A thesis in conflict & peace studies by Danjuma D. Jise

POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL AND CONFLICT OF PARTIES: THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION AND THE CONFERENCE OF PARTIES (COP)

DANJUMA D. JISE

A THESIS IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE M.Sc. IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT & PEACE STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF JOS, NIGERIA 1

ABSTRACT

This work looks at the vexed problems in the politics of Climate Change Control at the international arena. It examined the historical issues connected to the emergence of Climate Change as a global issue, first as a scientific controversy and later as a truism. The author discussed Climate Change as a developmental challenge facing humanity hence the need for a concerted effort in the politics of controlling it. The study explores how such interests by states, runs counter to â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Common goodâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in the global community thereby generating some conflicts between parties. The author examined how such conflicts has undermined mitigation and adaptation efforts as well as the drive for a common understanding. The work ends with some recommendations on how to better manage the politics of climate change control without compromising mitigation and adaptation paths.

CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 1.0.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

At the twilight of the 20th century and the dawn of the 21 st, we are confronted with the “fierce urgency” of a crisis that links today and tomorrow. From the 1990s to the dawn of the 21 st Century, Climate Change and the Politics of the changing climate, have taken central place in the agenda of international politics with their consequential conflicts. Although Climate Change is relatively new as one of the many topical issues that have vexed the global community, it is no doubt the most potent catastrophe that humanity faces in the contemporary world if nothing urgent is done. (UNDP 2007). The difficulty of the world’s nations in marshalling out a common roadmap towards mitigating and adapting to already manifest crisis associated with Climate Change, has remained a cause for worry. Poor consensus that has characterized the attempt to both mitigate and adapt to the problem isn’t a healthy situation either. The politics that has rocked the debate and the attendant conflicts on emission cuts leaves much to be desired. Yet an ambitious mandate of limiting global temperature to 2 0 C above preindustrial levels is still steering at the UNFCCC on the face.( Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC 2007) Some of the major emitters have long abandoned the protocol and have walked away from ‘Kyoto’ with impunity. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC) is an international environmental treaty produced at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the, Earth Summit held at Rio-dejenario, Brazil from June 3 to 14, 1992. (Mastrandrea & Schneider 2008).

The principal update is the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which has become much better known than the UNFCCC itself. (Scheinder 2008). The UNFCCC was opened for signature on May 9, 1992, after an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee produced the text of the Framework Convention as a report following its meeting in New York from April 30 to May 9, 1992. It entered into force on March 21, 1994. As of May 2011, UNFCCC has 195 parties. (UNFCCC 2009). By 1995, countries realized that emission reductions provisions in the Convention were inadequate. They launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change, and, two years later, adopted the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol legally binds developed countries to emission reduction targets in principle but not necessarily in practice. The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and ends in 2012. At COP17 in Durban, governments of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided that a second commitment period, from 2013 onwards, would seamlessly follow the end of the first commitment period. The length of the second commitment period is to be determined: it will be either five or eight years long. The COPs Since the inception of the UNFCCC, the climate talk has gone through series of diplomatic deliberations and conferences from (COP 1, The Berlin mandate 1995, COP 2, Geneva Switzerland 1996, COP 3 The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 1997, COP 4 Buenos Aires 1998, COP 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, COP15 the Copenhagen Accord. This was followed by COP, 16 in Cancun Mexico City in 2010. Then came the last COP as far as the scope of this study is concerned, COP 17 at Durban in the Republic of South Africa. It is worthy of note that of the numerous conferences of parties held annually from the founding of the UNFCCC in 1992, it is rather unsatisfactory that only one of such many COPs (COP 3 held in Kyoto, Japan 1997) has translated into a ‘legally binding’ treaty – indeed only the Kyoto Protocol could find expression on the platform of the UNFCCC. And even that would later turn 4

a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;lame or toothless dogâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; when in 2001 bigger emitters like the U.S. walked away from Kyoto or the Kyoto Protocol with impunity. Similarly, the composition of nation-states into the three main categories of the parties to the UNFCCC, all together have continue to be basis for conflict, scepticism and distrust among states. Consequently, this phenomena has tended to undermine the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC/the KP. And only less than a year from this time, the Kyoto Protocol would have expired as the first and only binding ever treaty on Climate Change. (UNFCCC 2011). According to Mastrandrea & Schneider (2008), Schneider (2008), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC 2011), one of its first tasks was to establish national green house gas (GHG) inventories, emissions and removals. These were used to create the 1990 benchmark levels for accession of Annex I countries to the Kyoto Protocol and for the commitment of those countries to GHG reductions. Updated inventories must be regularly submitted by Annex I countries. Thus the requirement for ratification of the KP was such that the treaty can only go into effect, if it was ratified by at least 55 countries and by enough industrialized nations to account for at least 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Schneider notes that although the United States initially helped negotiate the treaty, the administration of President George W. Bush withdrew its support when it took office in 2001.

The Bush

administration said the treaty would hurt the United States economically and gave too many advantages to developing countries. Because the United States accounts for about 35 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, its withdrawal from the protocol meant that the treaty could not go into force unless Russia, the next largest polluter at 17 percent, ratified the agreement. By August 2004, 126 countries had ratified the agreement but the ratifying industrial nations only accounted for 44 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Then in September 2004 the cabinet of

Russian president Vladimir Putin approved the treaty, and it went into force in 2005. (Mastrandrea & Schneider 2008, Schneider 2008).The near failure at COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009 and the lack of comprehensive and all-inclusive deal at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico City in 2010 are pointers to a global climate crisis that looms. This is likely because the Kyoto Protocolthe first and only legally binding treaty so far, was billed to expire by 2012. By which time, a successor treaty is expected to have been negotiated to replace it, but which is very unlikely. Yet right up to the eve of the expiration year for the Kyoto Protocol, no truly effective understanding has been reached by parties, for its replacement. Yet, the UNDP (2008) in its Human Development Report remarked that what we do today about climate change has consequences that will last a century or more. It adds that the part of that change that is due to greenhouse gas emissions is not reversible in the foreseeable future. The heat trapping gases we send into the atmosphere in 2008 will stay there until 2108 and beyond. (Ibid) We are therefore making choices today that will affect our own lives, but even more so, the lives of our children and their children. At issue is the continues non-ratification of some â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Big Playersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; such as the US and China and their continues indifference to the mitigation and adaptation efforts of the UNFCCC on the one hand and finger-pointing at each other to a near physical conflict guided by so called national interest and the political economy of the problem. But while the international community was still lamenting the non compliance and non ratification of the US, another global giant and a very important member of the UNFCCC as well as a close ally to the US, Canada, also pulled from the KP deal at COP 17 in Durban South Africa. Again, this was with impunity and many believed the act was informed by the continues refusal of the US to ratify and the non inclusion of China among Annex I parties.

Yet these three economies are among the five largest global emitters for different reasons. The researcher wonders if the Kyoto Protocol will succeed without these two ‘giants’ having to make commitments to the common humanity we all share. But notwithstanding the vacuum created by their noncompliance to the treaty, this work intends to explore the other side of the coin to see if actually their excuses are worth considering or if for that matter they may profer a better strategy for the success of the Kyoto and the FCCC in the next regime now that the current one is at the verge of its expiration come 2012. Obviously, large emitters must be involved, for any protocol or treaty to succeed. Is the Protocol actually worth anything at all without the US in it? The US accounts for around a quarter of global emissions, and 45% of the total emissions reductions pledged in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was drawn. (Mastrandrea & Schneider 2008). When the US withdrew however, the Protocol could only be saved with the agreement of virtually all the remaining countries. Most parties feel aggrieve with the exit of the US from the Kyoto commitments, they think it is cardinal to get the United States to enter a binding agreement what so ever it takes to achieve such,, especially in the build-up to Durban. Similarly, the mere classification of the parties to the UNFCCC into Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I is misleading and may not remain so for long. This is because some of the world’s larger emitters today are developing countries (such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa), who thus far have refused to agree to binding emissions limitation obligations under the international UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol regime, in part because of the lack of any US limitations commitments. This is a challenge as it tends to undermine the viability of the UNFCCC in its current classification of parties in the so called Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I countries. The Annex II countries who are largely members of Annex I group but who have claimed to pay

for the emission of developing countries and Transition economies under the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) have not been able to embark on taking the national Inventory of the nations whose emission they claimed to have paid for, let alone to tie such emission to a price tag. Similarly, the state of literature regarding the UNFCCC is yet to tie the significant global emission of the aviation and maritime or shipping industries to any of the nations who make fortunes in these industries. Certainly, they are not the Developing Countries/LDCs. Herein lies the real issues that raises moral questions to the emission trading scheme as one of the operational strategies of the Kyoto Protocol. When the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) 1947 was reached, which metamorphosed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), Climate Change was not yet an issue of global concern as far as the state of knowledge was concerned. Thus the instruments of the GATT/WTO as the case may be, have not as yet integrated emission cuts variables into trade rules. Understandably, state sovereignties were still strong and trade barriers very much in place at the time that marked the beginning, the zenith and only recently, the end of the Cold War (1947-1991) But today transnational corporations have watered down the Westphalian meaning of state sovereignties in a world that is increasingly ran by the dictates of market forces. The integration of Climate Change variables into Trade rounds and deliberations in the Conference of Parties is still far from reach. In the post Kyoto regime in 2012, integrating climate change variables/emission limitation quotas into trade rounds such as the Doha Rounds and the Uruguay Rounds is a gab that needs to be filled although the framework for achieving such, is already in place. (WTO 2011). Economic theory shows that making individuals and groups pay the full costs of their activities is necessary to restore market incentives and to balance benefits with costs. In the case of Climate

Change, this is yet to be achieved on a planetary scale to be fully effective and efficient. (Caney & Hepburn 2011). Also of concern is the Geographic Differentia. The threats of Climate change, certainly is not the same for all nations. And in facts the geographic differentials, the geospatial position and location of some of the parties to the UNFCCC on the globe, makes them better off with a rising global temperature as they have been threatened by extreme cold and a permafrost condition prior to the emergence of the so-called Climate Change Talk. The researcher wonders if the current geographic differential in impact and the variation in consequences at least over time and space, among nations, is in part a major reason for the setbacks in the UNFCCC deliberations and progress. And whether the non-compliance or near indifference of some of its parties is owing to this geographic fact. The researcher notes that although viewed in retrospect, the causal factors are tied to the so called Annex I states but beyond the scientific evidence of the cause are the stark reality of the consequences, seen prospectively, climate change is a developing-countries problem at least for now, as predictions indicate that, in the near future, developing countries will be the major victims of the consequences of climate change, especially countries near the equator. In this connection, the researcher attempts to examine what has constituted a cog in the desired wheel of progress connected to the politics of Climate Change Control. The author attempts to explore the factors that tend to cause conflict and thus militate against the aspiration of parties . It is imperative to know in very objective terms, sentiments, interests and the defects, if any, that have undermined the UN Framework on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol in attaining their original mandates. This is in a bid to making these international instruments truly multi-lateral and all-inclusive treaties.

Also at issue is the question of the power of number, when issues are put to vote by delegates. Often the most powerful countries send dozens of delegates: with only few representing the so called poor countries for reasons of cost and affordability of such nations. As notes Chandani (2011) the COP 15 in 2009 for instance, Japanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s team had 114 members, and the United States has 155. But Gambia, which leads the 48 countries in the least Developed countries (LDC) group, had only four. For the poorest countries, the UN provides funds to support just two delegates per state, leaving individual states with the onus to fund the over hundred others. Chandani posits that during high-stakeholders conferences like the one held in Copenhagen in 2009, negotiators labored through deadlocked all-night meetings. In LDCs representatives are rarely based on expertise on the subject but mostly domestic politics, ethno-religious affiliations, and other factors that run counter to both merit and the desired output of such sophisticated conferences. (Chandani 2011). 1.1.1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The global debate over who should take action to address climate change is extremely precarious, as diametrically opposed perceptions of climate justice threaten the prospects for any long-term agreement. Poor nations fear limits on their efforts to grow economically and meet the needs of their own people, while powerful industrial nations, including the United States, refuse to curtail their own excesses unless developing countries make similar sacrifices. Meanwhile, although industrialized countries are responsible for over 60 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change, developing countries suffer the "worst and first" effects of climate-related disasters, including droughts, floods, and storms, because of their geographical locations. In their work, A Climate of Injustice, J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks analyze the role that inequality between rich and poor nations plays in the negotiation of

global climate agreements. This is the basis of conflicts in part that has characterized the politics of Climate Change Control. The paste of progress in the politics and the attempts to control Climate Change leaves much to be desired. The difficulty of reaching consensus among parties is a cause for concern given the manifest reality that the world is already facing from the scourge of climate change. Moving the climate change agenda forward multilaterally among the 195 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is proving to be a serious challenge. The Conflict arising from the politics of Climate Change Control has become one of the vexed issues at the international agenda of global politics. It would appear that current approach to negotiating a comprehensive, universal, and legally binding global deal on the subject is being undermined by its own conflicts. This is evident from the many repeated failures of parties to replace the Kyoto Protocol with a successor treaty from right from COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009 till the expiration of the protocol in 2012. Not to talk about the many instances of deadlocks at the yearly conferences of parties. Secondly, it would appear there is a trade-off between compliance with the global responsibility in climate change control and the attainment of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;selfâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interests for states especially for parties with commitment to GHG cuts under the Kyoto Protocol. This variance between global responsibility and state interest, has tended to undermine the desired progress of the Framework from inception in 1992 to date. It has also over heat the politics of Climate Change Control to the point of generating some dysfunctional conflicts among parties. The rather checkered history of the protocol from its inception in 1997 confirms some of the weaknesses of multinational firms in living up to being globally responsible and morally so. The researcher wonders if leaving the responsibility of emission limitation targets to states only,

would yield the desired outcome-limiting global temperature below 2 0C. The non inclusion of regional bodies with significant emission footprints such as the G-8, G-20, NATO and the OECD states etc, on GHG cuts, is not a healthy arrangement. It is worrisome why such groups are not committed to emission cuts like the EU which has been exemplary. The near failure at COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009 and the lack of comprehensive and all-inclusive deal at COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico City in 2010 are pointers to a global failure of Climate Change Control. This is likely because the Kyoto Protocol-the first and only legally binding treaty so far, was billed to expire by 2012. And having already expired, the intense politics of control and its attendant conflict could not allow for a successor treaty at COP 17 in Durban South Africa. Thus a second commitment period for Kyoto was adopted at the COP only as a soft landing for the failure of politics and conflict of parties. Also at issue is the continues non-ratification of some â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Big Playersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; such as the US and China and their continues indifference to the mitigation and adaptation efforts of the UNFCCC on the one hand and finger-pointing at each other to a near physical conflict guided by so called national interest and the political economy of the problem. But while the international community was still lamenting the non compliance and non ratification of the US, another global giant and a very important member of the UNFCCC as well as a close ally to the US, Canada, also pulled out from the KP deal at COP 17 in Durban South Africa. Again, this was with impunity and many believed the act was informed by the continues refusal of the US to ratify and the non inclusion of China among Annex I parties. I.1.2

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. In what ways have the Politics of Climate Change Control resulted to Conflict?

2. How has the politics of Climate change control affected efforts on adaptation and mitigation? 3. In what ways have parties attempted to resolve the conflicts between states and groups? 4. What measures can be put in place to better resolve the conflict between parties and groups? 1.1.3. AIMS OF THE STUDY The study aspires to explore some of the factors that have undermined the many attempts to control Climate Change and its impacts. It seeks to explore the interests that are at play among parties in their respective categories and the conflicts arising therein. It is also in the intent of the study to investigate the causalities of conflict in the attempt to proffer a more functional, multilateral and veritable alternatives towards the management and resolution of such conflicts without loosing sight of adaptation and mitigation responsibilities of parties. 1.1.4. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY The study seeks to achieve the following objectives: 1. To examine how the Politics of Climate Change Control has resulted to Conflict 2. To investigate how the conflicts arising from the politics of Climate change control has affected efforts on adaptation and mitigation drives. 3. To appraise the efforts of parties and authorities in their attempts to resolve the conflicts. 4. To explore alternative measures to better manage and resolve the conflict between parties and groups. 1.1.5. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY. The scope of the study is both in time, space and the number of what constitutes a greenhouse gas (GHG) or what is referred to, as the Kyoto Basket . Although the problem of climate change

and the global political mobilization to garner support for collective action predates the founding of the UNFCCC at Rio (1992), the study will focus only from the founding of the UNFCCC and appraise the degree to which it has either made progress, stagnated or retrogressed in terms of its founding mandate as the case may be. This will span the periods from 1992- to date. And whereas many other factors are causalities to climate change, the researcher will be focus only on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emission and the politics that has characterized their cuts or limitations. And whereas the Kyoto Basket has recognized six greenhouse gases as being most important in terms of global emissions that increases atmospheric temperatures, this study is focus only on the most important of these i.e Carbon Dioxide (CO2). 1.2.0

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study will be of immense utility, both in terms of domestic policy within states and multilateral understanding by way of treaty between and among parties. This is even more so that it has come at a time that spans from the eve of the expiration of the first Commitment period of the very first and only legal instrument of the UNFCCC-the Kyoto Protocol, through the expiration time proper (2012) and the period marking the dawn of a new regime or 2 nd Commitment Period as approved at COP 17 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Durban, South Africa in 2011. It was also intended that the findings and recommendations of the work would give impetus to the Durban conference and contribute to resolve some of the vexed issues of the subject as it affects the developing countries, but the work and its time schedules did not catch up with the scheduled date for the COP 17 in Durban last year. This notwithstanding, the findings will serve a veritable mitigation/adaptation reference point to stake-holders in subsequent COPs beginning from COP 18.

The study will be of utility to the time, given the newly approved 2 nd Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). It is hoped that the study will be in tune with the current discourse on the subject in the continues search for better alternatives in making the UNFCCC to achieve its set goals. The Rio+20 Conference held in 2012, was yet another major reminder of the spirit that led to the Rio Earth summit in 1992 and this piece, by its focus, will add weight to that historic reminder in the context of the conflicts that have ensued since then. Moreover, the work will serve as a reference material to other researchers coming behind who may wish to explore literature on the subject of Climate Change Control as well as the Politics, Interests and Conflicts arising thereof. It is intended that the outcome of this piece will add to the state of knowledge in a unique manner not because it is an ivory tower as such but perhaps because it is one of the few attempts from the global South to strike an academic balance between the subject of Climate Change and the field of Conflict Studies coming from a social science perspective. 1.2.1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Given the varied nature of the research data, which comprises of both qualitative and quantitative stuff, the Researcher employed the method of Triangulation which allows for the use of different methods and techniques in both collection and analysis of data. In addition to this, the method of Historiography was used in reviewing the trend of the origin, development, and emergence of climate change as a global issue only as anchored on the platform of the UNFCCC. It also engaged the Survey method where necessary to both generate and analyze quantitative sets of data as elicited from their sources across space and time. UNFCCC being a multilateral institution has in principle provided a netting of states/parties which serves as the population sample for the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s people as represented by their respective sovereignties or states. These states are represented as equals, in tan dem with the principle of

state equality justified by the character of sovereignty. This notwithstanding however, the peculiarities in each of the three categories of parties as classified by the UNFCCC namely; Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I states were given their respective group analysis with the UNFCCC as the provider of the needed level-playing ground for such analysis to underpin the social, political and historical problems, prospects and issues that have unfolded in respect to treaties on climate change. The study employed tools of descriptive and comparative analysis of three

main

variables

namely;

Industrialization

index,

Emission,

Emission-limitation

commitments of states and population/per capita consumption as acknowledged by the UNFCCC. It also engaged the method of triangulation where necessary to both generate and analyze data across space and time. The study employed tools of descriptive and comparative analysis of three main variables namely; Industrialization index, Emission, Emission-limitation commitments of states and population/per capita consumption as acknowledged by the UNFCCC. The method of Historiography was used in reviewing the trend of the origin, development, and emergence of climate change as a global issue only as anchored on the platform of the UNFCCC. It also engaged the method of triangulation where necessary to both generate and analyze data across space and time. This notwithstanding however, the peculiarities in each of the three categories of parties as classified by the UNFCCC namely; Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I states will be given their respective group analysis with the UNFCCC as a platform of analysis to underpin the social, political and historical problems and issues that have unfolded in respect to treaties on climate change. The study will employ tools of descriptive and comparative analysis of three main variables namely; Industrialization index, Emission, Emission-limitation

commitments of states and population/per capita consumption as acknowledged by the UNFCCC. 1.2.2. STUDY FRAMEWORK The Study framework is anchored on the platform of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change which has the mandate of galvanizing all parties together for a common but differentiated action. Parties are the confirmed signatories or states whom have ratified the UN framework as approved by the Secretariat. At its founding in 1992 the UNFCCC had 194 member states but lost two of them as having withdrawn â&#x20AC;&#x201C;the US in 2001 and Canada in 2011 leaving the membership size to 192 currently. (The UNFCCC 2012). These states are categorized as stated previously, into the following groupings: Parties The Convention divides countries into three main groups according to differing commitments: Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Annex II Parties consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties. They are required to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change. In addition, they have to "take all practicable steps" to promote the development and transfer of environmentally friendly technologies to EIT Parties and developing countries. Funding provided by Annex II Parties is channelled mostly through the Conventionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s financial mechanism.

Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others (such as countries that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel production and commerce) feel more vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response measures. The Convention emphasizes activities that promise to answer the special needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as investment, insurance and technology transfer. The 49 Parties classified as least developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations are given special consideration under the Convention on account of their limited capacity to respond to climate change and adapt to its adverse effects. Parties are urged to take full account of the special situation of LDCs when considering funding and technology-transfer activities Observer organizations Several categories of observer organizations also attend sessions of the COP and its subsidiary bodies. These include representatives of United Nations secretariat units and bodies, such as UNDP, UNEP and UNCTAD, as well as its specialized agencies and related organizations, such as the GEF and WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Observer organizations include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the OECD and International Energy Agency (IEA), along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Over 1,409 NGOs and 86 IGOs are admitted as observers. The NGOs represent a broad spectrum of interests, and embrace representatives from business and industry, environmental groups, farming and agriculture, indigenous populations, local governments and municipal authorities, research and academic institutes, labour unions, women and gender and youth groups.

Constituency groupings have emerged from the above groups to facilitate interaction. (UNFCCC 2012). 1.2.3. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION The method of data collection for the work was largely via institutional or records by means of virtual or online exploration of GHG inventories (secondary sources) from the respective websites, E-books, and other data bases of the UNFCCC, UNEP, IPCC WMO and other related organizations connected to the global research on climate change and its politics of control. Similarly, the yearly issues arising from the annual COPs, as captured in their respective position documents and reports, provided the data on the politics and conflicts on Climate Change Control. But only data whose sources were verifiable, were used and even at that, such data or set of data were often compared with those of authoritative sources like the IPCC and the UNFCCC before they were put to use in the work. Only data whose sources were verifiable, were used and even at that, such data or set of data were often compared with those of authoritative sources like the IPCC and the UNFCCC before they were put to use in the work. 1.2.4. SOURCES OF DATA Data for the research were obtained largely, from secondary sources . The preference of secondary data was connected to time and resource. Although it was a wish but the researcher could not afford to embark on a research trip to the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, Germany in pursuit some vital and up-to data as well as possible interviews with some secretariat staff. This gab was however filled by the efficiency of the ICT through the robust UNFCCC website as already provided. Vital data as recent as 2012 were obtained via the site just as old archives that predate the temporal baseline of the study-1992, were also found. This is understandably, given the nature of the work which comprises of both qualitative and quantitative data.Other sources were UNEP, WMO, UNDP and the IEA .

1.2.5 NATURE AND TYPE OF DATA The data used in executing the work, were both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Quantitative sets of data are:

the emission stocks of states and regions into the global

atmosphere as provided by the UNFCCC and other related agencies as well as monetary endowments be they pledges or tangible funds for various intervention activities on fighting climate change. Other quantitative sets of data includes the GHG cuts allocated to all member states to the Kyoto Protocol as well as the tradable emission allowances/deficits of respective states at various times under the Kyoto’s Emission Trading Scheme. Others include proportion of total national energy per capita that are traceable to fossil fuel per state/region. And of course, the number of conferences of parties as well as their repeated instances of failures or success in reaching a deal as the case may be. In this connection it is sad to note that from Rio to Durban there has been more failures than success stories. Similarly, quantitative data were drawn from the various position papers and consensus reached at the yearly Conferences of Parties COPs 1-17 ie from Berlin to Durban in South Africa. Qualitative and secondary data sets included views and counterviews that unfolded yearly at the COPs. Moreover, A great deal of historical data/information was used to appreciate the pattern of foreign relations between Annex I and Annex II; Annex I/II and Non Annex I states or better put ‘North’ and ‘South’; ‘East’ and ‘West’; US and China; and the UNFCCC and every member state. 1.3.0

FORMS OF DATA

The set of data used in the research range from news items via cable satellite, editorials institutional positions, authoritative academic perspectives, foreign policy or statements of states

and multilateral organizations in connection with the study area and theme, proceedings and position documents of the Conferences of Parties (COPs) direct observations of trends and progress at the various COPs and the incremental databases of international academic agencies/institutes with a mandate on Climate Change and its politics of intervention. The Inventories of such multilateral bodies as the UNEP, the IPCC and of course the UNFCCC itself were resourceful. No instruments were necessary as such, as institutional records and databases provided the needed data (both qualitative and quantitative) given that the work was largely based on secondary sources of data. In practice, no â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;fieldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; work per se was directly necessary for the research

since the global atmosphere/Climate and the politics of managing its harm, are

anchored on the platform of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) safe for the use of online data bases via a functional modem by which surfing of the net allowed access to such data, satellite real-time capture of events, graphics and cable satellite news updates via the decoder and the internet so as to keep abreast with the continues updates and other developments connected to the Conferences of parties as well as the respective commitments of states in line with the current regime of the Convention/KP. 1.3.1

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Reliability and validity was ensured through the efficacy of the method of data collectionTriangulation which is a powerful technique that facilitates validation of data through cross verification from more than two sources. With its tenets of credibility and defensibility of results according to (Johnson, 1997: 283), and Stenbacka (2001). Maxwell 1992 cited in Golafshani (2003) observes that the degree to which an account is believed to be generalizable is a factor that clearly distinguishes quantitative and qualitative research approaches. Triangulation is

typically a strategy (test) for improving the validity and reliability of research or evaluation of findings. Mathison (1988:13) elaborates this by saying: Triangulation has risen as an important methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation [in order to] control bias and establishing valid propositions because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate epistemology. Patton (2001:248) advocates the use of triangulation by stating â&#x20AC;&#x153;triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods. fruitful. Golafshani (2003). In this view, Healy and Perry (2000) explicate on the judging validity and reliability within the realism paradigm which relies on multiple perceptions about a single reality. Another paradigm in qualitative research is constructivism which views knowledge as socially constructed and may change depending on the circumstances. Therefore, to acquire valid and reliable multiple and diverse realities, multiple methods of searching or gathering data are in order. If this calls for the use of triangulation in the constructivism paradigm, then the use of investigators, method and data triangulations to record the construction of reality is appropriate (Johnson, 1997). Thus to meet the criteria of triangulation, the researcher held three principles of objectivity in mind so as to achieve the goals of triangulation as a method of social research namely: i.

Authenticity: That is, whether the evidence gathered for the thesis is genuine and of unquestionable origin;

ii.

Representativeness: That is, whether the evidence obtained is typical of its kind or not; and finally

iii.

Meaning: To find out the extent to which the evidence gathered is clear and comprehensible.

To meet these criteria, the researcher attempted to gather comprehensible and clear information from authentic and credible sources. But this not withstanding, painstaking effort has been deployed in selecting relevant pieces of information. The various sources from which the research data were collected include the following: Information from textbooks, articles and journals on the politics of Climate Change Control and the politics arising thereof. The researcher attempted to elicit pieces of information on the challenges faced by the UNFCCC in particular, as it bids to coordinate and advance the control of climate change as well as its politics of control.

In addition, a textual analysis of relevant documents from the World

Meteorological Organization(WMO), United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) the IPCC, ADB, IIED and other institutes committed to environmental matters, the FAO, professional journals,

official gazettes of states, the World Bank, UNDP, UNFPA, PRB, World Food

Summit, the academia, and the United Nations Organization (UN), the International Energy Agency (IEA), Mass media outputs such as newspapers and magazines as well as Virtual outputs of Internet resources. 1.3.2. METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS The researcher used a combinations of techniques to analyze the research data: qualitative method of data analysis was used for the qualitative data while a descriptive and comparative method of analysis was used to analyze the quantitative data. These were guided by the principles of Discourse and Content Analysis . 1.3.3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In their article "Global Warming", Mastrandrea & Schneider (2008), have defined both Global Warming and Climate Change as the measurable increases in the average temperature of Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atmosphere, oceans, and landmasses due to increase in heat-trapping gases called Greenhouse

gases. It is however contended herein that although Climate Change and Global Warming are often used interchangeably the two terms differ slightly. Global Warming is the measurable increases in the average temperature of Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atmosphere, oceans, and landmasses due to increase in heat-trapping gases called Green house gases(GHGs) including Water vapor, CO2, Methane, Nitrous Oxide, and synthetic chemicals . To that extend, Global Warming is unidirectional in that it focuses only on increase in temperature. On the other hand, Climate Change encompasses Global Warming and other reversal changes that may imply the antithesis of warming, i.e. it caters for a cooling world as well. Climate Change may be seen as a two-tailed phenomenon. In this context however, the researcher has conceptualized the phrase Climate Change to mean warming of the planet since it is better understood as such. Moreover, it is important to add from the onset of this section that GHGs do not represent everything that is negative. But for them, the earth would have been too cold for human and other biological existence. Their excess however may be moving the earth to a state of becoming less habitable. Specific amount of Greenhouse gases under a natural world devoid of the excesses of technology, were part of the Intelligent Design of our planet safe for the human-induced quantity added to the natural and finite supply. Greenhouse gases occur naturally, and without them the planet would be too cold to sustain life as we know it. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-1700s, however, human activities have added more and more of these gases into the atmosphere. For example, levels of carbon dioxide, a powerful greenhouse gas, have risen by 35 percent since 1750, largely from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas.( Mastrandrea & Schneider 2008).

THE CONCEPT OF ECOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCE ď&#x192;&#x2DC; The concept of Ecological Interdependence may be new, but its practice and our consciousness

about it, is as old as existence. Popularized by the UNDP Human

Development Report (2008), Ecological Interdependence Above all, is a concept that challenges us to think about what it means to live as part of an ecologically interdependent human community. (UNDP 2008). We live today in a world that is divided at many levels. People are separated by vast gulfs in wealth and opportunity. In many regions, rival nationalisms are a source of conflict. All too oft en, religious, cultural and ethnic identities are treated as sources of division and difference from others. Yet, in the face of all these differences, climate change provides a potent reminder of the one thing that we share in common. It is called planet Earth. All nations and all people share the same atmosphere. And we only have one habitable earth. This presupposes that when people in an American city turn on their air conditioning or people in Europe drive their cars, their actions have consequences to rural communities in Bangladesh, farmers in Ethiopia and slum dwellers in Lagos. Whereas the world has six continents and seven oceans, it has only one atmosphere. Added to this is the natural tendency of gases to diffuse beyond state sovereignties Global warming is evidence that we are overloading the carrying capacity of the Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atmosphere Plants and animals and their various species; peoples of various races and nation-states with our regional peculiarities and resource-advantages makes us share the same planet with its various endowments which have temporal and spatial differences. But the consequences of our activities affect the earth as an entity. Climate change is different from other problems facing humanityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and it challenges us to think differently at many levels.. All these are pointers to the shared vulnerability of the human community and especially the developing

and transition economies to climate change even if their own carbon footprint is not yet consequential. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL: The Control of Climate Change may be conceptualized as the concerted deliberate efforts put in place by parties and stake-holders to both mitigate and adapt to its adverse negative impacts. Such is premised on the assumption that if left unchecked, its destructions could be monumental to livelihood if not shattering human and other biological existence. (UNDP 2008). Parties as used herein, are all sovereign states who are signatories to the United Nations comprising of 194 states in 1992. These states were tied to a common but differentiated responsibilities in their respective categories namely Annex I (Industrialized Countries), Annex II ( Industrialized Countries who have paid for the emission cost of Developing Countries) and Non Annex I parties( Developing Countries and Economies in Transition). POLITICS: According to the Merriam- Webster Dictionary (2012), Politics is defined as the art or science of government, the art or science concerned with guiding or influencing governmental policy or the art or science concerned with winning and holding control over a government. CONFLICT The University of Wisconsin Academic Leadership Support UWALS (2012) defines Conflict as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. The same source adds that within such simple definition there are several important understandings that emerge as follows: Disagreement - Generally, we are aware there is some level of difference in the positions of the two (or more) parties involved in the conflict. But the true disagreement versus the perceived disagreement may be quite different from one another. In fact, conflict tends to be accompanied

by significant levels of misunderstanding that exaggerate the perceived disagreement considerably. If we can understand the true areas of disagreement, this will help us solve the right problems and manage the true needs of the parties Parties involved - There are often disparities in our sense of who is involved in the conflict. Sometimes, people are surprised to learn they are a party to the conflict, while other times we are shocked to learn we are not included in the disagreement. On many occasions, people who are seen as part of the social system (e.g., work team, family, and company) are influenced to participate in the dispute, whether they would personally define the situation in that way or not. In the above example, people very readily "take sides" based upon current perceptions of the issues, past issues and relationships, roles within the organization, and other factors. The parties involved can become an elusive concept to define. Perceived threat - People respond to the perceived threat, rather than the true threat, facing them. Thus, while perception doesn't become reality per se, people's behaviors, feelings and ongoing responses become modified by that evolving sense of the threat they confront. If we can work to understand the true threat (issues) and develop strategies (solutions) that manage it (agreement), we are acting constructively to manage the conflict. Needs, interests or concerns - There is a tendency to narrowly define "the problem" as one of substance, task, and near-term viability. However, workplace conflicts tend to be far more complex than that, for they involve ongoing relationships with complex, emotional components. Simply stated, there are always procedural needs and psychological needs to be addressed within the conflict, in addition to the substantive needs that are generally presented. And the durability of the interests and concerns of the parties transcends the immediate presenting situation. Any efforts to resolve conflicts effectively must take these points into account.

