CRIME PREVENTION URBAN DESIGN MA THESIS Learning from Merton: What design measures can be incorporated in a master plan for Southall, London, to help achieve sustainable development by designing out crime? Carl Stjernstrรถm w1449866 Urban Design MA University of Westminster 2015
Contents 1.0 Introduction
5.4 Ravensbury Draft Master Plan p.84-90
1.1 Introduction p.8-9
5.5
The Expert’s Views and Considerations
2.0
6.0
Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon
6.1
Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon
Literature Review: Crime Prevention Theory
2.1 Forms of Crime
p.12
p.91
p.94
2.2 The Purpose of Crime Prevention p.13
6.2 Notifiable Offences p.95-97
2.3 Offender Motivation and Crime Patterns
p.14
6.3 Residential Burglaries p.98-101
2.4 Defensible Space and Territoriality
p.15-16
2.5 Density, Movement and Permeability
p.17-18
2.6 Responsive Design p.19-21
7.0
Southall Master Plan
7.1 The Draft Master Plan p.104-105 7.2 The Revised Master Plan p.106-107
3.0
7.3 The Focus Area p.108-109
DOCOs and Experts
3.1 DOCOs and Experts p.24
7.4 Draft Design Proposal p.110-119
3.2 Expert Profile p.25
7.5 Final Design Proposal p.120-135
4.0
Secured by Design
8.0 Evaluation and Conclusion
4.1
Secured by Design Interactive Guide: Poor Design Examples
p.28-43
8.1
4.2
Secured by Design Interactive Guide: SBD Design Examples
p.44-61
8.2 Conclusion p.139
4.3
Summary of Key SBD Design Principles
p.62-63
Evaluation of the Design Proposal
p.138
Bibliography p.142-144 5.0
Analysis of Merton Master Plans
5.1 Merton Master Plans p.66-67 5.2 Eastfields Draft Master Plan p.68-75 5.3 High Path Draft Master Plan p.76-83
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Introduction ‘To build city districts that are custom made for easy crime is idiotic. Yet that is what we do.’ (Jacobs, 1961, p40).
AIMS OF THE STUDY The aim of this design thesis is to follow the advice of Secured by Design (SBD) as well as the advice of an expert with knowledge about three major ongoing regeneration master plans for Merton to see how the crime prevention measures and principles applied in Merton can be applied in Southall to help achieve sustainable development.
The following hypothesis, consisting of two parts, will be tested: 1. Due to the uniqueness of the three Merton estates, the design measures and principles for designing out crime reflect local differences. The subjective views of DOCOs and experts involved with CPTED - including their interpretations of SBD guidance - are most likely influencing regeneration in Merton. 2. The design principles and measures used in the Merton master plans (analysed), together with SBD guidance, can be incorporated in a proposed master plan for Southall in an effective manor to achieve sustainable development by designing out crime (however, subjective views and differing interpretations of SBD guidance, along with other external factors, will inevitably affect the final result of the design proposal).
DESIGN ISSUES METHODOLOGY • •
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Design measures and principles that are effective in one place may not necessarily be effective in another. Local Designing Out Crime Officers (DOCOs) and other experts have local knowledge and make use of SBD guidance to give urban designers advice. Places and related issues - as well as people’s understanding and interpretations of places and issues - differ. Observing how issues are resolved in projects of a similar scale will most likely remain the most effective way to avoid unwanted results unless human beings evolve to resemble predictable automatons.
RESEARCH QUESTION Learning from Merton: What design measures can be incorporated in a master plan for Southall to help achieve sustainable development by designing out crime?
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Following an exploration of classic theory, SBD and the role of experts and DOCOs will be explored. The available SBD guidance on designing out crime will be explored. The recommendations made in the SBD Interactive Guide, which provides examples of how to design out crime, will be studied. Also, Secured by Design: New Homes 2014 will be considered. Three major redevelopment projects are currently taking place in The London Borough of Merton. The regeneration master plans for Eastfields, High Path, and Ravensbury will be examined. This will include an analysis of the crime prevention measures and design principles incorporated. The expert’s (anonymous) design considerations will be expounded and an independent analysis of the Merton estates will be carried out.
The Merton master plans are currently being developed, providing an educational insight into the sorts of considerations made during the early stages of the master planning process, drawing upon contemporary guidance from 2014; Merton will be studied because designing out crime has been considered at the outset (not ubiquitous in London) and the scale of development is appropriate to the local context in Southall. To conclude, the design proposal for Southall will be evaluated. The hypothesis will be answered and recommendations for future study, policy and practice will be made. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 1. The final design proposal should show awareness of CPTED theory. 2. The expert’s views on the Merton master plans, as well as an independent analysis, should inform the design proposal - the design proposal should reflect lessons learned from Merton. 3. The final design proposal should take into account local circumstances. 4. The design proposal should show consideration of SBD guidance (challenged if necessary). 5. The design proposal should be evaluated to answer the hypothesis and to make recommendations for future study, policy and practice.
The findings of this analysis will serve as appropriate guidance to incorporate in a focus area of a proposed master plan for Southall.
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Literature Review: Crime Prevention Theory
2.1 Forms of Crime There are several categories of crime and anti-social behaviour. The neighbourhood or location specific crimes that are the most significant are: burglary, assaults, criminal damage and vehicle crime (Greed and Roberts, 1998). M. Felson (1998) concludes that burglary and theft accounts for two to three times more of the total harm to society than aggravated assault.
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2.2 The Purpose of Crime Prevention It is the role of the police to handcuff offenders; it is the role of the criminal justice system to prosecute offenders - according to Felson (2006), crime can be described as an ecosystem that is dynamic; different activities draw upon each other. According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981), ‘four elements – law, the offender, the target, and the place – can be characterised as the four dimensions or crime’ (p7). According to Ekblom (1997), the purpose of crime prevention is ‘to reduce the risks of criminal events and related misbehaviour by intervening in their causes’ (p251). According to Crowe (2013), most criminals commit crimes based on opportunities created by the use or design of human space. Considering that the design of the built environment can have an impact on crime levels, it is important to consider the merits of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) measures. According to Crowe (2000), ‘the goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for crime that may be inherent in the design of structures or in the design of neighbourhoods’ (p46). CPTED is widely accepted to be effective in preventing crime. Examples of practical solutions that have been applied in the built environment can help determine how effective contemporary urban design and planning responses are in preventing theft associated with public space. The transition to practical solutions from planning-based research began in the 1980s and 1990s with work conducted by Brantingham and Brantingham (1981), Poyner (1983) and Poyner and Webb (1991) (Armitage, 2013). It has been suggested that using environmental design to prevent crime is not futile just because the roots causes of crime – the offender’s physiological condition, or socio-economic conditions may pose threats (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). According to Clarke (1992) ‘Jeffery’s (the criminologist who originally coined the term CPTED) general theory of criminal behaviour has enjoyed less support than his concept of CPTED’ (p6). According to Ekblom (2011), CPTED is:
Reducing the possibility, probability and harm from criminal and related events, and enhancing the quality of life through community safety; through the process of planning and design of the environment... (and)... achieving a balance between the efficiency of avoiding crime problems before construction and the adaptability of tackling them through subsequent management and maintenance. (Ekblom, 2011a, p4) At its core, the principles of CPTED include: • natural surveillance; • access control; • territorial reinforcement; • proper placement of land uses (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007, p24) Moreover, crime prevention approaches are regarded as innovative strategies that are practical and cost-effective (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). The belief that environmental design has a positive impact is also held by Tilley (2005), who argues that crime prevention should be considered because the layout and form of the built environment has an impact on the opportunity to commit crime (cited in Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). However, there has been some scepticism about the extent of its effectiveness. For example, according to Samuels (2005), environmental design can mitigate or shape the occurrence of crime but it cannot really prevent crime (cited in Schneider and Kitchen, 2007).
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2.3 Offender Motivation and Crime Patterns Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) developed crime pattern theory, which draws upon behavioural geography concepts, which suggests that crimes ‘do not occur randomly or uniformly across neighbourhoods, or social groups, or during an individual’s daily activities or during an individual’s lifetime’ (p79). Crimes are often committed because the offender sees an opportunity (Colquhoun, 2004). An absence of a clear definition between public and private space, along with easy access, poor lighting and landscape planting that can conceal someone’s presence, and places to hide, all provide opportunities for crime (Colquhoun, 2004). This includes burglaries. According to Colquhoun (2004), ‘rational choice... assumes that potential offenders will undertake their own risk assessment before deciding to commit a crime. They will consider the chances of being seen, ease of entry and the chances of escape without detection’ (p5). One has only to look at the lack of understanding of the importance of the public space between residential buildings. This lack of understanding has been prevalent historically. As Jane Jacobs points out, fortress construction makes it easier for crime to occur because monitoring the street is made more difficult (Felson and Boba, 2008), which may sound counter-intuitive.
