2018 Indonesia Tsunami Appeal Metasynthesis by Disasters Emergency Committee

DEC Meta-synthesis indonesia disaster response

Central Sulawesi May 2021

CREDITS COMMISSIONED BY DISASTERS EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

AUTHORED BY ROOTED IMPACT:

MEGHAN CORNEAL MEGHAN@ROOTEDIMPACT.COM PRADYTIA PERTIWI PRADYTIA.PUTRI@GMAIL.COM MARIKA BAIRAMYAN MARIKA.BAIRAMYAN@GMAIL.COM

acknowledgements The Rooted Impact team would like to thank everyone who contributed to this study.

Disclaimer The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Disasters Emergency Committee. This report is a learning document, not an evaluation. It does not offer an external and objective view, but rather tries to highlight the opinions, views and recommendations that have emerged from a desk review and limited consultations with stakeholders of the DEC funded disaster response in Central Sulawesi. CITATION: CORNEAL, M., PERTIWI, P. & BAIRAMYAN, M. (2021). METASYNTHESIS OF DEC RESPONSE IN CENTRAL SULAWESI, INDONESIA. ROOTED IMPACT

Table of Contents SUMMARY

The Appeal

The Response

The Meta-Study

WHAT HAPPENED

OUTCOMES

PEOPLE

IMPLEMENTATION

Highlights

Conclusion

37 40

Acronyms

Photo Credit: Save the Children

SUMMARY On October 4, 2018, following the devastating effects of a series of earthquakes and tsunamis, the DEC launched a fundraising appeal to support crucial disaster response and recovery efforts in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. The appeal successfully raised GBP £29.6 Million, including GBP £2 Million in matching funds, to deliver multisector programmes for disaster affected people. The funds supported 13 of the DEC’s members to provide life- and dignity- preserving activities from October 2018 until December 2020. Following the Indonesian Government mandate of a localised response, some DEC members faced preliminary access issues due to lack of presence in the region, restrictions on international personnel, and in some cases lack of pre-positioned partnerships with national disaster response actors. Phase 1 was delivered over a six-month period from October 2018 to March 2019. Partners focused on meeting immediate, basic needs through a range of sectoral interventions. These included emergency and transitional shelters; access to clean drinking water and emergency latrines; education in emergencies; emergency health services; and food and NFI distribution. Phase 2 was delivered over an 18-month period from April 2019 to December 2020, focusing on transitional recovery activities. During this phase, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic caused further disruption to relief activities.

DEC was flexible in its support of its members and their partners, which was crucial in addressing early operational challenges. DEC and its members continued to learn throughout the response to address ongoing needs while adapting to a new humanitarian paradigm that necessitated a stronger focus on how agencies will deliver a more localised, inclusive, and accountable. DEC members positively contributed to the humanitarian landscape in Central Sulawesi by designing and adjusting strategies to better include marginalised groups; to prioritise feedback; and to invest in local capacity development. The DEC response was comprehensive, covering many sectors and sub-sectors of disaster response. The diverse mandates of DEC members included both mainstream and specialised humanitarian partners and this contributed to the scope and success of responding to varied needs and crucial rights of communities. While successes were achieved across all sectors, cash programming was highlighted as an effective and important intervention to ensure dignity and flexibility for local communities. The voice and leadership of atrisk groups was instrumental in informing inclusive adaptations to mainstream

humanitarian activities (e.g. inclusive latrines) and safe spaces (e.g. Women’s Spaces). Members and their partners need to invest in partnerships and preparedness to ensure both technical and organisational readiness in future responses. There is also room for improvement to ensure greater coherence and collaboration as well as sharing of resources and expertise across DEC members.

Source: DEC 2018 Indonesia Appeal Final Report

This meta-synthesis study took place between late February and late April 2021 to examine key and shared learnings across partners and provide recommendations to inform future joint responses. The following key outcomes were achieved across DEC partners:

KEY Recommendations

ENGAGE in preagreements with national partners outside of programme specific partnerships, including plans for and investments in capacity development. Collaborate with other DEC members on how to support shared partners.

PLAN for greater harmonisation of approaches across DEC members, including approaches to localisation and joint exit strategies. Ensure flexible resources to support these efforts. CENTRE localisation in the partnership model between DEC members and national partners, prioritising the inclusion of representative organisations i.e. women's organisations, organisations of persons with disabilities, older people's associations.

COLLABORATE to create a common approach to cash programming from the onset of a disaster response. Integrate good practices in cash transfer with different sector strategies and behaviour change strategies to create greater shared impact.

STRENGTHEN DEC member capacities in inclusive data (Sex and Age Disaggregated Data and disability) as a preparedness strategy. Include and capacitate representative groups in the collection and ownership of inclusive data (e.g. OPDs).

PROMOTE multi-sector / integrated approaches within one organisation and collaborative approaches between different implementers (e.g. integrating health, nutrition, and livelihoods).

ESTABLISH common data quality strategies and minimum standards that reflect good practices such as data disaggregation, data sharing across stakeholders, and collaboration on data initiatives.

The Appeal When a series of devastating earthquakes1 and subsequent tsunamis hit the province of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia in September 2018, the DEC – which brings together 14 of the UK’s leading humanitarian aid agencies2 – launched an appeal to rapidly raise funding and roll out life and dignity preserving response and recovery activities to meet the needs and rights of disaster affected communities.

Estimates of the devastation in Central Sulawesi include mass casualties (4,400 people), thousands of people seriously injured, and mass displacement (170,000 people), severe environmental3 and infrastructural damage, and large-scale economic losses (estimated GBP £945 Million).4

The appeal successfully raised £29.6 Million, including GBP £2 Million in funding from the UK Government’s Aid Match scheme, providing assistance to meet the immediate needs of disaster affected people during Phase 1 (6 months) and ongoing support for recovery in Phase 2 (7-24 months).

On October 4, 2018, the DEC launched an appeal to the British public to support crucial disaster response and recovery efforts in the affected areas around the province.

Disaggregated figures show an estimated 46% of people reached by the DEC response were women and girls and 43% were men and boys.5

1 Including a 7.4 magnitude earthquake with its epicentre near Palu city centre. 2 DEC Member Charities include 14 members of which 13 responded in Central Sulawesi. 3 Caused by landslides and liquefaction. 4 World Bank (2020). Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. 5 The remaining 11% was not disaggregated across DEC member output data.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia shifted the delivery and timeline of some members’ relief and recovery activities and required flexibility of the current funding mechanism.

localisation, inclusion, and accountability to affected populations (AAP). The Central Sulawesi response provided an opportunity for real time application of these principles, since the Indonesian government mandated a localised response.

Being governed by its commitment to accountability to affected populations (AAP) and as a steward of good practice, the DEC encouraged and supported its members in adherence to the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) and Sphere Standards across individual member responses and its collective humanitarian action in Central Sulawesi.6

International agencies, including all DEC members, were directed to collaborate with and support national partners from the onset of the humanitarian action. The context in Central Sulawesi created some operational challenges and many opportunities for DEC and its members to aggregate their previous relevant experience in addressing responses, local networks and adapt to a new humanitarian paradigm.

In accordance with these key internal and external standards, the DEC accompanied its members to promote and implement key principles of the Grand Bargain Agreement, including policies and strategies for

DEC Funding Guidelines Phase 1 (6 months) Funds are for:

Scope

● ● ● ●

Immediate humanitarian relief Rapid impact livelihoods support Emergency shelter Early stages of recovery and reconstruction where appropriate

Phase 2 (7-24 months) Funds are for recovery and reconstruction: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Continuation of relief activities, if necessary Livelihoods recovery programmes Core shelter construction Consolidation of investments made during Phase 2 Ensuring that local scope, including partner capacity, is strengthened to withstand future crisis Conflict mitigation Rehabilitation of community structures

DEC’s commitments in their 2019-2024 strategy is ‘to continue to strive for the highest standards in programme quality, transparency and accountability, particularly to the people affected by crises’.

The Response Immediate Relief

Shelter

COMMON APPROACHES

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

COVID-19 Health

WHO WAS INVOLVED

People with Disabilities

National and local partners

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE

Protection

Education

Livelihoods

Cash

People of different gender identities

Pregnant Women

Indigenous Communitiess

Older People

Children

Women’s Empowerment

Advocacy

Infants

Disaster Risk Reduction

Food Security + Nutrition 3

Photo Credit: DEC

Photo Credit: Islamic Relief

Photo Credit: Yakkum Emergency Unit

The Meta-Study This meta-synthesis was commissioned to promote the DEC’s learning agenda and provide evidence where progress and improvements have been made, while also highlighting ongoing challenges and gaps that remained across the disaster response in Central Sulawesi as well as articulate on the lessons learned for future possible responses. It aims to be a strong tool for peer-to-peer and public accountability. The meta-study commenced in late February 2021, using a mixed methods approach, conducted by three researchers. Initial research questions were developed in consultation with DEC. The bulk of the study involved an extensive desk review of over 130 documents gathered from DEC and its members. Findings were initially coded against the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, followed by thematic analysis to reveal major learning themes. A partners’ workshop was organised in early April 2021 to discuss, validate, and deepen into the study findings. Representatives from DEC members and national partners attended and provided critical feedback. A follow-up survey was disseminated across partners to reach additional staff across DEC members. In late April 2021, a participatory workshop was conducted with DEC members and local partners to discuss final learnings in preparation for the final report.

Emerging learning

WHAT HAPPENED OUTCOMES The series of disasters in Central Sulawesi impacted local communities across many areas of their lives and created a significant need for humanitarian action and multisector interventions. Disasters Emergency Committee – through 13 of its members – successfully delivered a wide range of humanitarian actions in response to these disasters over the course of two years. These programmes were highly relevant to meet the immediate, basic needs of disaster affected communities during the emergency period and further improved their quality of life and recovery postdisaster. At the same time, the response empowered communities and respected their dignity and choices in assistance and services provided. ‘What Happened’ shares the major contributions as well as gaps and learnings emerging from DEC and members’ disaster response interventions and the effects these programmes made on the lives of communities across Phases 1, 2, and COVID-19.

