Credit Card Bail 14

Jerome E. McElroy Executive Director

NEW YORK’S CREDIT CARD BAIL EXPERIMENT

Mary T. Phillips, Ph.D. Project Director and Deputy Director, Research Department

Final Report September 2014

52 Duane Street, Third Floor, New York, NY 10007-1231 The mission of the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc., is to assist the courts and the City in reducing unnecessary pretrial detention.

(646) 213-2500

NEW YORK’S CREDIT CARD BAIL EXPERIMENT

Mary T. Phillips, Ph.D. Project Director and Deputy Director, Research Department Administrative Support: Annie Su Administrative Associate Research Assistance: Raymond P. Caligiure Graphics and Production Specialist Maria Annabel Mireles Research Assistant Information Systems Programming: Wayne Nehwadowich IT Deputy Director for Programming

September 2014  2014 NYC Criminal Justice Agency, Inc.

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... ii LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..............................................................................................iii I.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 A. Description Of The Bail By Credit Card Program ...................................... 1 B. Data Collection ......................................................................................... 2 C. The Credit Card And Non-Credit Card (Comparison) Samples ................ 4

II.

USE OF THE CREDIT CARD BAIL OPTION ......................................................... 7 A. Utilization Of The Credit Card Program By The Courts ............................ 7 1. Volume Of Cases With A Credit Card Bail Option ................................ 7 2. Judicial Participation ............................................................................. 9 3. Credit Card Bail Amounts ................................................................... 11 B. Utilization Of Credit Cards In Bail Making ............................................... 14

III.

DEFENDANT AND CASE CHARACTERISTICS: SAMPLE COMPARISONS ... 17 A. Demographics ......................................................................................... 17 B. Employment ............................................................................................ 20 C. CJA Recommendation ............................................................................ 21 D. Criminal History ...................................................................................... 22 E. Offense Type And Severity ..................................................................... 24

IV.

EFFECT OF THE CREDIT CARD PROGRAM ON PRETRIAL OUTCOMES ...... 27 A. Pretrial Release ...................................................................................... 27 1. Sample Comparisons......................................................................... 27 2. Controlling For CJA Recommendation............................................... 28 3. Multiple Regression Analysis Of Pretrial Release .............................. 29 B. Length Of Pretrial Detention ................................................................... 32 1. Sample Comparisons......................................................................... 32 2. Controlling For CJA Recommendation............................................... 34 3. Multiple Regression Analysis Of Detention Length ............................ 35 C. Failure To Appear (FTA) ......................................................................... 37 1. Sample Comparisons......................................................................... 37 2. Controlling For CJA Recommendation............................................... 38 3. Multiple Regression Analysis Of FTA................................................. 39

V.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ............................. 41

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 45 APPENDIX Statistical Procedures ............................................................................. 47

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

LIST OF TABLES Table 1 Number Of Cases For Which A Credit Card Bail Option Was Set

By Borough And Year .................................................................................. 7 Table 2 Logistic Regression Model Of Pretrial Release ......................................... 30 Table 3 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model Of Detention Length .............. 36 Table 4 Logistic Regression Model Of Failure To Appear ...................................... 40

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Research Samples ...................................................................................... 5 Figure 2 Proportion Of Cases With Bail Set At $2,500 Or Less In Which A Credit Card Option Was Offered By Borough............................ 8 Figure 3 Number Of Judges Who Set At Least One Credit Card Bail Option

By Borough And Year .................................................................................. 9 Figure 4 Number Of Credit Card Cases By Judge And Borough ............................. 10 Figure 5 Credit Card Bail Amounts .......................................................................... 11 Figure 6 Relative Amounts Of Bond, Cash, And Credit Card Options ..................... 13 Figure 7 Pretrial Release Outcomes In Cases With Credit Card Bail Option ........... 15 Figure 8 Sample Comparisons: Gender ................................................................. 17 Figure 9 Sample Comparisons: Age ....................................................................... 18 Figure 10 Sample Comparisons: Ethnicity ................................................................ 19 Figure 11 Sample Comparisons: Full-Time Employment ......................................... 20 Figure 12 Sample Comparisons: CJA Recommendation.......................................... 21 Figure 13 Sample Comparisons: Prior Warrant ........................................................ 22 Figure 14 Sample Comparisons: Prior Conviction .................................................... 23 Figure 15 Sample Comparisons: Offense Type ........................................................ 24 Figure 16 Sample Comparisons: Offense Severity ................................................... 25 Figure 17 Release Rates By Sample ......................................................................... 27 Figure 18 Release Rates By Sample Controlling For CJA Recommendation............ 28 Figure 19 Length Of Pretrial Detention In Days By Sample ....................................... 32 Figure 20 Percent Released (Or Case Disposed) Over Time By Sample ................. 33 Figure 21 Length Of Pretrial Detention In Days Controlling For CJA Recommendation ...................................................... 34 Figure 22 FTA Rates By Sample ............................................................................... 37 Figure 23 FTA Rates By Sample Controlling For CJA Recommendation .................. 38

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New York City’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank several individuals from the legal community and the Courts for taking the time to explain aspects of the Bail By Credit Card Program, and for keeping me informed as it progressed from a single-borough pilot project to a Citywide program. Marika Meis, Legal Director of The Bronx Defenders, was particularly helpful in providing insights on the origins and goals of the project, which she helped shape.

Eugene B. Nathanson, Esq., kindly forwarded to me the policy and operational memoranda from the Court announcing the pilot program, and then announcing its expansion. Justin A. Barry, Chief Clerk of the Criminal Court, provided supplementary data from cashier’s records during the first few months of the pilot project. And Hon. Richard J. Montelione of Kings County Criminal Court shared his considerable insights regarding the program’s use by the judiciary. All of these contributions were invaluable to this research, informing the analyses and conclusions as well as descriptions of the program.

The research never would have begun without an alert from Jordan M. Dressler, General Counsel at the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, who started the wheels turning when he notified CJA Senior Research Fellow Dr. Freda F. Solomon of the pilot project soon after its Manhattan debut. I am grateful to both for bringing the program to my attention.

Once begun, the study could not have been completed without the assistance of several members of the CJA research staff. Graphics and Production Specialist Raymond P. Caligiure and Research Assistant Maria Annabel Mireles spent many hours poring over court calendars and database screens, as well as entering and cleaning data. Tedious and time-consuming though the work was, they accomplished it with efficiency and competence. Administrative Associate Annie Su prepared the manuscript for printing and distribution with her usual excellent attention to detail.

Frank Sergi, CJA’s Director for Planning, assisted me in my quest to decipher the Office of Court Administration’s coding practices. I greatly appreciate his efforts, without which data collection would have been considerably more error-prone than it was.

Special thanks are owed to Richard R. Peterson, Research Department Director, for valuable suggestions and support, and for his careful reading of an early draft of this report. I also thank Jerome E. McElroy, Executive Director of CJA, for encouraging the research and offering his comments on the preliminary draft.

Finally, I am grateful to the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice for supporting this research.

The methodology, findings, and conclusions, as well as any errors, are the sole responsibility of the author.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

I. INTRODUCTION A. Description Of The Bail By Credit Card Program On March 26, 2012, the New York County Criminal Court began a six-month pilot program for accepting bail by credit card. After the six-month period, the program was extended and was subsequently expanded to all five counties of New York City starting January 28, 2013.

The maximum amount of credit card bail that the Court may set is $2,500, payable by Visa or Mastercard (a third credit card, Discover, was added at the time of expansion Citywide). In order for a credit card to be accepted for bail, the judge must specifically designate that a credit card is an acceptable form of bail in the case and the amount of bail that may be paid by credit card. The person posting bail must provide a government-issued photo identification and may use only one credit card for each bail transaction (Barry 2012, 2013).

For decades the Criminal Procedure Law has authorized the use of credit cards for bail, along with cash and various types of bonds (CPL § 520.10(1)(i)), but no directives had been issued prior to this program to enable cashiers to accept credit card bail payments. One hurdle was that the law provided for “a reasonable administrative fee,” which had never been fixed. The Office of Court Administration (OCA) resolved that problem at the outset of the program with the decision to absorb the fees charged to OCA by credit card companies, so that clients would not be charged a fee. In his memorandum announcing the pilot program, Criminal Court Administrative Judge Barry Kamins cited the “significant fees” incurred by the Court in accepting credit cards as the reason for limiting credit card bail amounts to $2,500 (Kamins 2012).1 Bail posted by credit card is treated like any other bail paid directly to the Court (i.e., cash bail) in that a full refund is made when the case is terminated by acquittal or dismissal and a 3% fee is imposed upon conviction. No additional fee is imposed for using a credit card, but the 3% administrative fee still applies where appropriate.

Only court cashiers accept bail payment by credit card, and the defendant must be physically present in the courthouse. The Department of Correction (DOC) does not accept credit card payments under this program, although DOC inmates continue to have the option of using a credit card to post cash bail in low amounts at one of the jails’ automated kiosks or through a telephone payment system. These options have disadvantages, including the fee charged by the third-party vendor used by DOC. The major drawback, however, is the length of time it takes to gain release. Many hours may

1

This memorandum implied that a reason for not charging a fee was uncertainty about who would get the money — the Court or some other government entity — and stated that if this issue is resolved in favor of the Court, OCA might institute a fee at some later time, and the $2,500 cap could be revisited (Kamins 2012).

