City Polarization and its Implication to Peace building in Jos and Environs

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CITY POLARIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO PEACEBUILDING IN JOS AND ENVIRONS

BEING A JOURNAL PAPER PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND PEACE-BUILDING IN NIGERIA. ORGANIZED BY THE CENTRE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT &PEACE STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF JOS, JOS NIGERIA. 19th -21st Feb 2013 A.D.

BY

DANJUMA D. JISE M.Sc. C/O The Center for Conflict Management & Peace Studies University of Jos, Nigeria E-mail: jise@peacescholars.org kutokng@yahoo.com, ddjise@gmail.com, 234-8036045105

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ABSTRACT

Fundamentalism and ethno-religious struggles have injured peace in alarming proportions.

Ethno-religious conflicts, brought about by, religious fundamentalism and political contestation for space, might have constituted the biggest challenge to development and human progress in our age. This is indeed one of the most catastrophic challenges that Nigeria faces in contemporary times. There is a sense in which globalization has eroded the traditional ‘parental role’ of the state while undermining its capacity, authority and legitimacy. (Mailafia 2012). In this connection, the once peaceful state of Plateau is brought to the spotlight of discourse. More than a decade after the first violent explosion in 2001, only the peace of the graveyard can be gleaned in the city as provided by the security sector and the joint Special Task Force (STF) Operating in the State. Caught in this web, genuine peace has eluded the once serene and peaceful city of Jos. The paper is premised upon the understanding that Plateau State and the city of Jos in particular, is currently at the phase of peace-building-a post conflict activity or process which bids to return a conflict-torn society to normalcy and stability in terms of lasting peace. In this regard, the researcher is bugged by the Polarization and Partitioning phenomenon visible in the city of Jos with ‘boundaries as rigid as what Winston Churchill would call Iron Curtain.

Such polarization is along ethnic and religious fault lines. The salience of communal identities is now more prominent and appears to have increased as a result of the violence over the past decade, which has generated greater spatial polarization of people in Jos along religious lines.

The work explores the implications of the polarization phenomenon to the peace-building process in Jos and the State at large. It examines the factors that have intermittently occasioned many relapses within the last decade. The paper brings to the spotlight, the contradictions associated with the role of the supposed ‘Third Parties’. It ends with some recommendations for genuine reconciliation, reintegration and sustainable peace.

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INTRODUCTION It is a truism that conflicts existed in all human societies. However, the end of the Cold war has brought to the fore a new path- stream of conflicts and domestic tension, which has seriously derailed the African development process in almost all aspects. Today, while increased cooperation between various countries in West Africa has fortunately helped to reduce the tempo of inter-state conflicts considerably, the post cold war period has ushered in its wake an upsurge of conflicts across regional, ethnic, and religious lines within some nations. The breakdown of the ideological mindset and the structures of the cold war global alliances, had also unfortunately, unleashed formally suppressed ethnic and political tensions in some West African countries. In other words, conflicts have arisen within these nations from deep- rooted antagonisms that had been held in check for so many years. In effect, the end of the cold war has brought to the fore exposed conflicts, which were hitherto overshadowed by superpower rivalry locally manifested by prolong unpopular and draconian military regimes. In countries like Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea- Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and lately, Mali there have been outright carnage and the destruction of property and traditional institutions which used to contain domestic tension and conflicts as well as environmental decay and instability. In these countries violent conflicts have, led to the dislocation of most of the population and wrecked their socioeconomic infrastructure. The North-Central States of the Nigeria Republic has been worse hit.

But even at that, the once peaceful city of Jos in Plateau State is perhaps at the epicenter in the quake that seem to herald the search for answers to the many unanswered National Questions of the Nigerian state. The horrendous effects of such conflicts, has accentuated the religious and ethnic sentiments and polarization, thereby undermining social cohesion and national integration among the polities in Jos. The residents of Jos no doubt provide a microcosm of the Nigerian federation.

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THE STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE OF THE PAPER

BACKGROUND The African Development Bank (2012) while presenting the economic climate of Nigeria says it is a nation with a population of 165 million, Nigeria is Africa’s largest country in terms of demographic size. With a GDP of US$415 billion, it is the second largest economy after South Africa. Nigeria holds the record for being the largest oil producer on the continent and the sixth in OPEC. The country is well endowed with petroleum, gas and yet-untapped mineral resources.

Its agricultural potentials are considerable, although the country remains a net importer of food.

Over the last decade growth has averaged 7.4% and is projected to be 6.9% by year’s end 2012.

(ADB 2012). Yet in spite of these hopeful prospects, Nigeria remains a paradox, if not an pariah state, to many observers. Although per capita income has improved in recent years to about US$2,500 (in PPP terms), more than 60% of the people live below the poverty line while income inequalities are also widening, with an estimated gini coefficient of 43.7 percent. Unemployment stands at a national average of 24%, with an estimated 54% of the youth population without jobs.

A recent World Bank study depicts the country’s development trajectory in terms of ‘jobless growth’.Massive revenues from oil earnings have gone into consumption and recurrent expenditure, with little left to finance the yawning gaps in physical infrastructures. Corruption is widespread in public life while capital flight is an endemic feature of the political economy. As a result, the vast majority have no access to electricity, water and basic social services. Lifeexpectancy stands at 51 years, which is well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. (World Bank 2009). After decades of military rule, the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Fareed Zakaria’s concept of ‘illiberal democracy’ as noted in Mailafiya (2012) perhaps best describes Nigeria’s current governance situation, where the culture of impunity reigns supreme and the rule of law and constitutionalism remain very much work in progress.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JOS Jos was officially founded in 1915. The Berom and other indigene groups argue that the city was founded on land that belonged to them as the native people of the Plateau. The Hausa–Fulani contest this claim and hold that the city was established on ‘virgin land’ that belonged to nobody (Best, 2007: 17). Jos was established with the commencement of tin mining. The indigene population on the Plateau consisted of mostly farmers with little interest in tin mining. Some indigene groups were hostile to the influx of Nigerian migrants and Europeans. During the 1940s, the Berom attempted to disrupt mining operations to prevent further destruction of farmland. The mining industry attracted migrant workers from all over Nigeria. By the mid1940s, more than 200 mining camps had been built on the Plateau and the miner population exceeded 40,000 (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009: 6).

The Bauchi Emirate was part of the Sokoto Caliphate which had been established in 1804 in contemporary northern Nigeria. It emerged during the Islamic reform movement of Usman dan Fodio (1754–1817). Paden, (2005: 70) notes that the Caliphate was one of the largest political entities in precolonial Africa and comprised about 30 emirates. fourteen of the current 36 federal states had direct experience with the emirate system. In contemporary Plateau State, however, the legacy of the Dan- Fodio movement is less than successful. Christians point out that the jihad expansion was stopped at the mountains surrounding the Jos Plateau. Most of the ethnic groups of the ‘Middle Belt’ thus remained animist and later turned to Christianity, during and after colonial rule. Only the lowlands of Plateau State came under the influence of the jihad movement and emirs came to reign in Wase and Dengi. The Hausa settled in self-governing communities in Jos and the surrounding rural area. From 1914 to 1952 they elected one of their members to the title of ‘Sarkin Jos’ (Chief of Jos) to represent their community.EADLY CYCLE STUDY AREA Crause (2011:17) posited that Jos is located on a mountainous plateau that rises more than 1,000 metres over the surrounding plain. To the south and south-east, the plateau falls off into savannah lowlands. The region is of scenic beauty, with gigantic rock formations arising from

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the plains. Given its high altitude, Jos offers a temperate climate and has long attracted both foreign visitors and retired elites. Its surroundings are known for its hillsides, spectacular waterfalls, and wildlife parks. Until the regime change in 1999, it was also known for its relatively harmonious communal relations. Jos lies in the centre of the country, at the juncture of the predominantly Muslim north and Christian south. Nigeria’s population of approximately 155 million inhabitants is almost evenly split between Muslims (50 per cent) and Christians (40 per cent). The predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani together constitute roughly one-third of the country’s population (CIA, n.d.). The Yoruba and the Igbo dominate the south of the country; while they are majority Christians, the Yoruba include a sizeable Muslim minorities as well.

