Dsa April 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief “T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .

wing state dynamics. India is regarded as the key Swing state of the 21st century. Which way it swings could shape the geopolitical map of the earth. Will it swing towards the Russia and China combine of continental powers to balance a Unipolar America? Or will it swing away towards the USA and its allies in the Asia Pacific to balance the power of a rising and increasingly aggressive China? There is a school of thought that feels that India can maximise its gains and potential energy, by delaying its decision to swing either way till as late as possible. In the George Bush era, India had signed the civilian nuclear deal with the US and given all indications of a swing towards America. The prospect of an Indo-US alliance directed at the containment of China, deeply disturbed Beijing. China bared its fangs in an unmistakable snarl designed to make India back off. Chinese military engineers came into Baltistan to construct roads to link the Gwadar Port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. It gave Fourth Generation Fighters and Frigates to Pakistan and announced plans to build its third nuclear plant. It questioned the status of Jammu and Kashmir by stapling visas, increased provocations on the border and began to supply arms to the Maoists via Myanmar. Visibly shaken, the Indian Foreign policy establishment soon produced the Non Alignment 2.0 document that pledged neutrality between US and China, largely to placate the latter. China seemed to thaw a little. The US meanwhile was intent on extricating its forces from Afghanistan and was trying to please Pakistan by providing F-16 fighters and hectoring India to hand over Jammu and Kashmir on a platter to Pakistan and sign a peace deal at any cost. We also had our tail twisted on Iran from where 12 per cent of our oil supplies came. Pakistani terror attacks continued unabated and nothing was done to bring the perpetrators to justice. With friends like these we hardly need enemies. This was when the limp signals on Non Alignment 2.0 were sent out. India would be neutral between the new Big Two.

Potential vs kinetic energy. The option of delaying India’s final swing till as late as possible does make strategic sense. It was thought that this would maximise the potential energy of the “Swing State” as also our gains and pay-offs from both sides. We could trade with China to our mutual benefit, as also acquire cutting edge technology from the US. It would increase ambiguity and uncertainity for our foes and friends, as also our adversaries. Attractive in theory, it hasn’t quite worked that way in practice. In trying to please and appease all (including Pakistan), we have ended up pleasing no one. The Asian half swing. As a major power we are not obliged to please others. We have our own vital interests to safeguard. China does not want us to swing at the global level and join the USA in containing China. Yet at the regional level it has cemented a strong anti-India alliance with Pakistan of surprising virulence. It gave to that country blueprints and enriched Uranium for its first few bombs. Then it tested Pakistan’s first bomb at Lop Nor. It then gave Pakistan M-9 and M-11 missiles. When the Americans imposed sanctions on the Chinese entities, it paid for Pakistan’s purchase of North Korean Nodong and Taipodong missiles. 70 per cent of Pakistani Jet fighters and virtually its entire Tank fleet is of Chinese origin. The Chinese Navy now has a dangerous foothold at Gwadar, from where it can block India’s entire energy flow from the Persian Gulf. China’s relationship with Pakistan is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas”. It is specifically designed to HURT India and it has. Pakistan has attacked India four times and is presently engaged in an asymmetric offensive against Jammu and Kashmir and all major Indian cities. This is in addition to the serious Chinese inroads into Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The India-Japan-Vietnam trilateral. To start with, we need to pay China back in its very own coin. We urgently need to fashion a relationship “higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas” with Japan and Vietnam (and also with South Korea, Philippines and Indonesia). India needs to execute this Asian “half swing“ right away. China has deliberately tried to hurt India greviously via its alliance with Pakistan. It has no right to complain if India pays back the compliment by forging equally effective alliances with Japan and Vietnam. India must urgently provide Prithvi and BrahMos missiles to Vietnam. If we can speed up our indegenisation act, we must strengthen the Vietnamese Air Force and Submarine arm. Why can’t India give to Vietnam LCA jet fighters, LCH and Dhruv helicopters at friendship prices? Why can’t India supply Scorpene submarines jointly manufactured with France, to the Vietnamese Navy? The potential for Indo-Japanese cooperation is immense. Japan should divert its vast FDI flows from China to India and help India set up a defense industrial base in its private sector as also help build its infrastructure. Why can’t India-Japan-Vietnam jointly manufacture Jet fighters, Tanks and ICVs as also Destroyers and Submarines in bulk? India and Japan must maximise their naval cooperation to police their SLOCs. China has little reason to protest – considering the level of aid and abetment it has given to Pakistan. If it reacts in a hostile fashion, it will only push india to complete the swing towards the USA, as a corollary. Above all India must forge strong people to people ties with the Buddhist countries of East and South East Asia and promote Buddhist pilgrimage tourism on a “Haj scale”. The India of the 21st century has tremendous hard and soft power. It must learn to use both.

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) April 2013 Defence AND security alert

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Defining alignments

lobal geopolitics has changed dramatically over the past two decades. There have been leadership and regime changes through external interventions in Europe as seen in the Balkanisation of Yugoslavia into its constituent ethnic and religious groups and the attempt to give the Shias of oil rich Iraq an ascendant role is a work still in progress. There have been revolutions sweeping across the Mediterranean coast of Africa and east Asia has the potential of becoming a political hotbed with conflicting maritime boundary claims that threaten to disrupt the very concept of sea lanes being international freeways. What we see today is that there is a paradigm shift in the power game on the globe which I think is because of two major reasons: One is the imperative to control or manipulate and ensure unhampered access to sources of hydrocarbons both gas and crude; and the second is to dominate the manufacturing and sale of arms and ammunition. The states that are small in size and resources are looking for new resourceful friends who could be their political props at the time of any crisis. The powerful states are adding more power to their muscles by associating with the other powerful states to make a total shift in the entire geopolitics of the globe. In their single-minded pursuit of global dominance we have witnessed big nation-states exploit local schisms to attain their own politico-strategic goals. We see what is happening in Iraq – the displaced Sunnis are wreaking havoc on the Shias with a reenactment of gory scenes on the tenth anniversary of the Coalition’s military intervention based on the falsehood that Iraq was trying to acquire a nuclear bomb. The similar dismantling of the former Yugoslavia has left the new nations in suspended animation, unable to reintegrate with neighbours who just cannot be wished away.

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In our part of the world China has been very aggressive in developing its defence industrial base and what it has been doing in the South China Sea makes it quite clear that its long-term designs and machinations converge on its intentions to control the areas which are rich in oil resources.

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On the other side are the states who have been quite peace-loving and neutral and are developing gradually to capitalise their resources like Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and the other ASEAN nations. As the environment of bilateral relations is changing such states have to look for options so as to safeguard their larger interests. Thus the time has come where all the developed and developing states have to look for a wider spectrum of strategic partnerships.

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: maj gen (dr) gd bakshi (retd).

India, Japan and Vietnam are the states that have many common factors to develop a strategic partnership, contours of which can be seen in the recent change in the leadership in Japan. India Japan bilateral relationship has been declared as “Strategic Global Partnership” since 2007. The evolving geopolitical and geostrategic scenario offers a once in a generation opportunity to India and Japan to forge strong, vibrant and wide-ranging partnership in areas of mutual interest strengthening the security environment in the region. Fortuitously the new Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe summed up his thinking on Indo-Japan partnership so succintly when he said: “Strong India is in the best interest of Japan and strong Japan is in the best interest of India” and “This will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world”. In his book Towards a Beautiful Country, Abe surmises “It will not be a surprise if in another decade Japan-India relations overtake Japan-US and Japan-China ties.” How India seizes this opportunity and reciprocates remains to be seen.

ndia has an announced 'look east' policy. It was first enunciated in the 1990s when the country was being buffeted by western winds that sought to trap it in the diplomatic quagmire caused by Jammu and Kashmir. Late Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao, the much underrated practitioner of statecraft, began the use of this term. He used it in terms of the need for a few constant pegs to Indian diplomatic and security interests. At that time nothing seemed to show a direction. The world had recently witnessed the end of the cold war and the emergence of new countries from the debris of the disintegrating Soviet Union was a very real reality. It was a world quite unlike anything seen in at least a couple of human generations.

In this world India was seeking to find its place under the sun. There was as much confusion within the country as there was globally. Little that was happening made much sense to most practitioners of the diplomatic craft. India was treading new grounds as it had only recently opened up its economy, gingerly. Diplomatic winds were not so favourable, as Pakistan and China teamed up to tie India down by the wrists. Even as China proliferated nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, the diplomatic campaign on Jammu and Kashmir pinned down India as a matter of routine. In the search for an alternative India seemed to find East Asia as receptive as it was concerned by China's rising stock. There was finally some commonality of interests with someone sharing India's concerns and vision.

Japan and Vietnam have had a historically fractured relationship with China, whether in the imperial, nationalist or the communist phases. Even as there have been territorial problems between China and these countries, the relationship seems to boil at the slightest instigation. India, on the other hand, has always had good relations with these countries. Historically India has always had good relations with China, making it the only conflict free neighbourly relationship in the world. But that was to change in the middle of the 20th century when the Communist Party of China came to power under Mao Zedong. A certain unease now remains between the two countries. Which makes for a 'look east' policy coloured by a certain prism.

It is not in India's national interest to be drawn into a military alliance that has a singular motivation – checking China. India's interests are far too complex to be reduced to a single agenda. At the same time it is not in Indian economic interests that there be a tense or conflictual situation in East Asia. The future of economic growth, global and regional, depends to a large extent on free and fair trade between East Asia and the rest of the world. A military complication precludes that in one stroke. Even as India and some East Asian countries are drawn together by the power of common fears, there are national security and economic interests that override single agenda concerns. It would be an insult to India, its history and its civilisational ethos, if it were to be drawn into a hyped alliance, only because some friends said so.

manvendra singh

We have no doubt that India-Japan-Vietnam strategic partnership will play a critical and defining role in the coming years and decades in the game plan unfolding on the Asia Pacific chessboard. Jai Hind!

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

pawan agrawal

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

contents

Special Issue April 2013

Strategic Partnership: India-Japan-Vietnam

A R T I C L E S web of maritime security coalition: bilateral, trilateral and multilateral Vice Adm Hideaki Kaneda JMSDF (retd)

c o n t e n t s

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Japan-India nuclear cooperation Takako Hirose and Takeshi Yokoo

emerging security environment in the Indian ocean region and its implications for India Lt Gen OP Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM, M-in-D (retd)

air war in Vietnam: lessons Air Marshal Anil Chopra PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (retd)

assessing the strategic importance of Vietnam: current security dynamics for Japan and India Dr Satoru Nagao

maritime contours: India-Vietnam and India-Japan relationships Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

India-Japan-Vietnam relationship Capt Bonji Ohara (retd)

security competition in Asia Pacific and imperatives for India, Japan and Vietnam Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma (retd) and Ms Anshu Paliwal

Japan and India: collaborating for the common good Cmde Sujeet Samaddar NM (retd)

a new phase in Delhi-Tokyo ties Dr Harsh V Pant

counter-insurgency: opsec and operational art paint a different picture Dr Rupali Jeswal and Damien Martin

E X C L U S I V E

Dr VK Saraswat, Director General, DRDO

political dynamics in the Asia Pacific region India-Vietnam-Japan triangle Chintamani Mahapatra

India-Japan security collaboration Dr Monika Chansoria

India-Vietnam: a lasting partnership Dr Rahul Mishra

developing geostrategic linkages in the Indo-Pacific: an imperative to the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Asian centuryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Nayantara Shaunik

Indian ocean and Asia Pacific: seamless imperatives RSN Singh

a new strategy for India: a classic geopolitics revision Michalis Diakantonis

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Indo-Vietnam strategic partnership in the Asia Pacific region 59 Maj Gen PK Chakravorty VSM (retd)

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strategic partnership

SAFEGUARDING THE GLOBAL COMMONS

Web of Maritime Security Coalition Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral A

senior Japanese Admiral takes an incisive look at the concept and need for a Trilateral and later a Multilateral Security Coalition to safeguard the SLOCs and global commons around Asia. The Malacca-Singapore Strait is in fact the “lifeline of the Northeast Asian countries” covering China and South Korea as well as Japan, making it in a way the “Achilles’ tendon” in the world economy. Annually about 50,000 ships, more than a quarter of the world’s maritime cargo shipment and about one half of entire trade volumes of Japan, China and South Korea navigate through this Strait. Considering only the tanker shipments, about 50 per cent of world’s tankers and about 85 per cent of oil tankers navigating from the Middle East region to the Northeast Asia go through the Indian Ocean and Malacca-Singapore Strait. The “Trilateral Maritime Partnership” of Japan-US-India should take responsibilities as the core responsible parties of a voluntary “Maritime Security Coalition” covering the Broad SLOC of the “East-West Expanded Asia” in the Indo-Pacific region. In light of the trend of Chinese aggressive maritime advancement, the other regional players may need to cooperate trilaterally or multilaterally on the “regional maritime security.” This kind of coalition does not necessarily require the entry into force of an international agreement, treaty or convention, but can be a multinational network (web) based on mutual confidence with common concepts.

eedless to say, ensuring the “security of SLOCs” in the Indo-Pacific region is the most important matter for the economy and the stabilisation of the region as a whole. The regional economy has developed with and is largely dependent on the maritime transportation using secured SLOCs. Especially oil resources that are indispensable for existence and prosperity of the regional countries are largely dependent on the security of the SLOCs, connecting Indian Ocean, Malacca-Singapore Strait, South China Sea and East China Sea. Hence these SLOCs are literally the lifelines of the region.

Importance of security of SLOCs The Malacca-Singapore Strait is in fact the “lifeline of the Northeast Asian countries” covering China and South Korea as well as Japan, making it in a way the “Achilles’ tendon” in the world economy. Annually about 50,000 ships, more than a quarter of world’s maritime cargo shipment and about one half of entire trade volumes of Japan, China and South Korea navigate through this Strait. Considering only the tanker shipments, about 50 per cent of world’s tankers and about 85 per cent of oil tankers navigating from the Middle East region to the Northeast Asia go through Indian Ocean and

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

Malacca-Singapore Strait. The regions increasingly recognise, especially, the importance of the security of the “Broad SLOC” which is the lifeline of the unified region, extending far beyond the Asia Pacific region toward the neighbouring waters of Indian Ocean and Oceania region. Considering the recent situation of international economy and security, India is one of the most important countries in the “Expanded Asia” extending from east to west of Asia, even as Australia is in the “Expanded Asia” extending from north to south of Asia.

This kind of coalition does not necessarily require the entry into force of an international agreement, treaty or convention, but can be a multinational network (web) based on mutual confidence with common concepts The country that has the most influential power in the Indian Ocean region is India. India is the world’s biggest democratic country governed by the administration elected through free multi-party elections. Moreover, India shares many common basic values and systems with Japan and other major sensible countries, such as freedom, democracy and market economy. Promoting the liberalisation and reforms of economy since 1990’s, India maintains higher economic growth rate through the development of

Vice Adm Hideaki Kaneda JMSDF (retd) The writer is Director for Okazaki Institute and an Adjunct Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. He is a former Senior Fellow of Asia Center and J F Kennedy School of Government of the Harvard and a Guest Professor of Faculty of Policy Management of Keio University. He is a graduate of the National Defense Academy in 1968, the Maritime War College in 1983 and the US Naval War College in 1988. He served in the JMSDF from 1968 to 1999, primarily in Naval Surface Warfare at sea, while in Naval and Joint Plans and Policy Making on shore.

information technologies and industries. Supported by its robust economic growth, India is exercising active and multifaceted diplomacy, assuredly enhancing their presence in the international community.

India shares many common basic values and systems with Japan and other major sensible countries, such as freedom, democracy and market economy. Promoting the liberalisation and reforms of economy since 1990’s, India maintains higher economic growth rate through the development of information technologies and industries. Supported by its robust economic growth, India is exercising active and multifaceted diplomacy, assuredly their presence in the international community However, the land route connecting the Indian Ocean region with the Asia Pacific region is not fully developed yet, inevitably increasing the dependence on the Broad SLOC passing through the region. Moreover, in both the regions of the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific, the “maritime resource usage” or the activity related to marine resources such as fisheries and ocean bottom resources is a key for their future development. Because of these factors, any disturbance or disruption of the maritime security will likely cause severe adverse effects on the economy and security of these regions.

Web of maritime security coalition Maritime cooperation for security of broad SLOC in expanded Asia The US-Japan alliance is fundamentally a Maritime Alliance in the past, at present and in the foreseeable future. Looking at the current security environment, however, it is obviously not possible for either the US alone, or Japan-US alliance alone to secure the entire Broad SLOC. It is indicated that both Japan and the US need to cooperate with other reliable maritime powers in pursuit of a new framework to secure the Broad SLOC. For this reason, India is expected to play a more important role and trilateral security cooperation among Japan-US-India is expected to strengthen further. Now the “Trilateral Maritime Partnership” of Japan-US-India should take responsibilities as the core responsible parties of a voluntary “Maritime Security Coalition” covering the Broad SLOC of the “East-West Expanded Asia” in the Indo-Pacific region. In light of the trend of Chinese aggressive maritime advancement, the other regional players may need to cooperate trilaterally or multilaterally on the regional maritime security.

One precondition for accession to such Maritime Security Coalition will be whether a nation can share three basic Marine Interests with other countries. Those are, in the maritime domain: (i) to cooperate in maintaining the security of the region from peace time as well as in emergency or crisis (co-existence); (ii) to cooperate and to prosper together in the commerce and trades as well as marine resource development (co-prosperity) and (iii) to sincerely pursue the conservation and development of various benefits which the seas can provide in terms of marine environment protection and marine resource control (co-value)

In the future, such coalition should become a core of the “seamless and

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

strategic partnership

SAFEGUARDING THE GLOBAL COMMONS

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unified broader voluntary maritime security coalition” to cover the Broad SLOC of the whole regions and ultimately to become a core of the “global voluntary maritime security coalition.”

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Maritime security coalition

Announces May 2013 Issue on

Here the “Maritime Security Coalition” is defined as the “broader regional nation-to-nation coalition with the objective to maintain and secure safe and free use of oceans from peace time to emergency and crisis situations.” This kind of coalition does not necessarily require the entry into force of an international agreement, treaty or convention, but can be a multinational network (web) based on mutual confidence with common concepts. Therefore, it is basically possible to enter into relationship of “coalition” with any coastal countries as long as they can share the common objectives. In building such global or broader regional maritime coalition, each member nation is required to take a responsible role proportionate to the features of the nation or the region. How to take responsibility may differ from a country to a country and each country can decide on what they can contribute within their intention and capabilities. One precondition for accession to such Maritime Security Coalition will be whether a nation can share three basic Marine Interests with other countries. Those are, in the maritime domain: (i) to cooperate in maintaining the security of the region from peace time as well as in emergency or crisis (co-existence); (ii) to cooperate and to prosper together in the commerce and trades as well as marine resource development (co-prosperity) and (iii) to sincerely pursue the conservation and development of various benefits which the seas can provide in terms of marine environment protection and marine resource control (co-value). In short, the coalition needs to be built on the action principle of each participant as “public goods,” which is based on the common sense of democracy.

Web of maritime security coalition In consideration of the above, it will be the best to create a coalition among sensible maritime countries that share the same three indicators of co-existence, co-prosperity and co-value, then add the regional sensible maritime powers that can fulfill these three indicator conditions and the action principle as “public goods” and eventually expand to include other nations. First of all, it is urgently needed to develop voluntary “Maritime Security Coalition”, inviting regional sensible maritime powers, centered around “Trilateral Maritime Partnership” of Japan-US-India to ensure the security of the lengthy SLOCs through the “East-West Expanded Asia” extending from the South of Suez Canal (or East of Cape of Hope) to Southeast and Northeast Asia, since these SLOCs are the most important and occasionally vulnerable among the Broad SLOC. Under this fundamental structure, if other sensible

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

Maoism: Militarisation Of The Conflicts

Latest Gadgetry To Counter Terrorism maritime powers, such as Australia, ROK, Taiwan and members of ASEAN including Singapore or Vietnam to join this coalition, it will boost the creation of the voluntary “Web of Maritime Security Coalition.” It may be true that the obvious security collaboration between some stakeholder countries is said to be unlikely for a moment. But it will not be difficult for such stakeholder countries to make efforts for the security of the Broad SLOC in each relevant region, through certain “Maritime Security Coalition” such as Japan-India-US, with a view to unify and develop more region-wide “Web of Maritime Security Coalition” in the Broad SLOC in the future. For the “Web of Maritime Security Coalition”, it is important to build global coalition with other global sensible maritime powers. It is certainly possible to build a “Web of Global Maritime Security Coalition” that is founded on freedom and democracy and shares common indices of “co-existence”, “co-prosperity” and “co-value”, mainly by voluntary coalition centered around the US in the regions adjacent to broadly unified SLOCs. In case of Japan, the initiative of the “Web of Maritime Security Coalition” coincides with the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” proposed by the then Foreign Minister Aso, now the Finance Minister and the “coalition of nations based on common values” stated by the then Prime Minister Abe, now the Prime Minister again.

Conclusion For the moment, voluntary Trilateral “Maritime Security Coalitions”, such as those of Japan-US-India can ensure the security of the Broad SLOC and in the future, opportunities may arise to develop voluntary “Web of Maritime Security Coalition” through the efforts of relevant countries to unify voluntary coalitions, creating ultimately a “Web of Global Maritime Security Coalition.”

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defence preparedness

DRDO INTERVIEW

n an exclusive interview with DSA Dr VK Saraswat, Director General, DRDO spent quality time with our Editor-in-chief Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi reminiscing about his long and eventful association with DRDO and sharing with DSA readers his DRDO VISION-2050. Defence and Security Alert: Everybody agrees with the dire need for Indigenisation. How can we become a major global power without autarky in critical weapon systems? The recent AgustaWestland scandal has only highlighted the need for indigenisation. Why then are we still dependent on imports to the tune of 70 per cent of our defence needs? How can we speed up the process of indigenisation? Dr Saraswat: First and foremost, I would like to question the figures of just 30 per cent indigenisation that are usually put out in our media. This was true of 1995. The Indian Council of Economic Research and Analysis and our own empirical calculations have shown that the extent of indigenisation in Defence items now stands at 55 per cent. Sanctions by DAC over a 10 year period confirm this. Some Rs 1,42,000 crore worth of DRDO developed indigenous defence products are under production now. So I would like to correct that erroneous impression. However, the fact is that we would like to aim for 70-80 per cent indigenisation. The need for indigenisation has always been strongly felt. We want it to happen. Imports of defence items are forced due to a gap in our capabilities. You can’t jeopardise the security of our country and hence we have to import in areas where we lack the indigenous capacity. It is not as if the need for indigenisation has been felt only now due to the recent painful episode. It has been in our blood for the last 30 years and more. Indigenisation in fact is the mandate of the DRDO. We have taken a whole range of measures to increase indigenous content in defence items. However it is important for us to define what we mean by indigenisation. 100 per cent indigenous content is not valid in the current global context. Even for commercial firms, producing electronic goods or even textiles, there is a considerable amount of foreign component. Today, there is a large global market with up and downstream linkages, and importing components is the norm.

R D O I N T E R V I E W

Defence indigenisation must be considered in respect of capability to make the nation strong. The Geopolitical situation can deny you the much needed equipment and technology in critical situations. We must achieve a critical mass in terms of indigenous technology. This implies that we must be independent of all existing and future controls / restrictions and technology denial regimes. That is why the DRDO does not engage itself in production of easily available products / low cost high volume items, which are available from multiple sources. There is no fear that these supplies will ever get choked. The critical mass for indigenisation therefore focuses on cutting edge technology sectors like missiles, electronic warfare, radars, SONARs, special materials, Life sciences products etc that are specific to our terrain. Technology denial regimes and unwillingness of other countries to sell such items, makes it essential for us to develop our own in-house capacities. The aim is to keep us independent of controls. This implies developing the integrated sum of academic institutions, industrial capacity, national laboratories and DRDO to meet national objectives. There is a gap currently and this must be bridged in a big way. DSA: What therefore must be done to achieve this end? Why is it that the HAL and other PSUs have not even been able to carry out upgrades on the aircraft / tanks that they are license producing in the country? How can we strengthen our Design capabilities? Dr Saraswat: It has more to do with our policies. The Indian industrial base has come up over the last 60 years. We had control through licensing system. Our PSUs went in for Technology Transfer / Acquisition for specific products. Our engineering capabilities have remained confined to what the foreigners gave us. There has been no innovative engineering development. Licensed production by itself is not complete indigenisation. As a result our manufacturing capabilities have gone up but not our design / innovation capability. The same is true even of our private sector. They have also largely acquired products from the West. They have done very little value addition. There is no indigenous product really with even around 20 per cent value addition. There are no Indian designed TVs, computers or communication systems. The only Indian made systems are those developed by the DRDO. Our industries must have a development culture initiated within. We must have a strong R&D base in our industry. Today, we do pure manufacture – we can’t build to specifications (referring to our industry). DRDO is now inculcating this through Joint Development. 400 industries are participating in DRDO programmes to graduate from pure manufacture to build through specifications.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

DRDO INTERVIEW

Dr VK Saraswat, Director General, DRDO and Chief Scientific Advisor to the Minister of Defence, India In our Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements, we only obtain the “Know How” and not the “Know Why”. That is why we don’t know how to upgrade the weapon systems we are manufacturing under license. This is now changing. In all our ToTs we now insist on getting the “Know Why”, the source codes etc. DSA: What are the measures we are taking to incorporate our vibrant private sector? Won’t that help us to achieve indigenisation? Do you feel that the 26 per cent cap on FDI in Defence needs to be raised? Dr Saraswat: With the private industry there is a Catch-22 situation. The private industry’s primary (and understandable) concern is will they get orders in bulk? We do not want to give preference to only one entity. We would want a level playing field with the public sector concerns addressed. Unfortunately, in practice, it is not so. In the absence of assured orders, the private industry is not willing to take risks. All committees, for eg the Kelkar Committee, have addressed this issue. Unfortunately, so far, little headway has been made. This gap can only be bridged by proactive action to build the private industry to become an R&D hub. The government will have to make investments in the private industry. We must be firm that as a policy we will not support import for defence. We may not be able to take that decision now because of our lack of capacities in certain fields. However, to start with, we could begin with modest steps. Say the requirement for a particular item is 100.

defence preparedness

DRDO INTERVIEW

You could exercise an option where you import 70 and 30 are given to indigenous manufacture in our country. As regards FDI in defence, the DRDO view is that FDI if enhanced will definitely improve indigenous content. With the existing cap, unfortunately, we have not been able to attract much investment in our Defence Industrial Base. 26 per cent is too small to participate. This could go upto 45-49 per cent at least. That will certainly attract better participation of Foreign Players and help the growth of Indian Defence Industries. They will then work on development programmes. We have very talented manpower. We have only to get that right ecosystem. For example, our joint venture of BrahMos has been an outstanding success. The investment ratios were 50.5 per cent to 49.5 per cent between us and the Russians. The entire process has helped the joint venture to work so well. This has enabled the growth of private industries, has helped indigenisation of various sub-systems. Hence raising the FDI cap to 49.5 per cent would certainly help attract more investment. DSA: The HAL had designed the HF-24 Marut in the sixties. Subsequently that design team / skills were lost. Similarly, we had designed the 75/24 mm Howitzer and the 105 mm Indian Field Gun. Once again these design teams were dissipated and dispersed. What should be done to build Design Capacities and nurture talented Design Teams / Bureaus? Dr Saraswat: Design capabilities exist in the DRDO and HAL. The Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and Light Combat Helicopters (LCH) are great success stories of the HAL. The DRDO has exclusive design capabilities in Missiles, Light Combat Aircraft, in the area of armaments, Radar, Electronic Warfare, SONAR, Naval Platforms etc. We have successfully produced the Prithvi and Agni Series of Missiles from Agni-I to Agni-V. We produce radars with ranges from 70–600 km. We have produced the LRTR in cooperation with Israel. When the DRDO does collaboration, we learn in a total transparent manner. Our aim is not just to get the know-how but even more important the “know-why” that will help us innovate and grow. For example, we learnt from the Russians how to design our seekers and are now doing it on our own. Wherever there are knowledge gaps, we work with other friendly countries and consistently bridge these gaps in technology. There are some limitations. We don’t have infrastructure for certain critical systems. We have the design capacities but we do not have a foundry for forging our own Focal Plane Arrays (FPAs). This is 40 per cent of the total cost of Thermal Imaging NVDs. Similarly we don’t have a plant for manufacturing Integrated Circuits (ICs) in the country. We have to import the ICs even for our Cyber Security and Electronic Warfare equipment. This can have serious security drawbacks. We need to build our own foundries for FPAs and for ICs. All these require very high purity materials. Policy decision must come at the highest level as these are very high investment items. DSA: Recently, concern was expressed over “delays in delivery” of major equipment and completion of critical projects. What are your views on this issue? How can we minimise time and cost overruns in DRDO projects? Dr Saraswat: We are suffering in this aspect from a baggage from the past. The delays have mostly been in the projects started in the 1970s / 1980s. I was just 30 years old when the Prithvi Project was sanctioned. I know well what the condition was of our academic institutions / industrial base then. Our DRDO budget was below Rs 100 crore. Today it is above Rs 10,000 crore. In 1986, came the Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was put in place to stop / delay our programme. We had planned to import certain items. All imports were suddenly denied. There were critical components like the servo valve for the control system and the hydraulic system. The American, British and European firms terminated their contracts and asked us to return their drawings. We had to design our products in-house then.

With the existing cap, unfortunately, we have not been able to attract much investment in our Defence Industrial Base. 26 per cent is too small to participate. This could go upto 45-49 per cent at least. That will certainly attract better participation of Foreign Players and help the growth of Indian Defence Industries. They will then work on development programmes 12

We had a smaller industrial base then and it did impose a lot of delay. But we persisted and overcame. The same happened with the LCA. However all this is the baggage of that era. Things have changed and today, the Ballistic Missile Defence, Agni-V, Electronic Warfare projects, Radars etc are all on schedule. Our industrial base has improved and the technological base level has gone up. We then had to learn to do Project Management. Today, we have mastered Mission Mode Programme Management The delays and cost overruns are now a thing of the past – the baggage we have to perforce carry. The Agni series of projects that were sanctioned in 2000s are on time and on course. The LCA was sanctioned in 1992 and has taken 20 years. However, please bear in mind that complex weapon systems like new aircraft, generally take 20-25 years or more even for advanced countries. The famous F-16 took the US 18 years to develop, the F-18 Hornet took 21 years and the F-22 Raptor has taken 25 years to develop. How then can India be expected to develop a weapon system like this faster than the USA? We also forget the costly failures that most advanced countries have had to go through as part of their learning curve. Quite obviously,

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these failed programmes are not advertised. Some of the criticism of inordinate delays in DRDO projects is uninformed. We must understand the concept of spiral development. If we truly want to indigenise we will have to take risks. An aircraft developed by the Russians / US is in production line for 20 years before it becomes a completely matured product with the production cycle well-established. Development in any country goes through stages of spiral development. You produce a prototype – give it to the user who tests it – gives back for you to improve and so on. We will have to go for such spiral development. Take the Mark-I today, exploit it, give extensive feedback for creating far better Mk II/Mk III versions. Unfortunately, we don’t want to take the risks of the spiral development process. The development of the Nag missile is an example. If we had accepted lower parameters for the Mark-I, by now we could have had an excellent system. Indigenous development is a painful process and the nation has to go through the labour pains. DSA: We have managed to produce good airframes so far. However both China and India have experienced difficulties in developing aero-engines. What are we doing to address this shortcoming? Dr Saraswat: That is correct. Aero-engines have been a problem – both for India and China. I had elaborated on this aspect at the Mumbai IIT Seminar. Gas Turbine Engine is the most complex piece of technology. These are being made for manned missions. Hence standards of reliability have to be very high. It needs good production infrastructure and stringent testing facilities. You have to work with ceramics. We do not have this. We took the Kaveri engine to Russia for testing. It was put as one of the engines on an Il-76 and did 55 hours of flying. It produced 78 kilo Newton of thrust against a target of 80 kilo Newton. Unfortunately, by then the requirement of thrust had been enhanced to 90 kilo Newton, due to additional equipment added to the LCA. A large number of countries including Brazil, Canada, Italy, Sweden etc produce aircraft. However aero-engines are produced only by four countries – USA, France, UK and Russia. The DRDO is making a special effort to bridge this gap and make a strong base for Engine facilities. We will need to spend some Rs 2,000-3,000 crore to upgrade testing and production facilities. The current HAL testing facilities are for 2nd/3rd generation aircraft like MiG-21s. We are now developing the Fifth Generation fighter aircraft with Russia and need to invest in these facilities. DSA: Please enlighten us about the development programme of the Agni-VI missile, said to be capable of carrying multiple warheads.

