DSA AUGUST 2011 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

he announcement of a troop withdrawal by President Obama has sent many theorists over the top, but there is much happening under the radar that suggests Armageddon is not imminent. And if the game is played well and fairly, that doomsday can safely be prevented till eternity. But that of course depends on the inimitable 'if' of regional politics and global visions. There are many imponderables enroute and much to happen before the last western soldier leaves the dust and destruction of Afghanistan behind. For starters it isn't even certain how the withdrawal of NATO / ISAF troops will pan out. There is a commitment to withdraw troops and there will be a departure. But there is no certainty to the scale of it. As of now the commitment stands for 2014, but between now and then there are yet many hurdles to overcome and many more baddies to neutralise. Even as the Afghan National Army and other domestic security forces take up greater responsibilities, a western military presence will remain in the country.

To support, train, even occasionally conduct a raid, but most certainly to keep the global alliance informed about the true conditions on the ground. Despite the presence of every conceivable snooping technology available, boots on the ground are still the most important intelligence asset. And it is unlikely that the western alliance, which freed Afghanistan from the horrors of the Taliban, will give up that greatest advantage.

There are two scenarios commonly doing the rounds in the minds of the analysts and the practitioners. The first believes that the Taliban will roll into Kabul even as the last flight hurriedly leaves for the west.

The other believes that the current formulation of governance will hold out in Afghanistan, pick up a battering and some serious bruises, but still prevent the Taliban from taking power. The former scenario is inspired by the visuals of Saigon 1975 and the latter by the indomitable spirit of late President Mohammad Najibullah of Afghanistan. Conditions globally, as wellv as regionally, suggest that the latter course is the more likely one to be realised.

Battling terror in Afghanistan has certainly lost its sheen for the citizens of western countries that have troops in combat roles. A war that was once considered just is now not the priority for people reeling under an economic crisis. But then the scenario of 1990s Afghanistan constantly rears its head as a reminder of what happens when a vacuum is allowed to develop in the Hindu Kush. The world as a whole has learned lessons from vacating the space in Afghanistan and allowing hell to appear on earth. That is a scenario unacceptable at any cost. And which will propel a larger alliance than that currently exists as boots on the ground. There is little likelihood of another Najibullah as a lone warrior holding out on his own.

For the preachers of terror will not any longer be allowed to make Afghanistan a home to horrors. The world is more experienced now and will mend its ways, even if every neighbour has yet not done.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

publisher’s view

executiv editor

Clarion call!

nother terrorist attack in Mumbai! Killing 19 innocents and injuring more than 118 persons who had no reason to die or get injured on 13.07.2011. 13/7 has just been added to the litany of dates that remind us of the sheer impotence of our nation in the face of such repeated attacks. Why are we such a “Sitting duck” target for the terrorists? The frequency of such attacks is increasing day by day. I have to ask myself sometimes if there is any co-relation between the escalation of these attacks and the increase in our budgetary provisions for internal security! Today, we are more insecure in spite of spending so much more for a safety infrastructure that finds itself at sea whenever terrorists strike at will. The more we spend the less safety we seem to get.

Vo l u m e 2 I s s u e 1 1 A u g u s t 2 0 1 1 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi (retd) SM, VSM director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales rajeev chathley ishani bhowmik creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution ranjeet dinesh e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

The basic question that we need to address is – why are we such sitting ducks in the face of repeated terrorist attacks? The simple answer is that we perhaps lack the basic political will to defend ourselves. Our leadership seems more obsessed with ensuring its reelection by pandering to certain sections of the population in the mistaken belief that going soft on terror will help them secure their votes and allegiance. The tragic fact is that terrorist strikes are indiscriminate. They kill Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, all segments of our population with no regard whatsoever for caste, creed or community. Terrorism is a crime against humanity. To equate it with any particular faith or community is to insult them in a most grievous manner. There is also the callous lack of concern for the lives of ordinary Indian citizens who do not rate the Zulu category. For them there are instead bizarre platitudes to stop whining, to grin and bear it and most insulting of all - to show resilience and act as if nothing at all had happened. Terrorism in India cannot stop till such time as we insist on being purely reactive and defensive in our basic approach to counter terrorism. Our liberals and intellectuals are far more interested in protecting the human rights of the terrorists. They have little patience with the need to defend the life of the man on the street. Let me take you back a few decades when terrorism in Punjab and the revived Naxal movement in the country had started. It was the time when Mrs. Indira Gandhi was leading the nation and she had been quite tough in handling such situations. There had been some instances where political compulsions had necessitated some relaxation but by and large she handled the situation very effectively and competently because she displayed the requiste political will and toughness to defend the nation-State and its citizens. In fact, she was ruthless in the pursuit of national interests. The current political leadership will have to show that spine if we are to put an end to such terrorist depredations. It will have to display such will in defending our interests in Jammu and Kashmir and in Afghanistan where we seem willing to crawl when we are asked to bend. By the end of the 20th century things had gone so much out of control in India that it seems that anti-national elements can strike at will at any time and place of their choice so that they can get publicity commensurate to the number of innocent men, women and children killed or wounded or security personnel slaughtered. Our entire gang of NGOs and Civil Liberties Groups are hell-bent on stopping or at the very least hampering the Operations of our security forces and creating a permissive environment in which terrorist groups can strike at will and leave the State in a paralysis. • Is there some force which is orchestrating this whole phenomenon in our country? • Is there any connection between the mafia groups, arms suppliers and some anti-national people in our country? • Is there a long term anti-India campaign masterminded by forces inimical to India? • Is our security policy being ghost-driven by the same international coterie that is destabilising Afghanistan? • Is there a larger game plan to subvert India as a mirror-image of Afghanistan? • Is all this part of a sinister design and machinations of anti-India forces hell-bent upon destabilising and balkanising India? The US and NATO forces appear to be in retreat from Afghanistan. The US forces have started going back to save their face, leaving the problem unresolved, nay, worse confounded, aggravating further the misery of our Afghan brothers who are going to face harsh realities once these forces are pulled back completely from Afghanistan in the near future.What has happened in Afghanistan may happen to us tomorrow if we do not become alert to our security realities immediately. Our government has to take a tough stand and must show very strong political will to handle this situation otherwise India and Indians will be heading for trying times. The recent revelation that the man lobbying in the US for the “right to self-determination for the people of Kashmir” was being paid by the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence rips the veil from the ugly face of Pakistani State-sponsored terrorism and the covert war of annexation it is conducting in Jammu and Kashmir. The ISI has been using American money to buy Americans to back the terrorism unleashed in the name of the “Kashmir cause”. What is worse is the number of educated Indians who can be seduced to ridicule and condemn their motherland for the price of a foreign junket. I demand that a separate ministry for Internal Security be formed for the modernisation and up-gradation of security and intelligence organs of the State. We should urgently procure the same sophisticated technologies that America is using to combat Pak-sponsored terrorism in Afghanistan. The bleeding of India through a thousand cuts will equally affect America as it seeks to balance the rising power of an aggressive and assertive China.

“The country comes first – always and every time”.

cosmetic draw down of American troops was expected to be announced in July this year. President Obama’s withdrawal time table however has been far more substantial, 10,000 troops in the current year and 23,000 in 2012. Steep fiscal constraints, electoral considerations and rising levels of military competition with China have forced this somewhat hasty transition from a Counter Insurgency to a Counter Terrorism posture in Afghanistan. Is this pace of withdrawal too precipitate? There is no peace agreement visible with the Taliban. The Taliban attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in the heart of Kabul and the assassinations of Ahmad Karzai and Jan Mohammed were not a good augury. Counter Insurgency campaigns require the ability to sustain large troop concentrations for at least a decade and more to wear down and psychologically exhaust the adversary. Admiral Mike Mullen, Gen. Petraeus and even Hillary Clinton are said to have opposed this fairly rapid rate of troop withdrawals. It risks undoing all the gains made so far. However, the Joe Biden camp seems to have prevailed and there will now be a distinct transition from CI to a CT mode of operations. America is not quitting Afghanistan. However it is drastically reducing its footprint. It will establish permanent bases there in terms of Air power and Special Forces capabilities for intervention not only in Afghanistan but even more in Pakistan. Pakistan in fact is increasingly coming into focus as the main component of the problem and less and less of the solution. There is a clear change of orientation from Af-Pak to Pak-Af. Helping to reduce the number of US ground troops in Afghanistan will sharply reduce the logistical dependency on Pakistan and make it easier to target that country. Some pertinent points need to be made at this juncture about the conduct of operations in Afghanistan so far. A surge is a classic withdrawal tactic. You hit the enemy hard prior to a withdrawal - so that a retreat does not become a running fight or a rout. However post-surge the US-NATO operations have been more successful than has generally been recognised. The Americans brought in some 21,000 troops in the first surge in 2009 and another 33,000 in 2010. These were primarily employed in the Opium producing areas of Marjah, Helmand and Kandahar - the core area of the Taliban. Historically guerillas do not stand up and fight in the face of such an offensive. They roll with the punch. The Taliban however was overcome with hubris. It was convinced the Americans lacked the stomach for a sustained battle - so it stood up and fought to defend Helmand and Kandahar. In the bargain the Taliban has reportedly suffered some 2,000 killed and 4,000 supporters apprehended and lost its financial support base of the opium harvest. Additionally the US Operations have focused on “Command and Control Attrition”. US Special Forces operations have focused on night raids to eliminate the middle tier Taliban commanders (the top leadership is safely ensconced in Pakistan). In the brilliant operation Neptune Spear the SEAL Team 6 eliminated Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani cantonment of Abbottabad. The Pakistani reaction has not been shame faced. It has been brazen. The ISI arrested the informants of the CIA, who gave the leads on Laden and Gen Kayani apparently is doing the rounds of his cantonments placating his “outraged” officers. Anti-Americanism had never been at such a strident pitch in Pakistan. Is this an orchestrated pitch? So what impact does all this have on India? What are our stakes in Afghanistan? And more importantly what are the options that we have? That is the core topic that this issue of the DSA seeks to address. The prime need is to Afghanise the conflict by a rapid and meaningful capacity building of the Afghan National Army (ANA). It is here that India can and should play a meaningful role. Why can’t we offer to raise, train and equip two additional Afghan Divisions? Why can’t we gift T-55 Tanks and 105 mm artillery guns to raise an armoured and artillery brigade? Why can’t we gift Dhruv Helicopters to strengthen the Afghan Air Corps? India does not need Pakistan’s permission to do so. Is India the aspiring global and actual regional power or is it Pakistan? Why is India behaving so timidly in Afghanistan? Why is it kowtowing to the Pakistani Generals on the Afghan issue? India is currently punching much below its weight and this needs to change - drastically and soon. As the Executive Editor, I look forward to the growth of the Defence and Security Alert as an invaluable forum for debate and discussion on issues of national security and for the generation of new and innovative ideas. The central credo of Team DSA is the identification and aggressive promotion of our national interests. “The country comes first – always and every time”.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi (retd) SM, VSM

Jai hind!

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

contents

AFGHANISTAN SPECIAL ISSUE August 2011

Volume 2 Issue 11 August 2011

A R T I C L E S

interaction with Afghanistan ambassador

Team DSA

regional imperatives Ambassador Rajiv Sikri endgame in Afghanistan: India’s stakes and options

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi (retd) SM, VSM Iran's role in Afghanistan Dr Ahmad Reza Taheri US counter-terrorism strategy: lessons for India Dr Jagmohan Meher repercussions in the region Lt Gen V K Jetley (retd) Pakistan’s strategy after Osama Prof P M Kamath Pakistan’s likely role Brig Rumel Dahiya (retd) the new great game? Sandhya Jain US exit strategy: recipe for instability? Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) future of Afghanistan: India’s role Dr Arvind Kumar India’s smart power strategy Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd)

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56 59

Maj Gen Afsir Karim (retd) AVSM

17 20

26 31 36 42 46

growing Af-Pak uncertainties Prof Chintamani Mahapatra time for realpolitik: is India ready? Lt Gen O P Kaushik (retd) stabilisation of Afghanistan Dr Tej Pratap Singh drugs and instability conundrum Dr Prem Mahadevan The Afghan national army: how prepared is it? Aditi Malhotra role of Russia Dominika Cosic India: intrepid benefactor Subimal Bhattacharjee China’s conticent presence Dr Monika Chansoria

63 66 70 76 80

84 86 88

49 52

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

regional rivalries Dr Harsh V Pant need for a regional solution

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DSALERT August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES Our Executive Editor Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi (retd) SM, VSM with H E Dr Nanguyalai Tarzi, Afghanistan Ambassador

Team DSA

Interaction with H E Dr Nanguyalai Tarzi

is Excellency Dr Nanguyalai Tarzi, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to India is a soft spoken, erudite and scholarly diplomat of royal lineage. In an effort to understand the fast changing situation in Afghanistan, the DSA Team led by the Executive Editor, spent over an hour in conversation with the Ambassador on 22nd July 2011 at the Afghan Embassy. Quite understandably, a large component of the discussion was off the record. He highlighted that “the situation is highly fluid and dynamic and the key players are all keeping their cards close to the chest”. His Excellency has served as Ambassador earlier in Pakistan in the Musharraf era. Prior to that, he was in Iran. He had done his PhD Thesis on the Russian-Afghan Border. His assignment to India he said was his most positive and refreshing challenge on how to exploit the massive potential inherent in this traditionally most friendly relationship. He felt so very much at home in New Delhi – such a refreshing change from his earlier assignment, he said with a twinkle in his eyes. India he said is at the centre of all diplomatic and political activity in the region. Five foreign heads of States of the leading powers of the World (the Presidents of the United States, Russia, France and China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain) had all made their way to New Delhi in the recent past. India has its roots in the South Asian region but it is today a global player with enormous economic resources and clout. The size of India’s contribution to the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan (a whopping US$ 2 billion) speaks for itself. There is more in the pipeline he said. The end game in Afghanistan needs a concerted regional effort and positive contribution by all neighbouring countries. Zero-sum games can be highly counter-productive and create problems for the whole region. H E Dr Tarzai is a great scholar of Afghan history and has put together a most impressive and priceless montage of Afghan history in an exquisite collection of invaluable lithographs, ink sketches and historic photographs that makes his book an invaluable collectors piece. The Ambassador’s deep insights and profound knowledge have helped us immensely in putting together this issue with its focus on the end game in Afghanistan. As a people, the Afghans have suffered most tragically from unending war and conflict in the last three decades. The 1979 Census had credited Afghanistan with a population of 15.3 million. The stark tragedy of Afghanistan is summed up in the following statistics:

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Ambassador of Afghanistan ■■ Since 1979 over 1.5 million Afghans have been killed.

■■ 5 million Afghans were forced to become refugees in Iran and Pakistan. ■■ 2 to 3 million Afghans have been internally displaced due to the fighting. ■■ The city of Kabul had been reduced to rubble and over 30,000 people were killed in this city alone. Like a phoenix Kabul today has risen from the ashes. ■■ The poppy crop acerage in Afghanistan had shot up from 20,000 acres in 2001 to over 4,77,000 acres in 2007. The Taliban had ensured that Afghanistan was producing 82 per cent of the world’s poppy and 93 per cent of its heroin to provide some US$ 4 billion each year to fund its insurgency against the Karzai government. The Resurrection. Paul D. Miller wrote in the Foreign Affairs Magazine (vol 90 No 1) that in 2001 there were some 3.8 million Afghan refugees still languishing in other countries and 1.2 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs). Of these, some 2 million external refugees and 2,50,000 IDPs have since returned to their homes. All Human Development Indices have shown remarkable improvement since then. One only hopes and prays that the world will at long last, leave the tragically suffering people of Afghanistan in peace; that the colonial ambitions of its eastern neighbour will not destroy all that which has been re-built at such great costs. Fed up of decades of languishing in refugee camps, the Afghan people are yearning for peace and stability and a chance to re-create their nation-State. It is earnestly hoped that the tragic and quixotic quest for “Strategic depth” will not once again reduce Afghanistan to rubble.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

A cogently argued article that analyses the matrix of options for a regional approach to the final outcome in Afghanistan. Reports indicate that the US plans to retain a number of large air bases to be used for combat and reconnaissance aircraft, drones and for electronic surveillance. Afghanistan’s neighbours, however, will not accept a long-term US presence in Afghanistan, particularly if they suspect US motives. The principal concerns of the Central Asian countries and Russia are to keep Islamic fundamentalism at bay and to stem the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. Iran too worries greatly about the narcotics trade. It does not look kindly upon the prospect of a fundamentalist Sunni regime in power there. China supports Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan, worries about the seepage of fundamentalism and terrorism to Xinjiang and wants to exploit Afghanistan’s mineral resources. For India, Afghanistan holds the key to a successful Central Asia policy. Any viable regional solution to Afghanistan has to be within the framework of a ‘grand bargain’ involving the principal players viz. Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, Iran and India. 8

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Ambassador Rajiv Sikri

regional P

resident Obama’s announcement that the US would withdraw 33,000 troops by end 2012 marks the formal beginning of the endgame of the latest of many foreign misadventures in Afghanistan. As he tries to wrestle with how to ensure an honourable US exit from an inherited war that has turned into a quagmire, Obama now realises that the US cannot achieve a military victory over the Taliban. Looking ahead to a possible second term, Obama understandably wants to be rid of foreign policy baggage – and do something that would justify his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

imperatives Even though he termed it a ‘war of necessity’, Obama has been clear that the US military mission in Afghanistan should be limited in scope and scale to what is necessary to attain US goals, without either open-ended commitment or mission creep. Today, US expectations are more modest than a decade ago. It is now merely a campaign of counter-terrorism, not counter-insurgency. When Obama became President, it was an Af-Pak policy; now it is increasingly a Pak-Af policy. Pakistan has clearly emerged as the greater problem. The US goal is to prevent Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups from having safe havens in Afghanistan or Pakistan. After eliminating Osama bin Laden, the US intends to go after other Al Qaeda leaders holed up there. As for the Taliban, they are no longer demonised. The US is prepared to give them political space provided they break ties with Al Qaeda and deny it safe havens, renounce violence and accept the Afghan Constitution. The US will be satisfied if a favourably inclined government controls Kabul, other key population and production centres as well as major transport arteries. Building the Afghan army and other security forces is an essential element of this strategy. Nation building is something for the Afghans themselves to handle. Having broken Afghanistan and unable to fix it, the US will leave it in a mess.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

Reports indicate that the US plans to retain a number of large air bases to be used for combat and reconnaissance aircraft, drones and for electronic surveillance. This should come as no surprise. In addition to providing security support for the regime in Kabul, a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan will enable the US to monitor and if needed put pressure on, countries in the region – be it China, Iran, the Persian Gulf states, Central Asian countries, Russia, Pakistan, even India US presence However, the US would not like to completely abandon Afghanistan. Although all US combat troops will depart by 2014, a substantial number of US troops, mostly from the Special Forces and the Air Force, are likely to remain in an advisory and supportive role. Reports indicate that the US plans to retain a number of large air bases to be used for combat and reconnaissance aircraft, drones and for electronic surveillance. This should come as no surprise. In addition to providing security support for the regime in Kabul, a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan will enable the US to monitor and if needed put pressure on, countries in the region – be it China, Iran, the Persian Gulf States, Central Asian countries, Russia, Pakistan, even India. The turmoil in the Arab world and the uncertainties surrounding Pakistan give the US additional reasons to want to retain a permanent presence in Afghanistan. After spending a trillion dollars and losing thousands of American soldiers over the last decade, it is extremely doubtful if the US will walk out of Afghanistan without securing some long-term strategic gains. In order to ensure this, the US must have in place an Afghan government in Kabul that welcomes a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan. An understanding with the Taliban is also essential – hence the softened US attitude towards both Karzai and the Taliban. Afghanistan’s neighbours, however, will not accept a long-term US presence in Afghanistan, particularly if they suspect US motives. Even without a US military presence, Afghanistan has always had enormous strategic significance for other powers in the region. Afghanistan per se is not

attractive to outsiders. It is landlocked, poor and has a subsistence agricultural economy – though its unexplored and untapped mineral riches are today attracting Chinese carpetbaggers. Afghanistan matters because of its strategic location. Notwithstanding its tribal and ethnic diversities and rivalries, Afghanistan has traditionally had a distinct identity as the strategic space between India, Iran and Central Asia – a kind of ‘negative security space’ where all its neighbours seek some influence in order to prevent any other power from dominating it. Throughout history, Afghanistan has survived because of and learnt how to leverage, its geographical location as the principal overland link between India and the rest of the world. More to ensure their own security than because Afghanistan was a tempting conquest, strong empires in India, Central Asia and Iran competed in Afghanistan and tried to control it. When its neighbours were weak, the Afghans asserted themselves and invaded them. While invading Afghan armies no longer threaten, terrorism, drug trafficking and fundamentalism emanating from Afghanistan remain real threats for its neighbours. That is why Afghanistan will never be peaceful, stable and prosperous till its neighbours agree with the rulers and people of Afghanistan on the contours of an enduring blueprint for the country. The principal concerns of the Central Asian countries and Russia are to keep Islamic fundamentalism at bay and to stem the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. Iran too worries greatly about the narcotics trade. In addition, as the flag bearer of Shia Islam, it does not look kindly upon the prospect of a fundamentalist Sunni regime in power there. China is trying to straddle many horses: it supports Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan, worries about the seepage

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

of fundamentalism and terrorism to Xinjiang and wants to exploit Afghanistan’s mineral resources. For India, Afghanistan holds the key to a successful Central Asia policy.

Pak reverie Geography has made Pakistan Afghanistan’s most important, indeed indispensable, neighbour. Afghanistan recognises this, but will never agree to become a puppet State of Pakistan. The Pakistani security establishment perhaps believes that once the Americans leave Afghanistan it will be able to re-establish its hegemony over Afghanistan through its proxies. Such hopes are unlikely to be realised. The situation has changed over the last decade and a half. The Kabul government may not be a pushover. Other countries with interests in Afghanistan will not stand by idly. Now that they have seen how the Taliban and their friends have wrought havoc on Pakistan, Pakistan’s attitude itself may change. Pakistanis may be wary of resurrecting a Frankenstein monster that could destroy Pakistan itself. If Pakistan absorbs the lessons of history – the real ones, not the fictionalised and self-delusional accounts propagated in Pakistan – it would realise that over the centuries, Kabul and Kandahar have prevailed over Lahore and Delhi more often than the other way round! Pakistan needs to change its approach towards Afghanistan because the policy that it has hitherto followed has failed. This is unsurprising, since it is predicated on false premises namely, that Pakistan can succeed in making Afghanistan its backyard and that Pakistan needs ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan against India. Yet Pakistan’s essential interests in Afghanistan coincide in many respects with India’s. If the Taliban take over

Afghanistan, Pakistan may also suffer the same fate and India will be the next target. There is no objective reason for India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan. Rather, if they are sensible, India and Pakistan must jointly deal with the challenge of Afghanistan. While the Indus plains have been the buffer that over the centuries absorbed the heaviest blows and protected the rest of the Indian sub-continent from the turbulent lands west of the Indus, it is the Gangetic plains that provided the strategic depth to Punjab to deal with threats from the northwest. Similarly today Pakistan needs to work closely with India to stabilise Afghanistan since Pakistan by itself just does not have the ballast to manage Afghanistan.

Economic imperatives From an economic perspective too, India is critical for Afghanistan. Afghanistan cannot indefinitely count on massive injections of foreign aid and must become an economically viable State if it is not to be a failed one. Traditionally, the Pashtun belt has been economically anchored to the Indian sub-continent. Afghanistan has floundered in recent times because the roots of its economic life have been sapped by Pakistan’s policy of restricting Afghanistan’s deep-rooted economic, cultural and people-to-people contacts with India. If Pakistan were to cooperate in restoring the traditional economic and transport links to India, Afghanistan can once again become a bridge between South Asia and the rest of the world. This would bring Afghanistan huge benefits – from India’s large market that can

absorb any high-value agricultural products that Afghans should be cultivating instead of poppy; from investments to develop its mineral riches and hydropower resources; from transit fees for Central Asian gas feeding the growing South Asian market; and from trade between India and countries to Afghanistan’s west, including Russia and Europe. Needless to say, Pakistan too would gain immensely. An essential pre-condition is that its leaders must change their traditional mindset and recognise that the existential threats to Pakistan are internal and from the west, not the east. The doles from US, China and Saudi Arabia do prop up Pakistan’s economy and feed Pakistani vanity, but will not bring stability and prosperity to Pakistan; that can only come if Pakistan has meaningful economic integration with its neighbours. Dark clouds line the horizon. US-Pakistan relations have sharply deteriorated and a reset may be more problematic this time. So far, Pakistan’s policies have merely corroded the country; a few more years of misguided policies could erode it – literally.