The Hausa constituted the most numerous ethnic group that worked in the mines. Significant numbers of Igbo, Yoruba, and members of smaller tribes also migrated to Jos during the same period. Those who had received a Western education in the south of Nigeria served within the colonial administration. Others worked as craftsmen or in commerce. Owing to the mining activities, the city expanded rapidly and the population grew steadily between 1930 and 1960 (Plotnicov, 1967: 36).

CONTEMPORARY POPULATION FIGURES The majority of the population in Plateau State is Christian, although accurate religious breakdowns are lacking (HRW, 2001: 5). Within the centre of metropolitan Jos, Muslim Hausa– Fulani constitute a significant population, many studies have also shown that the city of Jos is one of the most cosmopolitan centers in Nigeria. This paper contends that no single ethnic group in the heart of Jos could claim such a majoritarian significance in Jos North to the point of winning elections in its Local Council on its own safe by pooling together it’s numerical strengths with those of other groups. This point implies that integration is not a choice and polarization along religious lines would most definitely favor one religious group at the peril of the other as far as Plateau State and Jos North is concerned.

The Nigerian Census of 2006 recorded a total population of 3,178,712 for Plateau State (Nigeria, 2006). Plateau State is made up of 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs). The defunct Jos LGA was divided into Jos North LGA and Jos South LGA in 1991, with headquarters in the heart of

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Jos and Bukuru respectively. The city of Jos has expanded beyond Jos North and has largely merged with Bukuru into one urban centre. The Census of 2006 estimated the population of Jos North LGA at 429,300 people. Jos South and Jos East were less populated, with 306,716 and 85,602 inhabitants, respectively (NPC, 2006). A more recent estimate puts the number at more than one million inhabitants for the Jos–Bukuru urban complex (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009: 5). Given the city’s strategic position. Jos has long served as a communication centre between the north and south of the country. Decades ago, Jos also served as a major rail and highway hub.

Higazi (, 2011: 6) observed that the city has long housed the headquarters of several Christian and Islamic organizations. It was an important location for Christian missionary activities for the entire north of Nigeria and even housed the West African headquarters of several missionary societies. As a relatively young city in close proximity to the northern urban centres, it lacks more established Muslim traditional orthodoxies and has attracted Muslim reform movements.

Within a socio-political environment characterized by strong patronage networks, exclusion of one fraction of the political elite is widely felt as socio-economic decline among its constituency.

The urban conflict dynamics reverberates with tensions in rural areas. The increasing scarcity of land and access to riverbanks has resulted in contested claims over land use between indigene farmers and Fulani herders. Religion reinforces the boundaries between the mostly Christian indigenes and the Muslim Hausa and Fulani in both urban and rural conflicts.

In administrative terms, Plateau State is part of the North-Central Zone, one of six geopolitical zones. In addition to the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), the North-Central Zone includes Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, and Plateau states. These states were historically part of the Northern Region that emerged during colonial times, with its capital in Kaduna. The regional system was split into federal states in 1967 under the Gowon regime. Many northerners still consider the Plateau and surrounding states to be part of the north. In contrast, the smaller, largely Christian ethnic groups refer to their region as the ‘Middle Belt’. The concept of the Middle Belt emerged during the 1940s, when the United Middle Belt Congress was formed as a political party in opposition to the dominant Northern People’s Congress.

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Geographically, Jos lies in the centre of Nigeria, between the predominantly Muslim north and the mostly Christian south. The city of Jos was established around tin mining activities during colonial times. It attracted migrants from all parts of Nigeria to work in the mines and with the colonial administration. The colonial legacy of indirect rule initially relied on northern emirate structures. Later, political power was transferred to the ‘native’ tribes of the Plateau. Among these, the Berom were one of the largest tribes and they most vocally defend ‘indigene’ rights today. But Hausa migrants from the north constituted, a significant presence as a group in early Jos. Today, the ownership of Jos and claims to ‘indigene’ status are fiercely contested between the native tribes and the Hausa. Indigene certificates ensure access to political representation and positions within the civil service. Only local governments issue these certificates and therefore decide on indigene status. This arrangement opened the floodgates for the politics of labeling and the selective reciting of historical accounts that foster group boundaries to secure political control over local government areas.

It is a truism that parts of what is Plateau State today used to be under the Bauchi Emirate owing to the Indirect Rule system of the Colonialists. It is also the fact of history that the high Plateau was never conquered by the dan Fodio jihad movement because plateau people actively resisted the jihad expansion. Best (2007) contends that the British policy of indirect rule initially relied on the structures of the Bauchi Emirate to administer Jos. In 1926 however, the British introduced a separate administration for the high plateau area around Jos (Best, 2007:19). The contested history of Jos also finds expression in the trend among the indigenes to rename areas and streets to erase the Hausa legacy, although most people in Jos speak Hausa fluently.

The idea of a separate Middle Belt identity gained widespread support after Nigeria gained independence in 1960, in response to political domination by the northern states (IPCR, 2008: 53). Best (2007:4) notes that Plateau State is one of the most diverse federal states, with more than 58 ethnic groups. The region hosts a high concentration of relatively small ethnic communities with more than 40 languages (Blench, 2009: 2). The main ethnic groups in Jos are the Berom, the Anaguta, the Afizere, the Igbo, the Yoruba, and the Hausa–Fulani. The Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere are recognized as the main indigene groups in Jos and are predominantly Christian. Owing to their long residence in Jos, many Hausa–Fulani in the city refer to

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themselves as Jasawa (‘people of Jos’). The name is meant to distinguish them from the Hausa– Fulani population in the states farther to the north. The term Jasawa is also used for political representation of the Hausa in Jos. The Fulani have mostly remained cattle herders and their grazing routes often take them beyond Plateau State.

Over the last decade, crisis over ‘indigene rights and political representation in Jos, capital of Plateau State, has degenerated into a protracted communal conflict affecting most parts of the state. At least 4,000 and possibly as many as 7,000 people have been killed since late 2001, when the first major riot in more than three decades broke out in Jos. (Crause 2011: 9). Ten years later, only the heavy presence of military and police forces ensures a fragile calm in the city. Tensions between ethnic groups rooted in the allocation of resources, electoral competition, fears of religious domination, and contested land rights have amalgamated into an explosive mix. The presence of well-organized armed groups in rural areas, the proliferation of weapons, and the sharp rise in gun fatalities within Jos all point to the real risk of future large-scale violence.

More than 13,500 people have been killed in communal violence since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 (HRW, 2010a). The ‘Middle Belt’ region, to which Plateau State belongs, is one of the areas worst hit. Clashes between Muslim and Christian youths rocked the city of Jos again in 2008, killing at least 700. (Crause 2011:9). The year 2010 is one of the worst on record, with more than 1,000 lives lost. The human cost of the violence is immense. The number of internally displaced persons since 2001 peaked in 2004, with up to 220,000 people displaced (IRIN, 2005).

Crause notes regrettably that as neighbourhoods become religiously segregated, ‘no-go areas’ alter patterns of residency, business, transportation, and trade. This study finds that the historical, regional, and religious dimensions of the Jos crisis are crucial to understanding the protracted nature of the current conflict situation and the visible polarization that now hold sway. (Crause 2011:9). It is the view of the authors that until and unless the parties resume in trust and live the hitherto integrated way of living (prior to 2001), peace-building efforts and indeed the efforts of

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the STF currently operating in the state, cannot bring about the desired peace except at best what the authors refered to as grave-yard-Peace which the state and particularly the city of Jos currently gleans. No one but the people themselves, have the peace that is most sought after.

From the unset of the violent hostility in the city of Jos in 2001 intermittently to date, the city and indeed the entire state, has since been trapped in a dungeon of a complex social conflict caused by ethnic, religious and political factors within the social web. This aptly necessitated the stationing of the security forces for the sole purpose of ‘ceasefire’ or operation to keep the peace.

It began with the Army first and later to be followed by the Airforce, Navy and lately, the residents witnessed what the authors call a Hibrid Task Force-comprised of the military (Army, Navy and Airforce) and men of the Mobile- Police, Civil Defence and the State Security Service (SSS) which provides a covert dimension of the security architecture in terms of the required intelligence to keep the peace. The grey issues connected to the

national questions that

warranted the deliberate changing composition of the security architecture of the Special Taskforce in the state is one important dimension of the polarization phenomenon but whose details fall outside the focus of this paper. Suffice to say however that the polarization along ethnic and religious fault lines in Jos, is no less visible among the supposed umpires (men of the STF) and their various service organizations than it is among the parties in conflict.

