JIOS Spring Issue 2013 (Vol. 4)

Journal of

International Organizations Studies

VOLUME 4, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2013

Journal of International Organizations Studies (JIOS)

The Journal of International Organizations Studies is the peer-reviewed journal of the United Nations Studies Association (UNSA), published in cooperation with the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham Young University. JIOS provides a forum for scholars who work on international organizations in a variety of disciplines. The journal aims to provide a window into the state of the art of research on international governmental organizations, supporting innovative approaches and interdisciplinary dialogue. The journal’s mission is to explore new grounds and transcend the traditional perspective of international organizations as merely the sum of its members and their policies.

Details on Submission and Review

JIOS is published twice annually, in March and September, online and print-on-demand. Submission deadline for the Fall issue is 1 May each year and for the Spring issue is 1 November of the previous year. JIOS publishes three types of articles: • Research papers (8,000–10,000 words, including footnotes and references)

• Insider’s View (3,000–7,000, including footnotes and references): contributions from practitioners illuminating the inner workings of international organizations.

• Reviews of literature, disciplinary approaches or panels/workshops/conferences (single book reviews, panel or workshop reviews: 800–1,200 words, multiple book or subject reviews: 2,000–3,000, including footnotes and references)

Please send submissions to editors@journal-iostudies.org. For submissions and formatting guidelines, please see http://www.journal-iostudies.org/how-submit-your-paper. All papers will be reviewed by two or three external reviewers and then either accepted, rejected, or returned to the author(s) with the invitation to make minor corrections or revise and resubmit (medium to major changes). The final decision on acceptance of submissions rests solely with the editors.

Contact Information

UN Studies Association, c/o coconets, Hannoversche Str. 2, 10115 Berlin, Germany David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA E-mail: editors@journal-iostudies.org Web: http://www.journal-iostudies.org ISSN 2191-2556 (print)

ISSN 2191-2564 (online)

©2013 All rights reserved.

Editors

Editors-in-Chief

Kirsten Haack, Northumbria University; John Mathiason, Cornell University Review Editor

Klaas Dykmann, Roskilde University Insider’s View Editor

Nicola Contessi, McGill University Managing Editor

Cory Leonard, Brigham Young University Editorial Board

Christopher Ankersen, Royal Military College of Canada

Jonathan Koppell, Yale University

Donald C.F. Daniel, Georgetown University

Slawomir Redo, UN Office on Drugs and Crime

Malte Brosig, University of the Witwatersrand Martin S. Edwards, Seton Hall University

Dirk Growe, Global Policy Forum Europe Julia Harfensteller, University of Bremen Ian Hurd, Northwestern University

Adam Kamradt-Scott, University of Sydney Ina Klein, University of Osnabrück

Henrike Landré, DIAS/UN Studies Association

Manuela Scheuermann, University of Würzburg Tamara Shockley, Independent Researcher Kendall Stiles, Brigham Young University Jonathan R. Strand, University of Nevada

Markus Thiel, Florida International University Andrew Williams, University of St. Andrews

Journal of

International Organizations Studies

Volume 4, Issue 1, spring 2013

Table of Contents Contributors ...................................................................................................................... 5 EDITORIAL Managing Climate Change: Challenges for International Organizations and for Scholars Who Study Them John Mathiason ................................................................................................................... 7 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE MANAGEMENT THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR Frameworks for International Climate Governance: Assessing the Alternatives Michael Mehling .............................................................................................................. 13 NEGOTIATION PROCESS Managing Climate Change: The Africa Group in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations Anesu Makina .................................................................................................................... 36 FUNDING Climate Funding and the Governance of Climate Risks Orr Karassin .................................................................................................................... 49 Follow the Money: Navigating the International Aid Maze for Dryland Development Pamela S. Chasek .............................................................................................................. 77 ADAPTING ORGANIZATIONS TO THE TASK Moving Beyond its Mandate? UNHCR and Climate Change Displacement Nina Hall ........................................................................................................................... 91 European Union Environmental Governance in Transition—Effective? Legitimate?

Ecologically Rational?

M. Leann Brown .............................................................................................................. 109 INSIDER’S VIEW Organizational Culture, System Evolution, and the United Nations of the 21st Century Alisa Clarke .................................................................................................................... 127 REVIEWS The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development—Unimportant or Under-Researched?

Joren Verschaeve.............................................................................................................. 134 African Integration: Many Challenges, Few Solutions Shawn Robert Duthie ...................................................................................................... 137 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and International Relations of the Gulf Lars Erslev Andersen ...................................................................................................... 141 Institutionalized Pan-Americanism: The Organization of American States Klaas Dykmann ............................................................................................................... 144

Contributors Lars Erslev Andersen is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

Andersen’s research focuses on the history of terrorism, al-Qaeda, the relationship between rebellion and terrorism, and U.S. Middle East politics. He has written books and articles on philosophy, terrorism, and political order, as well as on the Middle East. Currently, he is writing a book on the intellectual history of terrorism.

M. Leann Brown is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida, where she teaches politics of the European Union, global political economy, and international environmental relations on the undergraduate and graduate levels. Brown’s most recent research interests focus on the concept of ecological rationality and environmental governance in the European Union. Previously, she was a Fulbright research fellow affiliated with the Environment Committee of the European Parliament and served as program coordinator of the International Studies Association.

Pamela S. Chasek is a professor of political science and director of the International Studies Program at Manhattan College. Chasek is also the co-founder and executive editor of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, a reporting service on UN environment and development negotiations. She is author of the best-selling textbook Global Environmental Politics, and her most recent book is the Roads from Rio: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations. She was a lead author for the first Scientific Conference of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2009.

Alisa Clarke holds a master of philosophy in international relations, and began her career at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad. Clarke has worked with the UN as a staff member and consultant for over ten years (including UNITAR, UNRISD, UNCTAD, OHCHR and UNDP). She has developed and managed the not-for-profit organization Global Vision Institute (GVI) and its predecessor initiatives since 2003. These support the fulfillment of UN universal values through individual and organizational awareness and change in the UN system. Now based in New York, she works on GVI and on projects with the UN. Shawn Robert Duthie is a master’s degree candidate at the University of Cape Town in international relations. Duthie holds degrees in criminology and sociology from the University of Toronto and in politics and international relations from the University of London. His current research interests include the African Union and regional integration in Africa, as well as South African foreign policy.

Klaas Dykmann is an associate professor at Roskilde University in Denmark. As a historian and political scientist, he does research on the history and politics of international organizations, human rights, and inter-American and European-Latin American relations.

Nina Hall is a Rhodes scholar with a doctorate in international relations at the University of Oxford. Hall’s DPhil (PhD) examines how intergovernmental organizations have responded to climate change, with a focus on the United Nations Development Programme; the United Nations High Commission for Refugees; and the International Organisation for Migration.

She conducted fieldwork in Geneva, New York, and Kenya’s two refugee camps: Dadaab and Kakuma. Previously, she worked for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and as an intern with UNICEF Nepal and the UN Department of Political Affairs.

Orr Karassin is a lecturer at the Sociology and Political Science Department of the Open University of Israel, where she currently heads the Public Law Program. Karassin was a visiting research fellow at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics. There, she conducted a research project on regulating climate change adaptation. She has been a member of the Israeli delegation to the past five UNFCCC conferences. Her current research continues to deal with questions of climate adaptation governance and environmental regulation.

Anesu Makina was a British Chevening scholar at the University of East Anglia in the United Kingdom. Makina’s research interests include climate change policies at a national level, the nexus between gender and climate change, as well as the socio-technical aspects of sustainable energy. She was an NGO observer at COP-15 in Copenhagen in 2009 and is currently at the University of Pretoria.

John Mathiason, the editor of this special issue, is currently a visiting lecturer at the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs of Cornell University. A combination of academic and practitioner, Mathiason has taught international relations and public administration at the Wagner School of New York University and the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. He is also the managing director of Associates for International Management Services, a consulting firm specializing in results-based management in international organizations, donors, and their partners. He was a career staff member of the United Nations Secretariat for twenty-five years.

Michael Mehling is president of the Ecologic Institute in Washington, D.C., an environmental policy think tank with partner offices in Berlin, Brussels, and San Mateo, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Mehling has led a range of research and advisory projects for government agencies as well as educational and civil society institutions in North America, Europe, and the developing world. Recent publications include the edited volumes Climate Change and the Law (2013), Improving the Clean Development Mechanism: Options and Challenges Post-2012 (2011), and Bridging the Divide in Global Climate Policy: Strategies for Enhanced Participation and Integration (2009).

Joren Verschaeve is a researcher at the Centre for EU Studies of Ghent University (Belgium).

Verschaeve holds a master’s degree in EU politics and is preparing a PhD on the position and impact of the European Union in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. His main research interests are the relations between the EU and other international organizations and EU development policy.

EDITORIAL Managing Climate Change: Challenges for International Organizations and for Scholars Who Study Them

by John Mathiason, Cornell Institute for Public Affairs, Cornell University The Challenge There is a strong scientific consensus that anthropogenic factors based on emissions of greenhouse gases are increasing global temperatures at levels that will cause significant climate change.1 The fifth assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to be issued in 2014, will reflect a consensus, based on new information, that the problem is even worse than previously suggested. Dealing with this problem will make exceptional demands on an emerging international public sector. This issue of the Journal of International Organizations Studies (JIOS) explores why this is the greatest challenge to global governance ever and presents some of the evidence about how institutions are responding. It indicates that more work needs to be done to understand the implications of the challenge.

Historically, international organizations have emerged when nation-states, the building blocks of international political order, have decided that a problem cannot be addressed in an orderly fashion by state actions within their own sovereign borders or by the magic of the marketplace and private enterprises. These problems usually cross borders, require concerted and agreed action by groups of states (or, in most cases, by all states), and need a competent but neutral public institution to ensure order in solving the problems.

Climate change is a borderless, universal problem that cannot be solved by the action of individual states or the marketplace. It requires that states act but that they do so in a consistent way. Managing climate change will involve significant regulation and considerable financial flows. These, in turn, will require neutral and competent international public institutions if the problem is to be addressed successfully.

Academic research has helped understand the dimensions of both the problem and the response by institutions in the past and is a significant part of the process of defining the contours of the problem to be addressed. In a formal sense, this has been done through the IPCC, which has been established to collect and weight scientific evidence about climate change and was analyzed in the inaugural issue of this journal (Mathiason and Bhandari 2010). There are many analyses of climate change, including some by early public figures like James Hansen (Hansen 2009), climate scientists (Cullen 2010), and economists (Goodstein and Intrilligator 2012).

Despite the fact that international institutions will clearly be tasked with coping with the global response to climate change, little research has focused on the current and new institutions dealing with climate change. This is partly due to the fact that the negotiations about how 1. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, 2007, p. 2 states “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.�

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to address the climate change problem have not concluded. Indeed, the negotiation process itself has received considerable attention over time (Paterson 1996; Mintzer and Leonard, 1994; Depledge 2004) including by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin from the International Institute for Sustainable Development, which has covered climate change since 1992.

As part of JIOS’ goal of stimulating new and innovative research on global institutions, the editorial board decided to dedicate this issue to the management of the institutions of the international public sector dealing with the international response to climate change. We reached out to scholars through the very active listservs dealing with climate change and received a modest response. This is probably because there has historically been a lag between the time an issue becomes noticed and when it generates academic research. Often the research is done by younger scholars who have realized the importance of the issue. That is clearly the case with several of the authors of articles included in this issue. A few are young, either just finishing their doctorates or at an early stage of their careers. Others are more experienced scholars like Pamela Chasek, who has been following the climate change negotiations for decades through her work with Earth Negotiations Bulletin, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, and her well-known publications on the climate change negotiations (Chasek, Downie, and Brown 2010). Her article on funding the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification is a result of her work on that key issue. Another is Michael Mehling, president of the Ecologic Institute and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Orr Karrasin, in addition to her teaching and research, has been a member of Israel’s delegation to the UNFCCC negotiations.

When I was the deputy director of the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women at the time of the first Rio Conference, one issue we addressed was whether there was a gender dimension to the environment. At that time, we observed one dimension: Women were more concerned with the environment than men, arguably because they were more accustomed to taking a longer-term view of problems and their solution. This finding is confirmed in this issue. With the exception of Mehling and myself, all of the authors are women.

The articles in this issue suggest there is beginning to be an interest in the institutional and managerial issues, but this is still in early stages. This is unfortunate, since many of the decisions to be made over the next five years will have to do with international public institutions. Absent from a clear understanding of what these institutions can and cannot be expected to do, decisions about how to organize the international public sector will be guided by political rather than managerial capacity criteria.

Management of international institutions has been a focus of governments, often in the context of financing the organizations, but not of scholars. One reason may be that the organizations themselves seem opaque and impenetrable. They are non-sovereign and exist formally at the behest of their sovereign member states. In fact, they are mostly visible only when member states negotiate. As I have argued in my study of international secretariats, Invisible Governance (Mathiason 2007), it is the de facto policy of international officials to remain below the radar. For that and other reasons, it has typically been difficult for scholars to examine the inner workings of the international public sector. Certainly, scholars of public administration and management have not paid much attention to the management of the international public sector, and there are few universities who have bothered to look seriously at these issues.

In examining the problems, the articles in this issue show the range of focus that is necessary to understand the management challenges. They include examinations of the overall structure of the international public sector in dealing with the issue, emerging elements of the negotiating process that will affect the institutional decisions to be made, the key issue of how to finance this part of the international public sector as it emerges, and how existing organizations can and will have to adapt to the new tasks. These analyses point to new needs for research and analysis.

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Overall Structure of the International Public Sector The complexity of management at the international level has to be taken into account in determining the governance structure to be put in place. The international system itself is complex, consisting of a system of independent intergovernmental organizations including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank Group and the IMF), regional development banks, regional organizations like the Organization of American States and the African Union, organizations of like-minded states like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Under normal circumstances, obtaining a consistent policy and management structure is difficult. As an example, the quadrennial report on operational activities of the UN secretary-general, in his capacity as chair of the Chief Executives Board of the United Nations System, sent to the General Assembly in 2012 stated: 16. . . . We no longer think in terms of agencies working in isolation as in the past. At the same time, we need a fresh approach where coherence is found through issue-based alliances and coalitions and in which United Nations agencies, singly or in groups, fully exploit their potential. We need to help countries build on the United Nations normative agenda and the Organization’s policy knowledge and advice, including by involving non-resident agencies.

17. Far-reaching change will require reform in a number of areas, supported by strong commitment from Member States. There is a limit to what can be achieved with the present instruments at our disposal, given the separate lines of accountability, funding, and governance. These matters are complex but warrant consideration both at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and in the preparatory discussions on the post-2015 development goals.

The problem of coherence in the structure was evidenced at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. There was an effort to upgrade the United Nations Environment Programme to the status of a specialized agency, as a means of ensuring coordination in all elements of environmental management, including climate change. This failed, and there is currently no central organization responsible for managing the system as a whole.

In this context, Michael Mehling’s analysis in “Frameworks for International Climate Governance: Assessing the Alternatives” looks at how scholars and research institutions have examined the nature of the governance issue. He reviews some major evaluations and concludes that there is an emerging consensus about criteria to apply in assessing institutional arrangement suggestions. He develops a matrix that could be applied to analyzing the likely effectiveness of proposed arrangements.

Negotiation Process Over the life of the climate change management regime, negotiation will continue to be an essential function, since once the procedures are built into an international convention, the periodic meetings of states party will continue to determine how the regime functions.

The annual meetings of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have been where agreements are reached or not. The COP having agreed to achieve the binding agreement by 2015, the next sessions will be critical.

UN negotiations, for very practical reasons, take place by groups. While individual states have the right to negotiate by themselves, in practice they find themselves more effective in groups. The main groups are the G-77, the European Union, and groups of the main non-European developed countries. Each seeks to achieve positions that they can use as the basis for negotiation. The EU, by rule, negotiates as a bloc. The G-77 is less homogeneous and within

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it regional groups negotiate. One of these is the African group. By its size in number and the consequence for its members of not dealing effectively with climate change, this group should have a major say in the negotiations and, if the negotiations are to be successful, the group needs to be effective.

This is the focus of Anesu Makina’s article, “Managing Change: The Africa Group in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations.” Her approach explores the factors necessary for the group to be effective. She finds that there have been serious problems in achieving results in different climate change negotiations. Based on an analysis of different cases, she suggests where African countries can improve their success in ensuring that their interests are taken into account in final agreements. The approach taken could be applied to other negotiating groups in the process.

Funding A major issue in managing international organizations is funding. Since international organizations cannot levy taxes to obtain revenue, they have essentially three sources: assessed contributions of members, voluntary contributions by members, and fees for services rendered. Each of these has limitations. Assessed contributions are somewhat like country club dues. States are expected to pay them as a condition for being a member of the organization.

Because they are mandatory, increasing them has proven extremely difficult, and for most organizations in the UN system, budget-to-budget resources have been limited to zero real growth or less. Voluntary contributions are also problematic. Many organizations, particularly the development funds, rely on them rather than assessments, but they can vary according to the global economy and, in any case, tend to follow the donors’ priorities rather than other needs. Finally, funding organizations using fees-for-services has proven difficult since there has been a principle that services should be free. The exceptions here are the development banks, who fund their operations by interest charges, and the World Intellectual Property Organization which charges for registering patents and copyrights.

How the new (or existing) organizations dealing with climate change management will be funded is an essential discussion. If they can be placed on a firm financial footing, they will deliver the necessary services, but if not, the political problems that have plagued international organizations, when one or another of the major contributors objects to policies and programs, will carry over to the climate change management institutions.

Probably more importantly, the existing premise of the climate change negotiations, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, means there will be a significant flow of financial resources through these multilateral organizations as issues of adaptation and mitigation are tackled in the main carbon emitting economies and those affected but not historical emitters.

The article by Orr Karassin on multilateral climate change funds and the governance of climate risks addresses fundamental concerns. Karassin notes that in climate change a different philosophy, alleviating risk, should motivate financial flows rather than classical references to development. She examines two funds that function differently than traditional funds.

One, the Adaptation Fund, is itself a beneficiary of another mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism, in that a fee for service in the CDM is used to provide resources to the fund.

For other organizations, obtaining sufficient funds to permit operations continues to be a problem. This is an issue addressed by Pamela Chasek in “Follow the Money: Navigating the International Aid Maze for Dryland Development.” She looks at the financing for the poorest of the Rio Convention organizations, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, which faces a constant financial crisis because secure funding is not available.

Funding from assessed contributions has not responded to need, although it should be noted that UNCCD is one of the few organizations of the UN system that has adopted results-based management and for one biennium at least had an increase in assessed contributions in real

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terms. In so doing, she looks at the Global Environment Facility (GEF) that was set up under World Bank management but with UNDP governance (one country-one vote) structures and is expected to be the source of voluntary contributions.

In that sense, Karassin and Chasek explore the two extremes of funding climate change organizations with those studied by Karassin increasingly being based on fee for service, while the UNCCD, studied by Chasek, continues to depend on traditional financing.

Adapting Organizations to the Task While to a certain extent climate change will be managed by newly created organizations, much will also depend on older, existing organizations that will have to adjust their policies and priorities in order to provide the policies and programs necessary to address climate change.

Nina Hall in “Moving Beyond its Mandate? UNHCR and Climate Change Displacement,” explores the issue of how an institution, set up primarily to deal with political refugees, often in the context of war and internal violence, can deal with the expected problems of people crossing national borders because of the consequences of climate change. She notes some of the difficulties in making this transition and her analysis suggests other organizations may face similar needs for reform.

M. Leann Brown in “European Union Environmental Governance in Transition” explores a different kind of institution. The EU is both an international organization and has some almost sovereign authority, depending on the subject area. In some areas it has been delegated authority by its members. Climate change management is one of these, and the EU, since its members have accepted the imperatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions established in the Kyoto Protocol, has set up functions that go beyond those of international organizations.

These include regulatory systems and also institutions to manage mitigation such as a Europewide cap and trade market.

What Next?

The articles in this issue show that solid research is possible but also show where there are gaps in dealing with management of the climate change regime. More research will be needed over the next decade if academics are to be able to influence and improve the process.

One area not covered by the papers for this issue, and in fact seemingly not of interest, is how to make the climate change management regime accountable. Because the institutions are not sovereign and are dependent of the compliance by individual states, ensuring that states live up to the obligations that they have taken on has been a concern for decades in areas like human rights, as well as in nonproliferation. A similar concern needs to be applied for climate change, where institutions (including funding institutions) will depend on national reporting of compliance to determine whether goals are being met and institutions are working effectively. We need research to look at how compliance is verified in other regimes and how that could be applied to the new and evolving climate change agreements and institutions would be very valuable.

REFERENCES

Chasek, Pamela S., David L. Downie and Janet Welsh Brown (2010) Global Environmental Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cullen, Heidi (2010) The Weather of the Future: Heat Waves, Extreme Storms, and Other Scenes from a Climate-Changed Planet, New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Depledge, Joanna (2004) The Organization of Global Negotiations: Constructing the Climate Change Regime, London: Routledge.

Goodstein, David and Michael Intrilligator (2012) Climate Change and the Energy Problem: Physical Science and Economics Perspective, World Scientific Publishing Company.

Hansen, James (2009) Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe

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and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity, London: Bloomsbury.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policy Makers.

Mathiason, John (2007) Invisible Governance: International Secretariats in Global Politics, Kumarian Press.

Mathiason, John and Medani Prasad Bhandari (2010) “Getting the Facts Right: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the new Climate Change Management Regime,” Journal of International Organizations Studies 1 (1): 57–71.

Mintzer, Irving M. and J. Amber Leonard, eds. (1994) Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paterson, Matthew (1996) Global Warming and Global Politics, London: Routledge.

United Nations (2012) Quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/67/93-E/2012/79, 11 June.

Frameworks for International Climate Governance: Assessing the Alternatives

by Michael Mehling, Ecologic Institute and Georgetown University1 Recent climate negotiations have evinced a controversial debate on how best to reform the institutional and legal framework of international climate governance. While this discussion on competing governance architectures is by no means new, it has rarely been pursued with the intensity prompted by the latest negotiating mandate adopted at the Durban Climate Change Conference in 2011. Unlike the domestic policy context, where widely recognized criteria have evolved to guide choices among alternative policy frameworks, no equally systematic approach has yet been developed for the international arena. Although inevitably prone to normative contingency, such criteria can offer a heuristic tool by which the defining characteristics of different governance approaches are identified and rendered mutually comparable.

Building on a survey of existing research, this article develops a matrix of criteria for the assessment of contending frameworks of international climate governance.

Introduction After almost two decades of negotiations, the momentous summit held in Copenhagen in December 2009 marked a watershed moment for international climate cooperation. Many observers pointed to this summit and its outcome as evidence that the international climate regime was in need of fundamental reform, while others defended the status quo and blamed any failure to achieve meaningful progress on the complex issues at stake or the political maneuvering of individual states. A heated and controversial debate followed in the wake of the Danish negotiations, evincing a broad spectrum of proposals on how best to reform the institutional and legal framework of international climate governance. More recently, at the 2011 climate summit in Durban, South Africa, the international community appeared to lay out a clearer path to the future climate regime, although the broadly stated mandate of reaching agreement on a “protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force” by 2015 (UNFCCC, 15 March 2012) still leaves central questions of architecture and regime design unanswered. And the discussion continues, with suggestions that range from various elements of formal, legally binding, and centrally organized authority to informal, voluntary, and decentralized approaches to climate governance.

While this discussion on competing governance architectures is by no means new,2 it has rarely been pursued with the intensity prompted by what many considered a failure of classical multilateralism at the Copenhagen Climate Negotiations. In the relatively short time since that summit, a large number of recommendations and reform proposals have been introduced into the debate, typically guided by a particular ideological outlook or epistemic interest. Unlike the domestic policy context, where widely recognized criteria have evolved to guide choices among alternative policy frameworks, no equally systematic approach has yet been developed for the 1.*This article is based on research conducted under the project “Coping with Complexity in the Evolving International Climate Policy Institutional Architecture (ICPIA)” funded by the Austrian Klima—und Energiefonds. The author is grateful to Daniela Kletzan-Slamanig, Angela Köppl, Andreas Türk, two anonymous reviewers, and the participants in an expert workshop held on 7 and 8 April 2011 at the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) in Vienna, Austria, for helpful comments and suggestions.

2. See, for instance, Aldy and Stavins (2007); Aldy and Stavins (2010).

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international arena, where narrow state preferences or a specific methodology tend to dominate the discussion.3 Drawing on lessons from the evaluation of domestic climate policies and measures as well as the study of broader international environmental governance, this paper defines a matrix of criteria for the classification of alternative frameworks for international climate cooperation.

For this purpose, it approaches international climate cooperation in the broadest sense, covering architectures, regimes, and institutions,4 and including venues for political negotiation as well as technical cooperation and exchange. Ultimately, the analysis hopes to facilitate a more transparent and systematic approach to the assessment of alternative frameworks for climate cooperation.

Diagnosis: Evolving Frameworks of International Climate Cooperation A Brief Retrospective Calls for concerted international action on climate change date back more than two decades.

When in 1988, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly declared global warming a “common concern of mankind,”5 it paved the way for formal negotiations6 under the auspices of the UN, ultimately resulting in the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.7 A milestone in early climate cooperation, the UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994 and has since been ratified by 195 parties, affording it one of the broadest memberships of any international agreement.8 Given the need for unanimous consent,9 however, broad participation translated into substantive commitments that were largely programmatic in nature; the adoption of more specific obligations had to be deferred to a subsequent instrument.

By late 1997, the international community had adopted the Kyoto Protocol,10 a separate instrument under international law that required ratification by a sufficient number of signatories before it could enter into force.11 Nearly a decade after its adoption, and only narrowly meeting the criteria for an entry into force, the Kyoto Protocol took effect on 16 February 2005, albeit without the backing of the largest greenhouse gas emitter at the time, the U.S. While the protocol marked an important step in climate cooperation, its practical effect was described as narrow, thin, and ultimately symbolic (Victor, 2001; Bell, 2006; Böhringer 3. Relevant criteria have been proposed by Aldy et al. (2003), Bosetti et al. (2008), Bodansky (2004), Keohane and Victor (2010), and Moncel et al. (2011), and will be amply referenced throughout this paper; still, the focus of these studies does not rest on the elaboration and assessment of criteria as such, but rather on providing a reference framework for the substantive proposals assessed in each study. See also Stewart (2007): 148 (“still in an early stage”).

4. In the debate on international climate cooperation, notions such as “architecture,” “institution,” and “regime” are used recurrently, although often without a clear or authoritative definition. An “architecture” may be understood as an “overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures, and organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics” (Bierman et al., 2009: 15). Defined thus, “architectures” differ from “institutions” and “regimes” primarily by virtue of their broader scope, which extends beyond solving only a particular governance challenge. Accordingly, “institutions” are typically approached as sets of rules stipulating ways in which states and other actors on the international plane should cooperate (Mearsheimer, 1994: 8; Martin and Simmons, 1998: 729). Closely related are regimes, which have been described as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982: 185; Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 491). A common feature of all three concepts is their permanence, that is, their ability to transcend individual actors, decisions, and interests.

5. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53, 6 December 1988, endorsing the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

6. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, UN General Assembly Resolution 45/212, 21 December 1990, which established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC).

7. On the negotiations, see Bodansky (1994): 45; Goldberg (1993): 244–51; Sands (1992): 270.

8. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, International Legal Materials 31 (1992) 849; the status of ratification is available at unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/ items/2631.php, accessed 15 January 2013.

9. On the role of unanimous consent and its problematic consequences for international environmental governance, see already Palmer (1992): 270–78.

10. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol), Kyoto, 10 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, International Legal Materials 37 (1998) 22.

11. Under Article 25 (1) of the Kyoto Protocol, it was to enter into force once fifty-five states “deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession,” on the condition that those states account for at least 55 percent of the 1990 CO2 emissions by developed states.

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and Vogt, 2004). Because the quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) for developed countries specified in the Kyoto Protocol set to expire in 2012, its governing body immediately adopted a mandate to negotiate new commitments by its parties.

This mandate had to account for the divergent membership of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, forcing the negotiations to proceed on two separate, yet overlapping tracks with distinct bodies and procedures.12 Also, the difficulties experienced in its negotiation and ensuing ratification prompted the emergence of new channels for international engagement on climate change, including several regional and bilateral initiatives,13 further increasing the complexity of international climate cooperation.

By December 2007, discussions under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol had progressed sufficiently to adopt a more sophisticated mandate, the Bali Roadmap, which called for a focused process to conclude two years later.14 When leaders from around the world converged in Copenhagen in December 2009, the parallel negotiation processes had failed to narrow down potential options sufficiently to allow for passage of an international agreement in the tradition of the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. Instead, in an atmosphere of tension and mistrust, a group of heads of state and government elaborated a new document that was sufficiently vague to meet with the approval of nearly all dissenting factions.15 Given the absence of alternative options, a majority of states agreed to “take note” of the ensuing Copenhagen Accord, with several parties censuring its lack of ambition and the undemocratic process in which it had been adopted.

Although parties soon resumed the negotiations following this traumatic summit, it was clear that faith in the UNFCCC regime had been severely shaken. Only when measured against significantly lowered expectations can the subsequent climate summits in Cancun and Durban be considered a success and, as some observers claim, a new lease of life for the UNFCCC negotiations (Oberthür, 2011: 5; Rajamani, 2011: 519). While some progress has been made on specific issues such as the institutional arrangements for climate finance and technology transfer, more divisive issues, such as the legal form of a future climate agreement and the extension of commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, remain controversial.16 As the 2012 climate summit in Doha, Qatar, showed these very questions are what threaten to again unravel diplomatic progress, and it is all but evident that international climate cooperation will continue to be driven at more levels than the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.

Alternative Scenarios for Future Climate Cooperation In many ways, the Copenhagen summit of 2009 marked an important departure from the practice of multilateral climate cooperation over the previous two decades. Although fissures had become visible at earlier stages in the negotiations, international engagement on the issue reached a new dimension of political controversy, yielding a compromise that was merely “taken note of” rather than formally adopted. At least in part, this document can be understood as a reaction to the challenges faced in achieving universal agreement on an international treaty, presupposing that its adoption be individually rational at acceptable cost to all parties (Lane et al., 2008: 33). Yet in doing so, recent events have also given new momentum to an 12. For details, see Bausch and Mehling (2006).

13. Such initiatives include informal partnerships and more formal forums on a variety of technical issues (e.g. the Global Methane Initiative, the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy, the International Carbon Action Partnership, the (no longer active) Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, or the International Renewable Energy Agency Methane) as well as various high-level ministerial dialogues (Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy, and Sustainable Development of the Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations, Major Economies Forum on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEF), or Group of Twenty (G20)); for an overview and analysis, see Bausch et al. (2013); Biermann et al. (2009): 21–24; de Coninck et al.

(2008); Michonski et al. (2010); Vihma (2009).

14. See, in particular, Decision 1/CP.13, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008 (“Bali Action Plan”).

15. Decision 2/CP.15, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010 (“Copenhagen Accord”).

16. See Rajamani (2011): 500.

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earlier debate about the merits of alternative regime architectures, giving rise to a number of conceptual proposals for the negotiation process.17 In an attempt to structure this debate, such proposals have often been framed as falling along a continuum, with one end representing the traditional “top-down” approach to international climate cooperation, the other end a “bottomup” aggregation of nationally or regionally defined efforts (Bodansky et al., 2007: 1).

As mentioned earlier, arguably no regime as complex as that governing climate cooperation can be easily assigned to either extreme, with features typically ascribed to one approach also present in the other (Dai, 2010: 633–634); still, the distinct shift marked by the Copenhagen Accord and preoccupation with this conceptual dichotomy in recent literature warrant a closer look at the proposed distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to climate governance.

Keeping with the foregoing characterization, a “top-down” approach is primarily based on formal engagement between sovereign actors (usually states) along traditional channels of multilateral diplomacy. Such negotiations are expected to result in binding international commitments adopted through an international treaty, often complemented by centrally integrated processes and hierarchical institutions, which in turn shape and drive domestic implementation efforts.

Under a “bottom-up” approach, by contrast, countries retain the ability to define both the nature and scope of their climate efforts; while they may cooperate with other partners by coordinating their activities and defining common aspirations, decision making remains decentralized and focused on the national level rather than being assigned to a specific international institution.

International climate cooperation then largely occurs through fragmented institutions with no identifiable core and weak or nonexistent linkages (Keohane and Victor, 2010: 3–4).

Proponents of “bottom-up” approaches highlight the importance of flexibility, which they believe will allow each actor to define priorities that are technically, economically, and politically acceptable in light of local or regional conditions. By avoiding the cumbersome process of international law and its requirement of unanimous consent, “bottom-up” cooperation is thought to lower the threshold for meaningful progress, allowing similarly minded actors to form coalitions and take action that accommodates their individual circumstances and specific interests. Unlike conventional diplomacy, such informal approaches might also avoid the conservative tendency of legally binding arrangements, which are apt to lock in low levels of ambition and prove vulnerable to defection (Victor et al., 2005: 1820).

Once underway, the resulting cooperation is expected to develop in an organic manner as parties explore new forms of governance and gradually increase their level of commitment.

Perhaps most importantly, advocates doubt the very ability of a “top-down” architecture to address the climate challenge, as it underestimates the underlying complexities and overestimates the willingness of decision makers and stakeholders to act; rather, action should occur at the same level as the causes and effects of climate change, which is the local level (Rayner, 2010: 616).

As a direct corollary, however, “bottom-up” approaches are thought to afford less certainty and reciprocal confidence than a formally binding “top-down” agreement, potentially deterring some actors from adopting commitments without assurance that others will engage in similar efforts (Hare et al., 2010: 607; Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2005: 19).

Without a single overarching framework, it may prove more difficult to predict environmental outcomes, both in terms of ensuring that individual efforts add up to what is scientifically required and that actors meet their pledges within the proposed timeline. In particular, if science is no longer the central point of reference for objectives and timelines, it can become difficult to identify a different benchmark for the success of the regime.

17. For recent examples, see Abbot (2012); Aldy and Stavins (2007); Aldy and Stavins (2010); Barrett and Toman (2010); Bodansky and Diringer (2007); Bosetti et al. (2008); Evans and Steven (2009); Hare et al. (2010); Keohane and Victor (2010); Okereke et al. (2009); Olmstead and Stavins (2009); Pizer (2007); Rayner (2010); Stavins (2009); Stavins (2010); Tangen (2010); WBGU (2009); WBGU (2010).

An overview of earlier proposals is provided by Aldy et al. (2003); Bodansky (2004).

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Absent from an ex ante allocation of collective efforts, moreover, the “bottom-up” approach may also contribute to higher levels of free riding and fail to capture equity concerns among participants (Dubash et al., 2010: 595). Indeed, by circumventing the established decision making processes of international law, the outcome of “bottom-up” regime building may be thought of as less legitimate than universally negotiated commitments, especially where small groups of powerful states decide to resolve a global challenge at the exclusion of large parts of the international community (Bodansky et al., 2004; Reinstein, 2004). And finally, existence of concurrent regimes in an increasingly fragmented policy system not only requires better interplay management (Biermann, 2010: 286) but also leads to potential forum-shifting in which actors move a regulatory agenda from one forum to another, abandon a forum, or pursue the same agenda in more than one forum (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 29).

Because of its relative simplicity and straightforward application, the distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to international climate cooperation has been widely used as a framework of analysis to structure and explain recent trends in the climate negotiations.18 Without disputing its conceptual utility, however, it stands to reason that the complexities of sovereign engagement on climate change cannot be fully captured by a binary dichotomy. In actual practice, climate cooperation clearly manifests elements of both approaches, which arguably complement each other—for instance when international targets incentivize domestic action, or varying progress at the national level results in efforts to achieve international coordination—and are unlikely to see one paradigm completely displace the other.

Acknowledging the discussion on “top-down” and “bottom-up” climate governance is important to understand much of the current literature on alternative regime options, but it is too narrow a framework for useful comparison of different regime elements and characteristics. In an attempt to bridge two largely separate debates, the following section draws on an existent body of work regarding the evaluation of policy instruments for domestic climate policy and rules and institutions for international environmental governance, leveraging criteria developed therein for application to the context of international climate cooperation.

Evaluating Frameworks of International Climate Cooperation Evaluating Climate Policies and Measures: The Domestic Dimension Decision makers seeking to address the causes and effects of climate change can take recourse to a portfolio of policy instruments, including pricing controls and rationing,19 performance standards, subsidies, agreements, and informational instruments (IPCC, 2007: 750; OECD, 2009: 18–22).20 In practice, these instruments are applied alone or in varying combinations to different sectors, such as electricity generation, transport, buildings, and industry (Krupnick, 2010: 8–9).21 By diverting resources and capital away from the production of conventional goods and services, and often into costly abatement measures, these instruments can have a detrimental effect on economic growth in the short term. Over the medium and longer term, the various co-benefits of mitigation action, such as energy savings, reduced health impacts, or improved energy security, suggest that a carefully designed strategy to lower greenhouse gas emissions will generate greater benefits than 18. See, for instance, Barrett et al. (2010); Bodansky (2004); Reinstein (2004); Victor et al. (2005); retaining the notion of two extremes along a continuum, but arguing for a “middle ground” of parallel efforts integrated in a multi-track framework or regime complexes: Bodansky et al. (2007); Keohane and Victor (2010); Pew (2005).

19. Pricing models date back to Pigou (1920), and notably include emissions charges and taxes set to cover the marginal damage caused by polluting activities, thereby internalizing their costs; rationing, in turn, is based on work by Dales (1968): 92–100 and Montgomery (1972): 395, both building on Coase (1960), and generally requires the creation of a market for tradable emission allowances, where each allowance confers the right to discharge a specified quantity of pollutants for a limited duration of time; for further details, see Tietenberg (2006). For a discussion of relative merits, see Weitzman (1974).

20. This is a very broad categorization of policy instruments, and further differentiation is possible, see OTA (1995): 81–89.

21. In a majority of sectors, greenhouse gas mitigation will be achieved by improving the efficiency with which energy is used or by reducing its carbon intensity, see OECD (2009): 11, but in agriculture, forestry, and certain chemical and industrial processes where emissions are not related to energy use, different approaches—such as stabilization or expansion of carbon sinks—are applied.

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costs,22 but current political and economic decision making cycles are noted for being myopic and providing little incentive for anticipatory governance or foresight (Fuerth, 2004). Additionally, while the social cost of action is expected to be lower than the impacts of unabated climate change, it will nonetheless rise over time as readily available abatement options are exhausted and more costly solutions need to be explored (Stern, 2006: 63, 191).

In the context of climate change, therefore, both the rationale of policy instruments and the manner in which they are designed have been sensitive to economic concerns from a number of important stakeholders, prompting widespread adoption of flexible or suasive incentives alongside more coercive regulatory prescriptions.23 With this broad range of available instruments comes a need for reliable criteria to guide and justify selection processes between contending approaches to climate governance. While it is widely agreed that no single model can serve as a panacea for all regulatory purposes (Goulder et al., 2008: 2), a number of criteria have gradually evolved in various academic disciplines to evaluate individual instruments and their combination in a coordinated portfolio.

At a sufficient level of abstraction, the following criteria are typically proposed: • Environmental effectiveness: How well does a policy instrument meet its intended environmental objective? How certain is its level of environmental impact?

• Cost effectiveness: Can the policy achieve its objectives at a lower cost than other policies? Does it create revenue streams that can be reinvested?

• Distributional considerations: How does the policy impact consumers and producers?

Can it be considered fair and equitable?

• Institutional feasibility: Is the policy instrument likely to be viewed as legitimate, gain political acceptance, be adopted and ultimately implemented? (IPCC, 2007: 751).

While these criteria are widely advocated, albeit with slight variations,24 it bears noting that processes of instrument choice are often complicated by the fact that individual criteria tend to compete with each other, rendering tradeoffs inevitable and any selection largely dependent on specific circumstances (Goulder et al., 2008: 2), contested assumptions, and contingent preferences. Additionally, climate governance tends to address several market failures and seek a variety of outcomes, thus necessitating the use of more than one instrument (Tinbergen, 1952).

Yet with the simultaneous operation of various instruments comes a risk of adverse interactions or even redundancies (OECD, 2009: 27). Some instruments will pursue more than one objective (Knudson, 2009: 308), and the extreme uncertainties underlying causes and impacts of climate change as well as policy outcomes further complicate the evaluation of relevant instruments (Weitzman, 2009: 8–10). And yet, despite being prone to epistemic limitations and normative contingency, evaluation criteria can still offer a heuristic tool by which the defining characteristics of different policy instruments are identified and rendered mutually comparable.

As the next section illustrates, similar complexities are also faced when seeking to apply evaluation criteria to international regimes; many of the considerations guiding the debate on domestic instrument choice can, however, be applied to the international plane (Stewart, 2007: 159).

22. Especially when taking into consideration the expected costs of climate change impacts, such as extreme weather events, flooding, crop losses, vector-borne diseases, and biodiversity loss, see e.g., CBO (2008): 11.

23. Limiting the economic burden requires equalization of marginal abatement costs across the economy and for each source, something price- and quantity-based instruments are said to achieve better than rigid technology standards (Baumol and Oates, 1988: 177; Keohane et al., 1998: 313); as a result, conventional regulation, criticized for belonging to an “extraordinarily crude, costly, litigious, and counterproductive system of technology-based environmental controls” (Ackerman and Stewart, 1985: 1333), has been increasingly joined or supplanted by market incentives, all with an aim to “improve the command system through better balancing of regulatory costs and benefits, improved risk analysis and management, and greater flexibility” (Stewart, 2001: 21).

24. Similar criteria are e.g., reported in the broader academic literature, see, for instance, Baumol and Oates (1988): 57–78; Goulder et al.

(2008): 3–23; Harrington et al. (2004): 5; OTA (1995): 143–147; or Sterner (2003): 133–134; of course, actual practice has often “diverged strikingly from the recommendations of normative economic theory,” see Keohane et al. (1998): 313, and will be strongly influenced by local traditions, cultures, institutions, and infrastructures, with institutional capacity especially constraining viable choices in developing countries, see Bell (2003): 22.

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Evaluating Climate Cooperation: The International Dimension Both the nature of climate governance and its objectives differ fundamentally between the national and international level. Unlike domestic climate policy, which can rely on public institutions endowed with authority to enforce obligations and settle disputes, international cooperation presupposes that sovereign states assent voluntarily to any obligations they assume and subsequently implement these (Wiener, 1999: 683; Werksman, 2010: 673).

Climate change is a complex and long-term challenge that can only be solved through collective action (Underdal, 2010: 1), and any abatement efforts—or absence thereof—will have repercussions on the international community in its entirety, as well as on the position of domestic constituents in the states undertaking such efforts (Hare et al., 2010: 602). For instance, while all states will benefit from the greenhouse gas controls adopted by any one state, the acting state will enjoy only a small share of the benefits of its own efforts (Ostrom, 2009: 7–8, differentiating on Hardin, 1968, and Olson, 1965). Given this inherent disposition to encourage free-riding and generate spillover effects, countries have a strong incentive to limit emissions only “so long as it were assured that all others would reduce their emissions as well” (Barrett et al., 2010: 4).

Conversely, domestic entities in active states will face a rising regulatory burden, potentially placing them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors in countries without comparable environmental constraints. In a global economy with increasingly free movement of trade and investment, such differences in the ambition of national abatement efforts can have farreaching consequences, both in economic and environmental terms. Accordingly, international climate cooperation needs to achieve a balance between substantive ambition, scope of participation, and level of compliance. Any set of criteria used to evaluate different models of global climate cooperation will need to reflect this underlying reality of international environmental governance (Stewart, 2007: 161).

Consequently, the categories guiding an assessment and classification of contending international governance architectures can only be informed by, but not identical to, the criteria set out in the preceding section. Unlike the domestic level, where the research community and scientific bodies have formulated a widely recognized canon of evaluation criteria, no benchmarks of comparable authority have yet been defined for the international debate. Instead, different approaches to the study of international relations and global governance have resulted in very diverse assessment metrics, each premised on a particular outlook and understanding of cooperation between states and the social, political, or economic priorities it is meant to address. In the field of international environmental governance, a rich and insightful literature has emerged on the assessment of regimes, treaties, and institutions, some of which has clearly informed our current understanding of international climate cooperation. Some major strands of this research are briefly highlighted in the following subsection.

