SELECTED WORK 2002-2017 DAVE HAMPTON
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RE:GROUNDING RESILIENCE Networked and Productive Landscapes in Cuba (excerpts)
DAVE HAMPTON
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TABLA DE CONTENIDO TABLE OF CONTENTS FRAMING
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Models The risk of replication: Lessons from Medellín Impacts and connections On process Cuba Faces Forward: A conference as testing-ground Context: Socialism in transition Regrounding resilience Towards a methodology
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INTERVENTION 1: Limonar - Field of Dreams
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1.00 Prelude: The cast of characters 1.01 The stage 1.1 Entry 1.2 Currency exchange 1.3 Parish church 1.4 Courtyard gardens 1.5 ‘Reprogrammed’ sugar mill 1.6 Field of dreams 1.7 Agricultural recolonization INTERVENTION 2: Matanzas - Hosting the Raindrop
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45 47 49 51
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Relocation Incline and Sustain The resilience of relocation: Lessons from Port-au-Prince New connections
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INTERVENTION 3: Policy - A Seat at the Table BIBLOGRAPHY ADDENDA
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ENMARCACIÓN FRAMING
Fig. 1: Models of models
Fig. 2: Models as being of lesser importance than the relationships within and between.
Models The dominant (international) development narrative – whereby foreign investment and power is wielded by the few and leveraged in a space and time of political, economic, or social transition – induces external and internal pressures. A unique set of risks arises: 1. Importing models of development which are inappropriate to the context 2. Subverting existing institutions 3. Dampening the potential of collective and networked action 4. Benefitting some groups of people while marginalizing others 5. Upsetting delicate environmental and socio-economic balances Anyone who has traveled recently to places such as Spain’s Costa del Sol, Cancún, or most anywhere in the Caribbean is painfully aware of the first. How models move is arguably as complex as those processes which shape them, rather than being simply imported wholesale, descending from ‘above’ or ‘below’ or being easily scaled or replicated (Fig. 1). We may liken the proliferation and mobility of models - cropping up here and there, often in the most unexpected of places - to the mobility of policies (Peck & Theodore, 2010).
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First, policies are socially constructed, establishing dialogic connections between actors and sites. Second, they are comprised of actors which are sociologically complex, rarely acting alone, with shifting motivations. Third, policies arrive “already-in-transformation”, moving in bits and pieces rather than presenting themselves fully-fleshed. Fourth, policies reproduce nonlinearly. Finally, policies operate on “a three-dimensional mosaic of increasingly reflexive forms of governance, shaped by multidirectional forms of cross-scalar and interlocal policy mobility.” Models, continue Peck and Theodore, “do not simply designate place-specific processes of innovation or sites of creative invention, as the diffusionist paradigm might have it; they connote networks of policymaking sites, linked by overlapping ideological orientations, shared aspirations, and at least partly congruent political projects.” Models move and proliferate because they have advocates, having been “ideologically anointed or sanctioned.” But first, let us explore the possibility of another risk: that of the replication of models in the absence of context.
Figs. 3-5: Quebrada Juan Bobo creek relocation project, Medellín, Colombia.
The risk of replication Lessons from Medellín
The prevailing popular (and professional) perception of Medellín, Columbia as a ‘model’ for the (re)development of a city is one example where even such a counter-model, antithetical to the NGO- and foreign government-driven model of international development, might gain traction internationally, risking becoming – in itself – yet another international model to be applied without full understanding of the contexts and forces which shaped it. The temptation to replicate is great. Miguel Robles Durán, a recent visitor to Medellín, was surprised to find that a well-intentioned and well-educated group of Cuban and international professionals concerned with the redevelopment of Havana seemed to be taking in the sights of Medellín uncritically, and with an eye toward applying not the processes, but the resultants to a Cuban context (Durán, 2016). Medellín dazzled – its transportation systems: Metrocables soaring above, its architecture: the striking onyx forms of the Biblioteca España and the soaring, flowering latticework of the Orqideorama, and new infrastructure: public stairs, plazas, and colorful bridges linking neighborhoods across a ravine. Peter Brand writes of the effects of Medellín’s self- (and external) branding, often
shallowly understood as an updating of the public space-making ‘Barcelona model’, cautioning that the restructuring of city’s image as progressive, enlightened, and innovative threatens to pervert the political underpinnings of social urbanism (Brand, 2015). To see the ‘Medellín model’ applied across the land may be just as misguided as to (mis)apply any model before it. Medellín’s experiment with ‘social urbanism’ under the administration of Sergio Fajardo, a mathematician turned reform politician, is well documented. Fajardo – also the son of an architect – and his interdisciplinary team – which included architects and planners in prominent roles – was able to build upon a growing popular exhaustion with a decades-long history of drug crime and violence, directing it into an intensive participatory planning process. Fajardo and team were able to apply the resultant ‘social urbanist’ principles through a combination of existing and new legislative and management structures. PRIMED, begun in 1993, while tied to mayoral administration, “managed to lay down the bases for a new form of tackling marginality, for its methodological design, the capacity for achieving management and institutional coordination” The 2004 Municipal Development Plan, refined during the community engagement process, identified and prioritized Strategic Urban Projects and Integral Urban Projects – such as the aforementioned ‘Library-Parks’, Juan Bobo Creek redevelopment (Figs. 3-5), and other infrastructure – locating their management under the direct control of the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano (EDU), a decentralized and quasi-independent planning and development entity which is part of Medellín’s municipal government. Finally, funding for the new civic interventions 5
drew upon the financial support of international partners, the state-owned utilities company EPM, and several national funding streams, such as the reframing of socially-engaged work as ‘cultural patrimony’ to reach federal arts and culture funds. Thus, during a unique point in the trajectory of the city and of Colombia, the implementation of Medellín’s iconic public works occurred over a secure continuum convened by design and planning - a politicization of design, to paraphrase designer and activist Teddy Cruz, whereby urban design was brought (back) into city management. Medellín stands as exemplary of both a synthesis of ideals and the capacity to act, under the aegis of design, but in terms of process, should be understood as being inextricable from its particular time and place.
Impacts and interconnections Architect and planner Dilip da Cunha has cautioned against urbanism, or, more specifically, the risks of urbanization as an industry upon which international development depends, and its impact on environments. More germane to the discussion of models, da Cunha encouraged focusing on projects wherever they may be located. Referencing Alejandro Echverri, the architect and planner most instrumental in Medellín’s Strategic Urban Projects, da Cunha said “some of your projects in Medellín… I don’t think they are there for the city. You could see them that way. But I think they contribute on the Columbian stage. They contribute on the world stage. They are much larger in their impact.” (Affordable Housing Institute, Hampton, & Brickman Raredon, 2016). However, does this refer to a model, or a process? To what extent might the model be the process? If we allow the tension inherent between the general and the specific, or the generalizable from the specific conditions of a particular context, to become less acute, what possibilities present themselves? Teddy Cruz and Fonna Forman have noted in Medellín the logic of focusing on global challenges “right here”(Cruz & Forman), and have attempted to put into action global justice at the municipal scale in their own work at the Tijuana-San Diego border. Their call for the reconstruction of urban governance and the resuscitation of civic lineages imbedded in a city’s institutional framework is a stirring one. In terms of actionability, their example of the removal of a barrier wall in an old bo6
tanic garden separating the informal settlement of Moravia from new connections to Medellín’s city center is a simple, but extremely effective, catalytic project. This resonates with Cruz and Forman’s staging of a crossing, again at the Tijuana-San Diego border, though a sewer culvert to highlight issues of environmental and human impact in all senses of those terms. These small manifestations of global justice, insist Cruz and Forman, are scalable. If part of the power of policies and models are their mobility and mutability, and if they are able to move across political and physical boundaries, cities speaking directly to each other - further evidenced by the Rockfeller Foundation’s focus on the municipal scale through their 100 Resilient Cities initiatives (Rockefeller Foundation, 2016) - how might we begin to leverage the possibility of testing models in unique, specific contexts, not necessarily for application of the model itself more broadly, but to leave the ‘residue’ of the process, the traces of unraveled strings (Fig. 2) within that particular context? What if, rather than fearing the descent of models from on high, or their stealthy approach from abroad, models themselves were downplayed, becoming of comparately less importance than the units and actors within and between (Fig. 2)? This shift away from the model itself and towards the machinations within - and among - presents the possibility that one actor or relationship might be teased out to make the difference in whether the implmentation of a policy or model might even be attempted, resulting at the very least in unexpected interactions, especially in a rigid contexts where such unsanctioned interactions might not otherwise occur. In short, how might we leave the imprints of a process upon - within and among - local actors: institutions, organizations, people? And what might this process look like?
On Process Sharon Sutton and Susan Kemp detail the objectives and outcomes of an interdisciplinary design charette which involved students and faculty from design, planning, social science, and members of three U.S. communities. Among the advantages noted were the use of visualization tools to engage community members in co-learning – in this case specifically aerial photographs – which allowed a more intuitve understanding of the excess of paved areas within a business district than counts of traffic and parking spaces could provide. “By using designers’ tools, the group evolved a shared vision that reflected [local] expert wisdom and it’s own heightened awareness.” (Sutton & Kemp, 2006)
Fig. 6: Ecology, Culture, and Community panel from the ‘Cuba Facing Forward’ conference. From left: Ajejandro Echeverri, David Guggenheim, Jorge Angulo Valdés, Dilip da Cunha, and Dave Hampton.
The authors go on to detail the tensions between disciplines – design and social science – and two types of technical knowledge – “the visual, subjective, and specific knowledge of designers and the analytical, objective, and generalizable knowledge of social scientists” against the “practical knowledge of community members.” In the more successful charettes, design becomes that force capable of suspending the limitations of existing conditions and allowing others to envision what might be. “By equipping community members with the tools of design, they begin to see familiar places with a new clarity and detachment, observing their neighborhood with suspended skepticism, which provided the groundwork for envisioning novel possibilities.” “While social scientists would find it foolhardy to attempt interventions before fully understanding a problem, studies have found that testing potential solutions relative to the situation under study is essential to design. Thus, successful designers aggressively impose their view of the situation, tackling the problem simultaneously.” In short, interdisciplinarity might be characterized as having inherent tensions when it involves expected outcomes: for disciplinary lines to be reinforced or defended, types of knowledge as distinct but complimentary, and the reluctance of / necessity of proposing interventions.
Cuba Faces Forward: A conference as testing-ground One needs look no further than contemporary Cuba for a context which presents immense possibility for challenging of the nature of models and the potential of applying the creative tensions of interdisciplinarity, within a unique space and time of transition. Recognizing a critical moment in history, the November 14th, 2015 conference ‘Cuba Facing Forward: Balancing transition with development in the Caribbean’s mostwatched nation’ was developed by myself, the Affordable Housing Institute, and students from the Harvard Graduate School of Design to explore the changes taking place in Cuba-U.S. relations and how those changes might impact the built and natural environments in Cuba. Speakers included leading professionals, both Cuban and international, in architecture, urban planning, ecology, law, real estate development, and scientific research. (For more information, please see a summary of the conference in the Addenda, and for continuing conversation, see cubatransition.org). The primary goals of the conference were to: • Create an open, frank, and constructive discourse on Cuba’s future. • Explore the possible effects of transition on Cuba’s built and natural environment, and how to harness the forces of change to improve both. • Foster an ongoing multi-party conversation leading to guiding principles for
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Fig. 7: Cuba Facing Forward’ conference closing discussion.
economic, ecological, and cultural resilience in Cuba. The conference was used partly as an opportunity to workshop the following framing questions, which would inform later research questions: 1. The economy, built environment, and ecology all influence each other, which, in turn affect and are affected by government policy and regulation. How can Cuba find a way forward that yields a sustainable, prosperous, inclusive island that at the same time maintains its distinctive Cuban character? What can we do to help achieve that vision? 2. What is a transition? Who - and what - sees this as a transition? Is there a transition underway? If so, what is being transitioned? Where do the environment and development fit in? 3. U.S. impact: Will an increasing thaw in Cuba-U.S. relations – driving an increasing number of tourists and investment from the U.S. – tip an already delicate balance of foreign interests and influence in Cuba? What role will / should Cuban expatriates play? How might these challenges be shifted from risk to advantage? 4. How can Cuba become a model of resilient transitional development for future contexts that weaves together the built and ‘natural’ environments? What planning and regulatory tools will need to be strengthened and enforced, and 8
what will need to be introduced to allow for effective implementation? 5. Is the preferred/ideal development model merely a continuation of the traditional, business-as-usual model, or, does it require an updating of accepted development practice to arrive at a more considered, measured, and appropriate paradigm? From the conference, key themes emerged: • The need to question the dominant international model of development and investment • Optimism, confidence, and faith existing side-by-side with trepidation as to the nature of change, and what that change might bring. • The tendency toward bilateralism • The importance of building partnerships, interdisciplinary approaches, and collaboration within and with Cuba, rather than the simple application of models from outside the island • The high capacity of Cuban professionals was repeatedly emphasized, in particular highlighting the possibilities of the imaginative, projective, and entrepreneurial thinking that design processes could enable. Many of these themes resonate with - and reinforce - the earlier framing with respect to the nature of models and interdisciplinary process, pointing the way to an operating ethos, which we will sharpen by focusing on additional background in Cuba.
