CHAOS RECONSIDERED
The Liberal Order and the
Future of International Politics
Edited by Robert Jervis, Diane N. Labrosse, Stacie E. Goddard, and Joshua Rovner
INTRODUCTION
ROBERT JERVIS, DIANE N. LABROSSE, STACIE
E. GODDARD, AND JOSHUA ROVNER
Four years ago, the H-Diplo/ISSF editors commissioned a set of essays from international relations scholars and diplomatic historians on the shocking outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. They were published in Chaos in the Liberal Order. 1 At the time, many scholars and pundits focused on the implications of Donald Trump’s election for U.S. politics—the president’s forceful anti-immigration policies, his tacit encouragement of white supremacists, and his challenges to the rule of law. We wondered what a Donald Trump presidency meant for international politics and the global world order. Even before he was elected, Trump made it clear that he disdained the norms and customs of the liberal international order, as it is commonly known, as well as the postwar institutions that promoted traditional liberal values. During his campaign, Trump promised to correct “failed trade policies,” rejecting free-trade agreements and embracing trade wars and protectionist policies. He called the U.S.-led alliance structure obsolete, with NATO in particular being “disproportionately too expensive (and unfair) for the U.S.”2
For these reasons, Trump’s election in 2016 cast doubt on the future course of U.S. foreign policy. If he made good on his bombastic campaign rhetoric, Washington would withdraw its support for longstanding international norms and for decades-old international institutions. “Trump seeks nothing less than ending the U.S.-led liberal order,” Thomas Wright argued, “freeing America from its international commitments.”3 In Chaos in the Liberal Order, the essayists analyzed the extent to which Trump’s rhetoric and emerging policies departed from precedents and norms and asked whether Trump’s influence
would prove to be merely a blip or would in fact radically transform U.S. foreign policy and international relations more generally. Although most of the essayists argued that tradition and institutional norms would hold, there was no consensus.
If Chaos in the Liberal Order offered predictions, Chaos Reconsidered represents a moment of reflection. With 2020 came Trump’s chaotic loss and the election of Joe Biden, a president who seems to operate—at least on the surface— firmly in the American tradition of liberal foreign policy.4 The contributors here address several key questions. What did the Trump presidency and Trump’s embrace of nationalism and populism mean for our understanding of the liberal international order? How did Trump’s “America First” foreign policy change relations with U.S. allies and with liberal institutions more generally? What are the long-term effects of the Trump years for diplomacy abroad, with both strategic partners and competitors? What are the implications of the Capitol riot and the racism and norm busting of Trump’s presidency, along with its failed response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for the ability of the United States to lead the liberal international order? And, looking forward, to what extent is a Biden administration likely or able to rebuild the reputation and leadership abilities of the United States? Will China’s assertiveness cause U.S. allies to rally around traditional liberal themes? Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine breathe new life into old liberal institutions?
An Interdisciplinary Response to the Trump Moment
In his initial response to Trump’s 2016 election, Robert Jervis captured the feeling of bizarre historical dislocation. Yet when other analysts were scrambling for purchase, he saw an opportunity for genuinely interdisciplinary analysis, noting that “I never thought that I would write the phrase ‘President Trump,’ let alone liken it to IR theory. But the former is a great opportunity for the latter.” Indeed, in Chaos, he points out that “whatever else is true of Donald Trump’s presidency, it offers a great opportunity to test theories of international relations. . . . Now that he is in office, will he carry out radically different policies? Or will domestic and international constraints prevail? We are in the process of running an experiment, and even if the results are not likely to be entirely unambiguous, they should provide us with real evidence.”5
How we interpret that evidence and what counts as a radically different policy depend on our understanding of the past. The notion that Trump represented a sharp turn implies that there was a long stretch of policy continuity beforehand. It also implies that his beliefs and preferences would have been outside the bounds of reasonable debate in past administrations. Yet these assumptions require both theoretical and historical scrutiny. Trump’s crude and
belligerent language certainly shocked longtime observers of U.S. foreign policy, but this does not necessarily mean that his approach was unprecedented. Indeed, it is possible that Trump’s style obscured the fact that in terms of substance his policies were hardly unique or novel.
