The Bolivarian Revolution: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela

Feb 01 FINAL

1/11/01

12:44 AM

Page 80

(Black plate)

“The new Venezuela, with its vague Bolivarian ideology of nationalism, integrity, and strong leadership, is characterized by a concentration of power in the person of the president, a conquest of institutions that had represented the political and socioeconomic elite, the empowering of the masses through popular consultation, and a new third worldism that challenges the dominant West, particularly the United States.”

Defining the “Bolivarian Revolution”: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela JENNIFER MCCOY AND LAURA NEUMAN

T

the savage system of income distribution that exists in Venezuela, that progressively eliminates the great difference that exists between a minority that has everything and a huge majority that has virtually nothing except hope.” Venezuelan representative democracy of the last 40 years had been lost, he says, and is a farce. He has sounded this theme since the 1998 presidential campaign, when he promised to write a new constitution, transform Venezuela into a true democracy, and act as a counterpoint to United States dominance in the hemisphere.

After being elected twice—first in December 1998 and then “relegitimated” in July 2000 under a new constitution—Hugo Chávez has continued to define his revolution while mystifying observers with his behavior and rhetoric. Nevertheless, at the close of his second year in office, Chávez’s revolution is beginning to take rough shape. The new Venezuela, with its vague Bolivarian ideology of nationalism, integrity, and strong leadership, is characterized by a concentration of power in the person of the president, a conquest of institutions that had represented the political and socioeconomic elite, the empowering of the masses through popular consultation, and a new third worldism that challenges the dominant West, particularly the United States.

Chávez’s Venezuela evokes a class-based revolution in rhetoric: the elites are vilified for ruining the country, and the masses are promised a better life.

Institutionally, however, it concentrates power in the executive and relies on the personal popularity of the president. The military is given high visibility through prominent government appointments and “Plan Bolívar”: the employment of soldiers in humanitarian relief efforts, social programs, con-

wo years after taking office, Venezuelans and many other increasingly interested observers are asking: Where is President Hugo Chávez taking Venezuela? Thumbing his nose at the West, Chávez became the first elected leader to ignore international sanctions and visit Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. He followed that trip with a lavish reception for Fidel Castro in Venezuela. Evoking Simón Bolívar’s dream of a united South America, Chávez renamed the country the “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.” He has sought to build a South American NATO-like defense force and has been accused of harboring intentions to spread his “Bolivarian revolution” to Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

Is Venezuela’s leader a modern-day Simón Bolívar, seeking to change the geopolitical map of the hemisphere, or will he form partnerships with his neighbors to champion the needs of the poor? Will Venezuela become a new model of participatory democracy that can finally address the needs of its people, or will it succumb to a populist autocracy?

Just what are the long-term aims of this military coupster turned elected president?

DEFINING

A REVOLUTION. . .

In his own words, Hugo Chávez wants to create a participatory democracy that “gradually eliminates

JENNIFER MCCOY is a professor of political science at Georgia State University and director of the Carter Center’s Latin American and Caribbean Program. She is the editor of and a contributor to Political Learning and Redemocratization in Latin America (University of Miami: North-South Center Press, 2000). LAURA NEUMAN is an attorney and a senior program associate at the Carter Center. She organized the center’s election-monitoring mission for the 2000 Venezuelan elections.

80

Feb 01 FINAL

1/11/01

12:45 AM

Page 81

(Black plate)

Defining the Bolivarian Revolution • 81

struction projects, and even the operation of new schools. Social policies are populist, although a market economy has been retained. Constrained by low oil prices and an undefined economic plan in his first year in office, Chávez practiced fiscal austerity and focused on political change. Buttressed by soaring oil prices in his second year, Chávez announced a major social spending plan in September 2000.

Winning the position of secretary general of OPEC in 2000, the clearest element of the government’s economic policy seems to be to keep oil prices high by controlling production. But a systematic plan to clean up Venezuela’s corrupt practices, rebuild rotted public services, and make the country’s nonoil exports competitive has yet to emerge.

Chávez has spent most of his first two years eviscerating the old political parties and the social organizations they controlled. In their place has appeared his Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR), an eclectic collection that Chávez claims is a movement beyond his control. The two parties that had virtually controlled Venezuelan politics during the previous 40 years—Acción Democrática (Democratic Action, or AD) and COPEI (Social Christian Party of Venezuela)—have been severely weakened. COPEI has practically disappeared, holding only 7 seats in the new 165-seat National Assembly and 1 governorship. AD became the largest opposition party to the MVR, with 31 seats in the assembly and 6 governorships (although some are still in dispute). Yet the AD split soon after the July 2000 election, and the National Election Council was charged with deciding which faction would retain the party name (late in 2000 that council blessed the weaker of the two factions). The third traditional party— Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism)—joined Chávez’s Polo Patriotica coalition so that parties loyal to him now control 60 percent of the National Assembly and 14 of the 23 governorships. While this is insufficient to reform the constitution, this supermajority can delegate important decree power to the president.

