessary, and cover a retreat if the attack FIG 15. This flat-bottomed bateau is smaller, but similar, to those failed. And fail, it did. Warriors attacked at Parent’s Creek, used to resupply Fort Detroit. www.dec.ny.gov, drawing by Mark later to be known as Bloody Run. The gunboats picked Peckham.

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shore of Lake Erie not far from the Detroit River. Only mission commander Lt. Abraham Cuyler of the Queen’s Rangers and approximately forty soldiers escaped in two bateaux. The Indians forced the captured soldiers to row the eight remaining bateaux up the Detroit River to an Indian village where the prisoners were hacked to death, dismembered, and had body parts cooked and eaten. One Fort Detroit soldier lamented, “Was it not very agreeable, to hear every day, of cutting, carving, boiling, and eating our companions!” This massacre prompted British commander Gen. Jeffrey Amherst to send the force under Captain Dalyell and Major Rogers to reinforce Fort Detroit in late July.39 Two more Indian attempts to thwart British control of the Detroit River approach were almost successful. In July, Pontiac launched fire rafts downriver to ram the sloop Michigan, hoping to destroy or disable it through burning. The ship’s skillful captain and crew, however, steered away from the rafts. On 2 September, the Indians nearly overwhelmed the schooner Huron when approximately 350 warriors in 25 canoes, under the cover of darkness, attacked the ship anchored about nine miles south of Detroit. Several warriors climbed over the ship’s sides, fighting hand-to-hand with the crew and killing the captain until being driven off. The crew killed many of the retreating warriors by firing grapeshot from the ship’s four cannons and six swivel guns.

Not only did the river and lake system provide the best avenue into Detroit, it was also the only practical line of communication between Niagara, Detroit, and the smaller British posts further north and west. For the forts at Michilimackinac, Sault Ste. Marie, Green Bay (Fort La Baye), and St. Joseph, the interconnected waterway of lakes and rivers was their supply and communications lifeline. Likewise, the Indians used this vast water system as their major conduit for transportation and communications.

Land Approaches: While the British maintained control of the Detroit River avenue of approach, the Indians dominated the land approaches. The main avenue of approach on land was the river road which paralleled the Detroit River and ran for approximately sixteen miles.

This dirt road connected Fort Detroit with the numerous French homesteads both north and south of the fort.

Several trails from all directions fed into the river road, making an extensive network available to an attacking ground force.

Groups of warriors and individual runners frequently used the forest trails between villages. When Pontiac wanted faraway chiefs to attend war councils, he sent runners with wampum belts to landlocked villages. Many

FIG 16. Major Robert Rogers, commander of Rogers’ Rangers and the leader of the British covering force at Bloody Run. newhampshireadventures.blogspot.com.

warriors participating in the siege arrived in the Detroit area via the trails. Other than to offload supplies from the ships, and occasional sorties to destroy buildings offering cover to the Indians, few British left the protection of the fort. The Indians held a stranglehold over the ground approaches.

The one time the British used a land approach ended in disaster. To punish the Indians and destroy Pontiac’s village north of Detroit, Captain Dalyell and Major Rogers led approximately 247 soldiers and rangers out of the fort and onto the river road in the early morning hours of 31 July. Marching two abreast in bright moonlight, the British advance guard reached the bridge at Parent’s Creek, about two miles north of Detroit. Pontiac’s spy network around Detroit, however, had told him about the attack. When the warriors waiting in ambush saw soldiers cross the bridge, they opened fire, killing and wounding enough soldiers that the creek would be remembered as “Bloody Run.” Although the soldiers fought bravely, they were forced to retreat to the fort. Dalyell was killed, but Rogers rallied enough men to cover the retreat. By about o830 a.m., the defeated British survivors were safely inside Fort Detroit.

They had suffered over sixty casualties, approximately 25 percent of their force.40 Even though the siege was a stalemate, Pontiac and his warriors remained masters of the ground avenues of approach.

Obstacles Natural or man-made, obstacles delay or stop an advancing or retreating army.

Fort Detroit: Unfortunately for the Indians, the British soldiers occupied the most significant obstacle of the siege, Fort Detroit itself. With its fifteen-foot palisaded walls of carved and pointed upright oaken and cedar logs, the fort was an intimidating structure for a ground force to attack. Along the interior side of the walls was a rampart accommodating a constant patrol of British sentries. Also, along the walls were corner blockhouses and bastions with artillery. At least the Indians had good knowledge of the fort’s interior; for years they had been allowed inside on Saturdays to trade with the local French, and now a few English, traders. This knowledge led Pontiac to use trickery and deception in his unsuccessful attempt to subdue the fort on 7 May. The thwarted attack led to the six-month siege, and the Indians never did capture the fort.

In addition to the palisade, the ground around the fort was an obstacle for the Indians. Over the years, it had been cleared of trees, stumps, and buildings, out to about one hundred yards in all directions except south, making an all-out frontal assault nearly suicidal. Just south of the stockade flowed the Detroit River, leaving little room to maneuver in that direction.

Indian Tactics: Although not a physical obstacle, the Indians’ aversion to long sieges and frontal assaults against well-defended positions was a barrier to success at Fort Detroit. Warriors sought victory through quick, decisive raids and ambushes, not long-term sieges and battles that could cause many casualties. For all six months of siege, Pontiac fought the Indians’ tendencies to avoid frontal assaults and drift away to their families.