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

pass while processing is completed for the transfer to DOC custody and the defendant is taken to Rikers Island or another of the City jails. There is a further delay while the facility waits to receive payment from the vendor. The defendant is not released until the money is received at the facility, which can take 24 hours or longer from the time the credit card transaction is completed. By contrast, the defendant is released immediately at the courthouse upon payment of credit card bail under the new program.

The current research provides a preliminary assessment of the success of the program. We examined the extent to which it was used by the Courts and by defendants during its first year of Citywide implementation, and asked whether the program is accomplishing its goals of helping defendants gain release and decreasing the time they spend in detention, without raising failure-to-appear (FTA) rates.

B. Data Collection CJA project staff identified cases with a credit card bail option by examining arraignment court calendars from March 27, 2012, to December 31, 2013. Only Manhattan calendars were examined in 2012 when the program was restricted to that borough. After the program expanded Citywide in January 2013, we examined arraignment calendars in all five boroughs until the end of 2013.

When bail is set at arraignment, OCA clerks enter the bond amount followed by the alternative cash bail amount, separated by a slash: e.g., 2500/1000. When a credit card option is set, a third amount must be added to specify the bail that can be posted by credit card (even if the credit card amount is the same as the cash amount): e.g., 2500/1000/1000. In this example, bail may be made by posting a $2,500 bond or $1,000 in cash or by credit card.

The clerk also flags credit card options with a notation of “CC” or “credit card” written on the same calendar line as the amount. This notation distinguishes credit card options from other reasons for specifying a third bail amount, such as setting a partially secured bond. Partially secured bonds are flagged on court calendars with the notation “PSB”. Using these calendar entries, research staff identified credit card cases (excluding partially secured bonds) and manually entered the bail and release information from the court calendar into a data file that was later linked with defendant and case-processing data from the CJA database.

Although most bail is set at the Criminal Court arraignment, bail may be set initially at a later court appearance, or a change in bail may be made post-arraignment, particularly upon a defendant’s return to court after a failure to appear. When a postarraignment hearing at which credit card bail was set appeared on an arraignment court calendar, the case was also included in the sample. In these cases, bail had not been set earlier at arraignment or had been set without a credit card option at arraignment.

Such cases constitute a very small proportion of the research sample (fewer than 3%).

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

We made no attempt to include cases in which credit card bail was initially set in nonarraignment court parts; we assume that there were few if any such cases.

Brooklyn was the only borough of New York City in which not one credit card case was found on an arraignment calendar during the entire study period. This is puzzling, especially since it does not correspond to perceptions among the Brooklyn judiciary.2 On the other hand, Brooklyn was the only borough in which our coders routinely found cases in which a partially secured bond was offered as a bail option.

Perhaps there was some confusion among OCA clerks in Brooklyn regarding the coding of these two different bail options, each of which involves specifying a third bail amount.

Although we suspect that some credit card cases may have been missed in Brooklyn, we are fairly confident that elsewhere in the City we were able to identify cases in which a credit card option was set, and to do so with a high degree of accuracy.

We have less confidence in our ability to determine whether a credit card was actually used to post bail, once the option was offered. And we had no way at all of knowing whether people who posted bail using a credit card met their credit card payments — something we were asked about in the course of this research, but which lies outside the scope of the study.

We attempted to determine the form in which bail was posted — as bond, cash, or credit card — despite some ambiguities in the way this information was recorded by the courts. When bail was made at arraignment, the form of bail could usually be determined through calendar notations. Notations do not follow a consistent format, but a receipt number is routinely entered when bail is made, prefaced by “CC” for credit card receipts or “CB” for cash bail. Sometimes the credit card amount is also entered, and/or the word “credit.” Bonds are specified by the word “Bond.” This gave us confidence in our form-of-bail categorization for bail posted at arraignment.

When bail was not made at arraignment, we used the OCA database to attempt to ascertain the form of bail made at later court appearances. This was an imperfect method because OCA uses the same code — (C) — for both cash and credit card bail; other codes are (B) for bond, and (N) for bail not made. However, the “Comments” section of the screen displaying court appearance outcomes sometimes contained clues, such as “Credit card payment $500,” or the abbreviated “CC PYMT.” Form of bail in such cases was coded as “credit card.”

Most OCA comments in credit card cases were limited to a credit card amount (e.g., “CC 1000/750/750”) without the word “payment.” Such comments were often

2

Judge Richard Montelione, who was assigned to arraignments in Brooklyn Criminal Court during the study period, confirmed that credit card options were rare in that borough, but he reported setting credit card bail himself “more than once” (private correspondence 3/7/2014).

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

found in conjunction with (N), meaning only that a credit card option was offered, not that bail was made. When we found a comment with “credit card” or “CC” but no mention of payment, we categorized the form of bail according to the OCA code found on the court appearance line: C (cash), B (bond), or N (not released).

Because of the inconsistent nature of the OCA comments, we cannot be sure that the omission of an explicit comment indicating that bail was made by credit card was a reliable indicator that bail was not made by credit card. We opted for the most conservative measure: only when the evidence of a credit card payment was unequivocal did we categorize it as bail posted by credit card. It could be that a credit card was used in some additional cases that were categorized as cash bail.

C. The Credit Card And Non-Credit Card (Comparison) Samples The credit card sample contained 1,237 cases that were identified from arraignment calendars as having bail set with a credit card option during the study period. Of the total number of cases in the credit card sample, 221 had credit card bail set in 2012 and 1,016 had credit card bail set in 2013 (Figure 1). In most cases the arrest occurred in the same year as the year of bail setting, but a few arrests from earlier years were also included in the sample because credit card bail was set postarraignment in an arraignment court part during the study period (usually when the defendant returned to court after a warrant had been issued for failure to appear, sometimes years earlier). In a small subgroup of 165 cases in the credit card sample, bail was posted using a credit card.3 A comparison group of non-credit card cases was created using a dataset of all cases with an arraignment in 2013 in which bail was $2,500 or less (using the lower amount if a cash alternative was set), with no credit card option. Brooklyn cases were excluded from the non-credit card sample to make it more comparable to the credit card sample, which contained no Brooklyn cases. Cases with $1 bail — an indication that the defendant was held on another matter — were also excluded from the comparison group, as there were no $1 credit card bail amounts. The comparison sample contained 20,554 cases.

The research data file contained both the credit card and comparison cases (21,791 cases in the combined samples), of which 21,570 were cases arraigned (or credit card bail was set) in 2013. Some analyses included 8,481 Brooklyn cases with an arraignment in 2013 and bail set at $2,500 or less, which were retained in the research data file despite their exclusion from the comparison sample. Including Brooklyn cases, the research file contained 30,051 cases with bail set at $2,500 or less in 2013.

3

Eventually we reached the conclusion that many additional cases in the credit card sample also had bail posted using a credit card, but 165 were positively identified.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 1 Research Samples Credit Card, Credit Card Subgroup, Non-Credit Card (Comparison), and Combined Samples

(2013)

20,554 Non‐Credit Card (Comparison) Sample (2013)

221 Credit Card (2012)

1,237 Total Credit Card Sample

1,016 Credit Card

21,570 Combined Comparison + 2013 Credit Card

21,791 Combined Samples

165 Subgroup: Paid By Credit Card

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8,481 Brooklyn (2013)

30,051 All 2013 Cases (including Brooklyn)

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

II. USE OF THE CREDIT CARD BAIL OPTION A. Utilization Of The Credit Card Program By The Courts 1. Volume Of Cases With A Credit Card Bail Option The distribution of cases with a credit card bail option by borough is shown in Table 1.

Credit card bail was used most extensively in Manhattan, even after the program was expanded to the rest of the City. During 2013, a credit card option was set in 644 Manhattan cases, comprising 63% of all credit card cases in the City during that year.

Queens came in second with 239, or nearly a quarter of the total for 2013. The Bronx had 130 cases with a credit card bail option (13% of the total for 2013), and Staten Island had three. As noted previously, there were none in Brooklyn.

Table 1 Number Of Cases For Which A Credit Card Bail Option Was Set

By Borough And Year Borough 2012 2013 Total (9 months) (12 months) (21 months) Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten Island Total

0 0 221 (100%) 0 0 221 (100%)

130 (13%) 0 644 (63%) 239 (24%) 3 (<1%) 1,016 (100%)

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130 (11%) 0 865 (70%) 239 (19%) 3 (<1%) 1,237 (100%)

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

A credit card option was offered in only a small proportion of all cases in which bail was set no higher than $2,500. Among the 30,051 cases citywide in 2013 with bail set at $2,500 or less, the option of posting bail by credit card was offered in only 1,016 cases, or 3% of the total (Figure 2).

In Manhattan, that proportion was 8%, considerably larger than in other boroughs. This percentage represented an increase from 3% the year before, during the nine-month startup period.

Brooklyn had more cases within the eligible bail range than any other borough (8,481), so the absence of credit card options in Brooklyn cannot be attributed to any scarcity of low-bail cases.

