D E BAT I NG RACE, ETHNICIT Y, AND LATINO IDENTIT Y JORGE J. E. GRACIA AND HIS CRITICS
EDITED BY
IVÁN JAKSIĆ
8. H I S PA N I C I D E N T I T Y , I T S O R I G I N , A N D H I S PA N I C P H I LO S O P H E R S ROBERT GOODING-WILLIAMS
Jorge J. E. Gracia’s Hispanic/Latino Identity (2000c) is a valuable contribution to contemporary philosophical discussions of racial and ethnic identities. In my commentary here, I will more or less ignore chapters 1 and 2 of Gracia’s book, the first of which reviews in detail some arguments against using the expressions “Hispanics” and “Latinos/Latinas” “to name us,” as Gracia puts it, and the second of which analyzes the relation of names to ethnicity and identity. Rather, I begin my remarks with a look at chapter 3, which is Gracia’s positive account of Hispanic identity. I then proceed briefly to consider three other topics: Gracia’s description of the origins of Hispanic identity; his discussion of political justifications for the use of a common name; and his treatment of the status of Hispanics in American philosophy. My aim in all of this is to probe Gracia’s arguments, to raise some questions regarding his conclusions, and, most of all, to invite him to further clarify his views. THE ARGUMENT FOR HISPANIC IDENTITY
Gracia (2000c:47–60) denies that there is an essence, a property, or a set of properties shared by all Hispanics at all times and in all places. Rather, he holds that Hispanics “constitute a family tied by changing historical relations which in turn generate particular properties which can be used to distinguish . . . [them] . . . from others in particular contexts” (xvii). Gracia’s familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity stands at the heart of his book. In what follows, I argue that, strictly speaking, this concept does not
Hispanic Identity, Its Origin, and Hispanic Philosophers
115
pick out and distinguish from other groups the group of people Gracia wishes to pick out and identify as Hispanic. Put otherwise, the extension of the concept is broader than Gracia wishes it to be. As we shall see, Gracia also articulates a geobiological conception of Hispanic identity that, though he does not distinguish it from the familial-historical conception (in fact, he seems to believe that the two conceptions are identical), has a narrower extension than the familial-historical conception. It turns out, however, that the geobiological conception is too empty for Gracia’s purposes, which is why it gives way, I think, to a Hispanic-world conception of Hispanic identity. In sum, Gracia develops three distinct notions of Hispanic identity, though he purports to develop just one. Let me begin with Gracia’s familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity. According to this conception, Hispanic identity is the identity of “a unique web of changing historical relations” (Gracia 2000c:49). To illustrate the sort of situation he has in mind, Gracia describes the case of four individuals, A, B, C, and D, where A is directly related to B, B to C, and C to D, though there are no direct relations between A and C, or between A and D, or between B and D. In Gracia’s account, the relations that connect the members of the group ABCD are relations (1) that “tie each member of the group with at least one other member of the group” and (2) that “allow us to separate the group ABCD from other groups” (49). How does Gracia conceptualize the relations he has in mind? He conceptualizes them, I believe, as historical events. He writes, for example, that “the history of Hispanics is a history of a group of people, a community united by historical events” (Gracia 2000c:50; emphasis added). More expansively, he asserts that the unity of Hispanics “is a historical unity founded on relations. King John II of Portugal has nothing in common with me, but both of us are tied by a series of events that relate us and separate us from Queen Elizabeth II and Martin Luther King” (50; emphasis added). In Gracia’s view, then, to be Hispanic is to be a member of a community all of whose members are tied, or related, to at least one other member of the community by a historical event or a series of historical events. Of course, Gracia wants the familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity to involve a bit more than this. To be Hispanic is to be a member of a distinct and unique community (again, what he calls “a unique web of changing historical relations”) and not of just any community whose members are tied to one another by a series of historical events. Thus, Gracia wants also to identify a criterion for distinguishing the historical community of Hispanics
116
Hispanic/L atino Identit y
