The Deerfield View

THE DEERFIELD VIEW

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The Deerfield View

A Political Journal Commited to Raising Questions and Inspiring the Exchange of Thought

Issue VI

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Editor’s Note

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hat do you think are the chances that a nuclear attack will take place on our planet within the next ten years? Our pole taken of Deerfield students showed that only 11.6% of participants thought that the chance a nuclear attack will take place within the next ten years is 60% or greater. I believe that unless global actions are taken to control nuclear proliferation that we will see the first nuclear attack since the United States dropped a nuclear missile on Nagasaki 65 years ago. With men like Kim Jong-il, Mahmoud Admadinejad, and Hugo Chavez leading the most threatening rogue nations of our time, we must be aware that they could have the capabilities to launch an attack and change the course of history.

Why do countries like North Korea, Iran, and perhaps Venezuela desire to obtain nuclear arms?

One would think that presidents like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chavez, whose countries have poverty rates of 18% and 38% respectively, would focus on domestic issues, rather than gather world attention as they attempt to further their nuclear capabilities. The reason to fear these leaders, Kim Jong-il included, is because they are willing to spend their resources to construct nuclear weapons for no other reason than to attack nations that have little interest in harming them. If they were true leaders and focused on the most demanding social issues that their countries face, the advancement of nuclear technology would not be pertinent to their long-term agendas.

As I peruse newspapers and news websites, issues such as health care reform, the banking bill, and the war in Afghanistan absorb a great deal of the daily media coverage. What will it finally take to motivate the leading nations of the world to develop together a viable plan against the nuclear ambitions of rogue countries and to implement effective ballistic missile defense systems? If the global community does not take action against these possible future threats, the civilized world will be held hostage if a rogue country were to start a nuclear war and would be placed in a position to have to retaliate and escalate a conflict that they did not seek.

The editors of The Deerfield View decided to examine the topic of nuclear proliferation this year, because we truly believe that the threat of a nuclear war is more apparent than most people might predict.

One of my goals since assuming the editorship of The Deerfield View was to discuss topics about which I believe the Deerfield community should be more informed and to ensure that the articles presented in this publication are educational. I truly think that the subject of nuclear proliferation meets this goal and will provide you with views to consider as you read the perspectives presented in this issue.

I would like to thank my editors and writers tremendously for the time and effort that they volunteered toward this project. They eagerly assumed their responsibilities along with their many other commitments, and without them this journal would not be possible. I hope that you enjoy Volume VI of The Deerfield View and that it challenges your intellectual curiosity in the realms of politics and current events.

Thank you and enjoy.

Alexander Heller ‘10

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EDiTors: Alexander Heller ‘10, Editor-in-Chief Kathryn Kaelin ‘11, Assistant Editor-in-Chief Peter Roth ‘10, Head Layout Editor Emory Buck ‘11 Bryant Seaman ‘11 Ali Schulz, Layout ‘12 Chris Wong ‘10, Surveys Anne Mosely ‘11, Cartoons and Cover Faculty Advisors: Joel Thomas-Adams Robert Moorhead The Deerfield View would like to extend a special thank you to Mr. Thiel and the communications office, as well as Dr. Curtis for her continued support.

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Contents Kayla Corcoran ThE CubAn MIsslE CRIsIs: nuClEAR WEAPons AnD ThE IllusIon of sECuRITy

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Glossary for Nuclear Proliferation

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Malcolm Phelan TERRoRIsM AnD nuClEAR WEAPons

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The spread of Nuclear Capabilities Around the World

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Eliot Taft nuClEAR sTAlEMATE

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Camille Villa hElP oR hInDRAnCE? PAkIsTAn AnD ThE A.Q. nETWoRk

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Worldwide Nuclear Testing 1945-2009

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Charlie Wall ThE unITED nATIons AnD nuClEAR PRolIfERATIon

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Nuclear Proliferation by the Numbers

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Nuclear Proliferation Timeline

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Andy Harris WhERE’s ThE ChAngE

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sam Bryne ThE ThREAT of A nuClEAR ATTACk on ThE unITED sTATEs

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surveys pn Nuclear Proliferation

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Voices in the Crowd

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sources

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The Cuban Missile Crisis: Nuclear Weapons and the illusion of security kayla Corcoran ‘10

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S ECOND W ORLD WAR IN 1945 WITNESSED THE BREAKDOWN OF not only Hitler’s Nazi Germany, but also of the relationship between the Allied Powers, who could not “reconcile divergent political objectives even as they pursued a common military task” (Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History). Though it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to establish a singularly clear, determinative point at which the Cold War began, it is inevitably in this “failure that the roots of the Cold War lay” (Gaddis). The Cold War and its subsidiaries—the arms race, the space race—consumed the United States and the Soviet Union for the better part of the later twentieth century as both sides simultaneously sought to secure self-preservation and expand spheres of influence around the world to further the ideologies of capitalism or communism, respectively. The Cold War was unique in its nature: firstly, the presence of nuclear weapons and the seemingly arbitrary “rules” governing the use of these weapons complicated the dangers of the war. Secondly, there was no declaration of war nor were any obvious battles fought. It was, instead, a war propagated by events “in a great number of countries…throughout the world” (Churchill, Winston. “Iron Curtain Speech”) that the Americans and the Soviets treated as satellite nations. One such event was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which demonstrated that the presence of nuclear weapons made the Cold War only as safe as the motivations of the leaders possessing the capability of detonating these weapons. Though the safe resolution of the crisis can be attributed to the concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” brought about by the presence of nuclear weapons, the motivations of American President John F. Kennedy and of Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev undoubtedly bolstered the security promised by “MAD.” “Mutually Assured Destruction” was the concept that both the Soviet Union and the United States possessed enough second-strike capability to ensure imminent destruction of the other side should one nation choose to attack the other, a theory out of which arose a set of “rules” governing the usage of nuclear weapons. To understand such rules, it is necessary to understand the complications promulgated by the development of atomic technology: designed to use against Hitler during the Second World War, two atomic bombs were instead dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, thus ending the war in the Pacific little more than three months after Germany’s surrender in May of 1945. The act prompted Josef Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union during and after World War II to complain, “War is barbaric, but using the A-bomb is a superbarbarity” (Gaddis). The Soviets resented the upset in the balance of power between the Allies, which resulted in a “security dilemma,” a situation “in which one state acts to make itself safer, but in doing so diminishes the security of one or more other states, which in turn try to repair the damage through measures that diminish the security of the first state. The result is an ever-deepening whirlpool of dis trust from which even the best-intentioned and most far-sighted leaders find it difficult to extricate themselves: their suspicions become self-reinforcing” (Gaddis).

HE DyNAMIC END OF THE

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The disruption of the status quo drove the Soviets to develop their own technology, a capability that they achieved only four years after the Americans. But the gravity of the situation became quickly apparent when both the United States and the Soviet Union finally realized, “as the American strategist Bernard Brodie pointed out,” that the atomic bombs, and particularly the hydrogen bombs, were “‘several million times more potent on a pound-for-pound basis than the most powerful explosives previously known’” (Gaddis).

