Do We Actually Know Anything?

Student No. 11722219

Do We Actually Know Anything? Or, Do The Gettier Cases Undermine The Classical Account Of Knowledge?

In this essay, I will first outline Gettier‟s proposed formulation of the conditions which are classically adjudged to be both necessary and sufficient to say that someone actually knows a given proposition. Proceeding, I will explain how Gettier uses his first case to suggest that this conception of „justified true belief‟ does not necessarily count as knowledge, however I will go on to explain why Gettier‟s position in this regard is inconsistent and incoherent.

Finally, I will outline the simple reason which renders Gettier‟s second case void from the offset and conclude that the Gettier cases do not undermine the classical account of knowledge.

Gettier (1963) asserts that the classic formulation of the conditions which are adjudged to be both necessary and sufficient to say that someone actually knows a given proposition can be laid out as follows:-

(a) S knows that P if and only if…

(1) P is, in fact, true, (2) S believes that P, and (3) S is justified in believing that P.

In other words, Gettier suggests that conditions (1), (2) and (3) here represent the necessary conditions for knowledge in the classical sense – that they essentially make up the classical definition of „knowledge‟. However, Gettier claims that the classical definition of knowledge is flawed, as he proceeds to argue that satisfying these three conditions does not necessarily entail “the truth of the proposition that S knows that P” (Gettier, 1963).

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The first pillar of Gettier‟s argument attempts to illustrate that it is possible for a proposition to be false and yet for a person to be „justified‟ in believing that proposition – “in that sense of „justified‟ in which S's being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S's knowing that P” (Gettier, 1963). To establish this point, Gettier makes use of the following case… A man called Smith has applied for a job, and he has spoken to the president of the company which is taking the applications for the job. The president of the company has assured Smith that another man called Jones will be offered the job and, as it happens, Smith has counted the coins in Jones‟s pocket – finding ten coins in total. As such, Smith is supposed to be seen as justified in believing the following proposition:-

“(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket” (Gettier, 1963).

Proceeding, Gettier asks us to suppose that rather than Jones, it is actually Smith who will be offered the job. As such, it would appear that Smith is justified in believing proposition (d), despite the fact that proposition (d) is untrue. However, this point alone does not show classical definition of „knowledge‟ to be flawed; conditions (2) and (3) for „knowledge‟ in the classical sense have been satisfied (Smith believes that (d), and Smith is supposedly justified in believing that (d)), yet condition (1) has not been satisfied ((d) is not, in fact, true) and therefore, as this scenario presently stands, there is consistency with the classical conception of knowledge – this scenario can simply be taken as a case in which Smith believes he possesses knowledge, and he is justified in believing so; however he does not actually possess knowledge due to the fact that his justified belief is not of something which is actually true…

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However, Gettier expands the scenario, citing Smith‟s supposedly justified belief in (d) (that Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket) as justification for entailing proposition (e) – “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” (Gettier, 1963). Furthermore, Smith is unaware that he himself has ten coins in his own pocket. Then, since Smith is actually the man who will get the job, and given that he has ten coins in his pocket, it just so happens that proposition (e) is true – the man who will get the job does actually have ten coins in his pocket. Thus, Gettier makes the claim that all three conditions necessary to satisfy the classical conception of knowledge are in place (Proposition (e) is true, Smith believes that (e), and Smith is supposedly justified in believing that (e)) and yet Gettier asserts that it is clear that Smith does not actually know that proposition (e) is true. Gettier attempts to defend this assertion by explaining that Smith “bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job” (Gettier, 1963). This fact, according to Gettier, means that Smith does not actually know (e). However, there is a flaw in Gettier‟s reasoning…

The fact that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is a given - (e) is, in fact, true). The fact that Smith believes the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is also a given (Smith does believe that (e)). Gettier‟s problem with accepting that Smith knows that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket lies with the way in which Smith has supposedly been justified in believing that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. According to Gettier, the fact that Smith bases his correct belief in (e) on a false belief in (d) renders Smith as not truly knowing (e). This can be taken as nothing other than a subtle intrinsic rejection of the justification for Smith‟s belief in (e) due to the fact that it is a belief based on an underlying false belief in (d). Therefore, there is inconsistency in Gettier‟s reasoning which renders his argument incoherent. He is claiming

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that Smith is justified in believing in (e) while at the same time undermining the basis of the justification for this belief to bring about his end claim that Smith does not actually know (e).

But he cannot coherently claim that Smith‟s belief in (e) is justified while at the same time claiming that the fact that this so-called „justified‟ belief in (e) is based upon a fallacy renders Smith as not actually knowing (e). Furthermore, in formulating his argument, Gettier has suggested that Smith is justified in believing that Jones will get the job due to the fact that the president of the company in question has assured him that this is the case; however, this socalled „justified‟ belief is based upon the false belief that the president of the company in question is telling the truth. As such, Gettier‟s claim that Smith is justified in believing (d) despite the fact that it is based on a false underlying belief that the president of the company is telling the truth is inconsistent with Gettier‟s subtle intrinsic rejection of the justification for Smith‟s belief in (e) due to the fact that it is a belief based on an underlying false belief in (d).

The second Gettier case is more easily stripped of any apparent value. In this case, Smith has strong evidence that his friend Jones owns a Ford and therefore is said to be justified in believing that (f) - Jones owns a Ford. Smith has another friend called Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant (Gettier, 1963). Therefore, it is suggested that Smith is justified in inferring that:-

“(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston. (h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. (i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.” (Gettier, 1963).

Due to the fact that Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford, he is supposedly

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justified in creating any disjunctive propositions like these. However, due to the fact that Smith is completely unaware of Brown‟s whereabouts, he is clearly not justified in doing so.

Brown could be anywhere, and as far as Smith knows, Brown may well be in Boston or Barcelona or Brest-Litovsk… As such, Smith is simply not justified in pitting his justified belief that Jones own a ford in disjunctive propositions against things which he has no good reason to justifiably believe to be untrue. In other words, Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford but he is not justified in believing that Brown is not in any particular place – therefore Smith is not justified in inferring that „one or the other‟ is true, for as far as he knows they both bay be true. This simple point renders Gettier‟s second case void from the offset.

In conclusion, I have shown Gettier‟s position that justified true belief does not necessarily represent knowledge (which arises out of his first case) to be inconsistent and incoherent due to his explicit claim that a belief is justified in this case being in conflict with his intrinsic claim that the belief is not justified (which is contained within his conclusion that there is a problem with a so-called „justified‟ belief being based upon an underlying false belief).

Furthermore, I have shown that Gettier‟s own suggestion (in case 1) that Smith‟s belief in (d) is justified, is actually a suggestion which is in conflict with the aforementioned intrinsic claim of his conclusion (that there is a problem with a so-called „justified‟ belief being based upon an underlying false belief). I have also shown Gettier‟s second case to be void from the offset do to the fact that it makes a simple logical error at its foundation. Therefore, I have shown that the Gettier cases do not undermine the classical accounts of knowledge as they are both based upon demonstrably flawed reasoning rendering them intrinsically incoherent.

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Reference list:Gettier, Edmund, 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23: pp. 121–123.

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