The paper opens with the following posers: •

What is Peace and Peace-building?

•

What is City-Partitioning/Polarization?

•

How does City-Partitioning relate with Peace-building?

•

What are the factors that led to the current phenomenon of City-Polarization and/or Partitioning in Jos?

•

Are the causal factors being addressed by the stake-holders in the Peace process?

•

What are the Implications of the Polarization syndrome to the current feud and the Peace-building effort in Jos and Plateau State in general?

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•

When will the residents of Jos and Plateau people own the peace?

THEORETHICAL UNDERPINNINGS

The work lends itself to Henri Tajfel's social identity theory, in which Tajfel & Turner (1979) in McLeod, (2008) argues thus:

Social identity is a person’s sense of who they are based on their group membership(s). Tajfel proposed that the groups (e.g. social class, family, football team etc.) which people belonged to were an important source of pride and self-esteem. Groups give us a sense of social identity: a sense of belonging to the social world.

In order to increase our self-image we enhance the status of the group to which we belong. For example, Nigeria is the best country in the world! We can also increase our self-image by discriminating and being prejudice against the out group (the group we don’t belong to). For example, “The Americans, French etc. are a bunch of losers”. Therefore we divided the world into “them” and “us” based through a process of social categorization i.e. we put people into social groups. This is known as in-group (us) and out-group (them).

Social identity theory states that the in-group will discriminate against the out-group to enhance their self-image. The central hypothesis of social identity theory as postulated by Tajfel & Turner (1979) postulates thus: group members of an in-group will seek to find negative aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their self-image. Herein lies the basis of social identity –driven conflicts. Prejudice between cultures may result in racism; in its extreme forms, racism may result in genocide, such as

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occurred in Germany with the Jews, in Rwanda between the Hutus and Tutsis and, more recently, in the former Yugoslavia between the Bosnians and Serbs. Henri Tajfel proposed that stereotyping (i.e. putting people into groups and categories) is based on a normal cognitive process: the tendency to group things together.

Religion is complex in that it means an identity, a language, a source of authority and economic power, as seen in the case of Protestant ethics and the rise of Capitalism in Europe and elsewhere. Religion has territory defined by its spatial scope of influence such as the Former Ottoman Empire with Headquarters in Turkey, Christian Europe which is implied to be headquartered in England, the Kanem-Bornu Empire of old and the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria just to mension a few. These were religious structures and places that had political influence as well. It is thus argued that religion as an identity seem to unite people with a much more stronger tie than the integrative capacity of the state especially in the post Cold War Era and in the developing countries in particular.

Religion as a culture, provides a set of beliefs; it prescribes behaviors; creates institutions and therefore it has a leadership structure and the means of communication. The honor and reverence for religion makes it very powerful for mobilization and control

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PEACE Peace is a relatively notorious term to be defined but much easier to be conceptualized. It is therefore not a value-free concept. Peace is viewed by different scholars according to their respective backgrounds, sentiments and idiosyncrasies. Galtung in Miller (2005:55) posited that Peace is a political condition that ensures justice and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms. Several conditions must be met for peace to be reached and maintained: •

balance of political power among the various groups within a society, region, or,

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most ambitiously, the world; •

legitimacy for decision makers and implementers of decisions in the eyes of their

respective group, as well as those of external parties, duly supported through transparency and accountability •

recognised and valued interdependent relationships among groups fostering

long-term cooperation during periods of agreement, disagreement, normality, and crisis •

reliable and trusted institutions for resolving conflicts

•

sense of equality and respect, in sentiment and in practice, within and without

groups and in accordance with international standards. mutual understanding of rights, interests, intents, and flexibility despite incompatibilities Notoriously elusive, peace connotes more than a mere absence of war or hostilities; an absence of conflict is impossible. In addition, the state of peace should be distinguished from techniques that simply avoid conflicts or employ violent or coercive approaches to engage in, manage, or resolve them. Deriving from the Latin pax, peace in the Western world is generally considered a contractual relationship that implies mutual recognition and agreement. Understandings of peace throughout the world often disclose a much deeper comprehension of peace in relation to the human condition, which also includes inner peace. The comprehensive understanding of peace outlined above extends beyond what are referred to as positive conceptions of peace but acts in accordance with them as well. This contrasts with negative conceptions of peace, which are described most commonly as the mere absence of war or violent conflict.

PEACE BUILDING Closely associated with peace, Peace-building is a post-conflict process or experience in which efforts of stake-holders are channeled towards restoring stability in a society that has been affected by violent hostility or war. MIller (2005:56) defined the term Peace-Building as Policies, programs, and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political, and economic institutions and structures in the wake of a war or some other debilitating or catastrophic event. Peace building generally aims to create and ensure the conditions for ‘negative peace’, the mere absence of violent conflict engagement, and for ‘positive peace’, a more comprehensive understanding related to the institutionalisation of justice and freedom.. The

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conceptualisation of peace building, has probably never been more articulated than the views of the former UN Scribe- Boutros Boutros-Ghali in whose Agenda for Peace first issued in 1992 and the later edition in 1995. Speaking in relation to post-conflict situations, Ghali (1995:15) identified a range of peace-building programmes, including ‘co-operative projects ... that not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace’. More specifically, he mentions activities focusing on agriculture, transportation,

resource

management,

cultural

exchanges,

educational

projects,

and

simplification of visa regimes.Miller noted that there exists a connexion between security and development is an accepted tenet in peace building, and the implications of this mutually reinforcing relationship are extensive.(MIller 2005:57) Yet, peace building involves a wide range of international donors, aid agencies, and international, regional, community, and grassroots civil society organisations. Such initiatives have revolved around several foci. The following represents a small selection of them:  assisting an end to military or violent exchanges through the decommissioning of arms, the demobilisation of combatants, and rehabilitation and reintegration programmes  providing humanitarian relief to victims  protecting human rights  ensuring security and related services  generating an environment of trust in order for social relations to function properly  establishing non-violent modes of resolving present and future conflicts  fostering reconciliation among the various parties to a conflict  providing psycho-social or trauma healing services to victims of severe atrocities  repatriating refugees and resettling internally displaced persons  aiding in economic reconstruction  building and maintaining the operation of institutions to provide such services, and  co-ordinating the roles of numerous internal and external parties involved in such interrelated efforts.

With these points in mind, we are now better disposed to provide answers to some of our posers above, you can better judge if peace building has been ungoing or not or better still if it is in place but with little success so far. MIller (2005:57) argues that although isolated or partial

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elements of such a conception of peace building have been implemented to alleviate the consequences of past wars and acute conflicts, the integration of this complex model of processes is a relatively new phenomenon. The changing nature of war, and the increasing frequency of wars within nationstates as opposed to between them, has also complicated peacebuilding initiatives. To date, no comprehensive formula for peace building exists. Such efforts have been developed and implemented mostly on an ad hoc basis, and they vary widely from case to case in accordance with local and temporal circumstances. (MIller 2005:57).

P As an extremely broad concept—encompassing democracy, development, gender, human rights, and justice— MIller notes that Peace-building can be thought of as a bridge from conflict resolution to ‘positive peace’. Peace building aims to create and foster stability and adequate functioning of a region or society.

CONTESTED /POLARIZED CITIES The literature on the subject of Contested Cities is relatively scanty, in part because the term itself is still at an embryonic stage. Bollen (2007:1-2) after nearly twelve years of research on the theme said his emphasis has been on the role of policy and planning in contested urban environments and the effects these urban strategies have on the magnitude and manifestations of ethnonational conflict. Bollen have explored whether there are lessons for regional and national political negotiations that come from polarised cities regarding how to produce more mutually tolerable multi-ethnic living environments. Bollen’s study was focus on the cities of Jerusalem (Israel/Palestine), Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia (Cyprus), Sarajevo and Mostar (Bosnia) and Basque cities and Barcelona (Spain). Each of these cities has been, or is, politically contested or polarised, meaning that they are characterised by deep-rooted and often historically based nationalistic group conflict. The existence of competing nationalistic allegiances can lead to violence and instability, which can eventually tear a society and the city apart.