Our approach to understanding Trump and the world relies on a dialogue between IR theorists and historians. The former generate ideas about the causes of consequences of state actions; the latter put those ideas to the test. Historians also act as an intellectual guard against presentism, which is always a looming danger for analysts who focus on contemporary international affairs. Because the president’s behavior was so utterly outlandish, this is particularly important for evaluating America and the world before and after Trump. It is possible that his actions did in fact symbolize a deeper shift in international relations, but it is also possible that they were superficial and largely meaningless. Grounding our analysis of the Trump presidency in the past is essential for an understanding of this key difference.
Of course, the dialogue among theorists and historians is not as simple as the stylized version just outlined. IR theorists are serious about history, and historians are quite capable of thinking theoretically. Some of the most important and lasting historical analyses come from trained political scientists, after all, and some of the most provocative theories come from historians. Encouraging conversations among these scholars can lead to more creative approaches to understanding the present as well as the past. We believe they will help readers put the Trump years in context and offer some guideposts for those who wonder about the future of the international order.
The Liberal Order and Trump’s Nationalist Turn in Theory and History
The Trump presidency certainly generated questions for scholars who had argued for the resilience of the liberal international order. Most scholars agree that in the wake of World War II, the United States led the world in establishing a liberal international order, putting in place “settled rules and arrangements between states that define and guide their interaction.”6 The United States used its economic and diplomatic influence to promote free markets and democracy across the globe. It also used its military power to “isolate aggressive regimes and prevent them from upsetting a liberalizing global order.”7 It exercised its leadership in international forums to punish human rights abuses, broaden and deepen international law, and promote transnational cooperation to address common challenges. Scholars did not all agree that the U.S. pursuit of the liberal order was sincere. While some emphasized the benefits of an order designed to encourage trade, democracy, and diplomacy through multilateral
institutions,8 others charged that U.S. appeals to a liberal international order were based upon little more than a self-serving and often dangerous myth.9
But whatever the substance of these debates, a general consensus held that there was a liberal international order and that U.S. leaders—whether on the basis of principle or power—would continue to support a foreign policy dedicated to preserving that order. Enter Trump, who seemed committed to tearing down the liberal order. He withdrew the U.S. from key agreements and institutions, such as the Paris Climate Accord, and hobbled others, such as the World Trade Organization. He dismissed NATO as outdated and called U.S. allies free riders. He called for a turn away from globalism and back toward U.S. nationalism. He also embraced and supported Brexit, an event that some scholars suggest has signaled the demise of the liberal order.10
As Jervis argued, no international relations theory predicted the ability of a single individual to challenge the fundamental norms and rules of the liberal order in this way. Liberal institutionalist theorists certainly saw the American liberal order as resilient, as “easy to join and hard to overturn.”11 Realists might have been skeptical: according to their theories, liberal norms depend on the support of dominant states, and as relative power shifted away from those states, the norms would atrophy. But it was material shifts in power—not a single individual and his nationalist ideology—that would lead to the order’s demise.
Historians too wrestled with questions about Trump’s nationalism and the liberal international order. Like their critical IR theory counterparts, many asked whether it was genuinely liberal at all, given the long history of decidedly illiberal policies, as well as longstanding patterns of U.S. trade and support for international institutions, both of which are pillars of the liberal international order. In some ways, Trump’s antiglobalist stance might have presented less of a departure for American foreign policy than it appeared. And even if Trump’s appeals to nationalism and populism were uniquely disruptive, they might still have been rooted deep in U.S. social and political processes that long preceded his presidency. Careful attention to past practices is necessary to determine whether Trump constituted a profound challenge to the order.
