Manchester Rapid Transit Study, volume 1

Manchester rapid transit study

Volume 1 Report of the Working Party September, 1967

THE MIN I S TRY 0 F TRANS P 0 RT . MANCHESTER C 0 RP 0 RAT I 0 N , BRITISH ' RAILWAY S

Manchester Rapid Transit Study, Volume 1 Report of the Working Party, Sept. 1967 This report has been digitised by Martin Dodge from the Department of Geography, University of Manchester. The digitisation was supported by the Manchester Statistical Society’s Campion Fund.

Permission to digitise and release the report under Creative Commons license was kindly granted by Manchester Libraries, Information and Archives, Manchester City Council.

(Email: archiveslocalstudies@manchester.gov.uk) This work is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. 20 April 2014.

Manchester rapid transit study

Commissioned jointly by:

Consulting Engineers:

The Corporation of Manchester ;

De Leuw Cath er & Partners in

The Ministry of Transport;

association with Hennessey,

in association with British Railways.

Chadwick, 0 hEocha & Partners.

Volume 1

Report of the Working Party Copies available from MANCHESTER CITY TRANSPORT, 2 Devonshire Street North . Ardw ick . Manchester, 12.

Copyright Reserved.

Printed by The Willi am M orris Press Ltd. Wythenshaw e, Manchester. 22.

Price ÂŁ2. 2s. Od. Plans based upon Ordnance Survey map reproduced with th e sancti on of the Controller of H.M . Stationery Office.

I

Manchester rapid transit study MEMBERS OF THE WORKING PARTY

CHAIRMAN:

R. F. Bennett, General Manager, Manchester City Transport

MEMBERS :

Lieut. Col. I. K. A. McNaughton- Headquarters

Ministry

D. J. Lyness- Headquarters

of }

J . D. Wallace, Divisional Road Engineer, North West

C. P. Millard, Divisional Manager. Manchester

Transport

London Midland Region

F. W. Young, Assistant Planning Manager

}

British Railways

J. Hayes, City Engineer & Surveyor Manchester

J . S. Millar, City Planning Officer

Corporation

H. R. Page, City Treasurer

CO-OPTED MEMBER:

D. McCorquodale,

Representing

Project Manager of the

the

}

Feasibility Study

HONORARY

Consultants

Town Clerk of Manchester

SECRETARIES: Sir Philip B. Dingle, C.B.E., (to July 1966) G. C. Ogden, C.B.E., (from July, 1966)

The Working Party wish to thank the very many persons in the Ministry, British Railways, and the Corporation who have contributed to the Study, and in particular the following who were directly engaged in the work of the Study and in the preparation of the Report: City Planning Dept.:

J Dean

City Transport Dept.: E. H. Stiff, H. Gibbon

R. P. Ross

G. Watson City Engineer's Dept.:

A. W. Egan W. A. Lewis

British Railways:

F. Mitchell

Artist's impression of Duorail rapid transit for Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Gammell

Contents

Page Frontispiece

Section

Section

Section

1

2

3

Introduction Summary and Recommendations 1.1.

Introduction

13

1.2.

Summary of Main Conclusions

13

1.3.

Recommendations

15

Manchester's Structure and Transport System 2.1.

Manchester and the Conurbation

19

2.2.

Preservation of the Central Area

19

2.3.

The Transport System

19

2.4.

The Need for an Improved Public Passenger Transport System

28

2.5.

Difficulties Facing Public Transport

28

2.6.

The Case for Rapid Transit

28

A Rapid Transit System 3.1.

The Consultants

33

3.2.

The Consultants' Terms of Reference

33

3.3.

Systems Studied

33

3.4.

Final List for Evaluation

38

3.5.

The Route

38

3.6.

Costs

39

3.7 .

Effect of Reducing Route Length

39

3.8.

Special Study of '2-mile' Elevated Route

41

3.9.

Civil Engineering Costs

42

3.10.

Rolling Stock

42

3.11.

Operating Costs

42

3.12.

Stations

42

3.13.

Quality of Estimates

42

3.14.

Underground or Overhead? The Environmental Problem

42

Final Choice of System for Manchester

43

3.15.

7

Figures Index

Contents

Section

4

5

49

4.1.

Studies Commissioned

4.2.

Possible Improvements to the Suburban Rail System

49

Feeder Bus Services and Station Improvements

51

4.4.

Traffic Management and Bus Operation

53

4.5.

Restraint of Traffic at Peak PeriodsParking Policy

4.3.

Section

Frontispiece Artist's impression of Duorail rapid transit for Manchester

The Potential of t he Existing Public Transport System

55

T he Futu re for Public Transport

A possible rail rapid transit network

2.1.

Individual local authorities and major central business areas in the conurbation

20

2.2.

Urbanisation of the area over the last 120 years

21

2.3.

Main concentrations of employment in the central area, and their relationship to bus routes and railway stations

22

Growth in numbers of vehicles and car ownership

23

2.5.

Railway network

24

2.4.

3.8.

Westinghouse vehicle and test track

39

3.9.

Total annual cost (operating, maintenance and debt charges) and annual maintenance and operating expense

41

Photo-montage comparing visual impact in a low density residential area (structures seen at 25 feet and 50 feet)

44

Photo-montage comparing visual impact in a low density residential area (structures seen at 100 feet and 150 feet)

45

Railway links showing alternatives 'A', 'B' and 'C'

57

14

1.1.

3.10.

3.11.

4.1 .

5.1.

A possible primary transportation network for In pocket at back Manchester

5.2.

Concept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Cammell

61

Concept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Cammell

62

Duorail concept of vehicle interior for Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Cammell

63

5.5.

Station interior, Montreal

64

37

5.6.

Station interior, Montreal

64

38

5.7.

Shops in station mezzanine, Toronto

65

5.1.

Results of Studies

61

2.6.

SELNEC highway plan

26

5.2.

Parking Policy

63

2.7.

Network of bus services

29

5.3.

The Development of Rail Rapid Transit

63

2.8.

Lost bus miles

30

3.1.

Safege prototype vehicle

34

3.2.

Safege beamway and vehicle suspension

35

3.3.

Duorail, steel wheel on steel rai l

36

3.4.

Guided Busway, standard buses with side guidance

36

3.5.

Alweg train, Seattle

37

3.6.

Alweg vehicle suggested for use in Manchester Westinghouse vehicle and test track, Pittsburgh

3.7.

8

Page

Page

Page

5.3.

5.4.

9

Tables Index

Page 2.1.

2.2.

Summary of parking accommodation in and around the central area

25

Cities which have or are constructing rapid transit systems

27

2.3.

Cities without rapid transit where stud ies are in 28 progress

2.4.

Traffic trends -

3.1.

Comparative cost of special busways

34

3.2.

Attitude considered for systems evaluation

39

3.3.

Capital cost- 16-mile route

40

3.4.

Annual maintenance and operating costs16-mile route

40

3.5.

Total annual cost-16-mile route

40

3.6.

Cost comparison- 16-mile and 9-mile routes

39

3.7.

Cost estimates for '2-mile' study

41

3.8.

Comparison of systems

46

4.1 .

Carrying capacities of railway lines

50

4.2.

Cost estimates -

51

4.3.

Survey of Altrincham line

52

4.4.

Comparative costs-busways and duorail

54

London Transport

railway improvements

30

INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10

Section one Introduction, Summary and Recommendations

1.1

INTRODU CTION

The Working Party was constituted in June 1966, following a decision by Manchester City Council and the Ministry of Transport to commission Consultants to undertake a comparative study of various forms of rapid transit* for Manchester.

The terms of reference were : (a)

to supervise the work of the Consultants.

(b) to examine ways in which the existing road and rail public passenger transport services in Manchester might be improved.

The main objective has been to find out, within the limits of time and resources available, how to improve public passenger transport to the centre of the city, especially at peak periods. Everyone who travels at these times knows how the bus services have deteriorated in recent years through the effects of severe traffic congestion. Many are also aware of the arguments, given publicity in this country by the Buchanan Report, that there is not the space in our bia cities for more than a small proportion of people who work in the centre to travel to their work by private car. The truth of this is borne out by experience in North American cities where massive investment in urban highways has failed to solve the peak hour traffic problem, and where great efforts are now being made to revive public transport.

Although there is widespread appreciation of the need to improve public passenger transport, there seems to be relatively little reliable information and certainly no agreement on how this can best be done. To some the word 'monorail' has magical properties; others pin their faith on 'banning private cars'. If progress is to be made, those responsible for planning our larger cities must have more information on the practical possibilities of improvements to public passenger transport. How do the various new systems perform; what can be done at modest cost and what might be achieved with greater investment ; what is involved for people and for the urban environment? There is a need too for greater awareness of the complexity of the problem and of the action that is essential if the centres of our biggest cities are to survive as places of dense employment and activity.

It is hoped that the Manchester Rapid Transit Study will help answer some of these questions. The Consultants' report, which is published in full as Volume 2 of this Study, *Rapid Transit, i.e., public passenger transport operating on its own rese rved track with close station spacing and frequ ent services. The London Underground and tube network and the Glasgow underground railway are the only existing rapid transit systems in this country, although some British Rail suburban services approach rapid transit standards.

examines and compares various rapid transit systems, including monorails, and provides detailed information of their costs and other characteristics. Section 3 of this Volume 1 summarises the Consultants' main conclusions.

The examination of the potential of existing road and rail public passenger transport services by officers of the City of Manchester and British Rail shows how the suburban rail services cou ld be improved by such measures as station car parks, feeder bus services, re-equipment and the construction of links under the city centre. This part of the Study also considers various ways of providing better road conditions for buses. The results are summarised in Section 4 of this Volume. The conclusions from Section 3 and Section 4 are considered in Section 5.

This Study points the road ahead but does not conclude with a specific and detailed plan for a complete rapid transit network, nor does it make out a detailed economic case for specific investments in public passenger transport.

There are general arguments, put forward in Section 2, which point to the conclusion that a rapid transit system will be needed in Manchester, as indeed has been found to be necessary for other cities of comparable size and development all over the world . The social and economic benefits of such a system are indeed obvious and of great magnitude but the Working Party did not have the time, information or techniques at its disposal for making accurate assessments of the benefits to travellers and to the prosperity of Manchester, which would result from specific investments in rapid transit; neither was it possible to quantify the social and economic harm to the area which would result from failure to make these investments.

A major land-use/transportation study for the South East Lancashire/ North East Cheshire (SELNEC) area is in progress, with the object of producing by the end of 1968, a tentative strategic transportation plan covering highways and publ ic passenger transport for the year 1981 . The SELNEC study will provide much of the basic information required to evaluate the benefits, and specific proposals for rapid transit development will have to be justified in the light of this plan.

1 .2

SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS

(i) Although only 15% of those who work in Central Manchester now come to work by car, there is acute traffic congestion at the peak hour, especia lly in the winter months. Congestion prevents the buses keeping regular schedules, and the bus services-used by the great majority of central area workers- are giving a progressively worse service to the public. (ii) As bus services get less reliable and as more people come to own cars, more will want to use them for the

13

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POSSIBLE NORTtt SOUftt RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM

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(viii) A rapid transit system for Manchester could most economically be developed by taking the maximum advantage of British Rail rights of way. The linking of suburban lines, and the construction of new lines, would be a major investment which would need to be considered in the context of the SELN EC Transportation Study but whatever rapid transit network may be recommended in the study it would take at least five years to design and construct the first stage, which would be certain to involve a tunnel under the city centre.

(v) Other conurbations throughout the world comparable in size and development to Manchester have similar traffic problems. Many have decided that these can be solved only by putting more public transport onto its own reserved tracks. Those with old rapid transit systems are extending and modernising them. Most others have decided to build or are investigating new systems. (vi) Of all developed rapid transit systems, a modern urban electric railway (Duorail) is preferable for Manchester on grounds of cost, proved reliability and compatibility with the existing suburban rail system. If an entirely overhead route had been acceptable the Consultants' report indicates that the various monorail systems, and especially Alweg, would have been competitive with a railway. In the Working Party's view an overhead route would not be acceptable in the densely built-up inner area of Manchester because of the visual intrusion of the structure and the noise of passing trains. Where an overhead structure can be accepted, that required to support a railway is no more intrusive than the various monorail structures. Architectural treatment and quality of construction are visually far more important than the inherent shape of the structure necessary for any particular system. (vii) On the 16-mile route investigated by the Consultants, underground construction is recommended for the central

(ix) It would take many more years to develop a network to serve the main corridors. Thus the great weight of demand for central commuting will have to be met by buses for many years. Even with a developed rail system, buses would have a major role in feeding the railway system and providing services for cross-town journeys, local journeys and along radial corridors not served by rail. Thus the possibility of rail development does not affect the need for urgent measures to help alleviate the road conditions under which buses operate.