from other historical communities. In other words, he wants to identify a criterion for distinguishing the historical events and multiple series of historical events that constitute the Hispanic community from the historical events and multiple series of historical events that constitute other historical communities. Gracia explains the criteria he identifies for this purpose by resorting to his conception of the Hispanic community as a sort of family. “Now, families are formed by marriages,” he writes. “So we are entitled to ask: Is there a point in history when our Hispanic family came to be? . . . We must find a point in history when we came together, and this, I propose, is the encounter of Iberia and America. It makes no sense to speak of Hispanics before 1492. Our family first came into being because of the events which the encounter unleashed” (Gracia 2000c:50–51; emphasis added). It is obvious, I suppose, that being a historical event or a series of historical events that relates Hispanics cannot be Gracia’s criterion for distinguishing Hispanic historical events and series of historical events from non-Hispanic historical events and series of historical events, for, in his account, being related by Hispanic historical events and series of historical events is precisely what makes someone Hispanic, or a member of the Hispanic community, in the first place. Thus, Gracia looks for a different criterion, which is causal relatedness to a particular historical event. That event, the encounter between Iberia and America, is what engendered the Hispanic community. For Gracia, it seems, the historical events and series of historical events that constitute the Hispanic community are exactly those events and series of events that were “unleashed” by Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the Americas in 1492. As I interpret Gracia, then, he suggests that someone is Hispanic, or a member of the Hispanic community, if, and only if, she is related to at least one other individual through an event, or events, the character of which was causally conditioned by events stemming from—or, again, “unleashed” by— the encounter of 1492. For the sake of concision, I shall say that Gracia suggests that someone is Hispanic, or a member of the Hispanic community, if, and only if, she satisfies the familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity. Now, the problem with this criterion, plainly, is that it is too broad. That is, it permits us to count as Hispanic indefinitely many more individuals than Gracia is willing to count as Hispanic. Consider, for example, the case of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., whom Gracia does not count as Hispanic. It would be very difficult to show, I think, that his life, or that of any other African American, involved no events or series of events relating him to
Hispanic Identity, Its Origin, and Hispanic Philosophers
117
other people the character of which events or series of events was causally conditioned by events stemming from Columbus’s arrival in America. Flip Wilson made the point better than I can in his 1967 televised comic monologue “Christopher Columbus”: At thirty-five, he’d gotten out of grammar school. He arranged an audience with the queen, Queen Isabel. Isabel Johnson, that was the queen’s name. She asked him about this American project. And Chris tells her, “If I don’t discover America, there’s not gonna be a Benjamin Franklin, or a Star-Spangled Banner, no land of the free, and home of the brave, and no Ray Charles.” When the queen heard “no Ray Charles” she panicked. The queen said, “Ray Charles? You gonna fi nd Ray Charles? He in America?” Chris said, “Damned right, that’s where all the records come from.” So the queen’s running through the halls of the castle, “Chris gon’ fi ne Ray Charles. He goin’ to America on that boat. What you say.” (quoted in Sollors and Dietrich 1994:6)
Martin Luther King Jr., Flip Wilson, Ray Charles, and, for that matter, millions of non-Hispanic and non–African American inhabitants of the United States satisfy Gracia’s familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity, as I have construed it. Again, the familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity is too broad. That, I think, is why Gracia also sketches a geobiological conception of Hispanic identity. By doing so he suggests that satisfying the familial-historical conception is at best a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, for being a member of the Hispanic community that someone is Hispanic, or a member of the Hispanic community, only if (but not if and only if ) she is related to at least one other individual through an event or events, the character of which was causally conditioned by events stemming from—or, again, “unleashed” by—the encounter of 1492. Thus, Gracia can justify the view that the Hispanic community includes neither King, nor Wilson, nor Charles. Consider, then, Gracia’s (2000c) geobiological conception of Hispanic identity, which tells us that “Hispanics are the group of people comprised by the inhabitants of the countries of the Iberian peninsula after 1492 and what were to become the colonies of those countries after the encounter between Iberia and America took place, and by descendants of these people who live in other countries (e.g., the United States) but preserve some link to those people” (48).