Trump and the Practice of U.S. Foreign Policy: Allies and Competitors in the International Order
International observers had become accustomed to a certain brand of American diplomacy. U.S. presidents from both parties have been reliable supporters of international institutions and sturdy champions of liberal values. To be sure, U.S. policy sometimes deviated from these lofty principles. Cold War presidents violated free-trade ideals, embraced covert action, and bankrolled illiberal regimes. Yet they cast these actions as temporary expedients in the long-term
effort to contain Soviet communism and thus as necessary evils in the service of a greater goal. And whatever their actions, the liberal legitimation of U.S. foreign policy was consistent.12 Declarations of support for common values and shared commitments underwrote the U.S. effort to sustain the postwar international order. There may have been a gap between U.S. words and deeds, but allies were willing to forgive a little hypocrisy.13 Such is the nature of international politics.
According to some observers, the image of America as a benign liberal superpower, one whose excesses might be forgiven, was hard to sustain after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Overwhelming U.S. military and economic advantages would surely cause other states to be wary of U.S. adventurism, no matter how it justified its actions.14 Others, however, believed that smaller states would tolerate the unequal distribution of power because the United States had bound itself to international institutions. These commitments made it inherently less threatening than hegemons of the past.15 Yet the aggressive response to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the George W. Bush administration’s preference for “coalitions of the willing” in place of permanent alliances seemed to foreshadow an end to the institutional grand bargain that had prevented serious balancing against U.S. power.
These two trends converged in 2016. Donald Trump’s election seemed to reveal the U.S. preference for unilateralism, once and for all, and it caused foreign leaders to question their historic trust in the United States.16 Trump had no interest in projecting a friendly image to U.S. allies. Instead of praising strategic partners who provided ground for American bases, he issued blistering attacks against the states he described as free riders and the institutions that gave them influence. Instead of offering familiar bromides about the staying power of shared values, Trump promised a kind of transactional diplomacy, in which deals among states could be negotiated, renegotiated, or abandoned altogether.
The contributors to this volume reflect on how Trump’s departures from liberal foreign policy shaped relations with allies and partners. Did their views of America’s image change as a result of Trump’s provocations? Did he cause them to reassess their views, or did they think that Washington had already chosen unilateralism? And if it was the latter, how much did Trump cause this shift in relations, or was it a symptom of other causes? Might it be that Trump’s rhetoric pulled back the curtain on a change in U.S. foreign policy that was already well underway before his election? Could Trump’s policies toward U.S. allies and partners simply reflect changes in the distribution of power, an inevitable return to national identity?
Finally, the contributors grapple with the question of America’s image abroad after the Trump administration. It may be that Trump was an aberration. He won the Electoral College while losing the popular vote, after all, and the
unusual circumstances of his victory might have encouraged foreign observers to be cautious about drawing grand conclusions about its meaning. Trump’s successor, moreover, is a trusted and decades-long fixture in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Whatever U.S. partners think of President Joe Biden’s policy choices, they most likely do not doubt his basic commitment to the postwar order. Upon taking office, Biden declared that “America is back,” and he launched a deliberate effort to restore America’s image. Yet many of our contributors question whether longtime partners in the liberal order will be confident that Biden can accomplish this restoration—or even win a second term. As of this writing, he had not completely overcome that skepticism.