So, is it still a simple definition of conflict? We think so, but we must respect that within its elegant simplicity lies a complex set of issues to address. Therefore, it is not surprising that satisfactory resolution of most conflicts can prove so challenging and time consuming to address. Conflicts occur when people (or other parties) perceive that, as a consequence of a disagreement, there is a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Although conflict is a normal part of organization life, providing numerous opportunities for growth through improved understanding and insight, there is a tendency to view conflict as a negative experience caused by abnormally difficult circumstances. Disputants tend to perceive limited options and finite resources available in seeking solutions, rather than multiple possibilities that may exist 'outside the box' in which we are problem-solving. . (UWALS (2012) Similarly, Kenneth Boulding 1962 in Capozzoli (1995) defined conflict, as, "a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility with the wishes of the other." In theory, conflict, like water and fire, is neither good nor bad. Unlike water or fire, however, conflict is not something that can been directly touched, weighed or seen it lies in the minds of the people who are in conflict. The results of conflict can be seen, however, when it shows itself in arguing, brooding, or fighting. Boulding adds that Conflict becomes a problem when people are unable to manage and resolve it effectively. If conflict is not dealt with constructively, it can be a powerful destructive force between people and within organizations. If it can be managed effectively, conflict can be turned into a constructive force. Conflict can be considered constructive if: 1. People change and grow personally from the conflict. 2. The conflict results in a solution to a problem. 3. It increases the involvement of everyone affected by the conflict.

4. It builds cohesiveness among the members of a team. Conversely, Conflict can be considered destructive if: 1. No decision is reached and the problem still exists... 2. It diverts energy from more value adding activities or issues 3. It destroys the morale of teams or individual team -members 4. It polarizes or divides teams or groups of people. (Capozzoli 1995). As agues Wallenstein (2007:13) that conflict is formed of three parts: incompatibility, action and actors – and therefore a ‘complete definition’ of conflict is ‘a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources’ (Wallenstein 2007:15). The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD 2002:4) also posits in tanden with Wallenstein to note that conflict is: a state of human interaction where there is disharmony or a perceived divergence of interests, needs or goals. There is a perception that interests, needs or goals cannot be achieved due to interference from the other person(s). Whatever form conflict takes, it is likely to have several impacts (albeit at different geographical scales) which may include physical harm to both humans and the natural resource base, impact on productivity levels and economic development more generally. The researcher would want to argue that environmental change and conflicts affect livelihoods and health, and exacerbate poverty and inequality, with women often carrying a disproportionate burden. As applied in context, we cannot but also make reference to certain categories of conflict termed as Environmental conflicts: Key issues in both the academic and political spheres are that people are exerting increasing control over the natural environment with a range of consequences. Furthermore, the phenomenon of privatizing nature in its many forms especially land ownership

air and sea pollutions are prevalent. Yet the global environment has repeatedly proved itself to be a single interdependent whole. Humans have and continue to compete for control of the natural environment, while it is used as a sink for the effects of global economic growth. However, what is becoming clear is that the natural environment can fight back. This is most noticeable in the increase in natural hazards (droughts, floods, etc.) and the adverse effects of climate change. It is needful to revisit the key issues relating to environmental conflicts and exploring the nexus between environmental considerations and increased conflict on the African continent. In particular, while environmental conflicts are on an increase, it remains a relatively neglected field of research. It is the view of the researcher to posit that the politics of climate change and the continues difficulties in reaching consensus at the conference of parties every year, is a form of conflict and particularly and indirect environmental conflict between the parties. The association between the environment and conflicts is varied and complex. The causes of environmental conflicts vary across the globe and their manifestations differ considerably. Causes can range from the refusal to cut down greenhouse gas emissions, control over vital environmental resources such as fossil fuels to contestations over natural resources at the community and/or household level. Conflicts can manifest in various ways â&#x20AC;&#x201C; from outright wars and even genocide to disagreements at the local level. There seems to be agreement that while conflict depends on the actions (not necessarily violent) of actors, it relates to incompatibilities. 1.3.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE OF THE THESIS Chapter one gives the general introduction, description and statement of the problem with some highlights on the historical trajectory of when and how the Subject of Climate Change emerged as an agenda of international discourse. It gives the background of the many attempts by states,

to control its impacts as it delved into the politics associated with such deliberations and the conflicts arising thereof. The chapter then looks at the repeated failure of the UNFCCC in reaching a binding deals for all parties since the Kyoto Protocol emerged in 1997, it attempts to consider factors responsible for the slow paste of progress at the Conferences of Parties COP from Rio 1992- Durban 2011 and the inability to draw up a successor treaty to replace Kyoto at its expiration in 2012. It also gives an in-depth discussion of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks in the areas of Climate Change Control, Politics and Conflict of Parties. Chapter two gives a review of relevant literature related to the state of discussion on Climate Change Control, issues, politics and the attendant conflicts that go with it at the various COPs from COPs 1-17. Chapter three explains the political history of Climate Change and its Control structure- the UNFCCC. It also chronicled the roles played by some key parties and regions as it segments the three categories of the 194 signatories to the UNFCCC. Chapter four, presents the research data as captured from their sources. The chapter also attempts to sort out and analyze the data in the search for patterns and meanings. Chapter five makes a comparative analysis of the emission footprints among states, the stakes of emission limitation commitments among the three categories of parties, their levels of compliance, the politics and conflicts involved. The chapter also attempted the interpretation of the data, Summary of findings, Conclusion and recommendations for a better approach to the management and control of the adverse impacts of Climate Change as well as the conflicts arising from its politics.

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1. CLIMATE CHANGE This chapter makes a review of the state of literature on the subject of Climate Change, the attendant Politics of its Control, Interests of parties (states) and the Conflicts arising there from. Climate change as a moral challenge: Cause Versus Responsibility Debate Studies have established a relationship between Climate Change and the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Before the Industrial Revolution began in the mid-1700s, there were about 280 molecules of carbon dioxide per million molecules of air (abbreviated as parts per million, or ppm. By 2007 it has gone up to 379ppm (IPCC, 2007). This is in addition to methane which is emitted into the atmosphere during the mining of coal and the production and transport of natural gas and oil. Methane also comes from rotting organic matter in landfills, rice paddies, and wetlands, as well as from animals that chew the cud, especially cows, as a byproduct of digestion. Live plants also emit small amounts of methane. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the amount of methane in the atmosphere has more than doubled. Methane traps nearly 30 times more heat than the same amount of carbon dioxide. Compared to carbon dioxide, methane appears in lower concentrations in the atmosphere and remains in the atmosphere for a shorter time. In total, methane contributes about a third as much as carbon dioxide to global warming. To stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, global emissions would need to be cut significantlyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;on the order of 70 to 80 percent. If efforts are not made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, carbon dioxide is projected to reach concentrations more than double or even triple the level prior to the Industrial Revolution by 2100. In a higher-emissions scenario carbon

dioxide is projected to reach 970 ppm by 2100, more than tripling preindustrial concentrations. In a lower-emissions scenario, carbon dioxide is projected to reach 540 ppm by 2100, still almost doubling preindustrial concentrations (IPCC, 2007). The same source cautioned that even if greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere ceases growing, the climate would continue to warm for an extended period as a result of past emissions, and with more dramatic effects than were observed during the 20th century. If greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase, scientists project severe climate changes. In October 2007 a study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences warned that climate models used to project future global warming may have been overly optimistic. The study found that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels had increased 35 percent from 1990 to 2006, a rate of increase far higher than most climate models had assumed. The researchers reported that the average rate of growth in carbon dioxide levels was 1.3 percent during the period from 1990 to 1999, but 3.3 percent from 2000 to 2006. In 2000 an estimated 7 billion metric tons of carbon were released into the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels; by 2006 that number had grown to 8.4 billion metric tons, according to the study. Scientists pointed to the unexpectedly rapid melting of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean during the summer of 2007 as evidence that climate models were failing to predict how quickly the climate was changing. In terms of contribution to emission of GHGs, which is the major cause of Global Warming, developed countries of the North are fingered as the principal culprits, compared to developing countries of the south. Mingst, (2004:289) noted the Per capita emission of CO2 (the major GHG) in thousands of metric tons as at 1998 shows:  developed countries – 10.8  Developing countries – 1.9

Current statistics shows that this gap has widened due to rapid growth of industrialization.  Africa which accounts for 14% of the world population is only responsible for 3.5% of the most serious global climate changing gases. Writing in 2008 article title “Cooling It: The World Acts to Slow Global Warming” Stephen H. Schneider, a Professor of biological sciences at Stanford University in California has expressed concerns about the clear evidence of Climate Change, Schneider posits that for more than a century scientists have known that certain gases in the atmosphere—most notably water vapor, carbon dioxide, and methane—contribute to atmospheric warming. This heat-trapping capacity of the atmosphere is popularly known as the “greenhouse effect.” Despite public controversy surrounding global warming, the natural greenhouse effect has been long established as fact in the scientific community. Indeed, were it not for the heat-trapping action of clouds, water vapor, carbon dioxide, and other gases, the earth's natural climate would be about 33° C (about 60° F) cooler than it is. Life would have evolved quite differently in such a climate. Schneider Also posits that some of the issues at dispute are whether projected world population growth to more than 10 billion people by the year 2100 will result in a doubling or tripling of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Average surface temperature of the earth was about 15 degrees centigrade prior to 1800s, 100 years later, it has risen by about 0.7 degrees centigrade and the increase has not stopped. The IPCC, in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report predicted a further warming of 2.4 to 6.4 degrees Celsius by the year 2100 given present and future emissions of GHGs. In 2009 however, studies by Judith Lean of the US Naval Research Lab, and David Rind, of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies show that temperatures will shoot up at 150% of the rate predicted by the UN’s IPCC by 2014 (Daily Trust, 2009:45). The consequences are manifest around us.

Warming temperatures are already causing significant changes to mountain glaciers around the world, ice sheets in Greenland and the Antarctic, and polar sea ice in the Arctic. From Europe to Africa to Asia to North America, mountain glaciers have receded over the 20th century, and melting is becoming more rapid. The large-scale melting of ice may accelerate the pace of global warming in what is known as a feedback process. Because ice reflects sunlight back out to space, it has a cooling effect. Water and land, which are darker than ice, absorb and retain more heat. Glaciers on Kilimanjaro-the highest mountain in Africa for instance, are said to have lost 82 percent of their ice since 1912 (the year that Titanic Sank). This trend has dare consequences on Human Security. “Global warming impacts everyone regardless of national borders”, so says UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali. He charged delegates to marshal out a common roadmap towards tackling the challenge. Average changes in temperature on the scale projected in business-as-usual scenarions will trigger large-scale reversals in human development, undermining livelihoods and causing mass displacement. By the end of the 21st Century, the UNDP notes, the specter of catastrophic ecological impacts could have moved from the bounds of the possible to the probable. The UNDP addresses that question by drawing upon climate modeling simulations. These simulations define a carbon budget for the 21st Century. If everything else were equal, the global carbon budget for energy-related emissions would amount to around 14.5 Gt CO2 annually. (UNDP Human Development Report 2008). Fuhr, Unmüßig, Verolme, & Yamin (2011) in their Discussion Paper for the Heinrich Böll Foundation “A Future for International Climate Politics –Durban and Beyond”, laments that two years after the Copenhagen summit, the real world is moving away from a safe and equitable climate future faster than ever. Political leaders are busy fighting the global

financial crisis. Fuhr et’al posits that Climate change is not disappearing. It is real. People are suffering from its impacts now around the world. The Earth's climate is a historical phenomenon and has changed throughout history. Glaciers are retreating almost everywhere around the world — including in the Alps, Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, Alaska and Africa ( NASA 2012). exception in the western Himalayas and northern Pakistan in Karakoram Range where the glaciers are increasing (ICIMOD 2011). The famine at the Horn of Africa and recent floods in Thailand and Central America are only a few shocking examples of what a warming world with inadequate institutions, low adaptive capacities, and inequitable distribution of resources looks like. The injunction to “do no harm” is an important value in Western society, yet when it comes to climate change, short-term economic self-interests often prevail. For this reason, uncertainty is no longer seen as an acceptable ground for delayed action. Climate change challenges our deeply felt conception of fairness, as its causes are often generated locally but the harm is felt on a planetary scale. Climate change gnaws at the very foundation of our societies, as it upsets the existing fragile social balance between the haves and have-nots. The poorest people, who bear little to no responsibility for the climate problem, face the most dire, even catastrophic, consequences. They are also the ones unable to cope with these consequences. Ironically, the security threat posed by climate disruption has become an important reason for climate action by the richest economies . ( Fuhr et’al 2011). According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report (2007/2008) Climate change is now a scientifically established fact. Prudence and care about the future of our children and their children requires that we act now. (UNDP 2007). This is a form of insurance against possibly very large losses.

The UNDP Human Development Report (2008) remarked that Global warming is evidence that we are overloading the carrying capacity of the earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atmosphere. The earth is often said to have six continents and seven seas but it has only one atmosphere- a thin layer of air that lies directly above the land and oceans, we depend on this one and only atmosphere for our survival. In a globalized world, human security ought to be viewed through the lens of Collective Security and a universal moral code. Soros (2002: 163) notes sadly that we have been so put off by the perversion of morality that we are trying to do without morality. He added that we have gone wrong, as according to him, no society can exist without morality. (Soros 2002: 164). He contends that the distinguishing feature of both market fundamentalism and geopolitical realism is that they are amoral. The attendant consequences of climate change put us at the risk of loosing the gains of a century and possibly reversing human progress. This confirms Fisher (1936) that progress is not a law of nature, the grounds gained by one generation may be lost by the next. Climate change brings us close to this point until something urgent is done. As contends the UNDP, the fact that we do not know the probability of such losses or their likely exact timing is not an argument for not taking insurance. We know the danger exists. We know the damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions is irreversible for a long time. We know it is growing with every day of inaction. Even if we were living in a world where all people had the same standard of living and were impacted by climate change in the same way, we would still have to act. If the world were a single country, with its citizens all enjoying similar income levels and all exposed more or less to the same effects of climate change, the threat of global warming could still lead to substantial damage to human well-being and prosperity by the end of this century.

The UNDP posits that the changing climate began since the advent of the industrial era—and the rate of increase is quickening. There is overwhelming scientific evidence linking the rise in temperature to increases in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere. There is no hard-and-fast line separating ‘dangerous’ from ‘safe’ climate change. Many of the world’s poorest people and most fragile ecological systems are already being forced to adapt to dangerous climate change. However, beyond a threshold of 2°C the risk of large-scale human development setbacks and irreversible ecological catastrophes will increase sharply. The UNDP Report argues that business-as-usual trajectories will take the world well beyond that 2 0C threshold. The 2008 Human Development Report (HDR) says to have a 50:50 chance of limiting temperature increase to 2°C above preindustrial levels will require stabilization of greenhouse gases at concentrations of around 450ppm(part per million) CO2e. Stabilization at 550ppm CO2e would raise the probability of breaching the threshold to 80 percent. In their personal lives, few people would knowingly undertake activities with a serious injury risk of this order of magnitude. Yet as a global community, we are taking far greater risks with planet Earth. Scenarios for the 21st Century point to potential stabilization points in excess of 750ppm CO2e, with possible temperature changes in excess of 5°C. Temperature scenarios do not capture the potential human development impacts. In reality, the world is a heterogeneous place: people have unequal incomes and wealth and climate change will affect regions very differently. This is, for us, the most compelling reason to act rapidly, says the UNDP. The UNDP submits that Climate change is already starting to affect some of the poorest and most vulnerable communities around the world. A worldwide average 3° centigrade increase (compared to preindustrial temperatures) over the coming decades would result in a range of

localized increases that could reach twice as high in some locations. The effect that increased droughts, extreme weather events, tropical storms and sea level rises will have on large parts of Africa, on many small island states and coastal zones will be inflicted in our lifetimes. Often the phenomenon of climate change is worsening when states pursue a monolithic economy which further deprives citizens from what the Nobel Laureate- Amartya Sen, in his work Poverty and Famine, calls social entitlements.

Of course when such happens, it often leads to some

structural violence as a response to corrupt governance and social deprivation. The UNDP report argues that what we do today about climate change has consequences that will last a century or more. The part of that change that is due to greenhouse gas emissions is not reversible in the foreseeable future. The heat trapping gases we send into the atmosphere in 2008 will stay there until 2108 and beyond. We are therefore making choices today that will affect our own lives, but even more so the lives of our children and grandchildren. This makes climate change different and more difficult than other policy challenges. (Human Development Report 2008). Twenty years ago Chico Mendes, the Brazilian environmentalist, died attempting to defend the Amazon rainforest against destruction. Before his death, he spoke of the ties that bound his local struggle to a global movement for social justice: Quoting him in 2007, the UNDP Human Development Report notes: â&#x20AC;&#x153;At first I thought I was fighting to save rubber trees, then I thought I was fighting to save the Amazon rainforest. Now I realize I am fighting for humanity.â&#x20AC;? Indeed the battle against dangerous climate change is part of the fight for humanity. Winning that battle will require farreaching changes at many levelsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in consumption, in how we produce and price energy, and in international cooperation. Above all, though, it will require far-reaching changes in how we think

ecological interdependence, about social justice for the world’s poor, and about the human rights and entitlements of future generations. In her technical position paper, Cammack (2007) argued about diminishing the socio-economic threats posed by climate change must include the sort of analysis used to design aid interventions in conflict-ridden and particularly difficult to develop countries. She outlined Four key lessons learned in the past decade or so by development specialists which in her view, were particularly relevant: I. The problems of fragile states – Climate change is already recognised as a threat multiplier, but analysis would be improved if the discussion were placed within the context of fragile states. Why fragile states — which are variously defined as poor performers, conflict and/or postconflict states — function differently from other countries, and why they have trouble absorbing and using aid effectively are key questions that should be considered by anyone planning to assist communities that are already weak, or are being weakened by climate change. Analysts working on resilience and climate change are furthest ahead, but even they acknowledge that issues of power and social equity are being given insufficient weight. It does little good to say that peace-building is necessary and that communities should participate, unless there is an understanding of the long-standing constraints upon both. How to tackle problems related to strengthening weak capacity, state-building, sequencing of assistance, and addressing conflict have already been thought through by fragile-state specialists, and their lessons should be considered by those working on climate change. II. Understanding informal governance It is now understood by governance specialists ‘Discussion about how to address climate change at local levels is often devoid of politics.’that decision-making around the use of state resources

in many poorly performing states is driven by informal relations and private incentives (including patronage, clientelism, and ethnicity), rather than formal state institutions that are underpinned by equity and the rule of law. These actions are rooted in domestic social structures and therefore undermine political systems and structures that appear to function according to rational-legal rules. Because outsiders (e.g. donors) have relatively little influence over those deep social forces that induce or hinder change, adoption of reforms is dependent on domestic institutions and incentives being in place that motivate state leaders and citizens to take action. Political economy analysis (such as DFIDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Drivers of Change, or Swedenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Power Analysis) have provided insights into the underlying systems that determine whether new initiatives are likely to work. Similar studies can identify the entry points for intervention that are the most likely to be successful. III. The difficulty in effecting social change Underdevelopment is often linked to long-term collective-action problems, where societies are incapable of working together to address issues that affect their wellbeing and hinder progress. Also, communities under pressure are less likely to develop the technical and social ingenuity needed to solve problems; as conditions deteriorate, there is less scope for finding solutions. Many communities are resistant to change, rejecting innovation and new ways of thinking. Developmental change is painfully slow mostly because cultural change is required, and this is incremental. Analysts therefore look to the developmental state to create incentives to promote transformation. But in many of the least developed and most fragile states the regimes and institutions in place are anything but developmental. How then, can we expect them to take on board the urgency of the climate-change agenda, to assume a facilitative role, and to find the will

to design appropriate interventions, to use funding honestly, and to implement an adaptation agenda? IV. Changes in aid delivery Finally, because poverty has been so persistent in some parts of the world, and because aid has often been ineffective in addressing it, the donor community has undertaken reform of it its own aid-delivery mechanisms. This culminated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. It promotes recipient-country ownership of the development agenda, donor alignment with both the priorities and goals set by aid-receiving countries, an increased reliance on national administrative systems, more streamlined and harmonised actions among donors in a country, as well as mutual accountability and an emphasis on management-for-results. The profound changes to aid delivery being shaped by this agenda need to be transferred to the mechanisms for providing aid to combat climate change. Also relevant are discussions about scaling-up aid â&#x20AC;&#x201D; how to double aid to Africa, for instance, while developing the local absorptive capacity to use it well, and without harming domestic fiscal stability. Studies on aid architecture are meaningful for those designing rational and effective methods for delivering massive amounts of climate change funds. Ensuring that all state activities support similar outcomes is also vital. Technical solutions are not enough. Evaluation frameworks are being designed to assess the resilience and adaptability of countries and populations to climate change. These will be used by scientists to tell us what affected nations must do, and how outsiders can help. But technical solutions alone will simply not work in many poorly performing countries. Political economists must study the deeply-rooted, domestic socio-political constraints to change; the capacity (or lack of capacity) of societies and governments to absorb resources; the impact of incomplete nation-building and state-building processes; the collective-action

problems that make communities resistant to development; and the links between underdevelopment, state fragility and climate change. Aid specialists need to design methods of delivering aid to climate change-affected states that avoid the shortcomings of existing development assistance. Only then will climate change interventions have a chance of being successful. 2.2. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL Writing in 2008 article title “Cooling It: The World Acts to Slow Global Warming” Schneider, a Professor of biological sciences at Stanford University in California and the author of many books, including The Genesis Strategy: Climate and Global Survival, The Coevolution of Climate and Life, and Laboratory Earth: The Planetary Gamble We Can't Afford to Lose, wrote thus: At the December 1997 international summit in Kyoto, Japan, world leaders for the first time agreed to specific targets and rough timetables for reducing “greenhouse gas” emissions. Scientists have long warned that such emissions could cause significant global warming (an increase in the earth's surface temperature) in the decades ahead. However, negotiations among summit participants were marked by deep contention and disagreement. Heated debate is thus likely to continue for years as various government officials, environmentalists, industry advocates, and scientists attempt to influence ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in national capitals around the globe. (Schneider 2008). Schneider notes that the Third Conference of Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, as the Kyoto summit was formally named, culminated five years of international wrangling to fashion a worldwide solution to the problem of global warming. The meeting had its origins in the United Nation's (UN's) 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. At that

conference, treaty signatories pledged to prevent “dangerous” human interference with the global climate system, although no clear definition of “dangerous” was agreed upon. The summit was held at the massive Kyoto Conference Center, located on an artificial lake and framed by late fall-colored hills. Thousands of diplomats, nongovernmental organization (NGO) observers, journalists, and political leaders from more than 150 nations attended the summit. National delegates and several luminaries, including Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan and Vice President Al Gore of the United States, delivered formal statements in the center's gigantic main hall, Schneider added. Schneider recalled that although the opening speeches of high government officials drew large crowds, the hall was sparsely populated most of the time, since each delegate's speech could be seen in multiple languages at television monitors situated throughout the immense complex. While speeches were being delivered, interviews, press conferences, private negotiations, strategy sessions, and political negotiations were also taking place. Outside ,colorful posters and sculptures greeted delegates. Greenpeace, an international environmental group, provided a memorable work of art dubbed a “fossil-fuel dinosaur.” A mock-up of Tyrannosaurus rex, the sculpture was assembled from used car parts, gas pumps, and other symbols of carbon dioxideemitting machinery. Other artwork included ice sculptures of penguins that melted at the delegates' feet, symbolizing the melting of the polar ice caps and the alleged threat posed for Antarctic birds. Prior to the Kyoto summit, at least five vocal “sides” representing distinct economic, political, and national perspectives vied for momentum. Environmentalists, proposing sharp emission reductions in industrialized nations, battled the fossil fuel industry, which sought minimal reductions and the full participation of developing nations. Industrialized nations disagreed

among themselves, as well, with large greenhouse gas producers, such as the United States and Japan, fighting for limited immediate emission reductions, and Europe supporting deep cuts. Finally, developing countries, which have blamed industrialized nations for causing most of the emissions buildup, demanded that steep emission reductions be imposed on the developed world while largely exempting themselves, a position supported by Europe but strongly opposed by the United States. Elements of these different positions contain important components of an effective global climate treaty. However, in the opinion of some experts, none of the positions provided for the single most important action that fairness, economic efficiency, and environmental protection demand: that polluters cease to use the atmosphere as a free sewer. Prior to Kyoto, the European Union (EU) agreed to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions within Europe as a whole. Under their plan, less developed European nations, such as Portugal, would be permitted to emit more than the EU average, so long as other nations in Europe picked up the slack. Their original proposal would roll back emissions to 15 percent below 1990 levels for the entire EU by 2010. The Europeans had sharp words for the United States and Japan, who they portrayed as unwilling to make sacrifices considered necessary for the sake of the planet. The EU also argued that developing countries be exempted from Kyoto's initial round of reductions, since they needed time to catch up economically with industrialized nations. The Developing World Developing countries portrayed themselves as victimized once again by the wealthier industrialized nations. On one hand, these countries believe they have the most to lose from continued global warming. Because much of the developing world occupies warmer regions, where many species of crops and domesticated animals live at the upper limit of their natural

temperature tolerances, higher temperatures could lead to widespread livestock declines and crop failures. Moreover, unlike the industrialized world, most developing nations lack the capital and infrastructure to develop new varieties of heat-tolerant crops and animals, build flood control systems, and deploy disaster relief when needed. The United States The United States arrived in Kyoto acknowledging the fossil fuel industry's argument that slowing global warming required a global solution. The U.S. delegation called for all nations, developed and developing, to accept binding emission reductions. United States negotiators also strongly backed a tradeable permit system for carbon dioxide emissions. After national emission caps were negotiated, the system could give various industries within each country specific emission allotments. Those industries that reduced pollution and did not use up their allotments would be allowed to sell their remaining allotments to others. In addition, the United States called for funding to subsidize alternative energy technologies on the order of $5 billion a year for five years, a figure that President Bill Clinton increased to $6 billion in his January 1998 State of the Union address. The subsidies would be used to spur the development of more efficient, clean-energy technologies. However, U.S. negotiators carefully avoided discussing any direct mechanisms to increase the price of polluting fuels relative to the price of cleaner alternatives. The Kyoto Compromise Remarkably, despite strong disagreement, endless negotiations, and widespread confusion, a compromise emerged in the waning hours of the ten-day summit. This occurred shortly after Vice President Gore unexpectedly departed from his prepared text to instruct the U.S. delegation to adopt a â&#x20AC;&#x153;more flexibleâ&#x20AC;? negotiating position. Many hailed what emerged as a diplomatic

miracle. Others claimed the protocol would curb only a tiny fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions and could be regarded as a success only if it was the first in a series of truly global actions to address global warming. The Kyoto Protocol calls for 38 industrialized nations to reduce their emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. The United States, which currently emits more than 20 percent of the world's carbon dioxide from fossil fuels, agreed to a 7 percent cut below 1990 levels, while 15 nations of the EU committed themselves to an 8 percent reduction. Japan agreed to a 6 percent cut. The pact does not require any binding emission reductions for developing countries, but subsequent rounds of negotiations were set up to consider this and other issues in the years ahead. The United States argued strenuously for the participation of developing countries in â&#x20AC;&#x153;joint implementationâ&#x20AC;? activities. Such activities include investments made by developed nations to lower emissions in developing countries. Developed nations would get credit for emission reductions even though the reductions themselves occurred elsewhere. The rationale for this is that industrialized countries already have relatively efficient production processes making it cheaper, per unit of emissions, to invest in reductions in developing countries. A limited version of this plan was approved at Kyoto, but many critical details have yet to be negotiated. There is no deadline for the politically tricky process of treaty ratification. In the United States, the administration of President Bill Clinton will likely defer submission of the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate until it is more politically opportune than at present. One thing is certain: The ratification battle will see a continuation of the partisan and ideological sparring that marked the pre-Kyoto confusion.( Schneider 2008).