1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS (a)

In view of the evidence that a rail rapid transit system is needed for the Manchester area, consultants should be retained to: (i) investigate possible realistic rail rapid transit networks (such as those illustrated in Figure 1.1) ' characterwith a view to determining performance istics, capital and continuing costs and quality of service to the public. (ii)

undertake the detailed planning of any central section which could be constructed as a first stage of development.

(b) The SELNEC Transportation Study should be pursued with all possible speed so as to evaluate suburban rail, rapid transit, and bus services as part of a detailed land use/transportation plan for the whole conurbation designed to make the best possible use of limited resources for investment in transport and urban renewal. (c) To improve the quality of peak hour bus services, present car parking policies should be so phased that greater priority is given to short period parking for shopping and business calls, at the expense of the all day parker.

•IN(

COM~lRUC110N

USINQ

yii) As car ownership grows, as industry in the centre is V replaced by offices and as new residential areas are developed at greater distances from the centre, the commuter of the future will demand and will deserve public passenger transport services of higher standards of comfort, convenience and speed. If these are not provided the future prosperity of Central Manchester as a regional centre of employment will decline.

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five miles. The estimated capital cost of constructing and equipping a railway to rapid transit standards, with a capacity of 30,000 passengers per hour, would be £61,000,000 for the whole 16-mile route, or £43,000,000 for the central section of 9 miles on which most of the traffic would be generated.

(iv) There are very great difficulties in bringing bus services up to the required standards for radial journeys during the peak periods. Traffic management schemes can only exceptionally be designed to give buses a major advantage.

Special facilities for buses such as reserved stretches of road or tunnel have only limited application and are extremely expensive to construct. A parking policy aimed at reducing all-day parking space and giving priority to uses such as shopping and business calls outside the peak hour, can have some impact on peak hour traffic congestion. All measures to alleviate the conditions under which ordinary buses operate should be pursued, but they cannot be expected to do more than halt the present trend of deterioration in bus services. They will not achieve any radical improvement to public transport for long journeys to the city centre.

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journey to work. But future increases in road capacity over the next few years will be fully taken up by the anticipated growth of business and industrial traffic. Even in the long term the space that can be provided for roads and parking, while preserving the character of the city centre, will not allow more than 25-30% of people to commute by car.

RAIL fRACI(

1 .1 - A possible rail rapid transit network

15

I

•

.

MANCHESTER'S STRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT SYSTEM

T

Section two Manchester's Structure and Transport System

-路路 2.1

MANCHESTER AND THE CONURBATION

Manchester (population 600,000 plus) is the largest city within the SE LN EC conurbation (population 2f millions), an area covering some 470 square miles. Figure 2.1 shows the individual local authorities in the area, and the important town centres.

The structure of the conurbation is largely a result of industrial development in the last two centuries which has made the area a world centre for the cotton industry and engineering. Figure 2.2 illustrates the dramatic urbanisation of the last 120 years and shows how once individual market towns have grown together into almost continuous built-up areas though population is unevenly distributed.

Until the 1920's growth largely followed the tracks of publ ic transport facilities (both suburban railways and trams) which developed on a radial pattern with Manchester as the dominant centre. After the first world war the move towards better housing standards, lower residential densities, and the replacement of trams by buses led to development between main radial roads. More recently, the growth in motor-car ownership has enabled some residential development to be sited with little regard to public transport services.

The central area of Manchester has become the commercial, shopping, educational, cultural and entertainment centre both of the conurbation and of a wider region within the North West. About 160,000 people work in this area of less than 2 square miles and a larger area of 12 square miles in and around the centre provides jobs for about 280,000.

Figure 2.3 shows the main concentrations of employment in the central area and their relationship to bus routes and railway stations.

The main trends in land-use development are: (a) the decline of industry and warehousing, the growth in offices and the development of the higher education precinct in and around the central area ; (b) the clearance of slums in the inner suburbs, and the subsequent development at lower densities of new municipal housing mainly at some distance from the City Centre; (c) the growth of private housing in North East Cheshire and in areas north of Manchester; and {d} the greater concentration of shopping in local centres.

2.2

summarise why the Working Party took as a basic assumption that it is intended to preserve the city centre as the focal point of activity.

Manchester's centre, like the central area of other major cities, has grown and changed in response to regional and national ecdnomic pressures. This has been evident over the years, and while the size and function of the city centre has altered, the location has not shifted; at all times it has been the point of maximum accessibility. The components of a central area do change, and in recent years there has been a decline in the industrial and warehousing functions of many cities, and a rapid increase in the amount of office floor space. Nevertheless, with the growth in motor-car ownership and the increasing congestion in central areas and also, in part, arising from improvements in telecom ~ munications, there are now factors which could stimulate growth of a kind normally associated with city centres at points away from the historic cores of our urban regions.

In recent years proposals have been put forward to build offices and shops outside central areas on a scale previously considered unique to conurbation centres. The North American city centre has shown a notable deoree of resilience, despite the development of shopping and commercial areas outside it.

In the City of Manchester about 30% of the rateable value is in the central area which comprises only 3% of the total area, but the preservation of the central area is important not only in terms of rateable value. The life of the whole area around Manchester would clearly be poorer if the vitality of the city centre were sapped. Suburban centres, because of the limited population on which they can draw, can never support the wide variety of specialised shops and services which thrive in a busy city centre.

Furthermore, art galleries, museums, theatres, symphony orchestras, and other cultural institutions rely for their existence on their accessibility to concentrations of population. Western civilisation, from the classical era onwards, has depended for its advancement on the concept of 'living in cities'. Whilst it is clear that the basic functions of a city centre are worth preserving, it is also clear that the transportation needs of such a city centre cannot be met on the basis of private transport alone. A choice has to be made between preserving the central area and permitting the unrestrained use of the private motor car. If we want cities to be all that they can be, good public transport is essential.

PRESERVATION OF THE CENTRAL AREA

Because some people argue that decentralisation is inevitable once traffic congestion and the difficulties of finding parking space reach a certain level, it may be useful to

2.3

THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM

Growth in numbers of vehicles and car ownership is illustrated in Figure 2.4 which shows the anticipated 19

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t County Boroughs

SALFORD

Municipal Boroughs

Hyde

Urban Districts

HORWICH .

8ural Districts 0

3<1'iles

FOOTNOTE. POPULATION FIGURES ARE 1965 MID - YEAR ESTIMATES

1924

1965

2.1 - lndividual local authorities and major central business areas in the conurbation 2.2-Urbanisation of the area over last 120 years 20

21

increase in the SELN EC area. It will be seen that by 1981 there will be one car to every three persons. The network of main roads and railways in the Manchester area has changed little in the last 30 years and, as in other urban areas in this country, is not adapted to the recent rapid growth in road traffic.

Persons per Acre 2.3.1

0-

There is an extensive network of railway lines, many of w hich carry heavy freight traffic, but some no longer carry passenger services. Figure 2.5 shows the railway networks and highlights those lines on which passenger services still operate. The railway system has suffered, because, built as it was a hundred years ago, it often goes through industrial areas which are now decaying or of poor environmental quality. Residential development in recent decades has taken place mostly well away from the railway system. There are, at present, no parking facilities at many suburban railway stations and the bus services compete with the railway lines rather than feed them. A further adverse factor is that the main stations are some distance from the heart of the city as shown in Figure 2.3. For example, a commuter to the Town Hall has a ten minutes' walk from any of the central area stations (except Central Station, which is to be closed). Nonetheless, the railways still carry a substantial number of passengers in the morning peak period at which time 22,000 arrive at stations in the central area ; about 15% of those who work in the central area commute by rail. The railways are operating well below capacity; in consequence the operation is costly and commuter rail services do not pay their way.

62

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-

251 - 500

-

501-1000

Th e Railways

111111111111001 -2000

- -Bus Routes

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2.3.2

The Road System

The main road system is inadequate. Some fine arterial roads were built before the war, but their capacity is limited by intersections and at peak periods these are severely con gested at points as far as 10 miles from the city centre.

Following a road traffic survey in 1960, the Surveyors to the local authorities in the SELNEC area produced a plan shown in Figure 2.6 (known as the SELNEC Highway Plan) for new roads and improvements to provide sufficient capacity to take times the 1960 volume of traffic. Some of the schemes in the plan have already been completed (e.g.

Mancunian Way) or are in the course of construction, and others are near the construction stage. The City Engineer, however, estimates that the increase in capacity from schemes in the present programme will be more than absorbed by the general increase in traffic levels over the next few years. The SELNEC Highway Plan estimated that by 1982, when it was envisaged that the highways system would be completed, the road capacity would be sufficient to allow approximately 25% to 30% of central area workers to commute by private car. The original estimate of the cost of implementing the plan was £300,000,000, but in the light of more realistic schemes and estimates, and higher design standards, this figure is more likely to be not less than £500,000,000. Furthermore, because of the increased demands being made upon the National Exchequer for road schemes, and the limitations on resources available, completion of the plan by 1982 is unlikely.

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2.3- Main concentrations of employment 22

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the central area. and their relationship to bus routes and railway stations

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2.4-Growth in numbers of vehicles and car ownership

23

2.3.3

The Bus System

There is an extremely dense network of bus services, as illustrated in Figure 2.7, provided by 11 municipal undertakings, and by three large bus companies which also serve rural areas outside the conurbation. About 70% of those working in the central area travel to work by bus, but the services are becoming increasingly less reliable, and the cost of running them (and thus the fares that have to be charged) is rising at an alarming rate. Figure 2.8 shows how 'lost bus miles' i.e., miles not operated because of traffic congestion, incurred by Manchester City Transport, the largest bus operator in the conurbation, have increased over the last eight years.

2.3 .4

Car Parking

Parking facilities in and around the central area are an important feature of the total transport system. Table 2.1 summarises the existing parking accommodation available both 'on' and 'off' the street. within the 2.1 square miles which comprise the central area of the City and its fringes.

The number of on-street parking spaces is expected to be reduced by the extension of parking meter control and parking restrictions, and in the long term it is envisaged it will be necessary to eliminate on-street parking at least in

the central core of the city. In addition all off-street temporary car parks will eventually be extinguished as redevelopment of the central and fringe areas proceeds. However, these losses may be balanced by an increase in permanent offstreet parking spaces, and in the city's present proposals 40,000 new off-street spaces will be provided in the central area in the long term. The total long term parking requirement is estimated to be 47,000 spaces in the central area, of which 32,000 would be filled during the peak period.

There is, however, no firm programme for the construction of these permanent off-street spaces. The provision of this number of spaces, based on a car occupancy of 1.5, would allow approximately 25% to 30% of those who work in the central area to travel to work by car, and this is consistent with the road capacity contemplated in the SE LNEC Highway Plan. It is well known that it is impossible to plan in Manchester on the basis that all those employed in the city centre could use their own private transport for the journey to work. If every car carried two persons, more than a third of the total floor area of the city centre would be devoted to car parking, in addition to the space occupied by a highway system designed on a corresponding scale. Apart from the questionable desirability of the final result, the cost of a surgical operation of such magnitude would be prodigious and the difficulties of phasing almost incapable of solution.

TABLE 2.1 SUMMARY OF PARKING ACCOMMODATION IN AND AROUND TH E CENTRAL AREA

OWNERSHIP

TYPE OF PARKING SITE

DAILY RATE

Private

Permanent Multi-storey

5s.

6s.6d.-8s.

8s.-9s.

Temporary

2s.-3s.

Permanent (underground)

5s.

Temporary

2s.

3s. (Chepstow St.)

Municipal

Meters (on-street) Other parking under various ownerships, for which no charge is made to the motorist. â&#x20AC;˘

EXISTING PASSENGER LIN ES

Total number parking spaces within survey area

SHORT PERIOD RATE

9 hrs.

12 hrs.

24 hrs.

3s.-3s. 6d.

2 hrs.

4s.-5s.

5 hrs.

No. OF SPACES AVAILABLE

1,150

3,600 3s.

4 hrs.

320

1s. 3d.

4 hrs. (aher 10 a.m.)

1,350

6d.

1s.

hr.

2 hrs.