Artificial contouring Any viable regional solution to Afghanistan has to be within the framework of a ‘grand bargain’ involving the principal players viz. Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, Iran and India. To start with, Afghanistan must have recognised borders. If Afghanistan were to accept the Durand Line as the border with Pakistan, Pakistan’s insecurities vis-à-vis Afghanistan may be mitigated. Recognising the Durand Line will be a difficult step for any Afghan leader unless there are credible and enforceable guarantees that Pakistan will not undermine Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Afghans will also want a soft border between the divided Pashtun lands. A de jure soft Afghanistan-Pakistan border is possible only within a regional cooperative framework involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Undoubtedly, any such move would also greatly help to reduce the trust deficit between India and Pakistan and may well trigger a fundamental change in India-Pakistan relations. The ball is in Pakistan’s court. If it wants to break free of the US grip and not remain a pawn of the Chinese, it will have to make up with India. The other key precondition for

a regional solution is that the US withdraws its military presence in Afghanistan. The interesting thing is that while some countries for tactical reasons do not want a hasty US withdrawal, neither the Afghans themselves nor any of Afghanistan’s neighbours want a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan. Continued US military presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan is feeding militancy in both countries. If they want, Pakistan, Iran and Russia can collectively easily squeeze out the US from Afghanistan since they control all the access routes to Afghanistan. Having already articulated his vision of US relations with the Arab world, maybe President Obama will have the vision and courage to change the traditional US geopolitical perspective on this region too – by completely pulling out of Afghanistan and striking a US-Iran deal. For Iran’s leaders, an understanding on Iran’s role in the region and normalisation of US-Iran relations is critical. The nuclear issue is a bargaining chip for both sides. Afghanistan can be peaceful and stable only if it is neutral and free of foreign troops and its neighbours, the great powers and the UN guarantee its independence and sovereignty. Next year’s international conference on Afghanistan being convened in Chicago by President Obama will provide a timely occasion for all concerned countries to outline their strategic vision for Afghanistan. Iran should be there too. Unless all countries, especially Pakistan, have the courage and vision to look at innovative solutions, Afghanistan – and the region as a whole – will remain mired in misery and conflict. India and Pakistan can take the first step to break this logjam by initiating serious discussions on Afghanistan. Perhaps one day both Iran and Afghanistan can be economically integrated with South Asia. Improbable as it may seem today, such a turn of events cannot be ruled out forever. The writer was a career diplomat and retired in 2006 as Secretary in India’s Ministry of External Affairs. He has served as India’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan and headed the Departments dealing with West Europe as well as the Soviet Union and East Europe in India’s Ministry of External Affairs. Now a strategic consultant, he is associated with leading think tanks in India and abroad. He is the author of “Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy”.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

The key to long term success in Afghanistan would hinge upon a successful Afghanisation of the Counter Insurgency campaign. It is here that India can play a very positive role by helping to raise, equip and train minimum two additional Afghan Infantry Divisions and at least an Armoured and Artillery brigade. Undue deference was being shown by the Americans so far to Pakistan’s hyper- sensitivities about Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted it treated as a virtual colony. After Abbottabad, this mindset will have to change. Pakistan is not a part of the solution in Afghanistan. As the Americans are rapidly beginning to recognise, it is the primary problem. Economic and domestic constraints have impelled President Obama to accelerate the pace of withdrawal beyond a point of prudence. Fairly evident military gains have been made post the Surge. However, these are fragile and could easily be reversed. That is all the more reason for India to step up its profile and stop punching so much below its actual weight. 12

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi (retd) SM, VSM

ENDGAME IN AFGHANISTAN: INDIA’S STAKES AND OPTIONS P

resident Obama’s speech of 22 June 2011 was widely awaited in this region. It was anticipated that under pressure from his Generals, Obama would only go in for a token troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The contents of the speech indicate however that President Obama is under greater pressure over the issues of the US economy. The US national debt now amounts to a staggering US$ 14 Trillion which almost equals the entire American GDP. With rumours

of a deliberate debt default, the economy has acquired even greater salience in the election stakes than security. The killing of Osama bin Laden has provided emotional catharsis to the American people and they are now seemingly keen to bring the boys back home from an unpopular war. Economic and electoral constraints therefore have forced President Obama to accelerate the withdrawal time table despite the deep reservations of his Generals and even his Secretary of State. The US proposes to take out 10,000 troops by the end of the current year and another 23,000 by the end of 2012. Thus the Second surge sent in 2010 would be completely retracted. Gen Petraeus had apparently suggested relocation of just 5,000 troops each in 2011 and 2012. This accelerated withdrawal

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The economics of the campaign in Afghanistan needs to be grasped at the earliest. It costs the USA one million dollars to sustain each American soldier in Afghanistan. By sharp contrast each Afghan soldier costs the Americans just 12,000 dollars a year. The most cardinal error of the Afghan campaign was not to start the raising of a viable Afghan army after the rout of the Taliban in 2001 schedule clearly indicates a transition from a Counter Insurgency (CI) to a Counter-Terrorist Posture (CT). It also indicates a subtle shift from an Af-Pak to a Pak-Af oriented stance wherein America will increasingly use Afghanistan as a base to deal with Pakistan’s support to the Al Qaeda / Taliban. Vice President Joe Biden had long been a proponent of such an operational stance. He felt that since the US aim was confined to “defeating, disrupting and dismantling the Al Qaeda” it should not escalate into a Counter-Insurgency campaign against the host Taliban (which was regarded as an unwinnable proposition). This argument is basically flawed. The simple fact is that the actual US military aim in Afghanistan is to prevent the mounting of another mass casualty strike against the US Homeland or that of its allies. It was primarily the Taliban shelter provided to Al Qaeda that had enabled the devastating 9/11 attack. Any resurgence of the Taliban will once again make Afghanistan a base for such irredentist groups and franchises of the Al Qaida (like the LET and JEM). All talk of a deal with the Taliban fails to factor in the basic ideological orientation of this organisation which is not nationalist but radically Wahabi and Extremist. There are equally Indian proponents of sucking up to the Taliban who make the same cardinal error of refusing to recognise the basic radical orientation of this group. This radicalisation makes the concept of a moderate Taliban a complete oxymoron. So if the US and its allies wish to keep their homelands secure from any further assaults they will have no choice but to ensure that the extremists do not acquire base areas / sanctuaries in Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen and elsewhere. This calls for a continuation of the CI campaign in Afghanistan and the Taliban has to be seriously attrited instead of being appeased. Easing up of CI pressure on the Taliban now could well result in a regrouping of Al Qaeda franchises there and a possible repetition of attacks on the US or Europe could well follow. This could lead to a total waste of the entire military investment made so far in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that over 2,550 US / ISAF soldiers have been killed and over US$ 420 billion sunk. Counter-insurgency operations demand sustained committal of large force levels for at least a decade and more to wear down and exhaust the insurgents. The operational fact is that post the US surges in 2009 and 2010, the American and NATO forces have been fairly successful in bringing to battle and causing meaningful attrition on the Taliban. The most successful component of these operations have been the US Special Forces drive against the Taliban / Al Qaeda senior and second tier leadership. As Operation Neptune Spear highlighted so clearly, this Command and Control attrition has been the most eminently successful component of US-ISAF operations and needs to be sustained. The cardinal error made by the Taliban was to stand up and fight in Helmand, Marjah and Kandahar (instead of rolling with the punch as any guerilla force should do). In the bargain it has sustained over 2,000 combatant casualties and lost over 700 middle tier leaders to Special Forces night raids. Reports indicate the distinct

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reluctance of Taliban military commanders to return to these areas. Some 30 top Al Qaeda leaders have been eliminated so far. However, as Gen Petraeus and Admiral Mike Mullen have warned, an accelerated pace of withdrawal could jeopardise the successes gained at such considerable cost in casualties and treasure. The gains so far are fragile and could easily be reversed.

Afghanisation is the key The economics of the campaign in Afghanistan need to be grasped at the earliest. It costs the USA one million dollars to sustain each American soldier in Afghanistan. By sharp contrast each Afghan soldier costs the Americans just US$ 12,000 a year. The most cardinal error of the Afghan campaign was not to start the raising of a viable Afghan army after the rout of the Taliban in 2001. This forced Karzai to rely on the thoroughly unpopular and discredited warlords and local militias. This in turn made him very unpopular – because it was the warlord depredations that had so harried the Afghan population that they were even willing to tolerate the Taliban (as long as it provided a modicum of order). The hubris of the air power generated victory in 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom) led the Americans to ignore the dire need for putting boots on the ground. The shock and awe of air power quickly wears off over time and air craft cannot hold ground. In a basically flawed response, the USA declared premature victory in Afghanistan and turned its sights on Iraq. The Afghanistan war was seriously under resourced and underfunded thereafter. The first essential to establishing a viable nation-State is to raise its Armed Forces. The USA simply refused to fund the raising of an Afghan National Army till it was too late. The Pakistani ISI sensed an opportunity in the second American retreat from Afghanistan. It revived the Taliban in 2005 and covertly encouraged it to overthrow Karzai and take over Afghanistan. Pakistan had started jockeying for the endgame in Afghanistan as far back as 2005, when it brazenly gave shelter to Osama bin Laden and the entire senior leadership of the Taliban. The USA today is spending US$ 120 billion a year in Afghanistan. Cumulatively it has spent some US$ 1.2 trillion in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (over US$ 420 billion in Afghanistan alone). However till 2006 it had spent only US$ 1.9 billion on the ANA. By 2007 it was forced to spend US$ 7.4 billion on the Afghan army in the face of the strong Taliban resurgence. The success of the British colonisation venture in the 18th and 19th centuries depended upon nativising the colonial army. India was largely conquered and kept in control by a British Indian army, over 70 per cent of whom were local Indian soldiers. The American failure in Vietnam and Afghanistan has stemmed from a failure to “Nativise’ the conflict. It has failed to invest adequate resources and effort in fielding a professional Afghan army. This was largely dictated by the Pakistani Generals who

objected to the building of strong Afghan armed forces. Undue heed was paid to Pakistani sensitivities and this has proved highly counter-productive in Afghanistan. The US deferred to its Pakistani ally and kept the Afghan army weak. It was reduced to an all Infantry Force – (more or less an armed constabulary) that would pose no threat to Pakistan. Pakistan in turn has done its best to topple Karzai and replace him with its proxy of the Taliban. It has given shelter to all the key Taliban commanders and their Shuras. The key question today is, given its ideology, can the world accept the re-Talibanistion of Afghanistan? Will that not lead to the Talibanisation and total radicalisation of the Pakistani State itself? Can India afford to have a swathe of radical States take root in South West and Central Asia? Have the votaries of sucking up to the Taliban ever factored in the rabidly radical nature of the Taliban and the very slim chances that it can ever be made more moderate and de-ideologised? India as a secular and liberal democracy, has always shied away from taking a principled ideological position and has consistently tried to appease the votaries of the two-nation theory and is now thinking of appeasing the Taliban. Democratic India and the extremist Taliban are ideologically irreconcilable. Our firm support to the Karzai regime must be non-negotiable as an ideological stance. It will make eminent common sense because it is inconceivable that the Taliban will ever ditch its patron State Pakistan to side with India. Those who entertain such fond hopes are being naïve and subjective.

Readiness of the ANA to take charge The key question today would be – is the under-funded and under-resourced ANA ready to assume operational charge in a stand alone mode by 2014? Elsewhere in this issue, Aditi Malhotra in her article “The Afghan National Army: How prepared is it?” has analysed the readiness profile of the ANA. The picture is not reassuring. The US Combined Security Transition Command had established Capability Milestones (CMs) to evaluate the operational capabilities of ANA units. These ranged from CM-1 (fully capable of undertaking primary military operations with some support) to CM-4 (incapable of undertaking primary military operations). In 2008 out of a total of 105 ANA units, only two were graded CM-1. In 2009 this went up to 47. However as a result of the intense fighting in Helmand and Marjah, this was rapidly brought down to 44 and then by the end of the year, to just 34 ANA units that were deemed fit to fight in the stand alone mode. The response of the ANA to the recent attack on the International Hotel in Kabul has not been reassuring. Equally worrying has been the killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai the President's brother as also the surge of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban into the eastern provinces of Kunar, Nuristan and Paktia post withdrawal of American troops from this area. What then is the underlying American intention? Is it to implement the Blackwill plan which felt that a 1,50,000 US troops were simply inadequate to control the human terrain in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan. Blackwill had proposed a de facto partition of Afghanistan to secure only the Northern Areas with some 35,000 to 50,000 troops and let the local correlation of forces take its course in Southern Afghanistan. If it falls to the Taliban, so be it. The alternative view point is that even by the end of 2012 over 60,000 Americans will remain in Afghanistan. The first instalment of 5,000 could

be token (logistical personnel) and the second could largely be trainers who are not involved in direct fighting. That could give the combat surge forces another year to impose attrition on the Taliban and try to secure the areas cleared in Helmand, Marjah and Kandahar – the key narcotics belt that finances the insurgency. The eastern border provinces of Kunar, Nuristan and Paktia will also have to be stabilised. The Pakistan army has commenced shelling and rocket attacks on the Afghan Border Police outposts here. The ANA has commenced taking operational charge in six cities to include Mazar-e-Sharief, Bamiyan, Panjshir, Herat, Mehtalam ect. The ANA’s training will have to be intensified. Above all, its proposed strength will have to be enhanced by at least two divisions. It will have to be given armour and artillery to give it the military edge over the Taliban (The Americans are largely fighting from Stryker armoured vehicles). It is here that India can play a significant and meaningful role. This was not being permitted by the Americans so far in deference to Pakistan’s hyper- sensitivities. Post Abbottabad the hyper-sensitivity for Pakistani concerns needs to be urgently revisited. Lately there have been some curious developments. In April 2011 PM Gilani and Gen Kayani had hectored Karzai to dump the USA and bandwagon with China and Pakistan. In end June this year, the Pakistani army fired artillery and missile barrages into the eastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. Reportedly the Pak army provided covering fire for the Pakistani Taliban’s attacks on Afghan border police posts. President Karzai accused the Pakistani army of firing 470 rockets into Afghan territory. This is indeed serious. Is the Pakistani army trying to facilitate the infiltration of Taliban across the border. A mini border war already seems to be on and Qari Zai Rahman is leading the operations of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in this area.

India’s stakes and options This brings us to the key question – what really are India’s stakes in Afghanistan and what are our options? Why are we punching so much below our weight in this critical region?

India’s stakes ■■ Robert Gates (when he was Director CIA) had asserted

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that 22 per cent of all terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir were either Afghans or had been trained there. The re-Talibanisation of Afghanistan is bound to effect the internal security situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of India very adversely. ■■ Afghanistan has traditionally been hostile to Pakistan on issues of the legality of the Durand Line and access to the sea. This has served to put Pakistan in a classic two front situation.

Dr Ahmad Reza Taheri

■■ In purely military terms, a strong and stable Afghanistan (whose military had been revived by the USSR) used to tie down two Pakistani Corps (XI and XII Corps) on the western front. Post the overrunning of Afghanistan by Pakistan’s proxy of the Taliban – these corps became available for use against India and thereby encouraged Pakistan to launch its proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir. ■■ The Re-Talibanisation of Afghanistan could lead to a collapse of the dominoes in Pakistan and Central Asia. The highly adverse impact of a coalition of radical States on our western borders needs no emphasis. India simply cannot afford to let Afghanistan be controlled or dominated by any power hostile to India. ■■ Afghanistan is India’s land bridge to Central Asia. Its complete domination by Pakistan would adversely impact our trade and ties with the Central Asian States. ■■ The basic question is, can India really live with the extremist philosophy of the Taliban? The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan could well lead to the Talibanisation of Pakistan itself. That would be highly detrimental to India’s national security as it could place the weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-State actors.

India’s options ■■ Aid the Afghanisation process. We firmly believe that the problems of Afghanistan are best resolved by the Afghan people. They have been yearning for peace and stability for the past three decades. A modernist and inclusive State must be allowed to stabilise in that country. This translates into the need to urgently build up the capacity of the ANA. ■■ India could offer to help Afghanistan raise, equip and train up to two infantry divisions and an armoured and artillery brigade each. India could gift the entire equipment and either send a brigade strong training team to train these in situ or alternatively get them to India for training in our Regimental Centres. The Iranian Defence Minister had visited Kabul on 18th June this year and signed a Security Cooperation agreement. It is imperative that our Defence Minister should equally visit Kabul to sign such a Security Cooperation agreement. The US cannot force India to defer to the sensitivities of Pakistani generals and ignore its own vital interests. ■■ Post 2014 – India should work out contingency plans to respond to any emergent calls for assistance by the Karzai government. (in the face of any Pakistani aided Taliban offensive on Kabul). Up to a division strength with additional armour and artillery could be flown in by C-17s via the Iran

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route to help defend the capital Kabul. ■■ India should try and cobble a regional coalition of States (including Iran, the Central Asian States and Russia) to provide a Regional Security Force to defend key population centres in Afghanistan (while the ANA is freed for offensive operations against the Pakistani aided Taliban). Alternately it should seek to deploy troops there under the UN flag. ■■ Should Pakistan’s military aid to the Taliban cross certain thresholds (induction of Pak army Pashtuns with tanks and artillery) India could consider activating the line of control / international border against Pakistan to put pressure on it to recoil from any direct military intervention in Afghanistan. ■■ Any Indian military intervention in Afghanistan must be under the UN Flag or as part of a regional coalition and never alone. ■■ It must be clearly understood that the Afghan State will need up to US$ 4 billion annually for at least the next decade (after 2014) to sustain its armed forces till its economy can fully stabilise. India may have to join other regional States in providing this monetary assistance in cash or kind (arms/ammunition/stores). ■■ India will need to rapidly repair its relationship with Iran if it is to develop any viable intervention options to assist the Afghan State in any emergency situation of direct / armed intervention by Pakistan.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of DSA.

Perhaps the key to any meaningful Indian role in Afghanistan lies with Iran. Iran alone can provide India access for trade or provision of military support. To that extent it is vital for India to understand the Iranian perspective and thinking on the vital subject of Afghanistan. This article provides most invaluable insights into Iranian thinking on the subject. Iran has traditionally been hostile to the Taliban. However in the given scenario, Iran, the writer states unequivocally, can either play a negative role by seeking to keep American and Western attention and resources tied down in Afghanistan or play a positive role by facilitating reconciliation and reconstruction. To that extent a prolonged US engagement in Afghanistan suits Iran tactically, even if it has to temporarily support the Taliban. However Iran, he says, can equally play a very positive role in the reconstruction and pacification of Afghanistan, provided it is permitted to do so. This may call for steps by the West to diplomatically engage Iran and reduce hostility with that State. However, the writer clearly spells out that a return of the Taliban in power in Kabul cannot be viewed favourably by Iran; that it can play the Tajik card and it may need help in doing so. An excellent espousal of the Iranian position which we need to study in great depth. August 2011 Defence AND security alert

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n order to understand Iran’s role in Afghanistan after the departure of the US forces, the article is divided into five sections. The first one, however, deals with the question itself; whether the US withdrawal is likely to happen. The second section presents a recent brief history of the Iran-Afghan relations. The third part focuses on the why and how of a possible Taliban return. The fourth and fifth sections shall be on Iran’s role in Afghanistan. This part deals with the issue from two different perspectives.

Withdrawal of the US forces: myth or reality The question of the “US withdrawal from Afghanistan” itself is contentious. Although both US and UK authorities claim that they will pursue a gradual withdrawal in 2012-2014, the likelihood of such action is dubious; they are not very much clear about leaving Afghanistan. Contradictory statements do exist among the Western chiefs. Some believe that the action will be dangerous and risky. Some others do not hope for a complete withdrawal. In this regard, David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, had stated that, “there will be no UK troops in combat roles in Afghanistan by 2015.” The statement vividly implies that there will not be a total withdrawal; Western involvement in Afghanistan will continue even after 2014, perhaps a non-military engagement. In fact, any reductions of the US or NATO forces, will depend on the circumstances and conditions on the ground. In case of a US withdrawal, however, what will be the role of Iran in Afghanistan? The role of the Islamic Republic of Iran needs to be understood in two different contexts. But, before proceeding, two issues must be taken into consideration. It is advisable to refer first to a recent brief history of Iran-Afghan relations and then to follow the present internal scenario in Afghanistan itself by focusing on the Taliban’s likely rise to power.

Iran-Afghan ties: a flashback The two States for most part of their relations have benefited from close strategic cooperation. In the reconstruction of Afghanistan Iran has been an active player, working on various areas, such as infrastructure, energy, economic, medical and cultural. However, Afghanistan’s ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran became strained when Taliban took over. From the very beginning of the emergence of Taliban, relations with Taliban deteriorated due to number of reasons, such as harsh treatment of Shias and the execution of Iranian diplomats by Taliban. Iran, no doubt, played a key role in the overthrow of Taliban. It has since helped revive Afghanistan’s economy and infrastructure. Despite some differences such as Iran’s toughened policy on Afghan asylum seekers and the periodic disputes over the water rights of the Helmand River, business boomed between the two nations since the overthrow of Taliban in 2001. It has been claimed that Iran is considered to be among the first ten top investors in Afghanistan. Of course, the West does not have an optimistic view of such involvement. Many Western politicians believe that Iran is meddling in Afghan issue. But, both Iran and Afghanistan deny such accusations. In his official presentations on Iran, President Karzai time and again has referred to Iran as a “helpful partner.” Yet, the question is that the West, particularly the US, is not positive

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about Iran’s involvement in Afghanistan. They are suspicious of the extent of the Iranian role in the Afghan crisis. The crisis in Afghanistan has forced the NATO to deal with the situation differently; that may promise the return of Taliban.

Re-emergence of Taliban? Inside Afghanistan, the present dissatisfaction of the corruption within the current regime and its inability to function in limiting the role of the NATO forces who pledged to restore peace and stability and the continuing violence in the country that has claimed the lives of thousands of civilians, somewhat reflects the past. This, ultimately, may repeat the old scenario, i.e. return of Taliban to power. Equally important, however, responsible for the likely emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan, is the recent differences between the Afghan president and the US high level officials. On the one hand, the US is pessimistic about the role of Karzai in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Afghan president is criticising the US role in the country, saying that “the US is an occupying force pursuing her own national interest.” It seems that the development so far has led the Americans to act independently without having Karzai involved in peace talks with Taliban. Although in the beginning both Karzai’s government and the US have been involved in negotiations with Taliban to break with Al Qaeda and work on peaceful purposes, the recent scenario indicates that the US is involved unilaterally. Karzai himself shed light on the matter. In his recent public confirmation, the Afghan president disclosed that the US is holding direct talks with Taliban, a development that the US so far hasn’t publicly acknowledged. What has pushed the US into talks with Taliban partly can be because of Iran’s important presence in the region and partly because of the US fear of the rise of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. As far as the latter issue is concerned, the US intelligence needs the support of Pakistan’s ISI. The ISI is constantly in contact with the Pak-Taliban. The Pak-Taliban is influential in Afghanistan. Thus, US assists Pak-Taliban through ISI. The negotiations are mainly taking place with the PakTaliban or “good Taliban”, as it is called by some Americans. It has been claimed that it was Pak-Taliban or some rogue agents of ISI who informed the US of the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. The strategy, however, is to control the Al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. Coming back to the question of Iran’s role. The Islamic Republic of Iran, whether a foe or friend of the United States serves a dual purpose as far as the case of Afghanistan is concerned. Iran’s role can be both constructive as well as destructive. The role of Iran, however, will be discussed the other way round by focusing first on Iran’s destructive (or negative) role and then on its constructive role.

Iran’s destructive role An effective role by the Iranians, first and foremost, depends on the stability of the regime itself and, next, on its international prestige. Iran is facing multifaceted challenges. The Western sanctions, economic problems such as unemployment, the ongoing political crisis hitting North Africa and Middle East, the concern with the rightist-leftist clashes that went off in the immediate aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections resulted in the disputed victory of Ahmadinejad and the current differences between president and leadership highlighted recently, has seriously preoccupied Iran. Hence, an unstable Iran certainly will not be able to play a constructive role in the development of Afghanistan. Yet, an unstable Iran will be capable of playing a destructive (or negative) role. In this context, Iran will have to keep the Americans busy in Afghanistan. The intention is to divert the NATO’s attention off Iran and keep the attention to Afghanistan by making NATO deeply involved in the Afghan crisis. An internationally isolated Iran has been pretty successful in backing conventional

Iran in Afghan crisis cannot be overlooked; the US is forced to change the strategy. It is trying to bypass Iran by winning over Taliban. In doing so, “the US government is into direct and secret talks with senior Taliban leaders.” On this account, President Karzai, has pointed out that the foreign military and especially the United States itself is going ahead with these negotiations. Apart from that, the Western allies are preparing the grounds to officially involve Taliban into negotiations. A major development, in this regard, is the UN Security Council’s recent pro-Taliban move. The UN sanctions list for Taliban and Al Qaeda has been sundered into two. This can legally support Taliban into talks on the Afghan crisis. At this time of writing, however, nothing is certain; the extent of the discussions and negotiations is unclear. No doubt, the success of the American diplomats in winning over Taliban relies on two major factors, first, understanding well the social psychology of Taliban and, second, diplomatic efficiency. American success will mean a blow to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, Iran then will have to play with the remaining cards. Iran may remobilise all available Afghan sources against Taliban. The Tajiks, for instance, have never favoured a Taliban form of government. However, the successful implementation of the project to a large extent depends upon Iran's power and influence, which is again doubtful, due to Iran's own internal crisis. In any case, even an unstable Iran will be capable of manipulation in Afghanistan, making Afghan progress difficult.

Iran’s constructive role

warfare and assisting Afghan insurgency against the NATO forces. The Iranian support of Taliban can be noted as a prime example. Although Shia Iran and the Sunni Taliban are ideologically different and that they have not enjoyed good terms, the post 9/11 situation has changed the scenario. The US was projected as the common enemy of both Iran and Taliban, making Taliban a friend of Iran; recalling the concept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The US intelligence officials had declared that the Islamic regime is helping Taliban. Accordingly, Taliban receives both military and financial backup from the Iranians particularly from the revolutionary guard corps both in Iran and Afghanistan. In addition to that, however, Iran has an indirect involvement in the so-called development of Afghanistan, which the US does not like. Iran has handed over several of its Afghan projects to China, mainly because, Iran is neither in the position to export manpower, nor legally can contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, due to the sanctions. Again, in this connection, it is not clear what Iranians are actually doing in Afghanistan. A peaceful Afghanistan under the US control, however, will be dangerous for Iran, as the “attention” will be fully focused on Iran then. Iran will not tolerate a peaceful Afghanistan under the US control. Therefore, to the US administration, the destructive role of

In order to avoid confrontation with Iran as far as the question of Afghanistan is concerned, the West in general and the United States of America in particular has to count on Iran’s part by taking the Islamic Republic extremely seriously. Any instability in Iran, whatever, will leave its impact on its neighbours including Afghanistan. Comparatively speaking, Afghanistan has always enjoyed better relations with Iran than Pakistan. The pre-Taliban takeover and post-Taliban overthrow periods are concrete examples of Afghan-Iran close ties. In infrastructure, economic construction, cultural and medical fields, Iran, undoubtedly, like any other Western States will be equally useful for the development of Afghan society; the historical records approve of this positive approach. Perhaps, more than any other State, Iran may play a vital role in preserving Afghan security. However, to push Iran up to that level, the US has to deal with a herculean task. It has to resume diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, to ease the economic and political sanctions on Iranian regime particularly on issues such as Iran’s nuclear energy and, more importantly, both should develop a mutual trust and confidence. Under such circumstances only, Iran will be able to play a constructive role in the peace and security of Afghanistan. The United States can broaden Iran’s constructive role in Afghanistan. It can engage Iran in the reconstruction of Afghanistan through a new diplomacy. The strategy itself may lead both Iran and US to redefine their relations for the common good. The writer is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Iranshahr, Iran. He is an expert on Iran and Western Political Philosophy. He has published many books and contributed articles in academic periodicals.

