ONE Presidents, Politics, and War
If you’re going to be involved in some type of foreign activity that is going to t ake resources a nd entail r isks to forces, you need to do it i n a m anner t hat is both most practical a nd most effective, but at t he same t ime t ry to keep your political support at home, i n terms of t he Congress, i n terms of t he A merican public, a nd w ith t he election c ycles, both m idterm elections a s well as presidential elections.
—JOHN BRENNAN
THIS C HAPTER I NTRODUCES a new c onceptual f ramework for u nderstanding the influence of electoral politics on presidential decision making i n war. It conceptualizes electoral pressures as a conditional source of constraint on a leader’s room for maneuver, which may push or pull presidents toward more c autious or more aggressive courses of action depending on t heir perception of t he strategic a nd electoral stakes. It t hen outlines five mechanisms t hat explain precisely how a n i ncumbent’s desire for reelection i nfluences decisions concerning m ilitary a nd d iplomatic strategy, a longside t he conditions u nder which each mechanism m ight be ex pected to operate. While the domestic political calendar plays a crucial role in mediating t he significance of electoral considerations, it does not do so in a linear fashion. Rather, t he i mpact of electoral pressures varies quantitatively a nd qualitatively across the four-year c ycle. By plotting these five mechanisms of constraint onto a model of the electoral cycle, the chapter illustrates how the domestic political calendar generates a rhythm of decision making that may be observed during each of t he major wars examined i n t he remainder of the book.
Warrior Politicians
In approaching decisions about m ilitary a nd d iplomatic s trategy i n war, U.S. presidents have dual responsibilities. On t he one hand, t hey a re commanders i n chief, responsible for pursuing courses of action t hey deem to be i n t he national interest. On the other hand, as elected officeholders, they must ensure that any course of action they choose carries minimal electoral r isk to their personal political f uture. In thinking about how electoral constraints a ffect wartime decision making, then, we can employ a useful heuristic that conceptualizes decision making a s a n attempt to balance t wo sets of preferences, a s i llustrated i n figure 1.1. 1 This conceptualization may be considered a k ind of t wo-level game i n which t he president is d riven by concerns about the national interest at the international level and political self-interest at the domestic level.2
On one side of this balance is the strategic preference of the president. This refers to the course of action on the table that the president perceives to carry optimal characteristics in terms of military and diplomatic utility. The way in which this preference manifests in practice will of course vary depending on several contingent factors, including the nature of the broader war a ims being pursued a nd t he president’s a ssessment of t he relative costs a nd benefits of the proposed action. For the purposes of this study, however, the precise origins of a president’s strategic preferences fall outside the scope of a nalysis. This i s because t he book seeks to examine how electoral constraints cause presidents to deviate f rom what t hey m ight otherwise have done. To do t his, we need to k now what leaders’ preferences entail, but not necessarily where they come from.
FIGURE 1.1 Presidential preference alignment. (Image by author.)
On t he other side of t his decision-making process is a president’s electoral preference. This refers to the course of action the president understands to carry m inimal r isk to h is or her electoral fortunes. Electoral pressures a re conceptualized as constraints on decision making, rather than independent sources of strategic preferences. A s such, t hey a re denoted a s a n i ntervening variable in this model, acting to variously push and pull presidents away f rom options t hey deem to be strategically optimal. The precise character of t his preference depends on t he president’s u nderstanding of t he electorate’s likely reaction to a proposed course of action.
Not every decision made by a president carries electoral significance, of course. Indeed, t he public is t raditionally t hought to k now l ittle a nd care less a bout foreign p olicy. Yet more recent s tudies of m ass attitudes m ake clear that public attentiveness varies across issue a reas, a nd decisions involving t he commitment of m ilitary forces abroad a re particularly l ikely to “activate” public opinion.3 During an ongoing conflict, when the costs of military engagements a re most v ividly felt a nd placed u nder a spotlight by political elites a nd t he media, many of t he decisions t hat reach t he president’s desk do tend to garner public attention, a nd i n ways t hat i nfluence both voting patterns a nd t urnout.4 It is not without reason that elected officeholders worry a bout public appraisals of t heir war records. I n t his sense, it is not circular logic but political reality to suggest that electoral politics a ffect wartime decision making because wartime decision making a ffects electoral politics.