Understanding the offender’s motivation is key to understanding what urban design responses can and cannot realistically achieve. This is because there is often a degree of randomness associated with the circumstances specific to the place and time (as mentioned earlier, Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) make this point). The idea that there are patterns of crime is logical when one considers that ‘offenders go to jobs, visit friends, come home, stop at the store, and carry out other daily activities just like the rest of us’ (Taylor, 2002, p419); Johnson and Bowers (2010) explain that ‘offenders may seek opportunities outside of their activity spaces, but research suggests that such spatial exploration is atypical’ (p5) and, similarly, Schneider and Kitchen (2007) concur that ‘crimes are not purely random events but follow patterns that are largely predictable’ (p29).
According to Schneider and Kitchen (2007), environmental cues found at the macro (broad range) and meso (mid range) levels inform offenders. Landscape features, external façades, and general maintenance are features that offenders may consider to determine prosperity (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). The ‘broken windows’ theory, a term coined by Newman, focuses on the importance of the appearance of places and the stigmatization that results from images of publicly subsidised, low-income housing, for example (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). The ‘broken windows’ theory explains the norm-setting effect of vandalism and urban disorder that sparks additional anti-social behaviour and crime.
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2.4 Defensible Space and Territoriality Defensible space and territoriality are key components of CPTED. According to Newman (1972), ‘defensible space is a... range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance – that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents’ (p3). Defensible space is a place-based theory at the heart of the British SBD scheme that currently has practical implications in the United Kingdom for community planning and design (Town et al., 2003). Newman’s early thinking and philosophy was influenced by Jane Jacobs’ views about the importance of the density of street uses, the vibrancy of street life, and the importance of clear boundaries between private and public spaces (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). Newman was inspired by Elizabeth Wood’s work with the Chicago Housing Authority. She found that, along with increased surveillance opportunities, improved housing design and site design could boost chances for informal social control, thus enhancing security for tenants (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007).
a crime taking place (cited in Armitage, 2013, p14). Furthermore, Rosenthal (1964) and Latane and Darley (1970) suggest that even if they do notice, they will not necessarily intervene (cited in Armitage, 2013). Furthermore, streets and pavements (forms of public space) are difficult to control and the security that can be provided is minimal (Felson and Boba, 2008). Crime prevention measures can discourage urban out-migration generated by crime and related social and economic disorder and improve residents’ (present and future) quality of life and enhance community stability (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002).
Table contrasting the ‘open’ position (preferred by Zelinka & Brennan) with the ‘closed’ defensible space principles Source: Hillier, B. and Sahbaz, O. (2008). An evidence based approach to crime and urban design: or, can
Hillier argues that Newman’s defensible space propositions (and territoriality) make the connection between design and behaviour too easily (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). Similarly, according to Crowe (2013), Jacobs seemed to overestimate the influence of natural surveillance on offenders and the influence of the physical environment on human behaviour. Furthermore, it has been suggested by several authors that the term ‘defensible space’ contains ‘a rat’s nest of intertwining hypotheses’ (Rubenstein et al., 1980, p6). According to Crowe (2013), real effective control is not automatically achieved by creating opportunities for natural surveillance. According to Armitage (2013), ‘the first (limitation of Jacobs’ theory regarding natural surveillance) is that the crux of Jacobs’ theory relates to the trust that those using the street... would intervene should a crime occur’ (p14). Gelfand et al. (1973) and Mayhew et al. (1979) note that residents or passer-by will not necessarily notice
we have vitality, sustainability and security all at once? London: Bartlett School of Graduate Studies, University College London. Bartlett School of Graduate Studies, University College London.
Hillier and Sahbaz have found that both ‘open’ and ‘closed’ solutions can be appropriate. According to Hillier and Sahbaz (2008), ‘the advocates of the closed solution seem to have been too conservative in overstating and over-simplifying the case for cul-de-sacs and closed areas... underestimating the potential for, and importance of, life outside the cul-de-sac...’ (Hillier and Sahbaz, 2008, p27). On the other hand, ‘the advocates of the open solution have been too optimistic about exposing the dwelling to the public realm, in not linking permeability to a realistic understanding of movement patterns, and perhaps in not appreciating the interdependence between residential numbers and the safety of mixed use areas’ (Hillier and Sahbaz, 2008, p27). As the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy 12 Development and Research (1996) mentioned, ‘the larger the
2.0 Crime Prevention Theory
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number of people who share a territory, the less each individual feels rights to it’ (p17). A key point that Hillier and Sahbaz (2008) make is that ‘every area, closed or open, inter-depends with its context, and both design and research must reflect this’ (p27).
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2.5 Density, Movement and Permeability Felson and Boba (2008) argue that no space can be kept entirely secure from crime. However, ‘hot spots’ for crime and theft have been identified. Public routes i.e. parking facilities, unsupervised transit areas, and foot paths are especially risky settings (Felson and Boba, 2008). In analysing the classic theory, it is clear that several environmental design factors can have an effect on crime associated with public space. Jane Jacobs and others highlight the importance of density, movement, and permeability. Hillier argues that space syntax - the dynamic analysis of urban space that is empirical - should replace Newman’s architectural determinism (Schneider and Kitchen, 2007). White’s research found that neighbourhood permeability (the number of access streets to the neighbourhood) had an effect on the number of burglaries carried out (Schneider and Kitchen 2007). A point that is made by several authors (including Schneider and Kitchen (2007) and Felson and Boba (2008)), is that crime rates are especially high close to public transport nodes; the rates are higher than in areas that are inaccessible. This is because ‘(public spaces) a block or two away from the station have too few people around for constant natural surveillance and are the most dangerous; offenders can wait there for stragglers’ (Block and Block, 2000; Smith, 2005; Smith and Cornish, 2006).
Cities as movement economies Hillier, B. (1996) Cities as Movement Economies. Urban Design International, 1 (1), 41-60.
Crime is not random and there is plenty of research that supports the ubiquitousness of crime clusters (Felson and Boba, 2008). Places and people that have not been victimised in the past are less likely to be victimised than places and people that have been in the past (Farrell & Pease, 1993). This insight is the best predictor for victimisation according to Weisel (2005). In a suburban society, crowds suitable for pick-pocketing decline (Felson and Boba, 2008). According to Felson and Boba (2008), ‘a crowd drives away most offenders but invites pick-pocketing’ (p45). Critique of Jane Jacobs’ theory Source: Crowe, T.D. (2013). Crime prevention through environmental design, 3rd ed. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
The burglaries in the Barnsbury area within a twelve-month period can be seen below. Less integrated locations have the densest concentrations (Hillier, 1996). Hillier (1996) found that, on average, burgled dwellings are more segregated than unburgled dwellings.
Certain principles and concepts such as permeability are poorly understood and therefore poorly applied (Tim Stonor – managing director of space syntax, 2006). Many perceive the creation of connections per se as a panacea of sorts (Tim Stonor, 2006). According to Tim Stonor (2006), in reviewing urban design projects, it is common that there are too many connections where, typically, there would not be enough. Moreover, ‘too much permeability can bring with it the risk of underused linkages’ (Tim Stonor, 2006). According to Tim Stonor (2006), cul-de-sacs are a contentious subject. According to research, cul-de-sacs can be safe (Tim Stonor, 2006). Safer Places provides the following checklist (cited in Tim Stonor, 2006): Have the consequences of the number and nature of all connections been considered? Do all routes lead to somewhere people want to go? Are all routes necessary? Do routes provide potential offenders with ready and unnoticed access to potential targets? 14routes for different users segregated when they could be Are
2.0 Crime Prevention Theory
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integrated? Will pedestrians, cyclists, and drivers be able to understand which routes they should use? Is it easy to understand how to travel through an area?
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2.6 Responsive Design ‘Designers need positive thinking about what they’re designing … this won’t happen if designers think they’re going to be blamed for problems which are affected by other social problems. Designers can’t be held accountable, but they are trying to change behaviour and attitudes.’
Comparing various locations reveals that the risks of theft can vary dramatically (Greed and Roberts, 1998). Also, the per capita crime rate will be greater the larger the conurbation (Greed and Roberts, 1998). Many authors point out that zoning has resulted in a lack of occupation at certain times of the day or week in various parts of conurbations. This has led to locations being made ‘more ideal’ for street crime (Greed and Roberts, 1998). Most break-ins that result in theft (commercial) occur during the weekends or at night and most home burglaries occur during the day (Greed and Roberts, 1998). Weisel (2002) also points this out.
Lynne Dobney, Chair of the DBA, on not holding designers accountable for crime University of Cambridge, Sheffield Hallam University, The University of Salford. (2000). Sight Lines
Cues in the immediate setting will cause an offender to respond and decide what to do (Felson and Boba, 2008). To assist selfcontrol, we may need environmental cues (Felson and Boba, 2008). Based on the knowledge that crime patterns occur, it is logical that responsive design should help to prevent theft associated with public space. The internal layout and positioning of a neighbourhood in relation to other key facilities will affect the likelihood of potential offenders becoming aware of potential targets (Armitage, 2013). Colquhoun (2004) notes that offenders can be demotivated by making access more difficult, increasing the level or surveillance, removing escape routes or by increasing security, and, or by blending socio-economic groups and creating a street layout that is lively (echoing Jane Jacobs’ suggestions).