Suddenly, the age-old notion that weapons developed which could be used should be used had to be reworked. President Harry S. Truman remarked, “[T]he human animal and his emotions change not much from age to age. he must change now or he faces absolute and complete destruction…It is a terrible thing…to order the use of something that…is so terribly destructive, destructive beyond anything we have ever had…so we have got to treat this dif ferently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that” (gaddis).

“If no one could be sure of surviving a nuclear war, there wouldn’t be one,” (Gaddis) so long as “rules” were developed to control nuclear power’s capability of destruction. The primary rule was that such weapons could not be used: to do so would mean “the end of world civilization,” (Gaddis) reported Stalin’s successor, Georgii Malenkov. But how were nuclear weapons to be used then, if they could not be deployed? Stalin answered the question when he claimed, “Atomic bombs are meant to frighten those with weak nerves” (Gaddis). Atomic bombs were to be used as threats; the possibility of deployment constantly loomed on the horizon, rendering it necessary for both sides to take all threats seriously. The third and fourth rules concerned the attitudes of the other side: hope that the other side is rational enough to recognize the potential for mass destruction in the deployment of nuclear weapons, but trust that the other side is irrational enough to risk such destruction to further its ideology and promote its own security.

The first major world crisis to test the safety of these rules and the assurance of “MAD” was the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 during the Kennedy Administration.

Wrote Robert F. Kennedy in Thirteen Days, his memoir of the crisis, “Experts arrived with their charts and their pointers and told us that if we looked carefully, we could see there was a missile base being constructed in a field near San Cristobal, Cuba,” by the Russians under the leadership of Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev. To handle the crisis, President Kennedy formed the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, but Kennedy “was distressed that the representatives with whom he met…seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of the steps they suggested. They seemed to assume…that war was in our [America’s] best interest” (Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days, 91). The Russians, meanwhile, continued to assure the United States “that the only assistance being furnished Cuba was for agriculture and land development, so the people could feed themselves, plus a small amount of defensive arms” (Kennedy, 31). Kennedy at once found himself trapped: “MAD” supposedly assured the non-usage of nuclear weapons, but both his own advisors, among them Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McCone, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, and the Russians, who continued to weave “one gigantic fabric of lies” (Kennedy, 22) as they built up their missile sites in Cuba, seemed bent on war. What kind of safety could reciprocal possession of nuclear weapons provide if there was still a constant threat of nuclear warfare present?

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President Kennedy recognized his advisors’ “inability to look beyond the limited military field” (Kennedy, 91) and chose, instead, to dedicate himself to preserving “both peace and freedom” (Kennedy, speech) “in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race” (Kennedy, John F. Address dated October 22, 1962). Outwardly, Kennedy expressed heated rhetoric towards the Soviet Union as he demanded that Khrushchev “abandon [his] course of world domination” (Kennedy, Address). Although, as he said, the United States would “not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of world-wide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth,” “neither will we shrink from that risk any time it must be faced” (Kennedy, Address). The blockade of Cuba, Kennedy assured the American public, “was the initial step. He had ordered the Pentagon to make all the preparations necessary for further military action” (Kennedy, 43). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who sided with Kennedy on the decision of blockading Cuba, privately felt that “rationality [would] not save us:” the brink of nuclear disaster could be brought on by the most rational individuals, as demonstrated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who felt that “the issue was clear. Now was the time to do the job for which they had been preparing contingency plans. The Bay of Pigs was badly done; this round would not be. The missiles provided the occasion to deal with the issue for which they were prepared: ridding the Western Hemisphere of Castro’s Communism” (Kennedy, 119). But Kennedy was more than a rational thinker—he was a forward thinker.

Privately, the President was a different man from the belligerent, public figure who appeared to take a hard stance against Communism: he was a man consumed by the fear and anxieties of a totalitarian war also simultaneously struggling with his responsibility to the safety, security, and good name of the American people. And Kennedy’s motivations, whatever proportion of these factors, proved to be the saving grace of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In a private letter addressed to Khrushchev dated October 28 after the resolution of the crisis, Kennedy wrote, “Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the united states can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war…. I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament… Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field” (kennedy, John f. letter dated october 28, 1962).

Kennedy’s private correspondence with Khrushchev revealed a man who sought to avoid nuclear war in all possible events, even with the presence of a situation that may have allowed for the erasure of the disastrous legacy of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Despite McNamara’s claim that chance was the only force that saved the world from nuclear warfare, Kennedy’s ability to recognize that “Mutually Assured Destruction” only assured safety if the “rules” of nuclear warfare were followed, which included not using nuclear weapons, was a largely influential factor in the resolution of the crisis.

If Kennedy’s driving force behind holding off nuclear war was on part of his forwardthinking nature, then the driving forces behind Nikita Khrushchev’s motivations for holding off nuclear war were emotional. Khrushchev was dealing with a similar situation in the Soviet Union that Kennedy was dealing with in the United States: the reputation of the Soviet Union’s dominative power in the world was at stake, and yet, he, too, recognized the dangers of a nuclear war. Kennedy acknowledged their similar situations following the crisis, saying, “Mr. Khrushchev and I occupy approximately the same political positions inside our governments.

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He would like to prevent a nuclear war but is under severe pressure from his hard-line crowd, which interprets every move in that direction as appeasement. I’ve got similar problems… The hard-liners in the Soviet Union and the United States feed on one another” (Kennedy, 14).

Publicly, Khrushchev was on par with the hard-liners of the Soviet Union. A letter addressed to President Kennedy dated October 26, 1962 that was made public over Radio Moscow, demanded “that the united states, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey…the united states will respect the integrity of the fron tiers of Cuba, its sovereignty, [undertake] not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory available as [a] place d’armes for the invasion of Cuba” (khrushchev, nikita s. letter dated october 26, 1962).

But a private letter addressed to Kennedy from Khrushchev sent twelve hours earlier than the second letter expressed Khrushchev’s true concerns, which, Robert Kennedy described as being “very long and emotional. but it was not incoherent, and the emotion was directed at the death, de struction, and anarchy that nuclear war would bring to his people and all mankind. That, he [khrushchev] said again and again and in many different ways, must be avoided. We must not succ umb to ‘petty passions’ or to ‘transient things,’ he wrote, but should realize that ‘if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war’” (kennedy, 66).

Thus Khrushchev also recognized the realities of war, and, having participated in two of them himself, he had no desire to begin another with the United States, and as such, he communicated privately with the President of the United States to negotiate a resolution, which was eventually, and safely, reached on October 28, 1962.

The danger of the Cuban Missile Crisis arose from the possibility “that either side could take a step that—for reasons of ‘security’ or ‘pride’ or ‘face’—would require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring about a counterresponse and eventually an escalation into armed conflict,” (Kennedy, 49) which could have had the most disastrous consequences that neither side could, nor wanted to, imagine.