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A very convincing analysis of some of the lessons India can learn from US operations in Afghanistan. The writer highlights the role of the CIA in intelligence gathering on the ground which facilitates the Drone strikes and Commando raids by the special forces. These have inflicted significant attrition on the Taliban leadership. He also highlights the use of innovative technology like the Predator UAVs and new airborne surveillance systems like the Gorgon Stare. He also highlights the very lethal use of local militias and contrasts this with the banning of the Salwa Judam by the Supreme Court.

n the third week of June 2011, when President Barack Obama announced the withdrawal plan of US troops from Afghanistan, he expressed a sense of accomplishment claiming that the United States was starting the draw down “from a position of strength”: Al Qaeda has been pummelled, the Taliban have suffered serious losses and that ‘the tide of war is receding’. The President stopped short of declaring victory, but suggested that the mission had been a success. But the most striking part of the President’s speech was when he elucidated America’s goal, saying that “No safe haven from which Al Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland”. It means that the United States would indeed continue to maintain a very effective counter-terrorism capability to strike at the terrorist targets both in Afghanistan and the ‘badlands’ of Pakistan. It also explicates American military’s perception that whatever success they have so far is the outcome of their counter-terrorism initiatives which requires significantly fewer boots on the ground, but seemed to outperform the more troop-intensive counter-insurgency strategy pursued by the top military planners of the Afghanistan war for nearly a decade after 9/11. And finally, it is the success on this arena that seemed to bolster arguments for a swift withdrawal from the war-torn country.

Ground situation in India It may be noted that it is more or less for the same reasons that 33 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan were under Taliban shadow governance whereas approximately 220 districts of India are

considered to have come under Maoist influence. Like the American troops in Afghanistan, Indian security forces have been confronting the terrorists in such a huge landmass, apart from their intermittent encounters with them in the country’s big cities including Mumbai, north-eastern states and Jammu and Kashmir; causing innumerable loss of life and property. That is why it is pertinent for us to have an in-depth look at America’s “success story” in terms of its counter-terrorism strategy which appears to have focused on reliable intelligence, Special Operation Forces, modern arms and sophisticated drones, use of intense force and last but not least, the “clear, hold, build and transfer” approach. This article is an humble attempt to understand these components in a proper perspective and to examine whether we can take home some lessons from their “success” to deal with our own terrorists menace.

Largest CIA station CIA plays a very important role in Afghanistan with the largest Central Intelligence Agency station – since the Vietnam War – located in Kabul. Apart from its intelligence related responsibilities, the world’s most powerful spy agency command an Afghan paramilitary force in thousands and most part of clandestine war in Pakistan through armed drones is carried out by them. It has been reported that the CIA-directed Afghan militias – known as Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams – have carried out a number of secret missions into Pakistan’s tribal areas. The CIA also maintains a huge presence through the Afghan special operation forces that operate around the cities of Paktika, Kandahar, Kabul

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US counter-terrorism strategy:

lessons for India

Dr Jagmohan Meher

and Jalalabad as well as in the rural provinces of Khost and Kunar. Military experts claim that the rapid pace of attacks by the intelligence operatives has dealt an unusually heavy blow to the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists. The remotely controlled drones launched by the CIA seeking to destroy Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds in the mountainous region of Afghanistan-Pakistan borders demonstrate the contours of latest technological warfare which can hit a chosen target with a high degree of precision. As per one assessment, 28 drone strikes the CIA carried out during mid-January to mid-June 2011 killed about 150 militants. It highlights how the CIA and its drones have changed strategic thinking in the ten years old Afghanistan war.

Special operations After taking over as the US and NATO Commander-in-Chief in Afghanistan, Gen David H Petraeus looked for ways to show quick results. The General is the author of the COIN (Counter-insurgency) manual and known as an expert on modern war strategy in the United States and hence, many believe, he can do whatever he wants. Petraeus seems to be one step ahead of his predecessors in the sense that it is he who for the first time encouraged and allowed frequent use of Special Operation Forces, use of intense force, night time air-strikes and several other oppressive measures. Soon the special operations troops stepped up a campaign to kill or capture insurgent leaders as the new General made such an intention a central component of

his counter-insurgency strategy. Within months, thousands of insurgent leaders and lower-level fighters were killed or captured which was considered as rare gains and it was noticed that the Taliban fighters became fearful of moving into higher-level command positions because of these lethal operations. The operations were most effective in and around the southern city of

Kandahar and in eastern Afghanistan, where roadside bomb attacks have decreased and the Taliban control has reduced. Gen Petraeus has argued that special operations troops are just one tool, albeit a highly effective one, in fighting an insurgency. Nevertheless, the tempo of Special Operations raids has greatly increased on the ground; resulting in what the United States military says is a six-fold increase in captures and killings of Taliban

commanders. It has also resulted in an increase in night raids. In a shift that signals a further escalation in the aggressive tactics that have been employed by American forces to attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the United States deployed heavily armoured tanks in Afghanistan. The deployment of a company of M1 Abrams tanks, which were fielded by the Marines in the country’s southwest,

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CIA plays a very important role in Afghanistan with the largest Central Intelligence Agency station – since the Vietnam War – located in Kabul. Apart from its intelligence related responsibilities, the world’s most powerful spy agency command an Afghan paramilitary force in thousands and most part of clandestine war in Pakistan through armed drones is carried out by them. It has been reported that the CIA-directed Afghan militias – known as Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams – have carried out a number of secret missions into Pakistan’s tribal areas allowed ground forces to target insurgents from a greater distance and with more of a lethal punch - than is possible from any other US military vehicle. The 68-ton tanks are propelled by a jet engine and equipped with a 120 mm main gun that can destroy a house more than a mile away. The tanks were used initially in parts of northern Helmand province, where the Marines were engaged in intense combat against resilient Taliban cells that typically were armed with assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and homemade bombs. US officials argue that the tank round is far more accurate than firing artillery and it can be launched much faster than having to wait for a fighter jet or a helicopter to shoot a missile or drop a satellite-guided bomb. Experts believe that “tanks give you immediate, protected firepower and mobility to address a threat that’s beyond the range of machine guns”.

New weapon systems Several new technology weapon systems have been introduced and tested in the Afghanistan war in last few years. One such latest game-changing “revolutionary” rifle is called XM25, which has the capacity to figure out an enemy, even when he is hidden behind building or other barriers. The XM25 counter defilade target engagement system is reportedly a high-tech rifle that can be programmed so that its 25 mm ammunition does not necessarily explode on impact, but it can be set to detonate either in front of or behind a target, meaning it literally will go through a wall before it explodes and kills the enemy. It has a range of roughly 2,300 ft, which enables it to fire at targets well past the range of the rifles and carbines that most soldiers use these days. Military experts believe that this “game-changer,” provided to the US soldiers in Afghanistan only in November 2010, lead

to new ways of fighting on the battlefield. Another cutting-edge technology that is being introduced and tested in Afghanistan war theatre is a revolutionary airborne surveillance system called Gorgon Stare, which would be able to transmit live video images of physical movement across an entire town. The system, made up of nine video cameras mounted on a remotely piloted aircraft, can transmit live images to soldiers on the ground or to analysts tracking enemy movements. It can send up to 65 different images to different users; by contrast, Air Force drones today shoot video from a single camera over a “soda straw” area the size of a building or two. Gorgon Stare would be looking at a whole city, so there would be no way for the adversary to know what the American troops were looking at. Practically, they would be looking at everything and that their capability to strike strategic targets would be enhanced manifold.

“Clear, hold, build, transfer” Clear implies reversal of the Taliban momentum, hold involves controlling of the territory by preventing the insurgents from returning, build entails rebuilding the area through economic development and to establish the writ of the law and transfer means to handover the area to the trained Afghan National Security Forces. Thus, the strategy requires control of territory and a separation of insurgents from the population. Troops clear an area, remain there and implement an ambitious development programme intended to gain the support of the population. This strategy is quite significant in view of the fact that the war in Afghanistan is being waged one village and valley at a time. Officially,

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

the Afghan National Police have a presence in each of the country’s 365 districts, but many local police units are outgunned, under-trained, or corrupt. The administration’s “clear, hold, build and transfer” strategy is meant to win over Afghans in those sensitive areas. It is based on the counter-insurgency principle of protecting the population and to win confidence and support, before isolating remaining insurgents to be killed or captured.

Forming local forces In a crucial stopgap arrangement to combat rising violence in the south and the east, the United States military and the Afghan government mobilised local armed forces to combat the Taliban. The programme borrows from the largely successful Awakening Groups that General Petraeus created in Iraq, although the two programmes are not identical. Unlike the Iraqi units, the Afghan forces would not be composed of insurgents who had switched sides. They would be similar as a lightly armed, trained and, significantly, paid force under the Afghan Interior Ministry. They are armed and trained to defend their own communities; thus their job is purely defensive by nature. Historically, community defence has deep cultural roots in Afghanistan, where local men form village watch groups to keep out foes. Both the Karzai administration and the American military are describing it as a short-term remedy to the problem of lack of police officers and soldiers in many areas of the country.

Use of intense force Situation in the battlefield indicates that the US troop operations since September 2010 have been more intense and have had a harder edge than at any point since the initial 2001

drive to oust the Taliban government. The military allowed the use of intense force, at times, to wipe out opponents and create conditions for population-centric operations. The pace of Special Operations missions to kill or capture Taliban / Al Qaeda leaders tripled and the US and NATO aircraft unleashed more bombs and missiles in October 2010 - 1,000 total - than in any single month since 2001. The United States intends to kill large number of insurgents in the next few years – the military refers to it as “degrading the Taliban” and maintain that all these aggressive measures have dealt a staggering blow to the terrorists. Given such an aggressive posture of the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan, one could easily visualise their future role once the draw down begins and beyond 2014 when Washington hopes to cease combat operation. President Obama has clarified that the US counter-terrorism capability would be maintained in Afghanistan even after the 2014 deadline.

Lessons for India What lessons can the Indian political / military / strategic community learn from America’s counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan? One would argue that the United States never would have succeeded in killing so many Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists or would have gotten Osama bin Laden if it did not have the large military and Central Intelligence Agency presence along with its sophisticated military

hardware on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But what prevents India to carry out such operations even on its own soil against the nonState actors such as the Maoists or the insurgents in the north-east; leave alone inside hostile lands including Pakistan which has a strategy of using terrorism as a State policy to attack India and have done so several times? Given India’s stature in today’s world, this dimension of the country’s military preparedness has been viciously neglected. It is high time, after a long slumber, India wakes up to the ground realities in the region and the country’s political leadership and military planners take home some lessons from America’s successful counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan proves that when there was hardly any positive outcome from years of counter-insurgency operations that cost thousands of precious lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, counter-terrorism strategies and surgical strikes do the job. What is required is a will power, a nation’s determination and resolve to acquire an assertive military / strategic culture. First, India’s political leadership does not have the courage of conviction. Political idealism does not work in national security, real politik does. It is indeed difficult to imagine any of India’s present political leaders doing what President Barak Obama did on April 29, 2011: signing, on record, an executive order authorising an operation to kill a terrorist leader on foreign soil. What happened in Pakistan’s garrison city of Abbottabad four days later is now history, known to the world. President Obama

declared that justice was done to the 9/11 victims and also later visited the ground-zero in New York to show America’s resolve and determination. Can we expect such audacity from our political leadership? This is not to lay blame on an individual, but to ask ourselves: Do we have that military / strategic culture? Why not? As a nation – especially one which suffers continual torment of terrorists both internally as well as externally – how long can we afford to live in perpetual pessimism and fear? Second, America’s counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan shows that India is yet to acquire the wherewithal in terms of planning, intelligence, capability, etc. There is no tri-Service Special Forces Command, tasked with planning and executing clandestine warfare. The Special Forces of Army (Para-SF), Navy (Marcos), IAF (Garuds), NSG and RAW all have components of men trained to do operations with strategic aims, but they function separately and are yet to be equipped with specialised gadgets to carry out covert missions behind enemy lines with precision. Intelligence is another area, the agencies of which have not been able to broaden their horizons enough to make themselves reliable. RAW and IB suffer from several serious loopholes that prevent them from generating and sustaining credible intelligence from the external enemy targets. The condition of internal intelligence agencies is such that they find it difficult to operate within the population centres, leave alone to locate the Maoists or other terror targets deep inside the jungles. It is also known that Indian intelligence

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Afghanistan

network lacks discipline, especially on gathering and sustaining data sources. On the contrary, the CIA plays a very remarkable role in the day to day military operations in Afghanistan and known for its accuracy and accountability. In terms of capability, India is far behind the modern warfare technology, especially high-tech surveillance tools and satellites and combat drones like the US Predators controlled from thousands of miles away. Indian army’s plan to acquire some 500 micro- and mini-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is a welcome step in the right direction. There is an urgent need of UAVs to track the Maoists against whom intelligence gathering is very difficult because of the nature of the terrain they inhabit.

Not learning from experience Third, the American and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan have far superior technology on the battlefield, such as communications, surveillance, precision-guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, mine-resistant ground vehicles and air assets with advanced avionics, among others. On the contrary, the Indian political / military / strategic community tasked to develop counter-terrorism and surgical strikes capability seems to have suffered from some kind of bureaucratic inertia and past hangovers. It has been pointed out that many of the mistakes of 1987 catastrophic Sri Lankan operation were there to be seen in November 2008 in Mumbai when NSG commandos were deployed to take on the Pakistani terrorists. The same kind of heavy Russian helicopters (not easy to manoeuvre), intelligence and surveillance systems and also weaponry were used in Mumbai operations even after more than two decades of a terrible Sri Lankan experience. It shows the apathetic and lackluster attitude of Indian policy-makers to learn lessons from others or from their own past mistakes and experiences on this vital aspect of the country’s national security.

Security prime requirement Fourth, the counter-terrorism strategy applied by the Americans in Afghanistan as a part of their “clear, hold, build and transfer” approach has lot of relevance in terms of our fight against Maoists which is considered

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES as the “single largest security threat” to this country with its influence in huge swathes of land of about 220 districts in the “Red Corridor.” Through aggressive counter-terrorism initiatives, the US military successfully evacuated and liberated several states from the clutches of the Taliban militants. One vital component of this approach, however, has to be its prime emphasis on security dimension. One recently released scholarly research on the subject reveals: “The insurgent elites obtain popular support by doing the government’s job better than the government is doing it, particularly in the areas of security and governance. When choosing whether to support the insurgents or the counter-insurgents, the number one criterion for most people living amidst an insurgency, including most Afghans at the present time, is security. Governance comes second, and development is well back in third place … Support of the government increases sharply as security improves, somewhat less sharply when governance improves and very little when development improves. In Afghanistan and numerous other cases, the insurgents have been able to control large amounts of territory with little or no expenditures on development, by outperforming the government in security and governance.”

executive. The recent Supreme Court judgment on Salwa Judum and Special Police Officers (SPOs) - Chhattisgarh’s state-armed tribal militia aimed at fighting Naxalism – is a case in point. The Apex Cour t asking the Chhattisgarh government to “immediately cease and desist” from deploying SPOs in anti-Maoist operations and recall their firearms “forthwith” is bound to create a discouraging trend on the ongoing anti-Maoist operations.

Develop own models

SC’s ruling

For obvious reasons, India has to apply its own models and strategies keeping the Indian conditions in mind. But as an emerging power in global politics and a country of over a billion people, we must pay sufficient attention to our national security. The US has demonstrated its determination to eliminate non-State actors who plan terror strikes against them. India too must do the same. It is only relevant to note that as a result of their effective counter-terrorism strategy, not a single terrorist attack has taken place in the US after 9/11. On the contrary, it has become customary for terrorists to attack Indian cities at their own will, apart from the sporadic cold-blooded murders of civilians by the Maoists. We must put an end to this menace by developing a three dimensional approach to start with: first, Indian national security deserve a larger hands-on role of political / military / strategic community as well as media; second, India must develop a proactive military / strategic culture of its own, adequate enough to meet at least our minimum security requirements and third, the country must invest more on security – more recruitment of personnel, procurement of effective modern weaponry including remotely piloted drones and more significantly, an accountable and reliable intelligence structure. The Indian nation must start addressing its vital security concerns before it goes out of hand.

Fifth, as stated above, local armed forces play a crucial role in combating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, as they are the people who know their own land and are trained to defend their communities. But in our country, even on the question of national security, our judges appear “too judgmental,” and increasingly view their role as a check on the inept

The writer teaches Political Science, International Relations and Area Studies at National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, Pune, India. He is a former Fulbright Fellow at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and author of the books, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success That Failed and Afghanistan: Dynamics of Survival.

What comes out from the above study – which is quite pertinent in dealing with the country’s Maoist problem – is the fact that it is better to have no development where there is no security rather than to have development in the absence of security. Without security, allocating money in the name of development is just an exercise in futility as it directly or indirectly fills the coffers of the terrorists, which in turn, enables them to procure arms and carry out recruitment.

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Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

The writer has carried out a cogent analysis of the implications of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan upon the principal actors in the region. The number of US troops being left behind would eventually barely be sufficient to protect themselves. Phasing out troops from Afghanistan means that the US and its partners will be unable to prevent an even greater resurgence of the Taliban. The concern expressed by some of the senior American generals towards the withdrawal is therefore justifiable from the military point of view. The forthcoming withdrawal will also lend currency to the perception that the power and influence of the Western world, is on the wane in South Asia and elsewhere. Pakistan has kick-started its military campaign to control Afghanistan by the expulsion of US and British military and intelligence officials from Pakistan. Reports from Kabul also indicate that additional Chinese investments are underway. Given China's special relationship with Pakistan, it was to be expected that “good friend” Pakistan would canvass support for China. It would be prudent for India to be on the guard against Pakistan’s designs of unleashing out of job Taliban elements into Jammu and Kashmir.

he turning point in the “war on terror” by the US and its allies supposedly came on 02 May 2011, with the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US Navy SEALs. That he was killed in his hideout of five years at Abbottabad, Pakistan, has come as no surprise to Pakistan watchers who know only too well that Pakistan is the world’s epicentre of terrorism and that giving sanctuary to Osama in Pakistan was a clever, nay cunning, strategy on its part to continue to extract billions of dollars in aid from the US. That notwithstanding, it is not that the war on terror has come to an end with the assassination of the wily and charismatic leader; it actually gives an excuse to the US and its allies to effect an exit from the quagmire that they find themselves stuck in after a decade of mindless military operations in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan.

Well-timed exit? Keeping in mind the fact that the US public is tiring from their “patriotic resolve” to fight terror anywhere in the world and are unhappy to see their young ones come home in bodybags and coffins, not to mention the effects of heavy drain on the exchequer caused by the deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan with consequent drastic effects on the US economy, President Obama has wisely announced the phased withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. The raison d’être for the US and the coalition partners to deploy in Afghanistan was to wage a “war against terror”, which translated in

simpler language meant eliminating the Al Qaeda and its allies and killing Osama bin Laden. The US and its Allies have been reasonably successful in achieving this aim, although the war on terror is far from over. With eyes on the elections due in 2012, President Obama has got the timing of the announcement to withdraw from Afghanistan just right. His senior military commanders however feel differently. Admiral Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee is on record to have said that the reductions were “more aggressive and incur more risk” than he considered prudent. He went on to add “More force for more time is, without doubt, the safer course. But that does not necessarily make it the best course. Only the President, in the end, can really determine the acceptable level of risk we must take. I believe he has done so.” However, since the President’s order is irreversible, the important issue is to see what may be the likely repercussions post the withdrawal of the US and coalition forces from Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, welcomed Obama’s decision and said that Afghan forces were ready to take over the burden from the departing troops: “The Afghan people’s trust in the Afghan army and police is growing every day and preservation of this land is the job of Afghans,” he said. In actual fact however it sounds more like wishful thinking than a firm resolve, for, in its present form, the Afghan

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Lt Gen V K Jetley (retd)

army and police forces are neither very well trained nor well equipped to take care of themselves leave alone the country. Crystal ball gazing is the favourite pastime of soothsayers whose predictions go awry at the best of times. More often than not, such predictions are as “accurate” as weather forecasts, however, intelligent guesses can and should be made to try and predict the repercussions of such a withdrawal. First and foremost, it must be understood that the withdrawal will be done in a phased manner spread over a period of time. This would give the government of Afghanistan sufficient time to take control of the situation, although this is easier said than done. However, keeping in mind the designs of neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan; the ambition of a resurgent Taliban and the Haqqani faction, the task of the government of Afghanistan is going to be far from easy.

Inadequate backup forces The reason for US to leave 68,000 American troops behind after the planned withdrawals is basically to see that their interests in the region are not jeopardised. These troops would also serve as the eyes and ears, a sort of a “listening post” to keep a check on the activities of those who are inimical to the interests of the US and their partners in this region and to keep a watchful eye on the remnants of Al Qaeda and even on Pakistan. Although the US and their coalition partners have spelt out in concrete terms the number of troops being

repercussions

in the region withdrawn and the timeframe in which the withdrawal is to be affected, it will be safe to assume that the number of troops being left behind would eventually barely be sufficient to protect themselves. When the US and their partners were in full strength, they were unable to quell the Taliban and other disruptive elements like the Haqqani faction. Phasing out troops

from Afghanistan means that the US and its partners will be unable to prevent an even greater resurgence of the Taliban and other factions than has been occurring while the US and other troops were still in full strength. The concern expressed by some of the senior American generals towards the withdrawal is therefore justifiable from the military point of view.

US in decline The forthcoming withdrawal will also lend currency to the perception that the power and influence of the Western world, with particular reference to that of the US, is on the wane in South Asia and elsewhere. The US will be seen both domestically and internationally to be entering into a period when it is less

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Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

India would do well to continue with its efforts to help Afghanistan and not get intimidated by Islamabad’s machinations in the region. When the withdrawal of the US and its partners gets underway it is possible that military operations in Afghanistan would either get reduced in scale and numbers or escalate. If the former happens then a lot of Taliban elements will be at loose ends. It would not surprise anyone if these “out of job” elements are used by Islamabad against us. It would be prudent therefore for India to be on the guard against Pakistan’s designs of unleashing these elements into Jammu and Kashmir willing or able to intervene militarily in trouble spots around the world. Lending credence to this perception is the fact that the US has studiously kept itself away from UN peacekeeping operations since the debacle faced by it in Somalia more than a decade ago. The perception of American inability / unwillingness to intervene is likely to embolden the Taliban, the Haqqani faction, the Al Qaeda and its affiliates to fill the vacuum that will be created by their withdrawal. It may also give ideas to other countries, especially Pakistan, China and perhaps Iran to increase their involvement in Afghanistan.

Targeted assassinations Withdrawal by the US and its partners will result in the intensification of insurgent activities which are already on the increase in the recent months. These have spread beyond traditional strongholds in the South

to districts surrounding the capital, exposing the slow erosion of security in the Afghan heartland. Prominent nonPashtun politicians are being targeted by the Taliban and assassinated. The Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Hizb-e-Islami are growing in strength with active support from Pakistan. There is a school of thought that is of the opinion that “there is a great deal of collusion between the government and the insurgency. The situation today is one where an organised crime network has essentially taken over the State. You have State capture in the largest possible sense - and the insurgency has taken advantage of this. They have gained so much ground and they plan to extract so much more over the next two years as withdrawals take place, that we can expect a lot more violence and bloodshed at a much more rapid tempo.” Afghanistan has a common border with six countries viz. Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Pakistan. All these countries have been affected in some way or the other by the turmoil in Afghanistan over the past decade. Afghan refugees have poured into these neighbouring countries during the long years of fighting. The attitude of these countries will have some bearing on future stability of Afghanistan. It will be prudent to analyse what this reaction might be. While the reaction of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan may not have much impact on Afghanistan post the withdrawal, the reaction of the remaining three is definitely worth analysing.

Pakistan’s avarice Afghanistan has strategic geographical importance as it is considered to be the gateway to Central Asian Republics which are rich in mineral and energy resources. It is itself rich in energy and mineral resources, that is why it is of particular importance to its immediate neighbours viz. Pakistan, China and Iran. Let us briefly see what interests these countries have in Afghanistan. To Pakistan, the first and foremost reason is to be predominant in Afghanistan, and, if possible, to make it its colony. This would give Pakistan “the strategic depth” that it craves. The next is access to the mineral and energy resources that

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the country is richly endowed with. That is why in the 1980s, Pakistan enhanced its influence in Afghanistan while fighting against the Russians alongside the CIA and the Afghan Mujahideen. In the mid-1990s, the Pakistan-backed Taliban took power in Kabul, enhancing Pakistani influence over the country. To further strengthen the Taliban in Kabul, Pakistan - along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - recognised the Taliban regime. And now with US forces preparing to withdraw, Pakistan senses that it once again has an opportunity to re-establish its control over Afghanistan. To this end, it is implementing a two-pronged campaign - military and political / diplomatic - to try to convert Afghanistan into a Pakistani colony. Pakistan has kick-started its military campaign to control Afghanistan by the expulsion of US and British military and intelligence officials from Pakistan. A recent Pakistani media report states that some 500 CIA personnel and 18 British trainers were told to leave Pakistan. The Americans were particularly asked to leave from the Shamshi airbase in the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. It may be noted that this is the base from which drones are launched to monitor and destroy Taliban safe havens. The efforts being made by the US to have a pact with the “good” Taliban is being jeopardised by Pakistan who have had the gall to tell the US that US-Taliban peace talks cannot succeed without their involvement. To convince the US that they are in deadly earnest in making this statement, Pakistan has instigated the Taliban under its influence to carry out suicide bombings in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and other Afghan cities. Afghan NDS spokesman Lotfullah Mashal said: “Unfortunately, neighbouring countries, in particular the Pakistani army have continued to intervene in different ways ranging from suicide attacks, roadside bombings to commando-style attacks on hotels, mosques and hospitals.”

Joint commission Yet, bilateral talks between the Afghan and the Pakistani leaders were held on 16 April 2011 in Kabul. During the talks, it was decided to set up a two-tier Afghan-Pakistani joint commission, composed of both military and government officials,

which should include Pakistani Army Chief and its ISI Chief. It is obvious that the only purpose for such a decision was to officially create a role for the Pakistan military in the shaping of post withdrawal Afghanistan. Speaking after the Kabul talks, President Karzai said: “The Pakistani Prime Minister, the Chief of Army Staff and the intelligence agency chief would now represent the country on the peace commission, charged with finding a way of reaching a peace deal with the Taliban”.