I visualise a highly integrated defence development system where the user and DRDO will work together in a well-integrated, seamless network of Academic Institutions, the Industry, the User and the R&D components

Dr Saraswat: There is no Agni-VI. This has been misreported in the media. The Agni-V as you know is under development. Another force multiplier capability that

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defence preparedness

DRDO INTERVIEW

we are working on for this missile is the Multiple Payload Capability or how to make it MIRVed. So what is under development is an enhanced capability, MIRVed variant of the Agni-V. DSA: As per media reports, many scientists have left DRDO for greener pastures. Reportedly the DRDO has lost 700 scientists in the last five years to this exodus. Does that worry you? What are we doing to attract and equally important, retain talent in the DRDO?

We have very talented manpower. We have only to get that right ecosystem. For example, our joint venture of BrahMos has been an outstanding success. The investment ratios were 50.5 per cent to 49.5 per cent between us and the Russians

Dr Saraswat: 700 scientists leaving in the past five years works out to an attrition rate of some 140 per year. Considering that the total strength of DRDO is 7,000 scientists, this works out to just 2 per cent attrition per year, which is not very high. It is not a matter of concern for us. Why do these people leave? It is not because the DRDO job is not challenging enough. They generally leave because of emolument differences in the IT sector and what the government pays. This is more so in IT and not so much in Engineering, where our pays are better. We are attracting our share of the higher ability levels. Last year we got 80 graduates from our IITs. It depends on the ecosystem. Whenever the IT Sector salaries rise, there is an exodus towards that side. However, bright young men are coming forth to take up the challenging assignments in the DRDO. We have not recruited more due to austerity measures on manpower now in vogue.

DSA: The Dong Feng 21D missile of the Chinese is being tested as an aircraft carrier killer missile. It is felt that it will be a game changer in Naval Warfare. Given India’s success in developing a family of missiles – what will be our response? Should we not create this capability ourselves? Dr Saraswat: The Chinese have built the Dong Feng Missiles to deny access to the US Carrier Battle groups (CBGs) in the Pacific. These anti-ship missiles will target platforms that are being sent far out into the Sea of Japan, East China Sea or South China Sea by nations in prospective conflicts. We will need to counter these missiles with Anti-Ballistic Missile capabilities. We have already developed these and will have to make them shipborne. We could also create such an anti-access capability, which is not very difficult. It will be more reliable only when we have our own GPS Grid like the GLONASS. The Gagan is theatre-specific and will not give global coverage. In the BrahMos – we already have the seekers, hence we can manage without GPS. DSA: In the light of prevailing security environment, what is your vision for the DRDO? Dr Saraswat: We have developed a document – Vision 2050 to look ahead and anticipate the requirements of that era. We should start looking at where warfare will take place globally and how it will be fought. We should now build-up technology for that era. As I see it, it will be the era of Non-Contact Warfare. Unmanned systems to include UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), UWS (Underwater Systems) and UGS (Unmanned Ground Systems) will proliferate. Weapons would mostly be in the form of lightweight systems, guns / bombs and Directed Energy weapons. In fact by 2030, we should be ready to field Directed Energy Weapons. All this will need exploitation of Nano-technology, Robotics, IT, Autonomy and Expert Systems. Unmanned Systems will have to be made autonomous. We will have swarms of Robots that operate intelligently in tandem. They will have the intelligence to carve out a path without collision. High levels of miniaturisation and complex software will be needed. We will need to create a huge database. I visualise a highly integrated defence development system where the user and DRDO will work together in a well-integrated, seamless network of Academic Institutions, the Industry, the User and the R&D components.

We must understand the concept of spiral development. If we truly want to indigenise we will have to take risks. An aircraft developed by the Russians / US is in production line for 20 years before it becomes a completely matured product with the production cycle well-established 14

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DSA: Dr Saraswat, it has been a long and memorable journey for you in the DRDO. As you look back, what are the most memorable events of this journey? Dr Saraswat: Yes, it has been a very long and highly satisfying journey. My most memorable moments of course are the first launch of a Ballistic Missile and then the very first intercept of a Ballistic Missile at an altitude of 70-80 km. These gave you the thrill that as a technological power we had finally arrived.

Unique. Ahead Ahead of of the the Art. Art. Unique. Unique. Ahead of the Art.

strategic partnership

SIGNIFICANT THAW

JAPAN-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

ivil nuclear cooperation is an important element of Japan-India cooperation and is expected to play a significant role for the prosperity of our two nations. The world trend is to continue the use of civil nuclear power, while recognising its risks and trying to reduce them. Japan concluded bilateral agreements with UK, Canada, USA, France and Australia in the 1950s-1970s and agreements were concluded with China and Euratom in 1986 and 2006 respectively. Agreements with Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Jordan and Russia were signed before March 2011 and came into effect in 2011 and 2012. Negotiations with India, Turkey, South Africa and other nations started before March 2011, but were deferred mainly because of the inconclusive debates on Japan’s own energy policy.

ince around the turn of the century, the peaceful use of nuclear power started to be recognised as one of the effective measures to pursue both combating global warming and pursuing economic growth and the movement toward its promotion had been spreading in the world. The Great East Japan Earthquake and the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that occurred in March 2011 triggered renewed discussions on the risks and merits of civil nuclear power, not only in Japan but also in many countries. As a result, Germany, Italy and some other nations decided to take the non-nuclear option in their energy policies. But USA, France and many other nations are going to continue their use of civil nuclear power, putting great efforts to further upgrade the safety. Emerging nations such as China, India are keeping their plans to increase civil nuclear power. Also, the projects to newly introduce civil nuclear power are still on-going in Vietnam, Turkey and other nations. It appears that the world trend is to continue the use of civil nuclear power, while recognising its risks and trying to reduce them. Nowadays, large scale economic enterprises are to a large extent operated globally. Civil nuclear power is no exception. Import / export of materials as well as technologies and various international cooperation are almost indispensable in design, construction, operation and maintenance of the facilities.

To secure the peaceful purposes and non-proliferation, concerned nations are obliged to accept the IAEA’s safeguard, implement strict export control and conclude bilateral civil nuclear co-operation agreements. Japan opted for the use of civil nuclear power in the late 1950s and started its use in 1963, which was steadily increased until the first decade of the 21st century. In due course, Japan concluded bilateral agreements with UK, Canada, USA, France and Australia in the 1950s-1970s and agreements were concluded with China and Euratom in 1986 and 2006 respectively. More recently, Japan has been engaged in negotiations with later nuclear nations and also nations planning to introduce civil nuclear power, who expect Japan’s contribution to their development. Agreements with Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Jordan and Russia were signed before March 2011 and came into effect in 2011 and 2012. Negotiations with India, Turkey, South Africa and other nations started before March 2011, but were deferred mainly because of the inconclusive debates on Japan’s own energy policy. But, according to the media reports, negotiations are being resumed and fundamental agreement was reached with Turkey in March 2012. India had long been outside of the global nuclear community due to being non-signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, in seeking stronger relationship with

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

India, USA signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India in 2007, on certain conditions including India’s acceptance of the IAEA’s safeguard, with which India complied. In 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to grant India a “clean waiver” from its existing rules, which forbid nuclear trade with a non-signatory of the NPT. Following the decision of the NSG, India started negotiations with some nations and agreements with Russia, France, UK, ROK, Canada, Argentine, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Namibia have been signed. The cooperation with these countries is bound to promote India’s use of civil nuclear power.

Takako Hirose The writer, PhD from University of London, is Professor in South Asian Politics and International Politics at Senshu University, Tokyo, Japan. She also served as Atomic Energy Commissioner of Japan in 2006-2009 and in 2010 a member of the Council on “Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era” appointed by the Japanese Prime Minister.

mutually satisfactory agreement. But, in the interview with Japanese reporters held on March 21, 2013 before visiting Japan on 26-28 of March to attend the Seventh Japan-India Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, External Affairs Minister Mr Salman Khurshid said that India is not in a hurry to conclude the nuclear agreement, stating that “India is ready to give Japan time to cope with its problems,” thus showing sympathy towards Japanese sensitivity to nuclear issues .

India had long been outside of the global nuclear community due to being non-signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, in seeking stronger relationship with India, USA signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India in 2007, on certain conditions including India’s acceptance of the IAEA’s safeguard, with which India complied. In 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to grant India a "clean waiver" from its existing rules, which forbid nuclear trade with a non-signatory of the NPT. Following the decision of the NSG, India started negotiations with some nations and agreements with Russia, France, UK, ROK, Canada, Argentine, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Namibia have been signed. The cooperation with these countries is bound to promote India’s use of civil nuclear power

India has become increasingly important for Japan especially in the 21st century. Japan’s “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond” categorically mentions India as one of the most important countries together with Australia and ROK, both US allies, for “multilayered security cooperation.” No doubt “the Japan-US Alliance remains indispensable in ensuring the peace and security of Japan,” but the Japanese government is trying to widen and diversify cooperation with other countries. Japan perceives India as “share(ing) common interests in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia.” Within the constitutional limitation, Japan has extended defence and coastguard cooperation with India. Political dialogues have been regularly taking place; summit, two plus two dialogues et al. The slow pace of the negotiation of the nuclear deal should be an irritant for India. Considering the patience as illustrated by Mr Khurshid and the increasing importance Japanese government attaches to India, the negotiation is expected to proceed further. Civil nuclear cooperation is an important element of Japan-India cooperation and is expected to play a significant role for the prosperity of our two nations.

Takeshi Yokoo The co-writer is Associate Vice President, International Cooperation and Nuclear Technologies, Planning Group, Central Research Institute of Power and Industry (CRIEPI), Tokyo, Japan. He is former Deputy Director, Office of Atomic Energy Policy, Cabinet Office (CAO), government of Japan.

The world trend is to continue the use of civil nuclear power, while recognising its risks and trying to reduce them

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

strategic partnership

MARITIME LIFELINE

Emerging Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region

and its Implications for India I

ndian Ocean is vital to our defence. It is a lifeline for India. It is the third largest of the world’s five oceans covering an area of 68,556 million sq km. It has emerged as a major oil supply route and centre for immense economic activity. Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean is a great cause for concern for us. To limit China within its genuine interests we must seriously consider increasing our presence in the South China Sea by developing cooperative strategy with Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and even Taiwan. This will be a step in checkmating Chinese illegitimate expansion in the Indian Ocean. Being a core country in the Indian Ocean littoral there is a need for us to safeguard common interests. There is a need to develop a doctrine to defend our island territories. We have to prepare to take part in sudden and short wars involving island grabbing actions.

nlike any other ocean, Indian Ocean is landlocked and has Indian sub-continent in the North, Indonesia and Australia in the East, Continent of Africa in the West and Antarctica in the South. It is the third largest of the world’s five oceans covering an area of 68,556 million sq km. It has emerged as a major oil supply route and centre for immense economic activity. Its littorals are diverse in religion, culture, political system and levels of socio-economic development. There are regular conflicts among its littorals due to which it is the most volatile zone of the world. The British controlled the Indian Ocean by having full control on the choke points of Aden, South Africa, Australia, Singapore and Malacca Strait. They had refuelling points in Mauritius and other places. It is almost impossible to control the Indian Ocean and guard our interests by sitting on the shore. As the Indian land frontiers do not begin from our borders, similarly, our sea frontiers are not the coastline of India. The Hindu Kush provided our true land frontiers, as history shows us that whenever any invaders crossed Hindu Kush they succeeded. Similarly our sea frontiers are not the West and East coasts. Anybody who ventured into the Arabian Sea after

having crossed East Africa succeeded in ruling India. Our Western sea frontier is almost the East coast of Africa and the Eastern sea frontier is the junction point of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, which is today commanded by Vietnam and Cambodia. Anybody who comes this side of that junction point is a threat to us. Therefore, the geographical limits of our maritime security concerns start at the East coast of Africa in the West and the junction point of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans in the East. A country cannot be a world power unless it has got some control on the seas. It has an opening into the Pacific Ocean, but the Pacific Ocean is primarily controlled and dominated by the USA. China could control South China Sea to an extent, but to have total domination of the Pacific Ocean will call for war with USA and its allies, which China will not venture. China’s interest will be to seek an entry into the Indian Ocean. This is the reason for the Chinese foray into the Indian Ocean through military assistance to Myanmar. The assistance for construction of highways to Malaysia and Myanmar also is for the purpose of obtaining an opening into the Indian Ocean in order to dominate the area

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Maritime frontiers Indian Ocean is a closed ocean unlike other oceans of the world. There are restricted entries and any country that can establish control or effectively deny these restricted waterways can have a true control over the Indian Ocean. Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal open out into the Indian Ocean. There are no islands guarding them. The Lakshadweep Islands are just adjacent to our western coast. Similarly on the eastern side, we have Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but they provide early warning and protection from any move from the Malacca Strait only. There is no protection from the southern approaches. Unfortunately, we are not well placed by nature in guarding our coastline. The naval defences are not effective without advanced bases. In the absence of advanced bases, a strong navy is a prerequisite for guarding our maritime frontiers. Therefore, there is a need to modernise and expand our navy.

China factor China, a massive Asian country extending from the desert mountain of Sinkiang and passing through entire length of Asia, has no opening into the Indian Ocean. China has

Lt Gen OP Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM, M-in-D (retd) The writer has been the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command, Indian Army and a former Vice Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, Haryana.

aspirations of becoming a world power. A country cannot be a world power unless it has got some control on the seas. It has an opening into the Pacific Ocean, but the Pacific Ocean is primarily controlled and dominated by the USA. China could control South China Sea to an extent, but to have total domination of the Pacific Ocean will call for war with USA and its allies, which China will not venture and therefore China’s interest will be to seek an entry into the Indian Ocean. This is the reason for the Chinese foray into the Indian Ocean through military assistance to Myanmar. The assistance for construction of highways to Malaysia and Myanmar also is for the purpose of obtaining an opening into the Indian Ocean in order to dominate the area. China is apprehensive of threat to its oil supply. China imports approximately 60 per cent of its oil requirements from the Persian Gulf. In the event of a conflict in the Indian Ocean region, the flow of oil through tankers can get intercepted and even be stopped China is apprehensive of threat to oil supply. China imports approximately 60 per cent of its oil requirements from the Persian Gulf. In the event of a conflict in the Indian Ocean region, the flow of oil through tankers can get tampered and even be stopped. At present, her oil tankers from the Persian Gulf to her ports in the South China Sea traverse nearly 5,000 km distance and pass through the Malacca Strait which is a very sensitive choke point. Indonesia, an ally of USA in this part of the World, easily monitors and can intercept traffic through the strait. China is, therefore, busy in laying pipelines from Gwadar and Pasni Ports on Pakistan’s

Baluchistan coast. These ports have been built by China at their own cost, to destinations in Sinkiang. As a part of bargain, China has obtained rights to utilise these ports for rest, refit and refuelling of her naval vessels. Similarly, China is busy in building a port next to Rangoon in Myanmar and this port is being connected by an eight lane highway along which massive pipelines are being laid through the Irrawady Valley to China. These pipelines will eliminate Chinese vessels’ dependence on passing through the Malacca Strait. These will also save massive costs in transportation and provide accesses to Chinese to the Indian Ocean. Another port, Hambantota, at the Southern edge of Sri Lanka, is being developed by China where it will have rights to temporarily harbour for rest and refuelling her naval vessels. Very recently, China has acquired an island from Maldives for developing a naval station and a base. Our objections in this regard were totally ignored by the Maldives government. China claims that these ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan are being developed to ensure safety of her oil tankers passing through the Indian Ocean.

Indian Ocean region has become a springboard for international terrorism. al-Qaeda covers North African countries, South West Asia and Pakistan. It is also rapidly making inroads into Sinkiang province of China and central Asian Republics. In the south east is Jemmah Islamiah – Hambali terrorist outfits based in Indonesia and spreading its wings into Malaysia, Thailand, South of Philippines and New Guinea. There are reports that these two organisations are collaborating and interlinking their modus operandi in organising piracy, people smuggling and use of sea for terrorism and movement of weapons and explosives for sabotage activities

International Islamic terrorism is active in Indian Ocean region and has its active agents in India. Bangladesh, Pakistan and most of the Persian Gulf countries are already in its grips

The above activity of Chinese has serious security concerns for India. Pipelines being laid through Pakistan and Myanmar will need to be guarded at the start point which will invite strong presence of Chinese Navy at these places. It is, therefore, of vital concern for India to ensure that these ports developed by China are not used for military purposes. Diplomatic efforts with these countries and close and constant monitoring of Chinese

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strategic partnership

MARITIME LIFELINE

activities in these areas will have to be undertaken by India vigorously.

Big power presence The presence of US and Russian Navies in the Arabian Sea is with a view to develop their own sphere of influence and to deny sphere of influence to hostile nations. China has become the third highest weapon seller of the world today and most of the littoral states, along the African coast, a very large number of countries in South East Asia, our neighbours, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar are totally flooded with Chinese weapons. This is a shape of coercive diplomacy; make your presence felt, therefore make the country subdued, flood the countries with weapons, give them money and create a hostile organisation – socially, politically, economically and destabilise the country internally. We, must take a closer look into this aspect. Countries of the Pacific region and specially Japan and China have become increasingly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East. One estimate suggests that by 2020 this region will consume 38 million barrels per day of oil, of which 80 per cent will be imported from the Persian Gulf. Their oil supplies are totally dependent on sea lanes of communications passing through Indian Ocean. Hence, Asia Pacific region countries are greatly concerned on Indian Ocean remaining stable so that their economic activity can take place unhampered. To ensure this, they are demanding presence of friendly navies covering their sea lanes of communications or deployment of ICBM’s and SLBM’s guaranteeing safety and security of their commercial activity through the Indian Ocean.

US interests The US moved into the Indian Ocean region after UK and France withdrew from it. Their interests are clearly visible from President Carter’s statement in his state of the Union address on 23 January 1980, “Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA and such

an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”. It followed establishment of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) with a strength of over two lakh troops by the USA and was given the operational responsibility of this region. Subsequently, they acquired base facilities for this force in Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The base in Diego Garcia, previously a military base of UK, was developed as a formidable base facility and a vital area. The RDF was reorganised as central command with operational responsibility over 25 countries of the Persian Gulf region which also includes Central Asian Region and South Asia upto Pakistan. India is outside the Command Jurisdiction of Central command and is covered by the Pacific command. Due to the requirements of security of world energy supplies, (US gets 20 per cent of its oil imports from Persian Gulf), US military presence in the Indian Ocean and particularly in the Persian Gulf has come to stay as a permanent interest. The presence of US and Russian Navies in the Arabian Sea is with a view to develop their own sphere of influence and to deny sphere of influence to hostile nations. China has become the third highest weapon seller of the world today and most of the littoral states, along the African coast, a very large number of countries in South East Asia, our neighbours, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar are totally flooded with Chinese weapons

European Union’s interests Except France, who maintains a naval base in Djibouti, no other European country is maintaining any military bases in the Indian Ocean. The European Union members import approximately 10 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil of which 5 bpd come from the Persian Gulf. For secured supply of energy from the region, they rely mostly on US military presence. None of the European Union countries seems inclined to maintain forces in the region on permanent basis. They

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do not share US view of declaring Iraq and Iran as “Axis of Evil” and would want USA to follow a more moderate and placid policy towards these countries and specially Iran. However they are supporting USA militarily in her efforts to fight out terrorism and extremist groups in the Indian Ocean region. For this reason, as also emerging threats from piracy, European countries will maintain readiness of forces for deployment in the region without opening permanent bases.

Geographical factors There is a multipolar environment developing in the Indian Ocean from economic and industrialised point of view. Historically, Indian Ocean has been sailed in by the Arabs, Romans, Greeks and Chinese for the wealth in the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Ocean region contains 80 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, manganese, rubber and 70 per cent of the world’s iron. USA, Japan, Western European Union and China will be struggling in this area to have bases to explore raw material and other requirements from the Indian Ocean. Their presence is a cause for concern to us because it impinges on our interests and we cannot ignore it. These countries have signed several bilateral agreements and pacts. USA formed SEATO and CENTO. Russia went for bilateral agreements with India, Egypt and Iraq. China established relations with Somalia and Mozambique. This has an effect on our security. We have to explore options which will help us protect our interests in this scenario, specially security of our islands located in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region contains 80 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, manganese, rubber and 70 per cent of the world’s iron. USA, Japan, Western European Union and China will be struggling in this area to have bases to explore raw material and other requirements from the Indian Ocean

Africa There is political instability in Somalia, Tanzania and Mozambique on the African coast. South Africa is seemingly stable, but internally there

is a volcano developing. It may erupt today, it may erupt after twenty years. This will cause tremendous security ramifications. We have a very large presence of Indians in these countries and we have extensive trade ties with them. Their instability is a security concern to us. We have to build-up the response capability of the Indian Navy to deal with situations arising in these countries.

Southwest Asia The countries of South West Asia are called ‘wells of Power’ because of the large reserves of oil. They have purchased large quantities of modern weapons which they do not need. These weapons find their way to other organisations. The al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan, is reported to have been armed by the weapons purchased by these oil rich countries. Weapons purchased by Saudi Arabia are finding place in Pakistan. During the ’65 and ’71 wars, Saudi Arabia gave an open understanding to Pakistan that their missiles will be available to Pakistan against India. This is a point of concern for us.

South Asia India has 78 per cent of the area, 77 per cent of the GNP and 72 per cent of the entire population of South Asia. There are problem areas in our relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has a fabulous natural harbour along with large oil tanks in Trincomalee. Great powers, including China, are making an effort to have base facilities in Sri Lanka. This will affect our interests. Maldives, a very small country, is strategically located in the Indian Ocean, sitting astride the trade routes from West to East. The great powers are trying to acquire Gan, an erstwhile RAF base, from Maldives. Our island territory of Minicoy is very close to Maldives. Any foreign power coming into Maldives will have a direct effect on the security of Minicoy Islands. China has acquired naval bases in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan.

Southeast Asia All countries of South East Asia (starting from Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia) are suffering

from insurgencies initially helped and propagated by China. There are internal struggles between these countries. Malaysia is having trouble with Singapore and Philippines. Malaysia does not have good relations with Thailand because of a boundary dispute. USA has a defence pact with countries of the region and any effort by China to venture into the Indian Ocean through South East Asia will be contested by the Americans. Chinese effort to come through South East Asia is a very big danger. All countries of South East Asia (starting from Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia) are suffering from insurgencies initially helped and propagated by China Indonesia, spread over approximately 3,000 km, provides four important straits which connect Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. These are the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombarwetar. Hence, Indonesia is strategically important for movement from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and since it is only 150 km from great Nicobar of India, it is of great importance to us. However, Indonesia is suffering on account of declining economy, rising terrorism and some secessionist movements. Some fundamentalist organisations are wanting Indonesia to be declared an Islamic state. Its strategic importance and disturbing internal pressures are of concern to India. China is deeply interested in improving road communications with Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Malaysia. Major highways from China to these countries are under construction. All these will provide Chinese access to the Indian Ocean.

International terrorism Indian Ocean region has become a springboard for international terrorism. The al-Qaeda covers North African countries, South West Asia and Pakistan. It is also rapidly making inroads into Sinkiang province of China and Central Asian Republics. In the south east is Jemmah Islamiah – Hambali terrorist outfit based in Indonesia and spreading its wings into Malaysia,

Thailand, South of Philippines and New Guinea. There are reports that these two organisations are collaborating and interlinking their modus operandi in organising piracy, people smuggling and use of sea for terrorism and movement of weapons and explosives for sabotage activities. Indian Navy will have to pay special attention to these activities.

Challenges posed to India Turbulant Indian Ocean region will demand a proactive stand from India which will involve sustained naval deployment in the Arabian Sea in consultation with the US, whose presence in the region is of near permanent nature, to guard India’s interest and any emerging situation which may affect peace and security. In coming years, India will accumulate enormous economic wealth, sizeable portion of which will be acquired from the Indian Ocean. This wealth will require corresponding naval and army strength to safeguard it. International Islamic terrorism is active in Indian Ocean region and has its active agents in India. Bangladesh, Pakistan and most of the Persian Gulf countries are already in its grips. We have approximately 4 million Indian Nationals in the Gulf countries who send approximately US$ 8 billion annually to their families in India. Terrorist elements may pose a risk to Indian interests and we should be prepared to act under such situations by deploying our naval vessels. We have to guard 6,100 km of coastline, 1,400 km of island territories and 2.8 million square km of exclusive economic zone in the sea. We share sea boundaries with seven states namely Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives, Thailand, Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Whereas demarcation with others has been resolved, it is still outstanding with Pakistan and Bangladesh. So the security of Indian seas is important for us. Oil dependency of India, China, Japan and South Korea on Persian Gulf is going to increase approximately 75 per cent by the year 2020. Naval experts suggest that approximately 400 ships traverse the Indian Ocean everyday. Three

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MARITIME LIFELINE

choke points in Indian Ocean region through which traverse oil valued at US$ 300 billion are the strait of Hormuz, located about 1,000 km from our shores and India’s Lakshadweep and Andaman Islands. About 65 super tankers traverse between the Lakshadweep and Andaman Island everyday and it is estimated that by the year 2020 this number is likely to increase to approximately 200. India’s consumption of oil by that year will be approximately 250 million tons annually. Adding to all these is India’s own offshore oil and gas infrastructure spreading over 50,000 sq km. We also have to cater for new findings of gas in our East coast and Gujarat coast as well as Hubli basin in West Bengal. Hence, maritime security and guarding of our interests in the Indian Ocean will pose much greater challenges. Efforts must be made to find a cooperative framework in the Indian Ocean, because of security of free flow of oil interests of most of the Asia Pacific region countries. Finding such a cooperative framework is quite possible. However, Chinese efforts to surround India by building and acquiring naval base facilities in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan are certainly causing enhanced security concerns for India. We would like China to be a part of above mentioned cooperative framework, but her policy of containment of India and isolating India from its neighbours will act as a constraint in her becoming an active partner in this cooperative endeavour. On the contrary, the US has acknowledged India’s concern and role in the Indian Ocean region as stated by President Bush in his National Security Doctrine made open by him in the year 2002 wherein he stated, “The US has undertaken a transformation in its relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving towards greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia”. Building partnership with the US

in the Indian Ocean will be in our interest in the backdrop of Chinese activities. China is rapidly expanding her presence in the Indian Ocean and for next 15-20 years she will remain our contending power in this region. Entry to the Indian Ocean, for the Chinese Navy, is from the South China Sea. We must guard it. We must, therefore, develop and maintain good relationship with the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. It is worth a consideration whether a formal alliance with these countries is desirable. In such an alliance, mutual security will be a prime concern. Most of the littorals in the Indian Ocean are economically backward and not capable of defending themselves. During the colonial era, they were ruled by one of the European powers. Unlike this setting of the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean is flanked by powerful nations like the USA, Russia, China and Japan. Similarly, Atlantic has its powerful littorals in the USA, France and Britain. Hence, there is an absence of a local powerful littoral in the Indian Ocean region whereas other oceans have rich and militarily powerful nations flanking them. As a result, Indian Ocean has come to be dominated by outside powers prominent among them is the coalition of Western powers. Russian presence from the Indian Ocean got reduced subsequent to dismemberment of the Soviet Union. China is making rapid forays in establishing a standing in the Indian Ocean and for that purpose she has succeeded in gaining base facilities for her navy in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. In next 20 years, she will become a dominant force in the region. Hence, in years to come, India’s worry in the Indian Ocean will not be the littorals, with whom our policy of continuous dialogue and good relationship is sound, but big powers who are there to stay and who are manifesting security relationship with weak and backward littoral states of the Indian Ocean region. To deal with big powers and guard our national interests India needs a bigger and better equipped maritime capability.

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Conclusion In South East Asia, China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean is the biggest threat to us in the next decade or so. In West Asia, it is the presence of the great powers. We must develop very fine relations with Vietnam and Cambodia to prevent China or any hostile power entering the Indian Ocean from the Pacific side. We have to extend a helping hand to Vietnam and Cambodia by providing them economic and rehabilitation grants. There is a need to develop a doctrine to defend our island territories. We have to prepare to take part in sudden and short wars involving island grabbing actions. Indian Ocean is vital to our defence. It is a lifeline for India. Our trade, commerce and supplies pass through Indian Ocean. Our defence of our interests in the Indian Ocean and especially in the two seas, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, is inadequate. Inadequate defence calls for aggression. We must prepare for it now or we will perish. India’s oceanic frontiers stretch from the Gulf of Aden to the South China Sea. We, therefore, must guard all our interests in this region. Our history provides a naked truth that we had to pay a heavy price for ignoring our expanded maritime frontiers. Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean is a great cause for concern for us. To limit China within its genuine interests we must seriously consider increasing our presence in the South China Sea by developing cooperative strategy with Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and even Taiwan. This will be a step in checkmating Chinese illegitimate expansion in the Indian Ocean. Being a core country in the Indian Ocean littoral there is a need for us to settle our maritime boundaries and end conflict with smaller neighbours on this account. There is an inescapable need to develop economic interdependencies among the Indian Ocean littorals to avoid presence and influence of outside powers in this region. It may be necessary to have regional alliances to safeguard our mutual interests. In the long run India has to achieve equivalence with China in military strength and capabilities in order to ensure that China’s hegemonistic attitude does not affect our national interests in the Indian Ocean.