Detroit River/Lake Erie System: Besides the encircling effect of the Indians surrounding the fort, which prevented effective British ground operations, the most critical obstacle for the British was the 250-mile resupply route to and from Fort Niagara. The route was nearly all water including the Detroit River and the often windy and stormy Lake Erie. On 28 August, a sudden storm caused the Michigan to break apart in eastern Lake Erie, destroying eighty barrels of provisions bound for Detroit.

Complicating and slowing matters was the fact ships like the Huron and Michigan could not go all the way to Fort Niagara. They were forced to stop south of the massive falls where they would receive their loads of provisions.

Before that, wagons with the supplies from Niagara had to ascend a difficult portage route around the falls to deliver the supplies to the ships. This land route, called “the Carrying Place,” and including a gorge called “Devil’s Hole,” was vulnerable to attack, particularly by Senecas living in western New York. On 14 September 1763, a war party of at least 300 Seneca warriors attacked a wagon train with supplies heading south toward the Lake Erie loading site (near today’s Buffalo, New York). The Senecas

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 375

FIG 17. This chart shows relative depths of the Great Lakes. Lake Erie was an obstacle to Detroit’s resupply system; its location and shallowness contributed to high waves, winds, and storm damage to ships and bateaux. geosurvey.ohiodnr.gov.

killed about seventy-five soldiers and captured horses, oxen, wagons, guns, and ammunition.41 This attack temporarily interrupted a resupply mission by the Huron and illustrates the obstacle presented by the rivers and lakes.

Cover and Concealment Although closely related, cover and concealment are different. Cover, such as entrenchments or trees, provides a combatant protection from enemy fire and possibly observation. Concealment, like camouflage or tall grass, hides a combatant from enemy observation but offers little protection from bullets and arrows.

FIG 18. The green uniforms of Rogers’ Rangers provided good concealment in spring, summer, and fall foliage; not so with the red coats of the British. www.globalsecurity.org.

fire were excellent around the perimeter of Fort Detroit.

Because most of the fort’s surrounding forest had been removed long before 1763, the British occupants enjoyed great views out to about 100 yards. Although the soldiers could not see Indians lurking in the woods, warriors Fort Detroit: When the British stayed inside the attacking during the day were sure to be seen right walls of Fort Detroit, they had excellent cover and good away by sentries on the fort’s ramparts. To get within concealment. Once outside the fort, however, their red effective range of their muskets, the Indians had to expose uniforms became obvious targets. Major Rogers and the themselves to British fire on the open ground. Equipped rangers, with green uniforms, had at least some measure of primarily with muzzle-loading French Charleville muskets camouflage and concealment against the forest backdrop. and a few British Brown Bess muzzleloaders, both with The ships Huron and Michigan provided their crews good effective ranges of about one hundred yards, Indians cover from Indians firing along the banks of the Detroit hidden in the woods could not effectively pick off many River or from their much smaller canoes. soldiers inside the fort.43 The Forest and Camouflage: For the Indians, both cover and concealment were provided by the trees, hills, and ridges of the forest. When they attacked British supply bateaux along the Detroit River, the warriors hid behind trees and ridges to avoid the soldiers’ gunfire.

Warriors were experts in personal camouflage, using various clothing, paints, tattoos, and feathers to conceal themselves. Indian warfare in the woodlands was about taking plunder, captives, and scalps with minimal 19. The top image is a British Brown Bess musket. Below is a exposure to enemy fire. The forest covered and concealed FIG French Charleville musket. These weapons and their variations the warriors almost completely. One British soldier wrote were the two most-used shoulder arms in the 1760s. en.wikipedia. after a fight, “The … Indians crept about in small Parties com. so that the Fire was quite round us, and in all the time To cover the open ground around the fort, the British had I never saw one … and they either on their Bellies or three cannons, two six-pounders and one three-pounder, Behind trees … almost by the ground.”42 Despite their skill in the fort’s bastions, along with several small mortars. at using available cover, concealment, and camouflage On the ships Huron and Michigan were a combined 10 techniques, however, it didn’t do Pontiac’s warriors much four-pounder cannons and 14 swivel guns.44 These guns good when launching an attack across the cleared, open could deliver a devastating fire of shell and grapeshot. ground around Fort Detroit.

The soldiers on the ramparts covered the ground with With all their experience in frontier warfare, it is a mystery their Brown Bess muskets. The only significant British why Major Gladwin and Major Rogers went along with weakness was that soldiers could not shoot down to the Captain Dalyell’s plan for the attack at Bloody Run. Other base of the palisade without leaning over the wall and than advancing under the limited concealment provided exposing themselves to Indian fire. by darkness, there was apparently little thought given to The Indians had excellent observation across the open camouflage and the lack of cover and along the river road ground toward the fort, but their fields of fire were approach. Instead of putting Rogers and his quiet, greenseverely obstructed by the palisade. Most of their bullets coated, and forest-savvy rangers in the advance and on passed over the palisade or smacked into the oak and the flanks to root out warriors lying in ambush, Dalyell’s cedar walls. Also, they could not see much of what was order of march called for relatively inexperienced redcoats happening inside. Pontiac’s treacherous initial attack plan to lead the column. Rogers and the rangers followed in for 7 May failed when Major Gladwin learned of the plot the main body. The Indians, quiet, painted for battle, and to massacre the garrison. Because he had no observation hidden behind trees, ridges, and crude entrenchments, of the fort’s interior and the British preparations to defeat used cover and concealment expertly to prepare their him, Pontiac was stunned to see that the soldiers were ambush. Concealed warriors unleashed a brutal fire that ready with guns, bayonets, and artillery when he and his eventually forced the British to retreat. warriors were escorted into the fort. The warriors got Observation & Fields of Fire some revenge on 31 July, however, when Pontiac deployed Not all battlefield locations that provide good observation them in concealed ambush positions with clear fields of of the enemy also offer suitable, open fields of fire. Some fire. The quiet, well-prepared Indians nearly wiped out fields of fire might be too far from the enemy, too infested Captain Dalyell’s punitive sortie at Bloody Run. Detroit River: Pontiac and his warriors also had superb with tree stumps, or have slopes that are too steep or observation of the Detroit River and other locations along heavily vegetated.

