By
MORE Than
PROVIDENCE
G R A N D ST R AT EGY A N D A M E R IC A N P O W E R I N T H E A S I A PAC I F I C S I N C E 1 7 8 3
MICHAEL J. GREEN
CONCLUSION THE HISTORICAL CASE FOR ASIA STRATEGY
I
s the United States capable of grand strategy? Two centuries of American engagement with Asia and the Pacific strongly suggest that the answer is yes. American grand strategy has been episodic and inefficient, but in the aggregate it has been effective. The American people have repeatedly mustered the willpower, focus, and resources to prevail when access to an open order in the region has been fundamentally challenged, and they have contributed in the aggregate to a more prosperous and just Asia-Pacific region. It did not matter whether the United States had a preponderance of power at the time. John Quincy Adams and Richard Nixon advanced American interests in Asia at times of limited power in ways that Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, or Bill Clinton sometimes did not during times of seemingly abundant national power. The critical difference was the former leaders’ clarity of purpose and deliberate identification of ends, ways, and means. It is also evident in this study that the most effective American strategies have been rooted in a clear understanding of the geopolitics of the region. Asia has changed enormously with technology, war, economic growth, and social revolution, but it is still a region where international relations are defined by hierarchy and competition. It may be fashionable
542
CONCLUSION
in some corners to argue that nation-states no longer dominate the international relations of Asia—that we now live in an era of epistemic communities, nonpolarity, multilateralism, and shared transnational challenges that diminish the centrality of national power. However, it is a fallacy to believe that multilateralism or transnational challenges will transform the geopolitics of Asia in the foreseeable future, even as we must work on these nonstate challenges on their own merits. When CSIS in a 2009 survey asked hundreds of experts across Asia whether they wanted greater multilateral cooperation, for example, more than 80 percent answered yes. When asked if they would rely on regional institutions in the event of pandemics, terrorism, financial crises, or military confrontations ten years hence, more than 80 percent of respondents answered no— choosing instead their own national capabilities or global institutions like the UN or IMF before putting faith in regionalism.1 In follow-up surveys in 2014, the confidence in regional collective security and communitybuilding was no higher overall, and among the larger powers, it was markedly lower.2 Administrations that have thought they could transform regional geopolitics through multilateralism or transnationalism have inevitably found themselves retreating to the balance-of-power strategies that should have been their starting point. As Trotsky would say, you may not be interested in strategy—but strategy is interested in you. Although most successful American strategies have begun with geopolitics, pure realpolitik has never been a sustainable basis for American policy in Asia and the Pacific. A Metternich would not long survive in the pluralistic foreign policy process in Washington (the exception, Henry Kissinger, almost proves the rule, as he rushed to explain the moral dimensions of foreign policy in his closing years as secretary of state lest his strategies be reversed); nor would the United States have achieved the successes it has in Asia over the longer term with a purely Metternichean realpolitik approach. Maintenance of balance-of-power and stable great-power relations are the sine qua non for effective grand strategy, but the United States is much better positioned to protect its interests at a time of shifting power in Asia today precisely because of past investments made to support the spread of democratic norms and more open markets. It is important to recognize these strengths in American strategic culture at a time when China’s own strategic intentions are coming under increasing scrutiny. After years of debate about whether modern leaders in Beijing themselves are capable of grand strategy, there is growing clarity in the era of Xi Jinping that China is putting in place economic, military,
CONCLUSION
543
and foreign policies to wean Asia from dependence on American leadership and enhance China’s own centrality in the region. Though China is attempting to combine attraction and coercion toward neighboring states, the net effect of Chinese policies has thus far been to push most governments closer to the United States. This is because Beijing now evokes fears of hierarchical domination, whereas Washington increasingly stands for the right of smaller states to determine their own political destiny without coercion by larger powers. Nevertheless, most states are also hedging to some extent, knowing that the United States is separated from them by thousands of miles of ocean, whereas China is separated from them by mere rivers, mountains, or inland seas. They are also hedging because China’s willingness to leverage its power is becoming more apparent to the entire region. A clear and consistent demonstration of American strategic intent is therefore more impor tant than ever in Asia. Indeed, it is indispensable to stable U.S.-China relations, which have suffered most from inconsistency in Washington. Improving this situation requires mastering a strategic concept at least as complex as three-dimensional chess. To use that analogy, on the top board, the United States must seek to reinforce a rules-based regional order underpinned by U.S. leadership and backed by strong alliances, partnerships, trade agreements, and multilateral engagement. On the middle board, the United States will have to work toward a stable and productive relationship with China, constantly seeking new areas of cooperation based on a recognition of how much China can potentially contribute to global progress and prosperity. On the bottom board, the United States will have to continue ensuring that it has the military capabilities and posture necessary to defeat any attempts to overturn the current regional order through force. Moves on each of the three boards impact the other boards, yet without continual play on all three of the boards, imbalance and crisis become more likely. This complex three-dimensional chess game allows ever less margin for error as China evolves its own pieces from pawns and knights to rooks and queens. Meanwhile, there is a parallel game with North Korea that at any time could change the dynamics on the three other boards. And unlike real chess, of course, the players do not know the precise utility or impact of the pieces arrayed on the board, particularly those new pieces in the domains of cyber and outer space. Steady play in this three-dimensional chess game will require better management of the five tensions that have vexed American statecraft