And then there is the question of the Trump effect on the relationship with strategic competitors of the United States, especially Russia and China. The shift toward talking about Russia and China as strategic competitors preceded Trump; President Barack Obama “pivoted” to Asia in his first term and levied sanctions against Russia in his second. The Trump administration went further, centering “Great Power Competition” as the organizing principle of the 2017 National Security Strategy.17 Despite his public criticism of American allies, Trump actually increased the military presence of the U.S. in Europe and Asia, reinforcing the country’s extended deterrence commitments. The Biden administration has continued this approach. As of this writing, it, along with the United States’ traditional allies in the European Union and NATO, is actively opposing Russian president Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine and dissuading China from acting against Taiwan.18
Going forward, Russia and China have two basic options for responding. The first is to back down in the face of U.S. pressure. The second is to escalate. International relations theory provides models that describe and explain these choices. The deterrence model holds that states are impressed by forward displays of military power and will only restrain themselves if they fear the consequences of action. Efforts to preserve the status quo require a demonstrated willingness to fight for it. By contrast, the spiral model holds that states are more likely to lash out if they are under threat. They cannot be sure that their rivals are only interested in preserving the status quo. Instead, they increasingly feel that their own security is at stake and are impelled to take greater risks. A dangerous spiral of mutual hostility and mistrust ensues.19
Great-power competition has also revived the possibility of nuclear conflict. The United States, Russia, and China have invested in modernizing their nuclear arsenals over the last twenty years. The United States has developed extremely accurate warheads, supported by an impressive array of computing technologies and remote sensors, which might cause its leaders to believe that they can fight a nuclear war without suffering nuclear retaliation. Meanwhile, China and Russia have diversified their nuclear capabilities in order to assure the survival of their own forces. And all three great powers have invested in cyberspace
capabilities that some scholars view as destabilizing: cyberattacks against enemy communications in the early stages of war might cause leaders to lash out in fear and frustration.20 Prewar confidence in fighting capabilities might give way to panic after the first volley. Critics have recently sounded the alarm about the danger of escalation if great-power competition transforms into war, echoing earlier warnings from the Cold War.21 These precedents suggest that something deeper than the Trump phenomenon is at work, even if Trump’s bellicose rhetoric may have accelerated the process.
Trump and a Changing International System
Great-power politics have long occupied the attention of diplomatic historians and IR theorists. The theoretical issues animating debates over Russia and China are familiar: alliance demands, deterrence requirements, stability, arms control, and so on. But these policy debates are taking place at a time in which scholars are challenging our traditional understanding of security.
Many of the contributors to this volume point out that despite the Trump administration’s focus on “conventional” IR issues, international relations under Trump encompassed a wide range of social issues.22 Transnational social movements grew alongside transnational security threats during the Trump years. The Women’s Marches and the #metoo movement highlighted stubborn patterns of inequality and ongoing sexual misconduct. The scale of the marches and the speed at which #metoo became a household hashtag suggest a serious challenge to the gender hierarchy in international politics. Later, the Black Lives Matter protests forced critical debates about race and politics in the United States. Like the Women’s Marches, they were also noteworthy because the protesters’ message resonated globally. There was something remarkable about witnessing protesters in distant capitals unite in response to George Floyd’s killing in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
These movements forced a reconsideration of the meaning of security. Traditionally, such theories focused on national security and military conflict, narrowly defined. But the scale and intensity of the protests suggest that for most individuals, insecurity comes not from foreign armies but from domestic inequality. Some scholars argue that it makes little sense to talk about national security when so many citizens feel unsafe. Students of international security stand to benefit from deeper dialogue with students of human security.23 The converse is also true, given that states sometimes intervene abroad in order to protect vulnerable groups.
Two other nontraditional security issues loomed over the Trump administration: climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Climate change was hardly a new problem when Trump took office, but extreme weather events
became more frequent during his tenure: bitter cold snaps, bizarre heat waves, fires, and floods. Concerned scientists called for immediate policy action, which Trump resisted, in part because he ran for election as a climate change denier and also because he believed that the worst climate offenders were countries like China, who stood to benefit from anything that slowed the U.S. economy. President Biden entered office declaring his commitment to meaningful action on climate change. Although this was a relief to like-minded world leaders, it remains unclear whether he and other sympathetic leaders can stem the tide. Because climate change is a global problem, progress will require durable international cooperation. Resurgent nationalism and great-power competition may, however, get in the way.