Figs. 8-10: Relocations of coastal communities by the Institute of Physical Planning: demolition of nonconforming buildings along the coastal zone outside Havana (left); at transition community at Playa Rosario stands incomplete (center); the ruins of Playa Rosario, abandoned in 2005 during Hurricane Wilma (right)
Context: Socialism in transition Cuba has been moving toward a hybrid form of Socialism over the last 25 years. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s benefactor and prime trading partner and the announcement of the ‘Special Period in a Time of Peace’, important legal and economic reforms began to occur in the late 1990s and after the ascendancy of Raúl Castro in 2008 (Hernández & Domínquez, 2013; Stricker, 2007). These reforms have strengthened environmental regulation, better codified foreign investment, and further opened a window for small-scale free enterprise. However, this period appears to have failed to make inroads into the tendency of power to be concentrated in a top-down, bureaucratic, and siloed national government and for non-state actors to be ignored (Affordable Housing Institute, Hampton, & Brickman Raredon, 2016). The latter, coupled with the adoption of more conciliatory policies between Cuba and the United States in 2014 presents a potential tipping point - primarily in the form of additional tourists and foreign investment - which leaves open the possibility of widening social and economic inequity in Cuba. As marine researcher and scientist Jorge Angulo Valdés has said, “Cuba is a country full of contradiction” and remains so. Decree-Law 212 (see Addenda), for example, gives teeth to environmental regulation
in the face of land subsidence and sea level rise without necessarily providing for much nuance. This legislation allows for human habitations in coastal areas identified by the Cuban Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (CITMA) as being threatened by sea level rise to be slated for re-accomodación - wholesale relocation - by the Institute of Physical Planning (IPF)(Environment Directorate of the Cuban Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (CITMA), Environmental Defense Fund, and Tulane University, 2003). However, because of budgetary constraints and a stiff regulatory approach, this model of relocation does not insure follow-though in constructing adequate ‘replacement’ communities, such as that at Playa Rosario (Figs. 9-10) which was relocated with little to no participation by the communities themselves (Pickett, 2015). The rise of the non-state sector, or sectór no-estatal is an exciting example, but holds inherent risk as well in terms of inequity. It has been estimated that of Cuba’s population of 11.3 million, as many as 1.2 million, or 23% of the labor force, now comprise the non-state sector. Within this category, cuentapropistas (see p.84 for a list), or regulated legal independent businesses, number over 500,000 (Mesa-Lago, Veiga, & Gonzalez, 2016; Henken, 2015). Informal and collective economies, the potential of which was first explored during the Cuba Facing Forward conference, must also be recognized. The U.S. State Department estimates remittances from families abroad to their counterparts in Cuba at 9
Fig. 11-13: The risks of the non-state sector: who will be responsible for equitable housing? Afro-Cuban neighborhoods in poor condition a short walk from the pristinely-restored UNESCO World Heritage center of Trinidad (left); disparity in the improvement of properities in Havana (center); when planning was central, strong, and top-down: new development of La Habana del Este, near Havana, 1959-61.
being between $1.4 (billion) and $2 billion (Lovitt, 2015). However, architect and planner Miguel Coyula notes “remittances sent by Cuban émigrés is shifting away from merely helping their Cuban family members to survive, or ease their lives, to investment in properties, small businesses, and the improvement of both.” Coyula noted inequities between haves and have-nots, the latter usually Afro-Cubans (Fig. 11) (Affordable Housing Institute, Hampton, & Brickman Raredon, 2016), widening a disparity already evident in an institutionalized socialism already under pressure, internal and external. In terms of industry, especially agriculture, models - and their mobilty - again loom large. Cuba has a new opportunity to continue to reverse both a colonial legacy of environmental manipulation: overproduction and irrigation contributing to the depletion of soil nutrients, deforestation, and a general decline in rivers and streams tapped for irrigation - and the neocolonial model of the Soviet-bloc: intensive petrochemical-input, mechanically-driven monocrop production. Regarding the latter, Miguel Coyula notes “what we inherited from them was that what matters is the goal, not the process.” Due to the global shift in sugar production, sugar is no longer ‘king’ in Cuba, with Cuba’s former Ruhr – El Valle de Los Ingenios, where large, booming sugar plantations once proliferated – ceasing to be competitive in global markets since the mid-1990’s (Stricker, 2007; Scarpaci, 2009). Building on well-documented successes of the organic urban agricultural move10
ment (Altieri, Funes-Monzote, Petersen, 2012; Clouse, 2014; Cruz, 2003; Funes, 2002, Stricker, 2007) Cuba is also in a position to reimagine its agricultural landscapes - as will be seen in Intervention 1 (p. 21). Finally, with regards to the agency of planning and design, Cuba’s trajectory has been away from centralized and powerful planning to a more ad-hoc approach. The establishment of the aforementioned IPF following the success of the Revolution in 1959 marked a period characterized by the ability to implement large planning works with a high level of design, such as Habana del Este (Fig. 13). Since 1991, there has been a marked decline, with a tendency towards reactivity and sectoriality (Affordable Housing Institute, Hampton, & Brickman Raredon, 2016; Valladares 2013). Architects, in particular, have seen their agency greatly eroded. The intial successes of the Community Architect program, established in 1993 and modeled on participatory consultation with families for the design of homes, has been overtaken by the National Housing Institute in 2001 and reduced to a bureaucratic function. Design professionals are few in number in proportion to population and unable to work legally outside government positions, often driving them to work on the side, furtherremoving the possibilty to positively influence the broader built environment.
Regrounding resilience If there is a chance of teasing out those locations - “unraveling the string”, so to speak - where actors may be brought into dialogue with each other, those spaces and actors must be understood. A simple ‘Community resilience opportunities stakeholder matrix’ (Figs. 14-15) is proposed in order to map the possible actors/agencies in the vertical against the activity - and phase - along the horizontal, with the example being the implementation of any built work such as housing or infrastructure. One might reasonably infer other activities as (international development agencies might define them) such as livelihoods, building construction standards, etc. For Cuba, the greatest amount of activity tends to cluster at the national level (B), with its proliferation of government ministries. Dialogue rarely occurs other than between the international level (A), again, due to tight government control. For example, negotiations with foreign companies such as hotel developers Bouygues or Melia can only happen with national government. Due to lack of available data, the regional or provincial level (C) remains ill-defined, but some evidence does point to both a lack of capacity at this level and an acknowledgement by the government to address it (Hernández & Domínquez, 2013). At the municipal / local level (D) again,
little information was available, but again evidence points to a lack of capacity and agency, especially to influence and implement other than at small scales, such as that of individual homes and businesses (Affordable Housing Institute, Hampton, & Brickman Raredon,
2016; Mesa-Lago, Veiga, & Gonzalez, 2016; Henken, 2015).
The latter presents inherent risks, especially in a climate of transition not as capable of delivering affordable and equitable housing. If we begin to put the matrix through its paces (Fig. 15), we can test scenarios. For example, the majority of small improvements can occur using small investors (remittances, A2) for families with access to such funds. However, what of marginalized populations, such as Afro-Cuban neighborhoods in poor condition a short walk from the pristinely-restored UNESCO World Heritage center of Trinidad (Fig. 11)? This may be why some mix of other financing (e.g. INGO, multilateral) is needed in some cases. Additonal capacity might be ‘grounded’ at the community level if the matrix is filled in with additional structures at the regional/provincial level (C) or municipal/local
levels (D). For example, a Junta de Acción (C4, D4- yellow highlight) - a joint action committee prevalent in Colombia and other Latin American countries - is an excellent precdent. Such additional capacity would increase the possibility of both implementing and conceiving of projects, reducing the risk of inapproriate models subverting or ‘steamrolling’ local actors, institutions, and networks. Other specific scenarios are notable: A3-1 standards: Possibly INGOS, but their strengths tend not to favor international standards but rather individual internal (I)NGO processes
A3-1 sites:
Multi-site assessment by an international NGO on criteria formed by national govt and local community action group.
A3-5/6 standards: INGOs, rather than providing services which Cuban entrepre neurs can do, might be well-suited to evaluate success or fail ures and help evaluate how a code or new housing program might be designed. A8-1 standards: Harmonize with best international practices and standards. A8-5/6 standards: Partnerships between academic institutions would be an excellent synergy, well-suited to evaluate success or failures and help evaluate how a code or new housing program might be designed. C2-4 standards: Interface with local architects hired to do construction obser- vation /oversight, see below. D3-1 services:
An electrician could assess how to upgrade a house, but can they currently advise on a block-scale solar PV retrofit? Is this a new potential job, or teaching existing electricians a skillset? An electrical engineer cannot operate an independent business. D3-4 standards: Architects hired to do construction observation / oversight, to compliment inspection by local enforcement officials. 11
A. International 1. investors, large 2. investors, small (remittances) 3. INGOs 4. UN 5. foreign govts 6. foreign companies 7. multilateral lending agencies (WB, IDB) 8. academia B. National 1. Ministry of Environment 2. Institute of Physical Planning 3. National Hydraulic Resources Institute 4. Academia de Ciencias 5. Ministry of Agriculture 6. Ministry of Construction 7. Ministry of the Economy and Planning 8. Nat'l Institute of Housing 9. Minstry of Transportation 10. Ministry of Basic Industry 11 12. Association of Artists and Writers 13. civil society (ex. Antonio Nunez Fnd) 14. academia C. Regional (provincial) 1. Physical Planning Provincial Directorate 2. Community Architect 3. civil society
M Y Y Y Y Y Y Y CITMA IPF
MINAG
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D. Municipal and local 1. Physical Planning Provincial Directorate 2. community development agency CEDEL 3. cuentapropistas / individual contractors
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Fig. 14
5. collective(s) 6. construction companies 7. inspectors
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y M
Y M M Y Y M
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
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livelihoods
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housing
services / infra
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services / infra
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sites
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finance
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6. Operate Run businesses. Continue to respond to changing market needs. Provide additional feedback, statistics.
standards
5. Evaluate Assess the degrees of success/failure of the implemented project, and inform the design of future intiatives, programs, standards
housing
4. Implement Build/redevelop it! Ongoing inspections and quality control oversight needed.
services / infra
3. Design + permit Undertake the design and engineering of improvements. Permiting and licensing process.
sites
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
sites
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
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DO THEY EXIST?
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE STAKEHOLDER OPPORTUNITIES MATRIX LOCATION: CUBA PHASING 1. Assess 2. Select/link Evaluate existing Prioritze sites for conditions. Allow real improvement. Link on-‐the-‐ground sites and actors conditions to dictate (owners, developers) criteria vs. using to promote synergies arbitrary criteria and of uses approaches YEAR IN TIMELINE 0-‐1 0-‐1 LEVEL ACTOR / AGENCY ACRONYM
Fig. 15
A. International 1. investors, large 2. investors, small (remittances) 3. INGOs 4. UN 5. foreign govts 6. foreign companies 7. multilateral lending agencies (WB, IDB) 8. academia B. National 1. Ministry of Environment CITMA 2. Institute of Physical Planning IPF 3. National Hydraulic Resources Institute 4. Academia de Ciencias 5. Ministry of Agriculture MINAG 6. Ministry of Construction 7. Ministry of the Economy and Planning 8. Nat'l Institute of Housing NIH 9. Minstry of Transportation 10. Ministry of Basic Industry 11 12. Association of Artists and Writers 13. civil society (ex. Antonio Nunez Fnd) 14. academia C. Regional (provincial) 1. Physical Planning Provincial Directorate 2. Community Architect 3. civil society 4. Junta de Acción Regional 5. construction companies D. Municipal and local 1. Physical Planning Provincial Directorate 2. community development agency CEDEL 3. cuentapropistas / individual contractors 4. Junta de Acción Communal 5. collective(s) 6. construction companies 7. inspectors
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
sites
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
sites
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
3
services / infra
3
sites
2
finance
2
livelihoods
6. Operate Run businesses. Continue to respond to changing market needs. Provide additional feedback, statistics.
standards
5. Evaluate Assess the degrees of success/failure of the implemented project, and inform the design of future intiatives, programs, standards
housing
4. Implement Build/redevelop it! Ongoing inspections and quality control oversight needed.
services / infra
3. Design + permit Undertake the design and engineering of improvements. Permiting and licensing process.
sites
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
sites
finance
livelihoods
standards
housing
services / infra
sites
DO THEY EXIST?
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE STAKEHOLDER OPPORTUNITIES MATRIX LOCATION: CUBA PHASING 1. Assess 2. Select/link Evaluate existing Prioritze sites for conditions. Allow real improvement. Link on-‐the-‐ground sites and actors conditions to dictate (owners, developers) criteria vs. using to promote synergies arbitrary criteria and of uses approaches YEAR IN TIMELINE 0-‐1 0-‐1 LEVEL ACTOR / AGENCY ACRONYM
M Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y M
N N Y M M N Y N M
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Fig. 16. Proto-organizational chart: approaching a more complimentary structure of actors at national, provincial (left) and municipal levels (right).
Towards a methodology Taking cue from the ‘Community resilience opportunities stakeholder matrix’ (Figs. 13-14), I seek less to define an overarching structure and to fill in voids, but rather to allow to find compliments between levels (Fig. 16) and allow for the more fluid interplay described by Peck and Theodore, whereby interchange may occur. If social urbanism projects in Medellín presented a rare alignment of stars which allowed for the placing of design as central to the shaping of civic ideals – and spaces – and Cruz and Fonna’s work in(-between) Tijuana-San Diego as a quest to make the global critical by acting locally though design, Cuba’s unique context presents similar opportunities, less for deploying a new model, but for attempting a methodology: restoring design as a critical, convening force at the local level, bringing actors and disciplines often siloed - and with little reason to interact otherwise - into direct and proactive contact within a community of design. Contrary to the dominant models of (international) development, this new methodology would support the following goals: • Support existing institutions • Encourage nascent sectors/markets • Foster interdisciplinary collaboration • Find new linkages and networks • Create a framework where people may realize their full potential as part of a broader design community.
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Let us, then, propose the interventions in specific contexts.
INTERVENCIÓN 1: LIMONAR CAMPOS DE SUEÑO FIELDS OF DREAMS
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Map of Cuba’s networks: topography (gray), roads (white), and railroads (aqua).
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Limonar derives its name from the lemon groves established by French plantation owners fleeing the 1791 slave rebellion in Haiti. This typical Cuban town owes its existence to the production of sugarcane, as do many small towns in Matanzas and the central provinces. Why Limonar and not Havana? Havana is a critically important context, but an anomaly in Cuba and in the Caribbean, presenting a unique set of challenges which come with any
metropolis. Too often, Havana becomes a stand-in for Cuba as a whole. Limonar, then, is more emblematic of the challenges Cuba in terms of size at 25,000 population, its location slightly inland, but most importantly in terms of its narrative. Once covered in hardwood tropical forest harvested for Spanish ships, then sown in sugarcane, with road and rail networks stretched out to meet it, how might we recast Limonar to become a productive landscape of a very different sort?
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“The planning profession has remained essentially reactive toward urban agriculture, and control-oriented approaches have prevailed.” “There are virtually no built examples of proposals from planners, urban designers, or architects in which urban agriculture forms part of a landscape strategy. There have been no proposals promoting synergies with other components of the urban fabric in more than two decades of urban agriculture development” “Design has the opportunity to become the primary tool for integrating the food-related and spatial demands of a new urban scenario, currently only in its nascent stage.” - Jorge Diaz Peña, architect and planner “Inserting urban agriculture into the management system is not a task to be worked out on a drawing board. It depends, to a great extent, on the interrelation among planners and doers, the community, and governments.” - Maria Caridad Cruz, permaculturist and planner
Create a framework where people may realize their full potential as part of a broader design community.
What follows is a series of imagined dialogues between possible actors, most real with a few imagined. In this specific case, Limonar is primarily populated with those who have helped reshape the landscape around food; it becomes a moment where an agroecologist might become the lead designers in the remaking of a town. This intervention is an attempt to put flesh on the earlier matrix (Figs. 13-14) and the proto-organizational chart (Fig.15), in order to further personify the bits and pieces that truly make models succeed or fail - people.
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We’ll have some wonderful agronomists at your disposal.Within a few years, Cuba’s sugarcane production will be the envy of the Caribbean.
Timeline-section
Nikita Khruschev and Fidel Castro, 1962
LIMONAR
MATANZAS
Sin problema, hermano.
We appreciate the help. Spacibo, comrade.
Por adelante! Don’t look back. The success of the Revolution is production.
Fidel Castro visits a Cuban state agronomy school, 1967 19
1.00. PRELUDIO - ELENCO DE PERSONAJES PRELUDE - THE CAST OF CHARACTERS After the Special Period, it was a matter of urgency. Since we were importing more than 80% of food consumed by Cubans. We had to begin to produce our own food.
In Milwaukee and now Chicago, I’ve seen firsthand how organic urban agriculture can not only make a difference with food sovereignty, but in people’s lives.
After the collapse of sugar, then what?
We did this through organic farming practices.
When you see someone put their hands in that soil, you see the change in their eyes... and their attitude towards food.