544
CONCLUSION
toward the region so often in the past. Of course, there is no absolute choice between Europe and Asia, maritime and continental approaches, forward defense and Pacific depth, self-determination and universality, or free trade and protectionism. Each reflects a conundrum in the geography of Asia and the Pacific or a foundational contradiction in the values of the United States itself. It may be possible, however, to turn these uniquely American tensions into strategic advantages. Instead of pitting Asia policy against Europe policy by declaring a “pivot” to Asia, for example, the United States would do far better working with Europe to reinforce support for a rules-based system within Asia. There will still be a question of prioritizing resources, of course. In the Second World War, the consequences of a “Europe first” strategy for the Pacific theater were eventually overcome with massive wartime production. That will not likely be the case in the current budgetary environment. Moreover, the United States will have to respond to intractable problems in other parts of the world, ranging from Russian bullying to Islamic terrorism and Iranian irredentism. Asia will merit a higher proportion of diplomatic, military, and developmental resources given the return of economic and geopolitical weight to the region, but there will be more immediacy to the violent acts against Americans and American interests in the Middle East. Asia hands will need to recognize that failures of commitment or deterrence in Europe or the Middle East will inevitably reverberate in Asia. However, principals meeting in the Situation Room of the White House to manage a crisis in the Middle East or Central Europe should never again do so without also having a clear picture of U.S. objectives and strategy in Asia to inform their decision-making. Asia, after all, is now affecting the global order after years of being the object of events in the West. The perennial swings between continental and maritime priorities and thus between China and Japan must also be controlled. China is the independent variable that could most impact regional stability in the future. However, when U.S. administrations declare “strategic partnerships,” “respect for core interests,” or a “new model of great power relations” in order to stabilize U.S.-China relations, the signal to the entire region is that Washington is accepting a bipolar condominium that elevates China above America’s democratic allies. When subsequent friction with China then causes the United States to swing back to its allies to restore the strategic equilibrium, both China and the United States’ allies are left uncertain about where American interests really lie. Thus, as Richard Armitage and Joe Nye put it in a 2007 report, the key to a successful
CONCLUSION
545
China policy is “getting Asia right.”3 That begins with Japan, a nation now bonded to the United States by common values and common interests in maritime security, but should also include India, Australia, Indonesia, and other aspiring stakeholders in the region. As Nixon recognized after the sapping of American power in Vietnam, multipolarity in Asia often works better for the United States when potential adversaries are on the rise. Whereas Chinese leaders speak of global multipolarity vis-à-vis the United States, with the implicit assertion being that China represents the Asian pole, the United States has historically been prepared to embrace the rise of other powers within Asia in order to maintain a favorable strategic equilibrium in that region. It is ultimately in the interest of the United States for states in Asia to be free from coercion, something that cannot be said with confidence in Asian capitals about China. This is not to say that progress on issues with China should somehow be calibrated to progress with Japan or other allies and partners. Indeed, Japan can benefit when the United States and China reach agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or improve military-to-military transparency and confidence-building, as long as the approach is carefully coordinated with allies. Every administration should seek to expand cooperation and trust with Beijing where possible. China should be treated with respect, as Theodore Roosevelt treated Japan a century ago, but not to the point that it appears the United States is willing to accommodate Chinese interests at allies’ expense. Those administrations that have been most consistent on this point have had the most successful China policies because they established clear expectations and avoided surprises. In recent history, the examples of Ronald Reagan and George Shultz come to mind. The definition of the United States’ forward defense line in the Pacific will become increasingly complex as China tries to draw its own defense line forward to the First and Second Island Chains and North Korea develops its missile and nuclear inventories. There is less debate about where that American line should be than there was with the MacMurray Memo or War Plan Orange in the interwar years, let alone the debates of the mid-nineteenth century about coaling stations. The United States has been drawn back into establishing more engagement and presence in Southeast Asia decades after the Guam Doctrine, to recommit to the defense of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and to continue with wartime operational control on the Korean Peninsula—all because China and North Korea have strategically surprised Washington (an expansion of the American area of responsibility that Gaddis might have predicted).