Responding to critical needs (Phase 1) Learning points: ● ● ● ●

The diversity of assistance and services supported affected communities to meet basic needs and alleviate suffering during the emergency period. DEC partners showed a strong commitment to the needs and rights of marginalised groups. The response addressed gaps and ensured complementarity, i.e., mobile clinics, partnership with non-banking institutions for cash interventions, etc. DEC members empowered affected populations to be involved in the response (e.g. cash-forwork scheme).

The objective of the first phase was immediate humanitarian relief, which required rapid mobilisation of DEC members and implementing partners. In alignment with DEC funding guidelines for Phase 1, projects focused on meeting high priority, basic human

needs and alleviating suffering in the aftermath of the disaster. Early reports from the United Nations Humanitarian Country Team (UN HCT)7 confirmed priorities for immediate needs that were used by the DEC partners to plan for responses. The partnerships delivered critical

7https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sul

awesi%20Overview%20101018.pdf

assistance in shelter, livelihoods, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), distribution of food and non-food items (NFI), emergency health assistance, education in emergencies, and protection for communities in the districts of Palu city, especially Sigi and Donggala districts where DEC members focused their activities. DEC members, collectively, covered a range of sectoral interventions that contributed to supporting affected populations in meeting their basic needs during the emergency period (see Table 1). An analysis reference shows WASH, shelter and multi-purpose cash grants as the top three common interventions that provided affected populations with access to their basic needs. There were also few organisations providing specific interventions around other basic needs such as: food, nutrition, and health. There was a strong commitment to account for the needs of and provide targeted interventions for marginalised groups such as people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA), older people, people with disabilities, children, young women and girls. For example, Plan International and World Vision provided support to ensure the continuation of education for children during the emergency phase. Christian Aid and partner YEU ensured proactive health treatment by providing mobile clinics to deliver treatment to ‘hidden populations’ such as people with disabilities and PLWHA.

procedures within implementation and standard monitoring and reporting. ‘... The team was not able to find any tools to show how safeguarding was embedded into the programme cycle...' - PREDIKT evaluation. It is important to note that mass displacement and population movement created uncertainties that impacted the delivery of various interventions. Throughout the Phase 1 response, partners remained adaptable and responsive in meeting the needs of displaced people. Furthermore, the Indonesian Government shortened the emergency phase mandating agencies to move into the transition phase which had an impact on anticipated objectives. For example, in CARE’s programme framework, initial targeting for emergency latrines was one latrine for every 50 people during the emergency period. This shifted to one latrine for every 20 people during the transition phase to align with the Sphere standards. This change reduced the overall number of beneficiaries of emergency latrines.

A clear focus was put on safeguarding at-risk community groups. DEC members8 raised awareness of their staff and communities on Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) and child protection. Nevertheless, external evaluations9 reported inconsistencies in the integration of protection

Despite the success of some members in conducting multi-sector assessments through their local partners, others relied on external data (e.g. UN HCT Report) that guided ‘blanket relief’ distribution for some partners in the early days. It further affected the relevance of the intervention and scope of contribution to communities. For example, ActionAid’s livelihoods activities were constrained due to limited contextual understanding of the government’s livelihoods priorities during the emergency period and partners’ capacities in delivery of an intervention. Inevitably, activities such as those on planned income generation were refocused to Phase 2, with Phase 1 activities limited to producing coconut oil.

8 ActionAid, Tearfund, Plan International, Oxfam, Age

9 PERDIKT and Rooted Impact evaluation documents.

International, Save the Children, CARE.

Table 1. Changes to the community, gaps, and learning from Phase 1

Implementing partners

Major contributing factors to community wellbeing

Gaps

Livelihoods ActionAid

Health Age International World Vision Christian Aid

Limited livelihoods activities contributed to communities.

Marginalised Improved hygiene communities and access to PLWHA, older clean water led to a persons, persons with reduction in high disabilities were epidemiological provided with access risk. to emergency health services and regular Household medication. emergency latrines enhanced the protection for women and young girls.

Limited experience of members and local partners in livelihoods interventions. Uncertainty over priorities for livelihoods interventions.

Lack of awareness and stigma in the local context impacted identification of marginalised groups.

WASH British Red Cross CAFOD Christian Aid Age International TearFund Oxfam CARE Plan International World Vision

Shelter British Red Cross CAFOD Christian Aid TearFund CARE Islamic Relief

Cash Save the Children TearFund Oxfam CARE

Displaced people survived the sheltering period with shelter kits, kitchen kits, and repair kits.

Unconditional, unrestricted cash grants were used to meet end needs and provide flexibility and choice for people to decide how their money should be used.

Children were able to access safe ‘Cash for work’ spaces to learn in supported during emergencies. communities to financially and Local builders were psychologically empowered to survive the participate in shelter emergency. initiatives.

Limited technical expertise to address the needs of children and people with disabilities.

Delay in construction Unavailability of ID of Temporary cards for a large Learning Spaces proportion of target (TLS) and supply of groups required by shelter kits due to banking institutions to extended delay in open accounts for the procurement and transfer of funds. Prior lack of delivery of materials adequate hygiene by external vendors. Conflict within practices of the communities over targeted Limited availability of selection criteria. communities. materials in the local markets. Government policy Limited experience restricting cash of government transfers. stakeholders in WASH in emergencies.

Learnings

Responding partners

Major contributing factors to community wellbeing

Adapted Mobile clinics as a livelihoods proactive approach intervention for for revealing and Phase 2 with more reaching ‘hidden/ accurate marginalised contextual populations.’ mapping and coherence between members and partners.

Universal design latrines benefited everyone in the communities, including pregnant women, older people, and people with disabilities.

Empowering locals rather than outsourcing to external vendors.

Food ActionAid Action Against Hunger Tearfund

Nutrition Save the Children Action Against Hunger

NFI British Red Cross Age International Plan International

Protection ActionAid Tearfund Plan Oxfam Age International Save the Children

Helped restore household food security and improved nutritional quality of sustenance provided to disaster affected communities, including at-risk groups.

Proper Food and Enhanced survival Supplementary ability and an Feeding programmes alleviation in contributed towards suffering of the nutritional targeted improvement of communities. affected communities, particularly at-risk groups.

Data disaggregation provided information The intervention used to tailor also widened nutritional support opportunities for across groups, i.e., women and girls children, pregnant, to participate, i.e: and lactating women. through planning household nutrition, distribution of food.

Pre-agreement with non-banking institutions such as Post office/ Mastercard to Replacing transfer cash without Cash/Voucher the need to open intervention through individual accounts. the distribution of Common hygiene (shelter support) Clearly outlined nonpromotion materials. discriminatory messages aligned guidelines for with government’s selection criteria. Community Led Total Sanitation Using ‘cash for work’ (CLTS) to ensure approach to speed consistency in up cash hygiene disbursement amid messages. government restriction. Education Save the Children Plan International World Vision Islamic Relief

Provided safe Children were able to spaces for women, access safe learning girls, and children for facilities during engaging in emergencies. humanitarian action. Learning packages Raised awareness were a source of of staff and targeted benefit to students communities on and their siblings. GEDSI and the protection of at-risk communities in emergency situations.

Gaps

Maintaining the freshness/ quality of perishable foods (vegetables, fruits) during transport to communities.

Understanding contextual factors in relation to nutrition and its correlation with local dietary habits and food consumption.

Learnings

Strict scheduling of food delivery and good quality packaging of food items helped to maintain quality of food nutrition.

Empowering Consultations with midwives and cadres relevant helped educate stakeholders such communities on as the affected nutrition and how to population maintain a nutritious themselves, proved diet through effective in consultations on local addressing the eating habits, types of needs and rights of foods available and the disaster consumed, food affected longevity, and communities distribution method and schedule.

Reaching the Unreachable – Emergency Mobile Clinics of Christian Aid/YEU The YEU mobile clinics strategy was adopted as a proactive approach to reach community groups who, due to limitations with mobility or social stigma, were hidden away from society (for example, PLWHApeople living with HIV and AIDS, older persons, and people with disabilities. Christian Aid/YEU further provided regular medication for PLWHA, which deserves to be applauded given the systematic exclusion of these community groups pre-disaster, which only increases their risk in a crisis.

10 Data from Islamic Relief, CARE and Plan International.

Plan International experienced significant delays, with

Understanding Inconsistencies over contextual needs of evidence of different groups. integration of safeguarding into monitoring and reporting.

A clear, consistent plan for integrating protection and safeguarding into implementation, monitoring and reporting raised awareness of staff and communities to provide proactive intervention and support.

School attendance rate in target areas is not only dependent on the provision of kits and facilities but it can also be influenced by precrisis factors that are linked with sociocultural aspects (e.g. poverty) and competing priorities (e.g. girls entering into early marriage vs. sending them to school). Construction of TLSs have helped schools resume their ‘normal’ and routine educational activities.