Fort Detroit: Both observation and open fields of the waterway between Lake Huron and Fort Niagara.

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Villages of Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, and Huron/ Journal of the Company of Military Historians 377 Wyandot tribesmen were strategically placed to provide intelligence on the activity of British ships and supply bateaux. Despite the excellent observation and several successful raids, however, the Indians could never bring enough coordination and firepower to bear to stop the well-enough stocked with provisions to prevent starvation and scurvy. Any force seeking control of the region had British maritime resupply missions. to control the key and very decisive terrain that included Key & Decisive Terrain Fort Detroit. Major Gladwin and the determined British In his book Crucible of War, author Fred Anderson hung onto it; Pontiac and his warriors could never take it. wrote, “Indians would not fight to defend ground but Detroit River: The other significant key terrain was 45 only to destroy enemies or take captives and trophies.” the Detroit River avenue of approach from Lake Erie to Otherwise, warriors would normally disperse. Although Fort Detroit. This river was the fort’s lifeline to and from Indians might defend their villages, it was more likely Niagara. Indians prowled the banks and occasionally they would pack up what possessions they could and attacked the supply transports in canoes, but the British hastily leave before an enemy force attacked. They were retained control of the waterway. The larger ships sailed, interested in locations that provided good hunting, or were anchored, primarily in the middle of the river, fishing, and shelter for villages. In warfare, they sought thus limiting fights with the Indians. sites advantageous for ambushes and short-term attacks where they could surround an enemy. Most Indians Aftermath Considering the normally short-term and undisciplined did not consider gaining and holding “key and decisive way of Indian warfare in the eastern woodlands, it is terrain.”

Fort Detroit: True to this concept of taking, but not remarkable that Pontiac maintained the siege of Fort occupying or defending a site, Pontiac’s initial plan for Detroit for over six months. Although Forts Detroit, Pitt, capturing the key terrain of Fort Detroit was to overwhelm and Niagara were never captured, ten other forts fell or it with treachery, massacre all the British soldiers and were abandoned to the Indians during Pontiac’s War. traders, and turn it over to the local French citizens. He Fort Detroit’s British and American Colonial soldiers, might have considered destroying the wooden stockade, occupying a key location in the Great Lakes country, held but he probably never intended to take long-term control on despite facing a much larger Indian force. By retaining of the fort itself. The failure to subdue the fort and its control of the fort and the Detroit River/Lake Erie supply British occupants on 7 May forced Pontiac to lay siege to a route, the soldiers outlasted Pontiac and his followers, structure, a piece of land, key terrain. This was counter to many of whom gave up the siege and left the Detroit area in late 1763. Pontiac was killed by a Peoria (Illinois the normal Indian way of warfare.

For the British inside, the palisade surrounding Fort confederacy) warrior in 1769 near Cahokia, Illinois.46 Detroit meant survival. The fort occupied land overlooking the Detroit River and was close to the landing where supplies were delivered from bateaux convoys and the sailing ships, Huron and Michigan. Although there were a few times when food had to be rationed, the fort was FIG 21.

Most sources say Pontiac was murdered by a young Peoria warrior near Cahokia in the Illinois country in 1769. photos.

legendsofamerica.com.

FIG 20. Not only did palisaded forts like Detroit and Michilimackinac occupy key terrain, they also provided their defenders superb cover, observation, and fields of fire. www.accessgenealogy. com.

doomed. If Pontiac had pressed the siege into the winter with its ice-choked rivers and limited chances for the British to resupply, the results might have been different.