The Scientific Imperative Studies have established a relationship between Climate Change and the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Before the Industrial Revolution began in the mid-1700s, there were about 280 molecules of carbon dioxide per million molecules of air (abbreviated as parts per million, or ppm. By 2007 it has gone up to 379ppm (IPCC, 2007). This is in addition to methane which is emitted into the atmosphere during the mining of coal and the production and transport of natural gas and oil. Methane also comes from rotting organic matter in landfills, rice paddies, and wetlands, as well as from animals that chew the cud, especially cows, as a byproduct of digestion. Live plants also emit small amounts of methane. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the amount of methane in the atmosphere has more than doubled. Methane traps nearly 30 times more heat than the same amount of carbon dioxide. Compared to carbon dioxide, methane appears in lower concentrations in the atmosphere and remains in the atmosphere for a shorter time. In total, methane contributes about a third as much as carbon dioxide to global warming. Although the scope of this study has limited itself only to CO2 as one of the six major greenhouse gases recognized by the so-called Kyoto Basket. Thus to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, global emissions would need to be cut significantlyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;on the order of 70 to 80 percent. If efforts are not made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, carbon dioxide is projected to reach concentrations more than double or even triple the level prior to the Industrial Revolution by 2100. In a higher-emissions scenario carbon dioxide is projected to reach 970 ppm by 2100, more than tripling preindustrial concentrations. In a lower-emissions scenario, carbon dioxide is projected to reach 540 ppm by 2100, still almost doubling preindustrial concentrations (IPCC, 2007). The same source cautioned that even if greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere ceases growing, the

climate would continue to warm for an extended period as a result of past emissions, and with more dramatic effects than were observed during the 20th century. If greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase, scientists project severe climate changes. At the Instance of the Bali Conference on Climate Change, Cammack (2007:1) notes that Climate change has reached the top of the international agenda even while debates about its causes, consequences, timing, trajectory and remedies continue. Technologists and planners are devising ways of mitigating and adapting to climate change in advance of its full impact. Financial experts are exploring the impact of climate change on trade and investment, the cost of climate change and the cost of addressing it. Development specialists are beginning to plan for the impact that climate change will have on social services and public goods. Meanwhile defence specialists are studying the security threat that climate change poses – labelled by the UK Chief Scientist as ‘more serious than even the threat of terrorism’. Post-conflict analysts are linking peacebuilding and adaptation to climate change. (Cammack 2007: 1). Cammack posits that there are two problems with many of these discussions. First, they tend to run in parallel, with experts talking past one another, and many not listening to those outside their own disciplines. Second, discussions about how to address climate change at local levels are often devoid of politics. For instance, delegates attending a UN debate on climate change earlier this year focused almost exclusively on the expected developmental impact and the need for financial support to tackle it. The lack of public interest and disengagement of relevant actors in the UN climate negotiations (UNFCCC) has – in light of the rise of the G-20 as the new and powerful global governance forum – the potential to conceal what is really at stake. If the G-20 is “the premier forum for international economic development”1 and we are serious about stopping climate change, we

have to ensure that G-20 politics do not undermine our objectives for the climate, the environment, poverty eradication, and global justice. (Fuhr et’al). Fuhr et’al (2011) posits that Political engagement in this changing climate requires entirely new thinking about strategies and alliances that, in our view, should build on the following considerations: There is no alternative to a legally binding agreement if we are serious about preventing dangerous climate change. The UNFCCC needs to be safeguarded as the central forum for negotiating climate politics; at the same time, we need to shift our focus to those fora and political agendas that are undermining serious climate efforts, specifically the G-20. At the same time, policies for national energy, economics, and development have to provide the groundwork for a global shift toward a safe climate future. International deadlock is no excuse for national inaction. Climate politics require new resource politics at the local, national, and international levels and need to move beyond a purely carbon perspective. The role of civil society in international climate politics today should focus on: rebuilding coalitions and developing a clear division of labor inside and outside of the UNFCCC, as well as across different thematic “silos” while taking into account changing geopolitics and global governance; refocusing advocacy efforts on the real spoilers and vested interests on the local, regional, and global levels; and, mobilizing global and local movements to reclaim the commons: the atmosphere, natural resources such as land, forests, biodiversity, and water, but also knowledge and public spaces. It is not by accident that one of the UN Millennium Development Goals is concerned with the relationship between economic and social development issues and those of the environment. Goal 7 is to integrate the principle of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the losses of environmental resources. (MacQueen 2010: 142). MacQueen

notes that over recent years concerns about the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s physical environment have increasingly become intertwined with questions of human development. Although global concerns with the environment is itself a recent phenomenon. Writing about the changing discourse in the international agenda, MacQueen (2010: 142) observed that the word Environment does not appear in the United Nations Charter, nor would anyone in 1945 expect it to. He added that the idea of world wide environmental risk let alone potential catastrophe was quite literally, the stuff of science fiction even into the 1960s. This notwithstanding however, the UN established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) in 1988, which was formed as a joint venture between the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), with the sole purpose of providing objective scientific information in an area which from the outset was highly contentious as many counter -argued the existence of Climate Change. The debate for and against went on until scientific data made Climate Change denial untenable. Then the debate shifted from the facts of rising temperatures to their causes. Skeptics still think that natural reasons for change, such as solar activities or simple historical oscillations in temperatures were advanced by those who for whatever reasons were unhappy with the idea that Climate Change was due to the burning of fossil fuel. Obviously, many vested interests were involved and the major oil companies were for clear reasons, at the fore-front of skepticism about the role of their products. Interestingly, the near hostile approach by the Bush Administration on emition limitation commitments was greeted with what MacQueen (2010: 155) describes as internal dissent when within the US, many individual states passed their own Anti Emission legislations in line with Kyoto requirements. And to further drive home the message of internal dissent, Al Gore, Clintonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Vice President at the time of the Kyoto Negotiations became a powerful and

vocal public voice for Climate Action through the instrumentality of his film, An Inconvenient Truth. Such consolidation of the IPCCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s campaign was crowned with a shared Nobel Prize between the Former Vice President Al Gore and the IPCC in 2007. Such encomium laid to rest the debating phase of climate change leaving room only for the era of action and collective response which is not without its own politics. The IPCC has been instrumental in shifting the discussion and the debate on, from these early unproductive brawls and in making the facts of man-made climate change a given in all serious debates about regulations. Yet this is only a bold first step in the tortuous, long and turbulent journey of the Politics of Climate Change Control. When awareness of threats began to emerge, however, the United Nations was quick to respond and has atleast since the early 1970s, provided real leadership in the area. The greatest environmental challenges are by their very nature global and transnational, and they can only be effectively met by coordinated action. Yet this essential coordination in the face of environmental challenge is burdened with some special difficulties. MacQueen laments that although this is an area where the acceptance of interdependence is essential if reciprocal benefits are to be achieved. It is also where it is very difficult to build collective motivation and unity of purpose. For one thing, adds MacQueen, it is possible and politically tempting-for countries simply to stand aside from generally agreed collective measures and leave the efforts and pains of restoring and protecting environmental stability to everyone else. Once achieved, the communal benefits that comes as a result of that effort and pain can still be enjoyed. Concerns over national image and prestige on the international stage which often drive compliance with other areas of international regulations can be overpowered by domestic pressure to protect particular industries in order to maintain established standards of living and lifestyle.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC) is an international environmental treaty produced at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the, Earth Summit in Rio-Dejanerio-Brazil from June 3 to 14, 1992. The objective of the treaty is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The treaty itself set no mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and contains no enforcement mechanisms. In that sense, the treaty is considered legally non-binding. Instead, the treaty provides for updates (called "protocols") that would set mandatory emission limits. The principal update is the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which has become much better known than the UNFCCC itself. The UNFCCC was opened for signature on May 9, 1992, after an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee produced the text of the Framework Convention as a report following its meeting in New York from April 30 to May 9, 1992. It entered into force on March 21, 1994. As of May 2011, UNFCCC has 195 parties. (UNFCCC 2009). The COPs Since the inception of the UNFCCC has gone through series of diplomatic deliberations and conferences from (COP 1, The Berlin mandate 1995, COP 2, Geneva Switzerland 1996, COP 3 The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 1997, COP 4 Buenos Aires 1998, COP 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and COP15 The Copenhagen Accord. The COP 16 held in Cancum Mexico City in 2010 which drew up the Cancum Agreement. (UNFCCC 2009). From then came the last COP, COP 17 at Durban South Africa where a second commitment Period was agreed for the Kyoto Protocol. Sadly, this was only a soft landing for partiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; inability to agree on a new treaty that will replace the Kyoto Protocol which initially was meant to expire in 2012.

It is a matter of concern that of the numerous conferences of parties held annually from the founding of the UNFCCC in 1992, it is rather unsatisfactory that only one of such many COPs (COP 3 held in Kyoto 1997) has been able to draw up treaty that is somewhat legally binding in principle – But even the Kyoto Protocol could barely find expression on the platform of the UNFCCC. And no sooner than the protocol had been drawn did it become a ‘lame or toothless dog’ when in 2001 bigger emitters like the U.S. bluffed and backed out of Kyoto or the Kyoto Protocol with impunity only to be followed by Canada in 2011 at Durban. Yet these are giant emitters though not of equal standing. Similarly, the composition of nation-states into the three main categories of the parties to the UNFCCC’s Annex I, II, and Non Annex I, all together have continue to be basis for conflict, scepticism and distrust among states. Consequently, this phenomena has tended to undermine the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC/the KP. Thus the requirement for ratification of the KP was such that the treaty can only go into effect, if it was ratified by at least 55 countries and by enough industrialized nations to account for at least 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. It entered into force on March 21, 1994. As of May 2011, UNFCCC has 194 parties. Although the United States initially helped negotiate the treaty, the administration of President George W. Bush withdrew its support when it took office in 2001. The Bush administration said the treaty would hurt the United States economically and gave too many advantages to developing countries. Because the United States accounts for about 35 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, its withdrawal from the protocol meant that the treaty could not go into force unless Russia, the next largest polluter at 17 percent, ratified the agreement. By August 2004, 126 countries had ratified the agreement but the ratifying industrial nations only accounted

for 44 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Then in September 2004 the cabinet of Russian president Vladimir Putin approved the treaty, and it went into force in 2005. 2.2.1 THE IPCC The UNFCCC Secretariat, augmented through the parallel efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), aims to gain consensus through meetings and the discussion of various strategies. The parties to the convention have met annually from 1995 in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to address with climate change. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was drafted and established legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.(The UNFCCC 2011) Concerning the Conference of the Parties here is an outline of what had been the fate of climate change in the present and past negotiations. Writing in 2008, the IPCC via its website, articulated on its own web site, its founding mandate, aims and objectives as follows: The IPCC was established to provide the decision-makers and others interested in climate change, with an objective source of technical information about climate change. The IPCC conducts research and monitors climate related data or parameters. Its role is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the latest scientific, technical and socioeconomic literature produced worldwide relevant to the understanding of the risk of humaninduced climate change, its observed and projected impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. IPCC reports should be neutral with respect to policy, although they need to deal objectively with policy relevant scientific, technical and socio economic factors. They should be of high scientific and technical standards, and aim to reflect a range of views, expertise and wide geographical coverage." The IPCC is indeed a child of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;circumstanceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. It emerged in the heated

debate in the 80s and 90s as to whether global warming and climate change was occurring or not. Not even the scientific community was left out in these poignant debates. And thus emerged the IPCC to provide technical and objective directions to the United Nations and by extension, the international community as to where the scientific fact lies. They are meant to "reflect a range of views, expertise and wide geographical coverage". "Why the IPCC was created Climate change is a very complex issue: policymakers need an objective source of information about the causes of climate change, its potential environmental and socio-economic consequences and the adaptation and mitigation options to respond to it. This is why WMO and UNEP established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988." At present, it would appear there no room for any reasonable doubt about whether climate change is happening or not. In fact there is no doubt at the moment that there is "human-induced climate change". With the clarity in this doubt however, the IPCC is now committed to the science of adaption and mitigation which still leaves much to be desired as there’s still a lot more to be done in this aspect. 2.2.2. THE COPs/MOPs Olivas, Gagnon-Lebrun , and Figueres (2005) in their work Navigating the COP and MOP cited the Honorable Stéphane Dion, Environment Minister, Government of Canada during the Conference in Canada as saying: Canada is honoured to host the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Montreal. The Conference comes at a crucial juncture in the global effort to address climate change. Climate change is an issue that transcends most others in terms of its complexity and potential impact – a profound yet unquantified effect on ecosystems, species, air and water quality, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and human health. This Conference will be the first meeting of the 156 Members to the Kyoto Protocol since it came into effect on February 16

of this year. As such, Montreal 2005 will stand as a milestone in the history of international climate change negotiations. This will also be the 11th conference of all 189 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, with as many as 10,000 participants expected, is set to be the largest intergovernmental climate conference since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997. Dion added that the document offers a wealth of information about the process and procedures. It will be a key reference tool for all those who seek a fuller understanding of the global communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts to achieve its objective with respect to climate change Olivas H. Gagnon-Lebrun F. and Figueres C. (2005: 1) note that the February 2005 entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol has added one more layer of complexity to the already multifaceted international climate negotiations. Until then, climate negotiations were held exclusively under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, however, negotiations will now be held in parallel sessions under both the COP and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP). Olivas etâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;al (2005:2) maintained that the COP/MOP is the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol and carries the responsibility for its implementation. The COP/MOP is to be scheduled during the same twoweek period, in the same venue, and with almost the same participants as the COP. Yet the COP/MOP must deliberate separately, as it is a distinct governing body. The first COP/MOP was held in Montreal, Canada, from November 28 to December 9, 2005. Olivas etâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;al notes that this is a historical event marking an important threshold in the evolution of the climate change regime. The Kyoto Protocol is the first instrument in the history of the UNFCCC to set quantified commitments to Parties, and COP/MOP. This is the first time highranking government representatives from all over the world met as the governing body of the

Protocol and with the single explicit purpose of ensuring its implementation. At the same time however, the COP/MOP embodies the most critical weakness of the current regime. Non-Parties to the Kyoto Protocol cannot actively participate in its governing body except as observers. Therefore, given the fact that the United States and Australia chose to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, the COP/MOP demarcates a political division previously non-existent within the group of industrialized countries. This schism is one of the main challenges to the further evolution of the regime. From an organizational perspective, the initiation of annual COP/MOP meetings is understandably challenging to all participants. As noted Olivas et’al, the novelty of this binary process – COP and COP/MOP – deserves careful consideration by all Parties Navigating the COP/MOP and observers. Participants will need to evaluate how their strategies might need to be adapted to this new reality, examine how the relative leverage of different coalitions may be affected under the COP/MOP process, and assess new lobbying techniques to adapt to these changes. Helping participants understand these variations is the rationale behind this guide. Navigating COP/MOP is meant to be a user-friendly guide to this new governing body. The guide focuses solely on process and does not analyze issues to be negotiated at COP/MOP.3 Readers are led first through the procedures of the meeting itself and then through the structure of the COP/MOP process. Finally the guide presents a forward-looking perspective on the COP/MOP. Offering this guide as a compass for navigating the new challenges, the authors wish all participants a productive and creative inaugural session in Montreal. Describing the structure of the COP and the COP/MOP, Olivas et’al (2005: 5) posits that they are legally distinct and therefore follow separate agendas provided by the Secretariat. COP and COP/MOP will meet separately during the sessional period, except for a few joint sessions, such

as the Welcoming Ceremony and part of the High- Level Segment. Neither the COP nor the COP/MOP will take decisions during joint sessions. Olivas etâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;al notes that COP and COP/MOP sessions will be organized so that related items can be dealt with in proximity. If Parties decide to consider related UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol items jointly, this will also be possible. The two Subsidiary Bodies willl address UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol items within their usual sessions. Only one provisional agenda will be prepared for each body. However, UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol items will be clearly identified in the Subsidiary Bodies agendas, as only Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can participate in decisions on COP/MOP related issues. In Subsidiary Body meetings, Parties will also be allowed to decide if some UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol items should be considered jointly. For practical reasons, Parties may express a preference for joint consideration of items that are common to both UNFCCC and the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at COP 3 in 1997 to strengthen the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol rests on the UNFCCC institutional structure and aims to contribute to the achievement of the Conventionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ultimate objective. The Kyoto Protocol is a legally binding instrument that sets quantified reduction or limitation targets of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for developed countries and countries undergoing an economic transition. These targets are to be achieved over the first commitment period, 2008-2012. Summarizes the milestones that led to the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on February 16, 2005. As of October 31, 2005, 194 countries had ratified the UNFCCC Only 6 countries in the world have not ratified the Convention: Andorra, Brunei Darussalam, Holy See, Iraq, Somalia and Timor Leste. Of the countries that are Parties to the Convention, 156 (or80%) are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.

Organization of the COP/MOP It is logical to ask the question-Who can participate in the COP/MOP? Based on the information in FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/1. is straight about the answers. Only States that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and thus are Parties to it can participate in the decisionmaking processes at COP/MOP. However States that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can participate as observers and therefore cannot speak during the plenary negotiating sessions. In a similar manner, only States that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol participate in the Subsidiary Body deliberations on matters related to the Kyoto Protocol; other States can only participate as observers. This, the researcher things is a misplaced priority of elevating the culprit to the ‘high’’ table as a distinguished guest’. A situation where the main polluters of global environment are made the occupy the top echelon of conference discourse while the ‘innocent’ is welcomed only as an observer leaves much to be desired. The Kyoto Protocol commits developed countries – those included in the Annex I of the Convention – to individual, legally-binding targets to limit or reduce their GHG emissions, as listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B. However, there are three exceptions to this rule. Two Annex I countries – Belarus and Turkey – are not listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B as they did not take on an emission limitation or reduction commitment. This is because they were not Parties to the Convention when the Protocol was adopted. Belarus has now ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but Turkey has not. Belarus has requested to be assigned an emission target and be included in Annex B of the Protocol. Furthermore, Kazakhstan, although a Non-Annex I country, had declared that it wished to be bound by the commitments of Annex I Parties under the Convention and the Protocol upon its entry into force.11 Kazakhstan will not be added to Annex B, since it did not request to be included; to do so now would require an amendment to the

Protocol, as no specific provisions exist within the agreement to add countries to the list in the Annex. Observers Olivas et’al (2005: 5) goes on to say that any country not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol and non state actors – environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), research NGOs, industry and business NGOs, other type of NGOs as well as intergovernmental organizations – can attend the COP/MOP as observers, unless it is decided otherwise by the COP/MOP. Observers are allowed to speak in formal meetings and can submit written proposals, but cannot vote. The possibility for observers to intervene throughout the sessions has varied over time depending on the preference of the presiding officer. Observers are not allowed to attend closed meetings and may be excluded from certain other meetings. Their admission and participation are subject to the Rules of Procedure. Seating Arrangement Olivas et’al (2005: 9) notes that Seating arrangements for parties will remain the same for the COP, the COP/MOP and the High-Level Segment. COP and COP/MOP sessions: COP sessions are not to be held simultaneously to COP/MOP sessions. New nomenclature: COP/MOP documents use the prefix FCCC/KP/CMP, whereas COP documents use FCCC/CP. Other abbreviations used in the nomenclature, such as INF., Misc., Add. and Corr., will continue to be used for COP/MOP documents. Similarly,

accreditation to participate in COPs will

Furthermore, Olivas & Figures (2005: 11), speaking on the Rules of Procedures says It is standard practice to adopt rules of procedure to provide structure and direction to the formal negotiations and decision-making process. Rules usually secure the right of all Parties to have a voice. Respecting these rules is important for the smooth proceeding of the negotiations. The Kyoto Protocol states that the rules of procedure of the COP should also apply to the COP/MOP, unless Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decide otherwise at COP/MOP. However, the COP has not yet adopted the rules of procedure. Two rules still cause disagreement. The first relates to regional representation at the Bureau and how to make it equitable (Rule 22, paragraph 1), and the second concerns the voting arrangements for decisions on matters of substance (Rule 42, paragraph 1). The COP has been applying draft Rule 22, but not draft Rule 42. In the absence of a final rule on decision-making, all decisions are taken by consensus, meaning that a decision is adopted unless one or more Parties explicitly object to it. In 2002, Parties have expressed the view that the draft rules of procedure of the COP should also be applied by the COP/MOP, with the exception of draft Rule 42 As a result, all decisions at COP/MOP are taken by consensus until Rule 42, or an alternative, is adopted. 2.2.3. THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES The COP is the supreme body responsible for reviewing and making decisions on the implementation of the Convention, including any related legal instruments that the COP adopts such as the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the COP will serve as the meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol and fulfill the same type of functions as those prescribed to the COP under the Convention.

2.2.4. THE UNFCCC SECRETARIAT The UNFCCC Secretariat is responsible for coordinating and organizing the annual meetings of the COPs, the COP/MOP and bodies involved in the intergovernmental processes (such as SBSTA, SBI, Article 6 Supervisory Committee, CDM Executive Board, Compliance Committee) Some of the Secretariatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s services include: preparing meeting agendas, organizing the multiple events during meetings, providing interpretation and translation services, reproduction and distribution of documents, recording of meetings, providing the COP and COP/MOP Bureaus with recommendations, etc. . At least two main aspects will have to be considered. First, decisions would need to be made about how the new instrument would account for under- or over-compliance with Kyoto Protocol targets. Second, a decision would need to be taken with respect to whether the flexibility mechanisms (CDM, JI and Emissions Trading) will continue to exist, and if so in what form. Both of these carry-over issues would need to be addressed should Parties contemplate adopting another instrument after 2012. The healthy evolution of the climate regime therefore depends to a great extent on ensuring an appropriate transition beyond the first commitment period. Thus, the COP/MOP has an important role to play not only in the successful implementation of the Protocol itself, but, perhaps more importantly, in demonstrating that the regime 2.3. CONFLICT OF PARTIES The most awaited United Nations climate change conference (COP 17/CMP 7) started in Durban, South Africa on 28 November 2011 with the slogan working Together Today, Saving Tomorrow.(Earth Times 2011) Second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol and design of Green Climate Fund along with legal architecture of decisions are hot topics everyone was waiting to hear about in the COP17 besides others. The decision on the second commitment of

Kyoto is crucial as the first commitment period was to expire in 2012. Major parties to Kyoto, including Japan, Russia, and Canada, have already signaled that they will not take on a second commitment because China and the United States—the world’s top two polluters—are not included in it. The European Union (EU) is prepared to sign up for a second round, but it insists that major developing countries, whose emissions are surging as their economies grow, must embrace and follow through on real commitments. The EU’s preference is to negotiate “a single global and comprehensive legally binding instrument” including all emitters, though it would countenance an “interim” solution whereby major emerging countries would accept a “road map” and timetable for treaty commitments. Even this fall-back position faces resistance from the so-called “BASIC” caucus—Brazil, South Africa, India, and China—who are disinclined to accept binding targets that might jeopardize their domestic growth and development goals. Beside these Durban also discussed on modalities and structure of committees under Adaptation Framework and Technology mechanism. Criteria of selection and detail work plan of Climate Technology Center (CTC) and diverse views on National Adaptation plan (NAP) are other challenges to be finalized by Durban. (Knowledge Aliance 2011v). 2.3.1. THE NUMERICAL POWER OF DELEGATES/REPS OF LDC/ SKILLS AND EXPOSURE OF DELEGATES At issue is the often checkered nature of proportionality in the representation by delegates of states at the Conferences of parties (COP). Often the so called Less Developed Countries (LDC) seldom can afford to sponsor an adequate number of delegates to represent them at the conference due in part, to dearth in the financial means to do so. And where few delegates are sponsored by the states of such LDC, issues of incompetence and poor exposure to the somewhat technical issues that often characterize discussions on Climate Change, strategies of adaptation

and mitigation as well as the challenge of not understanding the pros and cons of international politics, and diplomacy in global affairs. As noted Chandani (2011) in a project of the International Institute for Environment and Development’s Reflect & act series: “Supporting Less Developed Country Negotiators in the UNFCCC Negotiations”. In Chandani ( 2011). Ed. Helping UN Negotiotors Protect the Poorest Reflect & act series. IIED July 2011. Negotiators from low-income countries need support to shape global solutions to Climate Change. Chandani argued that the UN climate change negotiations are beehives of intense activity. Parallel negotiating sessions, contact groups, drafting sessions and side events all contribute to the complexity. During high-stake conferences like the one held in Copenhagen in 2009, negotiators labour through deadlocked allnight meetings. Adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and finance are just a few of the controversial and technically challenging issues on the table. The UNFCCC process itself imposes an additional labyrinth that participants must learn. Thus to meet these demands, and participate in the negotiations effectively, Chandani posits that countries need talented teams of negotiators and expert advisors. The most powerful countries send dozens of delegates: Japan’s team has 114 members, and the United States has 155. But Gambia, which leads the 48 countries in the least developed countries (LDC) group, has only four. For the poorest countries, the UN provides funds to support just two delegates. IIED saw an urgent need to strengthen the negotiating teams from the LDCs. Even in a system with one vote per country, the vast gaps in negotiating teams, along with uneven knowledge and technical support for LDC delegations, lead to unfair outcomes that hurt the most vulnerable. For example, the Copenhagen meeting created a US$30 billion Fund with ‘balanced allocation’ between climate change adaptation and mitigation in developing countries over 2010–2012. But countries desperate for adaptation

support were unable to lock away funds for that purpose. Of the money disbursed so far, only around one tenth has been allocated for adaptation. Much mitigation funding has gone to rapidly growing economies and economies in transition such as China and Malaysia. Left behind as noted Chandani, are nations that face grave threats from climate change but scarcely contribute to the problem. To address such inequity, IIED as part of the European Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI) introduced bursaries to support more delegates from poor countries. This program allowed bursary holders to participate in negotiations over several years, as well as in regional workshops where they met with other decision makers and discussed strategies for upcoming UNFCCC conferences in an informal, friendly setting. Such meetings helped strengthen understanding and connections among policymakers and assisted countries’ efforts to build national expertise on technical aspects of the negotiations, funding mechanisms and adaptation plans. Speaking for IIED Chandani remarked thus; “We also gathered LDC negotiators together with their leaders — the chairs of the Africa group and LDC group, for instance — immediately before UNFCCC meetings, to discuss key topics and plan their negotiating positions. We found that the continuity of the workshops, which since 2007 have drawn more than 300 participants, was crucial to their success. Generally, one workshop was sufficient to raise awareness, but it took multiple meetings to see knowledge develop and relationships blossom”. Speaking on the challenges and prospects in IIED’s gab-filling initiatives Chandani notes: We commissioned 25 briefing papers for the workshops, covering contentious issues as well as important negotiation processes, players and tactics. Initially, we planned to rely on Northern authors with abundant resources and technical knowledge. But we soon realised that the writing process offered another opportunity to strengthen Southern capacity and ownership of outcomes. We therefore partnered Southern and Northern authors on each paper. In effect, this created more knowledgeable, specialised experts within low-income countries.

In many LDC negotiation teams, each individual covers not only the multifaceted climate debate, but other UN environmental conventions such as those on ozone and biodiversity. The bursary programme served to create additional subject specialists. In 2010, bursaries funded eight delegates to climate conferences from Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Nepal, Sudan and Tanzania, who otherwise would not have been able to attend. Each chose a specific topic to follow in the negotiations. One bursary recipient who focused on technology transfer became the new coordinator in that area for the LDC group; others were instrumental in shaping LDC negotiating positions. The new delegates credited the bursaries and workshops, in part, for a marked rise in the group’s influence. The programme’s impact spread further at regional workshops, where UN delegates held discussions with policymakers and government officials about translating international policy to national and local levels, and vice versa. A meeting in Senegal produced the Dakar Resolution, an unprecedented agreement between parliamentarians from West African countries recognizing the importance of regional cooperation on climate change and calling for consultations among experts, ministers, heads of state and others to develop shared negotiating positions aimed at a fair international solution. In the project’s next phase, we will put greater emphasis on workshops linking national and international policymaking. We are seeking funds to continue and expand the bursary program, so that bursary-holders who have grown into seasoned experts can mentor a new cohort of junior delegates. And we will follow up on emerging issues, such as the Green Climate Fund established after the 2010 conference in Cancun, Mexico City, with briefings and other technical support to the LDC group. The influence of these delegations is higher now than in 2007 or even 2009, and with ongoing support, poor countries struggling with climate change can keep pressing hard to get their needs met in the UN. (Chandani 2011). 2.3.2. EQUITY AND PROPORTIONALITY OF COMMITMENT As noted Camilla Toulmin, the Director of the International Institute for Environment and Development at the Rio+20 Conference “We live in an era of unprecedented wealth and extraordinary technical prowess, ever more connected across the globe through a web of economic, environmental and communication links. Yet extremes of wealth and life chances

within and between nations are greater than ever.â&#x20AC;? For every advance in material wealth, its converse is plain to see in extremes of hunger and impoverishment alongside obesity and overconsumption. Toulmin (2012:1) argues that the costs of the financial crash four years ago show how the pursuit of individual greed can wreak havoc on broader society. We have access to more evidence and information than ever before which show the risks we are running to environmental and social stability. Yet the will to act on our knowledge and understanding of these risks is sapped by inertia, shortsightedness and interests lobbying to keep things as they are. Toulmin went further to say Rio+20 in June offers a vitally needed arena to urge a change in direction and gear our economic model to generate fair shares, within a stable and resilient planet. ( Toulmin 2012). The argument for the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the commitment of parties to adaptation and mitigation has been the acceptable by stakeholders although not without dissenting views. 2.3.3. STATE CENTRICISM AND ROLES OF MNCS The type of economic enterprise that concerns us in this analysis is the small number of corporations that exert an excessive influence over many aspects of global economic, political and social life. They operate in multiple countries, in all commercial markets and share similar business models, assumptions and structures. The vast majority of corporations are publicly traded and their shares are mainly owned by other corporations, senior board members, a few wealthy stake holders and, indirectly, the public through investment institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds. As notes Makwana (2006) these corporations thrive best in an economy where market forces determine the production, price and supply of goods and services. This fact is mirrored in the prevailing attitude to the economy that dominant governments, economists and industrialists

maintain. The argument is that centrally planned economies are less efficient and are unresponsive to consumer demand. They argue that to achieve efficiency, government intervention needs to be reduced to a minimum and the democratic, public control of the economy minimized. Thus, free trade and neoliberal policies are being actively promoted through international bodies such as the WTO, World Bank and IMF. Makwana (2006) laments that many of these unaccountable corporations now have a greater turnover than the GDP of most countries. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 52 are corporations and 48 are countries, and these corporations have sales figures between $51 billion and $247 billion. Seventy percent of world trade is controlled by just 500 of the largest industrial corporations, and in 2002, the top 200 had combined sales equivalent to 28% of world GDP. However, these 200 corporations only employed 0.82% of the global work force, highlighting the reduction in employment created by excessive economies of scale. In the US, ninety-eight percent of all companies account for only 25 percent of business activity; the remaining two percent account for nearly 75 percent of the remaining activity. The top 500 industrial corporations, which represent only one-tenth of one percent of all US companies, control over two-thirds of the business resources in the US and collect over 70 percent of all US profits. Thus there is also a disproportionate distribution of financial benefit from economic activity, which clearly does not pass to local communities through opportunity or wages. It is retained instead by a small number of major shareholders of an even smaller number of corporations. (Makwana 2006). Whereas corporations are based mainly in affluent countries such as the US, the EU, Japan, Canada and Australia, their key markets, productive facilities and many of their resources are based in or extracted from developing countries. According to the International Finance

Corporation (IFC), inflows of foreign direct investment to the emerging markets have grown by an average of 23 percent per year between 1990 and 2000. The combined value of stock markets in emerging economies is set to exceed $5 trillion in 2006, and has more than doubled in the past decade. The resulting influence of the private sector has manipulated global economic, political and public thinking and established an unsustainable, consumerist culture. Against this backdrop, the roles of markets in influencing either negatively or positively, in tandem with their profit motives, cannot be over-emphasized. The problematic in a state-centric approach to mitigation/adaptation efforts in the politics of climate change arises where institutions such as individual states and their agencies as well as multilateral corporations such as the UN and all its agencies are not seen to be strong enough to stand the might and assimilating capacity of market forces and transnational capital especially when treaties tend to run counter to their profit interest. 2.3.4. THE GLOBAL ENVT/ GATTS/ WTO AND THE TRADE ROUNDS When the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) 1947 was reached, which metamorphosed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), Climate Change was not yet an issue of global concern as far as the state of knowledge was concerned. Thus the instruments of the GATT/WTO as the case may be, have not as yet integrated emission cuts variables into trade rules. Understandably, state sovereignties were still strong and trade barriers very much in place at the time that marked the beginning, the zenith and only recently, the end of the Cold War (1947-1991) But today transnational corporations have watered down the Westphalian meaning of state sovereignties in a world that is increasingly ran by the dictates of market forces. The integration of Climate Change variables into Trade rounds and deliberations in the Conference of

Parties is still far from reach. In the post Kyoto regime in 2012, integrating climate change variables/emission limitation quotas into trade rounds such as the Doha Rounds and the Uruguay Rounds is a gab that needs to be filled. Both the carbon tax and emissions trading system are designed to correct what economists call a market failure, that is the private actions of individuals, organizations, or countries that do not account for costs external to their operations, such as damage to people's health, coastlines, or ecosystems of the earth. Economic theory shows that making individuals and groups pay the full costs of their activities is necessary to restore market incentives and to balance benefits with costs. In the case of Climate Change, this is yet to be achieved on a planetary scale to be fully effective and efficient. 2.3.5. THE EMISSION TRADING SCHEME EMSSION TRADING FLAWS/CURRUPT ACCOUNTING The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) as one of the three strategies of the Kyoto Protocol is believed by its critics to have become cartel for internationalization of corruption among states and parties. And at best it is believed by some experts, to be unrealistic. This research intend to explore the efficacy or otherwise of the Emission Trading system. Against the background of the increase erosion of state sovereignties in a world economy that is shaped by market forces, it is not clear enough, who bears the emission responsibility of Multi-national Corporations when taking the stocks/inventories of nations in the emission trading scheme. Their host or home countries? Putting a price on the natural world? Having attempted to describe the meaning, principles and techniques of the ETS scheme, Some may object to emissions trading on the grounds that it puts a price on carbon dioxide emissions.

