New Perspectives in Foreign Policy Vol 9, Summer 2015

NEW PERSPECTIVES

in foreign policy

A JOURNAL WRITTEN BY AND FOR THE ENRICHMENT OF YOUNG PROFESSIONALS SUMMER 2015 | ISSUE 9

Aflatoxins: Why the Fungus Among Us Concerns U.S. Global Health Policy Sahil Angelo

Fueling the Future: Maritime Applications of Liquefied Natural Gas Mariah Deters and Tomi Stahlberg

Indian-Nepal Hydropower Collaboration: A River of Opportunity

Xiaoqun Dong

Embracing Unmanned Aerial Systems for International Peacekeeping Richard Say

The Internet of Cities: Prospects and Challenges for the Future of Smart Cities and the Internet of Things Breanna Thompson

Also Featuring An Interview with Dr. Jon B. Alterman

About New Perspectives in Foreign Policy New Perspectives in Foreign Policy is published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to provide a forum for young professionals to debate issues of importance in foreign policy. Though New Perspectives seeks to bring new voices into the dialogue, it does not endorse specific opinions or policy prescriptions. As such, the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editorial Board, CSIS, or the CSIS Board of Trustees.

Submit articles to newperspectives@csis.org.

About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practical solutions to the world’s greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continue to provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world.

Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999.

John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS was founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke.

New Perspectives was designed by Alison Bours.

Photo Credits

Front cover (left): https://www.flickr.com/photos/internationalrivers/7646856796/ Front cover (right): https://www.flickr.com/photos/manginwu/12427729623/ Back cover (left): https://www.flickr.com/photos/iita-media-library/6846617887/ Back cover (right): https://www.flickr.com/photos/fabiovenni/321225759/

© 2015 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

All rights reserved.

Center for Strategic and International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org

Letter from the Editorial Board

I

n this new and thought-provoking volume of New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, young professionals at CSIS tackle a variety of complex issues facing today’s society, providing measured, insightful analysis: Sahil Angelo discusses the policy implications of aflatoxins, a common group of highly toxic chemicals to which 4.5 billion people are exposed worldwide and that may have a critical role to play in the United States’ global health strategy.

Mariah Deters and Tomi Stahlberg consider impending fuel regulations for international shipping fleets and the role that liquefied natural gas (LNG) might play in the fuel mix for international shipping.

Xiaoqun Dong addresses the opportunities for increased cooperation between India and Nepal in Nepal’s hydropower development, analyzing the progress already achieved, the potential benefits of expanded collaboration, and the challenges to moving forward.

Richard Say argues that unmanned aerial systems (UAS) will play an important role in UN peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian efforts, especially in remote areas.

Breanna Thompson surveys innovations taking place in governing and developing cities through the “Internet of Things,” arguing that each urban environment will call for a unique approach.

Finally, we feature an interview with Dr. Jon B. Alterman, senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program at CSIS. Dr. Alterman reflects on his experience as a Middle East expert and offers his thoughts on how a think tank career compares to work in government. We found our conversation with him illuminating, and we hope you will too.

SINCERELY,

New Perspectives Editorial Board

Aflatoxins: Why the Fungus Among Us Concerns U.S. Global Health Policy Sahil Angelo AFLATOXINS are a group of

highly toxic chemicals that pose a significant global health problem, with an estimated 4.5 billion people chronically exposed to aflatoxins worldwide. Until recently, scientists believed aflatoxins only caused extreme liver damage, but recent evidence reveals that they also contribute to the spread of deadly infectious diseases like HIV, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria.1 Aflatoxins’ widespread exposure means that these newly discovered properties might be compromising U.S. investments in global health— many of which focus on prevention and control of infectious diseases.

To preserve the integrity of its health efforts abroad, the United States should first discern the exact impact of aflatoxins on its global health investments and then develop a strategy to appropriately address aflatoxins and mitigate their impact.

Aflatoxins are produced by the food-

borne fungi Aspergillus flavus and A. parasiticus. The fungi grow on maize, grains, and other staple cereals when they are grown in poor farming conditions, mishandled during harvest and drying, or improperly stored.2 Humans and animals become exposed to the chemicals after consuming contaminated crops. Animal products like meat, eggs, and breast milk may also transmit aflatoxins if the animals ingest infected feed.3 In high concentrations, aflatoxins can trigger acute aflatoxicosis, a rare disease that causes severe liver damage and often death. Chronic exposure to low levels of aflatoxins is more common, but it is also insidious: approximately 30 percent of the world’s liver cancer cases are attributable to these fungal chemicals.4 New research over the past decade has revealed that aflatoxins also

AFLATOXINS {1}

cause malnutrition, child stunting, and New research over the past decade immunosuppression, has revealed that aflatoxins also factors that may cause malnutrition, child stunting, increase susceptibility to major infectious and immunosuppression, factors diseases like HIV, that may increase susceptibility to TB, and malaria.5 For major infectious diseases like HIV, example, aflatoxins TB, and malaria. impair the immune system directly by blocking the activation of the immune cells and indirectly by preventing the absorption of essential vitamins.6 Scientists have also discovered that aflatoxins can interact directly with disease pathogens. For example, they actively help the HIV virus replicate and proliferate.7 The exact biological mechanisms explaining these phenomena are unclear and require more research; what is clear is that these effects work in concert to facilitate the spread of other infections—especially in regions where both aflatoxins and infectious diseases are prevalent.

Aflatoxins are most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and China. Together, these areas comprise almost 90 percent of the world’s prevalence.8 Climate conditions in these regions are ideal for growth of A. flavus and A. parasiticus. In addition, these two areas have few to no trade regulations on contaminated crops; if they do, these standards vary greatly, making rules difficult to enforce.9 Aflatoxins complicate international trade, as many countries have strict trade bans on the fungal byproducts. For example, the United States and European Union reject aflatoxin-contaminated food exports, rendering the crops unusable for commerce. When farmers cannot sell their crops abroad, they instead use them either for their personal consumption or as animal feed, exposing themselves further. These trade restrictions also have significant economic

AFLATOXINS {2}

costs, especially because aflatoxins contaminate approximately 25 percent of our world food supply10: tainted groundnuts and cereal alone cost sub-Saharan Africa about $750 million every year in lost trade, and Thailand has an estimated trade loss of $50 million due to infected maize.11,12 The impact aflatoxins have on food security, trade, and health creates a vicious cycle that undermines important U.S. global health priorities, like combatting HIV, TB, and malaria. In FY2012, the majority of the $8.9 billion the United States spent on global health13 in sub-Saharan Africa was earmarked specifically for prevention and control of these three infectious diseases.14 Since aflatoxins can facilitate the spread of these diseases by immunosuppression and interacting with the pathogens, Aflatoxins contaminate they can consequently approximately 25 percent of compromise the majority of U.S. global health programs in the our world food supply. region. However, it is difficult to determine the exact impact aflatoxins have on these other programs because there is a still a large gap in knowledge about the biology and epidemiology of aflatoxins.15 This lack of data has made it difficult to convince policymakers of the gravity of the problem. In addition, there is a fear that more resources for anti-aflatoxin efforts will draw resources from an already-shrinking global health budget.16 The United States has begun collaborating with other stakeholders to tackle the problem.17 In 2004, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO) commissioned a working group to develop a public health strategy for addressing aflatoxins.18 Their final report provided four recommendations to better understand the epidemiology and the resulting health impacts of aflatoxin exposure.19 However, there was very little action after the report until 2012, when Feed the Future, USAID’s flagship food security program, donated $12 million to the new Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa (PACA).20 AFLATOXINS {3}

According to its 2014–2022 strategy, PACA will conduct research and develop interventions to mitigate the impact of aflatoxins in Africa.21,22 The question is whether the current level of U.S. engagement is enough to ensure that aflatoxins are not compromising the country’s large global health programs—especially given the magnitude of the problem. The United States needs to clarify and quantify these connections. This will help policymakers develop and implement a more robust aflatoxin strategy that will simultaneously save lives and strengthen other U.S. global health investments.

Sahil Angelo is a program coordinator and research assistant for the Global Health Policy Center at CSIS.

1. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Danya International, “Aflatoxin: A Synthesis of the Research in Health, Agriculture and Trade,” Feed the Future, USAID East Africa Regional Mission, 2013, http://www.aflatoxinpartnership.org/uploads/ Aflatoxin%20Desk%20Study%20Final%20Report%202012.pdf.