Figure 2 Proportion Of Cases With Bail Set At $2,500 Or Less* In Which A Credit Card Option Was Offered By Borough Arraigned 2013 Bronx

Manhattan

0

2% (130)

8% (644)

4% (239)

<1% (3)

3% (1,016)

8,481

6,228

8,035

5,836

1,471

30,051

N=

Queens

Staten Island

Combined Boroughs

Brooklyn

Arraigned March 27, 2012 – December 31, 2012 Manhattan 3% (221)

*Excluding $1

N=

6,555

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

2. Judicial Participation Whether or not to offer a credit card option is at the discretion of the Court, within the bail parameters set by the program. Some judges participated more fully than others, but a large number of judges — 76 in all — set at least one credit card option during the study period. Judges from every borough participated, with the exception of Brooklyn.

Figure 3 shows the number of participating judges by borough in each year of the study period. In 2013, the results were as follows: 21 judges in the Bronx, 30 in Manhattan (15 of whom had also set a credit card option during 2012), 14 in Queens, and 2 in Staten Island. An additional 9 judges in Manhattan set a credit card option in 2012, but not in 2013 (possibly because they were no longer assigned to arraignment court parts).

Figure 3 Number Of Judges Who Set At Least One Credit Card Bail Option

By Borough And Year

2013 (12 months) Bronx:

2012 (9 months) 24 judges (all Manhattan) 15 repeated in 2013 9 in 2012 only

Brooklyn:

21 judges 0 judges

Manhattan: 30 judges 15 judges same as 2012 + 15 additional judges Queens: Staten Island: TOTAL:

14 judges 2 judges 67 judges (4 boroughs)

COMBINED 2012 – 2013 (21 months) 9 judges in 2012 who did not repeat in 2013 + 67 judges in 2013 = 76 total number of judges who set credit card bail during the study period

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

While many judges set a credit card option at least once, only a few judges did so with any frequency. In each borough, the judge with the most credit card bail cases was coded “Judge A,” the judge with the second most credit card bail cases was coded “Judge B,” and so on. The codes correspond to different judges in each borough.

Figure 4 shows that only three or four judges in each borough were responsible for a majority of the credit card cases. In the Bronx, Queens, and Staten Island a single judge set more than a third of all the credit card options within the borough during the study period.

Figure 4 Number Of Credit Card Cases

By Judge And Borough

Bronx

Manhattan Judge A

30% (39)

36% (47)

11% (14) 11% (14)

12% (16)

Judge A 29% (255)

Judge B Judge C

12% 17% (104) 14% (144) (118)

Judge D All Others

15% (37)

Judge A

33% (1)

Judge B

Judge B 67% (2)

Judge C All Others

N = 239

N=3

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All Others

Staten Island Judge A

22% (52)

Judge D

N = 865

Queens 36% (85)

Judge B Judge C

N = 130

27% (65)

28% (244)

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

3. Credit Card Bail Amounts The program authorizes the courts to offer defendants the option of posting bail by credit card in any amount up to $2,500. Figure 5 shows that the mean credit card amount for the study sample was $1,260, and the median was $1,000.

In 60% of credit card cases, the credit card option was set at $1,000 or less. In 18% of credit card cases the credit card amount was exactly $1,000 and in 19% of credit card cases the amount was $2,500. The credit card amount was $350 or less in 5% of credit card cases. (No credit card bail was set in amounts falling in between the dollar categories specified in Figure 5.)

In nine cases, the credit card amount was set higher than the amount authorized

by OCA. These amounts ranged from $3,000 (four cases) to $3,500 (two cases) to $5,000 (two cases) to $25,000 (one case). In eight out of the nine cases, all three amounts (bond, cash, and credit card) were higher than $2,500. In the remaining case, the credit card amount was set at $3,000 (equivalent to the bond amount) despite a cash alternative of only $2,500.4 Figure 5 Credit Card Bail Amounts Mean Median

N = 1,237 = $1,260 = $1,000

$50 ‐ $350 N=61 5% $450 ‐ $500 N=308 25%

Above $2,500 N=9 1% $600 ‐ $750 N=150 12%

$1,000 N=228 18%

$1,250 ‐ $2,000 N=241 19%

$2,500 N=240 19%

4

No common element stood out in these cases: seven were in Manhattan, one in Queens, and one in the Bronx, each set by a different judge. The defendant was never released in three of the cases and cash bail was posted in four of them, which could have been an indication that the cashier would not accept a credit card for an amount higher than allowed by the program, even though the judge had authorized it. However, a credit card was used in the other two cases, for $3,000 and $3,500 respectively. In the $3,500 credit card payment, “CC bail approved” was explicitly noted in the OCA comment section.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

There are no restrictions on bond and cash bail amounts in credit card cases. In practice, most judges seem to consider the credit card option to be an alternative mechanism for posting cash bail; the amounts were most often the same for credit card and cash options. When a higher bond amount was set with a lower cash alternative, the credit card option usually matched the cash alternative. When no cash alternative was set, the credit card amount usually matched the single amount set for bond or cash.

Figure 6 displays the relationships among bond, cash, and credit card amounts among cases in the research sample. In 87% of the credit card cases, the amount that could be posted by credit card was set equal to the cash amount (the true cash alternative, if there was one, or the single amount that could be posted as bond or cash).

The credit card amount was lower than the cash amount 3% of the time, and higher than the cash amount 9% of the time.

Compared to bail bond amounts, the credit card option was lower in the majority of cases (53%), reflecting the common practice of making the credit option equivalent to cash bail. In nearly half of the credit card cases, the amount that could be posted by credit card was the same as the bond amount (45%), reflecting the frequent absence of a true cash alternative. In a tiny fraction of cases, the credit card amount exceeded the bond amount (18 cases, or 1%).

Setting a credit card amount that is higher than cash bail — sometimes even higher than the bond amount — could reflect a concern on the part of some judges that allowing bail to be posted by credit card would increase the likelihood of failure to appear for future court dates. The intention may be to offset the ease of using a credit card by raising the price of release. The low proportion of bail cases in which a credit card option was offered may reflect the same concern. We will address this issue later by comparing FTA rates in credit card cases with rates for the comparison sample.

The bottom pie in Figure 6 shows that in most credit card cases, bond and cash amounts were no higher than $2,500, despite the fact that the program places no restrictions on them. Any bail case is technically eligible for a credit card option, as long as the judge is willing to set the credit card amount at $2,500 or less, but in fact higher bond and cash amounts were rare. In 79% of the credit card cases, all amounts — bond, cash, and credit card — were within the $2,500 range. In another 19% of credit card cases, the cash amount was $2,500 or less with a higher bond amount. In only 2% of the credit card cases were both bond and cash bail amounts higher than $2,500, with a lower credit card amount. Higher amounts for all three options were set in 8 cases, with one additional credit card amount higher than $2,500 (1%). This suggests that the comparison sample of cases with bail set no higher than $2,500 is a good match for bail amounts in 98% of the credit card cases.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 6 Relative Amounts Of Bond, Cash, And Credit Card Options N = 1,237

Credit Card Lower Than Cash (3%) n=43

Credit Card Higher Than Cash (9%) n=117

Credit Card Amount Relative to Cash Bail

Credit Card = Cash (87%) n=1,077

Credit Card Higher Than Bond (1%) n=18

Credit Card Amount Relative to Bond Amount

Bond & Cash Higher Than $2,500 (Credit Card $2,500 Or Less) (2%) n=19

All Amounts Relative to $2,500 Eligibility Maximum

Credit Card Lower Than Bond (53%) n=660

Credit Card = Bond (45%) n=559

Credit Card Higher Than $2,500 (1%) n=9 Only Bond Higher Than $2,500 (19%) n=235 All Amounts $2,500 Or Less (79%) n=974

Pie slices do not total 100% because of rounding.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

B. Utilization Of Credit Cards In Bail Making Four cases in the credit card sample were excluded from the analysis of bail making because of missing case processing data, leaving 1,233 cases in the analysis.

These included 123 cases in which the defendant posted bail, but we could not determine whether a credit card was used.

Figure 7 shows that a credit card was used to post bail in only 165 cases, or 13% of those with a credit card option set by the court. In spite of the availability of this option, nearly half (45%) used cash to post bail,5 and 5% used the services of a bail bondsman. Some were released on recognizance post-arraignment (6%). The form of bail release was unknown for a substantial minority (10%), usually because the bail was posted while the defendant was in the custody of the Department of Correction (DOC) and the form was not identified in the OCA database. We assume that when bail was posted at DOC, a credit card was not used (except perhaps under the separate DOC system, which does not require that a specific credit card amount be set), but the “cash” category was reserved for cases explicitly coded as cash by OCA. Finally, one in five (21%) never made bail, resulting in detention throughout the pretrial period.

In the Bronx, credit cards were used in 26% of cases with a credit card option, more than double the proportion in Manhattan and Queens (12% in each). The Bronx was also distinguished by a smaller proportion of credit card cases with no release throughout the pretrial period: 14% in the Bronx, compared to 19% in Queens and 23% in Manhattan.