Though one could argue that the Cuban Missile Crisis operated exactly to the standard rules of nuclear warfare—both sides threatened, but chose, eventually, not to resort to nuclear weapons while also operating under the impression that the other side was irrational enough to do so— it didn’t matter. “Mutually Assured Destruction” only provided for a theoretical illusion of safety; it didn’t eradicate the need to continue taking security precautions. For the remaining duration of the Cold War after 1962, it became necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct themselves as under the constant threat of nuclear warfare—a seemingly illusory threat which the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated could quickly morph into reality if not for the sincere motivations of leaders like Kennedy and Khrushchev.

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Nuclear Proliferation Glossary Proliferation- expansion, production, or an increase in abundance NPT- An acronym for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was proposed by Ireland and Finland, and opened for signature on July 1, 1968. There are currently 189 countries who have signed this agreement; of which there are five possessing nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, and France. India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea are the only sovereign states that have not acceded to the treaty.

Nuclear arsenal- The total number of nuclear weapons a country is believed to possess.

Three Mile island- An island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania where, in 1979, a cooling malfunction caused one of the two reactors to melt, releasing radioactive gas. This marked the turning point in the public’s perception of nuclear power, giving new validation to the cries of caution. Sdthi iwas preceded by the eopening of the china syndrome which opened a few weeks earlier and made everything seem that much more drastic.

Uranium 238- The main component in a nuclear bomb, popular because of its increased number of neutrons that are released, producing more power upon explosion. Plutonium 239 is also used.

Cold War- Lasting from 1945-1991, the Cold War was a political conflict between the USSR and its allies and the United States and Western Europe. Although there was no physical combat between the respective militaries, the tension was expressed through competition in technology, arts, and space programs, covert operations such as espionage, and most notably a nuclear arms race.

Half-life- The amount of time that is necessary for an amassment of a radioactive material to decay to half its original quantity. The half-life for uranium 238, the most popular component in a nuclear bomb, is 4.5 billion years.

Atomic Bomb- Also referred to as fission bombs, they are the first type of nuclear weapons which, when detonated, propels neutrons into the nucleus of a enriched plutonium or uranium atom, forcing the neutrons to break apart and releasing a tremendous amount of energy. They have only been used aggressively twice, by the United States on two cities in Japan, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in World War II, resulting in both short term and long term catastrophic damage.

Hydrogen Bomb- The second type of nuclear weapon relies on fusion for its energy. Two isotopes of hydrogen fuse, creating the same massive amounts of energy. This thermonuclear weapon is less widely experimented with.

Manhattan Project- The project that was conducted to develop the first atomic bomb; the same bombs that were ultimately used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. Predominately led by J. Robert Oppenheimer of the United States, the project also included scientists from Canada and the United Kingdom. It was born out of the fear of Nazi Germany’s own development of a “master weapon,” and eventually grew to cost the United States 22 billion dollars in today’s value.

Us Nuclear Testing Program- Located in the Marshall Islands, and established in June 30, 1946, the program was used predominately between that 1946 to 1958. During that time, 67 tests were conducted, with a total yield was 108 megatons, or the equivalent of 7,000 Hiroshima bombs. While an impressive number, these experiments comprise only 14% of the United States nuclear testing. This base is currently still in use, although the agreement reached in 1983 between the residents of the Marshall Islands and the United States specified the terms for compensation to the peoples of the Marshall Islands for any damages, has greatly reduced the activity in the region.

Chernobyl- A Russian region in which a nuclear meltdown occurred in 1986. The accident was attributed to flawed reactor design, coupled with inadequately trained personnel. During the incident, 5% of the radioactive core was released into the atmosphere resulting in 56 deaths as of 2004, in addition to the depletion of natural life in the area.

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Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons Malcolm Phelan ‘11

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FTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR IN 1991, MANy AMERICANS DISMISSED THE THREAT OF A NUclear attack on their home soil. For decades and through events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis the United States believed it was on the brink of thermonuclear war. This threat ended abruptly as the Berlin wall fell and citizens across America breathed a sigh of relief. A decade later, in 2001, a new public threat emerged; militant Islamic extremists. With the fall of the Twin Towers, the U.S.’s misguided sense of isolated safety withered and died. In response President Bush launched his own campaign of terror against Afghanistan in retribution. The Department of Homeland Security was formed and the infamous USA PATRIOT Act was passed. And although the events of the September 11, 2001 attacks drew a death toll of nearly 3,000, a more deadly threat has been looming over the U.S. for years.

In October 2001, a month after the 9/11 incidents, a C.I.A. HUMINT (Human Intelligence) asset informed his handlers that a nuclear fission weapon of Russian origin had been smuggled into New york City by Al-Qaeda, a group known to all Americans today. Simultaneously, SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) officers at the C.I.A. intercepted Al-Qaeda radio transmissions speaking of an “American Hiroshima”. President Bush was informed and immediately dispatched a team of experts to New york to find the bomb. In an attempt to prevent public panic, he did not inform any NyC officials, not even the mayor. The bomb was never found.

Upon review, the C.I.A. determined that the report was fully plausible. Although the attack fortunately did not occur, one must imagine the possible consequences if a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon, the smallest standard warhead, were to be detonated in the heart of New york City. If the bomb were to have been successfully assembled, smuggled into the U.S., and then set off in Times Square, the temperature of its immediate surroundings would instantly reach 10,000°F. The blast radius would destroy the entire Theater District and reach up to the U.N. headquarters. According to computer simulations, the death toll would be approximately 500,000, nearly 170 times that of the 9/11 attacks. In addition to the death toll, the social and economic implications of such an event would be more than catastrophic.

Unfortunately, many reports of Al-Qaeda having nuclear capabilities have regularly surfaced within the Western intelligence community, although none have been confirmed. There are some disturbing truths however. First, Al-Qaeda did negotiate for a $1.5 million purchase of enriched uranium (believed to be of South African origin) from a retired Sudanese cabinet member. Second, Al-Qaeda has repeatedly sent envoys to Central Asia in search of weapons-grade nuclear material. Third, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s deputy, has boasted that “We sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent [the capital of Uzbekistan], to other Central Asians states, and they negotiated, and we purchased some suitcase [nuclear] bombs”. If nothing else, these three points prove one disturbing reality: Al-Qaeda is making active efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. If they were to acquire such a devise, they can only have one use for it: to attack either the U.S. or one of its Western allies. The important part is how they would acquire such a weapon. Once they have one in their possession, its transportation and detonation would be nearly unpreventable.

One potent example of a nuclear weapons sale occurred in the ex-Soviet state of Georgia. Oleg Khinsagov, a 50-year-old Russian fish and sausage merchant, was arrested by Georgian authorities for attempting to sell highly enriched uranium for $1 million. Upon analysis, an American laboratory determined that the material was of Russian origin. Since 1993, 18 such criminals have been arrested. Although this may seem encouraging, nearly all were amateurs in weapons dealing. Khinsagov was attempting to sell only 100g of uranium, not remotely enough to produce a weapon. Experts agree that men such as Khinsagov

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are not the major threats, his experienced and professional counterparts are.