Caney & Hepburn (2011). They may argue that what is objectionable about emissions trading is not that it allows people to alienate their responsibilities or exchange benefits, but rather that emissions trading puts a monetary value on carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gases). This, they may object, is an inappropriate attitude to take to the natural world, because its value simply cannot be captured in monetary terms. Caney & Hepburn in their analogy on the ethical moral legal implications of the ETS argues as follows: A defender of emissions trading can, however, reply that emissions trading does not necessarily involve any expression of the value of the natural world. One might, for example, quite consistently adhere to both of the following tenets; (a) the natural world is of intrinsic value and its value cannot be captured by monetary estimates, and (b) the most efficacious way of protecting the natural world involves setting strict limits on the extent to which humans emit greenhouse gases and then allocating the remaining legitimate emissions through the operation of an emissions trading scheme. To hold that market mechanisms are an effective way of protecting the natural world does not entail anything about why the natural world has value. Emissions trading here is simply a means to an end and is not in any way a statement about why the natural world has value. This point might be put in another way: it is often said (and we endorse the claim) that political actors should ‘put a price on carbon’. Cap and Trade schemes are obviously one way (though not the only one) of putting a price on carbon. It is, however, crucially important to be clear on what this does and does not entail. On the one hand it clearly entails that to emit a certain quantity of greenhouse gases will cost a certain amount of money and hence these emissions permits have a price tag. The contradictions and conflicts arising from the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) are issues yet unresolved. But most importantly, concerns have been alluded to the supposed advantages that the scheme should have for countries with low emission footprints which implies a huge tradable allowance for such states mostly in the global ‘South’. Caney & Hepburn (2011) also notes though, that emissions trading schemes do not elide the distinction between a ‘fee’ and ‘fine’. Emissions trading schemes are, thus, not in principle objectionable. The first critical issue is the

effect of emissions trading schemes on the distribution of wealth. “This takes us to our third conclusion which is that while cap-and-trade systems are not intrinsically unethical, they (like other policies that put a price on greenhouse gas emissions) are likely to hit poorer households harder than richer households, with unwelcome implications for distributional justice.” Caney & Hepburn maintains that the current EU ETS puts a price on pollution without providing adequate compensation for poor households and, as a result, it has had a greater impact on the poor relative to the rich. This leaves the final crucial consideration, namely ‘are emissions trading schemes an effective means of mitigating climate change?’. In response, Caney & Hepburn says our conclusion here is that careful analyses of cap-and-trade systems shows that they are more effective at reducing emissions than many of their critics appear to believe. As noted above, even in the 2005- 2007 learning phase of the EU ETS, discredited as having “failed” by some critics, it is estimated that 50-100 million tonnes of CO2 a year were reduced compared to business asusual.( Caney & Hepburn 2011). The current phase (2008-2012) of the EU ETS will deliver greater reductions, notwithstanding the recession, and the reductions delivered in the next phase (2013- 2020) depend upon whether the EU commits to a 20% or a 30% target in the course of the next year or so. Given the moral virtues of cap-and-trade systems and the absence of compelling moral objections relative to other policy possibilities, we conclude that emissions trading remains a valuable policy tool with which to address climate change. The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) as one of the three strategies of the Kyoto Protocol is believed by its critics to have become cartel for internationalization of corruption among states and parties. And at best it is believed by some experts, to be unrealistic. This research intend to explore the efficacy or otherwise of the Emission Trading system. Against the background of the increase erosion of state sovereignties in a world economy that is shaped by market forces, for

instance, it is not clear enough, who bears the emission responsibility of Multi-national Corporations when taking the stocks/inventories of nations in the emission trading scheme. Their host or home countries? 2.3.6. THE POPULATION-INDUSTRIALIZATION DEBATE Of signal concern to the politics of Climate Change is the lingering debate as to whether the absolute emission in terms of high population density from what President Bush called the Population zone like China and India amounts to a significant portion of global emission. And if the inclusion of such countries into the group with emission limitation targets (Annex I Countries) will lay to rest the possible reason why the US has continued to evade this allimportant global responsibility. Moreover, As of 2000, the top 25 GHG emitters accounted for approximately 83% of global emissions. Moreover, the top five GHG emitters today (China, the US, the European Union (EU)â&#x20AC;&#x201D;treated as a single entityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;India, and Russia) were responsible in 2000 for over 60% of global emissions. By contrast, most of the remaining countries contributed very little in absolute terms to GHGs in the atmosphere (i.e., the 140 least-pollutant countries were responsible for only 10% of global GHG emissions). These countries include the least-developed countries and many small island states. (the IPCC 2007). At the Conference of Parties in Copenhagen 2009, the near physical fight of direct verbal attacks ensued between two states- the US and China, each accusing the other of being a culprit state responsible in the current global crisis connected to Climate Change and its politics. While China accuses the US on the basis of excessive industrialization-related pollution, the US accuses China for contributing to global Greenhouse gas from the standpoint of absolute population impact. Similarly, the state of literature regarding the UNFCCC is yet to tie the significant global emission of the aviation and maritime or shipping industries to any of the nations who make

fortunes from these industries. Certainly, they are not the Developing Countries/LDCs. Herein lies the real issues that raises moral questions to the emission trading scheme as one of the operational strategies of the Kyoto Protocol. Itself a basis for conflict among and between parties. 2.3.7. CONFLICTS OF PARTIES AND ISSUES FROM RIO TO DURBAN The Conference of Parties (COPs) as a part of the politics of Climate Change Control Since the inception of the UNFCCC has gone through series of diplomatic deliberations and conferences from (COP 1, The Berlin mandate 1995, COP 2, Geneva Switzerland 1996, COP 3 The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 1997, COP 4 Buenos Aires 1998, COP 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15(The Copenhagen Accord )and 16 . Then came the last Conference of parties COP 17 at Durban, South Africa in 2011). Although the United States initially helped negotiate the treaty, the administration of President George W. Bush withdrew its support when it took office in 2001. The Bush administration said the treaty would hurt the United States economically and gave too many advantages to developing countries. Because the United States accounts for about 35 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, its withdrawal from the protocol meant that the treaty could not go into force unless Russia, the next largest polluter at 17 percent, ratified the agreement. By August 2004, 126 countries had ratified the agreement but the ratifying industrial nations only accounted for 44 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Then in September 2004 the cabinet of Russian under President Vladimir Putin approved the treaty, and it went into force in 2005. The Politics and Interest of States in the Context of Sustainable Development In their submission to the UN Headquarters, Drexhage & Murphy (2012) notes that the term, Sustainable Development, was popularized in Our Common Future, a report published by the

World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. Also known as the Brundtland Report, Our Common Future included the “classic” definition of sustainable development: “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Acceptance of the report by the United Nations General Assembly gave the term political salience; and in 1992 leaders set out the principles of sustainable development at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ( Drexhage & Murphy 2012). It is generally accepted that sustainable development calls for a convergence between the three pillars of economic development, social equity, and environmental protection. Deep structural changes are needed in the ways that societies manage their economic, social, and environmental affairs; and hard choices are needed to move from talk to action. While some would argue that we have failed on sustainable development, 20 years is a relatively short time frame to implement the required changes in such a daunting area. Drexhage and Murphy maintain that the needed systemic changes will require a revolution in the way the world does business. This will have an impact on lifestyles and consumption patterns— especially so in developed countries, but also for the growing middle class in developing countries. The recent financial crisis and the beginning of the decline of trust in the liberalization and globalization model could mean some renewed receptivity for a new sustainable development paradigm. As notes McQueen (2010), Washington’s position was particularly damaged under the Bush administration when it was clear that the President himself and his immediate circle were especially hostile to any form of global accountability but rather in favor of apparent unilateralism. Within the United States several individual states passed their own anti-emission legislation in line with Kyoto requirements. To drive home the message of internal dissent,

AIGore, Clintonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s vice-president at the time of the Kyoto negotiations, became a powerful public voice for climate action, in particular through the vehicle of his film, An Inconvenient truth. The debate sharpened when the Nobel Committee awarded the 2007 Peace Prize jointly to Gore and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In short, the costs of unilateralism, of departure from the global consensus, though they may be indirect, can be considerable. An awareness of this no doubt helped determine that in his first days in office in January 2009 President Obama made a considerable effort to signal a change in Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position on greenhouse emissions. Tellingly, perhaps, these moves still fell short of any firm commitment to sign up to the Kyoto protocol life. At the beginning of February 2007 the IPCC produced its Fourth Assessment Report in which it stated baldly that the evidence for potentially catastrophic global warming was now `unequivocal`. In response, the then French president, Jacques Chirac, proclaimed the Paris Call for Action, urging a renewed global commitment to confront the situation. Specifically, he proposed the replacement of UNEP with a new and more powerful United Nations Environment Organization. Forty-six UN member states associated themselves with the Call for Action. Significantly, however, the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China, the United States, Russia and India, were not among them. In what may have been an attempt to rescue some prestige while setting targets more acceptable to American interests, McQueen notes, the Bush administration attempted to move the debate away from the United Nations. The Washington Declaration of February 2007 brought together the United States and its Western allies along with Russia, China, India and Brazil. In this apparent alternative to Kyoto all participants would agree to meet specific targets. These would however be non-binding. McQueen maintain that there was structural difference in this plan between developed and developing countries. The

initiative was greeted with widespread skepticism , with many dismissing it as a transparent attempt to subvert the Kyoto process. The absence of the UN from the initiative both heightened this suspicion and denied the Declaration any real international legitimacy despite the obvious weight of the superpower which sponsored it. Long before the arrival of Barak Obama in the White House at the beginning of 2009, the Washington Declaration had been quietly forgotten. Shyam Saran 2008 in McQueen (2010) was quoted of saying “ In India i need to give electricity for light bulbs to half a billion. In the west you want to drive your Mercedes as fast as you want. We have “survival” emissions, you have lifestyle emissions. You cannot put on the same basis. I am trying to give a minimal commercial energy service, whereas you are not prepared to give up any part of your affluent lifestyle to give up consumption patterns”. ( Shyam Saran, Indian Special Envoy on Climate Change to the UN-interview with the Guardian, 2008). In the meantime, attention shifted emphatically back to the United Nations at the end of 2007 when 192 national delegations gathered in the Indonesian island of Bali. The purpose of the meeting was to consider what was to be done after the end of the Kyoto process in 2012 when the five per cent greenhouse gas reduction target would supposedly be met. ( McQueen 2010). The Bali conference followed the alarming IPCC Assessment Report which predicted nothing short of a global climate disaster if immediate steps were not taken to reverse global warming. The Arctic was warming at twice the rate of the global average and the shrinking of its ice cap would have major climatic effects. Extreme weather events were already being recorded throughout the world. Entire island states were in danger of being submerged under rising sea level. African crop yields, already inadequate for the continent’s needs, would be halved. The gross domestic product of the world as a whole would shrink by at least five per cent.

These bleak predictions set the tone of the Bali meeting and many delegations responded accordingly. Australia now with a new government announced that it would move immediately to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. McQueen notes that the failure of the previous government to do so, which left Australia isolated in the UN and beyond with only the United State for company, had in fact been an issue in the recent elections. Bali was not without its own intrigues

theatricality. So controversial and interesting are the issues in the politics of climate change that the delegates of Papua New Guinea- many of whose islands are at risk of disappearing through the sea level rise, -denounced American selfishness at the COP 13 In an emotionally charged speech in Bali Indonessia . At a critical point, the Senior UN Climate Change official chairing the meeting, Yvo de Boer from the Netherlands, broke down in tears in the face of Chinese accusations that he was mishandling the negotiations. (McQueen 2010) Despite such high drama, McQueen submits that an agreement was salvaged from the threatened wreckage. Once again, the intangible but powerful influence of the United Nations was brought to bare. 2.3.8.

THE

STATE

REDEMPTION

FINANCIAL

PLEDGES

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES At COP 15 in Copenhagen, developing countries pledged a 30 Billion Dollar fund for intervention ( adaptation and mitigation activities) for developing countries and transition economies. It is not very clear if these pledges have been redeemed beyond the rhetoric of international politics at the COPs. It is the thinking of the researcher that Africa and indeed the global ‘South’ needs a ‘Marshal Plan’ beyond conventional aid to help it adapt and mitigate the eminent impacts of climate change. In the aftermath of World War II, the Marshall Plan was conceived and implemented to get Western Europe back on its feet. The Marshall Plan transferred $13 billion in aid from the United States to Western Europe in the years from 1948 to

1951, Bradford De Long & Eichengreen(1991). Indeed the Plan did succeed in serving the springboard for the recovery of Europe from the ashes of the World War II. But such success story could not have been achieved merely because of the quantum of funds but more because the US knew and rightly so, that her progress is inextricably tied to the recovery of Europe. Today however, with the end of isolationism in US and EU Foreign policies and with the accelerated spade of globalization, the progress of the global ‘North’ largely depends on the state of things in the developing world and Africa in particular. The same spirit with which the Marshall Plan was reeled out, should motivate the

west and the ‘North’ for yet another

‘Marshall Plan’ for Africa to be directed at intervention(adaptation and mitigation) programs connected to the averse impacts of climate change hence the continent has been pointed out by the UN IPCCC as the most likely vulnerable in the short, mid and long term. In tandem with the Poznan Strategic Technology Transfer, the Global Environment Facility GEF anchors the finances connected to technology transfer to developing countries. While progress in redeeming pledges by developed countries may not have been ample enough, the efforts of the UNFCCC and some Annex I and Annex II states towards ensuring the needed technologytransfer to developing countries is worthy of note: The Global Environment Facility (GEF) prepared this report for the seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (UNFCCC 2011). COP decision 2/CP.14, in Paragraph 1, welcomed “the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer, as a step towards scaling up the level of investment in technology transfer in order to help developing countries address their needs for environmentally sound technologies” and recognized “the contribution that this strategic

programme could make to enhancing technology transfer activities under the Convention.â&#x20AC;? This initiative is laudable and should be encouraged.

While COP decision 2/CP.14, in Paragraph 2, requested the Global Environment Facility: (a) To promptly initiate and expeditiously facilitate the preparation of projects for approval and implementation under the strategic programme referred to in paragraph 1 above in order to help developing countries address their needs for environmentally sound technologies; (b) To collaborate with its implementing agencies in order to provide technical support to developing countries in preparing or updating, as appropriate, their technology needs assessments using the updated handbook for conducting technology needs assessments for climate change published by the United Nations Development Programme, to be made available in early 2009 in collaboration with the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, the UNFCCC secretariat and the Climate Technology Initiative; (c) To consider the long-term implementation of the strategic programme, including: addressing the gaps identified in current operations of the Global Environment Facility that relate to investment in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies; leveraging private-sector investment; and promoting innovative project development activities; (d) To report on the progress made in carrying out the activities referred to in paragraph 2 (a-c) above to the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session, in addition to providing interim reports to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its thirtieth and thirty-first sessions, with a view to assessing its progress and future direction in order to help inform Parties in their consideration of long-term needs for implementation of the strategic programme. (UNFCCC 2011)

The Program aimed to scale up the level of investment in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies (ESTs). The approved Program included a funding window of $50 million with $35 million coming from the GEF Trust Fund and $15 million coming from the SCCF. The Strategic Program was then renamed the Poznan Strategic Program on Technology Transfer at COP 14. (GEF 2011). The secretariat notes that there are three funding windows to support technology transfer under the Poznan Strategic Programme, namely: (1) technology needs assessments (TNAs); (2) piloting priority technology projects linked to TNAs; and (3) dissemination of GEF experience and successfully demonstrated ESTs. Total GEF funding for the selected 14 pilot projects amounted to $58 million, and total co-financing for these projects amounted to more than $195 million. The Conference of the Parties, by its decision 2/CP.14, welcomed the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer proposed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), at its thirty-fourth session, invited the GEF to provide reports on the progress made in carrying out its activities under the Poznan strategic programme, including its long-term implementation, for consideration by the SBI at its thirtyfifth and subsequent sessions, for the duration of the Poznan strategic programme. In response, the GEF secretariat has submitted the report dated 24 October 2011 with the following statistics: As of September 2011, GEF Agencies charged with implementing the technology transfer pilot projects have reported considerable progress in project preparation and implementation. The GEF (2011), reports that three projects have been CEO-endorsed and are progressing in project implementation. Nine projects have been undergoing preparations for CEO endorsement. One project was cancelled upon request from a GEF Agency in late 2010. It has since been resubmitted by another GEF Agency, and was approved for Work Programme inclusion by the

GEF CEO in September 2011. If approved by the GEF Council in November 2011, this project will again be included under the Poznan pilot project portfolio. Another project was cancelled upon request from the GEF Agency in July 2011. (GEF 2011). As of September 2011, the total GEF funding for the three CEO endorsed projects and nine projects under preparation amounted to $54.6 million, and total co-financing for these projects amounted to more than $180.8 million. If the re-submitted pilot project is approved by the GEF Council in November 2011, the total GEF funding amounts to $57.3 million, with total cofinancing

$186.5

million.

(GEF

2011).

GEF

website:

http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_projects_funding. Immediately following COP 14, the GEF Secretariat organized a stakeholder consultation meeting in January 2009 to formulate a strategy and work plan for the implementation of the TNAs. Participants at the meeting, including representatives from the GEF agencies, the UNFCCC Secretariat, the Climate Technology Initiative, and the GEF Scientific Technical Advisory Panel (STAP), provided suggestions, stressing that TNAs should be actionable to provide a pathway to the implementation of projects on the ground. Other suggestions included engagement with the private financial sector in the TNA process, identification of priority technologies for pilot projects, and investment opportunities based on the TNA for future funding by the GEF and other sources. The TNA project concept, under window one of the Poznan Strategic Program, was approved by the LDCF/SCCF Council in April 2009. Based on this TNA project concept, UNEP, as the GEF Agency, developed a full project document, which was endorsed by the GEF CEO in September 2009. Project implementation by UNEP started in October 2009. Total GEF funding for this project is $9 million. (GEF 2011).

The project also seeks to use the updated TNA Handbook and provide feedback to finetune methodologies through an iterative process.Thirty-six countries are participating in the TNA project. They include: Africa: Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Zambia; Asia and Europe: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Laos, Lebanon, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam; and Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru. A Project Steering Committee (PSC) has been constituted by UNEP, to assess the project progress and plan the upcoming activities. The PSC consists of representatives of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT), the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNEP, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Bank, UNEP Risoe Centre (URC) and the GEF Secretariat. PSC meetings have been held in December 2009, June 2010, and November 2010. The fourth PSC meeting is planned for November 2011. (GEF 2011). 2.3.9. FOOD INSECURITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD Closely tied to the political economy of Climate change, is the exacerbation of ethnic, religious and interstate conflicts. Droughts and conflicts interact in the Sahel to exacerbate vulnerability and human insecurity in the region. Human security can be seen as the ability to reduce or eliminate the vulnerability to social, economic, environmental, and cultural threats that undermine sustainable development of communities. These vulnerabilities can occur as sudden

shocks, long-term trends, or seasonal cycles. Drought has been a recurrent feature in this region and is a serious threat to human security. The magnitude and intensity of these droughts have been on the increase over the last 100 years and consequently in the destruction caused by it. Adger and Brookes, 2001 in (Nyong & Fiki 2006). The Sahel is characterized by very scanty rainfall, with an annual average of between 150 and 1,000mm. Annual rainfall levels have been decreasing in the region over the course of this century, with an increase in inter-annual and spatial variability. This has resulted in about 200km southward shift in isohyets (Lebel et al., 1997, L'Hôte et al.,2002). There is generally no convergence in predictions of climate change over the Sahel however. A Many areas that presently have a semi-arid climate will become arid and sub-humid areas will become semi-arid IPCC, 2001 in Nyong & Fiki (2006). Whatever the predictions, there is enough reason to believe that the climatic conditions for agriculture in the region might deteriorate, resulting in resource scarcity and increasing vulnerability in the region, particularly to food and human insecurity. Conflict in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa has been associated with per capita declines in food production of over 12% per year Messer et al, 1998 in (Nyong & Fiki 2006). This notwithstanding however, vulnerability in the Sahel is not only caused by climate variability or climate change. Social, economic, and political factors act together to cause vulnerability. Nyong, one of Africa’s shared Nobel Laureate at the instance of the IPCC in 2007 and a University Don from the Department of Geography University of Jos- Nigeria, has argued along with his co-author McLeman, that climate change is associated with conflict over land resources in Africa (Nyong & McLeman, 2006). In tan dem with this point are the works of WBGU, 2007; Garcia, 2008 in FAO (2010). Similarly, the UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 2007)

stated that the conflict in Darfur, for instance, had in part, been caused by tension between farmers and herdsmen over the dwindling pasture and declining waterholes. The report therefore warns that there could be a succession of new wars across Africa if not much is done to contain the damage of climate change. In conflict prone areas, the most vulnerable group is the refugee community, the bulk of which are women and children (Nsiah-Gyabaah, 2005).The underlying factor in these conflicts is resource scarcity. Homer-Dixon and Percival 1997 (Nyong & McLeman, 2006), stressing the causal pathways between resource scarcity and conflict in selected developing countries, argue that under certain circumstances, the scarcity of renewable resources such as cropland, forests and water generate social effects (such as poverty, weak institutions, resource capture and migration) and produce conflict and instability. The efficacy of traditional institutions in the management of conflicts in the past, particularly in the West African Sahel has been noted (Moore, 2005; Appiah-Opoku and Hyma, 1999 in Nyong and Fiki (2006). However conflict is managed, the results of this management could help to reduce or escalate further conflicts. In their submission, Nyong & Fiki considers two models of conflict management - state-directed models and local community models. Conflict management by the state-often refered to, as Track One Diplomacy comprises the formal institutions that make up the state, functioning to ensure the compliance of the populace with the existing arrays of regulation and program within the broad framework of state hegemony over the community. Climate Change is already causing floods, droughts, and migration in Africa that could trigger political instability. But violent consequences are not inevitable. This is already manifesting in North-Central Nigeria especially the lingering feud between Fulani Herdsmen and sedentary native farmers in Jos and some parts of Plateau State for instance.

Domestic political

institutions– “constitutional design”–could buffer the impact of climate change by channeling societal stress into non-violent outcomes. Cases abound in Dafur Sudan, Mali etc. In this 12th issue of the Environmental Change and Security Program Report, eight African leaders and scholars write about their continent’s struggle with resource conflict— and the possibilities for peace that population and environment initiatives may hold. According to 2004 Nobel Laureate Wangari Maathai, poor governance and mismanagement of resources spur the violence that plagues many countries in Africa: “Below the thin layer of racial and ethnic chauvinism, religion, and politics, the real reason for many conflicts is the struggle for the access to and control of the limited resources on our planet.” But she sees hope: “When we manage our resources sustainably and practice good governance we deliberately and consciously promote cultures of peace.” Violent conflicts, insufficient resources, lack of coordination and weak policies continue to slow down development progress, particularly in Africa. Nonetheless in many countries there have been real advances. For instance, Viet Nam has been able to halve poverty and achieve universal primary education way ahead of the 2015 target. Mozambique has also managed to significantly reduce poverty and increase school enrollment as well as improving the rates of child and maternal mortality. This development progress is increasingly going to be hindered by climate change. So we must see the fight against poverty and the fight against the effects of climate change as interrelated efforts, they must reinforce each other and success must be achieved on both fronts jointly. Success will have to involve a great deal of adaptation, because climate change is still going to affect the poorest countries significantly even if serious efforts to reduce emissions start immediately.(UNDP 2008). Countries will need to develop their own adaptation plans but the international community will need to assist them. Responding to that challenge and

to the urgent request from leaders in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, UNEP and UNDP launched a partnership in Nairobi during the climate convention or the Conference of parties COP 12 in November 2006. The two agencies committed to provide assistance in reducing vulnerability and building the capacity of developing countries to more widely reap the benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in areas such as the development of cleaner and renewable energies, climate proofing and fuel-switching schemes. This partnership, that will enable the UN system to act promptly in response to the needs of governments trying to factor in climate change impacts into their investment decisions, constitutes a living proof of the United Nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s determination to deliver as Oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; on the climate change challenge.(UNDP Human Development Report). While we pursue adaptation we must start to reduce emissions and take other steps at mitigation so that the irreversible changes already underway are not further amplified over the next few decades. If mitigation does not start in earnest right now, the cost of adaptation twenty or thirty years from now will become prohibitive for the poorest countries. Stabilizing greenhouse emissions to limit climate change is a worthwhile insurance strategy for the world as a whole, including the richest countries, and it is an essential part of our overall fight against poverty and for the Millennium Development Goals. This dual purpose of climate policies should make them a priority for leaders around the world. But having established the need for limiting future climate change and for helping the most vulnerable adapt to what is unavoidable, one has to move on and identify the nature of the policies that will help us get the results we seek. According to the UNDP, Several things can be said at the outset: First, non-marginal changes are needed, given the path the world is on. We need big changes and ambitious new policies. Second, there will be significant short term costs. We have to invest in

limiting climate change. There will be large net benefits over time, but at the beginning, like with every investment, we must be willing to incur the costs. This will be a challenge for democratic governance: political systems will have to agree to pay the early costs to reap the long term gains. Leadership will require looking beyond electoral cycles. We are not too pessimistic. In the fight against the much higher inflation rates of the distant past, democracies did come up with the institutions such as more autonomous central banks and policy pre-commitments that allowed much lower inflation to be achieved despite the short term temptations of resorting to the printing press. The same has to happen with climate and the environment: societies will have to pre-commit and forego short term gratification for longerterm well being. (UNDP 2008). The UNDP 2008 citing Martin Luther King added that “Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable. We are faced now with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are confronted with the fierce urgency of now. In this unfolding conundrum of life and history there is such a thing as being too late…We may cry out desperately for time to pause in her passage, but time is deaf to every plea and rushes on. Over the bleached bones and jumbled residues of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words: Too late.”Martin Luther King Jr. ‘Where do we go from here: chaos or community’ Delivered in a sermon on social justice four decades ago, Martin Luther King’s words retains a powerful resonance. At the start of the21st Century, we too are confronted with the “fierce urgency” of a crisis that links today and tomorrow. That crisis is climate change. It is still a preventable crisis. Writing in 2008, the UNDP posits that the world has less than a decade to change course. No issue merits more urgent attention—or more immediate action. Climate change is the defining human development issue of our generation. All development is ultimately about expanding

human potential and enlarging human freedom. It is about people developing the capabilities that empower them to make choices and to lead lives that they value. Climate change threatens to erode human freedoms and limit choice. It calls into question the Enlightenment principle that human progress will make the future look better than the past. The early warning signs are already visible. Today, we are witnessing at first hand what could be the onset of major human development reversal in our lifetime. Across developing countries, millions of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poorest people are already being forced to cope with the impacts of climate change. These impacts do not register as apocalyptic events in the full glare of world media attention. They go unnoticed in financial markets and in the measurement of world gross domestic product (GDP). But increased exposure to drought, to more intense storms, to floods and environmental stress is holding back the efforts of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poor to build a better life for themselves and their children. Climate change will undermine international efforts to combat poverty. Seven years ago, political leaders around the world gathered to set targets for accelerated progress in human development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) defined a new ambition for 2015. Much has been achieved, though many countries remain off track. Climate change is hampering efforts to deliver the MDG promise. Looking to the future, the danger is that it will stall and then reverse progress built-up over generations not just in cutting extreme poverty, but in health, nutrition, education and other areas. The description of what needs to done is no better captured elsewhere than in the theme of the 2007/2008 Human Development Report of the UNDP- Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world. In concluding this chapter, one important point that has remain a common thread that runs through the literature on the politics of climate change control is that states often would have to decide between their national aspirations/interests and global

commitment for the ‘common good’ of the human ecological and universal community, in which a clear trade-off exist. Such contested interests combine with the inequitable historical footprints of states/regions as relates to GHG, becomes the basis for Conflict. 2.4.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Theory of Imperialism Hans J. Morgenthau (1948).in his work Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, defines imperialism as a national foreign policy aimed at acquiring more power than the state actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations, in other words, a favorable change in power status. Imperialism as a national foreign policy is in contrast to 'status quo' foreign policy and a foreign policy of 'prestige.' The policy of imperialism assumes the classical realist theory perspective of analysis at the unit level in international relations. Furthermore, imperialism is based on a 'balance-of-power' construct in international relations. The three types of imperialism as outlined by Morgenthau are: Marxist theory of imperialism which rests on the foundation that all political phenomena are the reflection of economic forces; the Liberal theory of imperialism which results because of maladjustments in the global capitalist system (e.g., surplus of goods and capital which seek outlets in foreign markets); and finally, the 'devil' theory of imperialism which posits that manufacturers and bankers plan wars in order to enrich themselves. Morgenthau, Hans (1948). It is such Imperialist drive that tends to explain the historical factors in profit terms, by way of industrialization that have accumulated the greenhouse gases over the years in the global atmosphere, which is responsible as a causality to Climate Change. While the theory has adequately explained factors of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ in Climate Change as well as the profit motive of individual states, theory fall short of providing

the collective action for the common good and in the search for answers that will lead the way for a consensus among and between parties at the international arena. Theory of Internationalism Internationalism is a political movement that advocates greater economic and political cooperation among participating actors for the benefit of all. It is by nature opposed to ultranationalism, jingoism and national chauvinism and presupposes the recognition of other nations as equal, in spite of all their differences. Indeed, it is most commonly expressed as an appreciation for the diverse cultures in the world and as a desire for world peace. It also encompasses an obligation to assist the world through leadership and cooperation, advocating robust global governance and the presence of international organizations, such as the United Nations.

CHAPTER THREE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL AND CONFLICT OF PARTIES 3.1.