EVALUATING FRAMEWORKS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

Past decades have seen an astounding proliferation of international arrangements in the area of the environment. A widespread perception that these have proven only marginally successful sparked growing interest, both institutional and academic, in the conditions and requirements of improved environmental governance. Over time, this shift in attention from the design of new international environmental arrangements to their evaluation and improvement has elicited a number of individual and collaborative research efforts across academic disciplines, producing a wealth of output and generating intense debate.

In effect, research on the role and consequences of environmental regimes, treaties, and institutions became such a dominant part of the study of international relations at one point that it compelled a scholar to speak of a “veritable growth industry” and a “driving force” in his field (Zürn, 1998: 649). Much of the resulting literature has focused on specific dimensions of regime performance, with the greatest weight being afforded to

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questions of effectiveness, followed by research on economic impacts, fairness, and equity (Mitchell, 2008).

But even within these narrow categories, terms and definitions have varied greatly due to “elusive” (Keohane, 1996: 8; Young et al., 1999: 3) concepts involving “daunting evaluative and analytical problems” (Bernauer, 1995: 352) that have given rise to much “disagreement, both in method and approach and in substantive views” (Kingsbury, 1997: 50). Significant variations in the focus of relevant studies, as well as the distinct intellectual backgrounds and orientation of their authors, have resulted in very different approaches to the measurement of performance in terms of outputs, outcomes, and impacts (Underdal, 2008). Research on the effectiveness of international environmental governance, for instance, was initially prompted by a shared concern about the ability of cooperative arrangements to influence state behavior, and hence focused on issues of regime design and improved compliance management. But definitions of what exactly constitutes “effective” governance differed widely in earlier research, with some authors merely seeking behavioral change or observable political effects,25 while others set the threshold higher by looking for an improvement in—or even resolution of—the situation that necessitated cooperation in the first place.26 Although later research has become more critical in terms of applied methods and concepts (Mitchell, 2008; Underdal, 2008), even a recent shift to more empirical27 and quantitative28 approaches has failed to altogether eliminate some of the more persistent epistemic challenges in the study of regime effectiveness, including identification of the purpose of cooperation and of causal connections between governance systems and subsequent behavioral or physical change (Dai, 2008:158).

While the conceptual limitations of this line of research are thus readily apparent,29 the work to date reflects a sophisticated intellectual effort to determine whether international environmental cooperation plays a role in shaping collective action and social practices. Progress has been made, in particular, when it comes to distinguishing normative and utilitarian motives for state behavior (Young, 2002) and extending the perception of environmental compliance beyond binary treaty observance to a more managerial process focused on clarity, capacity, and priority (Chayes et al., 1995; Brunnée et al., 2002; critically Koskenniemi, 1992: 147), in which soft incentives and facilitation play as much a role as traditional legal coercion (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al., 2009; Skjaerseth et al., 2006). More recently, scholars have responded to the rapid growth in environmental regimes by focusing on regime fragmentation and overlap, discussing options to manage conflicts and leverage synergies between multiple levels of governance and concurrent governance systems (Biermann et al., 2009; Keohane and Victor, 2010; Selin and VanDeveer, 2009).

Overall, there can be little doubt that our comprehension of international environmental cooperation has been greatly advanced, from the earliest stages of diplomatic negotiation to the final application and enforcement of individual arrangements. Nonetheless, studies of regime performance have so far failed to yield a set of clear and robust generalizations about the conditions for successful environmental governance (Young, 2010: 7). In particular, aspects other than compliance and effectiveness, such as economic impacts, fairness, and legitimacy, have received less systematic 25. Greene (1996): 200; Haas et al. (1993): 7 (“observable political effects”); Raustiala et al. (1998): 1; Young (1996): 10 (“behavioural effectiveness”).

26. See, e.g. Carroll (1988): 276 (“when measured against getting the problem solved, and that should be the only real measure”); Endres et al. (2000): 73 (“[u]nter der Wirksamkeit eines Vertrages verstehen wir, daß sein Abschluß . . . zu einer Wohlfahrtssteigerung . . . führt”); Helm et al. (2000): 635 (“perfect regime”); Keohane (1996): 14 (“[t]he proof of effectiveness is to be seen in the improvement of the targeted aspect of the natural environment”); Levy (1996): 395; Oberthür (1997): 47 (“die Verhaltenswirkungen, die im Sinne einer Problemlösung positiv zu bewerten sind”); Raustiala et al. (1998): 1 (ability to “help solve environmental problems”); Susskind (1994): 12 (“tangible environmental improvements”); Young (1994): 3 (“[a]n effective governance system is one that channels behavior in such a way as to eliminate or substantially to ameliorate the problem that led to its creation”); Young (1996): 8–9 (“problem solving” and “goal attainment”); Young et al. (1999): 5.

27. See, e.g., Miles et al. (2002).

28. See, e.g., Breitmeier et al. (2006); Hovi et al. (2003); Mitchell et al. (2006).

29. As Bernauer (1995): 356 has phrased it, “[t]he authors . . . refer almost interchangeably to institutional effect, impact, effectiveness, institutional roles or functions, success or failure, and compliance, as well as to actor behaviour and the state of the natural environment.”

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consideration in the absence of large, integrated research networks (Mitchell, 2008: 93).30 Future work is likely to address such remaining gaps while further improving the clarity and transparency of analysis. Standardized definitions of key concepts, more rigorous comparison of findings across projects and disciplines, and use of advanced methods such as statistical analysis, simulations, and integrated case studies will help aggregate cumulative knowledge about the dynamics that affect regime formation and implementation (Young, 2010: 21–24). In the meantime, however, the research agenda remains heterogeneous, underscoring the earlier assertion that no single approach can capture the diverse ways of looking at international environmental cooperation,31 calling instead for a case by case determination of suitable evaluation criteria.

SURVEY OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON CLIMATE COOPERATION

Where studies have sought to evaluate different options for international climate governance, parallels to the substance and rationale of the foregoing criteria are readily apparent.

To the extent that such analysis has gone beyond the simple dichotomy of “top-down” and “bottom-up” categories, central categories—such as the effectiveness in addressing climate change—recur throughout pertinent literature. Additional criteria are assembled in a more eclectic fashion, with research guided less by systematic considerations and variedly focusing on distributional and economic impacts, regime coherence, institutional capacity, and other considerations held to have an impact on climate governance. In the absence of large-scale coordinated research work, most benchmarks applied to the study of international climate cooperation reflect a more pragmatic and spontaneous approach than comparable research on domestic climate policies and measures, or indeed on international environmental governance. Although offering unquestionable flexibility, this approach to the discussion of alternative governance frameworks again suffers from drawbacks in terms of comparability and systematic accumulation of knowledge. Drawing on brief summaries of relevant literature, the following subsection will seek to identify guiding criteria for the evaluation of international governance options for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Only five research efforts have sought to define such criteria; interestingly, four out of five have been conducted at academic institutions or think tanks in the U.S., and the fifth is directly connected to a project in the U.S. Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures (Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins, 2003) In an early article reviewing the Kyoto Protocol—the fate of which was still unclear at the time the article was written—as well as thirteen alternative policy architectures for international climate cooperation, the authors base their evaluation on six “key performance criteria” (Aldy et al., 2003: 374): • Environmental outcome:32 likely magnitude of environmental outcomes, taking into account temporal delays, leakage effects, and the challenges involved in measuring highly uncertain variables against a counterfactual baseline; • Dynamic efficiency: achievement of maximum aggregate net benefits, covering actions, impacts, benefits, and costs that occur over very long time horizons, and accounting for uncertainties due to the intertemporal nature of the problem; • Cost-effectiveness: least costly means of achieving a given target or goal, regardless of

30. By contrast, where comprehensive research has been undertaken the criteria applied are so far-reaching as to render their subsequent application more difficult outside of the specific project context, see the detailed set of thirty criteria applied by Jacobson et al. (1998): 536, covering the nature of the activity being regulated, the way the regime is designed, the international environment, and the characteristics of the countries that are subject to regulation.

31. See, however, efforts such as the “Oslo-Potsdam Solution” to performance measurement through performance scores, Hovi et al. (2003).

32. The authors point out that, from an economic perspective, measuring dynamic efficiency would obviate this criterion; yet it is nonetheless included, as it better reflects the priorities of some participants in the debate.

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whether it is efficient in terms of the net benefits achieved through this cost; • Equity: distribution of the benefits and costs of policy action, both cross-sectionally and over time, necessitating the identification of international, intranational, and intergenerational distribution effects guided by a subset of criteria including responsibility for the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, ability to pay for response measures, accrual of benefits from policy action, and the trade-off between present distributional and intergenerational equity; • Flexibility: ability to adapt to new information through sequential decision making that facilitates the modification and adaptation of policies as new information reduces uncertainties; and • Participation and compliance: ability to deter free riding behavior through either nonparticipation or noncompliance, taking into account trade-offs between “narrow-butdeep” and “broad-but-shallow” cooperation.

In the remainder of the article, the authors apply the foregoing six criteria to the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative frameworks for climate cooperation proposed in academic literature. None of the assessed frameworks score high on all criteria, leading the authors to identify certain inherent trade-offs in their conclusions (Aldy et al., 2003: 394).

International Climate Efforts beyond 2012: A Survey of Approaches (Bodansky, 2004) For this policy paper prepared on behalf of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, the author proposes general criteria that could be used to evaluate alternative frameworks for international climate cooperation beyond 2012. Unlike the other studies mentioned here, the author distinguishes “policy” and “political” criteria. Policy criteria relate to the intrinsic characteristics of the proposed framework, and include (Bodansky, 2004: 5): • Environmental Effectiveness: primarily relates to the stringency of the surveyed approach, but also includes corollary aspects such as controlling leakage, stimulating long-term technological change, and ensuring adequate enforcement; • Cost-Effectiveness: ability to reduce emissions at lower cost than comparable proposals; • Equity: perception that a proposal is sufficiently equitable or, at the least, not demonstrably unfair; • Dynamic Flexibility: commitments can be scaled up or down, or otherwise modified, to allow easier reassessment and revision in light of new scientific and economic information; and

• Complementarity: facilitates linkages among multiple regimes or approaches.

By contrast, political criteria relate to whether a proposed cooperation framework fits with the political and institutional context, determining the ability to negotiate and implement future climate efforts (Bodansky, 2004: 5–6): • Continuity: ability to build on, or remain within, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol architecture; • Economic Predictability: ability to limit unpredictable cost variables such as economic and population growth, and the rate of technological change; • Compatibility with Development Goals: ability to help advance, rather than compete with, development priorities such as economic growth and poverty reduction; and • Implementability: compatibility with the capabilities and limitations of the institutions on which implementation and compliance will depend, including ease of monitoring and predictability of compliance.

As the author notes, some of the foregoing assessment criteria may be complementary, such as cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness, while others may give rise to

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tensions, for instance, certainty of mitigation cost and certainty of environmental benefit (Bodansky, 2004: 6).

Modeling Economic Impacts of Alternative International Climate Policy Architectures (Bosetti, Carraro, Sgobbi, and Tavoni, 2008) In this discussion paper, a group of Italian authors have sought to provide a quantitative assessment and comparison of competing architectures for climate cooperation beyond 2012.

Drawing on the work conducted in the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, they assess eight possible successors to the Kyoto Protocol based on four criteria (Bosetti et al., 2008: 11–19): • Relative Environmental Effectiveness: degree to which the problems associated with climatic change are addressed, measured as temperature change above pre-industrial levels in 2010; • Economic Efficiency: cost implications of the proposals, measured as changes in Gross World Product (GWP) under each proposal with respect to the status quo over the next century, discounted at a 5 percent discount rate; • Distributional Implications: distribution of the costs and benefits of climate change and climate change policy, assessed by an index that represents the concentration of income between regions of the world, and shows inequality in income distribution at the end of the century; and • Potential Enforceability: degree to which a proposal limits incentives to free ride and is enforceable, measured by changes in global and regional welfare with respect to the status quo.

Based on these indicators and a set of modeling tools, the authors arrive at quantitative scores for each of the foregoing criteria. As part of their conclusions, they submit a number of general recommendations, including the need to strengthen the ambition of all surveyed proposals and the expedience of incorporating gases other than CO2 as well as the forestry sector.

Likewise, they affirm trade-offs between the different criteria, and find that only cooperation on technological research and development will be sufficiently attractive in economic terms to be global and self-enforcing, yet virtually ineffective in addressing climate change (Bosetti et al., 2008: 21).

The Regime Complex for Climate Change (Keohane and Victor, 2010) With this more recent paper drafted for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, the authors draw on their earlier work on regime complexes—defined as loosely coupled sets of specific regimes and hence closer to the concept of a governance “architecture”—and propose evaluating these on the basis of six criteria, with each running from dysfunctional to functional (Keohane and Victor, 2010: 19–20). The criteria are: • Effectiveness: appropriateness of and level of compliance with rules, and ability to thereby create net benefits for members; • Coherence: degree to which the various regimes that form part of the broader climate change regime complex are compatible and mutually reinforcing, as opposed to incompatible and mutually harmful; • Accountability: degree to which relevant audiences, including states, nongovernmental organizations and the public, have the right to hold elements of the regime complex to a set of standards, to judge whether relevant actors have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met; • Determinacy: degree to which rules have a readily ascertainable normative content, reducing uncertainty and thereby improving long-term planning and investment;

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• Sustainability: degree to which elemental regimes represent a coherent equilibrium and are hence politically more stable and resilient to shocks; and • Epistemic quality: consistency between rules and scientific knowledge, and capacity to revise both rules and terms of accountability of decision makers accordingly.

Applying the foregoing criteria to the existing climate change regime complex centered on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the authors conclude that none of the current institutions obtain high rankings on any of the six criteria. In addition, the authors point out that these criteria are particularly useful when applied to a complex of loosely coupled elements rather than a single, integrated scheme.

Designing an International Climate Regime: Moving the UNFCCC Forward (Moncel, Joffe, McCall, and Levin, 2011) In a joint effort to examine proposals “that are relevant to the design of an institutional architecture,” the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) recently conducted a project to survey academic literature as well as proposals by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governments based on a set of criteria that “are necessary for any future regime to be politically, economically, socially, legally, and environmentally sustainable.” Specifically, the project based its assessment on the following criteria: • Adequacy: ability of the regime to effectively elicit and deliver actions by countries in a manner commensurate with the best available scientific information, both with a view to the time frame and the range of measures required; • Equity: perceived legitimacy of an agreement by all parties, encompassing both equity of process and equity of substance; and • Implementation: ability of governments to enforce within their jurisdiction rules agreed nationally or internationally, including the capacity to put rules and regulations into force, to monitor and track adherence to the rules, and to enforce compliance or remedy noncompliance where it arises.

According to the project leaders, the foregoing criteria are “fundamental to ensuring legitimacy and effectiveness of any agreed outcome.” While they acknowledge other criteria could be selected, they affirm their belief that these criteria capture the “essence of a longterm, enduring, and sustainable climate regime” and aim to provide more complete definitions and context behind each definition (Moncel et al., 2011).

INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

As the foregoing subsections have shown, efforts to evaluate alternative frameworks for international environmental governance and climate cooperation share a number of characteristics. Unsurprisingly, both areas of research are guided by the same overarching concern about the ability of governance frameworks to achieve what is typically their primary raison d’être, the alleviation of an environmental challenge. In the literature on alternative climate policy frameworks, the corresponding criteria have different designations, ranging from environmental outcome and environmental effectiveness to level of ambition, but what they have in common is an underlying preoccupation with how cooperation addresses the problem of climate change. In the broader work on the performance of international environmental regimes and institutions, this focus on effectiveness has seen a greater level of differentiation and methodological sophistication, with more recent studies distinguishing the actual achievement of environmental outcomes from the preceding ability to elicit compliance and behavioral change. Of the five surveys of climate policy architectures, four single out this latter aspect to formulate a separate criterion related to implementation, which comprises

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aspects of compliance and enforcement, but also of administrative and financial capacity.

Arguably, this reflects the greater complexity and scale of climate change and of appropriate response measures, at least relative to many other environmental challenges.

In domestic environmental policy, the economic impact of specific instruments features prominently in the debate on their respective merits and shortcomings. For international institutions and regimes, it becomes significantly more difficult to estimate the economic cost of achieving an agreed objective, let alone to measure costs against benefits in an issue area where both are highly uncertain and spread out over an extended period of time, necessitating application of inevitably controversial discount rates. As a result, few studies of the performance of international governance frameworks incorporate an economic criterion, and to the extent they do, they largely limit themselves to broad indicators such as the use of market mechanisms or other flexible approaches. Still, three of the studies proposing criteria for the assessment of climate governance frameworks explicitly mention cost-effectiveness or economic efficiency, and two go even further to calculate aggregate welfare effects of alternative models of cooperation. A fourth study incorporates economic considerations, but rather in terms of the predictability of costs rather than a genuine cost benefit analysis.

Given the changing nature of scientific knowledge about climate change but also the potential for technological innovation and other unforeseen developments, a majority of studies also include aspects of flexibility or adaptability, again resonating with similar work in the broader study of international environmental governance. Likewise, equity concerns—variously defined as the distribution of costs and benefits, fairness, and legitimacy—are mentioned in most studies, reflecting the disproportionate importance these issues have held in the international climate discussion. Of the proposed sets of criteria, two also list regime coherence or complementarity, acknowledging the existence of more than one concurrent forum of cooperation. A related consideration is continuity, that is, the degree to which a cooperation framework can build on existing institutional and regulatory architectures. Surprisingly, only one of the surveyed studies lists participation, that is, the geographic scope and coverage of a climate governance framework. Likewise, only one study each lists the criteria of accountability, development compatibility, determinacy, and sustainability. Finally, one study lists epistemic quality, that is, the consistency of environmental objectives with scientific insights and recommendations, but this may be subsumed under the broader categories of environmental outcome and flexibility. All criteria proposed in the studies surveyed in the foregoing section are listed in Table 1 below.

An Assessment Matrix for International Climate Cooperation Existing surveys of alternative approaches to international climate governance have already devoted significant intellectual effort to defining generally applicable criteria for the evaluation of cooperative frameworks. What is more, they have been, to a greater or lesser extent, able to build on the cumulative insights offered by previous research on the assessment of domestic environmental policy and international environmental governance. Still, the criteria proposed to date in relevant literature are fairly heterogeneous. Only one criterion—environmental effectiveness—is common to all proposals, and even that is characterized by variations in the conceptual definition and scope. Other criteria, such as economic implications and considerations of equity, feature in a majority of studies, but again, their material content varies substantially. Comparisons across surveys are difficult, if not impossible.

What this section attempts to formulate is an assessment matrix comprised of harmonized criteria drawn largely from the existing literature but geared toward a pragmatic approach that avoids speculative or highly uncertain concepts and facilitates application without the need for sophisticated models or datasets. Additionally, it seeks to accommodate the trends apparent in recent international climate cooperation described in the second section, notably the emergence of multiple regimes simultaneously addressing the challenge of global climate

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change, and the shift toward more informal, decentralized approaches to climate governance.

In this new reality of horizontally fragmented multilevel governance, where systemic coherence becomes as much a challenge as balancing narratives of equity with broader (and deeper) participation in global climate efforts, the following assessment matrix can help compare alternative governance options currently proposed by governments, the research community, and other stakeholders.

Table 1: Criteria for the Evaluation of International Climate Cooperation Proposal Criterion

Environmental Effectiveness Environmental Outcome

Implementation Control

Geographic Scope

Economic Implications

Bodansky (2004)

Bosetti et al.

(2008)

Keohane et al.

(2010)

Moncel et al.

(2011)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Aldy et al. (2003)

X

X

Cost Effectiveness X X X 33

Dynamic Efficiency X X (X)

Economic Predictability

X

Impact on Development

Fairness and Legitimacy Equity

Accountability

X X

X

X

Sustainability

X

X

Adaptability 34

Flexibility X X (X)

Epistemic Quality

Structural Aspects

Regime Coherence

Regime Continuity Determinacy

X

X

X

X X

Source: Author, based on Aldy et al. (2003), Bodansky (2004), Keohane and Victor (2010), and Moncel et al. (2011).

Defining a Common Set of Criteria

Drawing on the existing body of literature and also accounting for recent trends in international climate cooperation, the proposed matrix includes the criteria listed in the following subsections.

It bears restating that the selection below neither seeks perfect analytical stringency, nor claims 33. Effectiveness as a criterion is defined as including the ability to “create net benefits for members,” a consideration that factors into dynamic efficiency.

34. Epistemic quality as a criterion also includes an element of flexibility in that it integrates the “capacity to revise . . . rules” in accordance with scientific knowledge.

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to be exhaustive in scope; rather, it hopes to provide a practical framework for the evaluation and comparison of alternative models of climate governance, albeit incorporating the current state of research on the topic, and hence providing some continuity vis-à-vis relevant past efforts. None of these criteria is inherently more important than its counterparts; instead, the importance of each criterion will largely depend on the context and priorities of those applying them, with inevitable trade-offs and a need to balance or give weight to different preferences and expectations.

LEVEL OF AMBITION

As in the domestic context, international climate governance is not an end upon itself. A central measure of any governance framework should be its ability to address the challenges that gave rise to it. In the case of climate cooperation, the primary benchmark can be defined as the suitability of a regime or institution to contribute to the mitigation of climate change and, given the increasingly evident inevitability of some measure of atmospheric warming, the adaptation to its impacts. Unlike most previous studies, however, including the substantial body of research into the performance of international environmental regimes and institutions, it is submitted here that any attempt to capture the expected impacts of a climate cooperation architecture ex ante, that is, before actual implementation, is by necessity highly speculative or dependent on the availability of extremely sophisticated modeling capacities and data. As past research has amply shown, even an ex post evaluation still faces rigorous challenges in terms of establishing causality and assigning outcomes in an issue area as complex as climate change governance. What is more, identifying the desired or intended environmental outcome is frequently difficult given other competing aspirations, explicit or tacit, of the respective governance framework (Mitchell, 2008: 94).

For the foregoing reasons, the criterion proposed here is “level of ambition,” defined as the ambition of objectives set out under a cooperative framework vis-à-vis accepted mitigation and adaptation imperatives. It is an essentially normative criterion and avoids the discussion about whether changes in state behavior are simply reflections of underlying power structures in international society or whether regimes and institutions exercise significant influence in their own right (Mearsheimer, 1994). When it comes to climate change mitigation, for instance, the level of ambition can be assessed based on the declared objectives of cooperation.

As an external benchmark, the evaluation could draw on widely agreed goals, such as the decision recently endorsed by the international community in Cancun to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above preindustrial levels.35 Rather than relying on a static benchmark, however, it may be preferable to measure the ambition of objectives against evolving scientific recommendations, thereby incorporating an element of flexibility and improving the epistemic merits of this criterion.

Ultimately, “level of ambition” is thus not so much a criterion aimed at predicting environmental or behavioral outcomes with mathematical precision, but rather a “first approximation surrogate for effectiveness” (Chayes et al., 1993: 176). Defined this way, it comes to encompass the criteria of environmental outcome and epistemic quality listed in Table 1 above.

COMPLIANCE FACILITATION AND CONTROL

Because the achievement of an agreed objective is intrinsically linked to the design of the accompanying cooperation framework, the evaluation will also need to factor in aspects such as the clarity and determinacy of commitments, the robustness of incentives for compliance, the mechanisms—whether facilitative or coercive—to address noncompliance, as well as the provisions set out to ensure sufficient transparency of efforts undertaken by participants. It 35. See Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011 (“Cancun Agreements”), para. 4. In the context of adaptation, no similar benchmarks have been defined, except perhaps the decision to provide certain financial transfers through mechanisms such as the Adaptation Fund, see also OECD (2008): 27.

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is also here where the legal nature of commitments and procedures—binding or voluntary— can be subsumed, without prejudice to whether legally binding commitments are more likely to promote compliance or deter their adoption in the first place. And while the domestic capacities of regime participants are not initially a consequence of the regime design, provisions to address capacity constraints and promote capacity building may count toward the overall ambition of a regime or institution. Similarly, experience suggests that procedures to ensure accountability and stakeholder participation are likely to help achievement of the objectives of cooperation and should be taken into consideration when assessing the level of ambition. Under this definition, “compliance facilitation and control” incorporates the criteria of implementation control, accountability, and determinacy listed in Table 1 above.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Ambitious objectives and procedures to ensure their achievement are necessary, but not sufficient, criteria for the performance of a governance framework. Increasingly, climate cooperation involves sophisticated responses and mechanisms that call for some form of institutional capacity, be it to monitor implementation by participants, perform procedural functions, or facilitate the operation of regime elements. For instance, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have seen the creation of an infrastructure with proprietary resources and a staff of several hundred experts,3636bringing technical knowledge, an institutional memory, and professional routines to the climate negotiations and specific regime elements, such as the carbon market established by the flexibility mechanisms. Another aspect that can be considered in this context is the relevance of climate change to the mandate of an institutional architecture: Would climate change be its central focus or merely one of many competing issues to which institutional and political resources are allocated? To some extent, this criterion encompasses aspects of regime continuity and implementation proposed by the studies listed in Table 1 previously.

PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSIVENESS

Given the projected emission trends around the world, long-term stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations will not be achieved or will only be achieved at an unacceptably high level of emissions or cost, unless there is sufficiently broad participation in cooperative efforts to address climate change (OECD, 2009: 23–24). In particular, all major emitters—including most developed and many emerging economies—would need to be included in a future climate architecture to effectively mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, if only some countries or regions participate in the cooperative framework, certain sectors of the economy—such as energy-intensive industries—in those countries or regions would be at a disadvantage relative to their competitors in excluded countries, resulting in political pressures and an increased risk of emissions leakage, where emission reduction in participating countries may be offset by higher emissions in others. Past experience suggests there is a tradeoff between broad participation and level of ambition; yet because participation in international environmental regimes is voluntary, there is a tendency to create arrangements that are shallow when measured by substance so as to make them palatable to all the relevant actors (Young, 2010: 16). This criterion takes up the notion of geographic scope included in Table 1 above.

SYSTEMIC COHERENCE

With the growing number of distinct regimes active in the area of climate change, concerns about potential interactions, such as an overlap of activities and mandates, are acquiring increased weight. As recent studies have observed, international cooperation on climate 36. According to the UNFCCC secretariat, its staff of “around 500 international civil servants works towards the UNFCCC’s goals. . . . Among other things, the staff supports climate change negotiations, organizes meetings and analyses and reviews climate change information and data reported by parties,” see UNFCCC, 2010.

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change can range along a continuum in which one extreme is a comprehensive and integrated governance system for the entire issue area and the other extreme is total fragmentation (Keohane et al., 2010). Conflicts and tensions between different institutional arrangements can potentially compromise the effectiveness of cooperation. At the same time, properly integrated regimes will ideally complement each other and leverage synergies (van Asselt, 2011). This underscores the need to ensure some level of coordination between institutions, for instance by adopting mandates that specify clear and separate responsibilities, or by including conflict clauses and procedures that address potential overlaps.

But systemic coherence is not purely an issue at the level of institutions active in the area of climate policy: Regimes may also interact with each other at a material or conceptual level, be it horizontally between regimes devoted to different issue areas such as climate change and international trade or vertically at different levels of implementation. On the latter, because climate policies and measures ultimately have to be carried out and enforced at the domestic level, successful cooperation frameworks need to take into account potential interactions with local or regional rules and institutions. Again, however, a trade-off may exist between high levels of integration and more loosely organized, flexible cooperation. Typically, integrated arrangements will be more cumbersome and time-consuming to establish and more apt to entail compromises that dilute the content of their substantive provisions (Young, 2010: 12). “Systemic coherence� also incorporates aspects of flexibility and regime coherence mentioned in Table 1.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY

Perceptions of equity and fairness are clearly important for the acceptance of and adherence to a cooperative governance framework. Likewise, the expected economic burden and the distribution of costs and benefits will have a strong influence on whether regime participants are willing to enter cooperative efforts in the first place and whether the regime is sustainable in the medium and long term. Both dimensions involve inherently contingent, epistemologically complex, and highly debatable considerations. Any definition of fairness, for instance, will be invariably contingent on a number of assumptions and preferences and cannot be adequately Table 2: Assessment Matrix for the Evaluation of International Climate Cooperation Frameworks Level of Ambition High

Medium

Low

Compliance Facilitation and Control Strong

Medium

Weak

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Low

Institutional Capacity High Participation and Inclusiveness Systemic Coherence Political and Economic Feasibility Source: Author

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captured through anything but the most differentiated and concrete (e.g., survey-based) conceptual framework. Likewise, cost benefit analyses require essentially contested decisions on how to value current and future benefits of adaptation and mitigation, the application of controversial discount rates, as well as calculations of distant, highly uncertain costs. For these reasons, the proposed assessment matrix (see Table 2) includes a broader and more intuitive category of “political and economic feasibility,” which loosely incorporates the criteria of cost-effectiveness and dynamic efficiency, equity, and sustainability listed in Table 1.

Conclusion No single approach to the study of an area as complex as international climate cooperation can hope to capture all variables or anticipate future trends and emerging priorities. What the foregoing exercise has attempted is to build on a survey of approaches to the evaluation of environmental governance frameworks, both at the domestic and the international level, and propose a uniform assessment matrix for alternative approaches to climate cooperation.

In so doing, it has singled out six criteria that capture and expand on the central tenets of existing research: level of ambition, provisions for compliance facilitation and control, institutional capacity, participation and inclusiveness, systemic coherence, and political and economic feasibility.

Only the application of this matrix to existing and proposed climate governance frameworks will determine whether the proposed criteria offer a suitable benchmark for the evaluation and comparison of contending climate architectures, regimes, and institutions. Given the dynamic proliferation of existing and proposed venues to advance climate governance, such a framework would seem timely and, hopefully, useful. But as always, this first attempt to systematize further inquiry marks only one stage in an ongoing and open intellectual process.

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Managing Climate Change: The Africa Group in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations

by Anesu Makina, University of Pretoria This paper aims to add to the growing body of knowledge regarding climate change negotiations and the role of African countries. Utilizing regime theory as a foundation, it provides a firm backdrop against which the political economy of climate change management is discussed especially as it pertains to African countries. The premise of this paper is that owing to the structure of the international climate change regime, African countries are disenfranchised. In an endeavor to unpack elements of this marginalization, the capacity of the Africa Group is examined. The paper concludes that a solid continental framework complemented with endogenous resources is an important step in strengthening the international climate change architecture.

Introduction and Background Africa as a continent has received ample attention in relation to climate change, more specifically adaptation, and is often depicted as a helpless victim. As one reviews literature on the governance structures pertaining to climate change, therein lies a dearth of information on Africa, which is often lumped under the broad group of developing countries or the south in spite of its unique needs. A reason for this paucity could be attributed to Africa’s position as a recipient, not formulator, and a victim, not participant, of responses that will affect future generations of its citizenry. It has been suggested the continent has set itself up in a manner that it can be marginalized and altogether ignored. Unlike emerging developing countries that are of strategic importance to developed countries, Africa can only receive attention if it puts forward a compelling case (Mumma 2001). The emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa pose a threat to the atmosphere with regard to their increasing global emissions, and some small island countries will cease to exist in a few decades. These states receive prominence in climate change architecture so much that negotiations hinge on their ability to commit to future regulation.

Climate change makes for an interesting study because of the wide varying issue linkages that are handled. There are a number of competing aspects in the arena of environment diplomacy such as deforestation, trade, GHGs, development, disaster management, energy, business—these issues have also been dealt with in separate forums, through organizations with divergent mandates to those of the UNFCCC. It must be noted that climate change is novel in that it is predominantly governed through a convention-protocol model as opposed to an organization. This, however, has not hindered the operationalization of a climate change regime. Proponents of the UNFCCC purport that the necessity of the institution for organization has proved an overwhelmingly stronger response than nations showing strong interest (Glover 2006).

In terms of genesis, global interest in climate change has gained considerable traction in the international development arena since the first World Climate Conference in 1979. A breakthrough conference held in 1988 in Toronto, Canada, preceded the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which culminated in the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC, whose ultimate goal is to stabilize

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greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere, was an important step in committing to the fight against climate change (Article 2, UNFCCC). Of the then fifty-three African countries, forty-seven signed the convention in Rio de Janeiro, thereby demonstrating tremendous support and commitment. As of September 2000, it had been ratified by fifty-one African states (UNFCCC 2001). The UNFCCC was expanded through the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997, which ran through 2012. Under this protocol, Annex 1 or “developed” countries (including the Eastern European “economies in transition”) are encouraged to reduce their GHG emissions, and a subset of states are required to assist (through financial, scientific, and technology transfer support) developing countries (also referred to as non-Annex 1 countries) to adopt more climate-friendly technologies as well as to adapt to the impacts of climate change (Richards 2001). The current status of the global climate change architecture involves state parties working toward a post-2012 regime in order to secure a deal that will be agreeable and equitable to all. Climate change management is a huge undertaking that will require constant changes, adjustments, and “tweaks” as it were, in accordance to the changing status of signatory parties and the emergence of new scientific developments. Climate change management can be viewed from different aspects and pillars such as provision of financial assistance or enforcing compliance to treaties. This paper which takes a normative view that climate change should be governed in a manner that is equitable, and will deal with the aspects of the international climate change regime as the overarching system of administration.

Although negotiations are the main focus of this analysis, there is an acknowledgment that global negotiations are associated with the formation and development of regimes. Mathaison (2007a) contends that regime theory provides an excellent structure to organize what happens on the inside of an international public sector institution and is particularly useful for investigating complex processes such as climate change negotiations. Regimes are defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. With relevance to developing countries, iterative functionalism is also a good way of understanding the negotiation process because it accommodates the notion that regimes are not static, there is the continuous replication and gradual refinement of rules, procedures” (Feldman 1995).

The paper, which is premised on the basis that African countries are disenfranchised in global climate change management structures, endeavors to examine the capacity of the Africa Group within the context of international climate change negotiations. It asserts that African countries should proactively seek to strengthen their negotiating methods to suit individual situations irrespective of whether or not the current regime adequately accommodates their needs and concerns. Of the variety of perspectives that could be taken to analyze this topic, the interaction of African countries with the UNFCCC climate change negotiations was sufficient enough to rouse attention and pique interest further.

This paper is a limit analysis of the current challenges that African delegates face in their navigation of the international climate change regime. It utilizes information from researcher observation made during COP-15 as well as desktop (secondary) data. In particular, there will be an examination of the structure of international climate change negotiations and the role it (structure) plays in limiting or aiding African country delegates. It will analyze capacity challenges with which African countries have historically dealt with and probe how the dynamics within the group of African countries (and its structure thereof) play a role in the group’s ability to negotiate in unison. Because the successful influence of any negotiating group is context dependent, this study delimited to the meetings and conferences mentioned in this paper.

The North-South Divide With reference to multilateral negotiations of the many divisions among negotiators, one of the most marked has been that between the north and the south. Barriers that impede efforts to formulate an equitable, sustainable solution to climate change lie in the conflict between

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these two broad groups. Although not inherent to negotiations, inequality is fairly ubiquitous.

The notion of the north-south divide is more than a binary distinction between haves and have nots. The south wishes to not only have economic development but also a say in political decisions that affect its future. This is especially true in the case of multilateral negotiations; the notion of north-south is not only about economic poverty but about the poverty of influence (Najam 2005). Climate change management still requires all players to have a comparable voice through voting structure and the outcomes (Feldman 1995). This will possibly ensure more robust outcomes because there is a tendency for multilateral negotiations to be limited in effectiveness because of their frequently sluggish pace combined with diplomatic strategies such as lowest common denominator measures, and double standards provisions. Indeed, the poorest and most vulnerable groups are likely to be at the receiving end of policy responses to climate change. They have not been given a choice about whether or not to adapt, yet for a number of reasons fall behind in making processes (Adger et al. 2006).

Resultantly, equity debates have historically hindered the successful conclusion to negotiations; this divide is linked to the proposed policy responses. The south’s arguments have developed around the principle of “common, but differentiated responsibilities� (Article 3, UNFCCC). While industrialized countries generally agree that responsibilities to combat climate change should be common, developing countries stress the viewpoint of differentiated (Kasa et al. 2008). Where the poorer south views climate change as a development issue, the richer north views climate change as an environmental issue. Moreover, the north, in official texts, has recognized its historical irresponsible use of the atmosphere.

It is the compensation schemes that are currently being contested. Where the north prefers market-based economically framed solutions in the form of buying and selling carbon, the south proposes solutions ranging from financial compensation to agreements that do not bind it to future emissions reductions (Newell 2000 and Gupta 2000). Throughout international efforts to tackle global warming, the south has maintained that solutions must not hinder its ability to develop, an important point because institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program are working to halt and even reverse poverty.

Because the UNFCCC is not an institution, the onus is on various intergovernmental bodies to feed into its processes.

Political Economy of South in International Climate Change Negotiations Political economy is defined here as the processes by which ideas, power, and resources are conceptualized, negotiated, and implemented by different groups at different scales (Tanner and Allouche 2011). In the case of multilateral negotiations, this takes place within the framework of global governance architecture, defined as the overarching system of public and private institutions, regimes, principles, and norms that regulate decision-making procedures (Biermann et al. 2010). It is a structure that allows for a variety of actors to utilize different capabilities in order to increase their effectiveness and influence the process to their advantage.

Because global governance is a political process that is often guided by economic interests, a political economy analysis will be a reoccurring thread in this paper. Perhaps ironically, climate change as an overarching issue relegates control of individual states to a global system.

By simply controlling its own behavior, a state cannot protect itself from the effects of climate change hence the need for coordinated efforts through a regime. Of the many functions that the climate change regime has been tasked with, the most salient of these roles at this stage is the negotiations. Mathiason (2007b) posited a number of functions of a regime, these include: regime creation (including negotiations and modifying an international system), mobilization of information, and norm enforcement. According to Auer and Racine (2001), a multilateral negotiation is determined by a series of elements such as the convening organization and its own internal configuration, the formal and tacit rules that apply to the negotiation process, the emergence of coalitions, the roles assigned to the presidency, the Secretariat, ad-hoc groups

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and commissions, and the time factor, i.e., whether negotiations are a one-time event or a recurring process.

Negotiations in the context of multilateral environmental agreements can be defined as a decision-making procedure with which one or more parties have shared interests and others are opposed and in which one party’s utility in the outcome depends on the other parties’ courses of action (Skodvin 1993). This analysis begins with the recognition that the south remains a key but reluctant actor in global environmental policy whose ability to influence global environmental processes has remained severely constrained by its self-perception of marginalization and its capacity limitations (Najam 2005). Theoretically, treaties, conventions, and protocols have input from each participating nation; with respect to African countries, it might be argued that decisions are predominantly by consensus. In international negotiations, states have the decision-making power over both contents of decisions and over procedural issues (Corell and Betsill 2001), and, in theory, each country has an equal vote and equal participation is equivalent to equality of power (Fisher and Green 2004).

In practice, situations unfold differently, and this paper will illustrate how. Structure is at many times the cause of inefficient and undesirable outcomes. To assess capacity or lack of, it is imperative to have understanding of the structure of the UNFCCC negotiations, because it has a direct impact on how the various actors can maximize their impact within this complex architecture.

The UNFCCC The formal negotiations of the UNFCCC take place in the Conference of Parties (COP) plenary sessions and in meetings of the two subsidiary bodies. The COP presidency is rotated and it is customary for the host country to preside. COPs are heavily choreographed in advance to prevent spontaneous debates that may erupt due to the size and diversity of the delegates.

Whilst it is important to have diverse voices representing their views, numerous voices may also be disruptive to the process of consensus building.

The COP bureau has two officers from each region. It has been observed that those able to articulate their position with evidence may be able to swing a position in their favor especially because the decision-making procedures at the COPs are indeterminate (Depledge 2005 and UNFCCC 2000).

The COP also serves as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of the Kyoto Protocol in which all the parties to the convention can participate as observers but cannot vote unless they are parties to the protocol (UNFCCC, 2000). Organizing negotiations for over 180 states is no easy feat. Coupled with the numerous tracks and themes that are for discussion, most of the actual negotiations take place informally in contact groups, “corridor groups,” expert consultations, and informal workshops. Decisions in multilateral conferences are rarely the result of a vote. They are reflective of consensus among a large number of parties, while the others do not categorically oppose (Auer and Racine 2001). There are smaller groups which are constructed by the COP president and subsidiary body chairs to prepare, reframe, and redefine text in order to develop consensus. These groups are presided over by what have been titled “friends of the chair” (Richards 2001 and Depledge 2005). The (few) selected “friends of the chair” represent groups of countries and negotiate the actual wording of the decisions. This process has been deemed as undemocratic, because many a time the friends of the chair will ultimately prioritize their own country’s interests. If this happens, the input of national delegations is very limited, as is the role of the Secretariat of the UNFCCC and other UN bodies. Voting and membership are also critical in exercising influence. The weight and number of votes are an important consideration, as is membership on committees, expert groups, and boards. This is where coalitions and negotiating blocs become important (Green and Chambers 2006).

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How Developing Countries Negotiate One of the most important structural features of multilateral negotiations is the emergence of coalitions. Coalitions form because they allow their members to exert more influence in a negotiation than they could as individual participants (Auer and Racine 2001). An analysis of the capacity of developing countries in multilateral negotiations would be incomplete without a section on the coalitions. African countries negotiate through the Group of 77 + China (G77) and through the Africa Group. There are also smaller powerful coalitions such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC), least developing countries (LDC), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The G77 and Africa Group will be the main coalitions distinguishing to this paper.

The G77 + China South-south cooperation is particularly visible with the UNFCCC negotiations, with the most important developing country coalition being the G77. Established in 1964 to promote the collective economic interests of developing countries and increase their negotiating powers.

It consisted of 130 developing countries in December 2009. African countries participate in international negotiations through the G77, although country groups and delegations often negotiate in their own capacity and within these coalitions.

The G77 is the largest and most diverse bloc of countries consisting of both converging and diverging views. In order to accommodate dissonant interests, the group’s positions are usually stated in general rather than specific terms and are normally the aggregate sum of the viewpoints of its members in order to enhance the group’s influence in international negotiations (Kasa et al. 2008). Due to a variance in policy preferences, the G77 is flexible with their positions, this being an issue of pertinence to their overall effectiveness (Gupta 2000a and Najam et al. 2003). For example, due to conflicting policy preferences on the clean development mechanism (CDM)1 during the initial negotiations, more advanced developing economies believed they could benefit from this market-based mechanism for emissions trading suggested under the Kyoto Protocol. China and India wanted the CDM to include nuclear energy projects to support the energy needs of their increasing populations.

The AOSIS was strongly opposed to such an inclusion due to their negative experiences with nuclear testing. African-country delegations on the other hand argued that there were few benefits for them implementing CDM, because their region’s energy consumption was less than 3 percent of global energy resources. Consequently, the G77 position papers on the CDM were phrased to leave fundamental differences on this all-so-important matter (Chasek and Rajamani 2002). This inability to have a concrete policy position translates in the failure to move debates forward to a resolution. As such, the group tends to react to specific suggestions put forward by Annex I Parties rather than leading the debate by proposing detailed measures (Frost 2001).

Obstacles to negotiating within G77 include the delineation of policies and positions to those adopted by the group. With the generalist nature of the G77 position, it is important that each country campaign for its own voice because even within this coalition, there are winners and losers—weaker countries may be marginalized at this macro level (Green and Chambers 2006). Although countries can choose to intervene independently in debate situations, solidarity with the group is important. Irrespective of the internal (G77) voting procedures, delegates will always have the right to address the floor, introduce proposals, and negotiate text. However, due to the limited individual capacities of delegates from smaller developing countries, these same delegates may be unable to exercise power or influence the discussions 1. The most important “flexible mechanism” for developing countries is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created under Article 12. This allows investment by Annex 1 countries in climate change mitigation projects in non-Annex 1 (developing) countries in exchange for “Certified Emission Reductions” that can be set against emission reduction targets. CDM projects should also meet sustainable development criteria.

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of multilateral policy-making (Frost 2001). Perhaps one of the more important obstacles of negotiating with the G77 coalition is that the group spends more time opposing than proposing. While this strategy allows for blocking and preventing unfavorable policies, it does not give room for advantageous proposals (Green 2004).

