affect, race, class

Affect, Race, and Class An Interpretive Reading of Caring Lahor DRUCILLA K. BARKER AND SUSAN F. FEINER

Over the past two decades the relationships between women's roles in social reproduction, women's subordinate position in paid labor markets, and the marginalization of caring labor in capitalist economies have emerged as central concerns in feminist economics. This attention is warranted because the transnational feminization of the labor force and the neoliberal policies associated with globalization impinge on the types of activities that have come to be called caring labor. Women have increased their participation in the paid-labor force but on a highly unequal footing. When relatively affluent women enter the labor market, they are able to use some of their income to purchase the domestic services no longer produced in the home, services provided mainly by poor women from minority, working-class, or ThirdWorld immigrant backgrounds. The pressures created by the neoliberal policies accompanying globalization leave these women with few options other than to participate in the poorly paid, insecure, and devalorized segments of the transnational market for domestic labor, often forgoing the care of their own children and families.

At least since the nineteenth century, caring for others has been associated with feminine identity. Caring labor—attending to the physical and emotional needs of others—has been considered the quintessential form of "women's work." But just what sort of work it is has been a matter of debate since at least the eighteenth century. This debate was part of the larger question concerning the appropriate way to specify the construction ofthe "economy" by drawing a boundary between those human activities that were part of the economy and those that were not. As the heterodox economist David Brennan has argued, the classical political economists began by narrowing the definition of what counted as economic activities to include only those activities for which people were paid a wage or those that created goods or services for exchange.' Activities undertaken for their own sake, such as gaz-

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ing at a sunset or writing a poem (unless it was for sale) were not considered economically productive; thus they were not considered work. To paraphrase Adam Smith, they make no contribution to the annual product of an economy. The feminist economist Nancy Folbre has shown that by the middle of the nineteenth century this work/nonwork, productive/unproductive dichotomy was firmly entrenched in both the United States and the British system of national accounts.^ The myriad of economically necessary activities that took place inside the household but outside monetary exchange were officially expunged from the realm of the economic.

Boundaries are, however, permeable. The importance of non-market activities—such as cooking, cleaning, shopping, and caring for dependents—to the functioning of the economy was apparent to many concerned scholars.

In the United States during the years between World War I and World War II, institutionalist economists, mainly women in Midwest land-grant universities, turned their attention to activities within the household and developed the field of consumption economics.' During the 1960s Marxist feminist scholars in the United States and in Britain turned their attention to women's work in the home, coining the term reproductive labor to describe it and analyze the ways in which it contributed to women's subordination.

The legacy of the institutionalists' work is somewhat unfortunate; it was absorbed by home economics and lost its critical edge."* The Marxist feminist work followed a much different trajectory. The concept of reproductive labor engendered considerable debate and laid the foundation for what came to be called caring labor. Caring labor, as stated above, is considered distinct from other types of reproductive labor; whether paid or unpaid, the quality of care received depends in part on the quality of the relationships connecting the givers and the receivers of care.

We will argue, however, that the ways in which the concept of caring labor has been articulated blunts the critical edge of the concept of reproductive labor for at least two reasons. First, the association between women and care is a controlling image refiecting feminine/masculine, public/private, market/nonmarket, selfishness/altruism dualisms. Feminist discourses on caring labor generally do not disrupt these dualisms but instead reinscribe the very antimonies they are challenging by masking the constitutive roles played by race, class, and nation in their construction. Moreover, as pointed out by Bergeron (in this issue of Frontiers) these discourses reinscribe heteronormative scripts that mask women's multiple and often contradictory relationships to social reproduction. Second, they implicitly cast the problem of care as a problem for individuals and families who enjoy the privileges of citizenship and are entitled to protection from the state. As the spectacles of

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Katrina, Darfur, Palestine, and Iraq have shown us, these lucky citizens are the privileged few. As the social critic Henry A. Giroux has argued, entire populations marked by race and class are disenfranchised and disposable.^ A critical discourse on care needs to open the door to an interrogation of just who is entitled to be cared for and why. This paper employs an interpretive approach to explore the discursive construction of caring labor in feminist economics. Finally, we suggest ways to employ it that do not reinscribe essentialist gender relations and other power relations of global capitalism.

AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH

Following the work of V. Spike Peterson,* we use the term "interpretive approach" to allow for a variety of post-positivist, feminist commitments.^ Interpretive approaches are particularly useful for feminist analysis because they provide a way to negotiate the tensions between the material and the representational, between power and knowledge, and between the subject as constituted through discourse and the subject as capable of resistance and agency. There are basically two possible objections to this approach. First, it seems to undermine the scientific status of feminist economics; and second, considering women as a political/discursive category rather than a natural one seems to be antithetical to the aim of feminist economics to speak on behalf of all women." It seems to undermine the goal to "hold economic thought to a standard that requires it to be more responsive to the needs and well-being of women and their families."' In other words, one of the objectives of feminist economists is to use a gender-infiected economics to improve the lives of all human beings, especially women. We argue that an interpretive approach is not antithetical to this Enlightenment impulse, but, on tbe contrary, is necessary to its realization. It is necessary because it facilitates a critical examination of the relationship between knowledge and power. This is also, however, what makes it controversial for feminist economists and other social scientists.

Exploring the knowledge/power nexus begins with the notion that the material and the representational are not radically separate. Meaning is constituted within discourses, so, as Foucault puts it, discourses are not just groups of signs, but "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak."'" The concept of discourses as practices implies that they refer not only to language, but also to social institutions and symbolic systems.

Similarly, knowledge consists of that "which one can speak in a discursive practice . . . it is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak ofthe objects with which he deals in his discourse."" As Foucault's

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subsequent genealogical work shows, the truth values of particular discursive formations are explained in terms of power. "Truth is a thing of this world . . . it induces regular effects of power."'^ What he calls the politics of truth determines what sorts of discourses are counted as true and who is permitted to speak the truth.

Feminist economists are embedded in a network of power relations by virtue of their connection to economics." Feminist economists enjoy the prestige of neoclassical economics while at the same time endeavor to bend its methodological commitments, especially statistical analysis and formal modeling, to anti-sexist, anti-racist, and anti-nationalist ends. However, the question of whether feminist economics can use an interpretive approach and still be considered to be doing economic science depends on what the purpose ofthat designation is." What are, as Foucault asks, "our aspirations to the kind of power that is presumed to accompany . . . science."'^ The answer for most feminist economists is to use economic knowledge to improve the human condition. In this connection to mainstream economics, however, lies the very real possibility that feminist economics will be appropriated by mainstream economic discourse. As Foucault has argued, unitary discourses are always willing to recolonize historically subjugated knowledges. That is to say, dominant discourses may seek to bring counterbegemonic discourses back into the fold, with all that implies for knowledge and power. For example, the rhetoric of gender equity and women's empowerment, articulated by the gender and development theorists, has been appropriated for the pro-growth polices of the World Bank in their report.

Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and

Voice}^ As Bergeron has argued, the Bank takes gendered social and cultural forces into account without sacrificing the core principles of economics. An interpretive approach is necessary to uncover the dynamics of these processes.'^ As Nancy Naples has argued in the context of social movement frames, to understand the ways in which they are co-opted to serve goals that are antithetical to feminism, it is necessary to understand the way that frames are "circulated, interpreted, and reinscribed with alternative meanings."'^ Finally, for the purposes of this analysis, an interpretive approach facilitates a deconstruction of the equality/difference dilemma that haunts feminism. In the case of feminist economics, women are either rational economic agents (equality) or relational selves (difference). The rational economic agent, economic man, is radically separate, motivated only by self-interest, and free of natural obligations. He, and we use the pronoun deliberately, is the disembodied liberal speaking subject of Enlightenment philosophy. An interpretive approach, which understands the subject as discursively consti-

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tuted, enables feminists to interrogate the gendered character of economic man without simply reversing the dualism and positing a connected, caring, and relational self in its place. It leaves room for a notion ofthe subject constituted through contradictory discursivefieldsthat create space for both accommodation and resistance. This is particularly important for the analysis of caring labor.