2. Felicia Wu, “Aflatoxin exposure and chronic human diseases,” 2020 Focus Brief, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2013, http://www.ifpri.org/publication/ aflatoxin-exposure-and-chronic-human-diseases.

3. Aflatoxins undergo a process known as bioaccumulation, which is the gradual buildup of a toxin in an organism’s body. When that organism is eaten (or its animal product consumed), they will transmit those chemicals, leading to rapid buildup in animals higher up the food chain, a process called biomagnification.

4. In addition to directly damaging the liver, aflatoxins also increase the risk of contracting hepatitis B and C by a factor of 30. These two diseases eventually progress to liver cancer if left untreated. USAID and Danya International, “Aflatoxin: A Synthesis of the Research in Health, Agriculture and Trade,” 18.

5. Ibid.

6. Specifically, vitamins A, B, C, and E. 7. More research is needed to determine whether aflatoxins directly interact with diseases other than HIV. See Pauline E. Jolly, “Aflatoxin: Does it contribute to an increase in HIV viral load?,” Future Microbiology 9, no. 2 (2014), http://www.futuremedicine.com/doi/pdf/10.2217/ fmb.13.166.

8. Devesh Roy, “Trade Impacts of Aflatoxin Standards,” 2020 Focus Brief, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2013, http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ focus20_12.pdf.

9. Ibid.

10. USAID and Danya International, “Aflatoxin: A Synthesis of the Research in Health, Agriculture and Trade.”

11. Amare Ayalew, “PACA: Holistic Approach to Addressing the Aflatoxin Challenge in Africa,” Presentation at Africa Day for Food and Nutrition.

AFLATOXINS {4}

{5}

12. Roy, “Trade Impacts of Aflatoxin Standards.”

13. Note that the $8.9 billion spent in this region was roughly 70 percent of the United States’ total global health budget. See J. Stephen Morrison, “U.S. Health Engagement in Africa: A Decade of Remarkable Achievement—Now What?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Global Health Policy Center, 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/130822_ Morrison_USHealthEngageAfrica_Web.pdf.

14. Ibid.

15. The CDC-WHO working group report argued that quantifying human health impact and burden of disease due to aflatoxin exposure was one of four key priorities, but nearly a decade later, very little research has been conducted to assess how they affect U.S. global health programs. See World Health Organization and Centers for Disease Control, “Public Health Strategies for Preventing Aflatoxin Exposures,” International Mycotoxin Workshop, 2005, http://www.who.int/ipcs/events/2005/workshop_report.pdf.

16. Laurian Unnevehr and Delia Grace, “Tackling Aflatoxins: An Overview of Challenges and Solutions,” 2020 Focus Brief, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), November 2013, http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/focus20_01.pdf.

17. USAID and Danya International, “Aflatoxin: A Synthesis of the Research in Health, Agriculture and Trade.”

18. WHO and CDC, “Public Health Strategies for Preventing Aflatoxin Exposure.”

19. The four recommendations are: “1) quantify the human health impacts and the burden of disease due to aflatoxin exposure; 2) compile an inventory, evaluate the efficacy, and disseminate results of on-going intervention strategies; 3) develop and augment the disease surveillance, food monitoring, laboratory, and public health response capacity of affected regions; and 4) develop a response protocol that can be used in the event of an outbreak of acute aflatoxicosis.” See WHO and CDC, “Public Health Strategies for Preventing Aflatoxin Exposure.”

20. The Feed the Future initiative will provide technical assistance for aflatoxin prevention, improve the regulatory environment, and support development and distribution of biotechnologies invented by the USDA and Feed the Future’s partner universities.

21. PACA, “PACA Strategy 2013–2022,” Partnership for Aflatoxin Control in Africa, African Union Commission. September 2013, http://www.aflatoxinpartnership.org/uploads/PACA%20 Strategy%202013-2022-%20FINAL%20formatted%20for%20A4.pdf.

22. The U.S. has yet to make similar investments in Southeast Asia and China.

Fueling the Future: Maritime Applications of Liquefied Natural Gas Mariah Deters and Tomi Stahlberg GLOBALIZATION HAS CREATED an

interconnected world economy that relies heavily on shipping—90 percent of global trade is seaborne. Challenges facing the international shipping industry resonate in all arenas of world commerce. Costs for shipping have been continuously rising in recent years, partially as a result of premium prices for permissible shipping fuels as environmental regulations tighten.

New standards for marine emissions in 2015 and 2020 are creating profound economic hurdles for commonly used “bunker fuels” in international waters, particularly in high-traffic areas.

Faced with these increasing costs, the shipping industry should look to longerterm solutions. While the near-term economics of using liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a shipping fuel have seemed prohibitive in the past, increasingly stringent regulation of the shipping industry is mandating a long-term solution: LNG could successfully fulfill the industry’s need for an economically viable, environmentally sensible fuel source.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annex VI mandates reduction of sulfur content in marine fuels to 0.5 percent by 2020.1 As this deadline approaches for the 171 member countries of the IMO, it is increasingly crucial for the industry to adapt to Annex VI requirements as conventional bunker fuels contain more sulfur than is permitted under the new regulations. Active European shipping areas, particularly the English Channel, North Sea, and Baltic Sea, as well as most of the United States, the Canadian coast, and the Caribbean, will be affected even sooner: as IMO Emission Control Areas (ECA), they face new sulfur content limits of marine fuel of 0.1 percent2 as of January 1, 2015.3 These stricter regulations reflect a global trend toward stricter climate regulations. With recent climate talks in Lima and bilateral agreements4 FUELING THE FUTURE {6}

providing momentum for a new global climate deal in Paris in 2015, the valid possibility of future, more stringent emissions standards demonstrates the necessity of alternative, cleaner fuels as a long-term solution.

In this context, continued use of common bunker fuels will significantly increase operating expenses for the shipping industry.

The options for regulatory compliance are limited: using low-sulfur fuel oils, installing engine “scrubbers” to filter emissions, or shifting to alternative fuels. Conventional fuels, such as diesel, marine gas oil (MGO), and heavy fuel oil (HFO), contain more sulfur than is allowed under the new regulations. Low-sulfur MGO/HFOs are available, but are significantly more costly. Alternatively, expensive engine “scrubbers” can be installed to “clean” the emissions of sulfur before release. In either case, operating expenses will increase with a businessas-usual approach to fuel.5

Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, with almost no sulfur emissions and 20-30 percent less CO2 emissions than traditional fuels, making it highly attractive from an environmental perspective.

In contrast to solutions that grow more expensive as regulations tighten, an opportunity for a new status quo has emerged with the possible use of LNG as an alternative fuel for marine shipping. Though the expense of such a transformation should not be understated, an opportunity for the shipping industry to utilize LNG has emerged in light of environmental catalysts and long-term economic benefits.

Natural gas is the cleanest-burning fossil fuel, with almost no sulfur emissions and 20 to 30 percent less CO2 emissions than traditional fuels, making it highly attractive from an environmental perspective.6 The economic story is more complex. Successful implementation of LNG as fuel hinges on several factors: retrofitting costs, price differentials between LNG and other fuels, and infrastructure developments. Several studies have estimated engine retrofitting to be between 10 and 30 percent more expensive than installing an engine scrubber.7 As for fuel price spreads, several studies have shown FUELING THE FUTURE {7}

favorable economics on an energy-content basis for LNG as a transport fuel. An evaluation of the conversion of public buses to natural gas in 2014 showed a per-BTU cost advantage over petroleum.8 More specific to marine transport, a study conducted by French energy giant Total in 2013 examined the price competiveness of LNG versus heavy fuel oil (HFO) and marine gas oil (MGO), two commonly used marine bunker fuels. The study incorporated a full range of considerations, such as the additional space required for LNG bunkering, scrubber costs, additional operating and capital expenditures, and extra investment and logistic costs. The comparison in the price environment at the time found LNG to be competitive on a price-per-energy basis against MGO in all regions, and against HFO with a scrubber in U.S. and European markets. The price environment in 2015 is markedly different than 2013 when the study was conducted; however, the relative change in price for crude oil versus the price of LNG has shown to follow analogous fluctuation patterns, albeit with a contract-induced time lag. The price for crude-based bunker fuels and the price of LNG have historically fallen at similar relative rates, as is the case in 2015.9 Further, while infrastructure limitations have traditionally resulted in higher costs for LNG as a fuel as compared to bunker fuels, recent global developments have the potential to ease the economics of LNG. Longterm global supply of natural gas is extremely promising, instigated by the “shale revolution� in the United States. This, combined with a drive While infrastructure limitations to diversify supplies have traditionally resulted in and growing demand higher costs for LNG as a fuel for gas in light of its environmental benefits as compared to bunker fuels, in Europe and other recent global developments countries, has resulted have the potential to ease the in a build-out of LNG infrastructure. While economics of LNG. individual government support varies across regions, the global expansion of infrastructure will increase LNG trade in general, enhancing the timing of a transition to LNG as it will likely have FUELING THE FUTURE {8}

a positive effect on the economics of LNG as a shipping fuel as well.