Historically, many simplistic, design deterministic solutions have been proposed following Newman’s ideas of defensible space (i.e. territoriality and surveillance). Coleman demonstrated the correlation between the size of design disadvantagement variables and frequency of abuse (Center for Spatially Integrated Social Science, no date). In a report, AGIS – Action SAFEPOLIS (2007) point out that achieving continuity of urban fabric and streets is important for safety in the city because flows are thereby facilitated. Furthermore, there is vitality wherever movements occur; spontaneous surveillance is produced when eyes are kept on the street (AGIS – Action SAFEPOLIS, 2007). Also, daily movements are cut short if flows are interrupted, causing insecurity, and spaces lacking specific use can result from physical discontinuities, facilitating illegal activities. (AGIS – Action SAFEPOLIS, 2007). If continuity and clarity are lacking in existing
Sight Lines Source: Felson, M. and Santos, R. (2008). Crime and everyday life, 4th ed. United States: SAGE Publications.
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areas, the sense of orientation can be improved through the introduction of some design elements (AGIS – Action SAFEPOLIS, 2007).
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3.0 DOCOs and Experts
3.1 DOCOs and Experts ‘No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down.’ (Jacobs, 1961, p40).
In London, all boroughs will now come under one of four Designing Out Crime units (Secured by Design, 2014). According to Felson and Boba (2008), people expect ‘beefed-up’ police presence to stop crime. Greater police presence in itself does not equal less thefts. For example, in Kansas, police patrols were intensified in an experiment - this did not affect crime levels (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974). Cozens et al. (2004) suggest that ‘the significance of what ALOs (now DOCOs) actually do is clearly an important factor in understanding not merely whether SBD as a whole appears to be successful but also whether some elements of it are more effective than others’ (cited in Schneider and Kitchen, 2007, p121).
Urban crime and disorder problems Source: Crowe, T. (2013). Crime prevention through environmental design, 3rd ed. Oxford: ButterworthHeinemann.
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3.0 DOCOs and Experts
3.2 Expert Profile BACKGROUND
THE EXPERT ON CPTED
The expert holds the following views:
• •
DOCOs have been police officers and have had real life experience dealing with crime. All DOCOs have attended courses. DOCOs meet every quarter to update each other on what is happening and to discuss problems. Architects and urban designers have to comply with the views of the DOCO; there is never opposition to tweaking drawings.
•
Comes from a practical background. Has two university degrees: 1. BSc (Hons) in Natural Science with Biological Science and Environmental Science 2. Open degree mainly in human biology • Has completed the Crime Prevention Design Advisers (CPDA) course and a CCTV course.
• •
The central question that DOCOs must ask themselves is: will I feel safe? A small amount of private space is good and beneficial to people’s health (not explicitly promoted by SBD). With larger spaces, ‘anyone’ has the right to walk through; there might be minimal ‘control’ of the area.
The main guidance that DOCOs go through is Secured by Design: New Homes 2014 (previous version is from 2010). Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention and Crime Opportunity Profiling of Streets (COPS) are examples of additional guidance. The expert’s understanding has grown over the years but basic considerations will always be made. The Secured by Design: New Homes 2014 guidance can be seen as a ‘checklist’ which DOCOs refer to. The expert does not have preconceived ideas about density influencing safety. A greater number of people in a given area means that there is a higher chance of having victims as there are more people passing through a space. This contradicts the conclusion reached by Felson and Boba (2008) who state that ‘a crowd drives away most offenders’ (p45). However, Felson and Boba (2008) concede that crowds can invite pick-pocketing. A DOCO could have a different view concerning ‘open’ and ‘closed’ principles, suggesting that an individual DOCO’s subjective views can influence design.
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3.0 DOCOs and Experts
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4.0 Secured by Design
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
Secured by Design Interactive Guide: Residential scenarios
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4.1 Secured by Design Interactive Guide: Poor Design Examples The online toolkit helps to explore designing out crime principles through a fictional residential development. The toolkit also details the current standards required by ACPO Secured by Design.
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Scenario 1: Layout of vehicular and pedestrian routes
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 2: Communal areas
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Source: Secured by Design (2014) Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 3: Dwelling boundaries
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Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 4: Layout and orientation of dwellings
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 5: Rear access paths
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Scenario 6: Climbing aids
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Scenario 7: Car parking
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Scenario 8: Landscape planting
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Scenario 9: Street lighting
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Scenario 10: Front door
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Scenario 12: Communal entrance doors
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Scenario 14: Dwelling security lighting
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Scenario 15: Bicycle parking
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Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Secured by Design Interactive Guide: Residential scenarios
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4.2 Secured by Design Interactive Guide: SBD Design Examples
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Scenario 1: Layout of vehicular and pedestrian routes
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 2: Communal areas
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Scenario 3: Dwelling boundaries
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Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 4: Layout and orientation of dwellings
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
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Scenario 5: Rear access paths
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Scenario 6: Climbing aids
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
48
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
Scenario 7: Car parking
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
49
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
6
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
Source: Secured by Design (2014) Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
Scenario 7: Car parking
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
50
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
51
Scenario 8: Landscape planting
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
Scenario 9: Street lighting
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
52
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
53
Scenario 10: Front door
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
Scenario 11: Windows
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
54
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
55
Scenario 12: Communal entrance doors
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
Scenario 13: Mail delivery
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
6
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
56
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
6
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
57
Scenario 14: Dwelling security lighting
Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
1
2
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
4
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
5
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
Scenario 15: Bicycle parking
3
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
6
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
Source: Secured by Design (2014) Source of images: Secured by Design (2014). SBD interactive guide: residential scenarios. Available from http://interactive.securedbydesign.com/residential/ [Accessed 5 August 2015].
58
4.3 Summary of Key SBD Design Principles ‘SBD housing developments suffers up to 75% less burglary, 25% less vehicle crime and 25% less criminal damage.’
features which prevent unauthorised vehicular access. 13. REAR ACCESS FOOTPATHS 9.2.4
Positioning amenity/play space to the rear of dwellings can increase the potential for crime.
(Secured by Design, 2014, p3).
13.1 Up to 85% of entries occur at the back of the house. 13.2 Footpaths should not be placed to the back of properties.
10. DWELLING BOUNDARIES 2. LAYOUT OF ROADS AND FOOTPATHS 2.1
Vehicular and pedestrian routes should be visually open, direct, well used and should not undermine defensible space.
3 THROUGH-ROADS AND CUL-DE-SACS 3.1
3.2
Road layout - pattern frustrates the searching behaviour of the criminal and his need to escape. Excessive permeability is to be avoided (access to rear or side boundaries of dwellings not to be granted). Overlooking of the street from dwellings and a high level of street activity are desirable. Neighbourhood permeability is one of the design features most reliably linked to crime rates. Neighbourhoods with smaller streets or more one-way streets, or fewer entrance streets or with more turnings have lower property crime rates.
16. CAR PARKING 10.1 The boundary between public and private areas should be clearly indicated. Buildings need two faces: a front onto public space and a back for private activities. Streets should be overlooked by buildings fronts, offering surveillance. It is desirable for dwelling frontages to be open to view (fences etc. should be kept low - 1m). 10.2 A dwelling may front a public footpath, road or public area. Requirements for the security of doors and windows to be upgraded to reflect the vulnerability of the dwelling. 10.8 Where a development is to be located in an area of extremely high crime and gardens abut open land or vulnerable areas, an area of defensible planting to protect boundary fencing may be required (fencing certified to LPS 1175 Security Rating 1 may be specified). 10.10 All fencing should provide clear demarcation.
16.1 Cars should be parked in locked garages or on a hard standing within the dwelling boundary. 16.2 Communal car parking areas should be in small groups, close and adjacent to homes and within view of the active rooms within these homes. 16.3 Rear car parking courtyards are discouraged.
11. LAYOUT AND ORIENTATION OF DWELLINGS 4. FOOTPATH DESIGN 4.1 4.2
59
Routes for pedestrians, cyclists and vehicles should be integrated to provide a network of supervised areas. Public footpaths should not run to the rear of and provide access to gardens, rear yards or dwellings.
11.1 Dwellings should be positioned facing each other to allow neighbours to easily view their surroundings. Larger schemes should incorporate a mix of dwellings, enabling greater potential for homes to be occupied throughout the day (maximum environmental control).
9. COMMUNAL AREAS
12. GABLE END WALLS
9.1
12.1 Windowless elevations should be avoided as well as blank walls adjacent to public spaces.
Playgrounds and seating areas should be positioned to allow supervision from nearby dwellings. Open spaces must have
4.0 Secured by Design
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
what you think. We’re happy to arrange another time to talk through the draft master plans and answer any questions. We will be visiting residents in their homes in November and December to talk through these plans. Please let us know if you would like to set up an appointment.
5.1 Merton Master Plans
eastfields@circle.org.uk highpath@circle.org.uk ravensbury@circle.org.uk Regeneration Consultation Team, The Grange, 1 Central Road, Morden, Surrey, SM4 5PQ www.mertonregen.org.uk
Next steps
If the regeneration goes ahead
THE MASTER PLANS Now - Jan Consultation with residents on the 2015 draft planpermission. If points In Merton, SBD is not obligatory for master planning
Summer 2015
Planning applications submitted for each neighbourhood
Final master plan and details of the Residents Offer
Winter 2015
Planning applications considered by Merton Council
Decision on whether to go
Spring 2016
Work starts if planning applications are approved
are needed for code (Code for Sustainable Homes), the DOCO will be approached, according to the expert. From Jan 2015
The current layouts of the neighbourhoods cause a lack of access to open and amenity space and facilitate antisocial behaviour. March
MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MASTER PLANS 2015 ahead with regeneration • • •
63
High Path has the most blocks of housing – larger blocks, more people and highest density. Ravensbury has the strongest village, community feel. Eastfields is the least safe and there is minimal surveillance.
