The Human Element

THE HUMAN ELEMENT Diego M. Martinez de la Escalera and Lorenzo Martínez Gómez, Corrosión y Protección – ITESCAM Alliance, Mexico and Juan Carlos Sanchez Ghenno and Francisco Fernández Lagos, PEMEX, Mexico, discuss enforcing operator qualification rules for pipeline oil and gas transport.

I

n the search of high standards for safety and process reliability, PEMEX launched the operator qualification programme (OQ) for the technical personnel of the pipeline transportation network consisting of 60 000 km of land and 4000 offshore oil and gas pipelines. OQ addresses specific critical competences of operation and maintenance of all pipelines, pumping and compressor stations, control centres, as well as in the company’s marine terminals (Figure 1).

Human competence and organisational processes are widely recognised as determinants for safety and performance of operation of oil and gas pipeline transport. The OI-OGP reports yearly the case study analysis of incidents involving fatalities around the globe in the oil and gas industry. Over 15% of the case studies attributed fatalities to human errors, and further training was prescribed nearly 25% of the time as a result of subsequent root cause analysis.

Muhlbauer has established training as the first line of defence against human error and accident reduction.

The US DOT integrity management and OQ regulations have contributed significantly to mitigation of the human error impact both in operations and maintenance during pipeline works since the 49 CFR 92 and 95 codes were established by the US Congress early this century. Pipeline Integrity Management (PIM) is now enforced in the Mexican federal energy regulations for all marine and onshore

oil and gas transport in the country under the NOM 027 SESH 2010. The PEMEX PIM rule contains an important chapter dedicated to OQ. Two years in advance to the Mexican PIM rule, the company was in charge of the conception and development of the OQ certification programme in Mexico involving a pilot stage, followed by a full-scale application now in progress. The early stages involved the identification of the applicable covered tasks, also called critical competences in the ILO adopted language, relative to the personnel responsibilities regarding the safety and performance of the operations of compressor and pumping stations and control centres.

The US DOT basic concept for OQ is to develop competences enabling the personnel to recognise and react to abnormal operating conditions that can occur during the pipeline transportation of oil, gas and other hazardous materials. Nearly 150 critical competences were identified among operation and maintenance of transport in pipelines.

OQ programmes have delivered significant benefits in the safety and efficiency of pipeline operations for the companies in compliance with the mandatory requirements of the US DOT. In order to comply, the OQ programmes in the US and Canada considered the implementation of training, certification and monitoring mechanisms that could verify and store all qualifications and other relevant information of

APRIL 2012 | Reprinted from World pipelines

Is relevant to the integrity of the pipeline.

Is executed directly at the pipeline location.

Figure 1. Oil and gas logistics, transportation and distribution networks in Mexico. The map depicts about 60 000 km of pipelines onshore, 5000 km offshore and several dozens of pumping and compression stations, as well as control centres.

API selected a set of over 150 critical competences for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline networks distributed in topics such as operation, corrosion control, instrumentation, electrical and mechanical. The US DOT rule 49 CFR 192 & 195 requires pipeline owners to develop an operator qualification programme to evaluate the individual’s ability to recognise and react to abnormal operating conditions, as well as to perform correctly the critical competences of her or his responsibility.

The rule also sets record keeping requirements that operators must follow to successfully demonstrate compliance, and the information that must be maintained on each person who has been evaluated and deemed qualified to work on a pipeline facility.

The scope of the pilot programme described here focused on critical competences of the operation of pumping and compression stations, as well as control centres, where operators were trained and certified in the following critical competences: Start-up of a pipeline.

Shutdown of a pipeline.

Monitor pressures, flows, communications and line integrity within allowable limits.

Manually or remotely open or close valves or other equipment.

Purge gas from a pipeline.

Figure 2. Operation Qualification involves training and

performance verifications in the facilities under the supervision of certified master trainers.

the operators. ISNetworld is now the largest depository for the verification of OQ compliance programmes in the US, Canada and Mexico. The PEMEX pilot programme developed an internal system to manage all qualifications and certifications of the operators, and is subscribed to the ISNetworld platform.

The strategy of human resources development at the company has been aimed to link the learning processes with the content of the activities at work. The development of critical competences together with selected transversal skills has improved the functionality of the organisational systems within the company such as the security management processes (ASP), mechanical integrity and quality assurance (IMAC) and operative discipline (OD).

Technical and soft competences Following the API methodology, the PEMEX pilot programme considered training, qualification and certification of operators following four selection criteria where each critical competence: Complies with an official regulation.

Is closely related to the operation and maintenance.

Reprinted from World pipelines | APRIL 2012

Purge air from a pipeline.