Nevertheless, d ifferent courses of action w ill vary i n terms of t heir salience, a nd by extension the degree of political risk they entail. The deployment of large numbers of boots on t he g round may naturally be expected to i nvite perhaps t he g reatest level of public attention, for i nstance, since t his is the most direct and obvious way in which the costs of war may be perceived by the public. It will be particularly acute, moreover, if those t roops a re tasked w ith t ime-a nd t roop-intensive m issions that put soldiers d irectly i n harm’s way, a s i n attrition strategies, or counterinsurgency campaigns. While t he average voter m ight not be expected to u nderstand t he i ntricacies of relevant m ilitary doctrine, t hese approaches a re more l ikely to fail the “Dover test,” whereby images of flag-draped coffins returning f rom overseas battlefields t rigger a decline of public support for a war. Even i n cases where public sensitivity to casualty rates is reduced, scrutiny from the media or political elites can provide important cues to the public in ways that raise
the electoral stakes of a ny decision. 5 Strategies t hat entail less r isk to U.S. forces or t hat may be kept secret f rom t he public, such a s t hose i nvolving t he u se of special forces, d rones, a nd c yber technology, m ight reasonably be considered less salient a nd t herefore less electorally significant. Yet even here, ethical, moral, or legal concerns c an generate p olitically d amaging headlines. The i nfamous “Black Hawk Down” scenario i n Mogadishu, for i nstance, demonstrates t hat even m issions of relatively low human a nd financial cost can backfire, with political consequences that dwarf their strategic significance.6
Ultimately, however, t his is a study of presidential decision making, not public opinion. A s such, what matters i n establishing t he electoral preference in this model is not objective assessments of what public attitudes actually were in a ny given case, but rather what the president perceived them to be. Moreover, t he president’s decision-making process u sually i nvolves perceptions of latent as well as active public opinion, since presidents necessarily need to gauge the expected public reaction to a decision before that decision is made.7 In coming to t hese judgments, presidents may u se a variety of d ifferent i ndicators. Most academic studies of public opinion a nalyze mass polling d ata, yet while approval ratings a nd t rends may be generally instructive for presidents, attitudes toward more specific courses of action m ight show up only in more sophisticated surveys.8 Media coverage, congressional sentiment, a nd t he v iews of other political elites may be monitored a s a lternative or additional bellwethers of the public mood on a ny g iven issue.9 As seasoned politicians, of course, presidents may simply rely on t heir own political instincts to a nticipate how voters might react.10 Finally, in estimating current a nd especially f uture public opinion, it should be remembered that political leaders can be, a nd often a re, w rong.11 While it may still be instructive to examine opinion polls, congressional sentiment, a nd media coverage, then, these a re not foolproof proxies for presidential perceptions of electoral risks. It is essential to strive to u ncover evidence of presidents actually engaging with a nd speaking about their thoughts on the public mood wherever possible, as will be done in the empirical chapters that follow.12
In l ine w ith t his book’s focus on decision making during a n ongoing conflict, t he outcomes i n t his heuristic refer to m ajor decisions t aken by t he president to escalate or de-escalate a conflict to which t he United States i s a lready committed. I n t he a bstract, t his m ay i nclude a w ide variety of m ilitary actions, f rom operational decisions (such a s t he authorization or
cessation of bombing programs or a lterations to the number of t roops committed to a conflict) to broader strategic shifts (such a s changes to t he a ims being sought t hrough m ilitary means). I n t he d iplomatic sphere, it could i nclude various bargaining positions adopted during negotiations designed to bring a bout p eace t hrough t he g ranting of concessions or t he u se of t hreats to generate concessions f rom a n opponent. Yet t he i ntended utility of t his heuristic l ies not i n its generalizability across categories of decisions so much as its ability to provide a coherent explanation of exactly how electoral pressures mattered in the intrinsically significant cases explored in subsequent chapters. The scope of decisions to be examined is therefore limited by t he actor i nvolved a nd t he h istorical context rather t han some predetermined class of actions. In other words, t his book is i nterested i n t he major decisions t hat reached t he president’s desk during t he wars i n Korea, Vietnam, a nd Iraq, a s derived f rom a review of t he h istorical l iterature of each conflict.