Bollen (2007:3-4) defines “polarised”/“contested” cities as cities where the very legitimacy of their political structures and their rules of decision-making and governance are strongly contested by ethnicgroups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power or demand

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group-based autonomy or independence. Socioeconomic cleavages and urban questions become bound upwith strong political claims; socially “divided” cities at this juncture become politically “polarised” cities. The case cities I have investigated are a sample of a troubling number of cities across the world that are prone to intense inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures.1 In these cities and societies, ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures for group rights, autonomy or even territorial separation. Such politicized multiculturalism constitutes a “challenge to the ethical settlement of the city”. By this description, the authors find the city of Jos apt as to be so described.

Keith in (Bollen 2007:3) notes that the political control of multinational cities can become contested as nationalists push to create a political system that expresses and protects their distinctive group characteristics. Whereas in most cities there is a belief maintained by all groups that the existing system of governance is properly configured and capable of producing fair outcomes, assuming adequate political participation and representation of minority interests, governance amidst severe and contested multicultural differences can be viewed by at least one identifiable group in the city as artificial, imposed, or illegitimate.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION Many factors have been advanced by scholars, as the causes of what has come to be known as the Jos Crisis which have negatively boomeranged in other Local Government Areas of the State. No matter the varied views however, one theme runs through them all as uncontestable ‘Truth’- the grey issues arising from the so called National Questions which is christened in the indigeneship/settler questions. This is super imposed on the contestation over scarce resources as well as the struggle over political space including the quest for identity assertion and self actualization. In this sense, the issues connected to Jos North and the claim of indigeneship by some of its non-native residents, seem to be the melting pot of not only the Jos Crisis but the Plateau feud in general.

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Whatever the views are, one thing is certain- the unresolved so-called national questions are at the heart of the pogrom that has intermittently stained the name of Jos with blood. The long-term solution to the Jos and wider Plateau State crisis will need to tackle the indigene–settler divide.

However, given that the conflict over indigene rights is endemic all over Nigeria, Plateau State will hardly arrive at a durable solution on its own. The author contend that the Plateau Question might have provided the template in search for a stable Nigeria. For instance, Christian indigenes often point to the discrimination against fellow Christians in northern, predominantly Muslim states to justify exclusion of the Hausa–Fulani in Jos. The latter constitute Nigeria’s most numerous ethnic group. Plateau’s indigenes feel threatened with marginalization and are not willing to be the first to step down from exclusive indigene privileges.

In the north, non-Muslims have always been kept apart in Sabon Garis and enjoy neither rights nor privileges that the majority enjoy. The ‘indigene-settler dichotomy is not a Plateau problem. It is a national challenge. The people of Plateau State have paid a heavy price not only in blood but also in terms of the massive destruction of the physical and social infrastructure. While the killing of dozens of Muslims, savagely butchered in places such as Kuru Karama and their bodies said to have been covered somewhere is condemnable in all its ramifications, the killing of over 700 defenceless women and children in the village of Dogonahawa in January 2010 presented not only the extend to which the alter of hate has been elevated between parties but it depicts the reality of our collective decline to the Hobbessian state. In no other episode in the Jos Crisis, could the concept of savagery be better painted .

Crause noted that religious leaders will have to take responsibility for invalidating the perceptions of existential threat to religious identity that have become entrenched in many people’s daily lives. Top-level religious leaders have preached peace and tolerance, but the message does not trickle down fully. While grassroots initiatives echo their tenor, mid-level religious leaders feel under pressure to protect their communities. People tend to be suspicious of inter-religious dialogue, making it difficult to rebuild trust among communities. From field data collected during interviews with residents of Jos North (which is without doubt the melting pot of not only the Jos Crisis but the entire feud that has bedeviled the once peaceful city) most respondents said many within the churches and mosques call for a more militant response from

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their community. The city has thus managed to stay calm during the 2011 elections, but political elites in Jos and Abuja will need to tackle the Jos crisis. A heavy military presence is no durable solution. (Crause 2011:11).

In principle, all Nigerian citizens are equal no matter the circumstances of their birth and whether or not they reside in their places of origin. But in practice, one is a Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin no matter for how long one resides or domiciles in a state other than his own.

(Ojukwu and Onifade in Crause 2011). Citing Golwa and Ojiji Crause noted “the conflict over citizenship and indigene rights is in no way peculiar to Plateau State. Most states of the Nigerian federation face an indigene or citizenship crisis. The constitution privileges local descent over residency. The Jasawa population complains that since the early 1990s it has become almost impossible for them to receive indigene status, despite the fact that their community settled there generations ago. (Crause 2011:26).

Proponents of indigene rights claim that any settler can return to his ‘place of origin’ and demand an indigene certificate there. In theory, therefore, no citizen would be discriminated against. In practice, however, many settlers have lived within their localities for several generations and cannot trace back their origins to a place where their ethnic group would constitute a majority.

Although the Hausa–Fulani dominate the northern Muslim states, many Hausa– Fulani settlers in Plateau State have no ancestors in these states and cannot claim indigene rights there. Human Rights Watch refers to such settlers as ‘stateless citizens’ who are gravely disadvantaged and have no access to higher education or jobs in the civil service, the military, or the police forces (HRW, 2006:38).

However, many Christians of the Igbo and Yoruba communities are also ‘settlers’ in Jos North LGA. Their ancestors moved there during the same time period as the Hausa–Fulani. These settler groups do not claim indigene rights and have never been dominant in the politics of the city. In contrast, the Jasawa elite held political offices under the British and under the former military administration. To date that omen has not changed. Ostien, (2009: 11). In 2001, Berom elders stated that ‘not only is Jos on Berom land, but Jos is our ‘Jerusalem’ and is indigenously inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere’ (Best, 2007:35). A few years later, the traditional

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Berom leader stated that even if the Hausa had been in Plateau State for more than 1,000 years, they would remain non-indigene (HRW, 2006:42). Indigene politicians add that the problem is one of assimilation.

Writing in 2012, the International Crisis Group in its Africa Report N°196 issued on 17 Dec 2012 notes sadly that since 2001, violence has erupted in Jos city, capital of Plateau state, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. The ostensible dispute is over the “rights” of the indigene Berom/Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers to land, power and resources. The International Crisis Group adds that Indigene-settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing widespread inter-communal strife, which particularly affects the Middle Belt. Constitutional change is an important step to defuse indigene-settler rivalries that continue to undermine security. It must be accompanied by immediate steps to identify and prosecute perpetrators of violence in Jos and other parts of the country. Elites at local, state and federal level must also consistently implement policies aimed at reducing the dangerous link between ethnic belonging and access to resources, power and security if inter-communal violence is to end. Lately, the politics of exclusion has come to play a crucial role in the Jos crisis as well as other remote and familiar causal factors as already stated.

The indigene principle, or indigeneity (that is, local origin), means that some groups control power and resources in states or local government areas (LGAs) while others – who have migrated for different reasons – are excluded. This gives rise both to grievances and fierce political competition, which too often lead to violence. It is to be noted that indigeneity was given constitutional force at independence in 1960 to protect the ethnic minorities from being submerged by the larger Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba groups and preserve their cultural and political identity as well as the traditional institutions of governance. Religion is a pertinent, albeit secondary factor, which reinforces underlying tension and, over the years, has assumed greater importance, especially since the return of democracy in May 1999. Fierce and unregulated political competition characterised by ethnic mobilisation and violence, coupled with poor governance, economic deregulation and rampant corruption, have severely exacerbated ethnic, religious and regional fault lines. The notion of national citizenship appears to have been abrogated by both ethnicity and ancestry.

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International Crisis Group lamented the persistent settler-indigene conflict in Plateau state reflects the longstanding sense of grievance the BAA, including a small Muslim community among them, continue to nurse against their perceived treatment as second-class citizens by the Hausa-Fulani. The predominantly Christian Middle Belt, famous for its history of bitter struggle against attempts by the Muslim-dominated Far North to subjugate it, understands the citizenship malaise better than any other region. Reclaiming their rights, as the indigenous peoples of Plateau state, is the dominant narrative that runs through the BAA’s attempted politics of reverse discrimination against their perceived ancient oppressors. Conversely, the Hausa-Fulani claim that they, not the BAA, are the authentic indigenes of Jos and have been aggrieved about their lack of access to power and resources despite being the majority in the biggest of the LGAs, Jos North.