FROM SOCIAL REPRODUCTION TO CARING LABOR

Debates around social reproduction and caring labor in feminist economics are best understood in terms of the two intellectual traditions in the field, one informed by Marxist/socialist feminism and the other by liberal feminism." Early feminist work in economics following the liberal feminist tradition assumed that women's equality with men would come about as a result of their participation in paid labor on equal footing witb men. Women's subordinate position in paid labor markets was attributed to tbeir responsibility for the lioness's share of household production.^" Early feminist work in the Marxist/socialist political economy tradition understood gender oppression as resulting from sexual division of labor, which under capitalism meant the division between paid and unpaid, productive and reproductive, and domestic and waged labor. Women's emancipation in this tradition required that men engage in reproductive labor in the same way that women do. We will refer to these two broad traditions as Marxist/socialist feminist economics and liberal feminist ecotiomics.^^ Both link "women's work" and women's subordination, but the differences between household production and reproductive labor are more than semantic.

Liberal feminist economists do not treat household production as analytically separate from productive labor. That is, although analyzing the economics of household production requires explicitly accounting for the nonmarket value of time expended on household activities, these activities are forms of work like any other. The question is, how do women's household responsibilities influence their experiences in paid labor markets? To the extent that the influence is negative, housework and childcare stand in the way of gender equity. Barbara Bergmann, a contemporary feminist economist in the liberal tradition argues that women's household labor traditionally assigned to women be commodified and either purchased from business enterprises or provided by the state." Bergmann's position is aptly summarized in the title of her 1998 article, "The Only Ticket to Equality: Total Androgyny, Male Style." More recently, the philosopher Linda R. Hirshman echoed similar sentiments when she criticized the choice of elite women who drop out ofthe

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labor force to raise their families." She argued that although the repetitious, socially invisible, physical tasks of family life are necessary, they allow fewer opportunities for human flourishing than the public spheres of the market or the government. Opting out of the labor force is wrong, because in addition to denying society access to their talents and intelligence, these women cut off their own human development. For liberal feminists such as Bergmann and Hirshman, extolling caring labor or any form of household production will only reinforce women's subordinate status.

In the Marxist/socialist tradition in feminist economics, reproductive labor is analytically distinct from productive labor." From its inception, this new category presented considerable difficulties. Susan Himmelweit argued that forcing domestic labor into the category "work," which is derived from the Marxist notion of wage labor producing commodities for capital, renders invisible caring and other self-fulfilling activities.^^ Work is a purposeful activity that takes time and energy, forms part of a division of labor, and is separable from the person doing it. This concept of work is an abstraction not applicable even to all paid work, and its fit is even more problematic when extended outside that domain.

Himmelweit argues that activities such as childcare do not fit into the category work because the notion that work is separable from the person doing it is violated. Although it may seem appropriate to commodify many things formerly produced in the household, other things such as childcare, elder-care, and caring for the emotional needs of family, friends, and colleagues are qualitatively different. Caring labor should be considered analytically distinct from other sorts of reproductive labor. The distinction is that whether paid or unpaid, the quality of care received depends, in part, on the quality of the relationships connecting the givers and the receivers of care.^'^ Himmelweit's concern over treating caring labor as work is that it devalues the relational and self-fulfilling aspects of those activities. Moreover, people who perform caring activities are not considered real workers and the work remains largely invisible. Her conclusion is that caring and self-fulfilling activities will challenge the work/consumption dichotomy only if they are shared equally within households.

Concern over the commodification of caring labor is likewise found in the work of Nancy Folbre and Julie A. Nelson. Folbre's classic article argues that caring labor presents a paradox for feminist economists because the affective nature of care implies that it should be its own reward; however, if it does not command an economic return its global supply will be diminished." Later, an article by Folbre and Nelson begins with the concern that many of the caring activities and tasks formerly performed by family or friends are now

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being performed within relationships based purely on monetary exchange.^' Drawing a contrast between caring for and caring about, they argue that one ofthe distinctive things about care work is that it is undertaken for both love and money. Their concern is the effects of commodification on the quality of care.