In figure 1.1, O utcome A m ay be considered t he s trategically optimal course of action, which reflects t he strategic preference i n a ny g iven case. If electoral considerations have no effect on decision making—akin to t he null hypothesis in this a nalysis—we would expect to be able to observe a correlation between t he strategic preference a nd t he option u ltimately chosen. If, however, a s is a rgued here, electoral pressures do matter, we would expect t he decision to look meaningfully d ifferent, w ith t he strategic preference pushed off course by such electoral constraints, a s represented by Outcome B. A s t he following section explores, t he president may choose to adapt t he proposed course of action i n various ways—for i nstance, by a ltering t he size of proposed t roop deployments, employing a lternative means of (de-)escalation, or delaying a decision altogether. The primary point, however, is t hat t his course of action w ill not be predicted by a n examination of t he strategic preference a lone.
The degree of (mis)alignment between the president’s strategic and electoral preferences is a n i mportant factor determining t he degree to which electoral pressures shape decision making. In general, it may be reasonably i nferred t hat a s t he gap between each preference i ncreases, so does t he potential i mpact t hat electoral constraints may have, a s more adjustment w ill be required to bring a proposed course of action to a n acceptable balance. E xtreme cases of near perfect a lignment or near total m isalignment may a lso be observed. In t he former scenario, i n which a proposed course of
action is deemed both strategically optimal a nd of v irtually no electoral risk (i.e., because overwhelming public approval is a nticipated in response), electoral pressures w ill be pushing against a n open door. More permissive t han constraining in nature, they may in this situation be considered causally epiphenomenal. The latter scenario, i n which presidents may struggle to fi nd a ny viable course of action that sufficiently balances both their strategic and t heir electoral preferences, is more i nteresting. In t his case, presidents may be forced to pick between t he u npalatable choice of prioritizing either strategic optimality or political self-interest. Indeed, i n the empirical part of this book, we w ill see i nstances of both t he noble a nd c ynical outcomes of t his conundrum.
Go Big or Go Home: Mechanisms of (De-)escalation
Electoral pressures push a nd pull presidents, t hen, but i n what d irection? How might the relative a lignment between preferences encourage a n incumbent to double down on a n ongoing conflict? What k ind of balance m ight i nstead incentivize a commander in chief to climb down the ladder of escalation? I n t hinking a bout t hese questions, t hree mechanisms of electoral constraint are instructive.
Delay
When presidents perceive a clear need to increase the level of military commitment to a conflict, but fear a political backlash a s a n election approaches, t heir first preference is likely to be to delay making any decision until after polling d ay. This mechanism w ill be particularly prominent i f t he relative electoral risk of escalation strongly outweighs the strategic opportunity at s take. To take an obvious example, if on October 1 it is deemed militarily desirable to deploy a reserve battalion to shore up security in a certain position, but doing so r isks t he prospect of provoking a n extreme political reaction at home g iven recent casualty t rends, t his course of action would be a prime candidate for the delay mechanism. Even i f t he proposed action is deemed absolutely essential, however, t he timing of that decision may be more flexible. Since the electoral risks of
making u npopular changes to strategy a re a mplified t he closer one gets to a n election, t he president m ay be w illing to accept some s ubstantive cost of postponement to avoid suffering a ny political fallout when it matters most.13 For i nstance, i f t he position i n question is a nticipated to weaken a nd u ltimately fall w ithin six months u nless reinforcements a re sent, t he president may simply wait u ntil a fter the election before belatedly sending the required t roops, hoping t hat t he status quo policy could at least prevent a more serious setback in the meantime.
Similarly, t his mechanism m ight o ccur even i f t he proposed course of action i s expected to u ltimately gain a significant s trategic advantage or even t urn the t ide of the war i n ways that would garner public acclaim. Both r isky m ilitary gambles w ith potential for a t remendous political upside a nd slow-burning military strategies that will take time to yield visible success a re u sually best left u ntil a fter t he election. Much better to pursue s uch courses of action early i n t he following electoral period, g iving t hem more t ime to succeed, or otherwise a llowing political space for t heir failure to be forgotten by voters w ith notoriously short t ime horizons.14 E xamples here include major offensive operations or shifts to a counterinsurgency strategy.