The same is true for COVID-19. As of this writing, the virus has killed over six million people worldwide, including one million Americans, which in part reflects the Trump administration’s initial denial of the seriousness of the pandemic. The virus has also mutated into several highly contagious variants, leaving millions more at risk of infection, long-term illness, and death. Effective vaccines, which were developed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany and the European Union, have yet to be made widely available in large parts of the globe, and large unvaccinated populations have made viral mutations more likely. Vaccines developed by China and Russia proved to be of low efficacy. Critics warn that the uneven distribution of vaccines of varying efficacy will prolong the pandemic, but practical and political disputes made cooperation difficult. The race for vaccines took on a national character rather than a global effort to coordinate vaccine development in order to produce and distribute the most promising shots. Great powers also continue to struggle to share information; mistrust abounds.
Climate change and COVID-19 highlight the problem of complexity and unexpected feedback. Domestic policies affect the international system; system effects complicate domestic policy making. Decisions to manage problems at home create or exacerbate problems abroad in ways that are not always predictable, and international responses constrain the menu of subsequent options. Seemingly routine decisions (for example, modifying regulatory standards for industry) have lasting implications for international coordination. System effects are nonlinear in interconnected systems and thus hard to manage. As the international system becomes more complex, the lines between domestic and foreign issues are blurred, as are the relations between cause and effect. Even the most judicious policy makers will struggle to maintain control.24
The contributors to this volume are almost all critical of Trump’s response to these transnational social issues. They agree that his rhetoric stoked racial tensions in the United States and may have deepened racial divides abroad. Trump’s inconsistent response to COVID-19 was partly a result of his disdain for institutions domestic and international. Transnational issues are inherently
hard to manage, to be sure, but critics might be more charitable if Trump had expressed more seriousness about them. The essayists have had less time to evaluate Biden’s effort, finding that thus far he has worked, to the extent that is possible, to restore traditional U.S. alliances and partnerships as well as confidence in U.S. leadership, especially given his response to Russian aggression against Ukraine. Even so, most agree that Biden is digging out from a very deep hole.
Looking Forward and Back: The Liberal Order and International Relations Theory in a Post-Trump World
What did four years of Trump teach us about international politics today, and what if anything do they portend? As with the first volume, there is no consensus. And as before, this is hardly surprising. Most of the authors are critical of Trump, arguing that he did serious damage to America’s position and prestige. A minority disagree, seeing his blunt nationalist rhetoric as a necessary corrective to past hypocrisy. (Interestingly, Jonathan M. DiCicco notes in chapter 18 a similar perspective among Beijing officials. They did not view Trump as friendly, but at least they understood him.) And still others wonder if the Trump administration will have lasting impact. Trump’s disinterest in the mechanics of policy making might have limited his influence, at least for now. A second Trump presidency or the rise of a pro-Trump leader will bring the debate roaring back.
In the meantime, scholars must rely on their own theories to assess the ongoing Biden administration. Those who remain confident in the underlying rationale of the liberal order are confident Biden can make good on his promises to allies and partners. Critics of the order are doubtful not because of his policy or diplomatic shortcomings but because the structural forces that encouraged cooperation are no longer present. Whatever the outcome, it is safe to say that the next decade will be a hard test for the postwar order. The rise of nationalism, the return of great-power rivalry, and the increasing complexity of transnational threats will strain the alliances and institutions that Washington spent so long assembling. The liberal order may have outlasted Trump, but it has not outlasted the structural and domestic politics that brought him to power.
When we commissioned essays for this volume, we hoped to shed light on the Trump administration’s lasting impact on U.S. grand strategy and international politics. It is clear that, much like in the first volume, there is no absolute
consensus in the pages that follow, even if Putin’s war is suggesting a new coherence and strength for the liberal international order. As noted earlier, Jervis concludes that “we cannot fully judge the Trump experiment at the end of his term. The impact of what he has said and done will last longer and, for better and for worse, will carry over into the Biden presidency and perhaps beyond.” We cannot, as Jervis tells us, provide a clear and easy answer. But this is not unusual. “As in so many cases of history and international politics,” he writes, “at this point all I can do is to raise the question.” Our authors all follow Jervis’s charge to illuminate the important questions, offering invaluable guideposts and commentary for scholars and students alike. Sadly, we have to do without an analysis by Jervis of the consequences of Putin’s war, a topic on which he would have had much of value and insight to say.