AFFECT, REPRESENTATION, AND VALUE IN CARING LABOR

We share the concern of all three of these authors over the global supply of caring labor and agree that its affective component makes it theoretically distinct. However, theorizing the affective component as "caring about" leaves in place its gendered dualisms and invites no consideration of the ways in which the social value of caring labor is constituted by the social locations of the givers and receivers of care. Moreover, by restricting the concept of care metaphorically to the domestic sphere, it provides no space to interrogate why some populations are entitled to be cared for and cared about, while others are not afforded this privilege.

We begin with the poststructuralist rereading of caring labor by feminist economist Gillian Hewitson.^' She argues that if one begins with the assumption that biological difference between the sexes is the basis for the social differentiation between masculine and feminine genders, then general gender socialization allocates feminine traits to biological females and male traits to biological males. In this scenario, caring is a female trait because normal feminine identity is one believed to be naturally endowed with both the capacity and the desire to care for others. Normal masculine identity, on the other hand, is understood to be lacking these capacities. Feminists are then faced with the question of whether women should be socialized like men or whether women are in fact naturally different from men. In other words, the equality/difference dichotomy is left intact.

If, as in the liberal tradition, gender equality requires that women become more like men, then women must fit into a set of structures and meanings that are organized around male bodies. If, as in the socialist tradition, valorizing care requires a reorganization ofthe gender division of labor, then the problem is with the assumption that the sexual division of labor creates gender difference.'" In both cases it is the notion that sexual difference precedes gender difference that creates the impasse. If, however, we adopt a poststructuralist approach in which the real is constituted as meaningful through representations, then we open a space for theorizing sexual difference and sexed bodies. This space allows us to deconstruct the link between women and care and to theorize other embodied differences.^'

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Hewitson argues that sex/gender behaviors and practices are understood very differently when they are displayed by women rather than men." We argue that they are also understood differently according to differences in race, class, sexuality, and nation. In the United States, tax policies, welfare policies, and popular opinion extol the decisions of affluent women of European descent to drop out of the labor force to care for their children.

Poor black women, who must depend on the state as well as on their partners, are considered lazy and shiftless for the same decision. Poor black, Latina, and Filipina women who provide child care for the children of the affluent are considered "workers," even though they are poorly paid relative to what might be earned by a young woman of European descent. The difference lies in the political and cultural representations of those doing the care work and those being cared for.^^ Not only do race, class, and nation mutually constitute the value of caring labor; but the category itself, with it emphasis on the affective, nurturing qualities of care, reinscribes hierarchies of race, class, and nation. Sociologists Mignon Duffy, Evelyn Nakano Glenn, and Dorothy Roberts have explored the ways in which the affective component of caring labor is racialized.'"* Nakano Glenn argues that white women have been the public face of reproductive labor, and Roberts argues that the spiritual dimensions of domestic labor have been the province of white women. Both call attention to the fact that women of color are disproportionately represented in "back room" menial and manual tasks. Duffy's empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that the theoretical emphasis on nurturance privileges the experiences of white women and excludes the experiences of poor women and women of color.

Understanding the ways in which the affective (nurturing) quality of reproductive labor came to be racialized and separated from tbe productive aspect needs to begin with the productive/unproductive distinction and the development of the cult of true womanhood in the nineteenth century.