To demonstrate t he existence of t his delay mechanism, t here a re several observable implications that the case studies presented in this book should be able to identify. First, of course, it should be possible to find evidence that a change i n s trategy was deemed necessary a nd p erceived a s s uch by t he president. Indications t hat t he president specifically favored a n escalatory course of action would also ideally be identifiable. Next, we must be able to show that a decision was deferred, in the sense that viable opportunities to review the status quo strategy were not pursued. Relatedly, we must be able to show t hat t he reason for t he delay was electoral i n nature. Finally, i f t he decision was truly delayed and not simply ignored, we should be able to find evidence of t he same problem being considered i n t he postelection phase, l ikely w ith a degree of u rgency not h itherto seen, a nd a n escalatory decision being made very quickly.
Dampening
If t he president a ssesses t he strategic cost of delaying a decision to be more significant t han t he electoral r isk of doing so, or i f a preelection decision is
made necessary by c ircumstances outside of t he president’s control (for i nstance, due to fi xed deadlines i mposed by i nternational organizations, or i mmediate t hreats p osed by other actors), p olitical sensitivities remain a c ritical component of t he decision-making process. Under t he dampening mechanism, escalatory courses of action deemed to carry high utility in military a nd d iplomatic terms w ill be watered down, w ith t heir most politically “noisy” aspects removed to satisfy the president’s electoral preference.
There a re t wo ways t his may manifest i n policy deliberations. First, t he president can choose to employ a broadly similar method of escalation while scaling down its intensity. For instance, more t roops may be the order of the d ay, but a president could send lower numbers t han m ilitarily desirable, or i nsist on adopting r ules of engagement or a strategic approach that employs these forces i n less costly ways, such a s a ssuming active defense rather than offensive operations. Second, a president m ay choose to adopt a d ifferent method of escalation that carries less salience or electoral risk.15 For instance, i f it is deemed strategically optimal to destroy a n enemy’s m ilitary i ndustrial base through strategic bombing operations, covert sabotage operations m ight plausibly be used instead to achieve some measure of the same goal.16 This mechanism operates i n a fairly straightforward manner. In a “first c ut,” proposals brought to t he White House must pass a test of “political acceptability.”17 If they are deemed to carry an unacceptable level of political r isk, t hey w ill be rejected, often before a ny serious i n-depth s trategy review has even begun. After this initial screening, the remaining options w ill be a ssessed across a range of d ifferent metrics, of which political “noisiness” will remain an important one among many others. The remaining proposals w ill now likely be finessed to provide what the president perceives to be t he most optimal plan i n m ilitary or d iplomatic terms w ith a s ufficiently low level of political risk. Spur
The spur mechanism describes a scenario in which presidents dial up the bellicosity of a ny option u nder d iscussion i n a n effort to satisfy t heir electoral preferences, despite such escalation not a ligning w ith what is deemed to be t he strategically optimal course of action. This is in some sense the logical m irror of the dampening mechanism. Typically, this would entail a president
responding to concerns that a belligerent mood among voters might imperil h is or her political future should a preferred course of action be branded excessively “weak” or “soft.” Hence, we might expect to see decisions to send more troops than strictly needed to a conflict, or the authorization of particularly bold major operations in the run-up to an election.
To observe t he existence of t his mechanism, we would not expect to see substantial evidence of presidents expressing support for escalatory courses of action on the grounds of strategic optimality. Instead, we might find evidence of t hem favoring a much more constrained course of action—or, i ndeed, t he status quo—on t he g rounds of m ilitary or d iplomatic utility. We would then expect to uncover evidence of the president perceiving a generally hawkish existing public mood a nd adopting a course of action i n l ine w ith these more belligerent tendencies.