They have wide experience of similar projects and are on hand to answer questions and safeguard residents' interests. Contact: Freephone 0800 644 6040 (charges apply for calls from mobiles) Tel 0208 555 2139 mertonregen@newmanfrancis.org NewmanFrancis 18 Lorne Road London E7 0LJ www.newmanfrancis.org
Stages Source: Circle Housing (2015). Merton regeneration timeline. Available from http://mertonregen.org. uk/Regeneration/Timeline [Accessed 5 August 2015].
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
5.2 Eastfields Draft Master Plan 5.2 Eastfields Draft Master Plan - Levitt Bernstein Associates • •
Circle Housing Merton Priory have continued to consult with residents on the master plan for Eastfields. Merton Council has to give planning permission before the regeneration can go ahead.
We’re committed to providing highquality homes for all. This means providing safe and secure properties that meet people’s needs now and in the future.
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Eastfields. Available from http://mertonregen.org.uk/Eastfields/Eastfields_draft_master_plan [Accessed 5 August 2015].
65
Above: Eastfields draft master plan
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
• •
•
The estate is tucked away behind numerous houses and is very residential. Based on the Radburn estate based on the idea of separating pedestrians from traffic, effectively making houses vulnerable to car theft on one side and burglaries on the other. There is currently minimal surveillance.
N
66 Source: Google Earth
Above: Current situation
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
66
Master plan feedback - you said, we will… We’ve taken people’s feedback on board and made some important changes to the master plan. ■
Play Park
You said: keep roads as traffic free as possible
Streatham Park Cemetery and Crematorium
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■ ■
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■
2
We will: put people first rather than cars on all streets We will: create narrow parts of the road and shared surface junctions to calm traffic speeds
We will: provide safer parking for flats, including secure undercroft parking bays, courtyards to the rear and overlooked on-street parking
BMX Track You said: there needs to be more detail on housing types and layouts ■
We will: make Mulholland Close one-way at its eastern end
■
We will: increase the amount of underground car parking We will: create new open space to make more direct connections between Acacia Road and the central green area
■
St Mark’s Church of England Academy Mitcham Eastfields Station
We will: provide further details of house, flat and maisonette types with 3D models
We will: show sizes of current and proposed new homes ■
We will: increase amount of houses in Phase 1 3
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Eastfields. Surrey: Circle Housing. Available from http://mertonregen.org.uk/~/media/250E2072E6D94023A15A3CB54F465934.pdf?la=en [Accessed 6 August 2015].
67
You said: the parking needs to be overlooked
Above: Feedback on the master plan from the public
Proposed house and flat types
The Future of Eastfields
Houses types 1, 2 and 3 - Town Houses House types 4 and 5 - Courtyard Houses
BMX Track
House type 6 - Multi-generational
nd
House type 7 - Maisonettes
lla o lh
e os l C
u
M
Play Park
Courtyard houses along lanes
House type 8 - Maisonettes Flat types St Mark’s Church of England Academy d oa R ia ac c A
ue
n ve A ay Cl
Flats with balconies
Town houses along Clay Avenue
Streatham Park Cemetery and Crematorium Levitt Bernstein
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Eastfields. Surrey: Circle Housing. Available from http://mertonregen.org.uk/~/media/250E2072E6D94023A15A3CB54F465934.pdf?la=en [Accessed 6 August 2015].
Above: Eastfields master plan types of homes
68
The buildings are currently like a ribbon.
Some of the garages have been converted. Is the central green area overlooked? Yes.
There is currently no natural surveillance!
There are high fences. Anyone can get to anything without anyone seeing!
Can people overlook each other? Yes. Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Eastfields. Surrey: Circle Housing. Available from http://mertonregen.org.uk/~/media/250E2072E6D94023A15A3CB54F465934.pdf?la=en [Accessed 6 August 2015].
Above: Expert’s considerations
69
Mulholland Close and Acacia Road to be connected and improved - with traffic calming to slow down cars, along a direct tree lined route between Woodstock Way and Tamworth Lane.
Keep roads as traffic free as possible.
Shared surface streets follow SBD New Homes 2014 guidance on Layout of roads and footpaths: Where it is desirable to limit access use to residents and their legitimate visitors , features such as rumble strips, change of road surface or narrowing of the carriageway may be used.
The parking needs to be overlooked. Shared surface streets have the potential to increase safety.
Strong connections to surrounding open spaces.
A wide range of houses, maisonettes and flats ensure a varied scale of development.
Follows SBD New Homes 2014 guidance on through-roads and cul-de-sacs: Pattern frustrates the searching behaviour of the criminal and his need to escape.
Houses along Clay Avenue to have long views across the cemetery edge. Streets leading to Clay Avenue will provide views into the cemetery.
A series of traditional streets with homes opening onto them, will create safer routes for residents and improve access to surrounding areas and nearby facilities.
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Eastfields. Surrey: Circle Housing. Available from http://mertonregen.org.uk/~/media/250E2072E6D94023A15A3CB54F465934.pdf?la=en [Accessed 6 August 2015].
Above: Independent analysis of the master plan
70
70
Independent Analysis PROS
CONS
•
•
•
•
• • •
• • •
• •
71
Mulholland Close and Acacia Road will be connected and improved with traffic calming to slow down cars along a direct tree lined route between Woodstock Way and Tamworth Lane. Safety will be increased and crime may be prevented by minimizing the probabibilty of a quick getaway. Higher density flats and taller buildings of five to seven storeys closer to the station and the facilities in the north will increase eyes on the street and surveillance, making pedestrians walking to and from the station and facilities feel safe. A series of traditional streets with homes opening onto them, will create safer routes for residents and improve access to surrounding areas and nearby facilities. Front doors on the street will provide eyes on the street. The level of permeability within the area is appropriate to the proposed scale. Higher densities on the central neighbourhood park will provide ample surveillance of the park. Houses along Clay Avenue will have long views across the cemetery edge, providing surveillance of the surrounding open space. Acacia Road and Mulholland Close will create a direct route direct routes help to limit unnecessary permeability. There will be secure parking underneath buildings. This is efficient use of space. Shared courtyards mean that the residents have a high degree of ‘control’ and the territoriality and defensible space will ensure that the space is used appropriately. Maisonettes with direct access onto central space provide active frontages and eyes on the street. Smaller parking areas in courtyards will be well overlooked and ‘protected’ by surrounding residential buildings.
• •
•
•
•
Access to nearby schools needs to be addressed. How well overlooked is it? Fences to courtyard areas are an issue that needs to be addressed. There will be strong connections to surrounding open spaces but this will weaken the territoriality created within the area as connections between the area and surrounding open spaces will enable people to enter the area at these points. The size of the central neighbourhood park may potentially decrease the sense of territoriality as residents surveilling the park will not feel a sense of ‘ownership’ of such a large open area. The high densities on the central neighbourhood park especially the clusters of taller flats - will potentially decrease the sense of territoriality. Parking courts facing the cemetery will be somewhat overlooked by residents but will be suscepible to crimes committed by people reaching the parking courts from the cemetery and surrounding open spaces.
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
5.3 High Path Draft Master Plan 5.3 High Path Draft Master Plan - PRP Architects LLP • Circle Housing Merton Priory have continued to consult with residents on the master plan for High Path. • Merton Council has to give planning permission before the regeneration can go ahead.
A stronger, more sustainable and better integrated community. High quality public spaces which are safe, welcoming and attractive.
N
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of High Path. Surrey: Circle Housing.
73
Above: High Path draft master plan
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
• • • • •
Established, high tower blocks. Goal of creating a community feel. A lot of industry on the edge and the Underground station is located at the corner of the site. There are major roads. The design of Victory Road, Nelson Road, Hardy Road and Hamilton Road on the northern side of Merton High Street are linear (the architect wanted to bring the design of the existing roads into the design of High Path to increase the community ownership of those families living there).
N
74 Source: Google Earth
Above: Current situation
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
74
Master plan feedback - you said, we will… We’ve taken people’s feedback on board and made some important changes to the master plan. ■
You said: we need more larger homes for families
■
Haydons Road Recreation Ground
We will: replace the mews houses along the inner street with larger, family townhouses
You said: an underground refuse system would be better than existing bin stores We will: look into the possibilty of introducing this
We will: increase spaces between flats and houses to improve the privacy of communal and private gardens
gh St i H n Merto ■
High Path Community Resource Centre
ad Morden Ro
■
■
2
You said: we need more parking for residents and visitors We will: increase parking with more covered ground floor spaces
y Wa n u rat e M
St John The Divine Church
You said: we need greater privacy and less overlooking, especially between flats and houses
You said: we like the idea of multigenerational homes We will: include more multi-generational homes
3 Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of High Path. Surrey: Circle Housing.