CLIMATE CHANGE

In their article "Global Warming", Mastrandrea & Schneider 2008 in Jise and Obadiah (2009), have defined both Global Warming and Climate Change as the measurable increases in the average temperature of Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atmosphere, oceans, and landmasses due to increase in heattrapping gases called Greenhouse gases (GHG). It is however contended herein that although Climate Change and Global Warming are often used interchangeably the two terms differ slightly. According to Jise & Obadiah (2009) Global Warming is the measurable increases in the average temperature of Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s atmosphere, oceans, and landmasses due to increase in heattrapping gases called Green house gases(GHGs) including Water vapor, CO2, Methane, Nitrous Oxide, and synthetic chemicals . Global Warming is unidirectional in that it focuses only on increase. On the other hand, Climate Change encompasses Global Warming and other reversal changes that may imply the antithesis of warming, i.e. a cooling world. Climate Change may be seen as a two-tailed phenomenon. In this context however, we may operationalised the phrase Climate Change to mean warming of the planet since it is better understood as such. Moreover, it is important to add from the onset of this paper that GHGs do not represent everything that is negative. But for them, the earth would have been too cold for existence. Their excess however may be moving the earth to a state of becoming less inhabitable. Greenhouse gases were part of the Intelligent Design of our planet safe for the human-induced quantity added to the natural and finite supply. Greenhouse gases occur naturally, and without them the planet would be too cold to sustain life as we know it. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-1700s,

however, human activities have added more and more of these gases into the atmosphere. For example, levels of carbon dioxide, a powerful greenhouse gas, have risen by 35 percent since 1750, largely from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and natural gas. World carbon dioxide emissions are one way of measuring a country's economic growth too asides being a major emission indicator. And the latest figures - published by the respected Energy Information Administration - show CO2 emissions from energy consumption by states and regions. Carbon Dioxide (CO2) being the leading Greenhouse gas (GHG) of global significance as far as causality to Climate Change is concerned. The data shows the emission footprints of states and regions as follows: Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Country/State/Region Table Rank, Country or region id 2009

2009, 2008, mil2009, TOTAL, capita, tonnes mil tonnes tones

225 179 188 1 7 54 91 107 194 102

30,493.23 12,338.41 6,803.92 6,885.07 5,833.13 4,628.98 2,595.86 1,658.55 1,473.73 1,698.38

30,398.42 13,264.09 7,710.50 6,410.54 5,424.53 4,310.30 2,358.03 1,714.09 1,602.12 1,572.07

4.49 3.53 5.83 14.19 17.67 7.14 8.32 8.22 1.38 11.23

-0.3 7.5 13.3 -6.9 -7 -6.9 -9.2 3.3 8.7 -7.4

1,228.65

1,219.78

2.57

0.7

1,157.71 1,215.48 823.07 598.46 521.77 510.61 563.88 455.62 482.88 452.05 421.60

1,121.59 1,097.96 765.56 540.97 528.13 527.18 519.94 470.00 450.44 443.61 420.16

1.13 8.64 9.30 16.15 10.89 6.94 8.35 18.56 9.18 3.99 2.11

-3.1 -9.7 -7 -9.6 1.2 3.2 -7.8 3.2 -6.7 -1.9 -0.3

1 2

3 4

8 122 196 67 3 199 109 90 118 169 5 17

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

World Asia & Oceania China North America United States Europe Eurasia Middle East India Russia Central & South America Africa Japan Germany Canada Korea, South Iran United Kingdom Saudi Arabia South Africa Mexico Brazil

per

% change, 2008 to 2009

Table Rank, Country or region id 2009 182 195 73 66 86 217 80 105 218 89 78 120 138 97 11 51 214 202 210 57 106 123 110 69 223 62 193 113 82 198 160 212 111 20 56 117 19 94 119 104 81 183 150

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Australia Indonesia Italy France Spain Taiwan Poland Ukraine Thailand Turkey Netherlands United Arab Emirates Egypt Kazakhstan Argentina Venezuela Singapore Malaysia Pakistan Belgium Uzbekistan Algeria Iraq Greece Vietnam Czech Republic Hong Kong Kuwait Romania Korea, North Nigeria Philippines Israel Colombia Austria Qatar Chile Belarus Syria Turkmenistan Portugal Bangladesh Libya

2009, 2008, mil2009, TOTAL, capita, tonnes mil tonnes tones 425.34 417.68 19.64 403.74 413.29 1.72 449.75 407.87 7.01 428.54 396.65 6.30 360.13 329.86 7.13 301.94 290.88 12.66 294.78 285.79 7.43 355.48 255.07 5.58 253.55 253.38 3.80 272.90 253.06 3.29 249.50 248.91 14.89 195.85 193.43 40.31 185.85 192.38 2.44 168.48 185.06 12.02 172.47 166.92 4.08 164.31 161.96 6.04 161.23 161.12 34.59 148.30 148.01 5.32 139.71 140.29 0.77 154.76 137.36 13.19 127.10 115.16 4.17 107.28 113.92 3.33 100.00 103.70 3.58 106.04 100.37 9.35 103.86 98.76 1.12 99.10 95.32 9.33 77.92 85.98 12.19 79.83 84.87 31.52 96.56 80.52 3.66 69.57 79.55 3.51 100.16 77.75 0.52 74.57 72.39 0.74 67.26 70.48 9.74 64.99 70.15 1.61 71.01 69.24 8.43 63.45 66.52 79.82 68.30 65.70 3.96 66.93 60.57 6.28 53.60 56.88 2.61 57.48 56.78 11.62 55.74 56.55 5.28 50.39 55.13 0.36 57.24 55.03 8.70

per

% change, 2008 to 2009 -1.8 2.4 -9.3 -7.4 -8.4 -3.7 -3 -28.2 -0.1 -7.3 -0.2 -1.2 3.5 9.8 -3.2 -1.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 -11.2 -9.4 6.2 3.7 -5.3 -4.9 -3.8 10.3 6.3 -16.6 14.3 -22.4 -2.9 4.8 7.9 -2.5 4.8 -3.81 -9.5 6.1 -1.2 1.5 9.4 -3.9

2009, 2008, mil2009, TOTAL, capita, tonnes mil tonnes tones Serbia 54.08 52.33 5.70 Finland 54.86 52.15 9.93 Sweden 54.77 50.56 5.58 Hungary 56.05 50.03 5.00 Denmark 54.22 49.56 9.01 Oman 44.56 48.96 16.83 Trinidad and Tobago 49.89 47.82 38.88 Switzerland 45.34 45.81 6.00 Bulgaria 50.46 44.46 6.17 Ireland 45.37 40.27 8.79 Norway 39.69 39.58 8.49 New Zealand 39.51 39.07 9.28 Peru 36.71 38.19 1.29 Morocco 37.30 36.49 1.17 Azerbaijan 39.69 36.16 4.39 Slovakia 37.42 35.75 6.54 Puerto Rico 34.37 33.26 8.38 Bahrain 30.63 31.10 42.68 Cuba 29.01 30.37 2.65 Ecuador 28.24 28.71 1.97 Angola 23.57 24.00 1.88 Yemen 20.19 22.92 1.00 Tunisia 21.67 22.90 2.18 Croatia 22.60 21.54 4.80 Jordan 19.54 20.02 3.19 Dominican Republic 19.45 19.86 2.05 Bosnia and Herzegovina 21.81 18.35 3.98 Estonia 19.83 17.49 13.46 Slovenia 17.28 17.37 8.66 Lithuania 18.07 15.75 4.43 Panama 15.20 15.46 4.60 Lebanon 14.32 14.84 3.62 Bolivia 14.27 13.89 1.42 Sudan 12.19 13.04 0.30 Sri Lanka 12.54 12.76 0.60 Burma 13.87 12.54 0.24 Virgin Islands, U.S. 12.93 12.49 113.71 Jamaica 12.70 12.11 4.29 Netherlands Antilles 12.13 11.64 51.26 Kenya 11.23 11.50 0.29 Guatemala 11.46 11.30 0.85 Armenia 11.06 11.23 3.79 Zimbabwe 8.95 10.61 0.93

Table Rank, Country or region id 2009 83 65 87 70 63 115 48 88 59 72 79 208 42 156 93 84 43 108 22 25 124 121 174 60 112 24 58 95 85 100 40 114 16 170 216 186 52 35 38 147 31 92 178

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

per

% change, 2008 to 2009 -3.2 -4.9 -7.7 -10.7 -8.6 9.9 -4.1 1 -11.9 -11.2 -0.3 -1.1 4 -2.2 -8.9 -4.5 -3.2 1.6 4.7 1.7 1.8 13.5 5.7 -4.7 2.4 2.1 -15.9 -11.8 0.5 -12.8 1.7 3.6 -2.7 7 1.7 -9.5 -3.5 -4.6 -4.1 2.4 -1.4 1.5 18.6

Table Rank, Country or region id 2009 74 61 99 144 34 185 129 204 75 50 101 141 21 172

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

136

115

134 165 103 26 98 96 13 211 55 139 142 155 126 39 68 158 41 187 125 206 71 116 151 76 207 173 161

116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142

Luxembourg Cyprus Latvia Ghana Honduras Brunei Cameroon Mongolia Macedonia Uruguay Moldova Ethiopia Costa Rica Tanzania Cote dIvoire (IvoryCoast) Congo Senegal Tajikistan El Salvador Kyrgyzstan Georgia Bahamas Papua New Guinea Albania Equatorial Guinea Gabon Mauritius Botswana Nicaragua Gibraltar Namibia Paraguay Cambodia Benin Nepal Iceland Palestine Madagascar Malta New Caledonia Togo Reunion

2009, 2008, mil2009, TOTAL, capita, tonnes mil tonnes tones 11.92 10.58 21.51 9.77 9.42 8.68 7.89 8.53 3.82 7.40 8.11 0.34 8.13 7.94 1.01 10.40 7.58 19.53 7.63 7.48 0.40 7.65 7.36 2.42 9.18 7.34 3.55 8.06 7.24 2.07 7.36 7.05 1.63 6.42 6.88 0.08 7.14 6.83 1.53 6.25 6.69 0.16

per

% change, 2008 to 2009 -11.2 -3.5 8.1 9.6 -2.4 -27.1 -1.9 -3.8 -20.1 -10.2 -4.1 7.1 -4.4 7.1

6.49

6.63

0.32

2.2

6.09 6.14 6.84 5.91 5.67 5.60 5.09 4.50 4.45 4.71 4.72 4.60 4.20 4.60 4.55 3.92 3.83 4.11 3.33 3.31 3.68 3.08 2.77 3.20 3.04 2.70 2.82

6.32 6.25 6.13 5.91 5.65 5.32 5.25 4.81 4.62 4.61 4.57 4.55 4.52 4.47 4.38 4.06 3.97 3.86 3.47 3.44 3.41 3.21 3.15 3.12 3.04 2.85 2.82

1.57 0.52 0.83 0.98 1.04 1.15

3.8 1.8 -10.4 0 -0.4 -4.9 3.1 6.7 3.8 -2.1 -3.2 -1 7.7 -2.9 -3.8 3.7 3.7 -6.1 4.3 3.8 -7.4 4.3 13.4 -2.5 0 5.6 0

0.81 1.55 7.28 3.02 3.55 2.27 0.76 151.96 1.93 0.63 0.27 0.39 0.12 11.12 0.80 0.15 7.71 12.23 0.44 3.68

Table Rank, Country or region id 2009 154 177 135 36 201 157 30 33 47 190 175 77 137 192 32 127 166 14 171 159 145 152 167 200 224 28 12 191 15 203 168 180 64 140 162 153 2 10 149 181

143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 153 152 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 165 164 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 178 177 179 181 180 182

219

183

184

Mauritania Zambia Congo, Dem Rep Martinique Macau Mozambique Guadeloupe Haiti Suriname Fiji Uganda Montenegro Djibouti Guam Guyana Burkina Faso Seychelles Barbados Swaziland Niger Guinea Malawi Sierra Leone Laos Wake Island French Guiana Aruba French Polynesia Belize Maldives Somalia Afghanistan Faroe Islands Eritrea Rwanda Mali Bermuda Antigua and Barbuda Liberia American Samoa Timor-Leste (East Timor) Greenland

2009, 2008, mil2009, TOTAL, capita, tonnes mil tonnes tones 2.61 2.75 0.88 2.25 2.67 0.20 2.72 2.65 0.04 2.46 2.61 6.13 2.41 2.44 4.36 2.24 2.35 0.11 2.30 2.18 4.91 2.00 2.06 0.21 1.96 2.04 4.24 2.06 1.93 2.22 1.99 1.93 0.06 1.81 1.88 2.80 1.70 1.76 2.43 1.77 1.71 9.60 1.51 1.51 2.01 1.40 1.43 0.09 1.34 1.42 16.21 1.44 1.39 4.87 1.18 1.38 1.03 1.29 1.34 0.09 1.35 1.33 0.13 1.26 1.31 0.09 1.24 1.31 0.26 1.23 1.24 0.20 1.28 1.23 NA 1.06 1.12 5.87 1.05 1.09 10.62 0.99 1.07 3.73 0.99 0.94 3.06 0.89 0.92 2.31 0.87 0.90 0.09 0.85 0.83 0.03 0.75 0.80 16.36 0.72 0.77 0.14 0.74 0.74 0.07 0.70 0.74 0.06 0.69 0.71 10.53 0.66 0.69 8.04 0.68 0.69 0.19 0.65 0.67 10.20

per

% change, 2008 to 2009 5.3 18.8 -2.6 6.3 1.3 4.6 -5.1 2.9 4 -6.2 -3 4.3 3.4 -3.5 0 2.1 6.1 -4 17 3.5 -1.2 4.6 5.9 1.1 -4.3 6.1 4.2 7.7 -5.4 3.4 3.4 -2.9 6.4 6.4 0 6.4 4.2 4.4 2.2 2.2

0.58

0.63

0.56

8.7

0.64

0.61

10.62

-4.8

2009, per 2008, mil2009, TOTAL, % change, capita, tonnes mil tonnes 2008 to 2009 tones 146 185 Guinea-Bissau 0.46 0.46 0.30 0 143 186 Gambia 0.38 0.44 0.25 15.4 18 187 Cayman Islands 0.49 0.43 8.86 -11.8 45 188 Saint Lucia 0.41 0.41 2.57 0 128 189 Burundi 0.35 0.37 0.04 4 130 190 Cape Verde 0.32 0.34 0.68 4.5 184 191 Bhutan 0.37 0.33 0.48 -11.1 176 192 Western Sahara 0.32 0.32 0.67 0 9 193 Antarctica 0.26 0.31 17.6 29 195 Grenada 0.28 0.30 2.78 4.8 44 194 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.27 0.30 6.09 11.1 132 199 Chad 0.26 0.29 0.03 11.1 221 198 U.S. Pacific Islands 0.29 0.29 1.20 0 215 197 Solomon Islands 0.23 0.29 0.54 25 131 196 CentralAfrican Republic 0.34 0.29 0.06 -13 Saint 46 201 0.23 0.27 2.53 17.6 Vincent/Grenadines 148 200 Lesotho 0.26 0.27 0.14 5.9 205 202 Nauru 0.19 0.20 21.96 9.1 37 210 Montserrat 0.09 0.15 28.73 58.7 213 209 Samoa 0.18 0.15 0.77 -16.7 53 208 Virgin Islands, British 0.12 0.15 6.00 25 222 207 Vanuatu 0.12 0.15 0.68 25 164 206 Sao Tome and Principe 0.13 0.15 0.86 11.1 133 205 Comoros 0.12 0.15 0.20 25 189 204 Cook Islands 0.09 0.15 12.71 66.7 220 203 Tonga 0.20 0.15 1.28 -23.1 23 211 Dominica 0.13 0.14 1.93 11.1 Saint Pierre and 6 212 0.09 0.11 17.78 16.7 Miquelon Turks and Caicos 49 213 0.08 0.08 3.37 0 Islands Falkland Islands (Islas 27 214 0.05 0.05 14.57 0 Malvinas) 197 215 Kiribati 0.04 0.04 0.45 0 209 217 Niue 0.01 0.01 2.59 2.9 163 216 Saint Helena 0.01 0.01 1.93 11.2 Source: International Energy Agency Statistics "http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject Table 1: Showing CO2 Emission by States and Regions. Table Rank, Country or region id 2009

3.1.1. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL

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Historically, many attempts have been made to control Climate Change. From the founding of the United Nations Environmental Programs UNEP in 1972

following the

1972 UN

Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden, the outcome of which proposed the creation of a global body to act as the environmental conscience of the UN system. In response, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2997 on 15 December, 1972 creating the UNEP Governing Council, composed of 58 nations elected for four-year terms by the UN General Assembly, responsible for assessing the state of the global environment, establishing UNEP's programme priorities, and approving the budget. The UNEP Secretariat, with its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, provides a focal point for environmental action and coordination within the UN system, headed by an Executive Director, with the rank of UN Under-SecretaryGeneral; and a voluntary Environment Fund to finance UNEP’s environmental initiatives, to be supplemented by trust funds and funds allocated by the UN regular budget. (UNEP 2012). Some major landmarks on Environmental and Climate-related efforts of Control includes but are not limited to the : 

Founding of the UNEP in 1972



The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1973



The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985



The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Depletes the Ozone Layer in 1987



The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988



The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste in1989



The Global Environment Facility (GEF) established in 1991

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

UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) which issues the Rio Declaration and ‘Agenda 21’ in 1992



The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992



The Convention on Biological diversity in 1992



The Convention to Combat Desertification in 1994



The Global Program of Action (GPA) launched to protect marine environment from landbased sources of Polution in 1995



Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent in 1998



The UN Global Compact launched in 1999

Although all these periods have their respective land marks on the many efforts aimed at controlling the global environment and Climate Change in particular, the year 1992 and the tripartite feats of reaching the Rio Declaration or ‘Agenda 21’ at the Earth Summit, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological diversity in 1992 makes the year particularly special as a base year in discussing Climate Change Control. The joint efforts of the UNEP and the Intergovernmental Pannel on Climate Change (IPCC) saw to the founding of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).at the historic Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Since then the many Conferences of Parties (COP) that have held from COP 1 in 1995 to COP 17 in 2011, have been on the platform of the UNFCCC. Thus the time frame of this study which has its base year from 1992, makess the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change from the Rio Earth Summit, marks a watershed in the chronicle of efforts aimed at controlling Global Climate Change. It was at the instance of the Rio Earth Summit that United Nations drew up its Framework Convention on Climate Change

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often christened the UNFCCC which is the highest multilateral platform in galvanizing sovereign states towards collective action. Consequently, the politics of Climate Change Control and its attendant conflicts between parties is incidence on the platform of the UNFCCC. Thus by its mandate, the UNFCCC is necessarily involved in the management and resolution of conflict even if in principle. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC) is an international environmental treaty produced at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as the, Earth Summit in Rio-dejenerio-Brazil from June 3 to 14, 1992. The objective of the treaty is to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The treaty itself set no mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and contains no enforcement mechanisms. In that sense, the treaty is considered legally non-binding. Instead, the treaty provides for updates (called "protocols") that would set mandatory emission limits. The principal update is the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which has become much better known than the UNFCCC itself. First and foremost, the UNFCCC members states are categorized into three groups or parties namely: Annex I, Annex II countries and Non Annex I or developing countries of course, on the platform of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in At Rio On June 12, 1992, 154 nations signed the UNFCCC, that upon ratification committed signatories' governments to a voluntary "non-binding aim" to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases with the goal of "preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with

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Earth's climate system." These actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries, with the intention of stabilizing their emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000; and other responsibilities would be incumbent upon all UNFCCC parties. The parties agreed in general that they would recognize "common but differentiated responsibilities," with greater responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the near term on the part of developed/industrialized countries, which were listed and identified in Annex I group of the Framework and thereafter referred to as "Annex I" countries. UNFCCC members With 194 members from its founding in 1992, The UNFCCC had lost two states due to the intensity of the politics and the vested interests in the issues at the COPs. These states are the United State and Canada in 2001 and 2011 respectively. It has two states or dominion territories â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Andorra and Holy Sea as observers. Note: that a comprehensive list of the UNFCCC members and their respective categories in the 3 classifications will be attached subsequently pls. One of its first tasks was to establish national green house gas inventories.(GHG) emissions and removals, which were used to create the 1990 benchmark levels for accession of Annex I countries to the Kyoto Protocol and for the commitment of those countries to GHG reductions. Updated inventories must be regularly submitted by Annex I countries.

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STRUCTURE OF THE UNFCCC.

Figure 1 The UNFCCC Secretariat The UNFCCC Secretariat is responsible for coordinating and organizing the annual meetings of the COPs, the COP/MOP and bodies involved in the intergovernmental processes (such as SBSTA, SBI, Article 6 Supervisory Committee, CDM Executive Board, Compliance Committee) Some of the Secretariatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s services include: preparing meeting agendas, organizing

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the multiple events during meetings, providing interpretation and translation services, reproduction and distribution of documents, recording of meetings, providing the COP and COP/MOP Bureaus with recommendations, etc. The Organization and Departments of the UNFCCC The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) The SBSTA was established to review progress made in science and technology and provide policy recommendations based on its analysis to the COP.25 The SBSTA will provide the same functions to the COP/MOP on issues directly related to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.26 The COP Bureau guides SBSTA on procedural issues related to the Convention, while the COP/MOP Bureau guides it primarily on process matters related to the Protocol. The Subsidiary Bodies for Implementation (SBI) The SBI is responsible for providing assistance in evaluating and reviewing the implementation of the Convention.27 The SBI will serve the COP/MOP with this same function for issues specific to implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Like the SBSTA, the SBI is guided by both the COP and COP/MOP Bureaus, depending on the issues being negotiated during the meeting. FORMAL BODIES SPECIFIC TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (KP) The CDM Executive Board The CDM Executive Board is responsible for supervising the operation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), reviewing and preparing detailed CDM decisions presented to the COP/MOP, and ensuring its successful operation. In this context the CDM Executive Board will make further recommendations on modalities and procedures to the COP/MOP, report on its activities at each COP/MOP session, and report on regional and sub-regional distribution of CDM project activities to the COP/MOP in view of ensuring equal distribution. The COP/MOP

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will assist the Executive Board in arranging for funding of CDM activities, as necessary. The CDM Executive Board has been operational since 2001, under a mandate from the COP. (UNFCCC 2011).

THE ARTICLE 6 SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE The responsibility of the Article 6 Supervisory Committee (A6SC), established through the Marrakech Accords, is to supervise the verification of emission reduction units (ERUs) from track 2 JI projects, to report on JI activities to the COP/MOP, and to ensure successful implementation of the mechanism. At the end of the first commitment period, the Committee will review and make recommendations to the COP/MOP on JI implementation procedures. The A6SC is to be established at COP/MOP 1, where further procedural rules for the A6SC will be determined. THE COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE The Compliance Committee and its operations represent one of the strongest and most sophisticated mechanisms established in any Multilateral Environmental Agreement to date. The main responsibility of the Compliance Committee is to ensure that Parties are respecting their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The Compliance Committee is made up of

two

branches. The Facilitative Branch is accountable for providing advice and assistance to Parties that may be in danger of not complying with the Kyoto Protocol. It therefore promotes compliance and plays an early warning role. The Enforcement Branch is responsible for ensuring that Parties meet their commitments, which may mean applying consequences for failing to meet commitments.

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The Enforcement Branch will operate with a limited degree of discretion in order to maximize legal certainty and will make public the consequences to be applied. The work of the Compliance Committee is overseen by a Committee Plenary and facilitated by a Committee Bureau. These are specific to the Compliance Committee and are in no way related to the Bureau and the Plenary of the COP/MOP. All members of both branches meet in the Plenary, whose main role is to communicate decisions taken by the Committee to COP/MOP and receive guidance from COP/MOP. The Bureau is mainly responsible for coordinating the work of the two branches and ensuring they interact and cooperate effectively. It is composed of the Chair and Vice-Chair of each branch. The Compliance Committee is to be established at COP/MOP 1 and will operate beyond the first commitment period irrespective of the future of the Kyoto Protocol. Compliance will be assessed in part on the basis of a report provided by the Parties that is due after the grace period for fulfilling commitments â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 100 days following the completion of the expert review process, which is to be decided on by the COP/MOP.37 Therefore, the Compliance Committee will have to operate until it can ascertain the degree to which each country has met its Kyoto Protocol target, and until it has taken a position on the consequences of any non-compliance â&#x20AC;&#x201D; probably well into 2015. THE WORKINGS OF THE BODIES SPECIFIC TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL The three bodies described were specifically designed to facilitate the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. These bodies have ten members and ten alternate members each, and their decision-making processes are all based primarily on consensus. However, they differ from each other in their composition, last-resort decision-making processes, meeting frequency and openness Since the Marrakech Accords stress the need for the A6SC process to draw on the experience of the CDM Executive Board, it can be expected that the workings of the CDM

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Executive Board will inspire that of the A6SC. On the other hand, as the Compliance Committee was designed to serve a significantly different purpose from that of the CDM Executive Board and the A6SC, the workings of its two branches may be quite different. Thus with the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, notes Olivas & Figures the already challenging intergovernmental process will have a new layer of complexity due to the initiation of the COP/MOP process. At a 2004 workshop held in conjunction to SBI 21, Parties met to discuss the organization of the intergovernmental process. A number of issues were flagged by negotiators in relation to the challenges they face. Some of the main issues identified include extensive and complicated agendas leading to busy meeting schedules and a large number of contact groups and informal consultations during sessions. In addition, the COP/MOP will likely raise new substantive concerns for negotiators and other participants. Additional challenges in a nutshell: Olivas & Figures describes - Decision-making under COP versus COP/MOP as uneasy as a number of issues related to the Kyoto Protocol are still under negotiation. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can decide to address these under the COP or the COP/MOP. In such cases, according to them, negotiators will need to understand the consequences of this choice. If the matter is dealt with under the COP, it will allow non-Kyoto Protocol Parties to block decision-making on an issue that may be related to the Kyoto Protocol. This can present benefits or drawbacks, depending on what the Party seeks to achieve on the issue. It is therefore imperative to understand the consequences prior to deciding under which body the matter should be addressed. Olivas & Figures (2005: 21) contends that the long-term fate of the COP/MOP is obviously predicated on the future of the Kyoto Protocol. According to the Protocol, consideration of the next generation of commitments must be initiated at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period in 2012.

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Those commitments are a hotly debated issue, and observers and negotiators hold diverging positions. In our view, two scenarios are relevant for the COP/MOP. If Parties negotiate a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, the COP/MOP will remain operational with the responsibilities it has been assigned already, plus any further functions that may be allocated to it. Another possibility is that Parties choose to adopt a different instrument to further the advancement of the climate regime. In this case, the COP/MOP would continue dealing only with the Kyoto Protocol issues that are still relevant in the post- 2012 period. The COP/MOP may then also be called upon to collaborate with the COP to ensure a harmonious transition from the Kyoto Protocol to that new instrument. The climate regime cannot draw an impermeable line at the end of the year 2012 and start a completely new architecture in 2013, in particular because the work of the Compliance Committee may well extend to 2015. At least two main aspects will have to be considered. First, decisions would need to be made about how the new instrument would account for under- or over-compliance with Kyoto Protocol targets. Second, a decision would need to be taken with respect to whether the flexibility mechanisms (CDM, JI and Emissions Trading) will continue to exist, and if so in what form. Both of these carry-over issues would need to be addressed should Parties contemplate adopting another instrument after 2012. The healthy evolution of the climate regime therefore depends to a great extent on ensuring an appropriate transition beyond the first commitment period. Thus, the COP/MOP has an important role to play not only in the successful implementation of the Protocol itself, but, perhaps more importantly, in demonstrating that the regime The COPs Since the inception of the UNFCCC has gone through series of diplomatic deliberations and conferences from (COP 1, The Berlin mandate 1995, COP 2, Geneva Switzerland 1996, COP 3 The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 1997, COP 4 Buenos Aires

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1998, COP 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 , 15 and COP 16. Then came COP 17 which was the last COP, during which time, the Kyoto Protocol expired and a second commitment period was renewed to it’s span of operation. Of the numerous conferences of parties held annually from the founding of the UNFCCC in 1992, it is rather unsatisfactory that only one of such many COPs (COP 3 held in Kyoto 1997) legally binding treaty – The Kyoto Protocol could find expression on the platform of the UNFCCC. And even that would later turn a ‘lame or toothless dog’ when in 2001 bigger emitters like the U.S. ran away from Kyoto or the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, the composition of nation-states into the three main categories of the parties to the UNFCCC, all together have continue to be basis for conflict, scepticism and distrust among states. Consequently, this phenomena has tended to undermine the ultimate objectives of the UNFCCC/the KP. Thus the Kyoto Protocol expired in 2012 as the first and only binding ever treaty on Climate Change. The crisis and conflict that has repeatedly featured at the COPs could not allow for the drawing of a successor treaty that was meant to succeed Kyoto, the last option and by every standard, a soft landing, was to renew the commitment period of the existing Kyoto protocol. 3.1.2. PARTIES AND GROUPS The confirmed parties or states who are signatories to the UNFCCC and other affiliated interest groups as approved by the Secretariat. At its founding in 1992 the UNFCCC had 194 member states but lost two of them as having withdrawn –the US in 2001 and Canada in 2011 leaving the membership size to 192 currently. (The UNFCCC 2012). These states are categorized as stated previously, into three groupings. The Convention divides countries into three main groups in line with the principle of Common but differentiated Responsibility in accordance with emission footprints.

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Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD. These parties are further classified into groups according to the respective carbon footprint which is largely a function of industrialization

Annex I countries There are 41 Annex I countries and the European Union is also a member. These countries are classified as industrialized countries and countries in transition: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Annex II Parties consist of the OECD members of Annex I, but not the so called economies in transition ( EIT )Parties. Annex II countries There are 23 Annex II countries and the European Union. Turkey was removed from the Annex II list in 2001 at its request to recognize its economy as a transition economy. These countries are classified as developed countries which pay for costs of developing countries:

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Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America They are required to provide financial resources to enable developing countries to undertake emissions reduction activities under the Convention and to help them adapt to adverse effects of climate change. In addition, they have to "take all practicable steps" to promote the development and transfer of environmentally friendly technologies to EIT Parties and developing countries. Funding provided by Annex II Parties is channeled mostly through the Conventionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s financial mechanism. Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries. Certain groups of developing countries are recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with low-lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. Others (such as countries that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel production and commerce) feel more vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response measures. The Convention emphasizes activities that promise to answer the special needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as investment, insurance and technology transfer. The 49 Parties classified as least developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations are given special consideration under the Convention on account of their insignificant â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;footprintâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in emissions of GHGs ( in tan dem with the principles of

Common but Differentiated

Responsibility) which is a function of industrialization. They are also considered on the basis limited capacity to respond to climate change and adapt to its adverse effects. Parties are urged to

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take full account of the special situation of LDCs when considering funding and technologytransfer activities. 3.1.3. OBSERVER ORGANIZATIONS Several categories of observer organizations also attend sessions of the COP and its subsidiary bodies. These include representatives of United Nations secretariat units and bodies, such as UNDP, UNEP and UNCTAD, as well as its specialized agencies and related organizations, such as the GEF and WMO/UNEP Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Observer organizations include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the OECD and International Energy Agency (IEA), along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Over 1,409 NGOs and 86 IGOs are admitted as observers. The NGOs represent a broad spectrum of interests, and embrace representatives from business and industry, environmental groups, farming and agriculture, indigenous populations, local governments and municipal authorities, research and academic institutes, labour unions, women and gender and youth groups. Constituency groupings have emerged from the above groups to facilitate interaction. (UNFCCC 2012). 3.2. 1. Conflict of Parties Conflict Drivers, Issues and Actors From the early 1990s up to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the first conflict that almost rocked the boat in the Climate Talk was the debate as to whether Climate Change was real or a mere fiction. It was an issue of tense debate on whether the phenomenon was taking place or not. Such division and polarization of stake-holders was not without its conflicts. Ceding of emissions by parties and its attendant trade-off with industrial gains, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, technology transfer, redemption of intervention pledges to GEF, inclusion or

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otherwise of developing countries in emission cuts, Population versus Industrialization debates, violation of the Principle of Common but differentiated Responsibility, non reference or reference to historical footprints and disregard to the idea of a universal human community beyond the concept of state and narrowed national interests have repeatedly featured as some of the issues in the conflict between and among parties in the discourse, politics and wrangling connected to Climate Change. Yet other issues include the current categorization of the parties into Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I groups, itself a source of conflict, while the lack of inertia for a successor treaty to Kyoto has remained a manifest failure of all parties, getting a second commitment period to it was in principle only a soft landing and the overriding consequence of all the vexed issues that were unresolved. Earlier in the years preceding 2005 the requirement for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was that at least 55 countries comprised of industrialized nations in part, who accounted for at least 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions of the 1990 benchmark would ratify for the treaty to go into force. This marked one of the phases of the Conflict in Climate Change Control and it took another eight years from Kyoto in 1997 to the commencement of operational effect of the protocol in 2005. Although the United States initially helped negotiate the treaty, the administration of President George W. Bush withdrew its support when it took office in 2001. The Bush administration said the treaty would hurt the United States economically and gave too many advantages to developing countries. Because the United States accounts for about 35 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, its withdrawal from the protocol meant that the treaty could not go into force unless Russia, the next largest polluter at 17 percent, ratified the agreement. By August 2004, 126 countries had ratified the agreement but the ratifying industrial

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nations only accounted for 44 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. Then in September 2004 the cabinet of Russian president Vladimir Putin approved the treaty, and it went into force in 2005. 3.2.2. A HISTORY OF THE POLITICS Once the era of debate on whether Climate Change was occurring or not, was over, the issue became highly political as states that would, by the demand of the IPCC scientific evidence, cut down their national greenhouse gas emissions to meet compliance expectations, became more engrossed with their narrowed ‘self’ interests at the peril of the ‘common good’. Clearly, the ‘North-South’ debate in mitigation and adaptation efforts places more burden on Developed countries for reasons of industrial wastes as found to connect with greenhouse gas emissions globally. This position is popular and has found expression in the manner of correlations between the commencement of global temperature rising and the beginning of the Industrial Revolution as shown by the UNDP Human Development Report 2008. The cost of compliance with the demands of mitigation is high especially so, that it is closely linked to the developmental aspirations of states and parties. In the short run, it seems at variance with economic growth of such states. From the emergence of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the politics and contestation on who to do what has featured repeatedly at the international agenda, this is closely tied to its operational mechanisms –the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Emission Trading Scheme(ETS). The efficacy of these mechanisms have proved to provide less than expected. They are opened to many controversies with many instances of corrupt accounting among and between states. Key in the history of the politics of Climate Change is the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 as already discussed. This has had an overriding negative impact on the effort of parties in reaching consensus on the Climate Deal given that the US alone accounts