HONEYWELL’S SMARTPATH TO INCREASE AIR TRAFFIC CAPACITY AT CHENNAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SmartPath Ground-Based Augmentation System selected by AAI for precision approach and landing pilot project at Chennai International Honeywell’s (NYSE: HON) SmartPath – the world’s only Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) – has been selected by the Airports Authority of India (AAI) as part of a pilot project for satellite-based precision approach and landings at Chennai International Airport. With growing passenger numbers across India expected to reach 540 million annually by 2025, SmartPath will support future demand at Chennai International by reducing delays and journey times for passengers, lowering operational costs for airlines and increasing traffic throughput at the airport. The pilot project is being led by the AAI in collaboration with the US-India Aviation Cooperation Programme and with partial funding from the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). The AAI plans to install further GBAS infrastructure at other Indian airports in the coming years as part of its air traffic management (ATM) upgrade programme. A New Approach with the World’s only Certified GBAS SmartPath is the only GBAS to hold certifications from the FAA and Germany’s BAF, allowing it to fly revenue-generating, unrestricted, all-weather CAT I landings today. It uses GPS satellite data to provide more accurate guidance to aircraft on approach, enabling them to fly a wide range of closely spaced, complex approaches to increase arrival capacity. Unlike traditional Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), which can only support one approach at one end of a single runway, SmartPath handles up to 26 separate approaches across four runways simultaneously. Maximising Departure Capacity at Chennai International Honeywell, in collaboration with the FAA and USTDA, will provide technical assistance and training to support SmartPath’s certification by India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation. The system will initially supplement Chennai International’s existing ILS. Unlike ILS, SmartPath’s GBAS technology is not susceptible to signal interferences from weather, terrain, surrounding aircraft or other obstacles, reducing the risk of runway closures. This also means aircraft can avoid “holding short” and taxi closer to the runway, saving up to two minutes of taxi time and increasing departure capacity. Honeywell first demonstrated GPS approaches in the early 1990s and today is proving its GBAS capabilities at 14 airports globally including Bremen, Germany; Malaga, Spain; Newark, USA; Sydney, Australia; and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, with further certifications expected in 2013. About Honeywell International India Pvt Ltd Honeywell (www.honeywell.com) is a Fortune 100 global diversified technology and manufacturing leader. Each of the company’s four businesses – Aerospace, Automation and Control Solutions, Transportation Systems and Performance Materials and Technologies – has a significant presence in India. Honeywell has set up state-of-the-art manufacturing and engineering operations for its automation, turbocharger and refining businesses and operates its global centres of excellence for research, product development and innovation in India. Honeywell directly employs more than 12,500 people based in Delhi, Pune, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Chennai, Gurgaon, Madurai and several other cities. Honeywell’s aerospace business is a leading global provider of integrated avionics, engines, systems and service solutions for aircraft manufacturers, airlines, business and general aviation, military, space and airport operations. April 2013 Defence AND security alert

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AIR POWER MOXIE

Air War in Vietnam: Lessons A

useful historical analysis of the Vietnam Air War with many valuable military lessons. USAF used 10 major Airbases in South Vietnam for its fighter bomber and air support operations. Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were operational from beginning till the end from 1961 to 1973. 5.25 million sorties were flown. 2,251 aircraft were lost, 110 of these were helicopters. 1,737 aircraft were lost to enemy action from the ground or in the air and 514 in accidents. More F-4 Phantoms were lost than any other type of fighter. A loss ratio was 0.4 aircraft per 1,000 sorties which compares favourably to 2.0 rate in Korea and 9.7 during WW II. 17 North Vietnam pilots had more than 5 aerial kills each and 5 USAF pilots had a similar score.

he Vietnam War which started in 1959 and lasted till 1975 was longest ever fought by United States and the first war that they lost. At the end of World War II, petrified with the rise of communist Soviet Union, who beat the Allied Forces to Berlin, the US was obsessed with the idea of containment of communism and propounded the domino theory. With communists under Mao coming to power in China, the economically weak South Asian nations were easy targets. When French pulled out of Indo-China, Communists under Ho Chi Minh seized power in northern Vietnam in 1954. The country got split at the 17th parallel, but even in the capitalist ‘South’ there were serious communist pockets of resistance more famously known as the ‘Viet Cong’. US moved in to support Saigon to stop the further spread of the ‘Red’ ideology and also to prevent the fall of Laos and Cambodia. It all began with financial and military advisory role to the French in early 1950s and giving supplies using C-47 aircraft. Other aircraft deployed initially were B-26 Invaders, Bell P-63 Kingcobras, Grumman F6F Hellcats, Grumman F8F-1B Bearcats and Vought F4U Corsairs. The small force of about 1,000 in 1955 grew to 18,000 by early 1960s. Serious fighting erupted in 1964 when there were reports of US Navy ships being attacked. By 1965 there were over 80,000 US troops in Vietnam and a full war had begun. US Pacific Air Force (PACAF)

Headquartered at Hawaii ran the US Air War. 1961 to 1964 were the ‘Advisory years’, 1965 to 1968 was the ‘Build-up and escalating war phase’ and 1969 to 1973 was the ‘destructive-offensive and withdrawal’ phase. It was one of the most offensive air wars ever, flying over 1,50,000 bombing missions a year, dropping more bombs in a year than those dropped in the entire WW II. At the peak of the war in 1969, US had more than half million troops in Vietnam.

During the Vietnam War 6,43,000 tons of bombs were dropped and they cost US$ 900 million. Armed reconnaissance missions constituted 75 per cent of the total bombing effort. 97,000 North Vietnamese volunteered to work full-time in repairing the damage inflicted by US bombs. Another 370,000–5,00,000 worked part-time. The logistical effort was supported by citizens driving carts, hauling wheelbarrows, or physically carrying supplies on their backs to keep the war effort going. In the intense period, CIA estimated that approximately 1,000 casualties had been inflicted on the North Vietnamese population per week, or approximately 90,000 for the 44-month period, 72,000 of whom were civilians The Advisory phase also was the learning phase. The enemy was unconventional. They often raided at night. It was thus important to improve night capability by dropping flares. Large part of the

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terrain was forested. Defoliating the jungle to deny the enemy cover was another exercise. In spite of US desire not to engage the enemy directly; it was getting drawn into it. A full air division had deployed by 1962. Significant US air build-up consisted of army and marine helicopter units. Final flare-up took place on August 5, 1964 when North Vietnam torpedo boats attacked USS Maddox in what is called the ‘Gulf of Tonkin Incident’. US retaliated by launching air strikes against boats and oil storage sites. This also forced US to send Fighter / Bomber aircraft to the region. Phantom F-4s soon became the workhorse along with B-52 Bombers. Viet Cong also began direct engagement of US forces.

Big air action begins March 1965, USAF began ‘Operation Rolling Thunder’ involving bombing pre-designated targets. Launch bases were also in Thailand. Aim was to break the enemy’s will and bring them to the negotiating table, yet the threshold of a possible all-out war with Soviet Union and China was not to be crossed. In July 1965 US lost its first aircraft to Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM). Special missions ‘Iron Hand’ were launched against the SAM sites. Extensive reconnaissance flights were flown to identify the sites. Carpet bombing of the sites was avoided to reduce collateral damage. Agent ‘Orange’, a chemical was used for deforestation so that enemy could

Air Marshal Anil Chopra PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (retd)

be seen from the air. Unfortunately it also killed other forms of life and brought adverse reactions around the world and at home. In spite of heavy bombing, the Viet Cong moved freely using unconventional routes at night. North Vietnam’s near 50,000 troops were up against half a million US forces. First big success for Viet Cong was when they overran a Special Forces camp in Shau Valley. In the meantime Washington made repeat attempts by unilaterally stopping bombing and proposing political discussions. Hanoi was not willing to consider. Soviet Union and UK also tried to mediate. So the ‘Rolling Thunder’ rolled on. The air war escalated in 1966. The 2nd Air Division made way for the Seventh Air Force to take charge. Meanwhile B-52s started targeting areas near Hanoi as part of ‘Operation Arc Light’. To defend, Hanoi’s MiG 21s entered the air war first time. Over a 100 aircraft were used to stop attacks on Hanoi. North Vietnam also started using sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia for launch of its operations. USA was forced to attack MiG airbases. By end 1967

nearly 180 MiG 21s had been shot in air battles against 25 US planes lost in air combat. The ‘Tet’ offensive was launched by communists in 1968 destroying a large number of installations including airfields. The offensive failed due to heavy US air effort but the media brought the pictures of devastation caused by collateral damage to American homes. For the first time media had become a significant player in any war. Increasing public doubt about the prospects of winning the war forced US to induct more troops to hasten the end. US doubled its air strikes north of 20th parallel dividing Vietnam. They were under pressure that all the might of a super power could not supress a poor Asian country.

The final phase Richard Nixon’s entry into the White House also marked the beginning of final phase, that of handing charge to South Vietnamese to defend themselves and allow American withdrawal. The war was far from over though. American troops started withdrawing but the

The writer is highly decorated and qualified aviator with more than 3,400 hrs of flying experience on over 40 types of aircraft, Test Pilot and Qualified instructor and examiner of Indian Air Force. Held important appointments such as Command of No. 1 Squadron (Mirage 2000), Air Officer Commanding of two major fighter bases. Team leader for an aircraft upgrade project in Russia. Commanded the prestigious Aircraft and System Testing Establishment where 4 prototypes were under testing and development at that time. Served as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Inspections), directly responsible for Operational, Maintenance and Administrative Quality audit of entire Indian Air Force. In the last two years of service, served as Air Officer in Charge Personnel managing the Human Resources of entire IAF.

Aerospace is where the action is. Armies and navies the world over today want more aircraft than tanks and ships. Air power is fast engulfing the celestial space which is already getting weaponised. Air power has reach, speed and flexibility. It can bring quick results

Air power remains the fastest means to deliver immediate impact and results and its use considerably reduces own causalities

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AIR POWER MOXIE

bombing resumed. Even as the first USAF unit was withdrawing, USAF flew nearly 50,000 sorties in three months. China and Soviet Union continued actively providing logistic support to Hanoi. CIA became active in killing communist agents. North started training and inducting more soldiers and converting guerrillas into a modern force. When Cambodia allowed Hanoi to use of its territory for operations, it was considered a violation of neutrality. This forced US to launch ‘Operation Menu’, bombing of Cambodia for next 14 months. Cambodia suffered more bombs than those dropped by Allies in WW II. US war in Cambodia was also attacked by Human Rights activists. US backed coup by Lon Nol resulted in increased support for Khmer Rouge who took hold of substantial part of the country.

The ‘Tet’ offensive was launched by communists in 1968 destroying a large number of installations including airfields. The offensive failed due to heavy US air effort but the media brought the pictures of devastation caused by collateral damage to American homes By end 1971 total USAF aircraft in Vietnam had dropped from a high of 740 in 1968 to 280. USAF fighter-bombers were now attacking SAM sites, enemy roads and oil-storage facilities. Hanoi was not being attacked any more. Hanoi had inducted 250 MiGs by now. The airfields were being targeted under operation ‘Proud Deep’. It was one of the most massive air campaigns. Early 1971 secret documents acquired by US indicated plan of a massive offensive by Hanoi. As part of diplomacy Nixon visited China. Meanwhile USAF planned appropriate tactical response. By February massive pre-emptive air strikes were launched. In March, North Vietnam launched its ground offensive across 17th Parallel with heavy armour. Massive US air effort halted the offensive and destroyed most tanks and artillery pieces. Heavy bombing in Cambodia kept Khmer Rouge under pressure, but air power alone had its limitations. This offensive

North forced

Vietnamese Nixon to

suspended peace talks and ordered ‘Operation Linebacker’. Essentially it meant renewal of heavy bombing of land targets and mining of harbours and rivers. Its purpose was to halt or slow the transportation of supplies and materials for the ‘Nguyen Hue Offensive’ (known in the West as the Easter Offensive), an invasion of the South Vietnam planned with 30,000 troops. North Vietnam initially appeared ready for talks, but later reneged. President Nixon ordered on December 18, 1972 the heaviest bombing of the war against Hanoi and Haiphong as part of Operation Linebacker II. This brought the North Vietnamese to return to the peace table. The Paris talks that followed resulted in stoppage of all offensive air operations. Last US military personnel departed Vietnam by end March 1973.

Statistical data USAF used 10 major Airbases in South Vietnam for its fighter bomber and air support operations. Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were operational from beginning till the end from 1961 to 1973. Figures gleaned from various reports available on the internet, 5.25 million sorties were flown. 2,251 aircraft were lost, 110 of these were helicopters. 1,737 aircraft were lost to enemy action from the ground or in the air and 514 in accidents. More F-4 Phantoms were lost than any other type of fighter. A loss ratio was 0.4 aircraft per 1,000 sorties which compares favourably to 2.0 rate in Korea and 9.7 during WW II. 17 North Vietnam pilots had more than 5 aerial kills each and 5 USAF pilots had a similar score. Serious development of Aviation began in North Vietnam only in 1956 when a number of trainees were sent to the Soviet Union and China for pilot training. The first unit was formed only in May 1959 with An-2 and Il-14 transport aircraft. The first North Vietnamese combat plane was T-28 Trojan trainer whose pilot had defected from Laos. The T-28 was also the first North Vietnamese aircraft to shoot down a US aircraft, a C-123 in February 1964. North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) got their first jet fighter, a MiG-17 in the same month. The unit was named as

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‘Red Star Squadron’. In May 1965, first bomber squadron was formed with Il-28 twin engine aircraft. The North Vietnamese Air Force’s first jet air-to-air engagement with US aircraft was on April 3, 1965, shooting down two US Navy F-8 Crusader aircraft. Consequently, April 3 became “North Vietnamese Air Force Day”. In 1965, the NVAF received supersonic MiG 21s from Soviet Union. The MiG-21 tactics became so effective, that by late 1966, US had to mount an operation to especially deal with the MiG-21 threat. ‘Top Gun’ school was established in 1969 to counter MiG 21 threat and was often called ‘the MiG Killer’ School.

An inferior air force should best resort to ‘Hit and Run’ tactics. Camouflage and concealment pays great dividends. Electronic Warfare shows immediate results. Foreign policy and the military’s goals need to be reconciled. It is very important for close Civil-Military integration. Most civilians in the decision-making loop did not understand air power well enough to know that their policies might be crippling it The NVAF did not engage all US sorties with fighters. Most US aircraft were destroyed by SA-2 surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft (AA) guns. In 1969 Chinese MiG-19s were inducted. Many NVAF aircraft were destroyed on the ground by US bombing and those that were not, were withdrawn to sanctuaries in China. In December 1972, the North Vietnamese air defences nearly exhausted their supply of surface-to-air missiles trying to down the high-flying B-52 raids over the North. During the entire war, NVAF operated MiG-17, MiG-19 (J-6), and MiG-21 variants. US claimed to have destroyed 204 MiG aircraft and at up to six An-2s.After withdrawal, US left behind F-5s, C-123s, C-130s and UH-1s which were operated by Vietnam for many years. During the Vietnam War 6,43,000 tons of bombs were dropped and they cost US$ 900 million. Armed reconnaissance missions constituted 75 per cent of the total bombing effort. 97,000 North Vietnamese volunteered to work full-time in repairing the damage inflicted by US bombs. Another 3,70,000–5,00,000

worked part-time. The logistical effort was supported by citizens driving carts, hauling wheelbarrows, or physically carrying supplies on their backs to keep the war effort going. In the intense period, CIA estimated that approximately 1,000 casualties had been inflicted on the North Vietnamese population per week, or approximately 90,000 for the 44-month period, 72,000 of whom were civilians.

Lessons The world learnt many lessons on use of air power. Air power remains the fastest means to deliver immediate impact and results and its use considerably reduces own causalities. It emerged that it is not easy to break the will of a very determined enemy which is supported by a mass movement. Air power requires more clearly defined targets, destruction of which would have direct or profound effect on the outcome of the war. Target selection has to be logical and linked to end results. Collateral damage or death to innocent civilians is not acceptable to the civilised world. Use of chemicals and its effect on all forms of life was once again put in question. The need to evolve air combat and other tactics through the campaign got

reemphasised. Campaign has to be swift so that public pressure at home does not overtake operational decisions. Cutting logistical supply routes remains an important aspect of any air war. Targets should be chosen for their military, rather than their psychological significance. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) are crucial missions and air is the best medium for it. SAMs have a significant role in any air war. 70 per cent of North Vietnam’s oil facilities had been destroyed for the loss of 43 aircraft, yet it had no serious effect on the war because of the nature of war. Therefore targeting has to be situation specific. There were serious Command and control issues. Air war had been compartmentalised between different zones and also with the naval fleet. The navy’s Task Force 77 faced even more complex command and control problems. To complicate matters, the US ambassadors to Thailand and Laos exerted undue influence over operational and command arrangements. This crazy and complex command structure was against the basic grain of the air force’s single air manager concept within a combat theatre. USAF pilots were more prepared for a strategic

war with Soviet Union and needed brushing of conventional tactics. Fear of escalation had put severe restrictions on the air campaign. Pressure from families back home had forced USAF to rotate aircrew every year resulting in delusion of crew experience and Op status. Lack of adequate all-weather day and night capable aircraft forced USAF into mostly day operations and thus resulted in higher SAM and AAA kills. An inferior air force should best resort to ‘Hit and Run’ tactics. Camouflage and concealment pays great dividends. Electronic Warfare shows immediate results. Foreign policy and the military’s goals need to be reconciled. It is very important for close Civil-Military integration. Most civilians in the decision-making loop did not understand air power well enough to know that their policies might be crippling it. Once again aircraft designers realised the importance of air combat and the internal gun. Aerospace is where the action is. Armies and navies the world over today want more aircraft than tanks and ships. Air power is fast engulfing the celestial space which is already getting weaponised. Air power has reach, speed and flexibility. It can bring quick results.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

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NEW THEATRE

Assessing the Strategic Importance of Vietnam: Current Security Dynamics for Japan and India

n 1990, US Navy possessed 230 “big surface combatants” while China possessed only 16. By 2013, however, US possession has come down to 101 while that of China has increased to 40 “big surface combatants”. This has been fuelling Chinese assertiveness. In response Vietnam ordered six new submarines in 2009. Likewise, Malaysia got two submarines in 2009. Singapore, also, increased their submarines from four to five. Indonesia plans to increase submarines from two to twelve. Similarly, Philippines’ and Thailand’s plan to acquire their first submarine are under consideration. Japan and India need to support Southeast Asian countries to strengthen their military power themselves. Vietnam, because of its strategically important location and its image as a “strong” willed state, becomes priority for both Japan and India. Hence, both countries have started to further their security relations with Vietnam. Recently Japanese PM Abe said “a strong India is in the best interest of Japan and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India." If so, both Japan and India should cooperate to support Vietnam as the first step of India Japan cooperation.

n recent times, China’s rising naval power in the Indo-Pacific Region compared with declining US naval power, which is instigating China’s assertiveness, rightfully reflects the security situation in the said region. Just a quick glance over the last two decades will show the changing balance of proportion in the favour of China. In 1990, US Navy possessed 230 “big surface combatants”* while China possessed only 16. By 2013, however, US possession has come down to 101 while that of China has increased to 40 “big surface combatants”. The theoretical implication of this declining US naval power indicates at the emergence of a power vacuum in the region. By further implication, it substantiates the role of US allies and friendly countries like Japan, India to fill up this power vacuum to ensure stability in Asia. The necessary question is that what exactly should Japan and India do? What is expected of their strategic moves? This question is directly related to the critical point of US-China power balance in Asia. Where exactly is the theatre of US-China power game? And secondly, which country will be the key for Japan and India to stabilise this power balance? In this article, I analyse the importance of Vietnam as a strategically key factor for both Japan and India. The article will also elaborate on how Japan-India-Vietnam Trilateral Strategic Dialogue should be initiated. In the worst case of escalating power competition, Southeast Asia is likely to be the theatre of power game Where exactly will be the theatre of the US-China power game in the worst case scenario? During the cold war Central Europe (East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary etc) was divided between US and Soviet power blocs. There were convulsions like the Berlin-Blockade, the Hungarian rising, Prague Spring, the movement for democratisation in Poland etc. If Central Europe was the theatre of the US-Soviet power game, we can imagine three basic features. Firstly, Central Europe is strategically an important place. Secondly, Central Europe stood separated as a major military power arena. Thirdly, Central Europe was surrounded by great powers like Soviet Union, France, Britain and United States of America. In the case of Southeast Asia three similarities with the Central Europe can be drawn. Firstly, Southeast Asia region is a strategically important place. Southeast Asia is sitting on key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) between the Middle East and Northeast Asia. In addition, Southeast Asia is a resource rich region. Secondly, ASEAN is not an integrated region. Thirdly, Southeast Asia is surrounded by great powers like China, Japan, US, Australia and India. Therefore, if the US-China Power Game will escalate, there is a possibility that Southeast Asia will be US-China theatre of Power Game in the worst case. Under such situation, ASEAN needs to amalgamate their leadership as one integrated power and ensure strong military power to maintain their stability and prosperity.

* The battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes with more than 3,000t of full load displacement

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Dr Satoru Nagao The writer is a Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan. He is an expert on strategic affairs and has written a PhD thesis about India’s military strategy, the first of its kind in Japan.

The similarities between two regions

Southeast Asia needs to ensure strong military power To this end, there are two methods ie enhancing military power themselves and finding a trustworthy security provider. Building submarine forces Nowadays, most ASEAN countries have been expanding their navy which implies a certain arms race in the region. Submarines are a symbol of arms race in Asia because of two reasons. Firstly, because submarines cannot carry out military operations other than war, submarines are a symbol of regular war. Secondly, submarine is an effective weapon for small countries to tackle threat from great powers. Further, to deter a great power, the weaker power needs a cost effective strategy. And sea denial strategy is relatively a cost effective strategy. Mr Christian Le Miere explained in his article “sea denial is a far more cost-effective strategy than competing for sea control” because “sea denial only requires the perception of threat to cause unease in an opponent that might prevent it committing expensive assets to potentially dangerous situation”. He further says, “the submarine is a more effective sea denial platform, as an opponent is unaware which particular area of the sea might be perilous”1. This is one of the most lucid explanations for submarines being a viable cost-effective strategy.

US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s statement at the annual Shangari La dialogue, “By 2020, the navy will reposture its forces from today's roughly 50-50 per cent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60-40 split between those oceans,”, the number of deployed warships in the Pacific will nearly remain the same in 2020 because total number of warships which US Navy possessed is declining. Thus, in 2011, US deployed 31 of their 54 nuclear submarines in the Pacific. This US presence is likely to remain unaltered in near future

Japan and India need to support Southeast Asian countries to strengthen their military power themselves. And Vietnam, because of its strategically important location and its image as a “strong” willed state, becomes priority for both Japan and India. Hence, both countries have started to further their security relations with Vietnam

Japan has shown the will to cooperate with India to check China’s assertiveness. All the facts clearly indicate that Japan-India-Vietnam have strong common interests Hence, we can understand why Vietnam ordered six new submarines in 2009. Likewise, Malaysia got two submarines in 2009. Singapore, also, increased their submarines from four to five. Indonesia plans to increase submarines from two to twelve. Similarly, Philippines’ and Thailand’s plan to possess their first submarine are under consideration2. 1. Christian Le Miere “Waves of concern: Southeast Asian states plan naval defences” Jane’s Intelligence Review, volume 23, number 5 May 2011, pp 8-13. 2. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011, Part I, Section 5. Web source: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2011/14Part1_Chapter2_Sec5.pdf

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NEW THEATRE

However, China possess 71 submarines which include ten nuclear submarines in 2012. Hence, even if the Southeast Asian countries increase their number of submarines, China will still outnumber them. In addition, the navies in Southeast Asian countries are not integrated. Southeast Asian countries need military support from other countries as security provider. Security provider for Southeast Asian countries US military power has been playing the role of a stabiliser in Southeast Asia since the cold war. Back then, US had their bases in Thailand and Philippines. Recently, US have again started to show their presence in Southeast Asia. They have concentrated their naval and air power in Guam under Air-Sea battle concept, increased naval exercises, restarted naval assistance to the Philippines, furthered defence relationship with Vietnam, set up new base in Darwin in Australia, will deploy Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore etc to give some examples. However, when compared with bases like Subic Bay in Philippines, which was set up by US during the cold war, new bases located in Darwin and Guam are farther away from China. It appears that China’s military modernisation has somewhat pushed US military bases further east. And, despite US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s statement at the annual Shangari La dialogue, “By 2020, the navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50-50 per cent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60-40 split between those oceans,3”, the number of deployed warships in the Pacific will nearly remain the same in 2020 because total number of warships which US Navy possessed is declining. Thus, in 2011, US deployed 31 of their 54 nuclear submarines in the Pacific. This US presence is likely to remain unaltered in near future4. As can be concluded from the aforementioned elaboration, Japan and India should cooperate to support Southeast Asian countries to strengthen their military power themselves. The prioritised situation of Vietnam If Japan and India support Southeast Asian countries, which country is likely to get priority? Three reasons, as given below, may be outlined for making a case for Vietnam’s priority. Strategic location Firstly, Vietnam is located at a strategically important place and operates as “the gate” to enter Southeast Asia from north. At the same time, if China is to occupy most area of South China Sea based on their territorial claim “nine dotted line”, Vietnam again lands the key position to protect their interest as naval and air bases. Image of “strong will” Secondly, Vietnam has the image of “strongly willed” state for deterrence. This image is garnered by facts such as Vietnam defeating France in 1954, defeating USA in 1973 and nearly winning the battle when at war with China in 1979.

Japan and India have already started a 2 + 2 dialogue (Vice Ministerial level) and an annual exercise called Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX). In 2012 was also the first such endeavour by Japan to participate in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Not only that, but on 27 December 2012, just one day after Mr Abe was sworn in as prime minister, he published his ideas about Asia’s security in the report titled, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” Vietnam also fosters a similar image with Afghanistan on comparison. For example, just after 9/11, US did not send massive land troopers in Afghanistan. Because Britain and Soviet Union had lost war in Afghanistan in the past, there is a possibility that the image of Afghanistan as “the grave of big powers” affected the decision. The basic thrust of this argument lies in emphasising the role of past factors in the formation of threat perception on the part of the opponent. Therefore, despite the fact that Vietnam’s small navy will be consisting only of six submarines and small surface combatants, the strong possibility of an enhanced perception of threat of Vietnam’s image cannot be denied. Japan and India having strong relations with Vietnam Thirdly, Vietnam has long military relations with India. When Vietnam attacked Pol Pot dominated Cambodia in 1979, India supported Vietnam. Also because both India and Vietnam used similar Soviet era weapons, both have faced shortage of spare parts and new weapons when Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. India has supported Vietnam to refurbish their Soviet era weapons. At present, military relations between the two countries are very strong. Vietnamese Military officers have been receiving training in India for a long time. In 2011, Vietnam asked India to 3. “Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific” (BBC, 2 June 2012). Web source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18305750 4. Masao Kobayashi, “Submarine Operations of JMSDF in Near Future” Ships of the World, Oct 2012, Kaijinnsya, pp 70-77.

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train their newly founded submarine forces. Vietnam also offered permanent berthing rights to India in Na Thrang Port which is located just south of China’s new naval base at Sanya in Hainan Island. Indian state-run ONGC Videsh had won a contract to explore Blocks 127 and 128 in the Phu Khanh basin jointly with Vietnam’s state-run PetroVietnam despite China’s opposition. Because both India and Vietnam use Russian originated weapons like Su-30, Vietnam is planning to buy India’s weapons like BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. In addition, in December 2012, Navy Chief Admiral DK Joshi, while responding to the questions about South China Sea, said “when the requirement is there for situations where country’s interests are involved, for example ONGC Videsh, we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that. Are we holding exercises for that nature, the short answer is yes,”5. Such information refurbishes the strength of India-Vietnam military relations. During the cold war, Japan did not have strong military relations with other countries except US. However, after the cold war, Japan has been gradually changing the security policy. In 2011, two defence ministers from Japan discussed incidents involving China’s obstruction of maritime activities and signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the enhancement of defence cooperation with their Vietnamese counterparts. This MoU includes provisions for regular defence talks at deputy minister level and exchanges between the Japan Self-Defense Force and the Vietnam People’s Army. In the current context, it will be relevant to mention that the key statesmen with whom Mr Shinzo Abe had a telephonic conversation right after being sworn in as the Prime Minister of Japan included his counterparts in India, Dr Manmohan Singh and in Vietnam, Mr Nguyen Tan Dung amongst others from UK, Indonesia, Australia and Russia. Vietnam is also the first foreign country for PM Abe to visit in 2013. At present, Japan is planning to export patrol boats to Vietnam. In addition, because Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister was accepted as new secretary general for ASEAN, Vietnam will be important as a representative ASEAN country for both Japan and India.

Southeast Asia is sitting on key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) between the Middle East and Northeast Asia. In addition, Southeast Asia is a resource rich region. Secondly, ASEAN is not an integrated region. Thirdly, Southeast Asia is surrounded by great powers like China, Japan, US, Australia and India Coming back to the military relations between Japan and India, the present scenario is quite conducive to furthering military cooperation between the two countries. Japan and India have already started a 2 + 2 dialogue (Vice Ministerial level) and an annual exercise called Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX). In 2012 was also the first such endeavour by Japan to participate in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Not only that, but on 27 December 2012, just one day after Mr Abe was sworn in as prime minister, he published his ideas about Asia’s security in the report titled, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”. In this concept, he aimed at preventing the South China Sea from becoming “Lake Beijing”. And “If Japan were to yield, the South China Sea would become even more fortified” and “I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific”6. By way of such a statement from the prime minister, Japan has shown the will to cooperate with India to check China’s assertiveness. All the facts stated above clearly indicate that Japan-India-Vietnam have strong common interests. Secondly, Vietnam is priority for both India and Japan because of its location, strong will and sharing of common interests with the other two countries. Conclusion: Japan and India should cooperate to support Vietnam Along with declining US naval power and China’s naval modernisation, China’s assertiveness has been sharpening. Therefore, because China will rapidly keep modernising their navy, we can expect that China’s assertiveness will be even more strongly felt. If US-China power game escalates, Southeast Asia region will be in danger as the theatre of that Power Game. Therefore, Japan and India need to support Southeast Asian countries to strengthen their military power themselves. And Vietnam, because of its strategically important location and its image as a “strong” willed state, becomes priority for both Japan and India. Hence, both countries have started to further their security relations with Vietnam. A statement made by PM Abe at the Indian Parliament will further reiterate this argument. He declared “a strong India is in the best interest of Japan and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.”7 If so, both Japan and India should cooperate to support Vietnam as the first step of India Japan cooperation. To implement the support, Japan and India need to find what kind of support Vietnam needs for which Japan-India-Vietnam Trilateral Strategic Dialogue will be the best structural mechanism. 5. India will protect its interests in disputed South China Sea: Navy chief (The Times of India, 3 December 2012). Web source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-will-protect-its-interests-in-disputed-South-China-Sea-Navy-chief/ articleshow/17463910.cms 6. Shinzo Abe “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” (Project Syndicate, 27 December 2012). Web source : http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe#Vd6yytDokZJCiwtv.01 7. H E Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India “Confluence of the Two Seas” (Ministry of Foregin Affairs Japan, 22 August 2007). Web source: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

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CONJOINTMENT

Maritime Contours: India-Vietnam and India-Japan Relationships

Map: Complexities of EEZs in Asia Pacific

aritime security relationships with both Vietnam and Japan need to be nurtured as they hold the key to freedom of navigation in South China Sea, they also extend the strategic reach of India’s maritime capability up to Japan. Japan was the first country to sign Strategic and Global partnership pact in 2006 with India. The geographical location of Vietnam on the southern tip of China makes it a strategic partner not only for Japan and the US but also for India. A Joint Declaration of the strategic partnership was signed between the two countries in 2007. India has given a large consignment of spare parts of Petya class of warships to Vietnam and the periodic port visits to Vietnam by Indian naval ships ensure an Indian presence in the South China Sea. BrahMos missile has been cleared for export to Vietnam. It has been reported that the Uran missile is likely to be jointly produced by Russia and Vietnam. This missile is already in use on Indian naval ships.

Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer is a Gold Medalist in MSc (Solid State Physics). He was awarded Sword of Honour and has specialised in Quality Assurance of Naval Armaments. He superannuated in the post of Director General of Naval Armament Inspection. As DGNAI, he was directly responsible for timely availability of reliable and safe naval armament to the Indian Navy.

rchaeological findings of shipwrecks found along Chinese coast have confirmed existence of Sea trade as early as 203 BC, to and from Chinese Kingdom ports to India, Sri Lanka and further on to Persia. Excavations at Guangzhou have revealed existence of a dockyard capable of building ships suitable for coastal sailing. Other ports on the route to India and beyond most probably provided transitory facilities of lodging, boarding, warehousing etc. The goods being traded however belonged to China, India and the Arabian countries. The Maritime Silk Road, known as an alternate to the land silk road was used from 25 AD onwards by Qin and Han Dynasties. Han dynasty records reveal that ships laden with raw and processed silk would transit to Rome via India / Sri Lanka, loading pearls and other goods produced in these countries. The maritime road weaved its way from China, India, Persian Gulf and Red Sea to the ports in the Mediterranean. The Maritime Silk Road thus enabled trade and cultural exchanges for centuries between Far East and the West through the transit ports. It gained importance with improved skills in navigation and shipbuilding and opening of other sea routes in South Asia, by the middle of 8th century it blossomed into a preferred route because the land silk route was rendered unsuitable due to warring tribes. However in the early 17th century, The Ming and Qing dynasties banned maritime trade leading to a rapid decline in the usage of Maritime Silk Route. The spread of sea trade and the associated Map: Ancient maritime silk road intermingling of cultures along the Maritime Silk Road, in a way, opened the doors to nearly 18 centuries of cooperative economic engagement between sea faring countries in Asia and Europe. Incidentally two of the important eastern ports were Jiaozhou, now in northern Vietnam and Guangzhou in China. Today, the energy flows and to a lesser extent, seaborne trade dominate the Maritime Silk Road with the SLOCs becoming economic lifelines for growth and sustenance in the Asia Pacific region.

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Maritime commerce has flourished and would continue to do so because it is a far cheaper and quicker means of fuelling a country’s needs in a globalised world. Post cold war, it has been a major contributor to rapid growth in Asia although it has led to a host of security issues like, spectre of choking of SLOCs, sea piracy, strikes by terrorists and non-state actors, drugs and arms running, human trafficking, fishing disputes and environmental pollution. The wide spectrum of security issues have goaded the countries to cooperate through a loose framework of arrangements at sea to ensure safety of SLOCs while guaranteeing that their own sovereign interests are not impinged in any manner.

There has been no official Chinese response to the strategic maritime security cooperation between Japan and India. Even though bilateral and multilateral naval exercises involving Japan, USA and Australia have been conducted, India on its part has been non-committal towards an alliance with USA, Australia and Japan

He has two MPhil degrees pertaining to nanotechnology and associated issues and has a Doctorate from ‘School of International Studies’ at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). He is also an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC), NHCC and DSSC. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation. He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation.

Since India does not have any territorial aspirations in the region it is largely perceived as a benign power as well as a large market for their goods and services. India’s look east policy appears to be paying considerable dividends as far as economic integration with Asia Pacific is concerned

Maritime claims and disputes Even though majority of territorial boundary issues have been satisfactorily resolved, maritime disagreements and disputes continue to exist due to complicated maritime boundary claims by multiple countries mainly in the light of rich offshore resources and the gains associated with extended land mass in marking of EEZs. For example Republic of Kiribati consisting of three island groups in the South Pacific, with a land mass of just over 717 sq km (compare with India’s land mass of about 3,287,590 sq km) lays claim to an EEZ of the size of India! The countries in the region have however resorted to process of dispute resolution by showing a flexible and cooperative approach in almost all the cases and have put in place provisional arrangements in case of unresolved issues.

Maritime security relationships with both Vietnam and Japan need to be nurtured as they hold the key to freedom of navigation in South China Sea, they also extend the strategic reach of India’s maritime capability up to Japan

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strategic partnership

CONJOINTMENT Map: Disputed islands

Japanese claims China and Japan have two disputes, one related to ownership of Daioyu / Senkaku Islands and the other related to demarcation of the sea boundary between the two.

Source: Interfax Map: Disputed Sea Boundary and Islands – Japan

India’s maritime engagements with Vietnam and Japan

Vietnamese claims The hydrocarbon rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are claimed by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and Philippines. Vietnam has laid claim to Paracel Islands which are under occupation of China since mid-seventies. Vietnam and China have disputes over claims to portions of Vung May, Song Hong and Phu Khanh basins. China stepped up the ante when it objected to oil and gas exploration in blocks 127 and 128 in the EEZ of Vietnam by OVL of India. However OVL which had initially withdrawn has decided to continue exploration after an extension of 2 years was granted by Vietnam.

South China Sea Territorial Claims Country

South China Sea

Spratly Islands

Paracel Islands

Brunei UNCLOS no formal claim Cambodia China all* all Indonesia UNCLOS no Malaysia UNCLOS 3 islands Philippines significant portions 8 islands Taiwan all* all Thailand Vietnam all* all * excluding buffer zone along littoral states (calculations for buffer unknown) Source: US Energy Information Administration

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no all no no no all all

Gulf of Thailand UNCLOS UNCLOS UNCLOS UNCLOS

The Asia Pacific region is characterised by differing threat perceptions with respect to neighbours as well as countries they perceive as hegemons, they do not like interference by outsiders in their matters and prefer dispute resolution bilaterally or through discussions between the directly involved parties in case there are more than two. They look upon multilateral agreements of the type in vogue in Europe as a sort of military alliances (which were created to resolve military issues) which could lead to military intervention by powers outside the region. With reduction in the deployment of forces by the US and the end of cold war, there is a sense of void in the maritime security of the region. The broad security concerns of the region with respect to ‘outsiders’ are best summarised in the words of Mr Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, “when there is vacuum in ASEAN maritime security, Japan surely will involve in it, … so will China, what if India also sends two aircraft carriers to our ocean? If all these happen, the consequence will be turbulence and disaster”. The region therefore prefers cooperative engagement on both economic and defence fronts. The multilateral maritime security arrangements amongst them help to have a positive say in maintaining balance in the region. They look upon rising China, Japan, India and the US Asia Pacific shift, to attain a favourable counterbalance in the region leading to peaceful economic growth. In fact these countries engage in maritime security cooperation with England, Russia, Australia and New Zealand also. This approach guarantees them sufficient maritime security in the region while allowing them enough room to manoeuvre between the larger extra-regional powers.

Japan was the first country to sign Strategic and Global partnership pact in 2006 with India. In 2010 both countries decided to expand the defence and security cooperation by enhancing the capacity to respond to maritime security challenges through information sharing, multilateral and bilateral exercises, dialogue and training. Since India does not have any territorial aspirations in the region it is largely perceived as a benign power as well as a large market for their goods and services. India’s look east policy appears to be paying considerable dividends as far as economic integration with Asia Pacific is concerned. A look at economic indicators with respect to India reveals that while total trade, as a proportion of the GDP, from US and EU decreased from 12.69 per cent and 20.84 per cent to 8.5 per cent and 15.94 per cent (between FY 2003-04 to FY 2009-10); trade increased from 26.70 per cent to 30.19 per cent with the Asia Pacific region. India’s main concern is its seaborne trade, as about 50 per cent of its eastbound trade passes through Malacca Straits and uses routes in the South China Sea / East China Sea and therefore as a part of look east diplomacy India has entered into multifarious agreements with many Asia-pacific countries, bilaterally and multilaterally, including maritime security, cultural and educational exchanges, development programmes, defence cooperation and exercises involving all the three services, training, HA / DR, port visits etc.

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CONJOINTMENT

The look east initiative by India is also accepted by USA and the same was articulated by President Barack Obama in his speech to both houses of Indian Parliament in November 2010, he said, “Like your neighbours in Southeast Asia, we want India not only to “look East,” we want India to “engage East” because it will increase the security and prosperity of all our nations”. In view of the above, India’s maritime engagements with Vietnam and Japan have to be seen with the backdrop of countries in the Asia Pacific and the issues affecting their economies. Vietnam has been a trusted friend and an ally not only historically but also since its independence in 1954. India shares a rich cultural heritage with Vietnam and Vietnam supports India’s political ideology of non-alignment. The geographical location of Vietnam on the southern tip of China makes it a strategic partner not only for Japan and the US but also for India. A Joint Declaration of the strategic partnership was signed between the two countries in 2007. India has given a large consignment of spare parts of Petya class of warships to Vietnam and the periodic port visits to Vietnam by Indian naval ships ensure an Indian presence in the South China Sea. It is also understood that BrahMos missile has been cleared for export to Vietnam. It has been reported that the Uran missile is likely to be jointly produced by Russia and Vietnam. This missile is already in use on Indian naval ships. With impending opening of the private sector to defence post Choppergate, joint ventures with Vietnamese firms may pay rich dividends for both the countries. In view of rising tensions due to disputes over island territories and offshore exploration in South China Sea, India has articulated that freedom of navigation in South China Sea has to be respected by all and has supported a collective mechanism to resolve the issues in South China Sea and East China Sea. It is imperative that the sea corridor from India to Vietnam through Malacca remains open and unencumbered for free flow of trade. Shri AK Antony, Defence Minister at ADMM+ meeting in Hanoi, in October 2010 has said that “The security of sea lanes is important for the Asia Pacific region, which is now one of the most important drivers of global economic growth … Cooperative approaches on maritime security would offer benefits for the region as a whole.”

India has articulated that freedom of navigation in South China Sea has to be respected by all and has supported a collective mechanism to resolve the issues in South China Sea and East China Sea. It is imperative that the sea corridor from India to Vietnam through Malacca remains open and unencumbered for free flow of trade India and Japan have had very cordial relations historically as well as for over 60 years since India’s independence; incidentally Japan was the first country to sign Strategic and Global partnership pact in 2006 with India. In 2010 both countries decided to expand the defence and security cooperation by enhancing the capacity to respond to maritime security challenges through information sharing, multilateral and bilateral exercises, dialogue and training. The prime ministerial meet on 25 October 2010 was accompanied by the launch of Japan India Shipping Policy Forum and mutual exchange of schedules of escort operations by Indian Navy and the JSDF. Cooperation on maritime security issues, which include non-conventional security threats and HA / DR, is one of the pillars of India-Japan bilateral relationship. Japan is also planning to create a multilateral maritime security forum in which India is likely to play a prominent role. China however feels that this strategic partnership would eventually lead to containment of rising China. Li Hongmei in an article titled “India’s ‘Look East Policy’ Means ‘Look to Encircle China’?” in People’s Daily (27 October 2010) has written that “by taking advantage of the face-off between China and Japan, India still cannot relax its spasm of worries about China, nor can it brush aside the fear that China might nip its ambitions in the bud”. However there has been no official Chinese response to the strategic maritime security cooperation between Japan and India. Even though bilateral and multilateral naval exercises involving Japan, USA and Australia have been conducted, India on its part has been non-committal towards an alliance with USA, Australia and Japan. The recent Asia Pacific shift by the US would also, in all probability, help in de-escalating tensions in the South China Sea. India maintains that there is enough space for both the giants in Asia and much can be achieved through economic engagement and cooperation. Maritime security relationships with both Vietnam and Japan need to be nurtured as they hold the key to freedom of navigation in South China Sea, they also extend the strategic reach of India’s maritime capability up to Japan. The way forward to prosperity of the Asia Pacific region lies through cooperative engagement and not through escalation of disputes to conflicts which would impede much needed economic growth of nations in the region.

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MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

India-Japan-Vietnam A

Relationship

Capt Bonji Ohara (retd) The writer entered JMSDF in 1985, Master Degree (Area Study: China’s Diplomacy) at Tsukuba University in 1995, Naval Attache in China from 2003 to 2006, Chief of Intelligence Section in MSO, Commanding Officer of 21st Flight Squadron (Helicopter). He resigned from JMSDF in 2010 and joined The Tokyo Foundation in 2013.

former Japanese Captain of The MSDF writes perceptively on the issue of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to address the threat to our commerce on the high seas. Chinese Navy went into Spratly Islands in 1988 and then engaged in an artillery battle with the Vietnamese Navy sinking two Vietnamese Ships and killed 80 Vietnamese soldiers. China prefers to use Bilateral Talks rather than Multilateral Talks to discuss the dispute in South China Sea. But, the denial of Multilateral Security Cooperation will make China isolated in International Society. Ad hoc Multilateral Security Cooperation based on these kinds of Bilateral Security Frameworks can be one of the solutions to Maritime Security. The effect of the Network isn’t enough, even if the Network can be built in the region. In order to activate the Network, incentives of each country for cooperation must be heightened. Those incentives are “Common Profit” and “Common Assets”. Common assets are common military equipment eg the US-2 amphibious aircraft, or other military ships or aircraft. This fosters jointness and interoperability and could form the first steps for cooperation between India, Japan and Vietnam against common threat perceptions.

he Maritime Security for each country mainly means the Security of Sea Lanes and the protection of Marine Resources. The instances for dominion of enclosed sea / half enclosed sea by plural countries tend to involve violent measures if the water has rich resources. These kinds of disputes bring damage to countries; even if they are not concerned with the disputes directly, because these kinds of disputes have huge influence on the marine transportation. Only the marine transportation can transport large supplies without crossing some borders. Therefore the maritime transportation is vital for countries. But there are potential threats on marine transportation in the Sea Lane from East China Sea to the destinations through South China Sea, Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean. Besides, the threats on the Sea Lane

are not only the disputes between countries. There are various threats like natural disaster, shipwreck and piracy etc. It means the multilateral cooperation in many fields is needed to secure safe navigation.

South East Asian countries are trying to get profit through the contract of defence equipment, even now. The effort includes “offset” of technology and manufacturing the equipment in domestic concerns under license In the 1990s, the multilateral security cooperation between South East Asian countries was developed, because China started taking aggressive action in South China Sea from 1988. But at the same time, it also showed us the limitation of the cooperation. Japan and US show their recognition that

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ARF isn’t the framework to secure the safety in Asia, but is only to supplement the Japan-US alliance. Actually, Multilateral Security Cooperation isn’t the idea which was born only from the necessity of Maritime Security. We can see the idea of Multilateral Security Cooperation at the League of Nations which was built after WW1. The Covenant of the League of Nations prohibited a war and systemised Collective Security. But the Security System of the League of Nations couldn’t deter WW2. The United Nations, for overcoming the fault, tried to build a powerful and centralised security system by setting up the Security Council which consisted of 5 victorious nations. The United Nations was supposed to protect the international security. But the cold war caused the exchange of veto by permanent

US and Vietnam have concluded their second defence policy dialogue with the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that aims to promote cooperation between the two countries' government Defence Departments on 19 September 2011. India and Vietnam also have the good relationship traditionally. US is seeking the cooperation with India. Japan is making effort to build a Cooperation Framework with India and trying to develop Security Cooperation with South East Asian countries

members of the Security Council and then international society understood the United Nations Security Council didn’t work. This situation shows that it’s difficult to share the perception of threat and to adjust the interests in plural nations.

China changed its behaviour in 1996. But the change of China’s behaviour doesn’t mean the change of China’s perception of threat. China is showing its positive attitude to ARF, but at the same time, trying to control the pace of the process of CBM and it seems to be succeeding International society started considering the necessity of Security System which wasn’t based on the United Nations. One is PKO and the other is regional or sub-regional Security System. The regional or sub-regional Security System is the effort to avoid the military

clash. CSCE – Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – is the successful example. The idea of “Common Security” was displayed in the report of Palme Commission in 1982. It said the sharing of perception is necessary for “Cooperating with Enemy”. ARF was sometimes considered to be an Asian version of CSCE. ARF was built by ASEAN initiative. “Singapore Declaration of 1992” said “ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC)” and the framework for security dialogue was picked up as theme in ASEAN ministerial meeting in July 1992. SOM for ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in July 1993 decided the member nations and the name as ASEAN Regional Forum.

Ad hoc Multilateral Security Cooperation based on these kinds of Bilateral Security Frameworks can be one of the solutions to Maritime Security, issue by issue

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strategic partnership

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

The approach should be taking place in three stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts “Chairman’s Statement” of the First Meeting of ARF held in July 1994 said “the ARF would be in a position to make significant contribution to effort towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region” and produced “confidence and security building”, “nuclear non-proliferation”, “peacekeeping cooperation”, “exchanges of non-classified military information”, “maritime security” and “preventive diplomacy” as the subjects of such further study. The Concept Paper of the Second Meeting stated “the approach should be taking place in three stages, namely the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts.” In the Third Meeting, Myanmar and India were approved to join ARF. They showed the positive attitude to grapple with Maritime Security by discussing about South China Sea. But in the Fourth Meeting of ARF held in July 1997, Chairman’s Statement said “the process has progressed at a pace acceptable to all participants” then show ARF couldn’t move the process forward easily. Continuous clash concerns with dominion on islands and EEZ in South China Sea testified that Multilateral Security Cooperation in this area doesn’t work. ARF is based on Multilateral Cooperation involving Disputing Parties, the dispute in South China Sea brings serious antagonism between China and ASEAN countries. But it’s very difficult to share the perception of threat. Chinese Navy went into Spratly Islands in 1988 and then engaged in an artillery battle with Vietnam Navy sinking 2 Vietnamese Ships and killed 80 Vietnamese soldiers. Chinese diplomat declared that China wouldn’t cause trouble in “South China Sea Dispute Workshop”. At the same time,

Chinese Navy posted a territorial marker on Gaven Reef. China’s deeds don’t match its words and this inconsistency makes ASEAN countries distrustful of China. But China’s behaviour was not affected by the distrust and the protest of ASEAN; means China didn’t recognise ASEAN countries as threat. China prefers to use Bilateral Talks rather than Multilateral Talks to discuss about the dispute in South China Sea. But, the denial of Multilateral Security Cooperation will make China isolated in International Society. China changed its behaviour in 1996. But the change of China’s behaviour doesn’t mean the change of China’s perception of threat. China is showing its positive attitude to ARF, but at the same time, trying to control the pace of the process of CBM and it seems to be succeeding. The Chinese marine surveillance ships cut the exploration cables of a Vietnamese survey ship Binh Minh 02 at 120 nm off the Vietnamese central coast on 26 May 2011 and the protests in society follow the Vietnam Foreign Ministry’s protest over this incident. There were protests against China’s concern with the dispute over Spratly islands in the Philippines, too. But these protests couldn’t have an influence on China’s behaviour. China kept developing both organisations and equipment of Oceanographic Administration and Fisheries Bureau and then strengthening the “management” in South China Sea. Once antagonism appears in participating parties, then it’s difficult to treat it within the framework of the Cooperative Security which ARF is trying to build. It’s also difficult to share the perception of threat as a basis of the Common Security. It means ARF doesn’t function as an effective framework to solve the dispute in South China Sea. ARF can function as an effective Maritime Multilateral Security Framework only for natural disaster, shipwreck and crimes on ocean. However, there are some more influential actors like India and Japan in Asian region. Maritime Security requires the Multilateral Cooperation, but permanent framework which fixes the participating parties can’t

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function. On the contrary, Bilateral Cooperation is developing concrete measures. For example, US and Vietnam have concluded their second defence policy dialogue with the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) that aims to promote cooperation between the two countries’ government Defence Departments on 19 September 2011. India and Vietnam also have the good relationship traditionally. US is seeking the cooperation with India. Japan is making effort to build a Cooperation Framework with India and trying to develop Security Cooperation with South East Asian countries. Ad hoc Multilateral Security Cooperation based on these kinds of Bilateral Security Frameworks can be one of the solutions to Maritime Security, issue by issue.

India, Japan and Vietnam don’t have to build permanent trilateral security cooperation, but have to build bilateral cooperation framework with each other. If three countries have unique “Common Assets” which are attractive for ASEAN countries, the framework will extend in the South East Asia. These Networks of bilateral security cooperation will be effective against many kinds of problems This is only the philosophy of dealing with the threat. The effect of the Network isn’t enough, even if the Network can be built in the region. In order to activate the Network, incentives of each country for cooperation must be heightened. I would like to present two keywords for it. Those are “Common Profit” and “Common Assets”. “Common Profit” points that both sides can get new profit through the cooperation. The profit includes economic, political, military and technological etc. Political profit means the support of people in domestic and the bargaining power against the rivals. Military profit means, generally say, improvement of operational capability. But economic profit gives each country much bigger incentive to act and economic profit is concerned with other profits deeply. Looking at the defence / security events happening

in the world, we can understand clearly that the business has huge influence on them. South East Asian countries are trying to get profit through the contract of defence equipment, even now. The effort includes “offset” of technology and manufacturing the equipment in domestic concerns under license. In these kinds of contracts, both sides have incentives to cooperate with each other, because both can get profit from the contract. This situation will show us that “Common Profit” drives both countries to have bilateral cooperation. However, the adjustment of sharing profit has not been achieved in many Asian countries. South East Asian countries didn’t procure equipment based on the military rationality. For example, in the situation where an Air Force operates different types of Aircraft from different countries gives the Air Force difficulties in operation, training, maintenance and supply. And this situation gives problems to the security cooperation in Asia, too. The joint pilot training which is led by Malaysia has limitation inevitably, because of many types of aircraft owned by each country. “Common Assets” becomes necessary here. If countries use “Common Assets” then wider range of cooperation can be achieved. In

the

maritime

security,

“Common Assets” can be effective infrastructure of the security cooperation. Japan and India have already started the security dialogue on some level, but both countries must go beyond the discussion and build the effective framework. The framework must be extended to South East Asia and “Common Assets” will help it. For example, US-2 is the only aircraft that can make splash down on the ocean in the world. India and Japan have been discussing about the introduction of US-2 to India since early 2011. South East Asian region has many islands and then has various occasions to use US-2; therefore some countries are considering the introduction of this amphibious aircraft. If US-2 is to be the one of “Common Assets”, it will improve the maritime operation capabilities of each country and provide them technology by offset. In addition, operational cooperation between countries must be easier than present and countries can save the cost for training, maintenance and supply through the cooperation. India and Japan can build the cooperation framework with South East Asian countries in operation, maintenance, supply and training by using the “Common Assets”. India and Japan will have huge damage, if the problems occur in South East Asian region. They will

suffer economic damage, because it has influence on maritime transportation. India also suffers economic damage by stopping joint development of seabed resources with Vietnam. We can consider port facilities, supply facilities, repair structures and various facilities for the prevention of accidents as other “Common Assets”. In this way, India and Japan can give Asian countries the strong incentives to cooperate and then make the regional security cooperation framework to be effective. One of the key countries in ASEAN is Vietnam. Vietnam had a military clash with China in South China Sea and India has good relationship with Vietnam traditionally. Vietnam keeps seeking the effective security cooperation without ARF and tries to get cooperation with Japan and USA. India, Japan and Vietnam don’t have to build permanent trilateral security cooperation, but have to build bilateral cooperation framework with each other. If three countries have unique “Common Assets” which are attractive for ASEAN countries, the framework will extend in the South East Asia. These Networks of bilateral security cooperation will be effective against many kinds of problems.

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strategic partnership

COUNTERING ASSERTIVE CHINA

SECURITY COMPETITION IN ASIA PACIFIC

AND IMPERATIVES FOR INDIA, JAPAN AND VIETNAM

ndia, Japan and Vietnam have to come together in a meaningful, goal oriented strategic partnership, if Chinese great, proxy states driven game is to be countered in the Asia Pacific region. China’s aggressiveness in the region has created a demand for US force posturing in the Asia Pacific once its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced. China, India and Japan are today the largest consumers of energy resources in Asia. The challenge before the United States over the next decade plus will be to develop capabilities to exercise command of the sea lanes and the ability to operate in the contested zones with minimal risk and confrontation. It needs new alliance partners like India, Vietnam and Indonesia to ensure that this happens. India’s close relationship with the US makes China wary and the New Delhi-Washington nuclear deal raises the insecurity level in Beijing. New Delhi must ensure that Sino-Russian relationship does not take on strategic overtones. As a swing state, India needs to balance Chinese assertions and American interests. It may find it difficult to maintain a non-military alliance stand with developments in the Asia Pacific region hurtling in a direction that might well force New Delhi to take sides. The ‘rise of China’ is also bringing India and Japan closer together. Security interests opposite China are also leading India and Vietnam to more strategic engagement with ASEAN states.

sia Pacific region will be the scene of intrinsic rivalry, even though this century is named as Asian century. The region could witness the new cold war between the US (and its allies) and China. ASEAN nations can withstand pressure from China with US backing. Asia as a region is not politically unified and faces many challenges. It is useful to see the Asia Pacific region with a systems-of-systems approach. From an economic and strategic perspective, this region is dynamic and growing. The world’s second, third, tenth (fourth on PPP) and fifteenth largest economies in China, Japan, India and South Korea respectively are in the region. The Sino-US equation has depended on two factors. First, is economic growth in each country and response of

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new administration in Washington DC. The Democrats see China as strategic partner while the Republicans see India and Japan as strategic allies. The global financial crisis has made the US work with Beijing especially to ensure that China continues to buy the US treasury bonds. This has had a telling effect on Beijing’s overall posturing in Asia and beyond. US reluctance to put pressure on China on issues such as North Korea raises doubts about the former’s credibility as an alliance partner in the Asia Pacific.

Strategic logic should dictate all ASEAN countries and India too, that Vietnam provides potential as their respective first-line of defence against China

Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma (retd) The writer is currently Professor cum Director-SA in the University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun and Joint Director at Institute of National Security Studies, New Delhi, as also Senior Research Fellow with Forum for Strategic and Security Studies, New Delhi. He is former head of the Office of Net Assessment, HQ Integrated Defence Staff and retired from armed forces in April, 2008 and, since then, has been actively involved in Research Project of 13th Finance Commission, National Security Secretariat, NCAER, DRDO and the USI of India.

Ms Anshu Paliwal The co-writer is Research Associate in the team headed by Brig (Dr) Sharma for research in Strategic Management.

This view has changed causing the region to welcome back US presence. At the same time, the US would like its alliance partners to be more assertive militarily. This in US eyes is the balancing of China. The challenge before the United States over the next decade plus will be to develop capabilities to exercise command of the sea lanes and the ability to operate in the contested zones with minimal risk and confrontation. It needs new alliance partners like India, Vietnam and Indonesia to ensure that this happens. China sees its position from its core concerns. Make the region safe for the

continued rule of the CCP. Internal stability, increase military power and keeping China ‘one’ is a policy. Emphasis on protecting ‘core interests’ appears to be driven by their perceived fears on internal security challenges and their external dimension with respect to issues of ‘sovereignty’ over Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan. Essentially, to preserve its core interests Beijing is willing to shelve old disputes and move forward without compromising on its fundamental position. ‘Diplomacy of four circles’ is China’s interconnected and interlocked strategy that aims to make it a regional and global power and gain competitive advantage over the West.

India’s geopolitical, energy, economic and maritime interests force it to get into serious security partnerships with US allies and partners like Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Australia. There is marked enhancement in her defence self-reliance capabilities which were initially boosted by US technology and military hardware support. It develops strong maritime capability and nuclear triad as also significant space and cyber capacities with large C4ISR footprint over its region of strategic interest

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COUNTERING ASSERTIVE CHINA

Chinese economic growth is becoming critical to internal stability as it supplants communist ideology in unifying the population. This realisation is also driving its external policies. PLA is keen to expand its maritime periphery. China’s military ambitions threaten the Asian strategic balance. Fact is that while we may understand China’s concerns, they may not be inherently stabilising.

If Russia in a deep strategic relationship with China can build-up Vietnam’s military capacities, what stops India from doing so when both India and Vietnam face a menacing China threat? China’s aggressiveness in the region has created a demand for US force posturing in the Asia Pacific once its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced. China, India and Japan are today largest consumers of energy resources in Asia. China’s vision of energy disruption by the US has led it to develop a ‘string of pearls’ ie, ports and refuelling stations, in the Indian Ocean and beyond. China remains ‘geostrategically restrained’ owing to largely continental construct and its maritime borders surrounded by the First and Second Island chains, posing threat to heartland and restraining Chinese maritime projection. Military modernisation is driven by economics and power status concerns and the need to take advantage of global developments. The PLA is today far more advanced and the earlier weakness in air and maritime dimensions is being rapidly made up. Essentially, what the Chinese are doing is building on their strengths and focusing on areas like cyber warfare to make them competent to take on any adversary. Maritime strategy is one of area denial. Also anti-ship missile capabilities are being boosted to take on the US and other navies of the region. Blue water capability combined with new stealth fighters like the J-20 will improve combat capability and increase operational reach for force projection. Land warfare capabilities are relevant to both India and Vietnam. India’s close relationship with the US makes China wary and the New Delhi-Washington nuclear deal raises the insecurity level in Beijing. Similarly Beijing is wary of India’s closer ties with Japan, Vietnam and the entire south-east Asian region.

India has a legitimate strategic interest in the stability and security of Vietnam. India’s cardinal precept in this direction that it is in India’s national security interests to ensure that Vietnam’s does not end up as buckling down to Chinese coercion and pressures New Delhi must ensure that Sino-Russian relationship does not take on strategic overtones. Options in the region are limited to economic cooperation, maritime cooperation in protecting sea lanes of communication and in non-traditional security areas. It may find it difficult

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to maintain a non-military alliance stand with developments in the Asia Pacific region hurtling in a direction that might well force New Delhi to take sides.

Strategic reconfiguration All this has led the US to re-strategise and re-arrange its priorities in the Asia Pacific. This calls for re-claiming lost political space in the region, re-positioning of military forces and seeking new alliance partners like Vietnam. Attempts are also being made to wean away Myanmar from the Chinese. The Chinese declaration of the South China Sea as an area of ‘core concern’ has made the US realise that it needs to find countervailing force to the assertiveness of Beijing in the area. Countries in the region look upon the US to act as the countervailing force. In the regional context, Japan is at the forefront of a new military revival concerned as it is by its own security (read protection of sovereign territory) and security of trade and investment relations. Within Japanese context of strategic horizons in order of precedence is North Korea, Chinese intervention in its EEZ and attempted disruption of sea lanes of communication in the Persian Gulf. Seen another way Japan’s focus on military modernisation relates to the arc of China, Korea and South China Sea. In fact, the attitude of North Korea is a key factor in the US-Japan strategic partnership. South Korea on the other hand appears to be moving away from a purely country specific threat perception and is focusing on the arc, including China. One of the major imperatives for China keeping Pyongyang as an ally is because it serves as a buffer state between the pro-West US-allies and Beijing. Whether this continued North Korean nuclear angle will make Tokyo move in the direction of nuclearisation is a moot question.

Washington is keenly aware that failure to help the economies of the region will only strengthen the hands of China. American re-visualisation of the economy of nations like Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand is going to be part of the strategy of engagement For ASEAN, the prime concern is likely to be the need to maintain current economic growth, increase production for exports to set off a negative trade balance and regulate the respective domestic consumption. If India manages to move on a faster growth trajectory it could contribute to the South East Asian growth rates. Set in the global economic turn down, SE economies know that the US cannot by itself do too much, as the latter is preoccupied with Europe. But Washington is keenly aware that failure to help the economies of the region will only strengthen the hands of China. American re-visualisation of the economy of nations like Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand is going to be part of the strategy of engagement.