Chinese interest Afghanistan’s rich mineral and energy reserves and their openness to foreign investors combined with China’s growing energy and natural resource demand have drawn Beijing’s attention to Afghanistan’s potential in meeting this requirement. This is one of the main reasons for China to invest US$ 3.5 billion in Afghanistan’s Aynak copperfield. This is by far the largest foreign direct investment in Afghanistan’s history. However, a Taliban takeover of the Pashtun-dominated area around the Aynak copperfield would probably endanger China’s economic investments. That notwithstanding, reports from Kabul also indicate that additional Chinese investments are underway. Another significant reason for China to show interest in the stabilisation of Afghanistan is the fact they are worried about a boost being given to insurgency in their Xinjiang province, as China has for long suspected the Al Qaeda of training insurgents / separatists in this province. It fears that if the Taliban were to return to power, these ties may be resumed. Instability in Afghanistan may also result in the increase of Afghan drugs into China; in 2004, Chinese officials conceded that up to 20 per cent of heroin in China could be of Afghan origin, a figure which has probably since increased.

Reconstruction funds Since the American invasion of Afghanistan, a decade ago, which resulted in the ouster of the Taliban, China has renewed political contact with Afghanistan. They have also contributed a good amount of money and resources for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In 2001, it provided

US$ 4 million worth of humanitarian aid. At the Tokyo conference, China pledged US$ 1 million for the country’s reconstruction. Subsequently, pledges of aid worth US$ 150 million were made. China has taken part in the Parwan irrigation project. It has also helped reconstruct hospitals in Kabul and Kandahar. In 2008, China decided to provide an additional US$ 6 million in aid. Since 2001, political ties between China and Afghanistan have been cordial. Impressed by China’s economic growth, President Karzai has publicly expressed his desire to emulate “America’s democracy and China’s economic success”. China and Afghanistan have signed a number of agreements for the establishment of bilateral business councils and other similar institutions devoted to the development of bilateral ties.

Geopolitical outreach Given China’s special relationship with Pakistan, it was to be expected that “good friend” Pakistan would canvass support for China. It was therefore not surprising to find that in the 16 April talks between the Afghans and the Pakistanis, the Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Gilani blatantly asked President Karzai to forge a relationship with the Chinese instead of with the US. While the Chinese overtures towards Afghanistan have been guarded, their proxy the Pakistanis have left no doubt in the minds of the Afghan leadership as to their intention in this regard.

After obtaining billions of dollars in aid including cash from the Americans for close to a decade, on the pretext of assisting them in their “war on terror”, while actively supporting terrorism, a typical case of “running with the hare and hunting with the hounds”, they switch their loyalty and support to the Chinese, without batting an eyelid. This should be surprising, to say the least, but knowing Pakistan’s penchant for double dealing and their closeness to China, it isn’t.

Iranian concerns Afghanistan and Iran have historical ties with each other stretching over centuries. Not only is there commonality of culture and religion, there is also commonality of language as a dialect of Persian and what is known as Dari Persian is the dominant language of Afghanistan. Despite centuries of friendship with each other, there has also been a century old outstanding dispute over the water rights of the Helmand River. In fact, this dispute goes back to 1870’s. The two nations signed treaties with each other in this regard in 1939 and 1973, however, in both cases the treaties were not ratified. Relationship between the two countries plummeted when after the defeat of the Soviets in the 1990’s, the Taliban, backed by Pakistan amongst others, took over the country. In 1998 the Taliban seized the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif killing

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Afghanistan

Iranian diplomats. This not only soured relationship further but almost provoked Iran into a war. However this was prevented by the US intervention in early 2000. Another irritant in the relationship between these two countries is the large number of Afghan refugees seeking asylum in Iran. As per UNHCR, there are at least three million refugees living in Iran. Iran has adopted a stringent immigration policy forcing many asylum seekers to return back to Afghanistan. However with the Karzai government coming into power, relationship between the two countries has improved considerably. Economic and trade ties have improved over this past decade as Iran has helped Afghanistan to revive not only its economy but helped build infrastructure, roads, power transmission lines and border stations. There are plans afoot to build a new railway line connecting Mashhad in Iran with Herat in Afghanistan and eventually perhaps connect the two capitals. In 2008, Iran’s exports to Afghanistan were close to US$ 800 million while imports from Afghanistan were US$ 4 million. In 2009, Iran was the fourth largest investor in Afghanistan. Iranian investments were basically made on infrastructure related projects, It exported oil products, cement, construction material, carpets, home appliances and detergents and imported nuts, carpets, agricultural products as well as handicrafts from Afghanistan.

Indian support

Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES re-established diplomatic relationship with the Karzai government and provided economic and humanitarian aid to the tune of US$ 650 – 750 million. It has participated in reconstruction work like rebuilding air links, roads and power plants. Indian army’s Border Roads Organisation has constructed a major road in the interiors of the Nimroz Province in the face of fierce opposition from the Taliban. India has invested in the health and education sector, is training their Police, civil servants and diplomats and assisting in the development of supply lines of oil, gas and electricity. During the 15th SAARC summit held in Sri Lanka, India pledged aid to the tune of US$ 450 million. This was in addition to the US$ 750 million pledged earlier. By May 2011, India’s contribution to rebuild Afghanistan reached a staggering total of US$ 2 billion.

Well-earned goodwill India’s efforts in Afghanistan have resulted in earning a lot of goodwill for it from the Afghans as is evident from an opinion poll conducted amongst people in the war-affected areas of Afghanistan. India has been voted as the most reliable partner of Afghanistan, much to the chagrin of India’s arch rival in this region Pakistan who have been given the dubious vote of being the most unreliable. Needless to say, Pakistan does not like India’s popularity in this region and will resort to all the tricks in its repertoire to show us in poor light. The withdrawal of the US and its coalition partners from Afghanistan will surely lead to Pakistan spreading its influence in Afghanistan to counter India.

Before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, India had a common border with Afghanistan in what was known as North West Frontier Province. Historically both countries have always had very cordial relationship with each other, with cultural and economic ties continuing to date. In 2007 India backed Afghanistan’s entry into the SAARC because of which they have full membership as of now as the eighth member of SAARC.

The countdown for the withdrawal has begun and there will be no stopping the tide. However, the US and its partners are not likely to squander away the gains made so painstakingly over the last decade at the cost of so many lives and with such enormous cost to the exchequer. They will put into place sufficient checks and balances to prevent Afghanistan from sliding back into near oblivion from where it has been rescued by the international community.

India has always government in Kabul, the Taliban came into the overthrow of the

And while striking a deal with the so called good Taliban is still an option, it is not going to be done at the cost of handing over full control of

backed the except when power. After Taliban India

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Afghanistan to them. Further, after the Abbottabad episode, the international community has seen Pakistan in its true light. People are now sceptical of the “efforts” being made by Pakistan in the so called war on terror. The US has recently made its disappointment with Pakistan apparent by withholding US$ 800 million aid promised to it earlier.

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

Prof P M Kamath

China’s growing interest in the vast potential of mineral and energy resources in this region and the strategic location of Afghanistan as the gateway to CAR, should be tapped for Beijing has the potential of playing a very important role in the region. It should be asked to use its friendship with Pakistan to persuade Pakistan’s military from continuing to adopt an antagonistic and defensive posture towards India and instead focus its energies to fighting the Taliban to bring relief to the Afghans. Having said that it appears to be easier said than done. India would do well to continue with its efforts to help Afghanistan as it has been doing for the past decade or so and not get distracted by Islamabad’s machinations in the region. When the withdrawal of the US and its partners gets underway in full swing, it is possible that military operations in Afghanistan would either get reduced in scale and numbers or escalate. If the former happens then a lot of Taliban elements will be at loose ends. It would not surprise anyone if these “out of job” elements are used by Islamabad against us. It would be prudent therefore for India to be on the guard against Pakistan’s designs of unleashing these elements into Jammu and Kashmir to continue with its policy of staking a claim to this region.

The writer retired as Master General of Ordnance, Army Headquarters. A fourth generation officer, who was commissioned into the Infantry in 1965. During 40 years service in the Indian Army he has held various prestigious command and staff appointments which include command of a Brigade deployed in the highest battlefield in the world, a division in the desert and a corps in active insurgency areas. As UN Force Commander in Sierra Leone from November 1999 to October 2000, he executed the highly acclaimed "Operation Khukri" which broke the back of the rebels.

Pakistan’s strategy after Osama

Convoluted as is the Pakistani military mindset, it has not hesitated to posit China as its new polestar in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how far Beijing will go along with the terrorism of the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine. Hitherto it has reaped huge geopolitical gains by using Pakistan (and hence its terrorist network) as its forward echelon against India and the US. Now that the façade has been torn away and Pakistan stands exposed as mentor and beneficiary of Taliban / Al Qaeda terrorism the Chinese will have to tread more cautiously in their relations with Pakistan. With drone attacks increasing by the day Pakistan may find itself left with few options by the time Barack Obama makes his bid for a second term in office. August 2011 Defence AND security alert

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wo recent developments in relation to US war on terror in Afghanistan might have really forced a change in Pakistan’s strategy towards Afghanistan. These are, first, Obama’s success in tracing Osama, independent of any assistance from Pakistan, in Abbottabad right under the nose of military academy and unilateral action to bring him under “justice” by his extermination right inside his hiding place. Second, as a result of the first, Obama’s announcing his decision to withdraw ten thousand troops now and eventually withdrawing thirty three thousand US troops by end 2012. In this article, I propose to examine Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan before Osama bin Laden’s extermination and changes likely to occur thereafter in that strategy. What has been Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan in the last three decades? To find an answer to the question, we need to understand answers to four interrelated, but very important questions. First, what is the lasting national interest that is pursued by Pakistan’s strategic community? Second, who is the enemy or adversary

The US current extreme fulmination against Pakistani duality of going with it as partner in international war on terrorism while promoting actively terrorism against US interests in Afghanistan, seems not to last beyond November 2012 elections. But India should continue to talk to political side of Pakistani government. Though it is not the task of India to promote democracy in Pakistan, if that is going to help Indian national interests, India should do it as it is involved in strengthening democracy in Afghanistan

from which, to save Pakistan, the strategy is formulated? Third, who, in strategic community of Pakistan are the real shakers and movers of that strategic policy and finally in order of declining significance, who are the mainstay for the sustenance of the strategic policy?

National interest It is an old saying that a State has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies but only permanent interests. Applying this yardstick since 1971 more obviously—because of the loss of Eastern wing of Pakistan by it’s becoming an independent nation of Bangladesh, finding a ‘strategic depth’ for the survival of Pakistan as an Islamic State has been its lasting national interest. Strategic depth generally refers to distance between a nation’s frontlines and its civil and military assets. Strategic depth increases if a State is able to move its frontlines farther away from its civil and military assets. Pak Army Chief, General Zia-ul Haq (1979-1988), who also enjoyed political power in addition to military power, focused on India’s province of Punjab bordering Pakistan to create a buffer state between itself and India. Success of the project would have not only healed hurt ego of Pak army for its defeat in Bangladesh War in 1971, but it would have also provided strategic depth to Pakistan. Having failed in the mission to force a secession of Punjab from India, subsequent military generals focused on Kashmir and Afghanistan. The victory of its protégé Taliban in capturing power in 1996 in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan looked at it as providing strategic depth to it. Another military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, the one who was dragged by former US President, George W. Bush, into its war against Afghanistan after 9/11 also considered Afghanistan providing strategic depth to Pakistan in the event of a conflict. Though this was a policy followed by every military dictator, no one so well articulated it as the present Army Chief of Pakistan, General Kayani. During his interactions with correspondents of foreign media in Islamabad on February 1, last year, he said: “We want Afghanistan to be our strategic depth …” It sounds as though he meant

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan as Pakistan’s client State. But he added: “The way we understand it, if Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly (emphasis added), we will have strategic depth because our western border is secure …” While he has used the concept many a times, he spelt it out in this rare foreign media briefing. He however, hastened to say, that his concept of strategic depth did not imply “controlling Afghanistan.” Of course, he was aware that no one in history has been successful to control Afghanistan!

Permanent enemy Pakistan’s search for strategic depth revolves around army’s threat perceptions. Earlier, in the 1980s the Soviet Union was considered as a security threat along with India. But now security threat emerges only from India. Army has very well succeeded in creating this perception within the majority of their countrymen. A recent survey confirmed that fifty-four per cent of Pakistanis see India as the greatest threat to its security. It is an open secret that the Obama administration had tried, so far unsuccessfully, to drive the point to Pakistani army that it is not India but Pakistan-bred internal terrorist groups and Al Qaeda, which are the greatest threat to Pakistan’s survival as a moderate Islamic State. Obviously when Kayani argues in favour of western borders being secure it suggests that strategic depth provides Pakistan the ability to concentrate on Indian borders. A friendly Afghanistan can help it to shift its moveable military assets from Afghanistan in case of a conflict with India.

Strategic policy Discussion so far makes it clear that despite having been a part of Indian cultural ethos to begin with, Pakistanis, have not only become a military dictatorship where even semblance of democracy does not survive for more than a few years at a time. This has been mainly achieved through Islamisation of society and polity and constant hate-India campaign! After Zia, Benazir Bhutto ran a ramshackle democracy where all key decisions where taken by the army. Later, during Nawaz Sharif’s democratic rule, again power was seized by the then Army Chief, General Musharraf in October 1999. Military dictatorship of

Musharraf came to an end in January 2008. In Pakistan it is military that alone controls nation’s nuclear policy and determines its use! As a result democracy that returned to Pakistan in 2008 is only an outer shell without any democratic content or spirit in it. It is the army that really lays down the strategic policy of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto after her demitting power had said that she had absolutely no knowledge of Pakistani status on the nuclear weapons. The present elected government had no idea—I am sure about the 26/11 that was given the go ahead by the ISI with tacit consent of the army. Initially I was skeptical of Zardari’s claim that it was a handiwork of ‘non-State actors.’ But subsequent developments in India-Pakistan political relations and continued dominance of army in strategic affairs convince me that political establishment must have been ignorant about the anti-India moves of Military-ISI-Jihadi complex.

American in-out policy During the last thirty years, the US has been mainstay of Pakistan.

But it has played ‘In and Out’ policy towards Pakistan; Afghanistan has been the factor responsible for the US to pull Pakistan into its orbit and also push it out as well. In 1979-1980 the US was keen to make Pakistan frontline State to pump-in arms, money and Mujahideen into Afghanistan to force its then arch rival, Soviet Union out from Afghanistan. Having achieved that goal in 1989 and also seeing the demise of the Soviet Union, Americans abandoned Pakistan to develop as a university to train terrorists for the globalising world; and Afghanistan to their warlords! But Osama bin Laden forced George W. Bush to get himself invited in 2001 in Pakistan to hunt for him in Afghanistan! In this period Pakistan received a bounty of over US$ 40 billion as military and economic aid. It also got large unaccounted prize money for killing US-wanted Pakistani terrorists - that was an extra bonus.

Obama eliminates Osama Thus, Osama bin Laden played at least three significant roles in the triangular relations with the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan at three different phases. First he was for Americans and Pakistanis an anti-Soviet Islamic

crusader to get the Russians out from Afghanistan. Second, after Russian withdrawal and capture of power by the Taliban he was a welcome guest of Pakistan and a friend of Afghanistan. The Taliban which was trained in Pakistan-established, funded and protected Madrasas for the first time created a hope in Pakistan of fulfilling their dream of creating space for their concept of ‘strategic depth.’ Finally, since 9/11 he was hunted by the US during the Bush administration but protected by Afghanistan. But hunt got over after Taliban was dethroned more particularly after Tora Bora escape of Osama to Pakistan in December 2001; then he became a strategic asset of Pakistan with US as a financier and Afghanistan as a strategic depth. It is the US and Pakistan that really reaped benefits of their changing relations with Osama. However, his presence became a liability for Afghanistan. An American spy, Lt Col Anthony Shaffer, who has published his exploits in Afghanistan in a work called ‘Operation Dark Heart: Spycraft and special ops on the frontlines of Afghanistan’ says that despite ground operators and his stating that the intelligence “indicates

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

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that the most of leadership [of 9/11 terror] is … now in Pakistan” their superiors forced them to focus on Hindu Kush mountains—their winter safe havens.

Helpful Osama? President Bush lost political interest in getting Osama after the latter helped him to get elected for a second term by issuing a threat-message of terror attack on October 29, 2004. To put it in simple language, till that date, sixty per cent of voters considered Bush as competent to protect US security while 60 per cent of voters considered John Kerry as capable to improve economy and people were more concerned about economic situation than security. But Osama’s message helped Bush to win November 2, elections by making security once again a main issue. Having won a second term, thanks to Osama, Bush spared the life of Osama bin Laden. Contrary is the case with Obama’s search for Osama. For Obama getting the US troops out from Afghanistan is an electoral necessity to win a second term. May 2nd extermination of terrorist Osama is expected to help US president Obama in fulfilling his promise to withdraw 33,000 troops by end 2012, which in turn is expected to help him, to get elected for a second term. Whether he will really get elected or not will be known only after another 17 months.

Post-Osama strategy American daring but successful adventure of elimination of Osama is likely to bring about a change in Pakistan’s Afghan strategy. American top policymakers like President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director of CIA, seem to be deliberately divulging information damaging credibility of the militaryintelligence-jihadi complex of Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan, on its part, is likely to demonstrate its sincerity in adhering to terms of engagement. Pakistan has been weakened vis-à-vis the US since the killing of Osama bin Laden who was well protected till May 2nd this year with the intention of claiming a bigger price from the US. Either the US had a secret understanding with Pakistan or it is possible that forces inimical to Kayani within the army might have

leaked the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Whatever may be the facts, but either way it is likely to weaken the Pakistani army; public perception today is one of an army weakened. It might embolden the political establishment to assert itself to secure a greater say in strategic policy making hitherto not permitted to it. It is evident that it has begun to perform its role as scripted by the US under the new situation. It has begun to strike at Pakistani Taliban. What are significant changes in Pakistan’s strategy towards Afghanistan, which we are likely to see since Osama’s burial in the Arabian Sea? First, it is clear that as far as making of strategic policy is concerned, there are going to be two policy centres, which are likely to compete with one another. One is dominant military, which inseparably includes ISI and another is a weak and subservient political democratic elite. In the beginning it has been made clear that in strategic policy formulation political establishment had a minimal role while military dominated. But now, post-Osama extermination onwards under American calculated policy, military is being downgraded in making of strategy policy.

Pressure on Pakistan Second, it seems to be clear that Pakistan will be forced to change its strategy in Afghanistan. Thus, President Obama said in his June 22nd address on Afghanistan that US “will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region.” In particular Pakistan is expected to “address terrorist safe-havens,” root out “the cancer of violent extremism.” The US officials now publicly say that threat to US emanates from Pakistan and not from Afghanistan. Third, Pakistan is warned that the US will continue to hit any terrorist hideout even in future, if that helps it to secure itself greater safety and security. This is not an empty threat as American drones now attack Pakistan’s tribal areas more often from Afghan bases, demonstrating that it can still carry out its threat independent of the Pakistani cooperation including non-use of Pakistani territory.

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The Most Established

Fourth, American focus, has been on Taliban. However, it should be remembered that the American distinction, wrongly in my opinion, that is being made between Afghan-Taliban and Pakistani-Taliban is untenable. It has to be noted that a majority of Taliban cadre consists of Pashtu ethnic people. These are divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan across the Durand Line. Hence, this national distinction is insignificant; what binds them together as Taliban is their Pashtu ethnicity. Therefore it is often misleading for the Americans to use the terms as good Taliban and bad Taliban because Taliban in Afghanistan is bad for Afghanistan while Taliban in Pakistan is bad for Pakistan. A combined Taliban is bad for the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

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In conclusion, it is relevant to ask: How does it affect India? The US current extreme fulmination against Pakistani duality of going with it as partner in international war on terrorism while promoting actively terrorism against US interests in Afghanistan, seems not to last beyond November 2012 elections. But India should continue to talk to political side of Pakistani government. Though it is not the task of India to promote democracy in Pakistan, if that is going to help Indian national interests, India should do it as it is involved in strengthening democracy in Afghanistan. In the post-American withdrawal period India needs to evolve an independent Afghan policy to secure her interests in playing a greater non-combat role in Afghanistan. Since 2001, India has been the fifth largest donor to Afghanistan by providing it economic aid of US$ 1.5 billion in infrastructure development. Indian role after US withdrawal could be strengthened further by India playing a role in bringing about US-Iranian approchement.

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The writer is former Professor of Politics, University of Mumbai and currently Hon. Director, VPM’s Centre for International Studies, Mumbai and Adjunct Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Manipal, India.

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A valuable examination of Pakistan’s stakes and options in Afghanistan. Continued instability in that country will have serious consequences for Pakistan. Its proclivity to overplay its hand and miscalculate its strengths has already fractured its polity, ruined its economy and caused immense suffering to its population. Pakistan no doubt has leverages which it is trying to exploit for achieving its objectives in Afghanistan, some of which are unachievable. It is also trying to exploit its vulnerabilities in a high stakes game of creating strategic depth in Afghanistan. Like many times in the past, it may again miss an opportunity to help in establishment of peace in the region if it continues to play a high stakes, zero-sum game at the cost of all its neighbours. There are limits to the patience of other stakeholders. USA appears to have reset its objectives and draw down of US and ISAF troops is on course. The writer outlines three plausible scenarios that could emerge. A useful exercise in perspective thinking.

he draw down of US forces in Afghanistan has been announced. Some other countries forming part of ISAF have also declared their intention to scale down their presence in line with the US withdrawal. It is as yet unclear whether ISAF will withdraw completely by end of 2014. That would depend upon resetting of strategic objectives by USA, effectiveness of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) to manage the security, political and security situation within Afghanistan and more importantly, the role played by Pakistan. From the indicators emanating from Washington it seems likely that US will exit Afghanistan by 2014, with or without tangible success having been achieved while efforts to create space for some degree of involvement will continue. The role played by various actors; USA, Pakistan, Taliban, Afghan leadership and regional powers will have a bearing on the emerging situation. However, role of USA and Pakistan - along with its proxies, will have the most significant impact. Outcomes in Afghanistan will have a profound bearing on Pakistan’s own security and stability and will also largely depend upon what role it plays in next 17 months and thereafter. Pakistan has choices to make. It can help in establishing peace in Afghanistan by helping in

concluding a peace process involving all stakeholders or it can act as spoiler and obstruct the process of stabilisation of Afghanistan by holding the process hostage to its own unattainable objectives. The choice it makes will determine whether Pakistan itself comes out of the quagmire of economic stagnation, internal strife, fractured polity and diplomatic isolation. This article examines the emerging situation, Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan, what is achievable by it and the likely role that Pakistan will play by 2014 and beyond.

Emerging scenario The domestic political and economic situation in USA is forcing it to recalibrate its strategy towards Pakistan but there are no easy options available to it. The situation in Afghanistan is not showing signs of any appreciable change for the better. The ‘surge’ seems to have had limited impact. Continued economic difficulties and falling public support for war in Afghanistan, have forced the US President to announce draw down of almost one third of US troops from Afghanistan by end 2012. The current buzzword is that draw down is ‘inexorable’. Efforts to negotiate with Taliban for reconciliation are aimed at ending the conflict in Afghanistan and permitting an honourable withdrawal

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of coalition forces. It is not certain at this stage, however, if US will withdraw all its troops or withdraw irrespective of the situation prevailing at that point of time. Development of new and large US bases in some parts of Afghanistan indicates that USA is preparing for a long haul for reasons beyond Afghanistan, even if it has to withdraw most of its troops from Afghanistan by 2014. However, some voices in that country are questioning the wisdom of continuing to bleed in Afghanistan and are calling for redefinition of US interests in the region. It seems that the US administration is examining its exit strategy having given up on the initial objectives of nation building and establishing democracy in Afghanistan. It has made contact with Taliban for negotiating a power sharing deal and ending the conflict but the latter are convinced that they can win the war simply by not losing it and therefore need not make concessions necessary which will take the interests of other ethnic groups on board. Besides, it is not certain if Taliban leadership will abide by the agreed terms of reconciliation. Pakistan can help in bringing Taliban to the negotiation table but will do so at its own terms. Most analysts argue that Afghanistan cannot be stabilised without full cooperation from Pakistan. It is this

Pakistan’s likely role

commonly held belief that makes Pakistan act difficult and withhold cooperation unless its own interests are factored in. Pakistan believes that it holds most, if not all, of the aces and that ultimately it will prevail in installing a Pakistan friendly regime in Kabul sooner or later as long as it continues supporting Taliban and allied militants. That this approach has already fractured its polity, ruined its economy and destabilised the country has not persuaded Pakistan to rethink its Afghan strategy. Despite some sane voices emanating from within Pakistan, warning of catastrophic consequences of persisting with the policy, the

leadership in Pakistan, particularly its army and ISI, seem to believe that the risk is worth taking. Pakistan appears to be convinced that USA cannot win the war in Afghanistan and the only options available to it are to cut a deal with Taliban with full Pakistani involvement or concede defeat and withdraw after which Pakistani proxies will gain power in any case. This is the reason why Pakistan continues to play truant. It is ironic that whereas Pakistan does not wish to see America winning the war in Afghanistan, at the same time it wants America to facilitate achievement of its own objectives in that country. It would be pertinent

Brig Rumel Dahiya (retd)

here to examine Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s objectives Pakistan has not officially articulated its objectives in Afghanistan in a clear and comprehensive manner. But these can be deduced from the utterances of its leadership from time to time. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, while interacting with the media at the Army Headquarters on 01 February 2010, is reported to have said that Pakistan has no interest in establishing control over Afghanistan, while adding that a

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Pakistan appears to be convinced that USA cannot win the war in Afghanistan and the only options available to it are to cut a deal with Taliban with full Pakistani involvement or concede defeat and withdraw after which Pakistani proxies will gain power in any case peaceful Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with ‘strategic depth’ in the region. Strategic depth vis-à-vis India can only be achieved if there is a Pakistan friendly and anti-India regime in place in Kabul. That appears to be main Pakistani objective in Afghanistan. The other identifiable objectives are also contingent upon establishment of a Pakistan friendly regime in Kabul. These appear to be: to get recognised as the main, if not sole, arbitrator in Afghanistan; to get Durand Line recognised as the final border between Pakistan and Afghanistan; to severe the linkages between the Taliban and the Pakistani terrorist groups and; to build a ‘strategic regional consensus’ extending from Ankara to Islamabad. While attempting to achieve its objectives, Pakistan would also not like to let go of the economic aid from USA, the EU and China. Once its geo-strategic position improves Pakistan can hope to garner support for its disputes with India. Each of these objectives comes with some assumptions and caveats. Although validity of the idea of ‘strategic depth’ has been questioned by many commentators within the country and outside but it still fires the imagination of decision makers in Pakistan as can be made out from the statement of Gen Kayani mentioned earlier. In fact, from early days of its separation from India, Pakistan has been obsessed with the idea of creating strategic depth vis a vis India. It has at its core the military centric notion that in the event of war with India Pakistan’s military would be able to operate from Afghanistan to offset its

geographical disadvantage of very little depth to its East. Kamran Shafi, a noted Pakistani columnist writing in Dawn in early January 2010, raised a valid question when he said that presuming India loses its good sense and foolishly goes to war with Pakistan, “Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes? And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? More importantly, how can Afghanistan be our ‘strategic depth’ when most Afghans hate our guts, not only the northerners, but even those who call themselves Pashtuns?” The non-military concept of strategic depth could be that faced with a much stronger hostile neighbour to its East, Pakistan can ill afford to have another hostile neighbour to its West. It therefore wishes to install a regime in Afghanistan which it can control and manipulate and which does not raise the difficult question of validity of the Durand Line. It also realises the importance of Afghanistan in forging strategic links with Central Asian Republics (CAR) and West Asia. This version of the concept of strategic depth contains both geopolitical and economic elements within it. Perhaps it also encapsulates the desire of becoming a leader of the Islamic world. The question that arises therefore is whether Pakistan is using Taliban as a strategic depth to establish its hegemony over Afghanistan and extend its reach beyond or it is using them to create a strategic depth in Afghanistan? As regards Durand Line, Pakistan was unable to get even Taliban agree to its recognition as the final border between the two countries. It is difficult to foresee a Pashtun dominated regime in Afghanistan formally endorsing Durand Line as the recognised border. But sadly, Pakistan is working to establish a Pashtun dominated regime only. Also, the idea of forging a ‘strategic regional consensus’ to checkmate India will remain an unfulfilled dream since the world has moved on since the

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

idea was originally conceived. It is imperative therefore for Pakistan to redefine its interests and objectives in Afghanistan and reassess its strategy to achieve them. Lt General Hamid Gul, a known Jihadi ideologue and ex ISI Chief, was quoted in an article by Arnaud de Borchgrave having told Hubertus Hoffmann, President of the World Security Network that “The future government need not necessarily be exclusively Taliban. Pakistan will have to deal with whoever is in command in Kabul … and Taliban have reformed substantially compared to their earlier conduct in governance.” There may be a calculation behind this approach that a weak government dominated by Taliban will enable Pakistan to manipulate it for its own ends. It would help it in negotiating with jihadis operating within Pakistan and to reduce India’s influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, a certain degree of instability will serve Pakistan’s interests.