Which of t he t hree preceding mechanisms operate depends i n part on t he nature a nd relative a lignment between a president’s strategic a nd electoral preferences, as illustrated in figure 1.2:
1. If a president perceives an escalatory course of action to be strategically optimal, but their electoral preference points toward a de-escalatory decision a s less politically risky and it is possible to leave the decision until a less politically sensitive period in the future, the delay mechanism is likely to be observed.
2. If a president perceives an escalatory course of action to be strategically optimal, but their electoral preference points toward a de-escalatory decision a s less politically risky and it is not possible to delay making a decision, the dampening mechanism is likely to be observed.
3. When the president deems a de-escalatory course of action to be strategically optimal, while voters are perceived to favor a more escalatory approach, the s pur mechanism is most likely to operate.
4. When the preferences are aligned, electoral constraints push against an open door and thus carry minimal causal significance.
By reconceptualizing electoral pressures a s a constraint that can push or pull the president in different directions depending on their perception of t he strategic a nd electoral stakes, it is possible to model t he nuanced way i n
Strategic preference
Escalator yDe-escalatory
Electoral preference
Escalation
EscalatoryDe-escalatory YesNo
Possibility of delay
Electoral preference
Escalatory
De-escalatory
De-escalation
FIGURE 1.2 (De-)escalatory mechanisms of electoral constraint. (Image by author.)
which elections have a conditional impact on presidential behavior in war. The three (de-)escalatory mechanisms described in this section—delay, dampening, a nd s pur—provide key conceptual tools t hrough which we can identify exactly how presidents respond to t he pressures generated by t he ballot box.
The Rhythm of the Electoral Cycle
The relative strength of t hese constraints does not just vary based on t he a lignment of the president’s preferences, however. The stage of the four-year electoral c ycle is a lso a c rucial element to t ake i nto account, since d ifferent phases w ill carry varying degrees of political sensitivity. Building on earlier discursive models of the impact that the American electoral cycle has on foreign policy more broadly, I begin with the general notion that the influence of electoral considerations r ises w ith i ncreased proximity to a presidential election.18 Since t he public tends to vote retrospectively, a nd d iscounts t he significance of events a s t hey recede i nto t he past, it follows t hat t he audience costs for a ny u npopular policy w ill be g reatest on t he eve of Election Day.19 At root, this u nderpins a host of studies that find increased congruence between foreign p olicy choices a nd pu blic preferences a s a n
election approaches.20 Drawing on t he balancing heuristic described above, it c an t herefore be s urmised t hat a s a n election approaches, t he weight accorded to the electoral preference increases, and in cases where this misaligns w ith t he strategic preference, we m ight expect particularly notable departures f rom t he course of action originally deemed strategically optimal. By contrast, early i n t he electoral c ycle we m ight expect t he null hypothesis—t hat electoral constraints have no impact—to be supported.
The connection between t he electoral c ycle a nd t he strength of electoral constraints is, however, less l inear a nd more nuanced t han t his simple picture, for three reasons. First, it stands to reason that the anticipation of a campaign season may exert a s much of a n i nfluence on decision making a s being in the midst of a campaign. Electorally optimal strategies might take some t ime to y ield success on the battlefield, while other necessary yet electorally r isky strategies m ight be better i nitiated before t he political spotlight is f ully on. In either case, i f we restrict our a nalysis to a n election year, or t he t hree months preceding a n election, a s much existing research does, we a re l iable to m istake absence of evidence for evidence of absence t hanks to the limited time frame.