Advantage: Soldiers Avenues of Approach/Lines of Communication: So Which Side Made The Best Use Of WOCOKA? The Indians controlled the trails and all the land Weather: The moderate spring, summer, and fall approaches including the river road, where the warriors weather in the Fort Detroit region was ideal for the thwarted Captain Dalyell’s assault. Because the trails were offensive operations of the Indians. Although sieges were open, Pontiac maintained his lines of communication not the Indians’ preferred way of war, Pontiac was able with other tribes. Luckily for the British, the main avenue to keep his coalition together and well-fed through the of approach, the Detroit River/Lake Erie waterway to mild months. Trails were clear of snow and generally the south, stayed open for resupply and reinforcements. dry, allowing Indian runners to make effective use of This watery line of communication linked Fort Detroit their communication network. Summer foliage provided with Fort Niagara and the British command in New York. the Indians excellent concealment. The British used the Advantage: Soldiers Summary: Despite their individual and small-unit good weather and ice-free Detroit River to maintain their skills in wilderness warfare, Pontiac and his warriors supply route to Fort Niagara. Advantage: Indians Observation & Fields of Fire: Because of their could not effectively adjust their tactics to defeat the elevated ramparts inside Fort Detroit, and the open defenders of Fort Detroit. During the six-month siege, the ground around the palisade, the British defenders had British and their American colonial allies took advantage excellent observation and fields of fire. The deadly, of all six WOCOKA factors to retain control of Detroit and cleared ground around the fort provided open fields of fire the Detroit River avenue of approach. The Indians’ failure for artillery and limited the effectiveness of the warriors’ to capture Fort Detroit and its resupply route was the muskets. The two sailing ships, Huron and Michigan, beginning of the end for Pontiac’s War. had excellent observation both north and south along the Detroit River. Open fields of fire on the water minimized Indian attacks on the ships. Pontiac and his warriors had Notes: 1. Allan W. Eckert, The Conquerors: A Narrative (Boston, MA: good observation of the river and British activities along it Little, Brown, & Company, 1970), 186-187 (hereafter Eckert, The but could never fully exploit it. Advantage: Soldiers Conquerors).

Cover & Concealment: Inside Fort Detroit, the British 2. Raymond McCoy, The Massacre of Old Fort Mackinac had exceptional cover and concealment. Other than the (Michilimackinac): A Tragedy of the American Frontier (Bay City, MI: Raymond McCoy, 1956), 15 (hereafter The Massacre of soldiers on the ramparts, the Indians simply could not Old Fort Mackinac). see or kill the redcoats. On the two ships, the crewmen 3. Eckert, The Conquerors, 35. had good cover and some concealment. Once outside 4. Alan Gallay, Colonial Wars of North America, 1512-1763: An the fort and off the ships, however, the soldiers had Encyclopaedia (New York, NY: Garland Press, 1996), 218-219. inadequate cover and only the green-suited rangers had 5. Eckert, The Conquerors, 82. decent concealment. Masters of cover and concealment, 6. McCoy, The Massacre of Old Fort Mackinac, 106. the Indians were well-hidden in the dense summer 7. John F. Ross, War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers foliage, but were almost totally exposed to British musket and the Conquest of America’s First Frontier (New York, NY: Bantam Books, Random House, 2009), 292 (hereafter Ross, War and artillery fire when attacking across the open ground on the Run). surrounding the fort. Advantage: Soldiers 8. Richard Middleton, Pontiac’s War: Its Causes, Course, and Obstacles: Even with the two sailing ships, getting Consequences (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 44 (ebook). to Niagara and back for supplies was a challenge for the 9. Eckert, The Conquerors, 62.

British. The Detroit River/Lake Erie passage was windy, 10. Ibid., 17-18. stormy, and treacherous, but Fort Detroit itself was an 11. Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian obstacle the Indians could never overcome. Once Major Nations, & the British Empire (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 65 (hereafter Dowd, War Under Gladwin closed the gates to them forever, the warriors had Heaven). little chance to defeat the British behind the fort’s high, 12.

McCoy, The Massacre of Old Fort Mackinac, 104. ramparted walls. The open ground around the fort and the 13. Eckert, The Conquerors, 82-83.

Indians’ aversion to siege warfare discouraged sustained 14. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 105-106. attacks. Advantage: Soldiers 15. Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac: and the Indian War Key & Decisive Terrain: The British maintained After the Conquest of Canada (New York, NY: Literary Classics of control of the key terrain of Fort Detroit and its supply the United States, Inc., 1991), 485-486 (hereafter Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac). lifeline, the Detroit River/Lake Erie waterway. As long 16. Eckert, The Conquerors, 150-151. as the soldiers stayed secure in the fort and the supply 17. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 118. ships and bateaux continued to sail, Pontiac’s siege was 378 Military Collector & Historian

18. Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 70.

19. Eckert, The Conquerors, 184-187.

20. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 120.

21. Eckert, The Conquerors, 218-219.

22. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 125-126.

23. Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 37 (hereafter Dowd, A Spirited Resistance).

24. Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac, 567-568.

25. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 121.

26. Ibid., 135.

27. Ibid., 136.

28. Ross, War on the Run, 349.

29. Stephen Brumwell, White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004), 267.

30. Ross, War on the Run, 349.

31. Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 36.

32. Walter R. Borneman, The French & Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), 291.

33. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 145.

34. Ibid., 139.

35. U.S. Climate Data, usclimatedata.com/climate/detroit/michigan/ united-states/usmi0229, accessed 28 December 2019 and 9 January 2020.

36. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 134.

37. Eckert, The Conquerors, 547-549.

38. Ross, War on the Run, 348-349.

39. Ibid., 342.

40. Ibid., 346-349.

41. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 137.

42. Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf/ Random House, Inc., 2000), 100-102 (hereafter Anderson, Crucible of War).

43. guns.fandom.com/wiki/Charleville Musket; guns.fandom.com/ wiki/Brown Bess, accessed 6 January 2020 and 29 January 2020.

44. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 132.