Notes
1. Robert Jervis, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane Labrosse, eds., Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
2. For the “failed trade policies, see “Trump Nominates Robert Lighthizer as U.S. Trade Representative,” PBS Newshour, January 03 2017, https://www.pbs .org /newshour /politics/trump-nominates-robert-lighthizer-u-s-trade-representative; for the statement on NATO, Donald J. Trump, Twitter, March 27, 2016, 14:23:51, https://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/tweets-march-27-2016. For an analysis of NATO, see chapter 15, by Susan Colbourn, in this volume.
3. Thomas Wright, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy,” Politico, January 20, 2016.
4. Although, as some of the authors in this volume discuss, Biden’s policies— especially his focus on great-power competition—suggest a step back from a universal liberal order. See, for example, Emma Ashford, chapter 6 in this volume.
5. Robert Jervis, “President Trump and IR Theory,” H-Diplo/ ISSF Policy Series, ed. D. Labrosse, “America and the World—2017 and Beyond, Introductory 2 January 2017,” https://issforum .org / ISSF/ PDF/ Policy-Roundtable-1-5B .pdf; Robert Jervis, “Trump and International Relations Theory,” in Chaos in the Liberal Order, 3.
6. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 12.
7. Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: US Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post–Cold War Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2016), 334.
8. See for example, Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan; Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 58–85.
9. See for example, John Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: the Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43, no. 4: 7–50; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ayse Zarakol, “Struggles for Recognition: the Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents,” International Organization 75, no. 2 (Spring 2021): 611–34. See also Nivi Manchanda, chapter 28 in this volume.
10. See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, “The Collapse of the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Policy (online), June 16, 2016; https://foreignpolicy.com /2016/06/26/the-collapse
- of-the-liberal-world- order- european-union-brexit- donald-trump/; and Sebastian Mallaby, “Britain’s Awful Vote May Be a Tipping Point,” Washington Post, June 24, 2016.
11. G. John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive,” Ethics & International Affairs 32, no. 1 (2018): 25.
12. See, for example, Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald Krebs, “Legitimating Primacy After the Cold War: How Liberal Talk Matters to Foreign Policy,” in Before and After the Fall, World Politics and the End of the Cold War, ed. Nuno Monteiro and Fritz Bartel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
13. Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity.”
14. Examples include Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011): 9–40; and Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005).
15. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan . See also Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for Twenty-First- Century Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020).
16. See, for example, Joshua Busby and Jonathan Monten, chapter 32 in this volume.
17. Office of the President, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content /uploads/2017/12/ NSS -Final -12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
18. Some commentators have found in the U.S. response to Putin a veiled threat to China. See, for instance, Yuan-kang Wang, “The Ukraine War and China’s Second Strategic Opportunity,” H-Diplo Essay 427, Commentary Series on Putin’s War, ed. D. Labrosse, https:// hdiplo.org /to/E427.
19. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
20. Ben Buchanan and Fiona S. Cunningham, “Preparing the Cyber Battlefield: Assessing a Novel Escalation Risk in a Sino-American Crisis,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 54–81; James Johnson, “The AI-Cyber Nexus: Implications for Military Escalation, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability,” Journal of Cyber Policy 4, no. 3 (September 2019): 442– 60; and Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Thermonuclear Cyberwar,” Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. 1 (February 2017): 37–48.
21. Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
22. See, for example, Deborah Avant, chapter 4 in this volume.
23. Variations on this theme include Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 123–53; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1989): 162–77; and Lincoln C. Chen, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, and Ellen Seidensticker eds., Human Insecurity in a Global World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
24. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).