A major common challenge for the DEC members was that none of them had a physical presence in Central Sulawesi prior to the disaster. This limited choices for reliable vendor selection for early distribution of aid. Some of the aid delivery or construction activities that were subcontracted to external (non-local) vendors by DEC members10 experienced delays due to the extended procurement process. The situation was further exacerbated by damage to infrastructure and limited availability of materials due to disruption in the local supply chain. Cash-based interventions were an emerging highlight in the DEC Central Sulawesi response. The emergency phase only one out of ten Temporary Learning Shelters completed by the end of Phase 1. The remaining nine were carried on to Phase 2.

embraced a variety of cash schemes, including unconditional and unrestricted cash grants, cash for specific purposes, and Cash for Work11. There is evidence on the success of cash-based programming providing flexibility and choice for people to decide how their money should be used. It has also been reported that Cash for Work contributed to the economic, physical, and psychological recovery of disaster affected communities. The implementation of cash-based programming was not without issues. Target groups were required to present Identification Cards (ID) for setting up accounts for receiving cash transfers. As most peoples’ documentation had been lost/destroyed during the disaster (and some older people and persons with disabilities never had ID cards in first place) reissuance or new civil registration for target groups resulted in delays in setting up an account. Members that did not work with banking institutions such as Save the Children, by passed this issue. Another systemic issue was the uncertainty over the Indonesian Government guidelines on cash-based programming. At the time, the government stipulated that unconditional cash transfers could not be released immediately and recommended using Cash for Work instead. In addition, the government restricted the number of cash distribution methods to one, giving exclusivity to the National Bank of Indonesia. In an effort to support localisation, DEC members were advised to liaise with the Indonesian Red Cross for problem solving/intervention solutions. Unfortunately, the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) at the time were not yet working at their full capacity and were not always available to assist.

Oxfam and World Vision Indonesia, as leaders of the Cash Working Group, joined forces with the Early Recovery Working Group and together advocated to speed up the process of cash-based transfer policy. The other issue regarding cash was the potential conflict that this intervention could create within communities. Due to the severity of disasters, villagers suffered equal financial consequences, and thus ‘jealousy’ over selection criteria took place. DEC members providing cash assistance combined strict selection criteria with wealth ranking in consultation with the communities to mitigate this issue. Defining selection criteria with communities – Save the Children Due to the sensitivity issue over the selection criteria of the recipients of multi-purpose cash grants, Save the Children used a wealth ranking exercise in consultation with the communities. Communities were engaged in the selection process, including selection committees, vulnerability selection criteria, and wealth ranking to identify the poorest people, and verify the lists before finalisation. Village members also identified the vulnerabilities in their area, developing together selection criteria which ensured the most vulnerable households were targeted. In addition to household damage and wealth, some of the community-defined selection criteria included: single/ woman/ child headed families, children below 2 years old, pregnant and lactating women, people with disability, and households with malnourished children.

11 Initiatives by Tearfund, CARE, Save the Children and

Oxfam

WASH was a major sectoral intervention in the DEC Central Sulawesi response due to damaged water infrastructure and poor hygiene practices of targeted communities, i.e., open defecation. DEC members provided structural and non-structural interventions, including hygiene kits and hygiene promotion and the construction of emergency latrines, including universally accessible water treatment units. Emphasis was also put on

educating the community for suitable hygiene behaviour and the maintenance of infrastructure. In this case, Save the Children and World Vision collaborated with the Ministry of Health to develop a module on CommunityLed Total Sanitation in emergency along with the IEC materials that were tested in the Central Sulawesi – Palu context and adopted by members providing WASH in Phase

Continuing interventions (Phase 2)

Learning points: ●

●

● ●

Clear-cut linkages between Phase 1 and Phase 2 brought greater depth of sectoral intervention quality which contributed to changing the quality of life and recovery of the affected communities. Prominent involvement of diverse community groups in the sectoral intervention through adoption of participatory and good practice approaches from past disaster responses, such as Cash/Voucher Transfer (cash), Rumah Tumbuh (shelter), Women Friendly Space. (Protection) ensured meeting the needs and rights of the disaster affected communities. Continued commitment and practices on inclusion by delivering tailored interventions to empower marginalised communities contributed to their active participation in the programme. However, tailored sectoral approaches targeting specific community groups were sub-optimal (i.e., livelihoods for older people). Emphasis on inclusion of women and child protection, limited structured approach on older age groups, and disability inclusion. Working with available mechanisms to create new spaces to stage voices and the participation of at-risk community groups, i.e., women and older people benefiting from sustained self-recovery.

The objective of the second phase was to provide a continuation of relief activities, with a focus on livelihoods recovery and shelter construction, emphasising empowerment of communities, and making available structures to benefit self and longer-term recovery. Due to COVID-19, Phase 2 also addressed changes that the pandemic brought to the

health sector and the way humanitarian action was delivered. While there was a limited period for proper assessment during Phase 1, the planning and design process for Phase 2 was supported by sound assessments and real-time learnings conducted by individual DEC members and

joint-evaluations or assessments12. Some members strengthened the process by conducting a complementary assessment to understand the needs, capacities, and characteristics of women, children, and older people through the implementation of tools such as Rapid Gender Analysis and Rapid Need Assessment for Older People13. Phase 2 also offered a longer period of project conception and implementation for meaningful engagement of the targeted communities and respecting their choices for recovery. Breadth of sectoral intervention was maintained in Phase 2. WASH, shelter,

livelihoods and disaster risk reduction (DRR) were the main priorities in this phase which was also in line with local government policies (e.g. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Master Plan14) as many households, especially displaced people, had lost both their homes and income earning potential during the disaster. Four organisations continued with the provision of health, nutrition, and education services. Cash remained a popular strategy that was adopted across sectoral interventions such as shelter, WASH, livelihoods and education. Table 2 outlines an overview of major contributions, gaps and learnings from Phase 2 sectoral interventions.

Table 2. Changes to the community, gaps, and learning from Phase 2

Responding partners

Major contributing factors to community wellbeing

Livelihoods Save the Children British Red Cross ActionAid Christian Aid Age International Tearfund Oxfam CARE, World Vision, Islamic Relief Incomes of targeted individuals or groups have increased steadily to help sustain selfrecovery. Knowledge and skills of community groups, including marginalised communities to produce goods from local resources (coconut oil, fisheries, etc.) has increased. Provision of livelihoods assets supported continuous business operation.

Health Save the Children Christian Aid Age International Tearfund

WASH CAFOD Christian Aid Age International Tearfund Oxfam CARE World Vision

Shelter Save the Children CAFOD Christian Aid Tearfund World Vision

Cash Save the Children British Red Cross Age International Tearfund Plan World Vision Islamic Relief

Specific and targeted health interventions providing complementary health intervention for women and older persons i.e., through Posyandu Lansia and IVA/SADANIS screening - helped with early detection of illness (e.g. cervical and breast cancer) and implementing a treatment plan.

WASH interventions contributed to improved hygiene behaviour, access to clean water for daily and productive purposes.

The project provided the disaster affected communities with access to transitional shelter and learning spaces.

The affected communities continued to exercise a degree of control over cash expenditure relevant to sectoral intervention aid such as livelihoods, shelter, latrine and education being provided to them.

DEC/SwS Real-Time Evaluation and Household Economic Approach (HEA) conducted by Plan Indonesia, Save the Children, WVI during April-May 2019.

The projects The affected empowered locals population was in the construction given the freedom and maintenance of of choice and DEC partners latrines and water control over the raised awareness points. shelter design and and empowered local communities construction Water points, through case and including children, household/family women and other 13

The assessment was carried out by CARE, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children and Age International. 14 According to Governor Regulation No. 10 stipulated on April 12, 2019.

The involvement of women and young people increased their bargaining position in the family.

Gaps

Varied capacities of DEC members on livelihoods, particularly working with specific target groups such as youth and older people. Weak assessment of livelihoods capacities across community groups that could guide tailoring strategy for livelihoods delivery. Undocumented or no documentation of learnings on livelihoods from Phase 1 that could be used as a starting point to guide the sectoral intervention. Disrupted chain of production due to COVID-19.

Learnings

Responding partners

and school latrines continued to enhance safeguarding women and young girls.

Rumah Tumbuh approach.

Women were involved and demonstrated leadership in shelter construction. Weak Sex, Age, and Inconsistencies Uncertainties over Disability over practices of government Disaggregated Data universallypermanent shelter (SADD) to guide accessible latrines programmes tailored health across DEC challenged the intervention and members. alignment of referral. shelter Uncertainties over interventions to Limited mechanism resources for the government’s and practice for case maintenance of plan. referral. water points and communal latrines. Unclear strategy to sustain health access of communities, particularly marginalised groups. Good efforts on capacity development of health cadres and reviving Posyandu Lansia, but unclear source for financial resources for sustained services.

Improve capacity assessment of members to implement livelihoods programmes.

Enforce practice of SADD collection within the health sector. Encourage the continuum of how data is Conduct capacity systematically assessment of target delivered and used groups to guide tailoring to inform and adapt strategy for the ongoing livelihoods interventions activities, or and anticipate issues. advocacies, i.e., health insurance. Refocus production to supply personal protective equipment such as masks, etc.

Explore and develop a unified manual on universallyaccessible latrine that could benefit diverse groups and would be used by all DEC members.

DRR ActionAid CAFOD Tearfund CARE Plan World Vision

Education Plan International Save the Children

Protection Save the Children ActionAid CAFOD Christian Aid Age International Oxfam

Engage with representative organisations (OPA and OPDs) to ensure quality and accessibility of latrines.

Rumah Tumbuh was an appropriate sectoral approach for the Central Sulawesi context. Continue with shared approaches that are context appropriate/ specific.

at-risk groups in overseeing aspects of cash management.

Cases of misuse of funds were found despite a low percentage. In these cases, funds were used for other purposes such as weddings and health treatment. Handling of the misuse of funds was unclear.

Strengthen the process for assistance given in handling cash and reducing violations at the community level.

COVID-19 British Red Cross Christian Aid Age International Tearfund World Vision

Major contributing factors to community wellbeing

Communities, families, and schools accessed for life-saving responses and emergency preparedness information which has increased their understanding of risks and has encouraged them to engage in mitigation efforts.

The intervention contributed to mainstreaming protection by establishing community groups representing voices of the marginalised members within the communities.

The project contributed to DEC partners widespread demonstrated their awareness on commitment to involve GEDSI and communities in building protection issues capacity in inclusive (GBV, PSEA, and disaster preparedness, child protection). informed by Gender, Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI). Inconsistency over documenting risk assessment and follow up action DRR as separate related to intervention rather than safeguarding issues. integrated/mainstreame d in sectoral Sustainability plans interventions. were unclear for the continued support and inclusion of representative (marginalised) groups, such as older peoples associations, within the existing disaster governance mechanism.