75
Above: Feedback on the master plan from the public
New improved homes for all : types of homes
We have developed a mix of housing types proposed within High Path to ensure there is a diverse and sustainable community. 6
1
3
2
•
Rear gardens to include a patio space for flexible use by residents
•
Larger rear gardens to include a lawn space for flexible use by residents
•
All boundaries will be designed to secure by design guidance and standards
to Vic oad ry R
oad on R Nels
Road Hardy
Hamilton Road
Private front garden
“Over 10 different types of new homes”
Private rear garden
reet
High St Merton
“10% of homes will be suitable for wheelchair users”
en R oad
oad ott R Pinc
ad Grove Ro Nelson
“Over 35% of homes will be family housing”
Mo rd
Rodney Place
“Every new home will have private amenity space; either a garden or a balcony”
High Path
Ho
Private Spaces - Key plan 5
1
Mews houses
2 or 3 bed mews houses with private terraces and rear patio space, set out on small mews streets and along the inner community street.
Families with teenagers
Young families
Single occupants/ couples
8
7
2
Multi-generation house
The house is designed around a ground level courtyard. Accommodation is flexible with easy adaptation of double rooms to single rooms as families grow and change.
Families with Families with Multi-generation teenagers family young children
3
4
Townhouses
Townhouses are designed to offer flexibility of orientation whilst adapting to future needs of residents including private amenity in the form of gardens and upper terraces.
Families with young children
4
Families with teenagers
Stacked maisonettes a maisonette above a maisonette
The lower maisonettes have gardens with front doors to the street and upper maisonettes contain full-size roof terraces.
Young families
Families with young children
5
Families with teenagers
Young families
7
Mixed use blocks
The mixed use blocks accommodate non-residential use on the ground floor and a mix of flats on the upper floors.
Two sets of stacked maisonettes with double aspect flats above, including private terraces.
Single occupants/ Family with couples wheelchair user
Families with teenagers
6
Maisonettes with flats above
Families with young children
Single occupants/ couples
Families with teenagers
Young families
Ground floor flats have private gardens and the flats on the upper levels have generous balconies and roof terraces.
Single occupants/ Family with couples wheelchair user
Families with young children
8
Flat blocks
Families with teenagers
Young families
Families with young children
Podium blocks
The ground floor comprises both accommodation and a ground level car park over which sits a podium garden.
Single occupants/ Family with couples wheelchair user
Families with teenagers
Young families
Families with young children
Communal gardens: On - plot garage parking
Separate 1B annex
Private amenity space
Private rear gardens
Priavte amenity space
Private rear gardens
Private rooftop terrace
Private rooftop terrace
Private rooftop terrace
•
Private balconies
Private courtyard space
•
Individual access
Main access to house
Private amenity space
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of High Path. Surrey: Circle Housing.
Main access to dwelling
Defensible space Main access to maisonettes
Defensible space
Private amenity space to rear
Individual Communal access to access to flats maisonettes above
Private amenity space
Mixed use/ commercial space
Communal access for flats
Private podium garden above car park
Communal spaces to be safe, attractive and accessible whilst appealing to different age groups Private balconies
Separate access to rear annex
Private rooftop terraces
Private balconies
Private rooftop terraces Private balconies
Planting for the courtyards will be carefully selected to provide visual interest through colour texture and diversity. Consideration will be given to seasonal variations in planting Front Communal Individual defensible access access to ground space for flats floor dwellings
Ground floor parking
Individual Communal Front access to ground access defensible floor dwellings for flats space
•
Where possible existing trees will be retained
•
Trees in courtyards will give a sense of height and soften the building elevations, species chosen will be robust and low maintenance.
Above: High Path master plan types of homes Communal courtyards
76
What else is happening in the area? What am I going to be afraid of?
High Path does not have the same community feel as Ravensbury.
As I walk up from the tube station, will I feel safe?
Can I get to my front door? What lighting is going to be there?
Would I feel safe to park my car using the onstreet parking?
The communal area has been discussed but not finalised. How do I get to the community centre? Will I feel safe going there?
The busy road is another crime deterrent as there are a lot of people.
There are courts just for the residents which is good (because of the defensible space created and territoriality).
A lot of people can overlook the central landscaped area, which is good. N
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of High Path. Surrey: Circle Housing.
Above: Expert’s considerations
77
Shared surface streets follow SBD New Homes 2014 guidance on Layout of roads and footpaths: Where it is desirable to limit access use to residents and their legitimate visitors , features such as rumble strips, change of road surface or narrowing of the carriageway may be used.
I like the on plot parking and the idea of overlooked parking. Active frontages residential streets.
On plot parking is preferred.
The strategy responds to the Victorian streets along the northern side of Merton High Street and offers new links with High Path. Active frontages - houses / lower massing.
Parking is an issue.
Central spine running east-west has front doors on the street ensuring eyes on the street.
Lower residential densities and building heights will be largely located along the east west ‘inner community’ streets. Active frontages - well defined elevations.
Higher densities on the central neighbourhood park, and to the west and south of the site.
N
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of High Path. Surrey: Circle Housing.
Above: Independent analysis of the master plan
78
78
Independent Analysis PROS •
•
•
•
• •
• • •
•
•
79
There will be active frontages along residential streets, including close to the Underground station. This will promote a feeling of safety for pedestrians entering the area from the station. Similarly, there will be active frontages along the perimeter of the site and well-defined elevations, indicating that the area is safe. The central spine running east to west should deter crime because front doors on the street will provide eyes on the street. This will help make the central park safe through increased surveillance. High density development near the Underground station will increase eyes on the street and surveillance, making pedestrians walking to and from the station feel safe. Higher densities on the central neighbourhood park will provide ample surveillance of the park. Lower massing will ensure a range of scales whilst creating active frontages that promote pedestrian activity and eyes on the street. The location of lower residential densities appropriately respond to context. There will be a range of parking arrangements that all maximise security. The parking arrangements proposed reflect the wishes of the residents. Courts just for the residents mean that the residents have a high degree of ‘control’ and the territoriality and defensible space will ensure that the space is used appropriately. The level of permeability is appropriate to the proposed scale. There are not more access routes than necessary, increasing the sense of territoriality, defensible space and eyes on the street whilst promoting an appropriate footfall. Currently, there is over 11000 sq. m. of underused public open space and over 9000 sq. m. of grass areas around buildings
•
•
contributing to poorly defined space. This will no longer be an issue due to more efficient land use allocation. Space currently occupied by garages and taken by parking courts wastes space. These are not overlooked. More efficient land use allocation will resolve this issue. Currently, fronts facing rear gardens contribute to confusing and unsafe public spaces and routes. Undefined fronts and backs and exposed fences onto the public realm are issues that will be resolved.
CONS • •
• •
•
•
The high densities on the central neighbourhood park (up to 8 storeys) will potentially decrease the sense of territoriality. The size of the central neighbourhood park may potentially decrease the sense of territoriality as residents surveilling the park will not feel a sense of ‘ownership’ of such a large open area. High Path does not have the same ‘community feel’ as Ravensbury. The high densities contribute to this. The security proposed for the service road through the site needs to be improved (secure service access to rear of blocks for retail use along Merton High Street). Though the heights of the proposed architect-designed ‘landmark’ building corners and gateway buildings have been reduced from 9 to 8 storeys, the buildings may attract attention by communicating affluence, whereby attracting non-residents into the area. Similarly, the heights of the blocks along Morden Road have been lowered from 8 storeys to 5-6 storeys. This shows that the architects have not necessarily responded appropriately to context, as the building heights along Morden Road are around 2 storeys, making the new development out of scale. Similarly, the buildings along Merton High Street are 3 storeys.
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
5.4 Ravensbury Draft Master Plan 5.4 Ravensbury Draft Master Plan - HTA Design LLP • •
Circle Housing Merton Priory have continued to consult with residents on the master plan for High Path. Merton Council has to give planning permission before the regeneration can go ahead.
A stronger, more sustainable and integrated community. Leafy tree-lined streets that reflect the ‘village’ feel of Ravensbury through well designed and high quality public spaces which are safe, welcoming and attractive.
N
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Ravensbury. Surrey: Circle Housing.
81
Above: Ravensbury draft master plan
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
• • •
•
•
There is a ‘village feel’ to Ravensbury. There is the river on one side and the park opposite. There is a lot of green space and a trail. There are currently parking bays outside houses. All houses look one way. There are gates to car parking spaces at the back. High back fences makes it difficult to view cars. Garden fences backing onto courtyard areas are currently an issue. The fences are too low to offer any surveillance, meaning that courtyard areas become isolated areas where cars, if left, are damaged. Young people loiter.
N
82 Source: Google Earth
Above: Current situation
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
82
Master plan feedback - you said, we will… We’ve taken people’s feedback on board and made some important changes to the master plan. ■
You said: make sure there are enough car parking spaces for all residents We will: provide car parking for all residents, with a mix of on-street, on-plot and small parking courts
■
■
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Ravensbury. Surrey: Circle Housing.