Targeted support for LNG in the marine transport sector is swelling beyond the ECAs, as major ports around the world embrace bunkering for LNG-powered ships, from Rotterdam to Singapore.

A realistic long-term supply of LNG coupled with environmental considerations and expanding global infrastructure make LNG an attractive fuel for the future of the shipping industry. With the costs of traditional fuels growing as environmental regulations become more stringent, it is important that the shipping industry adopt a long-term strategy.

Mariah Deters is a program coordinator and research assistant with the CSIS Energy and National Security Program, and Tomi Stahlberg was a research intern with the Europe Program at CSIS in 2014.

{9}

1. The IMO is the international agency responsible for the “safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships.” Member nations are required to implement the legislation adopted by the IMO, which is governed by an assembly of the 170 member nations. See “International Shipping Facts and Figures—Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment,” International Maritime Organization, March 6, 2012, http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAndShippingFactsAndFigures/ TheRoleandImportanceofInternationalShipping/Documents/International%20Shipping%20-%20 Facts%20and%20Figures.pdf; and “The Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL Annex VI),” International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/ AirPollution/Pages/The-Protocol-of-1997-(MARPOL-Annex-VI).aspx.

2. European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), http://emsa.europa.eu/main/air-pollution.html.

3. “Sulphur oxides (SOx)—Regulation 14,” International Maritime Organization, http://www. imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Sulphur-oxides-(SOx)%E2%80%93-Regulation-14.aspx.

4. The U.S.-China bilateral announcement on emissions reductions is an example of large, noteworthy bilateral agreements. See “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/ us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.

5. Commonly used bunker fuels for marine vessels usually contain between 4.5 and 3.5 percent sulfur. See Océane Balland, “LNG—A Cost-Efficient Fuel Option? Drivers, status and economic viability,” Åland Sjöfartens Dag, May 15, 2014, http://www.sjofart.ax/files/oceaneballand2014.pdf; Janina Pfalzer, “Ship-Scrubbing Order Boom for Alfa, Waertsilae on Rules,” Bloomberg, March 18, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-18/ship-scrubbing-order-boom-for-alfawaertsilae-on-rules.html; and “Sulphur oxides (SOx)—Regulation 14,” International Maritime Organization.

6. “Natural Gas 1998: Issues and Trends,” Energy Information Administration, 1998, http://www.eia. gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/natural_gas_1998_issues_trends/pdf/chapter2. pdf; Mads Lyder Andersen, Niels B. Clausen, and Pierre C. Sames, “Costs and benefits of LNG as ship fuel for container vessels”, Germanischer Lloyd SE, 2011, http://www.gl-group.com/pdf/ GL_MAN_LNG_study_web.pdf; Balland, “LNG—A Cost-Efficient Fuel Option? Drivers, status and economic viability,” Åland Sjöfartens Dag.

{10}

7. The latter requires high levels of maintenance, an expense not included in the comparison of sheer capital expenditure. See “Green Ship of the Future,” Paper from 9th annual Green Ship Technology Conference, Copenhagen 2012, 11–12, http://www.greenship.org/fpublic/greenship/ dokumenter/Downloads%20-%20maga/ECA%20study/GSF%20ECA%20paper.pdf; and Balland, “LNG—A Cost-Efficient Fuel Option? Drivers, status and economic viability,” Åland Sjöfartens Dag. 8. See Kevin Heaslip et al., “Effects of Natural Gas Vehicles and Fuel Prices on Key Transportation Economic Metrics,” Utah Transportation Center, Utah State University, June 2014, http://www. wsdot.wa.gov/research/reports/fullreports/829.1.pdf.

9. Pablo Semolinos, “LNG as bunker fuel: Challenges to be overcome,” 17th Annual Conference & Exhibition on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG 17), April 17, 2013, http://www.golng.eu/files/Main/ presentations/07_02-Pablo-Semolinos-Presentation.pdf.

10. Energy security concerns around the world are fueling LNG infrastructure expansion. Fifty countries will operate LNG import facilities by 2020, an increase from 29 in 2014. “Bubbling Up,” The Economist, May 31, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21603030-internationalgas-market-developing-buyers-will-gain-more-sellers-bubbling-up.

11. In addition to support for infrastructure, governments may need to address the implications for strategic refineries that derive income from bunker fuels. A transition away from these products would affect the economics of these refineries, which produce other important products.

12. In late 2014, the European Union directed its member states to ensure “minimum coverage of LNG refueling points in main maritime and inland ports across Europe by 2025 and 2030 respectively, with common standards for their design and use.” The Port of Singapore, the secondlargest shipping port in the world, has committed to LNG bunkering capability by 2020. “European Commissions’ study on LNG as a shipping fuel shows industry’s support,” Hellenic Shipping News, March 4, 2015, http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/european-commissions-study-on-lngas-a-shipping-fuel-shows-industrys-support/; Port of Rotterdam Authority, “Massive Boost for Rotterdam LNG Hub,” October 16, 2013, http://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/News/pressreleasesnews/Pages/massive-boost-rotterdam-lng-hub.aspx; and Mabel Tan, “Chinese Port to Build Inland LNG Bunkering Stations,” Bunkerworld, September 15, 2013, www.bunkerworld.com/news/ Chinese-port-to-buildinland-LNG-bunkering-stations-131837.

India-Nepal Hydropower Collaboration: A River of Opportunity Xiaoqun Dong IN AUGUST 2014, Narendra Modi

became the first Indian prime minister to visit Nepal in 17 years.

This visit signaled a warming of relations between two countries whose relationship has been marred by decades of political mistrust despite close historical and cultural ties. The warming of relations has in turn created an opportunity for greater economic cooperation. This opportunity is particularly evident in the hydropower sector, where India’s and Nepal’s interests are strongly aligned. In the past year, there has already been a flurry of activity, as New Delhi and Kathmandu finalized three bilateral agreements related to hydropower cooperation, which could pave the way for more intensive collaboration in the future. However, despite such initial successes, the value of these agreements will be determined by their implementation. The coming years will be a vital time to lay the foundation for sustained India-

Nepal hydropower collaboration, given the significant mistrust between these two neighbors engendered by long-standing disagreements and the challenges Nepal will face rebuilding from two earthquakes of over 7 magnitude in April and May 2015. If they are to succeed, it is particularly important that any agreements are perceived on both sides as equitable and transparent.

The potential for India-Nepal cooperation in hydropower stems from three primary factors: Nepal’s hydropower potential, India’s ability to supply capital, and the rapidly growing demand for power in both countries. With the flat river plain of the Ganges in the south, eight of the world’s highest mountains in the north, and three major rivers running through the deep gorges in between, Nepal is a country with impressive hydropower potential, estimated at over 50,000 MW. Despite this, its current production

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROPOWER COLLABORATION {11}

Successful Indian projects have the potential to better demonstrate the viability of commercial investment in Nepal.

is merely 800 MW, or less than one-sixtieth its projected capacity.1 In fact, during the dry season when rivers typically flow more slowly, power outages for 12 to 16 hours per day are common.2

Improving hydropower utilization is of great economic importance to Nepal.

Approximately 54 percent of the population has no access to electricity and domestic demand for power has been growing at 9 percent yearly for the past decade.3 Increased hydroelectricity generation could support economic development through supplying reliable and affordable power to domestic industry, education, and health care systems. In turn, economic growth could create thousands of new jobs and mitigate an estimated daily loss of 1,200 young workers to foreign job markets.4 Furthermore, Nepal could export surplus power to India to meet its southern neighbor’s electricity demand, which has grown rapidly at 11 percent annually over recent years.5 This could increase revenue for the Nepalese government and help reduce the country’s soaring bilateral trade deficit with India.6 Historically, the Nepali government’s capacity to build out its hydropower has been limited by a lack of long-term funding in the domestic market and hard currency reserves.7 Further, the country’s decade-long Maoist insurgency, which was followed by seven years of political instability, harmed investor confidence.