Children’s access to permanent learning spaces increased. Community ownership and engagement increased by involving parents in the construction of schools.

DEC partners provided affected communities with access to COVID19 health protocol messages and personal protective equipment.

The project supported transitioning to digital e-learning modules for students.

Gaps

Inconsistency/lack of effort towards DRR institutionalisation.

COVID-19 having a none reported negative impact on the learning process due to limited media and technology to support effective learning from home.

Learnings

Investing in local capacities for preparedness/ organisational readiness to respond will lead to a more timely and effective response to emergencies.

Direct representation Transitioning to e- none reported of marginalised learning contributed groups i.e., women, to strengthen older persons and access to people with education amid disabilities COVID-19. increased quality of safeguarding and protection.

Risk-informed sectoral interventions will benefit from increased agility and adaptivity in sudden onset crises such as COVID-19.

Despite the reported outcomes of increasing income or harvesting, livelihoods appeared to be the most challenging sectoral intervention in Phase 2 affected by both internal (programme) and external (contextual) factors. First, DEC members’ capacities on livelihoods varied, particularly around skills and understanding of working with specific target groups, such as youths and older people. Analysis showed weak or in some cases no assessment of livelihoods capacities across different target groups that could guide tailoring strategies for livelihoods programme delivery. There were no documented learnings on livelihoods from Phase 1 that could be used as a starting point in Phase 2 to guide the sectoral intervention. For example, livelihoods empowerment for older people led HelpAge and Christian Aid to trial several approaches due to sub-optimal outcomes, affected by motivation, level of energy, and financial literacy, that caused delays in project implementation. Early assessment of group characteristics and capacities could help with designing more tailor-made approaches, particularly for at-risk groups. For example, such insights could help members to apply a holistic approach involving the family as enablers of success for at-risk groups in livelihoods interventions. Second, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the local economy, exacerbating the risk of target groups to fall back from recovery progress. Businesses of target communities were affected, with many stopping their production due to no supply chain. Few with relevant capacities refocused their livelihoods activities to providing supplies of personal protective equipment such as masks. Nevertheless, this resulted in a deviation from business plans and there was no assistance provided around business continuity for communities.

Shelter for affected households (transitional and/or permanent) remained one of the most important areas for meeting immediate needs of disaster affected populations in Central Sulawesi. Additionally, permanent shelters for children and adolescents to be able to attend school was an important need met by Plan. All partners assessed shelter needs and responded with appropriate strategies that were aligned with government and international standards. Many members worked with local entities such as suppliers, builders, and local community members to benefit the local market, increase efficiency, and develop local capacities during the shelter construction process. Many programmes strongly included women in the decisionmaking process for shelter design and planning. The analysis showed the adoption of the Rumah Tumbuh model by DEC members to provide shelter intervention. The strategy was supported by the principle of a transitional shelter programme as the core structure, with a family’s holistic needs addressed through integrated and additional programming built around it. DEC members’ significant investment of time and resources in community involvement has not only built ownership, but also the capacities of the disaster affected communities to successfully receive, handle, and manage cash assistance. Communities supported by DEC programmes are now better prepared to receive government cash assistance in case of future disasters. Analysis also showed that a large number of beneficiaries self-invested additional funds to upgrade their temporary shelters into semipermanent shelters, indicating a level of ownership and in-kind contribution of communities to the delivered aid.

WASH committees were established to support the establishment of the WASH infrastructure. Training on water management was also provided for water committee members in each village. Engagement with communities revealed an ongoing substantial need for latrine rehabilitation and construction as well as awareness raising linked to the use of latrines and general hygiene promotion. Phase 2 created more space to empower communities and especially marginalised groups to take part in the project implementation – for example, activism of women in construction activities and children’s involvement in community planning (musrenbang). Systematic empowerment for Older People’s Associations (OPA) and Organisations of People with Disabilities (OPD) remains scarce, which limited exploration on potential pathways of leadership, contribution, and partnerships of these representative organisations with humanitarian organisations. Figure: Rumah Tumbuh model

Open defecation was observed as a common practice in most of the communities. WASH interventions, including support for water points to increase access to clean water was needed to improve the current conditions. The focus on delivering more inclusive latrines was an important element of the DEC response in Central Sulawesi, particularly in Phase 2. Many humanitarian actors were constructing latrines, but accessibility continued to be a critical gap. ‘Pregnant women, the elderly, and people with disabilities have access to appropriate, safe, clean, and reliable disabilityaccessible latrines. Each latrine is designed to be larger in size than the common latrine; comes with a toilet seat instead of squat toilet; ramp for wheelchair access; handrail for safety; the door opens outward to evacuate quickly and easily especially during earthquake/emergencies and provides adequate lighting.’

Partnering for inclusion – Age International Representation of older people in local humanitarian forums prior to the disaster in Central Sulawesi was scarce. Age International in the framework of inclusion, protection, and empowerment, established OPAs in five villages - now legally registered as local organisations. OPAs were also involved as partners in implementation. For example, in livelihoods, OPAs were involved in designing a selection of interventions, organising meetings, selection of beneficiaries based on agreed criteria, and monitoring of results. Acknowledging the administrative limitations, young volunteers were recruited to strengthen organisational management.

Finally, Phase 2 also marked the transition from response and recovery to preparedness. A variety of activities were implemented by DEC members to equip communities, families, and schools with life-saving responses, emergency preparedness information and an understanding of risks and mitigation efforts. Commitment to building inclusive preparedness, as informed by GEDSI, through an alliance was established among 13 villages15. Nevertheless, efforts to institutionalise DRR remained weak, and it is hard to predict the level of preparedness of communities to respond to future disasters. Furthermore, DRR was also seen as a separate intervention rather than an informing sectoral intervention, which can benefit the community’s adaptability and agility.

Adjustment to COVID-19 needs The first confirmed case of Coronavirus (COVID-19), which was later declared as a global pandemic, was reported on March 5, 2020 in Central Sulawesi. From the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in Central Sulawesi, DEC members were very responsive to establishing COVID-19 precautionary safety procedures. COVID-19 had a clear impact on the ability of staff to continue with in-person training and monitoring activities. Plans had to be adjusted to physical distancing guidelines, restrictions on the movement of people, particularly across regions, and changes in coordination with other public and private stakeholders in the region. DEC members adapted their implementation plans well to introduce COVID19 health and socio-economic solutions in the communities.

COVID-19 caused most DEC members to review programme plans and adjust the implementation timelines and activities, to allow sufficient time for the completion of their humanitarian interventions. Virtual training sessions were not common for staff and volunteers. For example, in the BRC programming, almost all training was done virtually for health workers, home care volunteers, and caregivers. Connectivity issues and a lack of familiarity with online learning methodologies created some barriers to learning for participants. COVID-19 limited members’ efforts to further invest in strategies for sustainability for sectoral interventions. For example, Christian Aid and partner CWS could not secure financial commitment from village officials to fund the maintenance of water committees and WASH infrastructure due to required reallocation of funds to COVID-19. Another similar situation occurred in the continued support of OPAs established by HelpAge, due to budgetary cuts from the village.

Overall CHS performance Members used the Core Humanitarian Standards on Quality and Accountability (CHS) as guidance throughout the response period. Different members also adapted variations of these standards to conform their own internal quality standards. For example, CARE has its own Humanitarian Accountability Framework (HAF), and Christian Aid developed a set of 10 Quality Standards. In addition to overall humanitarian standards, few organisations such as Plan International, were also guided by education-specific standards, such as InterAgencies Network for Education in

15 In Oxfam intervention.

Emergencies (INEE), and also benefited from Government SOPs, such as Regulation for Building Codes and Cash in emergencies. During the meta-synthesis process, an analysis of key data sources examined the reporting of DEC members against the CHS. The following table reports the tracked references according to each standard. The highest number of references revealed significant focus on the effectiveness and timeliness of members’ humanitarian actions. This finding is in alignment with many partners focusing on quantitative delivery of aid and

activities and adherence to technical quality standards (Sphere). The next highest reference reported was CHS 3, which focused on strengthening local capacity and aligned with the DEC and its members’ commitments to localisation. This was followed by appropriateness and relevance, adaptation (CHS 7), and feedback (CHS 4), which were given priority focus by DEC members. Other CHS were less reported, which in some cases directly correlated to areas for improvement – for example the need to address staffing issues (CHS 8).

Table 3. Quantitative results of desk review analysis by CHS during meta-synthesis study

Desk Research Reference by CHS CHS 9 CHS 8 CHS 7 CHS 6 CHS 5 CHS 4 CHS 3 CHS 2 CHS 1

35 37 147 80 45 131 176 262

152 0

100

150

200

250

300

WHAT HAPPENED PEOPLE Partnership The partnership model in Central Sulawesi was largely driven by the Government of Indonesia's new policy on localisation meaning that the access of international actors was limited, and local partnerships were essential. This created a unique context for the localisation of humanitarian aid and DEC members responded to this policy by partnering with local and national actors. To achieve and maintain mutual respect and trust between partners a Grand Bargain Localisation Workstream’s Guidance Note on Partnership Practices for Localisation16 was put into action by DEC members. The Note enabled clarification and guidance and allowed for a smooth two-way learning process between INGOs and local NGOs while supporting their individual abilities, knowledge and experiences. ‘Importance of relationships (organisations are made of people) – is crucial to ensuring a well-coordinated localised response.’ Some DEC members had pre-established working relationships with national partners through existing networks and past disaster responses, however many had to move quickly to solidify national partnerships in the early days following the disaster. For example, Christian Aid engaged with its partners CWS and YEU through the ACT Alliance network and CAFOD engaged partners through the

More than 400 humanitarian agencies contributed to identifying the priority partnership practices for localisation; approximately 85% of them were local/national actors. The basis of the guidance note is the findings of the research conducted in Myanmar,

Caritas network. The DEC members with previously established partnerships had partners with better capacities, strengthened through earlier engagements, nevertheless they still needed additional guidance and training. ‘However, the highly capable national and local organisations in the affected area is limited, resulting in multiple international agencies seeking to engage with the same partner, thereby causing an increased risk of their capacity being overstretched. This overstretch has been observed over the initial three months of the response.’ National and local partners were inundated with partnerships and funding from different INGOs. For example, national partner YEU had 11 different donors/partners during the Central Sulawesi response. There are limited case references where DEC partners intentionally collaborated and shared resources to better support national and local partners in capacity development and activities. In cases where synergies were found, this was facilitated by the national partner. For example, YEU facilitated better coverage of different at-risk groups by engaging Christian Aid (people with disabilities) and HelpAge (older people) in collaborative planning for a shared target area. Another example is the Household Economic Approach (HEA) conducted jointly by Plan Indonesia, Save the Children, and WVI.