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for nearly 35% of global GHG emission. Close to the US national footprint is that of China IEA(2008) and the inclusion of China among the Non Annex I parties given their absolute emission footprints on the basis of population factor. There are still issues of uncertainty as it relates with the subject of Climate Science. More discoveries are still being made. This too seem to have implications on the politics of controlling climate change. The precautionary principle should imply an emphasis on the need to prevent such adverse effects. (Toth etâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;al 2001: 655656) Toth etâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;al argued that in decision making, the precautionary principle is considered when possibly dangerous, irreversible, or catastrophic events are identified, but scientific evaluation of the potential damage is not sufficiently certain. Uncertainty is associated with each link of the causal chain of climate change. For example, future GHG emissions are uncertain, as are climate change damages. However, following the precautionary principle, uncertainty is not a reason for inaction, and this is acknowledged in Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC (Toth et al., 2001: 656). The ultimate objective of the Framework Convention is to prevent "dangerous" anthropogenic (i.e., human) interference of the climate system. As is stated in Article 2 of the Convention, this requires that GHG concentrations are stabilized in the atmosphere at a level where ecosystems can adapt naturally to climate change, food production is not threatened, and economic development can proceed in a sustainable fashion. The only quantified target set in the original FCCC (Article 4) was for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Goldemberg et al., 1996: 32â&#x20AC;&#x201C;33). The future levels of GHG emissions are highly uncertain. In 2010, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) published a report on the voluntary emissions reduction pledges made as part of the Copenhagen Accord. As part of their assessment, UNEP looked at possible emissions out until the end of the 21st century, and estimated associated changes in global mean

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temperature. (UNEP 2010: 18) A range of emissions projections suggested a temperature increase of between 2.5 to 5 ºC before the end of the 21st century, relative to pre-industrial temperature levels. The lower end temperature estimate is associated with fairly stringent controls on emissions after 2020, while the higher end is associated with weaker controls on emissions. Graphical description of risks and impacts of climate change by the IPCC, published in 2001. A revision of this figure by Smith and others shows increased risks. Smith, Schneider, Oppenheimer, Yohe, Hare, Mastrandrea, Patwardhan, Burton, et al. ( 2009). Conferences of the Parties Since the UNFCCC entered into force, the parties have been meeting annually in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change, and beginning in the mid1990s, to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol to establish legally binding obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. From 2005 the Conferences have met in conjunction with Meetings of Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (MOP), and parties to the Convention that are not parties to the Protocol can participate in Protocol-related meetings as observers. 1995 – COP 1, The Berlin Mandate The first UNFCCC Conference of Parties took place in March 1995 in Berlin, Germany. It voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries' abilities to meet commitments under the Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). 1996 – COP 2, Geneva, Switzerland COP 2 took place in July 1996 in Geneva, Switzerland. Its Ministerial Declaration was noted (but not adopted) July 18, 1996, and reflected a U.S. position statement presented by Timothy

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Wirth, former Under Secretary for Global Affairs for the U.S. State Department at that meeting, which 1. Accepted the scientific findings on climate change proffered by the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its second assessment (1995); 2. Rejected uniform "harmonized policies" in favor of flexibility; 3. Called for "legally binding mid-term targets." 1997 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change COP 3 took place in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. After intensive negotiations, it adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which outlined the greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligation for Annex I countries, along with what came to be known as Kyoto mechanisms such as emissions trading, clean development mechanism and joint implementation. Most industrialized countries and some central European economies in transition (all defined as Annex B countries) agreed to legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6 to 8% below 1990 levels between the years 2008â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United States would be required to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990 levels; however Congress did not ratify the treaty after Clinton signed it. The Bush administration explicitly rejected the protocol in 2001. 1998 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 4, Buenos Aires, Argentina COP 4 took place in November 1998 in Buenos Aires. It had been expected that the remaining issues unresolved in Kyoto would be finalized at this meeting. However, the complexity and difficulty of finding agreement on these issues proved insurmountable, and instead the parties adopted a 2-year "Plan of Action" to advance efforts and to devise mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to be completed by 2000. During COP4, Argentina and Kazakhstan

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expressed their commitment to take on the greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligation, the first two non-Annex countries to do so. 1999 – COP 5, Bonn, Germany COP 5 took place between October 25 and November 5, 1999, in Bonn, Germany. It was primarily a technical meeting, and did not reach major conclusions. 2000 – COP 6, The Hague, Netherlands COP 6 took place between November 13, – November 25, 2000, in The Hague, Netherlands. The discussions evolved rapidly into a high-level negotiation over the major political issues. These included major controversy over the United States' proposal to allow credit for carbon "sinks" in forests and agricultural lands, satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the final hours of COP 6, despite some compromises agreed between the United States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP 6, suspended COP-6 without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume.[21] It was later announced that the COP 6 meetings (termed "COP 6 bis") would be resumed in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July. The next regularly scheduled meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC – COP 7 – had been set for Marrakech, Morocco, in October–November 2001. 2001 – COP 6 bis, Bonn, Germany

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COP 6 negotiations resumed July 17â&#x20AC;&#x201C;27, 2001, in Bonn, Germany, with little progress having been made in resolving the differences that had produced an impasse in The Hague. However, this meeting took place after George W. Bush had become the President of the United States and had rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001; as a result the United States delegation to this meeting declined to participate in the negotiations related to the Protocol and chose to take the role of observer at the meeting. As the other parties negotiated the key issues, agreement was reached on most of the major political issues, to the surprise of most observers, given the low expectations that preceded the meeting. The agreements included: 1. Flexible Mechanisms: The "flexibility" mechanisms which the United States had strongly favored when the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions trading; Joint Implementation (JI); and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which allow industrialized countries to fund emissions reduction activities in developing countries as an alternative to domestic emission reductions. One of the key elements of this agreement was that there would be no quantitative limit on the credit a country could claim from use of these mechanisms provided domestic action constituted a significant element of the efforts of each Annex B country to meet their targets. 2. Carbon sinks: It was agreed that credit would be granted for broad activities that absorb carbon from the atmosphere or store it, including forest and cropland management, and re-vegetation, with no over-all cap on the amount of credit that a country could claim for sinks activities. In the case of forest management, an Appendix Z establishes countryspecific caps for each Annex I country. Thus, a cap of 13 million tons could be credited to Japan (which represents about 4% of its base-year emissions). For cropland

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management, countries could receive credit only for carbon sequestration increases above 1990 levels. 3. Compliance: Final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that would address non-compliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP 7, but included broad outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets that would include a requirement to "make up" shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1, suspension of the right to sell credits for surplus emissions reductions, and a required compliance action plan for those not meeting their targets. 4. Financing: There was agreement on the establishment of three new funds to provide assistance for needs associated with climate change: (1) a fund for climate change that supports a series of climate measures; (2) a least-developed-country fund to support National Adaptation Programs of Action; and (3) a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund supported by a CDM levy and voluntary contributions. A number of operational details attendant upon these decisions remained to be negotiated and agreed upon, and these were the major issues considered by the COP 7 meeting that followed. 2001 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 7, Marrakech, Morocco At the COP 7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco from October 29 to November 10, 2001, negotiators wrapped up the work on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, finalizing most of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The completed package of decisions is known as the Marrakech Accords. The United States delegation maintained its observer role, declining to participate actively in the negotiations. Other parties continued to express hope that the United States would re-engage in the process at some point and worked to achieve ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the requisite number of countries to

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bring it into force (55 countries needed to ratify it, including those accounting for 55% of developed-country emissions of carbon dioxide in 1990). The date of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (August–September 2002) was put forward as a target to bring the Kyoto Protocol into force. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa. The main decisions at COP 7 included: •

Operational rules for international emissions trading among parties to the Protocol and for the CDM and joint implementation;

•

A compliance regime that outlined consequences for failure to meet emissions targets but deferred to the parties to the Protocol, once it came into force, the decision on whether those consequences would be legally binding;

•

Accounting procedures for the flexibility mechanisms;

•

A decision to consider at COP 8 how to achieve a review of the adequacy of commitments that might lead to discussions on future commitments by developing countries.

2002 – COP 8, New Delhi, India Taking place from October 23, – November 1, 2002, COP8 adopted the Delhi Ministerial Declaration that, amongst others, called for efforts by developed countries to transfer technology and minimize the impact of climate change on developing countries. It is also approved the New Delhi work programmed on Article 6 of the Convention. The COP8 was marked by Russia's hesitation, stating that the government needs more time to think it over. The Kyoto Protocol's fine print says it can come into force only once it is ratified by 55 countries, including wealthy nations responsible for 55 per cent of the developed world's 1990 carbon dioxide emissions.

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With the United States – and its 36.1 per cent slice of developed-world carbon dioxide – out of the picture and Australia also refusing ratification, Russia was required to make up the difference, hence it could delay the process. 2003 – COP 9, Milan, Italy December 1 – 12, 2003 The parties agreed to use the Adaptation Fund established at COP7 in 2001 primarily in supporting developing countries better adapt to climate change. The fund would also be used for capacity-building through technology transfer. At COP9, the parties also agreed to review the first national reports submitted by 110 non-Annex I countries. 2004 – COP 10, Buenos Aires, Argentina Not to be confused with Convention on Biological Diversity, also called COP 10 (10th Conference of Parties) leading to the Nagoya Protocol in 2010. December 6 – 17, 2004. See also Climate ethics: The Program on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change COP10 discussed the progress made since the first Conference of the Parties 10 years ago and its future challenges, with special emphasis on climate change mitigation and adaptation. To promote developing countries better adapt to climate change, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was adopted. The parties also began discussing the post-Kyoto mechanism, on how to allocate emission reduction obligation following 2012, when the first commitment period ends. 2005 – COP 11/MOP 1, Montreal, Canada COP 11 (or COP 11/MOP 1) took place between November 28 and December 9, 2005, in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. It was the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol since their initial meeting in Kyoto in 1997. It was therefore one of the largest intergovernmental conferences on climate change ever. The event marked the entry into force of the Kyoto

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Protocol. Hosting more than 10,000 delegates, it was one of Canada's largest international events ever and the largest gathering in Montreal since Expo 67. The Montreal Action Plan is an agreement hammered out at the end of the conference to "extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 2012 expiration date and negotiate deeper cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions." Canada's environment minister, at the time, Stéphane Dion, said the agreement provides a "map for the future." ( Stephane Dion December 13, 2005). COP 11 pages UNFCCC.int at the UNFCCC. 2006 – COP 12/MOP 2, Nairobi, Kenya COP 12/MOP 2 took place between November 6 and 17, 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. At the meeting, BBC reporter Richard Black coined the phrase “climate tourists” to describe some delegates who attended “to see Africa, take snaps of the wildlife, the poor, dying African children and women”. Black also noted that due to delegates concerns over economic costs and possible losses of competitiveness, the majority of the discussions avoided any mention of reducing emissions. Black concluded that was a disconnect between the political process and the scientific imperative. (Black 2006). Despite such criticism, certain strides were made at COP12, including in the areas of support for developing countries and clean development mechanism. The parties adopted a five-year plan of work to support climate change adaptation by developing countries, and agreed on the procedures and modalities for the Adaptation Fund. They also agreed to improve the projects for clean development mechanism. 2007 – COP 13/MOP 3, Bali, Indonesia COP 13/MOP 3 took place between December 3 and December 15, 2007, at Nusa Dua, in Bali, Indonesia. Agreement on a timeline and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework (the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) was achieved with the adoption of the

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Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.13). The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) was established as a new subsidiary body to conduct the negotiations aimed at urgently enhancing the implementation of the Convention up to and beyond 2012. Decision 9/CP.13 is an Amended to the New Delhi work programme. These negotiations took place during 2008 (leading to COP 14/MOP 4 in Poznan, Poland) and 2009 (leading to COP 15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen). 2008 – COP 14/MOP 4, Poznań, Poland 2008 United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 14 in Poznan. More image and news: 2008 United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 14/MOP 4 took place from December 1 to 12, 2008 in Poznań, Poland (UN 2009). Delegates agreed on principles for the financing of a fund to help the poorest nations cope with the effects of climate change and they approved a mechanism to incorporate forest protection into the efforts of the international community to combat climate change.(Laurie 2008). 2009 – COP 15/MOP 5, Copenhagen, Denmark COP 15 took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, from December 7 to December 18, 2009. The overall goal for the COP 15/MOP 5 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Denmark was to establish an ambitious global climate agreement for the period from 2012 when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires. However, on November 14, 2009, the New York Times announced that "President Obama and other world leaders have decided to put off the difficult task of reaching a climate change agreement... agreeing instead to make it the mission of the Copenhagen conference to reach a less specific “politically binding” agreement that would put the most difficult issues into the future." (Cooper, 2009). "Leaders Will Delay Deal on Climate Change". New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ Retrieved

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December 5, 2009 Ministers and officials from 192 countries took part in the Copenhagen meeting and in addition there were participants from a large number of civil society organizations. As many Annex 1 industrialized countries are now reluctant to fulfill commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, a large part of the diplomatic work that lays the foundation for a post-Kyoto agreement was undertaken up to the COP15. The conference did not achieve a binding agreement for long-term action. A 13-paragraph 'political accord' was negotiated by approximately 25 parties including US and China, but it was only 'noted' by the COP as it is considered an external document, not negotiated within the UNFCCC process. (UNFCC. 2009). The accord was notable in that it referred to a collective commitment by developed countries for new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, that will approach USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012. Longer-term options on climate financing mentioned in the accord are being discussed within the UN Secretary General's High Level Advisory Group on Climate Financing, which is due to report in November 2010. The negotiations on extending the Kyoto Protocol had unresolved issues as did the negotiations on a framework for long-term cooperative action. The working groups on these tracks to the negotiations are now due to report to COP 16 and MOP 6 in Mexico. 2010 – COP 16/MOP 6, Cancún, Mexico COP 16 was held in Cancún, Mexico, from November 29 to December 10, 2010. 2011 – COP 17/MOP 7, Durban, South Africa The 2011 COP 17 was held at Durban, South Africa, from November 28 to December 9, 2011. 2012 – COP 18/MOP 8 Two countries, Qatar and South Korea, are currently bidding to host the 2012 COP 18.

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UNFCCC members With 194 members from its founding in 1992, The UNFCCC had lost two states due to the intensity of the politics and the vested interests in the issues at the COPs. These states are the United State and Canada in 2001 and 2011 respectively. It has two states or dominion territories â&#x20AC;&#x201C;Andorra and Holy Sea as observers. Note: that a comprehensive list of the UNFCCC members and their respective categories in the 3 classifications will be attached subsequently pls. 3.2.3 THE STUDY/CONFLICT TIMELINE ( 1992 2012 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; or from Rio -Durban) The study timeline takes its origin from the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) 1992 through the many conferences of parties starting from COP 1 Berlin to Cop 17 now which just ended in Durban South Africa. 3.3.1. CHALLENGE/LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY Given the study design, the constraints of both time and resource as well as the proximate gab between the researcher and the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, Germany and the nature of data used in executing the work, the researcher cannot but own up to some limitations of the study which by and large were inevitable. For one, sources of data such as were used herein are subject to biases, fraud, distortions and incorrectness, especially so, when dealing with issues as sensitive as the politics of Climate Change with all the vested national/regional interests in it. Such interests could have altered certain data sets or facts about their sources. The work could have been more academic perhaps, if the resource and time were more ample for the researcher to have interacted directly with some of the past delegates of states to the COPS as well as some staff of the UNFCCC itself who are directly involved with the Climate Talks. This wish alas would have provided more insight as the largely secondary data could have found some blending

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with primary ones as well. This notwithstanding, the work was scrutinized as much as the suspicion of this fear made necessary. And all forms of data both primary and secondary, were corroborated with the available records from the UNFCCC Secretariat. Moreover, the efficacy of triangulation as a technique The Scotts Four Criteria of validity as discussed above, was employed to ensure that garbage were sieved out of the required

data before they were put to use. Moreover, the nature of

qualitative data was characterized by some elements of subjectivity and bias, as such, its weaknesses were mitigated upon, by the principles of Content Analysis and Discourse Analysis which were the methods of data analysis used in the research. Secondly, the issues of climate change are still unfolding and albeit very dynamic. Some of the topical issues in the context of this research, were still brewing and perhaps will so be for a while beyond the time frame of this work. Yet it was only normal to keep adding and altering perspectives as new issues unfolded themselves at the UNFCCC and within the domain of member states that are signatory to it. For instance, the thought of the thesis began when the Climate Talks was still at COP 13 BaliIndonessia in 2007. Five years later, it has gone through COPs 14, 15, 16 and 17 in PoznanPoland, Copenhagen- Denmark, Cancum- Mexico City and Durban -South Africa respectively. Each one presenting new issues,

problems,

conflicts, interests and politics. At the

commencement of this thesis, the talk was at Copenhagen Denmark COP 15, yet months after Durban, the conclusion of the work is yet to be reached. Such periodic update and increment was not an easy task.

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CHAPTER FOUR AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL AND CONFLICT OF PARTIES 4.I. CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL AND CONFLICT OF PARTIES The global debate over who should take action to address climate change is extremely precarious, as diametrically opposed perceptions of climate justice threaten the prospects for any long-term agreement. Poor nations fear limits on their efforts to grow economically and meet the needs of their own people, while powerful industrial nations, including the United States, refuse to curtail their own excesses unless developing countries make similar sacrifices. (Robert & Parks 2006) Meanwhile, although industrialized countries are responsible for over 60 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change, developing countries suffer the "worst and first" effects of climate-related disasters, including droughts, floods, and storms, because of their geographical locations. In their work, A Climate of Injustice, Roberts and Parks analyze the role that inequality between rich and poor nations plays in the negotiation of global climate agreements. This is the basis of conflicts in part, that has characterized the politics of Climate Change Control. Secondly, it would appear there is a trade-off between compliance with the global responsibility in climate change control and the attainment of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;selfâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; interests for states especially for parties with commitment to GHG cuts under the Kyoto Protocol. This variance between global responsibility and state interest, has tended to undermine the desired progress of the Framework

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from inception in 1992 to date. It has also over heat the politics of Climate Change Control to the point of generating some dysfunctional conflicts among parties.

Parties and Group Classifications Parties to UNFCCC are classified as: •

Annex I countries – industrialized countries and economies in transition

•

Annex II countries – developed countries which pay for costs of developing countries

•

Non Annex I countries - Developing countries.

Annex I countries which have ratified the Protocol have committed to reduce their emission levels of greenhouse gasses to targets that are mainly set below their 1990 levels. They may do this by allocating reduced annual allowances to the major operators within their borders. These operators can only exceed their allocations if they buy emission allowances, or offset their excesses through a mechanism that is agreed by all the parties to UNFCCC. Annex II countries are a sub-group of the Annex I countries. They comprise the OECD members, excluding those that were economies in transition in 1992. Developing countries are not required to reduce emission levels unless developed countries supply enough funding and technology. Setting no immediate restrictions under UNFCCC serves three purposes: •

it avoids restrictions on their development, because emissions are strongly linked to industrial capacity

•

they can sell emissions credits to nations whose operators have difficulty meeting their emissions targets

•

they get money and technologies for low-carbon investments from Annex II countries.

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Developing countries may volunteer to become Annex I countries when they are sufficiently developed. Some opponents of the Convention argue that the split between Annex I and developing countries is unfair, and that both developing countries and developed countries need to reduce their emissions unilaterally. Some countries claim that their costs of following the Convention requirements will stress their economy. Other countries point to research, such as the Stern Report, that calculates the cost of compliance to be less than the cost of the consequences of doing nothing. Annex I countries There are 41 Annex I countries and the European Union is also a member. These countries are classified as industrialized countries and countries in transition: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America Annex II countries There are 23 Annex II countries and the European Union. Turkey was removed from the Annex II list in 2001 at its request to recognize its economy as a transition economy. These countries are classified as developed countries which pay for costs of developing countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America

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Many multilateral agencies have been commited to building and managing data bases around the globe on the subject of climate change and its key variables. One of such is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In its 2012 data as accessed via its sites - http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php, the emission footprints of the various states and parties to the framework convention on Climate Change were presented along side other vital sets of data:

The qualitative data to the research begins with the real substance of the Kyoto Protocol ,which has a special place in the theme of the work and more so, as the first ever, and the only standing treaty as far as the international community and the society of states are concerned, the UN recognizes no other working document from the stand point of international law apart from the Kyoto Protocol at least for now. Thus the considered it apt to have a place in the work as a qualitative data, although only the abridged version of the historic Kyoto document (which emerged at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan 1997) was captured and presented. 4.2.

CLIMATE

CHANGE

CONTROL

AND

THE

CHALLENGES

CONSENSUS-BUILDING Technology gab between ‘North’ and ‘South’ as well as poor funding base for developing regions have constituted a major challenge in the mitigation and adaptation effort aimed at combating Climate Change. Furthermore, the high political will that greeted the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 among parties and the international community has been hampered and grossly eroded by the parochial national self interests of some of the big emitters. Finger pointing between China and the US on the basis of Population/Industrial indices of emission has remain a cog in the wheel of progress. Such has raised some moral questions perhaps in favour of China

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whose absolute emission quantum is not base on extravagant consumption and wasteful exploitation of environmental resource as such. But rather on population factor as manifest in its amiliar population size as well as relative density. The US on the other hand depicts the industrial emission factor as one of the highest exploiter and consumer of fossil fuel globally. The US has also proved to have perhaps one of the highest per capita consumption among states but with a population far much less than that of China in comparism. Whereas the developing countries have no significant footprint in global emissions nor have they made much from the benefits of industrialization from the Industrial Revolution to date, they are already in the first category of regions to be hit by the adverse impact of Climate Change. Just when they are gearing efforts to expoit their resources improve living conditions, the threshold of environmental limits have drawn much closer so much that the expectations of limiting emissions stares at all states on the face. The historic roles of Colonialism and Imperialism as it relates to the emissions of some states and regions of the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Southâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; has remained one of the points of contention in the bid for consensus between parties especially the industrial giants known as the Annexed Group and the Non Annex I parties or developing regions and transition economies. Pledges of Financial Aid to support Clean Development Mechanisms and the Technology Transfer to developing countries, have not delivered to their mandates under the Copenhagen Accord. This too has made it somewhat difficult for consensus to be reached, in addition to the impunity that goes with noncompliance by big emitters. That it took the Kyoto Protocol up to eight years from 1997 to 2005 to go into effect as a treaty goes to say how complex, it could be, to reach consensus on the subject of Climate Change Control. 4.3.

CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN PARTIES

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The rather slow paste of progress among parties in the immediate aftermath of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 was one point in time when issues connected to climate change and its attendant politics. Asides the often heated disagreements between states before any common consensus is reached, the parties to the UNFCCC went to Rio with a zeal for real action even at a time when the scientific community seem divided as to whether Climate Change was taking place or not. Skeptics were on their toes to kill the argument even if to protect their business interests around the globe, the data shows how multinational oil corporations championed and lobbied corridors of international politics to undermined any move that was going to push the debate towards cutting down Greenhouse gas emissions and in the long run occasion a global shift away from fossil fuel and carbon centeredness as is already the case. Some major landmarks in the many attempts aimed at resolving conflicts among and between parties in the concerted efforts of stakeholders at the international arena begins with the amicable ending of the debate as to whether Climate Change was real or a fiction. This was aided by the ground-braking works of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).Following this feat of course is a number of other consensus efforts with partial successes at varying degrees: ď&#x192;&#x2DC; The founding of the UNFCCC at the historic Rio Earth Summit in 1992 was one of the points that may be referred to, as a watershed as far as the Resolution of a structural conflict was concerned. Hence it was around such framework that subsequent Climate Talks, Deliberations and consensus building, would be anchored. ď&#x192;&#x2DC; Secondly, every conference of Parties (COP) is, in every respect, a conflict resolution attempt whether they were successful in resolving such conflicts or not. The existence of a yearly Conference aimed at addressing some of the vexed issues on the subject of climate change alone, gives some hope. Surfice it to say that Climate Change Control would have been more

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on the negative without these many efforts at resolving both the structural conflict that stares at humanity on the face from a warming planet as well as the social and inter-party conflicts that have engaged parties and some of the key players as far as global emission is concerned. The COPs have thus served as forms of Conflict Resolution attempts but with little success. In this category, one of the major breakthroughs and perhaps the only one is the third Conference of Parties or COP3 where the first treaty â&#x20AC;&#x201C;the Kyoto Protocol was born. Nothing can be a better conflict resolution mechanism in any international subject as the treaty that binds nations and states to some form of order. But while this is true, the treaty as drawn in Japan was not in effect yet until up to 55 states including major emitters that were responsible for 55% of global emissions had ratified and committed themselves to emission cuts, the treaty would remain yet without implementation. ď&#x192;&#x2DC;

In 2005 another milestone was reached when the Russian Federation on up to signing the Kyoto Protocol bringing the required percentage of major emitters into the needed quantum as to allow the treaty take effect. Thus the Kyoto Protocol became operational in 2005 until its expiration in 2012. Although the operational mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol( KP) were not without their imperfections, they have made situations better as climate and political anarchy would have been the case without them. One of the most critical aspects of the three mechanisms that remains with gabs to be filled is the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) as the accounting system between parties still leaves much to be desired. The Carbon Market is chequered with unprecedented levels of corrupt practices.

ď&#x192;&#x2DC; The joint Conference of Parties and the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol referred to, as the (COP/MOP) which began at the coming into effect of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 has generated more conflicts than the attempt to resolving them. The COP/MOP session has

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pointedly shown some grey areas of the politics of Climate Change Control and the Resolution among parties.  It is important to add here quickly that there has been more cases of failure than the success so desired in the many attempts to resolve conflict at the conferences of parties. The many repeated failures from COP 13 up to 17 made it impossible to draw up a successor treaty that was suppose to succeed the Kyoto Protocol at its expiration in 2012.  Two important things happened at COP 17 in Durban South Africa 2011; Parties to the Kyoto Protocol lost Canada from the group when it announced its pulling out as did the US 2001. Conversely, the same group gained the entry of China among the Annex I/II parties with commitment of emission cuts. In spite of these, a major conflict yet unresolved is the continues refusal of the US- a principal global emitter to commit itself to gas cut under the Kyoto arrangement.  The renewal of a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol from 2012 on is a soft landing of what was a failure of a conflict that could not be resolved. But for it, there would have been a political crisis on Climate Change Control and the Conflict arising thereof..  The Global Environment Fercility (GEF) aided by the World Bank has cushioned the structural impacts of Climate Change in developing countries by way of some funding to support green-friendly initiatives. Moreover, the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol and the Technology Transfer schemes under the Kyoto Protocol has in reality, lessened the impacts of Climate Change and served as a conflict resolution strategy in easing the suspicion and reservation of the developing commitment of the global ‘North’.

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global ‘South’ as concerns

 So important is the Conference of parties as a conflict resolution platform that it is sensitive to issues ranging from the rules of procedures that guide conference deliberations to the seating arrangements of parties as shown at various COPs. One gab that has remained an issue however is the fairness or otherwise in the numerical difference in the number of delegated between industrialized and developing countries which is believed to be a function of financial resources to sponsor representatives. Often these raises equity question on the basis majoritarian implications when contentious issues are put to vote. The Conferences of Parties and their outcomes 1995 – COP 1, the Berlin Mandate It voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries' abilities to meet commitments under the Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). Parties agreed that mechanisms under the UNFCCC were inadequate and agreed to what would be called the Berlin Mandate, which allows parties to make specific commitments. Non-Annex 1 countries are exempted from additional obligations. (The Berlin Mandate in UNFCCC 1995ix) 1996 – COP 2, Geneva, Switzerland It reflected a U.S. position statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under Secretary for Global Affairs for the U.S. State Department at that meeting, which Accepted the scientific findings on climate change proffered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its second assessment (1995); Rejected uniform "harmonized policies" in favor of flexibility; Called for "legally binding mid-term targets."( http://www.eesi.org/international_climate. Accessed on 3rd Feb 2012 viii) 1997 – COP 3, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change

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After intensive negotiations, it adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which outlined the greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligation for Annex I countries, along with what came to be known as Kyoto mechanisms such as emissions trading, clean development mechanism and joint implementation. Most industrialized countries and some central European economies in transition (all defined as Annex B countries) agreed to legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6 to 8% below 1990 levels between the years 2008–2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United States would be required to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990 levels; however Congress did not ratify the treaty after Clinton signed it. The Bush administration explicitly rejected the protocol in 2001. 1998 – COP 4, Buenos Aires, Argentina It had been expected that the remaining issues unresolved at Kyoto, Japan would be finalized at this meeting. However, the complexity and difficulty of finding agreement on these issues proved insurmountable, and instead the parties adopted a 2- year "Plan of Action" to advance efforts and to devise mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to be completed by 2000. During COP4, Argentina and Kazakhstan expressed their commitment to take on the greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligation, the first two non-Annex countries to do so. (

GlobalIssues/Articleshttp://www.globalissues.org/article/182/cop4‐buenos‐aires‐climate‐

conference. Acessed on 3th Feb. 2012 iv) 1999 – COP 5, Bonn, Germany It was primarily a technical meeting, and did not reach major conclusions. Parties continued negotiation efforts with a focus on “the adoption of the guidelines for the preparation of national communications by [developed] countries, capacity building, transfer of technology andflexible mechanisms.”

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2000 – COP 6, The Hague, Netherlands The discussions evolved rapidly into a high level negotiation over the major political issues. These included major controversy over the United States' proposal to allow credit for carbon "sinks" in forests and agricultural lands, satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the final hours of COP 6, despite some compromises agreed between the United States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP 6, suspended COP-6 without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume. It was later announced that the COP 6 meetings (termed "COP 6 bis") would be resumed in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July. The next regularly scheduled meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC – COP 7 – had been set for Marrakech, Morocco, in October–November 2001. 2001 – COP 6 bis, Bonn, Germany COP 6 negotiations resumed July 17–27, 2001, in Bonn, Germany, with little progress having been made in resolving the differences that had produced an impasse in The Hague. However, this meeting took place after George W. Bush had become the President of the United States and had rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001; as a result the United States delegation to this meeting declined to participate in the negotiations related to the Protocol and chose to take the role of observer at the meeting. As the other parties negotiated the key issues, agreement was

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reached on most of the major political issues, to the surprise of most observers, given the low expectations that preceded the meeting. The agreements included: Flexible Mechanisms: The "flexibility" mechanisms which the United States had strongly favored when the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions trading; Joint Implementation (JI); and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which allow industrialized countries to fund emissions reduction activities in developing countries as an alternative to domestic emission reductions. Carbon sinks: It was agreed that credit would be granted for broad activities that absorb carbon from the atmosphere or store it, including forest and cropland management, and re-vegetation, with no over-all cap on the amount of credit that a country could claim for sinks activities. In the case of forest management, an Appendix Z establishes country-specific caps for each Annex I country. Thus, a cap of 13 million tons could be credited to Japan (which represents about 4% of its base-year emissions). For cropland management, countries could receive credit only for carbon sequestration increases above 1990 levels. Compliance: Final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that would address noncompliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP 7, but included broad outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets that would include a requirement to "make up" shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1, suspension of the right to sell credits for surplus emissions reductions, and a required compliance action plan for those not meeting their targets. Financing: There was agreement on the establishment of three new funds to provide assistance for needs associated with climate change: (1) a fund for climate change that supports a series of climate measures; (2) a least-developed-country fund to support National Adaptation Programs of Action; and (3) a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund supported by a CDM levy and voluntary contributions.