Consequently, investors at home and abroad see high financial and political risks in Nepal’s hydropower sector. Through partnering with India to develop its hydropower resources, Nepal would acquire the much-needed capital to realize a positive cycle. Successful Indian projects have the potential to better demonstrate the viability of commercial investment in Nepal, both helping to create the necessary physical infrastructure and paving the way for a more diverse array of international investors to enter the Nepali market.

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROPOWER COLLABORATION {12}

International investment, particularly from its neighbors, has recently taken on a new importance for Nepal in the wake of the earthquakes, which took thousands of lives and destroyed a massive amount of homes and infrastructure.8 India has taken the lead in relief efforts for the international community, with Prime Minister Modi urging his country to “wipe the tears of every Nepali, hold their hands, and stand with them.” While the earthquake itself may justifiably delay immediate action on hydropower development, the cooperation between Nepal and India in relief efforts Through investing in may help strengthen goodwill between hydropower projects in the two countries, Nepal, India could expand its facilitating more renewable energy portfolio. cooperation in the future.

For India, hydropower development in Nepal provides an additional energy source, and protects India’s environmental and political interests. As global climate talks loom, India is under growing pressure to limit its emissions—particularly in the power sector. Through investing in hydropower projects in Nepal, where potential production greatly exceeds potential domestic consumption, India could expand its renewable energy portfolio. Furthermore, India is situated downstream of all Nepali rivers, which means it is directly affected

by Nepal’s hydro activities.9 Investment in Nepal’s hydropower sector could strengthen India’s bargaining power when it comes to issues like water rights, irrigation, flooding, and water pollution.

Building on these mutual interests, several steps have already been taken to advance collaboration in the hydropower sector. In late 2014, a long-awaited Power Trade Agreement (PTA) was signed to facilitate electric power trade, cross-border transmission interconnection, and grid connectivity10: the first step toward greater interconnectivity and thus strengthening the power sector in both countries. Furthermore, Project Development Agreements (PDAs) have been reached for the 900 MW Upper Karnali and 900 MW Arun III hydropower projects.11

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROPOWER COLLABORATION {13}

Both projects will be built, owned, and operated by Indian enterprises during a concession period of 25 years, after which full ownership will be transferred to the Nepali government. Of the two projects’ installed capacity, 12 percent and 21.9 percent, respectively, will be provided to Nepal for free. The remaining electricity generated will be exported to India.

Despite the potential for cooperation, however, Nepal remains deeply mistrustful of India, due in part to unresolved disputes between the two neighbors over territory and water rights. The territories of Susta and Kalapani, areas located on Nepal’s western and eastern borders, are now held by India—an arrangement that Nepal strongly contests. Compounding this situation are historical disagreements over the borders between the two countries. These disputes are currently being addressed through renewed dialogue and technical support from the Boundary Working Group, but concerns remain. Disputes over water resources have also hindered relations. Kathmandu has criticized earlier river treaties, such as the Koshi and Gandak agreements, for a perceived lack of transparency and equity—in large part because Nepal believes that it has benefited little and lost significant water rights to India through these agreements.

Furthermore, several questions remain as implementation of the PTA and PDAs advances. According to the PTA, separate agreements will be made for each specific cross-border transmission project on a project-by-project basis. The rates at which India will purchase electricity from Nepal and sell it in the Indian market are still unclear. This means there remains a significant potential for new disagreements to emerge through the implementation process.

The historical record suggests that Kathmandu will be particularly sensitive to perceived inequities in the agreements. As for the

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROPOWER COLLABORATION {14}

PDAs, it is still controversial whether the free electricity, and in the case of Arun III, other compensations to be provided to Nepal will be enough to cover the economic and environmental externalities that will result for residents and farmers affected by project construction. If these local people feel unfairly treated in the resettlement and rehabilitation process, the consequent negative public sentiment could threaten the successful implementation of these projects, and even broader India-Nepal relations.

{15}

The current political momentum presents a great opportunity for India-Nepal cooperation in hydropower development—cooperation that has the potential to generate positive economic and other spillovers. While the recent earthquake may delay concrete action, it will likely sustain and even support the momentum toward further cooperation. With encouraging agreements signed in 2014, the upcoming years are vital for the two countries to defy historic tensions and create lasting agreements that will remain acceptable to both sides. Whether hydropower collaboration could be the bandage or the salt to an aged wound depends largely on both countries’ commitment to ensure equity and transparency. These two important principles should always be applied while making future agreements.

Xiaoqun Dong is a research intern with the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS.

1. International Finance Corporation, “Harnessing Nepal’s Hydropower for Energy Starved South Asia,” Spring 2014, http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/south+asia/ news/nepal+hydropower.

2. “Nepal extends power cut to 12 hours per day as dry season comes,” Xinhua, January 5, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-01/05/c_133019859.htm.

3. International Finance Corporation, “Harnessing Nepal’s Hydropower for Energy Starved South Asia.”

4. Ibid.

5. Nepal Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, “Energy Statistics 2014,” March 2104, http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_new/upload/Energy_stats_2014.pdf.

6. “Nepal’s trade deficit with India continues to grow steeply,” Kathmandu Post, August 5, 2014, http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2014/08/04/money/nepals-trade-deficit-withindia-continues-to-grow-steeply/265774.html.

7. Udaya Raj Sapkota, “Hydropower Development and Foreign Investment in Nepal,” Nepal Ministry of Energy, July 27, 2011, http://www.nepembseoul.gov.np/uploads/files/document/ Hydropower_Development_and_Foreign_Investment_in_Nepal_19.pdf.

8. “Nepal earthquake: Rescue resumes after deadly tremor,” BBC News, May 13, 2015, http://www. bbc.com/news/world-asia-32716211.

9. Steve Matzker and Jennifer Gonzalez, “Nepal: Water Rights on the Koshi River,” Pulitzer Center, October 1, 2013, http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/asia-india-subcontinent-nepal-bihar-waterrights-kosi-river-basin-flood-environment-hydropower-dam-energy-economic-power.

10. “Power Trade Agreement between India & Nepal,” Nepal Energy Forum, September 6, 2014, http://www.nepalenergyforum.com/power-trade-agreement-between-india-nepal/.

11. Gopal Sharma, “India and Nepal sign electricity trading pact,” Reuters, October 21, 2014, http:// in.reuters.com/article/2014/10/21/nepal-india-power-idINKCN0IA1LF20141021; Sanjeev Giri, “It’s all about the water,” Ekantipur, January 26, 2015, http://www.ekantipur.com/2015/01/26/business/ its-all-about-the-water/400853.html; “Indo-Nepal Cooperation in Hydro Power Sector,” Central Electricity Authority of India, January 2015, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/hydro/nepal.pdf.

{16}

Embracing Unmanned Aerial Systems for International Peacekeeping Richard Say IN THE PAST 15 YEARS, unmanned

aerial systems (UAS), also known as UAVs or drones, have gone from being a relatively rare platform with limited capabilities to powerful weapons of war that dominate media headlines. The coverage these aircraft often receive, however, sometimes implies that they are only used either to fire missiles at targets on the ground or to directly support the manned aircraft that will. UAS, however, have already been used by international observers to save lives and monitor conflicts.2 For example, on May 5, 2014, UN peacekeepers operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) rushed helicopters and boats to the scene of a terrible ferry accident on Lake Kivu after one of their UAS identified a sinking vessel.3 Equipped with only a camera, the aircraft “stayed at the scene searching for survivors and providing situational awareness,� enabling rescuers to save the lives of 15 people.4 Though this is just one example, it offers an insightful glimpse into how UAS can 1

assist peacekeeping forces and why the UN should expand the use of this technology beyond the existing small number of deployments.

Modern UN peacekeeping forces are often underfunded, understaffed, and underequipped.5 In the late 1980s, many Western countries dramatically increased their contributions to UN peacekeeping operations to counter growing international instability.6 But as a result of a series of unsuccessful peacekeeping missions, changing regional security climates, and the rise of several radical terrorist groups, Western contributions to UN operations declined almost as quickly as they had appeared.7 Although Western forces would still work in tandem with UN peacekeepers on several occasions and contribute significantly to some missions, UN forces are being forced to do more with less.