45. Anderson, Crucible of War, 97.

46. Dowd, War Under Heaven, 260-261.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 379

The Montgomery Guard David M. Sullivan

I

n January 1837, several Irish-Americans from Boston petitioned Gov. Edward Everett for permission to form their own company. In the past, similar requests by Irish residents had been declined, but this time the petition came with the recommendation of the highest-ranking officers in the militia, and the request was granted.1 The new group, composed of eight naturalized Irish immigrants and thirty-two native-born citizens of Irish descent,2 became the 10th Company of Light Infantry, Regiment of Light Infantry, 3d Brigade, 1st Division, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia—otherwise known as the Montgomery Guards.3 The new company was one of several Irish-American militia companies named for Richard Montgomery, an Irish-born general who had served in the Continental Army; others were started in New York, Philadelphia, and New Orleans. Among the organizers of the Boston company was the philanthropist Andrew Carney, who was then a partner in a clothing firm that supplied the U.S. Navy with uniforms.4 Thus the Montgomery Guards of Boston were provided with custom-designed green uniforms with scarlet facings and gold trim, and caps bearing their own company emblem: an American eagle alighting on an Irish harp.5 Their motto, borrowed from the Charitable Irish Society, was, “Fostered under thy wings, we will die in thy defense.”6 They were first called to duty on 11 June 1837 to help quell the Broad Street Riot. City officials and the local press commended their performance, and a week later the governor himself reviewed their first parade, which was followed by a formal banquet at the Concert Hall.7 This auspicious beginning did not reflect the attitude of most Bostonians toward Irish Catholics. While Boston’s elites welcomed the new company, others were horrified by the thought of Irishmen being provided with weapons and military training. Anti-Catholic literature of the time depicted Irish immigrants as part of a “papist” conspiracy to take over the country. Rumors circulated that the governor had succumbed to “foreign influence,” and resentment simmered among the other companies at being forced to accept people they saw as dangerous outsiders into their regiment.8 On the morning of 12 September 1837, at the annual fall muster on Boston Common, the Montgomery Guards joined the other nine companies that made up the Light Infantry Regiment of the Boston Brigade. No sooner had the companies finished moving into line than a signal was given, and the rank and file of the City Guard marched off the field and back to its armory, playing Yankee Doodle on the fife and drum. Their officers were left standing at attention. Five other infantry companies followed suit:

380 Military Collector & Historian

the Lafayette Guards, the Independent Fusiliers, the Washington Light Infantry, the Mechanics Rifles, and the Winslow Guards. The walkout was intended as a public insult to the Irish company.9 Even the choice of song was significant, in that the term “Yankee” was understood to mean New England natives of English descent.

The Montgomery Guards went through their planned maneuvers with the remaining three companies, all the while being taunted and jeered by spectators. When the brigade was dismissed that afternoon, the Montgomery Guards marched back to their armory in Dock Square near Faneuil Hall. As the forty members of the Montgomery Guards marched down Tremont Street, a hostile crowd followed them, shouting epithets and pelting them with stones, lumps of coal, bottles, and billets of wood.10 One volunteer was knocked down and his weapon smashed; another was hit with a paving stone. Neither the local constabulary nor the other militia companies came to their defense.11 By the time they made it to their armory, the crowd had grown to about 3,000. The Montgomery Guards were trapped inside as the angry mob threatened to storm the building. Only when Mayor Samuel A. Eliot arrived with a group of prominent—and armed—citizens was the crowd persuaded to disperse. City officials and the press strongly denounced the riot and praised the Montgomery Guards for its restraint. Nevertheless, Governor Edward Everett ordered the disbandment of the company for public safety reasons.

FIG 1. Montgomery Guards Hat. en.wikipedia.org.

Notes 1. Robert Howard Lord, John E. Sexton, and Edward T. Harrington, History of the Archdiocese of Boston (Boston: Sheed & Ward, 1944), 251–252.

2. “Montgomery Guards Riot - 1837, Part II,” Donahoe’s Magazine, 18, no.6: (December 1887): 540–544.

3. Thomas H. O’Connor, The Boston Irish: A Political History (Boston, MA: Back Bay Books, 1995), 49-52.

4. James Patrick Byrne, Philip Coleman, and Jason King, eds., Ireland and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History: A Multidisciplinary Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 155, 552 5. O’Connor, The Boston Irish: A Political History, 49-52.

6. Lord, Sexton, and Harrington, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 251.

7. Ibid., 252; “Montgomery Guards Riot - 1837, Part I,” Donahoe’s Magazine, 18, no. 5 (November 1887): 415–419.

8. Lord, Sexton, and Harrington, History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 251.

9. Ibid., 252; “Montgomery Guards Riot - 1837, Part I,” 419.

10. “Montgomery Guards Riot - 1837, Part II,” 544.

11. Ibid.

FIG 2. Broad St Riots, hubhistory.com.

Journal of the Company of Military Historians 381

“A Most Extraordinary Circumstance,” The Capture of British Brig. Gen. Richard Prescott, July 1777 Ronald M. Westphal

O

n the night of 9-10 July 1777, Lt. Col. William Barton, Rhode Island State Troops, led a party of six officers and thirty eight men on a daring raid to capture British Gen. Richard Prescott who commanded the British forces that occupied Newport, Rhode Island, and the island on which that city is located.1 At the outbreak of the Revolution, Prescott was a lieutenant colonel serving in Canada and holding the local rank of brigadier general.