5

We reiterate the reservations expressed earlier about the accuracy with which our data distinguished cash bail making from the use of credit cards.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 7 Pretrial Release Outcomes In Cases With Credit Card Bail Option Citywide N = 1,233

10% 6% (n=123) (n=75)

21% (n=261)

13% (165)

5% (n=57)

No Release Bond Cash Credit Card ROR Bail Posted (Type unknown)

45% (n=552)

4%

Bronx

Manhattan

N = 130

N = 862

12% 14%

6%

4%

11%

23%

12%

26%

5%

41% 43%

6%

Queens

Staten Island

N = 238

N=3

6% 19%

12%

2% 100%

54%

Pie slices may not total 100% because of rounding.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

III. DEFENDANT AND CASE CHARACTERISTICS: SAMPLE COMPARISONS A. Demographics Gender, age, and ethnicity were examined for defendants in the credit card sample, and for the small subgroup with a credit card used to post bail. These demographics were compared to defendants with bail set at $2,500 or less who had not been offered a credit card option (the comparison sample).

Figure 8 shows that the credit card sample as a whole was identical to the comparison sample in terms of gender: 89% were male and 11% female in both samples. Among the small group who used a credit card to post bail, the proportion of females was slightly larger (13%).

Figure 8 Sample Comparisons: Gender Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554

89% 87% (1,100) (144)

89% (18,357)

11% 13% (137) (21)

Male

11% (2,197)

Male

Female

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Female

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 9 compares the ages of the credit card and comparison groups.

Defendants in the credit card sample were a little younger than defendants in the comparison group. The mean age for credit card defendants was 32, compared to 34 for the comparison sample. The median ages were 29 (credit card) and 32 (comparison).

Mean and median ages for the credit card sample did not differ from the subgroup with bail paid by credit card, although there were differences in specific age categories. Those who made bail by credit card were slightly more likely to be in the youngest or in the oldest age groups, compared to the credit card sample as a whole.

Figure 9 Sample Comparisons: Age Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554

42% 41% (514) (67)

2% 3% (27) (5) 13‐16

25% (5,196)

23% 23% (289) (38) 15% 14% (185) 9% 11% (23) (15) (133)

10% 7% (17) (89)

17‐19

35% (7,176)

20‐29

30‐39

40‐49

1% (263)

50+

13‐16

Mean age = 32 (same for both groups) Median age = 29 (same for both groups)

-18-

19% (3,951)

7% (1,341)

17‐19

20‐29

Mean age = 34 Median age = 32

30‐39

40‐49

13% (2,627)

50+

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

The largest demographic differences were found in ethnicity, where the small difference between the credit card sample and the comparison cases was magnified in the subgroup of defendants who used a credit card to make bail (Figure 10). Among the comparison cases, 10% of defendants were white, compared to 14% of the credit card sample and 24% of the subgroup. The proportion of Hispanics was about the same in all three groups (between 34% and 37%), but there was a much smaller proportion of blacks among those who made bail by credit card (34%) than in either of the other groups (45% among the credit card sample and 47% among comparison cases).

Figure 10 Sample Comparisons: Ethnicity Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554 47% 9,698

45% (557)

14% (178)

Black

37% 7,546

34% 35% (426) (57)

34% (56) 24% (39)

White

6% 8% (71) (13)

Hispanic

Other

10% 2,125

<1% (5) Missing

Black

White

Hispanic

4% 831

2% 354

Other

Missing

Totals for each sample may not equal 100% because of rounding.

Ethnic differences — and to a lesser extent, age differences — may reflect disparities among the defendant population in access to a credit card. We have no way of knowing if judges routinely inquire about access to a credit card before offering that option, but some surely do. It may be that younger, white defendants are more likely to have credit cards, or to have a family member with a credit card. This could explain why they are over-represented among those offered a credit card option and especially among those who made bail using a credit card.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

B. Employment Our measure of employment comes from the pre-arraignment interview conducted by CJA staff (described on the following page). A defendant is categorized as employed if he or she reports having a full-time job, or is in school or in a training program full time. A person with part-time work, school, or training is counted as “not employed.” CJA attempts to verify the defendant’s response by calling a contact person named by the defendant; conflicting responses from the defendant and the contact person are included with “not employed.”

One would expect a larger proportion of credit card holders to be employed than among the general defendant population, and the data shown in Figure 11 are consistent with this expectation. Only 35% of the comparison sample was employed full time, compared to 46% of the credit card sample and 61% of the subgroup of cases with bail posted by credit card.

Even though the majority of the credit card sample had no full-time employment, the higher rate of employment among this sample (46%) compared to non-credit card cases (35%) suggests that some judicial screening took place in making the offer of payment by credit card. However, actually using a credit card to post bail was much more closely related to employment than simply being offered a credit card option.

Figure 11 Sample Comparisons: Full-Time Employment Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554

61% (101) 46% (570)

60% (12,431)

50% (613) 35% (7,119)

35% (57)

4% (54) Employed

Not Employed

5% 1,004)

4% (7) Employed

Missing

Not Employed

Totals for each sample may not equal 100% because of rounding.

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Missing

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

C. CJA Recommendation CJA personnel interview defendants who, after arrest, are held for arraignment in the lower court (Criminal Court) in New York City. The purpose of the interview is to provide judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel with background information on defendants in order to assist in determining the likelihood that individual defendants, if released, will return for scheduled court dates. Selected items from the interview are used to calculate an objective score that reflects the estimated risk of nonappearance.

Based on this score, each adult defendant is assigned to a Low Risk (Recommended), Moderate Risk, Not Recommended, or other category.6 A separate recommendation system is used for youths under 16 years of age who are prosecuted as adults under New York State’s Juvenile Offender (JO) Law. The interview process and recommendation system are described in the Agency’s Annual Report (e.g., CJA 2013).

Figure 12 shows that the credit card sample had a higher proportion of low and moderate risk defendants than the comparison sample, and this difference was magnified in the subgroup with bail paid by credit card. Only 15% of the comparison sample had a low-risk defendant, compared to 21% of the credit card sample, and 38% of the subgroup.

Figure 12 Sample Comparisons: CJA Recommendation Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554

67% (13,850)

58% (715) 40% (66)

38% (62) 21% (259)

16% 18% (198) (30) 5% (65)

Low Risk Moderate Risk Not (Recommended) Recommended

15% (3,049) 4% (7)

Other

12% (2,478)

Low Risk Moderate Risk Not Recommended (Recommended)

6% (1,177)

Other

6

The Not Recommended category includes defendants assessed to be at high risk of failure to appear combined with defendants who were Not Recommended for other reasons (open warrant, bail-jumping charge, or conflicting residence information). The Other category includes all others, including those who were not interviewed and not assigned a recommendation.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

D. Criminal History Two aspects of a defendant’s criminal history — prior warrant and prior convictions — are examined next.

Prior warrant is an element in the CJA recommendation, but previous research has found it to be associated with FTA independently of the recommendation (Phillips 2011b).

On both measures, defendants in the credit card groups had less serious criminal histories than defendants in the comparison sample. Again, the difference was greatest among defendants in the subgroup of cases with bail posted by credit card.

Among defendants in the comparison sample, 66% had failed to appear in a previous case, as indicated by a prior warrant at the time of arrest (Figure 13). This is a larger proportion than among the credit card cases (56%), and a much larger proportion than among the cases in the subgroup with bail posted by credit card (37%).

Figure 13 Sample Comparisons: Prior Warrant Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,202

N = 161

N = 20,152 66% (13,288)

56% (669) 37% (60)

Percent with prior warrant

Excluded cases: 35 cases were excluded from the credit card sample (4 of them also in the subgroup) and 402 cases were excluded from the comparison sample because of missing prior warrant data.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 14 shows that similar differences were found in comparisons of prior convictions. Over half of the subgroup of cases with bail posted by credit card had a defendant with no prior conviction (61%), compared to 42% of the credit card sample as a whole, and only 35% of the comparison sample.

On the other hand, a much larger proportion of the comparison sample had a defendant with a prior felony conviction (42%), compared to the credit card sample (35%) and especially compared to the subgroup (21%).

Figure 14 Sample Comparisons: Prior Conviction Credit Card Sample N = 1,194

Comparison Sample N = 20,085

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card N = 159

61% (97) 42% (496)

35% (420) 23% (278)

No Convictions

18% (28)

Misdemeanor Conviction Only

42% (8,500)

35% (6,972) 23% (4,613)

21% (34)

No Convictions

Felony Conviction

Misdemeanor Conviction Only

Felony Conviction

Excluded cases: 43 cases were excluded from the credit card sample (6 of them also in the subgroup) and 469 cases were excluded from the comparison sample because of missing criminal history data.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

E. Offense Type And Severity Figure 15 compares the distribution of charge types among the research samples.

This comparison suggests that there is a relationship between some offenses and the offer of payment by credit card — and especially the use of a credit card to pay bail.

The largest difference among the samples was found in the proportion of offenses under the Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL).7 A VTL offense was the top charge at arraignment in only 6% of the non-credit card cases, compared to 11% among the credit card sample, and 19% among the subgroup with bail posted by credit card. It is reasonable to suppose that VTL charges were over-represented among the credit card samples because of a relationship between car ownership and credit card ownership.

On the other hand, drug and property crimes were under-represented among the credit card cases. Drug cases comprised 21% of the comparison sample, but only 16% of the credit card sample and 12% of the subgroup with bail posted by credit card. The comparable percentages for property crimes were 16% among the non-credit card cases, compared to 12% for the credit card sample and 10% for the subgroup.

The “Other” charge type category combines all remaining charge types, including a small number of cases with missing charge type data. The proportion of cases in this category was similar in the two sample groups and the subgroup.