The increasing commercialization, simplicity, and affordability of UAS

EMBRACING UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS {17}

can help alleviate many of these shortcomings by proNegative perceptions of UAS, viding increased situational particularly in active combat awareness to peacekeeping zones, might pose challenges forces on the ground. With to their use for more peaceful more accurate information, UN commanders can better purposes. deploy their limited personnel to combat hostile forces, as in the DRC mission, or to quickly respond to attacks, border violations, and other incidents in order to prevent them from escalating.8 Until recently, this type of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission required specialized manned aircraft, satellites, or helicopters; the former two are assets that the UN rarely has access to,9 and while most UN missions possess some helicopters, they are often needed for a range of other missions, such as ferrying people and supplies to and from areas with poor infrastructure.10 Tactical UAS can not only fill this void, but in many cases offer longer endurance than most UN helicopters and do so without putting pilots’ lives in danger.11 For example, Insitu’s ScanEagle can stay aloft for more than 24 hours and launches from an easily transportable, vehicle-towed catapult.12 Even with increased situational awareness provided by high-flying ISR assets, the UN will still need to deploy peacekeepers to isolated outposts, towns, and villages in the years ahead. Small UAS that weigh less than 10 pounds have the potential to change how peacekeeping operations are conducted on the ground.13 Equipped with a color video and infrared camera, these hand-deployable craft can provide a squad of peacekeepers in the field with a ready-to-go, eye in the sky without having to wait for a helicopter or seek out high ground.14 Small detachments of peacekeepers could use such devices to check on nearby settlements, monitor hard-to-reach valleys or mountains, and detect enemy ambushes ahead of a patrol—dramatically increasing their capabilities without tying up larger assets that may be needed elsewhere.15 These UAS are also far cheaper and easier to operate than multimillion-dollar helicopters, allowing EMBRACING UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS {18}

them to be deployed in greater numbers when needed to cover a wide area.16 The UN and other international organizations tasked with conflict monitoring have already demonstrated the value of UAS. In the DRC, the UAS can provide UN has used UAS to peacekeepers with provide crucial battleincreased situational field intelligence. In the spring of 2014, the UN awareness and help deployed one of its UAS monitor ceasefires. to assist a patrol that had been ambushed by heavily armed gunmen.17 The UAS scouted the area, confirmed that no civilians were present, and pinpointed the location of the attackers, enabling a UN attack helicopter to drive the rebels off.18 Officials stated that without the UAS, they would have been forced to fire on an area without knowing if civilians were present or use a helicopter to conduct the reconnaissance, risking the aircraft’s crew.19 In November 2014, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deployed the Schiebel Camcopter S-100 rotary UAS to help their personnel monitor the ongoing conflict in southeastern Ukraine between government forces and regional separatists.20 Already, their S-100s have been attacked multiple times by unidentified personnel on the ground, highlighting the risk posed to the monitors in what is still an active combat zone and demonstrating the value of deploying assets that do not put lives at risk.21 While these operations demonstrate how UAS can be used to support UN peacekeeping forces and international monitoring efforts, there are also obstacles to more regular, systematic use. Negative perceptions of UAS, particularly in active combat zones, might pose challenges to their use for more peaceful purposes. As a result of UAS missile strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen over the past decade, many civilians believe that these aircraft will harm them,

EMBRACING UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS {19}

regardless of who is operating them or their mission.22 The UN needs to be transparent about its future UAS deployments by announcing the type of aircraft being deployed, where and why it is being deployed, and providing locals with a representative to contact if they still have concerns. The UN will also need to develop data-retention polices for the video footage their UAS record, articulate those policies, and when necessary compromise with local leaders and amend them so both parties are satisfied. Lastly, the UN should make sure the aircraft are clearly identifiable and, of course, refrain from equipping UAS with weapons of any kind. The ultimate goal of UAS used by the UN should be to keep an eye out for hostile groups, whether they threaten villages or borders, and direct peacekeepers attempting to deter an attack or if necessary, combat the group, but not to use UAS as a weapons platform in active combat.

In addition to concerns about perception, there are other obstacles that currently limit the ability of peacekeepers to deploy UAS on a wider scale. The UN’s current use of civilian contractors to maintain and operate UAS in the DRC has raised difficult legal questions, such as whether those contractors might be perceived as legitimate military targets if they are providing operational support in a military zone.23 As the UN deploys more UAS in support of peacekeeping missions, they should avoid relying on contractors operationally in the field and have the contractors train UN operators outside of the country. Lastly, advanced UAS models, such as the MQ-9 Reaper or the RQ-4 Global Hawk, which can stay aloft for an extremely long time and carry advanced sensors, can be prohibitively expensive to operate, and they are currently nearly impossible to export under existing statutes. Large UAS that have a range greater than 300 km and a payload capacity of 500 kg are generally not available to peacekeeping forces, because the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an association of 34 countries, many of whom produce advanced UAS, limits their worldwide export of these aircraft.24 There are discussions underway about how best to update the MTCR, but a resolution is not yet in sight.25

EMBRACING UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS {20}

Thus, while some UAS offer truly exceptional capabilities, they may be too expensive for peacekeepers or simply be unavailable due to export restrictions and continued controversy about their use.

UAS will not be the solution to all of the UN’s troubles in the future, nor can they replace the personnel on the ground that provide security at refugee camps or the helicopters that ferry supplies to areas decimated by natural disasters. UAS can, however, provide peacekeepers with increased situational awareness and help monitor ceasefires. They can do this without putting personnel in harm’s way and often do so cheaper and more effectively than manned aircraft. With more accurate information, military commanders and political leaders can make more informed decisions and prevent misunderstandings from leading to wider conflicts. UAS will not solve everything, but they are a valuable tool that can greatly increase the efficacy of peacekeeping forces and international monitors. {21} Richard Say is a researcher with the International Security Program at CSIS.

1. An unmanned aerial system is a mobile electromechanical machine that operates in the air, comprising an unmanned vehicle (a platform and mission payload), control station, communications infrastructure, and external human operators and maintainers. This definition was created during a research project conducted jointly by the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI) and CSIS in the fall of 2014.

2. United Nations News Centre, “UN Mission helps rescue shipwrecked passengers in eastern DR Congo,” May 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47727#.VGe-nPnF9Oh; and Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe, “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine successfully completes the first flight of its Unarmed/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” October 23, 2014, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/125813.

3. United Nations News Centre, “Feature: New challenges spur UN peacekeeping to become ‘a force for the future,’” May 29, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47916#.

VJ7y_14BG; United Nations News Centre, “UN Mission helps rescue shipwrecked passengers in eastern DR Congo.”

4. Ibid.

5. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The West and Contemporary Peace Operations,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 1 (January 2009): 39–45; and Mark Piesing, “Why are UN Peacekeepers so badly equipped for modern conflict?,” Independent (United Kingdom), August 9, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/why-are-un-peacekeepers-so-badlyequipped-for-modern-conflict-2334052.html.

6. Bellamy and Williams, “The West and Contemporary Peace Operations,” 41–45.

7. Ibid.

8. Somini Sengupta, “Unarmed Drones Aid U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa,” New York Times, July 2, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/world/africa/unarmed-drones-aid-unpeacekeepers-in-africa.html.

9. Piesing, “Why are UN Peacekeepers so badly equipped for modern conflict?”

{22}

10. Colum Lynch, “Is it still safe to fly on a U.N. helicopter?” Foreign Policy, May 20, 2013, http:// foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/20/is-it-still-safe-to-fly-on-a-u-n-helicopter/; and Heidi Vogt, “United Nations Helicopter Crash in South Sudan Kills Three,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2014, http:// www.wsj.com/articles/united-nations-helicopter-crash-in-south-sudan-kills-three-1409070177.

11. Insitu Inc., “ScanEagle System,” http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle; Insitu Inc., “Launchers,” http://www.insitu.com/systems/launch-and-recovery/launchers.

12. Insitu Inc., “ScanEagle System.”

13. “RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, United States of America,” Army-Technology, http:// www.army-technology.com/projects/rq11-raven/.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid; “South Sudan crisis: UN helicopter crashes near Bentiu,” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 26, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28941930; Federation of American Scientists, “Mi-8 HIP,” June 17, 2000, http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/ mi-8.htm; and Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI Inflation Calculator,” http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/ cpicalc.pl?cost1=3%2C200%2C000&year1=1991&year2=2014.

17. Sengupta, “Unarmed Drones Aid U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Africa.”

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine successfully completes the first flight of its Unarmed/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.”

21. Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, “Spot report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 2 November 2014: Anti-Aircraft Rounds Fired at SMM UAV,” November 3, 2014, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126265; Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 3 November 2014,” November 4, 2014, http://www. osce.org/ukraine-smm/126364.

22. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Get the data: Drone wars,” 2014, http://www. thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/; and Conor Friedersdorf, “‘Every Person Is Afraid of the Drones’: The Strikes’ Effect on Life in Pakistan,” Atlantic, September 25, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/every-person-is-afraid-of-thedrones-the-strikes-effect-on-life-in-pakistan/262814/.

23. Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, “The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones) in United Nations Peacekeeping: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” American Society for International Law, June 13, 2014, http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/13/use-unmanned-aerialvehicles-drones-united-nations-peacekeeping-case.

24. Aaron Mehta, “UAV Firms Seek Easier Exports,” Defense News, July 13, 2014, http://archive. defensenews.com/article/20140713/SHOWSCOUT15/307130017/UAV-Firms-Seek-Easier-Exports.

25. Ibid.

The Internet of Cities: Prospects and Challenges for the Future of Smart Cities and the Internet of Things Breanna Thompson FROM FACILITATING the automated

management of traffic congestion to enabling trashcans to self-report when full, the Internet of Things (IoT) has the potential to dramatically improve urban management over the coming years. Various IoT technologies already implemented have saved cities around the world millions of dollars and improved the efficiency of essential public services.

As cities in the United States seek to harness these new technologies, they would do well to look abroad for lessons learned. Projects underway from Barcelona to Seoul are illustrating not only the potential of IoT, but pitfalls that may arise when attempting to integrate it into existing infrastructure.

In an urban context, IoT technologies—defined here as sensors and actuators embedded in physical objects that are linked through wired and wireless networks1—serve as tools for connecting city infrastructure and generating data regarding its use. Urban administrators can then use this

data to assist in tasks ranging from crime prevention to solar energy management. For example, City Technology Platform in Glasgow integrates streams of anonymized data from various IoT technologies installed across the city, analyzes the data, and presents it to citizens via websites and smartphone apps for everything from monitoring energy use in schools to reporting potholes and graffiti.2 In Rio de Janeiro—a city that just hosted the World Cup, will host the Olympics, and sees millions of attendees pour in annually for Carneval—IoT-enabled standardized coordination among agencies has been critical in ensuring public safety. Rio’s Operations Center, which merges information from approximately 30 agencies, is capable of viewing street images, producing a live map of the city’s transportation network, and using predictive analytics based on residents’ social media accounts to assist law enforcement and first THE INTERNET OF CITIES {23}

Rio’s Central Operations Centre merges info from 30 different agencies and helps to improve emergency response and disaster relief and combat crime.

responders. The center has helped to improve emergency response systems and disaster relief, and combat and control crime across Rio.3

The experiences of Barcelona and Singapore show that IoT integration in cities may also generate jobs, save money, and improve quality of life. Barcelona’s citywide network of sensors provides real-time information on noise and environmental pollution, the flow of people, and traffic and weather conditions.4 Its smart water system alone is saving the city $58 million a year, according to Antoni Vives, Barcelona’s deputy mayor for urban habitat. These savings are in addition to the increased $50 million in revenue from parking fees and 47,000 jobs created to implement the smart city effort.5 Singapore, a hub of international travel, has successfully used technology to minimize congestion on its streets. In 1998, the Singaporean Land Transport Authority implemented the world’s first Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system—tolls that vary according to traffic flows and work as a congestion charge.6 Singapore has also incorporated IoT devices into traffic signals, surveillance and monitoring, and distribution of travel information to drivers. As a result, “Singapore is one of the least congested major cities, with an average car speed on main roads of 27 km/h (17 miles per hour), compared to an average speed of 16 km/h in London, 11 km/h in Tokyo, and 5 km/h in Jakarta.”7 The challenges of harnessing IoT should not be underestimated.

Many cities are built upon proprietary communications networks, meaning they may require the construction of a new, secure IP infrastructure and cloud platform to deliver services and manage the data gathered, which can be costly and time-consuming. Local governments must consider how to connect infrastructure through THE INTERNET OF CITIES {24}

IoT technologies without unduly impacting a city’s traditions, history, and aesthetic—often major drivers of tourism. They must also ensure they have the technological capacity needed to turn data gathered by IoT hardware into usable information that can improve the larger urban management system.

Rio, Barcelona, and Singapore The ability to maintain and update both the are clear examples of the driving hardware and anatrends in smart city development lytical systems will be particularly challengand IoT integration. ing in cities that have minimal intelligent infrastructure8 to use as a building block.

The experience of Seoul illustrates some of the integration challenges cities may face and how they can learn to adapt IoT to existing infrastructure. One of the world’s most tech-savvy cities, Seoul’s administrators invested millions of dollars and years of work into embedding sensors into its transport infrastructure to improve monitoring of traffic flows and efficiency of traffic management, but the project never achieved favorable results. In 2012, city leaders changed tactics, abandoning embedded sensor technology in favor of a cheaper alternative—installing mobile GPS sensors into the city’s 25,000 taxis to monitor traffic information.9 Rio, Barcelona, and Singapore are clear examples of the driving trends in smart city development and IoT integration. Centralizing operations across various public offices, often starting with the transportation sector, provides cities with opportunities to figure out what works best for their residents at a lower cost. Retrofitting existing technologies to be better utilized across a broad array of urban management systems is an option in most of today’s cities, and there are still many places for cities across the world to integrate technology and reap the benefits of being connected.

Although U.S. cities looking to make the jump to smart city status, such as Los Angeles and Boston, can learn from their foreign counTHE INTERNET OF CITIES {25}

terparts, there is no one-size-fits-all for innovation and IoT implementation. If they are to be successful, urban planners must be creative in their integration of novel technologies and be willing to adapt them to the existing infrastructure of a particular city. Each successful smart city has moved forward with its IoT initiatives in different ways, and U.S. cities will need to do the same.

Breanna Thompson is a former program coordinator and research assistant with the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS.

{26}

1. Michael Chui, Markus Löffler, and Roger Roberts, “The Internet of Things,” McKinsey Quarterly, McKinsey & Company, March 2010, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_ telecoms_internet/the_internet_of_things.

2. City Technology Platform, “Future City: Glasgow,” http://futurecity.glasgow.gov.uk/index. aspx?articleid=10255.

3. Natasha Singer, “Mission Control, Built for Cities: IBM Takes ‘Smarter Cities’ Concept to Rio de Janeiro,” New York Times, March 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/business/ibmtakes-smarter-cities-concept-to-rio-de-janeiro.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnn lx=1415332151-6+wFdmSPSe1JQi5PMH+z8w.

4. Maged N. Kamel Boulos and Najeeb M. Al-Shorbaji, “On the Internet of Things, smart cities and the WHO Healthy Cities,” International Journal of Health Geographics, 2014, http://www.ijhealthgeographics.com/content/13/1/10.

5. Connie Guglielmo, “CES LIVE: Cisco’s Chambers Says Internet of Everything, $19 Trillion Opportunity, Is Next Big Thing,” Forbes, January 7, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ connieguglielmo/2014/01/07/ces-live-cisco-ceo-chambers-to-deliver-keynote.

6. “Electronic Road Pricing (ERP),” Land Transport Authority, Singapore Government, February 11, 2015, http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/managing-traffic-andcongestion/electronic-road-pricing-erp.html.

7. “Singapore: Intelligent Transport System,” City Climate Leadership Awards, 2014, http:// cityclimateleadershipawards.com/singapore-intelligent-transport-system.

8. Defined here as infrastructure capable of transferring information between systems for benefits such as improved safety, environmental performance, and general productivity. “Intelligent Transportation Systems,” Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Australian Government, July 22, 2014, http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/its.

9. Tim Smedley, “The new smart city – from hi-tech sensors to social innovation,” The Guardian, November 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/smart-cities-sensors-socialinnovation.

Interview with Jon B. Alterman January 16, 2015

The editorial board of New Perspectives in Foreign Policy sat down with Dr. Jon B. Alterman to discuss his experience as a Middle East expert and his career in academia, government, and the think tank world.

Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS in 2002, he served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. He is a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel and served as an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission).

In addition to his policy work, he teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Before entering government, he was a scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and at the Washington Institute for Near East

Policy. He received his Ph.D. in history from Harvard University.