The goal is not to produce the most of a single crop for export, relying on industrial inputs (petrochemical-based fertilizers and pesticides) and agricultural methods, but to use symbiotic and biodiverse mixtures of crops with readily available inputs (compost, beneficial insects as pest defenses) and time-tested methods (crop rotation, interplanting).
I wish I could say we could feed all of Cuba this way, but what we can say is that we have improved the diet of Cubans. The use of chemicals is inevitable. The chemists are going to return. But what we have to know is to what extent, use as little as possible, and continue to focus on organic agriculture.
Miguel Salcines, Organoponico Vivaro Alamar 20
Agroecology is as revolutionary as the Revolution, but totally different in ethos.
This brings the production of food closer to the scale of the individual and out of the hands of corporations.
Will Allen, urban farmer, Growing Power (USA)
Fernando Funes-Monzote, agronomist, Finca Marta
In southeast Cuba, Dalhousie University partnered not only with CITMA for coastal zone management issues, but with INIFAT as well to study practices further inland, as agricultural practices also affect the coast. This relationship is further institutionalized at the local and regional levels by working with University of Oriente.
I’m a little skeptical. But, we’ve seen great successes in the shift away from industrial agriculture during the Special Period. So... we’ll see.
This is not the way we would’ve done it 10 or even 5 years ago, but since we have the capacity to partner internally between ministries, this local pilot project has the potential to influence the approach taken at the national level, but based on research in very specific places in Cuba. So, this is why we’re trying it in Matanzas province.
So, we’re excited to see what new things they will be trying in Limonar.
Aldo Chircop, Marine Affairs Program Marine & Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University
An integrated approach is critical.
Juan Soles, agronomist, Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG)
Omar Cantillo Ferreiro, environmental engineer Minstry of Environment (CITMA) 21
When we first heard about Limonar, we were totally up for the challenge. Normally, we are focused on Havana, so a very urbanized area, but this was an exciting moment to rethink what urban and landscape could mean.
Orlando Inclàn, architect, habana[re]generación 22
I’ve worked now with Claudia for a year during the planning stages. I’ll be interested to see how things happen.
As an architect in Cuba, landscape is not often in our purview because landscape architecture is not a discipline in the university.
Normally, monitoring and evaluations are very straightforward: you meet the regulation, or you don’t. This has been an oppotunity to test new things. It has potential to influence policy, which does not normally happen.
But, Limonar presents some fascinating questions. Is this: The urbanization of a rural area by living systems? The ruralization of an urban area by living systems?
Marta Abreu, Chief Inspector CITMA, Matanzas municipal
Claudia Castillo, architect, habana[re]generación eración
1.01. EL ESCENARIO THE STAGE
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But the land is resisting, and with it, the people of Cuba.
dialogues that never existed, such as in the case of the sugar mill - once the raison d’ etre for the town - the landscape rises to (re)connect the unused shed with the baseball field, linking two things that had no business being linked previously.
A continuous band weaves through the town of Limonar, Cuba. Sometimes, it rises to offer a vantage point. Sometimes, it falls to hold water during hurricane season, letting it run towards its new purpose - nourishing the places where vegetables and fruits grow, no longer relegated to the ‘edges’ of town. Sometimes the band links the spaces between buildings. Sometimes, it even ‘invades’ the buildings themselves, bringing them back into dialogue with each other, or inducing
But, most importantly, the band brings people into dialogue with each other and the land. Rather than a site/sites of extraction and exploitation, the landscape has become become a framework for production of a different kind and on a different scale. Moments, instances, excuses to linger in places that were never places become the norm, a framework for dialogues of various kinds, within a new regime: a community of design.
First came sugar, then came the town. Sugar became a tool used to divide the land, and its people.
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1.01.1: Aerial view, Limonar.
1.01.2: Strategic plan sketch 25
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1.01.3: Strategic plan sketch.
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‘The Bow’
Calle Real (‘The Arrow’)
1.01.6: Axonometric sketch from southeast showing the curved street of ‘The Bow’ and the axis of Royal Street / Calle Real (‘The Arrow’).
1.01.5: Aerial perspective from northwest.
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1.2. TIENDA DE DIVISAS CURRENCY EXCHANGE
1.2.1: Existing view of currency exchange from south.
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The currency exchange is now fronted by a space for more open and undefined exchange. Taking inspiration from open, public spaces such as Chicago’s boulevards (Figs. 1.2.3, 1.2.4) and New Orleans’ ‘neutral grounds’ (Fig. 1.2.7), this unactivated space gains new possibility.
1.2.3 Chess on Chicago’s Southside 1.2.4 Community meeting at table built in in median along a boulvard in Chicago 1.2.5 Playing petanque on a median in Dijibouti 1.2.6 Picnicing along a highway in Mexico City 1.2.7 Community picnic along one of New Orlean’s ‘neutral ground’
2.2 1.2.3
1.2.4 2.3
1.2.5 2.4
CURRENCY EXCHANGE
1.2.2: View of currency exchange from south.
1.2.6 2.5
1.2.7 2.6 29
1.5. INGENIO DE AZUCAR REPROGRAMADO ‘REPROGRAMMED’ SUGAR MILL
1.5.1: Section at intersection of ‘Bow’ and ‘Arrow’
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1.5.2: Section at sugar mill and baseball field, showing new bermed landscape forming bleachers around field.
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1.5.3: View from sugar mill shed looking east to to baseball field prior to intervention.
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1.5.4: View from sugar mill shed looking east to to baseball field, after intervention, showing new connection to field, agricultural point of sale and bleacher-berm beyond.
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Similar to the Currency Exchange, great opportunity exists for reprogramming the industrial sheds of the sugar mill, so central to the town of Limonar, possibly drawing from local artisans (Fig. 1.5.5) and other industries such as stone quarrying (Fig. 1.5.6).
1.5.5: Potter Azariel Alcantar at work. 1.5.6: Workers at nearby Rocosera de Caobas stone quarry.
1.5.7: Reprogramming-adaptation-reuse of space for temporal events. 1.5.8: Monumental sculpture-casting factory in Santiago de Cuba, built by Cuban sculptor as inspriration for repurposing of similar sugar mill shed structure. 34
Peak rainfall in Limonar occurs in October, during the June to December hurricane season, which misses the November to April baseball season (opposite the April to September season in the PEA K States R AI N FALL United (Fig. 1.5.9). Might there be a better seasonal use for 26,000 sf (.6 acres) of lawn grass struggling during the summer heat (Figs 1.5.10-12)?
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1.5.9: Peak rainfall in Limonar
1.5.11 R A I N FA LL ( i n mm) JUNE AY
Month
Matanzas Limonar
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
01.0 03.3 04.1 05.6 09.9 24.6 23.5 48.9 28.6 44.3 16.4 06.7
1.5.12 AUGUST
26.8 20.9 41.3 38.4 104.9 43.6 43.9 80.77 122.6 135.8 75.7 23.1
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1.6. CAMPO DE SUEÑOS FIELD OF DREAMS
1.6.1: Edible lawn, a mix of small, easily harvested food crops, requiring fewer inputs (fertilizer, water) than standard lawn grass. 36
...and in the off-season, you harvest this ‘edible lawn’?
How did people accept it?
And production levels?
Absolutely! We go straight to El Caney next door and use it for community picnics. Or take it to the Punta de Venta. It was unexpected to many people at first. In other countries, you would never do this because of the pesticides, of course, pero en Cuba... Respectable. Enough for $4,500 in monthly sales, 75% of that to tourism. There are 60 towns in Cuba with a population over 20,000 - that’s 183 urban acres (75 hectares). But the real point is to challenge how - and where people think food can be produced.
1.6.0 BASEBALL OUTFIELD CESPED (GRASS) CLOVER MINT LETTUCE ARUGULA CARROT DILL
1.6.2: View from pitcher’s mound west towards sugar mill sheds, after intervention.
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1.7. RECOLONIZACIÓN AGRÍCOLA AGRICULTURAL RECOLONIZATION At the edges of town and fields, dialogues in - and on - the land become the most transformative. A recolonization is occurring, a reconception of what landscapes of production can mean, where design has become the convening force.
the citrus grove (1.7.A-D), but rather than in the service of a single crop - sugar - agroecological principles such as intercropping, crop rotation, nutrient-banking and composting are deployed, not at the scale of the circumference of the pivot irrigator or the span of the combine tractor, but at the scale of the courtyard gardens.
‘Redevelopment’ or recolonization marches northward and eastward from
The measure of land becomes that, once again, of the human reach.
1.7.A: View of citrus grove and agricultural fields, before intervention.
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So, Miguel, what’s new here?
Livestock? Like a holiday for pigs?
The luckier worms are over in vermicomposting!
1.7.0 GROVE CHICKEN GRAZER PIGS TILLER TURKEY GRAZER
Citrus trees were planted at the edge of town in the ‘90’s. A disease hit Cuba in the 2000’s. Some have survived, but their days are numbered, so we decided to try introducing small livestock grazing in the understory as we start new fruit and hardwood trees to replace the citrus. A few locals owned pigs, so we decided to try them to till the soil under the citrus trees for a short time. Haha! I guess so. They tear up young trees, so we have to protect the saplings in tubes. Fowl is ok, though, for natural pest control.
CITRUS FRUIT AVOCADO FRUIT PLANTAIN FRUIT SABICÚ HARDWOOD
1.7.B: View of citrus grove and agricultural fields, before intervention. 39
1.7.0 GROVE CITRUS FRUIT CROP AVOCADO FRUIT CROP PLANTAIN FRUIT CROP SABICÚ HARDWOOD MAHOGANY HARDWOOD OAK HARDWOOD
1.7.C: View of citrus grove and agricultural fields, after Phase 1 intervention. 40
1.7.1A AG RECOLONIZATION (PH. 1A) CORN/MAIZE VEGETABLE CROP CASSAVA VEGETABLE CROP PUMPKIN VEGETABLE CROP TARO VEGETABLE CROP BONIATO (SWEET POTATO) VEGETABLE CROP COWPEA VEGETABLE (FALL)
1.7.1B AG RECOLONIZATION (PH. 1B) CLOVER GREEN MANURE ALFALFA GREEN MANURE, COVER CROP ARUGULA VEGETABLE CROP CARROT VEGETABLE CROP LETTUCE VEGETABLE CROP MINT, SPINACH, CHARD, KALE, TURNIP, DILL
This place used to be visted only by the Minstry of Sugar. We’ll need to get Ministry of Forestry out here now. 1.7.0 GROVE 1.7.1A AG RECOLONIZATION (PH. 1A) AVOCADO FRUIT CROP AVOCADO FRUIT PLANTAIN FRUIT CROP PLANTAIN FRUIT SABICÚ HARDWOOD SABICÚ HARDWOOD MAHOGANY HARDWOOD OAK HARDWOOD
1.7.1B AG RECOLONIZATION (PH. 1B) CORN/MAIZE VEGETABLE CROP CASSAVA VEGETABLE CROP PUMPKIN VEGETABLE CROP TARO VEGETABLE CROP BONIATO (SWEET POTATO) VEGETABLE CROP COWPEA VEGETABLE (FALL)
1.7.2A,B AG RECOLONIZATION (PH. 2A, 2B) CLOVER GREEN MANURE ALFALFA GREEN MANURE, COVER CROP ARUGULA VEGETABLE CROP CARROT VEGETABLE CROP LETTUCE VEGETABLE CROP MINT, SPINACH, CHARD, KALE, TURNIP
1.7.D: View of citrus grove and agricultural fields, after Phase 2 intervention. 41
INTERVENCIÓN 2: MATANZAS HOSPEDAR LA GOTA DE AGUA HOSTING THE RAINDROP
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Map of Cuba’s networks: topography (gray), roads (white), and railroads (aqua).
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Matanzas, birthplace of poets and musical and dance forms such as rumba is Cuba’s fifth largest city, seat of the province of the same name lies 90 miles south of Key West. The city lies around the Bay of Matanzas, and at the confluence of two rivers - the Yumurí and the San Juan, and bounded by a third - the Canímar. Matanzas reveals both its Spanish colonial heritage in the dense urban blocks of Pueblo Viejo, similar to those of Limonar, as well as the post-Haitian slave rebellion French roots of the Versailles neighborhood. Dividing them is the Yumurí, subject
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to periodic flooding during hurricane season on the river valley slopes of which much of the older city is built densely, offering little opportunity for the current model of wholesale relocation (see p. 14), especially for temporary uses such as seasonal fishing villages. However, the often overlooked actor is that of rain, left to make its way downward, contributing to flood conditions. As Limonar was used to push for a reconception of productive landscapes, might the Matanzas intervention simulatneously critique reacomodación, or relocation, and the dismissal of rainwater as waste? Might a dialogue convened by design find new ways to treat the raindrop, and those in its path?
2.1.0: Orienting section.
LIMONAR
MATANZAS
VARADERO
2.1. REACOMODACIÓN RELOCATION
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2.1.5: Risk analysis sketch of vicinity. 46
2.2. INCLINAR Y SOSTENER INCLINE AND SUSTAIN Though moderately sloped (3.8% average), opportunity still exists to think upstream and uphill, holding water before it reaches the rivers.
2.2.1: West-east section/plan at Calle 73 47
2.2.2-5: Sloped streets and periodic flooding during rain events in Pueblo Viejo, Matanzas
TREE PIT SOIL DE-COMPACTION SOAK PIT FRENCH DRAIN FRENCH DRAIN (CHANNEL) PERVIOUS PATIO PAVING
As in Limonar along Calle Real, Spanish colonial-era blocks in Pueblo Viejo, Matanzas are built densely, but housing typologies and interior block open spaces allow for some block-scale water capture. 2.2.6: Rainwater/stormwater capture strategy, block scale 48
2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 Fig. 2.3.1: Ravine Pintade relocation/redevelopment, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; 2.3.2: Ravine Pintade community liasons; 2.3.3-4: Impasse Belo ravine relocation/redevelopment, Delmas 40B, Port-au-Prince,
2.3 The resilience of relocation Lessons from Port-au-Prince
Ravine Pintade, a redevelopment project in post-earthquake Haiti (2010-2012), stands as a positive example of relocation through process implemented with the assistance of the humanitarian aid and international development communities. First, Ravine Pintade (Figs. 2.3.1-2) serves as a counter-model to both coastal retreat, whereby property owners relinquish properties along threatened coasts - always a politically unpopular prospect in countries such as the United States - and the prevailing wholesale relocation approach taken in Cuba by the Institute of Physical Planning (see p. 14). Second, it corresponds to the teasing out of threads from within the model by connecting local actors in partnership with other national and international actors. In the aftermath of the 7.0 magnitude earthquake which struck Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 2010, CHF International and Project Concern International (PCI) and local community partner KATYE identified host families adjacent to the earthquake-affected area, pairing them with residents who faced lost or damaged homes. The goal was to maintain as closely as possible the social and economic ties - friends, family, church, livelihoods, etc. - both to and within the original community
Third, the design process appeared to be led by locals. On a visit to the job trailer, Haitian engineers and architects produced technical drawings and three-dimensinoal models which served as the basis for designs and for later (re)negotiation of property boundaries. Project manager Aram Khatchadurian noted that while the level of accuracy presented was a challenge, any errors made were of lesser importance than having reconstruction be led by Haitians (Khatchadurian, 2011). Fourth, dialogue occurred, quite literally, on the ground: community liaisons (Fig. 2.3.2) negotiated with “residents of Ravine Pintade [who] agreed to redraw their own property lines to accommodate the redesign of access paths and other public spaces for improved access and circulation.� (Embassy of the United States, 2012). The latter might be seen as a page from the Limonar playbook: put people into convesation on the ground, about the ground.