Figure 15 Sample Comparisons: Offense Type Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554

61% 59% (754) (97)

16% (199) 12% (20)

12% 10% (146) (16)

19% 11% (32) (138)

Drug

Property

VTL

56% (11,601)

21% (4,251)

Other

Drug

16% (3,390)

Property

6% (1,312)

VTL

Other

Totals for each sample may not equal 100% because of rounding.

7

The two most common VTL charges in each group were VTL 511, driving with a suspended or revoked license, and VTL 1192, driving while intoxicated.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 16 compares the samples in terms of the severity class of the top charge at arraignment. Charges among credit card cases were a little more likely to be felony level: 32% of the comparison sample were felony cases, compared to 39% of the credit card cases and 41% of the subgroup for which a credit card was used to post bail.8

Figure 16 Sample Comparisons: Offense Severity Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Paid by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,237

N = 165

N = 20,554

67% (13,750)

60% 59% (744) (97) 39% 41% (486) (68)

32% (6,658)

1% (7) Felony

Misdemeanor Or Lesser

1% (146)

0%

Unknown Severity

Felony

Misdemeanor Or Lesser

Unknown Severity

8

All the samples in this research were comprised of cases with bail set, so many of the case and defendant characteristics described for the research samples are not typical of the defendant population as a whole. Only about 16% of top charges at arraignment overall are felony level (CJA 2013).

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New Yorkâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Credit Card Bail Experiment

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Â

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

IV. EFFECT OF THE CREDIT CARD PROGRAM ON PRETRIAL OUTCOMES A. Pretrial Release 1. Sample Comparisons Defendants who were offered a credit card option were much more likely to be released prior to disposition than defendants in the comparison sample who had similar bail but were not given the opportunity to pay by credit card. Figure 17 shows that 79% of the credit card sample had a defendant who was released prior to disposition, compared to 56% of the non-credit card comparison sample. (The subgroup of cases with bail paid by credit card is not shown separately because by definition all were released.)

Although all defendants included in the research had bail set, not all releases were the result of posting bail. New York law requires the release of a defendant after five days (six days when a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday occurs during custody) if the complaint has not been substantiated by the filing of an information or an indictment, unless the defendant has waived that right (CPL §170.70 and §180.80).

Some defendants were released on recognizance post-arraignment as a result of this requirement. (Figure 7 showed that 6% of the credit card sample had a defendant who was released on recognizance.)

Figure 17 Release Rates By Sample 79% (967)

56% (11,566)

Credit Card Sample N=1,228

Comparison Sample N=20,549

Excluded cases (Figures 17 and 18): 9 cases were excluded from the credit card sample and 5 cases were excluded from the comparison sample because of missing release data.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

2. Controlling For CJA Recommendation We have seen that the credit card sample differed from the comparison group in defendant and case characteristics (Figures 8–16). Although the groups were well matched in terms of the amount of bail set in each case, they were not matched in other respects. Some of the differences between the samples were in factors known to be associated with release, such as the CJA release recommendation. The credit card sample had a higher proportion of low-risk, recommended defendants than did the comparison sample (shown in Figure 12). Before we conclude that being able to use a credit card in itself enabled more defendants to gain release, we need to take into account sample differences in the proportion of recommended defendants. Maybe the credit card sample had higher release rates only because it had more low-risk defendants.

Figure 18 presents release rates within each recommendation category for the credit card and non-credit card comparison samples. Among cases with a low-risk defendant, release rates were still nearly 20 percentage points higher among the credit card cases (93%), compared to the comparison sample (75%). The same difference in release rates was found within every other recommendation category: 20 or more percentage points separated the credit card cases from the comparison cases, and in every group the credit card release rate was higher.

Figure 18 Release Rates By Sample, Controlling For CJA Recommendation Credit Card Sample

Comparison Sample

N = 1,228

N = 20,549

93% (236)

86% (170) 75% (2,272)

73% (519)

66% (1,627)

68% (42) 52% (7,225) 38% (442)

N =

Low Risk (Recommended) 255 3,049

Moderate Risk 198 2,478

Not Recommended 713 13,846

Other 62 1,176

The Not Recommended category includes defendants assessed to be at high risk of failure to appear combined with defendants who were Not Recommended for other reasons (open warrant, bail-jumping charge, or conflicting residence information). The Other category includes all others, including those who were not interviewed and not assigned a recommendation.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

3. Multiple Regression Analysis Of Pretrial Release We have ruled out the disproportionate number of low-risk defendants in the credit card sample as the reason for their higher release rates, but the samples were also mismatched in other ways that could explain differences in release rates. In order to control simultaneously for a large number of defendant and case characteristics that could affect both release and the offer of a credit card payment option, we used logistic regression to estimate the model presented in Table 2. This procedure accomplishes statistically what would be accomplished by matching the samples on each characteristic tested in the model.

The model shows that the offer of a credit card option more than doubled the odds of release, holding constant the effects of CJA recommendation, prior convictions, prior warrant, ethnicity, age, sex, whether the defendant expected someone at arraignment, full-time employment, and the type and severity of the offense. The predicted probability of release for defendants who were offered a credit card payment option was 75%, compared to only 58% for the comparison cases. These probabilities, which take into account differences between the samples, are very close to the release rates presented in Figure 17. (The statistics provided in this and other models presented in this report are described in the Appendix.)

Bail payment by credit card was not included in the model because membership in this subgroup overlapped strongly with membership in the credit card sample. The effect of the more inclusive measure — offer of a credit card option — completely overshadowed the smaller effect of posting bail by credit card, when both were tested together in the model.

The factor with the greatest impact on pretrial release was charge type: defendants charged with a VTL offense were much more likely to be released than those charged with other types of offenses. The predicted probability of release was 82% for VTL cases compared to 57% for drug cases. Other factors associated with greater likelihood of release included a positive CJA recommendation, no prior warrant, white or “other” ethnicity, being under 30 years of age, expecting a family member or friend to attend the arraignment, having full-time employment, and being charged with a felony offense. The predicted probabilities of release for defendants with these characteristics were all over 60%, compared to significantly lower predicted probabilities for defendants lacking the characteristics.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

TABLE 2 Logistic Regression Model Of Pretrial Release Combined Samples (N=20,429)9 Dependent variable = Pretrial Release Standardized Beta and Significance Level

Independent Variable Credit Card Option Offered

Control Variables CJA Recommendation Reference category=Low Risk Moderate risk Not recommended No recommendation Prior Conviction

Prior Warrant Defendant’s Ethnicity Reference category = White Black Hispanic Other

Defendant Is Female

Reference category = Drug Offense Property VTL All Other Felony Offense

58% 75%

***

64%

0.993 0.726 0.442

64% 57% 46%

ns

–.02ns .01ns

0.957 1.018

–.13**

0.803

59%

No Yes

–.22*** –.20*** .06*

0.707 0.725 1.272

.18***

1.324

–.01ns

Defendant Expects Someone At Arraignment Defendant Is Employed, In School, Or In A Training Program Full Time Charge type (at arraignment)

No Yes

2.402

***

Defendant Is Under 30 Years Of Age

Predicted Probability Of Release

.26***

.00ns –.19*** –.08***

Reference category = No prior conviction Misdemeanor conviction only Felony conviction

Nagelkerke R‐square

Odds Ratio

0.979

.39***

1.922

.20***

1.386

65%

No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes

***

57% 58% 69% 56% 62% 59% 58% 54% 69% 56% 63%

57%

–.24*** .42*** .12***

0.605 3.674 1.208

.22***

1.431

58% 59% 57% 62%

No Yes

45% 82% 61% 56% 64%

.148

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ns = not significant

9

From the pool of 21,791 cases in the combined samples, 1,362 were excluded from the regression analysis because of missing data on one or more of the variables used in the analysis.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

The positive association between a felony offense and likelihood of release may seem backwards in light of the fact that felony defendants overall are much less likely to be released at arraignment, compared to defendants charged with misdemeanors or lesser offenses (CJA 2013, Exhibit 12). That is because non-felony defendants are more likely to be released on recognizance. However, once bail is set, felony defendants with bail of $2,500 or less are more likely to be able to post their bail than non-felony defendants with similar bail amounts (CJA 2013, Exhibits 14 and 18). The model results reflect this relationship.

The only factors tested in the model that were not significantly related to likelihood of release for defendants with low bail were the defendant’s sex and record of prior convictions. In addition, there was no significant difference in likelihood of release between defendants with Moderate Risk and Low Risk recommendations.

The fact that the offer of payment by credit card was a strong predictor of release, even after statistically controlling for other factors that are also associated with likelihood of release, constitutes credible evidence that the credit card option made it possible for some defendants to gain release who otherwise would have been detained to disposition of the case.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

B. Length Of Pretrial Detention 1. Sample Comparisons Detention length is calculated as the number of days from arraignment10 to the first release, or to final disposition in cases with no pre-disposition release.

Not only were defendants in the credit card sample more likely to be released, they were also released more quickly than defendants in the comparison group. The mean number of days spent in detention for the credit card sample was 10, compared to 18 days for the comparison sample (Figure 19). The medians were 1 day (credit card) and 5 days (comparison). As usual, the difference was magnified for defendants who paid bail by credit card: they spent an average of only 3 days in pretrial detention, and the median for this subgroup was zero. (A median of zero means that over half of the subgroup did not spend a night in jail.)