NPFP For over a decade now, from September 11 to the present, the Middle East has been a central focus of U.S. policy, arguably its central focus. The past few years have been especially turbulent. What has it been like to be a Middle East expert during this period?

Alterman It’s been a little strange, and more than a little exhausting.

My wife told me on January 28, 2011, when Egypt was reaching a fever pitch, “This is the week you’ve been preparing for your entire career.” And quite frankly, that week hasn’t ended. A week doesn’t go by that I’m not totally confounded, surprised, or seeing something that tests things I thought were true, or that brings things together that I thought were totally unrelated. The Middle East is on a wild ride right now.

It’s going to go on for a while.

What happens will determine the

{27}

trajectory for quite some time to come. And there is nobody who can tell you with any certainty how these different trends are going to play out.

It’s a little strange being in demand, because for a long time I wasn’t. Many of the problems in the Middle East were thought to have been solved in the 1990s. No one thinks that any more.

One of the most interesting experiences I had was about a week before President Obama went to Cairo to give his speech to the Muslim world in June 2009. The National Security Council (NSC) brought about 8 or 10 people into the White House to talk about what the president should say in Cairo. I have no idea how much of the speech was written at that point, I have no idea what decisions had already been made, but they went around the table and gave everyone an opportunity to pitch ideas for what the president should say. A few months prior, I had written one of my newsletters for the Middle East Program on what the president should say, were he to make such a speech. I had brought copies with me, and I slid one to a senior member of the White House staff sitting next to me.

He started reading it and underlining parts of it. That was a little bit surreal.

The president didn’t say what I thought he should, but I had a chance to make a pitch. Who knows where those ideas went after they had been underlined?

Even so, it was a tremendous opportunity to take the things that I have learned and come to care about and transmit them to people who are making decisions.

NPFP When you moved to the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, was there ever a time when there was a major policy question on which you found yourself in disagreement with the consensus— Alterman —Like, say, on the invasion of Iraq.

NPFP For example. What is it like to be in that kind of position, and how did you think about acting in that context?

Alterman I had a fellowship at the State Department from October 2001 to October 2002. I started off in the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau and moved to the Policy Planning Staff in February. And clearly one of the things that was being considered across the U.S. government was whether we should invade Iraq.

{28}

It’s important to remember that no one in the U.S. government knew anything about Iraq. We had not had an embassy there for years, there was only a tiny scholarly community that worked on Iraq, and there were very few books you could read. Iraq was kind of a black box for people in the U.S. government.

For people who had done academic study in the Middle East, Iraq was a weird authoritarian footnote.

That being said, I did not have a good feeling about where this was going to go, and the basis of my bad feeling was the certainty that seemed to be coming from senior levels of the government about how well it would all turn out. The State Department, as an institution, was very concerned that if it was overtly critical, then the State Department would be cut out of the planning and the discussions without being able to affect the outcome. Many felt that, as an institution, the best option was to remain quiet so that when there was really a need to intervene, you would at least be inside the room.

I recall a time in August 2002 when a senior official called in some Middle East experts one by one, and said, “Tell me what you think about Iraq.” I said, “I have two principal concerns. One is that nobody can imagine any future scenario for Iraq that is worse than the status quo.” And he said, “I’m not sure anything’s worse than Saddam.” I told him I was less sure. And then he said, “What’s your second concern?” I said, “Running someone else’s country is really hard, and all the former British colonial administrators that can tell you how to do it are dead.” And he responded, “But we’re not going to be in Iraq for a long time. Everybody’s being brought in on a 90-day personal service contract. There will not be any long-term U.S. occupation.” And I said, “Well, that’s what I have.” That’s when I began to look much more vigorously for employment when my fellowship was over, and, happily, I came to CSIS. To give you another example of the challenges on the Iraq front, one of the memos I tried to write was, “What does the United States do in the first week after Saddam falls?” It’s a hard question. We didn’t know very much about the country. But we also didn’t know under what circumstances he would fall.

Have you had an exchange of chemical weapons? Do you have 500 American troops on the ground, or 50,000 American troops on the ground? Has part of the country been contaminated with radiation? You have two pages to write

{29}

the memo, but to my mind, to do it responsibly, you had to spend a page and a half talking about the dramatically different circumstances under which Saddam could fall. But that was not a welcome conversation. The decision was, I think, made relatively early, that we were going to do this and make the best of it.

And there was an important piece of the context running through all of this, which was that the September 11 attacks systematically discredited Middle East experts. There was a broad consensus in the Bush administration after the attacks along the lines of “You [Middle East experts] were supposed to be paying attention to the Middle East. You didn’t predict this, and the continental United States was attacked for the first time since the War of 1812.

And therefore, the people who had the boldness of vision to win the Cold War are going to be the ones who have the boldness of vision to come in and avenge this, and make the Middle East right.” Ultimately that didn’t feel right to me. And that is when it became clear to me that the next portion of my career would be outside of government rather than in.

NPFP: Can you talk a little about the progression your career has taken and what roadblocks came up that you didn’t anticipate? How did you deal with them, and what did that teach you?

Alterman: There are some people who have had glorious and direct ascents to the heights of power. I haven’t ascended to the heights of power and it certainly hasn’t been direct.

I worked in the Senate for two years right after college and decided that, from my perspective, the world was divided into two kinds of people: process people and substance people. There are people that are really good at running processes, and they are very good “people” people, and they are sort of indifferent as to what they are working on. I remember meeting some very talented lawyers when I was working in the Senate, and they fit this bill well. And then there are people who accrue knowledge and hopefully, out of knowledge, they come up with wisdom. Those are the substance people. And I said, “You know, I really want to be a substance guy—that’s who I want to be.”

And so I decided to get a Ph.D.

{30}

By the time I was graduating from my Ph.D. program in 1997, there were four modern Middle East history jobs in the United States and five people graduating from my Harvard class with Ph.D.s in modern Middle East history—so that was not looking too promising. I got a one-year job at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which is a place that gave me opportunities but also is a place that has an institutional position to support Israel and Israeli policies. My academic training made me wary of institutional positions to support anything, and I said, “Well that’s OK for now, but I don’t think it’s a permanent place for me to be.” I met a lot of people and did a lot of networking. And then in one week I got five phone calls saying, “The U.S. Institute of Peace is hiring a Middle East guy, you should apply.” It turned out to be a great place to be, partly because I had a great boss, and partly because that is where I was able to transform from being an Egypt nerd who knew something about Arab media to become a more general Middle East expert.

It strikes me that there were at least three points in my career where I said, “I don’t know that this Middle East thing will work at all.” I had some funding issues in grad school, and the job market for Middle East things was enduringly miserable. Throughout the early part of my career, people in government and business had decided they were over the Middle East.

As I think back to the friends with whom I studied Arabic in Cairo, many of whom have gone on to prominent careers in government, business, journalism, and academia, there were a lot of us in the mid-1990s who were not sure we could make any of this work. Then the world changed, and as the world changed, we suddenly found opportunities.

NPFP: What distinguishes a career in the think tank world from other career tracks in foreign policy? What skills do you need to be effective in the think tank world?

Alterman: A think tank is a different environment: one with incredible freedom, but also with incredible risk, where what you do in a year can totally shape, for positive or negative, what happens in your career. The think tank world is, in some ways, a world without a lot of net. Figuring out what you want your brand to be is a much more profound issue in the think tank world than it is in a government setting. Certainly, it matters in a government setting, but I think in a think tank setting, in many ways, you are nothing but the brand that you create. {31}

I think the most effective things I have done have mostly had to do with framing things in ways that give people an architecture to work from. For example, I did a book on China, the United States, and the Middle East called The Vital Triangle. And in many ways, coming up with the title is 50 percent of the job. Because once you see this as a triangle, once you understand that no two sides can gang up on a third side, that’s the way you think about it. It’s the most basic ideas that have impact. You have to prove them, you have to do the research, and you have to do the legwork to make a case. But if you don’t have a frame that allows somebody to take your information and apply it to new information that comes to them—I don’t think you’ve done your job.

A problem in policymaking over the last decade —and it is a bigger and bigger problem—is that people are overwhelmed by data points: the number of things that are put out online, the number of things that are Tweeted, the number of columns, the number of online journals. That puts the premium on people who can give you a framework, give you an architecture, give you an understanding, because there’s no way to have lasting wins on the data points. The lasting wins are on the architecture and the framework. In doing so, you’re helping people understand what data points should engage their interest and what they all mean.