Nepal, Nigeria and South Sudan in 2018 as part of the Accelerating Localisation through Partnerships programme. It was further reviewed by participants of the regional and global Grand Bargain Localisation Workstream conferences in 2019and Localisation Workstream members.

The division of roles between DEC members and partners was apparent. Local partners were usually assigned to handle community engagement while DEC partners held the sectoral specific expertise providing capacity development or technical assistance to local communities.

humanitarian response improved significantly in comparison with previous responses. This was due to an improvement of new competences, resources, and approaches by local actors who were also very actively involved in the humanitarian coordination and decision-making mechanisms.

Partnerships with representative organisations, such as women’s groups, organisations of persons with disabilities (OPD), and older people’s associations (OPA) were mainly supported by members with specialised mandates on inclusion of these groups. For example, Age International and its partners worked to establish and build the capacity of OPA networks, ActionAid strongly supported the role of women’s groups, and Islamic Relief registered and utilised the Gender Age Marker (GAM) for the design phase. Working with women focused organisations was a strategic choice of partnership. It is important, however, to provide clear guidance and regular mentoring on how to ensure and measure programme performance in line with the YAPPIKAActionAid (YAA) agenda on women-led protection programmes in the humanitarian context. More mainstream DEC members did not systematically engage with these groups.

Staffing

There is also limited evidence on interpartnership cooperation, learning, and synergies between DEC partner responses. Although all of them participated in DEC member committee meetings, the follow up actions and flow of communication were not clear. Partnership with government institutions was seen as very supportive for the implementation of government programmes. Government agencies acknowledged that the quality of

Surge capacity was a challenge for most members and their partners in the early days with many international agencies ramping up operations. There was competition amongst INGOs entering Central Sulawesi, which created difficulties for smaller INGOs and national partners in recruiting experienced staff. Human resources were also constrained to undertake adequate capacity development. ‘Local hires with past humanitarian experience were limited and many members relied on new graduates and short-term volunteer models to fill gaps in staffing. It was difficult to recruit and retain qualified local staff with the resources available.’ Application of ethical recruitment principles as outlined in the Guidance Note on Partnership17 assisted in the hiring of local personnel with a deeper understanding of the local context and existing networks. Despite the fact that DEC members were trying to fulfil these gaps and provide some capacity building to the newly recruited staff, this was still insufficient, and thereby influenced the quality of implementation. For example, staff turnover at Plan created knowledge gaps in coordination meetings, information was lost, and cluster meetings were inefficient with no follow up actions. However, some capacity improvement of staff was still seen among local

17 referring to support of staff to do their job effectively

and treat them fairly and equitably

organisations. For example, YEU provided training on Protection and Inclusion in Humanitarian response, as well as training on CHS, old age and disability mainstreaming, PSEA, and awareness on GBV to all of its staff, and particularly to the new recruits. Oneon-one coaching and mentoring were also provided to staff during visits by HelpAge International advisor on disability, however the question of sustainability of this knowledge still remains, especially due to the turnover. Staffing challenges were also seen in the education sector (e.g. lack of availability of teachers and educators to operationalise TLS and actively engage in the implementation of Education in Emergencies (EiE)). Therefore, some of the organisations have taken lessons learnt and considered identification of human resources gap and staffing challenges for future responses. For example, as there was a gap in assessing capacity of local partners, YAA is going to maximise the assessment of local partners in accordance with programme needs in future. Despite staff turnover at local partners, meaning that staff working in the projects was often changing and communication with the beneficiaries was done by several people, the local partners managed to ensure that the staff received a positive attitude from community members. For example, as a result of Oxfam’s local partners experience and outreach with an existing network, they were able to ensure respect for the do-no-harm principle and prevent conflicts among target communities. This was also seen as a result of application of ethical recruitment principles in the Guidance Note that helped the actors to build better structures for their operations by recruiting locally and committing to strengthening the capacity of their local personnel. For example, Church World Service (CWS) and Christian Aid worked together to support several local actors; CWS provided management support,

while Christian Aid was responsible for providing programme support. The scale of the response was a steep learning curve for many national implementing partners. More support was needed from DEC members to help these organisations bridge gaps in capacities and activities. ‘To improve the quality and accountability of the programme going forward, it is important to identify staff capacity building needs from the outset, so that resource development programmes will be in line with the needs of programme implementation both in practical and sustainable ways.’

Coordination Coordination and coherence with the overall response was inconsistent – in some areas members achieved strong coordination and complementarity and in others there were gaps. For example, coordination with clusters and government came strong across DEC member, which benefited the quality assessment and sectoral planning, complementarity, and synergies. Some DEC members were leading cluster coordination such as CARE and Oxfam. Coordination between DEC members and local partners was not always effective as it was not clear what the roles were and how local NGOs were supposed to be involved in the coordination meetings of DEC. At the start of the emergency, when there was significant international technical support deployed to the response, there were difficulties in ensuring engagement with technical sector coordination as Bahasa Indonesian was predominantly spoken, which international staff did not speak.

The regulation and disaster management programme implemented by the Government did not run optimally. The process of coordination and information distribution had flaws, making it difficult to operate for agencies/institutions involved in the disaster response in Central Sulawesi. For example, the delay in providing lists of disaster affected communities from the government resulted in slowing down the response of Christian Aid. The coordination for DEC members and partners was demanding as the Government capacities were generally low. DEC members and partners had to work to build capacities of these offices (e.g. Water Management Department). Therefore, the above-mentioned encouraged DEC members (e.g. CARE and Oxfam) to actively engage and in some cases even lead the coordination of clusters. Such coordination was seen as a success, when for example, DEC members avoided working area overlaps, as well as exchanged information on the progress of the interventions. In the majority of cases cluster coordination meetings were used by the DEC members to avoid duplication or overlapping in assistance as well as to share learnings and good practices with other humanitarian partners. Such coordination has shown that there were informal relationships between organisations and the lack of formal agreements reduced the points of reference available to collaborate, or at least avoid particular overlapping. Overall, there was a need for greater harmonisation of approaches. Among the successful cases of coordination resulting from coordination meetings among DEC members in Palu was using the shared matrix informing the working areas of various agencies. For example, CARE changed its operation area from Dampal to Sibado village after noticing that one of the agencies was implementing similar livelihoods activities there.

The response was challenging to coordinate with the government, due to insufficient management between the different levels of government and UN mechanisms working in parallel. The DEC members successfully coordinated with various stakeholders to ensure quality implementation of their responses and supplement each other’s activities. For example, Plan Indonesia established coordination with the Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) Working Group (BNT) in Central Sulawesi regarding modalities, intervention areas, and institutions involved in CVA programmes to avoid overlapping interventions. YSTC coordinated with the Government of Indonesia, through the national disaster management agency (BNPB) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, YSTC collaborated with the Department of Registration and Civil Service for the distribution of new national ID cards to beneficiaries who lost them. At the UK level the successful coordination was done by Plan which coordinated with other DEC members through the DEC online learning platform and face to face meetings. Coordination with other DEC members in determining locations and implementing activities so as to not overlap with HEKS, HelpAge, Christian Aid, and CBM at Ngatabaru Village-Sigi district also took place. Few good collaborations were also held across DEC members when it came to joint need assessment, joint real-time evaluation (RTE), and learning (e.g. report on localisation). Overall, there is no extensive evidence that the DEC members had a follow up mechanism for the exchange of information and learnings from the coordination meetings as well as any joint follow up actions.

Additional tools also successfully supplemented the coordination of the response such as WhatsApp groups and emails. However, this was complicated with teams constantly moving and changing. Moving to national Technical Advisors and Programme Managers and trying to minimise turnover helped overcome this. Coordination and communication between field officers in project locations with the main offices in Palu was further hampered by distance and a lack of communication facilities in the field. This required staff to travel two to three hours one way for meetings to update on project progress and influencing efficiency of the response. The challenges faced by the programme during the COVID-19 period included work plan adjustments and coordination that did not work optimally due to internet constraints.

Information Management The information exchange between DEC members was limited to the DEC member meetings, UN cluster, and committee meetings and mainly covered information on the ongoing progress of the response and the coverage areas for avoiding overlaps. Positive information dissemination mechanisms have been observed that informed community members on the details of the humanitarian interventions from the very onset as well as ensured their involvement in various assessments such as real time evaluations (RTEs) and community needs assessments. Besides displaying the visibility banners with key project information, including feedback mechanisms and safeguarding reporting procedures in communal areas, they have also been efficient at spreading

information. One of the successful approaches of information transparency was displaying the beneficiary lists of non at-risk groups publicly for verification. However, information sharing was seen as challenging in some cases due to the lack of consideration for local language. DEC members considered the Complaints Feedback Mechanism as one of the successful means for receiving information from the communities. However, the majority of feedback received were questions, information requests or messages of thanks, which was eventually identified as a cultural tendency. The mechanism had various means for provisioning feedback such as a hotline, suggestion box, community meetings, and others. However, the most popular method of feedback was revealed to be face-to-face communication with project staff, although there was an increase in the use of phones and SMS/WhatsApp messages from April 2020 due to COVID-19. Training was also instrumental in assessing feedback/complaints and providing quick feedback to the communities. Nevertheless, some of the tools of this mechanism were seen as challenging, for example the timely access to information to all communities, such as comments provided in the suggestion box which could only be acknowledged by staff during field visits, resulted in delays to delivering responses. According to the partners’ reports, the majority of feedback and complaints were addressed and there was evidence of using community feedback to adapt sectoral interventions. Nevertheless, there is no clear indication of any one particular process of assessment and resolution common throughout all DEC members. Community meetings were also seen as an effective tool for the exchange of information (including budget and response plans). However, the provided information was not often retained, and regular reminders were

required. For OPAs in particular, information was also shared with family members and carers.

other organisations, and the mechanisms of cluster coordination at all levels.