1.450

Private user (permanent) Car parks (temporary)

2,800 6,100

Fly parking on vacant sites (temporary)

5,300

Other on-street parking

6,630

28,700

2.5- Railway Network 25

SELNEC HIGHWAY PLAN

TA BLE 2.2 CITI ES WHI CH HAVE OR ARE CONSTRUCTING RAPID TRAN SIT SYSTEMS

CITY

ROUTE MILES (AT PRESENT)

15·9 1-1 11 ·2 57 40·9

1,852 1.137 1,696 2,201 3,177

2·3

1,928

BUENOS-AIRES

19·6

7,000

CHICAGO

85·4

6,591

CLEVELAN D

14·9

1,958

ATH ENS BAKU BARCELONA BERLIN (W) BOSTON BUDAPEST

COLOGNE ESSEN FRANKFURT ON M AIN GLASGOW HAM BURG

2

6·5 47 ·2

841 728 694 1,018 1,856

1,070

KHARKOV KIEV LENINGRAD LISBON LONDON MADRID MILAN MONTREAL MOSCOW MUNICH NAGOYA NEW YORK

OSAKA OSLO PARIS

5·9 15·2

1,332 3,641

5·3 244·2

813 8,186

20·7 9·0.

14·9 80·8 6·1 237

2,558 1,661 2.260 6,423 1,182 1,935 11 ,260

20·1 16·6

3,156 484

127·1

7,369 1,017

PRAGUE PHILADELPHIA

LEGEND

POPULATION (000)

28·9

4,617

6·8

ROME ROTTERDAM SAN FRANCISCO

73·9

2.417 732 2,894

STOCKHOLM

35·7

1,179

STUTTGART TBILISI TOKYO

6·2 51 ·3

635 805 11 ,370

TORONTO

14·5

1,989

VIENNA WASH IN GTON

10·2

1,640 2,323

t. EXISTING AND PROPOSED MOTORWAYS AND MAJOR ROADS 2. LONG TERMED PROPOSED MAJOR ROADS (CONSTRUCTION COSTS NOT INCLUDED IN OVERALL ESTIMATE) ..............- .• - .. ..... .

3. CONTINUATION OF MAJOR ROADS INCLUDED IN SELNEC ESTIMATES .......

NOT

JMl.S.

-

-

-

PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS

Underground being considered.

Further line being planned.

Two lines being extended. Plans for another 100 cars.

Two lines being extended. Final target 119·2 miles.

Aiming to build 29 ·8 miles of track and buy approximately 100 more cars.

Existing tramway to be linked w ith 5 mile underground line. First section by 1970. finished 1973.

3·7-mile extension completed. Plans to integrate lines under different ownership and extend system to 41 miles.

Building new terminal and 14·9 miles of track. Plans to order 100 cars and put present 'Elevated' underground.

Building 4-mile extension to airport. Three further extensions being considered.

12·4-mile system under construction, first lines in operation by 1975.

Extensions under study.

Goal 68·4 route miles. First 3·1 miles by 1968. Completed sections being worked with trams.

No present plans.

0·9-mile extension open. Two new extensions of 8·6 and 2·9 miles being built. Greater integration foreseen through new overseeing agency.

Construction starts on 10·6-mile line this year. A further 11 ·8 miles to be built later.

New line being built in stages. Aim 18·6 miles.

5-mile extension opening this year. This with existing 7·8 miles to be operated automatically. Aim to have 26·7 miles of track.

0·9-mile extension to be opened this year. Aim to have 24·9-milesystem.

12·4 mile Victoria Line opens in 1968-fully automatic. Two airport links to be built. Further underground extension proposed.

7·5- mile extension opening 1967, 18·6 miles to be added.

1 ·24-mile extension completed. 12·7 miles under construction.

Three lines opened this year. Possible future integration.

8·8 mile line opened, 9·5 miles being built. Goal 186·4 miles.

9 ·8 miles of track under construction. first services in 1972.

2·0-mile extension being built. Further 26·1 miles to be constructed.

Three connecting lines being completed. Air conditioning being tried. Plans for East River Tunnel and two other lines. There is also 14·2 mile New York Path system.

21 ·1 miles of track being built. 70·8 miles planned by 1975.

Section opened 1966. new branch 1967 and one further branch to be built.

28·6 miles of high speed track being built. Prototype car delivered, two further high speed and three radials under study.

18·6 miles of track being built. First section to be opened in 1975, initially with trams.

10·6 mile extension to be built. 13·1 mile DRPA line to be opened in 1968.

9 mile extension being built. Three lines to be added.

Initial 3·1 mile line opens this year. Extension being considered.

New system under construction including 4 mile Cross Bay Tube.

450 cars to be ordered. First lines by 1969, finished 1971.

Three extensions being built. Further lines and new cars being designed.

10·6 mile line being built.

First section opened this year, another 2·5 miles planned.

0·85-mile bridge across bay to carry railway being built. 94·4 miles of track to be built. High speed system being considered.

7·9 miles of track opened last year, 3 miles this year. 6·6 miles next year.

First 24·9 miles approved. Goal 87 miles.

First boring for 24·9 mile system begun. Construction starts 1967.

First line by 1970, finished by 1972.

Population figures for cities taken from the U.N. Demographic Year Book 1965. Where available "Urban Agglomeration Population Figures" are given.

2.6- SELNEC highway plan 26

Summary compiled from a table 'Rapid Transit round the world' in the International Railway Journal, May, 1967.

27

TABLE 2.3 CITIES WITHOUT RAPID TRANSIT WHERE STU DIES A RE IN PROGRESS CITY

POPULATION (000)

PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS

ATLANTA AUCKLAND BALTIMORE BRUSSELS

1,161 515 1,829 1,057

CAIRO CALCUTTA CARACAS DORTMUND DUSSELDORF HANOVER HELSINKI

3,518 4,641 1,764 653 702 566 613

ISTANBUL JOHANNESBURG KOBE LOS ANGELES MANCHESTER MEXICO CITY MELBOURNE NUREMBERG PITTSBURGH SEATTLE ST. LOUIS SYDNEY YOKOHAMA ZURICH

1,152 1,750 1,216 2,479 2,448 3,192 2,061 467 2,368 1,178 2,203 2,300 1,788 651

Designing two lines of 29·8 miles. Aim 65 ·9 miles.

Regional Agency considering partly underground railway.

Considering 19·9 mile line, hoping to increase to 29 ·8 miles.

10·9 miles of tramway underground by 1975. Goal 29·2 mile four line system converted to railway with 204 two-car sets. £178·5 million system proposed.

Eastern Railway suburban line may be put underground.

Studies in progress.

Studies in progress.

Studies in progress.

Aim to build 3·9 mile line.

9-4 mile line approved, aiming at three lines totalling 27 ·3 miles by 1980.

Studies in progress.

Studies in progress.

Studies in progress.

63·4 mile system being designed. Aim 159·7 miles. Bond issue in 1968.

Studies in progress ; recommendations due this year. £46·5 million credit for one line.

Studies in progress. Possible underground system.

Studies in progress.

Studies in progress; report due this year.

Designing 11 .8 mile system.

Studies in progress.

Commuter rail line may be put underground.

Construction starts 1968 of a 40·1 mile system. First 7 ·5 miles by 1971 .

Studies in progress.

Population figures for cities taken from the U.N. Demographic Year Book 1965. Where available "Urban Agglomeration Population Figures" are given.

Summary compiled from a table 'Rapid Transit round the world' in the International Railway Journal. May. 1967.

2.4 THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT SYSTEM Assuming the central area is to be preserved as a focal point of activity, no highway and parking system could be designed, let alone financed, to cope with more than 25/30% of those working there to travel to their work by private car. It follows that the public transport system must be improved to a standard acceptable to up to three quarters of those travelling to work in the central area.

more people are encouraged to go by car, but future increases in road capacity over the next few years will be fully taken up by the growth of business and industrial traffic. Thus any increase in car commuting will make congestion worse, and bus services still more unreliable. (c) Financial prospects of Public Transport.

National statistics show that increases in public transport fares over the last decade have been at a rate of approximately 5% per year compared with approximately 1% in private motoring costs. Public passenger transport is suffering from rapidly falling revenues outside the peak periods, when services must stil l be provided for those without access to private transport.

DIFFICULTIES FACING PUBLIC TRANSPORT Traditional public passenger transport operators, both bus and train, have served the community well, but the trends outlined in this chapter will increasingly prevent them from offering services of the required standard. The main difficulties can be summarised as follows:

(a) Reduction in the 'captive' market.

By 1981 there will be one car'to every three persons in the conurbation. This in itself will exert a strong pressure to use the car for the journey to work.

(b) The effect of road congestion on bus services.

Traffic congestion has already seriously undermined the reliability of bus services making them less attractive to the public. As bus services become less reliable,

28

2.6

THE CASE FOR RAPID TRANSIT

Radical improvements will be needed in the public passenger transport system if it is to succeed in providing an acceptable service for three-quarters of the commuters to the central area of Manchester. The opportunities for specific improvements in the Manchester area are described in the next few sections. This sub-section gives some general arguments for rapid transit, and shows how these arguments have been accepted and applied in many other cities with problems similar to Manchester's.

2.7- Network of Bus Services

29

The general objective of improvements to the public passenger transport system must be to make it competitive with the private car predominantly in terms of speed, cost and comfort. Services must give shorter journey times than do bus services operating under existing conditions, and for the longer distances a quicker journey than is possible by private car. Fares must bear comparison with the perceived cost of motoring, i.e. what the commuter has himself to pay in running costs and parking charges arising directly out of his decision to drive to work. The highest possible standards of passenger convenience, reliability, comfort and safety must be provided. A particular factor in Manchester is weather protection-on average some rain falls on 17 days in each month. Lastly, these service improvements must be achieved in ways acceptable to the community; they must not be too expensive, they must not affect the urban environment too greatly, and they must be achieved without unreasonable restrictions on private motorists.

Other great cities faced with similar traffic problems to those of Manchester, have decided to modernise and extend existing rapid transit networks, or to build new systems, and have accepted the high cost involved. Such systems can provide services competitive with the private car. New systems opened in 1966 in Montreal, Oslo and Tbilisi, and new systems are opening in 1967 in Rotterdam and Baku. Other systems are under construction in San Francisco, Washington, Philadelphia, Kharkov, Frankfurton - Main, Cologne, Munich, Vienna and Prague. Numerous

others are being planned and almost all existing systems are extending their lines.

Table 2.2 gives a list of cities which have or are constructing rapid transit systems, and it can be seen that well over half these have a smaller population than the Manchester conurbation . Table 2.3 lists the cities which do not have a rapid transit system at the moment, but where studies are in progress. The fact that half the world's total rapid transit mileage has been constructed since the end of the second world war is very significant. It has been aptly said that a 'world rapid transit boom' is in progress.

Experience in London in recent years illustrates the enormous value of the immunity of a rapid transit system from traffic congestion. Table 2.4 below shows the traffic trends for London Transport bus and rail services: TABLE 2.4 TRAFFIC TRENDS- LONDON TRANSPORT Passengers Carried-Millions

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

Bus and Coach 2,522 2,485 2,430 2,252 2,132 1,978 Underground 675 668 673 674 637 667 It was against this background of a growing problem in Manchester, the general arguments in favour of rapid transit, and known developments in other cities, that the Manchester Rapid Transit Study was conceived.

2000

"'w ...J

1000

:e

A RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM

I-

"'g500 Q ,__~_._~_._~--'~~......_~-L-~-'-~~'--~-'-~-'-~--'~~-'-~-'-~--'-~~.L-~--'---~-'-~---''--~-'-~_J

1957

1958

1959

1960

19 61

1962

YEAR 2.8- Lost bus miles 路30

1963

1964

1965

1966

Sect ion t hree A Rapid T ransit System

3.1

THE CONSULTANTS

The comparative study of rapid transit systems and concepts was undertaken by De Leuw Cather and Partners, Consulting Engineers specialising in transportation, in association with Hennessey, Chadwick, 0 hEocha and Partners.

3.2

Limited, the licensees of the system in this country. In the Safege system illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, vehicles are suspended from a hollow concrete beam in which the rubber-tyred bogies are enclosed . The system is not in operation commercially, but its feasibility is demonstrated by a full scale prototype vehicle and elevated test track near Orleans in France.

TH E CONSULTANTS' TERMS OF RE FE RENCE

The following is an extract from the Consultants' terms of reference: 'The Consultants should assess the cost of building, operating and maintaining alternative forms of rapid transit systems along a route to be specified, and to provide a quality of service and to cater for traffic volumes also to be specified.

The forms of transport for study should include: (i) the Safege Monorail. (ii) an urban electric railway with a 4 ft.

St in. gauge.