From 1958 until the 1990s, Venezuelan politics had been characterized by a party system so strong that it was often called a “partyarchy.” The political parties controlled the labor unions, student organizations, and professional associations, and they strongly influenced the judges, the election authorities, and the military through appointments and promotions. Chávez and a majority of Venezuelans viewed that system as politically corrupt, and vowed to change it. But, after defeating the old institutions,

will the new ones be more participatory, or will they simply be controlled by different political forces? . . . AND IMPLEMENTING IT After Venezuelans overwhelmingly approved the new constitution on December 15, 1999, implementation of this magna carta began with the liberal use of its “transitory articles.” These articles provided the National Constituent Assembly with the authority to approve the next election date, to determine the electoral system, and to dissolve Congress. In one of its last acts before its dissolution on January 31, 2000, the constituent assembly appointed, by decree, the Supreme Court’s members. The assembly also appointed the Citizen’s Power troika of the attorney general, comptroller general, and public defender (ombudsman); the directors of the National Electoral Council; and the National Legislative Commission, popularly known as the Congresillo—the little Congress. Most of those chosen to fill these positions were widely considered Chavistas.

Critics argued that the constituent assembly’s appointments violated many provisions of the new constitution. Most important, they believed that the constitution’s transitory articles only allowed the assembly to select the new post of ombudsman and that all appointees must be made with civil society consultation. The government responded that these were only temporary assignments and that following the national elections, the positions would be filled permanently and through the mechanisms outlined by the new constitution. As of December 2000, these important posts were still filled “transitorily.”

The Congresillo, which officially opened on February 1, 2000, was comprised of 21 members, 10 chosen from the ranks of the popularly elected constituent assembly, and the others simply picked by the Patriotic Pole leadership of the constituent assembly. Initially, it was thought that the Congresillo might limit its activities to those specifically designated in the transitory law, but this was not to be the case. Rather, the Congresillo, presided over by one of President Chávez’s closest advisers, Luis Miquilena, acted as a legislature and worked on key proposals, including a new criminal code and local and municipal government reforms.

Meanwhile, charges of corruption began to haunt the government, and the Patriotic Pole and Chávez’s close circle of friends were beginning to unravel.

The first sign of a break came when Jesús Urdaneta, former director of the state intelligence agency filed corruption charges against Congresillo head Miquilena. Urdaneta, who had joined with Chávez

Feb 01 FINAL

1/11/01

12:45 AM

Page 82

(Black plate)

82 • CURRENT HISTORY • February 2001

in the failed 1992 coup attempt, publicly stated that Chávez’s government was behaving as corruptly as the traditional political parties against which it had fought. The transitional Supreme Court ultimately dropped all charges against Miquilena. Urdaneta then called on President Chávez to purge corrupt advisers and to continue the fight against patronage and corruption. In response, Miquilena brought charges against Jesús Urdaneta for illicit enrichment.

In addition to accusations of corruption, human rights groups charged Chávez’s government with extensive human rights violations. During the December 1999 flooding in the state of Vargas that may have killed as many as 50,000 people, Chávez deployed the military and security forces to maintain peace and security in the affected areas. However, witnesses claimed that some of these forces illegally entered homes and attacked, detained, and even killed alleged looters in the week following the floods. Although the state criminal courts threw out cases brought against the security forces, the Supreme Court in August 2000 agreed to reexamine the charges in light of the public outcry. At least four forced disappearances from this period remain unresolved, and the ombudsman’s office continues to request Supreme Court action on the accusations of human rights abuses.

Finally, questions were raised about the 1999 constitution. According to some critics, the constitution was substantially changed during a reprinting in March 2000 when edits were made to the version approved by popular referendum, thus creating impermissible ad hoc constitutional amendments. The Congresillo claimed these were grammatical corrections, but a report from the attorney general released in December 2000 showed hundreds of substantive modifications and revisions from the popularly approved constitution. This issue will likely continue to be the subject of numerous legal challenges.

AN

ELECTORAL FAILURE On January 20, 2000, the National Election Council announced elections for May 28, 2000. The election, designed to choose the president, a new unicameral legislature, governors, mayors, Latin American and Andean parliamentarians, and all local posts, was quickly dubbed the “mega-elections.”

Although not necessarily required to do so, Chávez decided to face reelection to “relegitimate” his rule.