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2001 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 7, Marrakech, Morocco At the COP 7 negotiators wrapped up the work on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, finalizing most of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The completed package of decisions is known as the Marrakech Accords. The United States delegation maintained its observer role, declining to participate actively in the negotiations. Other parties continued to express hope that the United States would re-engage in the process at some point and worked to achieve ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the requisite number of countries to bring it into force. The main decisions at COP 7 included: Operational rules for international emissions trading among parties to the Protocol and for the CDM and joint implementation; A compliance regime that outlined consequences for failure to meet emissions targets but deferred to the parties to the Protocol, once it came into force, the decision on whether those consequences would be legally binding; Accounting procedures for the flexibility mechanisms; A decision to consider at COP 8 how to achieve a review of the adequacy of commitments that might lead to discussions on future commitments by developing countries. 2002 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 8, New Delhi, India COP8 adopted the Delhi Ministerial Declaration that, amongst others, called for efforts by developed countries to transfer technology and minimize the impact of climate change on developing countries. It is also approved the New Delhi work programme on Article 6 of the Convention. The COP8 was marked by Russia's hesitation, stating that the government needs more time to think it over. The Kyoto Protocol's fine print says it can come into force only once it is ratified by 55 countries, including wealthy nations responsible for 55 per cent of the developed world's 1990 carbon dioxide emissions. With the United States â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and its 36.1 per cent

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slice of developed-world carbon dioxide – out of the picture and Australia also refusing ratification, Russia was required to make up the difference, hence it could delay the process. 2003 – COP 9, Milan, Italy The parties agreed to use the Adaptation Fund established at COP7 in 2001 primarily in supporting developing countries better adapt to climate change. The fund would also be used for capacity-building through technology transfer. At COP9, the parties also agreed to review the first national reports submitted by 110 non-Annex I countries. (The UNFCCC 2003). 2004 – COP 10, Buenos Aires, Argentina Not to be confused with Convention on Biological Diversity, also called COP 10 (10 th Conference of Parties) leading to the Nagoya Protocol in 2010. December 6 – 17, 2004. The Program on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change COP10 discussed the progress made since the first Conference of the Parties 10 years ago and its future challenges, with special emphasis on climate change mitigation and adaptation. To promote developing countries better adapt to climate change, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was adopted. The parties also began discussing the post-Kyoto mechanism, on how to allocate emission reduction obligation following 2012, when the first commitment period ends. The Buenos Aires Plan of Action, in (UNFCCC 2004). 2005 – COP 11/MOP 1, Montreal, Canada COP 11 (or COP 11/MOP 1) took place between November 28 and December 9, 2005, in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. It was the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol since their initial meeting in Kyoto in 1997. It was therefore one of the largest intergovernmental conferences on climate change ever. The event marked the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Hosting more than 10,000 delegates, it was one of Canada's largest international events

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ever and the largest gathering in Montreal since Expo 67. The Montreal Action Plan is an agreement hammered out at the end of the conference to "extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 2012 expiration date and negotiate deeper cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions. Canada's environment minister, at the time, Stéphane Dion, said the agreement provides a "map for the future. (The Montreal Action Plan, UNFCCC 2011). Organization of the COP/MOP It is logical to ask the question-Who can participate in the COP/MOP? Based on the information in FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/1. is straight about the answers. Only States that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and thus are Parties to it can participate in the decisionmaking processes at COP/MOP. However States that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can participate as observers and therefore cannot speak during the plenary negotiating sessions. In a similar manner, only States that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol participate in the Subsidiary Body deliberations on matters related to the Kyoto Protocol; other States can only participate as observers. This, the researcher things is a misplaced priority of elevating the culprit to the ‘high’’ table as a distinguished guest’. A situation where the main polluters of global environment are made the occupy the top echelon of conference discourse while the ‘innocent’ is welcomed only as an observer leaves much to be desired. The Kyoto Protocol commits developed countries – those included in the Annex I of the Convention – to individual, legally-binding targets to limit or reduce their GHG emissions, as listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B. However, there are three exceptions to this rule. Two Annex I countries – Belarus and Turkey – are not listed in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B as they did not take on an emission limitation or reduction commitment. This is because they were not Parties to the Convention when the Protocol was adopted. Belarus has now ratified the Kyoto

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Protocol, but Turkey has not. Belarus has requested to be assigned an emission target and be included in Annex B of the Protocol. Furthermore, Kazakhstan, although a Non-Annex I country, had declared that it wished to be bound by the commitments of Annex I Parties under the Convention and the Protocol upon its entry into force.11 Kazakhstan will not be added to Annex B, since it did not request to be included; to do so now would require an amendment to the Protocol, as no specific provisions exist within the agreement to add countries to the list in the Annex. Observers Olivas et’al (2005: 5) goes on to say that any country not a Party to the Kyoto Protocol and non state actors – environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), research NGOs, industry and business NGOs, other type of NGOs as well as intergovernmental organizations – can attend the COP/MOP as observers, unless it is decided otherwise by the COP/MOP. Observers are allowed to speak in formal meetings and can submit written proposals, but cannot vote. The possibility for observers to intervene throughout the sessions has varied over time depending on the preference of the presiding officer. Observers are not allowed to attend closed meetings and may be excluded from certain other meetings. Their admission and participation are subject to the Rules of Procedure. Seating Arrangement Olivas et’al (2005: 9) notes that Seating arrangements for parties will remain the same for the COP, the COP/MOP and the High-Level Segment. COP and COP/MOP sessions: COP sessions are not to be held simultaneously to COP/MOP sessions. New nomenclature: COP/MOP documents use the prefix FCCC/KP/CMP, whereas COP documents use FCCC/CP. Other abbreviations used in the nomenclature, such as INF., Misc., Add. and Corr., will continue to be

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used for COP/MOP documents. Similarly,

accreditation to participate in COPs will

automatically apply to the COP/MOP for the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. For observers, a single process will be used for their admission to both the COP and the COP/MOP. The COP will be responsible for decisions regarding the admission of observers. Observers admitted to previous COPs will be admitted automatically to COP/MOP Responsibilities of the COP/MOP The COP/MOP, as the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol, has the responsibility for ensuring its the successful implementation. The Kyoto Protocol assigns the following functions to the COP/MOP: - evaluate all information available on the actual implementation of the Kyoto Protocol; - review obligations that Parties have under the Protocol and ensure that these are implemented; - promote the exchange of information and experience among Parties as well as collaboration on implementation measures; - provide guidance and make recommendations to develop and improve methodologies that assist the implementation process; - assist the COP in promoting technology transfer and seek funding to help developing countries cover the costs of implementing the objectives of the Convention; - establish subsidiary bodies to ensure implementation; and - when appropriate, cooperate, use services and/or use information provided by international and intergovernmental organizations and by NGOs. The Kyoto Protocol allows the COP/MOP to enact other functions to ensure its successful implementation. Accordingly, decisions forwarded

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by the COP will, if adopted by COP/MOP 1, assign several new functions, such as: providing guidance for the implementation of the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) and JI (Joint Implementation), and exercising authority over the CDM Executive Board and the Article 6 Supervisory Committee; and - adopting the Compliance Committee and providing guidance for the successful implementation of its mandate. Furthermore, Olivas & Figures (2005: 11), speaking on the Rules of Procedures says It is standard practice to adopt rules of procedure to provide structure and direction to the formal negotiations and decision-making process. Rules usually secure the right of all Parties to have a voice. Respecting these rules is important for the smooth proceeding of the negotiations. The Kyoto Protocol states that the rules of procedure of the COP should also apply to the COP/MOP, unless Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decide otherwise at COP/MOP. However, the COP has not yet adopted the rules of procedure. Two rules still cause disagreement. The first relates to regional representation at the Bureau and how to make it equitable (Rule 22, paragraph 1), and the second concerns the voting arrangements for decisions on matters of substance (Rule 42, paragraph 1). The COP has been applying draft Rule 22, but not draft Rule 42. In the absence of a final rule on decision-making, all decisions are taken by consensus, meaning that a decision is adopted unless one or more Parties explicitly object to it. In 2002, Parties have expressed the view that the draft rules of procedure of the COP should also be applied by the COP/MOP, with the exception of draft Rule 42 As a result, all decisions at COP/MOP are taken by consensus until Rule 42, or an alternative, is adopted. 2006 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 12/MOP 2, Nairobi, Kenya COP 12/MOP 2 took place between November 6 and 17, 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. Certain strides were made at COP12, including in the areas of support for developing countries and clean

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development mechanism (CDM). The parties adopted a five-year plan of work to support climate change adaptation by developing countries, and agreed on the procedures and modalities for the Adaptation Fund. They also agreed to improve the projects for clean development mechanism. 2007 – COP 13/MOP 3, Bali, Indonesia COP 13/MOP 3 took place between December 3 and December 15, 2007, at Nusa Dua, in Bali, Indonesia. Agreement on a timeline and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework (the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) was achieved with the adoption of the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.13). The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative. Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) was established as a new subsidiary body to conduct the negotiations aimed at urgently enhancing the implementation of the Convention up to and beyond 2012. Decision 9/CP.13 is an Amended to the New Delhi work programme. These negotiations took place during 2008 (leading to COP 14/MOP 4 in Poznan, Poland) and 2009(leading to COP 15/MOP 5 in Copenhagen). 2008 – COP 14/MOP 4, Poznań, Poland In 2008 United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 14/MOP 4 took place from December 1 to12, 2008 in Poznań, Poland. Delegates agreed on principles for the financing of a fund to help the poorest nations cope with the effects of climate change and they approved a mechanism to incorporate forest protection into the efforts of the international community to combat climate change. Negotiations on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol were the primary focus of the conference. http://www.earthtimes.org/climate/3rd‐cop‐17‐cmp‐7‐chronology‐talks‐papers‐action/1654. Accessed on 3rd Fed 2011. 2009 – COP 15/MOP 5, Copenhagen, Denmark

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The overall goal for the COP 15/MOP 5 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Denmark was to establish an ambitious global climate agreement for the period from 2012 when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires. As many Annex 1 industrialized countries are now reluctant to fulfill commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, a large part of the diplomatic work that lays the foundation for a post-Kyoto agreement was undertaken up to the COP15. The conference did not achieve a binding agreement for long-term action. A 13-paragraph 'political accord' was negotiated by approximately 25 parties including US and China, but it was only 'noted' by the COP as it is considered an external document, not negotiated within the UNFCCC process. The accord was notable in that it referred to a collective commitment by developed countries for new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions that will approach USD 30 billion for the period 2010–2012. Longer term options on climate financing mentioned in the accord are being discussed within the UN Secretary General's High Level Advisory Group on Climate Financing, which is due to report in November 2010. The negotiations on extending the Kyoto Protocol had unresolved issues as did the negotiations on a framework for long-term cooperative action. The working groups on these tracks to the negotiations submitted their report to COP 16 and MOP 6 in Mexico. The Copenhagen Accord 2009 in (UNFCCC 2011) 2010 – COP 16/MOP 6, Cancún, Mexico The meeting produced the basis for the most comprehensive and far-reaching international response to climate change the world had ever seen, to reduce carbon emissions and built a system which made all countries accountable to each other for those reductions. Here is the overview of the Cancun Agreements, and here are the Cancun Agreements decisions in full.

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Among the highlights, Parties agreed: to commit to a maximum temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-Industrial levels, and to consider lowering that maximum to 1.5 degrees in the near future; to make fully operational by 2012 a technology mechanism to boost the innovation, development and spread of new climate-friendly technologies; to establish a Green Climate Fund to provide financing to projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing countries via thematic funding windows; on the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which included setting up an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of stronger, cohesive action on adaptation. On the mitigation front, developed countries submitted economy-wide emission reduction targets and agreed on strengthened reporting frequency and standards and to develop low-carbon national plans and strategies. Developing countries submitted nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), to be implemented subject to financial and technical support.. Governments also agreed to include carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), subject to technical and safety standards. (The Cancum Agreement 2010) COP, 17 Durban South Africa The most awaited United Nations climate change conference (COP 17/CMP 7) started in Durban, South Africa on 28 November 2011 with the slogan working Together Today, Saving Tomorrow.(Earth Times 2011) Second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol and design of Green Climate Fund along with legal architecture of decisions are hot topics everyone was waiting to hear about in the COP17 besides others. Durban was important, particularly because it was the last COP holding just before the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol.

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The decision on the second commitment of Kyoto was crucial as the first commitment period expires in 2012. Major parties to Kyoto, including Japan, Russia, and Canada, have already signaled that they will not take on a second commitment because China and the United States— the world’s top two polluters—are not included in it at the time. The European Union (EU) is prepared to sign up for a second round, but it insists that major developing countries, whose emissions are surging as their economies grow, must embrace and follow through on real commitments. The EU’s preference is to negotiate “a single global and comprehensive legally binding instrument” including all emitters, though it would countenance an “interim” solution whereby major emerging countries would accept a “road map” and timetable for treaty commitments. Even this fall-back position faces resistance from the so-called “BASIC” caucus —Brazil, South Africa, India, and China—who are disinclined to accept binding targets that might jeopardize their domestic growth and development goals. At Durban, major agreement was the renewal of a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, while the down side of what ensued was that Canada pulled out of the Parties who were hitherto, signatories to and members of the Kyoto Protocol ie. Withdrawing its GHG cuts commitment in part due to the noncommitment of both the US and China. For one, the parties had to settle their intergroup as well as intra-group differences from the standpoint of the UNFCCC Trio classification of states into Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I respectively. The data shows that this classification probably set the first conflict among parties for a number of reasons: Inter-group Conflicts First and foremost, is the agitation of the some states of the global ‘North’ not the least of which is the United States, pushing the argument that all parties be tied to gas cuts as according to them

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the gains of industrialization benefits all people and states in the global arena as such, they argue, that all parties ought have a commitment to emission cuts irrespective of their domestic footprints which remains largely a function of industrialization, is not only immoral but is off tune with the realities of history. On the other hand, states of the global ‘ South’ and a few of their former colonial ‘principals’ posited that it is morally out of place for states who have contributed least to the global footprint of GHGs to be tied to emission limitation especially at a time when most of such states are still lagging behind from the development continuum and such factors connected to Greenhouse gases(GHGs) will serve the springboard that should put them on the development/industrialization path. The discussions evolved rapidly into a high level negotiation over the major political issues. These included major controversy over the United States' proposal to allow credit for carbon "sinks" in forests and agricultural lands, satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the final hours of COP 6, despite some compromises agreed between the United States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP 6, suspended COP-6 without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume. It was later announced that the COP 6 meetings (termed "COP 6 bis") would be resumed in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July. The next regularly scheduled meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC – COP 7 – had been set for Marrakech,

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Morocco, in Octoberâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;November 2001Thus in sympathy to such development and technology gab as well as historical realities connected to colonialism legacies, the argument ended in favor of the developing countries thus exempting them from the Kyoto Protocol. This however, did not go down well with some industrialized states as the data revealed. Principally, this debate in part, became the reason why the US pulled out of Kyoto in 2001 when George W. Bush became President of the United States. The President said the cost of compliance would harm the US economy.

The pulling out from Kyoto by the US exacerbated a dysfunctional conflict and brought about a setback in the lofty ambitions of the UNFCCC as it was one of the factors that slowed down the takeoff time of the treaty hence the US is a leading emitter accounting for over 30% of global emission at least in the years following the Rio Earth Summit. As shown by the data, it took the historic response of the Russian Federation, another major emitter to bring the treaty into force in 2005 after being drawn up at COP 3 in 1997, a delay of another 8 years . Other major emitters as revealed by the literature, became reluctant of commitments because of the act shown by the US. Intra-group Conflict The intra-group wrangling were also consequential as parties within group were not uniform in their respective acts of compliance as agreed in tune with the protocol these were causing some distrusts between states of the same group at various times. The Analysis begins with a recast of the Research Questions that informed the investigations: 5. In what ways have the Politics of Climate Change Control resulted to Conflict? 6. How has the politics of Climate change control affected efforts on adaptation and mitigation?

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7. In what ways have parties attempted to resolve the conflicts between states and groups? 8. What measures can be put in place to better resolve the conflict between parties and groups? The politics of Climate Change control has remained very controversial following the Rio Earth Summit from 1992. It was undermined by the overt national interests of parties at the peril of universal morality, it has been characterized by heated debates, conflicts, accusations and counter accusations. As revealed by the data and the literature herein, a trade- off seem to exist between compliance to the politics of climate change control and domestic energy security for states and their people. Clearly, a pattern of change in the zeal for international corporation is seen as member states who were anxious to collaborate and act towards fighting the adverse menace of Climate Change, soon began to shy away when it touches on their national or state interests. Some leaders like those of the US and Canada were sensitive and committed at COP 3 when Kyoto emerged but later pulled out in 2001 and 2011 respectively due in part, to their consciousness about what their respective stance at the COP, will imply to domestic politics back home. It can be deduced from the data that striking a balance between compliance to the international agreement on climate change and securing oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s national interest was not an easy task to do, yet that was and still is the key criteria by which popularity is measured. It seems a trade-off exist. Conversely, it is also interesting to note from the data that some states who were foot-dragging to commit to emission cuts at the time of issuing the protocol, became more committed in later years and in fact, acted responsibly to have brought it to force in 2005. Such states as Russia were probably still managing the monumental impacts of the Soviet dissolution and perhaps the ego of the Cold War issues. It was more than a coincidence that the Russian Federation accepted

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no commitment of emission cuts at Kyoto when the US was in the fore front to steal the credit of global responsibility by an initial acceptance of an emission cut of 7% at the time. But when the US pulled out in 2001, and was condemned internationally for doing so, the Russian Federation came in from 2004/2005. Thus Russia took the credit of single-handedly kicking Kyoto into life in March 2005. Conversely, the US at the time had advanced as uni-polar Hegemon fourteen years after the end of the Cold War. It was thus relishing and basking in the euphoria of the ascendency of liberalism and Marketization of the global environment: When Francis Fukuyama wrote The End of History, he did ignored the down side of free market as their footprints would later show from the causalities to monumental threats of global proportions as Climate Change. The 'state' in the post Cold War Era is faced with two major threats: 'profit- Champions' on the one hand and 'Markets' forces on the other some of whose capacity often dwarf that of the states that serve as their host. In many fronts, it would appear the multinationals have portrayed an asymmetric relationship with the state, leaving the later as the subordinate. This was manifest at Rio 1992 when they attempted to push their way through sponsored Lobbyists and academics to advance the contrary perspective in the debate on Climate Change. The changing meaning of state sovereignty from what it was initially conceived at the historic Treaty of Westphalia (1648), is one of the most dramatic changes of our time. This phenomenon leaves much to be desired. The politics of climate change control as well as the conflicts arising thereof, the researcher thinks it is one of the many cases of the limitations of 'markets' or what Adam Smith refers to, as 'the invisible hands'. This is the problematic aspects of privatization/liberalization and the ascendency of capitalism. The data has also shown that some transition economies at the emergence of Kyoto, were more committed to gas cuts than some of the major emitters. The debate between industrialization

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versus population has prolong the reaching of concesus at the COPs and somewhat slowed down progress among parties. And such has been more between the US and China. From the available data, it is also suggestive that the Kyoto Protocol ab initio, had in place, a provision for any party to opt out if they so wish. This goes to say that the treaty was not unmindful of its cost and dire consequences as well as their possible contradictions when measured against the interests of states. •

The data shows that emission levels of approximately 44 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) (range: 39-44 GtCO2e*) in 2020 would be consistent with a “likely” chance of limiting global warming to 2° C.

•

Under business-as-usual projections, global emissions could reach 56 GtCO2e (range: 54-60 GtCO2e) in 2020, leaving a gap of 12 GtCO2e.

The data as demonstrated, shows that if the highest ambitions of all countries associated with the Copenhagen Accord are implemented and supported, annual emissions of greenhouse gases could be cut, on average, by around 7 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 equivalent by 2020. this action, it is likely that a business-as-usual scenario would see emissions rise to an average of around 56 Gt of CO2 equivalent by around 2020. Cuts in annual emissions to around 49 Gt of CO2 equivalent would still however leave a gap of around 5 Gt compared with where we need to be—a gap equal to the total emissions of the world’s cars, buses and trucks in 2005. That is because the experts estimate that emissions need to be around 44 Gt of CO2 equivalent by 2020 to have a likely chance of pegging temperatures to 2° C or less. However, if only the lowest ambition pledges are implemented, and if no clear rules are set in the negotiations, emissions could be around 53 Gt of CO2 equivalent in 2020—not that different from business as usual—so the rules set in the negotiations clearly matter. The Emissions Gap

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Report emphasizes that tackling climate change is still manageable, if leadership is shown. In Cancun action on financing, mitigation and adaptation need to mature and move forward— supported perhaps by action on non-CO2 pollutants such as methane from rubbish tips to black carbon emissions. From the available CO2 emission per states and regions as provided by the International Energy Agency, And the latest figures - published by the respected Energy Information Administration show CO2 emissions from energy consumption - the vast majority of Carbon Dioxide produced. A reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions is not only the goal of environmentalists but also of pretty much every government in the world. Currently 192 countries have adopted the Kyoto protocol. One of the aims of which is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% of the 1990 levels by 2012 collectively for countries starred on this list. It shows a world where established economies have large - but declining - carbon emissions. While the new economic giants are growing rapidly. This newly-released data is from 2009 - the latest available. On pure emissions alone, the key points are: • In absolute terms, China unarguably emits more CO2 than the US and Canada put together up by 171% since the year 2000. Between 2008 and 2009 China’s CO2 emission in millions of tones has moved from 6, 803.92 Mil tones to 7, 710.50 giving a percentage increase of 13.3% • The US has had declining CO2 for two years running from 2008 -2009 it shows a decline from 5833.13

5,424.53

giving

percentage

decrease

-7%

• The UK is down one place to tenth on the list, 8% on the year. The country is now behind Iran, South Korea, Japan and Germany

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• India is now the world's third biggest emitter of CO2 - pushing Russia into fourth place • The biggest decrease from 2008-2009 is Ukraine - down 28%. The biggest increase is the Cook Islands - up 66.7% But that is only one way to look at the data - and it doesn't take account of how many people live in each country. If you look at per capita emissions, a different picture emerges where: • Some of the world's smallest countries and islands emit the most per person - the highest being Gibraltar with 152 tonnes per person • The US is still number one in terms of per capita emissions among the big economies - with 18 tonnes emitted per person • China,

contrast,

emits

under

six

tonnes

per

person,

India

only

1.38

• For comparison, the whole world emits 4.49 tonnes per person For the entire world between 2008 and 2009 it appears there was a downward trend in CO2 emissions, moving from 30, 493.23 to 30, 398.42. This means a percentage increase on -0.3% Continental/Regional statistics for the same two-year period (2008-2009) as revealed by the data shows that Asia and Oceania top the list among regions with 12, 338.14 and 12,264.09 giving an increase of 7.5%; Followed by North America with 6,885.86 and 6410.54 for 2008-2009 respectively suggesting a decrease of -6.9 . Others are: Europe 4, 628.98 and 4,310.30 pointing a decrease of -6.9% Eurasia, 2, 595.86 and 2, 358.03 pointing a decrease of -9.2% The Middle East, 1,658.55 and 1,714.09 pointing and increase of 3.3% Central and South America: 1, 228.65 and 1, 219.78 an increase of 0.7% Africa: 1, 157.71 and 121.59 a decrease of -3.1%

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The ranking of absolute emission of CO2 by region shows that Asia & Oceania is 1 st from top. North America is 2nd , Europe 3rd, Eurasia 4th, followed by the Middle East in the 5th position, Centra &South America is 6th and Africa, as expected, is 7th in the ranking obviously located at the bottom for reasons of underdevelopment and relatively low industrial output and light carbon footprints. It can clearly be seen that emission in the various regions, both in absolute terms and their corresponding percapita for the regions, is a function of industrialization. This is because a pattern seem to emerge that shows a positive relationship between emission quantum and level of industrialization by such regions through the states that it is made up of. This confirms the literature as posited by the UNDP Report (2008) and IPCC 2007 4th Asessment Report. Forthwith, the data shows that industrialization alone, although a major factor, is not the only causal driver of climate change but second factor that cannot be ignored is population density. We see this in China’s number one ranking in absolute emissions but lagging behind a handful of nations in terms of percapita emission. Similarly, membership of the Meeting of Parties MOP to the Kyoto Protocol majority of which fall under the Annex I and Annex II parties of the UNFCCC seem to be the states/regions that have shown a downward spiral in the emission pathways, while their Non Annex I counterparts majority of which are located on the global ‘South’ comprising of Southeast Asia, Central & Latin America and the Middle East , have proved by this data, to be on an upward trend in terms of CO2 emissions as they are not tied to any sort of emission cut deals under the existing treaty. The case of Africa’s downward trend in emission as shown is however exceptional and a special clause connected to underdevelopment and perhaps stagnation and deprivation of basic essential

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social entitlements may be advanced to explain such phenomenon rather than any sort of Green compliance as such. Under the Inter-group analysis, one major recurrent dismal in the disputes associated with the politics of Climate Change Control is the exemption of some the major emitters who are classified as Non Annex I states but major economies at the global stage. Such group of states that are collectively referred to, as the ‘BASIC’ states in Table 4 above; Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India and China may have a combine emission output that is close to a third if not half of global CO2 emissions but non of these states is a signatory to the emission cut obligations encapsulated in the Kyoto Protocol. And this is one of the vexed issues that have dragged and occasionally destabilize agreements and conference proceedings at the COPs and the COP/MOPs beginning from 2005. From the Rio Earth Summit up to COP 1 in Berlin Germany, in 1995, counting down to date, means that the Climate Talk has spanned for not less than twenty years but it has only been able to draw up one treaty- The Kyoto Protocol. Whose success of implementation still leaves much to be desired because it has not proved to have garnered the ‘teeth’ with which to mobilize the active participation of the international community in the bid to fight Climate Change. This is in part, a pointer to the magnitude of the politics of control, as far as Climate Change is concerned. Yet in 2005, the politics of Climate Change Control, took a new turn and a more complex outlook when the Kyoto Protocol took effect that year. Until then, climate negotiations were held exclusively under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, however, negotiations will now be held in parallel sessions under both the COP and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP). Olivas et’al

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(2005:2) maintained that the COP/MOP is the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol and carries the responsibility for its implementation. The COP/MOP is to be scheduled during the same twoweek period, in the same venue, and with almost the same participants as the COP. Yet the COP/MOP must deliberate separately, as it is a distinct governing body. The first COP/MOP was held in Montreal, Canada, from November 28 to December 9, 2005. Olivas, Gagnon-Lebrun, and Figueres (2005) in their work Navigating the COP and MOP cited the Honorable Stéphane Dion, Environment Minister of the Government of Canada during the Conference in Canada as saying: Canada is honoured to host the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Montreal. The Conference comes at a crucial juncture in the global effort to address climate change. Climate change is an issue that transcends most others in terms of its complexity and potential impact – a profound yet unquantified effect on ecosystems, species, air and water quality, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and human health. This Conference was the first meeting of the 156 Members to the Kyoto Protocol since it came into effect on February 16 of 2005. As such, Montreal 2005 will stand as a milestone in the history of international climate change negotiations. This was also the 11th conference of all 189 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, with as many as 10,000 participants expected, is set to be the largest intergovernmental climate conference since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997. Olivas et’al added that it is Canada’s hope that the Montreal Conference will launch a constructive dialogue towards agreement on effective, more inclusive, longer-term international action to reduce the causes of climate change, and establish a new tone of mutual respect and determination in global discussions about

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on this critical issue. The Conference of the Parties / Meeting of the Parties is the central forum of the UNFCCC where the world coordinates its efforts to address climate change.

Discussions among the Parties to the Convention, and the Members of the Protocol, are conducted within the process established by the UNFCCC. Dion added that the document offers a wealth of information about the process and procedures. It will be a key reference tool for all those who seek a fuller understanding of the global communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s efforts to achieve its objective with respect to climate change Olivas H. Gagnon-Lebrun and Figueres (2005: 1) note that the February 2005 entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol has added one more layer of complexity to the already multifaceted international climate negotiations. Until then, climate negotiations were held exclusively under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, however, negotiations will now be held in parallel sessions under both the COP and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP). Olivas etâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;al (2005:2) maintained that the COP/MOP is the supreme body of the Kyoto Protocol and carries the responsibility for its implementation. The COP/MOP is to be scheduled during the same twoweek period, in the same venue, and with almost the same participants as the COP. Yet the COP/MOP must deliberate separately, as it is a distinct governing body. The first COP/MOP was held in Montreal, Canada, from November 28 to December 9, 2005 which summarizes the milestones that led to the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on February 16, 2005. As of October 31, 2005, 194 countries had ratified the UNFCCC Only 6 countries in the world have not ratified the Convention: Andorra, Brunei Darussalam, Holy See, Iraq, Somalia and Timor

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Leste. Of the countries that are Parties to the Convention, 156 (or80%) are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. Only States that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and thus are Parties to it can participate in the decision-making processes at COP/MOP. However States that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol can participate as observers and therefore cannot speak during the plenary negotiating sessions. In a similar manner, only States that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol participate in the Subsidiary Body deliberations on matters related to the Kyoto Protocol; other States can only participate as observers. This, the researcher things is a misplaced priority of elevating the culprit to the ‘high’’ table as a distinguished guest’. A situation where the main polluters of global environment are made the occupy the top echelon of conference discourse while the ‘innocent’ is welcomed only as an observer leaves much to be desired. The series of COPs convened at various instances from COP 1 in Berlin Germany to COP 17 in Durban South Africa, the politics of Climate Change Control has had more failures than successes as shown by the data. In other words there are fewer cases of success than those of failure. In sum, only one single binding treaty has emerged from the Rio Earth Summit through COP 1 to COP 17. The debates that have rocked the Conferences has been very volatile and occasionally overtly diplomatic. COP, 17 Durban South Africa The most awaited United Nations climate change conference (COP 17/CMP 7) started in Durban, South Africa on 28 November 2011 with the “Slogan working Together Today, Saving Tomorrow”. (Earth Times 2011) Second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol and design of Green Climate Fund along with legal architecture of decisions are hot topics everyone was waiting to hear about in the COP17 besides others. Durban is important, particularly because it

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was the last COP holding just before the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol. The decision on the second commitment of Kyoto is crucial as the first commitment period will be over by the following year-2012. Major parties to Kyoto, including Japan, Russia, and Canada, have already signalled that they will not take on a second commitment because China and the United States— the world’s top two polluters—are not included in it. The European Union (EU) is prepared to sign up for a second round, but it insists that major developing countries, whose emissions are surging as their economies grow, must embrace and follow through on real commitments. The EU’s preference is to negotiate “a single global and comprehensive legally binding instrument” including all emitters, though it would countenance an “interim” solution whereby major emerging countries would accept a “road map” and timetable for treaty commitments. Even this fall-back position faces resistance from the so-called “BASIC” caucus—Brazil, South Africa, India, and China—who are disinclined to accept binding targets that might jeopardize their domestic growth and development goals. At Durban, major agreement was the renewal of a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, while the down side of what ensued was that Canada pulled out of the Parties who were hitherto, signatories to and members of the Kyoto Protocol ie. Withdrawing its GHG cuts commitment in part due to a huge debt connected to its Kyoto compliance and the non commitment of both the US and China. It would be recalled that immediately following the conclusion of the 17th U.N. Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Durban, South Africa, on December 12, 2011 Canada announced its withdrawal from the first implementation period of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), known as the Kyoto Protocol. Peter Kent christened

As stated by the Canadian Minister of Environment

“Statement by Minister Peter Kent, Foyer of the House of Commons”

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(December 12, 2011), online: <www.ec.gc.ca> [Statement by Minister Kent]. In the Minister’s words: “. . . Kyoto – for Canada – is in the past. As such, we are invoking our legal right to formally withdraw from Kyoto. This decision formalizes what we have said since 2006 that we will not implement the Kyoto Protocol. Under Kyoto, Canada had committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 6% over the 1990 baseline levels between 2008 to 2012. Article 27(2) of the Kyoto Protocol permits states to withdraw within “one year from the date of . . . notification of withdrawal.” The Government stated its decision was meant to avoid an estimated $14 billion in penalties resulting from Canada’s failure to meet its emissions reductions targets once Kyoto expires on December 31, 2012. According to Minister Kent: a new agreement, with legally binding commitments for all major emitters, that allows us as a country to generate jobs and economic growth represents a path forward . . . Canada remains a part of the UNFCCC process for negotiating the next implementation period, similar to the position of the United States, which withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 prior to the entry of the Protocol into force, he added. Minister Kent reiterated Canada’s commitment to achieving its own targets announced at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of reducing emissions by 17% over 2005 levels by 2020. The recent news is that China has just accepted a binding commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emission which is a major blow to India questioning the unity of BASIC (Brazil, Argentina South Africa, India, China) grouping current round of climate negotiations (India Today 2011iv). Beside these, Durban also discussed modalities and structure of committees under Adaptation Framework and Technology mechanism. Criteria of selection and detail work plan of Climate Technology Center (CTC) and diverse views on National Adaptation plan (NAP) are other challenges to be finalized in the years following COP 17 at Durban, South Africa.