African countries formed a large majority of G77 countries at COP-15 and often had to struggle through many layers in order for the texts to reflect their concerns. Although clearly very vulnerable on account of climatic conditions and extreme poverty, delegations of larger developing economies such as China and India have been drawing attention to their own vulnerabilities, which differ greatly from those of most African countries. Even wealthy oil exporting countries have argued for compensation of costs to be incurred in adapting to a reduced global demand for oil (Kasa et al. 2008). African countries still negotiate through the G77: First, individual developing country negotiators that are not considered “big players” or included among the “friends of the chair” have limited influence outside coalitions. A big group can influence decisions via pressure or even boycott (Yamin and Depledge 2004; and Depledge 2005). Second, developing countries are reluctant to lose their “south vs. north” voice. The G77 offers “protection in numbers.” This dynamic is advantageous for disenfranchised delegations as they benefit through networking within the alliance. The negotiation process itself can be daunting, especially balancing political and economical interests (Yamin and Depledge 2004; Depledge 2005; Frost 2001; Richards 2001).

While under some circumstances working in unison within the confines of a large coalition provides immense bargaining power, it may be more convenient to separate to take advantage of the internal similarities and differences (Caparrós et al. 2004). For continental actors, this is where the usefulness of the coalition of African countries comes into play. African countries, when working in unity toward a common position have in some instances managed to achieve success.

The Africa Group The Africa Group, also known as the African Group, is a coalition of African states that works through the G77 in order to negotiate the best possible decisions for the continent. It is the only active regional group that participates in international environmental negotiations.

It has been highlighted by experts that developing country negotiators often enter meetings and forums without clear political directives from their relevant governments; this notion was termed a hallow mandate (Richards 2001). This was a challenge until recently when the continent strengthened its climate change architecture with positive results for the Africa Group.

The African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) is the current structure that guides the group and is a permanent forum where African ministers of environment discuss matters of relevance to the environmental affairs of the continent. The conference is convened every second year (UNEP 2009). The mandate and priorities of AMCEN are translated into a continental position which is presented to international environmental meetings by the African Group of Negotiators. This group of people is tasked with representing their own country positions, the continental position, and of course that of the G77. The position known as the African Common Position on Environment and Development (Common Position) was initially adopted in 1989 and focused on poverty eradication and environment as two intertwined issues (Eleri 1997). More recently, the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) was formed. It is important to note that 2009 was the first time the African Union (AU) presented a clear signal to the continent and the world that it had reached an African consensus on the issues of climate change, an important step given that the mandate to all representatives was now clear (Hoste 2009 and African Union/AMCEN 2009).

Understanding Capacity: How Has the Africa Group Fared so Far? The significance of climate to African economies in contrast to its insignificance in clout

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within the global regime is a cause of concern to scholars and policy makers alike. It was argued by Mumma (2001) that the Africa Group has struggled to demonstrably articulate an African position in the Climate Change Convention negotiations. An African position can be described as one that articulates Africa’s unique interests in the negotiations.

Furthermore, concern over the excessive influence of powerful nations such as China and India has been consistent with suggestions of U.S. hegemony (Glover 2006). This has seen climate games as synonymous with energy games, a direct contrast to the broader continental interests of development.

The struggles to promote the African agenda in negotiations can be attributed to participation. Participation (or voice) does not necessarily result in influence, but it is an essential precondition. These separate considerations are often conflated, yet it is the need to deepen and broaden the participation of delegations of poorer countries that will provide a contusive environment for reaching a fair, equitable, and legitimate agreement on climate change (Green 2004).

This aspect of participation is referred to as disenfranchisement, defined as the inability to both participate in and/or influence agenda setting and decision making in international regimes for sustainable development. Disenfranchisement has in the past resulted in latent energy being released then imploding into numerous debates about equity at all levels including the future of those most vulnerable to climate change impacts. In multilateral negotiations, all countries are afforded the same rights under international law, are recognized as sovereign nations, and are free to negotiate agreements with other nations. In this case, the major constraint is that some countries lack the authority to influence agenda setting or to affect outcomes (Fisher and Chambers 2006).

A number of factors rooted in the lack of endogenous resources account for African delegates’ disenfranchisement in international climate change negotiations. These were illuminated by Page (2004, 2003), Frost (2001), Richards (2001), Gupta (2000b), Fisher and Green (2004), Mumma (2001), Chasek and Rajamani (2002), and Minang (2009), and include the following items.

Delegation Size Many African country delegations are comprised of fewer people than those of more developed countries. This, in part, is because the bulk of the attendance is funded from the two air tickets availed to developing country delegates by the UNFCCC. After the AOSIS, the Africa Group has one of the smallest negotiating capacities in real numbers (Richards 2001 and Mumma, 2001). Minang in 2009 observed the delegation sizes of different negotiating groups—there were about one to four African negotiators against the fifties for the U.S. and ten for the EU (Minang 2009). Similar numbers were observed by Mumma in 1997 (Mumma 2001).

Size matters at COPs, as there are several meetings taking place concurrently. Small or oneperson delegations prevent attendance at multiple, simultaneous sessions/working groups.

Additionally, conference venues are vast in size and meetings take place after each other so a smaller delegation means a negotiator attending a meeting in one part of the venue has to rush across to the other side to make another meeting, possibly arriving tired and/or late. Because of the intensity of the meetings, a smaller delegation is also accompanied by fewer support staff so negotiators can often be exhausted and alienated.

Delegation Composition African delegations habitually negotiate in isolation, without sufficient support from their countries. Richer delegations may be accompanied by policy makers and scientists who can decipher the complex technical language, its implications to national priorities, and provide supporting evidence. Richer delegations often include technical and resource persons such as lawyers who can interpret legal language and procedures. This is advantageous in regard to

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challenging decisions by the chair—countries that lack similar support may miss opportunities to make appropriate interventions.

Lack of Familiarity on How Negotiations Are Done Previous sections of this paper synthesized the structure of negotiations and illustrated how complex the proceedings are, especially for novice participants. Delegates (state and NGO) usually require assistance in understanding the procedures and working of the negotiations before they may participate meaningfully. Within the climate change regime, many African delegations struggle due to internal reasons including civil service rotation, recruitment into civil society/intergovernmental organizations, and poor coordination.

Science versus Diplomacy—Lack of Research to Support Position The general lack of dedicated human and financial resources to the climate change agenda on the African continent means negotiators are unable to make evidence-based contributions since effects are country specific. It is easier to gain consensus if verifiable research is presented. Much of the research on developing countries is conducted by foreign researchers through NGOs who, although well meaning, may not churn out specific data sets because of their own organizational mandates. African countries spend less on domestic research compared to other regions across the world. Gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) comparable data indicates that Africa as a whole accounted for 0.6% share of world GERD in 2000: SSA 0.4%, and Arab states in Africa 0.1%. Other regional figures are Asia at 30.5%, Oceania at 1.1%, Latin America and the Caribbean at 2.9%, Europe at 27.2% and North America at 37.7% (Teng-Zeng 2009).

Other Technical Issues There are technical challenges specific to some African country delegations. These include slow or lack of Internet, which limits access to networks that can serve as information resources and powerful contacts. Language barriers sometimes affect effectiveness where, although many African countries are Anglophone, the Francophone and Lusophone countries are occasionally disadvantaged during small contact groups and late-night sessions that are normally held in English as opposed to the plenary sessions, which are translated into all six official UN languages.

Financial constraints manifest themselves at the COPs where the EU and U.S. have “manned stands” and “side events” (Mumma 2001). At COP-15, years on from when Mumma made his observations, only two African countries, Ethiopia and Malawi, had manned stands.

There were a negligible number of African institutions that had stands out of many organizations that provided an African view internationally. Based on my observations, it was also rare to find Africans presenting at panels during side events organized by others, and often Africa was included in those presentations on “southern perspectives,” despite its unique challenges.

Some of these matters outlined above speak directly to the reality that the state has a primary role to play in this process, and the climate-change regime will have to do much more to bridge the equity gap.

More important than the capacity matters outlined above is the structure of the Africa Group, which has played a pivotal role in recent negotiations, particularly at COP-15. The result was fragmentation and the inability for Africa to sing in unison, consequently reversing all the preparations made by the group ahead of this all-important conference.

Politics of the Africa Group As with all diverse negotiating coalitions, the Africa Group is not immune from politics. It is the inability to transcend the politics and disagreements that is of interest to this paper.

Furthermore, if a regional institution or regime is to be created and maintained, the very basis of the variances needs to be unpacked in order to form an operational continental system. This

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will ensure that African countries will strengthen their negotiating methods to suit individual situations irrespective of whether or not the current regime adequately accommodates their needs and concerns.

Singlehandedly, the issue of sheer numbers prerequisites disunity and poses coordination challenges irrespective of institutional support. However, the main causes of fragmentation within the group are policy positions on climate change, which vary according to whether the state is classified as a small island state; a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); a Least Developed Country (LDC) of which the bulk of the African countries are a part; or in the case of South Africa, listed as the eleventh largest emitter of GHG emission globally and the largest contributor on the continent. It has been observed that those few countries that fall under different (stronger) negotiating blocs are powerful and influential enough to derail and weaken the ability of the Africa Group to have one negotiating position and one voice. Despite these differences, there has been recorded success.

The most pronounced case within global environmental negotiations where the Africa Group performed resourcefully was at the negotiations on the Convention on Biological Diversity that resulted in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The delegation, led by a leading Ethiopian scientist, premised its arguments on solid scientific findings from the perspective of Ethiopia, one of the most biodiverse countries in the world (Rosendal 2000). Through scholarship, Africa came prepared with progressive positions, such as no patents on living materials and the recognition of community rights. As part of these negotiations, developing countries did not want unregulated genetic engineering added to their biodiversity. The U.S. was particularly opposed to such an agreement because of the implications on its biotechnology industry.

However, developing countries, especially those in Africa, contain the majority of the world’s biodiversity (about 75 percent of it), therefore, they could exclude those who were not directly affected by this problem and command either their support or sympathy. Most scientific work on biodiversity takes place on the continent, resulting in African countries and those based at those institutions having relative power in discussions (Fisher and Green 2004). This strengthened the G77’s negotiating positions, because Africa had a solid agenda. Despite the political strength of the U.S., civil society actors and the scientific community supported the Africa Group and, strengthened by the G77, there was some degree of success for the continent’s biosafety.

It can be concluded that the Africa Group was successful in achieving some of its objectives. To go and succeed against powerful countries such as the U.S. that had great stakes in protocol is indeed an achievement and a prime reason why this example has been studied extensively, especially from the perspective of NGOs that were present at these negotiations.

The Africa Group, having entered the negotiations from beginning, set and framed the agenda and saw it through to the end. Moreover, in this instance, the Africa Group organized itself and transcended above internal politics, something that should be done in the UNFCCC. The limitation of this example is that biodiversity is less complex in comparison to climate change, which encompasses multiple issues. Climate change is a global commons issue whereas biodiversity and desertification can be governed by individual states and in effect require little external effort and cooperation. The biodiversity negotiations and the current climate change architecture in regard to strategy employed by the Africa Group have some similarities, and there is potential for emulation.

So, How Has the African Group Fared? An Analysis It has been argued by some scholars that Africa was one of the most united groups at COP-15 and articulated its position very well as a result of over a decade of polishing the common position (Masters 2010). The matters highlighted in the previous section paint a dire picture of prospects of success for this group but these constraints are highlighted only because the Africa Group has failed to implement a foolproof strategy. Indeed, strategy goes further in negotiations and bargaining than endogenous resources. It has been established that developed

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countries tend to use realist and constructive negotiating strategies whereas developing countries, because of a range of limitations, resort to defensive tactics (Richards 2001).

This paper has noted that scholars have proposed the deepening of participation by developing countries. Part of this process would be to enable delegates from these countries to be proactive rather than reactive. For a coalition to be successful, Wagner (1999) observed that negotiation analysts tend to focus their attention to early negotiation stages as the key point for setting the stage for integrative outcomes. In a breakdown of the phases of negotiations to ascertain when each actor is relevant and influential, developing country delegates tend to be active toward the end of the processes when the least amount of influence can be exerted (Chasek 1997). Drawing from political economy theory, reasons for participation in negotiations can be twofold. From an economic aspect, governments need to explore how best to address the difficulties that climate change will bring. There is also the need to negotiate a deal that will open new funding and investment opportunities. Politically, the participation of African countries legitimizes the process by making it truly international. These are perhaps the underlying reasons for Africa’s continued engagement despite difficulties faced.

Nevertheless, criticisms of regime theory hold true in relevance to the struggles to strike a climate change settlement in that the theory relies too heavily on positivism and the predilection for approving procedure at the expense of substantial failure and effectiveness (Glover 2006). When procedure fails, some groups focus on alternative methods such as protest to get their point across. This strategy has been employed numerous times in many negotiations and was successful at the Barcelona climate talks in November 2009, the last milestone on the road to COP-15. According to media reports, the Africa Group walked out of the negotiations as there was insufficient progress in the talks on developed country emission reduction targets.

Of particular concern was the refusal of Annex 1 countries to adopt strong(er) climate change targets, with developing countries insisting that proposed targets were well below what was required to curb GHGs. When Annex 1 countries refused to comment on increments to emissions targets, the Africa Group members walked out of the meeting and talks on emissions reductions were suspended briefly.2 During the COP-15, the Africa Group, supported by the G77 staged another walkout, thus deferring two working groups. The walkout was due to the proposed suspension of discussions about ending the Kyoto protocol.3 The talks resumed after compromise had been reached, but precious time had been lost. The power of protest shaped the agenda toward one that was more favorable to the Africa Group. This perhaps demonstrates that at crucial stages of negotiations, the agenda can be steered to a particular party’s advantage with the right type of action. However, the impact was not long lasting as the Africa Group’s concerns were not met in December, hence the need for another walkout at COP-15, which brought the negotiations to a five-hour halt in defense of the continent’s priorities and interests. In the final analysis, walkouts did not produce the positive outcomes that the continent’s negotiators had hoped. This strategy does highlight the pitfalls with the structure of international diplomacy and the need for comparable voice.

Policy Considerations This paper deliberated on a number of aspects that contribute to an understanding of the role and effectiveness of Africa Group in climate change negotiations. Though not exhaustive in some areas, below are implementable recommendations: 1. The Africa Group is encouraged to utilize existing research. At the country level, there should be committees comprised of relevant stakeholders such as scientists, academics, and law makers to advise or even join country negotiating teams.

2. Barcelona Climate Change Talks—Main entrance shut down by activists while Africa boycotts talks. http://www.climateimc.org/en/ original-news/2009/11/04/barcelona-climate-change-talks-main-entrance-shut-down-activists-while 3. COP-15, Day 8—Walking away is not an option http://www.commodities-now.com/news/environmental-markets/1342-cop-15-day-8walking-away-is-not-an-option.html

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2. Training and capacity building should be done internally within countries so that individual states can build negotiating capacity. At COP-15, there were a number of schemes that supported the attendance of young people to these negotiations on the condition that they were put on their countries’ delegations. Such schemes should be maximized in order to enhance and increase not only the number of current delegates within a team but also for the future.

3. NGO delegates can be used as negotiators, although country teams who view NGOs as actors in opposition of their work may view this with skepticism. Some NGOs also perceive joining state teams as a betrayal of their cause.

Conclusion Utilizing regime theory, this paper examined a number of aspects relating to Africa’s disenfranchisement within the international climate change negotiations. It began by defining the key concepts and actors, then moved on to defining the capacity deficits that the Africa Group faces relating to getting their position heard, the conclusion being that these challenges were a manifestation of lack of financial resources. While some of the findings can be remedied with time, capacity building, and development efforts, others are a product of the current political situations at play that could change in the next few years. Despite this, these findings are important because they are still relevant in the current context and could be used by policy makers and development practitioners to ensure that in different international negotiations, these capacity shortages are avoided or eliminated in the early stages of African participation.

The paper also highlighted key strategies that developing countries use to negotiate and briefly outlined why this is so. Examples were provided to exemplify the strengths and weaknesses of these methods. The key issue on strategy was that the Africa Group is often defensive as opposed to proactive and should begin to move toward framing and defining agendas. This of course will be a challenge, because the political landscape of climate change negotiations has changed considerably in the past year with the rise in prominence of CAHOSCC and South Africa. The paper asserts that although the Africa Group is handicapped in regard to endogenous resources, these are not the only reasons why it has failed to articulate its position.

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Climate Funding and the Governance of Climate Risks

by Orr Karassin, Open University of Israel Multilateral climate change funds have an expanding role in the funding and governance of climate change. Several of these funds, including the Adaptation Fund and Pilot Program for Climate Resilience are dedicated to reducing climate induced risks, through funding adaptation in developing countries. The article formulates three models that serve in depicting the possible roles played by the funds in risk governance: the “risk compensation,” “risk redistribution,” and “risk regulation” models. The assessment of both funds in light of these models suggests they are far closer to the risk regulation model than would be expected or is mandated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The understanding that climate change funds are emerging as regulators, instead of compensators or redistributors, is looked at in the broader context of climate governance and implications are examined. This analysis may provide the basis for a possible reassessment of the design and function of multilateral climate funds in the future.

Introduction In an opening statement of a recent UN report, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commented on climate financing saying it “is one of the most important aspects of the world’s efforts to address the climate change challenge” (UN 2010). In recent years, climate financing, in the form of grants and concessionary loans, has been provided at an increasing rate by multilateral financing institutions. These organizations, supporting climate change mitigation, adaptation, and technology transfer, have grown in numbers and in prominence (Nakhooda et al. 2011; ECP 2006). Albeit, somewhat surprisingly, the governance of multilateral climate change funds (CCFs) has received little attention in the international organization literature.

Notably, the role of CCFs in governing climate risks has been wholly neglected. This article aims at rectifying this lapse by suggesting three possible models of risk governance that could be potentially employed by CCFs and by assessing the de facto current forms of governance in prominent CCFs in light of these models.

The proliferation of climate funds has been substantially attributed to the administration of the past climate regime and the ongoing efforts to solidify a new climate pact from 2012 onward (Pallemaerts and Armstrong 2009). It has become evident that the provision of new, adequate, and predictable resources is critical in trust building and serves as conditions for the participation of developing countries in any future climate regime (Gosh and Wood 2009).

Funding for adaptation, rather than mitigation, is of particular significance to most developing countries. Adaptation allows countries to prepare and lessen expected and already apparent risks associated with climatic change, while mitigation is aimed at reducing the emissions of green house gases causing climate change to begin with (Grasso 2011). It is well accepted that purposeful adaptation by human agency can prevent or decrease residual climate risks or strengthen the resilience and coping capacity of those affected by climate change (IPCC 2007C; UNFCCC 2007A; Tol and Verheyen 2004). A significant shift toward adaptation has been reflected in negotiations since the Copenhagen Round in 2009 (Blühdorn 2012), but even prior to that, adaptation funding has gradually come center stage since the 2001 seventh conference of the parties (COP7) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC or convention) held in Marrakesh (Mace 2005; Schipper 2006).

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The resources coming from multilateral and bilateral climate change funds provide the major source of capital for addressing adaptation and climate risks in developing countries.

As such, availability of funding and the architecture and policies of the funds will have a significant impact on the ability of developing countries to achieve their adaptation goals. At the same time, the funds’ institutional makeup, policies, and mechanisms are central to the evolving architecture of international adaptation governance (Tompkins and Hultman 2007).

Although CCFs supporting mitigation and adaptation are relatively new organizations, the availability of resources, administration, and procedures have encountered criticism from various quarters. The voice and votes accorded to developing countries in some of the funds, especially those administered through existing mechanisms, such as the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), have been deemed unsatisfactory (Gosh and Wood 2009). Others have mentioned the lack of openness of the funds to participation and consultation with non-state actors and civil society in particular (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011; Shankland and Chambote 2011). Others have suggested that financing instruments need to be better attuned to the respective needs of developing countries in order to achieve effectiveness (Sagasti et al. 2005; Möhner and Klein 2007). Governance structures of most funds have been regarded as complex and the rules for accessing funding difficult and timeconsuming (Davis and Tan 2010). Most funds, with the exception of the Adaptation Fund (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011), do not allow direct access and require the developing country to submit applications for funding through accredited external implementing entities (IE), such as the multilateral development banks or UN agencies. This has caused dissatisfaction among developed countries (LEG 2009). Additionally, except for the Adaptation Fund, finance provided through most funds, including the Least Developed Countries Funds (LDCF) and the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), has co-financing requirements. Funds only cover “full incremental or additional costs” (UNFCCC, article 4.3). The additional “full costs” then are borne either by the recipient government or by financing leveraged through other sources, creating difficulties inherent to meeting the requirement of co-financing (Ayers and Huq 2009).

Above all criticisms, the claim of the inadequacy and unpredictability of available resources to meet the needs and relevant costs of developing countries resonates strongly (Müller 2009; Flåm and Skjærseth 2009; Ackerman 2009). Funding sources have been deemed unpredictable, being mostly dependent on the voluntary contributions of developed countries.

Available resources have been found to be inadequate by scales to meet the current adaptation costs in the developing world (Flåm and Skjærseth 2009). Finally, the fragmentation of funding between various funds (both multilateral and bilateral) complicates a sound analysis of the additionality requirement—demanding that all funds be additional to previously committed Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding (Tan 2008).

These criticisms reflect possible and divergent views on the role of multilateral CCFs in general and in particular, on the function and place of CCFs dedicated to adaptation funding within the wider international framework for adaptation. The divergent views have impeded an understanding of the possible role of CCFs as risk-moderating institutions, given that adaptation is essentially and primarily about the moderation of climate risks. The article suggests viewing the work or CCFs in the context of various modes of risk governance. It is suggested that this analysis underlines the potential paths of governance for CCFs, enables the crystallization of gaps between contrasting views, and would promote a more fruitful discussion as to the desirable models of governance in climate adaptation funding.

In order to broaden the discussion on climate change funding governance, while focusing on typologies rather than incongruent details, the article articulates three models of possible risk governance in the institutionalization of CCFs. The models are developed through integrating lessons learned from the general literature on risk governance, climate liability, and adaptation. The models are described in the following section and are summarized in Table 1.

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They demonstrate the possible varied modes of addressing risks, uncertainties, and ethical considerations in the governance of adaptation funding.

The second section begins with a description of a “risk compensation” model that is highly correlative with the position held by many developing countries viewing transfers as entitlements and compensation. The second model projects many of the propositions of developed countries viewing transfers by CCFs as serving a redistributive function that is commensurate to parties’ shared and reciprocal responsibilities. Finally, a risk regulation model is suggested as a close representation of the manner in which similar international financing institutions have been found to work and perceive their role.

In section three, I investigate two central multilateral funds, with the aim of assessing their administration and governance in light of the three suggested models: the Adaptation Fund (AF), which was formed part and parcel of the UNFCCC process, and the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), which was formed in a donor lead process initiated by the World Bank (Seballos and Kreft 2011).

The article suggests in section four that despite the expected differences to be found between the funds, both are far closer to the risk regulation model than would be expected or is mandated by the UNFCCC. Although this may be an unintended outcome, at least from a developing country’s perspective, it may be explained by reference to similar processes that have been described for international financing agencies, such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The understanding that CCFs are emerging as new regulators instead of compensators or redistributors should be regarded with caution, and provide the basis for possible future reassessment in the design and governance of these international organizations.

Changing Prisms: Three Models of Climate Change Funding Governance Table 1: Three Models for Risk Governance in Climate Funding Model

Risk Compensation

Risk Redistribution

Risk Regulation

Normative Source

legal and moral principles of liability

negotiated principle of “common but differentiated responsibility”

autonomous

Purpose

restitution and compensation according to countries’ contribution to climate damages

distributional equity

regulating and monitoring risks

damages occurring

risk and vulnerability assessment

Financing Base Method for Identifying Risks

reciprocal donations based on relative wealth or “deficiency” funding

Criteria for Prioritizing Risks

immediate short term harms

degree of vulnerability

Monitoring

inconsequential

Accountability and Coercion Mechanisms

no role for central monitor

inconsequential

inconsequential

voluntary ODA style contributions risk assessment and evaluation potentially diverse and multiple: i.e., cost-effectiveness, catastrophic risks, geographic equity effectiveness efficiency fiduciary duties imposing procedures, norms and values assuring “compliance”

Risk Compensation The assumption underlying what I refer to as a “risk compensation model” of CCFs is that climate risks are the outcome of an unreciprocated historic contribution of developed countries

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to GHG accumulated in the atmosphere (Stern 2007). Emissions have historically fueled developed countries’ economies who have reaped the benefits. Developing countries, on the other hand, have contributed only slightly to creating global warming but are now bearing the main risks associated with this phenomenon (Stern 2007; Dellink et al. 2009). In this sense, CCFs funding adaptation can be seen as mechanisms to rectify and compensate for the harms and risks caused by developed countries, to the extent that these can be compensated by monetary transfers (Farber 2007–2008; Grasso 2010).

From a developing country’s perspective, monetary transfers from developed countries for climate adaptation are not to be considered as aid but rather as an entitlement (Smith 1996; Müller 2009). Commentators and representatives of developed countries throughout the UNFCCC negotiations process repeatedly claimed that adaptation funding is by no means “charity or development assistance” (Grasso 2011). In drafts preceding the UNFCCC, clear reference to the principle of liability was included. Several draft texts serve as testimony to the developed countries’ intent and demand that industrialized countries responsible for climate change compensate for resulting environmental damage (Verheyen 2005: 52). Diplomacy and public statements made since the signing of the UNFCCC serve as reminders of the developing countries’ call for compensation for damages and risks caused to them by climate change (see, for example, the recent statement made in COP17 on behalf of the LDCs the Minister of Forestry and Environment, Gambia, and the proposal for financing made by the Association of Small Island States UNFCCC 2007B; Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2003).

The inclusion of financial commitments to allocate adaptation resources in the final text articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the UNFCCC has been interpreted as placing a mandatory commitment on the provision of funding on developed countries. This interpretation views adaptation funding as substantially different from official development assistance (ODA) usually seen as voluntary (Verheyen 2005:52). Sands (1992: 275) has suggested that article 4.4 under which developed parties undertake to assist developing country parties that are “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects” implicitly suggests acceptance of responsibility of developed countries for causing climate change.

CAUSATION AND COMPENSATION

Central to risk compensation is the rebuttable claim of causation (Faure and Nollkaemper 2007). From a moral perspective, establishing causation could be claimed to give rise to liability for compensation if there is an agency (emission by countries), even if there is no fault—meaning the conduct creating the harm was not intentional. Others would argue causation in itself is not sufficient to beget liability but should be accompanied by some form of knowledge of the risk-creating activity (Coleman 1992). From this perspective, liability and a subsequent duty to compensate could only possibly be ascribed to developed countries for emissions made from a point in time from which they were aware (or should have been aware) of the possible resulting damages (Müller et al. 2007) Key to the determination of causation is the attribution of climate change damages to anthropogenic factors (as opposed to natural climate variations) (Dessai et al. 2009; Hallegatte 2009; Ranger et al. 2010). This determination embeds uncertainty especially as climatic events may at times be explained by natural variations in climate patterns (Allen et al. 2007). At the same time, risk compensation would require that causation be proved with some reasonable probability (Bouwer and Aerts 2006).

IDENTIFYING COMPENSABLE COSTS

Another aspect of risk compensation is the question of what costs are to be indemnified by those parties responsible for creating the risks. Damage already occurred (i.e., residual damage) is the most probable candidate for redistribution in a compensatory oriented system.

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Adaptation costs that reduce climate risks and residual damage are a second category (Farber 2006–2007; Farber 2008; Tol and Verheyen 2004). Finally, countries may be said to bear the costs of the raised probability of climate-related damages.

Compensation for residual damage has multiple bases both in law and moral theory. Just to name a few, “corrective justice” theory can be said to create a moral imperative for those developed countries that have caused harm by their emissions, to rectify the imbalance caused through compensatory payments (Adler 2007; Honkonen 2009). The “no harm principle” in international law has also been reverted to and asserts that although states have complete control over their natural resources, they also have the responsibility to insure they do not cause environmental harm to other states. If they do so, they are required to redress and compensate (Dellink et al. 2008; Tol and Verheyen 2004).

Another principle that has been suggested as the basis for compensation of climate change residual damages is the “polluter pays principle” (PPP). From an economic point of view, this principle would suggest the negative side effects of GHG emissions must be internalized by emitting countries in such a way that expected damages are included in profit and utility functions (Shukla 1999). Since PPP is forward looking, it could be said to include reference to adaptation costs and even costs of future risks. This would complicate assessments because of associated uncertainties but may be justified on the basis of economic rationale referring to all externalities. “Just desserts theory” strengthens this view. It suggests that developed countries should not be allowed to profit from the emission of GHGs and the consequential harm caused.

Hence, there is moral justification for requiring them to bear the costs of damages imposed by climate change on those bearing the lion’s share of harm (Baer 2006; Farber 2007–2008).

Compensatory transfers for required adaptation measures can be justified by the duty of those potentially harmed to take action to reduce anticipated risks. The party causing the harm is subsequently required to cover costs of such preventative and anticipatory measures (Tol and Verheyen 2004). At the same time, the country seeking compensation for adaptation measures would be required to prove the necessity of these measures to reduce the impact of anthropogenic climate change rather than the impact of natural climate variability, socioeconomic, or land use changes (Bouwer and Aerts 2006). In addition, adaptation costs would need to be justified on the basis of sufficient certainty of materialization of climate risks.

Compensating for climate risks (or the increased probability of climate harms) is not entirely self-evident under a compensatory framework. In most legal systems, costs of unrealized risks are not borne by the perpetrator unless the party at risk can establish that manifestation of risk is more probable than not (Farber 2006–2007: 1635). Providing such proof of above 50 percent probability is increasingly difficult and unlikely in the case of the manifestation of most local climate effects. The literature has tried to overcome this hurdle by suggesting the adoption of a relative compensation rule. Such a rule allows for a fraction of the anticipated harm to be compensated on the basis of the relative probability of harm occurring or fraction of the attributable risk (Porat and Stein 2001; Faure and Nollkaemper 2007; Allen et al. 2007).

Contrarily, Allen et al. (2007) have suggested the only way to compensate for residual harms where causation by anthropogenic climate change is difficult to establish, is to compensate for the increased levels of risk. Climate risks may also produce real and tangible harms, for example, by raising costs of public or private financing and insurance premiums or causing the restriction or removal of insurance coverage (UNFCCC 2008: 41). These damages associated with increased levels of risk could more easily be justified under a compensatory model.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMPENSATORY RESOURCES

In a compensatory framework, the contributions of countries to the CCFs would be tailored to their liability for harm. Recent studies have suggested overcoming the difficulty in assessing a country’s part in local manifested climate damages by an assessment of the country’s historical share in cumulative emissions and global average temperature increase (Hohne 2011; Dellink

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et al. 2009; Müller et al. 2007; Den 2005). Assessments vary as they are impacted by the choices in the initial year, gases included in the assessment, and the responsibility rule used (Müller et al. 2007; Dellink et al. 2009). Although there are variations in the country’s shares allocated according to the different responsibility rules, it would be possible to roughly sketch out a minimum percentage for the contribution of developed countries to CCFs funding sources (Müller et al. 2007).

THE IMPACTS OF A RISK COMPENSATION MODEL

At first sight a compensation model of CCFs governance would seem beneficial to developing countries, since it requires compensation for all or most damages occurred (not risks).

Yet, depending on the liability rule, several components of this model would in fact turn out to be counterproductive from a developing country perspective. The requirement for addressing causation would in all actuality create a significant barrier to those countries seeking compensation due to the difficulties in establishing a causal link between a particular experienced harm or a certain climatic event, to anthropogenic climate change.

The model favors transfers covering existing residual harms or already taken adaptation actions as opposed to funding actions aimed at addressing future risks. This approach would in effect create an incentive for a backward-looking rather than a forward-looking adaptation policy and could be expected to impede preventative planning. Finally, the model creates a latent preference for those countries already experiencing clearly related climate harm as opposed to those countries that are more highly vulnerable to climate change. Within a compensatory framework, vulnerability to future risks is, in effect, thrust aside at the potential expense of those most vulnerable.

Risk Redistribution SOURCES OF JUSTIFICATION

The widely referred to principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” adopted in the UNFCCC text entails, at least from a developed country’s perspective, the acceptance of responsibility rather than that of liability for climate change (Paavola and Adger 2002). Consequently, it is acknowledged that monetary transfers from developed countries to developing countries are according to the UNFCCC justified as redistributive rather than compensatory payments (Rajamani 2000).

Adaptation funding through multilateral CCFs is understood as a form of reciprocal venture aimed at trust-building and furthering consensus between developed and developing states to allow for the evolution and cooperation in climate policy (Rübbelke 2011). Bodansky (1993) suggests that the reason for the original inclusion of financial resources for adaptation in the UNFCCC was part of a bargaining package aimed at aiding “developing countries in adapting to the adverse effects of climate change if steps taken under the convention fail to abate global warning adequately.” Later commentators suggested that funding for adaptation is provided by developed countries as “quid pro quo” for the developing countries’ acceptance of duties under the convention and acquiescence to watered-down mitigation responsibility by developed countries (Horstmann 2011).

Both views suggest that CCFs as international organizations correspond to the functionalist (or institutionalist) view of international organizations as venues of compromise and cooperation between states based on the substitution of short-term self-interest with larger longterm goals (Keohane and Martin 1995).

Although used often interchangeably, there is a great difference between compensatory liability and distributive responsibility. Where liability implies externally derived obligations of a legal nature, responsibility connotes self-imposed duties and voluntary acquiescence to agreed norms. Liability is one sided and unidirectional—from harm causer to risk receiver.

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Responsibility is communal in nature and demands reciprocity at different levels, in and between funders and recipients. Where liability is primarily backward looking, responsibility addresses future risks and harms with a stronger focus on prevention. These aspects will be discussed hereafter.

TYPES OF REDISTRIBUTION

Risk and opportunities may be redistributed much in the same way as wealth to further equity in their allocation among parties. (Sefton 2006; Barr 2001; Haveman 1988). Funding could address exposure to risk, for example by endorsing sea barriers or other structural measures that reduce the likelihood of exposure, thus directly impacting the distribution of risk. At the same time, climate funding could be designed to address poverty, a significant determinant of vulnerability, thus impacting vulnerability as a key determinant of risk. (Paavola and Adger 2002). Funding priorities may be set to achieve distributional effects on additional strata such as geographic, gender, or ethnic descent (Danziger and Portney 1988).

REDISTRIBUTION BY VULNERABILITY

Prioritizing resource allocation to those most vulnerable has been seen widely as an acceptable way of advancing greater equitable climate-related risk distribution (Adger et al. 2006; Stern 2008, 2009; Bird and Brown 2010; Grasso 2010). Such an endeavor, however, is by no means free of contestation. An agreed meaning of the concept “vulnerability” has yet to evolve among scientists (Birkmann 2006; Gallopín 2006). To exemplify the multiplicity of meanings solely in the context of climate change, vulnerability has been defined both in terms of “outcome” and as “contextual” (O’Brien et al. 2007). Whereas “outcome” vulnerability is an end point definition that requires addressing scenarios of future climate hazards and the correlated expected impacts, “contextual” vulnerability relates to the starting point, entailing an assessment of socioeconomic vulnerability to current climatic stimuli (Fussel 2007). As no agreed definition has evolved, there are as of yet no agreed metrics nor a set of indicators that could automatically be used to enable a prioritization of countries or regions (Horstmann 2011; Sullivan and Meigh 2005; Yohe et al. 2006; Huq and Ayers 2007). A political rather than a scientific decision may have to be taken to determine the appropriate matrix of parameters that would be employed in determining vulnerability (Klein 2009).

CONTRIBUTIONS TO REDISTRIBUTIVE RESOURCES

The fact that the justification for redistribution is grounded not on legal liability but on collective responsibility and acquiescence to the UNFCCC’s common but differentiated principle, need not imply the lack of norms or standards to determine country contributions.

In line with the functionalist theory of international law, reciprocity norms are an important explanation of the ability to act collectively and provide public goods through the pooling of resources (Enjolras 2009). In this light, CCFs can be seen as “pooling mechanisms,” allowing countries with common interests to associate and organize to unite resources to advance those interests (Horch 1994). Those parties already committed to providing funding would seek to overcome free riding problems hindering collective action and assure optimum participation of all potentially responsible parties (Holländer 1990; Hardin 1992).

Optimum participation could be determined on using several criteria. One such criterion is that of contribution to damages, much in the same way as in the compensation model. However, the various uncertainties associated with this model described above, and the possible rejection of its implicit normative assumptions, leave room for the adoption of other principles as the basis for burden sharing. A second principle of reciprocal funding addresses the capacity of parties to pay. Capacity to pay may be judged by per capita wealth indicators (such as GDP or GNI) (Dellink et al. 2008) or possibly by a combination of these with other indicators, such as the UN scale for participation in UN funding (Dellink et al. 2008) or national debt

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indicators. These indicators entail much less uncertainly than historical contributions. Another possible principle for sharing resource provision could be prospective “deficiency” oriented funding: “Deficiency” meaning that countries falling short of their mitigation responsibilities would be required to substitute their mitigation deficits with payments to CCFs. This method stands in contrast to the harm-based principle. Instead of retrospective calculations of historical contributions, it would require prospective assessments of the future compliance of developed countries with their mitigation responsibilities. Each of these principles would most likely lead to different allocations of responsibilities among developed countries, adhering at the same time to a risk redistribution goal.

REDISTRIBUTIONS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRY AUTONOMY

In a risk redistribution model, vulnerability-based allocation would be far more important than ensuring efficiency or adopting any certain type of adaptation. Since assessing efficiency or determining the design of specific adaptation actions would not be required. Recipient countries would be left a great deal of discretion as to the effective paths for minimizing vulnerability. They could choose what risks to focus on and whether to focus on current risks, anticipated risks, (McGray et al. 2007; Klein and Persson 2008) catastrophic risks, or slow onsetting harms (Farber 2006–2007). Countries would also be free in deciding whether to promote specific adaptation programs, projects, or basic development and growth policies that complement adaptation efforts and are regarded as “no regrets” options (Fankhauser and Burton 2011).

CCFs as seen by the functionalist approach would not be required to create monitoring or enforcement mechanisms, as sufficient incentives would be in place for both developed and developing countries to effectively participate in such an allocation scheme. Noncooperation and noncompliance would be too costly to consider (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002; Shkabatur 2011–2012). CCFs would facilitate reciprocity, enabling states to use carrots and sticks on each other, and credibly build their international reputation and alter state behavior (Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Drezner 2000). Developed countries would regard their participation in resource provision as crucial for achieving an internationally agreed climate policy and reducing possible liability claims from developing countries. Developing countries would perceive continued and stable funding with utmost importance and would in turn strive to ensure effective compliance with the fund’s demands, without substantial regulation efforts by the funds.

Risk Regulation A risk regulation model traces the source of developed countries’ responsibilities neither to the principles of liability, underscoring risk compensation, nor to the voluntary approach embedded in risk redistribution. It assumes that CCFs as organizations autonomously take upon themselves regulatory functions much in the same way as other international funding organizations such as the WB and the IMF. These organizations have been documented to act as financial risk regulators (Black 2002; Gilbert et al. 1999) or as meta-regulators that steer governing institutions of recipient countries to create normative and regulatory change in various areas (Humphrey 2002: 60; Scott 2003).

Although the regulatory focus on the IMF and WB has grown, there is little if any literature that has suggested that CCFs act as regulators. If they were to act as regulators, it would be expected that the various stages of risk assessment, risk evaluation, and risk management and would be of importance to the CCFs (Renn 2008). At the same time, emphasis would be placed on monitoring, accountability, and coercion measures meant to achieve compliance.

THE CENTRALITY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment, as a critical component of a regulatory approach, would most probably emulate to some degree vulnerability assessments undertaken within the risk redistribution

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model. At the same time, regulatory posture toward risk may require addressing scientific assessments in conjunction with risk evaluations enabling CCFs to determine values upon which to judge the acceptability and tolerability of risks (Renn et al. 2011). As suggested by Renn (2008), climate change is an arena of both interpretive and normative ambiguity, where scientific evidence of impacts, and values establishing the acceptable level of risk, are disputed.

Risk evaluation could allow risk assessments to be infused by stakeholders’ perspectives and values. Other than scientific assessment, likelihood of exposure, and vulnerability, various considerations could be referred to in prioritizing risks, such as the prevention of catastrophic, low probability, high impact risks.

RISK ASSESSMENT AND REDUCED RECIPIENT COUNTRY AUTONOMY

Those risks found to be intolerable by CCFs through a risk assessment and risk evaluation process would require the adoption of response options designed to mitigate risk or increase social resilience (Renn et al. 2011). In managing risks, CCFs would need to investigate and choose among multiple measures available for addressing risk. Several principles could inform this process. Where uncertainty relating to impacts and vulnerability was not significant, cost-effectiveness would likely be the parameter for choosing among multiple response options (Baldwin and Cave 1999). If uncertainty was found as significant, the robustness of measures would be emphasized. This risk management strategy would place importance on measures designed to function under a wide range of climatic conditions (Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008). So-called “no regrets” adaptation actions focus on developmental measures, such as food security or poverty alleviation, aimed at strengthening individual and societal resilience or on those measures that increase institutional adaptive capacity.

Within a regulatory regime, monitoring is used to determine compliance, the effectiveness of regulatory efforts, and quality of outcomes. In a risk regulation framework, monitoring by CCFs as international organizations would be an important component of their institutional role. Through monitoring, CCFs would be able to act as information clearinghouses (Shkabatur 2011–2012) providing data on multiple aspects of the adaptation regime.

Monitoring could focus on data regarding effectiveness in achieving program or project goals or the general aim of reducing climate-related risk and vulnerability. It would be directed to enable an assessment of whether funds were being used efficiently in compliance with fiduciary standards.

As risk regulators, CCFs would design and apply appropriate means to ensure accountability and to coerce funding recipients to implement adaptation programs and projects as approved with appropriate procedures. They may even go beyond these measures and require additional institutional or regulatory changes that could support the funded adaptation project.

It is not uncommon for international funding and loan agencies to impose their worldview, norms, and demands for regulatory restructuring on recipient states (Goldman 2005: 205; Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 44). In the case of the IMF, Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 47) have found “there is little doubt that the IMF frequently uses its institutional authority to coerce—to compel others to make economic changes that they would otherwise would not.”

CONTROLLING DATA AND LEARNING

Data supplied by the monitoring and evaluation of adaptation efforts could be used to create inward and outward learning opportunities. Inward learning uses the information as a basis for adapting decisions on the design of risk reduction measures and the allocation of resources by the CCFs (Renn 2008). Outward learning would supply countries facing similar risks comparative data and lessons on adaptation actions taken and their effectiveness.

These appraisals could be expected to contribute to knowledge production and to solidify the CCFs ability to regulate. In similar fashion, the knowledge generation function of IMF has been documented as a crucial factor of organizational behavior and the single most important

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determinant of its ability to regulate domestic life in those states in which it is involved (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).

Two Climate Change Funds The following section explores the mandate, organizational structure, governance, and riskrelated practices of two CCF case studies, namely the Adaptation Fund (AF) and the Pilot Project for Climate Resilience (PPCR). This examination serves as a basis for assessing the funds’ attitude toward risk and the degree to which the funds serve as risk compensators, risk redistributors, or risk regulators. Research about the funds draws on primary data, documentation, minutes, and reports released by the funds as well as interviews with key actors engaged with the funds’ processes and governance, including secretariat members, board members (in the case of the AF), sub-committee members (in the case of the PPCR), and grant recipients.

The Adaptation Fund

ORIGINS AND FUNDING SOURCES

The Adaptation Fund (AF) has its formal origins in the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997 at the third session of the COP to the UNFCCC (Horstmann 2011). The KP established that a share of the proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) be used “to assist developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.” (KP: para. 12(8)). In 2001, at COP-6 in Bonn, parties agreed that funds generated by this new financing source should be allocated by a new fund.

They decided that “an adaptation fund shall be established to finance concrete adaptation projects and programs in developing country parties that have become parties to the protocol” (UNFCCC 2001). Only in 2010, however, did the fund become operational after the prolonged haggling about its structure, operational guidelines, and funding mechanisms. (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011).