Because the settlers are almost entirely Muslim and the indigenous people predominantly Christian, struggle over land ownership, economic resources and political control tends to be expressed not just in ethnic but also religious terms. The dispute is compounded by the fact that, of the settler groups, only the Hausa-Fulani lay proprietary claim to Jos. As violence recurs, spatial polarisation and segregation accentuate social and political divisions; people become more conscious of their sub-national solidarity and allegiances and are more forthcoming about expressing them. (Internation Crisis Group 2012). The traditional history of a people has thus, ran into conflict with what modern state has had to provide. It seems the actors of state craft may have to face the down side of modernity as it comes into conflict with traditional order which hitherto, has kept the people together. Consequently, what is left as a result is the Polarization phenomenon by residents in the city as a natural survival strategy brought about by suspicion, distrust and deep-animosity between adherents of the two major religions as well as between natives of Plateau origin and the Hausa-Fulani in particular.

Since the end of 2010, security has further deteriorated in Jos because of terror attacks and suicide bombings against places of worship and security targets by suspected militants of Boko Haram, the Islamist group responsible for an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks in the north.

Thousands have been killed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced internally and billions of dollars of property have been destroyed.

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During 2002—2004, the violence moved southwards into rural areas of Yelwa, Langtang, Shendam, Wase, Kanam, Kanke and Mikang. Fulani pastoralists became the vanguard of the new Jihad, increasingly armed with sophisticated weapons from AK47s to submachine guns, Mark4s and G3 rifles. Masters of the bush, they were a moving target and were able to inflict maximum damage to the settled communities of the area. Casualties were heavy on both sides. In February 2004 Muslim youths killed over 70 people who were taking refuge inside a church. In April, ‘reprisals’ followed, leading to the killing of over 700.

These killings sent shockwaves throughout the north. In Kano, over 200, predominantly Christian immigrants were killed. President Obasanjo declared a state of emergency on the Plateau for six months.

The November 2008 uprising was also centred on the issue of Jos North Local Government.

Elections had not been held there since 2002, but the new Governor, Jonah David Jang, was determined to hold them. According to one view, the so-called ‘Jasawa’ had made efforts to reach out to the Governor on the issue of political representation but had been rebuffed. Mailafia (2012) recalled that mosques and churches had openly urged their members to vote only for people of their own faith. It has been suggested that all sides were involved in rigging the elections. The emergence of an ‘indigene’ as the Chairman of the Local Government led to yet another bloodbath. More than 850 people were killed. Human settlements from this time were becoming increasingly segregated. There have also been silent killings of people who have the misfortune to be driving through the wrong side of town.

The violence of 2010 took place on the Sunday of January 17 th, because a Muslim who was trying to rebuild his home near a church was attacked by Christian youths. What is remarkable is that this individual chose precisely the worship hours of a Sunday to start rebuilding his home. And when he was cautioned about the bedlam that he was causing, his friends descended on the local Roman Catholic church with heavy sophisticated weapons.

There is no doubt that this particular attack was premeditated. The 2010 violence was probably the bloodiest, with an estimated 4,000 people killed and over 180,000 displaced.

The Federal Government was compelled to bring in the army to keep the peace.

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In spite of the heavy presence of the army throughout the capital, some attackers infiltrated from neighbouring Bauchi State at dawn, killing over 700 people – most of them defenseless women and children — in the villages of Dogo Nahauwa, Rasat and Zot in Foron District, barely a stone throw from Governor’s home. Major-General Saleh Maina, the General Officer in Command, claimed that the Governor had never alerted him on the impending crisis. He has been alleged to be “a killer, villain, supporter of Muslim against Christian, one who has asked soldiers to turn the other way when Fulanis are killing Christians and one who has directed soldiers under his command to protect Muslims against Christians whenever Christians attack Muslims, thereby exposing Christians to army gunfire”. (The Vanguard, News Paper of 27 March 2010). The use of sophisticated weapons and widespread use of army uniforms during these killings speak of possible complicity by the military in these episodes of violence. The Dogo Nahauwa killings were exceptional by their venom and brutality. Mailafia lamented that Torching a sleepy village at dawn and gunning down the fleeing women and children amounted to an abuse of Humanity and could properly only be described in terms of genocide.

Mailafia notes sadly that Since 2011, there have been sporadic attacks, mainly by HausaFulanis on local villagers. Local youth militias have also waged their own campaigns of reprisals and counter-reprisals.

The rise in terror insurgency has worsen the already precarious situation in Jos. There are now two schools of thoughts among residents of Jos as regarding the role of the Hausa – Fulani on the repeated terror activities in the city: one holds the view that they (the HausaFulani) are integrated partners and do serve as the gate-keepers to the terror groups whose continues bombing and other forms of attacks have brought the city under such a heavy onslaught thus exacerbating the vexed internal feud which has spanned for nearly two decades. But the second group believes that a majority of the Hausa-Fulani in the city of Jos do frawn at, and are opposed to the terrorist attacks meted against innocent citizens in the state and elsewhere. But inspite of the optimism in the later view, residents are increasingly polarized in various abodes residential arrangements including schools, markets places and other arenas of social interactions have been polarized. Vissibly, even the artisans craft outfits, mechanic workshops and work colleagues of civil service

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establishments, finds it difficult to relate as freely with persons of the opposite faith as they use to, prior to the bad times.

It would be recalled that during July 2012, suspected Fulani attackers descended on mourners in Barkin Ladi during a requiem service for 63 people killed in a previous massacre. It would seem that the people of the Plateau are not even allowed to mourn their dead. More than 200 were killed, prominent among them were two serving national and state legislators from the State, Senator Gyang Dantong, a distinguished consultant Surgeon turned politician, and a Member of the House of

Assembly, Fulani Gyang.

(Mailafia 2012) While much of the conflict may have originated from the problem of political representation, it has snowballed into a religious conflict with global dimensions. The Vatican has condemned the atrocities that have taken the lives of so many; and so has UN Secretary-General Bank Ki-Moon. Global media have reported the unfolding of the tragedy with increasing interest and alarm. Media such as Al-Jazeera have also orchestrated a line of reporting that pitches the entire Muslim world against a small group of people — the innately peaceful Berom people — as the principal villains in a tragic drama that they neither desired nor created. The people of the Plateau feel, quite justifiably, under siege by forces go as far afield as Niger, Chad and the Arabian Peninsula, in the context of a state apparatus that is weakened by over a decade-long depletion of resource for a peace much yet to be earned.

Thus far, responses from local and national authorities have proven mostly ineffective. They have come in three ways. First, several judicial commissions of inquiry have been appointed to “get to the root of the crises” and recommend “lasting solutions”. But authorities have been slow in publishing reports and acting on their recommendations. Tough public speeches have not been translated into tangible political action against instigators and perpetrators: none of the suspects named by the various commissions have been prosecuted, and impunity continues to feed violence.

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The positive role of the police and military is tainted by its own contradiction , which has had to water down the success stories. The International Crisis Group (2012) notes that Security forces not only fail to share intelligence among themselves, but they are also suspected of taking sides in the conflict and soldiers are accused of trading guns for money. The authors think that whereas this point is true for some of the bad eggs of the STF, it however disqualifies to stand as a generalization against the institution which has kept a long standing track record in pursuing the cause of stability and unity of the nation. Indeed it is also the view of this paper to say that a mutually assured destruction (MAD) would have been the case in the city of Jos without the security operatives deployed to keep the peace, particularly the men of the STF. This notwithstanding, one cannot also shy away from the contradictions arising from the STF itself with some of its elements involved in nefarious activities ranging from terror insurgency, rubbery and other related crimes.