Organisational Readiness The challenge was also seen in the overwhelming amount of information coming from various NGOs which confused communities. As a good solution, partners provided organisational information statements at the beginning of each meeting and wore visibility clothing. Another successful information delivery means on COVID-19 by the DEC members and partners was the distribution of Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) materials as well as the provision of training sessions (e.g. training on latrines and shelter building). Information with the communities was also shared by using the technology for COVID-19 IEC through SMS/WhatsApp or, when these were unavailable, via community focal persons directly relaying information from the Indonesian Red Cross/PMI. The decisionmaking processes were explained and contextualised, while expectations were also clarified. Village heads were also engaged to disseminate correct information on COVID-19 to the communities. Focus on more usage of technology due to COVID-19 in coordination, monitoring or programme implementation, was an innovative approach. For example, using WhatsApp Oxfam joined local and national actors to establish SEJAJAR, a national platform for CSOs and NGOs for responding to COVID-19 specifically, and more generally for promoting local coordination and leadership. The same platform was used in Central Sulawesi after the earthquake and tsunami for sharing information on rapid assessment results, contributing to the joint needs assessment and government response plan, analysing gaps and potential support from

DEC members had previous experience in disaster response which helped them in application of the lessons learned in the Central Sulawesi response. In its turn, DEC members also had a history of working with local organisations. Previous partnerships, through which capacities of local partners were increased, enabled successful implementation of the Central Sulawesi response. The social and relationship roles the local partners played at village level was crucial to the success of the interventions. For example, OXFAM and its long-time local partner Jemari Sakato established a Humanitarian Knowledge Hub (JMK), a network of international and local organisations that operate nation-wide. Many DEC members without pre-existing partnership relationships did not have the time to conduct a comprehensive partner assessment and faced challenges in understanding the specific capacity developmental needs of their partners and how to bridge these gaps during an emergency response. This meant that due diligence of new partners had to be conducted quickly to align strengths with proposed interventions. In cases where gaps and/or high-risk activities were identified, e.g. procurement, these activities were kept with DEC members or managed jointly. The main approach used by the majority of DEC members was capacity building of partners on the initial stage of the response, however less attention was paid to the additional identification of the capacity gaps and addressing those on ongoing basis, except for PSEA training, which were mainly encouraged by the donor requirements. The majority of partners still lacked sufficient capacity, especially financial one. For example,

Plan’s partner had a delayed process in reporting into YPII from REBANA and receiving feedback and government approval, which affected the flow of implementation. As a result, the financial instalments for procurement were delayed, causing delays in TLS and latrine construction. In another example, there was a delay in the TLS construction process due to inadequate financial reporting submitted by REBANA which caused delays with the disbursement of funds. As a result, delivery of specific services, such as education was delayed. Nevertheless, to overcome this situation, REBANA ensured the implementation of learning activities in temporary school tents. Few DEC members gave full authority to local partners to lead the response. For example, Oxfam and Christian Aid, both provided different levels of assistance to partners, with Oxfam having better processes and outcomes in building local leaderships, partly due to long term relationships and presence in-country. Some of the partners had to be coached and trained on the DEC project procedures such as the financial reporting mechanisms, narrative reporting requirements, technical sectors (WASH, Livelihoods, GEDSI), global standards (Sphere, CHS, Code of Conduct, safeguarding), development of JMK strategic plans, improved Standby Agreement and operational manuals (logistic, finance, and human resources). The largest issue with partner reporting was identified to be related to their supporting documentation for transactions. Another challenge was a lack of knowledge and expertise on standard monitoring, including documentation and data collection. For example, local partners were reluctant to follow the set rules related specifically to monitoring and financial management, and perceived the regular monitoring conducted by YAA in both financial expenditures and programme implementation

as too hands-on and showed lack of trust. They considered YAA’s practice of monitoring and close guidance as too meddlesome, therefore, efforts to increase cooperation from the local partners to follow YAA SOPs was quite challenging. Part of the reason was that all partners did not have prior experience of managing such large programmes and never had to follow such strict rules and procedures in planning, operations, and financial management.

Protection All the DEC member response activities are guided by core humanitarian standards and principles, including protection and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). For example, ActionAid's protection programme developed activities aimed at facilitating the formation of a system of protection mechanisms in the community, especially for survivors of gender-based violence. Informed consents were introduced as a form of accountability to affected communities for any information and material to be published. ‘DEC members and partners are always searching for ways to improve protection through various innovative approaches such as with the installation of solar lighting in latrines to increase the safety of the beneficiaries.’ Various protection related mechanisms and capacity building initiatives were put in place to avoid sexual exploitation and abuse by the DEC members. Some of the DEC members have issued an internal policy (Oxfam), others appointed safeguarding focal point (YPII), or applied code of conduct (Plan, AAH, Christian Aid and CAFOD). This commitment was translated to staff and field officers for signing and giving orientation towards code of conduct,

humanitarian principles, including CHS and the Sphere. PSEA and Child Protection Policies were also signed by each staff. Protection mechanisms were also applied on the community levels considering at-risk groups. YCP (CARE) also developed an output tracker that captured beneficiary data that was segregated by age groups, gender, and other factors of vulnerability, such as older persons, people with disabilities, and pregnant women. This is a good practice that could be promoted to other agencies for further adoption and replication.

developed a detailed Gender Action Plan to sensitise CARE and partner staff on matters that might be negatively impacting beneficiaries, if not taken into account during the intervention.

Capacity of DEC members and their partners is strengthened in terms of protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) principle, a zero-tolerance policy on serious misconduct, exploitation of vulnerable women and girls, anti-sexual harassment approach and safe and independent spaces for women. The members also searched for additional means to improve the quality of implementation of response and consider all possibilities for protection. For example, Child Protection was not covered under this funding. However, the Community Engagement Team of Save the Children worked with the Child Protection Team in an effort to establish and/or strengthen Children’s Forums in all the priority villages, to ensure that children’s voices were heard and accommodated in decision-making that would affect their lives. Plan Indonesia noticed that there was a risk for children to go to town for their basic needs. Bringing the local vendors to school areas provided safety for children and their families while acquiring education supplies. Protection aspects were also considered in the monitoring activities of various organisations such as CARE, which integrated gender and disability into its monitoring templates and

WHAT HAPPENED IMPLEMENTATION Context is crucial At the time of the earthquake, none of the DEC members had a presence on the ground in Central Sulawesi. Of DEC’s 14 members, 13 drew down funds18 for Central Sulawesi and responded through local partnerships.19 Some national partners also did not have an established presence in the province, while other partners were civil society organisations (CSOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). As international agencies, it took anywhere from a couple of days to over a week for DEC members to gain permission and access the region, establish operations, conduct rapid assessments and initiate the humanitarian response. The earliest operations commenced in early October 2018. The majority of DEC member programmes were based on sound assessments, which ensured the relevance and appropriateness of the response. For example, many members conducted multi-sector needs assessments and household economic assessments to identify priority areas during the emergency period as well as to prevent overlap and duplication with other DEC members and humanitarian actors. DEC programmes targeted people and areas where either no assistance had been received or where there were gaps in assistance and certain needs were yet to be met.

conducted specific assessments to meet the needs of at-risk and marginalised groups, including older people, people with disabilities, children, and women and girls. Local participation, including the voices of marginalised groups, was limited in the design process due to time constraints between arrival of members and pressure to meet immediate, life-saving needs. Members incrementally improved on this aspect and more meaningful participation was observed towards the end of Phase 1 and into the design and planning of Phase 2. Certain contextual factors constrained implementation strategies including obstacles perpetuated by cultural norms and dynamics within communities. For example, ensuring that all children can go to school and their protection in the process was an essential part of the delivery and coordination of educational activities. Plan, CARE, and Save the Children examined pre-crisis factors such as poverty, drop-outs, and early marriage to overcome cultural constraints and protection risks. Patriarchal culture also perpetuated certain discriminations in local communities, creating obstacles for DEC members to ensure equity of aid from the beginning of the response. Stigmas towards people with disabilities limited some assessments and accuracy of data collected since cultural norms often ‘hid’ these groups from public view.

Some members, such as CARE, Oxfam, Plan, Age International, and Save the Children

18 DEC member, CONCERN, fundraised for the

19 Concern Worldwide did not participate in the Central

response, but didn’t withdraw funds for implementation.

Sulawesi Response

Sensitisation and awareness raising was provided by different programmes to bridge possible cultural and behavioural constraints into enablers, such as caregivers. For example, during homecare visits in Age International’s programme, discussion and information sharing was done by health volunteers with family members on older people's care, including on nutrition and hydration. As a result, families started taking better care of the older people at home and paying attention to their specific needs. Where gender tensions were a risk in channelling resources into Women Friendly Spaces (WFS), partners worked to break down barriers and mitigate potential negative effects by creating spaces for open dialogue between women and men through the WFS. The local/regional procurement chain was a contributing factor to the delay of some activities. Members overcame this by surveying local markets to identify new potential vendors and find alternative solutions to the challenges of local sourcing and logistics. COVID-19 also significantly challenged members and their partners on the ground by having to shift to remote support during the first six months after restrictions were announced by the Indonesian Government (March 2020 – September 2020) and adapt programmes to be more responsive to new challenges and needs. In the future, it is important that DEC members work together to identify and incorporate strategies to address contextual constraints and embrace potential enablers to ensure success and sustainability of interventions.