When American forces successfully attacked Montreal in the autumn of 1775, Prescott attempted to withdraw Crown troops and stores to Quebec. Continental forces blocked his retreat route and he and his command were forced to surrender on 17 November 1775. Nearly a year later in September, he was exchanged for Gen. John Sullivan of New Hampshire, and in the month following he was promoted to colonel of the 7th Regiment of Foot, Royal Fusiliers. In December 1776, Colonel Prescott was third in command of the British forces that occupied Newport and the Island. With the opening of the Long Island campaign in July 1777, Prescott was promoted to the rank of general and placed in command of the four to five thousand troops that remained to occupy Newport and the Island.2 These troops were divided between two main camps, one just outside of Newport and the other at the north end of the Island over watching the Bristol and Howland Ferries.

Prescott established his headquarters in the city but within a few months decided to transfer his residence to a large country house owned by a Mr. Overing. Local lore holds the move may have been in part due to the presence of the owner’s attractive young daughter.3 The Overing farm, now called the Prescott House, is located on the West Main Road about five miles north of Newport and about the same distance from troop encampments at the north end of the Island. Although the farm was within marching distance of the two main British camps, several of Prescott’s officers recognized its isolated and exposed location and urged the general to relocate to a more secure position. He neither moved nor reinforced his guard detail.4 The detail consisted of a corporal and seven soldiers, only one of which was posted at the general’s quarters at any given time. Four dragoons were assigned to the general’s staff as couriers, but they had no security responsibilities.5 The guard detail was quartered at a farm house about a quarter-mile distant from the Overing farm. From Prescott’s perspective, he had good reason to feel secure. American forces were concentrated on the mainland near Bristol and Howland’s Ferries.

Between the Americans and Prescott’s quarters were numerous outposts and patrols across the northern end of

FIG 1. Rendered by the author from “A Topographical Chart of the Bay of Narraganset in the Province of New England …, by Charles Blaskowitz, July 22d, 1777,” Library of Congress available at www.loc.gov/resource/g3772n. ar100301, accessed 15 January 2020.

the Island, which supported a series of prepared positions manned by about two thousand British and Hessian troops. These would give ample warning of any attempt by the Continentals to land a significant force from the mainland. While the British defenses were well situated to counter a major attack, they were virtually defenseless against the small raiding parties that almost nightly harassed the outposts throughout the spring months of 1777.6 Narragansett Bay that forms the Island’s western shore was patrolled by several British warships. These vessels and their picket boats provided a strong deterrent to any sizeable American attack upon the Island from that direction.

William Barton was well aware of the small raids the

382 Military Collector & Historian

Colonials were frequently carrying out against the King’s troops. He also had access to the intelligence gathered by spies operating on the Island. When a deserter came through the American lines at Howland’s Ferry, providing specific information about guard mountings, their locations, and other useful details, Barton began to develop a plan to capture Prescott.7 Gen. Charles Lee, the second most senior officer in the Continental Army, had been taken prisoner in December 1776 and Congress was anxious to capture a British general in the hope an exchange might be arranged. Barton recognized British troop dispositions and Prescott’s isolated quarters might provide the opportunity to undertake what today would be called a high value asset with a minimum of risk. He concluded a small party coming from an unexpected direction had a good possibility of successfully capturing Prescott. If he and his men came by water in small boats and could elude the warships and guard boats stationed on the bay and land on the west side of the Island, the actual capture of the general would be a relatively low risk task.

After discussing his plan with his commanding officer, Barton obtained permission “to proceed to the Island of Newport and attack the enemy when and where you think proper.”8 Barton selected his men from a large group of volunteers and began training on the waters near Tiverton, Rhode Island, well away from the intended target. Among these volunteers, four former residents of the Island, one of whom had lived just a short distance from the Overing farm, would serve as guides for the raiding party.

In the early evening of 4 July, Barton and his troops set out in five whale boats from Howland’s Ferry and proceeded without incident to Bristol. After a reconnaissance of the bay from Hog Island on 5 July, Barton moved his force to Warwick Neck. On 10 July, conditions were favorable and well after dark they set out for their landing point on the west side of the Island.9 With muffled oars the boats passed between Patience and Prudence Islands and followed the shore of the latter until they had cleared the southern tip of the island. The boats then altered course slightly to the east and passed through a screen of at least three frigates and their guard boats. Shortly before midnight, the boats landed without detection on the north side of a cove near the mouth of a small stream.10 Barton’s men quickly disembarked and followed the stream until they reached the West Main Road a short distance from the Overing farm. The raiding party then split into several small parties, each tasked with blocking a possible escape route from the house. Barton with his detail made straight for the dwelling. When they were about ten yards from the front door, a sentinel challenged Colonel Barton.

Making no reply, Barton slowed but kept advancing.

FIG 2. Col. William Barton available at en.wikipedia.org, accessed 24 July 2020.

When the guard challenged him again and asked for the countersign, Barton continued to approach the sentry and replied that he had no countersign but was looking for deserters. When within a few feet, Barton rushed the soldier and knocked the unloaded musket from his hands and the rest of his party quickly overpowered the sentry.11 When Barton’s men found the front door locked, a free black named Jack Sisson threw himself against it forcing it open on the first attempt. Barton and his detachment rushed through the now open door just as one of the other details stormed in through the back door. Mr. Overing, the owner, was still up and at first denied any knowledge of the general’s whereabouts. When threatened with his life he quickly indicated that the general was asleep upstairs.