Part of being able to construct a framework is innate—some people are good at this, and some are not. The absolute smartest people I’ve been in seminars with, the political scientists Samuel Huntington and Lucian Pye, were masters at taking the most complex things and making them understandable. That moment of intellectual clarity they help you achieve is incredibly exciting.

There’s a tier below that where people take complex things and explain them, but they’re still very complex. That’s less satisfying. To me, no one wants an expert whose answer starts off with, “Well, this is all really complex,” and then does a huge data dump. Instead, the job of an expert in my world is to use knowledge and experience to pare down the data so that it’s understandable, digestible, accurate, and explanatory. You have to see the value and the beauty in the simplicity. You have to have watched other people do it. And you have to resist the impulse to look for three more data points.

In my experience, the part of writing that people too rarely do is to spend an hour with a blank sheet of paper in front of them just sketching out where the argument is going. What are you trying to prove? What fits into the

{32}

argument? What are the different elements you need to think through? There is no question that spending that first hour saves you time in the overall writing of the paper. The things I write quickly are uniformly better than the things I write slowly, because when I write quickly it’s because I know where it’s going. When the writing is painful, you have to pull back, and that alarm bell has to go off in your head. You have make yourself stop and say, “OK, where is this all going?”

NPFP: How do you translate those effective habits into having an impact?

Alterman: I still think back to a summer evening when I was about 10, and I went to the antique carousel on Martha’s Vineyard, and it had a ring dispenser. The ring dispenser is a long arm off to the side of the carousel that automatically dispenses three-inch metal rings that you hook your index finger into and grab as you ride by. Most rings are a dull iron, but one is a bright and shiny brass. If you get that one, you get a free ride.

It seemed simple enough. I started riding and grabbing a ring as I went by.

And then I saw what other people were doing. They were leaning as far ahead as they could and kept grabbing rings as they leaned back until the dispenser was so far behind them they couldn’t grab any more.

I don’t think you can be successful in the think tank world if you grab one ring every time it goes around. The challenge is figuring out how many rings can you grab, how many can you keep in your hand at once, and how to quickly tell the dull iron from the shiny brass. It’s harder than it seems.

It’s not just intellectual, though. It’s also personal. If you want to have an impact, you need to find a person who is receptive to precisely what you want to say.

You also have to be prepared to have an impact. If I had walked into that White House meeting and I hadn’t already written something about what the president should say when he goes to Cairo, then it would have been a different game. But I had it prepared, and I brought it with me, and I was able to just slide it over and watch the senior official start underlining it. It’s not just chance. You have to be ready for the chances you have, and you never know when the chances are going to be. That’s the great fun of this job. It’s also part of what makes it exhausting.

{33}

Overall, we are looking for ways to help people at decisive moments understand something so they make better decisions. When we have conferences that bring in people from academia and elsewhere, you can see clearly that most academics write for other academics. Timing doesn’t drive most of them. They’re not focused on finding the decisive moment to put forward the decisive idea or framework that people then take away and so makes a difference.

I recently ran into somebody in government who told me about an article I wrote several years ago about the way the Mubarak government used religion instrumentally. For the life of me, I couldn’t remember what that article was or when I had written it. Still, there was somebody who read that piece and at the moment he did it answered a question that had been bothering him.

I rarely know exactly when that happens, but I hear enough to know that sometimes it does. It’s exciting: there is something deeply interactive about what I do, and there is something really productive about that. You are able to make the world at least marginally a better place, and you are able to apply your skills and your knowledge to help people make better decisions in a world that has a whole bunch of people making some pretty miserable decisions. If you’re lucky, it can be a big deal.

This interview was conducted on January 16th, 2015, and edited for publication.

The NPFP Board would like to extend their thanks to Dr. Alterman for his time, insight, and candor.

{34}

The Editorial Board CAROLYN BARNETT is a research fellow with the CSIS Middle East Program. Her primary research interests are in the politics and society of North Africa and the Gulf states. She holds an M.Sc. in Middle East politics and M.A. in Islamic studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, where she studied as a Marshall scholar, and a B.S.F.S. from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where she was editor-in-chief of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.

ANNE HUDSON is a former program coordinator and research assistant for the CSIS Energy and National Security Program. In this role, she was responsible for all program components, including event planning and management, program outreach, and administrative support. In addition, she conducted research on a variety of domestic and international energy issues. Prior to joining the Energy Program, Hudson worked with the CSIS Transnational Threats Project, studying the evolving terrorist threat in Central Asia. She holds a B.A. in world politics and German from Hamilton College, where she focused on national identity and ethnic conflict.

PAUL NADEAU is an adjunct fellow and former program manager and research associate with the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business.

His prior work experience includes serving as executive officer for research and programs at CSIS, editor-in-chief of the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, and a member of the trade staff of Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME).

He is also a contributing editor with the Diplomatic Courier. Nadeau holds a B.A. from the George Washington University and an M.A. in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

DAVID PARKER is a research associate with the Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS, where he manages research projects on Northeast Asian states’ economic policy and policymaking and U.S. economic strategy toward the Asia-Pacific. His current research interests include the Japanese economy and Japan’s foreign economic strategy, the implications of technological change and globalization on American economic interests, and economic and financial architecture in the Asia-Pacific. He received an M.A. in international economic relations from the School of International Service at American University, a B.A. in Japan studies with a minor in economics from Tufts University, and studied at Doshisha University in Kyoto.

Contributors SAHIL ANGELO is a program coordinator and research assistant for the Global Health Policy Center at CSIS. He primarily focuses on infectious diseases, health systems strengthening, and global health security, in addition to a variety of other health topics. Prior to joining CSIS, Sahil interned at Partners in Health. At the same time, he led a student-run global health non-profit dedicated to containing infectious diseases and improving sanitation in India. He graduated from Boston College cum laude with a B.S. in biology and international studies.

MARIAH DETERS is program coordinator and research assistant with the CSIS Energy and National Security Program. Her research areas of focus include Chinese energy sector reforms and the evolving role of water in the energy industry.

Previously, she was an intern with the CSIS Energy Program, providing research support for the program’s project on medium-term trends that could have a large effect on the energy landscape. She holds a B.A. in international relations and East Asian languages & civilizations from the University of Pennsylvania. She has studied at Peking University in Beijing, China.

TOMI STAHLBERG was a research intern with the Europe Program at CSIS in 2014. He holds a degree in history from the University of Helsinki. He currently works at an art museum and as an independent writer in Finland, his country of origin. His fields of specialty include foreign policy related to the Arctic region and the European Union.

XIAOQUN DONG is a research intern with the Energy and National Security Program at CSIS. She is pursuing an M.A. degree in international economics and energy, resources and environment at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Xiaoqun previously worked as an intern at Volvo Cars Corporation and Knoell Consult in China. She holds a B.A. in international economics and trade and international business from Shanghai University.

RICHARD SAY is a researcher with the International Security Program at CSIS. He participated in American University’s five year program and graduated with his B.A. and M.A. in international affairs and a minor in economics. He has interned for both the U.S. Department of State and the House of Representatives.

His interests lie in unmanned systems, non-state actors, and the future of armed conflict.

BREANNA THOMPSON is a former program coordinator and research assistant with the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS. In this role she was responsible for all program components, including daily operations, budgeting, research support, and event planning. Prior to joining Strategic Technologies, she worked with the CSIS Middle East Program where her research focused primarily on the Maghreb region. She holds a B.A. in international relations and history, concentrating in U.S. foreign policy and Arabic language and culture, from Drake University where she graduated summa cum laude. She now works as a political analyst for the U.S. government.

Interviewee Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS in 2002, he served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. He is a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel and served as an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group (also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission). In addition to his policy work, he teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the George Washington University. Before entering government, he was a scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 1993 to 1997, Alterman was an award-winning teacher at Harvard University, where he received his Ph.D. in history. He also worked as a legislative aide to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY), responsible for foreign policy and defense.

Alterman has lectured in more than 30 countries on five continents on subjects related to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward the region. He is the author or coauthor of four books on the Middle East and the editor of two more. In addition to his academic work, he is sought out as a consultant to business and government and is a frequent commentator in print, on radio, and on television. His opinion pieces have appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and other major publications. He is a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of Arab Media and Society and is a former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is now a life member.

He received his A.B. from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

1616 rhode island avenue nw, washington, dc 20036 202.887.0200 | www.csis.org

CONNECT WITH CSIS