Victory would give Chávez a new six-year term with possible reelection, which would allow him to serve a total of 13 years in office. With Chávez’s popular-

ity rating still high, his victory was considered a sure thing until former coup coleader Francisco Arias Cárdenas split from the governing alliance and entered the presidential race in March. As a popular governor of the oil-rich state of Zulia, Arias Càrdenas quickly outstripped the third candidate, Claudio Fermín, winning support from the middle and professional classes—sectors concerned with Chávez’s anti-establishment and inflammatory rhetoric.

The mega-elections included more than 33,000 candidates for 6,000 positions and over 1,290 different ballots. Venezuela’s election administration is one of the world’s most complex, since the entire process is automated. The election balloting is accomplished by filling in ovals on a paper ballot and inserting the ballot into a machine that optically scans it for the voter’s selections. When the polls close, the machine electronically transmits the results from the voting center to a central location, where computers instantaneously total all the results. The technical mystery surrounding the automation has led to citizen suspicion and distrust.

Throughout April and May, the National Election Council proclaimed its ability and readiness to carry out the elections. Warning signs of problems began to emerge, however, as ballot production fell far behind schedule, trial runs of the automated vote system were repeatedly postponed, and election officials were increasingly accused of partisan behavior. In addition, the political climate grew more tense as reports of intimidation and harassment surfaced. Two civil society organizations filed an appeal in the Supreme Court to suspend the elections, citing the election council’s failure to inform voters about the identity of the candidates and the process for correctly casting a ballot. The technical and political problems came to a head on May 25 when the council notified the Supreme Court it was not prepared for the elections. Three days before the scheduled mega-elections, the Supreme Court ruled to postpone them. The megaelections then came to be known as the megafracaso (mega-failure).

Following the aborted elections, questions emerged about the competency of the National Election Council and whether it had been pressured to allow Patriotic Pole candidates to register well past the deadline, thus creating obstacles in the technical preparations. Additionally, rumors of sabotage and conspiracy abounded, all of which are still being investigated by the attorney general’s office. Even in the face of this electoral disaster, the citizens remained calm. By early June, the council’s

Feb 01 FINAL

1/11/01

12:45 AM

Page 83

(Black plate)

Defining the Bolivarian Revolution • 83

to a head with the December 3, 2000 referendum, members were forced to resign, and preparations which approved the suspension of union leadership began anew. and called for union reorganization and new direct The Congresillo then made three important decielections within 180 days. The referendum question sions. First, it chose 10 new National Election seemed to conflict with constitutional prohibitions Council directors, this time allowing greater civil against intervention in labor organizations, but the society consultation and participation. Second, the Venezuelan Supreme Court upheld the language.

Congresillo ordered the mega-elections divided into As early as 1999, relations between President two elections, with the first round to include the Chávez and the Roman Catholic Church began to national, state, and municipal posts. The second crumble in the debate over the new constitution. The election would be for more local posts. Finally, the issues of abortion and education led to name-calling Congresillo chose July 30 as the first election date. and invocation of the devil. Further stress was placed The opposition viewed this date skeptically, since on this relationship in mid-2000 when the president that was the Sunday before the traditional August of the Episcopal Conference, who resides in the state vacation period—a day when many of their middleof Mérida, was accused by the new governor of and upper-class supporters would be away from Mérida, a member of Chávez’s Fifth Republic Movetheir voting districts. ment, of corruption in his administration of a public Nonetheless, the July 30 elections enjoyed a hospital, and the government canceled the contract. voter-participation rate of approximately 55 percent Additionally, the government, citing expense, susand generally went off without any major probpended the public schools’ religious curriculum, but lems. Following the election, which President only in Mérida. The Chávez won with 58 struggle with the percent of the vote, more than 250 electoral Chávez’s foreign policy has been controversial church continues, both in the media and the appeals were filed. The and provocative. He embraces world pariahs courtroom. vast majority of these and seems to enjoy provoking the United States.

Venezuela has tradihave been adjudicated, tionally had a freealthough in some states wheeling, competitive media and this has continued voting officials were still recounting the ballots as under Chávez: criticism and praise of the governlate as December 2000. Five months after the elecment can be found. Nevertheless, newspaper owntion, a significant number of governorships ers claim that censorship and self-censorship are remained in question. growing. They claim that President Chávez’s attacks Finally, on December 3, 2000, the electoral cycle on the media and individual media personalities on following the new constitution was completed with his weekly radio program have led to increased the local elections. In addition to choosing neighthreats and harassment. Chávez, however, argues borhood representatives, votes cast ballots in a refthat freedom of expression is thriving in Venezuela erendum to suspend trade union leadership. Voter and that the media have the continued ability to fatigue—after seven elections and one failed elecrespond to his concerns and shape public opinion. tion in 2 years, and boycotts of the referendum— Civil society remains a thorn in this governled to less than 23 percent voter turnout, the lowest ment’s side. The 1999 constitution provides for in Venezuela’s history. increased citizen participation and Venezuelan civil society organizations have agitated for the governGROWING TENSIONS ment’s full compliance with these provisions.