What is achievable Amidst the noise of breakdown of trust between USA and Pakistan, particularly between the two militaries and the intelligence agencies, the two countries are talking to each other. Influential people from both sides are talking of working together to achieve common goals and objectives rather than emphasising lack of trust. Unfortunately, goals and objectives of USA and Pakistan are asymmetric. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is central to its national strategy whereas for USA it is just one part of its global strategy. Pakistan has to live with the reality of Afghanistan. Due to shared Pashtun ethnicity and unrecognised border, potential for discord with Afghanistan will always remain. In purely military terms, no other power has mastered Afghanistan in the past and Pakistan will certainly not be able to control it in future given its own lack of comprehensive national strength. The idea of ‘strategic depth’ is a mirage. Many people believe that the concept of strategic depth, in its military or non-military sense, is kept alive deliberately to shape the narrative of relations between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan due to Pakistan’s pathological hatred towards India. The idea serves to justify its misconceived

and single minded determination to deny any role to India in Afghanistan. What is lost on Pakistan is that it cannot gain any form of strategic depth without the consent and cooperation of not only the people of Afghanistan but also its neighbours. It is hard to imagine that Afghans, be it Taliban or the others, will support Pakistan’s idea of gaining strategic depth at the cost of their own interests.

Uneasy bedfellows Even if a Pakistan friendly regime is established in Afghanistan following the final withdrawal of ISAF, Afghan nationalism and Pakistani nationalism will ultimately clash. It is in Afghanistan’s interest to integrate its economy with the entire region, including CAR, Iran, India and China rather than being dependent on an economically and politically fragile Pakistan. No regime in Afghanistan, even if it is Taliban dominated, will countenance control of its strategic choices by Pakistan. Pakistan can also reap economic benefits flowing from export of Afghan and Pakistani minerals to resource hungry India, China and the West, transit fees from oil and gas pipelines running from CAR and Iran and expansion of regional trade. That would help in improving infrastructure in Pakistan, generate revenues and employment to absorb part of the rising population and wean them away from extremism. An alternative narrative of nationalism based on economic growth, moderation and inclusiveness will have to be created and sustained over a period of time for it to succeed. Indian interests in Afghanistan are premised

on historical, economic and geopolitical considerations and are not security centric. India does not see its and Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan as a zero sum game. Pakistan’s interests would also be served better if it realises that exclusive focus on Taliban, representing Pashtuns, would always put them at odds with other ethnic groups. If Taliban emerge as the sole power centre in Afghanistan, other ethnic groups will come together and challenge Taliban rule, giving rise to continued conflict and even a civil war. Therefore, it needs to broaden their engagement with Afghanistan involving all the ethnic groups and regions. All plausible outcomes from its political and economic isolation and exacerbated instability are likely to be dangerous for Pakistan. Its very survival as a State may become doubtful. Of course it will affect the region as a whole but its impact on the Pakistani State will be catastrophic. It is therefore rational to think that Pakistan will be amenable to course correction and will settle for achievement of moderate objectives of getting Taliban to negotiation table, agreeing to a power sharing deal and reduced presence of US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, guaranteed financial support for itself and share in reconstruction and rebuilding effort in Afghanistan.

Taliban calculus The process of negotiation and its successful conclusion are not likely to be easy. Accommodation of interests of Tajiks, Heratis, Hazaras and Uzbeks besides the Pashtun warlords and tribal elders will be as important as accommodating Taliban. Taliban

perhaps view the situation differently. They understand that the resolve of the coalition partners is weakening and they can be exhausted and driven out without conceding anything as long as Pakistan continues to support them. They may also be calculating that Pakistan has no choice but to support them if it wants peace in FATA and Pakhtunkhwa. But since the survival of their leadership and the movement itself is so critically dependent on Pakistan, Taliban may be amenable to talks under certain conditions of their own. Regional powers like Iran will also need to be taken on board for any solution to work. Peace in Afghanistan cannot be sustained without the cooperation of regional powers. It is certain, however, that a full withdrawal of US and ISAF without achieving a degree of stability and political settlement in Afghanistan will result in chaos on either side of Durand Line and Pakistan will be in jeopardy. It is hoped that Pakistan will realise the gravity of the situation and change course. Its behaviour along with that of other players makes the following scenarios plausible in next 5 to 10 years.

Scenario 1 Draw down of troops by USA proceeds simultaneously with negotiations with Taliban. Faced with the prospects of economic squeeze and strategic break with USA, Pakistan nudges Taliban towards negotiations. Taliban agrees to share power in Kabul with exclusive control of the East and the South. It also secures the guarantees for integration of some of its fighters in the ANA and ANP, with others to be rehabilitated economically. USA retains the right to maintain five bases,

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Even if a Pakistan friendly regime is established in Afghanistan following the final withdrawal of ISAF, Afghan nationalism and Pakistani nationalism will ultimately clash including Bagram. Focus shifts to consolidation of security situation and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan and further draw down of US forces from Afghanistan. Despite occasional hiccups, security and stability returns to Afghanistan. Economic situation improves with TAPI project making progress and major mining projects taken up by various countries. Foreign militants, other than Taliban, remain on Pakistani soil and it continues to face internal security challenge. US dependence on Pakistan is substantially reduced. Economic and military support to Pakistan is also reduced. International community, including India, joins hands in economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. Pakistan becomes a small player in Afghanistan but gains a measure of stability and its economy improves riding on increasing investments and trade flow.

Scenario 2 Draw down of ISAF proceeds as planned with about one third strength leaving Afghanistan by end 2012. Some areas in the North and the West handed over to ANA and balance of ISAF (mainly US and British troops) concentrate in the South and the East. Drones are relocated to Afghanistan. Greater reliance is placed on intelligence, employment of Special Forces, drones and air strikes to neutralise Taliban in the absence of a peace deal with them. Training and equipping of ANA and ANP continues. Taliban employ hit and run tactics against the ISAF bases and patrols but focus their attacks on ANA, ANP and political elements within Afghanistan. Political settlement with Taliban makes little headway. Continued violence and rising ascendancy of Taliban in the South and East Afghanistan emboldens militants East of the Durand Line. Dependence on Pakistan

for logistic sustenance of remaining ISAF troops comes down with increased cooperation from Russia and CAR. Military and economic aid to Pakistan is reduced substantially and Pakistani economy is kept on life support. Fearful of economic meltdown, Pakistan cooperates in a limited way - against Al Qaeda but not against Taliban - and keeps the supply lines open despite occasional attacks on convoys. ANA and ANP are better trained and equipped and establish a semblance of peace in the North and West Afghanistan with some help from US forces. Reelection of US President Obama in 2012 and improved economic situation enables USA to continue its involvement till 2014 and beyond. Status of Forces agreement with Afghanistan enables USA to occupy recently completed five or seven bases. USA stops combat mission except against specific targets. Pakistan’s cooperation with USA in resolving the conflict comes down further in response to reduced financial assistance. Russia, China and Iran oppose anticipated long term US presence in Afghanistan but are unable to do anything about it in the absence of any viable alternate regional solution. Prospects of an eventual bifurcation galvanise the Afghan nationalists on both sides of the divide, to find a negotiated solution. Pakistan is forced to rethink its strategy and comes round to encouraging Taliban to negotiate to prevent possible emergence of Pakhtunistan incorporating territory on either side of Durand Line.

Scenario 3 Following the partial draw down of ISAF by end 2012, lack of progress on political front due to internal politics in Afghanistan, combined with continued economic strain on economy in the US force it to rethink the strategic calculus of continued US presence in Afghanistan. USA decides to withdraw completely from Afghanistan by 2014, retaining the option of launching air strikes in case its interests are threatened by terrorism emanating from the region. In the interim, focus shifts to strengthening of ANA and ANP and building up a coalition of anti-Taliban warlords and regional leaders so that Taliban do not overrun the whole country. Regional players step in to support their favoured groups and frustrate Pakistan’s desire to control Afghanistan through their proxies. Afghanistan is embroiled

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in serious internal strife beyond the control of Pakistan. China is unwilling to replace USA as Pakistan's economic saviour.

dialogue and military action. Pakistan perhaps calculates that it is too important or dangerous for the world to let it fail and hence despite withdrawal from Afghanistan, USA and the West will continue to provide financial support to it. Shortfall may be expected to be made up by improvement in economy and assistance from China and the Middle Eastern countries.

Impact on Pakistan None of the three scenarios discussed above meet all Pakistani expectations. Scenario 1 envisages a stable and unified Afghanistan but not under Pakistani tutelage. Pakistan will be reduced to being a minor player in Afghanistan. Should Pakistan realise its limitations and moderate its goals in Afghanistan this scenario offers it substantial dividends. If Pakistani behaviour remains path dependent Scenario 2 is more likely to emerge; driven by nationalistic impulses within Pakistan and miscalculation on the part of Pakistan military about its indispensability. Initially it may appear that Pakistan is in the driving seat but ultimately it will have to cut its losses and support reconciliation from a position of weakness. The desperation of the situation and violence induced fatigue is likely to force various players to come to some solution. Pakistan will get no credit for such an outcome. Scenario 3 will be the worst for Pakistan. Its internal security situation will deteriorate further and it will lose external financial and military support also. The terrorists within Pakistan will be emboldened and take on the Pakistani security forces directly. Anxieties about threat from India will get exacerbated. Pakistan may like to believe that America’s strategic interests in the region are hostage to Pakistan’s decisions. These misconceptions have the potential to change the scenarios in unpredictable manner.

Pak miscalculation? Pakistan may miscalculate because of some realities and some myths prevailing in Pakistan. Some of those are; ISAF will be unable to stabilise Afghanistan and will be forced to withdraw; USA cannot achieve its war aims without Pakistan’s cooperation; participating countries in ISAF have no heart in continuing in Afghanistan due to domestic compulsions and USA by itself will not be able to sustain the war effort alone; main supply routes for ISAF passing through Pakistan provide it a leverage which can not be reduced to any appreciable degree; possession of nuclear weapons, its strategic

location, close strategic relations with China and its Islamic identity give it an advantage which USA can not overlook. Finally, Pakistan is aware that as the United States draws down, it will still need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal. Undoubtedly, US influence over it is hugely unpopular in Pakistan. Both the civilian government and the military, including the ISI, are accused by the Pakistani public of being deeply influenced by and working under US directions and waging a war against its own people. Pakistan army believes that it will be able to negotiate with the home grown jihadis once USA leaves Afghanistan. Release of known Lashkar-e-Jhangvi leader Malik Ishaq from jail in July 2011, presumably for opening a line of communication to the militants, points in that direction. Despite realising its precarious economic situation and critical role USA plays in keeping it going, many people in Pakistan are resentful of the dependency on USA. They think that with remittance from expatriates, reduced expenditure on military operations and resultant uptake in economic activity the country can manage itself without aid and support from USA. To be seen as non-cooperative or hostile to USA helps Pakistani establishment regain their credibility with the people. Pakistan army in particular is trying to create an impression of its strength and ability to withstand American pressure and strengthening the perception that it alone is capable of safeguarding Pakistan’s interests. It is mindful of the pitfalls in following an approach which will make USA harden its stance towards Pakistan but it perhaps believes that USA cannot let Pakistan collapse because of its geo-strategic importance and

fear of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of jihadis. This seems to be a misperception because the US which is facing difficult choices in managing its own finances may very well decide to call Pakistan’s bluff and restrict or stop financial support to an unwilling and intransigent partner if it persists in undermining US prestige and objectives. Pakistan’s problems are not merely economic in nature. Its militant proxies are following their own independent agenda, some of them having turned against the State and infiltrated the military. The sectarian and ethnic clashes in Karachi and elsewhere, inter-tribal conflicts in FATA, fractured polity, high rate of unemployment, angry population facing shortages of food and power and almost total disconnect between the military and the political class are the problems that appear insurmountable to any objective analyst.

Conclusion Presently there is little evidence of Pakistan having redefined its national interests vis a vis Afghanistan despite severe strains on its polity, security and economy. Its military still seems to believe that it can control and manipulate the militants fighting against the ISAF in the West and against India in the East. In its appreciation, its support to USA is the main reason for growth of militancy within Pakistan. It also believes that once its goals in Afghanistan are reached and a Pakistan friendly regime is installed in Kabul, USA will withdraw most, if not all, of its troops from Afghanistan and the Pakistani militants will have no reason to continue fighting against the State. Those who continue to fight can then be brought to heel by a combination of

Pakistan fails to realise that the international community sees the situation differently. If the situation deteriorates to the extent that the ISAF is forced to withdraw without stabilising Afghanistan, there will be utter chaos and perhaps a civil war will engulf Afghanistan. Pakistan does not have the capacity to handle such a situation by itself and therefore has to revisit its strategic goals in Afghanistan. Now that US withdrawal is likely to become inexorable, Pakistan will have to prepare itself for post withdrawal scenario and shape the scenario if it can. It would want to use the period before withdrawal to legitimise its role and deny regional powers, particularly India but excluding China, influencing the outcome in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan does not want USA to withdraw immediately for fear of anarchy in Afghanistan and loss of financial and military support to itself (US$ 20 to 22 billion since 2001 and more promised for future). It may therefore reluctantly fall in line and not obstruct negotiations between Taliban, Afghan government and USA. But it would like to share the negotiation table or be present in the side room. The degree of cooperation will be guided by its appreciation of its own leverages and vulnerabilities. The writer retired from Net Assessment Directorate at Integrated Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces in 2009 and joined IDSA in February 2010 as Advisor, Net Assessment and Defence Studies. He previously served as a Defence Attaché to Turkey, Syria and Lebanon and with the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan. He also served with Military Operations Directorate of the Indian Army. He has had extensive command and staff experience during his 32 years military career, including that in counter-insurgency situations. He is a graduate of the National Defence College and Defence Services Staff College. He was awarded the Sword of Honour and Gold Medal at Indian Military Academy on his commissioning.

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Sandhya Jain

A hard hitting article that provides some penetrating insights into recent events and happenings in Afghanistan. American attempts for a direct deal with the Taliban have raised hackles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Its attempts to put in place permanent bases in this country have the regional powers worried. Iran has begun to play a more activist role. Most curious are the developments in the eastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Paktia, from where US forces have pulled out but a whole host of Afghan and Pakistan Taliban groups have moved in and Pakistan has commenced heavy shelling and rocket attacks.

s the Russians went into Afghanistan at the end of December 1979, a cautious Soviet official is said to have remarked to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the British had got themselves into serious trouble there a century earlier. “Are you comparing the imperialist British to our gallant Soviet boys?” spluttered the indignant minister. “Of course not,” the official hurriedly replied. “The soldiers are quite

different. But the mountains are the same.” History’s legendary ‘graveyard of empires’ justified its formidable reputation as Imperial America beats an unhappy retreat, its only face-saving the culling of an unarmed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May this year. This has dented the image of the US-NATO alliance and undermined

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the position of Pakistan Army Chief Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, whose eleven corps commanders are apparently livid at his excessive cooperation with Washington .

Ravaged by war The raison d’etre for America’s invasion of Afghanistan post-September 11, 2001, is now under a cloud. Washington said it wanted to

w e N e h T Great Game? kill or capture Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar; but bin Laden was killed in Pakistan and US is in covert negotiations with Omar. Latter-day excuses like war for democracy, women’s rights, development, eradication of the opium trade, were just excuses. Afghanistan has been pushed back to the Stone Age; there is no talk of reconstruction or democracy … Taliban controls 70 per cent of the country and enjoys rising

support due to resentment at foreign occupation and thousands of civilian casualties caused by NATO. Ravaged by war, drugs and a ruined agriculture, Afghanistan is in deep crisis triggered by the retreat and intensified by the re-emergence of warlords, militants and the assassination of President Hamid Karzai’s brother and Kandahar strongman, Ahmed Wali Karzai, on 12 July 2011.

The Taliban owned responsibility, explaining that Ahmed Wali worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and had helped the US-led coalition forces to occupy Afghanistan and gain control of its entire south-western region, not just Kandahar. Ahmed Wali had assisted Gen David Petraeus in the failed troop surge in 2009; he remained on the CIA payroll after the retreat began and

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would have served Petraeus in his new avatar as CIA chief. The Taliban thus issued a warning to Afghan elites to desist from cooperating with the invaders [Ahmed Wali was killed by a trusted friend within his own home]. Earlier, on 29 May 2011, Mohammed Daud, commander of 303 Pamir Corps, was killed in Takhar due to his proximity with German forces in Amu Darya region. The Taliban opposes America’s plan of ‘leaving to stay’ by retaining permanent military bases on Afghan soil. America recently invested heavily in upgrading the military infrastructure in many provinces, including that

regional players are preparing for the new Great Game; manoeuvring amidst all the moves and countermoves makes diplomacy the art of ballet dancing on a trapeze rope! Washington has turned the object of its ire from Afghanistan to Pakistan, reversing Af-Pak to Pak-Af to neutralise Taliban havens inside Pakistan. The alliance between the two countries broke down under the cumulative strain of continuing Drone attacks from Afghan soil; the Osama bin Laden killing; the Raymond Davis affair; and the knowledge that America was dealing directly with the Taliban behind the back of the

(November 2010), Qatar (February 2011) and again in Germany (May 2011). At America’s nudge, the UN Security Council conveniently separated Taliban from Al Qaeda and removed sanctions on some Taliban leaders. The Pakistani response was to ask US (and British) military personnel to leave; ending of covert operations on Pakistani soil; and future cooperation in intelligence on explicit ground rules. After all, Islamabad cooperated in the Afghan war because it was assured it would be a key player in an Afghan settlement and its legitimate security interests would be taken care of.

New Delhi must remember how it allowed Washington to disrupt its traditional ties with Tehran, to no Indian advantage. Tehran is important to India’s energy security, and a major player in Kabul. India needs to disregard Washington’s shifting regional preferences and concentrate on its national interests built by the Soviets in the 1980s. Both Taliban and Hamid Karzai desire to keep Washington out, as do neighbours like Iran, Pakistan, China, India and (near-neighbour) Russia. But Afghanistan is critical to the new Great Game emerging in strategically crucial Eurasia, so the Anglo-Americans will certainly try to dig their heels in. After all, US retained the huge Camp Bondsteel and other bases in Kosovo for control over the Western Balkans long after that war was over. Afghanistan, like Kosovo, is deeply integrated in the West’s narco-traffic as leading producer of heroin that goes to Europe, Russia, Iran and Dubai (from where it reaches the rest of the world). Kosovo is a major artery in the heroin traffic to the European Union. The Afghan drug market is worth US$ 1 trillion and drug-generated money is one of few sources of cash in the present bankrupt global financial system (read City of London and Wall Street banks), as admitted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Washington is also attracted to the huge natural resources found in Afghanistan, which include iron, cobalt, gold, copper, columbic, molybdenum, lithium; the uranium and emerald discoveries are kept quiet. The bounty is worth US$ 900 billion. Naturally, all major imperial and

Rawalpindi generals. Pakistan’s own policy of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds breached the outer limits of its credibility with the culling of Osama bin Laden some 800 meters from the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul.

Covert operations President Hamid Karzai exposed the US-Taliban contacts in a nationwide address on 18 June 2011, following tensions over Washington pressuring him to agree to a strategic partnership and allow permanent US-NATO bases in the country. A direct US-Taliban deal would make Karzai expendable by 2014. He moved swiftly for alliance with Iran and Pakistan. Karzai is also furious at Washington trying to corner him in the Kabul Bank scam, which he claims was due to bad advice from the West regarding international banking practices. But the International Monetary Fund intervened and froze disbursal of funds from the World-Bank administered Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Pakistan realised the extent of the secret negotiations only during the arrest and interrogation of covert CIA operative Raymond Davis; this apparently released both Islamabad and Kabul from any obligations towards Washington. Meetings with Taliban took place in Germany

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armed forces, the conflict zone spread beyond FATA to Chitral mountains in the Northern Areas of undivided Kashmir. These can have grave consequences for Pakistan. Attempts to patch up ties through the visit of ISI chief Ahmed Pasha Shuja to Washington and Gen Petraeus to Islamabad are unlikely to have a lasting impact. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad took the lead in inviting President Karzai and Pakistan President Asif Zardari to Tehran on 24 June for a conference on terrorism, where the IranPakistan gas pipeline figured, to American dismay. Previously, Iranian

The security of Central Asian nations and Afghanistan’s stability are interlinked, as the return of the Taliban would energise Islamists in these countries, which are already worried by the ‘Arab Spring’. Much will depend on whether the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation can rise to the occasion by admitting Pakistan and India and evolving a regional security framework. The SCO has called for an “independent, neutral” Afghanistan (read: free of foreign occupation). Kazakhstan president Nurusultan Nazarbayev, “It is possible that the SCO will assume responsibility for many issues in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of coalition forces in 2014.”

bringing Beijing into the picture. New Delhi has wisely avoided the trap of letting Washington play on its tensions with China and Pakistan.

New stratagem

Islamabad must understand that if Afghanistan splits on ethnic lines, Pakistan too will split in many parts and Iran will be in distress. But India will remain intact and neither Kashmir nor any other part will break away. It is possible that the Northern Areas and Occupied Kashmir return to India. Hence Islamabad should work for a regional framework on Afghanistan; a tacit ‘standstill’ agreement would be in the interests of all.

Washington however, adopted a new agenda and new regional strategies and dealt directly with Taliban. It took up the Bush-era ‘Blackwill plan’ to partition the country along the main Pashtun ethnic fault line, ceding the southern and south-eastern provinces to Taliban for a “greater Pashtunistan” and keeping the mainly Tajik northern region. It all hinged on Taliban giving up opposition to US-NATO military bases in the Hindu Kush. Neither Kabul nor Islamabad could countenance such a move, or accept permanent military bases in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan partition would trigger unrest across the Durand Line among Pakistan’s sizeable Pashtun population. Any strengthening of ethnic faul tlines in Afghanistan and Pakistan would also impact Iran and Central Asian countries negatively. As Pakistan resisted American moves, the US suddenly began to pull out troops from Pech valley in Kunar, eastern Afghanistan, in February, even while Davis was under detention. The withdrawal was completed in two months and soon various insurgent groups from Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami, Al Qaeda affiliates and Lashkar-e-Taiba settled down in Kunar and launched a “low-intensity war” against Pakistan (covertly backed by the US). As the groups fight each other and the Pakistani

Defence Minister Ahmed Vahidi visited Kabul (18 June) and signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement with Defence Minister Abdulrahim Wardak. Vahidi denounced US efforts to establish bases in Afghanistan as a move to impose a ‘hegemonistic system’ on the region. Tehran is inimical to Washington expanding into the strategically vital Central Asian region. It also resents the US-Saudi-Israeli alliance. America supports the terrorist group Jundallah in Sistan-Balochistan province in eastern Iran, bordering Pakistan.

For India, the Afghan imbroglio involves walking on hot coals; a mature and calibrated response is in order. With regional cooperation the only way to ensure regional stability, New Delhi must remember how it allowed Washington to disrupt its traditional ties with Tehran, to no Indian advantage. Tehran is important to India’s energy security and a major player in Kabul. India needs to disregard Washington’s shifting regional preferences and concentrate on its national interests. Rethinking the gas pipeline with adequate safeguards and guarantees would be in order, besides

Yet, as American withdrawal accelerates, India may become more vulnerable to jihad as pro-jihadi elements in the Pakistani military seek to deny New Delhi a legitimate stake in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s June visit to Kabul and support to its “process of national reconciliation” was read in Islamabad as an Indian effort to deny it the “strategic depth” it craves in that country. As Islamabad emerges as America’s new regional punching bag, the ball is in its court. Pakistan must either implode from the weight of its own contradictions, or get real about the fight against terror. New Delhi’s persistence with the dialogue process must be reciprocated with meaningful action on the 26/11 investigations and dismantling of terrorist bases on Pakistani soil. ISI must stop training, arming and sending terrorists across the border, or recruiting them locally in India. The ‘boys’ from Kashmir must no longer be welcomed in Occupied Kashmir.