Figure 19 Length Of Pretrial Detention In Days By Sample Credit Card Sample N=1,223

Subgroup Paid by Credit Card N=164

Comparison Sample N=20,507

10 (Mean) 1 (Median)

3 (Mean) 0 (Median)

18 (Mean) 5 (Median)

Excluded cases (Figures 18 and 19): 14 cases were excluded from the credit card sample (including one from the subgroup) and 47 from the comparison sample because of missing release data.

10

For a few dozen cases in which the credit card bail option was initially offered post-arraignment, the clock started on the day credit card bail was set rather than at arraignment. This is not an issue for the comparison sample because only cases with bail set at arraignment were selected for the comparison group. When we refer to the “arraignment,” we mean the date on which bail was set, even though for a few cases this date was actually post-arraignment.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Figure 20 shows, separately for each group, the proportion released at arraignment11 and at intervals thereafter. Among those who posted bail by credit card, 77% did not spend any time in detention (0 days). This is more than double the proportion with no detention among the credit card sample as a whole (31%) and more than four times the proportion with no detention among the comparison group (16%).

Pretrial detention ends when the defendant is released, or when the case is disposed by conviction, acquittal, or dismissal. One day after bail was set, detention had ended for 85% of the subgroup, compared to 51% of the entire credit card sample and 26% of the comparison group. After five days, detention had ended for nearly everyone in the subgroup (92%), for 78% of the credit card sample, and for only 61% of the comparison group. After 60 days, pretrial detention had ended for over 90% of defendants in each sample, including the subgroup.

Figure 20 Percent Released (Or Case Disposed) Over Time By Sample Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Posted by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 1,223

N = 164

N = 20,507

100% 90%

85%

87%

88%

89%

92%

95% 91%

86%

77%

80%

95%

99% 96% 92%

84%

78%

70%

73% 66%

60%

61%

50%

51%

40%

44% 37%

30%

31%

20% 10%

61%

57%

32% 26%

16%

0% 0

1 Day

2 Days

3 Days

4 Days

5 Days

14 Days

30 Days

60 Days

11

Release at “arraignment” refers to bail-making on the same day that credit card bail was set, although in a few cases this date was actually post-arraignment (see previous footnote).

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

2. Controlling For CJA Recommendation The results did not change when we controlled for the fact that the credit card sample contained more recommended defendants than the comparison sample. Within each recommendation category, the length of detention was shorter for defendants who were offered payment by credit card than for the comparison group of non-credit card cases with similar bail, and shortest for defendants who posted bail by credit card.

These results are shown in Figure 21.

Among cases with a low-risk defendant, the mean length of time spent in detention was 8 days for the credit card sample and 13 days for the non-credit card comparison sample. Medians for the two groups were 1 day and 2 days respectively.

Defendants in the subgroup of cases with a credit card used to post bail spent even less time in detention: 5 days on average, with a median of zero.

Other recommendation categories were associated with longer detention times, but within each recommendation category, the defendants who were offered a credit card payment option spent less time in detention, and the subgroup with bail posted by credit card spent the least time in detention.

Figure 21 Length Of Pretrial Detention In Days Controlling For CJA Recommendation Low Risk (Recommended)

Moderate Risk

8

7

1

3

3

0

0

19

17

2

4

CC Sample N = 254 Subgroup N = 61 Comparison N = 3,036

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32

5

N = 198 N = 30 N = 2,470

Median

0

0

13

Mean

20

2

1

0

Other

11

1

5

Not Recommended

8

N = 710 N = 66 N = 13,828

N = 61 N = 7 N = 1,173

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

3. Multiple Regression Analysis Of Detention Length After finding that pretrial detention was considerably shorter for defendants in the credit card sample, we ruled out the higher proportion of recommended defendants in that sample as the explanation. Following the same procedure used in analyzing the effect of the credit card program on release, we next estimated a multiple regression model to control statistically for recommendation category along with a large number of other defendant and case characteristics. Whereas logistic regression was appropriate for the dichotomous outcome predicted by the release model, a different statistical procedure — ordinary least squares regression — was used for detention length because the outcome in this analysis is number of days spent in pretrial detention, which is a continuous interval-level measure. The results are presented in Table 3.

The offer of a credit card option was strongly associated with fewer days spent in pretrial detention, even after controlling for recommendation, prior conviction, prior warrant, ethnicity, age, sex, expecting someone at arraignment, employment, and charge type and severity. The unstandardized coefficient (beta) in this model can be interpreted as a rough measure of the number of days’ change in detention length associated with a unit change in the independent or control variable. Consequently, the unstandardized beta coefficient of –7.293 for the independent variable (Credit Card Option Offered) indicates that the offer of payment by credit card shortened pretrial detention by about a week on average, all other factors being equal.

The payment of bail by credit card was not included in the detention length model for the same reason that it was omitted from the release model: all of the defendants who paid by credit card were also in the group who were offered a credit card option.

Because of the large overlap, a model with both variables was not able to distinguish the contribution of each. A separate model was tested replacing the independent variable in Table 3 (credit card option offered) with “payment by credit card.” Payment by credit card had a smaller impact on overall detention because there were so few cases in which a credit card was used — but for those cases, pretrial detention was reduced by about 11 days, all else being equal (not shown).

The factors with the greatest impact on detention length were charge-related: felonies and property crimes were associated with longer detention. In addition, being assigned a “Not Recommended” category by CJA was associated with relatively longer detention times. These were the three variables with the largest standardized beta coefficients (.070, .073, and .066 respectively), a statistic that measures the variable’s importance in explaining the outcome. The “Other Recommendation” category was associated with an increase of almost 10 days in detention time, but there were few cases in this category so the overall impact on detention was smaller (as indicated by a small standardized beta of .021).

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

TABLE 3 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model Of Detention Length Combined Samples (N=20,388)12 Dependent variable = Detention Length (in days) Standardized Beta and Significance Level

Independent Variable Credit Card Option Offered

Unstandardized Beta –7.293

–.046***

Control Variables

.010ns .066*** .021**

1.073 5.257 9.797

CJA Recommendation Reference category = Low Risk (Recommended) Moderate risk Not recommended Other Prior Conviction Reference category = No prior conviction Misdemeanor conviction only Felony conviction Prior Warrant Defendant’s Ethnicity Reference category = White Black Hispanic Other Defendant Is 30 Years Of Age Or Older Defendant Is Female Defendant Does NOT Expect Someone At Arraignment Defendant Is NOT Employed, In School, Or In A Training Program Full Time Charge type (at arraignment) Reference category = Drug Offense

Property VTL All Other Felony Offense Adjusted R‐square

–.007ns .038*** –.034*

–0.646 2.832 –2.581

.020ns .050*** .004ns .022** –.034***

1.467 3.751 0.666 1.602 –3.993

.050***

3.956

.026**

1.954

.073*** –.035*** .053*** .070***

7.189 –5.071 3.905 5.439 .024

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ns = not significant

12

From the pool of 21,791 cases in the combined samples, 1,362 were excluded from the regression analysis because of missing data on one or more of the independent or control variables used in the analysis. An additional 41 cases were excluded because the length of detention was unknown.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Other factors that significantly lengthened pretrial detention were having a prior felony conviction, being Hispanic, not expecting someone at arraignment, being 30 or older, and being unemployed. Being female and charged with a VTL offense (and, curiously, having a prior warrant) were associated with reduced detention length.

This model provides strong evidence that the bail by credit card program, in addition to its role in enabling defendants to gain release, is also instrumental in reducing the length of time spent in pretrial detention before release.

C. Failure To Appear (FTA) 1. Sample Comparisons Despite higher release rates and shorter detention lengths, released defendants in the credit card groups were no more likely to fail to appear (FTA) than defendants in the comparison sample. Figure 22 shows that FTA rates were actually slightly lower among defendants who were offered payment by credit card (10%) than among the comparison sample of cases with similar bail (12%). The lowest FTA rate was found among the subgroup of credit card cases with bail posted by credit card (8%).

Figure 22 FTA Rates By Sample (Released Defendants)

10% (100)

Credit Card Sample N = 967

8% (13)

12%

Subgroup: Paid by Credit Card N = 164

Comparison Sample N = 11,566

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

2. Controlling For CJA Recommendation Figure 23 presents FTA rates for each group, broken down by recommendation category. When low-risk (recommended) defendants in each group were compared, the difference in FTA rates between the credit card sample and the comparison sample was still only two percentage points, but in the opposite direction: the 7% FTA rate for recommended defendants in the credit card sample was slightly higher than the 5% FTA rate for recommended defendants in the comparison sample.

Within all other recommendation categories, however, FTA rates were a little lower among credit card cases than among cases in the comparison sample. These findings suggest that neither the offer nor the use of credit card payment was associated with higher FTA rates for similarly recommended defendants with comparable bail. The small differences were not statistically significant.13

Figure 23 FTA Rates By Sample Controlling For CJA Recommendation (Released Defendants)

7% (16)

Credit Card Sample

Subgroup: Bail Posted by Credit Card

Comparison Sample

N = 967

N = 164

N = 11,566

7% (4)

4% (7)

14% (71) 3% (1)

11% (7)

Low Risk Moderate Risk Not (Recommended) Recommended N =

236

61

170

30

519

66

14% (6)

14% (1)

5% (118)

Other 42

9% (139)

15% (1,091)

Low Risk Moderate risk Not (Recommended) Recommended

7

2,272

1,627

7,225

19% (83)

Other 442

Totals for each sample may not equal 100% because of rounding.