Localising humanitarian action

Localising humanitarian action was both a result of Indonesian Government mandates and a shared vision for localising response by DEC, its members, and their partners. It was also one of the most challenging aspects of the response given the lack of prior presence in Central Sulawesi for most members while simultaneously navigating through the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. For DEC members that partnered with local CSOs/CBOs, such as Oxfam, ActionAid, CARE, Christian Aid, Save the Children, and Islamic Relief, the localised perspective, knowledge and relationships held by these partners helped facilitate better access to get to know the area, culture, and habits of the local community, while creating stronger connections and ongoing engagement and participation at the local level. For example, ActionAid’s partners SultengBergerak (SB) and IFRC quickly mobilised teams of local volunteers who responded in Palu, Donggala, and Sigi, carrying out needs assessments and providing relief supplies including tents, water, and food. Localisation is a journey and not a moment in time. Since preparedness was possible in this specific context, the DEC members were continuously balancing delivering activities and services that met ongoing needs with local capacity development. Despite challenges, localisation strategies were found across all DEC member programmes, starting from sector-based interventions through capacity development for sustainability and disaster risk reduction programming. The partnership model approach with local CSOs/CBOs and the involvement of beneficiaries as the centre of all activities were crucial to ensuring post-programme sustainability. Local government officials

acknowledged the increased role of national and local NGOs compared to in previous disaster responses. 20

The Accelerating Localisation Project identified and defined key guidance to support agencies to self-assess their partnership models. Some localisation strategies supported value for money across the response by utilising and salvaging local materials, creating synergies between sectors and connecting with other (government) funding sources to promote sustainability. Local government also noted that local actors have been better organised and thus making it easier for the government to provide policy guidance, information, and data. In the shelter component, DEC members worked with local entities such as suppliers, builders, and labour to benefit the local market and support efficiency. Alternative livelihoods activities included processing foods sourced from local raw materials, boosting the local economy, and creating connections with the local value chain. In the WASH programmes, training was provided to local government bodies to take over the responsibility for the operation of water treatment units. WASH committees were capacitated to facilitate maintenance and upkeep of water infrastructure by communities. For example, Action Against Hunger and its partner Aquaassistance donated two water treatment stations to the Public Works Office and Village Authorities in Sigi District for the production of safe drinking water. Operations and maintenance are covered by the local

government’s budget/village funds, ensuring sustainability over a longer period. To overcome constraints in order to meet educational outcomes, such as awareness raising on child marriage, Plan developed the local village’s capacity to establish a child protection committee and connected it with the yearly village fund allocated by the district government budget to ensure sustainability. Different partners were able to achieve different levels of localisation and much of this success could be directly correlated to the strength of local partnership frameworks and the inclusion of local government, communities and marginalised groups in different processes of the humanitarian programme cycle. The JMK initiative is a good example of strengthening local networks and capacities in the Central Sulawesi response. Oxfam and its long-time local partner Jemari Sakato established the Humanitarian Knowledge Hub (JMK), a network of international and local organisations that operate nationwide. Before the disaster in CS, there was more of a donorgrantee partnership between JMK and Oxfam but during the CS response the working relationship evolved to a more equal footing. The Oxfam-JMK collaboration built local capacity through a series of capacity building, coaching, and mentoring organised from the very beginning of its response, including focusing on Emergency Response Management, Standard Operating Procedures and technical standard delivery (WASH, livelihoods). JMK and local partners were embedded in the response structure with various functions and roles allowing them to learn, interact, and improve their capacity. Oxfam backed up the operation and continued to provide its support as relevant.

20 Consortium of ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid,

CARE, Oxfam, Tearfund)

However, no clear link was found between DEC members in terms of co-designing localisation strategies or collaborating on localisation plans to: a) provide DEC and members with an overarching perspective; b) outline common approaches from the onset of the response; and c) develop a joint exit strategy. More investment in preparedness and risk informed programming is needed to support localisation. Some DEC members had a presence in Indonesia at the time of the disaster and had a better understanding of the context and risks associated with disasters in Indonesia and the need for local partnerships. However, other members were limited to real time learning during the response. From this study it is clear that the pathway forward is for DEC and its members to initiate investments now to better understand local context and ways of working in order to be better prepared in the case of future disasters in Central Sulawesi and other disaster-prone areas. For example, there were no clear pathways for how DEC partners planned to develop the capacity of local government and civil society organisations to ensure continuity of activities upon exit of DEC members and funding. Some partners ended their interventions with clear exit strategies and handover to local government bodies while others without any proper handover.

function as community-based organisations by enabling them through intensive monitoring, reporting and finance training, and mentoring to undertake school construction work and continue to support schools. Late in Phase 221 of the response, the DEC supported a Collective Initiative – led by Oxfam, Plan, and Christian Aid – that focused on the different localised actions of DEC members. This study revealed and recommended a framework for measuring partnership for localisation,22 which is an important piece of learning to inform future preparedness and partnerships. The situation and constraints posed by COVID19 also encouraged the localisation of aid and support of the Grand Bargain commitment by prompting DEC members to pivot and support local organisations to significantly manage programmes. Localisation requires a significant shift in power from the current model of humanitarian action. DEC members would benefit from cocreating and co-investing in a framework of consistent and shared practices that advocate for and support local leadership and policy development, invest in local capacity development and preparedness, and define clear handover strategies with existing local institutions.

An example of a clean exit strategy case would be SCUK who supported school committees to

21 Pujiono Centre (September 2020). DEC Collective

Initiative: Measuring Localisation in the Central Sulawesi

Earthquake and Tsunami Operation – Towards Locally Led Humanitarian Response. 22 Pujiono Centre DEC Study Team.

Framework for Measuring Partnership for Localisation

Source: DEC Localisation Report – Central Sulawesi, Indonesia Response (September 2020)

Real time learning and adaptation The quality of monitoring, evaluation and learning practices, systems, and staffing was mixed across DEC members. Consistent practices included post-distribution monitoring, real time evaluation (RTE), focus group discussions and interviews with communities, periodic reviews, and learning events with various stakeholders. Adjustments were made to improve MEAL outcomes, including a more balanced approach to qualitative and quantitative information and outcomes. DEC members and their partners improved data collection processes, created real time data access and management, introduced new Information Communications Technology (ICT) systems, and mentored staff in quality practices. Gaps and slow delivery in the collection and use of sex and age disaggregated data (SADD) is attributed to the combination of limited MEAL experience by national and local partners, staffing challenges in Central Sulawesi, and contextual constraints, including

the fluidity of populations due to internal displacement and mobility as well as inactive government officers to support government data. During Phase 1, gaps in SADD were more prevalent. For example, data had to be recollected in some programmes due to inaccuracies and lack of understanding of specific nuances of collecting data around people with disabilities and older people. Some members used important tools like the Washington Group Questions; however, the capacity to properly use these tools is still limited across most DEC members. Partners incrementally worked towards addressing these gaps and delays in collecting and using SADD. Improvements provided members with the information needed to accommodate specific needs such as accessible latrines, determine hygiene kit items, and design more accessible community health service facilities, multi-purpose buildings and other public facilities within target villages. For example, Oxfam-JMK’s budget allocated for the construction of common latrines was

IDR 9 million and with accessible toilets it was approximately IDR 15 million. Having disaggregated data enabled management to adjust the budget and avoid any postconstruction renovations as experienced by some other organisations in the WASH cluster. As a result, the operation was more efficient and targeted.

The arrival of COVID-19 interrupted many activities and required adjustments to existing intervention plans, which impacted certain member activities. For example, the DRR component of BRC’s programme was removed to reallocate resources to the COVID-19 response. In these cases, the shift in activities was deemed appropriate.

Disaggregated data practices helped programmes to identify intersectional issues to better inform preparedness and protection.

Inclusion

‘The use of disaggregated data led to a more effective disaster recovery and preparedness process. It also helped us reach vulnerable and marginalised population groups and highlighted how it can promote inclusion and leadership by those left furthest behind.’ National and local partners need continued support by DEC members in SADD practices. In most cases, this needed to have happened earlier in the response and moving forward, will need to be improved to support stronger preparedness for future disasters. The DEC’s common reporting system and approach to learning supported DEC members to monitor, aggregate, and strengthen practices that contribute to SADD. Strengthening MEAL, including data practices, supported DEC members and their partners to be highly adaptable across Phase 1 and 2 and the DEC remained flexible in supporting its partners to adapt. For example, the decision to shift resources to address the impact of COVID-19 was a strategic move of the CS response and shows members’ responsiveness to the changing context.

Inclusion was a positive highlight of the DEC response in Central Sulawesi. Members prioritised at-risk and marginalised groups at all stages of the response. Some programmes had a stronger understanding and emphasis on the needs of specific groups from the beginning, such as the needs of women and girls, children, people with disabilities, and older people by using strategies such as detailed assessments (Rapid Gender Analysis by Oxfam and CARE), detailed household assessments (CAFOD/CRS), and equity and inclusion-based tools (Gender Age Marker introduced by Islamic Relief). There were also partners that strategically engaged with representative organisations in the collection of SADD, such as Age International and ActionAid however, this is an area that needs to be strengthened in future responses. While DEC members have strong technical capacity and a good knowledge base of inclusion concepts, inclusive humanitarian action is most effective when led by people and organisations with lived experience. For example, local OPDs can help guide – from experience – how to apply inclusion strategies in the local context to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Ensuring this becomes a characteristic of future responses is an important takeaway from the CS response.