During this time, concerns over capitalist relations of production were not so much concerned with those activities that we now call caring labor; but rather with the emergence of waged employment and changing class structures. The notion that women were unsuited for the world of work was in part a reaction to the anxieties engendered by capitalist social relations and infused with notions of race/class hierarchies. The woman who was the "angel in the house" was never every woman, but specifically an upper-middle-class ethnically European woman of means. African American women, lower-class British women, and indigenous Asian women were implicitly if not explicitly excluded. Although the nurturing qualities of such women

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were drawn upon, these qualities were considered natural and thus not needing compensation. More importantly, these qualities were considered inferior because they were not in単ected by the standards of piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity that were the special province of elite European women. Today, the special province of elite women of European heritage is not spelled out in such quaint terms, but instead this is understood in terms of education, technological prowess, and cultural sophistication.

The value of caring labor likewise depends on whether it is paid or unpaid.

The notion that paid care is inferior to unpaid care and that paying for care degrades its value is pervasive in the literature on this subject. Consider Folbre's assertion that the term caring labor denotes a caring motive: "labor undertaken out of affection or a sense of responsibility for other people, with no expectation of immediate pecuniary reward."" This motive, according to Folbre, is "particularly crucial to meeting the needs of children, the elderly, and the sick." Likewise, the joint article by Julie Nelson and Nancy Folbre begins witb the assumption that there is clear separation between tbe world of money and profit and the world of care concern and pose their research question in terms of the consequences of mixing the realms of "love and money."'* These are only two of many examples.

The worries over mixing the realms of love and money are manifestations of larger anxieties over commodifying human relationships. Like love, care is most genuine when freely given. Like sex, monetized transactions seem to degrade it. It may suffice; but, it is not the genuine article. This refiects the private/public split in which money, commerce, and contract are part of the public realm of business and government, while love, altruism, and obligation are part of the private realm of the family. As the anthropologist Holly Wardlow has argued in a discussion of sex work, "Women are the keepers of the affective economy, safeguarding emotional labor from its possible alienation in the capitalist economy."" Thus like sex work, care work that is undertaken for money rather than for love violates "this gendered imperative."

The problem, as Nakano Glenn bas argued, is that "those relegated to the private sphere and associated with its values . . . have long been excluded from full citizenship."'* As she and other researchers have argued, the ideal citizen, like the rational economic agent, is independent, autonomous, and radically separate. This fiction obscures the needs for connection and care that even "independent" people have. Despite the ideology that care is the province of the family, paid care work has become more and more common and it is done by people who have little status in society because of tbeir race, class, or immigrant status. The stigmatized social status of paid care workers affects the perception of the work they do; the fact that the service is

Barker and Feiner: Affect, Race, and Class 49

being provided for money demeans the affective aspect of the work, which reinforces the low status and meager wages of those who do it. So stressing the affective nature ofthe work, without interrogating its racialized and gendered history, reinforces this dialectic. Perhaps more importantly, it does not interrogate the role that affect plays in reproducing the unequal relations between employers and employees.

Christina Hughes has examined the discourse of care as a counter discourse to the hegemonic discourse of capitalist individualism.^' The interesting question is how the dissonance produced by these two contradictory discursive fields affects women. She argues that dissonance is internalized and "reinforced through everyday acts that teach women their inferiority.""*" So like other counter discourses, the discourse of care can be appropriated in ways that reinscribe the hegemony ofthe dominant discourse. An ethnographic study of working-class women in Britain reveals this process."" For these women, enrolled in college courses in health and social work, becoming a caring person was a way to become a respectable and respected person. It was a way to escape the stigma of the working class as pathological, dangerous, and threatening. The structure of the coursework and examinations reinforced the conflation of caring for and caring about; in doing so they reinforced the gendered stereotypes ofthe good woman, the respectable woman: a woman who obeys the rules rather than questions them, a woman who puts the interests of others before her own.

CONCLUSION

The notion that paid caregivers ought to be motivated by concern for others as well as for money works against effective strategies to gain higher wages, better working conditions, and so forth. This combined with the notion that caring is the special province of women, especially mothers, impedes socially progressive solutions to the crisis of care."^ The question remains, how can an ethic of care be a discourse of resistance rather than one of subjection? To that end, we suggest replacing the mother/child dyad as the paradigm of care and instead linking care discourses to collectivist social movements such as activist mothering, the caring activities exhibited by queer communities during the AIDs crisis, the collective nurseries run by the Black Panthers, and other communal style arrangements. This political move would likewise call attention to the importance of collective social responsibility for the care of populations marginalized by poverty, race, ethnicity, and nationality.