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RESIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE / SURVEY OF HOME Date: __________________ Interviewer name(s): ______________________ , J/P HRO Redevelopment Interviewer name(s): ______________________ , J/P HRO Redevelopment ___
Residence location no. (see diagram at right): _________________
Interviewee name: ___________________________ Cell: _____________ Owner? Y N
Head of household? Y N
Owner: ___________________________________ Cell: ______________ A. Questions for resident: 1. What are the terms of the rental agreement? a. Start date: b. End date: c. Cost: ___________ USD Gdes Haitian dollars 2. How many rooms are being rented? _______ 3. B. Interviewer(s) to verify – circle appropriate term or write in: 1. Construction type: ○ walls: wood-‐framed concrete block reinforcement: unacceptable acceptable (MTPTC) ○ roof: wood-‐framed/metal reinf. conc. 2. Quality of finishes, exterior: crepissaged (plastered) painted 3. Quality of finishes, interior: crepissaged (plastered) painted 4. Quality of openings: wood metal other: 5. Open areas: none shared private 6. Latrine: Y N private shared 7. Lavatory: Y N private shared 8. Shower: Y N private shared 9. Cistern (below-‐grade): Y N private shared 10. Water storage tank: Y N private shared 11. Potable water access: commercial kiosk other: 12. Describe other amenities (e.g. accessible roof, etc.) 13. Other information: 14. Sketch the plan of the home. Note the areas of rooms.:
2.3.6
2.3.5 Figs. 2.3.5-6: Impasse Belo ravine relocation/redevelopment, Delmas 40B, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; 2.3.6: field notes; 2.2.12: resident questionnaire.
My own professional experience in Haiti with J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO) included a potential ravine relocation (Figs. 2.3.3-2.3.6), whereby residents living in ravines were to be relocated in advance of a stabilization project (which was, in fact, subsequently able to be completed without necessitating relocation). Residents lived in various states of formality and vulnerability, ranging from a family at the flood-stage who would apparently vacate their home1 (Fig. 2.3.3) in anticipation of flooding to stay with extended family, to a 25-year resident well above the water line who had made numerous improvements (Fig. 2.3.4), including a riverwall, allowing him to safely raise three generations in his home.
If given the opportunity to redesign the resident questionnaire (Fig. 2.3.6), in light of the lessons of Ravine Pintade and looking forward to those vulnerable properties in Matanzas along the Yumurí River, what additonal information would be needed to anticipate future connections? How might the model of relocation change?
Note 1: ravines in this area of Port-au-Prince were state-owned land, but provisions had been made such that squatter’s rights were taken into account, allowing residents over 20 years to have reasonable expectation of lend tenure rights, further complicating relocations in designated at-risk areas. 50
2.4. CONEXIĂ“NES NUEVAS NEW CONNECTIONS Ravine Pintade, Port-au-Prince (pp. 78-9) set forth a methodology which resonates with the Limonar intervention: connecting local actors with those - designers and non-designers at other levels, allowing for mobility and scalability, and contribution on a stage broader than the local through in-situ, on-theground dialogues convened within a framework of design.
2.4.1: Relocation reconceived as connecting, first: a database of potential host-sites (preferably within a 1-mile radius) is created and matched to residents and business owners in at-risk areas. 51
These aren’t relocations like IPF has been doing outside Havana.
These aren’t relocations. This is matchmaking. We are linking people in at-risk urban areas with host families so that there are places they can go during periodic flooding.
But eventually, they will have to move.
That’s why I’m on the local Junta de Acción: I’m a resident, so I have a vested interest. This is different than the top-down we’re used to. It’s more proactive.
2.4.2: Rethinking relocation. 52
Until adequate funding sources and long-term planning can occur, we have to build the local networks to facilitate such a strategy.
ADDENDA
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HAMMOCK THE BISCAYNE BAY REGION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO EFFECT POSITIVE CHANGE IN ITS POTENTIAL TO TRANSFORM AQUEOUS TERRAIN INTO HIGHER, DRIER LAND. USING THE TOOLS AND LANGUAGE OF EARLY MIAMI BEACH DEVELOPMENT, FUTURE URBAN DEVELOPEMENT CAN ONCE AGAIN RELY UPON BUILDING GROUNDS IN WATER.
Fig. 1. Tree island, Everglades.
A. Island urbanism Islands are constructed, whether by ‘natural’ forces, people, or some combination. Hammocks – hummocks, or tree islands – demonstrate two interlocking general characteristics of islands which may be of great importance to Miami Beach, a place driven – and defined – by its relationship to water, and to coasts: 1) their dynamism, and 2) the capacity for fostering increasing density and diversity through the mediation of land and water. We might term this island urbanism. In nature, very little persists in a static state. The propagation of hammocks – as with other robust ecosystems – depends less on the presence of individual species and more on the interplay of forces over varying scales of time. Tree islands change in form and number and/or 2
type of species they support (and of which they are comprised) in response to fluctuations in nutrient levels and the flow, salinity, and quantity of water present. Being situated on Biscayne Bay, the latter becomes especially pertinent. Some high canopy species – such as oaks, red maple, or even highly-valued mahogany – may find fertile higher ground which once was fluid and inhospitable. 1 In cypress swamps, soil tends to be trapped and held around the “knees” over the roots, as it does among the buttressing roots of mangroves – indigenous to Biscayne Bay – where new ground is ‘made’. As botanist Peter del Tredici might say, “plants know what’s up” concerning how species might adapt to a future with more precipitation and greater fluctuations in temperature. Applying this to a changing Biscayne Bay, as we will see, could make things even more interesting.
Fig. 2: Shell spoil piles, Calusa tribe, Everglades.
Human history abounds with the shaping of aqueous terrain to become land in similar fashion to that of tree islands. Human intervention in the form of prehistoric trash mounds and shell spoil piles has even been thought to extend the reach of tree islands exemplified by the living patterns of indigenous peoples such as the Calusa (southwest Florida) in the Everglades,2, 3 Tequesta [Fig. 2] (southeast Florida), and Seminole (south Florida). This direct modification of islands is a language which Miami Beach’s early movers and shakers would understand perfectly. Originally shaped capitalize on the conditions of climate for agricultural production, workers were directed to hack, fill, and level the Miami Beach peninsula. The desire to be on or near the water in an ideal climate drove the cutting of channels and construction of islands in Biscayne Bay during the 1920s-30s. [Fig. 3]
structure for development, much like that of the orthogonal Jeffersonian survey grid. In cities like Boston and Mumbai, this landmaking has extended the reaches of the city, knitting together land and water, extending the grid. Is this the city reaching out into the water? Or, the water claiming land? This island urbanism – the increasing concentration of diversity of life where land and water mingle – happens at scales small, intermediate, and large. Why not use the tools and language of early Miami Beach development as we project forward?
Tree islands form, essentially, a field, an infra3
Fig. 3.: An island urbanism timeline, or, a biography of an archipelago-in-the-making. 4
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Fig. 4: North Biscayne Bay – inputs and flows.
B. Laguna Vizcaya Throughout anthropological and biological history, then, the following strategies for dealing with an excess of water persist: 1) Change land by going out (‘make’ land) 2) Change land by going up (raise ground) 3) Build high 4) Live on the water 5) Control the water 6) Relocate, or ‘retreat’ We consider the first three – on the site of Biscayne Bay – in order to make the fourth viable again and to avoid the need to resort to the sixth. Over the last century, northern Biscayne Bay – somewhat distinct from its larger southern portion – has been transformed by changes to hydrology from a subtropical estuary to an estuarine lagoon (which I coin ‘Laguna Vizcaya’) “with salinity, circulation, and water quality that
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varies and is dependent on freshwater flow, wind driven circulation, and ocean exchange.” 4 Coastal rivers and tidal creeks traversing Miami-Dade County have been eliminated or channelized, changing the pattern from distributed sheet flows and gradual inputs to ‘flashier’, intense discharge point sources of freshwater, where salinity drops sharply. Marine conditions are complicated by the new connections to the Atlantic Ocean: Haulover Cut to the north and Government Cut (1920) to the south, introducing ocean mixing and inlet sedimentation [Fig. 4]. Also, the fanciful lozenge-shaped confections of constructed land – or ‘made land’ to borrow Boston historian Nancy Seashole’s term5 - such as the Venetian Islands, Star Island, and Belle Island cluttered north Biscayne Bay in the 20th century, further altering its ability to flush and recharge as bodies of water normally do. Dodge Island, constructed in 1935 from dredge spoil, location for the Port of Miami, has clearly
Fig. 5.: Forces and flows within - and adjoining - Biscayne Bay: grounds for possibility.
impacted North Biscayne Bay’s formerly more open access to the sea, further modified by dredging along Government Cut. Despite their 20th century impacts upon the Bay, such an island urbanism has the potential to effect positive change in the Biscayne Bay region. First and foremost – and simply put – there is the possibility of more places to build. Rather than uniformly out-of-scale level of development, or an uncoordinated speculation as seen in the early 20th century which might further negatively impact the Bay, development could be targeted to a mix of greater densification and temporal uses – both vertically and horizontally. Where low-lying land on existing islands is dominated by low-rise private development, a shift to multistory buildings could be encouraged. Where the ground floors of existing buildings will be challenged by rising waters, wet- and dry-floodproofing could explored, with vertical expansion to upper floors to compensate.
Second, the Bay as an urbanizable field [Fig. 5] introduces further possibility for reducing vulnerability and increasing robustness. The opportunity for gradients of water – fresh, brackish, saline – across the Bay surface could address the effects of changes in salinity without relying on a regime of pumping and importing freshwater. New rainwater capture/recapture capacity could further extend water security. The impact of hurricanes and the effects of flooding from storm surges and extreme rain events might be lessened by decentralizing urban population centers and redistributing over a more pervious area suited to periodic inundation. In drawing on past ecologies, then, we have identified a potential surface for future opera6 tion: the water.
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Fig. 6.: Big Mac: linking public spaces from Miami to Miami Beach along the Macarthur Causeway.
C. Projection: The Big Mac The species found on tree islands colonize where the conditions are most favorable, but, to some extent, they also create those conditions. Two further lessons from the tree island playbook might be considered: connect the dots, and find the low-hanging fruit. Modifying some of the existing linkages from/to Miami could introduce new public space while introducing multimodality to evacuation routes, linking to existing public spaces 7 [Figs. 6-9]. Construction along Miami Beach’s west coast and Alton Road tends to already have a higher ground floor. If both the existing causeway and future construction were raised (and/or existing construction retrofitted), extending southeastward to South Pointe Park, a modest-height multipurpose levee would create new linkages around South Beach all the way to Miami, while introducing the possibility of additional flooding
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control measures - a tidal barrage - for tidal surges during the most acute times. While infiltration through karstic limestone still must be accounted for, and keeping the water out will never be fully viable, requiring pumps in the immediate future, the real objective is to draw people closer to the water – or at the very least, closer to the idea of not needing to keep it out. Because the two bridges connecting the Macarthur Causeway to the mainland already have high clearances (65’ and 45’, respectively), they are good candidates for weathering sea level rise. What if the existing roadbed were retained, and light rail built over top? What if pedestrians and bikers - who currently take their life into their hands - had dedicated widened paths all the way from Lummus Park to Bicentennial Park in Miami? What if a network of floating paths at varying scales – to which anyone who sails, boats, or
Fig. 7.: Looking southwest along Biscayne Bay Path from 592 W Ave. towards a multi-tied Macarthur Causeway.
does most anything on the water is already accustomed – could create not only a more robust balance between traditional evacuation routes and means for sheltering-in-place, but new paths to the water? Might this spur other possible uses for the Bay: short-term residential and seasonal tourist accommodation, scientific research in the form of floating research stations and in-situ seabed/ lagoon-bed research, and even new industries – fisheries, aquaculture, biomass energy, and algal biofuels? 8 Thus, Big Mac might be seen as the first armature along which a third lesson of tree islands might be deployed, encouraging a more nuanced interaction with the interface of land and sea, and preparing - as Dilip da Cunha might say – us to build (once again) upon the ground of water.
9
IMAGE
Fig. 8.: Above: Looking west at 10th Ave. along a raised Biscayne Bay Path - where a seawall once stood. Fig. 9.: Below: High Life on the ‘Low Line’: Light rail travels safely above, out of reach of rising waters, as the Venetian Causeway ‘returns’ to nature, giving pedestrians new access to the interface of land and sea.
10
Bibliography
1.
Hill, K. (2002). Maritime hammock habitats. Retrieved 10/05, 2015, from http://www.sms.si.edu/irl-
spec/Hammock_Habitat.htm (after Chapman, 1976)
2.
Sklar, Fred Hal, and Arnoud van der Valk. 2003. Tree islands of the everglades. Dordrecht ; Boston:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
3.
Choi, Charles Q. Prehistoric trash heaps created florida everglades’ tree islands. 2015 [cited 11/3
2015]. Available from http://www.livescience.com/13351-prehistoric-trash-heaps-created-florida-everglades-tree-islands.html.
4.
DiscoverBiscayneBay. A history of the bay. in DiscoverBiscayneBay.org [database online]. 2015 [cited
November 1 2015]. Available from http://www.discoverbiscaynebay.org/history.htm (accessed November 1, 2015).
5.
Seasholes, Nancy S. 2003. Gaining ground : A history of landmaking in boston. Cambridge, Mass.:
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2003.
6.
Corner, James. 2014. The Landscape Imagination : Collected Essays of James Corner, 1990-2010, ed.
Alison Bick Hirsch. First edition. ed.Princeton Architectural Press.
7.
Kopecky, Steven, and Heather Morgan. unpublished. ‘What is civil works sustainability?’ USACE pre-
sentation to south florida rise and sink class, october 12, 2015. unpublished.
8.
Buckminster Fuller Institute. Greenwave wins the 2015 fuller challenge . in Buckminster Fuller In-
stitute [database online]. 2015 [cited November 5 2015]. Available from Wednesday, 21 October 2015 (accessed November 6, 2015).