Barton mounted the stairs and calling upon Sisson, forced the door to the general’s chamber. Prescott thought he was being robbed until Barton informed him that he was now a prisoner of war.12 Sleeping in an adjacent room Lieutenant Barrington, Prescott’s aide-de-camp, was awakened by the commotion in the general’s room. He escaped immediate capture by jumping out of a window.

His freedom quickly ended when he was apprehended a

few dozen yards from the house by another of Barton’s Journal of the Company of Military Historians 383 detachments.13 Clad only in his nightshirt and carrying his breeches, he was returned quickly to the house. Within less than ten minutes of their arrival. the raiders and their prisoners were headed back to their boats. Although several souvenirs were taken, a roll of currency on the Notes table in Prescott’s room and a brace of pistols belonging 1. The city of Newport is located on the largest of several islands that to his aide-de-camp were left behind.14 lie in Narragansett Bay. Today the island is called by its NarraganA light dragoon, sleeping in the attic above the kitchen, sett Indian name Aquidneck, but in colonial times it was known as Rhode Island. To avoid confusion with the entire state, the author was awakened by the disturbance. Remaining quiet, he will refer to it as the Island. was undiscovered by Barton’s men and, once the trooper 2. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard Prescott was sure that the Americans had left, made his way to 3. Related to the author in about 1967, by Elton Manuel, volunteer the house where the guard detail was quartered. As the curator, Newport Artillery Company Museum, 14 Clark Street, dragoon approached he was challenged by a sentry.

Newport, Rhode Island. Manuel was a lifelong resident of Newport, well read on local history.

Fearing that the Americans had also overpowered that 4. Fredrick MacKenzie, Diary of Fredrick MacKenzie, Eyewitness post he returned to the Overing home, retrieved his Accounts of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard Unihorse and rode to the outpost at Fogland Ferry where versity Press, 1930), I: 149 (hereafter MacKenzie, Diary). he raised the first alarm about the raid. From there he 5. MacKenzie, Diary, 150. rode on to Quaker Hill and informed Col. Campbell what 6. Ibid., 137-184. MacKenzie cites various nightly harassing actions. had happened. Hoping to intercept the raiders and their 7. Frank Moore, comp., John Anthony Scott, ed., The Diary of the captives, Campbell dispatched patrols along the west American Revolution (New York: Washington Square Press, shore and ordered the officer-in-charge at Fogland Ferry to 1967), 231 (hereafter Revolution Diary).

8. www.amrevmuseum.org/read-the-revolution/history/kidnapdispatch search parties along the east shore of the Island. ping-enemy, accessed 15 January 2020.

At Windmill Hill, the British had set up a signal station to 9.

Moore, Revolution Diary, 232. communicate with the ships in the bay. When word of the 10.

Benjamin J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution (New raid arrived there shortly before 0200, two cannons and a York: Harper and Brothers, 1860), 643 (hereafter Lossing, Field rocket were fired to signal the ships. Although the ships in Book. the bay heard and saw the signals they had no idea what 11. Moore, Revolution Diary, 232; MacKenzie, Diary, 148; Lossing, they meant.15 Even if they had understood, it was much Field Book, 645. too late for them to interdict Barton and his men as they 12. MacKenzie, Diary, 148. Several other accounts, especially American newspapers, reported Barrington’s rank as being a major. had nearly reached Warwick Neck when they saw the flare However, with MacKenzie being a British officer, he most likely 16 of the rocket. knew Barrington’s actual rank.

British Capt. Fredrick MacKenzie best summed up the 13. MacKenzie, Diary, 148, 154; Moore, Revolution Diary, 232-233. entire episode when he wrote: 14. Ibid., 154.

They however executed it in a masterly manner, and deserve credit for the attempt. It is certainly a most extraordinary circumstance, that a General Commanding a body of 4000 men, encamped on an Island surrounded by a squadron of Ships of War, should be carried off from his quarters in the night by a small party of the Enemy from without, & without a Shot Being fired.17

Richard Prescott earned the dubious distinction of being the only British general to be captured twice by Colonial forces. In 1778, the exchange for Continental Gen. Charles Lee was completed. Lee had been captured by British troops under the command of Banastre Tarleton in the early morning of 12 December 1776, at Widow White’s Tavern, New Jersey. Ironically, Lee, like Prescott, was wearing only his nightclothes when he was taken.

15. MacKenzie, Diary, 149.

16. Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of ‘Seventy Six the Story of The American Revolution as told by Participants (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company 1958), 2: 705.

17. MacKenzie, Diary, 150.

384 Military Collector & Historian

“The Man Who Swam the Appomattox River,” Sergeant Major Edwin Wallace, Confederate States Marine Corps Ron Field

T

he first and only Sergeant Major of the Confederate States Marine Corps was not appointed until 1 February 1864. In January of that year, Colonel Commandant Lloyd J. Beall instructed Adj. Israel Greene to order Capt. Julius Ernest Meiere, commanding the Marines at Mobile, Alabama, to try to procure a suitable man for the post. Accordingly, Meiere placed an advertisement in the Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register on 22 January 1864, which offered recruits a, “Chance to See Something of the World” and specifically appealed for “a thoroughly drilled, sober and intelligent Man for the position of Sergeant Major of the Confederate States Marine Corps.”1 Of several applicants for the post, Meiere was most impressed with that made by Englishman Edwin Wallace, who claimed to have been educated at the Royal Military Asylum in Chelsea, London, and served in the British Royal Marines. He also maintained that his father [Thomas Wallace] had been a sergeant major in the same corps. However, as no Royal Marine record of service of Wallace or his father has been found, despite a careful search of the records at the Public Record Office in the UK, it must be assumed that Wallace was something of a stranger to the truth.