Funding for the AF was to come from a 2 percent levy on the monetization of certified emission reductions (CERs) (See UNFCCC 2002: para. 15 of Decision 17/CP.7). The creation of an independent funding source, unattached to specific pledges made by donor states, was considered at the time and still is an innovation (Chandani et al. 2009). Yet since 2010, volatile CER prices and low volumes of trade produced only modest funding. So-called ODA type contributions by donor countries, first perceived as a secondary, grew to $85.8 million, amounting to 34 percent of total funding available in 2011 (AF(e) 2011). In 2011, donor countries included seven European countries and Japan. Sixteen annex II countries, signatories to the UNFCCC, did not contribute directly to fund at the time. Notably, noncontributing countries included the U.S. and Canada (AF(e) 2011), who (in addition to Japan) hold the largest contributive share to cumulative emissions and temperature increase (Dellink et al. 2009).

Contributions made by significant and wealthy emitters such as Japan were minuscule even when compared to contributions by small polluters such as Monaco.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The AF is directly accountable to the UNFCCC COP serving as the meeting of the parties to the KP (CMP) (Horstmann 2011). The AFB serves as the AF governing body and is composed of recipient and developed country representatives with a majority for developing country representation, following a one vote rule (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011). Representatives of developed countries do not necessarily represent donor countries, yet, among the representatives of developed countries in the 2012 AFB, a majority did in fact represent those that donated to the fund.

One of the unique features of the AF was to allow for “direct access” by eligible developing country parties (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011). This arrangement was meant to allow developing countries to propose and design projects independently of international organizations (See UNFCCC 2009: paragraph 11; AF(a) para. 7). Instead of applying to the fund through

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an international or multilateral organization, developing countries could accredit a local organization that would receive the status of a National Implementing Entity (NIE), which could then apply on behalf of the developing country.

NIEs undergo a scrutinous accreditation process in order to become eligible to submit project concepts or proposals to the AFB (AF(a): para. 27). The data associated with NIE accreditation as well as interviews conducted with country representatives suggest that the difficulties in the accreditation process remain the main barrier to “direct access.” The accreditation process requires applying NIEs to meet extensive institutional, legal, and fiduciary standards adopted by the AFB. Financial integrity and management are scrutinized in the application process both from the budget perspective and the transactions perspective (AF(a): para. 33(a)). Also evidence of institutional capacity is required to demonstrate the ability to identify and develop projects, the competency to manage or oversee the execution of the projects, and the undertaking of monitoring and evaluation (AF(a): para. 33(b). These criteria have made it difficult for national ministries to be accredited as they usually are not experienced in designing and overseeing projects.

Transparency and self-investigative powers also require competence of the entity to deal with financial mismanagement and other forms of malpractice (AF(a): para. 33(c)).

ALLOCATION OF FUNDING

An open-ended, “country driven” submission process allows for the submission of proposals by any eligible developing country through a NIE (AF(a) annex 3 art. 1). Since submissions to the fund are essentially open ended and represent a bottom-up approach, developing criteria for the allocation of funding among countries and the review of project concepts and proposals are both critical aspects of the work of the AF Board (AFB).

Seemingly, the AFB places risk and vulnerability as the guiding principles for addressing funding allocation. The determination of vulnerability by the AFB is formally addressed in a general guidance adopted by the CMP on “strategic priorities, policies, and guidelines of the adaptation fund” (UNFCCC 2009: Decision 1/CMP.4; and AF(a), Annex I). The guidance states that developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change are eligible for funding from the AF. The guidance first mentions as particularly vulnerable those countries with low-lying islands and small islands, low-lying coastal, arid, and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought, and desertification, or those with fragile mountainous ecosystems. It goes on to add criteria that address the risk evaluation stage: the level of urgency or risk arising from delay in providing for adaptation and the degree of adaptive capacity. The risk-dominated considerations are supplemented by a requirement that allocation provides for equitable access to the fund (AF(a): para. 16).

Yet the wide terms in which vulnerability is stated do not provide a clear methodology for assessment and ranking. The consideration of vulnerability therefore depends on the specifications of the AFB on the operationalization and access to the fund (Horstmann, 2011).

In practice, an eligibility requirement has been used to label some countries (such as OECD members or countries that do not qualify for ODA) as non-eligible for funding (AFB 2010b; AFB 2010c). This criteria has allowed countries ranked by the OECD as ODA recipients to be allocated funding even when they are classified as upper middle income countries according to their GNI per capita (such as Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, and the Seychelles) (see OECDDAC 2012 and AF web site).

Vulnerability assessment and prioritization of eligible developing countries according to risk has been consciously avoided by the AFB until “the COP, or some other body, had reported some progress on the definition of vulnerability” (AFB 2011:18). Instead, of vulnerability ranking at the allocation stage, the AFB adopted an “equal access” uniform cap of ten million dollars for all countries funded (see Decision AFB/B.13/23). Although determined as a temporary measure, the cap effectively limits the AFB’s ability to substantially weigh vulnerability and risk in determining the division of funds (AFB 2011:18).

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PROJECT APPROVAL

While the difficulties in allotment policy have been overcome by an equal quota cap, the assessment of project proposals’ suitability is by far more complex. Project approval brings to bear various considerations that scrutinize the proposal at both technical and substantive levels. Criteria include whether the proposal is consistent with national sustainable development strategies and development plans and National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs); the degree to which the proposal meets national technical standards; arrangements for management, monitoring, and evaluation; whether the project has a learning and knowledge management component to capture and feedback lessons; cost effectiveness and avoiding duplication of funding; whether the project secures economic, social, and environmental benefits; whether the project includes a consultative process with stakeholders and particularly most vulnerable groups (AF(a) Annex 1 para. 15; also see AF(b) AF(c).

Project evaluations undergo a thorough review process, either as project concepts (an initial stage in which concepts are endorsed or rejected, and if rejected may not be submitted as proposals) or project proposals (fully developed) that may be approved or rejected. Both procedures begin with a technical screening by the AF secretariat, continue with a review by the Project and Program Review Committee (PPRC), which then makes recommendations to the AFB and are concluded by a decision of the Board (AF(c)).

In the review process, a considerable number of concepts and proposals are rejected or remanded for corrections. An AF Secretariat report reviewing the evaluation process from June 2010 to September 2011 established that 69 percent of the submitted concepts were endorsed (i.e., a 31 percent rejection rate), while 61 percent of the total proposals submitted were approved (a 39 percent rejection rate). Seventy-seven percent of the concepts received endorsement on the first round, while 64 percent of the project proposals were approved in the first round, the rest being remanded to the proposing entity for corrections and elaboration and then approved in a second round of evaluations (AF(d) para. 3).

Refusals are brought to the implementing entity and country with requests for clarification (RC). These RCs can serve as a possible indicator as to the issues that are deemed important, and the issues most scrutinized. In the same AF Secretariat report, it was found that 21 percent of all RCs were given on the basis of “concreteness,” i.e., the lack of sufficient cohesion between the project components and national policy, the unsuitability of measures to deal with the identified climate threat, and the difficulty of distinguishing between the adaptation project and a “business-as-usual” development project. A further 18 percent of CRs dealt with cost-effectiveness and insufficient description of alternatives. Twelve percent of the CRs related to the insufficient accounting of the social, economical, and environmental benefits of the projects. A lack of adequate consultative process preoccupied 7 percent of the CRs and a further 7 percent were related to the inconsistency with national technical standards or the absence of environmental safeguards for the proposed adaptation activity.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring, evaluation, and learning process are embedded in the AF procedures and are integrated through a Strategic Results Based Management Framework (RBMF) adopted by the AFB (AFB 2010a) The RBMF is dedicated to monitoring results in risk mitigation, resiliency, and capacity to address climate risks, and provides a concrete outcome oriented monitoring strategy (AF(f)).

Several layers of monitoring and evaluation complement each other to create a virtual monitoring pyramid. At the basic level, implementing entities undertake periodical data collection and monitoring for projects under implementation, according to performance monitoring plans set out in the project documents. Data is compiled and measured through indicators aligned to the RBMF. Reports are brought annually to the Ethics and Finance Committee (EFC) of the AFB and the Secretariat (AF(a)). The EFC, in turn, provides an annual report

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to the AFB on the overall status of the portfolio and progress toward results. The AFB is responsible for strategic oversight and the assessment of whether overall projects and programs comply with the RBMF. As project implementation comes to a close, projects and programs are subject to a final evaluation by an impartial and independent evaluating team selected and facilitated by the IE (AF (e)). Terminal evaluations are conducted according to common approved guidelines.

These include an assessment and rating of adaptation outcomes, risks to the sustainability of outcomes, and the contribution made to the achievement of the AF targets and objectives in reducing climate-related risks. The final evaluation is submitted to the AFB and disseminated widely to facilitate accountability and learning (AF (a)).

Finally, the AFB may decide to carry out independent reviews, evaluations, or investigations of the projects and programs, as and when deemed necessary (AF(a)). At any stage of the project cycle, either at its discretion or following the independent review evaluation or investigation, the EFC may recommend to the board to suspend or cancel a project. This coercion mechanism is complemented by the right retained by the AFB to reclaim all or parts of the financial resources allocated for the implementation of a project (AF(a)).

The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) ORIGINS AND FUNDING SOURCES

The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) was not institutionalized as a direct result of UNFCCC proceedings, as in the case of the AF. Its establishment was initiated by the World Bank and several donor countries. In early 2008, leaders from the UK, U.S., and Japan announced their intention to establish a multi-billion dollar fund that would boost the World Bank’s ability to help developing countries tackle climate change (Seballos and Kreft 2011). Following early discussions with the three leading donors and several Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), a “zero draft” document for the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) was prepared by the World Bank (World Bank 2008A). The draft was followed by criticism from commentators, civil society, and even some central donors, a process that brought about its amendment as well as the release of a specific proposal including among the CIFs, a pilot program that would focus on adaptation (World Bank 2008B). Following a meeting of donors, developing country, and civil society representatives in May 2008 that approved and modified the pilot program focusing on adaptation (named PPCR), a July 2008 meeting of the G8 countries formally announced the establishment of the CIFs and PPCR among them (Seballos and Kreft 2011). In November 2008, the PPCR became the first operational program among the three programs of the Strategic Climate Fund, one of the two climate funds under the CIF’s umbrella (Seballos and Kreft 2011; Ayers et al. 2011; Shankland and Chambote 2011).

Since its establishment in 2008 and until 2011, the PPCR received some $698 million from nine annex II country donors, while the remaining fourteen annex II countries refrained from contributing (CIF 2011(B)). The PPCR funds are sourced from ODA type grant funding in addition to concessional loan funds from the UK, amounting to 50 percent and from Spain, amounting to 2 percent of the total available resources until 2011 (data derived from CIF 2011(B)). The introduction of concessional loans as a major part of the resources available to the fund has rendered the PPCR the largest adaptation centered multilateral CCF (Harmeling and Kaloga 2011; Seballos and Kreft 2011).

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The PPCR is directly governed by a subcommittee that is accountable to the Strategic Climate Fund Committee (SCFC). The subcommittee is composed of an equal number of representatives from contributor donor countries and recipient countries (six). The developing country chair or vice chair of the AFB is also a member, thus rendering a small majority to developing

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countries (CIF 2011a: para. 5). This advantage was not, however, emulated in the membership of the SCFC which oversees the subcommittee. There, equal representation is broken by a representative of the World Bank and of a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB).

The important role of MDBs within the PPCR process is not limited to the SCFC. The PPCR mission guidelines issued to MDBs (CIF 2009a) gives the MDBs, at a minimum, equal stature with the PPCR country governments in initiating and managing programs. In many cases, although certainly not all, a lack of country level capacity has meant that the national government appoints the MDB as de facto leader of the process (Seballos and Kreft 2011).

Despite the equitable representation and small developing country majority in the subcommittee, the representation of developing countries may have limited effect. Organizational constraints and prior decisions on guidelines restrict change in the fund’s operation (Seballos and Kreft 2011). In addition, major issues such as project evaluation and monitoring are decided elsewhere and brought to the subcommittee only for comment (CIF 2009a).

ADDRESSING RISK IN THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS

In 2008, soon after the operationalization of the PPCR, an expert group (EG) was established by the subcommittee. The role of the EG was to make recommendations on the selection of countries that would be the first participants in the pilot program (CIF 2008: para. 15). In contrast to the AF, the PPCR aimed at forming a prejudgment on allocation on the basis of scientific analysis of country vulnerability.

The EG consisted of eight experts with scientific, economic, social, environmental, development, policy, and governance expertise as well as climate-related knowledge (CIF 2009B: para. 10). The guidance to the expert group established that it would make its recommendations based on several elements: transparent vulnerability criteria; country preparedness; willingness to move to a strategic approach in adaptation; and reasonable distribution of countries across regions and types of hazards (CIF 2008: para. 4).

The EG grounded its selection process mainly in the first element with some consideration to the second and third elements. It conducted an extensive, mostly quantitative risk assessment, using exposure to climate change hazards as an entry point to identify regional climate change “hot spots.” Ten existing quantitative indicators complemented by expert judgment were used to identify high-risk and vulnerable countries within these “hot spots” regions (CIF 2009b). It is worthwhile noting that even though the risk analysis performed by the EG did not fully match the terms of reference, its recommendations were almost fully accepted, with only few minor changes (CIF 2011a; Seballos and Kreft 2011).

From interviews held with PPCR subcommittee members it appears that the use of experts to identify the initial recipient countries and the basic allocation scheme was seen as a way of dismantling political pressures from both donor and recipient countries. “Deciding on nine countries and two regions as pilots out of over 145 developing countries, all in need of adaptation assistance, is a potentially baffling and explosive venture” (interviewee A). The EG was used to “put a plug” on those lobbying for some country or region and to divert the discussion to “what should be done” and not to where the “money should go.”

Basing the allocation scheme on expert analysis was seen as a way of “reduced controversy and enabling quicker decision making” (interviewee B). This rationalization complements the stream in literature calling for the relinquishment of the pluralistic approach to risk prioritization and the return to technical expertise (Breyer 1993; Graham and Wiener 1995; Coglianese and Lazer 2003).

The expert analysis was also seen by some subcommittee interviewees as complementing the aim for the cost-effective use of the PPCR’s resources. Some respondents mentioned that as funding was limited, the PPCR could not afford making mistakes and choosing the wrong countries to work in (interviewees B and C). “Investments in high risk countries are likely to produce larger reductions in risk at a relatively low cost” (interviewee C). “A thorough risk analysis could

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help ensure the Fund’s goal of cost-effectiveness” (interviewee B). Some respondents also mentioned the PPCR was a pilot project and, as such, continued funding would depend on success (interviewees B and D). “If countries were to be decided on politically rather than by experts this would place heavy responsibility on subcommittee members” (interviewee C). “They would pay a personal price if funding was discontinued by donor countries for any reason and especially if adaptation initiatives in recipient countries were perceived as failures” (interviewee C).

Indeed, the scarcity of resources and limited funding to address various essential risk areas has been cited in the literature as a driver for the revitalization of the “old idea” of the significant role of technical experts in risk analysis and the move away from policy responding to public perceptions of risk (Renn 2008). This may also explain the subcommittee respondents’ tendency to rely on expert judgment instead of their own. The EG analysis not only laid the ground for creating a decision-making environment, which was not dominated by political alliances and seemed to ensure cost-effective expenditure of funds but also helped in reducing the perceived uncertainty. The scaling process by which countries were prioritized based on what was considered transparent, measurable, replicable, and equitable criteria, reaffirmed the country selection and helped decision-makers sense that resources allocation was being made on sound ground. These perceptions were unhampered by the fact that the analysis did emphasize that although the projections upon which the risk assessment was based enjoyed reasonably high levels of confidence, some aspects were inherently afflicted by uncertainty due to the limits of climate scenarios, possible underestimation of risk, and over-simplification overlooking cumulative impacts. (CIF 2009b: sec. 4).

Finally, the EG analysis also helped identify and clarify areas in which improved knowledge and data would strengthen country hazard and vulnerability analysis. Concrete recommendations were made as to the development of a hazard index and the refinement of vulnerability indicators. The development of a global database that would assess exposure to climate-changerelated hazards at the national (or subnational, instead of the regional level as existed) was suggested as a means of improving the preciseness of the hazard exposure assessment (CIF 2009b: 51). The refinement of vulnerability indicators would improve their specification to a national developmental and hazard context (CIF 2009b: 51–52). This identification could potentially lead the way for the production of new knowledge and the integration of existing knowledge that would aid future decision making on adaptation funding and management.

Following country identification by the EG, and the selection and confirmation process by the PPCR subcommittee, a decision was taken to place an equal cap on the allocation of grants at forty to fifty million dollars per pilot country and sixty to seventy-five million dollars per pilot region, whereas concessional loans would not surpass fifty million dollars per country or region (CIF 2010b: para. 14). This decision requiring equal or almost equal allocation to those countries selected could be said to stand in stark contradiction to the purpose underlying the EG vulnerability-based selection process.

ADDRESSING RISK AT THE PROGRAMMATIC AND PROJECT PROPOSAL STAGES

The PPCR design document formally establishes the objectives of the fund as follows: “to pilot and demonstrate ways to integrate climate risk and resilience into core development planning, while complementing other ongoing activities.” (CIF 2011a: para. 3). Poverty reduction and sustainable development goals are placed at the forefront of these activities (CIF 2011a: para. 4). At the core of the PPCR is the notion that adaptation and development are closely interrelated processes, where general “good” development progress helps increase the capacity to adapt to climate change and reduce vulnerability to its impacts (Seballos and Kreft 2011). This outlook has had a significant impact on the manner in which risk, vulnerability, and uncertainty are addressed in strategic project design and at the assessment stage.

Whereas the AF fund assists countries to implement concrete adaptation projects or programs mandated by country National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs), the PPCR

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does not adopt existing NAPAs as a basis for action. Nor does it adopt existing national or sectorial development plans or natural hazard preparedness and contingency plans. Instead, the PPCR requires countries to produce a new document entitled, the Strategic Program for Climate Resilience (SPCR) (CIF 2011a; CIF 20011b). This document includes a general adaptation strategy and framework for programs and projects (CIF 2009a: para. 18).

The programming and financing modalities for the PPCR stress the importance of risk assessment as a basis for formulating a SPCR and identifying vulnerable areas, sectors, communities, priority action areas, and needs within participating countries (CIF 2009a: paras.

21, 22). While risk governance is a central component in the formation of SPCRs, these documents often do not provide for the rigorous quantification that is inherent to some forms of risk governance (Amendola, 2002). Instead, the PPCR promotes the use of a participatory approach and the integration of multiple perspectives and stakeholders as a principle method of risk prioritization (Renn 2008). Countries are guided, in conjunction with stakeholders to “develop and prioritize alternative climate resilient development interventions within identified priority sectors and themes” (CIF 2009a: 7). Prioritization should not only weigh climate risks but such issues as relevant development priorities, existing sectorial plans, and an ongoing policy reform process (CIF 2009a: 27).

A basic objective of the SPCR process is the enhancement of capacity of national institutions for “robust policy reform and priority setting” (CIF 2010a). Consequently, most country SPCRs acknowledge the need to create and integrate institutional structures and policies on climate risk into existing structures in the respective countries. For example, the Nepalese SPCR includes such outcomes as the revision of policies for key sectors to reflect climate change policy (CIF 2011c). The Nigerian SPCR sets as a primary indicator of success, the development and use of “environmental tools” in planning processes at all levels as well as the inclusion of climate resilience in policy documents and sectoral initiatives (CIF 2011d). The Mozambique SPCR acknowledges the importance of institutional and policy reform and includes as a key result the integration of climate resilience into key sector plans and provincial development strategies.

In order to overcome the innate uncertainties associated with climate risks, SPCRs are guided to emphasize capacity-building and win-win measures with early environmental or development benefits (in terms of agriculture, water management, etc.) (CIF 2011c). For example, the Cambodian SPCR includes as a primary component of poverty reduction, increased agricultural yield and diversification, food protection, improved public health, and urban livability (CIF 2011c). Since many SPCR components are framed as complementary to development, they are perceived as “no regret” measures. These types of measures are considered a good way to bypass much of the uncertainty associated with local climate scenarios and the evolution of climate risks at the local level (Fankhauser and Burton 2011; Heltberg et al. 2009).

While SPCRs do stress the need for these types of “no regret” measures, in effect, much room is left for measures that depend on the uncertain outcomes of climate scenarios. Such is the case with large infrastructural climate-proofing projects, subject to the uncertainties of climate change (Hallegatte 2009). Going back to the Cambodian SPRC example, it includes several measures of infrastructure climate proofing such as, continuity of services in road, water, and sanitation infrastructure, and enhanced protection of coastal areas from storm surge, sea level rise, and saltwater intrusion. Infrastructural measures amount to the greater part of $57 million out of $105 million SPCR requested budget (CIF 2011c).

The Cambodian example demonstrates that although the PPCR claims to focus on integrating climate resilience into development trajectories, the resources allocated to uncertain measures such as climate proofing infrastructure may still be a significant tranche of total expenditures. While improving infrastructure might complement development goals, uncertainty is still a major factor in these measures. The Cambodian SPCR does not mention any specific way of addressing uncertainty in these infrastructural investments other than a general remark

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acknowledging the risk and the need to integrate a “decision making framework to assist planners and decision makers to decide on investments in the context of uncertainty” (para. 214).

In order to more fully understand the way in which the PPCR addresses risk in projects, we turn to the first project confirmed under the infrastructural investments category in the Cambodian SPCR: A provincial roads improvement project (CIF 2011c), the aim of which is to “rehabilitate and upgrade 157 km of flood-vulnerable roads” in several provinces “to climate change-resilient conditions” (CIF 2011:2). As mentioned, the approval of a SPCR is a first but not final step in project funding allocation. In order to receive funding from the PPCR, a country must submit a full-length project proposal jointly with its respective MDB. The proposal is consequently discussed and accepted or remanded for adjustments by the PPCR subcommittee.

Looking at the budget allocation in the provincial road project proposal, it is evident that the direct investment in “low regret” climate resiliency measures, such as water capture and storage systems, planting appropriate species to restore ecosystem functions, and emergency management systems, constitutes less than a third of the overall approved budget of $17 million (CIF 2011c): 39). The major part of the investment is allotted to engineering works. The successful and sustainable outcome of the engineering segment of the project is highly influenced by climate scenarios and, as such, is subject to substantial uncertainty.

The project proposal and the assessment by the MDB partner, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), acknowledged the lack of hydrological data that would enable an assessment of climate risks affecting the road engineering improvements (CIF 2011c:31, 33). In addition, the ADB assessment of the project reveals that the project was not necessarily designed so as to address roads in the most vulnerable areas. The assessment mentions, for example, that “Despite Prey Veng being highlighted as a province that is highly vulnerable to flooding in Cambodia’s NAPA, the project road does not run through the highly flood-prone areas of the Province” (CIF 2011c:33, para. 13). This, however, did not hamper the ADB’s support for the project or approval by the PPCR. While no risk-oriented managerial strategy exists with regard to vulnerability outcomes of projects, a fully developed risk managerial strategy is implemented in the management of project risks. Going back to the Cambodian provincial roads project, we find that full governance and risk frameworks are implemented by the ADB as a supervising entity (ADB1, ADB2). A qualitative risk assessment identified five risk themes: public financial management, procurement, technical capability, corruption, and due diligence. The assessment also puts into place managerial mitigation measures for each theme, and assesses their effectiveness in reducing risk levels from high level to low (ADB2).

These assessments and measures do not only portray a different understanding of risk, which focuses on financial management, procurement, disclosure, and corruption rather than on climate and vulnerability. They exemplify the institutional understanding of the role of the PPCR as a funding source and MDB’s oversight role. Interviews indicate that officials at PPCR perceive that financial risk mitigation is an important function of the fund and hence their understanding of risk is first and foremost centered on the risks embedded in poor financial management, low implementation capacity, and corruption in the receiving states.

Officials in ADB accentuated the fact that the ADB supervising role is very much directed at the identification and rectification of project management risks.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Similar to the AF, the PPCR has adopted a multilayered monitoring and evaluation program supported by a PPCR results framework. However, in contrast to the extensive procedures adopted by the AFB to guide the monitoring process in a consistent and uniform manner, the PPCR has left the content of each level of assessment somewhat less defined and open to interpretation by MDBs and country participants. Efforts rest heavily on existing national

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monitoring and evaluation systems and the MDBs’ own system for monitoring development results. The PPCR has declared it will avoid the creation of parallel structures or processes and its subcommittee involvement in monitoring is scarce. Most of the oversight responsibilities rest with the SCFC. As mentioned, specific projects or program components under an SPCR are monitored

by MDBs in accordance with their respective results-based procedures. Country level SPCR monitoring is achieved through joint country and MDB data collection and evaluation. Monitoring is conducted according to key results and indicators identified in SPCRs (CIF 2009a).

Metrics and approaches differ widely, depending on country and targeted sectors and practices of MDBs. While MDBs own systems focus on development rather than adaptation goals and outputs, monitoring is not specified to addressing results in climate risk mitigation but rather has a broad focus on project completion with salience on financial and management issues.

Possibly as a substitution, the PPCR has pledged a final long-term monitoring component. The PPCR design document specifies that final ex-post evaluation of the country pilots will address the impacts and effectiveness of adaptation measures, including sustainability. The long-term monitoring commitment to take place years after SPCR pilots are completed (generally most pilots are expected to last for several years) is unique compared to AF. It is justified based on the claim that effects and sustainability of outcomes are typically apparent only after the lifespan of interventions (CIF 2009a).

Where They Stand: Are Climate Funds Compensators, Redistributors, or Regulators of Risk?

The analysis undertaken brings to light that although many developing countries have called for compensation for climate risks and damages, the current institutionalization of multilateral adaptation funding is far removed from a compensatory disposition. The idea of liability has been wholly neglected by the funds. Moreover, most interviewees indicate that it has been intentionally purposefully and persistently avoided (interviewee A, C, E, and F). Neither CCFs studied prioritize already existing harms nor do they rely on mandatory contributions by industrialized countries. Quite the contrary is true: Contributions to both funds are voluntary, vary between funds, and do not employ any scale of participation in funding.

Although the AF was set up as a direct outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations process, developed countries fail to perceive donations to the fund as mandatory. The U.S. and Canada, which are considered among the world’s largest contributors to historic GHG emissions, have made no contribution to the AF, while Japan, the second-largest emitter among developed countries, made a minuscule contribution (AF(e) 2011; Dellink et al. 2009). The PPCR has enjoyed much larger contributions by these significant emitters as well as contributions by Germany and Australia. Yet, no effort was undertaken for corresponding contributions to the relative historic share in emissions or the contribution of these countries to climate harms as is suggested by Dellink et al., (2009) and others. Nor have these funds, or the funding countries, made any serious effort to correspond donations on the basis of measurable principle of “capacity to pay” or in fact any other proven standard of equitable burden sharing among donor countries. This is the case despite the UNFCCC commitment to “appropriate burden sharing among the developed country parties” in providing funding (UNFCCC article 4(3)).

Risk redistribution judged from the allocation perspective (rather than from the contribution to funding) is somewhat more ostensible. Both funds have adopted to a degree a policy of resource distribution to those countries most vulnerable to climate change. Nevertheless, the means and degree by which both funds have strived to implement vulnerability-based resource allocation are found to be inconsistent.

The AF, although committed both legally and principally to the idea of allocation according to vulnerability, has deviated from this in practice. The AFB relies heavily on reporting by countries on climate hazards and the corresponding adaptations. In determining funding

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priorities, the AFB does not conduct independent comparative risk assessments but requires the country programs to correspond to NAPAs. A “first come first serve” or “bottom up” approach has been adopted for distributing funds. This has resulted not only in LDCs and lower middle income countries receiving funds but in some cases in contributions made to middle and upper middle income countries, such as, Uruguay, Georgia, and Ecuador (AF web site).

Additionally, a uniform upper limit, regardless of country size, wealth, or vulnerability set by the AFB, undermines the possibility of fund allocation according to risk. A uniform funding rule connotes equality in circumstances where there is none and undermines principles of just redistribution.

The PPCR has, in contrast, determined the initial participation of countries and the allocation of resources through a scientific lead vulnerability assessment. The multilevel assessment took into account physical exposure and country resilience as well as capacity to a lesser degree. This initial assessment could have served as a basis for determining just allocation.

However, as in the case of the AF, the consequent allocation scheme devised by the fund was also subject to an equal quota rule, ensuring practically equal allocation to all participating countries or regions.

In both cases, the equal allocation rule serves to facilitate decision-making through the deflection of the scientifically complex and politically sensitive issue of ranking relative risks and vulnerabilities. While it could be claimed that the principle of equality has been upheld by this policy, it is doubtful whether equity in risk redistribution has been served.

The process of evaluation and approval of project proposals has in both funds served as fertile ground for the introduction of regulatory considerations and criteria. The study of the AF evaluation process suggests that the ability of the project to reduce climate associated risk and vulnerability are important and central, albeit not exclusive concerns. Moreover, uncertainty in climate scenarios, in the outcomes or impacts of projects, is of limited concern. The AFB has not developed guidance on addressing uncertainty at the project proposal stage and is likely to accept a proposal even if significant uncertainty exists, as long as potential benefits are clearly prescribed. At the same time, the AFB is substantially involved in considering broader issues indirectly related to risk management, such as cost-effectiveness, governance, accountability, stakeholder participation, and the consistency of the proposal with national standards. Interviews of board members and the Secretariat indicated the AFB is ready to reject projects that do not meet the required standards set by the board, even if projects demonstrate a reasonable response to climate risks and vulnerability.

Reviewing the PPCR policy on actions included in country SPCRs brings to bear that the scientific assessment of climate risks is only one consideration in the prioritization of risks and corresponding actions. Rather, a participatory approach of risk evaluation through the involvement of multiple stakeholders is advocated. In addition, conformance of measures with existing development strategies and policies is highly supported. These considerations emphasize that the feasibility of measures for addressing risks is perceived as central by stakeholders.

This could be otherwise described as a form of pragmatic risk regulation (Renn 2008).

The PPCR promotes regulatory changes required to address adaptation at the planning and decision-making levels in respective countries. Advocating policy and institutional reform to address climate risks, it acts as meta-regulator (Humphrey 2002; Scott 2003).

Both funds closely regulate financial propriety and accountability. Through fiduciary duties imposed either on MDBs (in the case of the PPCR) or IEs (in the case of AF), the use of funding is closely scrutinized. The accreditation process in the case of the AF is heavily regulated to ensure accredited IEs are financially stable and capable of managing and monitoring appropriate use of funds.

Monitoring and evaluation are key components for the work of both funds and also suggest the dominance of a risk regulation approach. Both funds have multiple and layered monitoring and reporting requirements that draw from results management frameworks.

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Nevertheless, the involvement of both funds in setting standards and indicators for monitoring and oversight vary. While the AFB demonstrates strong stewardship and involvement in detailed requirements on monitoring, the PPCR imposes few preconditions and allows pilot countries and MDBs to design appropriate monitoring strategies themselves.

Finally, a similar disparity between funds exists with regard to the use of coercion mechanisms. Where the AFB retains full authority to compel countries to comply with program demands, the PPCR leaves any required coercion to the MDBs. The AFB, through the rigorous accreditation process of IEs and by retaining the right to withdraw funding, has preserved coercion authority over programming and financial demands. In the case of the PPCR, coercion is mostly delegated to MDBs by placing the supervision of financial and programing matters in their hands. This delegation may serve to diminish the ability and willingness to coerce since MDBs share in the program’s success or failure.

Implications and Conclusions The role of multilateral CCFs in the governance of climate change adaptation is clearly of central importance to the future of any climate regime. Diplomatic efforts have focused on establishing mechanisms of funding, the provision, availability and predictability of resources, and ensuring acceptable administrative structures (Gosh and Wood 2009; Grasso 2010; Seballos and Kreft 2011). Little regard has been paid to the manner in which these organizations distribute resources and ultimately the impact of the distribution on governing risks and adaptation. Looking upon the governance and policies of the studied CCFs, what are then the salient features that have created the existing risk governance style and what are their implications?

The Rejection of a Compensatory Approach to Resource Allocation In UNFCCC negotiations, many developing countries lobbied for a compensatory approach in dealing with climate risks and damages, based on developed countries’ liability (Müller 2009; Grasso 2011). This view has been either purposefully avoided or implicitly rejected by CCFs. Despite the fact that funding rests on the premise of responsibility of developed countries and is mandated by the UNFCCC both for incremental adaptation costs (UNFCCC article 4(3)) and the full costs for particularly vulnerable countries (UNFCCC article 4(4)), CCFs have harbored the idea that funding is essentially voluntary in nature and does not derive from liability. Hence, it does not connote compensation or any specific commitment by developed countries. The rejection of liability and duty to compensate for harms caused and risks already experienced is therefore the first prominent feature or risk governance by CCFs. Financially, an acknowledgment of liability would require developed countries to correlate their payments to CCFs on a scale corresponding to their contribution to emissions or harms caused. Funding provided would have to be proven sufficient to compensate for damages and risks attributable to anthropogenic climate change. Consequently, funding would be required to grow unconditionally to match the unfolding of climate damages, creating uncertainty as to the amounts due and the boundaries of liability. The recognition of liability for climate damages would thus be detrimental to developed countries financially.

Liability entails the imposition of external rules determining a country’s contribution.

Contributions could no longer be discretionary and would need to correspond to strict legal rules, minimizing developed countries’ ability to determine what damages would be paid.

Also, the recognition of liability would undermine the reciprocal nature of the UNFCCC and the negotiations process. It would provide for unidirectional responsibility, compromising developed countries’ ability to obtain concessions and demand actions from developing countries. Both of these considerations render the acceptance of liability as a model for allocation as politically unacceptable to developed countries.

It could be claimed that a compensatory model would have provided greater assurance and predictability of funding and a clearer model allocation among developing countries.

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Nevertheless, these assumptions may be countervailed by the requirement for causal attribution of harm and the prioritization of manifested harms that would complicate actual allocation.

Adopting a risk compensation model would also create adverse impacts on risk reduction and preventative planning, incentivizing the adoption of a retrospective approach. This would increase harms, as countries might opt for waiting until clearly attributable climate harms occur, rather than managing complex adaptation measures, seen as uncertain and possibly redundant.

The Limited Role of Vulnerability in Redistribution A second salient feature of risk governance by CCFs is the shallow and partial interpretation given to risk redistribution based on vulnerability assessment, which is especially pertinent in the AF. Efforts to quantify vulnerability have been portrayed as hindered by the uncertainties associated with the concept. At the same time, vulnerability-based redistribution has encountered a tendency toward an egalitarian division rather than a risk-based dispensation of funding. Consequently, CCF procedures have impeded the use of vulnerability and risk as singular criteria for monetary transfers.

Additional multiple considerations introduced through authorization procedures have further deflected from vulnerability as a basis for redistribution. Criteria such as cost-effectiveness, geographical distribution, and capacity have fractured the risk-driven incentive to fund adaptation. At the same time they have allowed stronger discretion in addressing funding allocation and project authorization by CCF boards.

The implications of a reduced role for vulnerability in the allocation of funding are already evident. When vulnerability is not an overriding concern in allocation of funding, monies may be dispersed among developing countries as well as those with medium and high-medium income, which are located around the median of the Human Development Index. The ability of more highly developing countries to access the funds occurs because these countries have both higher capacity for dealing with the complexity associated with the submission of detailed funding requests and for the implementation of projects once confirmed. The outcome may be that significant trenches of already limited adaptation funding will go not to the most vulnerable, but to those countries capable of preparing adaptation proposals and advancing their claim within the CCF boards.

Intensive Involvement in Determining Appropriate Adaptation Actions CCFs have developed (non-homogenous) visions of adaptation and are “implanting� these visions in recipient countries through funding. The PPCR vision of tying development and adaptation and the AF understanding of concreteness of adaptation projects determine to a large extent the nature of adaptation measures taken in recipient countries. This stance is justified on the claim for improved effectiveness of adaptation actions. It may however prove detrimental if little flexibility is left for funded countries to respond to changing circumstances or uncertainties in the manifestation of climate scenarios.

Intense Regulation of Fiscal Performance, the Demand for Internal Regulatory Reform, and Monitoring Boards have adopted a practice of scrutinizing projects, addressing not only issues such as risk reduction and suitability of adaptation measures, but in demanding evidence of sound fiscal and management practices. Fiscal issues are highly regulated, and detailed instructions for the fiscal and fiduciary management of projects are provided to funding recipients, who are then required to implement them. This measure is without doubt motivated by the need for assuring the sound use of the funds and preventing mismanagement and corruption. At the same time, it provides additional leverage to the CCFs in increasing their regulatory powers over recipient countries.

Additionally, projects are often directed to address policy and planning reforms required to advance and mainstream adaptation. The demand for integrating policy and regulatory

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reform as part of an adaptation strategy in the PPCR is a powerful tool used by the PPCR to steer changes in governance in recipient countries complementing the broader developmental agenda. This strengthens the influence CCFs hold over the adaptation agenda in developing countries and at the same time broadens their influence beyond what may be considered as purely adaptation.

Finally, affirmation of projects is followed by close monitoring, directed at project implementation and the compliance with fiduciary duties. Monitoring is supplemented by varying degrees with coercion powers and methods. These three characteristics: the laying of fiduciary rules, the requirement for internal policy and regulatory reform, and close monitoring of projects, when placed together promote the view that CCFs have become mechanisms of risk regulation rather than redistributive organizations.

Regulation entails a shift from emphasis on the provision of adequate funding and sharing of burden among developed counties. Focus is redirected to the role of developing countries in providing for appropriate adaptation plans and programs. Through this lens, developing countries are not seen as having entitlement to resources. Rather, they are constructed as recipients of aid that must adhere to the many terms and conditions applied by the donors. This shift diverts attention from risk reduction prevention and redistribution, the primary reasons and justifications for adaptation funding. It causes countries to focus on technical and managerial aspects of adaptation rather than on the substance of risk mitigation.

CCFs’ practices and countries’ responses to the imposed requirements create, in effect, a global phenomenon of regulating adaptation as an extension of what Goldman (2001) has termed the “regulatory regime for the environment” created by the World Bank. Regulation may contribute toward project and fiscal management and ensuring cost-effective action in adaptation. It may even benefit lesson-learning through the intense monitoring efforts undertaken. It will not, however, contribute to country ownership of projects, mainstreaming adaptation, or improving the resilience to climate change of those most vulnerable. Instead of providing incentives for rapid and effective adaptation, regulatory governance by CCFs may slow down the impetus for adaptation and reduce desired risk mitigation results, counteracting the very purpose of climate funding.

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Follow the Money: Navigating the International Aid Maze for Dryland Development

by Pamela S. Chasek, Manhattan College Funding to assist poor countries in combating desertification and other types of land degradation has been largely neglected in comparison to other sectors (especially water supply and sewage treatment, biodiversity, and climate change), despite continued warnings from the scientific community, staggering estimates of need, and the adoption and entry into force of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in the mid-1990s.

This paper examines the aid flows for projects and programs to combat desertification and address drylands degradation and development. The paper reviews the major multilateral and bilateral sources of aid and elaborates how the development of projects that also address other key environment and development issues, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and the Millennium Development Goals have increased the aid flows to countries and regions suffering from severe dryland degradation.

Introduction It is estimated that desertification and drought account for US$42 billion in annual loss in food productivity worldwide (UNEP 2006). On top of this figure is the uncountable cost in human suffering and lives lost due to hunger and the need to abandon once productive land. These statistics are not only disturbing, they are preventable. Historically, the drylands, for the most part, have been bypassed by development. They attract little investment, usually because their importance and potential is unappreciated (UNDP 2005). This confines dryland dwellers to poverty and destitution despite international efforts to put drylands on the global agenda, including the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), which arose from the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.

The challenge is how to improve economic and social development in the drylands without contributing to even greater environmental degradation in already fragile lands. For decades, bilateral and multilateral development assistance has been seen as the universal panacea and numerous attempts have been made to find ways to increase aid flows to the drylands.

Funds to combat the destruction of soil resources, however, have not been a priority for the aid community. In fact, there were only 1,537 land degradation assistance projects between 1980 and 2000, with an allocated total of approximately $4.6 billion over the entire period.

This represents only about 2 percent of the funding goals set in Agenda 21, adopted in Rio de Janeiro at the Earth Summit in 1992. Of all environmental aid given in the twenty-year period between 1980 and 2000, aid to address land degradation represents only 3.23 percent (Hicks et al. 2008).

This paper examines the aid flows for projects and programs to combat desertification and address dryland degradation and development. The paper begins with some background about how this issue was addressed in the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification, identifies the major multilateral and bilateral sources of aid, and elaborates how the development of projects that also address other key environment and development issues, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and the Millennium Development Goals, can increase the aid flows to countries and regions suffering from severe dryland degradation.

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The Convention to Combat Desertification: Background While the African ministers’ proposal for a convention to combat desertification was discussed during the UNCED preparatory process, it was only in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 where, after protracted negotiation, delegates accepted the idea of a global convention in paragraph 12.40 of Agenda 21: The General Assembly at its forty-seventh session should be requested to establish, under the aegis of the General Assembly, an intergovernmental negotiating committee for the elaboration of an international convention to combat desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, particularly in Africa, with a view to finalizing such a convention by June 1994 (United Nations, 1992:104).

In December 1992, the UN General Assembly took the first step in implementing this recommendation by adopting resolution 47/188, calling for the establishment of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), which would convene for five, two-week sessions with a view of finalizing the convention by June 1994. The INC held its organizational session in January 1993. The majority of the key negotiations on the socioeconomic and financial aspects of desertification were shaped by the opposing viewpoints of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) group of countries and the Group of 77 (G77) and China. Unlike many previous environmental negotiations, the INC was characterized by economic interdependence rather than ecological interdependence.

Developed countries held the purse strings to the financial and technical assistance needed by the affected developing countries. Thus, even though developing countries represented the larger of the two primary coalitions with greater voting power, the OECD group of countries formed an economic “veto coalition,” which had the power to influence the course of the negotiations.

From the beginning there were divergent views on the need for new financial resources and mechanisms. The developing countries, particularly the Africans, argued that new and additional financial resources from developed countries were necessary to fund programs stemming from the convention. The Africans proposed that the convention should establish a “new, independent, democratic, less conditional, and transparent financial mechanism,” such as a “fund for desertification” (United Nations 1993:64). The OECD group of countries believed there was no demonstrated need for either new or additional financial resources to implement the convention or for new financial mechanisms. They argued that lack of funding was not the problem. What was missing was information on the impact of funds, assessment of successes and shortcomings, and removal of bottlenecks. Existing financial resources and mechanisms should suffice, with suitable modifications to use them more effectively (United Nations 1993).

After three days of round-the-clock meetings in a small contact group, consisting of eight representatives from the G-77 and eight from the OECD group of countries at the final negotiating session in Paris in June 1994, a compromise was reached. The U.S. proposed the establishment of a “Global Mechanism” to promote actions leading to the mobilization and channeling of financial resources. After several lengthy discussions about the nature of such a Global Mechanism, the G-77 agreed to withdraw its proposal for a special desertification fund.

As a result, the negotiations concluded without a strong commitment by developed country parties to contribute new and additional resources to UNCCD implementation and without a consensus on the nature of the financial mechanisms that would support its implementation (Falloux et al. 2006:130). The final text of Article 20 “Financial Resources” states that developed country parties will undertake to mobilize substantial financial resources, including grants and concessional loans; promote the mobilization of “adequate, timely, and predictable financial resources, including new and additional funding from the Global Environment Facility”; and explore innovative methods and incentives for mobilizing and channeling resources.

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Affected developing country parties, taking into account their capabilities, undertake to mobilize adequate financial resources for the implementation of their national action programs.

Furthermore, the parties will use resources already allocated for combating desertification more effectively and efficiently (UNCCD 1994).

Paragraphs 4–7 of Article 21 “Financial Mechanism” discuss the establishment of the Global Mechanism that will function under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties (COP). At its first session, the COP would identify an organization to house the Global Mechanism and ensure that such mechanism identifies and draws up an inventory of bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs that are available to implement the convention, provides advice, on request, to parties on innovative methods of financing and sources of financial assistance and on improving the coordination of cooperation activities at the national level, and provides information on available sources of funds and on funding patterns in order to facilitate coordination among them (UNCCD 1994).

Not all parties were satisfied with the results. Developing countries, in particular, were concerned that these articles did not contain strong enough commitments by developed countries to provide new and additional financial resources or address the international economic environment that contributes to the socioeconomic causes of desertification. Unlike the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which both benefited from well-defined issues for which the international political and scientific communities had created the urgency and direction needed to instigate an influx of financing, the UNCCD’s financial provisions were instead designed to mobilize, channel, and coordinate financial flows to fight poverty and land degradation in the drylands (Falloux et al. 2006:130). The UNCCD thus faces the challenge of financing a convention with a broad mandate and stagnating funding for environmental official development assistance (ODA). It has now been nineteen years since the UNCCD was adopted in June 1994 and traditional sources of funding and institutional roles in securing new and additional financial resources have not met expectations.