The Military, in its tradition of discipline, is said to have squarely sanctioned some of the confirmed culprits under its umbrella by military justice. Even though the civil populace still believe there are sacred cows covered in the clouds of impunity. Wrong or right, there are clearly the aspects of the security architecture that calls for urgent improvements. In this connection a gab of integration seem to exist between the state-run Operation Rainbow (OR), and the Federal Government mandated STF. The view of this paper is that both Operation Rainbow and the Special Task Force are suppose to be partners in progress. It would be recalled that a joint initiative since June 2010 between the federal government and the Plateau state government with support from the UN Development Program (UNDP), gave birth to the ‘Operation Rainbow’ which is considered a holistic response to the crisis. although Still in its infancy, Operation Rainbow appears useful but will only be effective if it can, at the minimum, win the confidence of both sides. It should be publicized at the grassroots so that the population can own it. (International Crisis Group 2012).

The International Crisis Group (2012) posits that crisis in Plateau requires both national and local solutions. Constitutional provisions, by virtue of their ambiguity over the terms “indigene” (which the constitution fails to define satisfactorily) and “residency” for accessing citizenship

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rights, have done little to clarify the situation. Nigeria’s current conception and implementation of its citizenship (or national) question are inadequate and flawed.

The telecommunication revolution has only helped matters partially. It also entails the transborder diffusion of knowledge and information through new technologies such as the worldwide web, the Internet and mobile telephony with their consequential impacts in terms of both merit and demerit. National boundaries have thus become arbitrary as conflicting civilizations within state boundaries tend to reunite with their kinsmen beyond shores. This factor makes a case for the internationalization of the Jos crisis without underestimating the role of its shadow parties.

Local conflicts of religious and ethnic roots now are being fought and tele-guided by their shadow parties or proxies who share the sentiments of the direct parties and as such conflicts spread faster, wider and lasts longer due to the global interest often in local issues and vice versa.

In principle, these root causes of the conflict are well understood. Nigerian scholars have elaborated the problem of indigene rights in several publications. Yet there has been a lack of political will to address the situation. Religious identities have become strongly polarized.

Despite numerous peace efforts, tensions still hover on the Plateau . Compounding the tragedy of the Jos crisis, violent clashes are no longer sparked only by deliberate political instigation during election times, rather, any slightest britches of the fragile peace or any other minor upheaval between people, be it traffic frictions on the highways as long as it is not between persons of the same faith, it has the tendency of snowballing into social conflict of religious coloration, thus, making the cause, becoming a mere trigger. The hitherto, dominant cause of violent conflictpolitics, has been suppressed relatively by the men of the STF and other internal security operatives, leaving the Peace-building exercise to the mercies of Polarization.

FACTORS UNDERMINING THE PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS IN JOS Attempts to refine and implement peace building have encountered several difficulties, including the following: •

failures to address the underlying or root causes of the conflict

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•

lack of legitimacy in the eyes of recipients and target groups, particularly in relation to newly formed institutions

•

Lack of openness and ‘truth’

•

lack of agreement over the acceptance of roles and implementation of responsibilities by all parties to the conflict

•

limits on leadership in times of political transition or extreme crisis

•

over-reliance on external parties

•

aspirations to build a society that functions generally better than it did prior to the conflict It resulted in a breakdown of trust, communication and exchange between the

communities that has never been fully restored. Residents referred to the violence as ‘a fight to finish’. The year 2009 was one of uneasy calm. Renewed fighting broke out in Jos in January 2010 over the rebuilding of a house that had been destroyed during the 2008 violence. Ever since, the region has plummeted into a deadly cycle of reprisal and revenge attacks.

Numerous small-scale attacks, ‘silent killings’ of individuals discovered in the ‘wrong’ neighbourhood, and two major massacres in villages close to the city mark 2010 as the worst for Jos: at least 1,000 people were killed and more than 18,000 displaced. The series of violent events culminated in the detonation of several bombs on Christmas Eve. Bomb explosions were a novelty to Jos. They sparked yet another round of fighting and revenge killings that lasted well into 2011. At least 200 people were killed between January and April 2011 (HRW, 2011). Despite a host of peace efforts undertaken by various levels of society, the situation in Plateau State has only worsened. The main political actors in the perpetuated crisis have been on the scene over the last decade. The lack of political will to resolve the crisis has been lamented from all sides. Following the 2001 riots, the Christian leader of Plateau State’s Inter-Religious Committee had urged political leaders and elders to ‘bury their differences’ and cooperate for the common good of all communities, specifically naming Governor Jonah Jang and former governor Joshua Dariye, among others. Obateru,2002 in Crause (2011:13) posited that trading in illegal arms is endemic all

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over Nigeria. Since the crisis, illegal weapons have also proliferated within Jos and all over Plateau State.

In addition, a significant number of weapons are manufactured locally. Local communities blame each other for acquiring weapons and preparing for the next attack. Arms are financed and supplied by ethnic and religious militias, politicians, wealthy individuals, or traditional rulers as well as local communities via religious, cultural, and development organizations. The sharp rise in gun fatalities in the 2008 and 2010 Jos riots testifies to the alarming number of illegal arms in circulation. In the run-up to the 2011 elections, residents in Jos warned that ‘2011 will be bloody hell’. This time, security forces were on high alert and successfully prevented a major outbreak. Helicopters flew over the city to monitor protests and allow for rapid responses. Tear gas was used to disperse protesters who could have turned into rioters. Plateau State emerged as the northernmost state in support of President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian, in his race against Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a northern former military ruler. The subsequent violence in the northern states, particularly in neighbouring Kaduna and Bauchi states, underlined the vulnerability of the region to religiously framed political violence.

It would be recalled that the situation in Jos since the 2011 General and gubernatorial elections remained extremely tensed. While the heavy military presence within the city tended to prevent overt collective violence, ‘silent killings’ continue underground. Bomb explosions constitute a real threat to resident safety in market areas and houses of worship.

A decade of communal violence has reshaped the city and stained its once scenic landscape.

Today, Jos is largely characterized by religious segregation in residence, business, trade, and transportation. Some routes in the city have lost patronage almost irrevocably as far as vehicular flow is concerned. On the other hand, routes that are perceived to be relatively safer as adjudged by residents, have become extremely busy as they now carry much more traffic than their carrying capacity- this has occasioned a culture of lawlessness on the highways as incidences linked to traffic anarchy becomes daily occurrence.

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Humanitarian and relief agencies remain on high alert as violent clashes may erupt at any time. This study finds that the lack of sincere conflict resolution efforts in Jos resulted in the transformation of a once-localized confrontation between political elites of different ethnic groups into a protracted communal conflict with a strong religious dimension.

Subsequent to violent clashes in Jos, tensions in rural areas and small towns exploded.

Urban and rural cycles of violence have reinforced different conflict clusters along the overarching religious divide. Many residents have come to understand the conflict as a religious confrontation linked to regional and national political developments. (Crause 2011:60).

The increasing brutality of the killings over the past two years has had a traumatizing impact on the local population. This has resulted in a severe breakdown of trust and communication between religious communities. The high level of tensions, accusations that the other side is preparing for violence, and segregation severely hamper violence- prevention and peace-building efforts. The Mirror Effect once adduced to the Cold War is at play in Jos. The dynamics of urban violence are characterized by attacks, counter-attacks, and street battles of youth gangs and thugs. Crause notes that a common urban practice during riots is the blocking of major streets and the selective killing of individuals who do not recite the correct religious verses. While much of the killing in 2001 was perpetrated with knives and machetes, gunshot fatalities have become a feature of urban violence since the 2008 riot. On the outskirts of Jos, community members have commonly been attacked and murdered with machetes, while gunshots were used to expel villagers from their dwellings. Within Jos, much of the youth violence is organized along neighbourhood vigilante networks that have been transformed into community self-defence groups. Despite numerous clashes, these groups do not appear to have fully formed into standing gangs with citywide command structures.

The Religious Dimension Religion is a central part of human identity. Scholars and religious practitioners have defined religion from various perspectives. Derived from the latin word religionem, religion has been

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defined as a collection of beliefs, cultural systems and respect for what is sacred or divine.

Prentiss (n.d). Religion is characterized by religious activities such as prayers, sacrifice, pilgrimages to symbolic places, adherence to sacred documents and other relevant practices.