President Chávez, though receiving a popularity Chávez argues that civil society is made up of all rating of 66 percent as recently as December 17, citizens, and that existing organizations claiming to 2000, continues to battle with much of Venezuelan represent citizens are in fact elitist, unrepresentasociety. He has accused the trade unions, the tive, and often corrupt. Meanwhile, organizations church, and the media of corruption and elitism in such as Queremos Elegir (We Want to Choose) and a continuous verbal battle. Following an October human rights groups maintain their vigilance over a 2000 strike by petroleum workers that forced the government they believe is concentrating power in government to increase their salaries, President too few people’s hands.

Chávez again escalated the rhetoric against the “corThe year 2000 also saw tension even within rupt trade unions.” His long-standing struggle Chávez’s strongest organizational support, the milagainst the opposition-controlled trade unions came

Feb 01 FINAL

1/11/01

12:45 AM

Page 84

(Black plate)

84 • CURRENT HISTORY • February 2001

itary. Plan Bolívar, launched in 1999, was designed to employ troops in the provision of social services.

Consequently, Venezuela witnessed military personnel assisting with garbage pickup and road repairs. For many in the armed forces, this was degrading. In March 2000 a group of retired military officers gave a press conference at which they called on Chávez to stop the politicization of the armed forces. The split between Chávez and former Commander Arias Cárdenas further divided the loyalties of the military, and rumors of a potential coup in June appeared as though it would break Chávez’s stronghold. However, the coup threat was discredited and Chávez reinforced his support within the armed forces by placing dozens of active military leaders in such key government positions as head of the state-owned oil company and vice chancellor of foreign affairs.

VENEZUELA’S

OIL CARD? Chávez’s foreign policy has been controversial and provocative. He embraces world pariahs and seems to enjoy provoking the United States. He speaks of a new foreign policy to create a counterbalance to United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Yet he is pragmatic in his economic policy and is careful not to step too far across the line to elicit strong international reactions.

A surprising clash with the United States came in early 2000 when he turned away a ship with military engineers who had been requested by his own defense minister to help rebuild roads washed away by the devastating December 1999 floods. In midsail to Venezuela, Foreign Minister José Vicente Rangel refused to accept the engineers, arguing that Venezuela would welcome the machinery, but not the troops who operate it. Compounding this affront and similarly defending national sovereignty, Venezuela continued to deny American requests in 2000 to allow United States drug-surveillance planes to fly over Venezuelan airspace (Chávez had terminated that right in June 1999).

Chávez also staked out a global position as an independent player and leader in the decision by major international oil producers to raise prices. At an OPEC summit in Caracas in fall 2000, Venezuela pushed to continue production quotas to maintain high oil prices. Chávez then warmly welcomed Fidel Castro in an extensive five-day visit to Venezuela in October, and extended an offer of subsidized oil to Cuba. This was part of the larger Caracas Energy Agreement under which Venezuela provides oil to Central American and Caribbean—

and potentially South American—countries on preferential payment terms.

Creating tensions with his neighbors, Chávez reopened the old Venezuelan claim to half of Guyana’s territory, and insulted Colombian President Andrés Pastrana by verbally supporting leftist guerrillas fighting against the Colombian government.

Venezuela has opposed the United States–backed Plan Colombia, which provides military and economic aid to fight Colombia’s drug traffickers, and has imposed unilateral trade barriers on Colombia.

Relations broke down in November when each country recalled its ambassador after Venezuela issued visas to two guerrilla representatives so that they could speak to the Latin American Parliament in the Venezuelan congress building in Caracas.

Other Latin American governments began to distance themselves from Venezuela as Chávez verbally supported the coup by Ecuador’s indigenous organizations in January and Bolivian peasants resisting their government’s drug-eradication strategy. Chávez was rumored to be giving more substantial assistance to radical elements in the hemisphere, raising questions about Venezuelan expansionism, a charge that he denies.

