Really! No Mental Reservations: Jerry Brown Inherits California’s Budget Crisis Daniel J.B. Mitchell* Justice Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye (administering oath of office): …that I take this obligation freely… Governor-Elect Jerry Brown …that I take this obligation freely… Cantil-Sakauye: …without any mental reservations. Brown: …without any mental reservations. (Laughter from audience) Brown: Really! No mental reservations! The April 23, 2011 edition of the Economist magazine devoted a large section to California under the title “Where it All Went Wrong.”1 Its answer to the question was the state’s direct democracy (initiative, referendum, and recall) system. Initiatives in particular were the villain, producing ballot-box budgeting formulas that hamstrung the legislature. Especially after the passage of Prop 13 in 1978 – the initiative that dramatically cut property taxes and imposed a two-thirds vote for tax increases - so the narrative went, direct democracy in California had gone mad. At around the time the edition appeared, the Economist co-sponsored a public forum at UCLA on the subject of California’s dysfunctional government in which the thesis of runaway direct democracy was again put forth. While other panelists went along with the thesis, this author thought the matter was more complicated. It is certainly possible to show the contribution of direct democracy to California’s fiscal problems. However, the gridlock and inability to pass a budget in an orderly fashion also characterize the U.S. Congress, although there is no direct democracy and no Prop 13 at the national level. If there is communality of dysfunction at the U.S. and California state levels, it is party polarization and a need for a supermajority vote on critical issues. Polarization is not a function of direct democracy. At the U.S. level, the supermajority hurdle exists due to Senate rules, not because of something imposed directly by the voters. At the state level, supermajority hurdles are related to direct democracy. But – as it turned later – direct democracy in California had (partially) made a self-correction. Voters ended the two-thirds vote requirement to pass a state budget in November 2010. As it turned out, that change allowed a new state budget to be enacted – after an initial failure - before the fiscal year 2010-11 expired. In this chapter, we examine both the underlying problems in budgeting in California and the events that produced the 2011-12 budget. In earlier editions of California Policy Options, I have traced California budget woes over the years. And indeed, there is no single starting point for those woes since each *
Professor-Emeritus, UCLA Anderson School of Management and UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs. Chapter for California Policy Options 2012. Draft – August 6, 2011.
1