There are several religions practiced by people all around the world such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, African Traditional Religion, Buddism, Hinduism and so on. In Africa, and particularly in the Western region there are many religions. Even though the African traditional religion was the religion of its indigenous people, the advent and influence of colonialism and globalization has opened up Africa to other religions practiced in several countries around the world. These include Christianity, Islam, Buddism, etc.

So strong is the role of religion both as an ideology and for it’s own sake- ie. Religion sake, that all over the world, religion has proved to be both a cause of and panacea to resolving conflict. On the one hand it compounds the violence of society and takes it to a higher level and intensity because issues connected to it are not easily amenable to any feasible solution and it is often used to mobilize support in conflict situations as a means of social identity. Consequently, religiously motivated conflicts very often easily spread across national boundaries because loyalty to it might have surpassed those of states, sovereignties, nationalism and other state-centric allegiances.

Religion is complex in that it means an identity, a language, a source of authority, economic power as seen in the case of Protestant ethics and the rise of Capitalism in Europe and elsewhere.

Religion has territory defined by its spatial scope of influence such as the Former Ottoman Empire with Headquarters in Turkey, Christian Europe which is implied to be headquartered in England, the Kanem-Bornu Empire of old and the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria just to mention a few. These were religious structures and places that had political influence as well. It is thus argued that religion as an identity seem to unite people with a much more stronger tie than the integrative capacity of the state especially in the post Cold War Era and in the developing countries in particular.

Religion as a culture, provides a set of beliefs; it prescribes behaviors; creates institutions and therefore it has a leadership structure and the means of communication. The honor and reverence for religion makes it very powerful for mobilization and control.

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Crause (2011:31) contended that several factors have contributed to the religious dimensions of the confrontation in Jos. Generally, religion has become entrenched in Nigerian politics since the mid-1970s, with both politicians and religious leaders urging their followers to vote along religious lines . National regime change in 1999 lent the religious factor a new fervor. The birth of the fourth republic was followed by violent conflicts between Muslims and Christians in northern states, which further eroded trust between the religious communities in Jos. Specifically, the introduction of the sharia criminal code in 12 northern states in 2000 and 2001 provoked major protest from Christians. Many objected to what they perceived as a progressive Islamization of public life and discrimination against Christian minorities in northern cities.

Disputes over sharia resulted in deadly inter-religious violence in the cities of Kano and Kaduna.

This development led a substantive number of Christians to move out from the northern states, such as Kano and Bauchi, into Plateau State. They brought with them stories of discrimination and atrocities, exacerbating tensions between religious communities in Jos. Among Christians, perceptions of the Jos conflict have become interlinked with regional and national politics. In response to the 2008 crisis, many Christian leaders linked the Jos conflict to a broader religious confrontation. They pointed to the destruction of religious rather than political institutions after election disputes. . Crause (2011: 32).

Conversely, the Muslim leadership in Jos vehemently protested the religious framing of the 2008 crisis. In the name of the Jos North Muslim Ummah, in an interview granted at the time, they stated: Writing in 2008, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) alarmed that there were regional dimensions to the Jos Crisis beyond the intra-ethnic and political issues in the state. The indigene–settler issue is endemic in the ‘Middle Belt’ states surrounding the Plateau. The NorthCentral is a ‘hyperactive conflict zone’ plagued with rural conflicts over land and grazing rights and over political representation. Several states, such as Benue and Plateau, are reported to host large numbers of ex-soldiers with access to weapons. These individuals are also available to form and train militias based on existing vigilante groups. (IPCR, 2008:54).The proliferation of arms in the North-Central Zone has been recognized as an alarming trend for several years .The presence of militias and thugs for hire in neighbouring states is worrisome for Plateau State. In

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addition, Kaduna and Bauchi states are also infected by violent confrontations between Muslims and Christians.

In 2000, Kaduna city suffered massive communal violence between Muslims and Christians over the introduction of sharia criminal law, with at least 2,000 people having been killed. (Crause 2011: 29) Bauchi State was also badly hit by Muslim protests in April 2011. Bauchi has repeatedly been rocked by clashes with religious dimensions in rural communities. For instance, in May 2011, a Christian-dominated village was attacked and 16 people were killed (BBC, 2011b). The Muslim community in Jos is frequently accused of receiving mercenaries from Bauchi and other states farther north, as well as from Chad and Niger.

Citizenship and indigene rights Nigeria’s constitution grants every citizen the right to settle anywhere within the country and prohibits the government from discriminating against citizens based on ethnicity or religion. The Jasawa population complains that since the early 1990s it has become almost impossible for them to receive indigene status, despite the fact that their community settled there generations ago. Proponents of indigene rights claim that any settler can return to his ‘place of origin’ and demand an indigene certificate there. In theory, therefore, no citizen would be discriminated against. In practice, however, many settlers have lived within their localities for several generations and cannot trace back their origins to a place where their ethnic group would constitute a majority. Although the Hausa–Fulani dominate the northern Muslim states, many Hausa–Fulani settlers in Plateau State have no ancestors in these states and cannot claim indigene rights there. Human Rights Watch refers to such settlers as ‘stateless citizens’ who are gravely disadvantaged and have no access to higher education or jobs in the civil service, the military, or the police forces (HRW, 2006: 38).

Many Hausa–Fulani are now seeking to obtain certificates from Kano or Bauchi. But even if they can receive certificates there, indigene status in another state is of little use for employment within the Plateau State civil service. (Crause 2011: 26).

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At issue however, is that many Christians of the Igbo and Yoruba communities are also ‘settlers’ in Jos North LGA. Their ancestors moved there during the same time period as the Hausa–Fulani. These settler groups do not claim indigene rights and have never been dominant in the politics of the city. In contrast, the Jasawa elite held political offices under the British and under the former military administration.

Moreover, The Muslim

community in Jos is frequently accused of receiving mercenaries from Bauchi and other states farther north, as well as from Chad and Niger. These accounts are very widespread.

Given the small number of arrests made subsequent to violent clashes in Plateau State, it is difficult to assess their validity. Many Christians in Jos point to the discrimination against fellow Christians in Muslim-dominated northern states and therefore see no wrong in political exclusion of the Jasawa community in Jos. For instance, the ancient city of Kano hosts a significant Christian population that is denied indigene rights. Non-Hausa there have never been granted a local government area but ‘were divided and placed at Hausa dominated areas just to ensure that non-indigenes never dominated any political space in Kano’ (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010:178). Christians in Kano have been subjected to many forms of discrimination and to reprisal attacks following violence in Plateau State. Other indigene representatives in Jos demand a national solution to the problem. They argue that they will not be the first to compromise on privileges widely enjoyed by other ethnic communities throughout the federation. However, they know that a national solution would require an amendment to the Nigerian constitution, which is not on the agenda at the moment.

In 2001, Berom elders stated that ‘not only is Jos on Berom land, but Jos is our JERUSALEM and is indigenously inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere’ (Best, 2007:35). A few years later, the traditional Berom leader stated that even if the Hausa had been in Plateau State for more than 1,000 years, they would remain non-indigene (HRW,2006: 42). Indigene politicians add that the problem is one of assimilation: as long as the Hausa do not identify themselves as Berom, they identify themselves as settlers (HRW, 2006: 42–43), thus effectively demanding submission to Berom political control.

During a field interview conducted in a research for the British Council in North-Central Nigeria, a respected opinion molder in Jos Jarawa who granted interviews to the authors was quoted as

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saying: “if it were not for the Hausa– Fulani as a common enemy, the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere would be fighting among themselves over the ownership of Jos and privileges”. Several other respondents within the LGA had repeated shared thesame view in subsequent interactions Indeed, recent tensions between the Berom and the Afizere underline how easily notions of indigeneity are manipulated. The Afizere had sided with the Jasawa in the lead-up to the 2008 local elections against People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate Jonah Jang. After Jang assumed office, Afizeres complained that he intended to ‘chase them out to Bauchi’ and sent a letter of official complaint to the Prince Bola Ajibola Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Jos unrest of 28 November 2008 (Ostien, 2009:24). Urban discourse over claims to indigene rights and political control has since reverberated within smaller towns of Plateau State such as Namu, Yelwa, and Wase. (Crause 2011: 29).