13

This was tested using the chi-square test of statistical significance and was confirmed by the multivariate regression analysis that follows.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

3. Multiple Regression Analysis Of FTA Finally, we examined the association between FTA and the offer of a credit card option, while simultaneously controlling for recommendation category along with additional defendant and case characteristics. To do this, we used logistic regression to estimate the model presented in Table 4.

The model estimates the effect on likelihood of FTA associated with the offer of bail payment by credit card.14 So far we have not seen any evidence that the credit card program affects FTA, but we have shown that the samples are not well matched on many factors associated with risk of FTA. The regression analysis compensates for this statistically by calculating the effect of the independent variable, controlling for multiple defendant and case characteristics.

The results show that the offer of a credit card option had no significant effect on likelihood of failure to appear. Insofar as the credit card program had any effect, it was in the direction of reducing FTA (from 12% predicted probability for the comparison cases to 11% for the credit card sample). However, the effect was so small that it did not attain statistical significance, which indicates that it could be the result of chance.

As expected, some of the control variables did significantly affect FTA, particularly the CJA recommendation. The strongest predictor of FTA was a negative CJA recommendation, which raised the predicted probability of FTA from 8% (among low-risk defendants) to 13% (not recommended). The “Other” recommendation category had an even higher predicted probability of FTA (19%) but less of an overall impact on FTA because of the small number of cases in that group. Other factors associated with elevated risk of FTA included a prior warrant, being young (under 30 years of age), female, unemployed, not expecting someone at arraignment, being charged with a drug or property offense, and being charged with a misdemeanor or lesser severity offense.

On the other hand, ethnicity was not significantly related to likelihood of FTA, nor was the defendant’s record of prior convictions.

These findings confirm the conclusion that FTA rates were not affected by the offer of a credit card payment option to defendants with low bail set during the study period.

14

The independent variable was the offer, not the actual payment of bail by credit card, for the reasons given earlier in the discussions of release and detention length models. We tested the effect of payment by credit card in a separate model, with essentially the same results. Cases in which bail was paid by credit card had slightly reduced odds of FTA, compared to all other cases (and compared to the entire credit card sample), but the difference was not statistically significant.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

TABLE 4 Logistic Regression Model Of Failure To Appear Released Defendants Only (N = 11,991)15 Dependent variable = FTA Standardized Beta and Significance Level

Independent Variables Credit Card Option Offered

–.05ns

Control Variables

Predicted Probability Of FTA

Odds Ratio

0.892

No Yes

12% 11%

***

8%

1.284 1.842 2.825

10% 13% 19%

11%

13% 12% 10% 13%

CJA Recommendation Reference category = Low Risk (Recommended) Moderate risk Not recommended Other Prior Conviction Reference category = No prior conviction Misdemeanor conviction only Felony conviction Prior Warrant Defendant’s Ethnicity Reference category = White Black Hispanic Other

.15ns .48*** .12*** ns

.11ns .11ns

1.173 1.154

.27**

1.395

ns

.08ns .07ns –.10ns

1.097 1.092 0.760

Defendant Is Under 30 Years Of Age

.36***

1.556

Defendant Is Female

.14**

1.329

–.26***

0.724

–.14**

0.840

Defendant Expects Someone At Arraignment Defendant Is Employed, In School, Or In A Training Program Full Time Charge type (arraignment charge) Reference category = All Other

Drug Property VTL Misdemeanor Or Lesser Offense Nagelkerke R‐square

*** .18*** .14** .08ns

1.321 1.304 1.171

.27***

1.400

No Yes

11%

12% 12% 9% 10% 15% 12% 15% 13% 10% 13% 11%

No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes

11%

14% 14% 13% 10% 13%

No Yes

.058

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ns = not significant

15

From the pool of 12,533 at-risk cases in the combined samples, 542 were excluded from the regression analysis because of missing data on one or more of the variables used in the analysis.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS The research has shown that the Credit Card Bail program is effective but underutilized. Defendants who are offered the option of paying bail by credit card are released at a higher rate and spend less time in pretrial detention, compared to similarly situated defendants without the credit card option. In addition, defendants who are released under the Credit Card Bail program are slightly less likely to fail to appear than their counterparts who are not given the opportunity to pay by credit card, although these results were not statistically significant in our study.

Judges are probably selective in offering this option, and there is certainly an element of self-selection in a defendant’s ability to take advantage of it, but our statistical analyses controlled for differences between those who were and were not offered the option of credit card payment. The major findings — more release, less detention time, and no significant effect on FTA — remained strong in the multivariate analyses even when sample differences were held constant.

Unlike other bail payment options, using a credit card requires no cash up front.

This is its major attraction, of course, and the reason it results in speedier release.

Defendants who use a credit card may also pay less in the long run than those who purchase bail bonds because they avoid the 10% fee charged by bond agents in New York.16 Fees paid to the Court for using a credit card are the same as posting cash bail: 3% upon conviction, and no fee upon acquittal or dismissal. If the credit card is paid in full before interest accrues, this represents a substantial saving over the cost of a bond.

However, interest on a credit card payment could mount quickly, making the credit card option a more expensive alternative in the long run.

Although the program works well in reducing detention without increasing failure to appear, currently it benefits very few defendants. Only about 3% of cases with bail set at $2,500 or less had a credit card option specified by the courts in 2013. An explanation for that tiny fraction could be that credit card ownership is rare among the defendant population, and judges may be reluctant to set a credit card amount if it appears to be an unrealistic option. However, this cannot explain the total absence of credit card bail in Brooklyn.17 Even more puzzling is the finding that when a credit card option was offered, most of the time the defendant apparently did not use it. If judges peg their offers to credit card ownership, then we would expect the offer to be followed by a credit card payment far more often than the 13% rate found in this study.

16

By law, New York bond agents charge 10% on the first $3,000, 8% on the next $7,000, and 6% on amounts over $10,000. See Phillips (2010, 2011a) for a fuller description of the costs of commercial bail bonds in New York.

17 We continued to track arraignment calendars in Brooklyn for over four months beyond the end of the study period and found no credit card bail set in that borough through May 15, 2014.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

We suspect that the proportion paying by credit card could have been far higher than our data showed. The same bail-making code for cash and credit card is used in the OCA database — a primary source of data for this project — so bail paid by credit card could not be distinguished from cash bail using that field. A separate “comment” field sometimes flags credit card bail making, but seems to be used inconsistently by OCA. In the Introduction to this report, we explained that we used the most conservative criteria for coding bail paid by credit card, with the result that a credit card could have been used in many cases that were categorized for this study as cash bail.

This is a likely explanation for the apparently tiny number of cases (165) in which a credit card was used to pay bail, according to our data, even when the option was offered.

An undercount of credit card payments would also explain another puzzling finding. The data presented in this report suggest that merely being offered a credit card option raised release rates and shortened detention time. The effects were magnified among the small subgroup we identified as having used a credit card to post bail, but the beneficial effects extended to the larger credit card sample, the majority of whom — we thought — did not actually use a credit card.

In supplemental analyses (not shown), we examined more closely the cases in which a credit card option was offered but apparently not used. Release rates among these cases were almost as high, and detention times almost as short, as were found for the subgroup of cases with confirmed credit card use. Using logistic regression, we controlled for the possibility that release rates were higher for this group only because the option was offered to defendants who had a higher likelihood of release to begin with. The supplemental statistical model of release showed that cases with a defendant who was offered a credit card option and apparently did not use it had significantly higher odds of release — very similar to the subgroup with bail paid by credit card — than comparable cases with a defendant who was not offered a credit card option, controlling for other factors that affect release. This makes sense if we conclude that in many cases with a credit card payment option, bail coded as paid in cash was in reality paid by credit card.

A limitation of this study is that it was not possible to control for every factor affecting release, since some important items — such as family financial resources — were not available to us. The statistical models predicting likelihood of release and length of pretrial detention explained only a small proportion of the variance in outcomes, which is an indication that other factors not included in the models had an even greater impact than the factors that were examined. This leaves open the possibility that credit card payment offers were made to a select group of defendants who were less likely than others to be detained for lengthy periods even without the credit card alternative. To the extent that this may be the case, the credit card option in -42-

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

itself may have been somewhat less instrumental in reducing detention time than our research suggests. However, since fears of an increase in FTA rates were not realized, continuing the experiment does not appear to have a downside. And, if the actual increase in release rates and decrease in pretrial detention even approach the findings of this research, the benefits are clear.

Policy Implications The credit card bail experiment’s demonstrated success in meeting its goals justifies expanding the program, and its low utilization by the courts suggests that it could be expanded substantially. Undoubtedly, low credit card ownership among the defendant population creates a built-in limitation to expansion. However, the clustering of credit card cases among a few judges in each borough, and their total absence in Brooklyn, suggest that those limits have not yet been reached.

Some specific recommendations follow. 

Raising awareness of the program among judges and defense attorneys (especially in Brooklyn) could encourage greater use. Administrative judges in each borough could take the lead in this. In addition, defense attorneys could request bail payment by credit card routinely in appropriate cases.