11
No Building is an Island Introduction The ground on which the Prince Building now stands was once marshland, an ecosystem rich in diversity and productivity. The marsh was filled first with refuse, and later with rubble and soil in the late 19th century, part of Boston’s ever-‐expanding land mass. The land became an extension of a neighborhood admired for its openness to successive waves of immigrants. The North End’s sociability, culture, and architecture were immortalized by Jane Jacobs in The Death And Life of Great American Cities, who celebrated the “general street atmosphere of buoyancy, friendliness and good health.” However, with looming threats of climate change and sea level rise, the future of the Prince Building and the North End are uncertain. By 2100, daily tides will reach Commercial Street. Boston’s filled coastal areas face two distinct possible futures: steeply rising costs and ever-‐greater exclusivity in pockets with the means to adapt, and decaying or abandoned buildings and infrastructure in areas with fewer resources. We propose a different future: a coordinated set of public actions at the city and state level – in communication, regulation, financing and design – will help guide and incentivize the resilience of individual properties. Resilience, as defined by the Rockefeller Foundation, is “the capacity of individuals, communities and systems to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of stress and shocks, and even transform when conditions require it.” Resilience can be seeded in the Prince Building and others throughout Boston’s waterfront, and gradually grow towards neighborhoods that can preserve their social vitality and built history under changing environmental conditions. Our intervention requires major policy changes occurring progressively over time. Accordingly, those that occur closer to the present are more detailed, while actions further in the future are more speculative and would be subject to revision as climate predictions improve, socioeconomic forces shift, and an uncertain future reveals itself. Our proposal seeks to strengthen Boston’s neighborhoods by building upon a solid foundation of equity.
Action 1: Resilience Report Card A critical first step towards building a more resilient Boston is to acknowledge risk and explain its implications. Fragmented ownership, varying site conditions, and typological variety make building-‐ level risk assessments a complicated task. Modeled off of Boston’s Building Energy Reporting and Disclosure Ordinance, we propose a mandatory inspection and Resilience Report Card for every building in Boston’s 500-‐year flood zone.1 This will educate owners, landlords and tenants of their long-‐term 1
We choose the FEMA 500-‐year flood zone as the regulatory boundary for our actions because FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps only take historical flooding into account; given increased precipitation and sea level rise, the current 500-‐year flood zone is on its way to becoming the actual 100-‐year flood zone. Although the Resilience Report Card covers non-‐flood related risks, flooding presents the most dire hazard, and buildings in the flood zone are therefore the primary targets of this policy.
risks, and will also allow public officials to map risk citywide. Publicly accessible data and mandatory disclosures to potential renters and homebuyers will introduce transparency and essentially create a market for resilience. A high resilience score will be awarded with a decorative plaque to proudly display on a building. Buildings will be scored on three major categories – flood resilience, building resilience post-‐ event, and building resilience in relation to climactic changes. Within each category, points are awarded to buildings that meet or exceed specific criteria. Flood resilience evaluates a building’s lowest occupied floor elevation relative to the base flood elevation (BFE); floor area and use below the BFE; and value of mechanical equipment below the BFE. Post-‐event resilience considers emergency egress, passive systems, and structural integrity following flooding. Climactic building resilience assesses systems for water use reduction, heat reduction, and on-‐site energy production. The Report Card is not just evaluative, however – it includes specific advice on actions that can make a building more resilient. General recommendations – wet floodproofing, dry floodproofing, demolition, etc. – are based on the building’s foundation material and type, first floor use, and relationship between first occupied floor and BFE. For areas in which a building scores poorly, mitigating actions are listed along with approximate costs and relevant loans and grants for which the building would be eligible. In addition, information is gathered that indicates the building’s ability to build additional floors if it qualifies for a future density bonus as a component of vertical retreat, as described below. Report Cards will catalyze a public conversation that will be encouraged by the City through public art, interactive installations, and community-‐wide activities. By bringing long-‐timescale, abstract ecological issues to a tangible level, conversation can be encouraged in an engaging and playful way. Monthly artists-‐in-‐residence, in coordination with schools and institutions, will bring the issues to life for Bostonians to engage with and contribute to.
Action 2: Mandatory Insurance and Resilience Retrofits The next policy action is for Massachusetts to require flood insurance for all buildings in the revised 500-‐year flood zone, going beyond the National Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) mandate for buildings in the 100-‐year zone with federally backed mortgages. This recommendation takes inspiration from the 2006 reforms to the health insurance market in Massachusetts, which required all residents to purchase health insurance. Mandatory flood insurance will be based on predictive mapping that accounts for sea level rise and increased storm activity, unlike FEMA maps that look at historic trends, and will require coverage for the full expected loss from flooding, above the $500,000 NFIP coverage limit. A mandate is necessary to correct for the current duration mismatch: building owners often have ownership time horizons that are shorter than the time horizon in which a hazard is likely to occur2. However, when rare events do occur, the public absorbs the cost for repairing the underinsured building, through federal post-‐disaster funds and long-‐lasting disruptions for individuals and neighborhoods. 2
E.g., a building owner who plans to sell in five years would likely not, unless otherwise forced to, mitigate against a one-‐in-‐fifty year event.
The mandatory insurance program, building on the work done in the Report Card, will for each building estimate: • The market value of the building • The net present value (NPV)3 of future flood damage to the building, incorporating the most recent probabilistic climate models • The cost, in present dollars, to mitigate that damage. For each building, an annual premium will be calculated to cover all expected losses and overhead. Once this rate is assessed, the building owner will have several options4: 1. Resilience Retrofits: If the cost to physically mitigate the risk – i.e. make capital improvements to the building to reduce the risk profile – is less than the NPV of future damage, then it makes sense to physically mitigate the risk. The state, working with a designated reinsurer, will give a Resilience Loan to the building owner to perform the mitigation. After the retrofit, the insurance premium will be very low, and the premium plus debt service on the loan will be set equal to the insurance premium that the building owner would have paid had she not retrofitted. These payments though, instead of being paid in perpetuity to financially mitigate the risk (i.e. through insurance), will only be paid until they pay off the value of the loan. The low-‐interest loan will be fully amortizing, allowing it to be fixed rate and fixed payment, and will be collateralized by the building itself. Once the loan is paid off, the owner is left with a resilient building and low flood insurance premium. 2. Insure: If the cost to physically mitigate is greater than the NPV of damage, then physical mitigation does not make sense. Instead, the risk will be financially mitigated through the payment of the insurance premium. In the event of a disaster, the insurer or reinsurer will be able to pay to fix the damage to the property. 3. Waivers: Finally, if the NPV of damage is greater than the value of the entire building – which may occur in the case of older and smaller buildings – then it does not make sense to insure against damage, and the building owner may obtain a flood insurance waiver. Instead, all post-‐disaster funds for the property, such as FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants or Community Development Block Grants would go towards rebuilding to current resilient standards, or relocation.
3 4
Details for calculating the NPV of potential losses is provided in Exhibit B. See Exhibit A for sample retrofit and insurance calculations.
Resilience Tax Credits/Surcharge Just as Mayor Marty Walsh has made social equity the focus of Boston’s Resilience agenda, we recognize that insurance mandates can represent an economic hardship for building owners and tenants. Owners who can prove hardship will receive a property tax credit, paid on a sliding scale based on need, to offset their increased insurance or Resilience Loan payments. Landlords with low-‐ or middle-‐ income tenants, or small businesses, can also receive this property tax credit so that they do not need to raise rents. In this sense, the credit functions like a tenant-‐based section 8 voucher that allows residents to stay in their homes. The property tax credits can be funded by a small property tax surcharge for all property owners whose property value is above a certain cap. This is fair on both equity and economic grounds. On equity grounds, the burden is being placed on those most able to handle it. On economic grounds, the continued viability of the city of Boston, and the stabilization of waterfront neighborhoods, preserve and raise property values city-‐ and statewide. It thus makes economic sense for wealthier property owners to pay a small surcharge to preserve the investments they have made in their properties.
Action 3: Boston’s Recovery Program Although we hope Boston does not experience its Superstorm Sandy for many decades, hoping is not planning. One of the most important lessons from Sandy has been that cities need to work with communities to design their own recovery plans and tailor them to their own needs and aspirations, beginning a robust public dialogue long before a disaster. Acknowledging this need for citizen engagement, we propose the following policy measures in the event of a major flooding disaster in Boston. When a major storm does occur, buildings that undertook resilience retrofits should not suffer much damage or require much federal post-‐disaster relief. However, buildings that fell into categories two and three in the above insurance program, and thus did not retrofit, will experience a great deal of damage and be in need of repair. The City of Boston will change its building code to require that all affected buildings – not only those that were substantially damaged – be wet floodproofed to the projected flood level of the last year of the building’s projected life span, taking climate change projections into account. In addition, Chapter 91, The Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act, can be expanded to require use conversions of all space at risk of flooding to uses that can withstand flooding. This will of course be expensive, but for buildings that were financially mitigating their risks, this new construction can be largely paid out of funds from their insurance policies. For any remainder, and to cover those buildings that were in the third category of our insurance program, building owners will have two options. The first is to rebuild to a more resilient level by leveraging the vast amount of federal dollars that will likely come after a disaster5. Secondly, the city can offer a density bonus to provide building owners with an amount of capitalized rent equal or greater than the cost of reconstructing their buildings to the new standards, net of any federal dollars or 5
E.g., regions affected by Superstorm Sandy received $60 billion in federal assistance.
insurance funds received. Additional floor area can be built on-‐site if conditions allow, or transferred to sites identified through a City-‐led planning process.6
Action 5: A new street life for the North End Over the course of the next century, our proposal envisions a gradual strengthening of existing buildings against climate change threats, as well as new development built to meet new environmental conditions. However, as street-‐level flooding becomes a common occurrence, buildings move typical ground floor uses – retail, entrances, and lobbies – up one story in vertical retreat. In concert with building-‐level adaptation, the city reconfigures public spaces and infrastructure at the present-‐day second story elevation. The new North End public realm preserves the opportunities for spontaneous interaction that are key to healthy neighborhoods, while embracing a more intimate connection to an aquatic ecosystem. Flooding, vertical retreat, and transformation begin closest to the harbor, but slowly move inland as the sea rises and reclaims land. Our speculative design for this phase proposes elevated granite sidewalks that encase buildings, protecting their foundations and building systems. Streets are excavated to create ecologically productive marshlands. The high tide depth in 2100 creates an ideal level for situating a saltwater marsh with Spartina patens and Spartina alternifolia. Dredging a circular channel through the streets promotes saltwater flow through the marsh.7 Emergency vehicle access is maintained through short bridges spanning from the mainland, or through increased reliance on water-‐based craft. The ecological and social benefits of embracing saltwater marshes are substantial. Pollution control is improved as biofiltration of rainwater occurs in roots and soils. Public shore access is enhanced and barriers between people and nature are removed as the existing Harborwalk system is strengthened through connections to a new boardwalk. Creating beautiful environments that connect people to natural rhythms not only improves quality of life, but can also foster greater environmental empathy and action. Tidal marshes connect residents and visitors to the daily rhythm of the tides, the lunar cycle of bi-‐monthly high tides, and the annual cycles of birds, wildlife, and vegetation. Educational opportunities are created around the estuary’s diverse ecology, with opportunities including outdoor classrooms for public schools, research laboratories, and public programs. The investment in the public infrastructure will be gradual, driven by rising sea levels and public-‐ private coordination. All public infrastructure has a replacement lifecycle; streets are repaved every few 6
As another benefit, by mandating that all buildings be built to a new flood proof standard, the administration of the rebuilding effort will be greatly simplified. HUD and City officials often go to great lengths to determine income requirements of recipients, and to ensure that building owners are simply rebuilding what existed before, in order to prevent an unintended windfall for aid recipients. These concerns both go away once we simply mandate a new standard for all rebuilding, thus greatly simplifying and reducing the cost of administering the rebuilding effort. 7 Precedents for this type of remediation include Crissy Field by Hargreaves Associates in San Francisco and Fresh Kills by James Corner Associates in Staten Island. Crissy Field is an excellent example of what can be achieved by public and non-‐profit coordination on coastal historic sites, including having tens of thousands of school children carry out the planting of marsh plants. Our proposal takes these precedents a step further, as something far more urban, woven through a neighborhood. Coastal ecologists we spoke to assured us that the North End context (road width and surrounding building height) provided ample space and adequate conditions for a thriving saltwater marsh habitat.
years, while pipes may be in the ground for a half a century or more. Our proposal is to periodically rewrite infrastructure guidelines to match the interventions necessary for climate resilient neighborhoods. For example, street-‐to-‐marshland conversions will be timed with the regular street replacement cycle. The marginal cost increases will be significant, though they will likely represent a small fraction of city and state capital transportation maintenance funding. The improvements can thus be financed by the typical mix of sources for infrastructure investments, including the gas tax, municipal bonds, or District Improvement Financing. In this way, building resiliently will be a gradual process that occurs as the city and state replace obsolete infrastructure.8 This process is made possible by creating, adopting and continually maintaining a long-‐term plan for the neighborhood.
Conclusion When disaster strikes, the poor and the most vulnerable tend to suffer the most. The day-‐to-‐day stresses of a limited housing stock, aging infrastructure, and disruptive weather also affect us differently depending on our economic and social situations. Public policies like those described above must be enacted to strengthen buildings, neighborhoods, and the city as a whole, while lessening the burden on people who are already struggling. These programs have the potential to improve social and economic resilience by reducing risk and vulnerability across Boston, particularly for homeowners and renters who are less affluent. It should be understood as a coordinated effort with the City’s broader economic, social, and land-‐use policies that promote equality, since improved individual capacity, access to resources, and community cohesion are all important factors that determine outcomes in individual neighborhoods. While our proposal seeks to preserve the greatest qualities of Boston’s neighborhoods, the city’s resilient future does not depend on protecting the status quo. The city’s history is a source of pride, strength, and character, but Boston’s future depends on its ability to adapt and set collective priorities. To adapt, Boston must open opportunities to all its citizens and those citizens yet to come.
8
While in some cases still connected to the grid, buildings are expected to be significantly or completely energy self-‐sufficient, through a combination of solar, wind, and tidal power.