The writer is a contemporary affairs analyst and independent researcher. She writes a fortnightly column for The Pioneer and edits the web portal www.vijayvaani.com

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A clinical analysis of President Obama’s decision to accelerate the pace of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. General Petraeus has said candidly that though “the momentum achieved by the Taliban has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of areas, the successes are fragile and reversible.” The writer concludes that while President Obama’s domestic political compulsions are understandable, militarily the time is not ripe to commence withdrawing forces from Afghanistan.

nder pressure from his own party leaders to hasten the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan scheduled to begin in July 2011, President Barack Obama has approved the draw down of 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and another 23,000 by 2012. The President wants the draw down to be carried out at a pace that is much faster than what General David Petraeus, the commander of US and allied forces, had recommended as an operationally viable rate. After the killing of Osama bin Laden, Senator John Kerry and other Democrats urged Obama to change the campaign’s course from fighting the Taliban all over Afghanistan and continuing the unsustainable efforts at nation building to targeting only the Al Qaeda and protecting US interests. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, still a perceptive observer of the emerging strategic environment, has written that four conditions must be met to make the exit strategy viable (“How to Exit Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 8, 2011): “A cease-fire; withdrawal of all or most American and allied forces; the creation of a coalition government or division of territories among the contending parties (or both); and an enforcement mechanism.” None of the four appears viable at present. Nor do these conditions look achievable in the 2014-15 time frame in which the exit strategy is planned to be completed.

Taliban insurgency Although President Obama tripled the number of US forces to 1,00,000 in the two years he has been in office, this surge in force levels has failed to effectively counter the long-term threat posed by the Taliban and its Al Qaeda partners. In 2010-11, every single month was worse than the preceding month in terms of the number of incidents, the casualties to ISAF forces and the killing of innocent civilians. Along the Af-Pak border, despite continuing drone attacks, there has been a steady deterioration in the ability of ISAF to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban and Al Qaeda extremists. Even the Pakistan army has not fared well in its fight against the TTP cadres holding out in North Waziristan. The report on the situation in Afghanistan released by the White House in March 2011 clearly banked more on hope than reality. It admitted that the “challenge remains to make our goals durable and sustainable.” However, as is usually the wont with field commanders on the ground, General Petraeus, now approved to take over as CIA chief, continued to claim that the security situation was improving steadily and that the Taliban offensive had been contained. In testimony before

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Congress in early-March 2011, Petraeus claimed that the momentum achieved by the Taliban had been “arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of areas.” However, to his credit, he stressed that the “successes are fragile and reversible.” The Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police are to be entrusted with the responsibility to independently take over the security function from ISAF in selected provinces beginning in July 2011 so that the planned draw down of forces can begin. So far the Afghan security forces have not exhibited the standards of professionalism, battalion cohesion and the qualities of junior leadership that are necessary for success in the complex and challenging security environment prevailing in Afghanistan. They still need ISAF officers and quick reaction teams to accompany them for operations, failing which they tend to lose unit cohesion very quickly and disperse in panic. Desertion, absence without leave (AWOL), fratricide and indiscipline rates are high. The standards of junior leadership and basic infantry skills are low. As had been widely anticipated, the Taliban have launched a vigorous spring-summer offensive and the US-led NATO-ISAF forces have retaliated with equal force. Nuristan, a north-eastern province bordering Pakistan, has been almost completely taken over by the insurgents. Despite repeated offensive operations being launched by the US-led NATO-ISAF forces, the situation in Helmand, Kandahar and Marja is still grim. With the withdrawal of NATO-ISAF forces, Nuristan on Afghanistan’s north-eastern border has virtually become a stronghold of the Taliban. Recent bomb and suicide attacks in Kabul also point to the fragility of the security situation. The Pakistan army has apparently learnt nothing from the killing of Osama bin Laden and continues to pretend that his presence at Abbottabad was a mystery. Instead of reinvigorating its efforts to eliminate terrorists who are undermining Pakistan’s security, the army is still holding off from launching the long-delayed offensive against the TTP in North Waziristan. Meanwhile, reports of US drone attacks against terrorists along the

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

US exit strategy: recipe for instability? Af-Pak border continue to trickle in virtually on a daily basis despite the Pakistan army’s strident protestations. There have also been several attacks from Afghanistan into villages across Pakistan’s border. While it is early days yet in this year’s military confrontation, a continuing stalemate will be the most likely outcome.

Out of sync A US Congressional study report, released on June 8, 2011, has found that nation-building efforts in Afghanistan are floundering as the massive economic aid programme lacks proper oversight and breeds corruption. It says that most local officials are incapable

of “spending wisely”. It also says that there is little evidence to support the view that even the “politically pleasing” short term results will be sustainable once the draw down begins. The report notes that the Afghan economy could easily slip into a depression as it is mainly a “war-time” economy that is a “huge distortion”. It is well known, of

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Afghanistan

course, that the US military conducts its own development programme in the areas cleared of the Taliban to win the people’s support. Some of these aid programmes are completely out of sync with those approved by the Afghan government. The development work being undertaken by the Karzai government and the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) has not reached the poorest provinces as efforts are concentrated on areas that are relatively more secure and are well connected by roads. The PRTs spend large sums of money on security for their supply convoys

and most of this money ultimately ends up as a source of funding for the Taliban. The traditional notion that development work can be successfully undertaken by external agencies has not been borne out over the last 10 years in Afghanistan. A better method would be to assist the Afghans with aid, materials and expertise and let them take the responsibility for development. However, due to the lack of efficient governance and rampant corruption, this method also has serious pitfalls. The two-year-old efforts to move towards reconciliation with the so-called “good Taliban” have not made much headway. Secret talks being mediated by Germany between the US government and Tayyab Agha, said to be a close confidante of Mullah Mohammed Omar, are unlikely to achieve a major breakthrough as no one is quite sure whether Agha

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES is actually negotiating on behalf of Mullah Omar or whether the Taliban are simply using the talks as a ploy to buy time. The Haqqani shura, that enjoys ISI support and patronage, is not part of the reconciliation process as General Kayani’s offer of his good offices to negotiate with the Taliban has not found any takers. The Taliban are keen to buy time by pretending to be interested in a negotiated settlement. And, the Pakistanis are egging them on by telling them to hang in there for the Americans will soon go away. While regional efforts to secure peace in Afghanistan remain haphazard, these are likely to slowly gather

momentum when the draw down of NATO-ISAF forces finally begins. During a visit to Kabul in mid-May, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh endorsed President Karzai’s “process of national reconciliation” and said, “We hope that Afghanistan will be able to build a framework of regional cooperation that will help its nation-building efforts.” There is increasing realisation even in Washington that there cannot be a lasting solution to the intractable Afghan conflict unless Afghanistan’s close neighbours and those in its extended neighbourhood provide reasonable guarantees of non-interference. Also, in the post-Osama environment, it is being gradually realised that Pakistan is part of the problem and cannot, therefore, be part of the solution. The international community is realising that Pakistan’s sensibilities have been given too much weightage in the

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various major conferences that have been held to seek a solution to the conflict.

Conflict termination Overall, the situation in Afghanistan offers little cause for hope. The security environment is still fragile. Poor governance, political instability, ill-trained and badly equipped and poorly motivated Afghan security forces, rampant corruption, gross misuse of international aid, resurgent Taliban, lack of political and military will among several members of the coalition to continue the fight and Pakistan’s continuing double game do not augur well for peace and stability. While President Obama’s domestic political compulsions are understandable, militarily the time is not ripe to commence withdrawing forces from Afghanistan. In fact, what Afghanistan needs is another military surge in order to be able to hold cleared areas against the Taliban, rather than the thinning down of troops. The Taliban are fond of saying that the ISAF forces have the watches but they have the time. They are convinced that the US and NATO forces do not have the political will or the military staying power to last the course and they are biding their time for the foreign forces to quit. Finally, there is so far no evidence yet that the US and its allies are planning to make substantive efforts to put in place a viable international peacekeeping force to help the Afghan government to maintain security after their own exit from Afghanistan in 2014. If this is not done, the Taliban will gradually seize one province after another, with covert help from Pakistan and will eventually force the capitulation of the government – paving the way for their triumphant return to power to once again practice their peculiar brand of Sharia. Conflict termination on such terms would signify not only the failure of President Obama’s exit strategy but also that the war in Afghanistan has been fought in vain. It would also mean that one more American intervention has gone hopelessly wrong.

The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India.

Dr Arvind Kumar

future of Afghanistan: India’s role

A perceptive article that analyses the likely situation that will emerge in post- withdrawal Afghanistan and the ramifications of President Obama’s declaratory strategy. It also examines India’s likely role. It states that the lack of competent security institutions in Afghanistan became the main reason for the continuing crisis. The challenge has always been to create a capable and effective government in Afghanistan. It recommends that India must work to create a regional environment which would be conducive to Afghanistan’s success. Regional players must desist from the temptation to carve up Afghanistan into local spheres of influence. August 2011 Defence AND security alert

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he severe crisis emanating from the current situation (since the killing of Osama bin Laden) has led the members of the strategic and academic community to debate and discuss about the probable future of Afghanistan in the emerging regional security environment. It is a well known fact that the intensity and the degree at which the levels of insurgency and terrorism have been growing in Afghanistan reflect major concerns among the members of the international community in general and the United States and India in particular about the overall security scenario post the accelerated US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Root cause The internal fabric and architecture of Afghanistan’s security in the current circumstances has been threatened especially in the context of the growing influence of Taliban in Afghanistan. The ongoing war on terrorism since its launch in October 2001 has so far not been able to produce desirable results. It is, generally believed among the members of strategic and academic community that the ongoing global war on terrorism cannot eliminate or eradicate terrorism unless and until the root cause is properly addressed. The killing of Osama bin Laden has to a greater extent made a number of nations highly vulnerable from terrorism angle. It has not solved the problem. In fact, the vulnerability has been increased. How best the nation-States across the globe can make concerted efforts in terms of seeing that the existing vulnerabilities get decreased will be a real challenge. The debates on the future of Afghanistan in the regional security environment have again gained salience. There are conflicting perspectives on these debates. Some feel that the situation in Afghanistan is going to be stabilised soon. Others argue that Afghanistan will continue to be a very highly volatile place and peace and stability would be too difficult to realise. President Obama’s draw down strategy enunciated in June 2011 clearly envisages that the United States’ forces in Afghanistan are going to be reduced significantly by December 2011. The draw down strategy also discusses about the plans for complete withdrawal of the United States’ troops by end 2014. The

elucidation of draw down strategy by President Obama in the public domain has raised a number of queries including the stability of Afghanistan and the larger ramifications of such strategy. The questions asked are mainly focused on whether this is an opportune time to declare draw down strategy especially post-Osama’s killing when the degree of vulnerability from all angles has increased. How draw down strategy would help Afghanistan in bringing peace and stability in the region formed a major part of the debate and the discussion. It has also been expressed by some sections of strategic community that through the draw down strategy, the United States has a desire to move Afghanistan from an economy shaped by war to one that can sustain a lasting peace.

Ill-timed The declaration of draw down strategy by the United States also raises a fundamental question whether it would be drawing down from a position of strength. The other related issue has been whether the United States has been able to accomplish the enshrined task when it had launched the global war on terrorism in October 2001. It must be highlighted here that the United States so far in the last one decade has not been able to bring normalcy and stability in the region. In fact, the problems in Afghanistan have been compounded and many times gone beyond control. It must be reiterated that the United States does not seem to have gained significantly in terms of maintaining security in the region. The declaration of the draw down strategy has been made with a belief and assumption that Afghanistan would be able to protect and govern itself without any active involvement from the United States. The domestic factors also provided sufficient impetus to Obama’s administration to announce its draw down strategy. Afghanistan has by and large been always plagued by insecurity, insurgency, impunity and corruption. It has also been confronting with a number of problems including terrorism and warlordism. Such

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problems have always undermined the potential for progress on all the other fronts. The lack of competent security institutions in Afghanistan became the main reason for the continuing crisis. It must be pointed out here that within the international coalition, the goal of establishing internal Afghan-focused security achieved less primacy than the goal of destroying the international terrorist networks. It should have been the other way around because stable Afghan governance and security forces are required to create a viable long-term alternative to the Taliban. The challenge has always been to create a capable and effective government in Afghanistan. Another challenge has been to develop effective Afghan security forces, which can help in administering and maintaining the law and order.

Proactive civil society The future of Afghanistan depends upon the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its will and capacity to implement the rule of law. It would be crucial for effectiveness and the delivery of governance. In the past, the amir in Afghanistan established a centralised administration to assure security and sharia courts for justice and the authorities for local governance and dispute settlements were left to tribes and communities. Currently, the central government continues to ensure security and justice on the national level. The central government has been showing signs of its seriousness in terms of adherence of the rule of law within the communities. The civil society in Afghanistan has to become more mature and help the government in maintaining and adhering to the rule of law. The participation of the civil society in framing and evolving State’s policies might be a good way forward in terms of legitimising the government. Democracy would be the panacea to resolve the myriad challenges facing Afghanistan after a protracted period of conflict. The question arises whether democratic governance is the key to stability. The future of Afghanistan also depends upon the ability of its national and local leaders to mobilise public opinion on pertinent important themes impacting the country as a whole. It is a well known fact that more than half of the population in the

popular foreign country at the local level.

Power sharing

past three decades has been displaced. The decades of turmoil have made Afghanistan a very difficult place on earth.

Pakistan’s role The current scenario in Afghanistan undermines the potential for progress on all other fronts. The rise of Talibanism and Al Qaeda’s strategy of global jihadism has kept Afghanistan in perpetual tension. Whether 2012 will see the effectiveness of the United States’ draw down strategy is going to be a major question in the current scenario. The complete Talibanisation of the region will somehow see how best they can dominate and serve their interests. The ongoing reconciliation process has indicated that the role of Pakistan has become significant in terms of dealing with the Taliban. There is no denying the fact that Pakistan has a central role to play in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. India too has a dominant role in the overall reconstruction of Afghanistan. Pakistan has become a victim of its own State policy. Hence, the Talibanisation of the regional security environment has lots of negative implications for Pakistan’s national security. The wider ramification of such Talibanisation will also impact India and its national security. The United States certainly becomes highly vulnerable if the Taliban becomes stronger day by day. The back-channel diplomacy with the Taliban in all the reconciliation process so far has failed. It has not been able to garner the confidence and support of the Taliban. Such back-channel diplomacy had never included India. However, there is certainly a much greater acceptance among influential Pakistani civilians of India’s presence in Afghanistan. India remains the most

It cannot be, however, said with firm conviction that Afghanistan government and society is prepared to share the power with Taliban leaders. Hence, the future of reconciliation process seems to be getting nowhere. The rehabilitation and reintegration of lower-level Taliban may be a distant possibility. It requires trust, confidence and the adherence to the rule of law. The power sharing government will not be a strong one, but can help in restoring faith and confidence. If the power sharing method allows more number of warlords coming to power then the objectives and fundamental goals of a new Afghanistan will never be realised. The ongoing trend has always been on good governance despite a number of odds to it. It must be highlighted here that the corruption and accountability in Afghanistan are not under the sole control of the government and hence it would require concerted and integrated efforts from all donors and investors. The return of Taliban in a dominant role in the foreseeable future will have negative consequences for India and the region. However, India has been supporting for a reconciliation policy targeting foot soldiers and field commanders. The London conference on reconciliation saw lots of changes in India’s approach towards Afghanistan. The current position of India has been by and large in consonance with its policy towards domestic insurgent groups, in which rehabilitation and reintegration is commonly offered to militants who wish to give up all the violent methods and adopt constitutional means. It seems, however, especially in the context of the recent killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai, younger brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the role of Taliban has not been declining. The global war on terrorism has not been able to curtail the influence of Taliban. The killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai has also given a severe blow to the ongoing reconciliation process. It will certainly

be a difficult task to reach a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. Such gruesome killing also signals that the overall base and structure of current government will be weakening. It is high time the international community and the Afghan government must engage the capacity of the broader Afghan society making them the engine of progress rather than unwilling subjects of rapid change. India must work to create a regional environment which would be conducive to Afghanistan’s success. The ongoing global competition in terms of each nation creating its sphere of influence in Afghanistan has to a greater extent become a stumbling block in the overall stability of the region. The most immediate requirement would be to renew regional cooperation, which would help in providing with a significant security and economic boost in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region as a whole. India certainly can help Afghanistan in evolving a coherent and systematic strategy, which would help in bridging the gap between conflict and democracy and between tribal councils and a Supreme Court. The responsibility of India in the region will increase after the complete implementation of the United States draw down strategy. The primary goal of India should be to help Afghanistan secure an environment with sufficient food and basic elements of justice. Afghanistan should also be prevented from the tentacles of terrorists’ networks. The security of a nation is an essential ingredient of the stabilisation and reconstruction process. The challenge of creating rule of law and legitimate institutions in Afghanistan to transform or eliminate both the roots and perpetrators of conflict can only be addressed when the role of civil society becomes dominant and becomes a part of larger decision making process. The draw down strategy of the United States might help the civil society in Afghanistan in regaining confidence. It is high time Afghanistan shall resume its responsibility of maintaining security and develop bilateral relations to promote economic cooperation and reconstruction. The writer is Professor and Head of Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India.

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Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd)

An interesting article that highlights the onset of a new phase of the Great Game in Afghanistan once the Americans leave in 2014. The writer calls it Great Game Five. He outlines a very cogent strategy for India post the US withdrawal that envisages a combination of hard and soft power aspects. The writer terms it the use of Smart power. He envisages the deployment of Indian troops under the UN flag and calls for the steel plating of our infrastructure?. and Soft power projects in Afghanistan to protect them in the more permissive environment that would result post the draw down of US troops.

fghanistan’s sordid reputation as a, “graveyard of empires,” is likely to be reaffirmed as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) spearheaded by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with a major contribution by the United States starts pulling out of the country this year. Words of a British chaplain Reverend G. H. Gleig at the end of the First Anglo Afghan War in the 19th century may perhaps reflect the reality of the series of Afghan conflicts over the centuries. He says, “a war begun for no wise purpose, carried

on with a strange mixture of rashness and timidity, brought to a close after suffering and disaster, without much glory attached either to the government which directed, or the great body of troops which waged it. Not one benefit, political or military, was acquired with this war. Our eventual evacuation of the country resembled the retreat of an army defeated”.

act as an anchor in the years ahead. India will have to face up to the reality of a weak Afghanistan on the edge of failure in a worst case scenario or in the vortex of internal and regional power conflicts in the best case one in 2014. It would therefore be appropriate to evolve a strategy that can face up to these challenges in the years ahead.

For India however Afghanistan is not a passing enterprise, it is an important constituent of the South Asian region in which New Delhi is attempting to

Perilous playground

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Past two centuries of history of Afghanistan have been marked by

India’s smart power strategy the classical, “realism,” model of international relations theory. Realism is the matrix of power politics where States prioritise their national interest over ideological, moral or humanitarian concerns. Realism in Afghanistan has been eulogised by writers like Rudyard Kipling as the Great Game. The first Great Game was a contest between two imperial powers, Czarist Russia and Great Britain in the 19th century. True to the legacy there were no winners but the Afghans. The ambitions of two empires were ground to dust by Pashtun fighters.

While in the first half of the 20th century the World Wars occupied major powers they did not have time for peripheral theatres. Soviet Union was in Afghanistan by the end of the 1970’s setting off the second Great Game against the backdrop of the Cold War. Cloak and dagger games by the CIA, Saudi intelligence and the ISI saw raising of the mujahideen with spinoffs like Al Qaeda. The Soviets had to leave Afghanistan though there was a semblance of order, but Afghans quickly claimed victory against a super power.

The next Great Game was set off by the toppling of the regime in Kabul in 1996. For the first time a regional player Pakistan became the principal protagonist along with a series of non-State actors, the Taliban being the main one. Afghanistan was divided on ethnic lines and gradually other stakeholders emerged including India and Iran supporting the Northern Alliance or the United Front. Afghanistan soon proved that it was a dangerous playground for regional actors as well and Pakistan’s dream of, “strategic depth,” came to an end as

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Continuing with soft power tools by expanding aid and assistance, building tangible assets and creating favourable human capital in Afghanistan will remain an important part of the overall Indian strategy. Steel plating or hard wiring critical facilities and personnel will assume importance as the security grid may be diffused once ISAF leaves. While the Afghan National Army and Police are evolving rapidly, there will be elements suspect to subversion, thus providing higher levels of security will be necessary Afghans hate all outsiders even if it was the Pashtun neighbour from across the Durand Line which Kabul has never recognised. The current Great Game commenced with 9/11 in which the United States and a United Nations approved alliance is fighting an elusive enemy, the Taliban. The last whistle of this game has been blown for 2014, it is now a wait for regional and global players to position themselves to face what could be a situation of hybrid instability in the country. The Afghans will claim to have humbled another super power. This may also mark commencement of fifth in the series of Great Games in Afghanistan. The Americans are unlikely to leave lock, stock and barrel; while regional powers would not allow their permanent presence to affect their strategic autonomy and a jockeying for primacy in Kabul will be once more evident. Internally

three power structures are likely to emerge, the Central government in Kabul, the regional satraps dominating their pockets of influence and the Taliban with its various constituents led by Mullah Omar, Haqqani and Hekmatyar. Within this strategic geometry India would have to assert its national interest employing varying strategic tools. India’s options in 2014 thus need consideration.

India’s contemporary position India’s contemporary tools of engagement in Afghanistan have been soft power - economic, infrastructure development, institutional capacity building and aid. This has been flagged as a success story by the Establishment and has created an ambience of warmth in Afghan leadership as well as people towards India. This is ironically reflected in Pakistan’s anger towards New Delhi’s presence in Kabul. Islamabad has left no stone unturned to leave India out of the strategic equation, be it repeated attacks on the Indian Embassy or keeping New Delhi out of the loop in conferences as the one in London in January 2010 where the plan for reconciliation and reintegration was finalised. New Delhi’s bête noire remains the Taliban. While India cautioned the international community against classifying Taliban as, “good,” and “bad,” knowing fully well that such a distinction is notional if ideological motivation remains the same, reality of the situation has led South Block to willy nilly accept that Taliban may occupy a certain space in the future power structure in Afghanistan. There is a section of Indian strategic community which is not satisfied with the use of soft power alone and has strongly argued for active military intervention in the country. India is presently providing support to the Afghan Army for training and in the days ahead, arms, munitions and ancillaries are also likely to be offered. Troop deployment is not envisaged so far but may become an option under the UN Peacekeeping paradigm. Sensitivity of Pakistan which may be posed with a three front situation; India, Afghanistan and terrorism will have to be taken into account in deciding the hard option. Under the circumstances thus what

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should India’s strategy be in the next or the Fifth Great Game from 2014 onwards? Should India continue with the soft power strategy of the past or should it mix the same with a hard power one in case the situation so develops?

who will have to be geared up for taking up this challenge.

Security deployment As part of a UN mandated force, India will prove a good asset for stability in Afghanistan. India can also provide extensive assistance in security capacity building in various fields as determined by the Afghan government and forces. Police is one area where substantial help can be rendered without raising any concerns while assistance in training, provision of weapons and equipment, staff and organisational development, logistics are some areas which have good potential.

“Smart power” strategy To unravel this dilemma India should adopt a flexible indirect policy in Afghanistan which is increasingly being recognised as “smart power” strategy. What exactly is smart power? Joseph S. Nye, Jr. the doyen of power theories has put it most appropriately as a strategy that combines hard and soft power. Hillary Clinton’s used the term in Senate confirmatory hearings in 2009 calling it as, “use of all tools, diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural”, as appropriate to the situation to achieve policy objectives. Smart power also includes power projection and capacity building in a manner that is internationally acceptable. This paradigm will appropriately fit with New Delhi’s broader regional policy objectives of being an anchor of stability while hyphenating limits within which the same will be exercised. The broad contours of India’s smart power strategy in Afghanistan are identified as per succeeding paragraphs.

with new ones in Central Asia like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to expand its interests in Afghanistan and rebuff possible efforts by Islamabad to whittle the same. Balancing with the United States will also be essential as it will continue to occupy an important position despite having disengaged from Afghanistan. This would require some deft diplomacy for which we need to be prepared in advance.

Changed reality post-2014

New rubric

India’s smart strategy in Afghanistan will be dictated by changed reality that is likely in the post-2014, Fifth Great Game period. Expansion of India’s economic and political power will enable it to extend its reach with corresponding contraction of Pakistan’s capacity due to erosion of economy and internal cohesion. While China will concomitantly rise, Beijing’s focus towards East Asia and the Pacific may constrain it from devoting full attention towards the West and may be restricted to containing extremism in Xinjiang and energy access to Central Asia. Nevertheless India’s position will remain contested.

Concomitant with regional balancing, expanding internal political engagement will also be important. As brought out earlier, Afghanistan’s power structure is likely to represent a triad, the central government in Kabul, regional heads in the North or South who may retain a high degree of autonomy and Taliban which may or may not merge with the former. India’s present political engagement is primarily either with the government in Kabul or allies of the past mainly from the North. This influence is lopsided and has to be expanded to include the Pashtuns as well as some or all regional leaders depending on our economic investments in sectors such as mining. Eventually India should engage with elements within the overall rubric of the Taliban depending on how the situation evolves and in what manner our national interests develop. It should be remembered that the Taliban is not a homogenous entity,

Given the likely competition, India will have to depend on regional support through structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) if it gains prominence or bilateral and multilateral relations with its traditional partners, Russia and Iran

Red lines with Pakistan thus engaging elements which have compromised with the government or are open to the idea of interacting with India will provide considerable internal leverage in the emerging power structure. While we may not have much traction with Taliban entities at present, reaching out within the boundaries of abjuring extremism by such elements should not be anathema any more as it will fit into our larger strategy.