The contemporary political conflict between the indigenes and the Hausa– Fulani dates back at least two decades. Under the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the Hausa– Fulani actively lobbied for the establishment of a local government in which they would be predominant. In 1991, their request was granted with the creation of Jos North LGA. The new boundaries made the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere minorities within Jos North LGA. The aggrieved ethnic groups who vehemently protest the creation of Jos North, often argue that they had not been consulted and that they had not consented to it. They view the split of the old Jos LGA into Jos North and South LGAs as a deliberate strategy to give full political control over to the Hausa population (Best, 2007:51–53). Jos North LGA comprises the commercial centre of Jos as well as the main political and traditional offices, such as the palace of the indigene traditional leader, the Gbong Gwom of Jos. Since the creation of Jos North LGA, elections and political appointments have been accompanied by strong tensions between the Hausa-Fulani and the indigenes. A first minor crisis occurred in 1994 over the appointment of a Hausa candidate as chairman of the Jos North Local Government Council. The Berom and other indigene groups strongly protested the appointment. They maintained that the position should go to an indigene. Four people were

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killed during the protests and parts of several market areas as well as an Islamic school and mosque were destroyed. (Best, 2007: 54–55).

III It is in this quagmire that distrust and lost of confidence between parties has led to the current challenge of Polarization in almost every aspect of social life. The segregation of communities is proceeding rapidly. At the end of 2010, before the Christmas bomb blasts, residents had again begun to venture into neighborhoods dominated by the other religious group to carry out commercial activities. Just five months later, following several attacks around the Jos bus terminal, traffic routes became segregated. After the 2008 riot, some residents were still willing to build up their destroyed houses for a second or third time, trusting that they could live peacefully once again among their neighbours of another faith. Crause (2011:45). Today, even families whose houses have not been destroyed voluntarily move into areas dominated by their own religious group. Voluntary and forced displacements have reshaped the geo-spatial landscape of the city of Jos. More worrisome is the security sector and some traces of polarization within the various security institutions along religious and religious lines with far-reaching consequences. The immediate response of the state government to violent unrest has been the deployment of military forces in addition to riot police, and the declaration of dusk-to-dawn curfews at various times as situations demand. During the state of emergency in 2004, efforts were made to collect illegal weapons, particularly in Southern Plateau.

After the 2008 crisis, an STF comprising military (Nigerian army, navy, and air force) and police forces was established. It regularly patrolled well-known flashpoints within the city to quell further unrest.Crause (2011: 49). Since both the police and the military are federal institutions, their officers are usually not drawn from the immediate locality neither is their command chain.

We have seen from the last decades that the states Governors are called chief Security officers only to a limited extent. Nevertheless, the polarization between religious communities also affects the supposedly neutral security sector. Police officers and soldiers have long been blamed

35

for being bias and being very much part of the problem. Christians accuse soldiers of siding with Muslims; Muslims blame police officers for supporting Christians.

Religious communities find themselves under pressure when advocating the need to remain peaceful. People want to see measures being taken to improve their safety. Among the youths, calls for retaliation and revenge have become recurrent features of the social order.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The view of this paper is that the parties in the Jos and Plateau Crisis are the ones to bring about the needed peace given that the ‘Peace of the Grave yard’ will always be artificial. Without cohesion and integration however, sustainable peace will continue to elude the people. The current trend of Polarization in the social landscape of the city can hardly lead the people to the desired direction or destination, it is, as a matter of fact, retrogressive and destructive. But even more worrisome, it runs counter to Peace-building. The author thinks that such unhealthy state of living presents a journey in a circle that will always bring the system into many rounds of relapses. The author regrets the retrogression to Medievalism and at worst, the Hobessian state.

The following recommendations are proffered for a saver Jos and a more peaceful Plateau: To the Federal Government of Nigeria: Short term Measures 1. Address the long-standing national questions in Nigeria once and for all.

2. There is the urgent need for Security Sector Reform(SSR) in Nigeria given the nature of its involvement in most of the crisis across the nation and Jos in particular. This must begin with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ‘bag guys’ and terror groups in particular. The people by themselves should be brought together in every aspect of social life, and such should be aided by deliberate policy frameworks.

3. Implement the recommendations of the published Fiberesima, Tobi and Ajibola commissions of inquiry and the white papers, that promotes not only the peace and

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security but the principles of political inclusiveness, fairness, equity and justice; These include: a. prosecution of instigators and perpetrators of conspiracy, murder, arson and public disturbance; b. checking the proliferation of firearms; and c. ending the indiscriminate construction of places of worship in residential areas in Jos and other towns. By so doing 4. Establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for resolving the Plateau feud; 5. Create new local government areas and districts out of the highly disputed Jos North LGA; 6. Ensure that the Military Special Task Force (STF) in Jos works closely with the Plateau State Government to protect various ethnic and cultural groups, and by the same token, ensure a close working relationship between the STF and Operation Rainbow as partners in progress as against the occasional ‘dog and cat’ relationship; 7. End impunity by prosecuting those responsible, within and outside Plateau state, for masterminding and perpetrating violence and killings across the state; 8. Ensure, together with the Plateau state government, that Operation Rainbow is fully operational and has the capacity to take over from the STF within the shortest possible time, while guaranteeing its objectivity and neutrality at all times in order to elicit ownership by all participating parties; 9. Facilitate, in collaboration with the Plateau State government, a genuinely bottom-up approach to the peace and confidence-building process, through effective engagement with community, civil society and traditional leaders, informal peacemakers like elders, youth and women groups to assess their concrete needs and demands and by the same token a deliberate policy framework ought to be in place to ensure practical implementation; Medium term Measure 10. Strengthen all policy documents that aspire to entrench the indices of national integration and forthwith, organise and fund a nation-wide civic education program that would inculcate in Nigerians the significance of a common notion of citizenship, based on respect of ethnic and religious diversity, national unity and cohesion. This should be pursued without compromising the sense of ancestry among Nigerians and Plateau residents in particular.

To the Plateau State Government:

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In the short term Reach out to all settler groups in the state, particularly the Hausa-Fulani, to restore trust and confidence, structural issues such as unemployment among able and resourceful youths must be addressed if the consequences of idleness is to be avoided in all its ramifications. Provide security posts in strategic areas within the Jos metropolis and its environs in order to prevent civil unrest – a strategy that proved effective in Kaduna state; In the medium term 11. Take some measures against discrimination in education and employment opportunities between indigenes and settlers, for the time being before a long term national solution is provided. And henceforth, all forms of exclusion by power players must be avoided; 12. Disadvantaged groups(be it on religious, ethnic or political basis) should be given a fair chance to contribute to, and gain from development processes; 13. Adopt zoning and power rotation among all the ethnic groups residing in Jos North; 14. Ensure that future local government elections are credible, free and fair; 15. Modify the structure of the Jos North LGA to make the Local Council more representative of the desires of all the communities to foster a sense of community and belonging; To the UN and Bilateral Donors: 16. Press for accountability for perpetrators and instigators of violence to combat humanright abuses and the culture of impunity ; 17. Encourage the Nigerian government and the National Assembly, via a referendum or by itself following its public hearings on the matter, to amend relevant sections of the 1999 constitution in order to provide a national, constitutional solution to the perennial settlerindigene problem;

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18. Provide further capacity building and technical assistance to the Nigerian and the Plateau State Governments to complement current UNDP contributions in these areas and empower Operation Rainbow; 19. Provide requisite expertise and skills to the Nigerian government and security agencies to support efforts at improving intelligence-gathering and sharing, so as to boost efficiency in containing inter-communal conflicts and fighting terrorism and extremism; 20. Work with the Nigerian Government, the Plateau State Government and the ethnoreligious communities in the state to address

socio-economic marginalization,

disempowerment, idleness and political exclusion of youths and minority groups in the state through education and skill acquisition programs, aimed at bettering the lives of the down-trodden;

21. And as a last resort, the UN, with the support of regional and sub-regional bodies in Africa as well as other donors and concerned international partners to Peace and development, should be on the alert and be willing to invoke Chapter seven or seven – and-a-half as the case may be, of the UN Charter guided by its principles of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), to safe innocent citizens from what appears to be the insensitivity and incapacity of governments to protect citizens from insurgency and fundamentalism evident from the failing of the Nigerian authority to curtail a crisis that threatens the corporate existence of a nation-The Jos Crisis.

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