3.3.2

An Urba n Railway

The urban railway consisting of flanged steel wheeled vehicles operating on steel rails is the most familiar form of rapid transit, and there are installations in at least 30 of the world's major cities (see Table 2.2). Many of these installations are very old (e.g. London's Metropolitan Line opened in 1863), but new lines are being built incorporating the latest technology in vehicle design and control systems.

Perhaps the most significant of these is the Bay Area Rapid Transit District system at San Francisco. An illustration of a modern Duorail carriage is shown in Figure 3.3.

(iii) a reserved track for buses (special ' busway') .

3.3.3

(iv) any other comparable systems for urban mass transport which, in the opinion of the Consultants, have reached a stage in development which justifies consideration of installation within the next five years.

The Working Party were concerned that more information should be obtained on the possible role of buses using an exclusive track. It has been argued in some theoretical studies* that buses on exclusive roadways could prove the most economical and efficient method of rapid transit for volumes of passengers up to 20,000 per hour. Further economies in the construction of a special road for buses might result from a guided system such as that proposed by Throughways Transport Ltd., and illustrated in Figure 3.4.

However, one of the most attractive features of the busway concept-that vehicles can leave the reserved track and distribute their passengers in residential areas- proved to be an obstacle to studying it in comparison with the other reserved track systems in the compass of this study. In order. however, that the Working Party might assess the main costs involved in constructing guided and unguided busways, the Consultants were requested to investigate the civil engineering costs of roads reserved for ordinary buses, as compared with the busway proposed for guided buses

by Throughways Transport Ltd. The results of this investigation are given in Table 3.1. Two possible lane widths are given and these delineate a range of possible cost advantages for the Throughways system from approximately 10% to approximately 20%.

The Consultants should undertake: (i) capital cost estimates for the whole route for each system investigated with sufficient breakdown to show the cost of representative sections. (ii) estimates of all costs of operation including traction power requirements, · manpower requirements, maintenance costs etc. for each system. (iii) an evaluation of the noise and light effects of each system'.

The Working Party required the work to be done within the limits of a budget of less than £40,000, and a time period of one year.

3.3

SYSTEM S STUDIED

A list of systems was compiled based on those known to the Working Party and the Consultants. To ensure that the list of systems was complete, announcements were placed in the international press requesting interested developers to submit details of their systems. Comments on some of the systems follow.

3.3.1

The Safege M onora il

This system was specified as it had already been studied in the Manchester context by Taylor Woodrow Construction

' Busways'

The Consultants also draw attention to some of the operating problems that the system would need to overcome. Examples are the possibility of delays on the ordinary road system interfering w ith schedules on the reserved track, and the difficulties of vehicles leaving stations merging with • For example •The Urban Transportation Problem' by Meyer, Kein and Wohl.

33

TABLE 3.1 COMPARATIVE COST OF SPECIAL B USWAYS ESTIMATES PER 1,000FT. ATIITUDE

THROUGHWAYS 9 ft. 8 in. w idth

UNGUIDED BUS ROADWAY 14 ft. width 11 ft. width (recommended minimum) (not recommended)

1,000 ft. of Tunnel (bunter sandstone, no faults or special ground water problems) on th e straight

£315,000

£416,000

£357,000

1,000 ft. of Cut and Cover

£302,000

£381,000

£339,000

1,000 ft. of Earthworks (Open cut, average depth 16 ft.)

£45,000

£57,000

£51,000

1,000 ft. of Elevated Structure, on 40 ft. piles.

(Average height from roadway surface 20 ft.)

£92,000

£112,000

£106,000

1 4

The Consultants recommend 14 ft. as th e minimum width for a high speed unguided bus. In practice 11 ft. lane widths have been used on motorways and might be acceptable in certain circumstan ces.

9

5 ~-- 2

7- - - -- ---

--~-.\~~~~~~,;;.;;~~~~~a

through vehicles. It is understood that the Road Research Laboratory and Throughways Transport Ltd .. are making a detailed operational study of the system. Further comments by the Working Party on reserved tracks for buses are contained in Sub -Section 4.4.4.

3.3.4

T he A lweg Monorai l

In this system (illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 3.6) trains run on paired wheels (like those on heavy road vehicles) along a narrow concrete beamway of near rectangular cross section and are kept upright and guided by horizontal wheels running against the sides of the beamway. There are several examples of the system in operation includ ing an

8 -mile line to Tokyo Airport which is in commercial service.

3.3.5

T he Westinghouse System ' Tr ansit Expr essway')

('Skybus'

or

In this system (illustrated in Figures 3.7 and 3.8) lightweight rubber-tyred cars, operating singly or in trains, run on two parallel concrete tracks and are steered by small horizontal wheels which bear on the sides of a steel rail running midway between the concrete tracks. The system is not in operation commercially, but its engineering feasibility has been demonstrated by a prototype installed at Pittsburgh.

A striking featu re of this installation is the fully automatic control- the vehicles have no driver.

2

3

•5

3.1-Safege prototype vehicle 34

Precosr co11crttt beomwoy

6

Running '"' foce Troe 1ton mot or , red uct.011 oeo r , 0 1ffere nt1ol.

Pne umo ti c domper a ond out omot1c te ve llono

7

Roll domper

8

High ten• •'• • tt• I to tety c oble

9

8ro 1te•

Gui de wheel M11nn1no wllee t

3.2- Safege beamway and vehicle suspension 35

3. 3- Duorai/, steef

wheel on steel rat!

3.5- Alweg train, Seattle

ALWEG T"'째.Qr Unit W11h 8ogfes

3.4- Guided Busway, standard buses with side guidance

36

3. 6-Alweg vehic'.e suggested for use m Manchester

3.3.6

Other Rapid Transit Systems

Many of the rapid transit systems investigated proved to be unsuitable for study because they had not been fully developed and/or no prototype existed. It would have been impossible to evaluate systems which had not been mechanically proved and for which no firm cost data cou ld be made available. Examples of systems rejected for this reason are the British 'Automatic Taxi Train' and the American 'Teletrans' which are made up of small personal vehicles automatically directed to their destination.

The only system rejected from the detailed study, although it is in full operation for rapid transit purposes, was that installed on some lines in the Paris Metro, and more recently in Montreal, consisting of rubber wheeled trains guided by lateral wheels. The bogie is in fact similar to the Safege bogie. The Consultants' conclusion was accepted that while this system offers no real advantage over steel wheeled trains, it would certainly cost more to build, more to operate because of the additional power requirements of rubber wheels, and more to maintain because of the complexity of the bogies. The system was therefore not studied in detail.

The Paris Authorities have recently decided to stop con verting lines in the Paris Metro to this system, in view of the difficulties of doing this while maintaining traffic, and instead to re-equip the remainder of the system with steel wheeled vehicles.

3.4

FINAL LIST FOR EVALUATION

Four systems therefore emerged from this initial appraisal as being worthy of further detailed study in regard to the route specified for Manchester, and lhtise were: Safege.

Urban electric railway (Duorail) .

Alweg.

Westinghouse.

3.5 3.5.1

The Study Corridor

For the purposes of the study a 16-mile route was defined from Manchester Airport (Ringway) in the south to Langley in the north. The route followed a corridor passing through or adjoining major traffic generators such as the Wythenshawe Estate (population 100,000), the University area, the city centre, the proposed redevelopment at Harpurhey, and the Manchester overspi ll estate at Langley (population 20,000).

In the absence of detailed survey information no firm figures for the traffic potential on this route were available.

However, from information available it was clear that: (a) passenger demand would diminish towards the ends of the route, and (b) at least 10,000, and possibly as many as 30,000, passengers per peak hour wou ld use the system in the centra l area.

The Consultants therefore produced costings for all four systems for assumed passenger loadings of 10,000, 20,000 and 30,000 passengers during the peak hour and also for comparison purposes abstracted the costs for a central section of some nine miles.

3.5.2

greater speeds. In dry conditions, rubber-tyred vehicles can climb steeper gradients than the maximum of 4% used in this study. In the Consultants' view there would be little economic advantage in using steeper gradients or tighter curves in Manchester. Steeper gradients would result in high rates of power consumption and brake wear and might create operating problems for the Alweg and Westinghouse systems whose running surfaces are exposed and could suffer from conditions arising from snow, ice or water.

THE ROUTE

_,...

3.5.3

Vertical A lignment

After a careful study of the environmental effects of the various systems (see Section 3.14) it was decided that the route used for systems evaluation should be made up as follows: TABLE 3.2 ATTITUDE CONS IDERED FOR SYSTEMS EVALUA TION

TYPE OF CO NSTRUCTION

Length in miles 5·0 5·7 1 ·6 2·5 1 ·3

Elevated Cut and cover Tunnel Open cut At ground level

16·1

TOTAL

G radi ents and Curves

For costing purposes, a detailed alignment had to be establ ished and the Consultants adopted standards for curvature and gradient considered reasonable in the light of experience and generally accepted as good practice in the transit field. These w ere:

3.8

Westinghouse vehicle and test track

Note. Safege varies slightly from the above as fol lows: Elevated structure, 5·5 miles; open cut, 3·3 miles; at ground level nil.

3.6

COSTS

(a) maximum gradients of 4% ; and

The Consultants have established for the 16-mile route:

(b) curves having a minimum radius of 600 ft.

(a)

The three bottom -supported systems have an equal ability to negotiate curves, but Safege can negotiate tight curves at

(b) the annual maintenance and operating costs. (c)

the capital cost. the total annual cost including debt charges,

and these are shown respectively on page 40 in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. It will be seen from the tables that the capital cost for Duorail (at 30,000 passengers per hour, £61,000,000) is lower than that of any other system. Duorail also has the lowest annual maintenance and operating costs, and the lowest total annual costs as shown graphically in Figure 3.9 on page 41 .

3.7

EFFECT OF REDUCING ROUTE LENGT H

The effects on costs of reducing the route length from sixteen to nine miles are shown below in Table 3.6, using Duorail as an example.

TABLE 3.6 COST COMPARISON-16-M ILE AND 9- M ILE ROUTE (Duorail- Design Capacity 30,000 passengers per hour)

Rolling Stock Fixed facilities and property

3. 7- Westinghouse vehicle and test track, Pittsburgh 38

Total capital cost Annual maintenance and operating cost

16-Mile Route

9-Mile Route

£6,700,000

£5,200,000

£54.400,000

£38,300,000

£61, 100,000

£43,500,000

£1,410,000

£760,000 39

£ 9' 000,000

TABLE 3.3

PER ANNUM

CA PITAL COST-16-M ILE RO UTE •WESTINGHOUSE

ALWEG

DUORAIL

SAFEGE

DESIGN CAPACITY 10,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Fixed faci lities Rolling stock Property

£46,800,000 £3,100,000 £7,600,000

£43,700,000 £2,300,000 £7,600,000

£54,300,000 £5,200,000 £7,800,000

£43,300,000 £3,900,000 £7,500,000

I: 7 '000,000

TOTAL

£57,500,000

£63,600,000

£67,300,000

£54,700.000

£ 6' 000,000

DESIGN CAPACITY 20,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Fixed facilities Rolling stock Property

£48,900,000 £6,000,000 £7,600,000

£45,500,000 £4,500,000 £7,600,000

£56,300,000 £10,200,000 £7,800,000

£45,500,000 £7,800,000 £7,500,000

£ 5, 000,000

TOTAL

£62,500,000

£57,600,000

£74,300,000

£60,800,000

£ 4 I QQQ,QQO

DESIGN CAPACITY 30,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Fixed faci lities Rolling stock Property

£50,300,000 £9,000,000 £7,600,000

£46,800,000 £6,700,000 £7,600,000

£58,000,000 £15,300.000 £7,800,000

£47,000,000 £11,700,000 £7,500,000

£ 3, 000,000

TOTAL

£66,900,000

£61, 100,000

£81,100,000

£66,200,000

£ 8' 000,000

DESIGN CAPACITY 10,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual costs

SAFEGE

£ 2, 000,000

£ I I 000,000

£810,000

£940,000

£1,280,000

£1.070,000

£1,480,000

£1.320,000

DESIGN CAPACITY 30,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual costs

£1,760,000

£1,410.000

£2,040,000

£1,800,000

__ .::;:::-::I

30,000

20,000

Passengers Peak Hour Capacity

3.9-Total Annual Cost (Operating, Mamtenance and Debt Charges) and Annual Maintenance and Operating Expense

WESTINGHOUS E

DESIGN CAPACITY 20,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual costs

Alweg Duorail Safege Westinghouse

~:::::: ----~-;;:::::::::::---

ANNUAL MAINTENAN CE $ OPERATING EXPENSE

10,000

£880,000

-

---.

