THE SIAMESE TWINS OF INFORMATION AND CYBER VULNERABLE AND ALMOST INSEPARABLE text: ANTTI SILLANPÄÄ Erikoistutkija | Senior Researcher Turvallisuuskomitean sihteeristö | Secretariat of the Security Committee
Cyber infrastructure is in many ways inseparable from its content. Damage to either one may result in the failure of the whole system. The Information domain is in many ways the more vulnerable of the two due to its fuzziness and unclarity. Recent developments have shown that improving preparedness in one area has moved attackers’ attention to the other. National actions are seldom enough when trying to protect our information and cyber spaces.
ELECTIONS AS A CASE
Tactics of grand scale information operations seem to change. This is evident when we analyse what has been happening around election campaigns. Interference has caused problems for democratic processes for a long time. However, it was Russian meddling with the U.S. and French elections that raised this as a concern for Western democracies.
Democratic countries tend to be slow to act, if there is no imminent threat looming. Luckily, election security protection was something that nations prioritised, e.g. Prior to its parliamentary elections, EU announced concrete measures in order to strengthen the resilience of the Union’s democratic systems.2 In Finland, the Ministry of Justice took Finnish parliamentary election security to the Security
Committee and following its advice established a cross-government task force. It focused on informing the public, political actors, civil servants and media about the threats. In addition, the group analysed co-operation between different authorities. Based on the final report recommendations, several steps have been taken or are in the making. Finland is only one example, several countries
The methods used to interfere with elections include hacking, denial-of-service attacks, spreading of fake news, harassment towards candidates and parties, threats and bullying, trolling and the use of bot networks to steer the direction of debates1. The goal can be to support or undermine a political actor or to undermine confidence in the process. Hostile action can target authorities (electoral systems and processes, supporting authorities), political actors (campaigns, parties, individual politicians), general public (electorate and others) and media.
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