Exhibit A Discount Rate
MITIGATION ACTIONS Move Mechanicals Filling the Basement Elevate Building
Mitigation Cost
RISK INSURANCE MITIGIATION MODEL EXAMPLES
Damage caused
% Damage
100% 100% 100%
% Prob in Risk a given Increase per year
1.0% 2.5% 5.0%
annum NPV of Risk 3.0% $ 194,774 2.5% $ 1,065,498 4.5% $ 547,053
5.0% <-‐-‐ Figures i n Blue are Estimates; Figures i n Black are Calculated
Building Value
$ 10,000,000 $ 400,000 $ 1,000,000 $ 4,500,000 $ 500,000 $ 2,225,000 $ 500,000 $ 200,000 $ 450,000
Mitigation FINANCIAL PHYSICAL NO ACTION
Annual
Premium Loan Size $ 9,739 $ -‐ $ 53,275 $ 500,000 $ -‐ $ -‐
Building owner keeps premium after year X N/A 13
NET PRESENT VALUE OF LOSS CALCULATIONS 0 1 2 3 4 5… 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 … 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 Terminal Value $ 10,000 $ 9,810 $ 9,342 $ 8,898 $ 8,474 $ 8,070 … $ 2,383 $ 2,270 $ 2,162 $ 2,059 $ 1,961 $ 1,867 $ 16,120 $ 55,625 $ 54,565 $ 51,967 $ 49,492 $ 47,136 $ 44,891 … $ 13,256 $ 12,625 $ 12,024 $ 11,451 $ 10,906 $ 10,387 $ 71,734 $ 22,500 $ 22,071 $ 21,020 $ 20,019 $ 19,066 $ 18,158 … $ 5,362 $ 5,107 $ 4,864 $ 4,632 $ 4,411 $ 4,201 $ 145,081
NPV of Risk Calculations in Next Exhibit Mitigation is Determined: If Building V alue < NPV of Risk then No Action If Building V alue > NPV of Risk AND Mitigation Cost > NPV of Risk then Financial Mitigation (e.g., just pay i nsurance premium) If Building V alue > NPV of Risk AND Mitigation Cost < NPV of Risk then Perform Physical Mitigation = Discount Rate x Loan Size = Cost of Mitigation i n the case of Physical Mitigation = Number of Payments assuming annual payment = premium; l oan i s the l oan size and l oan i s fully amortizing
Annual Premium Loan Size Building Owner Keeps Premium After Year X
Exhibit B
Move Mechanicals Filling the Basement Elevate Building
((Value of Object Destroyed x % of Object Destroyed x Probability of Damage Occuring i n a Given Year) x (1 + Risk Increase Per Annum)) (1 + Discount Rate)^(YearN -‐ Year0) ((NPV of Loss i n YearN) / (Discount Rate -‐ Risk Increase per Annum)) (1 + Discount Rate)^(YearN -‐ Year0)
*Termi na l Va l ue i s b a s ed o n a G ordon Perpetui ty G rowth F ormul a w here 1/X -‐-‐> 0 o ver ti me; b rought b a ckwa rd i n ti me to toda y's d ol l a rs
Terminal Value in Year 0 *=
Net Present Value of Loss in a given year =
Team Design Process
The GSD design team has benefitted from the contributions of a diverse group of students and experts. The process was led by Thaddeus Pawlowski (Harvard Loeb Fellow) who facilitated the project, supported student work and provided perspective on lessons learned from Sandy and NYC’s rebuilding efforts. After some initial fact finding and goals setting, we began the process by dividing the 20 interested GSD students into three interdisciplinary research groups and rotating through each of the three sites (Prince Building, Fort Point Channel, and Morrissey Boulevard), capturing impressions and data to share with the other research groups. Each week we had conversations about our understanding of the major issues and potential ways forward based on our site visits and background research. Throughout this process we engaged a wide range of experts including coastal ecologists, legal scholars, housing experts, artists, and designers. After all members had visited each of three sites, teams coalesced around each site to propose a design intervention. Supported by the collective work gathered in the earlier stages, each site team created a Phase I competition proposal that was intended to fit within a larger framework of climate resilience. This framework was largely driven by policy actions the public sector could take today to implement a variety of design interventions, and responded differently in the various locations to institutions and actors that have different motivations, concerns, and resources. In January, Thaddeus conducted a research seminar that focused on future scenarios for each of the competitions sites. We walked through wetlands with ecologist Anamarija Frankic, poured over old maps with historian Nancy Seasholes, talked policy and panoramic models with BRA planner John Dalzell, toured the North End with journalist Matt Conti, looked at Art with Fort Point Artists, learned about citizen action with lawyer Peter Shelley, and were guided by the principles of design excellence, equity and social justice that drive the Loeb Fellowship program. Moving into the semifinalist stage, we re-‐formed a new student team around the Prince Building project and divided into three subgroups -‐ one focusing on policy and financing, another on building-‐scale architecture, and a third on neighborhood-‐level landscape and infrastructure. Drawing on the expertise within multiple disciplines (urban design, urban planning, landscape architecture, architecture, public policy, finance) we aspired to create a robust policy framework that could guide and incentivize building owners to pursue a set of desirable outcomes in the built environment, and then visualize the specific nature and design of those outcomes. While we were driven by policy, our conversations were also very much informed by outcomes in relation to urban design, architecture, public space, street-‐level interactions, and community engagement. All of the work produced was collaborative, often across disciplines, with multiple people working on individual diagrams, drawings, and renderings. We had feedback sessions with prominent faculty from the GSD, Kennedy school, Law School, and Business school, including Professors Alex Kreiger, Jim Stockard, Jerold Kayden, Pierre Belanger, Rosetta Elkin, Joyce Rosenthal Klein, Emily Lloyd, and more.
Although a few students were able to connect work completed for studios and theses with the Boston Living with Water competition, all work within the competition was unpaid, extra-‐ curricular, and did not count towards any coursework or graduation requirements for students. The Boston Harbor Association and the Boston Redevelopment authority has given us an invaluable learning experience. We admire most how they have openly embraced the spirit of collective learning in the way they conducted the competition. We are very honored to have been a part of this important public dialogue. We look forward to broadening and deepening this conversation. Team Member List all from Harvard Graduate School of Design Thaddeus Pawlowski (Urban designer, architect, Loeb Fellow) -‐ coordinator Jonathan Sandor Goldman (Urban planning, student) Dave Hampton (Architecture, student) Stephanie Hsia (Landscape architecture, student) Jared Katseff (Urban planning, MBA, student) Xinhui Li (Landscape architecture, student) Ho-‐Ting Liu (Landscape architecture, student) Nupoor Monani (Urban design, student) Kira Sargent (Landscape architecture, student) Jeenal Sawla (Urban planning, student) Jon Springfield (Urban planning, student) Karno Widjaja (Architecture, student) Lindsay Woodson (Architecture, urban planning, student)
1. resilience report card raises public risk awareness and creates market for resilience
major noreaster
Periods of Increased Precipitation Greater Variation in Temperature
CITY
FEDERAL
NO BUILDING IS AN ISLAND
2012 - 2014 National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
2016 new FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps
reforms increase the program’s financial sustainability but presents affordability challenges for flood-zone buildings that require insurance
take effect, adding 10,000 homes and 3,500 businesses to the flood zone
Each building in Boston’s 500-year flood zone is inspected and receives a
RESILIENCE REPORT CARD.
The report card increases transparency and empowers owners and residents to adapt to climate risks. RESILIENCE REPORT CARD Prince Building
score Building Address
Report Card Issued By: Boston Redevelopment Authority
FLOOD RESILIENCE
NEIGHBORHOOD
ELEVATION
B
0
Because of the stone/concrete foundation, first floor parking, and 2+ ft distance between first occupied floor and BFE, Prince Building’s first floor should be wet flood proofed.
0.5
0-2+
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FIRST OCCUPIED FLOOR AND BASE FLOOD ELEVATION (BFE)
Recommendations:
1
0
ft below
COST:
0-2+ ft above COST:
FLOOR AREA AND USE
less than
PERCENT OF OCCIUPIED FLOOR AREA ABOVE BASE FLOOD ELEVATION
70%
or more
100%
or more
100%
COST: $10,000
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT less than
PERCENT OF MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ABOVE BASE FLOOD ELEVATION (BASED ON VALUE)
70%
TOTAL RESILIENCE
50%
50%
for relocation of mechanical
ELIGIBLE FOR LOAN
YES
NO
TOP SCORE ON ALL 3 FLOOD resilience MEASURES?
2.5
4
BUILDING RESILIENCE (POST EVENT)
The neighborhood celebrates its legacy as one of the world’s most sustainable and livable places.
0
EMERGENCY EGRESS
0.5
1
NO
TO CODE, ADAPTABLE
PASSIVE SYSTEMS
COST:
YES
more than
1 week
less than
1 week
less than
COST: $4,000
overhaul of passive systems
AMOUNT OF TIME TO BRING BUILDING ONLINE - CONSIDERS QUALITY OF PASSIVE SYSTEMS, INCLUDING GENERATORS, OPERABLE WINDOWS, ETC
FLOOD RESILIENCE ELEVATION
COST: $5,000 structural issues,
ELIGIBLE FOR LOAN
2
XXX Building
Building Address
Report Card Issued By: Boston Redevelopment Authority
FLOOD RESILIENCE ELEVATION
C
0
0.5
0-2+
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FIRST OCCUPIED FLOOR AND BASE FLOOD ELEVATION (BFE)
Because of the stone/concrete foundation, first floor parking, and 2+ ft distance between first occupied floor and BFE, Prince Building’s first floor should be wet flood proofed.
1
0
ft below
less than
PERCENT OF OCCIUPIED FLOOR AREA ABOVE BASE FLOOD ELEVATION
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT less than
PERCENT OF MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ABOVE BASE FLOOD ELEVATION (BASED ON VALUE)
TOTAL RESILIENCE
100%
C 70%
70%
50%
50%
or more
100%
or more
COST: $10,000
for relocation of mechanical
ELIGIBLE FOR LOAN
TOP SCORE ON ALL 3 FLOOD RESILIENCE MEASURES?
0.5
4
0
EMERGENCY EGRESS
0.5
NO
TO CODE, ADAPTABLE
PASSIVE SYSTEMS
more than
1 week
less than
1 week
less than
1 day
structural issues,
AGAINST HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE, FLOOD VENTS
0.5
COST: $4,000
more than
no difference
less than
25% 30%
reduction
PASSIVE HEATING AND COOLING, AS COMPARED AGAINST CITY-WIDE MEDIAN PER SQ FT ENERGY USAGE DURING PEAK HOURS
COST: $10,000 more than
50%
upgrade appliances, install catchment/cistern
more than
or more
100%
50%
50%
or more
100%
COST: $50,000 - $100,000
reduction
options include: heat screens, green CoGen systems, etc
for relocation of mechanical
ELIGIBLE FOR LOAN
YES
NO
2.5
4
BUILDING RESILIENCE (POST EVENT) 0
EMERGENCY EGRESS
0.5
NO
TO CODE, ADAPTABLE
PASSIVE SYSTEMS
30%
A 70%
COST:
YES
more than
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
1
1 week
less than
1 week
less than
1 day
COST: $4,000
overhaul of passive systems
COST: $5,000
structural issues,
AGAINST HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE, FLOOD VENTS
ELIGIBLE FOR LOAN
1
3
BUILDING RESILIENCE (CLIMATE) WATER USE REDUCTION
no onsite production
less than
50%
more than
A
B
overhaul of passive systems
3
7
10
COST: $20,000 - $100,000
50%
0
C
COST:
YES
AMOUNT OF TIME TO BRING BUILDING ONLINE - CONSIDERS QUALITY OF PASSIVE SYSTEMS, INCLUDING GENERATORS, OPERABLE WINDOWS, ETC
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
1
25%
less than
PERCENT OF MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ABOVE BASE FLOOD ELEVATION (BASED ON VALUE)
TOTAL RESILIENCE
1
COST:
0-2+ ft above
COST: $10,000
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT
3
1
0
70%
AMOUNT OF TIME TO BRING BUILDING ONLINE - CONSIDERS QUALITY OF PASSIVE SYSTEMS, INCLUDING GENERATORS, OPERABLE WINDOWS, ETC
ENERGY PRODUCTION
BUILDING RESILIENCE (POST EVENT)
less than
TOP SCORE ON ALL 3 FLOOD RESILIENCE MEASURES?
0.5
less than
ONSITE FEATURES FOR PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY, AS A PERCENTAGE OF BUILDING’S ENERGY NEEDS
YES
NO
PERCENTAGE OF WATER SUPPLIED THROUGH ONSITE COLLECTION AND/OR WATER RECYCLING
HEAT REDUCTION
COST:
0-2+ ft above COST:
FLOOR AREA AND USE
WATER USE REDUCTION
0
0.5
ft below
COST:
FLOOR AREA AND USE PERCENT OF OCCIUPIED FLOOR AREA ABOVE BASE FLOOD ELEVATION
BUILDING RESILIENCE (CLIMATE) Recommendations:
0 0-2+
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FIRST OCCUPIED FLOOR AND BASE FLOOD ELEVATION (BFE)
Because of the stone/concrete foundation, first floor parking, and 2+ ft distance between first occupied floor and BFE, Prince Building’s first floor should be wet flood proofed.
A
Building Address
AGAINST HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE, FLOOD VENTS
score
XXX Building
score
Report Card Issued By: Boston Redevelopment Authority
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
RESILIENCE REPORT CARD
Recommendations:
RESILIENCE REPORT CARD
1 day
options include: PV solar, wind, CoGen
PERCENTAGE OF WATER SUPPLIED THROUGH ONSITE COLLECTION AND/OR WATER RECYCLING
4.5 10
0.5
less than
HEAT REDUCTION
3
0 25%
no difference
The structural capacity of the building would allow for of density.
2 additional floors
25%
less than
30%
reduction
PASSIVE HEATING AND COOLING, AS COMPARED AGAINST CITY-WIDE MEDIAN PER SQ FT ENERGY USAGE DURING PEAK HOURS
Notes:
1
more than
ENERGY PRODUCTION ONSITE FEATURES FOR PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY, AS A PERCENTAGE OF BUILDING’S ENERGY NEEDS
no onsite production
less than
50%
more than
more than
3
7
10
upgrade appliances, install catchment/cistern
30%
COST: $50,000 - $100,000
options include: heat screens, green
reduction
more than
CoGen systems, etc
COST: $20,000 - $100,000
50%
3 A
B
C
COST: $10,000
50%
3
7.5 10
options include: PV solar, wind, CoGen
Notes: The structural capacity of the building would allow for of density.
2 additional floors
COST: $5,000 ELIGIBLE FOR LOAN
3
BUILDING RESILIENCE (CLIMATE) WATER USE REDUCTION PERCENTAGE OF WATER SUPPLIED THROUGH ONSITE COLLECTION AND/OR WATER RECYCLING
0
0.5
less than
HEAT REDUCTION
no difference
1
more than
25%
less than
30%
reduction
PASSIVE HEATING AND COOLING, AS COMPARED AGAINST CITY-WIDE MEDIAN PER SQ FT ENERGY USAGE DURING PEAK HOURS
ENERGY PRODUCTION ONSITE FEATURES FOR PRODUCTION AND EFFICIENCY, AS A PERCENTAGE OF BUILDING’S ENERGY NEEDS
no onsite production
less than
50%
more than
3
7
10
COST: $10,000
upgrade appliances, install catchment/cistern
COST: $50,000 - $100,000
options include: heat screens, green
50%
more than
30%
reduction
more than
1
CoGen systems, etc
COST: $20,000 - $100,000
50%
0 A
B
C
More than 18% of building is below flood elevation
25%
3
options include: PV solar, wind, CoGen
Notes: The structural capacity of the building would allow for 2 additional floors of density.
10
NORTH END ADAPTATION COALITION
Flood elevation between 0 ft. and 2 ft. above 1st floor
Mechanical equipment below grade
Establish and Fund public art installation projects
base flood elevation
base flood elevation base flood elevation
major noreaster
NO BUILDING IS AN ISLAND
major noreaster
2. mandatory insurance and resilience assist people pay for risk and resilience through state initiatives
After years of gradual increases, NFIP Ever-increasing annual appropriations for disaster relief funds lead Congress to create new grant and loan programs for local resiliency upgrades.
INSURANCE PREMIUMS reflect true risk, impacting real estate values and affordability.
Boston focuses resilience program on equity. "They will read in the history books about the bold steps Boston took in 2015 to
ALL buildings in the FEMA 500-year flood zone to purchase flood Massachusetts requires
TREAT EVERYONE THE SAME."
Develop a post storm RECOVERY PLAN proposing short term relief and long-term resilience.