----- ---~~::::::::::~~~-----1§::::::::::---------

0

3.8 £850,000

Legend - A D S W

__ _..

TABLE 3.4 A NNUA L M AIN T ENANCE AN D OPERATIN G COSTS 16- M ILE RO UTE DUORAIL

ANNUAL

COST

•A revised lower cost for rolling stock submitted by Brush, recently appointed licencees for the Westinghouse system, was received too late for consideration in this study. Rolling stock prices shown for this system are based on costs in the United States of America.

ALWEG

TOTAL

~

SPECIAL STUDY OF '2- M ILE' ELEVATED ROUTE

During the course of the Study, it was decided that further comparative study of the environmental impact and the construction costs of building the four rapid transit systems over a roadway was desirable. An additional study was undertaken of approximately 2 miles of elevated route over

a residential road in the outer suburbs adjacent to the route used for systems evaluation. The capital cost estimates for the '2-mile' study, i.e., 1.9 miles elevated, compared with the alignment of the equivalent portion of the '16-mile' study, i.e. 1.40 miles cut and cover and 0.50 miles elevated are shown in Table 3.7. The significance of this is discussed in 3.14.4.

TAB LE 3.7 COST ESTIMATES FO R '2-MILE' STU DY ( Actual Length - 1 ·90 mi les) TABLE 3.5 TOTA L ANN UAL COST- 16- M ILE ROU T E Annual Maintenance and Operating Cost plus Debt Charges at 6% per annum ALWEG

DUO RAIL

SAFEGE

ALWEG 16-Mile 2- Mile Route• Route' WESTINGHOUSE

DESIGN CAPACITY 10,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual maintenance and operating cost Annual debt charges

£850,000 £3,630,000

£810,000 £3,380,000

£940,000 £4,280,000

£880,000 £3.470,000

TOTAL

£4,480,000

£4,190,000

£5.220,000

£4,350,000

Civil Engineering• Services Stations Property TOTAL

£754,000 £134,000

£3,040,000 £252.000

DUORAIL 16- Mile 2-Mile Route• Route'

WESTINGHOUSE 2-Mile 16- Mile Route' Route'

£1,368.000

£2,849,000

£1, 149,000

£3,244,000

£1,038,000

£2,896,000

£134,000

£252,000

£134,000

£252,000

£134,000

£252,000

£630,000

£500,000

£630,000

£500,000

£630,000

£220,000

£258,000 4

£220,000

£291,000

£220,000

£4,346,000

£1.963,000

£630,000

£500,000

£291.000•

£220,000

£291,000

£1,679,000

£4,142,000

£2,293,000

£500,000

SAFEGE 16-Mile 2-Mile Route• Route'

4

£3,951,000

£2,041,000

4

£3.998,000

DESIGN CAPACITY 20,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual maintenance and operating cost Annual debt charges

£1,280,000 £4,000,000

£1,070,000 £3,670,000

£1,480,000 £4,800.000

£1,320,000 £3,920,000

TOTAL

£5,280,000

£4,740,000

£6.280,000

£5,240,000

DESIGN CAPACITY 30,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual maintenance and operating cost Annual debt charges

£1,760,000 £4,330,000

£1,410,000 £3,920,000

£2,040,000 £5,310,000

£1,800,000 £4.330,000

3. (a) Civil engineering includes road reconstruction, traffic diversions, etc. (b) Civil engineering costs do not include: (a) an allowance for contingencies (b) engineering design and supervision (c) signals (d) crossovers (e) wayside power equipment (f) allowance for 'undertrays' for Safege.

TOTAL

£6,090,000

£5,330,000

£7,350,000

£6,130,000

4. Property costs do not include the purchase for environmental reasons of abutting property along the '2-mile route'. The acquisition of all property within 150 ft. of the structure (see Sub-Section 3.14.4) would add costs of approximately £500,000.

40

NOTES : 1. The total length of the '2-Mile route' is elevated.

2. The '16-mile route' consists of 1 ·40 miles cut and cover and 0·50 miles elevated.

41

3.9

CIVIL ENGINEERING COSTS

The estimates of cost for the supporting way are based on commonly accepted construction techniques and materials.

The work was divided into over 60 items, for which a specification was prepared and unit prices developed, making use of rates tendered for similar works from various contracts in Lancashire. No soil borings were taken, and the types of foundation necessary were based on an analysis of available soils and geological data along the route. The prices were current in May 1967.

Westinghouse has the lowest cost for supporting way, though the Consultants point out that on elevated sections the low structural costs for Westinghouse are not inherent to the system but result from a choice of small vehicles with low axle loading which could be applied to other systems. On elevated sections Alweg is the cheapest to construct, but suffers from requiring a relatively large diameter tunnel for the central section. Safege has the most expensive supporting way costs.

In all three rubber-tyred systems the cost of switches is an important element, and the need to continue the beamways into yards and shops makes these items substantially more expensive than for duorail.

3.10

on the known costs of existing systems, but costs for other systems can only be estimated. In the Consultants' view the cost of operation of the rubber-tyred systems would be significantly higher than for duorail, mainly because of:

be taken as a broad interpretation of the Consultants' findings ; detailed figures and a description of the methods used in taking measurements are contained in the Consultants' report.

(a)

These are the broad conclusions concerning the systems considered for Manchester:

the complication of the switches, and the resulting high maintenance costs,

(b) the maintenance of bog ies, including tyre replacement. (c) higher power costs for rubber tyres due to increased rolling resistance.

3.12

STATIONS

The Consultants' estimates include almost £10,000,000 for twenty stations on the route. The estimates are based on attractive and function al ly appropriate designs of varying complexity according to their location-the costs of individual stations range from £300,000 to £1,000,000. The Consultants point out that careful study would be required to establish the precise location of each station, to provide the best access both for pedestrians and road vehicles, and a layout of maximum convenience to passengers. Some stations 4ould be integrated with developments such as shopping and offices.

ROLLING STOCK

Passenger comfort in terms of seating arrangements, noise levels within the vehicle, interior finish, ventilation and heating can be made of equal quality for all systems, and good, but not luxurious standards, hav~ b~en assumed.

Brakes and motors for all systems are assumed to give rates of acceleration and deceleration of three miles per hour per second. The much greater rates possible with rubbertyred systems would not be feasible in practice where standing passengers have to be carried.

The differences in cost of rolllng stock arise because of fundamental features of the bogies and guidance arrangements. Steel bogies are simpler and can carry more weight than rubber tyres, and the rail car used for this evaluation is 70 ft. x 10 ft. (that is a similar width to London Transport's District and Metropolitan stock, though considerably longer), while the rubber-tyred systems all have smaller, and thus less economical cars. Safege has an inherent cost disadvantage in that both top and bottom of the vehicle have to be built to load bearing strength, whereas the roof of a bottom-supported vehicle is required only for protection against the weather.

The vehicle cost per passenger was : ALWEG

DUO RAIL

SAFEGE

£194

£143

£324

WESTINGHOUSE £246

*

3.13

QUALITY OF ESTIMATES

The Consultants' estimates cover all aspects of the construction of the system, and a 15% contingency item has been included. The Working Party consider that the estimates are realistic (at 1967 prices) and that unless exceptional difficulties in sub-soil conditions were encountered (no bore holes have been taken), the estimates would not be exceeded.

3.14

3 .14.1

UNDERGROUND OR OVERHEAD ? TH E ENVIRONMENTA L PROBLEM Introd uction

The cost figures given in the preceding paragraphs relate to a route of which 7.3 miles are underground, 1.3 miles are at ground level, 5 miles are elevated and 2.5 miles are in cutting. This vertical alignment was decided on after a careful study of the environmental effects of the various systems. A rapid transit system, other than underground, could be objectionable to people living and working in its area for a great number of reasons, but examination showed that the noise of passing trains and the visual intrusion of the structure were by far the most important.

•see footnote to table 3.3

3.14.2

3.11

OPERATING COSTS

There are many elements common to all systems (or with only minor variations) such as the cost of operating staff, and station maintenance. Costs for duorail can be established 42

(a)

Noise

The Consultants organised a number of noise measurements at varying distances from existing installations- the Safege test track, the Alweg test track, the Toronto Subway (built within the last ten years} , London Transport's Bakerloo and Metropolitan lines and British Rail's suburban lines.

It is difficult to describe noise, and the following can only

All the systems are noisy when trains are travelli ng at ground level or on elevated structure at speed, although from nearby the maximum noise made is somewhat less than that experienced at the side of a heavily trafficked urban road.

(b) The rubber-tyred systems are only slightly quieter, if at all, than a steel on steel system. (c)

There are very substantial noise reductions to be achieved both by noise shielding on the trains, and through arrangements such as barriers or cuttings.

(d) Noise only becomes of critical importance when a system is to be run above a residential road, or adjacent to residential property.

3.14.3

Visual Intrusion

To help the Working Party assess the impact of the structures on urban environment, the Manchester City Planning Department made models and montage photographs (see Figures 3.10 and 3.11 ) of the various elevated systems set against typical urban backgrounds. The Working Party also inspected the route and attempted to visualise the effects of the structures in situ over the road adjacent to it.

Photographs and films of monorail systems, and of sections of elevated railway on the Stockholm and Rotterdam systems, were examined. The following conclusions were reached: (a) The structural characteristics of the various systems are not so different that one would be acceptable where another was not. In so far as there is any significant difference the Safege structure, which is some 15 ft. taller than the others. seems most obtrusive, and the Alweg system the least obtrusive. Architectural treatment and quality of construction are far more important factors than the inherent shape of the structure associated with each system. (b) All the systems require a structure which is massive when compared with ordinary housing of two to four storeys, and there wou ld be a severe loss in the amenities of frontagers and others if such a structure was to be built alongside or over a residential road.

3.14.4

General Conclusions o n Environment

For reasons of noise and visual intrusion the Working Party do not think it would be acceptable for an elevated system to be built along residential roads or within 150 ft. of residential property (though where re-development is taking place the opportunities for special architectural treatment and sound insu lation might allow this distance to be reduced}. It is thought that a reduction in this standard could only be justified by very severe physical or financial difficulties in adopting any alternative. Generally speaking, as the Consu ltants' cost estimates show, building cut-and-

cover rather than elevated roughly doubles the supporting way cost, and it is considered that this is a reasonable price to pay for the preservation of existing amenity and flexi bility in the future development of the area through which the system runs. In practice, a detailed examination would be needed of every section of a proposed route to get the optimum compromise between economy and environment.

The results of the two- mile study (see Sub-Section 3.8) suggest that in outer suburban areas where property and land values are relatively low the acquisition of a swathe of land broad enough to build and landscape an overhead structure might prove the best solution.

The Working Party are convinced. however, that: (a)

the City would not tolerate overhead structures in the central area, and

(b) an elevated structure in inner residential suburbs could only be contemplated as part of a large scale redevelopment or by making use of the central reservation in a radial motorway. However, the practical difficulties of planning the development of a system in the inner suburbs of an existing City so as to phase in with the highway and redevelopment programme are probably too great to make this a real possibility.

These are basically the reasons which lie behind the choice of vertical alignment shown in Table 3.2, for the 16-mile route used for systems evaluation. In the Consultants' view the proportion of underground, ground level and elevated construction reflect desirable standards for a transit line through the study corridor and accord with decisions taken by other cities with comparable densities and property values.

3.15

FINAL CHOICE OF SYSTEM FOR MANCHESTER

The Consultants recommended that a steel wheel on steel rail duorail system be adopted for rapid transit in Manchester.

This system would have a lower capital cost and would have similar, if not lower, operating costs than the Alweg, Safege and Westinghouse systems. The duorail system would equal the other systems in terms of vehicle performance and passenger comfort. It has the additiona l advantages of being thoroughly tested and proved. Duorail would be compatible with the existing British Railways commuter network serving Manchester, should joint use of tracks prove advantageous. The duorail structure appears to lend itself to adaptability in conversion to likely new concepts in the rapid transit industry. Modern duorail vehicles and well designed elevated or ground level structu res would be as acceptable in the community in terms of disturbance and visual intrusion as any of the other systems considered. A further advantage of the duorail system is that the source of supply of vehicles and parts, track fittings and structural members is not restricted to a limited number of licensees.

These factors are summarised in Table 3.8 on page 46.

The Working Party fully endorse the Consultants' recommendation.