Following the Money: Where Are those “New and Additional” Financial Resources?

The issue of financial resources has been at the center of global environmental politics for many years and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Providing developing countries with financial and technical assistance to help them implement their obligations under environmental treaties remains a crucial challenge (Jacobson and Weiss 1998:527).

For many developing countries, the major obstacle to effective implementation is the lack of adequate financial and technical resources to fulfill treaty obligations. These countries simply do not have the resources to comply effectively. For others, it provides valuable economic assistance, so resources can flow to other social needs, as well as political assistance, to ease domestic objections regarding adjustment costs. Successfully expanding and implementing global environmental treaties, like the UNCCD, require transitions to environmentally sound technologies and new strategies for natural resource management.

Although they could yield long-term economic benefits, such transitions are costly in the short run and require significant investments to ease the transition (Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2010:308).

Adequate funding to combat desertification and land degradation in the drylands has always been a challenge. Part of the problem is that both multilateral and bilateral donors do not have a common interpretation of what constitutes direct support to UNCCD implementation and what supports the objectives of the convention indirectly. The UNCCD is perceived as an environment convention, even though its primary focus is to fight land degradation through sustainable rural development while reducing poverty. According to Falloux et al. (2006:138) following the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992,

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It was initially thought that the environment label would provide higher visibility and better support to the UNCCD. Unfortunately, this has not materialized. As a consequence, national UNCCD focal points are generally situated within ministries of environment without adequate links to ministries of finance, agriculture and other departments positioned to influence policies and budgets pertinent to UNCCD implementation (such as rural development and agriculture). . . . As a result, desertification is rarely cited among the priorities put forward by developing countries in their discussions with donor agencies.

Developed countries, on the other hand, have located their focal points within development agencies. However, they have failed to take the lead in helping their developing country counterparts to raise the profile of desertification into development planning. The result is that the money is focused elsewhere (Falloux et al. 2006:138). This assessment is echoed by Hicks et al. (2008:5), who argue that “land use and desertification have arguably created the greatest numbers of environmentally related deaths over the past two decades. Yet we find this type of aid is relatively neglected and funding does not appear to be flowing to the places where it is most needed.” While there are cost-effective interventions for improving soil health and combating land degradation including erosion control, sediment recapture, fertilizers, green manure, fertilizer trees, crop residues, and water conservation, funds to combat the destruction of soil resources are only “trickling in” from the aid community (Hicks et al. 2008:39–41). Land degradation aid hovered near or below $100 million a year until 1987 when two large projects boosted the traditional annual totals. That year, the Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations provided $75 million for a reforestation project in Ecuador and the African Development Bank gave $49 million for a reforestation project in Côte d’Ivoire. In 1990, a $350 million afforestation project funded by the World’s Bank IDA—over four times larger than any previous project—was given to China.

The years following the Earth Summit in 1992 suggest the issue of land degradation was overshadowed by other concerns. Land degradation aid fell in 1993 to around $260 million and followed a roller coaster ride of highs and lows over the next six years, with aid dipping to $178 million in 1996 and peaking in 1997 at $575 million. Looking back at twenty years of project-level data, the shifting size and types of land degradation aid projects reveal much about donors’ intended goals. While there are a handful of large land degradation projects, notably to China and India in the early 1990s, most aid given to countries comes in small packages averaging from $2.4 million in 1980s to $4.1 million in the 1990s (Hicks et al. 2008:42).

An example would be a project from Canada to Haiti for $3.9 million to promote “soil degradation control.” Another would be a project from Denmark to Zimbabwe for $2.3 million to increase “productivity in community land in five districts in eastern Zimbabwe through sustainable use of forests and trees” (Hicks, et al. 2008, 42). These projects suggest narrowly targeted interventions with limited funds, which contribute to the inconsistency in aid flows.

What tends to happen is that projects get funded for an initial period of a year to three years and then either the funding source dries up or recipients fail to secure additional funds to continue the project. The result is that the project dies and many short-term gains are lost.

Looking at the three largest donors during this ten-year period from 1997–2006, as reported by the Financial Information Engine on Land Degradation (FIELD), Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark (see Figure 1), the fluctuation in annual official development assistance flows illustrates the challenges in achieving consistency when aid is predominantly project based.

Overall, within the context of bilateral and multilateral aid flows (excluding foreign direct investment, NGO contributions, and other sources of financing to combat land degradation), there are a number of donors through which affected developing countries may seek financing. While this is not the same as having a dedicated fund, some would argue the amounts available, while much lower than expectations of affected developing countries in the early

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Figure 1: Bilateral Investment Fluctuations 1997–2006 (US$ million) 700 600

US$ millions

500 400

Germany

300

Netherlands Denmark

200 100 0 1997 1998 1999

2000 2001 2002 2003

2004 2005 2006

Source: Financial Information Engine on Land Degradation (FIELD) http://www.gmfield.info, accessed 8 December 2008.

Figure 2: Bilateral UNCCD-related Investments 1997–2006 (US$ million) Germany Netherlands Denmark Belgium Canada Australia Japan Switzerland United Kingdom Norway France United States Sweden Italy Finland Spain Austria Ireland Portugal

1,996 1,009 943 679

588 376 369 332 276 139 118 106 72 69 68 48 16 9 1 Amount in US$ million

Source: Financial Information Engine on Land Degradation (FIELD) http://www.gmfield.info, accessed 8 December 2008.

1990s, may be more than if a separate fund was established under and possibly managed by the convention (See Figures 2 and 3).

Despite the totals of UNCCD-related investments, the percentage of bilateral aid given for UNCCD-related aid is quite small. According to FIELD, the average percentage of bilateral ODA for the period 2001–2003 runs from a high of 5.9 percent in the Netherlands to under 0.5 percent in Sweden, the U.S., Norway, Greece, and Portugal (FIELD 2008). Needless to say, this is not what countries were hoping for. Not only are the amounts available less than expected, not all countries benefited equally. According to FIELD, between 2000 and 2003, the only countries that received more than $100 million in bilateral ODA were Bolivia, Burkina Faso, China, Egypt, and Morocco. Those receiving between $50–100 million included Mauritania, Mali,

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Figure 3: Multilateral UNCCD-Related Investments 1997–2006 (US$ million) 0

Amount in US$ million 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

IFAD World Bank GEF OPEC Fund for International Development World Food Programme UNDP Arab Bank for Economic Dev. in Africa African Development Bank UNEP European Investment Bank European Union West Africa Development Bank Asian Development Bank Arab Fund for Economic and Social Dev. Central American Bank for Economic Integration IADB FAO Islamic Development Bank Andean Development Corporation

Source: Financial Information Engine on Land Degradation (FIELD) http://www.gmfield.info, accessed 8 December 2008.

Niger, Chad, Ghana, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa, and India (FIELD 2008).

Overall, during the same period, Africa received 56.4 percent of the total desertification-related bilateral ODA, amounting to $1739.3 million.

At the adoption of the UNCCD, many affected developing countries, particularly in Africa, saw this new convention as a mechanism for targeting more financial resources towards dryland development, combating desertification, and mitigating the effects of drought. The reality is that this has not become a focus of multilateral and bilateral development assistance and the compromise Global Mechanism has not really helped.

Global Mechanism The Global Mechanism (GM) began operations as a compromise organization that did not really address the developing countries’ desire for “new and additional” financial resources to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought. Instead, the GM was defined as an organizational entity mandated “to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of existing financial mechanisms . . . [and] . . . to promote actions leading to the mobilization and channeling of substantial financial resources to affected developing country parties” (UNCCD 1994). In essence, the GM serves as a broker or matchmaker between donors and recipients, providing a range of financial advisory services to parties to the convention, in cooperation with international financial institutions, including its host organization the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). However, concern that the GM was not facilitating the mobilization of resources and was not providing adequate services to parties to the UNCCD never disappeared. In 2009, in response to a request from the UNCCD Conference of the Parties, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) of the UN conducted an evaluation of the GM entitled “Assessment of the Global Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification” (Ortiz and Inomata 2009).

During the assessment, the inspectors analyzed the overall resources mobilized by the GM over the years and also assessed the level of satisfaction by stakeholders concerning the use and impact of these funds, based on feedback from donors to and beneficiaries of GM activities, as well as from other partners and stakeholders. Overall, the GM received $38 million during the period 1998–2008 from a variety of donors, of which more than $20 million was received between 2005 and 2008. The number of donors has decreased, but the

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amount of the average contribution per donor has increased, as can be seen in Figure 4 (Ortiz and Inomata 2009:12).

Figure 4: Evolution of donor contributions to the Global Mechanism 1998–2008 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000

12 10 8 6 4

Number of Donors

Contributions in thousands of USD

10,000

Con. in 1000s of USD No. of Donors

2

0

98 999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 006 2007 2008 9 2 1 1

Year

Source: Ortiz and Inomata 2009:13

The JIU Report also noted that while GM was successful in targeting and leveraging

bigger amounts of contributions from its active donors, it had not succeeded in efficiently

integrating other funding avenues beyond the traditional donor exploring and systematically 0

community already targeted by all other intergovernmental organizations. Contacts with foundations, private sector, or other nontraditional donors were not a central component of the GM fund-raising strategy, limiting those to ad hoc efforts at national level and only in countries in which the GM has developed activities, such as workshops and seminars on IFS to which it invited representative NGOs, civil society organizations and private foundations to dialogue with government officials and multilateral donors (Ortiz and Inomata 2009:14).

Dissatisfaction on the part of many affected developing countries about the lack of a desertification fund in combination with the paucity of funds mobilized through the GM gave momentum to continued calls for additional funding, particularly in the form of a new “window” under the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

Global Environment Facility The GEF was established in 1990 as a three-year pilot program, which was restructured and permanently established in 1994 as a global environmental funding mechanism. The purpose of the GEF is to assist developing countries in their efforts to address global environmental problems. Initially, there were four focal areas: climate change, biological diversity, international waters, and the ozone layer. The restructured GEF was entrusted to become the financial mechanism for both the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In partnership with the Montreal Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Ozone Layer Depleting Substances, the GEF started funding projects that enabled the Russian Federation and nations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to phase out their use of ozone-destroying chemicals. The GEF subsequently was also selected to serve as financial mechanism for two more international conventions: the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) and the UNCCD (2003).

Project proposals are developed by countries in cooperation with one of the GEF implementing agencies—the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Food and

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Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the World Bank (IBRD). Project proposals are submitted for approval to the GEF Council, whose members represent thirty-two constituencies (sixteen from developing countries, fourteen from developed countries, and two from countries with transitional economies) and implementation is undertaken through partnerships between the relevant country or region and the GEF implementing agency.

When the GEF became the financial mechanism for the UNCCD in 2003, many developing countries hoped this would be the panacea to the financing problem. Between 2003 and the beginning of 2012, the GEF has approved ninety-six projects under the land degradation focal point in the amount of $346 million, which generated an additional $1,848 million in co-financing (GEF 2012)—far more than the GM had managed to mobilize. Cofinancing comes from bilateral donors, multilateral agencies (especially the GEF implementing agencies), NGOs, and other sources. Of these projects, the largest GEF grant was for $29 million for a project “LDC and SIDS Targeted Portfolio Approach for Capacity Development and Mainstreaming of Sustainable Land Management.” The largest project in terms of GEF grant money and cofinancing in the amount of $135 million (mostly from cofinancing), was for establishing the Central Asian Initiative for Land Management (CACILM), a multi-country and donor partnership to support the development and implementation of national level programmatic frameworks for more comprehensive and integrated approaches to sustainable land management, combating land degradation, and improving rural livelihoods in the region.

There were nine “global” projects, which averaged $10 million in GEF grants and cofinancing, seventeen “regional” projects—primarily in Africa and Central Asia—averaging $16 million in GEF grants and cofinancing. The remaining seventy projects were “country” projects, which averaged $26 million in GEF grants and cofinancing (GEF 2012). The regional breakdown is in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Allocation of GEF Funds for Land Degradation and Desertification Projects: 2004–2011 Region Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean TOTAL

GEF Grants (US$)

Percent of Total Projects

Percent of total GEF grants

13

19%

12%

221,039,129

10

14%

16%

1,570,312,613

70

100%

100%

Cofinancing (US$)

# of Projects

176,940,639 14,357,000

1,054,269,319 19,300,000

42 5

30,900,977

275,704,165

41,989,161 264,187,777

60% 7%

67% 5%

Source: GEF 2012

While the GEF and related cofinancing has contributed significantly to projects aimed at implementing the UNCCD, when compared to other GEF focal areas, the picture does not look as good. And, despite GEF successes, it is these figures that come to mind when government delegates complain about the lack of new and additional financial resources at various

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UNCCD and other related meetings. For example, since its inception through the end of 2011, the GEF funded 2,787 projects. Yet only 3 percent of these projects have been for desertification and land degradation (see Figure 6). In response to the argument that the GEF was funding climate change, biodiversity, international waters, and ozone depletion projects since 1991, the GEF started funding the Stockholm Convention in 2001, only two years before the UNCCD, and there have been more than twice as many projects (222) when compared to the ninety-six for desertification and land degradation (GEF 2012).

Figure 6. GEF Projects by Focal Area: 1991–2011 Multifocal 13%

Ozone Depletion 1% International Waters 7%

Biodiversity 37%

POPs 8% Land 3%

Climate Change 31%

Source: GEF 2012

The funding picture does not look much different (See Figure 7). Sixty-two percent of all GEF grants went to climate change and biodiversity projects. Only 4 percent went to land projects. In terms of the co-financing leveraged by the GEF grants during this twenty-year period, climate change projects received 47 percent of all cofinancing, followed by 18 percent for biodiversity and 15 percent for international waters. Land projects leveraged about 4 percent of all cofinancing.

Figure 7. GEF Funding by Focal Area: 1991–2011 (in US$) Focal Area

GEF Grants

Cofinancing

Total

Biodiversity Climate Change Land POPs International Waters Ozone Depletion Multifocal

2,798,567,800 2,981,231,400 346,401,980 425,499,768 1,081,559,000 186,702,530 1,464,792,400

7,519,474,100 19,934,473,000 1,847,492,710 722,981,346 6,356,475,700 200,588,080 5,872,524,200

10,318,041,900 22,915,704,400 2,193,894,690 1,148,481,114 7,438,034,700 387,290,610 7,337,316,600

Total

9,284,754,878

42,454,009,136

51,738,764,014

Source: GEF 2012

Finally, it is important to look at the multifocal activities. These projects address more than one of the six GEF focal areas and make up 13 percent of all projects and 16 percent of all GEF grants distributed—four times the amount that goes to land-related projects. However, upon a search of the GEF project database (2012) for reference to “desertification,” “land degradation,” or “drought” explicitly in any of the project descriptions for multifocal activities,

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the results are sobering. Only twenty-two of the 355 multifocal projects approved between 1991 and 2011 address these issues. On the positive side, this added an additional $97.8 million in GEF grants and leveraged an additional $520.5 million in co-financing (GEF, 2012).

However, these projects are not always calculated as UNCCD projects, which is part of the bigger problem. More funding does come into areas that are affected by land degradation and desertification, but not all of it is labeled as such. As a result, it is harder to track this funding and demonstrate that additional financial resources are available and being used.

Overcoming the Challenges “Follow the money” everyone always says and since land degradation and desertification disproportionately affect the least developed countries, especially in Africa, funding is a big issue. It is not so much that there is an absence of funding for implementation of the UNCCD from bilateral and multilateral donors, but when compared to other environment and development funding, the figures reinforce the oft-heard comment that the UNCCD is the “poor sister” of the Rio Conventions. There are challenges with both bilateral and multilateral funding that must be overcome to move beyond this reality.

First, the majority of foreign aid is provided by bilateral donors who determine their own priorities. Many countries do not give priority to land degradation and desertification when development policies and strategies are set. The contribution of land resources to national development, poverty reduction, green growth, and other sustainable development objectives, and the potential sustainable land management has to reverse the degradation of fragile ecosystems, are too often not recognized. Other, more “visible” and pressing issues are very often higher on the political agenda and therefore receive more attention and funding (Global Mechanism 2012).

A common problem with government-to-government aid is that “donor” and “recipient” politicians, parties, and officials are often more concerned about benefit from the aid for themselves, than about it reaching those most in need. Some donors, who try to benefit the disadvantaged, cannot get the aid past the gatekeepers—the politicians and officials who often manipulate it for their own benefit (Crocombe 2001:557). According to Hicks et al.

(2008:34), funding to control land degradation does not provide the same benefits to donor countries as water and sanitation projects, which can lead to lucrative contracts for Western construction, equipment and consulting firms, creating a political constituency for support within donor countries. Projects designed to control land degradation and desertification in developing countries, on the other hand, offer few direct benefits to voters in developed countries and often garner less support from voters and interest groups. Furthermore, if a politician is looking for rapid results, the construction of a water treatment plant fits nicely within an election cycle and can quickly show demonstrable results, whereas land reclamation projects take much longer and cannot be easily packaged for political gain in a donor country.

The GM has noted that with development aid allocation increasingly subject to nationallevel negotiations, the availability of external public finance in support of sustainable land management programs depends on the importance given to sustainable land and ecosystem management by the recipient government. Compelling economic arguments are needed to make the case for sustainable land management to ministries of finance, in particular. To this end, the GM has recognized that by assessing the total economic value of ecosystem goods and services, the direct and indirect costs of natural capital depreciation, and the net benefits of alternative land use approaches, it is possible to generate enough economic evidence to justify responsible land use policies and increased public and private investments into sustainable ecosystem management practices and initiatives (Global Mechanism 2012). But this does not always happen.

A second challenge relates to multilateral donors, most notably the GEF. The GEF has provided much needed financing for land degradation and desertification projects, but many critics

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argue that it is insufficient in volume and that certain changes must be made so that the funding is better utilized. Some of the structural problems are similar to those faced with bilateral aid: donor control over the aim and the direction of the GEF. Critics claim that multilateral development banks and donor countries alike use GEF money as a tool to get recipient governments to commit to larger loans with political conditionality. Some recipient governments note an unwieldy bureaucracy in the GEF and other multilateral funds and report that UN agencies routinely assess unreasonable administrative fees. For example, a 26 January 2009 audit of GEF by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu showed that more than $17 million went to pay for fees during the 2008 accounting period and more than $15 million was spent on fees in 2007 (Lattanzio 2010:12). Others, especially recipient countries, have complained that the project cycle needs to be streamlined.1 A third issue has been the relationship between country-driven strategic development and project success rates. In spite of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, funding remains donor driven rather than recipient driven. Recommendations to strengthen recipient country ownership include: 1) reforming in-country corporate programs to include greater project portfolio identification and enhanced stakeholder coordination and 2) developing a more flexible and transparent resource allocation framework (Lattanzio 2010:13; GEF, 2010). Other recommendations to strengthen GEF partnerships include: 1) enhancing accountability to the conventions and protocols; 2) streamlining the project cycle and refining the programmatic approach; 3) enhancing engagement with the private sector; 4) implementing the results-based management framework; 5) clarifying the roles and responsibilities of GEF entities, agencies, and conventions; and 6) enhancing engagement with civil society organizations (Lattanzio 2010:13).

On the other side, recipient country governments need to engage in a dialogue with bilateral and multilateral donors to ensure that a greater percentage of aid is recipient driven and meets national environmental and development priorities; the two must be linked. Until there is greater aid rationalization and coordination, the culture of scarcity and the competition between government ministries and departments will continue. In addition, there will continue to be a plethora of redundant projects that do not accomplish much in the long term.

By improving their ability to determine national priorities and sell these to potential donors, national governments have an opportunity to change the aid flow so it is more recipient driven.

Affected developing countries must also encourage donors by establishing aid coordination offices and linking development assistance with existing environmental programs and projects. Donor and recipient countries and multilateral donors also need to work together to ensure that projects fit into larger programs that will continue to bring benefits once the initial funding period is complete.

Finally, beyond better rationalizing and utilizing existing funds, countries need to better coordinate their action plans under the three Rio Conventions and develop both projects and larger programs that can effectively implement the UNCCD and either the Convention on Biological Diversity or the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To some extent, when it comes to the UNFCCC, this can be considered “bandwagoning,” which Jinnah (2011) says occurs when linking agents purposefully expand an international treaty or regime’s mission to include new climate-oriented goals, typically by foregrounding potential climate mitigation or adaptation benefits of these linkages. Linking agents usually bandwagon, because they believe that doing so will further their own agendas, regardless of whether the linkages detract from the common good (Jinnah 2011). The UNCCD has long seen bandwagoning as critical for mobilizing finances to combat desertification, both under the GEF and with other bilateral and multilateral donors.

Along these lines, in its 2011 report to the UNCCD COP’s Committee for the Review of the Implementation of the Convention, the GEF reported that investments in sustainable land management also benefited from other funding windows during the reporting period: 1. The GEF Council has since responded and took a number of streamlining decisions for both project and programmatic approach cycles at its June 2010 meeting (GEF 2012:17).

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Because of their emphasis on production systems and vulnerability of human livelihoods, three major funding windows focused on climate change adaptation are particularly invaluable in the context of UNCCD. The GEF recognizes that adaptation programs should not operate in a vacuum. For example, the need to address impacts from drought and floods can be pursued through integrated land and water resources management with multiple benefits. Such integrated approaches will have significant beneficial impacts on community livelihoods, food security, and a high potential to sequester carbon. Therefore, GEF eligible countries focusing on activities to combat land degradation (desertification and deforestation) can take full advantage of the adaptation funds being managed by the GEF: the LDCF (Least Developed Countries Fund) and SCCF (Special Climate Change Fund) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Adaptation Fund under the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol (UNCCD 2011:11).

For example, the Adaptation Fund has been established by the parties to the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC to finance concrete adaptation projects and programs in developing countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol. During 2010–2011, the GEF reported that UNFCCC Adaptation Fund projects have been approved in ten countries for a total of $60.57 million. At least four of the projects—Eritrea, Ecuador, Solomon Islands, and Turkmenistan— were focused on enhancing resilience or reducing risks and vulnerabilities in production systems (mainly agriculture) that underpin food security and livelihoods. Other projects, such as those in watersheds (Nicaragua, Honduras, and Mongolia) and in vulnerable coastal areas (Senegal, Maldives) also have direct implications for resilience of production systems. These projects are clear examples of the potential for affected parties to combat desertification and land degradation in the context of climate change adaptation by defining their priorities in accordance with principle on country-drivenness (UNCCD 2011).

The UNCCD has also attempted to bandwagon with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The UNCCD has argued that by controlling and reversing desertification, curbing the effects of drought and restoring productive lands, there is an opportunity to make a direct positive contribution to reducing poverty, improving people’s lives and meeting the targets of the MDGs. Addressing desertification ensures that reducing poverty and improving development are sustainable over the long term, especially with an expanding global population (UNCCD Press Release 2011). Yet it is not always possible to determine how funds allocated for the MDGs have directly impacted UNCCD implementation. This is, in part, due to the fact that there are also many initiatives that do not use the “desertification” label, but which alleviate dryland degradation, sometimes as a secondary goal to poverty alleviation, afforestation schemes, improving rural livelihoods—for example through community vegetable gardens that can reduce soil erosion—and introducing alternative energy sources can help reduce deforestation (Stringer 2006).

The GM has also provided lists of alternative sources of funding as part of a finance information kit for affected developing countries. For example, the GM lists twenty-four adaptation funds through which investors can implement projects and programs having adaptation to climate change as their objective. Adaptation activities are those that seek to provide adjustment to the adverse impact of climate change on the environment, and they revolve around the development of coping strategies. The GM also lists thirty-two carbon funds, which are funds established with the objective of allowing participants to invest in projects that seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. Since many of the countries struggling with land degradation and drought are also facing serious food security problems and hunger, the GM lists seven food security funds, since by acknowledging the importance of sustainable land management in ensuring sustainable food production and food security, there are great opportunities to access these funds (Global Mechanism 2012a).

To further supplement more traditional bilateral and multilateral sources of aid, the GM also identified thirty-seven foundations and ten civil society organizations that also provide funds for health, agriculture, environment, food security, and climate change in many

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countries also affected by land degradation, desertification, and drought (Global Mechanism 2012a). While determining the amount of aid from these nontraditional sources would require additional research, and could be the subject of a future project, for the purposes of this paper, it is notable that the GM has recognized that traditional bilateral donors and even the GEF funding is not enough to meet the needs of affected developing countries.

Since the adoption of the UNCCD in 1994, and especially after naming the GEF as the financial mechanism for the convention, new and additional financial resources have been mobilized to combat land degradation and desertification. Despite these achievements, the convention has also faced several obstacles, including the perception of desertification as a mainly developing-world problem and failure to link land degradation in the drylands with other environment and development issues, including climate change, biodiversity loss, food security, and poverty alleviation. Developing countries may have the political will to tackle the issue, but they often lack the financial resources, technology, and capacity for sustainable, long-term activities. Conversely, developed countries have the resources, but lack the interest and political will to invest in the problem (Stringer 2006). Until developed countries are willing to invest responsibly in sustainable land management and affected developing countries are willing to better utilize existing, new, and different resources to combat desertification while addressing other environmental and development issues, there will be no end to the excuses for failure to combat land degradation and alleviate poverty and hunger in the drylands.

REFERENCES

Chasek, Pamela S., David L. Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown (2010) Global Environmental Politics, 5th edition, Boulder: Westview.

Crocombe, Ron (2001) The South Pacific, Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific.

Falloux, François et al., (2006) “The Global Mechanism and UNCCD financing. Constraints and opportunities” in Pierre Marc Johnson, Karel Mayrand, and Marc Paquin, eds.: Governing Global Desertification, Hampshire, England: Ashgate.

FIELD (Financial Information Engine on Land Degradation), Online Data Information, available at http://www.gmfield.info/dashboard/dashboard.asp, accessed 8 December 2008.

GEF (Global Environment Facility) (2010) Policy Recommendations for the Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, GEF/R.5/26 (12 February), available online at http://www.thegef.org/gef/ node/2483, accessed 13 March 2012.

GEF (2012) GEF Project Database, available online at http://www.gefonline.org/, accessed 12 March 2012.

Global Mechanism (2012) Making the Case for SLM Investments, available online http://www.globalmechanism.org/en/our-services/making-the-case-for-slm-investments, accessed 17 March 2012.

Global Mechanism (2012a) Finance Info Kit, available online at http://www.global-mechanism.org/en/ our-services/finance-info-kit, accessed 17 March 2012.

Hicks, Robert L. et. al., (2008) Greening Aid? Understanding the Environmental Impact of Development Assistance, New York: Oxford.

Jacobson, Harold K. and Edith Brown Weiss (1998) “Assessing the record and designing strategies to engage countries,” in Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, eds.: Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Jinnah, Sikina (2011) “Introduction to climate change bandwagoning: the implications of strategic linkages for regime design, maintenance, and death,” Global Environmental Politics 11(3):1–9.

Lattanzio, Richard K. (2010) “Global Environment Facility (GEF): An Overview.” Congressional Research Service Report 7-5700 (May 17), available online at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/ CRSreports/10Jun/R41165.pdf, accessed 13 March 2012.

Ortiz, Even Fontaine and Tadanori Inomata (2009) Assessment of the Global Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, Geneva: United Nations Joint Inspection Unit, available online at http://www.unjiu.org/data/reports/2009/en2009_04.pdf, accessed 16 March 2012.

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Stringer, Lindsay (2006) “The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.” Commissioned peer-reviewed policy brief for Scidev.net (affiliated to the journals Science and Nature), available online at http://www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/the-un-convention-to-combat-desertification.html, accessed 13 March 2012.

UNCCD (1994) “Text of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification,” available online at http://www.unccd.int/en/about-the-convention/Pages/Text-overview.aspx, accessed 17 March 2012.

UNCCD (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification) (2011) “Report by the Global Environment Facility on its strategies, programmes and projects for financing the agreed incremental costs of activities concerning desertification.” ICCD/CRIC(10)/23 (22 August), available online at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/OfficialDocuments/cric10/23eng.pdf, accessed 13 March 2012.

UNCCD Press Release (2011) “Scientific and financial backing vital for fighting famine and drought, reversing land degradation, and eradicating poverty” (10 October), available online at http:// www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?page=view&nr=495&type=230&menu=39, accessed 13 March 2012.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2005) The Global Drylands Imperative: Implementing the Millennium Development Goals in the Drylands of the World. Nairobi: UNDP Drylands Development Centre, available online at http://www.energyandenvironment.undp. org/undp/indexAction.cfm?module=Library&action=GetFile&DocumentAttachmentID=2324, accessed 13 March 2012.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (2006) “Don’t Desert Drylands: United Nations Environment Programme Message on World Environment Day: 5 June 2006.” Nairobi: UNEP, available online at http://www.unep.org/wed/2006/downloads/PDF/UNEPWEDMessage06_eng. pdf, accessed 13 March 2012.

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Moving Beyond its Mandate? UNHCR and Climate Change Displacement

by Nina Hall, St Antony’s College, Oxford University1 States created UNHCR in 1951 with a specific mandate: the protection of refugees. In recent years many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics have argued that climate change will force people to move (Friends of the Earth 2007; Greenpeace 2008; Meyers 1993). However, UNHCR has no mandate for so-called “climate displacement” as it falls beyond the scope of its Statute and the Refugee Convention (McAdam 2010).

While some have called for a new legal convention to protect those displaced by climate change, there is no academic literature exploring if and how UNHCR has expanded beyond the established refugee regime to respond to climate displacement (Biermann and Boas 2010). Furthermore there are no IR theories which can adequately account for UNHCR’s changes in response to this new issue area. This article proposes a novel typology of IGOs and classifies UNHCR as a normative IGO. UNHCR’s normative type explains why it was slower to engage with climate change than other humanitarian organizations. This article fills a significant empirical gap in the scholarship on UNHCR, climate change displacement, and theories of IGO change.

UNHCR occupies a unique place as an international provider of protection for refugees and stateless people (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Loescher 2001; Freitas 2004).

States created the office in 1951 with a specific mandate to offer refugees legal protection (Betts, Loescher, and Milner 2008). Scholarship on this organization has emphasized how it has subsequently become of the world’s primary providers of humanitarian services to people outside of the refugee regime (Crisp 2009; Gottwald 2009). In recent years, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics have argued that climate change will force people to move from low-lying coastal lands, drought-prone areas, and other at risk areas (Friends of the Earth 2007; Greenpeace 2008; Meyers 1993). Some have also argued for a new legal convention to protect those displaced (Biermann and Boas 2010).2 Yet, UNHCR has no mandate to respond to people displaced across international borders by floods, droughts or other sudden-onset natural disasters. Although UNHCR’s scope of operations has expanded to encompass internally displaced persons and others ‘threatened with displacement’ states have not given the office a legal mandate equivalent to the 1951 Refugee Convention to protect them (Türk 2007:489; McAdam 2010). Moreover, there is no academic literature exploring if and how UNHCR has expanded beyond the refugee regime to respond to climate displacement. This article fills a significant empirical gap in the scholarship on the world’s refugee agency and on international organizations and climate change.

Furthermore, this article addresses an important theoretical question, unanswered in the international relations (IR) literature: How and why do intergovernmental organizations 1. The article is based on a chapter of my doctorate: ‘Moving Beyond Their Mandates? How International Organisations are Responding to Climate Change’ which was examined by Professor Ngaire Woods and Associate Professor Catherine Weaver on December 10, 2012.

2. The current literature on climate change and displacement has sought to either: investigate the causal links between climate change and displacement (Black 2001; Brown 2008; Zetter 2009); or examine the need for new legal frameworks to cover those displaced (McAdam, 2009, 2010, and 2011). However, none focuses on the politics of the links between climate change and migration (an exception is Betts, 2010a), nor how existing institutions are responding to this issue-linkage, which this article seeks to do. This article does not examine the causal relationship between climate change and displacement as this has been investigated thoroughly elsewhere (Gemène, 2008; Morrisey, 2009), nor does it claim that there is a clear causal connection between climate change and displacement.

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(IGOs) respond to new issue areas beyond their mandates? Intergovernmental organizations are a theoretically distinct group of international organizations. Unlike NGOs they are established and funded by states to provide services on states’ behalf. IGOs are traditionally viewed as organizations with limited autonomy while NGOs are independent, private entities that have autonomy to pursue their own agenda (Rittberger and Zangl 2006).

There are three principal IR theories which seek to explain IGO behavior: statist theories, principal-agent, and sociological institutionalism. Statist theories include neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism and would suggest that UNHCR will expand only if its member states instruct it do so (Mearsheimer 1994; Keohane 1984). Yet member states have not been supportive of the high commissioner’s calls to create new legal protection frameworks for those displaced by climate change. Principal-agent theory would argue that IGOs, with some “agency slack,” will expand in order to maximize tasks and budgets (Hawkins et al. 2006).

Yet UNHCR has not sought additional financing from the new climate change funds as a principal-agent theorist would expect. Finally, sociological institutionalism would suggest that IGOs are shaped by their organizational culture, yet offers no generalizable account of how organizational culture translates into organizational response to new issue areas (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Luken 2009). In short, these IR theories do not offer an adequate account of why and how UNHCR has changed in response to climate change.

This article develops a new typology of intergovernmental organizations based on their sources of legitimacy and logics of behavior to explain IGO change. It proposes that functional IGOs have pragmatic legitimacy and follow a logic of consequences, while normative IGOs, founded on moral legitimacy, follow a logic of appropriateness. It then argues that UNHCR is a normative IGO, adopted a logic of appropriateness in its response to climate change and displacement. UNHCR’s normative type explains why it was slower to engage with climate change than other humanitarian and migration organizations and why it sought to create new legal frameworks. This IGO typology is an important theoretical contribution to IR’s understanding of IGO change.

The article is structured into four sections. The first section outlines a typology of IGOs as functional and normative ideal-types. The second section illustrates how UNHCR’s supervisory status over the refugee convention classifies it is a normative IGO. The third section illustrates how UNHCR has engaged with climate change between 2000 and 2011. It focuses on changes in rhetoric, policy, and structure at headquarters and changes to its operations in Kenya. Finally, it demonstrates how a logic of appropriateness accounts for the nature and timing of UNHCR’s response to climate change and dismisses alternative explanations.

Normative IGOs and Organizational Change IGOs exist along a spectrum from functional to normative ideal types. Normative IGOs have a legal authority to ensure norm compliance. They can thus be identified by a core characteristic: They have supervisory authority over a body of international law. Supervisory authority means that states have mandated an IGO to promote and ensure compliance with a discrete body of international rules and norms (Türk 2007:3). Examples of normative organizations include the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which oversees labor law; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which oversees humanitarian law; and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which oversees refugee law.3 Meanwhile, functional IGOs are not mandated to promote, or ensure compliance with, international norms. They have no supervisory responsibility over a regime of international law. Instead they exist to perform specific, discrete tasks and are often project-based 3. Note that ICRC is not strictly speaking an IGO but an international NGO however it shares many similarities with IGOs which makes comparison useful. Namely, states have involvement through the International Red Cross and Crescent Movement and conferences that guide ICRC’s work (see Ratner 2011). ICRC’s work is based on the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols, which confer on the ICRC a “specific mandate” to act in the event of international armed conflict. ICRC, 2011, http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/mandate/ overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm accessed 15 November 2011.

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organizations as a result. Examples of IGOs in this category are the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The U.S. created IOM, for example, in 1951 to organize the relocation of thousands of labor migrants from post-war Europe to the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand (Ducasse-Rogier 2002:15).4 Neither IOM nor WMO was established with a supervisory status over an international convention or treaty.

These categories of functional and normative IGOs represent ideal types at either extreme of a spectrum of IGO. In practice, an IGO may not conform to all of the predicted behaviors (Weber 1948:90). Along the spectrum, between these ideal types, are a range of “hybrid” IGOs which have no supervisory authority but promote an international treaty and/or international norms. A hybrid IGO, for example, may provide organizational assistance to an international convention or play an active role in monitoring and advocating adherence to it. However, states will not mandate these organizations to promote and enforce the international law of concern. Examples of hybrid IGOs include UNICEF (which promotes the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but does not have supervisory status over it) and UN-WOMEN (which supports the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, but does not have supervisory status over it).

So how does IGO type influence IGO behavior? And in particular how does IGO type determine IGO response to a new issue area? I argue that functional and normative IGOs have different “logics of behavior,” which is a result of divergent legitimation strategies. This is summarized in the following table and elaborated below.

TABLE 1: IGO TYPOLOGY IGO Type

Type of Legitimacy

Behavioral Logic

Examples

Functional

Pragmatic Legitimacy

Logic of Consequences

IOM WMO IPU

Normative

Moral Legitimacy

Logic of Appropriateness

UNHCR HCHR ICRC

Functional IGOs have pragmatic legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is derived from “the self-interested calculations of an organization’s most immediate audience” (Suchman 1995:578). Functional IGOs seek to demonstrate to their core constituents (donor states) that they can perform a delegated task in an efficient and expert manner (Suchman 1995:548).

These organizations must demonstrate they are competent, technical actors and can perform tasks they are paid to do. Their primary concern is thus delivering “goods” (projects or policies) in exchange for material resources (funding). To ensure their survival they seek to maintain and generate pragmatic legitimacy.

Normative IGOs, meanwhile, are founded on a particular type of moral legitimacy.

Broadly speaking, moral legitimacy can be understood as promoting universal societal welfare rather than the interests of particular constituents (Suchman 1995:578). These organizations explicitly seek to prove they are not doing the “bidding of Great Powers but instead represent the ‘international community’” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:23). International law establishes what states ought to do and is the basis for normative IGO’s source of moral authority within a particular area. Importantly, a normative IGO’s moral legitimacy is limited by the scope of the international convention they supervise. A normative IGO does 4. Its primary function was “to make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities are inadequate, or who could not otherwise be moved, from European countries having surplus populations to countries overseas. . . .” ICEM, 1951, Resolution to Establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, 1951, Brussels.

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not have moral authority over issues beyond their regime. For instance, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has moral authority to demand that states protect workers’ rights but does not have moral authority to demand that states protect wildlife or that they reduce carbon emissions. ILO’s arguments will not carry the same moral force in these areas. The moral legitimacy of a normative IGO is defined as the promotion of societal welfare within a bounded issue area or regime. Normative IGOs derive this moral and legal legitimacy from their supervisory role over an international treaty and it is thus limited in scope. They seek ongoing acceptance that the issues and activities they pursue fall within the scope of their moral legitimacy.

These divergent sources of legitimacy lead to different behavioral logics that are internalized by staff and states and reflected in the structure of the organization. Functional IGOs follow a “logic of consequences which is the product of a rational cost-benefit calculation” (Krasner, 1999:5). A functional IGO will value the material benefits of an action over any other competing concerns (Georgi 2011). In short, expansion is determined by financial incentives. It will expand if there is funding available to take on this new issue area. Functional IGOs are typically projectized organizations with staff that are not ideologically committed to a core mandate or organizational identity. In short, a functional IGO is concerned with how they will gain additional funding, not if the new issue is linked to its core mandate.

Meanwhile, normative IGOs follow a “logic of appropriateness.” Action under this logic is based on whether or not it adheres to, and supports, the norms and laws at the heart of their identity and legitimacy (Krasner 1999:5). Staff in normative IGOs are strongly committed to the core treaty or convention(s) which give the organization its identity. This creates an organizational culture (within the bureaucracy and with member states) that is resistant to any change, which could weaken or undermine the identity of the organization. If there is a strong issue linkage between a new issue area and their core norm, then staff will endorse expansion.

However, if expansion into this area undermines or dilutes the core regime, then a normative IGO will not expand.

Alternative Explanations This IGO typology offers an alternative conception to the main IR theories of IGO change: neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, principal-agent theory, and sociological institutionalism.

Neorealists emphasize that institutions have no power or influence as they have neither military nor economic resources, independent of what states allocate them. Mearsheimer, for instance, argues that “institutions have no independent effect on state behavior” and maintains that what is most remarkable about international institutions is in fact how little effect they have had on state behavior (1994:43). IGOs matter for realists only as much as they are used by hegemonic powers for their own purposes and interests. In short, realists perceive IGOs as peripheral to the maintenance of world peace and security as they are neither autonomous nor influential.

Meanwhile neoliberal institutionalists claim that institutions can generate international peace and security by affecting states’ incentives to cooperate (Keohane 1982 and 1984).

Using game theory they illustrate how institutions can reduce transaction and information costs, regularize state behavior, and promote transparency (Keohane 1982). Institutions can play a critical role, for instance, in overcoming the prisoners’ dilemma (Snidal 1994). However, neoliberal institutionalism, like neorealism, is state-centric and does not assign agency or autonomy to international organizations. IGOs matter only in as much as they enable states to cooperate.

Principal-agent theory posits that IGOs (agents) are delegated to perform tasks by member states (principals). IGOs will expand when either a) member states tell them to do so, or b) states do not closely monitored them and thus they have “agency slack” (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson

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and Tierney 2003). Slack, represents a degree of autonomy and enables IGOs to follow their own preferences rather than pursuing member states. However, principal-agent theory assumes IGO preferences are “budget maximization, task expansion, and ‘slack’ maximization” (Gould 2006:308). Yet IGOs may have different preferences, not based solely on the expansion of mandate and budgets (Weaver 2007). Principal-agents’ theorization of IGOs as similar units with the same basic preferences is a significant limitation. In contrast, I argue that IGOs will not always seek to maximize their budgets and tasks.

Finally, sociological institutionalists explain IGO change by bureaucratic organizational culture (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Oestreich 2007). Barnett and Finnemore (2004), for instance, claim that IGOs tend to expand in both size and scope as they “try to square their rationalized abstractions of reality with facts on the ground” (2004:44). According to them, “conscientious bureaucrats very quickly recognize that to accomplish a great many ambitious social tasks they need to reach outside the narrow compartments in which we place them” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:64; see also Haas and Haas 1995:257). Essentially, bureaucracies deal with an interconnected and interrelated world by expanding beyond their original mandates, when there is a rational argument that resonates within their field of expert authority. However, sociological institutionalists offer no account of what—if any—IGO core interests are (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:4). In sum, none of these four theories offer an adequate account of IO preferences when faced with a new issue area beyond their mandate. I argue for a shift in theoretical focus to bridge the specific, or single-case study, account of organizational culture and the treatment of IGOs as black boxes with universal preferences. The typology of IGOs elaborated here does this. I will now demonstrate how the concept of normative type can explain UNHCR’s response to climate change and displacement. A case study can be an informative way to develop new accounts of IGO change.

UNHCR: A Normative IGO UNHCR is a normative IGO. It has responsibility for supervising two international conventions: the refugee and stateless conventions. The agency was created in 1950 by a UN General Assembly resolution (Loescher 2001). The UNHCR statute (1950) gave the agency a mandate to protect thousands of people displaced by war and those who fled Eastern Europe (Betts et al. 2012; Loescher 2001). In 1951, a year after the establishment of UNHCR, states signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which set out the definition and rights of refugees and identified UNHCR as the sole agent responsible for the convention. UNHCR’s role was stipulated in Article 35 of the convention: “The contracting states undertake to cooperate with the Office of the UNHCR . . . in the exercise of its functions and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this convention.”5 UNHCR was also given the authority and power to “promote the conclusion and ratification of international conventions” to protect refugees.6 In short, UNHCR was established with an exclusive mandate to supervise the Refugee Convention.

Refugees were defined narrowly in the convention, reflecting the post-war context. Refugees are someone with “A well-founded fear of persecution based for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”7 For UNCHR, a refugee is distinguished from an economic migrant or someone displaced by a climate change related disaster (flooding, drought, sea-level rise) or any other natural disaster (earthquake, tsunami) as they face persecution. Refugee status is a specific, legal category of persons and not to be confused with the broader conception of a refugee as anyone fleeing his/her country and seeking refuge, used often by media, NGOs, 5. UNHCR (1951). 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article 35.

6. UNHCR (1950). Statute of the Office of UNHCR. Article II, Paragraph 8(a).

7. See: UNHCR (1950). Statute, 1950, Article 6 (a) and 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1a, paragraph 2.