Expanding the program to bail amounts over $2,500 would enlarge the pool of potential beneficiaries. The current $2,500 maximum is too low to benefit defendants in about 40% of bail cases. In 2013, raising the cap by just $1,000 (to $3,500) would have increased the pool by about 8,000 cases. However, if this comes at the price of instituting fees to offset higher costs, a better strategy would be to focus on cases that are already eligible, retaining the no-fee provision. The usefulness of the program could best be expanded by raising the credit card bail limit while maintaining the fee waiver.



As the experimental status of the bail by credit card program makes the transition into a permanent bail option, we expect that the coding problems in OCA will be resolved. It is possible that some credit card bail in Brooklyn was missed by court clerks who were unfamiliar with the new program and did not know how to enter it on court calendars. Citywide, a distinctive code is needed for bail making by credit card to distinguish it from cash bail. Reliable record keeping by the courts will be essential for assessing the program’s impact in the future.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

REFERENCES Barry, Justin A. 2013. Operational Directive 2013-01: Bail By Credit Card Expansion.

New York State Unified Court System. Unpublished memorandum dated January 28, 2013.

——. 2012. Operational Directive 2012-05: Bail By Credit Card — New York County Only. New York State Unified Court System. Unpublished memorandum dated March 26, 2012.

CJA (see New York City Criminal Justice Agency) Kamins, Barry. 2012. Memorandum Re. Bail By Credit Card Pilot Program — New York County Only. New York State Unified Court System. Unpublished memorandum dated March 16, 2012.

New York City Criminal Justice Agency (CJA). 2013. Annual Report 2012. New York: New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc. Phillips, Mary T. 2011b. Effect Of Release Type On Failure To Appear. New York: New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc. ——. 2011a. “Commercial Bail Bonds in New York City. Research Brief series, no. 26.

New York: New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc. ——. 2010. “Making Bail in New York City. Research Brief series, no. 23. New York: New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

APPENDIX Statistical Procedures The multivariate statistical procedures used in this report are logistic regression and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Logistic regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is dichotomous, as it was in the analyses of release (Table 2) and failure to appear (Table 4). OLS regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is continuous, as it was in the analysis of detention length (Table 3).

The regression models were computed using SPSS1 to produce all of the statistics discussed below, with the exception of predicted probabilities, which are not included in the SPSS logistic regression output. Predicted probabilities were computed using Stata.2 The models showing the results of the multiple regression analyses present statistics that together estimate the relative importance of all the factors (independent and control variables) that influence an outcome (dependent variable), and the degree to which the outcome can be predicted from a knowledge of those factors. Statistics for the independent variable indicate its net effect on the dependent variable, after the effects of all other (control) variables have been taken into account.

Statistics Presented in Multiple Regression Models The statistics provided in this report for the logistic regression models of release and FTA presented in Tables 2 and 4 are the standardized beta, odds ratio, predicted probability, and Nagelkerke R2. The statistics presented for the OLS model of detention length (Table 3) are the standardized beta, unstandardized beta, and adjusted R2.

These statistics are described following an explanation of statistical significance.

Statistical Significance Statistical significance is a measure of the likelihood that the relationship between the variable and the dependent variable could have occurred merely by chance. The level of statistical significance of each item included in the model is indicated by asterisks, from one — the least stringent level of statistical significance (p ≤.05) — to three — the most stringent level (p ≤.001). Factors that did not have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable are indicated by “(ns)” for “not significant,” with no asterisks. It is standard practice to consider a relationship to be statistically significant if the likelihood that the result is merely a chance occurrence is equal to or less than 5% (p ≤.05). An even smaller likelihood — for example, equal to or less than 1% (p ≤.01) — is better. At the most stringent level of significance, p ≤.001,

1 2

IBM SPSS® Statistics Version 22.0.

StataCorp Stata® Release 13.1 -47-

New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

the likelihood of the result occurring by chance is equal to or less than 1 in 1,000.

Results that are not statistically significant have an unacceptably high probability (greater than 5%) of being merely the result of sampling error, which means that they may not be representative of the larger population.

Both the magnitude of the effect and the size of the sample contribute to the level of statistical significance. The combined samples used in all the multivariate regression analyses in this research were large (the smallest had over 10,000 cases), which is an advantage in detecting weak effects. In small samples, even a moderately large effect may be statistically insignificant because of the small number of cases. However, substantive significance should not be confused with statistical significance, which means only that the effect is real, not that it is important. The importance of a weak — albeit statistically significant — effect may be trivial.

Standardized Beta (Logistic and OLS Regression) The standardized beta coefficient is a measure of the strength of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, controlling for all other variables in the model. Although some inferences can be drawn about the strength of a variable’s effect from the odds ratio in logistic regression or the unstandardized beta coefficient in OLS regression, the standardized beta is a better measure of strength in both types of regression precisely because it is standardized to take into account the number of categories in the independent variable and the distribution of cases among categories.

Standardized betas can be directly compared to assess the relative strength of variables, which is not true of odds ratios or unstandardized coefficients. The value of the standardized beta ranges from 0 (no effect) to 1 (maximum effect), and the sign indicates the direction of the relationship: a positive sign indicates that as the value of the independent variable increases, the value of the dependent variable also increases; a negative sign indicates that as the value of the independent variable increases, the value of the dependent variable decreases. Dummy variables with only two values (yes or no) are usually coded so that “yes” is given the higher numeric value (0=no, 1=yes), with the result that a positive standardized beta indicates a greater likelihood of the outcome for those with the characteristic encoded by the variable.

To illustrate from Table 2 (logistic regression model of likelihood of pretrial release): the largest standardized beta in this table was .42, for the offense type “VTL” (the defendant was charged with an offense under the Vehicle and Traffic Law). The positive coefficient indicates that being charged with a VTL offense was associated with a greater likelihood of release, compared to the charge type designated as the reference category — drug offenses, in this example.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

Unstandardized Beta (OLS Regression Only) The unstandardized beta indicates the average change in the dependent variable for each unit of change in the independent variable, measured in the same units as the dependent variable. The sign (negative or positive) indicates the direction of change.

In the model of detention length (Table 3), for example, the unstandardized beta for an offer of payment by credit card was –7.293. The interpretation is that for an increase from 0 (no credit card payment option) to 1 (credit card payment option) in the independent variable, detention length dropped by about 7 days (after accounting for the effects of all other independent and control variables).

Odds Ratio (Logistic Regression) The odds ratio measures the change in odds of an event occurring when the value of the independent variable changes, controlling for all other variables in the model. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates an increase in the odds of the predicted event occurring when the value of the independent variable is higher; less than 1 indicates a decrease in the odds of the predicted event occurring when the value of the independent variable is higher. To illustrate from Table 2: the odds ratio for a credit card payment option was 2.402. This means that the odds of pretrial release more than doubled when defendants were given the option of using a credit card to post their bail.

Odds ratios less than 1 indicate reduced odds. For example, the odds ratio for a prior warrant was 0.803, meaning that the odds of pretrial release were reduced for defendants who had a prior warrant.

Predicted Probability (Logistic Regression) The predicted probability presents essentially the same information as the odds ratio, but in a more easily understood way. The predicted probability is the likelihood of the event’s occurring, after the effects of all other variables in the model have been accounted for. A predicted probability is presented for each value of the variable.

Table 2 shows that the predicted probability of release among cases with a defendant who was offered a credit card option was 75%, compared to only 58% among cases with no credit card payment option. These are not exactly the same percentages as were presented in the bivariate analysis (Figure 17), which merely reported the actual release rates for the two groups (79% and 56% respectively). As suspected, differences between the two groups accounted for some of the difference in release rates shown in Figure 17. For example, the credit card group had higher proportions of employed, low-risk defendants. The 23-percentage-point difference in actual release rates (79-56) was whittled down to a 17-percentage-point difference in predicted probability of release (79-56), which indicates that six percentage points were accounted for by differences between the two groups.

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New York’s Credit Card Bail Experiment

The software used to calculate predicted probabilities was Stata. The MARGIN command used in this analysis produces the average probability of the outcome if everyone in the data were treated as if they had the same value on the variable for which the margin is estimated, based on a logistic regression model. In the example above, the 75% predicted probability of release for credit card bail cases represents the average predicted probability if everyone were treated as if they had been offered a credit card bail option and had the average value on all other characteristics.

R2 (Nagelkerke R2, adjusted R2) The model R2 is interpreted as roughly the proportion of variance in the outcome that is explained jointly by all of the independent variables in the model, ranging from 0 (no variance is explained by the variables) to 1 (100% of the variance is explained).

Although the specific version of the R2 statistic for the logistic regression models (Nagelkerke R2) is different from that reported for the OLS regression models (adjusted R2), the interpretation is the same.

The Nagelkerke R2 statistic for the release model presented in Table 2 was .148, indicating that approximately 15% of the variance in pretrial release could be predicted from the variables in the model. The corresponding statistic for the FTA model (Table 4) was .058, and the adjusted R2 for the detention length model (Table 3) was .024.

The goal of this research was to examine the impact of the bail by credit card program, rather than to provide the best possible model predicting each outcome, so the low R2 statistics were not a concern. However, they do indicate that much more information would be needed to make accurate outcome predictions.

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