43

ALWEG

ALWEG

ALWEG

ALWEG

DUORAIL

DUORAIL

DUO RAIL

SAFEGE

SAFEGE

WESTINGHOUSE

WESTINGHOUSE

100 FEET

150 FEET

WESTINGHOUSE

44

25 FEET

50 FEET

3.10- Photo-montage comparing visual impact in a low density residential area (structures seen at 25 feet and 50 feet)

46

3.11-Photo montage comparing visual impact in a low density residential area (structures seen at 100 feet and 150 feet)

TAB LE 3路8 COMPAR ISON OF SYSTEMS ITEM

ALWEG

DUO RAIL

SAFEGE

WESTINGHOUSE

Development status

In operation at 5 locations

In widespread use

One test track and vehic le

One test track three vehicles

Safety

Acceptable

Acceptable

Acceptabl e

Acceptable

Reliability and operating experience

Limited to 5 locations

Fully known and understood

Limited to test track

Limited to test track

Switching device

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Compatibility with present railway systems

Not compatible

Fully compatible

Not compatible

Not compatible

Prospects for adaptability to future concepts

Fair

Excellent

Poor

Good

Testing required

Vehicles only

None or minor vehic le testing

Extensive for track and vehicles

Extensive for track and vehicles

Environmental effectselevated or in open

Acceptable depending on location

Acceptable depending on location

Acceptable depending on location

Acceptable depending on location

Maintenance and operation

Costs and techniques not well known

Costs and techniques well known

Costs and techniques not well known

Costs and techniques not well known

Ability to handle capacity above 30,000 passengers per hour

Good

Greatest

Good

Limited

Source of supply

Limited to Licensees

No restriction

Limited to Licensees

Limited to Licensees

Vehicle costs

Fairly high

Lowest

Highest

High

Capital cost property and fixed facilities

Fairly low

Lowest

Highest

Lowest

Annual operating expense

Low

Lowest

Highest

Low

THE POTENTIAL OF THE EXISTING PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM 46

Section four The Potential of the Existing Public Transport System

4.1 STUDIES COMMISSIO N ED

Manchester and make the Altrincham, Styal and Bury lines the most promising in terms of future traffic.

As described in Section 2 the existing public transport system, in so far as it serves the central area of Manchester, consists of:

Historically these railway lines formed part of different systems and are differently equipped:

(a)

Altrincham line

1500 volt DC overhead.

Styal line

25 kilovolt AC overhead.

Bury line

1200 volt DC third rail.

(b) buses operating on an intensive network of roads which are becoming increasingly congested.

Rochdale line

Diesel Multiple Unit.

The Working Party commissioned various studies designed to see what scope there was for radical improvement to the system. These studies were:

4.2.1 Sc hemes for Improvem ent

suburban rail services on lines serving Knott Mill, Oxford Road, Victoria, Exchange and Piccadilly stations, and Central station which is shortly to be closed, and

Improvements to the suburban rail services were examined

by British Railways under three headings:

(i) an examination of the four suburban railway lines on the north/ south axis through Manchester;

Scheme 1.

Intensification of services within the limits of the present signalling and terminal capacities.

(ii) an investigation on the four suburban rail lines in question of the potential for feeder bus services, interchange and parking facilities and residential development in and around the stations;

Scheme 2.

Improvement of the signalling systems and lengthening of platforms to permit higher density services with longer trains.

Scheme 3.

As Scheme 2 plus the construction of an

(iii) consideration of whether traffic management measures could be used to give priority to buses, and of the potential of reserved tracks for buses; and (iv) an examination of traffic and parking in central Manchester to see what influence parking policy might have on peak traffic conditions and thus on the reliability of bus services.

4.2

POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO TH E SUBURBAN RAIL SYSTEM

The study of possible improvements carried out by British Railways related to the following four suburban railway lines: Altrincham- Manchester Oxford Road serving nine intermediate stations Wilmslow-Styal- Manchester Oxford Road serving seven intermediate stations

8 miles 12

Bury- Prestwich-Manchester Victoria serving eight intermediate stations Rochdale- Castleton- Manchester Victoria serving two intermediate stations.

1Ot,,

Collectively these four lines carry 36% of rail passenger traffic to the central area between 8-00 a.m. and 9 -30 a.m., the Altrincham line being the busiest.

Land use trends indicate a potential growth of commuter traffic from north-east Cheshire and the areas north of

underground rail link between Oxford Road and Victoria stations, so as to allow throughrunning between Bury and Altrincham, with an underground station in the heart of the City.

4.2.2

Sc h eme 1

The requirements for this upgrading by intensification of services would be limited to the provision of additional rolling stock. It would not be possible to increase the peak hour passenger carrying capacity of the Altrincham line on this basis because of the limitations imposed by the track, platform and signalling arrangements at Oxford Road station.

On the other three lines the additional peak hour passenger carrying capacities would be: Styal line

4718

Bury line

2083

Rochdale line

5537

The approximate cost of these improvements on a mileage basis would be:

Styal line Bury line Rochdale line

Capital cost per mile

Additional annual cost per mile including debt charges at 6% p.a.

£103,000 £ 52,000 £ 90,000

£15,000 £ 8,000 £19,000 49

4.2.3

Sch em e 2

4.2.4

(a) This scheme would involve platform lengthening; some track alterations; installation of additional signalling; conversion of the Altrincham line to a 25 kilovolt AC overhead traction system and the provision of additional rolling stock to permit the operation of more intensive services of longer trains.

(c) The additional peak hour passenger carrying capacities of the four lines would be: Altrincham line

5,338

Styal line

9,161

Bury line

9,374

Rochdale line

8,277

The underground link would connect with the Altrincham line east of Old Trafford station and proceed to join the Bury line at Collyhurst tunnel. The total length of the new line would be 3.46 miles.

Stations would be constructed on the new underground railway adjacent to the present Oxford Road and Victoria stations and in A lbert Square. Direct access would be provided between the existing high level Oxford Road and Victoria stations and the new underground stations by escalators. (b) Construction of t his tunnel would permit the operation of through train services between Altrincham and Bury with direct access to the city centre.

To meet these requirements a total of 376 new vehicles would be needed.

The approximate cost of t hese improvements on a mileage basis would be: Capital cost per mile

Additional annual cost per mile including debt charges at 6% p.a.

£338,000

£42,000

Bury line

£390,000

£49,000

Rochdale line

£133,000

£28,000

Altrincham line } Styal line

4.2.5

(a) This scheme would embrace the works outlined in Scheme 2, with the addition of a tunnel connecting the Altrincham and Bury lines, with an underg round station in Albert Square (li nk A on Figure 4.1 ), see page 57.

(b) The assessment of the possible train services has taken into account the proposed closure of Manchester Central station and the consequent diversion of all trains to Piccadilly and Oxford Road stations.

The pattern of the train services at the peak hours would be 12 trains per hour between Altrincham and Wilmslow via Styal; 12 trains per hour between Bury and Manchester Victoria and 10 trains per hour between Rochdale and Manchester Victoria.

Sch eme 3

It would be possible to operate at least 24 trains an hour between Altrincham and Manchester with a carrying capacity of over 23,000 passengers. A similar number of trains could be operated between Bury and Manchester.

Journey times to Albert Square would be of the order of 22 minutes from Altrincham and 26 minutes from Bury.

The total carrying capacities of the services possible are shown below in table 4.1 : On a mi leage basis the approximate cost would be: Capital cost per mile

Line AltrinchamWilmslow via Styal and Altrincham- Bury Rochdale

Additional annual cost per mile including debt charges at 6% p.a.

Ro lli ng Stock

New rolling stock would be provided, with power controlled sliding doors, automatic safety train stopping device, automatic coupling and uncoupling between each four -car set, a maximum speed of about 50 mph and an acceleration rate of not less than 1.5 mph per second.

4. 2.6

...

The British Railways Board has under consideration conversion of the Altrincham line traction power supply from 1500 volts DC to 25 KV AC, which would permit through running between Altrincham and Wilmslow via Oxford Road and Piccadilly stations. As this alteration, which would be consistent with the proposed underground link, has not yet been authorised (August 1967) the ful l cost has been included in the estimates for Scheme 2 and Scheme 3.

4.2 .7

Estimat es o f Cost

British Railways have prepared approximate estimates of cost for the three schemes and these are shown in Table 4.2, w hich includes also the estimated passenger carrying capacities per hour.

4.2.8

Two alternative ways of linking the Altrincham line to the Bury line appear feasible (links B and Con Figure 4.1 ). (a)

4.V

v

Alternative Rout es for Tunnel

FEEDE R BUS SERVI CES AND STATION IMPROVEMENTS

The suggested improvements to the railway system would be more effective if combined with improvements in access to suburban railway stations, and other steps to increase the potential passenger demand, as follows: (a)

Link B could pass via the residential area to be bui lt at Hulme, with a station at that point. This extension which would involve the construction of approximately 0.36 miles of twin tunnel and an additional

Properly designed bus feeder services serving the outer stations. Station approaches modified so that bus passengers can conveniently transfer to rail, and cars conveniently deliver and collect passengers ('kiss and ride').

TA BLE 4.2

£871,000 £133,000

£92,000 £28,000

COST ESTIM AT ES- RA ILWAY IM PROVEM ENTS

LINE TRAIN CAPACITIES per hour Seated and Seated and Standing Standing•

Present max. peak hr. capacity (Seating/ standing ratio 5 :2)

LINE

No. of Trains

Seated

Altrincham to Oxford Road. Piccadilly and via Styal to Wilmslow

12

5,760

11,520

17,088

Altrincham to 6,182 Oxford Rd.

Oxford Road and Altrincham

12

5,760

11,520

17,088

Wilmslow to Oxford Rd.

Altrincham to Oxford Road, Albert Square and Bury

12

5,760

11,520

17,088

Bury to Albert Square, Oxford Road and Altrincham

12

5.760

11.520

17,088

Bury to Albert Square and Oxford Road

12

5,760

11 ,520

17,088

Oxford Road and Albert Square to Bury

12

5,760

11,520

17,088

Wilmslow via Styal to Piccadilly,

=23.040

34,176

Bury-Manchester

= 23,040

34,176

Wilmslow- Styal- Manchester

= 11,520

17,088

•The seated and standing figures in the end column are based on 2·75 standing to 1 seated passenger with space allowance as used in the Consultants" Scheme for a rapid transit line between Ringway Airport and Langley and are quoted for comparative purposes.

50

(b) The University is expected to become a major traffic generator, with an estimated day time population of 43,500 by 1984. The construction of the tunnel on the second alternative route, Li nk C, would provide a service for the Ayres Road area, the Moss Side District Centre and the University. This extension, which would involve the construction of approximately 1.58 miles of twin tunnel and three additional stations, would increase the capital expenditure by approximately £7,400,000, and the annual cost by £200,000, bringing the total cost of the scheme to £37,300,000, annual cost £3,500,000. This diversion would add approximately five minutes to the total journey time between Altrincham and Albert Square.

British Railways have concluded that a 25 kilovolt AC overhead traction system is preferable for the underground railway and the proposals have been costed on this basis.

CA RRYI NG CA PACITIES-SC H EM E 3

Peak carrying capacity Altrincham- Manchester

The diversion via Hulme would add no more tha n two minutes to the total journey time between Altrincham and Albert Square.

Tractio n Syst em

TA B LE 4.1

NOTE:

station would increase the capital expenditure by approximately £1,800,000 at an annual cost of £50,000, bringing the total capital cost of the scheme to £31,700,000, annual cost £3,350,000.

Additional peak hour capacity (Seating/ standing ratio 5 :2)

SCHEME 1 Additional Additional working capital outlay costs per annum

Additional peak hour capacity (Seating/ standing ratio 5 :2)

SCHEME 2 Additional Additional capital working outlay costs per annum

5,338}

Additional peak hour capacity (Seating/ standing ratio 1 :1)

16,858

Nil

Nil

Nil

2,359

4,718

£1,200,000

£200,000

9,161

Bury to Victoria

3,125

2,083

£500,000

£100,000

9,374

£3,800,000

£500.000 19,915

Rochdale to Victoria

1,435

5,537

£1,000,000

£200,000

8,277

£1.400,000

£300,000

13,101

12,338

£2,700,000

£500,000

32,150

TOTAL

SCHEME 3 Additional Additional capital working outlay costs

£6,800,000

£800,000 9,161

8.277(A)

£12,000,000 £1,600,000 54,211

£28,500,000 £3,000,000

£1.400,000

£300,000

£29,900,000 £3,300,000

(A) Seating/standing ratio 5 :2 NOTE : If on the Altrincham, Wilmslow and Bury lines the new stock was designed to permit a seating/standing ratio of 1 :2·75 the additional peak hour capacities would be increased by 11,136, 11,136 and 5,568 respectively.