The major trend lines and identified prominent drivers that will shape the strategic future of Asia Pacific region are as under: China’s role in emerging Asia Pacific US efficacy of rebalancing in Asia Pacific and its emergence as a pivot and a hedge against growth of Chinese military power. Japan. Its future behaviour, pacifist or assertive in support of its core interests and strategic horizons. Korean Peninsula. Likelihood of unification, continuation of current standoff perpetuating present instability? ASEAN. Preserve regional autonomy, by not choosing between China and US, seek American security umbrella or make strategic adjustments with China to ensure trade and investments. India. Nature of engagement? As a swing state? South China Sea. Nuclear factor. Resources in particular energy. Non-traditional security threats; piracy and water.

Japan scenarios Japan adopts upstream strategy based on deterrence and strategic cooperation. Japan develops capacities for attaining deterrence over SCS, Philippines Sea and IOR. Develops and deploys BMD and military space assets. It solidifies its strategic partnerships with India, Vietnam and Australia. Japan’s strategic assertion extends to East Asia, SCS, North Pacific, Choke points, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. It is nearly poised for

confrontationist approach. Japan goes in for downstream strategy by focusing on vital horizons. Develops deterrence against unilateral North Korean actions and downside effects of Korean unification. It possesses capability to deter Chinese unilateral actions in SCS. Japanese SDF continues to develop dissuasive deterrence while remaining dependent on US extended deterrence.

India scenarios As a swing state, India needs to balance Chinese assertions and American interests. With China enjoying unfettered hegemony in Chinese sphere of influence bandwagon with Southeast and East Asian states like Japan and South Korea to balance Chinese power. India’s geopolitical, energy, economic and maritime interests force it to get into serious security partnerships with US allies and partners like Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Australia. There is marked enhancement in her defence self-reliance capabilities which were initially boosted by US technology and military hardware support. It develops strong maritime capability and nuclear triad as also significant space and cyber capacities with large C4ISR footprint over its region of strategic interest. Andaman and Nicobar transform into a strong ‘iron choke’ to counter Chinese ‘string of pearls’.

In the regional context, Japan is at the forefront of a new military revival concerned as it is by its own security (read protection of sovereign territory) and security of trade and investment relations. Within Japanese context of strategic horizons in order of precedence is North Korea, Chinese intervention in its EEZ and attempted disruption of sea lanes of communication in the Persian Gulf

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COUNTERING ASSERTIVE CHINA

India continues its swing state status, balancing Chinese assertion and US interests, at the same time developing close economic and trade relationships with ASEAN. It also maintains close strategic relationship with Russia as a third support to secure its interests in Central and South Asia.

Strategic imperatives Geopolitical tensions continue to simmer in the South China Sea after the Obama administration’s declaration last year of a US ‘return to Asia’ stirred up regional dynamics. Now, non-claimant states India and Japan are entering into the fray. There are various reasons for this activity. The South China Sea is home to some of the world’s busiest sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which would be disrupted, should an armed conflict break out. There is the potential for non-claimant states to get involved in the exploration of oil and gas in the region through joint ventures with claimant states. Having a voice in a major regional security issue confers prestige commensurate with regional power status. For India and Japan, the South China Sea dispute provides additional indicators to gauge the assertiveness of China’s foreign policy. India and Japan have unsettled borders with China in the Himalayas and the East China Sea, respectively. India also has territorial disputes with Pakistan, who in turn is supported by China. To Japan, the safety of its SLOCs are a vital security interest and over 80 per cent of her oil imports from the Middle East pass through the South China Sea. The ‘rise of China’ is also bringing India and Japan closer together. The two countries signed the ‘Joint Statement Vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade’ and a ‘Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement’ in October 2010. No doubt India’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca, will also provide an important component for Indo-Japanese maritime cooperation. Security interests opposite China are also leading India and Vietnam to more strategic engagement with ASEAN states. Recently, India’s state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed a deal with Vietnam’s PetroVietnam to purchase BP’s stakes in oil and gas development in waters off the Vietnamese coast (following a naval confrontation between India and China in the area). While China protests the deal as violating its sovereignty, ONGC and PetroVietnam claim the area in question is within Vietnamese territorial waters. And on 12 October last year, India’s strategic stature took a big hit in Vietnam’s perceptions and also in ASEAN’s perceptions by strategic blunder of the Indian policy establishment pertaining to India withdrawing from joint prospecting in the

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South China Sea waters under Vietnamese sovereignty after objections by China. As for Japan, it held talks in September with Filipino diplomats on resolving the disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. It was proposed that the two countries set up a ‘permanent working group’ to regularly tackle disputes and other Asian maritime issues. Even more importantly, military and security ties were tightened with the elevation of the relationship to a ‘strategic partnership’. Japan also signalled its willingness to play a bigger role in regional security issues when the Japanese Vice Minister of Defence met with senior defence officials from the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand in late September.

The Chinese declaration of the South China Sea as an area of ‘core concern’ has made the US realise that it needs to find countervailing force to the assertiveness of Beijing in the area. Countries in the region look upon the US to act as the countervailing force It would be easy for China to interpret the events over the last year as tantamount to a strategic encirclement by the US, India, Vietnam and Japan. Now that ASEAN claimant states have a more favourable strategic position vis-à-vis China, all the states involved should turn their attention to the negotiating table, adding substantive content to the agreement reached at this July’s ASEAN Regional Forum to resolve the dispute peacefully. The 12 October signing of a six-point agreement between China and Vietnam to contain the South China Sea dispute, including the opening of a hotline to deal with potential conflicts and the promise of holding border negotiations twice a year, is one welcome development toward this. India needs to decide whether the evolving strategic and security environment needs greater impetus in the real “strategic dimension”. The impression, that one gains from the perusal of the coverage of various high-level two way meetings and the commemorative events this year is that military matters stand relegated and find mention at the end of the coverage giving the impression of India being apologetic about a military relationship with Vietnam. A strategic weakness shown by the Indian policy establishment pertains to devaluing or discrediting the assertions made by Indian Naval Chief that Indian Navy is ready to provide protection in the South China Sea oil prospecting by Indian firms. It was a legitimate assertion by India’s Naval Chief and should have been respected as such and should have been reiterated by the Indian National Security Advisor. India has a legitimate strategic interest in the stability and security of Vietnam. India’s cardinal precept in this direction that it is in India’s national security interests to ensure that Vietnam’s does not end up as buckling down to Chinese coercion and pressures.

Diplomatic platitudes by India will not help building Vietnam’s military capacity to withstand Chinese political and military coercion and brinkmanship. India has to actively engage in capacity building of Vietnam’s military forces. It also needs to be stressed that Vietnam is no economic ‘basket case’ and is capable of affording its own military requirements. Also Vietnam is a valiant nation militarily which fought to stalemate the present leading military powers – United States, China and Japan. Vietnam is the only nation which militarily repulsed Chinese aggression in 1979 with its border forces only. That is the mettle of the Vietnam military.

India’s close relationship with the US makes China wary and the New Delhi-Washington nuclear deal raises the insecurity level in Beijing. Similarly Beijing is wary of India’s closer ties with Japan, Vietnam and the entire south-east Asian region Russia is already engaged in providing advanced military weaponry to Vietnam especially submarines and joint production of missiles. Russia’s military capacity building of Vietnam should be an eye-opener for the Indian policy establishment in that there is no gainsaying the fact that any military capacity building of Vietnam is China threat-centric. If Russia in a deep strategic relationship with China can build-up Vietnam’s military capacities what stops India from doing so when both India and Vietnam face a menacing China threat?

Contextually in 2012 with the exception of China the entire international community would welcome if the Indian policy establishment could gird up its strategic will to embark on assisting Vietnam to build-up its military capacity to withstand China’s military brinkmanship. Strategic logic should dictate all ASEAN countries and India too, that Vietnam provides potential as their respective first-line of defence against China.

Conclusion Competition dynamics of China and any future competitors should be responded with a comprehensive package. Economic and Defence cooperation should be used as complementary instruments for attaining time bound objectives vis-à-vis the competitors. Highest priority should be given to the countries of South East Asia, particularly Japan and Vietnam. Recent North Korean nuclear tests and cyber attacks on South Korean banks with Chinese footprints behind are sending a message. Similarly China’s lease of Gwadar Port in Pakistan and numerous other defence and strategic projects with her, point to another reality. Furthermore, Chinese assertiveness in the island disputes where Vietnam is a concerned state indicates another imperative. Underlying strategic necessity is that India, Japan and Vietnam have to come together in a meaningful goal oriented strategic partnership, if Chinese great, proxy states driven game is to be countered in the Asia Pacific region.

India must extend and invest in substantial capacity building of the Vietnam Navy and the Vietnam Air Force which would be required in a big way to defend its maritime domains from Chinese onslaughts. India’s advances in the ballistic missile field could be of assistance to Vietnam.

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strategic partnership

BOLSTERING SECURITY

JAPAN AND INDIA: COLLABORATING FOR THE COMMON GOOD

Cmde Sujeet Samaddar NM (retd) The writer retired as the Principal Director Naval Plans. He served NOVA Integrated Systems – A TATA Enterprise as Vice President (Operations) until October 2011. He is presently Director and CEO, ShinMaywa Industries India Limited.

he rise of China and its growing influence in Asia has engendered perceptions in both India and Japan that it needs to be balanced and that each needs a major partner in Asia. The Japanese have signalled a long term commitment to India’s growing economy. Tokyo is qualitatively and quantitatively upgrading its military capacity and has adapted its own unique Anti Access and Area Denial Strategy. Major defence acquisition programmes of the Self Defence Force (SDF) include seeking the highly sophisticated F-22 aircraft from the US; nomination of the F-35 as the future fighter aircraft; substantial investments in Ballistic Missile Defence Systems including its home grown Aegis class destroyers; the launching of the largest ever warship building programme after WW II with the 19,500 tonne DDH 22 class helicopter carrying destroyers; and, bolstering its submarine fleet levels to 26 boats. “This will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world”.

Shinzo Abe, December 16, 2006

he emerging scenario in Asia is replete with opportunities and challenges for both India and Japan in the next decade. Firstly, Asian countries are poised to increase the Asian share of the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) significantly in a few years. Secondly, with many Asian economies on the rise, competition for resources and markets can cause friction and has security ramifications. Thirdly, Japan and India are increasingly aware of their role outside their immediate problematic neighbourhoods as major Asian powers, particularly in the Indo-Pacific where the US Asian pivot will anchor. Fourthly, there is a long-term possibility of Japan and India assuming larger responsibilities in a reformed United Nations although immediate prospects may have receded somewhat. Fifthly, the rise of China and its growing influence in Asia has engendered perceptions in both India and Japan that it needs to be balanced and that each needs a major partner in Asia. And finally, the United States has revised its Asia policy with its declaration of the Pivot to Asia. There is, therefore, every incentive as major stakeholders in Asian affairs to boost Japan-India relations to a truly strategic level. The annual summit meetings between the two countries have laid the foundations of a strategic and global partnership whose contours are geopolitical and geoeconomic in content. In effect, what is emerging

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from the tempo of recent summits, bilateral meetings and dialogues is that the Japanese have signalled a long-term commitment to India’s growing economy as well as recognised the inevitability of factoring India in any security structure in Asia. Japan has also, of late, assumed an unprecedented salience in India’s external and economic policy, particularly in the increased Japanese investments in India, scaling up of security interactions with the first bilateral naval exercise in 2012 and three visits by the Chief of Maritime Staff to India in four years.

As a matter of substantial cooperation the two countries need to explore opportunities to build-up the defence industrial complex as an Asian initiative. Japanese expertise and technology particularly in shipbuilding and amphibious aircraft is unparalleled and the Indian market for these products is possibly the largest in the world For India, in any discourse on Japan’s foreign and security policy the central issue of whether Japan would indeed become a ‘normal nation’ is overriding. Japan as a ‘normal nation’ implies that Japan would be largely responsible for its own security and foreign policies and not fully dependent on the Japan-US security arrangement. Contemporary events and trends suggest that Japan may indeed become a ‘normal nation’ in the midterm. Firstly, Japan’s visibly proactive approach towards combating maritime piracy off Africa and in the Malacca Straits with its first overseas base in Djibouti and its unprecedented military response to Chinese claims on the Senkaku Issue marks a significant step in its quest for rehabilitation as a global power capable

The Japanese have signalled a long term commitment to India’s growing economy as well as recognised the inevitability of factoring India in any security structure in Asia. Japan has also, of late, assumed an unprecedented salience in India’s external and economic policy, particularly in the increased Japanese investments in India, scaling up of security interactions with the first bilateral naval exercise in 2012 and three visits by the Chief of Maritime Staff to India in four years

of independently exercising military power in its national interest. Tokyo is qualitatively and quantitatively upgrading its military capacity and has adapted its own unique Anti Access and Area Denial Strategy which enjoys bi-partisan political support. The Second Abe administration has, for the first time in decades, raised the defence budget of the Self Defence Force and most importantly released its defence policy in a few months of its tenure.

A ‘normal’ Japan would be a military and economic power in its own right and thus compete to be another pole in a multipolar world. All things considered, a normal Japan, friendly with India, would be advantageous. For Japan, it sees India firstly, as a possible conventional, even if partial, balancer to China; secondly, as a possible mediator with Russia; and lastly, and most importantly, recognises the new US disposition towards India

A second indicator is the growing sense of nationalism in the country. For several decades, the Japanese were decidedly reserved in their display of nationalism – whether unfurling the Hinomaru or singing the national anthem Kimigayo. Times are now changing. Japan’s forceful response to a North Korean spy boat in Japanese waters; regular visits to the Yasukini Jinja by the political leadership in defiance of regional sentiments; Tokyo’s claim to Takeshima Islands (South Korea) and the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands (China / Taiwan) and its demonstrated intention of using military force to maintain the status quo are some indicators. Modern Japan’s nationalism is a response to what it perceives as a changing balance of power in Asia and is driven by the rise of China as a belligerent rather than a benign power and the North Korean nuclear challenge.

Third, faced with the stark realisation that its trade routes and access to resources and

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strategic partnership

BOLSTERING SECURITY

markets may need to be ensured through the Self Defence Forces (SDF) mechanism and with other partner countries and it’s clear desire to be counted as a power player in international bodies Japan’s war fighting and defence capabilities have seen major restructuring in recent years. Significantly, major defence acquisition programmes of the Self Defence Force (SDF) include seeking the highly sophisticated F-22 aircraft from the US; nomination of the F-35 as the future fighter aircraft; substantial investments in Ballistic Missile Defence Systems including its home grown Aegis class destroyers; the launching of the largest ever warship building programme after WW II with the 19,500 tonne DDH 22 class helicopter carrying destroyers; and, bolstering its submarine fleet levels to 26 boats. Its maritime power infrastructure – shipbuilding, shipping, ports and harbours and naval / coast guard capabilities – are now world class. Fourth, for a first, the Japanese signed a Security Cooperation pact with Australia which is “a groundbreaking event that opened a new horizon in Japan’s security strategy ... ,” being the only other country apart from the US to sign such a pact. A Security Cooperation Agreement followed with India in 2008. Therefore, one could speculate that Japan is now developing nascent collective security ambitions – a clear attribute of a ‘normal’ powerful nation.

Since 77 per cent of its energy requirements and about 85 per cent of its goods transit through the Indian Ocean region, Japanese economic security is, in the long-term, contingent upon non-interference in this traffic However, in any move towards becoming a normal nation the constant interpretation and re-interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution is an essential fixture of the domestic debate. Article 9 mandates, ‘the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.’ The Article has been interpreted to adapt to the prevailing situation for more than fifty years and,

remarkably, has remained unaltered in text. In 1954, within two years of the promulgation of the new Constitution which eschewed all forms of armed forces, Article 9 was interpreted to provide that ‘self-defense being a sovereign right of the nation’ an SDF could be created without violating Article 9. Thus, over the years Article 9 has been dexterously re-interpreted to result in creation of a full-fledged Ministry of Defense in 2007, the restructuring of the Security Council of Japan to a National Security Council and the reorganisation of the Joint Staff Office to become the single point military advisor on operational issues. Japan is already the world’s fourth largest and Asia’s most technologically advanced maritime power. In an unprecedented policy pronouncement Japan relaxed its “three principles of arms exports” on December 27, 2011 in a bid to obtain the volumes necessary to sustain its own defense industrial complex. In a major departure from the Basic Defense Force Concept enumerated in the first National Defense Program Outline in 1995 the National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2011 and beyond ventured to articulate a Dynamic Defense Force Concept. Under the new guidelines Japan’s security objectives are to (1) prevent and eliminate external threat from reaching Japan; (2) to prevent threats from emerging by improving international security environment; and (3) to create global peace and stability and to secure human security. These objectives would be achieved by a combination of Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with ally(s) and a multi-layered security cooperation with the international community. This policy change will increase the credibility of Japan’s deterrent capability through raising levels of equipment and increasing the operations tempo. Commensurate with the policy change the roles and missions of the Self Defense Forces would be aligned with a reviewed and renewed force structure and force mix to achieve deterrence and response, stabilise the security environment of the Asia Pacific and improve the global security environment. The SDF structure would be built around a defensive concept of area denial and anti-access operations, seamless, secure and strengthened ISR systems

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

to develop a common operational picture, coordinated and integrated response to contingencies by rapidly making appropriate decisions and accomplishing mission objectives achieved through joint operations.

Japan’s security objectives are to (1) prevent and eliminate external threat from reaching Japan; (2) to prevent threats from emerging by improving international security environment; and (3) to create global peace and stability and to secure human security. These objectives would be achieved by a combination of Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with ally(s) and a multilayered security cooperation with the international community The trends outlined above have significant implications for fostering a more substantial partnership between India and Japan. These in summary are: A ‘normal’ Japan would be a military and economic power in its own right and thus compete to be another pole in a multipolar world. All things considered, a normal Japan, friendly with India, would be advantageous. For Japan, it sees India firstly, as a possible conventional, even if partial, balancer to China; secondly, as a possible mediator with Russia; and lastly and most importantly, recognises the new US disposition towards India.

The Japanese signed a Security Cooperation pact with Australia which is “a groundbreaking event that opened a new horizon in Japan’s security strategy ... ,” being the only other country apart from the US to sign such a pact. A Security Cooperation Agreement followed with India in 2008. Therefore, one could speculate that Japan is now developing nascent collective security ambitions – a clear attribute of a ‘normal’ powerful nation The US-Japan Security structure would remain a fundamental feature of Japan’s national security, but, with greater ‘active’ participation and a much larger role for SDF in collective security until Japan becomes a normal nation. Indian engagement with the

SDF and the security apparatus of both countries should be extended to organised trilateral exercises to improve interoperability and develop joint doctrines. Simultaneously, India must keep China engaged through bilateral exercises. The Japan-China relationship is complex, but it is logical to expect that Japan (and the US) would not like any power vacuum in Asia to be occupied solely by China in view of the competition for Asian resources and markets. Matters are not helped by the complexities of the issues in North and South East Asia and the disputes in the South China Sea. Therefore, the only option to hedge against Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific are the US and to an extent India. Vietnam and Indonesia and more recently Myanmar, are the other options that both the US and Japan are pursuing should India thwart such alignments. It is in the context of maritime security that Japan has a clear visualisation of its requirements from India. Since 77 per cent of its energy requirements and about 85 per cent of its goods transit through the Indian Ocean region, Japanese economic security is, in the long-term, contingent upon non-interference in this traffic. Also, maritime terrorism, piracy and seaborne transnational crimes of small arms, drugs and human trafficking, dumping of toxic wastes and unbridled exploitation of ocean resources and fisheries are subjects of mutual concern. Both Japan

and India realise that no one navy is equal to this task. Hence, successive declarations of partnerships between the two countries have laid heavier emphasis on the maritime element of the security relationship. Other areas of interest to both Japan and India are aerospace and cyberspace technology. India’s competence in software and space technologies and Japan’s materials and propulsion technologies could be synergised to good effect.

The rise of China and its growing influence in Asia has engendered perceptions in both India and Japan that it needs to be balanced and that each needs a major partner in Asia. And finally, the United States has revised its Asia policy with its declaration of the Pivot to Asia. There is, therefore, every incentive as major stakeholders in Asian affairs to boost Japan-India relations to a truly strategic level As a matter of substantial cooperation the two countries need to explore opportunities to build-up the defence industrial complex as an Asian initiative. Japanese expertise and technology particularly in shipbuilding and amphibious aircraft is unparalleled and the Indian market for these products is possibly the largest in the world. To tread this path of industrial cooperation it would be best to begin with an immediately actionable agenda. The easiest one presently

on the table is the Indian Navy’s plans for acquisition of amphibious aircraft for benign, constabulary and diplomatic missions. Japan manufactures the world’s most sophisticated amphibious aircraft which best meets the requirements of the Indian Navy. As a signal of substantial cooperation Japan could offer the US-2i to the Indian Navy on generous terms. This would build capability in India, offer economies of scale to Japanese manufacturers and bolster confidence in Japan that the partnership is indeed the most important bilateral relationship in the world. It would also lay the foundation of a joint India-Japan partnership in the highly promising aerospace sector in India. The foregoing analysis indicates the contours of Indian and Japanese interest overlap at bilateral, Asian and global levels. India’s Japan policy for the next decade should be focused on encouraging Japan to be a ‘normal’ nation. Increased cooperation on substantial issues such as maintenance of the freedom of the seas, protection of the sea lanes of communication, preservation of the eco-systems of the oceans, safety of mariners and the mercantile marine, oceanic and coastal disaster management cooperation and cyber systems would best promote the credentials of both powers as responsible net security surplus states acting for the common good of the region.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

strategic partnership

BEYOND OLD SHIBBOLETHS

A New Phase in Delhi-Tokyo Ties

hina is steadily escalating its pressure on Japan as part of a strategy being overseen by the new leader, Xi Jinping. Concerns are rising for both states, about China’s assertive diplomatic and military posture. China’s attempts to test the diplomatic and military mettle of its neighbours will only bring Japan and India closer. Shinzo Abe has been the most enthusiastic about the future of India-Japan relationship. New Delhi should lose no time in reaching out to Tokyo. Given Abe’s admiration for India and his repeated articulation of the need for India and Japan to work more closely, this is a unique opportunity to radically alter the contours of Indo-Japanese ties. Of all its neighbours, India seems most willing to acknowledge Japan’s centrality in shaping the evolving Asia Pacific security architecture.

ith the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) winning a landslide in Japanese parliamentary elections and Shinzo Abe assuming the office of prime minister in Japan in December 2012, India-Japan ties have entered a new phase. For Japan, embroiled in its domestic political instability and economic drift, India has not been a top priority in recent years. Indian bureaucracy has also been unwilling to push the pacts underpinning the ‘strategic partnership’ to signal seriousness towards Japan. It is now possible to envision an end to this drift in Delhi-Tokyo ties.

Strategic calculus In his second innings, Abe has promised to stimulate the Japanese economy and end deflation by passing a strong stimulus bill as well as to make Japanese exports more competitive by devaluing the yen. Though he is viewed as a staunch nationalist and a hawk vis-à-vis

China, he has made it clear that he would be working towards improving ties with China as well as the United States. What is perhaps most significant is that nuclear power will be back in business with the coming to power of the LDP and what is very controversial is Abe’s expressed desire to rewrite the Japanese post-World War II pacifist constitution allowing for a full-fledged military. Abe is determined to bring Japan back to its past glory asserting during his trip to the US in February 2013 that “Japan is not and will never be, a second-tier country.” He has declared that he “will bring back a strong Japan, strong enough to do even more good for the betterment of the world.” This has not only forced the world to take note of a new Japanese attitude but has also made China anxious about its own role in what many have already dubbed as the “Chinese century.” Tensions between China and Japan have been rising over the islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China ever since the

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

Japanese government decided to buy some of the islands from a private owner. In recent days, China has not only sent a flotilla of navy ships near the islands but a Chinese military surveillance plane also entered Japanese airspace, forcing Japan to scramble fighter jets in response. China is steadily escalating its pressure on Japan as part of a strategy being overseen by the new leader, Xi Jinping. Abe was quick to underline after his party’s victory that “China is challenging the fact that (the islands) are Japan’s inherent territory” and suggested that his party’s “objective is to stop the challenge” and not to “worsen relations between Japan and China.” As the world watches carefully how Abe’s second term in office will shape Japan’s domestic and foreign policies, New Delhi should lose no time in reaching out to Tokyo. Given Abe’s admiration for India and his repeated articulation of the need for India and Japan to work more closely, this is a unique opportunity to radically alter

the contours of Indo-Japanese ties. While Delhi-Tokyo relations have been developing slowly and steadily over the last few years, the momentum seems to have left this very important bilateral partnership some time back. The two nations have recently concluded the agreement on social security as well as a memorandum on cooperation (MoC) in the rare earths industry. The rare earths industry MoC was a significant initiative in light of China’s decision to cut off its exports of rare earths minerals to Japan following a territorial dispute in 2010. But the discussions on civilian nuclear energy cooperation between the two states have been stuck for quite some time now. With Abe’s coming to power with a strong pro-nuclear power agenda, time is ripe to regain the initiative on these negotiations. China’s rise is the most significant variable in the Asian geostrategic landscape today and both India and Japan would like to see a constructive China playing a larger role in the solving of regional and global problems rather than becoming a problem itself. Concerns are rising for both states, about China’s assertive diplomatic and military posture. China’s attempts to test the diplomatic and military mettle of its neighbours will only bring Japan and India closer. While New Delhi and Tokyo would like greater transparency and restraint on Beijing’s part, there is now a need for them to be more candid about their expectations.

New dimension Of all recent Japanese leaders, Shinzo Abe has been the most enthusiastic about the future of India-Japan relationship and gave it an entirely new dimension. In his address to the joint session of the Indian Parliament, Abe talked about a “broader Asia” constituting of Pacific and Indian Ocean countries such as Japan, India, Australia and the US, that share common values of democracy, freedom and respect for basic human rights. He argued for greater cooperation among these states. In his book, Towards a Beautiful Country, Abe makes the case about Japan advancing its national interests by strengthening its ties with India. He has argued: “It will not be a surprise if in another decade Japan-India relations overtake Japan-US and Japan-China ties.” Building on the idea of a triangular security dialogue between Washington, Tokyo and Canberra initiated by his predecessor, Abe made known his desire to create a four-way strategic dialogue with the US, Australia and India, a framework that he stressed would be based on their shared universal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law. Since assuming office in December, Abe has once again underscored the importance of not only

consolidating Japan’s historic alliance with the United States but also expressed a desire to deepen partnerships with India, Indonesia and Australia.

As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has put it, “the time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole” A convergence of structural, domestic and individual leadership factors has transformed India-Japan relationship in recent years. At the structural level, the rise of China in the Asia Pacific and beyond has fundamentally altered the strategic calculus of India and Japan, forcing them to rethink their attitudes towards each other. At the domestic level, India’s booming economy is making it an attractive trading and business partner for Japan as Japan tries to get itself out of its long years of economic stagnation. Japan is also re-assessing its role as a security provider in the region and beyond and of all its neighbours, India seems most willing to acknowledge Japan’s centrality in shaping the evolving Asia Pacific security architecture. At the individual level, a new generation of political leaders in India and Japan are viewing each other differently, breaking from past policies, thereby changing the trajectory of India-Japan relations. Yet because of domestic pathologies in both New Delhi and Tokyo, the promise of this partnership has not yet been realised so far. New Delhi now has a chance to give a new dimension to its ties with Tokyo. With a new leadership in Tokyo with a decisive mandate, the old issues that once seemed insurmountable should be able to find some resolution. India should push Japan into giving Delhi-Tokyo ties a much more substantive dimension and move beyond old shibboleths. The time is right for India and Japan to seize the initiative and transform the strategic landscape in the Asia Pacific. As the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has put it, “the time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.” In the words of the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, “a strong India is in the best interest of Japan and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” So there is no excuse now not to build a strong partnership, especially as a rapidly rising China is out to challenge the pre-eminence of both Japan and India as major Asian powers.

Dr Harsh V Pant The writer is Reader in International Relations at King's College London and an affiliate with the King's India Institute.

New Delhi should lose no time in reaching out to Tokyo. Given Abe’s admiration for India and his repeated articulation of the need for India and Japan to work more closely, this is a unique opportunity to radically alter the contours of Indo-Japanese ties

Both India and Japan would like to see a constructive China playing a larger role in the solving of regional and global problems rather than becoming a problem itself. Concerns are rising for both states, about China’s assertive diplomatic and military posture. China’s attempts to test the diplomatic and military mettle of its neighbours will only bring Japan and India closer. While New Delhi and Tokyo would like greater transparency and restraint on Beijing’s part, there is now a need for them to be more candid about their expectations

The time is right for India and Japan to seize the initiative and transform the strategic landscape in the Asia Pacific

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

internal security

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Counter-insurgency:

OPSEC and Operational Art

paint a different picture

Dr Rupali Jeswal The writer is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings.

n traditional warfare the objective is to destroy the adversary and occupy the territory, the guerrilla’s aim and objective is to control the population. By using blind terrorism the insurgents win latent support and by selective terrorism they are able to isolate the counter-forces and terrorise the people into silence. Insurgents always start with a cause and nothing else; a counter-insurgent starts with everything else but the cause. Nepalese and Filipino Maoist outfits have long been suspected of providing rhetorical and material support to the CPI(M). Maoists are acquiring weapons through Bangladesh, Myanmar and possibly Nepal. Some members of the Communist Party of Philippines (CPP), one of the major communist insurgent outfits of the world, had met Indian Maoist leaders in Chhattisgarh. Agencies also claimed that CPI (Maoist) cadres are undergoing training in urban guerrilla warfare in different Indian cities

She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

If I were given an hour to save the planet, I would spend fifty-nine minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it” – Albert Einstein. “

his quote shouts out – Knowing what you are dealing with and Plan effectively. The influence on the population of the Naxalites – the “Red Taliban” as they have been called, has noticeably been growing and escalating, adopting tactics of blind and selective terrorism.

The Global Terrorism Index, 2012 reports: The Communist Party of India – Maoists (CPI-M) by itself is responsible for nearly 45 per cent of all attacks in India. If we include all groups affiliated with the Maoist insurgency, the vast majority of terrorism, which occurs in India, is by nationalists / separatists who are politically motivated. Personal security is an inalienable, fundamental human right; it is also the first primer for the survival and thorough development of a democratic society. Insurgencies and acts of terrorism weaken personal freedom and security of a society, threatening the foundations of a democracy.

Terrorism, like Guerrilla warfare is a method to achieve fear. The battleground though in regards to an insurgency is the relay of information and exploitation of people`s minds. Inspiring local inhabitants with an idea is a difficult tactic to see and combat. That imminent ambush creeps up slowly and by the time it is understood, it's already too late

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

Security is like oxygen, once you realise it is decreasing, it may already be too late. So the significant role is to understand the importance of prevention and how it can be achieved. We have heard in plentiful the need for good analysis, information and intelligence but we still are unaware of Operational art and Operational design. However, before this comes the need for OPSEC (Operations Security) and what it is. OPSEC is the only discipline that focuses primarily on critical and non-critical information and operation activities. OPSEC is threat driven, we have already seen strategies and tactics which are evidence-based, but evidence is as good as what is in front of you, to see what is not there is where OPSEC comes is most valuable. We need a correct interpretation of today’s security scenario and the relation to information; there is destabilising diffusion of powers with regional, non-regional and non-state actors. Insurgents, Terrorist Organisations, Crime Syndicates coming together and producing hybrids leading to hyper-accelerated incidents, wars are not new, but with the technological innovation the phenomenon has gained new, diabolical dimensions.