The root of the problem is the sheer number of nuclear materials in existence. According to a report done by the U.S. government, there are now 20,000 stockpiles of uranium and plutonium of Soviet origin scattered across 11 time zones. That is enough material to produce roughly 40,000 warheads. Even more disturbing is the lack of security at the storage facilities which are protected by untrained guards, locks of poor quality, and defective security cameras. In addition, large qualities of spent uranium can be found at some 130 civilian nuclear reactors across the globe. The protection at such facilities would be no match for a small group of highly trained terrorists. With the material in their hands, rudimentary engineering and chemical no-how is all that is required to assemble a crude nuclear device.

Nuclear proliferation means only one thing: more nuclear materials in existence. Even civilian nuclear power facilities produce waste that can be assembled into a weapon. With more and more countries announcing nuclear programs, more and more waste will be produced. Agencies must be formed to keep tabs on such material. In the U.S., for example, the Department of Energy has the National Nuclear Security Agency or N.N.S.A. for short. In 2008, the N.N.S.A. recovered 3,153 unwanted radioactive sources and still has a backlog of 8,800 known items. The materials that are recovered are closely guarded by the Department of Energy’s own highly trained security force.

The threat of a nuclear attack on the U.S. is real. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda are actively trying to assemble a weapon for the sole purpose of killing Americans. Such a weapon would cause massive loss of life but would also have further implications. The entire self-image of the U.S. would be destroyed. The first nuclear weapon since World War II would be implemented, and U.S. Infrastructure would be destroyed, the economic markets would shatter, and panic would break out nationwide. Nonetheless it is preventable through sheer diplomacy. Global nonproliferation is the answer.

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The spread of Nuclear Capabilities Around The World 1950

1960

1970

USSR 1949

China 1964

France 1960

United States 1945

Israel 1967

UK, Canada 1952

India 1974

Nuclear states Nuclear states (States that publically declare their nuclear capabilities) are represented by circles and are categorized by the year of their first detonation (Or for Israel and South Africa the first year that they could have tested).

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1980

1990

2000

2010

Belarus, Kazakhastan, Ukrain, 1996

Iran

North Korea 2006 Syria

Pakistan 1990

South Africa 1982

Algeria

Saudi Arabia Iraq 1991

Abandoned Nuclear Programs States that have abandoned their nuclear programs are represented by hexagons. States not shown: Switzerland, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil.

Libya 2003

Aspiring states States that are suspected to be developing nuclear programs are represented by squares.

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Nu cl ear s tal emate Eliot Taft ‘10

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HE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST DECADE OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM MARKS A HISTORIC

point where countries in turmoil seem to find diplomatic safety and security in the size of their nuclear arsenal rather than their success in negotiations toward limiting nuclear proliferation. The end of the Cold War still has not ceased political hostilities between countless countries, and as more states begin to initiate nuclear weapons programs, we an increasing danger in possible nuclear attacks. India and Pakistan, rival states that are not members of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) have risen as nuclear powers in the last decade, and other countries such as North Korea, Iran, Syria and Israel who many different parties consider as imminent threats have developed weapons with the potential to cause mass destruction. Therefore, nuclear proliferation is at its climax, with numerous countries attempting to secure a status of personal safety by instilling fear in the minds of possible or already existing enemies. As the fear of an impending attack increases in the minds of governments and civilians, an ironic sense of peace has formed in the trepidation of retaliatory attacks. Nuclear arms have so far proved not to be the world’s single greatest problem, because, the fear of them has created an understood deterrent to halt any form of a large-scale attack.

North Korea’s threat of a nuclear program and possible hostile force towards the US illustrates how nuclear weapons create the bilateral unsatisfactory stalemate that halts countries from initiating immense and potentially devastating attacks between each other, be them biological, chemical, nuclear or conventional offensive strikes. North Korea recently developed a powerful nuclear arsenal which, along with presumed unstable dictator Kim Jong il, poses an uneasy danger towards the United States. After negotiation attempts, the offer currently stands that the United States refuses to give security guarantees to North Korea until it has dismantled its weapons program, and North Korea will not disarm until it receives security guarantees from the US; neither faction wishing to succeed first. North Korea shows no reason to bomb the US or invade US ally South Korea, whose economy is 30 times larger than North Korea’s. North Korea’s own allies have crumpled since the end of the cold war, and a fear of the thousands of US and South Korean troops and missiles surrounding their borders have determined its leaders to build a strong military and nuclear defense. North Korea is in no way readily willing to create wanton destruction by nuclear means. Nuclear weapons are just used as a threat, with both countries, to deter an unlikely military strike.

In a an unstable South Asia, nuclear arms have seemed to quell any form of violent attacks between Pakistan and India, who have fought three wars in the last 50 years and still argue over the Kashmir territory. In the late nineties each country had just developed their nuclear program and had few nuclear equipped missiles, making that period the most volatile point thus far. Now that each state has multiple deployments of weapons, neither government can fear a single strike that could possibly wipe out their entire arsenal. If an attack should occur, either faction could retaliate. As each country has militarily modernized in the past twenty years, they have protected themselves from possible attacks. Pakistan, without nuclear

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weapons, could have suffered vicious conventional Indian incursions on boarder camps suspect of holding Islamic terrorists. Furthermore, India, lacking nukes, could have suffered great civilian casualties from careless Islamabad forces in Kashmir. Each country has obviously developed nuclear arsenals for the purpose of safety from hostile attacks, rather than possible offensive objectives. Because each government has had possession of weapons of mass destruction now for over fifteen years and neither country has used them, there is no likely cause for a nuclear strike, or even large scale conventional strikes, between either group in the near future.

The knowledge of nuclear weapon creation has propagated throughout the regions of the world creating a fission and fusion of various government amity and hostilities. Countries that have the resources and technology to develop nuclear weapons have self promoted themselves to a select tier of thirty five nations that currently instill a direct fear of invasion. Nuclear arms are dangerous, and it is their hazard that has possibly prevented many wars in the last fifty years and more so in the last twenty. They also have the potential to shatter the way of life for every human being in every country. In retrospect, nuclear arms have expounded in world governments a sad truth to our own human nature; each country wishes to be superior in order to feel safe. It is our own pursuit of security that has inevitably created the paradox of the nuclear bomb.

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Help or Hindrance? Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network Camille Villa ‘10

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HE LEADING VILLAINS OF THE CURRENT NON-PROLIFERATION STRUGGLE ARE

NORTH KOREA AND Iran. Of course, there is reason to pay such close attention to these countries, whose leaders have expressed sentiments supporting the destruction of the USA. However, one of the greatest threats to non-proliferation lies not with our enemies, but with their supplier, our ally, Pakistan. The U.S. remains hesitant to speak out against Pakistan due to our engagement with Afghanistan, where Pakistan remains a key ally. A matter of particular concern is that Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation of Weapons Treaty (NPT), and thus it is cannot legally be held accountable for its nuclear weapons program and its importing and exporting of nuclear technology and materials. Pakistan has good reason to reject the patronizing NPT, which permits only five nations (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) to have nuclear weapons. Pakistan also has reason to be skeptical about the protection offered by the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” when its neighbor and long-time nemesis, India, also refused to sign the NPT and has developed a nuclear program of its own. However, though claims of security may attempt to justify Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons, it does not excuse their active role in the nuclear black market.

Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons has been well established since 1980s, and it held its first public nuclear test in 1998 (Cirincione 64). However, Pakistan’s role as a dealer in the black market was only uncovered recently. In 2003, the BBC China, a German-owned ship was intercepted by the International Atomic Energy Association. They uncovered the components for building 10,000 uranium gas centrifuges to be delivered to Libya (Lutes 30). After subsequent diplomatic pressure, Libya’s President Muammar al-Qaddafi confessed to Libya’s secret nuclear weapons program, agreed to sign the NPT, and relinquished Libya’s nuclear weapons. Qaddafi revealed that Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan network had been shipping nuclear enrichment parts to Libya since the 1990s (Tetrais). Qaddafi’s information was crucial to unveiling the A.Q. Khan network, which had been operating since the 1970s.

The network originally began with Pakistan’s efforts to secretly establish its own nuclear weapons program, as early as 1972. Pakistan’s desire to have nuclear weapons stems from its tumultuous relationship with India ever since the two nations gained independence from the British Empire in 1947. India’s own nuclear program debuted in 1974 with a “peaceful” demonstration of a nuclear bomb, setting off an arms race in the region which continues to this day (Cirincione 38).

Abdul-Qadeer Khan, for whom the network is named, began his nuclear career began when he worked at a URENCO facility, where the uranium enrichment needs of several countries are serviced.

Bringing his knowledge and expertise back to Pakistan in the 1970s, he spearheaded Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Conducting his work in secret with Islamabad’s support, A.Q. Khan used an extensive network of personal contacts the network to obtain uranium enrichment technology from several European firms. During this period, Pakistan also secured supplies of uranium and nuclear weapons designs from China (Reed 250-252). Khan’s network consisted of contacts scattered around the globe, operating fake companies that shipped materials in patterns that obscured their origins and their destinations (Tetrais).

Using this successful procurement network, Pakistan began exporting enrichment technology to other countries, such as Iran and North Korea in the 1980s. Extensive exchange of centrifuges, conventional arms, and oil between Pakistan and Iran, along with the prevalence of government-to-government contacts suggest that Islamabad was well aware of the nuclear trade (Tetrais). Evidence suggests that it

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was highly unlikely Iran would have been able to develop centrifuge technology without the assistance of the A.Q. Khan network (Albright and Hinderstein). In 1997, North Korea began trading with Pakistan by exchanging its ballistic missiles for enrichment technology (Bechtol 136). North Korea has subsequently withdrawn from the NPT and publicly tested nuclear devices (Cirincione 119).

Following Libya’s disclosure of Khan’s involvement, Islamabad’s treatment of Khan has been disappointing, to say the least. Khan was feebly pardoned and placed under house arrest; he remains a national hero in the eyes of many Pakistanis. Much to the chagrin of investigators, Islamabad allowed only written questions to be passed to Mr. Khan. Though Libya’s revelation has resulted in a small dismantling of Khan’s network, much remains unsolved. Islamabad’s credibility was further undermined when they released Khan from house arrest last February (Masood).

We can never have complete control over the human factor of nuclear security, which relies on the choices of individuals to uphold that security. There shall always be the possibility of the bribed guard, the corrupt port official, manufacturers willing to collaborate, or the rogue nuclear scientist. However, the success of the A.Q. Khan network was unique because it combined the resources of a complicit state and an enterprising individual. If the U.S. alliance with Pakistan is based on the premise of promoting global security, the U.S. should inquire further into Pakistan’s activities in promoting the nuclear black market.

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World Wide Nuclear T 420 United States USSR/Russia UK China France

360

United States, USSR/Russia China France 300

Uni USS United States, USSR/Russia UK China France

240

United States, USSR/Russia UK

180

120

United Sates, USSR/Russia UK

60

United States, USSR/Russia 0

1945 - 1950

1951 - 1955 1956 - 1960 1961 - 1965

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1966 - 1970

1971 - 1975 197

Testing 1945 - 2009

ited States, SR/Russia UK China France

United States, USSR/Russia UK China France

United States, USSR/Russia UK China France

United States, UK, China France

6 - 1980 1981 - 1985 1986 - 1990

1991 - 1995

India, China, Pakistan, France

1996 - 2000

North Korea Iran

2001 - 2009

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The United Nations and Nuclear Proliferation Charlie Wall, ‘11

T

UNITED NATIONS PLAyS A CENTRAL ROLE IN PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR weapons. The UN has demonstrated its role by advocating that nations agree to comply with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT is a multilateral treaty with three purposes; to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to disarm active weapons, and to allow for the humane use of nuclear technology. Originally the treaty was meant to last only twenty-five years, but on May 11th 1995, the NPT committee extended it indefinitely. The most important articles of the treaty state that countries cannot receive, distribute, or develop nuclear arms. However the vitality of the treaty is cut down by one of its articles. Article ten is indicative of the treaty’s weakness because it allows countries to withdraw from the treaty. Although the NPT is not mandatory for UN member nations, the allowance of unilateral withdrawal from the treaty underscores its lack of power and frailty.

Ireland and Finland first proposed the treaty in 1970, and since then, 187 nations have signed it.

There are only five official nuclear weapon states in the world: The United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and China. All five nations are signatories of the NPT and are members of the UN Security Council. There are four countries that are suspected of having nuclear weapons that have not endorsed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty: Pakistan, Israel, India, and North Korea. In 1993, North Korea proved the treaty’s infirmity by withdrawing from it with out any repercussions from the United Nations.

There are currently more than 25,000 nuclear weapons worldwide. United Nations Security Council Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of South Korea proposed an explanation for the astounding statistic, “Some states view possession of such weapons as a status symbol. And some states view nuclear weapons as offering the ultimate deterrent of nuclear attack.” If some of the nuclear weapon states believe there are positive attributes to possessing nuclear weapons, what can the United Nations do to eradicate these weapons?

The UN Secretary General offered one idea; a five point plan to eradicate nuclear weapons: first, require the five nuclear weapon states to start disarming weapons and to keep the UN Security council aware of their progress with disarmament, second, ensure that countries with out nuclear weapons will not be threatened by and countries that do have the weapons, third, limit the testing of all fissile materials, fourth, the creation of a ‘nuclear weapon free’ zone in the Middle East, and finally, eliminate and forbid the development of additional weapons of mass destruction that could take the place of nuclear weapons. Although Ban Ki-Moon’s proposal is lengthy and difficult to carry out, his plan, if effectively carried out, would help mitigate diplomatic tensions.