51

TA BLE 4.3 SURVEY O F AL RINCHAM LINE

FEEDER BUSES STATION

MILES FROM OXFORD RD. STATION

MINUTES FROM OXFORD RD. DESCRIPTION OF AREA AROUND STATION STATION

TOTAL POPULATION WITHIN ii- MILE

.

TOTAL POPULATION WITHIN 1t MILES

PARKING SPACES AT STATION*

No. OF SERVICES

CO NGESTION NEAR STATION

No. OF BUSES MO RNING PEAK HOUR

REMARKS

.,

ALTRINCHAM

NAVIGATION ROAD

8

20

Sub-regional centre. Bus Station near.

Large railway yard.

3,000

26,000

7!

19

Largely residential. Some open space.

Current development at station.

5,000

5,000

18

Low density residential. Current housing development opposite station.

3,000

26,000

15

Neighbourhood centre. Low density housing.

4,000

22,000

30

14

District centre. Low density housing.

Redevelopment of shopping centre. Large railway coal yard.

3,000

8,000

10

12

On fringe of green belt. Mainly low density housing. Some industry.

2.000

32.000

10

District centre. Mixed density housing.

Redevelopment of shopping centre. Large railway goods yard.

5,000

31,000

TIM PERLEY

BROOKLANDS

6

SALE

DANE ROAD

4f

STRETFORD

WARWICK ROAD

2t

7

M ainly industry and open space.

Some low density housing.

1,000

12,000

OLD TRAFFORD

2

5

Mainly industry, shops and public buildings.

Poor quality housing. Large railway yard.

3.000

36,000

29,000

198,000

TOTAL

Severe

Bus Station adjacent to Railway Station.

3

Heavy {l evel crossing)

Bus stop 100 yards from station.

3

None

Bus stop 25 yards from station.

2

7

Severe

Bus stop 100 yards from station.

6

27

Severe

Bus stop outside station entrance.

Light

Bus stop 600 yards from station.

8

Severe

Bus stop 25 yards from station.

4

None

Bus stop 500 yards from station.

Severe

Bus stop 25 yards from station.

Frequent

70

Nil

15

*Typical all -day parking charges: 1 /6d.

as a 'feeder bus', 'kiss and ride', or 'park and ride' terminal, and/or as a centre of high density residential development, or should provide a combination of these facilities; if this cannot be achieved the station should be closed and possibly re-built in another suitable location.

(b) Adequate car parking at outer stations, at low or nominal charges, for those who wish to 'park and ride'. (c)

In the long term the exploitation of the potential of undeveloped land adjacent to certain stations by high density residential development within 5 minutes' walk.

(d) The discontinuance of the competitive trunk bus services.

A survey of each station on the four suburban lines was carried out to establish the potential for improvements (a), (b) and (c) above, and large variations were found. The Rochdale line was found unsatisfactory for the immediate development of rail rapid transit services because of the small number of people living in the station catchment areas and travelling to Manchester. The Altrincham, Styal and Bury lines had scope for substantial improvements.

As an illustration, Table 4.3 summarises the present position at stations on the Altrincham line.

The general conclusions of the station survey were: (a) The lines could be made effective and attractive commuter lines by a comprehensive policy for the intensification of services and the development of individual stations. Each station should be developed

52

(b) In deciding the future role of a station it would be essential to consider total travel time for journeys to the city centre. Feeder bus services and ' park and ride' facilities would be attractive to people living some distance from outlying stations, but with stations nearer the centre it would usual ly be better to con centrate on residential development within easy walking distance. Any possibility of improvements to stations would have to be considered in the light of the physical relationship of each particular station with the road system, and the number of existing or potential city centre workers in its catchment area. (c)

There would be no technical or operational difficylties in changing bus and rail fares, and altering bus services so as to make the rail alternative competitive in time and cost with the comparable through bus or car journey for many commuters. There would, however, be severe financial and organisational difficulties in

doing this in advance of the establishment of a Passenger Transport Authority for the Greater M anchester area. (d) Within modest term in parking 4.4

the present organisational framework, some improvements might be made in the short access to stations and in the provision of car space.

TRAFFIC MANAGEM ENT AND BU S OPERATION

Generally speaki ng the improvement of bus services is something for which individual bus operators must take responsibility ; much can be and is being done through more careful planning of services. improvements in vehicles, and measures- such as the adoption of one- man operationto reduce costs.

In this study, however, the Working Party has confined itself to consideration of the effect of road cond itions on bus services and the measures that might be taken to improve those conditions. On the radials to the central area, whatever improvements the operator attempts to introduce are likely to be insignificant in comparison with the effect of worsening traffic conditions. The Working Party has

therefore examined four ways in which buses might be given priority over other traffic. These are: (a)

general traffic management measures, such as one way systems,

(b) reserved lanes along existing radial roads, (c) exclusive bus lanes on new roads, and (d) the construction of special reserved tracks for buses off the normal highway.

4 .4.1

Convent ion al Traffi c M anagement M easures

Traffic management schemes designed to improve the flow in general traffic, such as one-way systems, often do result in better bus speeds, especially for express services, but buses do not benefit as much as other traffic because : (a) tidal flow schemes and linked traffic signals are designed to enable the smooth flow of traffic along a route without the need to be constantly halted at junctions. The local bus cannot take full advantage of this since it has to stop in between junctions to load and off load. This wi ll usually put it out of phase with the main traffic flow. Limited stop and express services benefit where not required to stop.

53

(b) one-way systems often divert buses away from major loading points. Again this applies mainly to local services and will not affect services not requiring to stop in the particular area. (c) the introduction of a one-way system over any appreciable area may increase route mileage for buses.

There may be opportunities to use conventional techniques of traffic management to give buses priority in particular places, e.g., against a one-way flow in a busy shopping street, but the Working Party do not believe that the spread of conventional traffic management schemes can provide any radical sustained improvement to bus services. In terms of the relative attractiveness of public and private transport, it is probably true to say that traffic management schemes tip the balance in favour of private transport. The Working Party believe, therefore, that it is all the more important that traffic management should be used to help public transport wherever this can be done.

4 .4 .2

Bus Lanes Along Existing M ain Radial Road s

Reservation for buses at peak hours of part of the carriageway of substantial lengths of the existing main radials would obviously give buses considerable advantage; but study has shown the existence of serious problems : (a) To avoid interference with other traffic, at least 5 lanes of carriageway would be needed, and even so the operation would need to be 'tidal'. If local and express services were to operate on the same route, bus bays, most desirable in any case, would become essential. Land would need to be acquired for any necessary road widening .

4.4.3

Exclusi ve Bus Lanes o n New Roads

A completely new system of high capacity roads, built to urban motorway or near motorway standards, would offer a means of providing a reserved bus lane system. However, the programme of motorway construction in the SELNEC Area, particularly in the heavily built-up urban areas of the conurbation, would mean that it would be many years before such a reserved bus lane system could be implemented .

Exclusive bus lanes in urban motorways should be considered for other than local services : (a) whenever a new motorway is being planned. (b) wherever bus lanes can be provided without excessive cost of land acquisition. (c)

whenever passenger demand does not warrant high capacity rapld transit.

4 .4 .4

(d) No physical separation of the reserved lane from the rest of the carriageway is possible, if the lane is to be made available to other traffic outside the peak. The reservation of the lane may be difficult to enforce where motorists see a relatively empty space beside them which they would be allowed to use if they were about to turn at the next junction. (e)

Another alternative would be the construction of special reserved tracks for buses off the normal highway. Unit costs of busways have already been given in Table 3.1 .

Applying these to the Consultants' profile used for the Ringway-Langley route, it was possible to make an approximate comparison between the cost of building various widths of busway and the cost of a duorail system along the same alignment. The total track and structure costs are given in Table 4.4 below: TABLE 4.4 COMPARATIVE COSTS-BUSWAYS AND DUORAIL

SYSTEM

Duorail Unguided (14 ft. single track)

COST OF DOUBLE TRACK AND STRUCTURE ONLY 16-Mile Route 9-Mile Route Ringway to Barlow Moor Langley Road to Victoria Avenue

ÂŁ

ÂŁ

28,000,000

19,000,000

36,000,000

25,000,000

(a)

It would not affect those passengers who either walked or drove by car to the reserved track station or who could not be provided with a through service for practical reasons due to limited demand . Indications in other cities with Rapid Transit are that increasing proportions of rapid transit journeys start as a journey by car from home to station.

(b) To provide the maximum number of passengers with the benefit of a through journey from home to city centre without transfer, buses would require to feed otf the reserved track at frequent intervals and provide a close mesh of residential services. The provision of the many spur roads on and off the reserved track which this would entail would be expensive and space consuming, especially when they joined the reserved track in an underground or elevated position. An attractive frequency of service to a great number of residential terminals would be difficult to justify. (c)

The benefit of a through journey would not in any case accrue to a passenger wishing to alight at a reserved track station further out from the city than the point where his particu lar bus service joined the reserved track.

The disadvantages of the busway system may be summarised as: (a) The cost of tracks and structure for a bus rapid transit system is at least equal to that for duorail.

Unguided (1 1 ft. single track)

31,000,000

21,000,000

Throughways (9 ft . 8 in. single track)

(b) The cost of stations with links to the highway system, and bays for waiting vehicles, is likely to be higher than for duorail.

28,000,000

19,000,000

(c) There are problems in ventilating underground sections.

Reservation of the centre or offside lane would involve expensive measures of passenger handling (subways, platforms, etc.) at each stop.

It should be noted that the Consultants recommended a 14 ft . track as being the minimum width for unguided buses travelling on a single lane at high speeds.

In general. the existing radial roads to central Manchester are, at best, four lane highways and are intersected at frequent intervals by busy cross traffic. The Working Party do not think that a long and continuously separated bus lane could be a practical possibil ity in the near future. While exemptions from banned turns and the provision of short lengths of 'bus only' road would be valuable to the efficient operation of the buses, they would not achieve a major change in the balance of advantage between the bus and the private car.

It is clear from the above table that although the costs are approximate, In order for a busway structure to be competitive with the cost for duorail it must be reduced to the minimum possible width only achievable by a guidance system. The guided bus system proposed by Throughways Transport is in a preliminary stage of development and is under examination by the Road Research Laboratory. It thus was not sufficiently advanced in development to fall within the criteria for full consideration in this Study.

54

The most important advantage of the bus system would be its ability to run off the reserved track and carry out its own residential distribution without the necessity for passengers to change vehicles. This advantage may not be of major significance when compared with a well designed trunk line system providing co-ordinated feeder schedules and well designed facilities to eliminate annoying waiting and physical discomfort. In any case the advantage would accrue to only a proportion of the passengers as outlined below:

Reserved Tracks for B uses

(b) Delays at junctions could only be overcome by extensive changes in intersection layout and control.

The position of turning bays would often involve the purchase of expensive property. (c) Where inner or offside lanes are given to exclusive use by buses, turning traffic must be allowed to use the restricted lane prior to the junction. This involves lane switching which may be dangerous.

Nevertheless, assuming that a guided bus system could eventually be perfected, the Working Party gave broad consideration to the advantages and disadvantages of a bus rapid transit system operating partly in reserved track and partly on the normal street system.

system which does not operate completely on reserved track. (f)

There is a low upper limit to the number of passengers per hour which could be carried on a reserved busway.

Preliminary investigations indicate that this is about half the number which can be carried by a modern duorail system if all stops are served. World experience indicates that the building of a rapid transit line often results in substantial urban development along the line. Against this background, the heavy capital investment to build a rapid transit system with a limited capacity would not appear to be justified.

4 .5

RESTRAINT OF TRA FFIC AT PEAK PERIODSPARKING POLICY

4 .5.1

General

Finally the Working Party has considered to what extent the problems of bus operation might be alleviated, and a better public transport service provided, through a policy of restraining private car traffic at peak hours. The main justification of restraint on peak hour commuting is that. as compared with the bus, the car represents a very uneconomical use of road space, and bus passengersthe great majority-are being unduly inconvenienced by a relatively small minority of people who are travelling to the city centre by private car at the peak hour. General arguments justifying some restraint of private car traffic are given in a report recently published by the Ministry of Transport. entitled 'Better Use of Town Roads'. and in this report it is shown that for Central London over half the benefits of a system of restraint would be in the form of savings in time to bus passengers.

The possible contribution of a policy of restraint will depend on the relationship between the quality of bus services and the amount of traffic on the road, and the practicability of measures to reduce the volume of traffic to that which allows tolerable bus operations. Although there Is no measure of congestion as such, the records of lost miles of Manchester City Transport (see Figure 2.8) show: (a)

that congestion has been a growing problem for bus operation since 1957, and

(b) that seasonal variation in the Manchester area is such that in August, even at the present time, conditions are tolerable.