Damien Martin The co-writer is an IT and Security professional, Counterterrorism and Combatives expert based in Japan for the last 10 years. He specialises in cyber threats, social engineering and corporate security and a regular keynote presenter for ASIS and OSAC. Currently he is the Director for the IACSP Japan and an Associate Professional with the OPSEC Society and a Certified Master Anti-terrorism Specialist. He is the only PDR (Personal Defence Readiness – Tony Blauer’s SPEAR system) coach in North East Asia.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

internal security

CAUSE AND EFFECT So will the final analysis be through explicit agreement of the populace or by mass submissiveness?

Terrorism, like Guerrilla warfare is a method to induce fear. The battle for ground in regards to an insurgency is the relay of information and exploitation of people`s minds. Inspiring local inhabitants with an idea is a difficult tactic to see and combat. That imminent ambush creeps up slowly and by the time it is understood, it`s already too late. If you can’t kill an idea how do you counter-ambush it? In order to plan effectively, we must understand what we are dealing with. The counter approach must be separated into 3 domains: 1. Counter-insurgency

2. Anti-guerrilla warfare

3. Counter-terrorism

Dividing an offensive / defensive strategy into three is imperative for the growth of a successful plan. Counter-insurgency tactics cannot be utilised to combat guerrilla warfare and vice-versa. Guerrilla warfare could be one characteristic of an insurgency, just as terrorism could be. The guerrilla is really the combative element of an insurgency. In order to understand this paradigm, looking at the flow of information is the first step. What information is being disseminated to the locals and what information is being released or acquired by the insurgents? Conversely, what information can be ascertained from the military? What information forces the guerrilla path? What elements forge terrorist action? To exclusively gather insurgent intelligence is insufficient without first protecting the military which is battling the enemy. This safeguard of critical information is done via OPSEC. The common ground all three of the aforementioned domains share is information. OPSEC as a mindset dates back to Sun Tzu, “If I am able to determine the enemy`s disposition while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide”. Keeping military information secure and activities unknown to the outside world is Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for any military entity. In the event of an insurgancy in particular, if critical information was obtained it could increase the likelihood of Guerrilla warfare or Terrorism. Nowadays, OSINT and observations of military operations isn't an arduous affair. Regardless of the enemy's resources, the issue lies with the traditional security mind-set, not the information medium. Too much emphasis is put on the medium not the processes that govern security. The traditional security model looks from the inside OUT, whereas OPSEC looks at the security problem from the outside IN. This idea of thinking as the enemy does, is the cornerstone to comprehending our own vulnerabilities and threats. The 5 Step OPSEC risk mitigation process (Identify critical information, Analyse the threats, Analyse the vulnerabilities, Assess the risks and Apply counter-measures) applies to operations across the board. The security of operations should not be dictated or restricted by the medium of the information. Information whether it is critical or non-critical is the raw data used to compile useable intelligence. Reducing points of reference, implementing an OPSEC programme and instilling the OPSEC mindset to all military personnel is a necessary step to reducing critical information leakage. To apply counterinsurgency TTP (Tactics, Tool and Procedures) requires a deep understanding of insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla warfare and its relationship to OPSEC. Guerrilla Warfare and insurgency have been around as long as recorded history. Guerrillas usually don’t win wars, but their adversaries often lose them.

The Global Terrorism Index, 2012 reports: The Communist Party of India – Maoists (CPI-M) by itself is responsible for nearly 45 per cent of all attacks in India In traditional warfare the objective is to destroy the adversary and occupy the territory, the guerrilla’s aim and objective is to control the population. By using blind terrorism the insurgents win latent support and by selective terrorism they are able to isolate the counter-forces and terrorise the people into silence. Insurgents always start with a cause and nothing else; a counter-insurgent starts with everything else but the cause. In the case of the insurgency issues in India, the element of surprise has proved to be the sole right of the insurgents. Success can be attained out of all proportion to the effort expanded by using surprise and in many cases this is just what the insurgents have achieved. Mao, Lenin and other leaders of global Communism paid a great deal of attention to organisational design and produced doctrinal statements of how Communist insurgencies should be organised. In his 1902 pamphlet “What Is To Be Done?” Vladimir Lenin laid the organisational foundations of modern Communist insurgency. Mao Zedong formalised the strategy and tactics of a protracted guerrilla war among the rural peasantry as a means of extending international Communism, this model has morphed into aboveground and underground and auxiliary features.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

What is of importance in war is to attack the adversary’s strategy; the paramilitary or military’s contribution is supportive but not as supportive as political efforts can be for long-term success. To identify the order of the battle (OoB) the insurgent strategy must be identified, understanding only sporadic encounters does not say much. In an article Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde said, “Security forces have launched large-scale operations in the Maoist strongholds of Jharkhand’s Latehar district”… but conceded it wasn’t going to be easy to clear out the well-entrenched Maoists. “The operations will continue till the Maoists are cleared from this area ... This is expected to be a tough battle since the Maoists are entrenched in this area for decades and are familiar with the terrain.” (http:// www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Jharkhand/Docs-detect-bomb-planted-by-naxals-inside-body-of-killed-CRPFtrooper/Article1-987683.aspx). The home minister said Maoists were employing new tactics but was confident that they may be only able to use this strategy to insert explosives in the body of slain jawans once.

Insurgents obtain information from watching the daily activities of a military base, tapping analogue lines, intercepting non-encrypted emails or speaking to locals – information is key, not the medium This explanation when analysed shows the obvious, that “clearing-out” just means pushing the issue to another area, unfamiliarity of security forces of the terrain, poor recon, (especially zone recon which is conducted to obtain information on all – the enemy, terrain and routes within a specific zone defined by set boundaries) lack of thoroughness in ORP, OP and ambush tactics. Yes the Maoist will employ new tactics, inflict brutal violence and precision, it is working of a planned strategic mind-set, they know what they want and how to get it. They are not only logistically better organised and better trained, they are also better motivated and better led. Naxalism has superseded the law and order problem. It has morphed into a continuum of ferocity with fervour. Fervour rests within a deep-rooted cause and an iron will to only move forward.

Past reports and excerpts Army intelligence states a close connection between the Maoists and the terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Nepalese and Filipino Maoist outfits have long been suspected of providing rhetorical and material support to the CPI(M). Maoists are acquiring weapons through Bangladesh, Myanmar and possibly Nepal, according to former Home Minister P Chidambaram, who had expressed government’s willingness for a dialogue with them provided they abjured violence. (The Hindu, “Naxals get arms from abroad: Chidambaram.” October 24, 2009.) http://beta.thehindu. com/news/national/article38017.ece “Intelligence sleuths have reasons to believe that some members of the Communist Party of Philippines (CPP), one of the major communist insurgent outfits of the world, had met Indian Maoist leaders in Chhattisgarh. Agencies also claimed that CPI (Maoist) cadres are undergoing training in urban guerrilla warfare in different Indian cities. (2010) http://articles. timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-04-12/india/28131010_1_maoist-leadership-intelligence-agencies-maoist-rebels On November 11, 2009, contacts told Asia Times Online that the LTTE, defeated in May by the Sri Lankan government after decades of struggle, is training the Maoists in the type of guerrilla war tactics for which the LTTE were known, including surprise hit-and-run tactics and jungle warfare. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK11Df03.html Money also comes through West Bengal-Malaysia drug trade route to procure sophisticated weapons such as the AK-47s, landmines and rocket launchers. The Naxalites also indulge in huge extortion from businessmen that extends over the region, also known as the Red Corridor. Poppy and Opium cultivation also figures among the chief sources of funds (Prof S Adhikari in Security Challenges From Naxalism; Centre For Air Power Studies; issue brief August 2012, National Defence and Aerospace Power). We are aware that the third phase of Naxal activity led to the adoption of protracted warfare strategy. It began with the revival of the movement from 1991 onwards. After the economic reforms from 1991 and the corresponding rapid industrialisation and globalisation, the Naxalite movement with an aim of capturing political power by armed struggle highlighted tribal rights and forest issues (Mao Zedong formalised the strategy and tactics of a protracted guerrilla war among the rural peasantry as a means of extending international Communism into underdeveloped areas of Asia). In order to implement the various strategies at the tactical level, the government must have a clear political goal. For winning the hearts of the people and implementing security simultaneously, what is needed is the combination of political and military strategy that could eliminate the insurgency.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

internal security

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Naxalism has superseded the law and order problem. It has morphed into a continuum of ferocity with fervour. Fervour rests within a deep-rooted cause and an iron will to only move forward New “Order of Battle” or “Line and Block chart is overdue, the organisations at all levels require methodology based on Operational art, that is creative thinking, leading to a unifying thought process encouraging the security forces capability goals and operating process. It is also, unity of effort and integrates end ways and means while accounting risks across all levels. Operational art leads to operational design that is conceptualisation and construction of an intellectual frame for subsequent execution. Operational art and design strengthen strategies and tactics. Operational design takes the creative process of operational art and makes us understand conceptually the complexed operational environment with tactical dilemma in space and time. In theory, an infinite number of possible goals and courses of action (COAs) exist in any situation, perceptive insight is the combination of analysis and intuition, seeing in parts and whole and combining them in such a way that it leads to new behaviour and response to the true nature of a situation. A commander must be able to see the potential of a manoeuvre but also to envision the future course of action (COA), the 3 elements of Clausewitz’s discussion of coup d’oeil (pronounced koo dwee) lays emphasis on using the perceptive insight with strategic intuition; that is strategy at all levels, deciphering the COA’s and the end state it leads to. Many incidents of insurgent attacks and the response of the forces have shown that we lack an Operational design and do not understand Operational art. Elements in nature too can influence a tactical operation but only if exploited. Strategy should also state that porous borders, rapid technological change, greater information flow and the destructive power of weapons now within the reach of small states, groups and individuals, make threats more viable and endanger our values, way of life and the personal security of the citizens. Specifically, a national focal point will be critical to articulate a vision for ensuring Homeland Security.

strategic partnership

EVOLVING AFFINITY

INDO-VIETNAM STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

fter the unification of Vietnam in 1975, India backed Vietnam’s Cambodia initiative and extended support against China’s offensive of 1979. India economically assisted Vietnam and signed the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) agreement on 18 December 1982. The current two way trade between India and China is US$ 76 billion. India Vietnam two way trade is US$ 5 billion. However, it is pertinent to note that China is the biggest trade partner of Vietnam with a two way trade of US$ 30 billion. India must strategically engage with Vietnam to balance the Chinese threat. India and Vietnam are strategic partners since 2007. There is a need for intensifying this relationship by greater cooperation between India and Vietnam.

What is crucial in times of war is to attack the adversary’s strategy; the paramilitary or military’s contribution is supportive in the following ways: • Psychological operations (PSYOP) • Military deception (MILDEC) • Operations security (OPSEC) • Counterintelligence (CI) operations • Counterpropaganda operations • Public affairs (PA) operations

The best way of countering insurgency is learning how to mirror strategy and tactics, turning the negative into the positive via affirmative action. The critical link between strategy and tactics is operational art. Strategy, operations and tactics routinely affect the dimensions of military conflict, each in a different manner. For instance, the Strategist aims at the enemy centre of gravity, which often is the nation’s will to fight, The operational artist’s centre of gravity is the mass of the enemy’s military force and its ability to command and control its forces. At the tactical level, the battlefield commander has a more limited and proximate perspective and focuses on his immediate foe. Strategy may dictate whether or not to fight, but operational art will determine tactics. For a tactician, intelligence is concerned with capabilities; but at the operational level, intelligence is focused on enemy intentions. A tactical commander will use deception to hide his forces; an operational commander will use deception to mask his intentions.

References 1. COUP D’OEIL: STRATEGIC INTUITION IN ARMY PLANNING; William Duggan, November 2005. 2. The Economics of Insurgencies: A Framework for Analysing Contemporary Insurgency Movements With a Focus on Exposing Economic Vulnerabilities; Robert W Schaefer. 3. HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF UNDERGROUNDS IN INSURGENCIES: SECOND EDITION, January 2013. United States Army Special Operations Command and The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, National Security Analysis Department.

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The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was comissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attache to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects. He is the consulting editor for Brahmand 2012 and is compiling a monograph for CLAWS, Firepower-2030.

But not as supportive as political efforts can be for long-term success.

This cognitive approach requires “creative imagination” which rests upon a foundation of both art and science. Science includes the physics of modern warfare. Art, on the other hand, while often informed by science, relies upon intuition, or coup d’oeil.

Maj Gen PK Chakravorty VSM (retd)

he Seventh East Asia summit held at Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia had participants from 18 countries. Ten of these countries belonged to ASEAN and the remaining eight comprised of US, Russia, China, India, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea. These 18 countries constitute 55 per cent of the world’s population and 55 per cent of the World’s GDP. The

region which is termed also as the Asia Pacific region is witnessing the phenomenal rise of China which is currently the World’s second largest economy and also efforts by the US to pivot its forces towards this critical region. Most of US imports come from this region and with regard to exports the area is the second largest destination for the US. The region has US deployments in Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines and recently

India has two major problems with China. The first is the border issue and the second pertains to supply of nuclear weapons to Pakistan. Vietnam would contest Chinese claim to the islands in the South China Sea. This has resulted in common objectives for India and Vietnam who would claim their rights and would militarily contest forcible occupations by the Chinese. Accordingly both countries have commenced military cooperation from 1990

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strategic partnership

EVOLVING AFFINITY

the Marines have moved to Darwin in North Australia. Apart from this the US preaches freedom of navigation in this area against Chinese maritime claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The East China Sea disputes are with Japan and the South China Sea disputes are with Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. While China has an unsettled land border with India, what surprised India was China’s objection to drilling for oil by ONGC Videsh in two oil blocks donated by Vietnam. India rightly stated her right to undertake commercial activities in international waters. This bold step by the Indian and Vietnamese governments led to China’s silence on this issue. Further it strengthened the bonds of friendship between these two countries.

In the cold war era India continued to have cordial relations with Vietnam. There was a convergence of strategic interests which resulted in mutual cooperation between the two countries. In June 1966, India openly called for an immediate cessation of bombings and the resolution of the conflict within the framework of Geneva accords. After the unification of Vietnam in 1975, India backed Vietnam’s Cambodia initiative and extended support against China’s offensive of 1979. India economically assisted Vietnam and signed the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) agreement on 18 December 1982.

Indo-Vietnam friendship

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 impacted both the countries. The period that followed witnessed Vietnam becoming a part of ASEAN and India launched her Look East Policy which ushered in a new era of cooperation between India and South East Asian countries. During this period Economic relations further strengthened between India and Vietnam. The key areas included capacity building, technical assistance and information sharing to ensure the security of the vital sea lanes of communication including piracy and rescue at sea.

The seeds of friendship between India and Vietnam date back to 2 BC when Indian traders sailed across to the regions of Indochina. These exchanges witnessed the proliferation of Indian culture particularly to the regions of Central and South Vietnam. Indian influence exists today in Vietnamese folklore, art and philosophy. The Champa temples in Central and South Vietnam demonstrate the closeness between the two cultures. Dr Tridib Chakraborti an expert on International Relations traces the proximity in thought between the two nations due to their commonality in National Liberation Movements of the two countries. Further during the Second World War, the leaders of both the countries came close to each other and laid the solid foundations of mutual relations of friendship, cooperation and understanding due to their common perceptions of anti-colonialism and non-alignment. India supported Vietnam in her nationalist struggle against the international powers. Large rallies were held to support Vietnam in her freedom movement. The famous slogan, “Amar Nam, Tomar Nam, Vietnam, Vietnam,” (My name, Your name and all our names are Vietnam). Thus there was a common understanding between the two countries for over two millennia.

India and Vietnam are strategic partners since 2007. There is a need for intensifying this relationship by greater cooperation between India and Vietnam

China's role In the post cold war period China played an active role in South East Asia. On 03 October 1990 China established diplomatic relations with Singapore. Vietnam was under the Han Chinese ruler from 111 BC to 938 AD. The Chinese provided essential support to Vietnam in the war against France as also against the United States. However, prior to the unification of Vietnam, the Chinese PLA captured the Paracel Islands in 1974. Further Vietnam invaded the Chinese supported Khmer Rouge government in January 1978 overthrowing the dictatorial rulers and this hurt the Chinese. On 17 February 1979 China launched an offensive on the Northern borders of Vietnam to

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teach the Vietnamese a lesson. The conflict lasted up to 06 March 1979 with no major gains being made by the Chinese. It is pertinent to note that India’s External Affairs Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee was visiting China when the attack was launched and had to terminate his visit prematurely. Hereafter China started bilateral cooperation with all ASEAN countries and provided aid to Vietnam while improving trade relations. China agreed to resolve border issues with Vietnam by peaceful means. This resulted in resolution of the land border and the maritime border in the Gulf of Tonkin. However the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands remained unresolved. In 1988, there were major clashes between the Chinese and Vietnamese Navies resulting in heavy casualties. Both sides thereafter established troops in parts of these islands as protective forces. In 1995 China occupied Mischief Reef claimed by the Philippines. In May 2011 the Chinese cut the cable of a Vietnamese oil exploration ship resulting in further tension between these two countries. India has been allotted two oil blocks by Vietnam in the South China Sea. China has cautioned India on the subject but India has taken a bold step in stating that commercial activity will continue in international waters.

Vietnam is looking for cooperation in areas of outer space with India. They have already launched two satellites and are planning their own navigation satellites. Cooperation with India would be mutually beneficial to both countries Economic linkages of India with Vietnam and China are improving at a brisk pace. The current two way trade between India and China is US$ 76 billion. Further India Vietnam two way trade is US$ 5 billion. However, it is pertinent to note that China is the biggest trade partner of Vietnam with a two way trade of US$ 30 billion. Interestingly China plays an important economic role in India and Vietnam. Yet

economic linkages necessarily do not move in the same direction as strategic partnerships.

Strategic partnership Shakespeare had aptly written in Julius Ceaser that “Coming events cast their shadows before.” China aspires to be a future World power. India has two major problems with China. The first is the border issue and the second pertains to supply of nuclear weapons to Pakistan. Vietnam would contest Chinese claim to the islands in the South China Sea. This has resulted in common objectives for India and Vietnam who would claim their rights and would militarily contest forcible occupations by the Chinese. Accordingly both countries have commenced military cooperation from 1990. The first area of cooperation was training. Vietnamese military officers were trained in the English language and attended military courses in Indian training establishments. Further maintenance of equipment was undertaken and both signed a strategic agreement in 2007. Not only were Vietnamese Air Force pilots trained on Sukhoi 30 MKI, but our officers commenced training in their schools in jungle warfare as also the visit by naval ships got underway with limited exercises with the Vietnamese. Further we provided them assistance in the field of atomic energy by training their nuclear scientists to reestablish the nuclear plant at Dalat.

President Barack Obama in 2011 laid tremendous emphasis to the Pacific Ocean and undertook rebalancing of US naval assets to ensure that the major portion was balanced towards the Pacific. To achieve this rebalancing pivots are being possibly established in Singapore, Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Philippines and Australia The Vietnamese President Troung Tang Sang visited India in October 2011 and was frank in strengthening defence relations with India. Vietnam would like to cooperate in the field of training as also gaining knowledge in the field of rocketry and missiles. It would be

in our interest to cultivate Vietnam and cooperate in strategic aspects to dissuade China from undertaking a misadventure. Vietnam is looking for cooperation in areas of outer space with India. They have already launched two satellites and are planning their own navigation satellites. Cooperation with India would be mutually beneficial to both countries.

The US connection At the outset Vietnam left no stone unturned to make India a part of the East Asia summit. Similarly India and Japan strongly favoured US joining the East Asia summit. Russia was supported by India and China to join the summit. US and Russia both participated in the Fifth East Asian Summit held in Hanoi in October 2010. President Barack Obama in 2011 laid tremendous emphasis to the Pacific Ocean and undertook rebalancing of US naval assets to ensure that the major portion was balanced towards the Pacific. To achieve this rebalancing pivots are being possibly established in Singapore, Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Philippines and Australia. The rebalancing puts a strong US deployment close to China and its claims on East China Sea and the South China Sea. The deployment also guards the Straits of Malacca, thereby enabling US to deal with any hostile situation effectively. China has been focusing on Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Sittwe in Myanmar and Marao in the Maldives. These are as stated by China for commercial use. However, warships could use these facilities if the need arises. Comparing the relative strength of the Chinese Navy with the US, it can be stated with humility that currently China is in a catch up process and would possibly require a minimum of 10 years to match the threats posed by strategic competitors in the region. China has a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles which is a matter of concern. The pertinent issue is both India and Vietnam are meeting

the Chinese challenge by strategic cooperation with the United States. It would be of interest to note the combat capability of PLA Air Force fighter jet pilots. Chinese pilots last witnessed combat during the Korean War in which they flew the Russian MiG-15 against US F-84 and F-86 more than 60 years ago. After that their pilots have not been tested in combat and as special skills are demanded in aerial operations, it would require efforts to match the US pilots who participated in Libya and are continuing missions currently in Afghanistan. The Chinese have openly declared that the policy of rebalancing is related to containing China and this would hurt Chinese interests of peace. China is very clear of her national interests. She is aware that the Comprehensive National Power of US is greater than any nation in the world and it would be inappropriate to adopt a hostile attitude in the East and South China Sea with the current deployment of forces. She would need to build-up her navy and air force to posture militarily. Further she is aware of the India Vietnam strategic partnership which compels her to adopt a rational approach to the islands in the South China Sea. India must strategically engage with Vietnam to balance the Chinese threat.

Conclusion Post Second World War the Pacific region witnessed the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The area has been witnessing skirmishes and China has been claiming maritime territories in the East and South China Sea. The ASEAN countries particularly Vietnam have resisted physical occupations by the PLA. India and Vietnam are strategic partners since 2007. There is a need for intensifying this relationship by greater cooperation between India and Vietnam. Further rebalancing of forces by the US has compelled China to moderate her claims.

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strategic partnership

SHIFTING SALIENCE

Political Dynamics in the Asia Pacific Region:

n the world of complex interdependence, soft balancing and rebalancing are the order of the day. In the current dynamics of Asian politics, there is a need for a new triangular construct consisting of India, Japan and Vietnam. India-Japan-Vietnam cooperative triangle can contribute to peace and stability and can in no conceivable way contribute to conflict. Early in the post-Second World War period, Australia and New Zealand had set up a triangular alliance along with the new global super power – the United States.

Chintamani Mahapatra The writer is currently Chairman, Centre for Canada, US and Latin American Studies and Professor at the School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Delaware, USA, Commonwealth Scholar at the University of London, Foreign Policy Fellow at University of Maryland, USA, Salzburg Seminar Fellow in Austria and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.

It has been recognised for quite some time now that the centre of gravity of world political economy has been shifting to Eastern Hemisphere, particularly the Asia Pacific region

he world politics is in a flux. The systemic change at the global level is expected in view of the economic woes of America and Europe that began in 2008 and that shows little hope of normalisation in the foreseeable future. Withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, proposed end of US military operations in Afghanistan by end of 2014, political and economic divide in the American society in the wake of domestic economic trouble, the severe financial meltdown in Europe all indicate that the decline of the power and influence of the West in global affairs has begun. It has been recognised for quite some time now that the centre of gravity of world political economy has been shifting to Eastern Hemisphere, particularly the Asia Pacific region. The unprecedented growth of the Chinese economy, vibrancy of

ASEAN’s economic performance, emergence of India as a major player justifies such prognostication that future of world politics will be partly shaped by Asian powers. However, the complex interplay of forces in a globalised world has not allowed growth of Asia and relative decline of the Western Powers to occur at the same time. The complex interdependence of economies has led to a negative impact of the American and European economic crisis on Asian economies as well. China has begun to develop its domestic market to reduce its trade-dependent growth strategy. Indian economy has suffered due to weakening of demands in Europe and America and so is the case with ASEAN economies. The political volatility of oil-rich West Asia and the turbulence in

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the Pacific with ascending political conflicts over territorial issues, such as the one between China and Japan over Senkaku Islands, Vietnam and China over islands in South China Sea, China and the Philippines over Mischief Reef, Japan and South Korea maritime disputes and last but not least the recent conflict in Sabah between Malaysian and some Filipinos have the potential to delay or even prevent the expected rise of Asia.

Vietnam’s relationship with the US is increasingly becoming closer with a remarkable American decision to sign a 123 nuclear cooperation agreement with Vietnam Since early 2012, Sino-Japanese tensions over the Senkaku Islands have intensified, particularly after

Japanese government bought three out of five disputed islands from Japanese nationals. China has been regularly deploying maritime surveillance and fisheries enforcement ships, Chinese military surveillance planes have entered Japanese air space and in early 2013 there were almost “daily encounters” with both countries scrambling fighter jets and one widely reported case of Chinese naval ship locking its fire control radar on a Japanese destroyer. While none expected a full scale war, such tensions did adversely affect economic relations and generated intense Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments. In 2011, confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels in South China Sea generated heated exchanges and nationalist sentiments in both the countries. Vietnamese have accused China of harassing their oil exploration activities by cutting of undersea cables. Besides six countries, including China, claim sovereignty over South China Sea

islands. China happens to be the only country that has staked its claim of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea raising the prospect of continuous tension in the region. Besides, the recent incursion of armed Filipinos into Malaysia’s Sabah region and military action by Malaysia for the first time in many years has given the clear signal that ASEAN can no longer remain an island of peace in volatile Asia Pacific. Kuala Lumpur pulled out of the Asian Confederation Youth Boxing Championship to be held near Manila to express its anger. The emergence of North Korea as a defiant and de facto nuclear weapon power has added another intricate dimension to the volatility of the political conditions in the Asia Pacific.

Japan has one of the most powerful military machines in the region. Vietnam’s military strength and resilience actually requires no introduction. Japan and Vietnam have a record of defeating powerful European countries. India, on the other hand, has emerged as powerful nuclear weapon state with considerable conventional capability as well. A consciously made endeavour to promote military-to-military ties among these three countries would go a long way in adding to the strength and capabilities of all three

While the Obama Administration has announced a pivot to Asia strategy highlighting its desire to strengthen its naval presence and economic engagement in the

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strategic partnership

SHIFTING SALIENCE

Asia Pacific, it does not seem to have enthused America’s traditional allies in the region. On the contrary, this strategy has increased the unease in Beijing raising new questions about Washington’s motivations. Political tensions in the Pacific are rising at a time when India has been trying to engage heavily in the region. One among many steps that India can take to promote its interests and protect its growing stakes in the region is to work towards establishing a triangular framework of engagement with Japan and Vietnam.

Triangular explanations Triangular political constructs are not an unknown concept in the international relations. Early in the post-Second World War period, Australia and New Zealand had set up a triangular alliance along with the new global super power – the United States. During the cold war, international relations experts spoke of triangular containment politics involving the United States, former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Initially, the Soviet Union and China combined their efforts to weaken the American containment strategy; and subsequently the United States and China made common cause against the expanding Soviet influence in Asia. Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation, rising Soviet influence in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; Vietnamese intervention to remove pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime from power in Cambodia and Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had brought the Americans and the Chinese together. In the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration and collapse of the cold war power structure, the US, China and Japan became the three important poles to maintain stability in great power relations in the Asia Pacific. Russia, China and India, on the other hand, began a process of triangular interactions that began at the second track level of diplomacy and moved on to higher levels of policy making. Then there was the talk of China-Japan-India constituting the

three most important powers of the Asian continent and the need for triangular peaceful interactions for peace and stability. In the current dynamics of Asian politics, there is a need for a new triangular construct consisting of India, Japan and Vietnam. India’s relations with Japan as well as Vietnam have a history of low key and periodic engagements. India’s preoccupation with South Asian issues, cold war complications and lack of a strategic vision acted as hurdles on the way to realising the full potential of opportunities in Japan and Vietnam. Same can be said about Japan’s relationship with Vietnam.

Japan’s technology and management skills have not been adequately tapped by Vietnam and India, while Japan is yet to optimally enter the Indian and Vietnamese market. A triangular initiative to promote cooperation in the areas of trade, investment and technology are the call of the day However in recent times, both New Delhi and Tokyo have shown interest in establishing more cooperative ties with Vietnam. It is expected that the new Premier in Japan Shinzo Abe, known for his revisionist thoughts on defence and security issues, will take a closer look at improving ties with Vietnam. About six years ago he had supported the idea of a cooperative relationship among Asian democracies. He was the one who backed the US-Japan-India-Australia naval cooperation and joint exercises. Since then Japan has seen six different Prime Ministers and the Abe’s idea did not take off the ground. Now that he is back on the saddle, new experiments on triangular cooperative ventures can be explored. It is true that Vietnam does not figure as a democratic country. But Tokyo’s recent initiatives towards Vietnam suggest that system of governance will not be allowed to come in the way of innovative ideas about regional cooperation. After all, Japan has built-up the largest trade and investment partnership with

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Communist China, the democratic America occupying the second position. Suggestions of Japan-India-Vietnam Triangle may appear strange on the surface. But it comes out as a feasible proposition when one begins to think out of the box. The fast changing political, economic and strategic scene in the Asia Pacific actually makes it exceedingly desirable that India take the initiative to forge such a relationship. Political geography as well as economic advantages justify the creation of such a triangle. First of all, these three countries are political and economic heavyweights in their respective regions – Japan in East and Southeast Asia, Vietnam in Indochina and India in South Asia. Harnessing their regional strength coupled with their individual economic and strategic muscle would be a win-win situation for all. Japan has one of the most powerful military machines in the region. Vietnam’s military strength and resilience actually requires no introduction. Japan and Vietnam have a record of defeating powerful European countries. India, on the other hand, has emerged as powerful nuclear weapon state with considerable conventional capability as well. A consciously made endeavour to promote military-to-military ties among these three countries would go a long way in adding to the strength and capabilities of all three. Secondly, Japan’s technology and management skills have not been adequately tapped by Vietnam and India, while Japan is yet to optimally enter the Indian and Vietnamese market. A triangular initiative to promote cooperation in the areas of trade, investment and technology are the call of the day. Thirdly, India and Vietnam both have shown their desire to tap nuclear energy as part of their efforts to meet current and future energy needs. Japan has been a storehouse of knowledge, expertise and equipment on civilian nuclear science. Fourthly, these three countries generally share a compatible

worldview that was not the case during the cold war. Japan was an American ally and Vietnam drew tremendous support from the Soviet Union during the cold war when India preferred to remain non-aligned. Today, Japan continues to be a close US ally with a treaty of alliance with indefinite duration. India has established a strategic partnership with the United States. Vietnam’s relationship with the US is increasingly becoming closer with a remarkable American decision to sign a 123 nuclear cooperation agreement with Vietnam.