83
Above: Feedback on the master plan from the public
You said: we need more information about the two proposed secondary access routes We will: remove one of the secondary routes
■
You said: reduce the impact of new flats opposite Ravensbury Court We will: increase the distance between the proposed buildings near Ravensbury Court
You said: use traditional house layouts We will: change the house designs to put bedrooms on the first floor and living rooms on the ground floor
2
■
You said: gardens for houses are too small We will: increase front garden sizes for some houses, and create more houses with parking spaces out the front
■
We will: have a larger new community room that will be at the heart of Ravensbury
Morden Hall Park
Mor den Roa d
You said: we welcome the plans to improve the community centre
■
Riv er W an dle
Ravensbury Park
You said: tree planting will enhance the area and help to keep the village feel We will: increase public green space with more trees and landscaping
3
Refurbishing and improving existing homes www.mertonregen.org.uk
The Future of Ravensbury
You said ...................
The emerging master plan... Town houses with gardens and flats along Morden Road
Shared surface pedestrian friendly streets
Prioritise new kitchens,
Refurbishment works options for Homes for Building at Refurbishment bathrooms, new windows and of Ravensbury older people the entrance Ravensbury Court could include Court and in the to Ravensbury insulate where possible the following improvements landscape centre of Grove improvements Ravensbury ............................................................... Modernised kitchens Modernised bathrooms Boiler replacement (where needed) Repairs and upgrades toregeneration services (e.g electrics) Refurbishment and diagram New doors and windows Upgraded communal areas k Private garden spaces and balconies al eW p v o a Privacy planting r St lg Be link Soft landscape -improved planting, rose beds To am Tr Hard landscape -pavements, courtyard Cycle storage Improved car parking Better lighting Improved sustainability standards Improved insulation and heating To Phipps Bridge Tramlink stop
Traditional pitched roofs and small clusters of green roofs on flat blocks
Mor de
Morde n
Road
n Ro ad
Rav ensb ury
Gro ve
Morden Hall Park
Refurbishment and regeneration diagram
Options for improvements to Ravensbury Court maisonettes and flats Hen g
elo
To Morden Underground
Planting around your
Gar den to create privacy home s
New balcony outside second floor living room Modern fit
tings
planting W an dl
eR oa d
living room Ri ve r
W an dle
kitchen
front garden Mews Street
Source:
Private garden with boundary planting
Homes facing the River Wandle and green spaces
Raven sbury G
rove
Brick houses and flats with large windows letting natural daylight into homes and gardens
Low density Community housing - 2 space in to 4 storeys the heart of in height Ravensbury Ground floor maisonette: planting buffer option
rear garden
Ravensbury
Parkroom living
kitchen
footpath
Tree-lined streets with central landscape swale for improving drainage Ground floorand ecology maisonette: private rear garden option
balcony
living room
rking Improved pa
arrangements
kitchen
external walkway
First floor maisonette: balcony option
Private amenity space
unal New comm
landscape
Circle Housing (2015). The future of Ravensbury. Surrey: Circle Housing.
Above: Features of the master plan
84
There is a strong community feel in Ravensbury.
Everyone knows everyone. The area is like a cul-de-sac with one way in. Opening the area up is something that is being considered. Rear access footpaths are currently an issue.
Defensible space is created through front and back gardens (like the SBD Interactive Guide residential example). N
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Ravensbury. Surrey: Circle Housing.
Above: Expert’s views on the master plan
85
Make sure there are enough car parking spaces for all residents.
Use traditional house layouts.
Shared surface streets follow SBD New Homes 2014 guidance on Layout of roads and footpaths: Where it is desirable to limit access use to residents and their legitimate visitors , features such as rumble strips, change of road surface or narrowing of the carriageway may be used.
Building at the entrance to Ravensbury Grove.
A single vehicular access point.
No large public open space within Ravensbury.
There should be fewer access points to discourage joy-riding and short-cut routes.
Low density housing - 2-4 storeys in height. Homes facing the River Wandle and green spaces.
Brick houses and flats with large windows letting natural daylight into homes and gardens and enabling surveillance.
N
Source: Circle Housing (2015). The future of Ravensbury. Surrey: Circle Housing.
Above: Independent analysis of the master plan
86
86
Independent Analysis PROS • •
•
•
•
•
• •
There will be no large public open space within Ravensbury. The issues relating to a limited sense of territoriality and defensible space will be avoided. The number of potential escape routes are limited to a single vehicular access point. In this way, the master plan resembles successful cul-de-sacs. Limited access points also discourages joy-riding and short-cut routes. Only small ‘doorstep’ play space will be provided for young children, and will be well integrated into the public realm. This follows the SBD guidelines. The refurbishment of Ravensbury Court will look at providing private garden and improving parking arrangements, creating defensible space and secure parking. A well-connected network of streets will provide safe, welllit, accessible and potentially attractive environments for walking and cycling, with well overlooked on-street parking for residents with eyes on the street. Similar to Eastfields and High Path, a mix of parking arrangements will be available and appropriately overlooked. Large private balconies will increase natural surveillance, territoriality and defensible space. The spacious balconies limit the outdoor open space that is ‘necessary.’
could be a more secure option. The option to retain and refurbish existing garages is questionable.
CONS •
•
87
Rear access footpaths and alleyways through the site have to be addressed. Bin stores outside or access at the back to get to the bins facilitates break ins and people will use the rear as main access instead of the actual main entrance (according to the expert, most burglaries are from the back because of rear access; people will jump over fences). Some of the side by side parking proposed for the eastern side of the area could be better overlooked and on plot parking
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
5.5 The Expert’s Views and Considerations KEY CHANGES THAT THE EXPERT WANTS TO SEE MADE • •
•
Eastfields: Access to nearby schools needs to be addressed. How well overlooked is it? Fences to courtyard areas are an issue that needs to be addressed. High Path: The security proposed for the service road through the site needs to be improved (secure service access to rear of blocks for retail use along Merton High Street). Ravensbury: Rear access footpaths and alleyways through the site have to be addressed. Bin stores outside or access at the back to get to the bins facilitates break ins and people will use the rear as main access instead of the actual main entrance.
Alleyways should be as straight as possible and clear of any hiding places and obstructions.
Priority should be given to making communal areas safe.
Ambiguous spaces are a problem.
Can people get right up to the window? There should be a clear demarcation such as a railing or hedge.
There is a risk that friends of friends of friends can claim space as ‘theirs’ if a space is ambiguous.
Private outdoor space is good. Front and back gardens provide defensible space.
Having ownership of the area where the cars are going to be parked is good - having it within the confines of the dwelling so you can see your car from your house.
Street parking - if well lit and overlooked - should be fine. However, the sense of ownership of the area is reduced.
The areas outside windows are especially important to consider. This is why defensible space is necessary.
Parked cars that nobody can see is an issue. People don’t use these areas. Parking overlooked from the front is the best. 88
5.0 Analysis of Merton Master Plans
88
6.0 Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon
6.1 Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon Both Ealing and Hillingdon are straddling the average regarding residential burglaries. In Ealing, the number of residential burglaries increased between 2012/2013 to 2013/2014, then decreased between 2013/2014 to 2014/2015 (to below the 2012/2013 level). In Hillingdon, the number of residential burglaries has gradually decreased between 2012 to 2015.
91
6.0 Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon
6.2 Notifiable Offences 6.2 Notifiable Offences, 2015
Areas of London are colour coded to show crime levels in areas relative to other areas of London (Metropolitan Police, no date).
Ealing
Hillingdon
92 Source: Metropolitan Police (2015). Crime figures: latest crime figures for London. Metropolitan Police. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/ [Accessed 15 July 2015].
Total notifiable offences, London 2015
6.0 Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon
92
1
2
3
4
1 Total Notifiable Offences, Ealing: Summary 4 Total Notifiable Offences, Ealing: Annual trends.
2 Total Notifiable Offences, Ealing: Comparison
3 Total Notifiable Offences, Ealing: Monthly trends
Source of images: Metropolitan Police (2015). Crime figures: latest crime figures for London. Metropolitan Police. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/ [Accessed 15 July 2015].
93
1
2
3
4
1 Total Notifiable Offences, Hillingdon: Summary 4 Total Notifiable Offences, Hillingdon: Annual trends.
94 Comparison 2 Total Notifiable Offences, Hillingdon:
3 Total Notifiable Offences, Hillingdon: Monthly trends
Source of images: Metropolitan Police (2015). Crime figures: latest crime figures for London. Metropolitan Police. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/ [Accessed 15 July 2015].
94
6.3 Residential Burglaries 6.3 Residential Burglaries, 2015
Ealing Hillingdon
Source: Metropolitan Police (2015). Crime figures: latest crime figures for London. Metropolitan Police. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/ [Accessed 15 July 2015].
95
Residential burglaries, London 2015
6.0 Crime in Ealing and Hillingdon
1
2
3
4
1 Residential Burglaries, Ealing: Summary 4 Residential Burglaries, Ealing: Annual trends
96 2 Residential Burglaries, Ealing: Comparison
3 Residential Burglaries, Ealing: Monthly trends
Source of images: Metropolitan Police (2015). Crime figures: latest crime figures for London. Metropolitan Police. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/ [Accessed 15 July 2015].