Steel plating soft power tools Continuing with soft power tools by expanding aid and assistance, building tangible assets and creating favourable human capital in Afghanistan will remain an important part of the overall Indian strategy. Steel plating or hard wiring critical facilities and personnel will assume importance as the security grid may be diffused once ISAF leaves. While the Afghan National Army and Police are evolving rapidly, there will be elements suspect to subversion, thus providing higher levels of security will be necessary. A stable Afghanistan will provide opportunity for expanded economic engagement be it in primary sectors as mining with the Hajirak mines offering good prospects, developing industrial infrastructure or transportation linkages. Indian capacity in this field is primarily with large public sector undertakings and private companies

India will have to factor in Pakistan’s resistance howsoever untenable it may appear in its overall strategy. Establishing clear red lines with Islamabad may be necessary from the very outset to protect our personnel and assets. Pakistan should see India’s engagement as a part of enhancement of overall regional security rather than in an adversarial context. This attitude may not be forthcoming but working towards the same will be necessary and pressures from regional players should be used effectively to involve Pakistan in a triangular or multi-polar cooperative paradigm in Afghanistan in the decades ahead. Power contests, internal and external in Afghanistan are likely to continue beyond 2014. The identity of players may change from NATO to regional to include Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics and India with the United States continuing to retain presence in the region. Indian policy will have to operate within this matrix for which smart power strategy outlined herein seems a viable option the contours of which need further exploration. The writer is an army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt. Ltd., a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, “Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities”.

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Landlocked as Afghanistan is, India is effectively shut out. Pakistan has managed to force on President Hamid Karzai a trade and transit treaty that bans all Indian imports through the Wagah-Attari border on the Indo-Pak salient. India has tried to minimise the effect of this by opening up the Delaram-Zeranj road linking Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chahbahar. It is still a bridge quite far. The alternative is for India to assert its rights in Jammu and Kashmir peacefully by seeking a

balance between the Sino-Pak road, rail and pipeline connectivity with an assured passage through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir through the Wakhan corridor to Kabul. If it cannot be done peacefully then it better find other ways of getting to Afghanistan because that is where the Great Game is yet to play itself out.

Dr Harsh V Pant

regional rivalries

he US President Obama’s announcement in June 2011 of far larger and more accelerated withdrawals of US forces from Afghanistan than many had expected affects Indian security interests and the US-India relationship in significant ways. While it is unfair to characterise the decision as a rush to the exits, it is clear to all that a deliberate pace is being set. This decision will set in motion a train of momentous events for all of Afghanistan’s neighbours. Looking towards the exits, Washington may not be overly fussy over a settlement’s

exact details, while Afghanistan’s various neighbours will be all too focused on how the strategic terrain in its neighbourhood is shifting to their detriment.

Indian geostrategy To a large extent, India’s approach towards Afghanistan has been a function of its Pakistan policy. It is important for India that Pakistan does not get a foothold in Afghanistan and so historically India has attempted to prevent Pakistan from dominating

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Afghanistan. India would like to minimise Pakistan’s involvement in the affairs of Afghanistan and to ensure that a fundamentalist regime of the Taliban variety does not take root again. Pakistan, on the other hand, has viewed Afghanistan as a good means of balancing out India’s preponderance in South Asia. Good India-Afghanistan ties are seen by Pakistan as detrimental to its national security interests as the two States flank the two sides of Pakistan’s borders. A friendly political dispensation in Kabul is viewed by Pakistan as essential to

escape the strategic dilemma of being caught between a powerful adversary in India in the east and an irredentist Afghanistan with claims on the Pashtun dominated areas in the west. Given its Pashtun-ethnic linkage with Afghanistan, Pakistan considers its role to be a privileged one in the affairs of Afghanistan. Given these conflicting imperatives, both India and Pakistan have tried to neutralise the influence of each other in the affairs of Afghanistan. Both are stuck in a classic security dilemma in so far as their policies towards Afghanistan are concerned.

Any measure by either Pakistan or India to increase its own security causes the other to act in response, thereby triggering a deterioration in the overall regional security environment.

Post-Taliban scenario India’s relations with Afghanistan have steadily improved since the fall of the Taliban for a number of reasons. India’s main focus has been to support the Afghan government and the political process in the country as mandated under the Bonn agreement of 2001.

Unlike Pakistan, ties between India and Afghanistan are not hampered by the existence of a contiguous and contested, border. Its support for the Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed Taliban in the 1990s strengthened its position in Kabul after 2001. Many members of the Alliance are members of the government or hold influential provincial posts. India has also done its best to restore the balance in its engagement with a range of different ethnic groups and political affiliations in Afghanistan. The balance was tilted towards the Tajik-dominated Northern

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Alliance during the 1990s as a counter to Pakistan-controlled hard-line Pashtun factions, led by the Taliban. India has used its vocal support for Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun educated in India, to demonstrate its keenness to revive its close ties with Pashtuns.

ISI machinations Pakistan’s security establishment is relishing the double game it is playing in Afghanistan. Pakistani support for the Taliban in Afghanistan continues to be sanctioned at the highest levels of Pakistan’s government with the ISI even represented on the Quetta Shura – the Taliban’s war council – so as to retain influence over the Taliban’s leadership. Taliban fighters continue to be trained in Pakistani camps. The ISI does not merely provide financial, military and logistical support to the insurgency. It retains strong strategic and operational control over the Taliban campaign in Afghanistan. Despite launching offensives against militants in North and South Waziristan, Pakistani military continues to look upon the Taliban as a strategic asset. The conclusion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA) is a major shot in the arm for Pakistan as it explicitly affirms that India will not be allowed to export goods to Afghanistan through the Wagah border. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are hedging their bets against a possible US withdrawal. The other regional rivalry being played out in Afghanistan is between Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan became the transit point for weapons and aid to Saudi-funded, US-equipped and Pakistani-trained mujahideen who fought to drive the Red Army from Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities, however, put a filter on the aid. The loss of Bangladesh – formerly East Pakistan – in 1971 had led the Pakistani leadership to be very wary of ethnic nationalism. Pashtun nationalism in Afghanistan had challenged Pakistani cohesion for as long as Bengali nationalism. The Pakistani government, therefore, only allowed aid to flow to those groups who rallied around a sectarian rather than a nationalist identity.

Iranian influence The Iranian authorities, in contrast, miscalculated. While generous with

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES aid to their allies, they had far fewer resources at their disposal because of the ongoing war of attrition with Iraq. That aid which Iranian officials could provide, they limited largely to Shia and ethnic Farsi-speaking Tajik groups. This transformed a potential Afghanistan-wide influence into a far more localised interest. Nor, in contrast to the actions of the Pakistani leadership, did Iranian authorities properly cultivate or manage their population of Afghan refugees in order to spread their influence. Tehran did not want to cede the advantage to Islamabad and continued to fight for influence in Afghanistan, even as the Pakistani and Saudi-backed Taliban consolidated control over 90 per cent of the country. This proxy fight, however, polarised Afghanistan and brewed further Pakistan-Iran mistrust. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States changed the foreign policy priorities of both Iran and Pakistan. The George W. Bush administration’s tough stance forced president Pervez Musharraf to support Washington’s “war on terror,” which ended Taliban rule in Kabul. Though Iranian officials welcomed the move, they soon found themselves encircled by US forces in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Divisive geopolitics While Karzai’s government is nominally supported by both Tehran and Islamabad, neither neighbour has been willing to sacrifice its own interests. With time, tension has increased. Iran retains its special interests in Afghanistan’s western Herat region, until 1857 part of Iran and Pakistan considers the Pashto-speaking southern sections of Afghanistan to be within its sphere of influence. Kabul remains a contested area within that sphere. The deterioration in Afghan security, perhaps sparked by one or both, has also created a dynamic of increasing tension between Iran and Pakistan. Increasingly, as a perception of US weakness spreads, Iran has raised

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its rhetoric against the presence of US and NATO troops in Afghanistan, which Islamabad nominally supports, at least publicly. Tehran continues to blame the US presence in Afghanistan for continuing instability in the region.

Pak military presence Maj Gen Afsir Karim (retd) AVSM

The situation in Afghanistan can only improve if Afghanistan’s neighbours revise their attitudes, but any deterioration in Afghanistan’s security

situation will instead compound suspicions and force them to prioritise their own security interests in a way which intensifies regional rivalries. Iran, for example, will only play a positive role in Afghanistan if it feels its vital interests are not under threat and a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan will only make Iran feel more vulnerable, forcing it to take steps to safeguard its interests, letting the conflict spiral further. Pakistan, meanwhile, is reluctant to cede the preeminent position it has enjoyed for the last several decades in determining Afghanistan’s political trajectory. And as the security environment in Afghanistan deteriorates further, Islamabad will view this as an opportunity to maintain its presence in its neighbour’s territory in order to secure its larger strategic interests. It is important for the US to recognise that they are not the only players in the sand box nor that their struggle to stabilise the Karzai regime and battle the Taliban is the only fight going on in the country. Indeed, until there is fundamental change in the attitudes of regional powers, Afghanistan will remain a crossroad if not for armies, then for their proxies.

need for a regional solution The writer highlights the need for a regional solution in Afghanistan. Post the assassination of Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani army is under siege and its stock has never been so low. The pity is that the stock of the civil government is even lower. Doubts about the timetable of troop withdrawal have been expressed by many who believe it is too fast and risky to thin out under the present conditions. The Pakistani military leadership is waiting for US withdrawal from Afghanistan so that the field is left wide open for them to install a favourable Taliban regime. India must firmly demand a legitimate role in Afghanistan based on its historical ties with that country and in matters related to trade and transit rights. Much, however, will depend on who eventually takes over the country after the American departure and that will depend on several unpredictable events.

mericans are still struggling to control the situation in Afghanistan. In Pakistan they are likely to continue their strategy of drone strikes in the tribal areas and stealth operations in many other parts of Pakistan. The Americans now seem to have little leverage to enable them to exert enhanced political and economic pressure on Pakistan to step up operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban but covert cooperation between the Pakistani and the US military and intelligence agencies is likely to continue even after American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Peace a far cry The writer teaches at King’s College, London and is presently a Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.

The current scenario in Afghanistan is rather murky, the conditions are unstable and it is clear that peace will not return to Afghanistan in the prevailing environments for a long time. Despite using very sophisticated

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"Enforcement is the most crucial element and the most difficult to sustain. After decades of civil war, the parties are unlikely to feel bound by provisions of any agreement. The Taliban especially will try to take over the coalition government or breach the cease-fire. In the absence of a plausible enforcement mechanism, a negotiation with the Taliban, whose forces remain while ours leave, will turn into a mechanism for collapse. An enforcement mechanism can be a residual American force, some international guarantee or presence, or - best - a combination of both. Total withdrawal is likely to be final; there should be no illusion of re-intervention" - Henry Kissinger technology and employing very large number of troops America and its allies have failed to defeat the Taliban. Insurgents have no doubt been pushed out of some heavily populated areas of Afghanistan but violence continues in outlying areas and the insurgents still mount frequent attacks in heavily defended areas despite large concentrations of US-led coalition forces. Afghan forces are stepping up operations against the Taliban, but their efforts are uneven and slow despite efforts to keep them in the front line. Regardless of the fact that the Taliban are still undefeated in Afghanistan American policy makers believe that President Barack Obama’s pull-out plan for 2011 and 2012 can be carried out without any adverse impact on the military’s mission or the plan of gradually handing over security responsibility to the Afghan government.

Doubts over withdrawal However, doubts about the timetable of troop withdrawal have been expressed by many who believe it is too fast and risky to thin out under the present conditions, on the other hand many others have said that the timetable of withdrawal is far too slow and over cautious. A number of American experts believe the plan of withdrawal will make little difference in the prevailing situation as the current deployment of troops has failed to achieve the desired results and has not been working in any case in America’s favour. The hawks call for a rethink on the draw down, moderates suggest a significant withdrawal at a faster pace; they believe this can be done safely in the current operational scenario. However, the former Secretary of Defense Gates had

advised caution in removing troops from a battlefield where the gains remain “fragile and reversible”. He believes, “Far too much has been accomplished, at far too great a cost, to let the momentum slip away just as the enemy is on its back foot.”

Kissinger prognosis Kissinger has made some profound observations on the Afghanistan situation. “For negotiation to turn into a viable exit strategy, four conditions must be met: a cease-fire; withdrawal of all or most American and allied forces; the creation of a coalition government or division of territories among the contending parties (or both); and an enforcement mechanism. Enforcement is the most crucial element and the most difficult to sustain. After decades of civil war, the parties are unlikely to feel bound by provisions of any agreement. The Taliban especially will try to take over the coalition government or breach the cease-fire. In the absence of a plausible enforcement mechanism, a negotiation with the Taliban, whose forces remain while ours leave, will turn into a mechanism for collapse. An enforcement mechanism can be a residual American force, some international guarantee or presence, or - best - a combination of both. Total withdrawal is likely to be final; there should be no illusion of re-intervention.” So far in its relations with Pakistan America has been moving with extreme caution because much more is at stake besides the Afghan problem, distancing from Pakistan could prove extremely harmful for American interests in the region and it would mean breaking up with an ally in this sensitive region without finding an alternative, without Pakistan support most intelligence sources will be lost and of course

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make sustained operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda very difficult. Engagement with Pakistan on security and proliferation of nuclear weapons will also become extremely difficult. Lack of cooperation with Pakistan will reduce pressure on Al Qaeda and its network that provides support and safe haven to anti-American forces in the region. Total US disengagement will be giving an excuse to Pakistan to walk into the open arms of China. There is no doubt that cooperation with Pakistan is critical for America’s long-term security interest in South and Central Asia, therefore Pakistan is in a position to cooperate with the US on its own terms.

Pak game plan Pakistan has been playing a double game all the while; the Pakistani government has been urging President Hamid Karzai not to accept the United States military presence in that country after the troops withdrawal, instead rely on Pakistan and China. Prime Minister Gilani is reported to have told Karzai that “the Americans had failed them both” and that Karzai should “forget about allowing a long-term US military presence in his country.” It is believed that the US administration is trying to evolve a new relationship in the post-Osama scenario and find a more stable basis for US-Pakistan relations but in that case it will have to accept that Pakistan is not likely to make any significant changes in its policies. But an inadequate relation is considered better than no cooperation by most US policy makers; it is the strategic importance of Pakistan that makes even an inadequate relationship acceptable. Pakistan is an important pillar in the US scheme of things in South Asia and the US administration

will not let Pakistan drift away whatever the cost, whether it is wise policy or not is a moot point.

Army under siege Continued drone attacks in tribal areas and the American action to kill Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil apparently without the knowledge or permission from Pakistan has made America an object of suspicion and hate in Pakistan. It has also created grave doubts in the minds of the people about the army’s ability to defend Pakistan, its honesty and competence; this has been a great shock to the people of Pakistan and brought down army’s prestige to rock bottom. However, the civil government has not been able to make any gains because it is distrusted even more than the army. The only gainers seem to be the jihadi groups who are taking advantage of the prevailing distrust of the people in the government for supporting the US policies that they consider anti-Islamic.

Jihadi penetration The attack on PNS Mehran in Karachi has once again raised the issue of the penetration of the Pakistani army by extremists and its inability to control militancy and extremism. It has created doubts about the armed forces sincerity and its claims as a saviour of Pakistan’s sovereignty. A weak civilian government and an incompetent army are a recipe for disaster and is a subject of bitter debates and dissent. Pakistan’s weak policies to tackle the terrorists and jihadi militants also raises questions about Pakistan’s role in the war on terror and its intentions

to use the terrorist organisations as a second line of defence. The Pakistani establishment and large number of people believe that the US, is determined to erode Pakistani sovereignty and the regional powers like India are waiting to destabilise and break up Pakistan. There is a vocal segment of Pakistanis who believe the relations with the US no longer benefit Pakistan and the right-wing and jihadi groups continue warning people about the US-Indo-Zionist conspiracies against Pakistan. The Pakistani military leadership is waiting for US withdrawal from Afghanistan so that the field is left wide open for them to install a favourable Taliban regime, whether the Taliban will continue to support Pakistani plans is difficult to guess at this stage. Taliban however would not pose any military threat to Pakistan in foreseeable future. Within Pakistan, conflicting interests and internal factions within the army, have made it ineffective, unless the military and the ISI change their strategy of supporting terrorist groups the situation will deteriorate further. The monster of domestic terrorism has already emerged stronger than the State and soon the army will find it more and more difficult to control it. The terrorists may lay hands on the nuclear weapons of Pakistan and threaten the entire civilised world.

Karzai brother’s assassination In the wake of Ahmed Karzai’s assassination the situation has changed and continued US presence

in Afghanistan after 2014 is almost certain. Three large US bases along with at least 25,000 troops and a robust air power will remain to look after US interests, any country including Pakistan with interest in Afghanistan will have to contend with these if they eye Kabul. Pakistan must realise the fact that placing a Pakistani puppet government in Kabul may not be a feasible proposition in these circumstances. The best arrangement to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan for the US may be to form a consortium of regional powers including Russia, Pakistan and India before handing power to the Karzai regime. However, this may not be easy to achieve as China and Pakistan, even Afghanistan, may scuttle any such proposals and the US may not be able to pursue it in the face of the opposition. India must firmly demand a legitimate role in Afghanistan based on its historical ties with that country and in matters related to trade and transit rights. India must be allowed to continue the development projects and other construction activities unhindered. Much, however, will depend on who eventually takes over the country after the American departure and that will depend on several unpredictable events that will unfold in the next few years.

The writer is a well known retired Indian army general and a military scholar who has authored several books on strategic affairs and military studies. He is a graduate of the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington and the National Defence College.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

GLOBAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY EVENTS / SHOWS August 2011

Afghanistan

Tuesday 9th August 2011 – Thursday 11th August 2011 International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems - ISRCS Boise Center on the Grove, Boise, USA

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

Prof Chintamani Mahapatra

Tuesday 9th August 2011 – Friday 12th August 2011 Military Vehicles Exhibition & Conference Cobo Center, Detroit, USA Wednesday 10th August 2011 – Thursday 11th August 2011 IDGA's MILITARY VEHICLES EXHIBITION & CONFERENCE Cobo Center, Detroit, USA Wednesday 10th August 2011 – Friday 12th August 2011 POLICE-TREXPO EAST Dulles Expo & Conference Center, Chantilly, USA Thursday 11th August 2011 – Saturday 13th August 2011 GIEPE - China (Guangzhou) International Explosion-proof Electric Apparatus & Technology Exhibition Canton Fair Pazhou Complex, Guangzhou, China Saturday 13th August 2011 – Sunday 14th August 2011 Glendale Gun Show - Glendale, CA Glendale Civic Auditorium, Glendale, USA Saturday 13th August 2011 – Sunday 14th August 2011 Florida Gun & Knife Shows - Panama City, FL Bay County Fair Ground, Panama City, USA Tuesday 16th August 2011 – Sunday 21st August 2011 MAKS Airshow, International Aviation & Space Salon, Zhukovsky, USA Saturday 20th August 2011 – Sunday 21st August 2011 MWCA Gun Show Forest Lake Sports Complex, Forest Lake, USA Monday 22nd August 2011 – Wednesday 24th August 2011 Armoured Vehicles South Africa Sheraton Pretoria Hotel, Pretoria, South Africa Saturday 27th August 2011 – Sunday 28th August 2011 CE Gun Show - Fishersville, VA Augusta Expo Land, Virginia Beach, USA

Courtesy: Pawitra International Private Limited, New Delhi, India www.pawitra.com

growing Af-Pak uncertainties The writer cogently analyses the endgame situation in Afghanistan and examines the likely scenarios that could emerge. Some of these see Pakistan gain its long coveted strategic depth and India almost losing all the investments it has made so far in that country. China, he argues, would retain its three billion dollar investment in Afghanistan’s copper mines and would gain influence there courtesy Pakistan. However he underlines that other regional players will not easily accept such a scenario. He rightly empahsises the need for a regional solution that avoids the kind of zero sum game that Pakistan is trying to impose. August 2011 Defence AND security alert

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he elimination of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by the US Navy Seals in the backyard of Pakistan’s military establishment in early May and the announcement in late June of staggered troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by US President Barack Obama have created unprecedented uncertainty over the future of the Af-Pak region and generated new anxiety among the regional countries over the continuing insecurity and instability. Despite occasional statements from Washington about the endgame in Afghanistan, many regional countries believed that the US would not abandon the region after so much of investment in time, money, lives and energy. There was a general understanding that the US could not exit from Afghanistan without decimating the insurgents and ensuring against a second 9/11 type attack on the US. It was also considered unthinkable that the only super power of the globe would take steps that would embolden the Al Qaeda and the Taliban and make the US look like anything other than a victor in the war against terror.

than what we had recommended.” In order to address the ambiguity over this decision Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy stated that the announcement “in no way marks a change in American policy or strategy in Afghanistan.”

Political constituency Obama’s decision on this issue was in keeping with his promises, demands of the anti-war liberals and cost-sensitive Republicans, wishes of the majority of American public and the need of the electoral politics. But the US president could not afford to create confusion over his Afghan policy in the backdrop of Taliban resurgence, spread of insurgency to northern parts of Afghanistan from south and east of the country and the need to keep the credibility of a super power intact. Obama’s envoy to the United Nations Susan Rice joined the chorus with Michele Flournoy and said: “As Afghan security forces move into the lead, the United States will continue to reduce its military footprint and our mission will change from combat to support”.

Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Like in the US, in European countries too there is certain amount of restiveness over continuing struggle against Afghan insurgency, particularly in the wake of economic recession. But the European countries too do not want to convey the impression that they would run away from this country without fixing things. The head of the EU delegation to the UN, Pedro Serrano, thus explained that the transition of security responsibility from ISAF to Afghan forces did not signify withdrawal but a gradual shift to “genuine supporting role.” Despite clarifications and positive interpretations of the latest US move by the Western stakeholders in Afghanistan, there is a sense in South Asia that sooner rather than later the US would leave Afghanistan and the first step in that direction is indicated by Obama’s recent announcement of troop withdrawal. The country that is visibly happy over Obama’s troop withdrawal decision is Pakistan. Under normal circumstances Islamabad would have loved to see the continuation of US engagement in Afghanistan, because it ensured billions of dollars of American

A large grey area that falls within the best and the worst scenarios is most likely to prevail. The old Taliban is unlikely to return to power. Pakistan will not be allowed a free hand in Afghanistan. Iran, India and Russia will do nothing to isolate and weaken the factions that once came to be known as the Northern Alliance. The Americans will not leave an Afghanistan controlled by forces that could re-stage a 9/11 in the US or against US facilities and interests in various parts of the world. The most likely scenario is creation of a broad-based and ethnically inclusive governing structure through negotiations that would be asked to take charge of the country When President Obama made a speech in late June and announced withdrawal 10,000 US troops by end of this year and another 23,000 by 2012 and made no victory declaration, speculations filled the air about the future of Afghanistan. There was no doubt that President Obama’s national security team was not united over this decision. Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen considered this decision “aggressive” and testified before the Armed Forces Committee of the House of Representatives that the President’s decision would “incur more risk than I was originally prepared to accept.” Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan David Petraeus, nominated by Obama as the next CIA Chief, said during his Senate confirmation that the final decision was “a more aggressive formulation … in terms of the timeline

This meant the US was not abandoning Afghanistan. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also hinted that the US would continue to play a substantive role in resolving the Afghan problem. While the goal initially was to turn Afghanistan into a “Switzerland” that would make the country neutral and prosperous, the goal has shifted to make it into a Belgium whose neutrality was guaranteed by the Congress of Vienna in the 19th century.

European position The European Union interestingly further backed the US through its interpretations of Obama’s speech. Many EU members are also the members of NATO and have contributed forces to the International Security Assistance

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aid to Pakistan. But the expanding trust deficit between the US and Pakistan in view of ISI’s nexus with anti-American Afghan militants and the US unilateral action to eliminate Osama bin Laden now explains why Islamabad has welcomed Obama’s speech on phased withdrawal of US troops.

Pakistani glee Pakistan apparently has begun to dream about its return as the main actor to decide the political future of Afghanistan. It also imagines that the US would stop drone attacks on its territory in exchange of its cooperation in negotiating the final deals between the Taliban and the US. It, moreover, expects substantial amount of US aid to continue to flow in to prevent State failure. The Afghan government, unable to influence Washington’s decision, has

welcomed it as a testimony of growing strength of its security forces to take care of the law and order situation in the country and considers this development as the beginning of a process that would result in restoration of Afghan sovereignty. Russia, China and Iran, while giving political support to the war against Taliban, have been weary of the possibility of a long term presence of the US forces in the region. There are apprehensions that the US / NATO might set up military bases in Afghanistan even after ending combat operations. Obama’s recent decision to reduce troop level in Afghanistan has thus been viewed as a welcome development that would restore sovereignty to Afghanistan and allow Afghans to set their house in order. India, on the other hand, does not appear to have been comfortable with the latest US move to open dialogue with the Taliban and reduce troops in Afghanistan. India’s main concern is the probable return of the Taliban as the ruler of Afghanistan with or without a coalition. As a matter of fact, with the solitary exception of Pakistan, no country would welcome a Taliban government in Kabul after the withdrawal of foreign forces. China, Russia, Iran, India and some Central Asian republics fear a resurgence of extremism backed by an emboldened Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The United States obviously would not desire to negotiate with a force it has been fighting with in its longest war abroad. But Washington has found no other sound alternative to negotiate with the Taliban in order to end its war in that country.

The future Obama’s troop withdrawal speech has empowered the Taliban. It seems to be waiting for a day when it would return to Kabul without conceding defeat, if not declaring victory. But the problem is Washington has shown its urgency to end combat operations in Afghanistan and Taliban just continues to fight. The worst case scenario is Obama Administration using a set of carrots and sticks to induce Pakistan to help negotiate a deal with the Taliban for a respectable retreat from Afghanistan

of its forces. Al Qaeda is weak, Osama bin Laden is dead, Pakistani military and ISI are discredited at home, American people have become war-weary, cost of war is sky high in the midst of a crippling recession and the US presidential election is round the corner. Obama has all the right rationales to draw down troops, hand over charge to Afghan forces and let the Taliban (and Pakistanis) decide the future of Afghanistan. In such a scenario, Pakistan would regain its strategic depth in Afghanistan. India will lose all its investments in Afghanistan. China would be better able to protect US$ 3 billion of its investments (largest foreign investment in Afghanistan) in mining sector in that country and hope to make the best use of Afghan natural resources. China, with Pakistani support, would be able to stabilise Xinjiang and fill the power vacuum in Afghanistan.