118
Hispanic/L atino Identit y
I refer to this conception as geobiological for it relies on geographical and biological criteria to limit the extension of the concept of Hispanic identity. The geographical criterion is being a post-1492 inhabitant of the region of Iberia or a post-1492 inhabitant of one of the regions of Latin America that was to become one of Spain’s or Portugal’s colonies. The biological criterion is being a descendant of people who live or have lived in one of these geographical regions and who preserve “some link” to the Iberian or Latin American Hispanics from whom they are descended. Through the reference to the year 1492, Gracia’s geobiological conception of Hispanic identity alludes to the encounter between Iberia and America but does not entail that Hispanics be related to one another by events the character of which was causally conditioned by events “unleashed” by the encounter. Strictly speaking, then, the geobiological conception of Hispanic identity abstracts from historical events. In other words, it is logically possible, if not at all probable, that there exists someone, now or in the past, who satisfies the geobiological conception of Hispanic identity but not the familialhistorical conception. Gracia’s geobiological conception of Hispanic identity is too empty. Although it mentions the year 1492, it makes no reference to the events of that year, or to any other historical events, and so fails to capture the historically formed, familial specificity of Hispanic life that Gracia wishes to capture. As we have seen, however, the familial-historical conception of Hispanic identity is also wanting. In my reading, Gracia’s most persuasive attempt to do justice to the rich, historical distinctiveness of Hispanic life is in his discussion in chapter 5 of a Hispanic world characterized everywhere by mestizaje (roughly, “mixed-blood-ness”). Here he accords particular emphasis to the cultural mixture that animates the language, religion, art, architecture, music, and cuisine of the Hispanic world (Gracia 2000c:115ff.). Gracia’s examples of cultural mestizaje suggest an approach to the question of Hispanic identity different from the ones he otherwise pursues. To be precise, they suggest that the contours of Hispanic identity will be most usefully limned not by philosophical attempts to say in a general and definitive way what membership in a transnational Hispanic community requires but by empirically dense and historically informed descriptions of Hispanic life that bring to light the specific, weblike, cultural connections that constitute the Hispanic world. Let me now turn to the three topics that, in addition to the argument for Hispanic identity, I wish to discuss here.
Hispanic Identity, Its Origin, and Hispanic Philosophers
119
THE ORIGINS OF HISPANIC IDENTITY
In connection to the question of origins, I have a small quibble. In particular, I want to question Gracia’s emphasis, throughout his book, on the year 1492. By treating Columbus’s appearance in the Americas as the event that spawns Hispanic identity, Gracia misleadingly separates the formation of Hispanic identity from the modern history of the Atlantic World that precedes Columbus’s voyage. That history begins, arguably, in 1441, when Portuguese members of the Order of Christ (a military order first produced by the Crusades) landed on the West Coast of Africa. Indeed, some scholars have held that the Atlantic World was initially a world of the eastern Atlantic, an arena wherein Europeans and Africans forged a new social reality that was transported westward after Columbus’s voyage, wreaking havoc on the world of the American Indians. By beginning his story in 1492 rather than 1441, and by permitting Africans to enter the picture only in 1518 (when the first license to bring slaves into the Americas was granted by Charles V), Gracia lets disappear from view the fact that many of the institutions and practices emerging in the New World after 1492—for example, black slavery and plantation agriculture—had their origins in the eastern Atlantic and in Portugal’s encounters with Africa prior to 1492 (e.g., slave plantations in Madeira). Thus, he tends to obscure the roots of Hispanic identity in Europe’s encounter with Africa and erroneously to accord Africans a secondary, belated role in a story line that highlights and gives primacy to Iberia’s encounter with America. COMMON NAMES/POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
I turn now to a second quibble. In his conclusion to chapter 3, Gracia (2000c) writes the following in response to the argument that Hispanic Americans need a common name to strengthen their political clout: This is, indeed, a strong argument. . . . The problem with it is that it does not properly take into account the diverse character and needs of the various groups which are covered by the name. Politically, the name does not produce the right results and may in fact be counterproductive. Puerto Ricans do not have the same needs as Chicanos, or Argentineans as Venezuelans, for example. Whether we speak of international or national politics, the use of one name need not be a good thing if the proper emphasis on the diversity of Hispanic groups is not maintained. The