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Generally these are the issues that have repeatedly heated up debates at the various conferences of parties and albeit deterred progress in most cases, as states come into conflict of interests among themselves in a group, between groups and most importantly, between national interests and the universal common good informed by the ideals of compliance. Clearly, the conflicts among and between parties is tied to equity and social justice or their comparative denial. But such is ultimately incidental to national economic interest from the stand point of current global economy that is fossil fuel-driven. The level of compliance as shown by the data, is not uniform for regions and states. But suffice it to say that the European Union has proved most responsible in the fight against Climate Change as well as compliance to the Kyoto Protocol compared to other regions on the globe. But for the controversial flexible mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, states committed to its implementation by way of gas cuts have shown some degree of willingness to go on but for the irresponsibility and rather amoral conduct of some major emitters, which has attempted to set in some apathy in compliance. The will seem in place but the rate of progress is rather slow given the vested interests that often characterize conferences of parties. On the question of what the challenges are. The data shows categorically that the continues rejection of the Kyoto Protocol by the US poses a major challenge to the attainment of objectives of the KP hence the US alone is home with over third of global emissions from the 1990 base year. Moreover, the plight of developing countries and EIT states are far from reached. Issues connected to the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) from the standpoint of emission allowances for states whose allocated quota is less than they emit. The transparency in the carbon market still remains blurred. The non involvement of the Non Annex I parties to the UNFCCC in issues connected to the Kyoto Protocol has both negative and positive implications. On the one hand,

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they stand the chance to progress on their development path without any interference on current emissions. But on the other, they risk loosing what could have been a huge tradable carbon allowance given their light emission footprints compared to the global â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Northâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. It is yet a moral issue to be addressed, if they so called Annex II parties who pay for the so-called emission of developing countries is anything significant given the low regional CO2 emissions of such regions as Africa and Latin America.

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CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS This Chapter presents the major finding of the thesis, it provided answers to the poignant research questions posed in the first chapter as it draws conclusions and summary. The work ends with recommendations in tan dem with key findings. 5.1.1. Findings Earlier, the work set out to provide answers to the following questions: 9. In what ways have the Politics of Climate Change Control resulted to Conflict? 10. How has the politics of Climate change control affected efforts on adaptation and mitigation? 11. In what ways have parties attempted to resolve the conflicts between states and groups? 12. What measures can be put in place to better resolve the conflict between parties and groups? The study has revealed that the politics of Climate Change Control has indeed degenerated to Conflict amongst parties. Such conflicts are rooted in issues connected to equity, morality, social and economic justice of global scale and beyond the boundary of states. The politics of Climate Change control has remained very controversial following the Rio Earth Summit from 1992. It was undermined by the overt national interests of parties at the peril of universal morality, it has thus, been characterized by heated debates, conflicts, accusations and counter accusations.

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As revealed herein, a trade- off seem to exist between compliance to the politics of climate change control and domestic energy security for states and their people. The disproportionality between cause of climate change and the commitment in managing its effects are some of the basis of the conflicts. The violation of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Common but Differentiated Responsibilityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; has not helped parties in reaching a lasting deal either. A situation where big emitters continue to evade efforts aimed at emission cuts leaves much to be desired and are key to the conflict. Also related to the conflict of parties, is the classification of parties into the so called groups: Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I groups. This too is problematic and does not address the reality of the problem as it ought to. This is because some major emitters are classified along the groups with no commitment per se (Non Annex I) while others with very low emission are classified in groups with commitments in emission cuts merely on the basis of being industrialized (Annex I & Annex II). The Population Versus Industrialization debate has also taken the conflict of parties to a new dimension following US and Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s open quarrels at COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009. In general, the politics of Climate Change control has remained very controversial following the Rio Earth Summit from 1992. It was undermined by the overt national interests of parties at the peril of universal morality, it has been characterized by heated debates, conflicts, accusations and counter accusations. As revealed by the study, there is a trade- off between compliance to the politics of climate change control and domestic energy security for states and their people. The rather slow paste of progress among parties in the immediate aftermath of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 was one point in time when issues connected to climate change and its attendant politics played out on the negative. Asides the often heated disagreements between states before any common consensus is reached, the parties to the UNFCCC went to Rio with a zeal for real

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action even at a time when the scientific community seem divided as to whether Climate Change was taking place or not. Skeptics were on their toes to kill the argument even if to protect their business interests around the globe, the study has revealed how multinational oil corporations championed and lobbied corridors of international politics to undermined any move that was going to push the debate towards cutting down Greenhouse gas emissions and in the long run, occasion a global shift away from fossil fuel and carbon centeredness in the global economy as is already the case. For one, the parties had to settle their intergroup as well as intra-group differences from the standpoint of the UN framework, in tune with the Trio classification of states into Annex I, Annex II and Non Annex I respectively. The data shows that this classification probably set the first conflict among parties for a number of reasons: Inter-group Conflicts First and foremost, is the agitation of the some states of the global ‘North’ not the least of which is the United States, pushing the argument that all parties be tied to gas cuts as according to them the gains of industrialization benefits all people and states in the global arena as such, they argue, that all parties ought have a commitment to emission cuts irrespective of their domestic footprints which remains largely a function of industrialization. On the other hand, states of the global ‘ South’ and a few of the former colonial ‘principals’ posited that it is morally out of place for states who have contributed least to the global footprint of GHGs to be tied to emission limitation especially at a time when most of such states are still lagging behind from the development continuum and such factors connected to Greenhouse gases(GHGs) will serve the springboard that should put them on the development/industrialization path. The discussions evolved rapidly into a high level negotiation over the major political issues. These included

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major controversy over the United States' proposal to allow credit for carbon "sinks" in forests and agricultural lands, satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In the final hours of COP 6, despite some compromises agreed between the United States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP 6, suspended COP-6 without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume. It was later announced that the COP 6 meetings (termed "COP 6 bis") would be resumed in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July. The next regularly scheduled meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC – COP 7 – had been set for Marrakech, Morocco, in October–November 2001Thus in sympathy to such development and technology gab as well as historical realities connected to colonialism legacies, the argument ended in favor of the developing countries thus exempting them from the Kyoto Protocol. This however, did not go down well with some industrialized states as the data revealed. Principally, this debate in part, became the reason why the US pulled out of Kyoto in 2001 when George W. Bush became President of the United States. The President said the cost of compliance would harm the US economy. The pulling out from Kyoto by the US exacerbated a dysfunctional conflict and brought about a setback in the lofty ambitions of the UNFCCC as it was one of the factors that slowed down the takeoff time of the treaty hence the US is a leading emitter accounting for over 30% of global emission at least in the years following the Rio Earth Summit. As shown by the data, it took the

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historic response of the Russian Federation, another major emitter to bring the treaty into force in 2005 after being drawn up at COP 3 in 1997, a delay of another 8 years . Other major emitters as revealed by the literature, became reluctant of commitments because of the act shown by the US.

The intra-group wrangling were also consequential as parties within group were not uniform in their respective acts of compliance as agreed in tune with the protocol these were causing some distrusts between states of the same group at various times. Clearly, a pattern of change in the zeal for international corporation is seen as member states who were anxious to collaborate and act towards fighting the adverse menace of Climate Change, soon began to shy away when it touches on their national or state interests. Some leaders like those of the US and Canada were sensitive and committed at COP 3 when Kyoto emerged but later pulled out in 2001 and 2011 respectively due in part, to their consciousness about what their respective stance at the COP, will imply to domestic politics back home. It can be deduced from the data that striking a balance between compliance to the international agreement on climate change and securing oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s national interest was not an easy task to do, yet that was and still is the key criteria by which popularity is measured. It seems a trade-off exist. Conversely, it is also interesting to note from the findings that some states who were footdragging to commit to emission cuts at the time of issuing the protocol, became more committed in later years and in fact, acted responsibly to have brought it to force in 2005. Such states as Russia were probably still managing the monumental impacts of the Soviet dissolution and perhaps the ego of the Cold War issues. It was more than a coincidence that the Russian Federation accepted no commitment of emission cuts at Kyoto when the US was in the fore front to steal the credit of global responsibility by accepting an emission cut of 7% at the time. But

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when the US pulled out in 2001, and was condemned internationally for doing so, did Russia come in from 2004/2005. Thus Russia took the credit of single-handedly for kicking Kyoto into life in March 2005. The study has also shown that some transition economies at the emergence of Kyoto, were more committed to gas cuts than some of the major emitters. The debate between industrialization versus population has prolong the reaching of consensus at the COPs and somewhat slowed down progress among parties. And such has been more between the US and China. From the available data, it is also suggestive that the Kyoto Protocol ab initio, had in place, a provision for any party to opt out if they so wish. This goes to say that the treaty was not unmindful of its cost and dire consequences as well as their possible contradictions when measured against the interests of states. This is in part, a form of conflict resolution too although not without its contradictions. •

•

Under business-as-usual projections, global emissions could reach 56 GtCO2e (range: 54-60 GtCO2e) in 2020, leaving a gap of 12 GtCO2e.

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equal to the total emissions of the world’s cars, buses and trucks in 2005. That is because the experts estimate that emissions need to be around 44 Gt of CO2 equivalent by 2020 to have a likely chance of pegging temperatures to 2° C or less.However, if only the lowest ambition pledges are implemented, and if no clear rules are set in the negotiations, emissions could be around 53 Gt of CO2 equivalent in 2020—not that different from business as usual—so the rules set in the negotiations clearly matter. The Emissions Gap Report emphasizes that tackling climate change is still manageable, if leadership is shown. In Cancun action on financing, mitigation and adaptation need to mature and move forward—supported perhaps by action on non-CO2 pollutants such as methane from rubbish tips to black carbon emissions. From the available CO2 emission per states and regions as provided by the International Energy Agency, And the latest figures - published by the respected Energy Information Administration show CO2 emissions from energy consumption - the vast majority of Carbon Dioxide produced. A reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions is not only the goal of environmentalists but also of pretty much every government in the world. Currently 192 countries have adopted the Kyoto protocol. One of the aims of which is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% of the 1990 levels by 2012 collectively for countries starred on this list. It shows a world where established economies have large - but declining - carbon emissions. While the new economic giants are growing rapidly. This newly-released data is from 2009 - the latest available. On pure emissions alone, the key points are: • In absolute terms, China unarguably emits more CO2 than the US and Canada put together up by 171% since the year 2000. Between 2008 and 2009 China’s CO2 emission in millions of tones has moved from 6, 803.92 Mil tones to 7, 710.50 giving a percentage increase of 13.3%

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• The US has had declining CO2 for two years running from 2008 -2009 it shows a decline from 5833.13 to 5,424.53 giving a percentage decrease of -7% • The UK is down one place to tenth on the list, 8% on the year. The country is now behind Iran, South Korea, Japan and Germany • India is now the world's third biggest emitter of CO2 - pushing Russia into fourth place • The biggest decrease from 2008-2009 is Ukraine - down 28%. The biggest increase is the Cook Islands - up 66.7% But that is only one way to look at the data - and it doesn't take account of how many people live in each country. If you look at per capita emissions, a different picture emerges where: • Some of the world's smallest countries and islands emit the most per person - the highest being Gibraltar with 152 tonnes per person • The US is still number one in terms of per capita emissions among the big economies - with 18 tonnes emitted per person • China,

contrast,

emits

under

six

tonnes

per

person,

India

only

1.38

• For comparison, the whole world emits 4.49 tonnes per person For the entire world between 2008 and 2009 it appears there was a downward trend in CO2 emissions, moving from 30, 493.23 to 30, 398.42. This means a percentage increase on -0.3% Continental/Regional statistics for the same two-year period (2008-2009) as revealed by the data shows that Asia and Oceania top the list among regions with 12, 338.14 and 12,264.09 giving an increase of 7.5%; followed by North America with 6,885.86 and 6410.54 for 2008-2009 respectively suggesting a decrease of -6.9 . Others are: Europe 4, 628.98 and 4,310.30 pointing a decrease of -6.9% Eurasia, 2, 595.86 and 2, 358.03 pointing a decrease of -9.2% ; The Middle

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East, 1,658.55 and 1,714.09 pointing and increase of 3.3%; Central and South America: 1, 228.65 and 1, 219.78 and increase of 0.7% Africa: 1, 157.71 and 121.59 a decrease of -3.1% The ranking of absolute emission of CO2 by region shows that Asia & Oceania is 1 st from top. North America is 2nd , Europe 3rd, Eurasia 4th, followed by the Middle East in the 5th position, Centra &South America is 6th and Africa, as expected, is 7th in the ranking obviously located at the bottom for reasons of underdevelopment and relatively low industrial output and light carbon footprints. It can clearly be seen that emission in the various regions, both in absolute terms and their corresponding percapita for the regions, is a function of industrialization. This is because a pattern seem to emerge that shows a positive relationship between emission quantum and level of industrialization by such regions through the states that it is made up of. This confirms the literature as posited by the UNDP Report (2008) and IPCC 2007 4th Asessment Report. Forthwith, the data shows that industrialization alone, although a major factor, is not the only causal driver of climate change but second factor that cannot be ignored is population density. We see this in China’s number one ranking in absolute emissions but lagging behind a handful of nations in terms of percapita emission. Similarly, membership of the Meeting of Parties MOP to the Kyoto Protocol majority of which fall under the Annex I and Annex II parties of the UNFCCC seem to be the states/regions that have shown a downward spiral in the emission pathways, while their Non Annex I counterparts majority of which are located on the global ‘South’ comprising of Southeast Asia, Central & Latin America and the Middle East , have proved by this data, to be on an upward trend in terms of CO2 emissions as they are not tied to any sort of emission cut deals under the existing treaty.

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The case of Africa’s downward trend in emission as shown is however exceptional and a special clause connected to underdevelopment and perhaps stagnation and deprivation of basic essential social entitlements may be advanced to explain such phenomenon rather than any sort of Green compliance as such. Under the Inter-group analysis, one major recurrent dismal in the disputes associated with the politics of Climate Change Control is the exemption of some the major emitters who are classified as Non Annex I states but major economies at the global stage. Such group of states that are collectively referred to, as the ‘BASIC’ states in Table 4 above; Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India and China may have a combine emission output that is close to a third if not half of global CO2 emissions but non of these states is a signatory to the emission cut obligations encapsulated in the Kyoto Protocol. And this is one of the vexed issues that have dragged and occasionally destabilize agreements and conference proceedings at the COPs and the COP/MOPs beginning from 2005. The series of COPs convened at various instances from COP 1 in Berlin Germany to COP 17 in Durban South Africa, the politics of Climate Change Control has had more failures than successes as shown by the data. In other words there are fewer cases of success than those of failure. In sum, only one single binding treaty has emerged from the Rio Earth Summit through COP 1 to COP 17. The debates that have rocked the Conferences has been very volatile and occasionally overtly diplomatic. Specific commitments of parties were reached at the Berlin Mandate during COP 1 1995, COP 2 in Genever merely adupted the Scientific findings of the UNFCCC’s IPCC which laid to rest the scientific debate but it was however, very controversial with attendant disagreements coming from the US principally. At COP 3, perhaps the most celebrated COPs in the series of conferences, the Kyoto Protocol emerged in the historic city of

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Kyoto-Japan. But even at that the US had an internal political crisis back home at Congress which refused to ratify the treaty after President Clinton had signed it. This crisis degenerated to the US pulling out under President Bush in 2001. 2005 – COP 11/MOP 1, Montreal, Canada The 11th Conference of parties marked a major shift in the politics of Climate Change given that it was the year that the Kyoto Protocol took effect after the Russian Federation Ratified and committed itself to emission cuts. From then on, the data shows that the COPs started holding cuncurently with the COP/ the Meeting of Parties (MOPs) to the Kyoto Protocol referring to states with cuts commitments. This changed the political landscape of the politics of Climate Change Control in a number of ways in that, it elevated the key emitters into what appears like yet another ‘P5 of the Security Council’ as key decisions connected to the emission cuts and the Kyoto Prorocol was taken at the level of the COP/MOP from 2005. The MOP which is more or less a ‘General Assembly sort of grouping, was left with limited power of decision-making. COP 11 (or COP 11/MOP 1) took place between November 28 and December 9, 2005, in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. It was the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP-1) to the Kyoto Protocol since their initial meeting in Kyoto in 1997. It was therefore one of the largest intergovernmental conferences on climate change ever. The event marked the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Hosting more than 10,000 delegates, it was one of Canada's largest international events ever and the largest gathering in Montreal since Expo 67. The Montreal Action Plan is an agreement hammered out at the end of the conference to "extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 2012 expiration date and negotiate deeper cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions. Canada's environment minister, at the time, Stéphane Dion, said the agreement provides a "map for the future.

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2006 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 12/MOP 2, Nairobi, Kenya COP 12/MOP 2 took place between November 6 and 17, 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. Certain strides were made at COP12, including in the areas of support for developing countries and clean development mechanism (CDM). The parties adopted a five-year plan of work to support climate change adaptation by developing countries, and agreed on the procedures and modalities for the Adaptation Fund. They also agreed to improve the projects for clean development mechanism. 2009 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 15/MOP 5, Copenhagen, Denmark The overall goal for the COP 15/MOP 5 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Denmark was to establish an ambitious global climate agreement for the period from 2012 when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires. As many Annex 1 industrialized countries are now reluctant to fulfill commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, a large part of the diplomatic work that lays the foundation for a post-Kyoto agreement was undertaken up to the COP15. The conference did not achieve a binding agreement for long-term action. A 13-paragraph 'political accord' was negotiated by approximately 25 parties including US and China, but it was only 'noted' by the COP as it is considered an external document, not negotiated within the UNFCCC process. The accord was notable in that it referred to a collective commitment by developed countries for new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions that will approach USD 30 billion for the period 2010â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2012. Longer term options on climate financing mentioned in the accord are being discussed within the UN Secretary General's High Level Advisory Group on Climate Financing, which is due to report in November 2010. The negotiations on extending the Kyoto Protocol had unresolved issues as did the negotiations on a framework for long-term cooperative action. The working groups on these

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tracks to the negotiations submitted their report to COP 16 and MOP 6 in Mexico. The Copenhagen Accord 2009 in (UNFCCC 2011) 2010 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; COP 16/MOP 6, CancĂşn, Mexico The meeting produced the basis for the most comprehensive and far-reaching international response to climate change the world had ever seen to reduce carbon emissions and built a system which made all countries accountable to each other for those reductions. Here is the overview of the Cancun Agreements, and here are the Cancun Agreements decisions in full. Among the highlights, Parties agreed: to commit to a maximum temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-Industrial levels, and to consider lowering that maximum to 1.5 degrees in the near future; to make fully operational by 2012 a technology mechanism to boost the innovation, development and spread of new climate-friendly technologies; to establish a Green Climate Fund to provide financing to projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing countries via thematic funding windows; on the Cancun Adaptation Framework, which included setting up an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of stronger, cohesive action on adaptation. On the mitigation front, developed countries submitted economy-wide emission reduction targets and agreed on strengthened reporting frequency and standards and to develop low-carbon national plans and strategies. Developing countries submitted nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs), to be implemented subject to financial and technical support.. Governments also agreed to include carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), subject to technical and safety standards. (The Cancum Agreement 2010)

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At Durban South Africa during COP 17 the much awaited United Nations climate change conference (COP 17/CMP 7) was held, on 28 November 2011 with the “Slogan working Together Today, Saving Tomorrow”. (Earth Times 2011) Second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol and design of Green Climate Fund along with legal architecture of decisions are hot topics everyone was waiting to hear about in the COP17 besides others. Durban is important, particularly because it is the last COP holding just before the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol. The decision on the second commitment of Kyoto is crucial as the first commitment period will be over by the following year-2012. Major parties to Kyoto, including Japan, Russia, and Canada, have already signaled that they will not take on a second commitment because China and the United States—the world’s top two polluters—are not included in it. The European Union (EU) is prepared to sign up for a second round, but it insists that major developing countries, whose emissions are surging as their economies grow, must embrace and follow through on real commitments. The EU’s preference is to negotiate “a single global and comprehensive legally binding instrument” including all emitters, though it would countenance an “interim” solution whereby major emerging countries would accept a “road map” and timetable for treaty commitments. Even this fall-back position faces resistance from the so-called “BASIC” caucus—Brazil, South Africa, India, and China—who are disinclined to accept binding targets that might jeopardize their domestic growth and development goals. At Durban, major agreement was the renewal of a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, while the down side of what ensued was that Canada pulled out of the Parties who were hitherto, signatories to and members of the Kyoto Protocol ie. Withdrawing its GHG cuts commitment in part due to a huge debt connected to its Kyoto compliance and the non commitment of both the US and China. It would be recalled that immediately following the conclusion of the 17th U.N.

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Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Durban, South Africa, on December 12, 2011 Canada announced its withdrawal from the first implementation period of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), known as the Kyoto Protocol. Canadian Minister of Environment Peter Kent christened

As stated by the

“Statement by Minister Peter Kent,

Foyer of the House of Commons” (December 12, 2011), online: <www.ec.gc.ca> [Statement by Minister Kent]. In the Minister’s words: “. . . Kyoto – for Canada – is in the past. As such, we are invoking our legal right to formally withdraw from Kyoto. This decision formalizes what we have said since 2006 that we will not implement the Kyoto Protocol. Under Kyoto, Canada had committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 6% over the 1990 baseline levels between 2008 to 2012. Article 27(2) of the Kyoto Protocol permits states to withdraw within “one year from the date of . . . notification of withdrawal.” The Government stated its decision was meant to avoid an estimated $14 billion in penalties resulting from Canada’s failure to meet its emissions reductions targets once Kyoto expires on December 31, 2012. According to Minister Kent: a new agreement, with legally binding commitments for all major emitters, that allows us as a country to generate jobs and economic growth represents a path forward . . . Canada remains a part of the UNFCCC process for negotiating the next implementation period, similar to the position of the United States, which withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 prior to the entry of the Protocol into force, he added. Minister Kent reiterated Canada’s commitment to achieving its own targets announced at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of reducing emissions by 17% over 2005 levels by 2020. Generally these are the issues that have repeatedly heated up debates at the various conferences of parties and albeit deterred progress in most cases, as states come into conflict of interests among themselves in a group, between groups and most importantly, between national interests

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and the universal common good informed by the ideals of compliance. Clearly, the conflicts among and between parties is tied to equity and social justice or their comparative denial. But such is ultimately incidental to national economic interest from the stand point of current global economy that is fossil fuel-driven. The level of compliance as revealed is not uniform for regions and states. But suffice it to say that the European Union has proved most responsible in the fight against Climate Change as well as compliance to the Kyoto Protocol compared to other regions on the globe. But for the controversial flexible mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, states committed to its implementation by way of gas cuts have shown some degree of willingness to go on but for the irresponsibility and rather amoral conduct of some major emitters, which has attempted to set in some apathy in compliance. The will seem in place but the rate of progress is rather slow given the vested interests that often characterize conferences of parties. The study has demonstrated categorically that the Politics of Climate Change Control has had both negative and positive bearing on the efforts to control the impacts of Climate Change. The interests of states at the peril of the universal commitment have generated both functional and dysfunctional conflicts among and between parties. Of particular concern to the control efforts is the continues rejection of the Kyoto Protocol by the US, this poses a major challenge to the attainment of objectives of the Kyoto Protocol hence the US alone is home with over a third of global emissions from the 1990 base year. Moreover, the plight of developing countries and EIT states are far from reached. Issues connected to the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) from the standpoint of emission allowances for states whose allocated quota is less than they emit. The transparency in the carbon market still remains blurred. The non involvement of the Non Annex I parties to the UNFCCC in issues connected to the Kyoto Protocol has both negative and positive implications. On the one hand, they stand the chance to progress on their development path

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without any interference on current emissions. But on the other, they risk loosing what could have been a huge tradable carbon allowance given their light emission footprints compared to the global â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Northâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. It is yet a moral issue to be addressed, if the so called Annex II parties who pay for the so-called emission of developing countries is anything significant given the low regional CO2 emissions of such regions as Africa and Latin America. 1. In what ways have the Politics of Climate Change Control resulted to Conflict? The politics of Climate change control has

indeed affected efforts on adaptation and

mitigation in a number of ways. It should be said from the outset that both negative and positive effects of the politics of climate change are visible on adaptation and mitigation drive as far as the data from the study is concerned. Questions connected to equity and compliance to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities have been undermined grossly. It is the debate as to who should do what, that has repeatedly undermined the adaptation and mitigation efforts of parties. Deeply seated at the root of these is the politics of Climate Change. These complex conflicts have been resolved by parties via the many conferences of parties, intervention packages, establishments of many multi-lateral platforms aimed at addressing the issues. Efforts geared towards

resolving the conflicts

between states and groups have no doubt eased the conflicts to an extent. A key mediating instrument is the Kyoto Protocol whose operational strategy â&#x20AC;&#x201C;the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) has softened some of the contentious issues between parties. But one must also not loose sight of the positive side of the politics of Climate Change Control which in effect has occasioned some levels of stability in the global climate system via GHG cuts. Also, there seem to exist a mechanism within such politics that is deliberately designed to resolve the conflicts. And in fairness to the designers of the framework, the United Nations

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Framework

Convention on Climate Change, founded in 1992, has since then provided a

veritable roadmap in both galvanizing collective action in the fight against the adverse effects of Climate Change as well as resolving the political conflicts arising between and amongst parties. It is not sufficient though, what the framework have achieved so far, and there are rooms for improving its capacity to mediate into such Climate Change-related conflicts on the basis of emission cuts among its parties. Suffice to say that the climate system as well as the conflict arising in the attempts to control it, would have been more precarious without such frameworks and the periodic conferences of parties. The imperfections inherent in such politics as it relates to Climate Change Control and the Conflicts of parties as well as recommendations for its resolutions are addressed in the recommendations of the work. 5.1.2. SUMMARY The global debate over who should take action to address climate change is extremely precarious, as diametrically opposed perceptions of climate justice threaten the prospects for any long-term agreement. Poor nations fear limits on their efforts to grow economically and meet the needs of their own people, while powerful industrial nations, including the United States, refuse to curtail their own excesses unless developing countries make similar sacrifices. (Robert

& Parks 2006) Meanwhile, although industrialized countries are

responsible for over 60 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change, developing countries suffer the "worst and first" effects of climate-related disasters, including droughts, floods, and storms, because of their geographical locations. In their work, A Climate of Injustice, Roberts and Parks analyze the role that inequality between rich and poor nations plays in the negotiation of global climate agreements. This is the basis of conflicts in part, that has characterized the politics of Climate Change Control.

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Secondly, a trade-off is found to be visible between compliance with the global responsibility in climate change control and the attainment of ‘self’ interests for states especially for parties with commitment to GHG cuts under the Kyoto Protocol. This variance between global responsibility and state interest, has tended to undermine the desired progress of the Framework from inception in 1992 to date. It has also over heat the politics of Climate Change Control to the point of generating some dysfunctional conflicts among parties. Parties and Group Classifications Parties to UNFCCC are classified as: •

Annex I countries – industrialized countries and economies in transition

•

Annex II countries – developed countries which pay for costs of developing countries

•

Non Annex I countries - Developing countries.

it avoids restrictions on their development, because emissions are strongly linked to industrial capacity

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â&#x20AC;˘

they can sell emissions credits to nations whose operators have difficulty meeting their emissions targets

â&#x20AC;˘

they get money and technologies for low-carbon investments from Annex II countries.

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Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America Many multilateral agencies have been commited to building and managing data bases around the globe on the subject of climate change and its key variables. One of such is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In its 2012 data as accessed via its sites - http://unfccc.int/essential, the emission footprints of the various states and parties to the framework convention on Climate Change were presented along side other vital sets of data: The qualitative data to the research begins with the real substance of the Kyoto Protocol ,which has a special place in the theme of the work and more so, as the first ever, and the only standing treaty as far as the international community and the society of states are concerned, the UN recognizes no other working document from the stand point of international law apart from the Kyoto Protocol at least for now. Thus the considered it apt to have a place in the work as a qualitative data, although only the abridged version of the historic Kyoto document (which emerged at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan 1997) was captured and presented. Technology gab between ‘North’ and ‘South’ as well as poor funding base for developing regions have constituted a major challenge in the mitigation and adaptation effort aimed at combating Climate Change. Furthermore, the high political will that greeted the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 among parties and the international community has been hampered and grossly eroded by the parochial national self interests of some of the big emitters. Finger pointing between China and the US on the basis of Population/Industrial indices of emission has remain a cog in the wheel of progress. Such has raised some moral questions perhaps in favour of China whose absolute emission quantum is not base on extravagant consumption and wasteful

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exploitation of environmental resource as such. But rather on population factor as manifest in its amiliar population size as well as relative density. The US on the other hand depicts the industrial emission factor as one of the highest exploiter and consumer of fossil fuel globally. The US has also proved to have perhaps one of the highest per capita consumption among states but with a population far much less than that of China in comparism. Whereas the developing countries have no significant footprint in global emissions nor have they made much from the benefits of industrialization from the Industrial Revolution to date, they are already in the first category of regions to be hit by the adverse impact of Climate Change. Just when they are gearing efforts to exploit their resources improve living conditions, the threshold of environmental limits have drawn much closer so much that the expectations of limiting emissions stares at all states on the face. The historic roles of Colonialism and Imperialism as it relates to the emissions of some states and regions of the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Southâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; has remained one of the points of contention in the bid for consensus between parties especially the industrial giants known as the Annexed Group and the Non Annex I parties or developing regions and transition economies. Pledges of Financial Aid to support Clean Development Mechanisms and the Technology Transfer to developing countries, have not delivered to their mandates under the Copenhagen Accord. This too has made it somewhat difficult for consensus to be reached, in addition to the impunity that goes with noncompliance by big emitters. That it took the Kyoto Protocol up to eight years from 1997 to 2005 to go into effect as a treaty goes to say how complex, it could be, to reach consensus on the subject of Climate Change Control. 5.1.3. CONCLUSIONS The study concludes that neither a state-centric nor a nationalist-driven approach will bring parties to the desired aspirations in the Politics of Climate Change Control safe for strict

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adherence to the laudable and fair principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities which is guided by emission realities. Clearly, the Politics of Climate Change Control has indeed affected efforts on adaptation and mitigation without doubt. This is often featured especially in the contestation between state interest of parties and the universal ‘Common good’. This notwithstanding, the parties have managed to navigate round the problem via the various mechanisms and efforts put in place to deliberate and therefore find solutions to such problems. Key in this respect is the series of Conferences of Parties COP with a handful of feats to show but certainly not without challenges as well as unresolved conflicts. But for these platforms and for a however, the Climate Talk would have been more problematic with much more conflicts that could have degenerated to affect the relations between states, the global environment would have been more precarious. Visibly, the efforts have slowed down emissions and thereby made better of, the warming climate system. As revealed by the study, a lot more needs to be done though. The Second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol and its salient aspects of improvements is one of the ways of resolving the conflict of parties. Most importantly, is the recent inclusion of China as a party to the Kyoto Protocol therefore with responsibility on emission cuts, this is one cherry news as far as resolving the conflict among parties is concerned. It is only hoped that the US will not continue to hold on to any further excuses for turning down the international community on the supposed commitment to emission cuts. 5.2.1. RECOMMENDATIONS The study ends with the following recommendations:  The framework in managing the affairs of the UN on matters of Climate change should be expanded into a multi-track forum to have a place for Multinational Corporations as

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entities, apart from states. This is crucial because the neoliberal ascendency of markets have in some cases proved to be more influential in the context of emission, than the states that hosts them.  The Kyoto Protocol should be provided with the needed ‘teeth’ in a bid to making it legally binding on all its parties.  A deliberate Conflict Resolution Mechanism should be integrated into the business of the UN framework Convention on Climate Change, and if it already exists, such should be strengthened to address some particular kind of conflicts between and amongst parties.  There is the urgent need to monitor and periodically evaluate the mechanisms mandated with

the role

of Technology Transfer and Climate-related funding to developing

countries for the avoidance of fraudulent acts and corrupt practices.  A softer version of the Kyoto Protocol should be drawn up in replacement to the current Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action(NAMA) and assigned to all Non Annex I parties (Developing countries) so as to enhance some Green-friendly initiatives in their region, this will serve as a concession to the agitation for an all-inclusive emission cuts push by the US.  Parties must not loose sight of historical emission pathways that have brought the climate to its current state, and for this reason, the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities must be adhered to. 

Other Regional Blocs ought to borrow a leave from the EU 25 and make a multilateral commitment to emission cuts.

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 The Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol should not exclude Non Annex I group members as it is currently done except on the subjects connected to the appraisals of emission cuts pledges or the review of compliance to the protocol.  The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) of the Kyoto Protocol should be redesigned so as to allow the developing countries to trade their light carbon footprints in form of huge tradable allowances with major emitters who might have hit their trade caps. This is opposed to the claim of having paid for the emission of such countries as meant by Annex II group.  The integration of Climate Change variables into Trade and other developmental plans is necessary to achieving the desired emission cuts by 2020 and beyond.

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