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NOTES 1. David M. Brennan, "Defending the Indefensible? Culture's Role in the Productive/Unproductive Dichotomy," Feminist Economics 12, no. 3 (2006): 403-25.

2. Nancy Folbre, "Exploitation Comes Home: A Critique of the Marxian Theory of Family Labour," Cambridge Journal of Economics 6, no. 4 (1982): 317-29.

3. See for example Hazel Kyrk, A Theory of Consumption (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923); Margret Gilpin Reid, Economics of Household Production (New York: John Wiley, 1934); and Elizabeth Ellis Hoyt, The Consumption of Wealth (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

4. Shoshana Grossbard has argued persuasively that this work provided the foundation for the "new home economics" developed by Jacob Mincer and Gary Becker.

See Shoshana Grossbard, Jacob Mincer, A Pioneer of Modern Labor Economics (New York: Springer, 2006).

5. Henry A. Giroux, "Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability," College Literature ;i^, no. 3 (2006): 171-196.

6. V. Spike Peterson, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies (London: Routledge, 2003).

7. The term interpretive analytics was coined by Rabinow and Dreyfus to characterize Foucault's method. Foucault was attempting to find a position between the structuralist model of human behavior as rule-governed systems in which subjects are produced through discourse and the transcendental subject of the hermeneutical method. See Hubert Dreyfus, Hubert and Paul Rabinow, Michel Eoucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Our use of the term interpretive approach is less precise and reflects a variety of commitments to the politics of knowledge.

8. Drucilla Barker, "Beyond Women and Economics: Rereading Women's Work," Signs; Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30, no. 4 (2005): 2189-2209.

9. Diana Strassmann, "Feminist Economics," in The Elgar Companion to Eeminist Economics, ed. Janice Peterson and Margaret Lewis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999). 360.

10. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smithy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 49.

11. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, 182.

12. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings i^j2-i97j by Michel Eoucault, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Solper (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 131.

13. Drucilla Barker, "A Seat at the Table: Feminist Economists Negotiate Development," in Feminist Economics and the World Bank: History, Theory, and Policy, ed.

Edith Kuiper and Drucilla Barker (London: Routledge, 2006).

14. One can also ask whether the accepted methods of social science, particu-

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larly its reliance on statistical evidence, are incommensurate with an interpretive approach. At the very least, the truth status of statistical evidence would need to be reconsidered. But this is a question for another day.

15. Foucault, "Truth and Power," 84. Foucault is referring to the aspirations of Marxism and psychoanalysis in this lecture. We think the argument is equally applicable to feminist economics.

16. World Bank, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

17. Suzanne Bergeron, "Colonizing Knowledge: Economics and Interdisciplinarity in Engendering Development," in Feminist Economics and the World Bank: History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Edith Kuiper and Drucilla Barker (London: Routledge, 2006).

18. Nancy A. Naples, Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research (New York: Routledge, 2003), 91.

19. Barker, "A Seat at the Table."

20. Mainstream economists were also concerned about the differences in labormarket outcomes between women and men in terms of the gendered and unequal distribution of household responsibilities. Their explanations centered on the notions of choice and marginal productivity. Women's subordinate position in labor markets was explained by their differences in education and training, and these differences in turn were explained in terms of rational choice. Women choose occupations that required relatively less training and that were compatible with their household responsibilities.

21. See Barker, "A Seat at the Table," for a fuller exposition of this point.

22. Barbara Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women (New York: Basic Books, 1986) and Barbara Bergmann, "The Only Ticket to Equality: Total Androgyny, Male Style," Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 9 (Spring 1998): 75-86. The problems associated with low pay and exploitation would be mitigated as women and men became more equal, or should be addressed by labor market regulations and unionization.