120
Hispanic/L atino Identit y
justification of one name should not be based on politics, but on historical fact. (67)
My quibble here is with the notion of politics that animates Gracia’s remarks. For example, I do not see a good reason for assuming that justification by appeal to political considerations and justification by appeal to considerations of historical fact are mutually exclusive. And I do not see that the particular political consideration in question—that Hispanics need a common name to strengthen their political clout—rules out taking into account the diverse character and needs of different Hispanic groups. To argue that, in some contexts, the use of a common name is politically needful is not necessarily to deny that there will be contexts in which pragmatic political considerations argue against the use of a common name. Finally, it seems to me that answers to questions like, Do Puerto Ricans have the same needs as Chicanos? will almost always be decided in the course of political arguments among Chicanos, among Puerto Ricans, and between Chicanos and Puerto Ricans regarding their respective needs/interpretations. Thus, I do not see a good reason to stipulate once and for all, as Gracia seems to do, that Puerto Ricans do not have the same needs as Chicanos, or Argentineans as Venezuelans, and so forth. HISPANICS IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
In summarizing his understanding of the status of Hispanics in American philosophy, Gracia (2000c) writes, The questions we want to answer have to do with the limited number of Hispanics in philosophy, the small number of established Hispanic philosophers, and the general indifference of non-Hispanic American philosophers and Hispanic-American philosophers to issues particularly related to Hispanics and Hispanic thought. My suggestion is that one reason behind all these facts is that Hispanics in general are perceived as foreigners; we are not thought to be Americans. (180)
Here Gracia argues that the perception of Hispanics as foreigners is an important factor in explaining the marginal status of Hispanics and Hispanic philosophical thought in the American philosophical community. And, to be sure, there is some truth in what he says. Still, my intuition is that
Hispanic Identity, Its Origin, and Hispanic Philosophers
121
Gracia’s argument needs some modification, precisely because, as he elsewhere acknowledges, the American philosophical community does not marginalize all other philosophers and traditions of philosophical thought that are perceived to be foreign (non-American), such as the English, French, and German traditions of philosophical thought. That being the case, one must be a bit skeptical of the claim that perceived foreignness per se explains the American philosophical community’s marginalization of Hispanic philosophers and Hispanic philosophical thought. An equally significant explanatory factor, I believe, is that Hispanic identity, as distinct, say, from English, French, and German national identities, is, in the United States, typically perceived as a nonwhite, nonblack, and nonAsian racial identity. This was evident, for example, when in the first sentence of a recent New York Times article it was reported that blacks and Hispanics are far more likely than whites to be stopped and searched by New York City police officers. And it was evident when, in the early days of the Ricky Martin craze, there was debate among my seventh-grade daughter and her friends as to whether Ricky Martin was “really” Hispanic, for his hair and fair complexion made him look white. So, again, Hispanic identity in the United States is, at least in part, a socially constructed racial identity. Thus, Hispanics, as distinct from English, French, and German “Euroforeigners,” are perceived as racial others, and Hispanic philosophy, in contrast to the philosophy of English, French, and “Euroforeigners,” is perceived as the philosophy of racial others. If American philosophy marginalizes Hispanics, it is in part, I suspect, because Hispanics, having been racialized as nonwhite, are subject to anti-Hispanic racism. Sometimes anti-Hispanic racism is explicit, but more often, in professional contexts like that of the American Philosophical Association, it takes the form of what Adrian Piper (1996) calls second-order discrimination. In this respect, the situation of Hispanics in American philosophy is not dissimilar to the situation of African Americans in American philosophy.