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and some academics (see Meyers 1995).8 The convention’s categorization of refugees is at the heart of UNHCR’s mandate and identity.9 The 1951 Refugee Convention took on an “almost constitutional character” within UNHCR (Türk 2007:499). The office’s supervisory status gave the high commissioner “considerable moral authority and legitimacy” even though he had little political legitimacy (Loescher 2002). In particular the agency was mandated with a unique and “central role” in supervising the implementation of international refugee law and offering protection to refugees (UNHCR 1991). UNHCR has legal authority to judge state behavior and challenge states whose policies undermined refugee law and threatened refugees’ rights (Türk 2007:497; Loescher 2002:5).

States on the other hand were expected to cooperate with the Office of the High Commissioner in its activities (Betts et al. 2012:82). These legal functions gave the agency a “unique identity and considerable independence,” according to UNHCR’s Director of International Protection (Türk 2007:481). Its ability to be openly critical of states’ behavior, with regards to refugee law, distinguishes it from functional IGOs. UNHCR’s legal and moral authority is widely recognized in scholarship and is often closely correlated with its relative autonomy (Loescher 2002; Betts et al. 2012). However, scholars of UNHCR have not explicitly associated these attributes with a broader typology of IGOs. UNHCR’s organizational culture reflects its moral duty for refugees. Staff in UNHCR are wedded to the convention and strongly committed to refugee protection. UNHCR staff “almost universally believe in principles of mandate” (Betts et al. 2012:116). Betts et al. state “there exists no other UN agency where values and principled ideas are so central to the mandate and raison d’être of the institution, or where some committed staff members are willing to place their lives in danger to defend the proposition that persecuted individuals need protection” (2008:74). An independent review of UNHCR’s organizational culture in 2005 found that staff had a “very strong collective identity” who almost universally believed in the principles of the organization’s core mandate (Betts et al. 2008:83). UNHCR’s organizational culture is derived from its supervisory status over refugee law, which drives the organization’s logic of appropriateness.

Since its inception UNHCR has expanded its spread, size, and scope (Loescher 2002).

In the 1970s, UNHCR operations moved from Europe into South East Asia, Latin America, and later the Middle East, and it now operates globally. Correspondingly, there was a rapid expansion of UNHCR’s budget and staff. It grew from a budget of several million and a few hundred staff in 1971 (Loescher 2002), to a budget of US$3 billion in 2010 and 7,735 staff by 2012.10 UNHCR also expanded its “persons of concern” and now offers assistance to returnees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other persons “threatened with displacement” (Crisp 2010; Freitas 2004; Türk 2007:489). There is thus some scope for UNHCR to respond to people displaced internally by sudden-onset environmental changes within its existing activities. Indeed, in the 2000s the agency offered assistance to IDPs in the Asian tsunami (2004), the Pakistan earthquake (2005), Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis (2008), the Philippines floods (2009), the Pakistan floods (2010), and the Haitian earthquake 8. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a refugee as “A person who has been forced to leave his or her home and seek refuge elsewhere, esp. in a foreign country, from war, religious persecution, political troubles, the effects of a natural disaster, etc.; a displaced person.” Oxford English Dictionary available at www.oed.com, accessed online 28 February 2012.

9. Note that states have established a number of definitions to determine refugee status. The most longstanding and well-established is the definition of International Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol. The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) adds that a refugee is also any person compelled to leave his or her country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.” 1989 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Article 1 (2), Adis Ababa, 10 September 1969. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration also includes persons who flee their country “because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”

Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 22 November 1984, Cartagena de Indias (3).UNHCR’s role is to interpret and identify refugees based on the various international conventions and also international practice (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007).

10. The 2012 staff and budget figures for UNHCR can be found online at: UNHCR, Staff Figures, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c17. html accessed 14 March 2012. UNHCR, Financial figures, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1a.html accessed 14 March 2012.

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(2010). However, this assistance was on an ad-hoc basis. UNHCR’s mandate for IDPs is unlike its mandate for refugees as it is not based on an international convention but on consent from states. Thus IDP activities are seen as additional “add-ons” or “extra-mandates” that must not detract from or dilute the agency’s core mandate for refugees (Goodwin-Gill 2000).11 UNHCR’s protection role for refugees was of a higher importance and priority, because it was stipulated in the UNHCR Statute and by the convention, and not a General Assembly resolution, which could be changed from one year to the next. I will now examine how UNHCR’s core identity as a protection agency for refugees has shaped its engagement with the issue of climate change and displacement.

UNHCR and Climate Change (2000–11) 2000–07: No Organizational Change UNHCR was a “late-starter” on climate change.12 It did not engage with the issue of climate change and displacement until 2007. Meanwhile, the research and policy work on the issue was led by other agencies, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, the International Federation of the Red Cross and IOM.13 During the early and mid-2000s there was increasing media and NGO attention to the plight of so-called “climate refugees” (Farbotko 2005). UNHCR did not engage with climate change during this period as the high commissioner and staff perceived the issue as outside their mandate. A UNHCR staff member explained that “few people had any clue within the organization about climate change or whether it was any interest to them” and there was a degree of “skepticism” about following global trends.14 Instead, UNHCR refuted that “climate refugees” were in fact refugees. They argued that according to the 1951 convention, refugees were only those fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. This was not a controversial stance and the agency was supported by refugee law experts (McAdam 2010). The term “climate refugees” posed a threat to UNHCR as it blurred the boundaries between convention refugees and popular conceptions of refugees. Engaging in debates over “climate refugees” was not in UNHCR’s interest, as it was a distraction from UNHCR’s primary concern: protecting the unique legal status of convention refugees.15 2007–08: Rhetoric Change

UNHCR first engaged with the issue of climate change and displacement in 2007. At the annual meeting of the executive committee, UNHCR’s governing body, which is comprised of states, High Commissioner Antonio Guterres began his speech by highlighting that the drivers of displacement were changing. He claimed that Almost every model of the long-term effects of climate change predicts a continued expansion of desertification, to the point of destroying livelihood prospects in many parts of the globe.

For each centimeter that the sea level will rise, there will be one million more displaced. The international community seems no more adept at dealing with those new causes than it is at preventing conflict and persecution. It is therefore important to examine the reasons, the scale 11. In 2011 UNHCR campaigned for a ‘more predictable role’ in IDP protection following natural disasters (Betts, Loescher, and Milner 2012:76). However states were not supportive of such an expansion. For more on this see: UNHCR (2011). UNHCR’s role in support of an enhanced humanitarian response for the protection of persons affected by natural disasters. Geneva: UNHCR. 12. Telephone Interview with UNHCR staff, 14 May 2010.

13. The International Federation of the Red Cross was the first humanitarian organization to significantly engage with climate change. They established a Climate Change Center in 2002. Phone interview with Director of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Change Center, 16 April 2010.

14. Telephone Interview with UNHCR staff, 14 May 2010.

15. The term “climate change refugee” was predominantly used by environmental NGOs and media who were not versed in refugee law (see Friends of the Earth 2000; Greenpeace 2008; Meyers 1993).

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and the trends of present-day forced displacement.16 In this speech, for the first time he acknowledged a substantive issue linkage between climate change and displacement. He made this as, according to one staff member, he had a “strong belief that climate change was new phenomena that must be dealt with.”17 The Official Summary Record of the 2007 Executive Meeting notes a mixture of responses from states to the high commissioner’s statements. One state was actively supportive (Norway), some states were vaguely supportive and one was completely opposed (Austria) (UNHCR 2007). Most of the UNHCR staff interviewed claimed that states were completely opposed to UNHCR expansion in this area.18 Jeff Crisp, the head of UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service, stated many key UNHCR donors have “expressed persistent wariness with regard to the organization’s expansion, often expressing the opinion that the organization should return to its ‘core mandate,’ which they consider to be that of providing refugees with protection in developing regions” (Crisp 2009:76). While a few member states went on the official record endorsing the high commissioner’s linkage of climate change and displacement, the institutional memory and the record of subsequent meetings suggest that the majority of the executive committee did not actively encourage the agency to work on climate change and displacement.

Nevertheless, over the course of 2008 and 2009 the high commissioner continued to emphasize that climate change would trigger mass displacement in high-level speeches, interviews, and articles (Guterres 2008). In numerous speeches he emphasized that climate change was one of five new “mega-trends” that were changing the nature of displacement.19 He also made climate change a core theme of many speeches and interviews. For instance, in an interview with the Guardian he claimed that “Climate change is today one of the main drivers of forced migration, both directly through its impact on the environment—not allowing people to live any more in the areas where they were traditionally living—and as a trigger of extreme poverty and conflict” (Borger 2008). These statements from the high commissioner were the first sign of a change in UNHCR’s position. The agency at the most senior level had shifted from refusing to engage in debates over “climate refugees” to acknowledging that climate change may lead to new forms of displacement.

Although there was significant rhetorical engagement from the high commissioner on the issue, there was a lag in policy outputs on the issue of climate change. It was relatively easy for the high commissioner to issue statements and make speeches on the changing nature of forced displacement, without committing the agency to any particular role in addressing these new “flows.” However, there was still widespread resistance within the UNHCR bureaucracy to the term “climate refugee.”20 Guterres avoided this term and was aware that adopting this language could weaken UNHCR’s core mandate. He stated that “UNHCR has refused to embrace the new terminology of ‘climate refugees’ or ‘environmental refugees,’” fearing this will “complicate and confuse the organization’s efforts to protect the victims of persecution and armed conflict.”21 This concern about expansion undermining UNHCR’s refugee mandate illustrates a logic of appropriateness.

16. He also highlighted the impact of climate change on displacement at subsequent executive committee meetings in 2008 and 2009. See: Statement by the High Commissioner, Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fiftyeighth session, Geneva, 1 October 2007.

17. Interview with UNHCR staff member, 17 March 2010, Geneva.

18. Telephone interviews with UNHCR staff members, 30 March and 14 May 2010.

19. António Guterres (2009). “Five ‘mega-trends’—including population growth, urbanization, climate change—make contemporary displacement increasingly complex, third committee told,” Third Committee, General Assembly GA/SHC/3964, New York: United Nations, 3 November 2009, 20. Telephone interviews with UNHCR staff members, 30 March and 14 May 2010.

21. See: António Guterres (2009). “Five ‘mega-trends’—including population growth, urbanization, climate change—make contemporary displacement increasingly complex, third committee told,” Third Committee, General Assembly GA/SHC/3964, New York: United Nations, 3 November 2009.

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2008–11: Rhetoric, Policy and Structural Change Broader UNHCR involvement with climate change, beyond the high commissioner, began in 2008. In May 2008, the UN secretary general called for all UN agencies to establish climate change focal points to prepare for Copenhagen and to give higher organizational priority to the issue.22 The high commissioner established a task force on climate change in 2008 backed by his “desire for the office to engage fully and effectively in the international discussion on these issues.”23 The brief of this task force included “Liaising with the executive office to ensure that a consistent UNHCR position on climate change and related issues is articulated and adjusted as needed; tracking developments relating to climate change as they concern the mandate of UNHCR.”24 The terms of reference for this task force included a number of people across the agency—from the Department of Operations to International Protection. Essentially the task force assigned responsibility to staff to work on aspects of climate change alongside their other routine roles.

The new task force’s other principal role was to work with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)’s sub-group on climate change.25 In mid-2008 the IASC established a working group on migration, displacement, and climate change.26 The aim of the group was to coordinate a common humanitarian advocacy strategy on climate change. Members sought to write collective submissions to the annual UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COPs). 27 The UNHCR climate change focal point represented UNHCR at these working group meetings. However, in early 2008 UNHCR had not developed a policy position beyond its critique of the term “climate refugee.”

UNHCR was apprehensive about the working group. They had a debate with IOM over terminology for people displaced due to climate change.28 Their primary position was that climate change could not produce “refugees” in the legal or official sense and the working group was reportedly mired in definitional debates.29 According to one IASC participant, UNHCR “argued there were existing mechanisms that could be used [to offer protection] and wanted to avoid using the term ‘climate change refugees.’”30 UNHCR’s position was manifest in the first sub-working submission to the UNFCCC on “Climate change and migration: who will be affected?” in October 2008. This submission included a detailed description of who constituted an IDP, refugee, or a stateless person under international law.31 Again, UNHCR’s initial engagement in the IASC demonstrated a logic of appropriateness: They sought to defend the unique status of refugees against new issue areas or the establishment of new groups of displaced peoples.

The IASC and the high commissioner’s frequent rhetorical statements on climate change were catalysts for policy development in UNHCR. In September 2008, the Policy Development and Evaluation Service published the agency’s first policy paper on climate change—a year after Guterres had first raised it at the executive committee. The paper, “Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Human Displacement” offered a preliminary and cautious policy stance to back-up the high commissioner’s previous statements and elaborate a position to the 22. Ban Ki-Moon. (2008). Letter to UN agencies, May 2008.

23. UNHCR (2008). Task force on Climate change and related issues, Final TORs [Terms of Reference], UNHCR: Geneva, August 2008.

24. UNHCR (2008), Final TORs. 25. The IASC is a humanitarian coordination group that consists of, and coordinates between, humanitarian NGOs and IGOs. UNHCR (2008), Final TORs. 26. Telephone interview with IASC member, 14 April 2010.

27. Interview with IASC members, March 2010, Geneva.

28. Telephone interview with IASC member, 14 April 2010.

29. Comments were made on this by a number of IASC members including telephone interview with IASC member, 14 April 2010 and OCHA staff member, 20 March 2010, Geneva.

30. OCHA staff member, 20 March 2010, Geneva.

31. Informal group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC (2008), Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected? Working Paper, 31 October 2008.

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IASC.32 The policy paper was strongly against the use of the term “environmental or climate change refugee,” which it argued was a misleading and “potentially dangerous” term. 33 It emphasized that “refugee” should only be applied to those covered by the refugee convention, the core mandate of the agency.

In addition, the paper identified gaps in the international protection framework where those displaced internationally by climate change would not fall under their mandate. It stated that “UNHCR does recognize that there are indeed certain groups of migrants, currently falling outside of the scope of international protection, who are in need of humanitarian and/or other forms of assistance.”34 The paper displayed a cautious shift: UNHCR acknowledged there were protection issues beyond the agency’s mandate. However, it offered little insights into if and how the agency would respond to those who fell outside its mandate—the agency was adhering closely to its mandate.

Despite the lack of member state support for UNHCR expansion the high commissioner continued to speak on the issue. In December 2009, he made his first appearance at the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. There he spoke at a number of high-level side events and press conferences on the humanitarian impacts of climate change. He implied for the first time that there was a need for a new framework to protect those displaced by climate change. He stated that “the international community must develop new mechanisms for the protection of climate refugees.”35 These were “bold statements” and constituted a shift in UNHCR’s position. The high commissioner, by suggesting that there was a need for new protection frameworks, was implicitly positioning his agency to provide this protection.36 2011: Mandate Change?

In 2011, UNHCR commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of the Refugee Convention and the fiftieth anniversary of the Stateless Persons Convention. The high commissioner made climate change a core theme of the year’s celebrations, which culminated in two major ministerial meetings in December 2011. In May 2011, UNHCR urged states to address this protection gap in their pledges to the Ministerial Meeting. The agency wrote a guidance note for the pledging process and encouraged states to identify situations that fell outside of the scope of the existing refugee protection instruments; develop the international protection regime in a way that provides appropriate and consistent responses to these situations; and/or develop a guiding framework for temporary or interim protection scenarios identifying the circumstances in which protection would be activated, the treatment that would be provided, and how it would come to an end.37 The pledging document did not explicitly mention climate change induced displacement as UNHCR was concerned that states would be less likely to support or make pledges on this agenda item if they did so.38 However, UNHCR hoped that states would be favorable to an involvement of UNHCR in addressing protection gaps related to cross-border displacement as a result of natural disaster and climate change induced displacement. 39 In 2011, UNHCR also established a new position, Senior Technical Advisor on Climate Change, to develop disaster risk reduction work within the agency. However, the position was 32. UNHCR (2008). “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: a UNHCR Perspective.” In Policy Paper. Geneva: UNHR. 33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., 9.

35. This was the only occasion that the high commissioner used the term “refugees” with reference to climate change displacement. He made the statement in French to Le Monde. Grégoire Allix (2009), “António Guterres « La distinction entre réfugiés et déplacés est dépassée »,”Le Monde, 16 December 2009, available at http://www.lemonde.fr/le-rechauffement-climatique/article/2009/12/15/António-guterres-ladistinction-entre-refugies-et-deplaces-est-depassee_1280843_1270066.html accessed 15 January 2010.

36. Telephone Interview with UNHCR senior staff member, Thursday 14 May 2010.

37. UNHCR. (2011). Additional guidance note to support the state pledges process, UNHCR: Geneva, 26 May 2011:9.

38. Interview with UNHCR senior staff member, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

39. Interview with UNHCR senior staff member, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

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only for one year and the Norwegian Refugee Council paid the bulk of the advisor’s salary and benefits.40 Moreover, UNHCR sidelined this operational work and focused on the legal (protection) of climate change and displacement.41 The climate change advisor explored financing opportunities for UNHCR from the various climate change funds. 42 However, there was little “buy-in” from the organization to develop adaptation projects and seek new financing. This example illustrates how UNHCR was not pursuing a logic of consequences in its engagement with climate change.

Meanwhile, UNHCR encouraged Norway to host a conference on Climate Change and Displacement. Norway had planned a commemoration of Nansen, the first High Commissioner for Refugees in 2011.43 It invited states, NGOs, academics, and policy-makers to Oslo to attend the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement and UNHCR used this occasion to lobby states for mandate expansion. The high commissioner in his opening speech outlined a role for UNHCR in offering protection to people displaced by climate change: “Even if they are not refugees, such people are entitled to our support and to have their voices heard and taken into account.”44 He called for a new legal framework for those displaced externally: “I strongly believe that a more viable approach would be to at least develop a global guiding framework for situations of cross-border displacement resulting from climate change and natural disasters.” 45 He urged conference attendees to endorse the Nansen Principles, which stipulated a role for UNHCR in advancing this new guiding framework. 46 The Nansen Principles were authored primarily by UNHCR in collaboration with a small group of representatives of the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Norwegian government prior to and during the conference.47 Principle IX was the most important as it recommended “a more coherent and consistent approach at the international level . . . to meet the protection needs of people displaced externally owing to sudden onset events.”48 It called upon states “working in conjunction with UNHCR” to “develop a guiding framework or instrument in this regard.”49 UNHCR wanted states to endorse their position as the leader and facilitator of discussions on a new protection framework. The Nansen conference was used by UNHCR to legitimate the importance of addressing “protection gaps” and to gain a mandate in developing these new legal frameworks.

There is some evidence to suggest that states were suspicious of this strategy. The Kenyan Commissioner for Refugee Affairs who was present at the Nansen conference, maintained that “UNHCR have already expanded to include statelessness, IDPs and [now] including environment-related movers, a fourth category of people, how amorphous is this organization going to be?”50 He was against mandate expansion “If [financial] support for UNHCR stays the same then they should leave it to another agency so that resources aren’t spread too thinly.”51 Some states argued that it was “too early” to talk about developing soft-law frameworks for climate change displacement.52 Other states expressed concern that UNHCR did not have capacity 40. Interview with UNHCR official, 6 June 2011, Oslo.

41. Interview with UNHCR official, 9 May 2012, Geneva.

42. Ibid.

43. Norway was commemorating the 100th anniversary of Nansen’s death. The conference was organized by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for the Environment. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 6 June 2011, Oslo.

44. António Guterres (2011). “Statement by António Guterres,” Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement, Oslo.

45. Guterres (2011). Nansen Conference.

46. Ibid.

47. Telephone interview with UNHCR official, 12 July 2011.

48. Nansen Principles, in the chairperson’s summary of the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century, Oslo, 6–7 June 2011, principle IX. 49. Ibid.

50. Interview with Kenyan Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, 7 June 2011, Oslo.

51. Ibid.

52. Telephone interview with UNHCR member state representative, 19 June 2012.

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or financial resources to expand, particularly given they had enough difficulty fulfilling their obligations to refugees.53 Nevertheless, in November 2011 Guterres made a speech to the UN Security Council on climate change and displacement. He stated that “More and more people are being forced to flee due to reasons that are not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention.”54 He argued that it was a “humanitarian imperative” to assist those displaced by climate change or other natural disasters. 55 Finally, he recommended that the international community “formulate and adopt a set of principles, specifically designed to reinforce the protection of and find solutions for people who have been forced to leave their own country as a result of catastrophic environmental events, and who may not qualify for refugee status under international law.”56 In this speech, he promoted expansion over affirming UNHCR’s core identity. Although he attempted to link this call for a new protection framework to UNHCR’s existing responsibilities, these issue linkages were tenuous.57 He reiterated this demand for a new international protection framework to states at the December Ministerial Meeting and stated that UNHCR was “ready to work with states who want to help develop such guiding frameworks.”58 The December Ministerial meeting was a disappointment for UNHCR as it did not gain a mandate for climate change displacement. UNHCR prioritized “future protection challenges” and burden-sharing as the two major issues for the ministerial meeting. In the UNHCR background paper, they highlighted the gap in the international normative framework and recommended a new “global guiding framework” or instrument for displaced peoples who did not fit inside the convention.59 However, there was no consensus support from member states to develop such a protection framework for climate change displacement.60 In sum, UNHCR has not gained a mandate to expand its activities into protection for those displaced across international borders by climate change sudden or slow onset events. However, the agency had changed its rhetoric, policy, and structure despite a lack of member state support, or financing opportunities, to respond to climate change displacement.

Operational Change in Kenya?

Kenya houses the largest refugee camp in the world—Dadaab—with over 500,000 refugees predominantly from Somalia. In 2011, the Horn of Africa faced a massive drought, which led to a humanitarian crisis with thousands leaving Somalia for Kenya and other neighboring 53. Interview with UNHCR member state representative, 10 May 2012, Geneva.

54. António Guterres (2011), “Statement by António Guterres,” United Nations Security Council Briefing “Maintenance of International Peace and Security: New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention,” UN Security Council, New York, 23 November 2011.

55. Guterres (2011). United Nations Security Council Briefing.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Statement by António Guterres, (2011). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Intergovernmental Meeting at Ministerial Level to mark the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Geneva, 7 December 2011.

59. UNHCR (2011). “Background Note for the Roundtables,” Intergovernmental event at the ministerial level of Member States of the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (7–8 December 2011), HCR/MINCOMMS/2011/08, 18 November 2011, Geneva.

60. There was no mention of climate change or natural disaster displacement in the final Ministerial Communiqué. However, Mexico, Argentina, Norway, Germany, and Switzerland are supportive of addressing the protection gap and under Norway’s lead have begun lobbying member states. See: Ministerial Communiqué, Intergovernmental event at the ministerial level of Member States of the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (7–8 December 2011), HCR/MINCOMMS/2011/6, 8 December 2011 and Mexico Pledges, Intergovernmental event at the ministerial level of Member States of the United Nations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (7–8 December 2011). Interviews with UNHCR member state representatives 8 and 10 May 2012, Geneva, Switzerland.

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countries.61 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) framed this as a climate-change-driven crisis, although also acknowledging the impact of ongoing civil war in Somalia. Studying UNHCR response to Somali asylum-seekers in Kenya illustrates how global debates on climate change and displacement resonated at the operational level.

UNHCR staff at the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps did not view climate change induced displacement as an issue of concern. The prevailing view is that those hosted in Kenyan refugee camps have been forced to flee due to well-founded fears of persecution and fit within the convention’s definition of a refugee.62 However, staff in UNHCR Kenya did claim that during the drought and resulting famine in Somalia there was an increase in refugee arrivals.63 Many staff highlighted the interconnections between conflict, drought and famine leading to displacement. UNHCR’s senior public health officer explained that “there are higher malnutrition rates [in Somalia] where there is drought, and where it is Al Shabaab controlled” suggesting that the presence of famine is linked to the Somali civil war.64 Yet no staff used the term “climate change induced displacement” to describe such movement—displacement had to be primarily driven by persecution for UNHCR to have a mandate and offer protection.

Moreover, UNHCR Kenya did not conceive of a “gap” in the international protection framework for climate change induced displacement. UNHCR staff had not read or seen UNHCR’s policy briefs on the issue.65 The position taken by UNHCR Kenya staff was predominantly because Somali asylum seekers, who constitute over 90 percent of Kenya’s refugee intake, have “prima facie” refugee status. They are recognized collectively as refugees and do not need individual status determination.66 UNHCR is thus mandated to offer them protection, even if a key cause of their flight from Somalia was drought. In short, Somalis’ prima facie refugee status and UNHCR’s operational focus on convention refugees meant UNHCR Kenya did not perceive climate change as driving displacement and did not need to.

In contrast, UNHCR Geneva had highlighted that climate change displacement was occurring into Kenyan refugee camps. In December 2009, UNHCR Geneva published a press release stating that many Ethiopians and Somalis were being “forced to flee due to climate change and general insecurity.”67 It cited the example of an Ethiopian (but ethnic Somali), Dulane Jama, and his family who were unable to sustain their pastoralist livelihoods due to a lack of rain and, thus, pasture. The article maintained that Jama saw the lack of rain and weather conditions as “the root of his problem.” Although most of the refugees in Dadaab had “fled conflict or persecution in their troubled homeland” (thus making them traditional refugees), Dulane was “slightly different—he and his family have been forced to flee by climate change and general insecurity.”68 There was some dissonance between UNHCR Geneva’s policy and rhetoric and operational activities in Kenya.

61. The crisis ran from June to September 2011 and covered much of the Horn of African including Northern Kenya and Somalia. The crisis was widely framed as a famine due to a severe drought in Southern Somalia and Dadaab received thousands of new arrivals. Press releases from UNHCR Dadaab and personal correspondence with Bettina Schulte, UNHCR Dadaab media advisor, July–November 2011. I visited Dadaab in April 2011.

62. Interviews with UNHCR staff in Nairobi, Dadaab and Kakuma March–April 2011. Note that Kenya also follows the OAU’s refugee definition—see endnote 8.

63. Interview with UNHCR Head of Dadaab Sub-Office, 20 April 2011, Dadaab. This trend became particularly noticeable during the famine and humanitarian crisis in Somali between July–November 2011 which saw thousands of new arrivals to Dadaab. However, it is important to note that drought cannot be directly attributed to climate change, nor can any other extreme weather events.

64. Interview with UNCHR senior public health official, 21 April 2011, Dadaab.

65. Interviews with UNHCR officials in Kakuma (7–15 April) and Dadaab (20–21 April).

66. Prima facie status is in the Somali case based on either the Refugee Convention or the Organisation of African Union Convention and given due to the ongoing civil war and lack of central government (Hyndman and Nyuland 1998).

67. Andy Needham. 2009. Nowhere to hide from climate change in Kenyan refugee camp, UNHCR News Stories, 18 December 2009, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b2b76a79.html accessed 20 December 2009.

68. The article was explicit that Jama did not use, and was not familiar with, the term climate change.

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Explaining UNHCR’s Change A Normative IGO and Logic of Appropriateness UNHCR’s core mandate is refugee protection. It has supervisory status over the Refugee Convention which makes it is a normative IGO. UNHCR’s IGO type has shaped its response to climate change. It has followed a logic of appropriateness—engaging with climate change displacement when deemed relevant to its refugee protection mandate. For this reason the agency was reluctant to engage with, and then refuted, the issue of “climate refugees.”

It feared this concept undermined the special status of convention refugees. This sentiment was outlined by the high commissioner who noted that the term “climate refugee” would “confuse” and “complicate” the “organization’s efforts to protect the victims of persecution and armed conflict.” 69 UNHCR had a strong desire to protect its core identity.

When UNHCR did engage with the issue it sought to broaden the scope of its moral legitimacy, rather than gain pragmatic legitimacy. This was most clearly seen in its advocacy for a new legal protection framework for people displaced by climate change in 2011. The office lobbied Norway to host a conference on climate displacement, and at the Nansen conference drew-up principles that set out a role for UNHCR in developing a new “guiding framework.”

It then urged states to support this process at the ministerial meeting. UNHCR advocated for new legal frameworks, reflecting its desire to expand with a legal mandate.

In sum, UNHCR was looking to replicate its moral legitimacy in new spheres rather than simply adding activities which might bring in additional funds but would detract from its core mandate. The office did not follow a logic of consequences and pursue new climate financing for climate change adaptation activities as we would expect a functional IGO to do. However, it is unlikely that any “framework” or “guiding principles” (should they eventuate) would be hard law which UNHCR would then have supervisory status over. The current proposals suggest a replication of the “IDP guiding principles” for those displaced by climate change fastonset events, across borders. We will have to wait and see if this proposal gains traction with states—it has the support of Norway, Germany, and a few other states at this point.

Alternative Explanations Neorealist and neoliberalist explanations would argue that member states directed UNHCR to respond to climate change. IGO change is a function of change in member state preferences or the balance of power amongst member states. However, as illustrated in this article, member states did not explicitly delegate UNHCR to respond to climate change. In fact, the majority were opposed to any expansion of mandate or activities. They did not make pledges in the 2011 ministerial meeting to address the protection gap for those displaced internationally by climate change. Member state preferences alone cannot explain UNHCR’s approach to climate change and displacement.

Principal-agent theorists would suggest that this is a case of “agency slack.” UNHCR took advantage of its limited autonomy to expand into a new issue area. It was prevented from fully expanding its activities by member state monitoring. UNHCR’s attempt to develop new frameworks for climate change induced displacement was stalled by states at the 2011 ministerial. While the office could set the agenda, put a proposal on the table and provide academic expertise to support its claims it could not develop a new legal framework without member state support. There was a limit to UNHCR’s autonomous expansion—member states’ preferences.

However, the principal-agent argument assumes UNHCR wanted to expand throughout the period. But why was the office so reluctant initially to engage in debates over “climate refugee”? And why did it subsequently respond to the issue of climate change by trying to 69. See: António Guterres (2009) “Five ‘mega-trends’—including population growth, urbanization, climate change—make contemporary displacement increasingly complex, third committee told,” Third Committee, General Assembly GA/SHC/3964, New York: United Nations, 3 November 2009.

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develop a new legal framework for climate displacement? In summary, principal-agent theories do not account for IGO preferences and, thus, will not explain why and how IGOs will expand into new issue areas.

Finally, sociological institutionalists would maintain that organizational culture accounts for UNHCR’s approach to this new issue area. There was strong staff identification and support for the core mandate of UNHCR, refugee protection. This culture explains why the agency was reluctant to engage in a new area, which could dilute their core protection mandate. In addition, it accounts for UNHCR’s strong stance against the use of the term “climate refugee” that would undermine the special status of traditional, convention refugees.

UNHCR’s response between 2007 and 2009 and slow subsequent change could be explained by the “traditionalist” culture of UNHCR. However, the sociological institutionalist explanation does not explain why UNHCR’s position changed. Given that organizational culture did not change significantly between 2000 and 2011 why did UNHCR’s position? Furthermore, a sociological institutionalist approach is specific to UNHCR and not generalizable to other IGOs and does not offer predictive power.

Conclusion On a theoretical level, this article demonstrates how a typology of IGOs accounts for IGO change where other IR theories do not. It is an important contribution to IR’s understanding of IGOs. This typology distinguishes the core attributes and behavioral patterns of two groups of IGOs, functional and normative, and suggests we can predict how IGOs will respond to new issue areas beyond their mandates. It shifts our focus from the specific organizational culture (sociological institutionalism) and challenges the assumption that all IGOs seek to maximize their budgets and tasks (principal-agent theory).

Further research is necessary to confirm how IGO type influences IGO behavior. First, we need to compare how a functional IGO, such as IOM, engaged with climate change. The typology of IGOs elaborated here suggests that its response would be quicker, more expansive, and not legalistic. In other words, we would expect to see variation in the timing, extent, and the nature of change. But was this the case? In addition, future work could investigate what unique power and strategies normative IGOs have. If their supervisory status over a regime of international law gives them leverage over states, under what conditions are they most effective? And what strategies do they use? There is great potential for future work on normative, functional, and hybrid IGOs beyond the climate change and refugee regimes.

At an empirical level, this research suggests that international humanitarian organizations are changing and responding to climate change. It has suggested that organizational change occurs along four dimensions: rhetorical, policy, structural, and operational. Change along one dimension may instigate change in other areas of the organization: The high commissioner’s rhetorical statements led to policy and structural change. There may also be a disconnect between these four dimensions; this is particularly noticeable in the operational sphere where UNHCR global press releases did not reflect UNHCR Kenya’s perceptions. It also found that organizational changes had to overcome resistance from states and staff.

For those concerned about the plight of “climate change displaced” this article has not advocated for a new protection framework (see also McAdam 2011). Rather it has pointed out how existing institutions may accommodate new groups of people within existing structures.

Those displaced internally by natural disasters and sudden onset events fit within the IDP guiding principles. Furthermore, it suggests that international organizations will adapt—even if it is slow process—and seek to respond to new crises. However, UNHCR is unlikely to acquire a new mandate explicitly for those displaced across borders by climate change. Moreover, it would be problematic to construct a new protection framework explicitly for those displaced internationally by “climate change.” This would marginalize those displaced by other sorts of human-induced and natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis (Betts 2010b). In sum,

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while a new protection framework is needed for those who fall outside the refugee framework it should be based on need not on cause of displacement. We are yet to see UNHCR, or states, outline a coherent proposal for such an expansion.

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Ratner, Steven R. (2011) “Law promotion beyond law talk: the Red Cross, persuasion, and the laws of war,” The European Journal of International Law 22(2):459–506.

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Rittberger, Volker and Bernhard Zangl (2006) International Organization: Polity, Politics and Policies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Snidal, Duncan (1994) “Coordination versus prisoners’ dilemma: implications for international cooperation and regimes,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., International Organization: A Reader, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.

Suchman, Mark C. (1995) “Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches,” Academy of Management Review 20(3):571–610.

Türk, Volker (2007) “Freedom from Fear: refugees, the broader forced displacement context and the underlying international protection regime,” in Vincent Chetail, ed., Globalization, Migration and Human Rights: International Law Under Review, Brussels: Bruylant.

UNHCR (1991) “Report of the Working Group on Solutions and Protection to the 42nd Session of the Executive Committee on the High Commissioner’s Programme,” Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR (2007) “UNHCR welcomes new Deputy High Commissioner L. Craig Johnstone,” in News Stories, available at http://www.unhcr.org/466807162.html, accessed on 30 December 2009.

UNHCR (2007) “The Protection of Internally Displaced Persons and the Role of UNHCR,” Geneva: Informal Consultative Meeting, UNHCR. UNHCR (2008) “Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective,” in Policy Paper, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR (2009) Climate Change, available at: www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html accessed 20 November 209.

UNHCR (2009) “Forced displacement in the context of climate change: challenges for states under international law,” in Submission to the 6th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 6) 1–12 June, Bonn: UNHCR. UNHCR (2009) “Climate change is a humanitarian problem,” in Pamphlet, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR (2009) “Tackling climate change in Eastern Chad,” in New Stories, available at http://www. unhcr.org/4b27b7039.html accessed 30 December 2009.

UNHCR (2009) “Nowhere to hide from climate change in Kenyan refugee camp,” in New Stories, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b2b76a79.html accessed 24 January 2010.

UNHCR (2009) “Non-paper: Comments and Proposed revisions to the negotiating text prepared by the Chair of the UNFCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action,” available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search%5C?page=&comid=4a2d26df6&cid=49ae a9390&keywords=UNFCCC accessed 30 December 2009.

UNHCR (2011) “Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement,” Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR (2011) UNHCR’s role in support of an enhanced humanitarian response for the protection of persons affected by natural disasters, Geneva: UNHCR. Weber, Max (1948) “Bureaucracy,” in H.H Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London: Routledge.

European Union Environmental Governance in Transition—Effective?

Legitimate? Ecologically Rational?

by M. Leann Brown, University of Florida This study chronicles the evolution of EU environmental governance to ascertain how it has changed over time and where it stands today in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy, and ecological rationality. The evidence suggests that EU hierarchical environmental governance became increasingly effective and legitimate during the 1970s and 1980s. However, many contend that these qualities have declined since the early 1990s. In response, the EU has made rhetorical and legal commitments to “new modes of governance,” but in practice environmental governance has remained predominantly hierarchical. This paper contends that EU policy is more effective than is commonly believed and that legitimacy derives more from normative consensus and legalization than perceptions of policy effectiveness. Moreover, EU environmental effectiveness and legitimacy potentially will be further enhanced with a more complete transformation to the new modes of governance which coincide with our understandings of ecological rationality.

Introduction Many analysts contend that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the European Union (EU) is at an all-time low, and its member states are failing to fulfill their professed goals to achieve sustainable development, to implement and comply with environmental legislation, and to integrate environmental objectives across all policy areas. This paper chronicles the evolution of EU environmental governance in terms of the polity’s changing legal foundations and institutional capacities, principles and discourses, decision-making processes, and policy instruments to ascertain how EU environmental governance has changed over time and where it stands today in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy, and ecological rationality.

Environmental matters were not addressed in the 1957 Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, and environmental goals did not achieve treaty status until the 1987 Single European Act. Over time, the original guiding hierarchical, technocratic, and scientific discourses have been called into question. The predominantly intergovernmental body has changed to include substate, nonstate, and global participants in decision-making networks. Environmental policy-making processes began as relatively ad hoc, fragmented, top-down, and regulatory in nature, but gradually “new modes of governance” (NMG) entered the lexicon. Although the evidence suggests that EU environmental policy improved in effectiveness and legitimacy during the 1970s and 1980s, analysts warn of decline in these areas since the early 1990s, and policymakers have attempted to put into place more inclusive, cooperative, integrated, and context-specific procedures and processes. While these participatory and holistic commitments conform to some ecologicallyrational prescriptions, in practice most EU environmental policies remain hierarchical and regulatory in nature (Jordan et al. 2005:489).

The EU has faced different environmental challenges along its evolutionary path, so assessing policy effectiveness is a moving target in terms of definition and indicators. During the 1970s through the mid-1980s, the primary objectives were to bring environmental protection to the agenda of the economic organization, to constitutionalize environmental objectives to a

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legal status equal to economic integration and growth goals, and to build institutional capacity.

Once those goals were achieved, the organization effectively promulgated hundreds of pieces of new legislation. With a host of new legislation and regulations on the books, EU environmental policies’ effectiveness came to be assessed in terms of the narrow indicator of rates of policy implementation and compliance. This paper argues, however, the EU’s constitutionalizing commitments to environmental goals equal to those of economic integration and growth, its articulating and embedding new principles and discourses, and its commitment to promoting the environmental agenda in the context of global negotiations provide more important criteria for assessing effectiveness.

In contrast with much of the existing literature, this paper also contends that legitimacy is not always directly related to policy effectiveness. Success or failure in one issue area is not always directly related to legitimacy in that area or in others. Progress was achieved on the environmental agenda even as the wider organization suffered the pangs of eurosclerosis during the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, organizational and policy legitimacy derives from deeply held normative commitment to environmental goals. Again, normative consensus and will embedded in the EU’s legal foundations provide the strongest indicators of legitimacy.

Finally, the study will argue that although the EU’s halting efforts to embrace new modes of governance have been roundly criticized as being rhetorical rather than put into practice, new modes of governance coincide more closely with our understandings of ecological rationality than the previous legislative/regulatory and scientific/technical modes of governing in that they are more holistic, integrated, participatory, cooperative, context-specific, and flexible. The new modes of governance should generate more effective environmental policies because the network-like processes are more inclusive improving policymakers’ access to vernacular and context-specific information. The EU also seeks to integrate environmental objective across sectors and issue areas. However, the most important consequences of the most recent structural and process changes in governance are that the enhanced participation and deliberations will yield greater understanding and commitment to environmental norms and principles that constitute the ultimate foundation for organizational and policy effectiveness and legitimacy.

Thinking Theoretically about Effectiveness, Legitimacy, and Ecological Rationality Effectiveness Defining effectiveness is a persistent dilemma in thinking about these matters. Functionalists tend to define effectiveness as a polity’s ability to achieve its objectives in a cost-effective, efficient way with minimum undesired side effects (Grant et al. 2000:1), but this parsimonious definition conveys only limited understanding of the effectiveness of EU environmental efforts. More recently, particularly since the end of the Cold War, EU effectiveness has also been discussed in relation to legitimacy and its conformity to democratic principles. Less frequently discussed but possibly more important to effectiveness in environmental matters, EU environmental structures, processes, and policies might also be assessed in terms of how well they correspond to ecological rationalities.

Functionalists claim that the EU and other intergovernmental and/or supranational organizations may possess superior problem-solving capacities relative to states because modern problems increasingly transcend state frontiers and are amenable to scientific/technical rather than state-based, political/ideological solutions. They predict that over time regional organizations’ effectiveness will result in a gradual transfer of political and societal actors’ expectations and loyalty from the state to the regional body. Thus, effective performance and socialization will constitute the bases for EU legitimacy (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995:3).

However, the EU has faced divergent environmental challenges along its evolutionary path, so assessing policy effectiveness is a moving target in terms of the polity’s objectives and indicators of success. During the 1970s through the mid-1980s, the primary challenges were to

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place environmental protection on the agenda of the economic organization, to articulate and legalize environmental objectives and principles to a status equal to economic integration and growth goals, and to address the most essential, health-threatening environmental concerns such as water quality. From the outset, the EC, acknowledging the holistic and global nature of many environmental challenges, also committed itself to providing leadership in global environmental governance. Once those goals were achieved, culminating with the 1987 Single European Act, the organization devoted itself to promulgating hundreds of pieces of new legislation and regulations and bringing its member states’ legislation in line with these obligations.

After the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the relatively less difficult environmental objectives had been achieved by legislation and regulation, and the organization was confronted with increasingly novel and complicated issues, within increasingly complex political processes, including increasing numbers of member states, many of whom assigned environmental issues relatively low priority and who lacked the administrative capacity to vigorously integrate sustainable development objectives into all policy areas.

With the host of new legal obligations on the books, EU environmental policies’ effectiveness came to be assessed in terms of the narrow indicator of rates of policy implementation and compliance. This paper argues, however, the EU’s constitutionalizing commitments to environmental goals equal to those of economic integration and growth, its articulating new principles and discourses, and its diligence in pushing forward the environmental agenda in the context of global negotiations are more important than rates of implementation and compliance for assessing EU environmental effectiveness. Further, a more complete transition to the more ecologically rational new modes of governance portends enhanced policy effectiveness.

As might be expected, analysts’ different definitions, criteria, and indicators of effectiveness yield disagreement over whether the EU has been, is, and will be environmentally effective. Collier (1997:1) writes that “environmental policy is considered to be one of the European Union’s most successful policies.” It has established a treaty foundation for undertaking environmental objectives and allocated powers, comparable to economic ones, to EU institutions, including creating a directorate general for the environment. It has promulgated hundreds of pieces of legislation and regulations to undertaking comprehensive and complex environmental policies. And, along the way, it has articulated and constitutionalized innovative principles and paradigms that shape dominant global discourses and negotiations around environmental issues. In this way and via diplomatic interactions, the EU has provided leadership in global governance of the environment since the early 1970s. Eckersley (2004:80–81) goes so far as to suggest (with particular reference to the EU’s embracing ecological modernization) that Europeans have made the transition “from environmental exploiter and facilitator of private environmental exploitation to public environmental trustee. . . . ” If the criteria for success is the degree to which EU efforts change member states’ behavior, there is some evidence that the EU has produced a “ratcheting up” of environmental standards, particularly among member states with previously nonexistent or ineffective environmental institutions and policies (Grant et al. 2000:66). And positive policy outcomes for the environment have been noted in some specific issue areas such as water quality and restoration of the ozone layer.

On the whole, however, Grant et al.’s (2000:66–67) assessment is negative: “The overall impact of EU environment policies through the legislative route has not been a notable success.”

Policy implementation and enforcement have been weak, many policies have not achieved their intended outcomes, and there has been a slow and unrelenting deterioration of environmental quality. Grant and his colleagues reach these conclusions by focusing mostly on rates of delayed, incomplete, or inadequate member state implementation of EU legislation and regulations, increasing numbers of public and official complaints of breaches of EU environmental law, and infringement cases registered by the commission and heard by the European Court of Justice.