Inclusive WASH facilities were an important intervention area supported across many DEC members, meeting a critical gap in the humanitarian context. ‘WASH facilities were designed to address the needs of people with disabilities, particularly people with limited mobility and vision impairment. Key features of the latrines are short distance from the classroom, wide pathway and room to accommodate mobility aid (wheelchairs, crutches, etc.), no steps, presence of hand railings, and wheelchair ramps.’ Women Friendly Spaces were supported by several partners to ensure women’s equal participation in various activities. This approach helped strengthen women’s capacity to participate in decision-making processes within the community related to humanitarian actions. Leadership training and other subjects introduced to women in the WFS have widened their perspectives and knowledge not only about gender equality, leadership, and GBV or SHEA, but also on parenting, psychosocial treatment, and citizen rights. ‘This Women Friendly Space, named Rumah Baca (Reading House), is managed by one of the focal points who formerly had no voice within her community, but following a series of training programmes with WALHI along with the close support by WALHI field staff, she managed to gain more confidence to speak up and even lead her group members to ensure their rights as women survivors to be respected by the village authority and other concerned parties.’

Intersectionality is an area that still needs to be strengthened to better understand how to address the disproportionate impact of crises on marginalised groups and intersecting identities, specifically women and girls as a result of gender discrimination, people with disabilities, and older people. ‘Research indicates that women, particularly young girls are more likely than men to be killed during a tsunami. Young women do not possess equal access to knowledge to survive and/or prepare for natural hazards. Action planning classroom evacuation drills facilitates equal opportunity to access knowledge.’ Partners continuously addressed social norms to support more equal participation in the humanitarian actions taking place; however longer-term interventions that address gender norms, intersecting identities, and power dynamics are needed to ensure equal access, knowledge, safeguarding and resilience of these groups. For example, some partners continued to observe that boys have more opportunities to participate in education, training, and other activities supported by communities.

Accountability Accountability to affected populations was of critical importance to both the DEC and its members and was evident at different levels of the response.23 Many partners highlighted accountability as a key strategy within the programme design through the establishment of feedback and complaint mechanisms and was also named

23 AAP and PSEA

https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/aa p_psea_2-pager.pdf

as a foundation of partnership agreements, including policies regarding protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). Communities were often engaged in the design of planned activities, though in this context the engagement often started a bit later due to the lack of presence in CS and the start-up challenges of humanitarian operations. Community leaders and representatives participated in needs assessment, response planning, finalising beneficiary selection criteria, beneficiary selection, and providing feedback on implementation, learning and project results.

engaging in interviews and focus group discussions around PDMs were effective. Some partners developed more robust systems and dashboards to support their partners in feedback/complaints. Christian Aid supported its partners with the visualisation of a feedback and complaint mechanism in the form of a dashboard that was used for information sharing, categorisation of feedback, and monitoring the response.

To DEC and its partners, community engagement meant not only participation of affected populations but also their leadership in decision-making and inclusion of marginalised groups as influencers of activities. Some DEC members actively engaged communities and local stakeholders as part of the MEAL process. Transparency was also an important part of the accountability process. For example, BRC’s cash programme required social orientation to explain the process, requirements, criteria, and other components for implementation. Twoway channels, including via social media, radio, and hotlines, were promoted in communities for information dissemination and to receive queries, complaints, and other forms of feedback from the community. Accurate and timely responses from volunteers ensured efficient implementation of the cash transfers and provided a trusted source of information to the target communities. Accountability was supported by several variations of feedback and complaint mechanisms. Suggestion boxes and hotlines were often established, but less utilised by the community. Face-to-face feedback was the most preferred by the communities and so

Highlights LOCALISATION - Context A localised response was one of the major learning points for DEC and its members after the disaster in Central Sulawesi. The Government of Indonesia’s policy on the localisation of aid required DEC members to adapt to a locally-led intervention, which ultimately improved effectiveness and accountability across the disaster response. In the beginning DEC members grappled with ‘competition’ to find quality Indonesian-based partners and only a few were advantaged by previous relationships with Indonesian humanitarian actors. Despite these challenges, DEC partners found ways of working and partnership models that enhanced local roles and capacities in leadership and implementation. The partnerships empowered local actors (e.g. government, key leaders, volunteers, local builders) and benefited local resources and local market, all of which contributed to a more sustainable recovery for communities.

LOCALISATION - Case Study Oxfam’s JMK (Jaringan Mitra Kemanusiaan or Humanitarian Knowledge Hub) provided a good cases study of localisation in practice. Established a few years before the Central Sulawesi disaster, the Oxfam-JMK partnership model invited 19 representative organisations across sectors, expertise, and thematic issues working in rotation, which benefited in achieving sectoral quality and accounting voices of everyone involved in the response, particularly the most marginalised. The Central Sulawesi response initiated Oxfam’s transition to a locally-led recovery programme with decentralisation of authority to JMK to manage all operational and programmatic aspects (~GBP 2.4 million) with continued technical assistance from Oxfam.

Conclusion The following table summarises the most significant findings from the 2018 DEC Indonesia Tsunami Appeal. Strengths CHS 1 - Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate to their needs.

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CHS 2 - Humanitarian response is effective and timely.

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Gaps/challenges

The breadth of DEC sectoral interventions and linkages between phases (including COVID-19) contributed to a more integrated recovery of targeted communities collectively. Real efforts in assessing and targeting most at-risk communities (i.e., people living with HIV, indigenous communities), ensured leaving no one behind. Clear linkages across phases ensured a holistic approach and continuity of responses. Innovative approaches were used and adapted: Cash and Voucher Assistance, technology in MEAL, and Complaints Feedback Mechanism.

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DEC ITA’s breadth of sectoral intervention and peoplecentred approaches addressed unmet needs and offered communities with choices and control over humanitarian aid. Adaptive changes underpinned by real-time disaggregated data, information, and learnings enhanced effectiveness and inclusiveness of the intervention.

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Risk-informed sectoral design and planning lacked foresight and adequate analysis. Tailored sectoral approaches targeting specific community groups were sub-optimal (i.e., livelihoods for older people).

Limited local resources (materials and human resources), and surge of demands affected the timeliness of information. Inconsistent practices in the MEAL system resulted in the slow collection and delivery of disaggregated data.

CHS 3 - Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects.

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Alignment with international and national standards ensured quality and replicability/scalability in-country.

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Optimum utilisation of local resources and empowerment of local communities and existing structures and mechanisms contributed to the sustainable community recovery. Some degree of locally-led partnership models led to enhancing organisational capacities, strengthened contextual understanding and engagement of targeted communities. Staff induction and CFM (Complaints Feedback Mechanism) resulted in systematic anticipation of unintended negative outcomes.

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Genuine efforts have been documented to engage and capture voices of targeted communities, informing on the relevance and effectiveness of the interventions. Good use of GEDSI framework in community engagement strategies contributed to better inclusion and leaving no one behind. Utilisation of multiple forms of CFM and adaptation to culture, language and accessibility contributed to enhanced accountability to affected communities.

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There has been varied level of effort to support in building support for meaningful involvement of at-risk groups. Emphasis was put on including women and children with less focus on people with disabilities and older persons.

Community feedback contributed to enhancing the quality of sectoral interventions.

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The analysis revealed inconsistent practices over record and follow-up on feedback/complaints on misconduct.

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CHS 4 - Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation and feedback.

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CHS 5 - Complaints are welcomed and addressed

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There were limited partnerships with Palubased organisations and representative organisations of at-risk groups (i.e., women’s groups, older people’s associations, and organisations of persons with disabilities). A more structured and continuous assistance in the pre-disaster phase has been preferred by DEC members and local partners.

CHS 6 - Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary

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CHS 7 - Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve.

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CHS 8 - Staff are supported to do their job effectively and are treated fairly and equitably.

CHS 9 - Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.

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Systematic and intentional approach to coordination and collaboration across stakeholders at all levels. Apparent complementarity and filling the gaps of Government-led response.

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The analysis demonstrated strong linkages between Phase 1 and Phase 2 interventions, the latter being designed based on the learnings from Phase 1. Programme adaptation across phases was evidently informed by the learnings through the existing MEAL mechanism across members. Learning sessions held by individual organisations and collective initiatives contributed to the enhancement of the quality of the humanitarian programming.

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Available staff induction on organisational conducts prior to project implementation. Available staff capacity development prior to project implementation relevant to sectoral intervention.

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Clear guidance on financial misconduct contributed to the financial accountability of the humanitarian interventions. Partners exercised good financial reallocation due to COVID-19. Changes in resources allocation were justifiable. DEC members relied on accountable financial monitoring and reporting systems.

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Limited coordination and collaboration across DEC partners that supported greater benefit for sectoral intervention. It is important that DEC members work together to identify and incorporate strategies to address contextual constraints and embrace potential enablers to ensure success and sustainability of interventions. The quality of MEAL practices, systems, and staffing across partners was mixed. Inconsistencies over the SADD data collection, usage and sharing were documented. Sharing learnings towards the end of the project and increasing contributions to programme adaptations. Limited common data quality strategies and minimum standards that reflect good practices like data disaggregation, data sharing across stakeholders, and collaboration on data initiative. The analysis revealed high turnover and limited involvement of local (Central Sulawesi-based) staff. In some cases, mentoring and assistance on technical standards was limited. Environmental impact was not specifically monitored.

ACRONYMS Aap - accountability to affected populations CFM - complaint feedback mechanism chs - core humanitarian standards cva - Cash and Voucher Assistance DEC - Disaster emergencies committee DRR - disaster risk reduction EIE - Education in emergencies fgd - focus group discussion gbp - british pound sterling GBV - gender based violence goi - government of indonesia kii - key informant interview mel - monitoring, evaluation, and learning opa - older people's associations opd - organisation of people with disabilities pdm - post distribution monitoring PLWHA - people living with hiv/aids psea - protection against sexual exploitation and abuse RTE - Real time evaluation SADD - Sex and age disaggregated data SCLR - Survivor and Community Led Response TLS - Temporary learning spaces