Political tensions in the Pacific are rising at a time when India has been trying to engage heavily in the region. One among many steps that India can take to promote its interests and protect its growing stakes in the region is to work towards establishing a triangular framework of engagement with Japan and Vietnam Fifthly, Japan, Vietnam and India have brief but troubled history of relations with the fastest growing super power of Asia – China. All three of them feel to varying degree that Chinese leadership has been trying to bully and bulldoze on sensitive territorial and other security issues. For example, China’s recent naval activism near Senkaku group of islands has incensed Japan.

Vietnam’s disconcert over China’s claim of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea has been increasing by the day. And India has its own set of grievances and worries over Chinese undue territorial claims, visa issues, WMD collaboration with Pakistan and growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region. All three are discomforted by the rapid rise of China’s assertiveness and the uncertain future of Chinese behaviour in the future. As far as the regional cooperative dynamic is concerned, Vietnam has become a respectable member of the ASEAN. While Japan has been a major foreign investor in ASEAN and a major trade partner of ASEAN, India has adopted a look east policy aimed at forging closer economic and political ties with ASEAN. Neither Japan nor India is feared by the ASEAN members, unlike the varying perceptions of ASEAN members about the uncertain role of China in the region.

Concluding observations Floating of such a triangular relationship is fraught with risks. Questions can be raised about the political compatibility of such a grouping. But India has deep experience in building cooperative ties with Communist countries both during and after the cold war. Japan

has consistently pursued a cooperative framework of relationship with China first and more recently with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Secondly, it can be argued that China may take strong objections to it. Beijing indeed sent diplomatic demarches to various capitals against the US-Japan-Australia-India joint naval exercises. But the answer to that is China should not be given a veto over other countries’ foreign relations. China has persistently maintained ties with Iran, North Korea, Syria, Pakistan, Libya and many other countries that were not the liking of the international community. Beijing does whatever it perceives to be in its national interest and does not become extra-sensitive to what others might think. Thirdly and more importantly, India, Vietnam and Japan all have positively engaged China in trade and other economic activities. China is the largest trading partner of all three countries. While Japan has long provided economic assistance to China, the latter has assisted Vietnam. In the world of complex interdependence, soft balancing and rebalancing are the order of the day. India-Japan-Vietnam cooperative triangle can contribute to peace and stability and can in no conceivable way contribute to conflict.

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strategic partnership

UNFOLDING SYNERGY

India-Japan Security Collaboration

sia’s strategic environs have recently witnessed change in leadership in leading nations, including China, Japan and South Korea. The American strategic “rebalancing” or “pivot” is also likely to cause a shift in the existing security calculus. The present decade shall be full of challenges. China’s rise, both economically and militarily, is not as “peaceful” as China claims. The power differential between China and other Asian players will be a significant factor in the coming future. As a matter of fact, China’s politico-strategic assertiveness has caused considerable fracas within Asia’s ongoing power shifts especially in countries with which Beijing has long-standing boundary and territorial disputes. In this backdrop, Indian and Japanese security collaboration should be explored seriously. This would prove instrumental in bringing about Asian power stability. While authoring his 2006 book, Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country), Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe had staunchly campaigned in favour of accentuating ties with India. Growing congruity between India and Japan are visible by virtue of a series of annual dialogues including a strategic dialogue between the foreign ministers, a defence dialogue between the defence ministers, military-to-military talks at Director General / Joint Secretary level and service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises.

he return of Shinzo Abe as Japan’s Prime Minister with the Liberal Democratic Party registering a massive victory by winning 294 seats in the 480-seat lower house of the Japanese Diet signals ushering of an upbeat phase in Indo-Japanese relations. Abe has publicly advocated the concept of a broader Asia that constitutes nations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, most significantly, Japan, India, Australia and the US. While authoring his 2006 book, Utsukushii kuni e (Towards a Beautiful Country), Abe staunchly campaigned in favour of accentuating ties with India. Abe’s return to the office of the Prime Minister expectedly should strengthen the bilateral security equation between Tokyo and New Delhi.

Regional integration During his previous tenure as the Japanese Prime Minister, Abe envisioned stronger bilateral ties with India, especially in the security realm

which later got manifested in the historic Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan in October 2008. The declaration announced information exchange and policy coordinationon regional affairs in the Asia Pacific region, including bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia particularly in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. From the perspective of achieving greater regional integration, India and Japan have reaffirmed their support for the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. The EAS can play a vital role in building an open, inclusive and transparent architecture of regional cooperation in the Asia Pacific region and both nations welcome participation of the US and the Russian Federation in the EAS. Tokyo and New Delhi have also committed to establish

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ASEAN plus Working Groups and decided to cooperate in the Groups, in addition to expressing support for ASEAN Connectivity which would develop further linkages between ASEAN and its partners.

Japanese collaboration in jointly undertaking R&D and other corrective technologies to counter the mounting cyber threat could prove to be a landmark area of cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo in the security realm and the launch of a Cyber Security Dialogue between the two nations is a right step in the said direction The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan provided special focus to the defence dialogue, cooperation between the Coast Guards and safety of transport and disaster management. Growing congruity between India and Japan are visible by virtue of a series of annual dialogues including a strategic dialogue between the foreign ministers, a defence dialogue between

Dr Monika Chansoria The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi and formerly a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Hokkaido University, Japan.

the defence ministers, military-to-military talks at Director General / Joint Secretary level and service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises.

Building naval capacity Recently, the first India-Japan Maritime Affairs Dialogue was held in New Delhi in January 2013 in which issues such as maritime security including non-traditional threats, cooperation in shipping, marine sciences and technology, marine biodiversity and cooperation at various multilateral forums were discussed intensely. Tokyo and New Delhi share a similar vision in the maritime domain recognising the universally-agreed principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The past few years have witnessed a steady increase in mutual cooperation in the realm of maritime security including safety and freedom of navigation and anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, by promoting bilateral and multilateral exercises and through information sharing. According to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, “ … renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” This article primarily allows for military forces to be kept for the purposes of self-defence and in this reference, the need for cooperating with allies / security partners becomes even more pronounced. An important pillar of the Indo-Japanese collaborative security mechanism is building naval capacity through port calls, naval and coast guard exchanges and joint naval and coast guard exercises. A joint exercise named “Sahyog-Kaijin-XI” between the Indian Coast Guard and the Japanese Coast Guard in January 2012 is a case in point wherein a mock drill on the deep seas by

the Indian and Japanese Coast Guard units demonstrated the inherent capabilities of the two forces to jointly counter a range of maritime threats in the Asia Pacific region. It is only natural for both nations to push for greater naval ties given their vital interests in protecting maritime trade and energy supplies along the Hormuz-Malacca-Sea of Japan route. During his previous tenure as Japanese PM, Abe had in fact, underscored the commonality of interests in securing these sea-lanes. The two Coast Guards are expected to continue to promote cooperation to ensure maritime safety and security through joint exercise based on the Memorandum on Cooperation between the Indian Coast Guard and the Japanese Coast Guard.

The recent past has witnessed virulent cyber attacks being launched against many nations including India, Japan and the United States with a purported aim of extracting sensitive information, specifically relating to foreign and defence planning and policies. What causes greater alarm is the fact that a sizeable number of these offensives have been mounted and spearheaded from server computers based within the People’s Republic of China Emphasis should be laid on conducting more bilateral and more significantly, multilateral naval exercises on the lines of the five-nation 2007 Malabar naval exercises. The exercise allowed for direct contact between the Indian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces in an operational capacity including vessels from the United States, India, Japan, Australia and Singapore. Moreover, according to the 2009 Action Plan to advance security cooperation based on the Joint Declaration, annual bilateral naval exercises, alternately off India and Japan have been agreed upon. In addition, multilateral naval exercises shall be held “when possible”

Abe envisioned stronger bilateral ties with India, especially in the security realm which later got manifested in the historic Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan in October 2008. The declaration announced information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia Pacific region, including bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia particularly in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum

Emphasis should be laid on conducting more bilateral and more significantly, multilateral naval exercises on the lines of the five-nation 2007 Malabar naval exercises. The exercise allowed for direct contact between the Indian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces in an operational capacity including vessels from the United States, India, Japan, Australia and Singapore

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strategic partnership

along with passing exercise (PASSEX) during ship visits.

Trajectory of conflict Besides, both India and Japan need to mutually work towards understanding that the canvas on which any / all future conflicts of the 21st century will be painted will not simply be restricted to traditional military spheres. Proficiency in employing asymmetric methods is likely to define the trajectory of conflicts in the future and foremost among them is the usage of cyber war techniques. In today’s age where information reigns supreme, the increasing usage and reliance on cyberspace has rendered issues pertaining to national security ever more vulnerable. The recent past has witnessed virulent cyber attacks being launched against many nations including India, Japan and the United States with a purported aim of extracting sensitive information, specifically relating to foreign and defence planning and policies. What causes greater alarm is the fact that a sizeable number of these offensives have been mounted and spearheaded from server computers based within the People’s Republic of China – as reported time and again. And the primary idea behind this pattern of cyber warfare is to strike in unexpected ways against specified targets. Following a cyber offensive being launched on the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament (Diet) in October 2011, allegedly spearheaded from China, Tokyo reportedly has undertaken substantive measures to counter the cyber attacks it has been subjected to in the recent past. The latest attack resulted in the loss of ID codes, passwords and sensitive documentation of 480 lawmakers of the Lower House. As a response – as reported by leading Japanese daily, Yomiuri Shimbun, the Japanese Defence Ministry’s Technical Research and Development Institute has delegated a three -year project, worth approximately 179 million yen (US$ 2.27 million), in January 2012 to technology maker Fujitsu Ltd to design a kind of software weapon programme that could trace the source of a cyber attack and consequently neutralise it.

strategic partnership

UNFOLDING SYNERGY This brings into focus the larger debate which structures around the consequential strategic changes taking place in Asia in tandem with the growing power of China. As China tries to put into effect its growing economic and military stature, Asia is likely to witness the ripple effects of the same. What adds to the quandary is the dubiety of Chinese intentions, as it refuses to clarify “the current status, or future vision, for the modernisation of its military capabilities”, as stated by the Japanese Defence Ministry. For New Delhi too, the main objective should be to secure its cyberspace, lessen vulnerability to attacks and minimise damage and recovery time from any attack. However, India does suffer from critical technical inadequacies as it prepares to confront the cyber menace. These include the absence of a single-operating unit which controls IT. There are too many nodal information security organisations / centres that tend to squander time, whereas the requirement is that of integration and operational units being made more centralised. More significantly, India lacks comprehensive laws pertaining specifically to privacy and data protection. India’s premier government agency responsible for the development of technology for use by the military, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), has lately commenced a project on cyber security that aims to put in place an infallible Computer Operating System. DRDO has stressed upon the need for R&D specific to cyber security based on robust platforms which can be trusted and, more importantly, could monitor the flow of cyber-traffic and decipher means to encrypt and disrupt them. However, instead of the present Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (Cert-In) which is the primary referral agency of India’s cyber response options, New Delhi should instead take immediate steps and put in effect a full-fledged cyber command that is designed to prevent hacking of computer networks and siphoning of strategic data stored in information systems. Further, international cooperation

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and information sharing is an important means by virtue of which nations confronting the ills of cyber attacks could mutually develop collaborative mechanisms so as to deal with them. In the given context, potential Indo-Japanese collaboration in jointly undertaking R&D and other corrective technologies to counter the mounting cyber threat could prove to be a landmark area of cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo in the security realm and the launch of a Cyber Security Dialogue between the two nations is a right step in the said direction. It would only be prudent for India and Japan to stress upon the importance of a coherent approach so as to notch up their capacity of putting forth a formidable layer of security, insulating them from a cyber offensive. This, in turn, would enable comprehension and improve capabilities to secure their respective cyberspaces and counter the overarching reality of offensive cyber war capabilities. Joint exploration of initiatives to counter cyber offensives can become a mainstay of the Cyber Security Dialogue between Tokyo and New Delhi.

Conclusion Asia’s strategic environs have recently witnessed change in leadership in leading nations, including China, Japan and South Korea. The American strategic “rebalancing” or “pivot” is also likely to cause a shift in the existing security calculus. The present decade shall be full of challenges in so far as decoding establishment of strategic primacy in Asia is concerned. China’s rise, both economically and militarily, is not as “peaceful” as China claims. The power differential between China and other Asian players will be a significant factor in the coming future. As a matter of fact, China’s politico-strategic assertiveness has caused considerable fracas within Asia’s ongoing power shifts especially in countries with which Beijing has long-standing boundary and territorial disputes. In this backdrop, Indian and Japanese security collaboration should be explored from a prism of political realism which would prove instrumental in bringing about Asian power stability.

STEADFAST ENTENTE

India-Vietnam: A Lasting Partnership M

uch before the initiation of the Look East Policy in 1992, India established a robust partnership with Vietnam. In 2012, India and Vietnam completed forty years of full diplomatic relations and five years of strategic partnership. In 2007, India and Vietnam had signed the new Strategic Partnership. India assists Vietnam in training its submariners and training of air force pilots, Vietnam has allowed Indian officers to avail jungle warfare training in its institutions since 2000. Interestingly, what makes the relationship remarkable is the fact that India is the only country in the world, having access to use Vietnam’s strategically located Nha Trang Port, which is in close proximity with Cam Ranh Bay. There is still a lot that has to be done to ensure that India and Vietnam stand together not only in terms of military and strategic cooperation, but also culturally and economically. For a broader and deeper engagement with Vietnam, India must ensure that initiatives taken are supplemented with regular ministerial meetings and substantiated by follow-ups.

Dr Rahul Mishra The writer, PhD from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi is a researcher at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. Most recently, he was a Visiting Fellow at S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), where he worked on India-Southeast Asia defence relations. He specialises on issues related to Asia-Pacific security, Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific region.

The Defence Cooperation Agreement 1994, Defence Protocol 2000 and July 2007 joint declaration on defence add value to it. In fact, the two agreements viz Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation 2003 and the 2007 Strategic Partnership Agreement define India-Vietnam defence relations

Despite bilateral trade increasing manifold in recent years, India is still lagging behind China in terms of trade ties with Vietnam. Many areas of cooperation are yet to be explored

There is still a lot that has to be done to ensure that India and Vietnam stand together not only in terms of military and strategic cooperation, but also culturally and economically

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ietnam is in the league of very few countries, with which India’s relations have been mostly unaffected by the systemic and sub-systemic factors of international relations. In fact, over the years India-Vietnam ties have only improved. Much before the initiation of the Look East Policy in 1992, India established a robust partnership with Vietnam. Understanding the commonalities of history and culture and realising the need to find friends in the post-colonial world, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru visited Vietnam in 1954 and President Ho Chi Minh paid a return visit in 1958. These two landmark visits by the two visionary leaders laid the foundation of India-Vietnam relations. India welcomed the unification of Vietnam in 1976 and subsequently it’s joining of ASEAN in 1995. Vietnam, on its part, has always been supportive of India’s membership in the ASEAN driven institutions.

India-Vietnam relations have been multifaceted. India supported Vietnam in its war against the US and Vietnam did the same during India’s war of 1971 and Kargil in 1999. India’s non-alignment policy has always helped it share ideas on global issues with Vietnam on a common platform. Today, India assists Vietnam in training its submariners, guerrilla war fighting and training of air force pilots. Joint naval exercises, coordinated sea-patrolling and simulation exercises are a regular practice. As part of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2007, India agreed to transfer 5,000 naval spare parts (belonging to Petya class submarines) to Vietnam for its naval upgradation. Moreover, in 2012, India and Vietnam completed forty years of full diplomatic relations and five years of strategic partnership. It may be mentioned that in 2007, India and Vietnam signed the new Strategic Partnership that envisages bilateral economic and political engagements, security and defence cooperation, scientific and technological capacity building and enhanced cultural contacts. On the cultural part, it has been reported that India will help Vietnam in restoring a part of My Son sanctuary, a world heritage site in Vietnam that has hundreds of Hindu temples dating back to 4th century AD.

The driving force, however, has to be an Indian initiative to enhance mutual cooperation. India should also try to bring Vietnam in BIMSTEC for a more comprehensive engagement To commemorate the fortieth anniversary, the year was celebrated as India-Vietnam Friendship year 2012. Minister of State, Ministry of External Affairs, E Ahamed inaugurated the celebration during his visit to Hanoi in January 2012. Vice President Hamid Ansari paid a visit to Vietnam from January 14-17, 2013 for the closing ceremony. The visit reiterated the importance India attaches to its ties with Vietnam. From the Vietnamese side, the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Van Ninh and Depty Finance Minister Tran Van visited India in the past one year. Defence and strategic cooperation has been the fulcrum of India’s multifaceted relationship with Vietnam, which

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has deepened and broadened over the years. Both New Delhi and Hanoi have been supporting each other in times of crisis and are on the same page on matters that matter most to them. For instance, India had supported Vietnam in its war against the US and Vietnam had done the same during India’s war of 1971 and Kargil in 1999. A number of mechanisms have been put in place to keep the bilateral defence relationship moving forward, including the strategic partnership, which completed five years in 2012. The Defence Cooperation Agreement-1994, Defence Protocol-2000 and July 2007 joint declaration on defence add value to it. In fact, the two agreements viz Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation 2003 and the 2007 Strategic Partnership Agreement define India-Vietnam defence relations.

It is beyond doubt that key to further strengthen the relationship lies in economic cooperation, which has been little so far. India and Vietnam are different sized economies. While India is destined to become the third largest economy by 2050, Vietnam is around US$ 71 billion economy. Both countries have achieved more than six per cent average annual growth in the recent past. Both have a huge young population (which apparently is lacking in Japan, China and EU countries) and both stand in the list of five most lucrative markets worldwide along with China While India assists Vietnam in training its submariners and training of air force pilots, Vietnam has allowed Indian officers to avail jungle warfare training in its institutions since 2000. Interestingly, what makes the relationship remarkable is the fact that India is the only country in the world, having access to use Vietnam’s strategically located Nha Trang Port, which is in close proximity with Cam Ranh Bay. The list of latest developments on the security front prominent issues include: the seventh annual security dialogue in New Delhi in September 2012 and the visit of INS Sudarshini’s visit to Da Nang Port in December 2012 as part of ASEAN sailing expedition. India’s current Chief of Naval Staff Admiral DK Joshi also visited Vietnam in November 2012 to further strengthen defence ties. Moving a step further on the maritime aspect of relationship, the Indian Cabinet on March 8, 2013 cleared a pact that aims to provide sustained mutual assistance on merchant shipping and bolster maritime trade between India and Vietnam. India is likely to ink the maritime shipping agreement with Vietnam soon. Both India and Vietnam are apprehensive of an increasingly assertive China. China’s objections to OVL India’s exploration activities off the Vietnam coast, buzzing India’s INS Airavat and cutting cables of a Vietnamese exploration vessel have further intensified such apprehensions. It may be noted that India was the first country to explore opportunities in the natural gas fields in Vietnam. While New Delhi and Hanoi are doing their bit to maintain cordial relations with Beijing, the ‘hedging strategy’ explains their behaviour towards China.

Balancing China to avert any potential conflict is and should be part of the larger agenda of this relationship. Both India and Vietnam have unsettled territorial disputes with (and have lost territories against) China. A military strategic understanding (and possibly collective security mechanism) would certainly boost their stature against their common rival Despite bilateral trade increasing manifold in recent years, India is still lagging behind China in terms of trade ties with Vietnam. Many areas of cooperation are yet to be explored. Agriculture technology and products, credit, higher education, IT sector, research, fishery, finance and trade are possible areas of cooperation. Ensuring energy security and food security also lend themselves to mutual cooperation. Vietnam is a major offshore oil producer in South China Sea and has an incentive to deeply engage India so as to strengthen its claims in that area and balance China. Moreover, such cooperation would help India’s energy security. A long history of territorial dispute with a common country, a legacy of mutual support for each other’s greatest wars, a common arms supplier and resultant similar problems, all of that could not strengthen economic ties and even a single direct flight connecting their respective capitals. This has been the irony of India-Vietnam relations. Nevertheless, the two sides are actively trying to improve the situation. According to the reports, during January-December 2012, trade turnover reached US$ 3.94 billion – an increase of 1.1 per cent over last year. Indian exports saw a 7.9 per cent decrease to US$ 2.1 billion – and imports from Vietnam increased by 14.6 per cent to US$ 1.7 billion. Realising the problem of connectivity between India and Vietnam, India’s Jet Airways signed a pact with Vietnam Airlines in 2011 to commence direct flights between the two countries.

human resource development. For India, there are many potential sectors of support from Vietnam, such as marine produce, processing of agricultural products, coffee, pepper, rice etc. Additionally, it is believed that the Pact on trade in goods with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) might help in boosting trade between the two. Apart from ASEAN, India and Vietnam are members of the sub-regional grouping Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Established on November 10, 2000 at Vientiane, MGC comprises 6 members – Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and India. Primary areas of cooperation include tourism, culture, transportation linkages and education. MGC holds promise in terms of sub-regional cooperation as Phase Two of India’s Look East Policy has an exclusive focus on CLMV countries: Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. Despite the fact that the Greater Mekong Initiative and China’s rising trade with members of MGC overshadows the group, there is a lot of potential. The driving force, however, has to be an Indian initiative to enhance mutual cooperation. India should also try to bring Vietnam in BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) for a more comprehensive engagement. Presence of Vietnam along with Thailand (already a BIMSTEC member) would strengthen India’s presence in East Asia. Endeavours to enhance people to people contact are also needed and tourism could help in this regard. This is important in the light of the fact that both the countries share cultural roots, which are more than a thousand year old. More than half of Vietnamese population is Buddhist (Mahayana 50 per cent and Theravada Buddhists 13 per cent). Indian Buddhist places could become a major religious and tourist attraction for them. Being multi-ethnic societies, both India and Vietnam can learn from each other’s experience in tackling problems of ethnic unrest. One must keep in mind that contrary to popular perception, this relationship is not solely influenced by India and Vietnam’s relationship with China. The ‘Big powers’ – Russia, US and China, have influenced this relationship, but only to a certain extent. Geostrategic compulsions and geopolitical limitations have forced them to look for reliable partners beyond their immediate neighbourhood and consequently engage each other. There is still a lot that has to be done to ensure that India and Vietnam stand together not only in terms of military and strategic cooperation, but also culturally and economically. For a broader and deeper engagement with Vietnam, India must ensure that initiatives taken are supplemented with regular ministerial meetings and substantiated by follow-ups.

Of late, India has also offered its expertise in development of infrastructure, engineering, transport and power generation projects, as also in

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Developing Geostrategic Linkages in the Indo-Pacific:

An Imperative to the ‘Asian Century’

his article addresses the need for sub-regional geostrategic linkages – similar to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM). In this context, the possibility of a strategic partnership between India, Japan and Vietnam is explored to substantiate the rationale behind building tenacious regional ties, not so much at the institutional level, as at a realistic functional level that efficiently and effectively fulfils mutual goals in the Indo-Pacific. Given that India, Japan and Vietnam already enjoy key bilateral relations, over the last decade, India and Vietnam, as well as Vietnam and Japan have already entered into bilateral strategic partnerships. The three countries when viewed on a map of the world, together represent a connecting, a geographical arc, which is largely recognised as the geopolitically significant subset of the Indo-Pacific. The maritime linkage of South Asia derived from India, Southeast Asia traced from Vietnam and East Asia stemming from Japan, forms the basis of the potential for the three nations to engage in trilateral geostrategic relations. India, Japan and Vietnam share similar democratic political economies that emerged from parallel colonial histories. A key dimension of the polities is the richness of their cultures, values, norms and traditions. In the light of the importance they give to cultural linkages, this aspect further deepens the possibility of geostrategically guided ties.

here is no doubt whatsoever that the ‘Asian Century’ has, indeed, arrived. In its simplest form, the implications of this reality largely define the phenomenal economic growth in the region and the consequent interdependencies that a globalised international market entails; within which, the region has established itself as the focal point. Perhaps the most far-reaching validation of this transition could

be argued vis-à-vis the United States of America’s (US) ‘pivot’ or ‘re-balancing’ strategy to Asia posited in early 2012. The intent of the Obama administration in pursuing this policy was, primarily, viewed as a means to balance the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasingly assertive and growing influence in the region. In this regard, it becomes exigent to begin by defining the term ‘Asia’ for any analyses on the subject to be veracious. ‘Asia’, here, loosely refers

to what the US State Department, for the purposes of policy, perceives as ‘East Asia’. In realist terms, this signifies the countries spanning across maritime Indo-Pacific1: Many argue that, in terms of sheer power and influence, the US never really left the Indo-Pacific. However, the mere fact that the strategy witnessed a huge thrust within US foreign policy, in itself, highlights the growing political significance the region holds in the international system today.

1. The paper, having first determined the geographical space of the region that witnesses the ‘pivot’ to Asia strategy, continues to then term it as the ‘Indo-Pacific’ for the sake of remaining specific and uniform, both realistically and theoretically. Although the Indo-Pacific has yet to find an official space in the lexicon of International Relations Theory, it has been widely used in the domain of real-time international politics over the last five years, both as a means of analysis and discourse. Whilst maritime Indo-Pacific biogeographically encompasses the western, eastern and central portions of the Indo-Pacific, in the geopolitically enshrined ‘pivot’ context of this essay, the term refers to a maritime subset comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific; littoral to which, are the states of Asia, including West Asia, the Middle East and eastern Africa.

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Nayantara Shaunik The writer is Research Officer, Southeast Asia Research Programme, The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

India, Japan and Vietnam share similar democratic political economies that emerged from parallel colonial histories. A key dimension of the polities is the richness of their cultures, values, norms and traditions, which the countries hold essential in defining their identities to and in, the world. In the light of the importance they give to cultural linkages, this aspect further deepens the possibility of geostrategically guided ties

Looking within: The need for a regional approach Having established the centrality of the Indo-Pacific in contemporary political discourse: in terms of the reality of balance of power politics playing out vis-à-vis China’s not-so-peaceful rise; the presence of territorial disputes such as the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS); and the clear emphasis being made to counter these developments via the ‘pivot’ strategy, this article seeks to analyse the imperatives that signify the paramount necessity of ‘regionalisation’ at a functional level.

The most far-reaching validation of this transition could be argued vis-à-vis the United States of America’s (US) ‘pivot’ or ‘re-balancing’ strategy to Asia posited in early 2012. The intent of the Obama administration in pursuing this policy was, primarily, viewed as a means to balance the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasingly assertive and growing influence in the region

At a structural level, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and other such institutions, have helped create regional frameworks for greater integration and a stronger, more concerted voice in international political forums. However, in the wake of the developments elucidating China’s rise, the consequent US ‘pivot’, and the interdependencies that arise as a result of complexly entwined economic compulsions; this article addresses the need for sub-regional geostrategic linkages – similar to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM) – amongst native countries in the Indo-Pacific having complementary geopolitical and geoeconomic motives in safeguarding their positions and interests in the region. In this context, the possibility of a strategic partnership between India, Japan and Vietnam is explored to substantiate the rationale behind building tenacious regional ties, not so much at the institutional level,

It is quite evident that when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, India, Japan and Vietnam share core security concerns and economic ambitions

All through the history of their bilateral ties, India-Vietnam, Vietnam-Japan and Japan-India have largely established durable relationships with each other. Both at regional and global forums, they have almost consistently remained in consensus over topical issues and concerns

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TENACIOUS TIES

as at a realistic functional level that efficiently and effectively fulfils mutual goals in the Indo-Pacific.

India-Japan-Vietnam: Multifarious countries, mutual concerns All through the history of their bilateral ties, India-Vietnam, Vietnam-Japan and Japan-India have largely established durable relationships with each other. Both at regional and global forums, they have almost consistently remained in consensus over topical issues and concerns.

Issues of energy and maritime security have become key factors in defining international relations Given that India, Japan and Vietnam already enjoy key bilateral relations, as well as engage in dialogue at regional and global platforms alike, a substantive justification for their entering a ‘trilateral strategic partnership’ becomes imperative. Of course the very fact that they share strong bilateral ties – based on interests that are common to all three nations – is a moot point in itself for extending this to a triad scenario. Further, it may be added here that over the last decade, India and Vietnam, as well as Vietnam and Japan have already entered into bilateral strategic partnerships. In this sense, it deems necessary to elucidate the contemporary bases and need for furthering these ties via a trilateral strategic partnership. Firstly and rather interestingly, the three countries when viewed on a map of the world, together represent a connecting, a geographical arc, which is largely recognised as the geopolitically significant subset of the Indo-Pacific. The maritime linkage of South Asia derived from India, Southeast Asia traced from Vietnam and East Asia stemming from Japan, forms the basis of the potential for the three nations to engage in trilateral geostrategic relations. Secondly, India, Japan and Vietnam share similar democratic

political economies that emerged from parallel colonial histories. A key dimension of the polities is the richness of their cultures, values, norms and traditions, which the countries hold essential in defining their identities to and in, the world. In the light of the importance they give to cultural linkages, this aspect further deepens the possibility of geostrategically guided ties. Thirdly, the ‘geopolitics of security’ has become a critical dimension of contemporary global politics. Stepping away from the traditional domain to that of the non-traditional, issues of energy and maritime security have become key factors in defining international relations. In terms of the energy paradigm, given the geographical space of the three nations and their topographical abundance, as well as need for natural resources, the issue has become exigent in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, competition from global players to gain primary access to energy resources has added significant pressure to the steadily widening gap between their demand and supply. It has also led to resource-rich countries having to precariously balance their relations amongst vying stakeholders. In this regard, the three nations remain at both ends of the contentious market for energy security. Plaguing issues of piracy and territorial disputes pertaining to islands in crucial sections of the Indo-Pacific, also highlight the need for countries to work together to solve mutual problems. Whilst regional organisations have sought international law, action and dialogue to facilitate interventions on issues pertaining to the maritime domain, which has helped address the issue of piracy to a large extent; conflicting interests have cropped up time and again, resulting in the lack of a resolution on territorial disputes and the continuance of the present status quo. On the subject of energy security, again, the lack of a concerted stance at an institutional level on the issue has lead to countries aggressively contending for strategic ties with resource-rich nations. Though

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energy policy is fast becoming an eminent dimension of states’ domestic and foreign policies; at a structural level, apart from sustaining dialogue on the issue, nothing significant has been attained on the subject. Contextualising the success of the BIMSTEC in making headway, in this regard, speaks volumes for the possibility of a similar scenario in the case of India, Japan and Vietnam.