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Legitimacy “Legitimacy” is also a contested concept. Backstrand et al. (2008:38) provide this definition: “The acceptance of a particular social order, rule, norm, or institution by set of actors or by a specific community.” Legitimacy may also be discussed in terms of “appropriateness”1 and commitment to participation and compliance (Baber and Bartlett, 2005:92). Legitimacy may potentially derive from several sources: 1) consensus surrounding a set of fundamental values, norms, and principles embedded in institutions, laws, regulations, and policies; 2) inclusive, free, fair, and transparent participation and deliberations guided by the public interest; 3) laws, regulations, and policies that effectively solve problems and meet public needs; 4) laws, regulations, and policies that coincide with the dominate public culture and discourses; and 5) laws, regulations, and policies that coincide with participants’ roles and identities. These multiple bases of legitimacy help explain why scholars disagree over whether and the extent to which organizational and policy effectiveness are related to legitimacy, how legitimacy in one sector is related to legitimacy in others, and how legitimacy in one sector affects the legitimacy of the entire organization and vice versa.

Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (1995:19–20) opine that a reciprocal relationship exists between effectiveness and legitimacy. Ineffective organizations and policies do not garner explicit or tacit public support and legitimacy, however, and organizations and policies cannot succeed without public support and legitimacy. However, Baber and Bartlett (2005) contend that a weak relationship exists between environmental policy effectiveness and legitimacy.

Livanis (2010:252) suggests that implementation and compliance effectiveness in one sector may be related to implementation and compliance in others, and several analysts go further to express concern that the failure to implement and comply with EU environmental policies undermines the credibility of the entire regional organization (Grant et al. 2000).

As was noted, the EU has fluctuated with regard to effectiveness in its primary economic mission, but most concur that a “permissive consensus” persisted with regard to the EC and its environmental policies. Profound ineffectiveness or stalemate may force the organization to undertake radical reform to avoid system failure. Clearly, the economic and organizational disorder of the 1970s and early 1980s forced the organization to promulgate the 1987 Single European Act. In this instance, economic ineffectiveness resulted in positive consequences in the environmental sector as evidenced by the constitutionalization of environmental objectives in the Single European Act and the subsequent promulgation of more than two hundred pieces of environmental legislation.

Hooghe and Marks write that after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, support for integration “essentially disappeared.” Proliferating European legislation and regulations began to reach deeper into society and affect citizens’ daily lives, creating winners and losers in ways that made EU policies salient and contestable. Politicization was only heightened by sustained debates and referenda over successive treaties and the EU constitution (Hooghe and Marks:2008:118, 123–25). By the mid-2000s, many judged overall EU legitimacy among the public at an all-time low, and the organization’s capacity to govern was increasingly called into question (Jordan and Schout 2006:ix). However, public support for the EU’s continuing pursuit of environmental objectives has remained strong over the decades.

The breadth of participation and quality of deliberations also constitute a possible source of organizational effectiveness and legitimacy. Particularly in the wake of the Cold War, although democratic government is a prerequisite for EU membership, there has been much talk about the EU’s suffering a “democratic deficit.” It is often pointed out that, although the heads of state and government who comprise the EU council are democratically elected, only the European 1. March and Olsen (2009) explain: “The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions.”

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parliament is directly chosen by EU citizens, and the multilevel, complex body generates concerns about transparency and accountability. The transition from hierarchical, regulationoriented governance to more horizontal, consensual structures and processes may portend positive and negative consequences for “democracy.” Some argue that bringing additional substate and nonstate actors into policymaking, administration, and compliance networks increases participation and transparency, allowing a wider array of information, opinions, and interests to be heard. Consensual and voluntary modes of governance taking precedence over more regulatory and coercive processes are compatible with notions of democracy.

Simon Hix (1998:51) opines that those arguing the new modes of governance enhance EU legitimacy and democracy fail to understand that state-centric conceptualizations democracy are not appropriate for the regional entity. A redefined concept of democracy is required that focuses on effectiveness rather than electoral competition, efficiency rather than parliamentarianism and representativeness, deliberation and consensus rather than majority rule, and transparency and other sources of accountability (e.g., judicial accountability) rather than electoral accountability. While policy effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accountability may well contribute to legitimacy, the importance of normative consensus and commitment and the quality of deliberations that create value and normative consensus and commitment are the most reliable foundations for legitimacy.

Ecological Rationality A final criterion by which the changes in EU environmental governance may be but are not commonly assessed is the degree to which they coincide with ecological rationalities.

Ecological problems are qualitatively different from other policy challenges due to the environment’s holism and interdependence; diversity and complexity; temporal and spatial variability (context specificity); substantive and scientific uncertainty; and adaptability and spontaneity (i.e., the potential capacity of ecosystems to rejuvenate and cope with stress without human intervention to achieve homeostasis), among other attributes. “Ecologically rational” human-natural systems possess the capacity to work within and manage these myriad attributes. Ideally, ecologically rational governance lexicographically, consistently, and effectively values the environment and structures, policies, and behaviors that protect the environment over other political, economic, legal, and social rationalities (Dryzek 1987:55).

These other rationalities exist and are necessary for large contemporary organizations to survive and flourish. However, the various rationalities may be partially incompatible or in direct conflict and are not equally important at various times to the organization’s mission (Dryzek 1983 and 1987; Baber and Bartlett 2005:19).

Human beings have devised multiple mechanisms and combinations of social choice mechanisms (e.g., liberal democracy, markets, law, hierarchical administrations) that express, embed, and pursue these various rationalities. Instead of a holistic-interdependent-organic approach, these social choice mechanisms typically manifest individualistic-mechanistic methodologies that assume that complex environmental problems are best addressed by disaggregating them into component parts and then formulating and executing actions in pursuit of specific ends.

An ecologically rational system of governance draws inspiration from and accepts as its paradigm to the degree possible “the actual and potential analogical relationships and the interdependences in nature and those in the social realm” (Valadez 2001:221). Ecological systems are open, holistic, interdependent, diverse, complex, temporally and spatially variable, and potentially possess the ability to self-regulate and cope with stress such that the system can consistently and effectively support humans and other life forms over generations. Therefore, ecologically rational governance ideally will be substantive with regard to its environmental goals, functional with regard to the characteristics of the system, and procedural with regard to its deliberative and decision-making processes (Baber and Bartlett 2005:18). To summarize, ecologically rational governance:

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1. Lexicographically privileges protection of the environment; 2. Integrates and coordinates environmental objectives and policies across multiple sectors, decisions, and actors; 3. Avoids spatial and temporal displacement of environmental risks and harm; 4. Is flexible, robust, and resilient (i.e., puts in place norms, principles, policies, processes, and structures responsive to substantive, spatial, and temporal diversity, complexity, and change); 5. Enables and institutionalizes meaningful participation by all relevant political, economic, and social actors; 6. Is open to changing and novel scientific and vernacular understandings, particularly with regard to negative policy feedback; and 7. Fosters organizational and social learning (Dryzek 1987).

While EU leaders exhibit a commitment to liberal democracy and unfettered markets, and have embraced discourses associated with sustainable development and ecological modernization, OMC, and “new modes of governance,” most structures, processes, and policies remain hierarchical and administrative in nature. Hierarchical, administered systems are not compatible with ecological rationalities for several reasons. While hierarchical models of governance may allow political elites and administrators to set environmental objectives for the entire system and ostensibly gain control over the system and environmental resources, these models assume that leaders understand and can respond to the holism, interdependence, complexity, uncertainty, and variability of environmental problems. Bureaucracies’ most common response to the environmental problems, however, is to disaggregate the problem into component parts. There is little guarantee that the various subunits will act adequately in concert to address the holistic and complex nature of environmental problems. Academic research into bureaucracies actually finds limited compliance with leadership objectives at lower levels of the hierarchy (Cyert and March 1963). Lower levels of administrative systems have a different, often superior, understanding of policy problems than leadership and greater sensitivity to negative feedback. Hierarchical administrative systems have flawed feedback systems; they lack sensitivity to external signals.

Openness to negative feedback requires a willingness to accept unanticipated consequences and admit errors in previous decisions. Error is probable in complex human-natural systems. However, administrators are rarely willing to admit their theories, models, and policies are fallacious or inadequate. Their personal reputations and fortunes as well as those of their administrative units are tied to their policy choices being interpreted as successful. Since failure is not an acceptable assessment, administrative systems have a tendency to conceal and perpetuate errors, denying themselves effective organizational learning (Dryzek 1987:91–101).

Because environmental problems are complex, uncertain, and changing, no static body of scientific theory or information is adequate to address policy problems. Dryzek (1987:104–05) explains that While hierarchy may be adequate for the coordination of routine tasks . . . , it is a bad problem-solving device. . . . [In] a world threatened by severe ecological problems— hierarchy is a bad principle for the organization of society. An effective problem-solving community, the archetype of which is the scientific community, is a community of equals in which good arguments prevail, not the authority of individuals.

Dryzek (1987:109) concludes that “the prospects for ecologically rational centralized, administered forms of social choice are bleak indeed.”

The evolution of EU environmental governance is the story of the polity’s gradually increasing rhetorical and legal commitment to establishing environmental protection as co-equal with economic growth and development and integrating environmental objectives across all policy areas. Particularly in putting into place principles like subsidiarity, creating business and civil society partnerships and network forms of governance at the agenda setting, policymaking, and policy-monitoring stages, and committing itself to context-specific modes of

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governance, it has sought to increase flexibility, robustness, and resilience. Network governance also has increased and institutionalized opportunities for multiple political, economic, and social actors to participate in more context-specific environmental governance. The commitment to new modes of governance that emerged in the 1990s relies for success on enhancing access to information, volunteerism, and social learning.

Most scholars agree EU environmental effectiveness and legitimacy increased and was sustained respectively until the early 1990s but many contend that these attributes since have suffered relatively steady decline. Most aspects of the hierarchical, administrative, scientific/ technical structures and processes of EU efforts do not conform to our understandings of ecological rationality. This study, however, contends the EU faced various environmental challenges at different stages of its evolution, and the case may be made that it effectively addressed these challenges. The degree to which the EU may be assessed as environmentally effective depends upon the indicator being used.

This study goes further to assert that there are also multiple bases (and indicators) on which the legitimacy of EU environmental efforts may be assessed. While many contend that policy effectiveness and legitimacy are reciprocally causative, in my view, normative consensus, commitment, and legalization are the strongest bases (and indicators) for legitimacy. Employing these indicators, the legitimacy of EU environmental efforts has remained strong over the past four decades. Finally, while some aspects of EU environmental governance conform to our understanding of ecologically rational governance, obviously much needs to be done in this area. However, the principles, discourses, and partially adopted new modes of governance of the past two decades exhibit greater ecological rationality than other rationalities embedded in the organization’s treaties, legislation, and discourses. There is a strong case to be made that the way forward is to complete the transition from hierarchical approaches of the “old government” to the “new modes of governance.”

Phase I—Addressing Environmental Issues without a Treaty Basis in an Era of “Permissive Consensus” As was noted, the 1957 Treaties of Rome did not reference the environment. Therefore, the European community’s initial environmental challenges were to bring these issues to the EC agenda, to address the most immediate environmental threats to human health, and to build institutional capacity to address environmental issues. From the outset, West Europeans also provided global leadership in creating global environmental governance. During the 1960s, the European economic communities promulgated several environmental directives congruent with its single market objectives. Directive 67/548/EEC on classification, packaging, and labeling of dangerous substances, agreed to in 1967, is usually identified as the first EEC environmental legislation. In 1971, an environment and consumer protection unit was established within the commission; that same year the commission presented a first detailed report on the environment to the European Council. In 1972, that unit became the Environment and Consumer Protection Service, with a staff of fifteen, attached to the Industrial Policy Directorate (then DGIII; Grant et al. 2000:9–10).2 Western Europe, birthplace of the industrial revolution, is densely populated and had achieved significant economic growth after the devastation of World War II. These factors exacted an environmental toll, and by the 1960s, environmental consciousness emerged on the grassroots in the member states. During June 1972, the UN sponsored a conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, which served as an important consciousness-raising event and marked the beginning of the global environmental movement and global environmental governance. At the October 1972 Paris Summit, the European Council confirmed that “economic expansion is not an end in itself,” laid down a series of environmental principles, 2. In 1981, a reorganization of the commission upon Greece’s accession transferred environmental policy responsibilities from DGIII to an environment directorate, DGXI (Grant et al. 2000:10).

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and agreed to adopt an EC environmental policy (EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce 1994:v). Since 1973, the EC has enacted six multi-year Environmental Action Programs (EAPs) establishing general principles and priorities and outlining measures to be undertaken in various policy areas. These programs demonstrate the member states’ growing commitment to coordinate and harmonize environmental regulations to level the economic playing field and to repair and protect the environment.

The first Environmental Action Program (1973–77) established several principles that continue to serve as bases for EU policy today: the polluter pays,3 preventive measures are preferable to remediation, harmonization of environmental policies is to be undertaken to ensure that divergent state policies do not become barriers to the common market, environmental protection is compatible with economic and social development, and environmental objectives should be taken into consideration in all socioeconomic decisions. In practice, however, during the first EAP the EC devoted most of its resources to environmental remediation rather than protection (Commission 1973). The second EAP (1977–81) endorsed the same principles and stressed the importance of environmental impact assessments for EU activities (Commission 1977).

Environmental protection rather than remediation received stronger emphasis in the third EAP (1982–86). A change in focus encouraging environmental management as the basis for economic and social development was discernible. Environmental goals were no longer to be regarded as subordinate to common market ones, and were to be integrated into other policy areas such as agriculture, energy, industry, and transportation (Commission 1982; Caldwell 1990:138–42).

Pre-1987 environmental legislation was justified primarily on the grounds that divergent environmental regulations in the member states distorted trade competition and constituted a nontariff barrier to free trade. While the aspirations and emphases expressed in the EAPs provide evidence of increasing commitment to prioritizing environmental objectives relative to economic ones and to integrating environmental concerns into other policy areas, without a treaty basis, environmental problems were addressed in a relatively ad hoc and fragmented way.

While the academic community debated whether intergovernmental or functionalist/supranational models best characterized the European communities, during this period, most EC policies were subject to member states’ vetoes, and without a treaty basis, environmental matters required unanimous member state approval.4 Between 1972 and 1986, in addition to the three EAPs, the EC enacted more than one hundred measures (approximately 20 percent of which were important) to affect and coordinate environmental protection (Koppen 1988).

Likely in reaction to the lack of treaty basis and the EAP and the directive format of many environmental decisions, Rehbinder and Steward (1985:33) describe the pre-Single European Act EAPs and other environmental legislation as “soft law [which] consists of programs and declarations of a non-binding nature,” representing “a new type of policy developed through political consensus of the member states.” However, reflecting the member states’ domestic orientations toward environmental policy, the EC approached environmental problems in an interventionist, legalistic, regulatory, and scientific/technocratic way, generally leaving implementation to the member states.

While the European communities’ economic agenda suffered markedly during the economic downturn of the 1970s and 1980s (i.e., global “stagflation” resulted in “Eurosclerosis”),5 its embracing of environmental objectives was congruent with the public’s and member states’ growing commitment to environmental objectives. Further, between 1981 and 1985, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered a series of judgments that progressively upheld the validity and legitimacy of the communities’ environmental policies (Koppen 1988). Thus, while 3. That is to say, the polluter bears the cost of avoiding environmental damage to specified (usually technological) limits and after that the cost of remediating residual pollution.

4. After January 1966, qualified majority voting was limited by the “Luxembourg Compromise” whereby France successfully reserved the right of any member state to veto a proposal in the council by declaring that a “vital” or “very important” interest was at stake.

5. During this period, even Ernst Haas (1975) despaired of the European project and declared regional integration theory obsolete.

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Euroskeptics maintained an ongoing side conversation, the polity’s environmental focus and legitimacy were not seriously called into question. With regard to EU governance in general, Risse-Kappen (1996:74) affirms that between the 1960s and the early 1990s before controversies erupted over the implementation of the Single European Act and the negotiation of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a “permissive consensus” was obtained, suggesting the organization’s legitimacy was not linked directly to contemporary economic effectiveness. While economic integration in the EC had been an elite-driven project, the polity’s increasing environmental emphasis may have contributed in some small measure to this permissive consensus and the polity’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

The economic turbulence of the 1970s undermined the Keynesian consensus in Europe and in the U.S. and brought to power Margaret Thatcher in Britain in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. in 1981, ushering in the era of neoliberalism. Scholars began discussing the downsizing of the state and the introduction of market and market-like policy instruments in terms of “the hollowing out of the state” and the advent of a “new governance” at the state level (Rhodes 1986 and 1994). “Liberalization,” “return to the market,” and “deregulation” became the new catchphrases (Holzinger et al. 2006:407). In the third EAP (1982–86), the commission began advocating use of “economic incentive instruments,” and in the fourth EPA (1987–92), instruments such as emissions taxes, state subsidies, deposit permits, voluntary agreements with polluters, and liability laws were dealt with in some detail.

The attractiveness of these instruments to the commission (and ecological economists) derived from the following understandings:

1. Market and market-like policy instruments correspond well to the “polluter-pays principle,” 2. Economic instruments guarantee the optimal allocation of environmental resources in that they are more flexible than regulatory instruments and they encourage firms to invest in environmental protection where costs are lowest. The assumption is that if preventive measures cost less than regulatory requirements, then firms will choose the former.

3. If pollution taxes must be paid and/or permits purchased and the firm is still liable for cleaning up residual pollution, firms are encouraged to develop more comprehensive and innovative mechanisms to avoid pollution (my emphasis; Holzinger et al.

2006:405).

During the mid- and late-1980s, commission interlocutors found these economic arguments particularly appealing. Against the background of worsening global economic conditions, the commission sought to preserve the commitment to environmental objectives by stressing that environmental protection could be carried out in a cost-effective manner, and that, with farsighted planning, a focus on the environment could actually contribute to solving economic problems. This having been said, only 2.9% of policy instruments outlined in the fourth EAP were market oriented, compared to 82.5% of instruments that were interventionist in nature, and 14.7% that could be labeled “new or context-oriented governance” (Holzinger et al. 2006:406, 413). While progress was made toward creating ecologically rational governance,6 in practice, many of these commitments remained legal and rhetorical and EC processes and policies remained predominantly hierarchical, administrative, interventionist, and regulatory in nature.

The Single European Act provides a Treaty Basis for Environmental Governance The 1987 Single European Act (SEA) represented the constitutionalization of EC environmental policy in that it amended the Treaties of Rome to require that environmental protection be incor6. Important principles such as the polluter pays were institutionalized into EU policies; protecting the environment was identified as the basis of economic and social development; environmental protection was to be integrated into other policy areas; the ECJ demonstrated a willingness to uphold environmental objectives; and environmental impact assessments became part of the polity’s standard operating procedures.

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porated into every aspect of community policy. The SEA also altered the polity’s institutional capacities and decision-making procedures. In 1985, Urwin (1985:231) wrote that the SEA “had the potential for revolution, suggesting a shift in the existing balance of power away from the member states towards the community institutions.” Qualified majority voting replaced the unanimity requirement in the council on matters relating to the single market, and the “cooperation procedure” was institutionalized whereby commission proposals were sent to the European Parliament (EP) for a “second reading,” affording the parliament greater participation and power in policymaking. With this procedure, the EP could amend proposed legislation unless overridden by unanimous opposition in the council. The EP is regarded as the “most green” among EC bodies, and this change contributed to the promulgation of more environmental legislation. The SEA also increased the power of the commission relative to the council. If the commission supported amendments offered by the parliament in the second reading, pressure was increased on the council to accept the amendments, which could only be altered by a unanimous vote.

The cooperation procedure made policy more transparent, more sensitive to public opinion since the parliament is an elected body, and more unpredictable (Haigh and Baldock 1989:12).

Consensus obtained within the EC regarding the desirability of providing a more solid legal foundation for the organization’s extensive environmental legislation. The British and other member states challenged the legal competency of the EC to promulgate specific environmental directives, but they never sought vindication of their position in the European Court of Justice. Over time, even the Danes and Germans voiced support for more formal authority for the EC to take on environmental tasks. For example, although the Danes had reluctantly agreed in 1979 to a directive protecting wild birds, they argued that the EC lacked legal competence to legislate in areas such as protecting wildlife habitats and, it was generally understood that no further wildlife legislation should be adopted unless it was directly related to trade. Thus, member states, for differing reasons, agreed that environmental initiatives of the organization required clearer legal foundations. The single market, however, rather than the environment, was the primary focus of this legislation. Andrew Moravscik (1991) contends that the commission was responsible for quietly slipping environmental provisions into the revised treaty without encountering opposition from members’ representatives.

The 1980s also brought a change in EC understandings associated with this policy area from predominantly economic/scientific/technocratic ones to include the “sustainable development” discourse. In 1987, the United Nations-initiated World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission) published its report, Our Common Future, and ideas associated with sustainable development gradually infiltrated the economic-growthoriented EC discourse.7 The 1993–2000 fifth EAP was titled Towards Sustainability (Commission 1998; Ward and Williams 1997:456–59; Gottweis 1999:65). Thus, simultaneous with the EC’s embracing of a more market-oriented discourse of environmental governance, the alternative discourse of sustainable development entered the lexicon.8 Sustainable development would ultimately become the predominate discourse in global environmental and development governance.

The SEA opened the door to profound changes in EU policymaking processes and instruments. In 1990 alone, the EC adopted two hundred pieces of binding environmental legislation (Lenschow 1999:46). For the first time, Brussels became an important site for decision making regarding environmental matters, which meant that environmental and corporate lobbyists were required to extend their activities beyond member state capitals to include EC bodies.

And even as this transfer of power to Brussels was occurring, the SEA also introduced the 7. See Dryzek (2005:143–180) for explications of the discourses of sustainable development and ecological modernization.

8. The Brundtland Report (1987:8, 46) explains that “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Later, it continued that “In essence, sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.”

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apparently contradictory concept of subsidiarity relative to environmental matters. This principle required that

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the community shall take action . . . only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the community (Article 5, formerly Article 3b, of the TEC, Commission 1992).

The subsidiarity principle may be interpreted as contributing to ecological democracy by its potentially increasing the number of participants in environmental decision making, bringing in additional and alternative sources of knowledge, making environmental policy more context specific, and increasing opportunities for deliberation and normative and policy consensus building, however, it also introduced more ambiguity and uncertainty in policymaking and implementation.

The legal and procedural changes wrought by the SEA and the subsequent rash of new environmental legislation and regulations exacerbated ongoing implementation and compliance problems and concerns that environmental challenges were going unmet. Policymakers interpreted these problems as signaling a need for greater policy integration and expanded participation via partnerships and networks. The fifth EAP (1992–2000) emphasized policy integration, and the commission reiterated this goal in its 1993 communication on Integrating by the Commission of the Environment into other Policies and the 1994 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment. Seeking to create horizontal connections between and among various sectors and to increase vertical interaction with societal actors, the commission created three categories of dialogue groups: 1. a consultative forum to serve as a sounding board for EU environmental policymaking in relation to its economic agenda;9 2. an implementation network comprised of member states’ officials; and 3. a policy review group composed of member states and DG Environment officials.

The commission expressed its intent to clarify the mechanisms for internal consultation, to prepare an annual integration report, and to require self-evaluation of integration efforts by the various DGs. A number of additional transparency measures were announced, including earlier publication of its annual work plan and the delineation of a code of conduct on access to information supported by technological innovations (Lenschow:1999:46).

DGXI’s efforts to move from a legalistic/regulatory/top-down approach to a more inclusive, participatory one was to be achieved by creating networks; Ward and Williams (1997:439) confirm that “networking provides the non-tangible infrastructure for this process.” They identify the 1990 Green Paper on the Urban Environment as the first sustained discussion and effort by DGXI to include subnational governments (SNGs, i.e., cities, regions, etc.) in policy-making processes. Prior to the 1990s, interactions between DGXI and SNGs had been limited and sporadic. The commission turned to networks to address a variety of capacity, democratic deficit, implementation and compliance, and legitimacy concerns. Increasing SNGs’, interest groups’, and experts’ input into environmental policy was seen as a way to improve the practicality of policies and to enhance implementation and compliance.

SNGs’ participation in networks was envisioned as a means to increase awareness and understanding of the EU across the various levels of government, and, thus, enhance legitimacy.

Transnational networks also represented a mechanism whereby the commission could gain access to representative European expertise and opinion while simultaneously coordinating 9. Forum membership included four representatives from regional and local authorities, five representatives from consumer and environmental groups, two representatives from trade unions, nine industrial representatives, two representatives from agricultural and agrifood organizations, and nine independent personalities (Lenschow 1999:46). Between 1998 and 2010, the EU created thirty-seven social dialogue committees who generated more than three hundred documents such as guidelines and codes of conduct (Pop 2010).

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and controlling interactions with lobbyists, avoiding lobbying overload. Networks were also regarded as a way to improve policy efficiency.

With regard to urban environmental matters, one official estimated that a predominantly regulatory approach required ten to twelve years to yield results, whereas encouraging networks of cities to become partners and stakeholders in designing their own policy solutions could achieve results in four to five years (Ward and Williams 1997:439). Networks were seen as an inexpensive, flexible, and efficient way to create and implement policies. Further, once operational, multi-issue networks exhibited a tendency to “breed” additional specialized networks. For example, Eurocities and the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives fostered creation of European Cities for Climate Change and Eurocities Environment (Ward and Williams 1997:452–53).

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union) strengthened the power of the European Parliament through creation of the co-decision procedure, which gave the EP greater legislative power in a number of policy areas. In line with the concept of subsidiarity, a Committee of the Regions and Local Authorities was created to formalize the growing importance of subnational entities (Ward and Williams 1997:439–48). An additional change that occurred during this period, particularly to address highly technical issues, was the creation of several quasi-autonomous agencies including the European Environment Agency and the European Food Safety Authority which became operational in 1990 and 1994 respectively.

The net consequences of these profound legal and procedural changes were mixed. While the legal authority to address many environmental problems moved from the member states to Brussels resulting in some loss of member state control over local authorities regarding environmental matters, it is difficult to distinguish between the consequences of European integration and pressures in member states toward centralization and decentralization. The thrust of the network concept was to change the roles of SNGs from implementers of hierarchically mandated policy into innovators, leaders, partners, and facilitators. Throughout the 1990s, however, SNGs’ abilities to participate effectively in network governance were limited due to the lack of resources, lack of knowledge of participatory opportunities on the regional level, and a lack of political will.

Many questions were left unanswered as to how these networks would work, including: How would the networks be structured and managed? How would the new governance be connected to the old forms of governance, i.e., legislation and regulations? How could their effectiveness and legitimacy be guaranteed? The commission had significant experience working with networks in relation to lobbying and policy-making activities, but it was less clear how networks could be used to govern, implement policies, and achieve compliance. Many policymakers realized that new coordination capacities would have to be created and managed to address the increasingly interconnected policy processes, but few had the time or political incentives to identify and create bureaucratic procedures, provide staff training, or manage the networks (Jordan and Schout 2006:xi–xiii). However, by the end of the decade, the responses of environmental networks were changing from reactive efforts to improve access to funding and to enhance their economic performance via lobbying to proactive partnership in policymaking.

Ward and Williams (1997:460) expressed optimism that SNGs-commission networks also were becoming more formal and stable, and “a process of incorporation . . . [was] occurring.”

The case may be made that the changes in governance wrought during this period represented progress toward creating ecologically rational governance in that many more participants were brought into the decision making, implementation, and evaluation stages of environmental policymaking. Access to both context-specific and scientific/technical expertise was enhanced through the introduction of new participants including semi-autonomous specialized agencies. The introduction of network governance also portended benefits in terms of flexibility, efficiency, and legitimacy derived from expanded participation, understanding and consensus building, and policy commitment.

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“New Modes of Governance” Over the past fifteen years, the EU has sought to achieve its objectives of sustainable development, and environmental policy integration via new modes of governance, particularly the “open method of coordination” (OMC) with regard to policymaking and the Cardiff process which aims to incorporate environmental objectives into other policy areas.10 The OMC and the Cardiff process involves creating networks of regional, state, and subnational partners, both public and private, within and across sectors to engage in environmental target-setting and benchmarking, performance reporting, identifying “best practices” via peer review, and “naming, faming, and shaming.” The multiple actors involved are encouraged to develop a sense of ownership of environmental problems. The EU hopes that the new modes of governance will encourage the multiple sectors to “design out” potential negative environmental externalities from policies at early stages of the policy process (Jordan and Schout 2006:x), and that the heightened level of participation would improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of environmental policies.

The 2001 White Paper on governance generally described rather than clearly defined approximately six new modes of governance; they were mostly explained in terms of what they were not—the legislative and regulatory approaches of the “old governance” (Commission, 2001; Jordan and Schout 2006:6). The new practices were designed to encourage voluntary policy convergence and policy learning rather than relying exclusively on legislation, regulations, and sanctions to achieve implementation and compliance. However, in the end, the commission presented the new modes of governance as complementing rather than replacing old modes of legislating and regulating.

Achieving sustainable development and integrating environmental objectives into all policy areas via new modes of governance are ambitious, ambiguous, and highly transformative aspirations. The commission remains committed to using market-based mechanisms, regarding them as a flexible and efficient means to achieving its environmental objectives (Commission, 2004; Jordan and Schout 2006:9, 19). No member state can be said to have completely made the transition to new modes of governance, and the European parliament has generally failed to join the networks. In 2001, Peters and Wright (157) wrote that “coordinating in a multilevel, multi-actor (they might have added multi-sectoral) system such as the EU, extends the ‘policy chain’ almost to the breaking point.” In 2003, the European Environment Agency (277) wrote with regard to the Cardiff process, “the process . . . lacked urgency and has yet to have a significant impact on sectoral policy making, let alone on improvements on the ground.” And, the following year, the commission conceded that “the [Cardiff] process has failed to deliver fully on expectations.”

With regard to governance approaches in general, Moravcsik (2005:366) opined that “there is little evidence that [they] . . . matter . . . for policy outcomes.”

In 2004 and 2007, twelve new East European states joined the European Union introducing formidable challenges to the achievement of regional environmental objectives and to the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance. Environmental problems of increasing scale, complexity, and scientific uncertainty proliferated.11 EU governance, in general, has become more deeply and widely involved in European citizens’ lives resulting in increased politicization and a concurrent perception of decreased effectiveness and legitimacy in all policy areas (Jordon and Schout 2006:20). By the mid-2000s, environmental policy integration via the new modes of governance came to a standstill. The Cardiff process never really got off the ground. Sufficiently stable and effective cross-sectoral networks had failed to materialize despite a rhetorical commitment to the goals and procedures. The EU is arguably more deeply vertically divided by sectors than most member governments; sectoral interests are strong and 10. The Cardiff process was articulated in 1998 and the OMC codified in 2000.

11. Two salient examples: the “Mad Cow Crisis,” which began in Britain in 1986 and persisted for more than a decade, was compared to the 1965–66 “Empty Chair Crisis” in its undermining of confidence in European integration, and member states often blatantly refused to comply with EU decisions regarding genetically modified organisms.

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highly divergent, and turf battles among them commonplace. In the mid-2000s, more than sixty multiyear sectoral plans were underway; harmonizing them to integrate environmental objectives represented a formidable challenge. A profound disconnect was apparent between environmental policy needs and the EU institutional capacity to respond (Jordan and Schout 2006:9, 13).

Critics charge that the commission remains overly wed to the status quo, and committed to a narrow interpretation of governance—reducing the quantity and detail of regulations (i.e., improving regulation) and creating more independent agencies (Scott 2002:61). The commission is seen as working diligently to manage policy areas where there are a clear legal mandate and political support from the member states. However, when policy problems are intractable and horizontal and vertical cooperation more difficult to achieve, its commitment to the new modes of governance is less evident (Jordan and Schout 2006:34, 37). Usually new governance instruments combine with and complement rather than replace legislation and regulations (Jordan et al. 2005).

During this governance stage, many analysts, employing as indicators rates of member state implementation and compliance (see fn 3), label EU environmental efforts as ineffective.

Livanis (2010:88, 92), whose dataset includes the years 1998–2007, identifies 2002 as having the lowest implementation rate of approximately 92 percent. He concludes that this level of “non-compliance amounts to a crisis.” What constitutes a “crisis,” however, is contestable— these data may be interpreted from a “half-full” or “half-empty” perspective.

Additional indicators employed to argue ineffectiveness are the annual numbers of complaints and alleged breaches of EU law deriving from the public, Parliamentary questions or petitions, and cases identified by the commission; and the number of environmental infringements cases brought before the ECJ. Livanis (2010:84) informs that between 1998–2007, 25 percent of all infringement proceedings brought before the ECJ were related to the environment compared to 21 percent that pertained to the single market. The usefulness of these indicators to assessing and comparing effectiveness is debatable. Over the years, the quantity and types of environmental obligations have proliferated and changed and EU citizens, NGOs, and EU bodies have increased knowledge of and procedures whereby complaints might be lodged. With stronger principles, norms, and legal embeddedness of environmental goals, the EU and its citizens have a greater commitment to and expectations with regard to environmental protection. Increasing numbers of complaints and infringements proceedings may indicate increased effectiveness and legitimacy of EU environmental governance. More environmental problems are being addressed by EU governance and EU citizens and bodies participate more actively in insuring implementation and compliance.

Our understandings of ecological rationality suggest also that more optimism is warranted with regard to the new modes of governance. Many aspects of the new modes of governance exhibit several attributes essential to effective environmental management. Ecologically rational systems lexicographically prioritize and coordinate environmental objectives across actors and decisions, act out of a holistic and interdependent worldview, and enable meaningful participation by all affected parties. Policy feedback loops are many and the organization is culturally and structurally open to learning. Rather than assuming that administrators and regulators understand the environmental problems and should be the sources of policy solutions, lower levels of governance are acknowledged as being more sensitive to negative feedback and likely having a superior understanding of context-specific policy problems. The new modes of governance incorporate input from multiple levels of governance including having private and subnational actors participate in policy deliberations, decision making, and implementation. These subnational and private actors are involved in setting environmental goals and benchmarks, identifying “best practices,” relying on policy learning rather than regulations, and sanctions to achieve behavioral change. There is an overt attempt to integrate environmental objectives within and across the various policy sectors, as exemplified by the

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EU’s recent efforts to link objectives regarding climate change with energy and economic development aid policies. The new modes of governance, including relying on market-based instruments, more closely reflect ecological rationalities than more top-down, interventionist policy approaches. A complex polity like the EU will not achieve a complete transformation to ecologically rational governance overnight. In the long term, the new modes of governance portend significant benefits for addressing the EU’s increasingly complex and intractable environmental challenges.

Conclusion The EU has evolved from undertaking intergovernmental, ad hoc, and legislative and regulatory responses to regional and global environmental problems to embedding environmental objectives into EU treaties and legislation, making them legally equal in importance to its single market objectives. Principles and discourses like the precautionary principle, sustainable development, and subsidiarity have been articulated, constitutionalized, and exported globally. The EU has increased its institutional capacity to pursue environmental objectives, requires that environmental objectives be integrated into every aspect of EU policies, and provides leadership in global environmental governance.

After the legal zenith of promulgating the 1987 SEA and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, hundreds of directives and regulations, and acknowledging the increased challenges of implementation and compliance, the EU embraced the concept of subsidiarity and via multilevel governance sought to create quasi-corporatist partnerships with relevant societal actors. In the 1990s, it then moved toward network governance, which includes bringing additional subnational government, private actors, and experts into the policy process, and employing OMC and the Cardiff process.

While the EU now has sufficient legal authorization to address environmental problems, its objectives are more daunting (sustainable development and integration of environmental objective with economic and social ones) and the environmental problems are more challenging in terms of their scale, complexity, novelty, and scientific uncertainty. (Consider climate change and biotechnologies in terms of these attributes.) By the early 2000s, “old governance” approaches to managing the environment were increasingly called into question.

The twenty-seven member states have vastly different attitudes toward environmental concerns and institutional capacities and interests in undertaking regional objectives. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the discourse, particularly within the commission, promoted reliance on market mechanisms and voluntary and negotiated targets, self-monitoring and reporting, and “naming, faming, and shaming” rather than legislation, regulations, and sanctions.

Assigning greater importance to the creation and legalization of norms and discourses associated with environmental protection, creating institutional capacity to address the environment, providing leadership in environmental leadership rather than increasingly numbers of member states’ failure to promptly transpose EU legislative into national law or number of complaints and infringement cases, this paper contends the EU has actually increased its effectiveness over time. Further, as the polity makes progress toward more fully embracing the new modes of governance, effectiveness should improve given the new modes of governances are more ecologically rational.

We have further contended that policy legitimacy is not directly causally related to policy performance as claimed by many but rather based on value and normative consensus. Many analysts insist the EU’s current reliance on a combination of the old and new modes of governance is not sufficient to achieve its environmental goals, which has negative consequences for the polity’s legitimacy. They point out that as EU policies reach deeper into national societies (beginning with the SEA and Maastricht) and more people are directly affected by its policies, public skepticism builds upon itself. Factors such the referenda associated with treaty change, food crises, heightened concerns about immigration, and the current economic downturn only exacerbate the legitimacy problem. I contend, however, that the EU’s steady progress toward

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creating and legalizing new norms and principles (the precautionary principle, sustainable development, subsidiarity) provides more persuasive evidence that environmental protection is viewed as legitimate by political leaders and the general public. Even in the midst of global economic downturn, citizens still regard EU prioritization of the environment as appropriate.

Many contend that in multicultural polities, processes of democratic participation are the primary sources of organizational and policy legitimacy. They submit that as more stakeholders are brought into the agenda setting, decision making, and implementation processes, legitimacy will be enhanced because participation will yield higher quality, context-specific policy, enhance parties’ commitment to the organization and policy, and increase the likelihood they will facilitate implementation resulting in more effective policy outcomes. All of this is persuasive. However, ecological democracy also creates and legalizes norms, principles, and discourses that are the ultimate foundations for organizational and policy legitimacy.

EU officials cannot reduce the size of the organization or change the scale and complexity of modern environmental challenges. They can, however, improve its capacity to govern on the regional, national, and subnational levels and address perceived legitimacy concerns. Most agree that internal reforms are needed in the European Commission to create sufficient internal and external management capabilities to coordinate or “steer” the networks across levels of governance and sectors. The relatively newly created networks should be formalized and strengthened among DG Environment, the European Environment Agency, the member states’ environmental and sectoral ministries, and the relevant subnational and private economic and social stakeholders. The commission’s ability to coordinate these networks must be honed to improve the gathering and exchange of information, identify and explicate the consequences of potential policy options, foster consensus and agreement, monitor environmental trends and policy outcomes, audit the networks’ and individual partners’ capabilities, and monitor implementation and compliance (Jordan and Schout 2006:20–25, 40). While the current diagnosis of the quality of governance is generally pessimistic, insufficient time has elapsed to bring about an entire change of culture and governance implied by the new modes of governance and to create the institutional capacity to manage the network governance. Embracing participatory processes that integrate environmental objectives in all sectors and involve quasi-self regulation and learning are compatible with our understanding of “ecologically rational” governance. Given the current state of the EU, the global economy, and the environmental challenges, the way forward is to more fully make the transition to the new modes of governance.

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INSIDER’S VIEW Organizational Culture, System Evolution, and the United Nations of the 21st Century

by Alisa Clarke, Global Vision Institute We live in a time of tumultuous global change, crisis, uncertainty, and potential. As the UN strives to keep pace with economic and financial stringencies, climate change, and food insecurity, with shifting fulcrums of power, the Arab spring and the Occupy movements, what will it take to meet urgent new needs? Beyond strategies, politics, and competencies, organizational culture is critical. The UN has developed a range of formal and informal arrangements to apply its principles. These reflect the history of the organization, as well as the interests and resources of the system’s actors. In the organization’s culture, formal adherence to impartiality, geographic representation, and professionalism are nuanced by practical institutional measures, management approaches, and values dilemmas that, inter alia, may foster myopia, risk-aversion, and competition. Efforts towards coherence and system functioning include interagency collaborations, “Delivering as One,” agency consolidation, and the human-rights-based approach. Progress toward a more fully valuesaligned culture, higher level system functioning, and greater responsiveness to its broadest constituencies, will signal strides toward meeting twenty-first century needs and more sustainable realization of the UN mission.

The question is not either the nation or the world.

It is, rather, how to serve the world by service to our nation, and how to serve the nation by service to the world.

(Hammarskjöld 2005:139) Introduction We live in a time of tumultuous global change, crisis, uncertainty, and potential. As the UN strives to keep pace with economic and financial stringencies, climate change, and food insecurity, with shifting fulcrums of power, the Arab spring and the Occupy movements, what will it take to meet urgent new needs? These new needs fundamentally entail a deeper and broader understanding of global interconnectedness across departments, organizations, sectors, species, and other previously defined classifications. Acting on this new understanding involves greater collaboration across old lines of separation and greater coherence in the form of more holistic systems more fully incorporating and accounting for its constituent parts, while seeking the optimal fulfillment of the purpose of the whole. These new needs demand an evolution in the way we interpret and embody the UN’s values for peace, justice, equality, human dignity, and environmental sustainability. Responding to new needs involves shifts and innovation in the culture of the system.

Beyond strategies, politics, and competencies, organizational culture is critical. As reported by a global management consulting firm, “more important than any of the individual elements [for innovation in organizations] . . . is the role played by corporate culture—the

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organization’s self-sustaining patterns of behaving, feeling, thinking and believing—in tying them all together.” (Jaruzelski, Loehr, and Holman 2011).

This paper outlines how UN member states, Secretariat staff, and other international community actors have interpreted the organization’s principles through its culture, and further explores trends in how the UN functions as a system as an expression of this culture. In identifying developments in the culture that more fully reflect the evolution in the manifestation of the UN’s universal values, and the corresponding institutional expression of a more holistic system, this paper argues that the UN can and should be better equipped to meet the needs of the twenty-first century, and serve the greater fulfillment of the universal values themselves.

The first section on organizational culture lays out the significance of international community actors for taking forward the UN’s universal values and examines the development of different aspects of this community’s culture. The second section explores the evolution of the UN as a system and how this both reflects and determines the organizational culture. It notes the historical fragmentation of the organization and traces the nascent tendencies towards greater consolidation and coherence in both function and approach. These trends include the Delivering as One pilot program, interagency efforts, and the human-rights-based approach to programing. The paper concludes that in developing and more fully applying these trends, the UN will be better equipped to support the increasing requirement for holistic functioning, participation, and interdependence. In this way, the organization can more fully adapt to serve its mission and values in the context of the needs of the twenty-first century.

Organizational Culture The UN’s main thematic areas of focus in peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, and humanitarian affairs define an array of intergovernmental negotiations, mandates, programs, and activities that have grown over time and embody the international community’s work and culture.1 This array has evolved in keeping with the values, interests, circumstances, personalities, resources, and needs of its member state delegates, Secretariat staff, related civil society actors, and ultimate beneficiaries on the ground worldwide.

This international community of actors assumes some significance in light of the farreaching mission with which it is charged for ensuring the promotion and realization of the world’s core universal values—peace, justice, equality, human dignity, and environmental sustainability. These universal values are endorsed by the body’s 193 member states and articulated in the UN charter and other documents, which further establish the mission, structure, and functioning of the organization. However, as the foremost mechanism of global governance for achieving universal values, the values, actions, interactions, and power relations among international community actors represent an important framework for the realization of these broader values globally. The UN’s culture is seen as expressing a range of characteristics that variously reflect and accommodate intergovernmental and Secretariat interests and aspirations.

Among the formal features of the organization’s culture that have grown to facilitate its functioning are the principles of impartiality and of fair geographic representation, with significant efforts undertaken in this latter regard in the General Assembly and in the Secretariat, employing strict quota arrangements. Notably, this does not apply to the Security Council. The UN also promotes the official organizational values of integrity, professionalism, and respect for diversity among its staff. Other important efforts include a growing internal justice mechanism, a system-wide integrity survey undertaken in 2004, a Secretariat Ethics Office established in 2006 (largely relating to financial disclosure and whistleblower measures), various ethics offices and officers in other UN organizations, and ongoing ethics training. Throughout its history, the UN has faced only a few major public ethics crises: The scandals of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers and the Oil for Food Program in Iraq among them.

1. Focus in this paper is essentially on the core UN agencies exclusive of the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, though they also officially comprise the UN system.

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Other informal features permeate the UN culture, however. Within the Secretariat, the system functions through a military-style bureaucracy and hierarchy that fosters risk-aversion and suppresses initiative (Darrow and Arbour 2009:452). While there is some variation between field and headquarters as well as among individual leaders and personalities, this approach frames much of the interaction, reporting lines, and ethos of the organization. With this institutional approach, the need for approval at higher levels and from various offices serves as a disincentive for creativity and means that responsiveness to dynamic situations is somewhat circumscribed. A more open structure and culture would accommodate greater adaptability, so that those at different levels in the hierarchy can explore new ideas and take initiative in response to changing circumstances, notably on the ground. Operationally in the field, the perceived need to maintain good relations with governments may also contribute to significant caution, and the employment of large proportions of local staff may additionally make for undermining independence (Uvin 2004:153).