Apart from the potential threat of a nuclear strike, our generation has not been affected by the growth of nuclear weapons; the American taxpayers have been. So far the United States has spent at least $5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons. Including disarmament and all future costs of disposing of nuclear weapons, the US will have spent over $5.8 trillion. The enormous expenditure divides into different costs for the various aspects and responsibilities of possessing nukes. Seven percent was spent on developing, testing, and building the warheads, fourteen percent was spent on the intelligence systems for the weapons, and an astounding fifty six percent was spent on making the weapons usable for deployment. If there is a justifiable amount of money to spend on nuclear weapons, it was the small sixteen percent of the $5.8 trillion that is spent on America’s defense against nuclear attacks.

The ideology of developing weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent implies the non-use of those weapons. The steep costs of these weapons could justifiably be cut in half if the United States had not spent the $3.2 trillion on making sure the weapons were ready for deployment; if our country has comHE

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mitted to the NPT and therefore the idleness of our weapons, why would the United States have to raise an exorbitant amount of money to be spent on the pointless endeavor keeping those weapons active?

The costs of nuclear weapons exhibit their worthlessness to our country and the statistics show how the US and its citizens would benefit from taking a strong stance against nuclear proliferation and start advocating for global nuclear disarmament. The United Nations has made advancements in Nuclear Non-Proliferation by proposing the NPT. There are still flaws in the treaty that show it should be modified to have more ‘teeth’ to enforce its purpose. The UN is representative of almost every country in the world, and with that representation comes a responsibility to solve global problems such as nuclear proliferation.

If the United Nations wants to realistically achieve global nuclear eradication, it needs to unite every one of its members in a firm stance against specific nuclear possessing countries instead of the idea in general. If these states were put under worldwide pressure from the United Nations, they would have no choice but to acquiesce and disarm their weapons.

Nuclear Proliferation by the Numbers 67,500—The numbers of nuclear missiles built between 1951 and 2008 151,000—Number of nuclear warheads requested by the United States Army during 1956 and 1957 104—Metric tons of plutonium produced since its creation 15,654 square miles—Total known land area occupied by U.S. nuclear weapons bases and facilities (Total land area of the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New Jersey: 15,357 square miles) $20,000,000,000—Cost of the Manhattan Project $1,200,000,000—Amount of money spent on nuclear testing between October 1, 1992 and October 1, 1995 911—The Number of U.S. nuclear tests conducted in Nevada 239—Number of high level radioactive waste tanks in Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina 280,000,000—Number of classified pages estimated to be in the Department of Energy’s possession $35,100,000,000—Estimated 1998 spending on all U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs 95—Percentage of global nuclear weapon arsenals in the U.S. and Russia 8— The average nuclear weapon in the US arsenal is approximately eight times more powerful than the nuclear bomb that destroyed Hiroshima DEERFIELD VIEW | 23

Nuclear Proliferation Timeline 1930’sThe research of Enrico Fermi, Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassman, Lise Meitner lays the foundation for the development of nuclear weapons 1945The United States, the first country to use nuclear weapons in active conflict, drops two atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan.

1949Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb in Kazakhstan.

1952- Great Britain tests its first atomic bomb off the coast of Australia 1954In response to the suspected development of nuclear weapons in Israel, Egypt beings a covert nuclear weapons program, introducing nuclear weapons to the Middle East.

1958United States and Great Britain enter nuclear arms partnership 1960France tests its first nuclear weapon in Algerian desert 1962Cuban Missile Crisis almost results in nuclear war between United States and Soviet Union 1963United States and Soviet Union sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting the testing of nuclear devices underwater, in outer space, or within our atmosphere.

1964China tests its first nuclear weapon in Western China 1965South Africa acquires means of developing a nuclear weapons program donated by United States.

Their nuclear program is officially launched eight years later.

1968Fifty-nine countries, including the United States, excluding India, sign the NPT- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in an effort to halt Nuclear Proliferation 1976In an effort to develop a nuclear program, Iraq purchases a reactor from France

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1979Israel and South Africa test nuclear weapon in South Indian Ocean The Iranian Revolution temporarily halts Iranian nuclear efforts 1981Israel bombs suspected site of Iraqi nuclear development 1987- North Korea completes reactor, capable of generating nuclear material to produce one atomic bomb every year 1990North Korea completes first nuclear weapon 1991United States and Soviet Union negotiate an agreement that commits them to 30% nuclear arms reduction to be completed with in seven years Iraq allows UN inspectors to conduct search 1993Former United States President George W. Bush and Russian President Boris yeltsin sign Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 2003United States, under Former President George W. Bush, invades Iraq under conviction they are hiding nuclear weapons 2006North Korea conducts under ground nuclear weapons trial

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Where’s the Change?

Andy harris ‘10

P

BARACK OBAMA RODE TO OFFICE ON A NUMBER OF PLANS FOR “CHANGE”: REFORMING health care, ending of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and reducing nuclear arms both domestically and abroad. In the past few months, health reform has monopolized almost every news network; some shows – the Rachel Maddow Show, for example – have spent the last few weeks discussing this topic almost exclusively.

While Congress debated and modified the health care bill, President Obama’s administration argued a less discussed, yet equally important, issue. President Obama has presented his vision of a “nuclear-free world” to global audiences on several occasions: last April in Prague, and at his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance speech on December 10th. In the map below, based on 2006 estimates, it is clear that the nuclear stockpiles of the two former “superpowers” still far outnumber those of any other nation.

Still, at his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Obama explained that we can no longer depend on a “my gun’s bigger than yours” method to defend us from cataclysm: “The world may no longer shudder at the prospect of war between two nuclear superpowers, but proliferation may increase the risk of catastrophe. Terrorism has long been a tactic, but modern technology allows a few small men with outsized rage to murder innocents on a horrific scale.” After describing the need to work globally, he returned to the topic of nuclear weapons, “Intransigence must be met with increased pressure - and such pressure exists only when the world stands together as one. One urgent example is the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to seek a world without them. In the middle of the last century, nations agreed to be bound by a treaty whose bargain is clear: all will have access to peaceful nuclear power; those without nuclear weapons will forsake them; and those with nuclear weapons will work toward disarmament. I am committed to upholding this treaty.” This treaty, to which President Obama is referring, is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We have, however, seen little change in the United State’s nuclear stockpile or even our policy on the issue. Less than 10% of our nuclear stockpile has been disposed of in the past eight years. In contrast to the platform on which he ran, Obama has taken a less proactive stance on nuclear proliferation as was promised. A recent Saturday Night Live skit parodied President Obama’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, suggesting that he won the award for “not being George Bush.” What, then, is being done about the reduction of the United States’ nuclear stockpile? For now, much of the future policies will remain a mystery. The current plan is considered “Top Secret” at the Pentagon and few details have been released. We know that during his term, the President plans to significantly reduce our nuclear weapons supply, but we don’t know to what extent he plans to reduce our arsenal. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union policy was to not use nuclear weapons unless already under nuclear attack. The United States has, however, still not created a “no-first-use” policy against unprovoked use of nuclear weapons. While some are optimistic about changes to the United States’ stance, with the current debate within Obama’s administration, it is unlikely that we will see “change” in the near future.