Loan pays for building level
insurance. The state simultaneously initiates a
RESILIENCY RETROFITS
RESILIENCY LOAN PROGRAM,
giving property owners access to the upfront capital they need to strengthen their buildings, and avoid future insurance premium increases.
-Mayor Walsh May 19, 2015
Unlike NFIP, Mandatory Massachusetts Flood Insurance Program assesses risk using PREDICTIVE MAPS that take into account rising seas and increased storm activity.
Vouchers are available for LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERS in the flood zone, funded by a surcharge on all homes worth over $2 million.
*Future flood map courtesy of Boston Harbor Association
If the cost of mitigation is less than the net present value of future expected repair costs, it pays to mitigate. We’ll loan you the money upfront and you’ll pay us back with interest. Once the loan’s paid off, you can save the money you would have had to use to pay for insurance.
FLOOD VENTS
If the mitigation cost is greater than the NPV of future repair costs, you can buy insurance, which will cover you to rebuild with resilience if and when a flood comes. WET FLOODPROOF GROUND FLOOR (tile lobby)
elevate critical systems potential damage = $1,000,000 current annual risk = 1% annual risk increase = 5% discount rate = 5% cost of retrofit =
}
NPV of damage =
$188,500
$400,000 How much will our MFIP policy cover?
don’t retrofit; insure against losses
$1,000,000 annual premium = $9,425 coverage amount =
How much will it cost to retrofit our building?
What’s our discount rate?
How much would it cost to repair our building?
FILL BASEMENT Resilience costs
wet floodproof ground floor potential damage = $1,000,000 current annual risk = 1% annual risk increase = 5% discount rate = 5% cost of retrofit =
}
NPV of damage =
$220,000
REPIPE BUILDING
What are the chances a storm will flood our building?
cost of retrofit > NPV of damage
Projected insurance savings
MOVE MECHANICAL
$150,000
cost of retrofit < NPV of damage
obtain resiliency loan for retrofit
$11,000 payback period = 23 years annual debt service =
BEFORE
AFTER
mandate full resilience in recovery, allow for vertical expansion
NO BUILDING IS AN ISLAND
major noreaster (catalyzing storm)
3. boston recovery program
HUD and FEMA adapt and implement
BOSTON RECOVERY PROGRAM
Boston Recovery Program helps building owners rebuild ground floor spaces to be ready for future flood levels. The program helps to maintain the vitality of the neighborhood by subsidizing publicly-oriented program such as farmers markets, community spaces, and art galleries in newly created flood ready spaces
State revises Building Code requiring
The City tweaks zoning to allow building owners to
ALL BUILDINGS BE BUILT OR RETROFITTED
RECAPTURE LOST FLOOR AREA
by building above or transferring floor area within a district defined by the City with community participation.
to the level of the reasonable worst storm during the life of the building. Building Code now references predictive maps
City expands
Chapter 91, The Massachusetts Public Waterfront Act, to require all ground floor spaces in the flood zone to be floodable and flexible, in compliance with state flood code.
6 MONTHS LATER
4. north end vision
vibrant streetlife with a new way of living with nature
NO BUILDING IS AN ISLAND
CURRENT HIGH TIDE RETROFIT
Resilient retrofit of ground floor of pier buildings
RELOCATE
Allow floor area to be rebuilt above building.
HIGH TIDE REACHES PIERS
HIGH TIDE REACHES ATLANTIC AVE.
RETROFIT
RETROFIT
Resilient retrofit of ground floor of Atlantic Ave.
Resilient retrofit of ground floor of Commercial St. buildings.
ELEVATE + CONNECT
ELEVATE + CONNECT
Elevate sidewalks around piers with bridge and ramp connections to mainland sidewalks.
Elevate sidewalks around vulnerable Atlantic Ave. buildings with temporary connections to Commercial St. sidewalks.
REMOVE + DEVELOP
Remove buildings and surfaces piers that will not be maintained after flooding .Remediate soil, dig channels, and plant marsh vegetation. Install temporary berm at Atlantic Ave.
The City has rebuilt sidewalks, terraces, and plazas at the level of future floods, making
REMOVE + DEVELOP
HIGH TIDE REACHES COMMERCIAL STREET ELEVATE + CONNECT
Elevate sidewalks around vulnerable Atlantic Ave. buildings. Build bridge, ramp and stepped connects to marsh and mainland. connections to Commercial Ave. sidewalks.
REMOVE + DEVELOP
Clear pavement, remediate soil, dig channels, and plant marsh vegetation. Relocate temporary berm as needed.
Remove buildings and surfaces on Atlantic Ave. that will not be maintained. Remediate soil, dig channels, and plant marsh vegetation. Move temporary bern to Commercial St.
LONG TERM INVESTMENT IN PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE that connects a new vibrant street live to a lower marsh. Structures have been reinforced to accommodate new, zero energy housing, Grade A resilient housing above.
New residential and commerical units built
Education and recreation opportunities multiply at a more accessible waterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s edge.
Excavate asphalt and remediate soils. Re-establish historic salt-water marsh. vegetation and wildlife.
Create biofilter and recharge basin for future increases in precipication. Combats urban heat island effect.
Bridges maintain residential and emergency service access to Pier and Atlantic Avenue buildings
Elevated sidewalks, infrastructure, and buildings are protected by granite sea walls that can withstand daily tidal flux for thousands of years
Building owners have built new entrances, retail and public facing program on what was historically 2nd and 3rd floors, maintaining vibrant street life celebrated by Jane Jacobs. Basement and 1st floors filled.
Disasters Depend by Dave Hampton
This article was originally published at messysystems.com on October 29, 2013
and urban than, say, Santiago, Chile and far less than Portau-Prince, the loss of life comparisons are startling: 519 in Peru, 521 in Chile, and somewhere between 49,190316,000 in Haiti. The point being: Chile, a country with a GDP per capita income over twice that of Peru and nearly 20 times that of Haiti, yet over three times less than the U.S., was prepared for the type of disaster that befell it. After experiencing a devastating earthquake in 1960, building codes and inspection, good design, engineering and construction, and high emergency response capability were prioritized. Fig. 1.: Whose density? Informal settlements ring the hillsides of Port-auPrince. Source: IOM/UN-Habitat.
Fig. 2.: A debris-choked street in the dense Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Delmas 32, May 2011.
Which disaster?
ress has been made, displaced Haitians still number in the hundreds of thousands, nearly 4 years after the quake.
During (and after) which disasters is density an asset, and where? Port-au-Prince, for example, fared poorly during (and after) the 7.0 magnitude earthquake which struck the island nation of Haiti on January 12, 2010. While the epicenter was 16 miles (25 km) distant in Léogâne, the capital city, with a population density on par with Mumbai or Kolkata, still experienced widespread injury, death, population displacement, and devastation to buildings and already overtaxed and inadequate infrastructures. Recovery efforts were hampered for years by millions of tons of debris lining very narrow streets, such as those in the highly-dense neighborhoods of Delmas. 250,000 buildings, many already inadequate in terms of life safety, were left in varying states of damage, often remaining occupied. Demolitions of unsound buildings still occur today, and, though prog-
Suffice to say, density in terms of population or disposition of dwelling units was not an asset for Port-au-Prince, either during or after its recovery from disaster. But, is it unfair to compare the resilience of the capital city of the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere to New York City? Possibly. Let’s try this: Marcial Blondet, an engineering professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru who helped develop earthquake-resistant reinforced adobe homes, compares three recent earthquakes of powerful magnitudes: Pisco, Peru in 2007 (mag. 8.0); Chile in 2010 (mag. 8.8); and Haiti in 2010 (mag. 7.0). While Pisco is considerably less dense
Fig. 3.: People potentially affected by earthquakes and tsunamis. Source: Swiss Re. See below for the full report.
Who is ‘us’? Second, we need to define the ‘us’ in ‘density makes us safer’: where are people and assets most at risk? In ‘Mind the risk: A global ranking of cities under threat from natural disasters’, Swiss Re, a company which knows a thing or two about urban risk and resilience, identifies 616 urban areas and their loss potential from a range of disasters: earthquakes, storms, storm surges, tsunamis,
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and river flooding. The indicators are the size of the urban population and impact on the local and national economy. The metropolitan areas most at risk from multiple types of disasters: China’s Pearl River Delta, and Japan’s OsakaKobe and Tokyo-Yokohama regions, all highly densely populated regions. The study acknowledges the preponderance of those high-production, high-income areas as being the most risk-averse since the evaluation criteria focuses on standardized absolute values of working days lost. Thus, Tokyo-Yokohama tops Jakarta, though population numbers are comparable between the two. However, when productivity losses of a city are weighed in relation to the GDP of an entire country, “a smaller country with only one or a handful of urban centres can end up in the first ranks because these cities play an essential role to their home country’s national economy. …These local rankings give an indication of how a disaster can impact the resilience of a whole nation.”
Fig. 4.: An urban system, just messy enough: a canal (left) doubles as a market corridor (right) in Ravine Pintade, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Bloomberg’s reign – have produced a highly sophisticated set of checks and balances in the form of strong building and health codes, zoning laws, inspections enforcement, and robust support networks of emergency response and public health.
While New York City’s influence on its state, region, and the nation is uncontestable, its overall loss potential is lowWhere Port-au-Prince struggled during the immediate er, in context, due in part to the types of disasters which it aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, and continues to do so is most likely to face. in the recovery period in part because of numerous prequake shortcomings, New York City’s many systems, deThus, the who and the where of dense urban areas holds spite some fits and starts during and after Hurricane Sangreat weight in determining resilience to disasters. dy, will ultimately prove more resilient. Systems matter Again, as Mr. Chakrabarti acknowledges “…cities are vulnerable sets of materials and systems.”
Over the coming months, we look forward to exploring how these kinds of systems work, and the lessons which can be shared to make many places the world over more resilient. We hope you’ll join… and contribute.
An economic powerhouse metropolis in a developed nation, New York has everything going for it. Density, admittedly, concentrates people, power, and capacity.Years of focused prioritization – with little chance this will evaporate anytime soon, regardless of the impending end of
32
Towards Resilient Regions by Dave Hampton
This article was originally published at messysystems.com on October 28, 2013
affordable place to live within the city.” However, policies which focus exclusively on certain areas, or notions of certain areas – cities, for example – without taking into account the wider regions of which they are a part, can be shortsighted and divisive. Where I End And You Begin There’s a gap in between There’s a gap where we meet Where I end and you begin I couldn’t put it better than Radiohead above, in a song subtitled ‘The Sky Is Falling In’, but let’s focus on the positive!
Fig. 1.: Post-Hurricane Sandy damage to older homes at the Rockaways.
Fig. 2.: Post-Hurricane Sandy damage to newer homes at the Rockaways.
In ‘How Density Makes Us Safer During Natural Disasters’
tools in mitigating climate-related risks”, writes Chakrabar- Scottish landscape architect Ian McHarg wrote in 1969’s seminal Design with Nature: ti.
by Vishaan Chakrabarti, the author uses the example of Hurricane Sandy’s effects within New York City to highlight urban resilience:
…higher-density neighborhoods—from downtown Brooklyn and Battery Park City up to Harlem—were up and running within a week. By contrast, lower density areas like Staten Island and Breezy Point—with their single-family homes, elevated power lines, timber construction, and auto-dependency—took longer to recover. He begins the article by citing the 1956 Highway Defense Act, a key piece of legislature which not only secured a critical system of infrastructure nearly unprecedented in scope at that time – a national highway system – but contributed to de-urbanization and sprawl. “Policies that support the development of dense urban areas are critical
As Director of the Center for Urban Real Estate at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Architecture, Planning & Preservation, and the author of A Country of Cities: A Manifesto for an Urban America, Chakrabarti is, unsurprisingly, an advocate of cities. What about the rest of us non-city dwellers? How will we be expected to weather future disasters? To be fair, Chakrabarti also writes “critics will assert that to put more New Yorkers in harm’s way is madness, but when coupled with well-conceived land-use plans that incorporate regional resilience considerations, these areas can become integral in providing these newcomers with a more
“While the name [‘metropolitan area’] has been coined to describe the enlargement of the older city, it is appropriate to observe that this is more a convenience for cartographers than a social organism.” Furthermore, McHarg notes that the American dream did not see that: “…a subdivision is not a community, that the sum of subdivisions that make a suburb is not a community, that the sum of suburbs that compose the metropolitan fringe of the city does not constitute community nor does a metropolitan region.”
29
Stephen Metts, a GIS and planning expert and a messy systems contributor, notes the utility of metropolitan statistical areas, or MSAs, in describing clusters of regions spatially (Fig. 4). Metts cites Craigslist ZIP code clustering as an example to describe regions, showing “how individuals think spatially of ‘how far’ they are willing to think of their ‘local’ space.”
Fig. 3.: A natural transect. Source: transect.org
Fig. 4.: Statistical Areas of the Contiguous United States by Laura Guzman. Click the image for an interactive map!
McHarg relied on the notion of a transect (Fig. 3), or cut through part of the environment showing a range of different habitats, to highlight the interconnectedness of nature as a positive example for design and planning, but tended to reinforce the dichotomy between nature and cities.
Sounds good, but the feasibility, impact, and popular and political acceptance of consciously blurring the distinctions between urban and rural, especially in the United States, is a work in progress.
Distinctions between urban and un-urban, dense and undense, often set up false dichotomies which belie the true nature of how places, people, and systems are interlinked and flow into – and out of – each other. Understanding how regions currently function and the degrees to which they are robust will lead to better ways of predicting how they will recover after a disaster, leading to greater success in making more distinct areas – cities, towns – ready to weather the next storm.
‘Resilient cities’ may very well turn out to be an oxymoron in the best sense – that cities are inherently resilient – but let’s not rest on our urban laurels just yet, and insure that when discussing policies and strategies for cities, we don’t do so while ignoring the contributions of, and the interconnectedness to, their supporting regions.
(for another take on transects, read about Alan Berger’s Drosscapes at Urban Transects Revisited). What’s in a name? Fundamentally, the issue could be considered one of naming.
When one thinks of the notion of ‘city’, one usually sets out of mind all things rural, suburban, or ‘country’. Conversely, ‘city’ tends to be, for those living outside of it, something In 2003, Duany Plater-Zyberk & Company extended the apart, different, and unconnected. Shirley Jackson, one transect idea to include human habitats. The resulting of my favorite short-story authors, highlights this either/ SmartCode, “is a model transect-based planning and zon- or distinction in “The Summer People”, to ominous effect. ing document based on environmental analysis. It address- Political mastermind and urban planner Robert Moses’ es all scales of planning, from the region to the community focus on New York City amenities, raising the the ire of to the block and building. The template is intended for lo- legislators in Albany, and that of wealthy industrialists, cal calibration to your town or neighborhood. As a form- aristocrats, and farmers from Cedar Point to the Catskills, based code, the SmartCode keeps settlements compact and is legendary. rural lands open, literally reforming the sprawling patterns of separated-use zoning.”
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The Ravines of Port-au-Prince by Dave Hampton
This article was originally published in two parts at UrbDeZine March 12, 2013 and in condensed form at Planetizen on March 14, 2013.