(d) The crew costs of a bus system are considerably higher than those for a rail system because of the necessity of providing a bus driver for say every 60 passengers, compared with a train crew of one or two for 1,000 passengers.

To achieve tolerable conditions all the year round would require a very large reduction of traffic, not as far as 1957 volumes, because capacity has been slightly increased by traffic management schemes and road improvements since that date. But restraint of the order required to get back to even 1960 volumes of traffic could certainly not be achieved by any techniques available at the present time.

(e) A reliable and close frequency of services on the main line, which is one of the most attractive features of any rapid transit system, would be affected by any traffic congestion on the non-reserved track portion of the journey. The Working Party are of the opinion that the high standard of reliability which the travelling public will demand of any new rapid transit system is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future by any

Some reduction in present volumes of traffic could, however, be achieved through a parking policy directed at giving priority to the short period parker, business caller or shopper at the expense of the car commuter. As shown in Table 2.1, there are over 20,000 potential parking spaces available ln the central and fringe areas which are free to the all day parker, including nearly 10,000 spaces available for private use only. At the same time there is a serious shortage 55

of short period parking space. Well proved measures such as parking meters and limited waiting traffic orders could be used to give priority to the short period parker and it is relevant that the report ' Better Use of Town Roads' concludes that 'the most promising method of restraint, at least for the shorter term, would be to intensify control over the location, amount and use of parking space, on and off street, especially in order to restrict long term parking, which is a characteristic of car commuting'.

Measures such as the extension of parking meter control, and parking restrictions, operational and financial control by the Corporation of all public parking places including those privately owned, and the closure of vacant sites used solely by commuters for 'fly' parking, would all tend to reduce volumes of traffic at the peak period and assist the operation of more reliable bus services.

4.5.2

4 .5.3

Findings Subsequent to the J oint Report

Work carried out for the Working Party by the City Engineer's Department has shown the extent of parking sites in the central area fringe, in areas of mixed land uses, obsolete property, vacant sites. and newly redeveloped areas. If parking control is to be successful as a means of restraining car commuting it must be implemented not only over the central area as envisaged in the Joint Report on Car Parking but also over the fringe areas covered by the latest parking survey, so that the car commuter displaced from the central area does not merely move into the fringe. (See Table 2.1 ).

t '

Bury

-!

The City's J oint Report on Car Parking

The importance of parking control as a means of making a better use of the road system is recognised in the J oint Report On Car Parking approved by the Manchester City Council in August, 1967. The objectives of the new parking policy as stated in the report are as follows: (a) to ensure that the scale of provision of car parks is related to the capacity of a highway network with a view to making the best and fullest use of the road system without causing undue congestion to essential traffic. (b) to ensure that car parking facilities are located where they can be adequately served by the highway network, as existing and proposed, and where they can best and most conveniently be related to pedestrian circulation within the City centre and to local public transport connections. (c) to ensure that adequate operational car parking on ly is permitted within the boundaries of new development. (d) to ensure the provision of adequate non -operationa l short period parking space of which, consistent with items (b) and (c) above, the maximum proportion should be located well within the Central area. (e) to provide long period parking spaces consistent with the residual carrying capacity of the road system after items (c) and (d) have been met. (f)

In the Joint Report it was suggested that parking control should be implemented immediately to cover the whole central area as defined in that report.

to ensure that a unified system of administration and control is applied to all major car parks within the central area, whether public or privately owned or constructed. This is an essential corollary to making the best use of the limited capacity of the highway system and a necessarily limited amount of parking.

4.5.4

Impl ementati on of Parking Policy

The immediate need for additional short period parking space was stressed in the Joint Report, which suggested that these could be provided in the first place by extending the meter control area, and by converting several Corporation controlled car parks exclusively to short period use. Existing commuter spaces displaced by these proposals would then be replaced in new car parks in more outlying areas. However, in the light of the present analysis the Working Party consider that no such replacement of long period parking spaces should be provided at the present time and indeed. that it might be desirable to reduce the provision of commuter parks even further. Only when a balance has been achieved between the public and private sectors of transport, and more highway space has been provided, should the amount of space for all day parking be increased. Sites must have been acquired and be avai lable at that time in order to implement the recommendations of the Joint Report on Car Parking .

Proposed Line of Ringway/ Langley Rapid Transit &Sins

â&#x20AC;˘

Electric Bury, Altrincham & Stya l Lines

Q

Other Suburban Lines

Q

At the same time the Working Party recognise that there are several difficulties in fully implementing a parking policy aimed at restraining car commuting to the central area.

Existing legislation does not cover the regulation of private parking sites, which have been in existence for four years or more, and affords only limited powers to control off-street parking. It would also be important to introduce the policy gradually, as the availability of commuter parking in some measure might be an important factor in ensuring that the City remains attractive to employers and employees alike.

There is a further difficulty of timing. Commuters by private car would want to see some improvement of the public transport services before accepting any significant loss of parking facilities, but the improvement of bus services depends on a prior reduction in congestion.

,

/

Princess Road + (Future Motorway)

0

mile.

4.1 - Railway links showing alternatives 'A', '8' and 'C' 56

57

THE FUTURE FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT 路'

Section five The Future for Public Transport

5.1

(c)

RESULTS OF STUDIES

The studies reported in the last two sections point to conclusions about travel to the central area which can be summarised as follows: 5.1 .1 (a)

Public Transport on Reserved Trac k

The monorail systems th at have been developed at the present time would offer no advantage over a modern urban elect ric railway in provid ing commuter transport to the centre of Manchester. Although the Consultants' detailed analysis was done on a single route- which might not be the best or the only route ultimately chosen for development- conditions on the route were typical for the conurbation and the conclusion in favour of a modern electric railway can be safely generalised.

(b) Busways are generally more expensive to construct than railways, and there would be special difficulties in ventilating a bus tunnel under the central area. There may be places where a special track for buses would be justified,

but

the

extensive

system

necessary

to

support services of rapid transit quality would give less value for money t han rail development.

It would be possible to improve existing suburban rail lines through feeder bus services, station car park improvements and, if justified by the extra traffic, quite modest expenditure on re-equipment. In the long term t he existing network could be greatly improved by a link under the central area. But the development of a ra il rapid transit network requires heavy investment, and the first results cou ld not appear for several years.

5.1.2 (a)

Buses

Whatever improvement or new construction by way of a rail rapid transit network is produced, the part to be played by buses, which at present carry 70% of people to work in the central area, should not be underestimated.

They must, for many years, continue to carry the majority of commuters. Even in the long term with rail rapid transit developed they will have a major role in feeding railway stations, and providing services for cross town journeys, local journeys and along radial corridors not served by rail.

(b) Bus services have deteriorated in recent years. and will continue to do so unless better road conditions at the peak hour can be secured. The difficulties of

5.2- Concept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester, prepared

by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Cammell

61

I

I ..

~ â&#x20AC;˘ I

~ -

l

.~ ¡,,

~-

I

5.4-Duorail concept of vehicle interior for Manchester, prepared

by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Gammell

giving buses selective priority through traffic management schemes seem overwhelmin!=I. There is, however, some traffic on the roads at peak hours which could be restrained through parking policy, with a consequent improvement in operating conditions for buses.

(a) the policy is not aimed at shoppers and business callers in the central area. In fact, as the Joint Report stresses, more space should be made available for these uses though it may be necessary to limit this to off-peak times of day;

5.1.3 Recommended Action The above conclusions do not hold out any prospect of quick, cheap or easy improvement to the public transport system. On the contrary they point to the need for policies which will be unpopular with some sections of the public, and for the spending of substantial amounts of money over long periods. Failure to take action of this kind is likely to prejudice the future prosperity of Manchester city centre and the benefits which flow from a strong regional centre. If central Manchester is to continue to be developed as a place of dense employment and of activity, immediate action must be taken to improve accessibility to it for the majority of people who will have to travel by public transport.

The most important steps in the Working Party's view, are:

(b) although some individuals will be inconvenienced by being unable to drive to work in the central area, the great majority, both bus passengers and motorists will gain from an improvement in traffic conditions;

(a) the positive use of parking policy to restrain one category of private car use-namely its use for the journey to work in the central area-with the objective of making a better use of the existing road system; {b) the development of a modern rail rapid transit system for the Manchester area, fully integrated with the bus and suburban rail systems.

5.3-Goncept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester, prepared

by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Gammell

62

5.2 PARKING POLI CY The Working Party believe that the general public will see the merits of a policy of restraint on private car commuting to the central area provided it is stressed that:

(c) restraint is not a complete solution, but only necessary as a means of holding traffic at manageable volumes until accessibility to the central area can be radically improved by investment in new transport facilities; (d) investment in new facilities, whether railways or highways, will bring about a new situation in which parking control policy can be reviewed.

5.3 5.3.1

THE DEVELOPM ENT OF RAIL RAPID TRANSIT Schemes Investigated

In this study the Working Party looked in detail at two possible rail schemes- the new 16-mile Ringway to Langley route, and the scheme for linking three British Railways suburban lines. Each of these schemes was conceived in isolation, i.e. not as part of a unified network, and it is clear that there is a very large range of possible rail networks combining aspects of each scheme, drawing on other parts of the existing rail network, and with lines extended into new corridors. A basic feature of any future rail network would almost certainly be the central link from Oxford Road to Victoria, but there are many ways in which a network might be built up from this link.

To achieve the full benefit of a developed rail network it

63

wou ld need to be integrated with the rest of the transport system, and with future land use developments. It would be necessary to make arrangements for feeder bus services and 'park and ride' faci lities at outlying stations on the line.

Good interchange with the main highways system wou ld be essential to encourage motorists to leave the new radia l motorways and to make the final stage of their journey to the city centre by public transport.

5.3.2

Possible Integrated Road/ Rail D eve lopments

The principles outlined above are il lustrated in Figure 5.1 (in pocket at back) which shows various ways in which a rai l rapid transit network might combine the use of existing British Railway tracks with new construction . Various networks can be visua lised, but as an example of the potential of such a rapid transit system Figure 5.1 illustrates the linking of the Altrincham and Wi lmslow (via Styal} lines and the use of a centra l tunnel to link existing and new tracks under the city centre.

5.5-Station interior, Montreal

One possibility described in paragraph 4.2.4 is the joining of t he Altrincham and Bury lines through th is central tunnel with underground stations in the city centre close to maj or centres of employment. Another possibility would be to link the Bury line through the central tunnel to new tracks running south through the University along the line suggested by the Consu ltants for the Ringway/Langley rapid transit.

This line could join and be extended along the existing British Railways 'Midland ' tracks as far as say, Cheadle Heath . Other possibilities illustrated in Figure 5.1 are the extension of the system north to Victoria Avenue, Langley and Oldham, and south to Wythenshawe. Ringway and Sale.

It would be possible to construct the whole of the above network in easy stages and the expensive central tunnel and stations could be used j ointly by up to three lines.

5.6-Statibn interior, Montreal 64

2t

Trains could operate through the central sections at minute intervals and with six-car trains the system would be capable of transporting up to 30,000 passengers per hour from north and south into the heart of the city, as well as serving other important centres such as the University and Hospital complex on Wilmslow Road.

At a later date an east-west line might be added to the system by linking existing rail lines running into Piccadilly Station underground via Piccadilly Plaza and Market Street to Salford Station and ra il lines in the west of the con urba tion.

Specially designed road/rail interchanges cou ld be constructed at strategic positions on the radial road system so that feeder bus services and cars cou ld transfer passengers conveniently on to the trains. Adequate facilities could be provided at these interchange points for car drivers wishing to 'park and ride' and for car owners being driven to the station by other members of their family.

The new public transport system could be equipped with trains and buses of the latest design with every attention given to passenger comfort and conven ience by way of escalators, covered walkways and shelters at stations and bus stops. Illustrations of the type of modern rapid transit trains and stations visua lised for the Manchester system are shown in Figures 5.2 to 5.7.

5.3.3

Fut ure Pl anning Work

The above are illustrations of ways in which a rapid transit system could be developed by combining new construction with the use of existing British Rai lway rights of way and stations. The Working Party believe that these possibilities need detailed investigation. The case for rail rapid transit must finally be assessed in the context of a total land use/transportation plan for the conurbation, designed to make the best use of the limited resources for investment in transport and urban renewal.

5.7-Shops in station mezzanine, Toronto 65

POSSIBLE PRIMARY TRANSPORTATION NETWORK FOR MANCHESTER TO HALIFAX

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