23. Linda R. Hirshman, Get to Work: A Manifesto for Women ofthe World (New York: Viking, 2006).

24. See Mariarosa Dalla Costa, The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community (Bristol: Falling Wall Press, 1972); Susan Himmelweit, "Domestic Labor," in The Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics, ed. Janice Peterson and Margaret Lewis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999), 126-35; and Maxine Molyneux, "Beyond the Domestic Labor Debate," New Left Review 116 (July-August 1979): 3-27.

25. Susan Himmelweit, "The Discovery of'Unpaid Work,'" Feminist Economics 1, no. 2 (1995): 1-20.

26. For an overview of this literature see, Nancy Folbre, "Holding Hands at Mid-

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night: The Paradox of Caring Labor," Feminist Economics l, no. l (1995): 73-92; Paula England and Nancy Folbre, "The Cost of Caring," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 561, no. 1 (1999): 39-51; Mary Daly, ed., Gare Work: The Quest for Security (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2001); Susan Himmelweit, "An Evolutionary Approach to Eeminist Economics: Two Different Models of Caring," in Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics, ed. Drucilla Barker and Edith Kuiper (London: Routledge, 2003), 247-65; Maren A. Jochimsen, "Integrating Vulnerability: On the Impact of Caring on Economic Theorizing," in Toward a Eeminist Philosophy of Economics, ed. Drucilla Barker and Edith Kuiper (London: Routledge, 2003), 231-46; and Guy Standing, "Care Work: Overcoming Insecurity and Neglect," in Gare Work: The Quest for Security, ed. Mary Daly (London: International Labour Office, 2001), 15-32.

27. Eolbre, "Holding Hands at Midnight," 73-92.

28. Nancy Eolbre and lulie A. Nelson, "Eor Love or Money—or Both?" The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 4 (2000): 123-140.

29. Gillian!. Hewkson, Feminist Economics: Interrogating the Masculinity of Rational Economic Man (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1999) and Gillian I. Hewitson, "Domestic Labor and Gender Identity: Are All Women Carers?" in Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics, ed. Drucilla Barker and Edith Kuiper (London: Routledge, 2003), 266-84.

30. Eor further discussion on the Marxist relationship between the sexual division of labor and gender difference, see Teresa Amott and Julie Matthaei, Race, Gender, and Work: A Multicultural History of the United States (rev. ed., Boston: South End Press, 1996).

31. Hewitson, "Domestic Labor and Gender Identity," 266-84.

32. Ibid.

33. Barker, "Beyond Women and Economics," 2189-2209.

34. See Mignon Duffy, "Reproducing Labor Inequalities," Gender & Society 19, no.

1 (2005): 66-82; Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "Erom Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor," Signs; Journal of Women, Gulture and Society 18, no. 1 (1992): 1-43; and Dorothy E. Roberts, "Spiritual and Menial Housework," Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 9, no. 1 (1997): 51-80.

35. Eolbre, "Holding Hands at Midnight," 73-92.

36. Eolbre and Nelson, "Eor Love or Money—or Both?" 123-140.

37. Holly Wardlow, "Anger, Economy, And Female Agency: Problematizing 'Prostitution' and 'Sex Work' Among The Huli Of Papua New Guinea," Signs: Journal of Women in Gulture and Society 29, no. 4 (2004): 1030.

38. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "Creating a Caring Society," Gontemporary Sociology 29, no. 1 (2000): 85.

39. Christina Hughes, Women's Gontemporary Lives: Within and Beyond the Mirror (London: Routledge, 2002).

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40. Ibid.

41. Beverly Skeggs, Formations of Class and Gender (London: Sage, 1997).

42. Rhacel Salazar Parrefias has shown such impedance to progress in the context of Filipina women migrants and their children who remain in the Philippines. The public rhetoric around the problems that the children face because their mothers are absent impedes an effective solution to the care crisis there. See Rhacel Salazar Parre単as, "The Care Crisis in the Philippines: Children and Transnational Families in the New Global Economy," in Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy, ed. Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 39-54.

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