Often we are critical of what we may call Obama’s inaction in the less than a year he has RESIDENT

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been in office. While it is easy to pin political stagnancy on the president, it is more often Congress that slows down “change.” With a minority in both the House and Senate, Republicans are still fighting fiercely against many policy changes. Senator McCain recently stated that he was appalled that Al Franken refused another Senator extra time, saying that “he’d never seen a Senator denied an extra minute or so.” McCain must have conveniently forgotten when he, in 2002, refused Senator John Cornyn extra time. Perhaps we need to look beyond the White House for problems in our policy making – now more than ever we need our two major parties to work together.

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The Threat of a Nuclear Attack on the United states sam bryne ‘10

E

VER SINCE THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, THE UNITED STATES HAS DEVELOPED A HEIGHTENED

concern with homeland security and threats associated with nuclear proliferation. As a result of the terrorist attacks eight years ago, former President George W. Bush and current President Barack Obama have taken steps towards strengthening our security policies, supplying the country with superior nuclear technologies, and fortifying our defense system against foreign threats. However, despite these efforts, it is hard not to contemplate the consequences, or even the likelihood, of a nuclear attack.

The United States is often recognized for its strength in regards to both military and technology; however, as a result, many fail to consider our inherent vu -lnerability. , Though it is true that every country in the world is susceptible to the possibility of a nuclear attack, it is important to realize the legitimacy of the risk that the US faces today. In 2007, FBI director Robert Mueller referred to nuclear terrorism as “one of the most dangerous and deadly threats” that we are currently challenged with. Furthermore, FBI officials recognize that following the 9/11 attacks, there is a “strong possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States.”

The United States government has responded to this threat by working hard to eliminate any chance of homeland devastation caused by foreign threats. Immediately after the attacks, the federal government began strengthening nuclear-nonproliferation treaties with other countries including Russia and France. Further efforts include increasing security at all domestic nuclear-weapons facilities, purchasing left over nuclear materials from Russia to strengthen our own defense system, and attempting to control nuclear weapons beyond US borders.

Though these efforts have kept our nation safe from nuclear disaster thus far, we are still susceptible to two primary threats, the first being that of the radiological dispersion bomb. The threat of the radiological bomb resides in its accessibility. The “dirty bomb” is most accessible to terrorists as it is created from waste by-products only to be wrapped in conventional explosives. Scientists predict that if one of these bombs struck downtown Manhattan during noontime, there would be an estimated 2,000 deaths, while thousands of others would suffer severe radioactive poisoning.

Another concern our country must be aware of is the change in policy apparent as President Obama forces his own agenda on the actions that President Bush and his administration have instituted over the last eight years. After 9/11, the Bush administration implemented a missile-defense system to protect the US’s deployed forces abroad, all 50 States of America, and allied countries overseas.3 Since the beginning of Obama’s presidency, other measures have been taken to decrease the threat of a nuclear attack such as the escalation of troops in Afghanistan to better monitor Al Qaeda activities and to keep them within the confines of their safe havens. However, President Obama has decided to discontinue Bush’s missile-defense program, justifying his judgment by pleading the necessity of “Cut[ting] investments in unproven missile defense systems.” This dramatic decrease in nuclear weapon production is a tactic that Obama hopes will encourage others to stop mass production of weapons as well. Up to this point, Russia has been an active participant in President Obama’s plan for a nuclear-free world.

Though the possibility of a nuclear attack against the United States is a legitimate risk, it is not something that should be of utmost concern to the American people. We are fortunate to not only have a government that has access to the greatest resources and technologies in the world, but also to have strong allies around the world that back our mission. While no country is completely safe from the dangers of nuclear weapons, we are fortunate to live in a country in which our government has the resources and leadership to actively avoid any future threats of nuclear proliferation.

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student surveys on Nuclear Proliferation

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Faculty responses to survey on Nuclear Proliferation Do you think the United Nations has a strong enough stance against nuclear development in North Korea

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Voices in the Crowd

student Body Weapons of mass destruction are not the biggest problem on Earth as long as they are handled with appropriate care (hence mild intervention). It is true that nuclear weapons can be very dangerous in the hands of the wrong people. However, if the weapons remain in the hands of long-term, stable governments with people and resources to protect there is not so much of a problem. It is Cold War politics all over again.

The threat of nuclear retaliation will always outweigh the benefits of a nuclear attach for an established nation.

Upperclassman Boy- Democrat I hope people aren't idiots to realize if they do start a nuclear war on a country, that country will retaliate.

If the nuclear war does start, the damage will be great and not only kill humans but ruin earth until there will be nowhere to live for humankind.

Underclassman Girl- Democrat One major problem is that the United States is asking other countries to refrain from owning or manufacturing nuclear weapons while we have a huge nuclear stockpile. A bit hypocritical, no?

Upperclassman Girl- Democrat Nuclear removal from the Middle East should be non-negotiable. While it is not necessarily America's issue, I honestly do not trust a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of governments such as Iran’s who have implicit ties to terrorists such as Hezbollah.

Upperclassman Boy- Republican Nuclear proliferation didn't used to be as big of an issue because only the wealthier, more advanced countries had access to nukes. Now the technology is available to virtually any country with the means and desire to have nuclear weapons, which is essentially everyone because at this time, countries that are trying to establish themselves as having the slightest bit of power want to be taken seriously. If that means that they are willing to put nuclear weapons into the hands of insane politicians and world leaders, then so be it. Nobody is going to mess with you if you are sitting on such a massive threat. However, if a country should feel threatened enough and is crazy enough to launch one; it would be the end of the human race because so many countries are trying to gain a monopoly on the nuclear warheads the Soviets didn't launch. And people are standing outside of grocery stores handing out pamphlets on saving trees?! A. They are using paper for the pamphlets, and B. There won't be any trees left to save! Or people to care about it, for that matter!

Upperclassman Girl- Republican The balance of power is all fine and good. The concept of mutually assured destruction prevents countries from daring to utilize their nuclear weapons. The greatest threat comes from "rogue nukes" in the hands of small organizations that fear no reprisal. Upperclassman Boy-Republican The United States should not be the only country involved; the UN needs to take a united stance on the control of nuclear weapons.

Underclassman Girl- Independent The greatest nuclear threat the world community faces is not a war between nuclear powers, but rather, the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons.

Upperclassman Boy-Independent

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No comments on nuclear proliferation. My opinion is that America needs to stop interfering because honestly, it's tiresome to have the United States in the center of every crisis even when it has nothing to do with the US. Underclassman Girl- Independent Nuclear weapons must not be allowed to be under the control of radical extremist governments. While on most issues of foreign policy, I would advocate for a non interventionalist outlook, The US and its allies in democracy must stop North Korea and Iran from developing any nuclear programs (including energy, since arms can be an easy byproduct). It is a travesty that governments likes China and Pakistan already have nuclear weapons. All we can do is stop further countries from adopting this wayward path, and negotiate reasonably with other nuclear powers.