After walking through more than one ravine – places where many Haitians dump their trash, direct their bodily wastes, and all too often wash clothes and even retrieve their water, the last adjective above – ‘beautiful’ – seems particularly out-of-place. Yet, as they say, there is much beauty in strangeness. In the summer of 2012, while gathering feedback from the community for a project, I met a man who built his home – a fairly substantial reinforced-concrete roofed affair complete with toilet and rooms to rent – in a ravine 25 years ago. Just above the floodwater mark, his is a relatively safe and stable location, which many would view as illegal since currently in a no-build zone, as well as for the fact that most ravines are considered state land. Compared to many Fig. 1.: Ravine near Rue Dalencourt in Canape Vert neighborhood. Fig. 2.: A typical view in a ravine in Port-au-Prince: retaining walls need- homes nearby which overlook concrete, concrete, and ing repair or replacement, ill-constructed squatter housing, people bathing more concrete with smatterings of asphalt and the all-perand washing clothing, prevalent garbage, and… gorgeous trees! vasive vehicular traffic, his existence seemed, by contrast, rural with views of red-flowered flamboyan trees, The ravines of Port-au-Prince represent for me a perfect Palace, the formal axes of the Champs de Mars – a vestige almost patiently munching goats, and the gentle sound of water. distillation of adjectives about this city. of colonial French planning – and other public spaces. A major problem with living in a ravine, however, is the negative amplification of seemingly natural processes. Ravines, however, despite some cosmetic efforts at comInteresting. Unusual. Disgusting. Extensive. Problematic. munity-led cleanups and municipal trash pickups, can still Port-au-Prince lies in a valley bounded to north and south be counted on to belie both specific challenges and the Dynamic. Maddening. Beautiful? by mountains, to the east the bay of Port-au-Prince, and to broader challenges still facing Haiti: deep, (infra)structurthe west Lake Azuei and the Dominican Republic beyond. In the six months since I wrote the first edition of this post al, inherently tied to environment and ecology, and inexWith vistas to the sea from multiple vantage points and tricably linked to the communities around them and the (for my own blog), and after having left Haiti to return to views of ‘mountains beyond mountains’, the perfect conpeople who live there. the United States, travel a bit in South America, and now fluence of geography, hydrology, and biological diversity, back in Haiti, I see some notable changes in Haiti’s capital the region could be considered an unparalleled and ideal The ravine is both a set of specific challenges in an urban city: a (more) modern airport arrival experience greets environment and a perfect analogy for what has occurred place… except for the city situated right in the middle. the visitor. More public spaces are either accessible or are and still occurs in this country where people and environbeing improved. ‘Tent cities’, for better or worse for the A subject for future posts, suffice to say that Port-auresidents, have been removed from their former and very ment intersect. Prince tests every conceivable input or output common to prominent locations near the now-demolished Presidential cities, with its own special vibrancy and flavor.
24
Fig. 4.: Garbage collects at the outflow of a canal near Blvd. Harry Truman in downtown Port-au-Prince, 2012.
Fig. 3.: Erosion in agricultural fields above Furcy. This is where ravines are born.
But back to ravines. The region roughly to the north-northwest of Route National #8, bisected by Route National #1 could be considered a floodplain at the foot of the Chaine des Matheux mountains. The southern portion of the Port-au-Prince watershed is formed by a nearer chain of mountains on which considerable parts of the city are built. Since unchecked development spurred by migration of rural populations to the cities following the departure of Jean-Claude
‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier in 1986, more of these hillsides have become densely packed with informal settlements filling in between the occasional elite hilltop aerie: Martissant, Villa Rosa, Jalousie. Trickling waters flowing from higher up – agricultural areas above the towns of Kenscoff and Furcy (Fig. 3) largely stripped of trees since colonial times and more recently by cottage industries that collect charcoal for cooking – become torrents in the rainy season, flowing through communities on hillsides, and accumulating in low-lying areas, rising during periods of heavy rains to 3 meters (10 feet) or more in height of garbage-choked rushing rapids. Cars have been known to be washed away in these floods.
truth in this adage which has gained traction in recent years. In developed nations, it is still possible to fool oneself into thinking one can throw something ‘away’ thanks to comprehensive waste (which I prefer to refer to as ‘mismanaged, underutilized resources’) management, recycling and, increasingly, composting: after doing our part, unwanted material is removed from sight by the trucks and/ or employees (or subcontractors) of a municipality. In many areas of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, however, the results of this line of thinking are readily visible, and painfully tangible, on a daily basis (Fig. 4). Parc de Martissant serves as a striking example. To those few travelers wanting to avoid the press and bustle of the downtown area by taking the ‘Martissant shortcut’ (Fig. 5) from Petionville through the historic neighborhoods of Turgeau and Pacot, skirting Carrefour-Feuilles, is an unpolished jewel coming as a pleasant surprise and last stand of green before the choke of Carrefour, to reach the southwest beaches beyond.
Erosion, usually held in check in healthy watersheds by stable vegetation, is made progressively worse by the action of surface, rain, and drainage water, rendering banks of the ravine more prone to degradation and eventual collapse. All along the way, people, of course, interact with water, and the paths along which it – and they – travel. There is no away On some philosophical level, most of us recognize the
Fig. 5.: The Martissant neighborhood.
25
Fig. 6.: A typical view of Parc de Martissant.
After driving through the Martissant neighborhood with its monotony of unpainted concrete-and-concrete-block houses jostling for space against each other on hillsides, the streets lined with brightly painted shops and informal markets selling produce, soda, shampoo, etc., arriving at the park itself is like entering a forgotten world; Jurassic Park without the dinosaurs (Fig. 6). A leafy canopy filters strong light. Climbing plants scale the trunks of mature trees.
Fig. 7.: Example of a recently constructed canal in Parc de Martissant. Geotextile fabric on either side helps anchor the banks.
Fig. 8.: Layering of garbage.
The remains of a hotel from the 1950’s, plaster crumbling, lend the air of a less grand version of Angkor Wat or, at least, something from the director’s cut of ‘Apocalyspe Now.’ At this writing, the park is effectively a nature preserve, a ‘public utility’ intended to become a public park of approximately 15 hectares (37 acres), assembled from three private properties – one of them the properties of the family of Albert Mangonès, influential Haitian architect and creator of ‘Le Marron Inconnu’. Unfortunately, the park is not yet open to the public. We’ll return to Parc de Martissant in later posts to address its long history and ambitious plans for its future. For now, let’s use it to illustrate an analogy.
– a ‘cattle-catcher’ of sorts – prevents garbage from the neighborhoods along the northern ridge of Morne l’Hopital mountains from flowing into the park. Our guide, Marc Bungener, a Haitian urban planning student studying the park for his Masters thesis, explains the years of marginalization the Martissant neighborhood faced – including at least a generation of no regular trash pickup – and the extensive community partnership between the neighborhood of Martissant and the Fondasyon Konesans ak Libète (FOKAL) since 2008 to do, among other things, ravine cleanups.
He points to the left of the canal outflow, to the steep side of the ravine. Cut by the flowing and scouring action of water, the earth is exposed to show the stratification of layAs one walks through the trees, winding up a path along a wooded ravine stabilized with recently constructed con- ers of garbage. “It’s amazing: trees are literally growing on top of, and out of, garbage – plastic bags, a shoe…” notes crete canals (Fig. 7) – the steep sides planted with understory plants anchored by geotextile fabric – one reaches the Marc (Fig. 8). top of a hill which signals the beginning of the lower part Again, the analogy is visceral: some communities are built, quite literally, on their own garbage, and ravines, as they of Leclerc bidonville in Martissant. A concrete cleanout wind their way through, ever deeper, expose this truth.
26
egy more sustainable than simple cleanups. Rather than relying on out-of-scale ‘hard’ technology deployed further downstream – namely concrete canals which divert water from place to place without actually treating and using it: “These banks and thresholds should allow rainwater to infiltrate the soil and thus reduce the risk of rockfalls and landslides,” said Felder Théolin, the Coordinator of the National Organization for Young Professionals Save Haiti (ONJPSH), initiator of the project. Best of all, using local labor not only helps by providing livelihoods, it exposes them at an early age to something easily replicable, involving them in long-lasting solutions, and, hopefully, strategic thinking about problems others dismiss as un-fix-able. Fig. 9.: Construction of terraces in Morne l’ Hopital. Photo: Logan Abassi – UN/MINUSTAH
Start high, work your way down As noted earlier, ravines are born in the mountains.
With tweaks such as adding hardwood and fruit tree varieties within terracing, as NGOs such as ORE do, projects like these would come closer to helping address a key environmental challenge for Haiti – reforestation.
To address violence and underemployment in Martissant, locals were employed by MINUSTAH, a peacekeeping mission of the U.N., in the mountains of Morne l’ Hopital above the neighborhood of Martissant. Teams built dry stone retaining walls and planted some 2 million bamboo plants and vetiver, a local grass variety with a modest root system good for anchoring banks (Fig. 9). Why do I single this example out? Because it uses readily available local materials – grass and rocks (ever-present in agricultural fields) – and simple, appropriate technologies and techniques – stacking rocks. The project attacks at its source high in the mountains the problem of environmental degradation affecting an entire watershed (and many neighborhoods) below with a strat-
27
HAITI 2010-2013 adapt
adaptive reuse aid
capacity-build cities conserve context demolition
developing nation displaced diverse educate engage
environment foster housing home
humanitarian design
impact integrate job lead mentor mitigate
training
multidisciplinary preserve relocate respond retrofit nonprofit outreach partner
permanent post-disaster reclaim reconstruct redevelop repurpose resilience stewardship strengthen temporary transition underserved urban urbanism A Haitian mason applies â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;crepissage and enduissageâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, or plaster finish, to the news walls of a seismically reinforced medical clinic, 2011.
12
13
14
15
16
Kay Solid/Kay Kat Fanmi Port-au-Prince, 2011-2013
Getting people back to safe homes following the January 12,
2010 earthquake in Haiti required rethinking traditional models for the design and delivery of housing by aid agencies. Kay Solid takes design cues from throughout the Caribbean - New Orleans, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and other cities in Haiti adapting passive cooling strategies and water conservation to a dense, urban context. Full-height openings and open floor plans allow for ample opportunities for ventilation as well as flexibility for customization by residents (i.e. subdivison for small businesses, rental spaces). Economy of material and simplicity of construction was achieved through the elimination of lintels, often a challenge for masons to do correctly, by incorporating them into reinforced roof and floor slabs. As the fourth anniversary of the earthquake approaches, permanent housing solutions such as Kay Solid are helping J/P HRO fulfill its goal to safely relocate all displaced residents of the Petionville Camp by January 12, 2014. Community design input session, 2012
A family relocated from Petionville Club camp moves to their new home, 2013.
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The two Haitian Creole names of the project reflect its fluid
identity, a path from original intent to its perception by the public. ‘Kay Kat Fanmi’, or ‘four-family house’, indicates its realization as two houses built by separate contractor teams to identify common challenges during construction. ‘Kay Solid’, or ‘solid house’, emerged after being overheard during public outreach.
Competitive spirit - one contractor is slightly ahead of the other in the application of plaster finish.
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During construction, the pilot project was used as a
model home by the Haitian Ministry of Public Works (MTPTC) to demonstrate earthquake- and hurricane-safe building practices to Haitian masons, homeowners, NGOs, and the general public. In 2013, I returned to Haiti with UN-Habitat to script and produce technical training films for use by the MTPTC, scheduled for release in spring 2014. A full compliment of public workshops helped shape the content for printed material (see following pages).
A Ministry of Public Works engineer shows local masons how to check for level. Still from a technical training film.
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SENIOR CENTERS 2002-2004 adapt adaptive
reuse aid capacity-build
cities conserve context demolition diverse educate engage environment foster housing home humanitarian design impact integrate job training lead mentor mitigate multidisciplinary preserve relocate developing nation displaced
retrofit nonprofit outreach partner permanent respond
post-disaster reclaim reconstruct
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These five facilities reach older citizens in some of Chicagoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most underserved communities. Whether providing classes in computer literacy, fitness, tax preparation, or addressing emergency and resiliency functions such as acting as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;cooling centersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in hot summer months, the Senior Activity Centers serve the specific needs of citizens age 60 and older in easily-accessible, and modern (but low-key) settings.
Sustainable design strategies include low-maintenance native species plantings, planters integrated into exterior walls and interior spaces, and large, flexible rooms. After extensive interviews with future users, continuous glass clerestories and skylit elements balance natural daylighting with security and privacy, limiting intrusive views by onlookers at street level while affording constant natural light and views of sky and trees.
Early clerestory and skylight concepts. 4
Englewood Center was planned as an adaptive re-
use and an addition to an existing muffler shop, featuring a skylit central atrium bordered by an interior planter, conceptually extending the landscape design to the interior. Urban space was layered - from most public at the street, a ‘mixing space’ at landscaped setbacks, to most private at interior. The building’s massing, articulation of openings, and textured coursing of brick, provide much-needed acknowledgement of the human scale and moderation to a street dominated by busy traffic.
The design of each center responds according to its particular
urban context. Portage Park Center was inserted into the existing walls of a historic Chicago Park District Fieldhouse changing area, eliminating the need for extensive demolition and improving user traffic to the popular Olympic-sized pool. My role on these centers covered design through client interaction and construction administration (completed under STL Architects).
A continuous clerestory quietly signifies the location of the new Portage Park senior center (right). 6
Ravine mitigation Port-au-Prince, 2011-2013
In late 2011, following unstable
conditions in the Petionville IDP camp managed by J/P HRO, the NGO conducted an extensive search for suitable locations for the establishment of a new clinic to serve both residents of the camp and the adjoining Delmas 40B neighborhood. A private residence was located, selected, and underwent an earthquake-resilient retrofit and adaptive reuse to transform it into a medical clinic. Located alongside one of the ravines which bisect Port-au-Prince, directing stormwater from mountains to sea, the facility was threatened by an eroding ravine edge composed partly of soft soil, undermined by the scouring action of water during the wet season, compounded by acceleration around a sharp turn in the ravine.
Ravine before mitigation, 2012. J/P-1 Clinic is visible at top left. Ravine curves sharply at Impasse Belo near the clinic (â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Câ&#x20AC;&#x2122;). LIDAR DEM digital terrain model of ravine bisecting the neighborhood. Source: World Bank Natural Hazards Assessment Team (NATHAT)
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Ravine before mitigation, 2011.
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Following analysis by a Natural
Hazards Assessment Team (NATHAT) from the World Bank, a two-phase mitigation was undertaken: 1) A temporary wall of wire gabions filled with stone was erected until funds were secured for 2) a permanent wall faced with concrete finish, topped with a concrete curb and gutter to direct surfacewater away down the ravine face, and a concrete balustrade to discouage the dumping of trash and protect pedestrians from falls. JP-1 Klinik Kominote continues to provide community healthcare services to over 1,000 individuals weekly. This project fueled my further interest in urban ravines, (see my article â&#x20AC;&#x153;The Ravines of Port-auPrinceâ&#x20AC;?, UrbDeZine, 2013).
Ravine after mitigation, 2013.
Ravine after mitigation (under construction), 2013. New gutter directs water along and away from ravine. New concrete walls prevent falls.
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