Second, a nd relatedly, it is not simply f uture elections t hat matter. Sensitivity to what had been promised in the previous election plausibly matters in decision making too, especially i f a president is l ikely to be r unning for reelection i n part on t he basis of having demonstrated a n ability to f ulfill t he mandate voters gave h im or her t he fi rst t ime a round. It is not a xiomatic t hat t he pressure to deliver on one’s campaign pledges w ill be i mmediately felt, of course. Indeed, not having to face voters for a nother four years, it may be t hat campaign rhetoric offers only weak constraints on decision making to begin w ith.21 By t he t ime t hat a president begins to t hink about a bid for reelection, however, t hese earlier commitments could come back to bite. The extent to which t his is t he case w ill of course depend on how t he public mood may have changed over time, but ongoing wars tend not to i ncrease i n popularity, meaning u nfulfilled pledges to bring t hem to a n end a re likely to carry electoral r isk as incumbents seeks to bolster their records a s elected officials who do what they promised voters they would do.22
Third, it seems fair to a rgue t hat it is not just presidential elections t hat matter, but congressional ones too. Though t he president’s personal political survival is not d irectly at stake, t he loss of political capital t hat follows a severe loss of support i n Congress can jeopardize both t he practical
ability to pursue various policy objectives as a n officeholder a nd of course a president’s reelection prospects t hereafter. Indeed, t he m idterms represent a moment when t he balance of power i n Congress can change, w ith a significant i mpact on a president’s ability to push through legislative priorities for t he remainder of h is or her term, or i ndeed pursue a ny proposed m ilitary strategy f ree of congressional interference. Through its formal powers, Congress can u ndermine such strategies by w ithholding appropriations; a nd t hrough its informal powers, such as in holding public hearings a nd providing scrutiny, it can make it hard to sustain a n u npopular strategy.23 With t he president’s popularity so t ied to h is or her party’s fortunes, a similarly s trong spotlight shines on t he actions of t he commander i n chief during t hese electoral periods.24 An increased sensitivity to voter opinion on wartime decisions is therefore only natural. And since the party of a newly elected president tends to suffer losses at t he fi rst set of congressional elections it faces, it is not only t he voters t hat presidents need to worry about. In a n effort to m itigate t his electoral t hreat a nd preserve political capitol, a president may face incentives to appease the faction that is expected to make gains, even superficially.
The electoral cycle plays an i mportant role in regulating t he strength of the three mechanisms of escalation describe above, then. Yet electoral pressures a re a lso qualitatively d ifferent across various phases of t he four-year c ycle, w ith t he domestic political calendar itself generating constraints of its own. Two further mechanisms may now be outlined.
Hangover
Presidents a re bound not only by pressures related to a n upcoming election; t hey also face constraints that derive from what they promised to voters during the previous campaign. The hangover mechanism refers to the degree to which a president’s strategic preference diverges from a course of action indicated in a prior campaign pledge. While this mechanism therefore operates according to a similar balancing logic a s t hose outlined above, its retrospective character introduces several distinct features that warrant separate ex amination.
Campaign promises a re policy prescriptions c rafted i n a way t hat a ligns w ith a candidate’s political interests in the middle of an election season. Not
“Andrew Payne has written a truly excellent book. From the Korean and Vietnam Wars to the recent conflict in Iraq, his copiously researched and cogently argued case studies persuasively underline the importance of elections in shaping crucial presidential decisions. This is a mustread for anyone interested in the politics of America’s wars.”
STEVEN CASEY, author of The War Beat, Pacific: The American Media at War Against Japan
“With its razor-sharp conceptual framework and meticulously researched cases—backed up by a treasure trove of sources—this book opens a new window on the many and often surprising effects of the U.S. electoral cycle on presidential decision-making in times of war.”
LOUISE FAWCETT, author of Iran and the Cold War
“Payne has written an important book on the impact of the electoral cycle on American foreign policy. His well-conceived model for how domestic political considerations affect decisionmaking is grounded on finely crafted and well-researched case studies of the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. An important contribution to a crucial dimension of American foreignpolicy making.”
WILLIAM B. QUANDT, author of Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics
“War on the Ballot is a richly detailed account of how electoral constraints affect presidential decision-making in war. In this important study of domestic politics and war, Payne shows how the shadow of an upcoming election can shape presidents’ choices—often with results that do not serve the voters well.”
ELIZABETH N. SAUNDERS , author of Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions
“Payne effectively demonstrates that domestic electoral politics does indeed affect presidential decisions, often decisively. He presents the argument in such a systematic and persuasive way that it will be very difficult to read his book and still see American wars in the same light.”
THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ , author of Henry Kissinger and American Power: A Political Biography
ANDREW PAYNE is a departmental lecturer in international relations at the University of Oxford.
COVER DESIGN: Elliott S. Cairns
COVER IMAGE: Everett Collection Inc / Alamy Stock Photo