An undeniably geopolitically motivated balance of power dynamic has thus emerged in the region. As a result, the ASEAN countries have openly viewed India as a means to maintain the equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific Finally and perhaps most crucially, over the last year, China has been increasingly assertive in terms of its territorial claims in the SCS and ECS vis-à-vis other countries with counter-claims on the maritime region of the SCS, and the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands in the ECS. China’s simultaneous military modernisation and its consistent efforts to increase its power projection capabilities in its external periphery through infrastructural, financial and technical investments has been observed as a looming threat, both by countries in the region and by the US. It was the US’ consequent pivot strategy that led to China’s resolve of keeping the country out of the western Pacific, which was when it adopted a harder stance regarding its territorial disputes. Whilst the Chinese maintained this posture to largely bolster the US threat and make a clear statement of its self-perception to the countries of the Indo-Pacific, the entire mêlée has resulted in the apprehension of there being a threat to the freedom of navigation of seas for all stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific. It has also wrought fears of potential – and unwanted – conflict over the presently unresolved territorial disputes. An undeniably geopolitically motivated balance of power dynamic has thus emerged in the region. As a result, the ASEAN countries have openly viewed India as a means to maintain the

equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific, given their apprehension of offending China’s sentiments by consorting too deeply with the US. Vietnam, which has possibly been the worst affected by the SCS stalemate, has looked at the US’ presence, the ASEAN and India’s capacity to be a regional player as a diplomatic means to counter China; given its apprehensions of stoking conflict in the wake of its relative weakness vis-à-vis the PRC and its unwillingness to jeopardise its economic development. Looking beyond the ASEAN countries, it has sought to strategically collaborate with middle-powers such as Japan, Australia and India to further its growth ambitions, as well as to ensure it does not ensnare China by relying too deeply on its relationship with the US. Japan, with its own set of territorial disputes in the ECS, its inherent alignment with the US; and its growing fears regarding the security of its sea routes, which largely connect the island nation to the Indo-Pacific and are the means to its economic survival, also views the pivot as a means to maintain hegemonic equilibrium. India, on the other hand, has several security and foreign policy concerns with respect to the entire dynamic. Whilst it has thus far posited a peaceful resolution of the SCS and ECS disputes without engaging in much beyond rhetoric, the huge energy potential in the region and its booming domestic demand for the same has the country looking to build on its future options. Further, the expectation from India to take a stand on the issue at some point in the future, given the perception of it being a regional player, cannot be ruled out. The freedom of navigation of the seas is paramount to India, which upholds the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), in the light of the sheer volume of trade it engages in via its maritime channels. India is also looking to manifest its Look East Policy into a credible driver of meaningful bilateral and institutional ties in the region. Whilst it has acknowledged the US ‘rebalancing’ strategy, in so far as its own interests are concerned, India has largely focused on

developing its soft power and economic relations as a means to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific.

‘Trio’ good to be true: Light at the end of the tunnel? From the above analysis, it is quite evident that when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, India, Japan and Vietnam share core security concerns and economic ambitions. It is also apparent that, on their own and at a structural level, these issues have largely remained unsettled. Therein, the scope for a functional trilateral relationship, built on the two pillars of geoeconomic and geopolitical ambitions, holds a plethora of geostrategic opportunities for India, Japan and Vietnam to cooperate on, to circumvent confrontations and mutually grow. A joint strategic partnership could also help reduce the wide hegemonic power gap between China and the triad. The possibility of benefitting from economic and financial investments and trade, developing strong ‘defence diplomacy’ vis-à-vis increased naval capabilities and joint exercises and multiple collaborations on technological advancements in terms of building infrastructural capacity in the military and civil sectors could spell a new level of growth for the countries. Given the triad’s stance on the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and their belief in the freedom of navigation of the seas, their collective voice may well influence the dynamic within the larger regional frameworks such as the ASEAN and the EAS to take a unified stand on the issue. Ultimately, a functional approach to regionalisation could help bridge the gap between rhetoric and realpolitik.

References

Yao Yang, “America’s Pivot to Asia will Provoke China”, 12 February 2013, FT.com (http://blogs.ft.com/thea-list/2013/02/12/americaspivot-to-asia-will-provokechina/#axzz2O9yB8NZX) Nayantara Shaunik, “Inside Southeast Asia, Second Annual Conference”, 24 December 2012, The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi (http://www.ipcs.org/ conference-report/southeast-asia/ inside-southeast-asia-secondannual-conference-46.html) Vikram Sood, “China Rises, India Falters”, 21 March 2013, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi (http://www.orfonline.org/ cms/sites/orfonline/modules/ analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmai d=49681&mmacmaid=49682) Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory: From Internal Development to External Engagement”, Strategic Insights, June 2012 Australian Strategic Policy Institute (http://www.openbriefing.org/ docs/vietnamtrajectory.pdf) Robert S Ross, “The Problem With the Pivot”, November / December 2012, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/138211/robert-sross/the-problem-with-the-pivot) “2013: Year of Vietnam’s solidarity with India, Japan”, 15 February 2013, Vietnam.net (http://english.vietnamnet.vn/ fms/government/66478/2013-year-of-vietnam-s-solidarity-withindia--japan.html)

Richard C Bush III, “The Response of China’s Neighbors to the US “Pivot” to Asia”, 31 January 2012, The Brookings Institution (http://www.brookings.edu/ research/speeches/2012/01/31us-pivot-bush)

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strategic partnership

ESCALATING STAKES

Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific: Seamless Imperatives B oth US and China, in fact the larger Asia Pacific community has begun to treat the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific Region as not only contiguous but integrated maritime domains. A fresh military pact has been signed between the US and South Korea on 22 March 2013. Significantly, in departure from US engagement in event of ‘full-scale conflict’, the pact assures joint military response even in face of low-level military provocation by North Korea. The defence budget of Japan and South Korea at approximately US$ 60 billion and US$ 39 billion respectively is also substantial when compared to China’s US$ 114.3 billion. Together these countries have 41 submarines, 76 major naval vessels and about 750 combat capable aircraft. Add to this Taiwan’s defence budget of approximately US$ 10 billion, four submarines, 26 major naval vessels and about 470 combat capable aircraft – the military challenge for China in the Asia Pacific, even after discounting the other five Southeast Asian countries and the US support, is daunting. 55 per cent of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the South China Sea. Our stakes in keeping these vital SLOCs open are enormous.

rinkmanship and hyper-nationalism, compelling characteristics of North Korea, have recently acquired unprecedented stridency under the new, tentative and young Kim Jong-un rule. On 12th February 2013 it tested a nuclear bomb and then threatened to nuke US. As per various estimates, this bomb was highest in terms of yield, ie 6 – 40 kT. The estimates of previous tests were: 0.7 – 15 kT in 2006 and 1 – 20 kT in 2009. Ratcheting its aggression, it has abrogated the armistice with South Korea. The country over the years has fine-tuned a pattern of diplomacy that is based on drawing international attention by provocative manoeuvres, then opt for the negotiating table, invariably be persuaded in agreement of sorts, only to renege upon it finally. This cycle has so far served not only the North Korean dynastic regime but also its strategic patron, China which has vested interest in perpetuating the hermit status of the country. In the process it is the people of North Korea who have paid the price by way of unmitigated impoverishment and international isolation. This time however the US too has responded by ratcheting its military posturing to new belligerent levels. A fresh military pact has been signed between the US and South Korea on 22 March 2013. Significantly, in departure from US engagement in event of ‘full-scale conflict’, the pact assures joint military response even in face of low-level military provocation by North Korea. These scenarios include maritime border incursions; shelling border islands; and violation of airspace by low fighter jets. In the ongoing military exercises, nuclear submarines are deployed in Korean waters and nuclear bombing exercises (Exercise Foal Eagle) have been carried out by the USAF B-52 bombers operating from Anderson Air Force Base, Guam. The US Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, who was

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

recently on a visit to South Korea during the exercise said: “The additional missile defense deployments are aimed at bolstering missile defenses as part of our determination to keep ahead of the progression of the North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile development”. Reflecting the heightened strategic concern and imperative with which the Obama administration views the Asia Pacific Region, Mr Carter also said the build-up in Asia “will occur despite the budgetary pressures in the United States. The Asia Pacific rebalance is a priority … our commitment to the United States-ROK Alliance will remain firm.”

33 per cent of the world’s trade and 50 per cent of world’s traffic in oil and gas passes through this water body. The volume of oil and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transported through the South China Sea is three times more as compared to Suez Canal and 15 times in case of Panama Canal. Proven oil reserves in South China Sea estimated at about seven billion barrels, and 266 million cubic feet of gas reserves, has made the region more contentious for regional players and added to the volatility It is pertinent to factor the reality that the US reconfigured its military commands recently and now its Pacific Command includes India and the Indian Ocean as well. In deference to its evolving threat perception, the US is planning to deploy 60 per cent of its fleet in the Asia Pacific Region. It is also in consonance with Obama’s characterisation of Asia Pacific as ‘top priority’. Presently there is 50-50 per cent split between Pacific and Atlantic. During his visit to Australia in November 2011, President Obama had announced his decision to station 2,500 troops in that country.

RSN Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects.

Immediate US concern The immediate and pressing American concern is with regard to China’s posturing on South China Sea which is critical not only for the US but also the global economy. 33 per cent of the world’s trade and 50 per cent of world’s traffic in oil and gas passes through this water body. The volume of oil and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transported through the South China Sea is three times more as compared to Suez Canal and 15 times in case of Panama Canal. Proven oil reserves in South China Sea estimated at about seven billion barrels and 266 million cubic feet of gas reserves, has made the region more contentious for regional players and added to the volatility. Currently oil production in the region is around 2.5 million barrels per day. While the South China Sea can be termed as vital for global economy; for China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea it determines their very economic viability. It is the enormity and stakes associated with South China Sea that has impelled China to claim the entire water body. As a corollary Taiwan also makes similar claims.

China’s posturing The international community, should not be confounded by China’s posturing in South China Sea. Dispassionate analysts do acknowledge the grave strategic and geopolitical imperative of China in creating a strong diplomatic and military leverage

against the US and its allies in the region. The presence of 47,000 US troops in Japan and 28,000 troops in South Korea and planned presence in Australia, as also the undeclared but close strategic partnership with Taiwan, Philippines and Singapore; and emerging strategic partnership with Vietnam is a security nightmare for China. The nerve-centre of China’s economic activity, ie the Eastern Coast, in Chinese perception, is therefore acutely vulnerable. Accentuating this vulnerability is the apprehension with regard to the security of its maritime trade routes and energy supplies. China’s trade is likely to double in a decade and its energy requirements may increase by 150 per cent. Ever since China became a net importer of oil in 1993, its anxiety over the security of oil imports to sustain its economy is only increasing. China therefore considers the Asia Pacific Region as an extension of Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait therein through which it receives 80 per cent of its oil imports. It is primarily for this reason that China is leveraging South China Sea in its perceived strategic inferiority to the US. The other and only leverage in the Asia Pacific region is its rogue ally or proxy, North Korea. China’s vice like grip over that country has essentially fed on the paranoia of the ruling dynasty.

In deference to its evolving threat perception, the US is planning to deploy 60 per cent of its fleet in the Asia Pacific Region. It is also in consonance with Obama’s characterisation of Asia Pacific as ‘top priority’. Presently there is 50-50 per cent split between Pacific and Atlantic

In the overall geopolitical context, it is the US strategic partnership with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, which evokes the anxiety of China. There are constituencies in both Japan and South Korea, which do not place much faith in the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Both these countries are believed to be ‘one turn of screw’ from military-nuclear capability

Both US and China, in fact the larger Asia Pacific community has begun to treat the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific Region as not only contiguous but integrated maritime domains

It is the acute sense of insecurity because of the geopolitical dynamics of Asia Pacific Region that has impelled China to adopt a hawkish posture with regard to South China Sea and the littoral states in the

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ESCALATING STAKES

strategic embrace of the US. The Chinese obduracy with regard to claims to South China Sea and its associated islands must be seen in this backdrop. It is for this reason that China insists on dealing with each country having rival claims individually rather on the basis of any grouping. The disputes and the countries that have to contend China are: Natuna Islands: Indonesia, China and Taiwan. Scarborough Shoal: Philippines, China and Taiwan. Spratly Islands: Vietnam, China and Taiwan. Some or all of the islands themselves are also disputed between Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. Paracel Islands: Vietnam, China and Taiwan. Maritime skirmishes between the protagonists and aggressive manoeuvres by China are a routine feature in the South China Sea. At least two major clashes have taken place between the Vietnamese Navy and the PLA Navy in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands ie in 1974 and 1988 respectively.

This is mere international posturing. But for China, North Korea cannot survive as a separate entity even for a day In what appears to be a calibrated move, China has been hardening its position incrementally. Significantly, last year, it incorporated the Paracel Islands and other South China Sea claims within newly declared Sansha city-level administrative unit, thus giving a new connotation to the region, in terms of territoriality. Nevertheless, so far China has been conscious that its posturing in the South China Sea is calibrated in a manner that its aggressive territorial and economic forays are seen bereft of military bias.

North Korea: China’s rogue China’s vote in the UN in favour of stringent sanctions against Pyongyang on 07 March this year and the stance of its Ambassador to UN, Li Baodong who stressed on ‘full implementation’ on the new resolution is being drummed by certain quarters. This however has been watered down by his insistence on resumption of the stalled six-party aid-for-disarmament talks between the players in the region, ie North Korea and South Korea, US, China, Russia and Japan. This is mere international posturing. But for China, North Korea cannot survive as a separate entity even for a day.

by the deniability factor it accords. It has also enabled China to indulge in nuclear and missile proliferation to influence geopolitics. The North Korean brinkmanship in effect is a stern strategic message by the new Xi Jinping regime in China to both Japan and South Korea, which also have new regimes. It may be mentioned that a new government under Shinzō Abe, known for his aggressive posture towards North Korea and China, took office in December 2012. Similarly, a new conservative and hardline dispensation under Park Geun-hye, the first woman President has taken office in South Korea.

Taiwan: Key to Asia Pacific security It is not unprecedented for China to carry out military manoeuvres or activate its proxy North Korea to influence voters in target countries in the immediate neighbourhood in run-up to elections, as also post-elections to intimidate new regimes, to influence the geopolitics in the region. The recent military standoff between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands, should be seen in this backdrop. Some of the conflicts are a legacy of the cold war era. Incorporation of Taiwan or Formosa, wherein Chiang Kai-shek and his followers were forced to retreat by Mao’s forces, remained the unfinished agenda. For China this unfinished agenda may have fructified, but for the Soviet Union. It may be recalled that Mao had undertaken train journey to Moscow to solicit Stalin’s support for capture of Taiwan in 1949. Stalin had other ideas and he instead compelled Mao to assist North Korea in its bid to capture the entire peninsula. There are reports to suggest that though the US accorded recognition to Chiang Kai-shek’s government as ‘sole and legitimate’, it had nevertheless decided not to interfere in case of PRC attack. The Korean War however completely changed the US stance and Taiwan emerged as the bulwark against communist expansion. Another unthinkable diplomatic upheaval that altered the geopolitics of the Asia Pacific Region was the change in diplomatic recognition of the Chinese government from ROC (Taiwan) to PRC (China) in January 1979. The diplomatic relations between the two countries since then are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. In accordance with this Act, US supports ‘One China Policy’ but stresses on ‘peaceful reunification’ and underscores US commitment to maintain Taiwan’s defensive capabilities against any possible use of force.

The collapse of North Korea, China apprehends, will trigger the exodus of millions of refugees to its territory. The unification of nuclear North Korea with South Korea which has US military presence, is a strategic nightmare for China.

The vicissitudes in the US-Taiwan relations since 1949 are characterised by three watershed, strategically anxious or crisis moments in the Taiwan Strait, ie First Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954-55, Second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 and Third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. The first crisis, wherein China’ forcible seizure of Yijiangshan Island and Tachen Islands had led the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend use of nuclear weapons. It was this threat that made the Chinese to back down. It is therefore based on precedence that the region is reckoned as a nuclear flash point.

The rogue status of North Korea allows China to neutralise the ‘West dominated international order’

The second crisis which began with intense artillery bombardment on Quemoy Islands by PRC also drew

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

US naval vessels in support of Taiwan. The third crisis is different because it took place in 1995-96 in the post-US recognition phase of PRC, wherein the provocation was the use of missiles, initiated by China. They were fired in waters surrounding Taiwan to influence the outcome of elections. It was a direct threat to the Taiwan’s electorate to dissuade them from voting Lee Teng Hu to power as he had questioned the ‘One-China-Policy’. The US in the biggest display of its naval might in the region since Vietnam deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups, ie US Nimitz in December 1995 and USS Independence in March 1996. Today, China is only communist in name. It has displayed flexibility and political cunning in pursuing ‘one country, two systems’ initiated by Deng Xiaoping with regard to Hong Kong and Macau. Yet China with its totalitarian or near totalitarian political system in China has no takers in Taiwan. China on the other hand fears that any dilution in the ‘one party rule’ may lead to the implosion of the state. The resolution of this dilemma by China probably holds the key to the security of the Asia Pacific Region. Taiwan therefore forms the core issue for the legitimacy and prestige of China. For China, the US support to Taiwan is unacceptable obstacle for reunification. It has not disavowed the use of force to achieve this objective. The American support and indirect presence by way of periodic US-Taiwan military exercises is seen by China as inimical.

Chinese polity and strategic balance In the internal context of China, its present ‘one party political system’ may have served well for its impressive economic and military growth, but in the regional context the same political system sustained by ultra-nationalism and alleged ‘expansionism’ has created more enemies than allies. In the overall geopolitical context, it is the US strategic partnership with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, which evokes the anxiety of China. There are constituencies in both Japan and South Korea, which do not place much faith in the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. Both these countries are believed to be ‘one turn of screw’ from military-nuclear capability. The US presence is therefore the stabilising factor in the region that is considered as a nuclear flashpoint. The deployment of two aircraft carriers during the third Taiwan crisis in 1995-96, was a sort of wake-up call for China. It was the decisive moment for the Chinese authorities to embark on an ambitious maritime development, acquisition and power projection project. China since then has developed a formidable nuclear submarine base on southern tip of Hainan Island. Of the four ballistic missile carrying submarines (SSBN), at least two of them carrying JL-2 missiles have a range upto 8,400 km. PLAN has deployed its largest and most modern ship Yuzheng 311 to patrol its EEZ. Only last year the PLA Navy inducted its first aircraft carrier Liaoning, which is a reconstruction of 32,000 tonne Soviet carrier Varyag. It plans to construct a 50,000-60,000 tonne carrier by 2015 and a nuclear carrier by 2020.

The defence budget of Japan and South Korea at approximately US$ 60 billion and US$ 39 billion respectively is also substantial when compared to China’s US$ 114.3 billion. Together these countries have 41 submarines, 76 major naval vessels and about 750 combat capable aircraft, which is neither insignificant and most of it is qualitatively much superior to China. Add to this Taiwan’s defence budget of approximately US$ 10 billion, four submarines, 26 major naval vessels and about 470 combat capable aircraft – the military challenge for China in the Asia Pacific, even after discounting the other five Southeast Asian Countries and the US support is daunting. It is this anxiety that has forced China to create leverages like North Korea and the issue of South China Sea. At one level, the Chinese are not very disconcerted with the US military presence (nearly 47,000 personnel) in Japan by virtue of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, as it subjugates the ‘militaristic tendencies’ of that country of which China has bitter memories in the 1930s and 40s. Significantly, the new Chinese president Xi Jinping immediately on assuming office in March this year chose Russia as his first foreign destination. It is not only burgeoning China’s energy needs that motivated this gesture, but also the imperative of neutralising US influence particularly in the Asia Pacific Region. Putin did not fail to underscore the ‘special nature of strategic partnership’ between the two cold war partners turned rivals. In the ultimate analysis only a change in the political system of China can alter the strategic behaviour of brinkmanship, amongst the protagonists in the Asia Pacific Region. It is only this change, which has the potential of triggering peaceful, productive and enduring geopolitical alliances.

Conclusion Both US and China, in fact the larger Asia Pacific community has begun to treat the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific Region as not only contiguous but integrated maritime domains. Accordingly, these countries are calibrating and hedging their maritime imperatives. The pitfalls of overwhelming dependence on South China Sea has compelled China to construct oil and gas pipeline from Sittwe Port in Myanmar in Bay of Bengal to the Yunan Province and secure presence in Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. 55 per cent of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the South China Sea. The Chinese belligerence towards India’s maritime presence in the region played itself out when it objected to ONGC Videsh (OVL) venture for offshore oil exploration (Block-127 and 128) in Vietnamese waters (not recognised by China). This is even as China continues in building strategic projects in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In dealing with China, strategically India therefore, cannot afford to continue to be Tibet centric and needs to lay greater emphasis on the maritime imperatives in the now integrated Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific.

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REALIGNMENT

A New Strategy for India: A Classic Geopolitics Revision T

he classic geopolitician Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters”. The Arabian Sea and the Straits of Hormuz are linked through the Indian Ocean to the archipelago of Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca, creating a sea corridor that both China and India want to control, because of their large energy needs and commercial interests arising from their rapidly developing economies. It will be necessary to create alliances that will “hold” the Chinese expansion. Two countries that have traditional ties of friendship with India and could support such a long-term strategy are Japan and Vietnam. India and Japan are culturally linked with the tradition of Buddhism and they developed a military alliance in the War of Indian Independence against the British.

n the near future, Asia will be the centre stage for the international relations field. Within this framework, India, a dynamic economy with a rich cultural past and a growing military power, must respond to the contemporary challenges to take the place it deserves in the global system. Which alliances it should develop and with whom? What has the classic geopolitical thought to teach us about the future strategy of India?

India is also engaged in energy projects with Vietnam since the 80’s and the ONGC Videsh Limited continues its oil and gas explorations in the blocks 127 and 128 of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone, causing the fierce objections of China. The latter is in dispute with Vietnam for the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, while the US and Japan see the aggressive Chinese stance as a danger for the freedom of sea trade

Evolving scenario Traditionally, India’s long-term foreign policy is well-known for its strict neutrality in matters of international conflict. This pacifist diplomacy should neither result in compliance nor should it prevent the development of strategic alliances that strengthen the country’s

position in the international system. In our days, the interest of India is focusing both in the Indian Ocean (a critical geopolitical point for world trade, energy transfer, international terrorism and piracy) and the South / East Asia. The classic geopolitician Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate Asia, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters”. The Arabian Sea and the Straits of Hormuz are linked through the Indian Ocean to the archipelago of Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca, creating a sea corridor that both China and India want to control, because of their large energy needs and commercial interests arising from their rapidly developing economies. China seems to wish to create a “string of pearls” in the Indian Ocean. The “string of pearls” consists of a series of friendly ports and possibly naval facilities throughout the Indian Ocean (Gwadar in Pakistan, Sittwe and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka). The American geopolitical analyst Robert D Kaplan mentions that: “China realises the use of these ports will always be dependent upon good political and economic relations with the host country”. That explains why China is Pakistan’s most reliable political ally and why it helped the Sri Lankan regime to win a civil war against Tamil rebels while it is also competing with India over aid to Bangladesh.

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

Given this policy, as both China and India have huge populations, rich cultural tradition and territorial disputes (Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin), the latter is necessary to create alliances that will “hold” the Chinese expansion. Two countries that have traditional ties of friendship with India and could support such a long-term strategy are Japan and Vietnam. India and Japan are culturally linked with the tradition of Buddhism and they developed a military alliance in the War of Indian Independence against the British. The diplomatic relations of the two countries were “frozen” both during the cold war and after the nuclear tests of India in 1998, but they have become close again. In December 2006, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan culminated in the signing of the joint statement towards “Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership”. Moreover, in 2007 (which was declared “India-Japan Friendship Year”) the Japanese Self-Defence Forces took part in a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, known as Malabar 2007 (followed by another one in 2009), which also involved the naval forces of India, Australia, Singapore and the United States. Eventually, in 2008, Japan’s PM Aso brought renewed attention by advocating for a “New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership”.

Michalis Diakantonis The writer is BA in Economics, MA in International Relations / International Political Economy and a Research Assistant at Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies / Centre for International Political Economy of Panteion University of Athens, Greece.

In addition, the two countries have developed strong economic ties and many Japanese companies operating in India (Suzuki, Sony, Toyota, Honda). The volume of bilateral trade is expected to grow, as in August 2012, came into force the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) while another milestone is the establishment of the Neemrana industrial estate as an exclusive Japanese economic zone. Furthermore, Japan has made its largest foreign direct investment in India (about US$ 4.5 billion) to construct a railway project between Delhi and Mumbai and the Indian government has signed recently a loan agreement of Rs 7,802.17 crore with Japan to fund four projects related to infrastructure and water. Last but not least, India is one of the topmost recipients of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Look east policy At the regional level the two countries are backing each other. Japan supported India’s membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and it’s an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) while the ASEAN+3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum provide a common platform for dialogue. The two countries have also established a joint working group on counter-terrorism and in June 2006, India ratified the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Anti-Piracy. Moreover, Japan, (like India) is involved in border disputes with China for the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Shinzo Abe’s recent election in Japan seems to be opening a new way for a broader

cooperation between the two countries, as Abe is a warm supporter of India-Japan partnership. In his previous term (2006-7) Abe played a crucial role in strengthening this relationship and in his book Towards a Beautiful Country: My Vision For Japan, stated that it would “not be a surprise if in another decade, Japan-India relations overtake Japan-US and Japan-China ties”. Abe has proposed (similarly with former PM Taro Aso) the Quadrilateral Initiative (QI), also known as “quad”, which is a strategic quadrilateral security dialogue between the United States, Australia, India and Japan, designed to balance power in the Asian context. However, this idea didn’t go further, because none of the proposed countries wanted to be seen as being involved in an anti-China coalition. It is true that the “quad” reminds us the cold war’s US policy of “containment” against USSR (introduced by the American geostrategist George Kennan). In today’s world where economic interdependence exists, it is impossible for any country to isolate China. On the other hand, the US has stated that it will focus its strategy in the Asia Pacific region and it is trying to develop diplomatic relationships with countries such as Myanmar, showing that the diplomatic “encirclement” of China is unavoidable (and possibly desirable) in the future. India’s aim to expand its “Look East Policy” can also be achieved through a closer relationship with Vietnam. A historical friendship exists between the two countries, as India supported Vietnam in the latter’s war against US and Vietnam backed India in its conflict with Pakistan in 1971. In the

A broader strategic alliance is needed in this region. Besides India, Japan and Vietnam this alliance should include the US, Australia, France, South Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines

In today’s world where economic interdependence exists, it is impossible for any country to isolate China. On the other hand, the US has stated that it will focus its strategy in the Asia Pacific region and it is trying to develop diplomatic relationships with countries such as Myanmar, showing that the diplomatic “encirclement” of China is unavoidable (and possibly desirable) in the future

In 2007 (which was declared “India-Japan Friendship Year”) the Japanese Self-Defense Forces took part in a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, known as Malabar 2007 (followed by another one in 2009), which also involved the naval forces of India, Australia, Singapore and the United States. Eventually, in 2008, Japan’s PM Aso brought renewed attention by advocating for a “New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership”

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REALIGNMENT

cold war era, India and Vietnam were strong allies and coordinated their activities in the framework of Non-aligned Movement. A Joint Declaration on the Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership signed in July 2007 and the first strategic dialogue meeting took place in New Delhi in October 2009, followed by a second one in Vietnam in August 2011. The two countries developed a framework for cooperation in military, security, high-tech and training of human sources areas while also a set of agreements were signed in 2000 concerning joint naval training, joint anti-sea piracy exercises in the East / South China Sea and jungle warfare and counter-insurgency training. India has also agreed to train Vietnam’s pilots, to repair Vietnam’s Air Force planes and to transfer 5000 items of naval spares (of Petya class ships) to Vietnam. Finally, a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation was signed in November 2009. In the economic field, the relationship between the two countries is getting stronger, as the bilateral trade in the period 1997-2007 has been raised with an annual rate of 86 per cent. Despite that fact, India’s proportion in Vietnam’s trade is quite low and vice versa. Vietnam is ranked 8th among India’s foreign direct investments destinations (1996-2002) and it’s also receiving India’s support through Initiative for ASEAN’s Integration programme. Most importantly, the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement in Goods, which came into effect in 2010, will boost India’s Vietnam trade. India is also engaged in energy projects with Vietnam since the 80’s and the ONGC Videsh Limited continues its oil and gas explorations in the blocks 127 and 128 of Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone, causing the fierce objections of China. The latter is in dispute with Vietnam for the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, while the US and Japan see the aggressive Chinese stance as a danger for the freedom of sea trade. Finally, in the regional level, India and Vietnam have developed a close relationship through ASEAN, East Asia Summit and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. But let’s return to geopolitical theory for a while. T h e Dutch-American geostrategist

N J Spykman in his magnum opus The Geography of the Peace (1944) described the maritime region around Eurasia as “the great circumferential maritime highway of the world.” This included among other sea lanes, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the marginal seas of the Far East and Indochina. The oceans, due to modern technology and advanced means of navigation and communication, are “not barriers but highways.” A “balance of power in the transatlantic and transpacific zones,” he further noted, “is an absolute prerequisite for the independence of the New World”. Now if we combine this analysis with the words of the Indian Defence Minister AK Antony in the First ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting Plus in October 2010: “It is in the common interest of nations to keep sea lanes open, secure and free for navigation,

trade and energy supplies. The security of sea lanes is important for the Asia Pacific Region, which is now one of the most important drivers of global economic growth”, then we should accept that a broader strategic alliance is needed in this region. Besides India, Japan and Vietnam this alliance should include the US, Australia, France, South Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines. As the US cannot rely only on Taiwan for the long-term containment of China (a RAND study of 2009, predicted that by 2020 the US will no longer be able to defend Taiwan) such a strategic alliance should include a series of steps:

April 2013 Defence AND security alert

1) Creation of a west-east “chain” in the Indian Ocean through the deployment of naval facilities in the Seychelles, Comoros, Reunion, Mauritius, the Malvides and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. 2) A diplomatic and strategic cooperation among the countries that form (as the Chinese call it) “the first island chain”, including the Korean Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, Japan and Ryuku Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. 3) Expansion of naval forces in the US owned Pacific territories (such as Guam and Northern Marianna) and other Oceania Islands (Caroline, Marshall and the Solomon Islands) that form the “second island chain”. 4) A strategic unification of the above three “chains” in order to create a free and secure naval arc in the Asia Pacific region. Paraphrasing Spykman, we can call this formation the “Asian Seas Rimland”.

That strategy shouldn’t be seen as an offensive axis against China but as a pacifist alliance that would provide security of navigation, trade and energy transportation. If China abandons its aggressive policy in the Indian Ocean and in East / South China Sea in the future, then it could participate in this formation, as no country should be excluded from economic prosperity and world trade. Until that becomes a reality, the ideas of well-respected geopoliticians such as Mahan, Kennan and Spykman remain extremely valuable and contemporary. That is why they are deemed classical.

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Marina Bay Sands, Singapore Hall D, E, F (Basement 1) 7 - 9 May 2013 www.safetysecurityasia.com.sg

Safety & Security Asia (SSA) 2013 A bi-annual showcase in Singapore, SSA brings together top experts in the field, as well as showcases an extensive array of new technologies, solutions, products and services catering to the safety & security sectors. SSA 2013 will be held concurrently with Fire & Disaster Asia 2013, Workplace Safety & Health Asia 2013, International Facility Management Expo 2013 and LEDTEC Asia 2013. For more information: Mr. Zack Tang e: zack@cems.com.sg t: +65 6278 8666 f: +65 6278 4077

Organiser

Conference & Exhibition Management Services Pte Ltd

Host

Security Systems Association of Singapore

Supporting Governmental Partners

Singapore Exhibition & Convention Bureau

Singapore Customs

Workplace Safety and Health Council

Knowledge Partner

Frost & Sullivan

Conference Partner

BCP Asia

Concurrent Events

Fire & Disaster Asia 2013

Workplace Safety Asia 2013

International Facility Management Expo 2013

Merlion Awards 2013

LEDTEC Asia 2013

Supporting Organisations

Asian Professional Security Association Singapore Chapter (APSA)

ASIS International Singapore Chapter (ASIS)

Building Owners & Managers Associations of the Philippines (BOMAP)

Singapore Institution of Safety Officers (SISO)

Singapore Retailers Association (SRA)

Singapore Security Alliance (SSA)