At the managerial level, the UN administration is often characterized by a short-term focus, influenced by factors such as the limited tenure and national interests of governments, specified financial timeframes for donors, and the usually biennial programming and budgeting cycle. The results-based management (RBM) approach, while useful as a response to requests from member states for more tangible rather than process-oriented outcomes, also translates into significant inflexibility in programming. RBM, increasingly applied by the UN since 1998, usually corresponds to a two-year time period for achievement of specific objectives through pre-identified results, inputs, activities, and outputs. As such, while lessons learned can be factored into subsequent programming cycles, current cycles do not usually allow for changes in any of the predefined elements and limits flexibility in often unpredictable conditions. More flexible use of the current results based budgeting and biennium budgets and corresponding programming would allow for deeper understanding of structural problems and longer timeframes for sustainably addressing them and would mean some accommodation of changing objectives, results, outputs, and activities. At least one organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has amended its cycle to reflect its concern for deeper and longer-term processes and since 2010 applies a four-year cycle.

With the proliferation of different organizations and governance bodies, the tendency in UN culture has also been toward a “silo” mentality and rivalry among agencies (Weiss 2009:73). Organizations and their respective staff protect their “turf” with regard to the allocation of responsibilities, funds, and personnel. The implications include less than optimal application of increasingly scarce resources, as well as the absence of the holistic understanding and streamlined interactions among different elements that facilitate systemic effectiveness.

Several developments can help counter this last general trend of “silo” thinking. First, there are a growing number of interagency efforts: At headquarters level, the UNDG human rights mainstreaming mechanism coordinates roughly a dozen human rights-related or other relevant interagency mechanisms in the UN System, covering such agendas as rule of law and gender mainstreaming, mostly with a headquarters or policy focus.2 Others address a range of UN issues. Additionally, at the field level, the pilot program to Deliver as One in eight countries—Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Vietnam—is an attempt to have the various UN country presences operate with one leader, one program, one budget, and one office. This follows the 2006 recommendation of the HighLevel Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment. These initiatives foster a movement away from the traditional 2. The panel was itself a response to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (General Assembly resolution A/60/1 2005) for implementation of reforms of operational activities aimed at enhanced UN effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and coordination. The 2012 evaluation report of Delivering as One provides further insights into the challenges of managing multiple partners and maintaining strategic focus. See “Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One: Summary Report” at http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/pdf/summaryreportweb.pdf.

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institution-specific, myopic thinking that often characterizes UN approaches and activities, and toward greater systems-oriented functioning. It also brings to bear more comprehensive and multi-disciplinary expertise, increasingly relevant to complex and crosscutting situations.

Other protective impulses have been displayed by the UN as a whole. Until the end of 2010, it was stipulated in human resources policy that specific explanations were justified for the hiring of external candidates for UN posts in the core Secretariat. While this has since been eliminated, the same general policy continues to apply in other UN entities.

Evolution of the UN as a System What is the relationship between this culture and the development of the UN as a system?

In systems thinking, evolution may be viewed as the movement from the small, simple, and mechanical toward that which is more expansive, more inclusive, more complex, more internally cohesive, and more energetically dynamic and responsive.3 Therefore, the degree to which inclusiveness, coherence, dynamism, and adaptability can be shown to be present in the UN culture, and to be informing the development of the UN system is the degree to which the culture can be asserted to be fostering system evolution, or, conversely, serving as an obstacle to such advancement.

I have pointed out some pervasive features of the UN culture in terms of caution, myopia, and “silo” mentality, and I have seen that trends in interagency efforts and Delivering as One may be showing the way forward for enhanced coherence and inclusiveness that counter “silo” thinking, while extension of the RBM programming timeframe by at least one organization may make for greater adaptability. An examination of the system below provides some insight into whether the same internal cultural forces, both progressive and otherwise, are expressed in the external institutional functioning of the international community.

The UN system comprises an intricate collection of agencies, funds, and programs, whose work and working methods are largely defined by member government delegates, who establish mandates to address specific issues or accomplish specific objectives. These mandates are then primarily implemented by the UN Secretariat.

The historical growth of the UN’s many agencies has given rise to a decentralized network of different entities with different governing bodies, different structures, different methods of work, and different priorities. This may be viewed as the institutional corollary of the silo mentality among staff mentioned in the previous section. Such a state of affairs would seem to serve the interests of at least some governments, an observation that can be made by perusing the different positions taken by the same government on the same issue in different forums. It does not, however, necessarily serve the interests of the organization’s mission objectives or the integrity of its functioning. On the contrary, the UN’s functioning as a cohesive, efficient system has been significantly compromised.

A particular feature of the UN system is the duplication of functions among agencies, as, for example, in the case of the multiple entities responsible for various aspects of development.

Conversely, an encouraging effort toward overcoming this is the consolidation of agencies working on gender equality and the empowerment of women: Established in 2010 as UNWOMEN, this new organization brings together the former Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW); the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW); the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues Advancement of Women (OSAGI), and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).

Such a development augurs well for the UN’s functioning as a system and for a more coherent UN identity among staff. It may also be viewed as especially welcome at a time when the UN must operate more cost-effectively—the 2012–2013 budgets represents a 5 percent reduction from the previous period.

3. See Senge, Peter (1990): The Fifth Discipline—The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization. New York, Doubleday, and Bánáthy, Bela (2000): Guided Evolution of Society: A Systems View (Contemporary Systems Thinking), New York, Springer.

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Similarly, the plethora of UN mandates, the intergovernmental resolutions that authorize UN action and programing estimated as numbering close to ten thousand, and their performance would require a thorough review, an effort likely to release resources consumed by outdated mandates and further reduce possible duplication.

Another notable trend is the growing role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors in the work of the UN. While consultations with NGOs are grounded in Article 71 of the UN charter and NGOs have always been active in the work of the organization, further efforts, notably with 2005 UN reform endeavors, have facilitated a broadening of the opportunities for civil society actors. NGOs are thus involved in information dissemination, awareness raising and advocacy, joint implementation of programs, and provision of technical expertise both at the international and national levels. They may also participate in conferences, and enter into consultative status with specific UN departments. As has been extensively examined elsewhere,4 issues persist regarding civil society accountability and legitimacy, and the degree of their substantive participation in global political processes. Nonetheless, the inclusion of NGOs in its functioning contributes to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN as a system.

The advent and growing application of the human-rights-based approach (HRBA) in UN development activities has significantly strengthened the participation of civil society. The HRBA rests on the principles of participation, accountability, and nondiscrimination. It employs examination of immediate, underlying, and structural causes of development problems, and how these relate to the respect, fulfillment, and protection of human rights; it identifies the most affected portions of the population and ensures the participation of all stakeholders in identifying core problems and framing solutions, including civil society groups and individuals as well as representatives of government; it undertakes strategic programing designed to address capacity gaps in claiming rights, fulfilling rights, and design-related activity.

As explored more fully elsewhere,5 the HRBA can represent a model for the UN system’s evolution as a more cohesive and better integrated machinery. This is because it has been proven to add value with sustained development results; governments consider it as a legitimate part of development assistance frameworks. Moreover, the interagency institutional arrangements employed for its development and implementations can help transcend the myopic “silo” functionality and move toward more holistic and interdisciplinary working methods.

The HRBA has also been shown to engender greater flexibility, openness, responsiveness, and adaptability of practitioners and the organizations they represent.

In promoting organizational change in these ways among its practitioners and processes, the HRBA has the potential to move the UN forward in terms of internal cohesiveness as a system and toward greater service to its ultimate beneficiaries, with more fully owned national human rights protection systems and development achievements. However, the approach can benefit from the development of indicators and a more compelling vision and from more advanced knowledge management techniques to capture lessons learned and best practices, thereby laying the basis for systems thinking in action.6 Among other things, it would also require further endorsement by the UN governing bodies and more consistent integration with the World Bank, to be more fully entrenched. Nevertheless, it holds the potential for enhanced UN adaptability to larger global shifts and opportunities.

For such progress to be fully rooted, it has also been noted that practitioners must also be conscious of more meaningfully embodying the principles they advocate. Internalization 4. McKeon, Nora (2009) The United Nations and Civil Society. Legitimating Global Governance—Whose Voice?

5. Clarke, Alisa. “The Potential of the Human Rights Based Approach for the Evolution of the United Nations as a System” Human Rights Review, Volume 12, No. 4, December 2011.

6. Peter Senge notes “Systems thinking also needs the disciplines of building shared vision, mental models, team learning, and personal mastery to realize its potential. Building shared vision fosters a commitment to the long term. Mental models focus on the openness needed to unearth shortcomings in our present ways of seeing the world. Team learning develops the skills of groups of people to look for the larger picture beyond individual perspectives. And personal mastery fosters the personal motivation to continually learn how our actions affect our world” (Senge 1990:12).

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of values also plays a role in ensuring system progression on various levels. As the Danish Institute for Human Rights affirms, “rights based organizations and their staff should move forward by setting an example and should focus on ensuring that the values of dignity, accountability, nondiscrimination, and participation are embedded in project implementation procedures as well as every day behavior and attitudes” (Boesen and Martin 2007:29).

Conclusion The UN has developed a range of formal and informal arrangements and procedures to apply its principles of peace, justice, equality, human dignity, and environmental stability.

These reflect to no small degree the historical development of the organization, as well as the respective interests, circumstances, and resources of the system’s actors In the organization’s internal culture, formal adherence to impartiality, fair geographic representation, professionalism, and integrity are nuanced by real-life institutional arrangements, management approaches, and values dilemmas. Among these, bureaucracy, hierarchy, silo-mentality, short-term focus, and risk aversion are seen to promote internal competition and erode initiative, adaptability, sustainability, and effectiveness of UN efforts. Some supportive trends toward greater coherence include increasing interagency collaborations and the Delivering as One initiative.

Some of the same forces of internal culture are expressed in the functioning of the larger UN system as a whole, and may be viewed as both reflecting and reinforcing the internal culture. As with “silo mentality” and hierarchy, critical current factors in this regard are the significant decentralization of organizations with different governance bodies and priorities, as well as traditionally top-down approaches to determining needs and impacts for beneficiary populations. In terms of advancements, the consolidation of agencies working on women’s equality and empowerment, the growth of opportunities for civil society, and expanding application of the human-rights-based approach are promising developments for ensuring greater institutional cohesiveness as well as sensitivity and responsiveness to its broadest constituencies.

We can broadly conclude that the internal culture of the UN is largely mirrored by the institutional functioning of the system, with a fundamental proclivity towards hierarchy, fragmentation, short-term timeframes, limited collaboration across different entities, and fixed agendas. At the same time, we can point to some trends that seem to foster system evolution through greater coherence (demonstrated internally by inter-agency initiatives and Delivering as One, and externally by UNWOMEN), greater expansiveness and inclusiveness (both internally and externally with more NGO consultation, and externally through broad stakeholder consultations with the HRBA), and greater adaptability (shown internally with extended RBM timeframes and externally through increasing incorporation of the HRBA in programming).

What does this mean for supporting UN system evolution? Whatever other forces there may be at play, its culture is something over which the UN actors themselves have significant control. Charged as they are with a primary role in taking forward the UN mission, and now further armed with the knowledge that their culture can have such far-reaching and profound implications for the way the system as a whole functions, it is incumbent upon all UN actors and especially its leaders, to consciously develop the ways of feeling, thinking, believing, behaving, and interacting that will cultivate higher fulfillment of its organizational mission.

It means that management should introduce greater incentives among staff for taking initiative and embracing the lessons of failure. It means building on the experience of longer RBM timeframes and the HRBA for programming. It means further collaboration across teams, divisions, and agencies, with a view to greater consolidation. It means flattening hierarchy internally and externally, consulting with a wider range of stakeholders, more often, and listening more fully. And it means “walking the talk” in ever more practical ways, with the values of accountability, nondiscrimination, and participation embedded in processes, in every day

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behavior and attitudes, as well as in recruitment and performance assessments. It means taking responsibility for UN culture shift and evolution.

Global political developments, evolving methodologies, and nascent consolidations are reshaping the contours and adaptability of the UN system, and calling into question much of the UN’s traditional institutional design and its corresponding culture. In the same way that the UN member states, Secretariat, beneficiaries, and partners have historically navigated their interests around the formal structure and organizational functioning, new forces and interests seek to assert their influence and will continue to determine the course and content of their representation as “we the peoples.”

For this quintessential world organization of universal values and ideals, progress toward a more fully values-aligned culture, higher level system functioning, and execution based on merit and openness, will be steps forward toward more meaningful and durable realization of the UN mission. Consciously supporting these culture shifts, both internally within organizations, and correspondingly through the larger external system, will be pivotal for the viability, relevance, and sustainability of the UN. In serving the evolving manifestation of the UN’s values, through more holistic system functioning and expanded collaboration, the UN is better positioned to respond effectively to the urgent needs of the twenty-first century.

REFERENCES

Action 2 Global Programme (2008) Third Interagency Meeting On Implementing A Human RightsBased Approach, 1–3 October, Tarrytown, New York, Comparative Review Of Human RightsRelated And Other Relevant Interagency Coordination Mechanisms In The UN System.

Bánáthy, Bela (2000) Guided Evolution of Society: A Systems View (Contemporary Systems Thinking), New York: Springer.

Boesen, Jakob Kirkemann and Tomas Martin, (2007) Applying A Rights Based Approach: An Inspirational Guide for Civil Society, Copenhagen: The Danish Institute for Human Rights.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1999) Unvanquished: A U.S.–U.N. Saga. New York: Random House Darrow, Mac and Louise Arbour (2009) “The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the United Nations,” American Journal of International Law 103(3):446–501.

Jaruzelski Barry, John Loehr, and Richard Holman (2011) The Global Innovation 1000: Why Culture is Key, http://www.strategy-business.com/article/11404?gko=dfbfc, accessed 17 January 2013 McKeon, Nora (2009) The United Nations and Civil Society. Legitimating Global Governance-Whose Voice?, London: Zed Books.

Senge, Peter (1990) The Fifth Discipline—The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization, New York: Doubleday.

United Nations General Assembly (October 2005) World Summit Outcome Document. United Nations, New York, U.N. doc. A/RES/60/1 24.

United Nations (2012) Independent Evaluation of Delivering as One: Summary Report at http://www. un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/pdf/summaryreportweb.pdf, accessed 17 January 2013.

Uvin, Peter (2004) Human Rights and Development, Bloomfield, CT.: Kumarian Press.

Weiss, Thomas (2009) What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, Cambridge: Polity Press.

REVIEWS The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development— Unimportant or Under-Researched?

by Joren Verschaeve, Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University Carroll, Peter and Aynsley Kellow, (2011) The OECD: A Study of Organisational Adaptation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 320 pages, ISBN 978 1 84542 954 6, £89.95 (hardback).

In 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) turned fifty.

Ever since its establishment, the organization has offered its members a forum to reflect on policy issues in a wide range of areas such as trade, environment, taxation, or development cooperation. During these discussions OECD members share among each other information on specific issues and a number of good policy practices are indicated. Given this strong emphasis on policy path finding, the OECD is often referred to as a think tank. However, the OECD is far more effective than most (real) think tanks since its policy recommendations are likely to be followed because the organization represents all major (Western) industrialized countries.

As a result, it can be concluded that the OECD is an important international organization (IO).

Nonetheless, “the OECD is a much cited but little studied institution and its role in international governance is poorly understood” (Mahon and McBride 2008). Especially compared to other IOs, the OECD attracted only little scholarly attention. As a result, this volume of Peter Carroll and Aynsley Kellow (2011) on “The OECD: A Study of Organisational Adaptation” is a more than welcome contribution to the academic literature.

The volume itself has its origins in a shared frustration by the authors on the absence of literature on the OECD. As a result, both professors came up with the idea to jointly publish a book on the history and functioning of the OECD. In recent years, however, two other volumes appeared on the organization. Driven by the same gap in academic literature, Mahon and McBride (2008) published an edited book covering a wide range of (specific) OECD activities, and Woodward (2009) offered a brief historical, institutional, and theoretical overview on the organization. Nonetheless, compared to both volumes, the work of Carroll and Kellow has a clear added value since it is the first examining the OECD in considerable depth. In doing so, both authors drew extensively upon interviews with key informants (e.g., present and past secretaries-general) and OECD archival documents. Since most of the organization’s working documents are only recently declassified, one can conclude that Carroll and Kellow are likely the first authors offering a complete (and in-depth) perspective on the OECD. The book itself is divided into fourteen chapters dealing with all important aspects of the OECD’s work. The first sections take a closer look at the institutional set-up and functioning, while other chapters elaborate on important topics such as the accession process or the relations between the OECD and other international actors. To fully understand the current (and future) nature of the OECD, Carroll and Kellow also included five chapters on the institution’s history. Starting with the establishment of the OECD in 1961, each chapter provides the reader a lengthy overview of all important events that occurred during the subsequent decades.

With regard to the content, especially the first chapters on the OECD’s institutional setup and

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decision making stand out. In an easily accessible language both authors elaborate on the nature and role of (and the relationship between) all important intra-organizational players.

Therefore, this book succeeds like no other before in offering a sharp and thorough insight on the OECD’s functioning.

The authors also address the international role of the OECD. Throughout the book (and especially in chapter eleven on the relationship with IOs) it becomes clear that the organization plays an important role in global governance. The reason is twofold: First, the OECD is a far more flexible organization than most of its counterparts. As new committees can be established without much effort, the OECD has always been one of the first to work on new (neglected) international problems, e.g., environment in the 1970s. As a result the organization is able to fill in emerging gaps in the international system. Second, the OECD is very successful in distributing and promoting (soft law) principles agreed upon in the organization. In doing so, the OECD largely relies on its network of IOs as the latter are willing to pick up these new concepts, norms, and good policy practices. This is possible because other IOs do not look upon the OECD as a competitor but as an important source of both information and policy recommendations (see also Marcussen 2004). As a result, the OECD upholds strong relations with most important IOs, e.g., the World Bank or the EU. In recent years, however, the OECD’s international role is challenged by the lack of involvement of the emerging powers. Especially China, India, and Brazil (still) have little interest in both adopting OECD norms and becoming a full member of the organization. Therefore, chapters eight and fourteen put great emphasis on the organization’s enhanced engagement strategy with regard to these countries. On the one hand, Carroll and Kellow argue that one of the major strengths of the OECD is the like-mindedness of its members since this facilitates the confident setting in which all committees operate. On the other hand, the authors also point at the adaptation strength of both the organization and its members. Especially the recent accession of atypical countries like Mexico or Chile proves the OECD can deal without many problems with new emerging powers. As a result, both authors share an optimistic view on a possible (stronger) involvement of China and India (and others) in the organization’s work.

As with all books, this volume also has some minor weaknesses. First, compared to most literature on IOs and/or the OECD (e.g., Woodward 2009), both authors fail in providing a theoretical framework. Although Carroll and Kellow give evidence of a number of strong theoretical insights throughout the different chapters, they fail in linking them consequently with the empirical findings. A second and final remark corresponds to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Unlike most OECD committees, the DAC plays a leading international role (on development cooperation). Moreover, the committee holds a quasi-autonomous position within the OECD framework. As a result the DAC is best seen as an IO in the OECD. Therefore it would have been better to dedicate an entire chapter to this unique committee, especially since most literature makes a clear distinction between both institutions (e.g., Mahon and McBride 2008).

Nonetheless, adding all the previous together, Carroll and Kellow published a state of the art reading on the OECD. Given both the prominent and underestimated role of the OECD and the lack of in-depth studies on this organization, this volume is a must-read for all scholars and students interested in international relations. Given the OECD’s wide range of activities, this book will also strongly appeal to academics and public servants active in policy fields such as international business or public administration. Moreover, one could strongly hope that this volume will be followed by other publications on the organization.

REFERENCES

Mahon, Rianne and Stephen McBride (2008) The OECD and Transnational Governance, Vancouver: UBC Press.

Marcussen, Martin (2004) “OECD governance through soft law,” in Ulrika Mörth, ed., Soft Law in Governance and Regulation. An Interdisciplinary Analysis, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

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Woodward, Richard (2009) The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), London: Routledge.

African Integration: Many Challenges, Few Solutions

by Shawn Robert Duthie, University of Cape Town Aleme, Yared Tesfaye (2011) Regional Integration Schemes in Africa: Limits and Benefits of Taking on EU’s model to the AU, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, ISBN 9783846554968.

Arowosegbe, Jeremiah (2011) The State and the Challenges of Nationhood in Africa: Ake’s Theory of Political Integration, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, ISBN 9783844300635.

Gabriel, Akwen (2011) The African Union and the Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa: What Hope for Africa’s Development, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, ISBN 978-3844315028.

Despite the political rhetoric, academic justification, and personal hopes of many, regional integration in Africa has not progressed as envisioned. Indeed, many see studies of this subject and its resulting organizations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU), as old news and no longer in need of attention or scholarly research. However, this is shortsighted, as what is needed is in fact more research and debate over the progress of integration and its apparent failure.

Yared Tesfaye Aleme, Jeremiah Arowosegbe, and Akwen Gabriel have continued the debate into integration on the continent. There are two main questions that each of these books attempt to answer: First, has integration in Africa been successful and, second, what may be the best approaches for integration to take place? The three authors all agree the answer to the first question, especially during the years of the OAU, is negative and concentrate more on solutions to this problem.

Akwen Gabriel’s the African Union and the Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa, analyzes integration as a solution to the continent’s problem of development. Gabriel sees many factors as the cause of Africa’s lack of development but focuses most on the effects of colonization and globalization in shaping Africa’s current position in the world economy as “a supplier of cheap labor and raw materials” (Gabriel 2011:16). Thus, he studies how integration can be sustainable given Africa’s narrow economic base and what could form the basis for integration (Gabriel 2011:17).

Yared Aleme also looks at whether the current conditions in Africa will allow them to follow a path toward integration in Regional Integration in Africa by looking at the institutions of the European Union (EU) as the inspiration for the AU and African integration. As Aleme notes, there are major differences between the two unions, notably the length and functionalist character the EU took as it built toward an economic union in comparison to the AU and the former OAU, which had grand plans but less than stellar results. His goal is to look at the benefits and limits of the EU model for the AU and for African integration as a whole.

Jeremiah Arowosegbe takes one of the more interesting approaches to integration, drawing upon Claude Ake’s theory of integration. While not explicitly writing about supranational integration, the steps for integration inside the African state and the reasons for its failure can be extended upward to the international system. Many of the reasons for the lack of political integration inside the state, such as the problem of inducing commitment to a political culture, the increasing of value consensus, and cleavages in the elite and nationalist movement

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(Arowosegbe 2011a:6–9) can also be seen as reasons for the lack of effective integration at the international level.

However, the problem with many of the articles and books written on this subject is that the question in regard to approaches to integration in Africa is rarely answered very well or in very much depth. Similarly, the studies conducted by these authors through primary and secondary research offer many recommendations for how African states can integrate but are broad and unspecific. Unfortunately, despite a good overview of integration efforts, these books do not offer any new ideas in the quest for economic and political integration in Africa.

Before looking at the author’s ideas for solving the stagnant integration in Africa, it is worthwhile to examine their reasons for it. While many reasons are given for the lack of integration in Africa by all the authors, none go into great detail to explain exactly why integration in Africa has not occurred as planned. Gabriel blames the lack of integration on the diversity of economies between African countries as well as the fact that African leaders refuse to cede sovereignty to a supranational institution (Gabriel 2011:41), in addition to ideological differences, the economic conditions of African states, and the abundance of nonfunctional regional bodies1 (Gabriel 2011:45–48).

Aleme provides a historical overview of Pan-Africanism, which led to attempts of African unity that were plagued from the beginning by the division between the so-called “Casablanca Group,” which, led by Kwame Nkrumah, called for a federation of African states, and the “Brazzaville/Monrovia Group,” which favored a slow progression toward an economic union.

Ultimately, a compromise was made to establish the Organization of African Unity, which was founded as an intergovernmental organization with no real powers over states. Its main objective was to end colonialism in Africa, especially apartheid in South Africa. Its record on this is debatable, as while these objectives were met, the OAU did not have much to do with the transition. Thus, integration in Africa was flawed from the beginning and despite a change to the AU, many are still skeptical. Adopting similar institutions to the EU will not help either, argues Aleme, since all African states, with the exception of Morocco,2 are already members; there is no shared value of democracy on the continent; and the AU has followed an overly ambitious timeline (Aleme 2011:59–65).

These authors are not alone in their criticisms, as many other articles and publications tend to provide a lot of detail about the OAU and AU by providing long lists of attempted treaties, declarations, charters, and programs that were founded under the auspices of the OAU but which accomplished very little.3 In addition, like the authors covered here, they list many reasons for these failures, including a lack of full commitment by leaders, the need for civil society to be included in the integration process, and the lack of information available to citizens about the benefits of integration (Adeyemi 2007:216).

While there is no disputing that these authors are correct that the reasons given for the lack of proper integration are major problems on the continent, these reasons are overly broad.

Ultimately, even if it was possible to create incentives to join the AU or to better include civil society, this would not actually improve the chances for successful integration on the continent. In fact, many of the problems stated as inhibiting integration, such as the unequal economic conditions in the international arena, may only be solved through further integration.

Arowosegbe goes deeper into the main problem of integration in Africa, be it at the state or international level. By using Ake’s theory, he concludes that the “primary prerequisite for a high degree of integration is the acquisition of a mature political culture” and that the major problem in attaining this is the limited autonomy of the state that spilled over from 1. Such as the Regional Economic Communities like the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern Africa Development Community, or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. In many cases, the membership of states overlap, thus decreasing the effectiveness and necessity of some of these organizations.

2. Morocco withdrew from the OAU when the contested Western Sahara was allowed to become a member.

3. For an abridged list, please see (Adeyemi 2007:215–16).

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colonization into the postcolonial state (Arowosegbe 2011a:14). In sum, this means that “in spite of independence, the absoluteness . . . and statism of the colonial state crept in intact into its postcolonial heir and defines its character as an autocratic and exclusive state,” which increases the stakes for the struggle for power (Arowosegbe 2011b:10). This, argues Arowosegbe, often leads to conflict, as the state is captured by hegemonic elites and politics is based off efficiency norms rather than legitimacy norms—he who can impose his will, alienate opposition, and centralize power most effectively will stay in power the longest (Arowosegbe 2011b:11). Thus, further regional integration will require a loss of sovereignty and power from these elites to a supranational authority, which is dubious considering they are loathe to give up any power inside their own state, let alone outside of it. In a similar fashion, EU leaders will only cede sovereignty to a supranational union if it will lead to increased national prosperity, which will make re-election for the ruling party more likely (Mattli 2000:150).

However, unlike their EU counterparts, the majority of African states have a low level of democracy, so national prosperity is not as important as political power and capital to continue the clientele and patronage system that keeps the leader in power. In sum, leaders in Africa refuse to surrender any sovereignty as it would mean a loss of political capital, which could develop into a loss of political power. As Adogambe states in Aleme:

Most African ruling elites tend to perceive state sovereignty as the sources of power, privilege, and wealth within their individual state, which enables them to maintain their patronage and clientele network systems. For that reason, many are doubtful that the African ruling elites will voluntarily commit political class “suicide” by surrendering their quasi-sovereign states for a continental union governmental project (Aleme 2011:62).

While the authors did note that a lack of political will was an impediment to proper integration, more research and focus needs to be placed on this subject to find a solution to this and other obstacles to African integration.

With the broad set of reasons for the lack of integration comes a very broad set of ideas to solve the impasse of integration on the continent. Aleme, who compared the similarities of the AU and the EU, concludes that the AU “will have to chart its own course, travel at its own pace, find its own rhythm” (Aleme 2011:74) but does not give any feasible solutions on how best to start down this path. Gabriel gives many recommendations, such as: formulating development policies aimed at agriculture, industry, and public services, improving infrastructure, reformulating integration efforts to prevent copying from European models and ensuring there are no losers in the integration process, and finding strong political will for the project.

Other authors, such as Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, agree with many of these, though they feel that it is best to follow the EU model, unlike the aforementioned authors. Also recommended are programs at the regional level, such as within the Southern African Development Community or the Economic Community of West African States, which will create “an atmosphere of trust and confidence among nations and their populations” (Adeyemi 2007:218). However, there is no practical plan for any of these admittedly good ideas. Arowosegbe, writing about Ake’s ideas of integration, contends that democracy is one way of reinventing the state (2011a:63) and the continent toward integration. That said, there are no solid ideas on how to achieve this democratization, though he stresses the need for developing ideas and solutions in Africa and not in the West, which seems similar to Aleme’s argument that something “African” must be done, though nobody can say for sure what that actually will be.

There is, of course, no one-size-fits-all solution to development and integration problems in Africa, and, hence, an author can be excused for not detailing the policies or programs that may need to be put in place. However, as said before, further research has to be done on the issues of integration to streamline the ideas and perhaps develop a theory of African integration, which takes into account the variety of reasons given for the slow, if not stagnant, pace of integration on the continent.

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While these papers are far from being definitive works in this field,4 they are a start in the right direction and are recommended for those with an interest in this subject. One of the problems with the books may have been that all of the works covered are masters or PhD theses published by Lambert Academic Publishing, which offers free of charge publications of theses and major papers. While this can be seen as a useful service for aspiring academics, they follow a structure that while appropriate for a thesis, means the publication is accessible mainly for academics, which may exclude an audience of lawmakers and civil society that the authors wished to reach with their work. However, each publication does advance interesting points about integration in Africa and is a good place for undergraduate students to begin their research. Post-graduate students who may need a refresher in the basics of the AU and integration will also find these publications useful. While these books fail to provide substantive ideas for promoting African integration, the fact that there are more publications on this issue is a helpful one. More research on this topic will only fuel more debate, which is needed to work toward a solution to improving integration in Africa and finding a solution that is “African.”

REFERENCES

Aleme, Yared Tesfaye (2011) Regional Integration Schemes in Africa: Limits and Benefits of Taking on EU’s model to the AU, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Arowosegbe, Jeremiah (2011a) The State and the Challenges of Nationhood in Africa: Ake’s Theory of Political Integration, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Arowosegbe, Jeremiah (2011b) Reflections on the Challenge of Reconstructing Post-Conflict States in West Africa: Insights from Claude Ake’s Political Writings, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet.

Gabriel, Akwen (2011) The African Union and the Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa: What Hope for Africa’s Development, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Mattli, Walter (2000) “Sovereignty Bargains in Regional Integration,” International Studies Review 2(2): 149–80.

Olu-Adeyemi, Lanre and Bonnie Ayodele (2007) “The Challenges of Regional Integration for Development in Africa: Problems and Prospects,” Journal of Social Sciences 15(3):213–18.

4. For definitive works, look at publications by Arthur Hazlewood, Joseph Nye, John Akokpari, and Timothy Murithi.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and International Relations of the Gulf

by Lars Erslev Andersen, Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies.

Legranzi, Matteo (2011) The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf:Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1845119218, £57.50 (hardback).

The rulers of the Arab Peninsula states did not welcome the political developments in north Africa and Egypt during the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011. Reluctantly, they followed the demonstrations in Tunisia that led to President Ben Ali’s fall and escape to Saudi Arabia, but as everyone else, they believed it to be a unique event that would be contained to Tunisia.

It was not, and a month later Egypt’s President Mubarak was overthrown and a wave of demonstrations demanding democracy, political reforms, and new leaders washed over the Arab Middle East including Yemen and Bahrain.

To the annoyance of Saudi Arabia’s king, the fall of Mubarak was endorsed by U.S. President Barack Obama, and immediately the king, together with the rulers in the other Arab Gulf states, took the initiative to build up a bulwark against the “Arab Spring.” On the one hand, they poured a lot of money into the society, and on the other hand, they banned demonstrations.

In other words, they tried to pay people to stay out of the streets. At the same time, they became very active in international affairs. First, they convinced the Arab League to support a resolution in the UN Security Council that gave the green light for the military intervention in Libya. Second, they engaged in trying to calm down the crisis in Yemen by getting President Ali Abdullah Salah out of office. And third, they became active in supporting the opposition in Syria. The signal was clear: The West needs the sheikhs and kings on the peninsula to manage the turmoil evolving in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. And the message was: The prize for help from the rulers in the Arab Peninsula would be ignorance from the West on how the kings and the sheikhs handled their own backyard like the brutal crackdown on the demonstrations in Bahrain—i.e., “we help you in the West, and you close your eyes on how we handle our own problems.” Since the summer war in July 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel, the Arab Gulf states, together with Jordan, have framed threats and conflicts in the Middle East in a narrative that points to a confrontation between Shia and Sunni Islam and argued for the necessity to keep Iran out of the region and the Islamists down. This narrative has echoed well in the West.

The six Arab Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman) both on their own and in concert with their regional organization Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have increasingly profiled themselves as important players in handling the evolving conflicts in the Middle East. Especially after the Arab Spring, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been active in the international relations of the Middle East, and often they have followed this policy, using GCC as a tool that gave them both a kind of cover and regional strength. GCC was established in 1981 in the context of the Iran–Iraq war, but until a few years ago, it was seen as a paper tiger without real significance in international affairs. However, in the last years it has become more visible and active and has functioned as an umbrella for Qatar’s effort to break a solution in the brutal conflict in the northern part of Yemen. During the Arab uprisings, the GCC in particular turned up on the international diplomatic scene as an active player.

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Thus, the study on the GCC by the Italian Middle East scholar Matteo Legrenzi is a timely publication since knowledge of the GCC outside the region is very limited both among politicians and diplomats and among Middle East scholars. Of course there have been books and articles that address the history and development of the council, but a comprehensive and thematically structured study of the organization is rare in Middle East research. The author is a professor in international relations at the University of Venice. He is well known for his diligent studies of Gulf affairs and has published and edited books and articles on security policy in the Persian Gulf. For these reasons, his book on the GCC is enriching. It is a wellwritten and wisely structured book, which gives the reader a comprehensive overview of the history, structure, and activities of the GCC, as well as an in-depth analysis of the problems this organization is facing in order to reach the ambitious goals the rulers of the Arab Gulf states rhetorically put forward at the establishment of the GCC. The vision was to create an Arab Gulf union inspired by the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union (EU), but as Legranzi convincingly demonstrates, this never happened, and it will probably never happen. So what kind of organization is the GCC? The book starts with an analysis of the context of the creation of GCC where Legranzi is very critical of the general assumption that its establishment is comparable to the creation of the federation of the seven emirates in UAE. He underlines that the emirates’ formation came about through heavy involvement from external and formal forces, the UK, Iran, and others, while the formation of the GCC was exclusively a result of negotiations among the Arab Gulf states. The idea was first drafted in 1978, but one obstacle at the time was the role of Iraq.

The Arab Gulf states were partly worried about the dominance of Iraq as well as reluctant to challenge Iran by allying themselves with Iran’s rival. After the war between Iraq and Iran broke out in 1980, there were good reasons for not inviting Iraq into the club. At the same time, the Arab Gulf states needed a bulwark against Iran and against the threat of exporting the Islamic Revolution to the peninsula that Iran posed after the revolution in 1979. Legranzi points out the interesting fact that while the dynamics behind the creation of the GCC were defense and security matters, these are almost absent in the institutional structure of the organization, which today is more focused on economic and cultural cooperation.

After the historical account and analysis of the formal structure of the GCC, Legranzi proceeds to analyze the organization thematically: the economy, defense, diplomacy, and problems with Iran’s nuclear program, ending with an analysis of the GCC’s relations with NATO. He also discusses the GCC in light of international relations theory, drawing on the debates of the Persian Gulf as a regional security complex. He closes by arguing for the need of a theoretical bricolage, combining the more constructivist aspects of regional security theory with classical realism and balance of power theory. This theoretical discussion is central in most scholarly studies of the Persian Gulf, and Legranzi seems to place himself in an Aristotelic middle way between classical realism and constructivists’ love for politics of identity.

The overall conclusion of the book is that the GCC never developed an institutional framework that brings it even close to being a strong regional player, not to mention a union.

Especially in defense matters, GCC member states have been extremely reluctant to develop institutional units. In that respect, the GCC mirrors the states themselves. Even if they are using considerable amounts on defense and weapon systems, they are afraid that strong armies would pose a regime threat. Therefore, they want neither strong armed forces nor something like a strong GCC army. Only in internal security matters, to counter different kinds of opposition, have they succeeded in cooperating. The decision-making process in the Arab Gulf states is limited to the ruler and his closest family, and this setup is mirrored in the GCC, which is, as the first general secretary of GCC labeled it, a club for gentlemen (the rulers) following “rules of Shaikhly exchange” as formulated by the gulf scholar Tim Niblock.

Matteo Legranzi has written a very timely book that explores an organization which increasingly seems to play a significant role in international relations of the Persian Gulf. It

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fills a gap in the research of the Middle East and is very useful both for scholars and students of the Middle East.

Institutionalized Pan-Americanism: The Organization of American States

by Klaas Dykmann, University of Roskilde Herz, Mônica (2011) The Organization of American States (OAS): Global Governance Away from the Media, London: Routledge, 138 pages, 978-0-415-49850-0: £19.99 (paperback), 978-0-415-49849-4: £90.00 (hardback).

Latin America and the Western Hemisphere have witnessed numerous attempts of institutionalized regional integration, particularly throughout the twentieth century. In a nutshell, there has been a competition between a) Pan-American or inter-American cooperation, including North, South, and Central America, as well as later the Caribbean, and b) South or Latin American integration, excluding above all the U.S. in order to achieve some autonomy from the mighty northern neighbor. The Organization of American States (OAS) is the institutional expression of inter-American cooperation, but at the same time it has occasionally served as an arena where the tensions between the U.S. and Latin American states became visible.

Mônica Herz, an associate professor at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, has now published a small monograph on the OAS. It describes the organization’s history, its functioning, the corresponding “contribution to global and regional governance,” and also endeavors to offer an analysis of “international relations in the Western Hemisphere” (p. 3). The book starts with a very short introduction. The first chapter reviews briefly the organization’s history and chapters two and three analyze the subjects of security and democracy (the “democratic paradigm”). The fourth chapter addresses the OAS, or better yet, the inter-American system, as “plural architecture for governance,” followed by a conclusion, and a selected bibliography.

While the introduction nicely underlines the importance of the historical context for the understanding of the OAS’ role today (p. 4), the periodization is somewhat conventional: during (1948–1989) and after the East–West conflict (1989 sq.) (p. 5). One may ask whether this categorization is a little myopic and, in the hemispheric context, too centered on the East–West confrontation. From an institutional perspective, 1970 (organizational reform) may equally represent a turning point, as well as the end of the dictatorships in the Southern Cone prior to the conclusion of the East–West “proxy wars” in Central America.

The historical part includes an inter-American and global perspective (though more through an East–West than a North–South prism), but—also due to the scope of a brief introductory book—tends to neglect intra-Latin American dynamics (social developments, reaction to dictatorships, and civil wars in the region) and U.S. domestic and foreign policy shifts. One paramount question seems not to be addressed satisfactorily: Why was the OAS established at all, and was it a continuation of the previous inter-American conferences or something new? Throughout the book, the “Cold War” prism is perhaps too dominant. Even though the East–West conflict was a determining force, it was also complemented by a particular interAmerican element of the North–South dispute, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. In this respect, one may ask: Was the U.S. antagonism toward communist Cuba (whose government was excluded from participating in the OAS in 1962) an East–West problem or did it also display a North–South clash? Moreover, scandals and the perceptions from different American societies could have been worth mentioning to help understanding of the OAS’ nature while also making reading more entertaining; for example, at some point in the 1970s/1980s, the OAS headquarters in Washington was considered a money-wasting party hall. In accordance,

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there were proposals to abolish the OAS in general, move its seat to a southern member state, or turn it into a Latin American organization. At the same time, discontent with the OAS in the U.S. grew and the request to withdraw from it emerged. And so, how did this affect the collective memory of the organization?

In contrast to the period until 1990, the developments since the 1990s are tidily described: The OAS became less U.S.-dominated and tried to act like a mediator for several regional trade agreements.

The “security” chapter offers a lot of information, but could have done better to provide the bigger picture. It succeeds in describing the transfer from civil wars and interstate wars affected by the East–West conflict to new areas such as drug-trafficking or terrorism and, more recently, also includes transnational crime, post-conflict peace building, and human security (p. 57). Beyond describing many programs and initiatives as well as the corresponding institutions and units, this chapter could also have addressed the very nature of the OAS as a security organization: How has the concept of security changed over time?

The chapter on the “democratic paradigm” neatly summarizes the process of democracy promotion in the inter-American system, particularly after 1990, including, for example, the Santiago resolution in 1991, the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001, the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, and the (successful) electoral monitoring. In her chapter conclusion, Herz provides a quite thoughtful and balanced summary. While the rule of law continues to be the topic of “gravest deficiency,” social inequality and exclusion have certainly led to widespread “popular disillusionment with democracy” (pp. 73, 74). The book stresses two problems: limitations of the concept of democracy and the organization’s difficulty in dealing with authoritarian regression.

The concern with the administration of the process aiming at the maintenance of order is in an example of the rationalizing role of an international organization that reaches for Western models of governance. The practice of the OAS in this sphere can be seen as part of a much broader history of encounters between Western and Latin American societies that has led to one of the crucial intellectual debates in the region about these tense and creative encounters and the process of modernization (p. 75).

The last part bears the title “Working within a plural architecture for governance” and addresses other regional arenas of global (or regional) governance with particular regard to security and democracy (p. 77). Here, the author 1) discusses several regional definitions and regional identities, 2) asks how some of these institutions contribute to global governance in terms of security, and 3) analyzes how these institutions perform in democracy matters.

The book focuses on four forums: the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Andean Community, the Common South American Market (Mercosur), and the Rio Group.

It would have been interesting to compare these four with the Bolivarian ALBA, as a contrasting example, particularly as the book seemingly identifies some ALBA countries to be on the road to a “collision course”—Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua (p. 87).

In this interesting chapter, Herz discusses the identities related to the concepts of Western Hemisphere/the Americas, Hispanoamerica, and Latin America (p. 78), where she focuses in particular on institutions such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, the Caribbean (ECLAC), and other regional integration bodies which discussed Latin America’s role in the world. The fact that both the historical concepts of Pan-Americanism, Hispanic America, or Latin America as well as the twentieth century integration efforts based largely on identity debates of the elites, remains unaddressed.1 Furthermore, the Rio Group, which brought together the Contadora Group and its supporters in 1989 (aiming at a negotiated solution to the Central American conflicts), is hardly discussed as a Latin American reaction to the OAS’ reluctance, unwillingness, or incapacity to mediate in the civil wars of Central America. This cooperation among Latin American states somewhat attested the OAS 1. See Eduardo Devés Valdés, El Pensamiento Latinoamericano En El Siglo XX: Entre la Modernizacion y la Identidad (Coleccion Historias Americanas). Editorial Biblos 2003.

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untrustworthiness. In contrast to other regional organizations that refer more generally to democratic rules, the OAS clearly strengthens representative democracy (emphasis on “constitutional continuity”) (p. 87). Nevertheless, Herz also identifies different concepts of democracy in the hemisphere (p. 90). She summarizes the various institutions with different regional bases presented in this chapter are a relevant part of governance mechanisms available in the Western Hemisphere. In the two areas under scrutiny here they both reinforce the contributions of the OAS to global governance and create alternative venues that can deal with issues the hemispheric organization cannot tackle (p. 89).

Herz concludes her book with the statement that the OAS, contrary to most analyses, actually does play an important role with regard to global governance (p. 91). Its relevance is emphasized in two areas in particular: “as a site for the administration and coordination of interests of states and other actors, diminishing transaction costs and generating predictability, and as a part of a global project of technological ordering” (p. 91). The organization constructs and distributes norms and serves as a meeting point for the North–South dialogue (p. 92).

Even though the aim of the book to provide merely a brief introduction certainly limits its scope, it could provide more details about the different concepts of democracy in the hemisphere or competing identities. A better revision of the language would have been desirable.

All in all, this is an interesting contribution for newcomers to the study of regional and global governance in the Western Hemisphere and the OAS in particular. Scholars who are more interested in the historical dimension of inter-American relations and more critical accounts should probably look elsewhere.