546
CONCLUSION
Nevertheless, as Beijing increasingly backs its own expanding defense line with fortified islands, fighter planes, submarines, surface combatants, and ballistic missiles, there is the possibility of another MacMurray emerging in the halls of the State Department, Pentagon, or NSC to recommend that the defensive line be pulled back to Hawaii. However, the American people have learned much since 1935 about the importance of keeping threats as far west across the Pacific as possible. Moreover, whereas in the late 1930s Southeast Asia consisted of weakly held colonies ripe for the picking, today the region is made up of successful nation-states. Indeed, Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula can no longer be considered strategically important only because they form the front lines against the hegemonic aspirations of America’s adversaries. Korea is the world’s twelfth-largest economy, and ASEAN as a whole constitutes America’s fifth-largest trading partner. These states must today be viewed as essential “strong points” in the same way Kennan saw Germany and Japan in his early concepts of containment. The United States will have to be resolute in its support of allies but agile enough to recognize that this will be country-by-country retail work and not a simple matter of forming a new collective security system. NATO would have been impossible if Western Europe had been trading as much with the Soviets as U.S. allies do with China today. That does not mean, however, that Asian states are prepared to be coerced by China without seeking the support of larger neighbors such as Japan, Australia, India, or—most of all—the United States. With a steady demonstration of strategic intent and commitment, the United States will find its universe of partnerships and alliances expanding. This is fundamentally a question of balance of power and not of containment, since the strategy is not premised on limiting China’s own economic growth or diplomatic relations with other states. The tension between self-determination and universal values will be equally complex. When democracy is reversed in Thailand or reforms stumble in Burma/Myanmar, should the United States temper expectations of progress lest Beijing fi ll in the vacuum left by American pressure and disengagement? There is no ready-made answer to this question, but each decision will have to be made with the recognition that the United States will never win a mercantilist/realpolitik contest vis-à-vis a cashrich/conscience-free Chinese leadership. American statecraft must reflect the values of Congress and the American people if engagement of any government is to be sustained. Moreover, support for civil society and
CONCLUSION
547
good governance will eventually yield dividends, as it did in every case of democratization in the region over the past half century. That is an advantage authoritarian regimes will never have, even if the dividends take longer to materialize. Nevertheless, consistency will be vital. If it is understood that the American president will speak openly but respectfully about human dignity, then there will be less backlash when the president is forced to do so by public opinion at home, as the George H. W. Bush administration might have learned after Tiananmen. Senior policymakers will also have to integrate the principles of freedom of religion, women’s empowerment, and human rights into their overall grand strategy rather than allow an open fight between regional and functional bureaus, as happened in the Car ter and Clinton administrations. That only weakens both arms of American diplomacy as the other governments play the factions in the U.S. government against each other. The United States can also take great confidence in the fact that citizens in a majority of states in the region now identify with the norms of democracy, human rights, good governance, and rule of law.4 To be sure, postcolonial democracies such as India and Indonesia continue to guard sovereignty zealously and adhere to the principle of noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs. However, there is no alternate regime type that attracts states the way Japanese pan-Asianism or Soviet communism briefly did in an earlier era of imperialism. The right of states to determine their own future free from coercion in Asia is more important to U.S. interests than ever, but it will depend on a combination of both engagement and support for improved governance and democratic institutions, without which these same states will remain vulnerable to coercion over time. The tension between self-determination and universality, in other words, is potentially healthy if policymakers understand both dimensions of the problem. The losing battle for the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Obama administration and the opposition of both presidential candidates to TPP in 2016 suggest that the tension between free trade and protectionism is becoming greater as time passes. Yet, in many respects, that close call on trade legislation reflects a failure of strategic vision and leadership as much as it does real divisions among the American people. In 2015, 70 percent of Americans supported free trade, while fewer than 20 percent of the members of unions that opposed it were actually engaged in manufacturing that might be affected by foreign competition.5 American
548
CONCLUSION
manufacturing, meanwhile, was on the rise in this period. Nevertheless, trade has become a proxy for other problems with the U.S. economy in terms of stagnating middle-class wages that are more related to globalization and automation than trade agreements. Had President Obama understood the centrality of trade to American internationalism and influence the way Reagan and Bill Clinton did—and made the case for it—then the trade arm of American engagement in Asia and the Pacific would have had more credibility at home and abroad from the beginning. It is also noteworthy that strategically vulnerable states in the region, including Japan and Vietnam, have been eager to liberalize their economies in order to deepen ties to the United States as China increasingly used its economic leverage to extract geopolitical concessions. American tariff reductions in recent agreements with Australia, Korea, and Japan have been minimal, since the U.S. market is already open. The real progress has always been in the reduction of foreign partners’ barriers to trade, particularly in behind-the-border rulemaking. Hegemonic stability is now underpinned by the willingness of other states in the region to bind their economies more closely to the United States for self-defense and economic growth. Trade negotiations touch on sovereignty and are always contentious, but an American grand strategy for Asia and the Pacific that does not continue to build on this advantage and extend it to North America and Europe will be like a stool with only two legs. Or as Mahan said, like shallow-draft ironclads rather than oceangoing battle cruisers. Over time, this broader trade and financial architecture will incentivize reformers within China itself to harmonize regulations, remove barriers, and improve the rule of law and intellectual property rights. In short, the impact of U.S.-led trade agreements within the United States is marginal, but the impact on regional order is enormous. In conclusion, as Mahan warned, the ability of the United States to shape events within China has always been limited, but a grand strategy that sets the regional stage in terms of deterrence, trade, and values will increase the prospects for peaceful management of the next power transition in Asia. There was nothing inevitable about conflict with Japan, as Theodore Roosevelt knew, or about the invincibility of the Soviet Union, as Ronald Reagan demonstrated. Both presidents made mistakes but successfully evoked the vision of John Quincy Adams, William Henry Seward, and dozens of other strategic thinkers who, over the course of history, understood that the United States would have to secure its position in the Asia Pacific by more than providence.