Staunchly defending a noninterventionist principle, Venezuela has been one of the leaders in limiting the Organization of American States’ response to abuses of democratic principles. When an OAS election observer mission declared Peru’s April 2000 presidential election unacceptable, Venezuela opposed hemispheric sanctions but supported a dialogue process. After eagerly accepting international observers to ensure a clean election and defend the legitimacy of Chávez’s own victory in 1998, the president’s foreign minister attempted, unsuccessfully, to get OAS approval to curtail the rights and access of international observers.

AN

ELUSIVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY One of Chávez’s major promises has been to lift Venezuela’s mass of poverty-stricken people to a higher living standard. Chávez supporters in the lower classes continue to believe in him, even after two years of little visible improvement in their lives. Estimates of poverty rates range from 45 percent to 80 percent, with scarce indication of advancement in recent years. In an oil-rich country, the perception that the downward slide of the middle and working classes in the 1980s and 1990s was a consequence of corruption helped fuel Chávez’s initial electoral victory. His unrelenting rhetoric about the villains who stole Venezuelans’

Feb 01 FINAL

1/11/01

12:45 AM

Page 85

(Black plate)

Defining the Bolivarian Revolution • 85

birthrights sustained his popularity. Yet progress has proved elusive.

In 2000 Venezuela benefited once again from an oil boom: the average price of oil in 2000 was $27 a barrel, up from $16 in 1999 and $11 in 1998. With this cushion, the government was able to announce a major job-creation program in the hopes of lowering the 14 to 18 percent unemployment rate. A coherent economic strategy has yet to emerge, however. A previously established oil stabilization fund, created to smooth out the oil cycle, has not been fully funded in the current oil boom, and some critics fear that the fund is being improperly used to finance the budget.

A reform of the tax code is before the National Assembly, and enforcement of tax collection has been a rallying cry of President Chávez. If successful, these attempts to increase tax revenues could reduce the government’s dependence on oil. Another potential source of government income, the privatization of the aluminum industry, has been stalled since the previous administration due to high levels of industry indebtedness. The government plans to expand privatization to the telecommunications sector.

Economic growth was forecast to improve from a negative 7 percent in 1999 to a positive 3 percent in 2000 and inflation is falling. But with oil prices declining from their heights earlier in the year, it is unclear how the government will meet Venezuelans’ high expectations, engendered by campaign promises and constitutional commitments.

CHANGE

OR A RETURN TO THE PAST? Two acts by the new legislature raised concerns about a concentration of political power in Venezuela. First, President Chávez sought, and received, approval from the National Assembly to rule by decree on a myriad of issues. The Ley Habilitante, or enabling law, allows the president to pass legislation without parliamentary debate or approval on issues ranging from the economy and government reform to public security. Although it is not unusual in Venezuela to provide a president with fast-track powers, this law is unique in the breadth of areas identified for special presidential authority.

Critics argue that the law abrogates the National Assembly’s legislative authority. This argument was clearly not convincing in the assembly, which passed the law overwhelmingly, but was used as the backbone of an appeal to the Supreme Court in late 2000.

The law regarding the nomination of candidates to fill the crucial positions of the Supreme Court and the Citizen’s Power was also appealed to the Supreme Court. Arguing that the constitution provides civil

society, and not the National Assembly, with the power to nominate candidates for these bodies, the attorney general and ombudsman filed a joint appeal with the Supreme Court. In the meantime, a committee comprised of 5 civic members, 11 National Assembly members from the government’s Patriotic Pole coalition, and 5 opposition members has selected the finalists for these two positions. The final ratification will come from the full assembly.

The overreliance on Hugo Chávez’s personal popularity poses a great risk to Chávez’s revolution.

Chávez has achieved his goal of deepening participation by going directly to the people in a consultative democracy. But direct consultation is not enough to create a thriving democracy.

If political institutions such as the courts, the Citizen’s Power, and the electoral branch become dominated by the president’s partisans or fail to serve as a balance to executive power, Venezuela may repeat the mistakes of the pre-Chávez years.

Post-1958 Venezuelan democracy became rigid under a closed group of party leaders and eventually fractured. By failing to create independent institutions that can serve as intermediaries between government and citizens, the political system may not weather the inevitable fall in popularity of a political party or an individual leader.

Similarly, by maintaining a confrontational style with significant sectors of society, Chávez risks alienating those very groups he needs to rebuild Venezuela, reminiscent of the mistakes of the Democratic Action party in its first attempt at democracy in 1945–1948. Indeed, intellectual and financial capital have already begun to flee Venezuela. Venezuela in the twenty-first century has the opportunity to become a model of participatory democracy that addresses the needs of its people, but only if it learns from its past.

■

& Adopt a Library If your local library is not getting Current History print or on-line editions, why not give it a gift subscription?

Call 800-726-4464 (U.S.) or 215-482-4464 (outside the U.S.).