Underclassman Boy-Republican It is a very sensitive issue as if the United States is too overbearing then they could make themselves a target. Additionally, actions need to be taken to slowly decrease warhead stock but at rate that will not make the US vulnerable.

Upperclassman Girl-Democrat Pakistan is by far the most likely country to start a nuclear war. Upperclassman Boy-Democrat I think that there are many more pressing issues than nuclear weapons that we as humans have to face today.

Underclassman Boy- Independent

Faculty Nuclear fusion would be the ideal if perfected.

Female-Independent

Ultimately, we can't control other countries. We have more nuclear weapons than any other nation and until we are ready to reduce the number of weapons we have what right do we have to demand that others reduce their stockpiles?

Female-Independent A much bigger and more serious issue than any single nation can manage. Fear of nuclear weapons development in Iran is likely the cause of the next major war.

Male- Democrat I'm all for nuclear power as a cleaner source of energy than fossil fuels; I also think it is the height of arrogance to maintain a stock of nuclear weapons while at the same time actively working to ensure that only a select few countries have the same capabilities. Who has appointed us the gatekeepers, and should we be trusted more than any other country in the world? I think not.

Male- Independent Students should educate themselves on this issue and then should become active voices in the debate over how to disarm. It is your world now, and the stakes are high.

Female- Democrat

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sources Glossary for Nuclear Proliferation www.world-nuclear.org www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com www.wikipedia.com The World Without Us by Alan Westwick Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons Allison, Graham. Nuclear Terrorism. N.p.: Holt Paperbacks, 2005. Print.

Crowley, Michael. "The Stuff Sam Nunn's Nightmares Are Made Of." The New york Times 25 Feb. 2007: n. pag. Web. Kristof, Nicholas D. The New york Times 11 Aug. 2004: n. pag. Web. The spread of Nuclear Capabilities (are there any sources?)

Allison, Graham. Nuclear Terrorism. N.p.: Holt Paperbacks, 2005. Print.

Crowley, Michael. "The Stuff Sam Nunn's Nightmares Are Made Of." The New york Times 25 Feb. 2007: n. pag. Web. Kristof, Nicholas D. The New york Times 11 Aug. 2004: n. pag. Web. The spread of Nuclear Capabilities around the World http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?scp=1spot&sq=nuclear%20weapons&st=cse Nuclear stalemate Nuclear Weapons Have Increased India's and Pakistan's Security. Matthew Parris.

Opposing Viewpoints: India and Pakistan. Ed. William Dudley. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003.

An Arsenal of Nuclear Weapons Prevents War. Charles Krauthammer.

Opposing Viewpoints: War. Ed. Tamara L. Roleff. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999.

North Korea Is Not a Nuclear Threat. David C. Kang.

At Issue: Is North Korea a Global Threat?. Ed. Debra A. Miller. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2005.

Help or Hindrance? Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network Albright, David, and Corey Hinderstein. “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks.” Washington Quaterly (Spring 2005): 111-128. Columbia International Affairs Online. Web. 1 Sept. 2009. <http://www.ciaonet.org>.

Bechtol, Bruce E. “The Impact of North Korea’s WMD Programs on Regional Security and the ROK-U.S. Alliance.” International Journal of Korean Studies IIX.1 (2004): 135-156. Columbia International Affairs Online. Web. 2 Sept. 2009. <http://www.ciaonet.org>.

Cirinicione, Joseph. Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons. New york: Colubmia University Press, 2007.

Print.

Donnelly, Thomas. “Choosing Among Bad Options: The Pakistani ‘Loose Nukes’ Conundrum.” National Security Outlook (May 2006): n. pag. Columbia International Affairs Online. Web. 1 Sept. 2009. <http://www.ciaonet.org>.

The United Nations and Nuclear Proliferation Ki-moon, Ban. “The United Nations and a Nuclear Weapons-free World.” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. N.p., 2009. Web. 29 Dec. 2009. <http://www.wagingpeace.org/‌articles/‌2008/‌10/‌24_ban_un_nuclear.php>.

Shwartz, Stephan. “The Cost of U.S Nuclear Weapons.” NTI. CNS, 2009. Web. 31 Dec. 2009. <http://www.nti.org/‌e_research/‌e3_atomic_audit.html>.

“Treaty on Non- Proliferation.” United Nations. N.p., 2009. Web. 30 Dec. 2009. <http://www.un.org/‌Depts/‌dda/‌WMD/‌treaty/>.

By the Numbers http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/10/facts_myths.pdf http://www.skeptically.org/onwars/id20.html Nuclear Proliferation Timeline nuclearfiles.org Project of the Nuclear Peace Foundation Where’s the Change http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=nuclear+weapons http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34360743/ns/politics-white_house/ http://www.hulu.com/watch/101502/saturday-night-live-powerball-cold-open

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http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,2198537,full.story http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2frg58DgVk The Threat of a Nuclear Attack on the United states Homeland Security NTARC News. "Experts Warn – Possibility of Nuclear Attack By Terrorists." National Terror Alert.

Homeland Security News, 11 June 2007. Web. 20 Sept. 2009. <http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2007/06/11/ experts-warn-possibility-of-nuclear-attack-by-terrorists/>.

Blair, Bruce. "What If the Terrorists Go Nuclear?" Terrorism Project. Center for Defense ‌ Information, 1 Oct. 2001.

Web. 28 Sept. 2009. <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nuclear.cfm>.

"George W. Bush on Homeland Security." On The Issues. N.p., 7 Dec. 2008. Web. 29 Sept. 2009. ‌ <http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/George_W__Bush_Homeland_Security.htm>.

"Barack Obama on Homeland Security." On The Issues. N.p., 7 Dec. 2008. Web. 29 Sept. 2009. ‌ <http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/George_W__Bush_Homeland_Security.htm>.

Lutes, Charles D. “New Players on the Scene: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market.” Foreign Policy Agenda (Mar. 2005): n. pag. Columbia International Affairs Online. Web. 1 Sept. 2009. <http://www.ciaonet.org>.

Masood, Salman, and David E. Sanger. “Pakistan Frees Nuclear Dealer in Snub to U.S. .” The New york Times. N.p., 6 Feb. 2009. Web. 1 Sept. 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/asia/07khan.html>.

Reed, Thomas C., and Danny B. Stillman. The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation. Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009. Print.

Tetrais, Bruno. “Not a ‘Wal-Mart’, but an ‘Imports-Exports Enterprise’: Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network.” Strategic Insights VI.5 (2007): n. pag. Web. 1 Sept. 2009. <http://www.cianoet.org>.

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"A full scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes...could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere.

And the survivors--as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, `the survivors would envy the dead.' For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot conceive of its horrors."

President John f. kennedy, address to the nation on the limited Test ban Treaty, 26 July 1963