Nonetheless, Edwin Wallace was appointed Sergeant Major, CSMC via a General Order dated 1 February 1864, and was transferred one week later to the Marine Barracks at Drewry’s Bluff, near Richmond, where his services were required with the field battalion of Marines in the Richmond-Petersburg defences. Afterward, Meiere apparently expressed regret he had not obtained permission to retain the Englishman for a month or two, as his command “… would have been much benefited by his instruction.” At the same time the officer was impressed by Wallace’s knowledge of various drill books and sword exercises, plus his “habits, neatness, and respectful demeanour.”2 Arriving in Richmond with a detachment of Marines consisting of a sergeant and four musicians, Wallace was issued several items of clothing and cloth sufficient to have the rest of his uniform made via recruiting officer 1st Lt. Nathaniel E. Venable. The issuance consisted of one pair of shoes, two cotton shirts, and two pairs of socks, plus two “yds Gray cloth,” one and a half “yds Blue cloth,” two “yds Serge,” two “yds Cambric,” a quarter ounce “Silk,” and one “skein [of] flax.”3 By 27 March 1864, controversy began to surround Wallace when Colonel Beall wrote to Captain Meiere asking what promises had been to the sergeant major on his enlistment. Meiere responded that no promises had been made to Wallace but he had been told that he would find comfortable quarters at Drewry’s Bluff.4 Despite the demands of duty in Virginia, Wallace apparently had time for courtship as on 9 April 1864, he is reported to have married Elizabeth Keating, a resident of Petersburg with what the Daily Express of that city described as “considerable éclat … for he kept up the fiddling and dancing for three consecutive nights, and caused the marriage notice to be kept in the columns … six days.” The notice stated, “Married – On the evening of the 9th of April, at the bride’s residence, corner of Lombard and Madison streets, by the Rev. W. H. Piatte, Major [sic] E. Orlanzo Wallace, to Mrs. [sic] Elizabeth Keating.”5

On 3 July 1864, the Marine battalion was ordered from the Richmond area to Wilmington, North Carolina, to take part in an expedition to free Confederates at Point Lookout, a Federal prisoner of war camp at the extreme tip of St. Mary’s County, on the peninsula where the Potomac River joins Chesapeake Bay. However, the whole operation was compromised when news of its planning and preparation was leaked and it was called off eight days later. After return to Drewry’s Bluff, further controversy surrounded Wallace when he was accused of stealing while encamped near Wilmington, North Carolina, earlier that month. As a result, decisive action had to be taken considering the importance of his duties, and he was reduced to the ranks on 25 July 1864, and assigned to Co. B, CSMC. Five days later Wallace deserted carrying information to the enemy and claiming he had swum across the Appomattox River. Nothing is known of the route he took or where he entered Union lines.

Following this, the Weekly Conservative of Raleigh, North Carolina, reported on 14 September, “The Major [sic] has been missing for several days, and there seems to be no doubt among his friends that he has gone to the enemy.”6 According to a report in Richmond’s Daily Dispatch entitled, “The Man Who Swam the Appomattox,” Wallace continued to recount his personal military exploits once behind Union lines, professing that he had been at “the grand charge at Balaklava [sic], where ‘cannon to the right of them, cannon to the left of them, rattled and thundered.’”7 He also claimed his family had been killed by an exploding shell in Petersburg, about which the Daily Dispatch reported, “His representations to the Yankees were, doubtless the coinage of his own brain, as the statement that his wife and child were killed by a shell in Petersburg is known to have been a deliberate falsehood.”

Furthermore, the editor of the Petersburg Express contradicted earlier reportage by claiming that he had never heard of Wallace before, “nor of the tragic event by which he professes to have lost his wife and child.”8 The Richmond Dispatch concluded its report about Edwin Wallace, the only sergeant major of the Confederate States Marine Corps, by stating, “The Confederacy loses nothing by the departure of such a man, notwithstanding the hue and cry raised by the Yankees on his arrival amongst them.”9

Notes 1. “A Chance to See Something of the World,” Mobile (Alabama) Daily Advertiser and Register, 22 January 1864.

2. Ralph W. Donnelly, The Confederate States Marine Corps: The Rebel Leathernecks (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, Inc., 1989), 9. See also Ralph W. Donnelly, Service Records of Confederate Enlisted Marines (Washington, NC: by the author, 1979), 107.

3. Confederate Navy Subject File, N – personnel, NA – compliments, rolls, lists of persons serving with or in vessels, C.S.S. New Orleans – Yorktown, 454. www.fold3.com.

4. Donnelly, The Confederate States Marine Corps, 9.

5. “From the Richmond Whig, 6th. The News,” Weekly Conservative (Raleigh, NC), 14 September 1864.

6. Ibid.

7. “The Man Who Swam the Appomattox,” Daily Dispatch (Richmond, VA), 14 September 1864.

8. “The War News – A Britisher Swims the Appomattox,” Daily Dispatch (Richmond, VA), 5 September 1864.

9. “The Man Who Swam the Appomattox.”

General George Patton’s Customized Jeep, Northwest Europe, 1945