96
1
2
3
4
1 Residential Burglaries, Hillingdon: Summary 4 Residential Burglaries, Hillingdon: Annual trends
2 Residential Burglaries, Hillingdon: Comparison
3 Residential Burglaries, Hillingdon: Monthly trends
Source of images: Metropolitan Police (2015). Crime figures: latest crime figures for London. Metropolitan Police. Available from http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/ [Accessed 15 July 2015].
97
7.0 Southall Master Plan
7.1 The Draft Master Plan
The consideration of movement and permeability was the starting point for the draft master plan for Southall.
7.1 The Draft Master Plan
101
N
Above: Initial draft master plan - movement and permeability
Scale: 1:5000
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7.2 The Revised Master Plan
The revised master plan for Southall focused on animating the canal. Development on both sides of the canal signals that the area is ‘safe guarded.’
7.2 The Revised Master Plan
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100m 150m
200m
300m
Scale: 1:5000
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7.3 The Focus Area
A mix of dwellings enables greater potential for homes to be occcupied throughout the day (maximum environmental control - in line with SBD guidance). This was a pivotal consideration when designing the draft design proposal for the focus area.
7.3 The Focus Area
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Above: Focus area for crime prevention measures
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100m 150m
200m
300m
Scale: 1:5000
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Source: Secured by Design (2014)
Draft Design Proposal
107
7.4 Draft Design Proposal The draft design proposal responds to the local context in Southall whilst drawing upon the SBD guidance. The sensitive nature of the land between the Canal and the Brook made a low density solution for this area the most appropriate response. Therefore, the available SBD guidance could be followed closely. A creative interpretation of the SBD guidance was necessary for higher densities.
108
108
N
N
1. Overlooking and surveillance across the canal
N
N
3. Categories of space 109
2. Vistas and views of the canal
Draft Site Strategy
4. Movement and permeability
Draft Site Strategy 1
Overlooking and surveillance across the canal: The heights of the buildings on either side of the canal will be appropriate to prevent overlooking of private gardens opposite whilst allowing adequate surveillance of opposite buildings.
2
Vistas and views of the canal: The layout of the buildings allows an appropriate number of generous views of the canal throughout the area, responding appropriately to the context.
3
Categories of space: Public and semi-public spaces facilitate pedestrian movement through the site. The surveillance of the semi-public spaces will be optimal and there will be a strong sense of defensible space and territoriality. Semi-private and private spaces will send signals of highly defensible space and a strong sense of territoriality. Fences and planting will help define such spaces (following SBD advice).
4
Movement and permeability: The main vehicular movement will be along the main road running east to west and across the bridge to the housing on the north side of the canal. The main pedestrian movement will be along the
public and semi-public routes and along the edge of the canal.
110
110
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Above: Draft layout of the focus area
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100m 150m
200m
300m
Scale: 1:5000
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Windows on gable walls to overlook street. First floor windows preferable as long as they do not cause overlooking of private back gardens. Ground floor windows are set back with either a buffer planted area or a fence to separate the window from the street.
Door located at front of building line for increased surveillance potential. Private paths with lockable gates for use of residents only increases security at rear of dwellings.
Dwellings are separated from communal area with private gardens and clearly defined boundaries.
Shrubs - mature growth height of 1m. Tree crown no lower than 2m, allowing a 1m clear field of vision between this and the top of the shrubs.
Reduced permeability through the block and increased privacy and security for residents.
Boundaries kept under 1m in height - front doors and windows remain open to view from the street. Active street frontages and natural surveillance of the public space. RESIDENTIAL LAYOUT BASED ON SBD INTERACTIVE GUIDE
Above: Residential layout based on SBD interactive guide 1:1000
Play area away from dwellings / more central to space. Footpath across a 'desire line' route to reduce potential for unsightly damage.
Change in road surface and rumble strip at the entrance symbolises the move from public to private space and gives residents a sense of "ownership".
Small communal parking areas provided adjacent to users properties. Parking spaces well overlooked by residents
R4 m
Youth shelter to the left has maximum natural surveillance from surrounding buildings.
*All potential climbing aids removed and replaced with defensible planting
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Private front garden boundaries defined with railings / low walls / hedges.
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Landscape buffer with appropriate shrubs between parking spaces and dwelling boundary where parking abuts rear of properties.
Not to scale
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LEGEND
flats
maisonettes
maisonettes with flats above courtyard houses
town houses
mews houses
terrace houses
N
Above: Housing north of the canal (draft)
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Scale: 1:1250
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flats
maisonettes
maisonettes with flats above courtyard houses
town houses
mews houses
terrace houses
N
Above: Housing south of the canal (draft)
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LEGEND
Scale: 1:1250
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LEGEND
flats
maisonettes
maisonettes with flats above courtyard houses
town houses
mews houses
terrace houses
N
Above: Housing to the east (draft)
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Scale: 1:1250
Source: Secured by Design (2014)
Final Design Proposal
117
7.5 Final Design Proposal The final design proposal is the result of altering the draft design proposal to: • • • •
Eliminate unecessary access routes. Optimise movement and permeability (and optimise security by doing this). Provide more and better surveillance opportunities. Improve defensible space and territoriality by reconfiguring the categories of space.
118
118
N
N
1. Overlooking and surveillance across the cana l
N
N
3. Categories of space 119
2. Vistas and views of the canal
Final Site Strategy
4. Movement and permeability
Final Site Strategy 1
Overlooking and surveillance across the canal: The heights of the buildings on either side of the canal will be appropriate to prevent overlooking of private gardens opposite whilst allowing adequare surveillance of opposite buildings.
2
Vistas and views of the canal: The layout of the buildings allows an appropriate number of generous views of the canal throughout the area, responding appropriately to the context.
3
Categories of space: Public and semi-public spaces facilitate pedestrian movement through the site. The surveillance of the semi-public spaces will be optimal and there will be a strong sense of defensible space and territoriality. Semi-private and private spaces will send signals of highly defensible space and a strong sense of territoriality. Fences and planting will help define such spaces (following SBD advice).
4
Movement and permeability: The main vehicular movement will be along the main road running east to west and across the bridge to the housing on the north side of the canal. The main pedestrian movement will be along the
public and semi-public routes and along the edge of the canal.
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120
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100m 150m
200m
300m N
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Above: Layout of the focus area
Scale: 1:5000
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LEGEND flats
maisonettes
12
courtyard houses
mews houses
terrace houses
1
11
river houses 6 2
commercial: cafe/restaurant
3
9
4 10
7
8 5
N
Above: Housing north of the canal
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Scale: 1:1250
Housing North of the Canal 1
Small communal parking areas provided adjacent to users properties. Parking spaces well overlooked by residents.
2
Reduced permeability through the block and increased privacy and security for residents.
3
Door located at front of building line for increased surveillance potential.
4
Private paths with lockable gates for use of residents increases security at rear of dwellings.
5
Private front garden boundaries defined with railings / low walls / hedges. Boundaries kept under 1m in height front doors and windows remain open to view from street. Active street frontages and natural surveillance of the public space.
6
Dwellings are separated from communal area with private gardens and clearly defined boundaries.
7
Play area away from dwellings / more central to space. Footpath across a ‘desire line’ route to reduce potential for unsightly damage.
8
Change in road surface and rumble strip at the entrance symbolises the move from public to private space and gives residents a sense of ‘ownership’.
9
Shrubs - mature growth height of 1m. Tree crown no lower than 2m, allowing a 1m clear field of vision between this and the top of the shrubs.
10
Gardens abut open land. An area of defensible planting (deterrent planting e.g. thorny shrubs can be used) to protect boundary fencing. Alternatively, fencing certified to LPS 1175 Security Rating 1.
11
Tall brick walls instead of wooden fencing to ensure security.
12
Land accessible to residents living in flats. No bridge to the other side of the Brook, achieving defensible space, territoriality and surveillance.
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LEGEND flats
maisonettes
courtyard houses 2 4
3
mews houses
1
12 13
terrace houses
8 6
7
10
16 9
river houses
11
15
5
commercial: cafe/restaurant
14
N
Above: Housing south of the canal
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Scale: 1:1250
Housing South of the Canal 1
2
3
Private front garden boundaries defined with railings / low walls / hedges. Boundaries kept under 1m in height front doors and windows remain open to view from the street. Active street frontages and natural surveillance of the public space. Door located at front of building line for increased surveillance potential. River houses along the canal max 3 storeys to prevent overlooking of the back gardens of the dwellings on the opposite side of the canal. The river houses help create a pedestrian scale, encouraging walking along the canal - increasing surveillance and deterring crime.
overlook street and parking (where possible).
7
Fences and / or shrubs reduce permeability through the block whilst enhancing views through the site increasing privacy and security for residents.
8
Shrubs - mature growth height of 1m. Tree crown no lower than 2m, allowing a 1m clear field of vision between this and the top of the shrubs.
9
Blocks of flats max 6 storeys provide sufficient surveillance of the park opposite. The park acts as a buffer from the railway tracks. Entrances to flats open to view from the street. Active street frontage and natural surveillance through optimal footfall and busy road.