Recognise and react to abnormal operating conditions (AOC).

The pilot programme developed by PEMEX also included training the operators in a set of soft competences. Teamwork, solving problems in work situations and effective communications are now recognised as very valuable soft competences in the pipeline transportation industry where safety, reliability and environmental protection are relevant issues. Soft competences are vital for the appropriate collective recognition and reaction of a group of operators facing an AOC event, enabling the successful application of the proper technical competences required by the circumstances.

Competence is also recognised as an ageing item that is declining along the years after each training and certification process. Presently, knowledge evolves at higher rates, equipment changes, and inspection/repair technologies improve. The ageing process of competence is depicted in Figure 3. Most pipeline companies now apply a three year recertification in the OQ compliance procedures in order to update and re-evaluate the competence.

Measuring risk mitigation by OQ The benefits of operator qualification are difficult to measure in terms of economic parameters. ISNetworld has produced correlations of the reduction of incidents attributed to

compliance with OQ rule of CFR 192 and 195 of the US DOT, from data of the main pipeline oil and gas transmission and distribution companies. Risk assessments of ‘incorrect operations’ chapters of PIM programmes are a suitable framework to evaluate the benefits of OQ in safety, productivity and overall business performance. Muhlbauer has indexed training at the highest impact in risk of operations as shown in Figure 4. The impact of the operator training and competence development on risk is associated to both normal operation, and more importantly to the ability to recognise and react in events of AOC. The benefits of OQ can be apparent in the reduction of surface facilities failure consequences, as well as insurance costs and penalties of regulatory bodies.

OQ can be a powerful tool for the operator to anticipate transients that could normally lead to events of AOC. The accurate actions of a skilled operator may reduce the probability or the consequence of incidents within the context of AOC. Besides competence, the certainty of what the operator knows and what he does not, the quality of knowledge, and most of all the specific skills and ability to recognise and properly respond to abnormal operation conditions are of big impact in risk assessment. In the field one can envision three general scenarios of the human factor development:

Figure 3. An operator’s competence ages over time. PEMEX, as

well as the majority of the pipeline operators, utilise a three year recertification in the OQ compliance procedure.

Level 1. Informal on-the-job training The operator developed competence following a process of learning on the job mainly from day-to-day verbal and experience acquisition by contact with senior workers. For many years in Mexico this type of knowledge was considered enough in the context of union enterprise negotiations, which is the equivalent to the ‘sit by Nellie’ training process described by Mansfield.

Level 2. Medium trained without certification The operator is exposed Level 1 on-the-job competence acquisition, plus a series of courses, and training sessions covering a variety of aspects of pipeline operations or maintenance, but limited by lack of specificity, uniformity and formal certification of competence of the operators as a team.

Level 3. Certified full OQ compliance The team of operators receives precise and uniform training with a certification process in specific critical competences indicated by the OQ rule US DOT 49 CFR192 or CFR195.

Although many industrial, rural, craft or office workers have been trained in the traditional way for centuries with relative success, it is now recognised that the Mansfield’s ‘sit by Nellie’ traditional approach can only transmit 50 - 60% of the competences from ‘Nellie’ to a trainee worker. Besides, the required training provided is since the competences learned in this traditional way are usually of the routine type, and not the expected skills necessary to overcome critical situations where knowledge, awareness, anticipation and accuracy are required to recognise and react properly to AOC. Training workers up to Level 2 could overcome many limitations of the traditional way described above. However, Level 2 training without certification harks back to the traditional approach; the limitation of the uncertainty of not knowing the specifics of which competences were or were not transmitted

Figure 4. Competence index rankings showing 10 of the 35 points

from the Muhlbauer score analysis of operations.

or assimilated by each member of a team. An insurance company would also perceive the uncertainty of the workers’ competences and would have no other choice but to elevate the risk evaluation of the facility, to raise the insurance prime, or to bluntly reject any possibility to provide insurance at all.

In the event of an incident occurring, or even during a routine revision, a government officer would also penalise the company for not exhibiting certification of the operator qualification of the personnel. The operators’ competence to recognise and react to AOC events may significantly affect both the probability and the consequences of a major system failure.

As a guiding example this article uses one year statistics of critical systems failures collected from a set of compression stations representing most of the gas transmission system in Mexico. By far the most common failure of a critical system failure is the interruption of electrical power supply from the grid. This happened about 40 times in 2008 according to statistics of incidents in compressor stations nationwide. External power outage is an AOC posing an inherent risk. Power outages trigger a variety of activities to be performed by the operators where skill, awareness, experience and teamwork abilities are critical to either minimise risk, or to react to consequences of an undesired turnout, such as gas flow interruption, or worse. The activities

APRIL 2012 | Reprinted from World pipelines

Table 1. Indexing risk attributed to AOC incidents of compressor station external electric power outages: the SME team indexed the impacts in a matrix of level

event of power outage.