4
Many people can overlook the landscaped area, creating a strong sense of territoriality.
10
5
Change in road surface and (potentially) a rumble strip at the entrance symbolises the move from public to semi-private space and gives residents a sense of ‘ownership’.
11
Small communal parking areas provided adjacent to users’ properties. Parking spaces well overlooked by residents.
12
Shared surface streets increase safety by causing vehicles to slow down and increase security by making potential
6
First floor windows on gable walls to
escape routes less clear, preventing quick getaways. 13
Dwellings front public area. Therefore, the security of doors and windows must reflect this and be of high quality (to satisfy SBD requirements).
14
The road is curved and non-linear, increasing safety by causing vehicles to slow down and increasing security by making potential escape route less clear, preventing quick getaways.
15
Routes are not completely linear, marking the transition from public to semi-public space.
16
Gates only for use by residents keeps communal space for residents safe whilst encouraging eyes on the street.
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LEGEND flats 14
maisonettes
16
courtyard houses
mews houses
15
11 13
terrace houses
1 12
17 2
river houses
commercial: cafe/restaurant
5
10
3 6 4
7
8
9
N
Above: Housing to the east
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Scale: 1:1250
Housing to the East 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Shared surface streets increase safety by forcing vehicles to slow down and increase security by making potential escape routes less clear, preventing quick getaways. Green space shared by residents of the same building. There is a strong sense of territoriality and natural surveillance.
helping to ensure that the area does not become derelict (facilitating crime). 8
Entrances to flats open to view from the street. Active street frontage and natural surveillance through optimal footfall and busy road.
pedestrian scale, encouraging walking along the canal - increasing surveillance and deterring crime. Overlooking of private back gardens is not an issue as there are no properties on the opposite side of the canal. 15
Courtyard houses allow sufficient light to reach surrounding flats and help to create a calm, pedestrian friendly atmosphere that creates an appropriate transition from the canal. Private gardens receive sunlight from the south.
9
Multi-storey car park max 3 storeys to prevent loss of sunlight for dwellings opposite and to allow for views across to the railway tracks and views of people entering the area.
10
Flat blocks max 6 storeys enable surveillance of the railway tracks and people entering the area.
16
Dwellings front public area. Therefore, the security of doors and windows must reflect this and be of high quality (to satisfy SBD requirements).
11
Many people can overlook the landscaped area and there is a strong sense of territoriality.
17
Maisonettes have balconies, eliminating the need for completely private space at ground level (semi-private).
12
Shrubs - mature growth height of 1m. Tree crown no lower than 2m, allowing a 1m clear field of vision between this and the top of the shrubs.
Door located at front of building line for increased surveillance potential.
13
Low fences and / or shrubs enhance views through the site - increasing privacy and security for residents.
Vehicular access limited to residents and delivery vehicles provides some activity,
14
Flat blocks max 5 storeys help create a
Small communal parking areas provided. Parking spaces well overlooked by residents. Change in road surface and (potentially) a rumble strip at the entrance symbolises the move from public to semi-private space and gives residents a sense of ‘ownership’. First floor windows on gable walls to overlook street and parking (where possible).
128
128
129
Above: 3D massing
Above: 3D massing
130
A
A N
Site section A-A Eyes on the street
Site section A-A 131
Above: Site section A-A
Scale: 1:500
Scale: 1:1000
B B N
Site section B-B Eyes on the street
Site section B-B Above: Site section B-B
Scale: 1:500
Scale: 1:1000 132
8.0 Evaluation and Conclusion
8.1 Evaluation of the Design Proposal The design proposal resulted from my own interpretation of the SBD guidance, together with the ‘take aways’ from the analysis of the Merton master plans (and the advice of an expert). In retrospect, some of the design principles set out in the SBD Interactive Guide could have been challenged more, which would potentially have changed the design outcome considerably - for example SBD scenarios 4.2 and 8.2. In the ‘Poor Design Examples’, scenario 4.2. is explained as: ‘Dwellings in one area are of a similar size potentially creating an unbalanced community.’ This is an extreme view which was challenged to some extent (for example the flat types). In the ‘SBD Design Examples,’ 4.2 is explained as: ‘A mix of dwelling sizes have been introduced, enabling greater potential for homes to be occupied throughout the day.’ This is a valid point but does the range of dwellings sizes have to be extreme if a lot of commercial uses exist or are introduced, ensuring that buildings are occupied and the streets are overlooked? Scenario 8.2 concerns landscape planting and surveillance. In the ‘SBD Design Examples’ 8.2 is explained as: ‘Shrubs have been selected to have a mature growth height of 1m. Trees planted within the public realm are an appropriate species or have been specified with a root stock which will control the mature size of the tree. Crown is no lower than 2m, allowing a 1m clear field of vision between this and the top of the shrubs.’ 8.2 could also be viewed as an extreme requirement. Narrow trees or trees that do not hinder visibility should be acceptable.
economic demands. However, the housing types are similar to the housing types of contemporary master plans proposed for Southall (for example Urbed). In summary, the Southall master plan incorporates the advice of an expert and follows SBD guidance and well established theory whilst taking valuable lessons from Merton to make the design proposal unique to the local setting. To verify the hypothesis: 1.
2.
Yes, the design measures and principles for designing out crime incorporated in Merton reflect the unique local circumstances of each estate. The subjective views of the DOCO and experts involved with CPTED – including their interpretations of SBD guidance - are influencing regeneration in Merton. Yes, the design principles and measures used for the Merton master plans could be learned from and incorporated in a master plan for Southall to achieve sustainable development by designing out crime. This led to a master plan for Southall that takes the unique local circumstances into account, also drawing upon SBD guidance and the expert’s advice. However, ultimately, feedback from the DOCO responsible for Southall would be needed to see whether they agree with the design solution. One can assume, based on the study of Merton, that subjective views and other external factors would lead to changes being made to the design proposal.
Comparing the three Merton master plans prior to producing a design proposal for Southall was useful because each estate posed a distinct set of challenges and the unique solutions to the challenges are reflected in the early master plan layouts. The wishes of a developer could not be factored into the design proposal for Southall. Moreover, a financial appraisal was not conducted to meet
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8.0 Evaluation and Conclusion
8.2 Conclusion A point raised by the expert is that there needs to be ongoing dialogue between DOCOs and those seeking their advice. However, clearly, public consultation, politics, and the subjective views of experts can affect time frames and designs, as exemplified by the regeneration in Merton. Studying the three estates revealed how the combination of subjectivism and unique local circumstances affect design. Building on large sites is normally completed in phases as this releases capital to continue the next phase. Circle Housing are currently behind schedule as planning applications for each neighbourhood were planned to be submitted during the summer of 2015. Dealing with existing housing estates is not an issue that is relevant to Southall, where the identified site is clear. However, it is likely that future development in Southall would have to be phased, and therefore similar issues may arise. Considering crime prevention at the outset (at all) distinguishes urban designers who do so. Making use of the available SBD guidance and learning from other projects of a relevant scale can be seen as positive - considerations that proffer long term value (both social and economic). The available SBD guidance may centre mostly around low density, traditional housing. However, the design advice can be applied to higher density residential designs too (as demonstrated by the Merton master plans). The points made about parking, for example, are principles that can be applied at most scales. Several ‘universal truths’ seem to apply to all scales, as the Merton MPs demonstrate. Because the SBD advice is limited to residential scenarios for traditional (in the UK context), low density housing, the onus is on urban designers to come up with custom design solutions for higher density residential layouts. This is significant because DOCOs currently rely on this limited guidance to advise urban designers
on master plans that are often large-scale like the Merton master plans. There is scope for further SBD guidance aimed at higher density layouts. According to the expert, tweaking drawings is much cheaper than making changes once a site has been developed. The earlier crime is discussed, the more money society will be able to save, with less crime. Circle Housing have shown a high degree of forward thinking by considering crime at an early stage. This approach can, and should, be applied in Southall. The SBD guidance needs to be developed to address higher density residential scenarios. SBD should become a mandatory consideration for planning permission in all boroughs and this should be reflected in planning policy. It is conceivable that CPTED will be taught more widely as part of urban designers’ education in the future. The views of the expert were followed closely, as were most of the SBD guidelines. Whether the urban design outcomes of the creative interpretaton of the SBD guidance is desirable is subjective. However, because the final design proposal addresses the known issues concerning crime prevention, the result can be viewed as a success. The psychology is simple: urban designers want to get the green light for their design proposals and are dependent on approval from the local DOCO. The DOCO uses the SBD guidance as a sort of ‘checklist’. This suggests that many urban designers may choose to follow the SBD guidance as closely as possible to achieve SBD accreditation and secure points for code. If the SBD guidance does not continue to be developed - for example by addressing higher densities - and the more extreme SBD requirements are not reevaluated, this could potentially lead to places which rule out the qualities of many places that are admired today.
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8.0 Evaluation and Conclusion
136
Bibliography
Bibliography AGIS - Action SAFEPOLIS. (2007). Planning urban design and management for crime prevention handbook. France: AGIS - Action SAFEPOLIS. AGIS - Action SAFEPOLIS.
Circle Housing (2015). The future of High Path [images]. Surrey: Circle Housing.
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