All OQ certified personnel Total risk indexing Competence Government penalisation Third party legal and social fallout involved in controlling Level 1. Informal on-the-job training 10 5 3 2 the AOC act as a team Level 2. On-the-job training plus sharing common language 8 3 3 2 courses and skills. OQ rule Level 3. Certification and full OQ <1 < 0.5 0 < 0.25 compliance eliminates rule compliance government penalisations, and it also reduces grounds Table 2. SME risk assessments of the most frequent incidents of AOC in compressor stations for legal or social issues Type of failure Incidents per year Risk index surrounding unpredictable Level 3. Certified full OQ Level 2. Medium trained Level 1. Informal on-the-job consequences. compliance without certification training Other frequent Instrumentation and events such as failure of 40 1 6 10 control system the instrumentation and Electrical switchboard 39 1 8 10 control systems, the board Main electric of electrical transference, 34 1 7 9 sub-station the main electrical Gas turbine failure 10 0 1 10 substation, the gas turbine or Communications 12 0 1 1 communications were also analysed by the SME team and displayed in Table 2.

The risk assessment was also indexed triggered are, for example, the management of the entrance considering the three levels of training, the frequency of incidents (manual or automatic) of backup systems, SCADA or phone per year and the effects of the technical competence itself, communications, etc. penalisations and legal or social fallout considerations.

Based on the experience of a team of three subject matter Full-scale benefits of the PEMEX OQ programme will be experts (SME) with over 30 years of experience operating made evident over years or decades to come as it expands to compressor stations, the case of a power outage was analysed every aspect of operation and maintenance. The evaluations employing the indexing method developed by Muhlbauer. Three of the programme by the operators and executives within the factors were identified to have a strong effect on risk: Mexican pipeline industry have had positive results. The human Operator competence. factor is emerging as one of the most valuable elements for a Penalisation due to non-compliance with government rule. safe, reliable and environmentally friendly pipeline operation in Mexico.

Legal and social fallout. of training, technical competence, compliance to government rule and other third party legal and social issues

As shown in Table 1, the recognition and response to the AOC triggered by an external electric power outage poses maximum risk index if the operator in charge received Level 1 training or less, since he or she may not be able to perform several important specific competences, including displaying awareness. Typically, a Level 1 operator would be too dependent on asking for instructions at every step during the AOC, rather than proactively take measures to minimise the impact of the power outage, such as starting up the back-up electrical units, or even putting them to work before a predictable outage expected by storms or other meteorological disturbances. The actions of a Level 1 operator could cause a critical delay in decisions, causing the compressor station to go out of service, the gas flow service to be interrupted or even worse scenarios. Level 2 workers may perform with better competence, but a significant risk reduction from the competence point of view can be obtained if the compression station operators do not systematically develop all the critical competences needed to face AOC events. The effect of not having a full compliance to the OQ rule in the event of a failure or on a routine revision may also increase risk mainly because of the impact on consequence.

The response of Level 3 certified OQ personnel is deemed to be the most effective application of a precise set of technical actions and procedures to control the AOC, in this case in an

Reprinted from World pipelines | APRIL 2012

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the co-ordination of the oil and gas pipeline transport division of PEMEX Corporate and ITESCAM in Campeche for the valuable support to develop this programme. We also thank the valuable contributions of SME Melinda Traynor, Phillip Keith, Darryl Gwinn, Tommy Richardson, Enrique Ortega, Ciro Torres, Alejandro Gaona, Rene Perez Polanco and Eduardo Garza, as well as the professional support of Gregorio Goycochea, Hector Miguel, Norma Segura Ada, Rosa Carvallo, Nora Aymamí and Ana Rosa Parrilla.

Bibliography 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

ASME Code for Pressure Piping, ASME B31Q-2006, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (2006).

CAMPBELL, A. and SOMMERS LUCHS, K. S., Core Competency-Based Strategy (London, 1997).

Guidance Document for the Qualification of Liquid Pipeline Personnel, American Petroleum Institute, API Recommended Practice 1161 (Washington. D.C., 2000).

MANSFIELD, B., Towards a Competence Workforce (1996).

MUHLBAUER, W. K., ‘Pipeline risk management manual’, Gulf Professional Publishing (2004).

Safety Performance Indicators 2008 Data Report No. 419. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (Brussels, 2009).

US DOT 49 CFR PT 192 Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline: Minimum Federal Safety Standards, US Department of Transportation (2008).

US DOT 49 CFR PT 195 Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline, US Department of Transportation (2008).