The best case scenario The US brings on board all the regional countries to help stabilise Afghanistan. It remains an important player among other stakeholders, but no longer continues to take all the decisions. Pakistan, considerably weak and aid dependent with a military that no longer receives unquestioned support of people, abandons its negative ambitions, sheds its suspicion of India, focuses on developmental issues and encourages its ally, Taliban, to be part of an inclusive governing structure in Afghanistan. Russia, Iran, India and China join hands with Pakistan and the US to help Afghan reconstruction led by Afghans. Both these scenarios can be explained away as unrealistic and unworkable. A large grey area that falls within the best

and the worst scenarios is most likely to prevail. The old Taliban is unlikely to return to power. Pakistan will not be allowed a free hand in Afghanistan. Iran, India and Russia will do nothing to isolate and weaken the factions that once came to be known as the Northern Alliance. The Americans will not leave an Afghanistan controlled by forces that could re-stage a 9/11 in the US or against US facilities and interests in various parts of the world. The most likely scenario is creation of a broad-based and ethnically inclusive governing structure through negotiations that would be asked to take charge of the country. It will take time, will have its ups and downs, will face challenges of development and law and order, but how far it would succeed is anybody’s guess. The diplomatic challenge for India lies in preventing Pakistan from using a veto to keep India out from efforts towards a negotiated settlement of the Afghan problem. India’s strategic partnership with the US, it’s newly achieved soft power in Afghanistan, its ability to generate resources and contribute towards Afghan reconstruction; and convergence of its interests with those of Russia and Iran in Afghanistan can be harnessed to protect and promote Indian interests in Afghanistan.

The writer is currently Chairman, Centre for Canada, US and Latin American Studies and Professor at the School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Delaware, USA, Commonwealth Scholar at the University of London, Foreign Policy Fellow at University of Maryland, USA, Salzburg Seminar Fellow in Austria and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

The writer persuasively argues for a much more robust Indian policy towards Afghanistan which is derived from the compulsions of realpolitik. So far, Indian policy in Afghanistan has remained totally sub-servient to the US-led policy towards Afghanistan. The Taliban has been mounting terrorist attacks on Indian establishments, which are involved in carrying out development activities in that country. The US is ignoring India’s concerns in Afghanistan. Indian policy must take into account the above developments and should change. It is no longer viable or possible to expect the US to maintain huge forces for long period in Afghanistan. A measured pull-out of the US forces will eliminate US remaining dependent on Pakistan for its supply lines and will result in reduced financial aid to Pakistan. Another important role that India has to play is preparing, equipping and training the Afghanistan National Army. Afghans find it easy to train with us. The sooner the Afghan National Army gets ready, better it would be for India. They can then take on the anti-Taliban role which the US is so hesitant to accept.

ndia’a policy toward Afghanistan is aimed at having a stable democratic government, which is free from control of Taliban. So far, Indian policy in Afghanistan has remained totally sub-servient to the US-led policy towards Afghanistan which has a limited goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda. With the killing of Osama bin Laden, this narrow objective of the US policy is nearing completion. Accordingly, the US pull-out from Afghanistan has begun with 10,000 US soldiers due to leave Afghanistan in 2011, the first batch of which, comprising 650 troops deployed in Parwan province of Afghanistan flew out on 13th July. The pull-out is expected to be completed by 2014. It appears that the rout of the Taliban is not the US objective. After all, the Taliban was the US creation to fight out the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late seventies and, although the US is fully aware that having caused an almost death blow to the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, their real foe is now the Taliban who are getting reinforced, rejuvenated and resurgent with open help from Pakistan army which has provided them safe haven and bases in Pakistan’s mountainous tribal areas along Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Ignoring this ground reality the US intelligence agencies, in collaboration with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia’s intelligence services, have started negotiations with the Taliban for a future political set-up in Afghanistan. The US did not consider it necessary to inform, let alone consult, India in this regard.

India targeted The Taliban in Afghanistan has been mounting terrorist attacks on Indian establishments, which are involved in carrying out development activities in that country. Pakistan has been openly opposing India’s involvement in any development programme in Afghanistan and has conveyed her annoyance in this regard to the US. Pakistan being geopolitically important for the US in this part of the world, including the presently ongoing operations by the US military in Afghanistan, the US is ignoring India’s concerns in Afghanistan and yielding to Pakistan’s nasty designs to involve the Taliban in proposed future political set-up in Afghanistan. In view of these developments, India must now consider, independent of US concern, our policy in Afghanistan to fulfil its two objectives, that is, one, establishment of stable democratic government in Afghanistan and, two, to prevent the Taliban from controlling the political set-up in Afghanistan.

Wishful thinking The US has commenced her troops pull-out on an assumption that insurgent elements in Afghanistan are nearing their end. Ground reality is that nearly half of Afghanistan, mostly East and South, is controlled by insurgent elements, which includes the Taliban in majority and remnants of Al Qaeda reorganising and reinforcing themselves with the Taliban’s help. The US troops are not allowed to enter the Afghanistan-Pakistan border even while hotly pursuing the militants.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Lt Gen O P Kaushik (retd)

They constantly face attacks from across the border. The killing of Hamid Karzai’s brother in Kandahar on 12th July by these elements is a testimony of an unstable situation in Afghanistan. Ignoring this ground reality, the US has started withdrawal from Afghanistan and is sponsoring negotiations with the Taliban who are mainly responsible for all the happenings in Afghanistan, including the killing of President Hamid Karzai’s brother.

Indian interests ignored The Taliban, with the help of Pakistan government, has gained health and strength. It has become a reckonable force in Afghanistan both militarily and politically. It is due to this state of affairs that the US is in the process of designing a policy of reintegration and reconciliation with the Taliban. Under reintegration, ground level troops and leaders of the Taliban are to be persuaded to lay-down their arms in lieu of huge concession. Reconciliation will initiate a dialogue with senior leaders of the Taliban to abandon the armed struggle. Hamid Karzai has been forced by the US to work in accordance with the spirit of reconciliation and offer greater role to Pakistan in Afghanistan’s future and give more freedom of action to the Taliban to spread their religious ideology. Karzai has also been directed by the US to involve Saudi Arabia in establishing reconciliation with the Taliban. India is well aware of close nexus between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. These overtures by Karzai and American outreach to

time for realpolitik: is India ready?

the Taliban are injurious to India’s interests and greatly diminish India’s position in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan do not recognise each other’s interest in Afghanistan, which is resulting in tension between the two. Pakistan has gone to the extent of organising the Taliban attacks on Indian establishments in Afghanistan. The US has deliberately avoided applying any pressure on Pakistan to exert influence on the Taliban and direct them not to cause any harm to the Indian establishments. Pakistan has even demanded from the US to put limits on India’s presence in

Afghanistan. The US overtures to the Taliban is an indication that Pakistan’s efforts in this regards have been rewarded.

Unabated instability Internal situation in Pakistan is having an impact on happenings in Afghanistan in that violence and turbulences by forces, which are anti-US and pro-Taliban, are fast spreading. These forces are also organising terrorist’s strikes in India, as it happened in Bombay on 13th July, in which during three blasts, 19 people died and nearly a hundred were

injured. These forces are opposing presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan and are using the Pakistani territory to mount operations in Afghanistan. This factor has been instrumental in uniting the various insurgent organisations operating in Pakistan. Internal administration in Afghanistan is in an unhappy situation. President Hamid Karzai’s government is highly corrupt and no effort, whatsoever, is being made to improve the situation. The Afghan National Army is neither trained nor prepared to take over conduct of operations

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against the Taliban and specially in the stronghold areas of the latter in Afghanistan’s Pashtun South and East. The country is divided on ethnic and tribal lines - Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other ethnic minorities demanding self governance in their respective areas - directly impinging on Afghan unity.

Alternative arrangement Indian policy must take into account the above developments and should change. It is no longer viable or possible to expect the US to maintain huge force for long period in Afghanistan. It is costing the US about US$ 100 billion a year to maintain a force of 1,00,000 troops in Afghanistan. It is too heavy an expenditure to afford over prolonged periods. The US cannot afford to withdraw the entire force either as this will open the gates for the Taliman to move in and easily overrun the whole country. Another course is to maintain a force of about 30,000 troops with the backing of powerful airpower and Special Forces. This force to be deployed at selected bases and ensure support to Afghan forces who should take over the security duties all over the country. The US should continue, with this force, along with air elements, hitting the remnants of Al Qaeda as also the recalcitrant elements of the Taliban. Such a force should be located in Afghanistan for a long enough period, say 10 to 15 years, or till such time that the Afghan National Army is fully prepared to take on the duties. This will also reduce the US commitment to support Pakistan with multibillion-dollar US aid to ensure safety and security of supply

lines of US troops passing through Pakistan. At present approximately 35,000 US troops in Afghanistan are being maintained by air and it can continue. A measured pull-out of the US forces will eliminate US remaining dependent on Pakistan for its supply lines and will result in reduced financial aid to Pakistan which will be in the overall interest of India. Hence, India should not insist on the US not to pull-out its forces from Afghanistan.

Joint strategy Having been stubborn in not negotiating with Pakistan till perpetrators of 26/11 were taken to task, India has recommenced talks with Pakistan. These should include a dialogue between the two to bring out a common strategy for both. Both have legitimate interests in Afghanistan and it should be recognised. Although a difficult task to achieve, as the US enjoys a position with both the countries, under her pressure and guidance a common strategy for both can be worked out. It will help in ensuring stability in Afghanistan, A conclave of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan under overall leadership of the US can be formed to work out stable and permanent settlement for Afghanistan. Come what may, India will not be able to dissuade the US from its newly adopted policy of outreach to the Taliban. Nor it is possible for the US to defeat the Taliban militarily since the Taliban insurgents have their roots and support in the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Hamid Karzai, who was initially instrumental in establishing

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close political ties with India, has now changed under the US pressure to show preference to Pakistan and allow more freedom to the Taliban. Local Afghan population is appreciative of India’s development work in that country but it is not of the level of mass support. Under these circumstances, it may be in our interest to be an active member of the US policy of reintegration and reconciliation with the Taliban. By this we will be able to ensure that no decisions are taken which are detrimental to our interests. In the meantime, we can start our diplomatic efforts with Iran, Russia and the Afghan-bordering Central Asian Republics to prepare a strong anti-Taliban base. Once such a base is ready and effective, the US may also stop yielding to Pakistan pressures in Afghanistan and a strategic unity of purpose may emerge among all these countries. Even China will get affected by events in Afghanistan and a conclave of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as proposed above will become an enlarged one with the inclusion of Russia, China, Iran and nearby Central Asian Republics. Since all major powers of the region will form part of the conclave, along with the US, it will certainly help in evolving a lasting and stable political system for Afghanistan.

Common roots Bilaterally, India should continue building her goodwill and rapport with local population of Afghanistan. Our involvement in building health, education and community services should be increased. Infrastructural development, in which India has remained involved, notwithstanding

Pakistan’s objections, must be further accelerated. We must not forget history. Few countries have had such a long and continuous association with India as Afghanistan. Many aspects of culture and civilisation are common between the two. Chandra Gupta Maurya ruled over Afghanistan. Ashoka and Kushans extended Buddhism in Afghanistan and 53.5 meter tall Buddha Idol at Bamian proves the Buddhist influence. Hindu Shahi dynasty ruled over Afghanistan from 400 to 900 AD. Mohammand Ghori came from Afghanistan and established his kingdom in Delhi in 1192 while Babar, also from Afghanistan, laid the foundation of

flourishing in independent India, Afghanistan having gone through severe turmoil since last 30 years,

deeper involvement on India’s part is called for. We must openly provide armament and equipment to the Afghan army and establish deep

We can start our diplomatic efforts with Iran, Russia and the Afghan-bordering Central Asian Republics to prepare a strong anti-Taliban base. Once such a base is ready and effective, the US may also stop yielding to Pakistan pressures in Afghanistan and a strategic unity of purpose may emerge among all these countries. Even China will get affected by events in Afghanistan and a conclave of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as proposed will become an enlarged one with the inclusion of Russia, China, Iran and nearby Central Asian Republics. Since all major powers of the region will form part of the conclave, along with the US, it will certainly help in evolving a lasting and stable political system for Afghanistan Mughal empire in India, in 1526 AD. These are old historical ties which cannot and should not be forgotten and should help us to build a formidable base with the local population.

India-aided infrastructure Afghanistan needs roads as there are no railway lines in that country. We have a massive Border Roads Organisation with more than 60 years experience in building roads in mountainous areas and are most suitable to take on this road construction work in mountain and arid regions of the land-locked Afghanistan. Afghanistan also needs hospitals and schools and we have vast network of these facilities with us. Whereas the white man’s presence in Afghanistan is being seen as a foreign occupier, India, on the contrary has an easy acceptability with the local population.

Political growth India must also help in building their political institutions. We have rich democratic traditions which are

is desperately wanting a stable democratic government, which among her neighbours only India has experience and is capable of assisting in Afghanistan. Students, research scholars, administrators, economic managers, political leaders, social workers and traders should be invited in large numbers from Afghanistan to study various aspects of democratic life in India and imbibe them for implementation in Afghanistan.

Training Afghan forces Another important role that India has to play is preparing, equipping and training the Afghanistan National Army. Afghans find it easy to train with us. Our organisations, weapons, equipment and training doctrine are more relevant in Aghan scenario. Our military training institutions are specially well organised to take on this task. We used to get Afghan army personnel in sixties and seventies for training at our institutions. A beginning has now been made again and Afghan soldiers are under training at our various institutions. This needs to be expanded and

and intimate relationship with their officers at various levels by frequent visits, exchange programmes, military aid and all other facilities that they need, The sooner the Afghan National Army gets ready better it would be for India. They can then take on the anti-Taliban role which the US is so hesitant to accept. It is only through India’s military help in terms of organisation, equipment, weapons and training that local forces can be prepared to control most of the Pashtun South and East, which have been deliberately left by the US to be controlled by the Taliban. One of the objectives of India’s policy on Afghanistan, namely, to prevent the Afghan Taliban from controlling the Afghan Pashtun homeland, can only be met by well-trained well-officered and well-equipped Afghan National Army and India has a lot to contribute in preparing them for this task.

The writer has been General Officer Commanding in the Kashmir valley. He was chief of staff of Eastern Command and is the former Vice Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, India.

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Stabilisation of This article examines the dynamics of inducing stability in Afghanistan. There are two competing groups of nations in this process, nations like Russia, India, Iran and CARs who want Afghanistan to stabilise as a modernist and inclusive State and the other grouping of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China, who want the Taliban reinstalled to maximise their geo-political gains. The US has now espoused modest, achievable objectives to ensure the face saving exist from Afghanistan. Americans have argued that State-building and nation-building is not the task of the US army, its sole task is to fight and win war and not build the nation-State. Pakistan is the most significant regional actor and major spoiler. Pakistan treats Islamic extremists as its strategic asset. Strangely, there is complete convergence between the Iran-India-US interests in Afghanistan. All three want destruction of Al Qaeda and Taliban; want to prevent the return of Taliban to power; Western and Iranian interests converge on the issue of drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan. The Central Asian Republics want stable and strong government in Afghanistan, which can check the radicalisation of the region. The writer contends that there is no such thing as good or soft Taliban. They are by nature hardened criminals and so their integration is fraught with dangers.

Afghanistan Dr Tej Pratap Singh

fghanistan since time immemorial has been the graveyard of empires. In ancient times, Alexander the Great on world conquering mission met the fierce resistance of native people of the region, what is now Afghanistan and it took more than three years to take control of the area at enormous cost. Alexander was exhausted and halted his further movement and returned to his kingdom. In modern times, British tried to control Afghanistan in the heyday of its power but despite several attempts failed to defeat proud Afghans. Soviet Union tried the same at the peak of its power and met the same fate. Now in contemporary world, the United States is trying to control Afghanistan and if history is any guide, it might fail like other empires.

Strategic location Modern Afghanistan was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani. Since its creation, it has been the arena of the Great Game of geopolitics. Key players have changed but the game has remained intact. Strategic location of Afghanistan as a bridge between South Asia, Central Asia and Middle East has always attracted the interest of global and regional powers to control Afghanistan to advance their strategic interests. Earlier it was Britain, Iran and Russia and now it is United States, Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and China. Intense rivalry among the global and regional powers and stiff resistance of Afghan people has always ensured its independence and defeat of invaders. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-cultural society. Pashtuns, Taziks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Baloch are major ethnic groups of Afghanistan. These tribes are spread in the neighbouring countries too. Hence any turmoil in Afghanistan leads to the exodus of Afghan refugees to these countries. Tribal affinity is one of the significant reasons for the interest of these neighbouring countries in the internal matters of Afghanistan. This also provides a pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and this intervention has usually aggravated the internal situation rather than resolving it.

Unilateralism to regionalism The US began with the unilateral approach in toppling the Taliban regime in October 2001 through ‘global war on terror’ and ‘operation enduring freedom’ in the wake of 9/11 attacks. The US with its NATO allies overthrew Taliban regime quickly. After the fall of Taliban government, the UN gave sanction to the creation of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. The US being the sole super power prefers unilateralism to multilateralism. However, to put up Afghan government in the post-Taliban period, the US supported multilateral regional approach in the Bonn Conference of December 2001, which led to the formation of new Afghan government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. Despite Bonn agreement, Bush administration was not very enthusiastic about multilateral regional approach

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for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Neoconservatives in the Bush presidency were of the opinion that ISAF led by the US will succeed in stabilising Afghanistan, but when this did not happen then at the end of Bush administration, US policy makers switched to the multilateral regional approach. However, it was Obama administration, which has wholeheartedly embraced the regional approach to the stabilisation of Afghanistan.

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To succeed, the US has to dump Pakistan-Saudi Arabia and China and extend full support to India-Iran-Central Asian Republics-Russia efforts in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Iran might be an adversary of the US in Middle East and its nuclear weapon programme has created grave threat to the security of the US and its allies but in Afghanistan there is complete convergence of the US-Iranian interests. At least for Afghan stabilisation, Iran must be engaged by the US. In case of India, the US is ambivalent. It appreciates the Indian contribution in the reconstruction of Afghanistan but under Pakistan pressure demands transparency from India in its developmental projects and suspects the motive of India in Afghanistan US objectives With the prolonged NATO-led ISAF military mission and no comprehensive victory against Taliban in sight, the US has scaled down its objectives in Afghanistan. The US began with the twin objectives of annihilation of Al Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic extremism and establishment of democratic, secular Afghanistan committed to the protection of human rights in general and women rights in particular. This is no longer the aim of the United States, it now only aims at severing all the links between Al Qaeda and Taliban, prevent the return of Al Qaeda and other global jihadists to Afghanistan, prevent the return of hardcore Taliban to power and enable the Afghan National Army and Police to take care of their security.

Destruction of Al Qaeda, Taliban and Islamic extremism and establishment of secular democratic Afghanistan are too ambitious and unattainable objectives. Hence the US has now espoused modest achievable objectives to ensure the face saving exit from Afghanistan. The killing of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad in Pakistan in May 2011 has also enabled President Obama to declare the attainment of Afghanistan objectives with elimination of Osama bin Laden, the key conspirator of 9/11 attack. The war weary American public is overwhelmingly in favour of a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan. Americans have argued that State-building and nation-building is not the task of the US army, its sole task is to fight and win war and not build the nation-State. The withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan has begun from July 2011 and the process is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014. After 2014, the Afghan National Army and Police will provide security to Afghanistan. However, the US intends to have around 10,000 American troops in secure military bases in Afghanistan in the post-2014 period. This permanent presence of the US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 is a major bone of contention between the US and regional powers such as China, Russia and Iran. The US favours the active involvement of the regional stakeholders in the stabilisation of Afghanistan after the complete pull-out of the NATO-led ISAF by the end of 2014. Regional solution to Afghan quagmire is very complex as different regional actors have different and competing interests in Afghanistan. A new Great Game of geopolitics to control Afghanistan among the regional and global powers is going to be intensified with the beginning of the phased withdrawal of NATO led ISAF. Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Central Asian Republics, Russia and China are the major regional powers that have significant strategic interests in Afghanistan. Surprisingly all the regional powers want stable Afghanistan as instability in Afghanistan might jeopardise their own national security. But they are pursuing diametrically opposite interests in Afghanistan and extending support to

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rival Afghan factions to advance their own narrow strategic interests, which instead of stabilising has destabilised the whole of Afghanistan.

Since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, Pakistan always arm-twists Afghanistan to grant it transit rights. India has always had friendly relations with all Afghan governments except Taliban, which was under the control of Pakistan ISI. This is the reason, India does not want the return of Taliban or other extremist groups to power in Afghanistan as it will be detrimental to Indian and regional interests as well.

Pakistan: Major spoiler Pakistan is the most significant regional actor. Without the active help of Pakistan Afghanistan can never be stabilised. The tragedy is Pakistan itself is the major spoiler in the global efforts for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. It is mainly because of Pakistan, the whole Af-Pak region has descended into chaos. Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Afghan policy is India-centric. Pakistan wants strategic depth in Afghanistan against its arch rival India and this is possible only when Afghan government is dependent upon Pakistan for its survival. Pakistan briefly enjoyed this strategic depth in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, when Taliban was in power. Pakistan has not abandoned this objective of strategic depth in Afghanistan. Pakistan will not allow any government to continue in Afghanistan which is not dependent on it for its survival. Therefore, stable, strong, independent government in Afghanistan is against the strategic interest of Pakistan. It is afraid of being squeezed between hostile India and Afghanistan. To prevent that from happening, Pakistan wants to have strategic depth in Afghanistan by denying any space to India in Afghanistan and having a pliable government in Kabul. Pakistan accuses India of destabilising it from Afghanistan. India has a large presence in Afghanistan in the form of five consulates in different parts of the country apart from embassy in Kabul. Pakistan has alleged that India is using its vast diplomatic presence in Afghanistan to foment troubles in Balochistan and other parts of the country. So far Pakistan has not furnished any proof to the international community to substantiate its charges against India. Pakistan treats Islamic extremists as strategic asset, which has to be protected, promoted and to be used against its enemy number one India. Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dreaded Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is actively involved in creating and sustaining this strategic asset, despite the global and American pressure not to do so. Taliban is the

Iran: Shia bulwark brainchild of ISI. Apart from Taliban other terrorist outfits active in India and Afghanistan such as Lashkar-eToiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Jamatud-Dawa, Hezb-e-Islami, Haqqani network, etc. are all ISI creations. These terrorist outfits are being used as a foreign policy instrument by Pakistan. These ISI-sponsored terrorist groups are a major source of instability not only in Afghanistan but the whole of South Asia. The policy of using terrorists as strategic asset has boomeranged on Pakistan as well. Islamic radicalisation has spawned some terrorist outfits, which are now targeting Pakistan itself. Tahrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) which is the product of Talibanisation of Afghanistan-Pakistan is targeting Pakistan itself. Now these terrorist outfits have created existential threat to the very idea of Pakistan.

border with Afghanistan, is the second most significant regional actor, which can play a very positive role in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Right now India is the fifth largest donor to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. India has spent around two billion dollars in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and all the assets created by India in Afghanistan are civilian assets. Pakistan is opposed to Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s active involvement in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and has used its strategic asset particularly Haqqani network in targeting Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008 and Indian workers in different parts of Afghanistan. Pakistan is afraid of rising Indian soft power in Afghanistan and so it is resorting to desperate measures such as using terrorists against Indian interests in Afghanistan.

The main bone of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the recognition of the Durand Line, which has never been recognised by any Afghan regime. Afghanistan has been contending that it has been unilaterally imposed by the mighty British Empire on a weak Afghanistan. Durand Line has divided ethnic Pashtun tribes between two States - Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan aims at bringing all Pashtuns into one nation-State. This objective of Afghanistan will lead to further truncation of Pakistan. This has created existential threat to Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan wants a weak, unstable and friendly government in Kabul, which should not question the Durand Line as international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

India wants Afghanistan to emerge as a major trade and energy corridor connecting India with Central Asia and Middle East, which has enormous energy resources. The energy deficit of India can be offset to large extent by the energy resources of Central Asia. India also wants revival of old silk route which passed through Afghanistan to Central Asia. If Afghanistan is emerging as a trade and energy hub, it will generate substantial revenue in the form of custom duties and transit fees for Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is the main stumbling block in this ambitious project. To overcome Pakistan problem, India is keen to enter Afghanistan through Iran. For this India is connecting Chabahar port of Iran with Afghanistan through metallic road, which can be used for trade between India and Afghanistan. This will also reduce the dependence of Afghanistan on Pakistan for its trade.

India: Stabilising factor India, though not having common

Iran is an important regional player in Afghanistan as it shares a vast border, communities, culture, language, etc. with Afghanistan. Like India, Iran was also opposed to Taliban regime and in 1998 almost went to the extent of waging war with Taliban government. Like India, Iran also extended moral and materiel help to Northern Alliance (a conglomerate of non-Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan, based in the northern part of the country) in its war against Taliban. Iran is concerned with the safety of Shias, Balochs, Hazaras and other minorities and Persian speaking people in Afghanistan, which are threatened by majority Sunni Pashtuns. India opposed Taliban because of its proximity to Pakistan but Iran opposed Taliban because of its anti-Shia attitude and practicing, promoting and patronising Deobandi brand of Sunni Islam which is akin to Wahabism of Saudi Arabia. Since Iran and Saudi Arabia are regional rivals, Iran cannot tolerate pro-Saudi Arabia regime in its vicinity. There is complete convergence between the Iran-India-US interests in Afghanistan. All three want destruction of Al Qaeda and Taliban; want to prevent the return of Taliban to power; want stable, strong and independent government in Kabul which is at peace with its neighbours. Western and Iranian interests converge on the issue of drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan. A large Iranian population is opium addict, which is trafficked into Iran by Afghan drug barons. Afghan opiates reach Europe through two routes one via Iran to Turkey to Balkans to Europe, another via Central Asia to Russia and then to Europe. Eradication of drug trade emanating from Afghanistan needs close regional cooperation between regional powers.

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Here Iranian role becomes significant in interdicting drug consignments coming from Afghanistan and preventing further trafficking to Europe via Turkey and Balkans.

Saudi Arabia: Pakistan ally Though Saudi Arabia is not having common border with Afghanistan but like India occupies significant position in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia’s interest converges with Pakistan in propping up puritan hardliner Sunni orthodox government under Taliban in Afghanistan. Taliban are ideological ally of Saudi Arabia and their Deobandi Islam is similar to Wahabi Islam patronised by Saudi kingdom. Containment of Iranian and Shia influence in the region is the main objective of Saudi dynasty. In this objective of Saudi family, puritan Taliban are best suited. Saudi Arabia and UAE have been the main donors of Taliban government in Afghanistan. It is precisely because of this convergence of interests; apart from Pakistan only Saudi Arabia and UAE had given recognition to Taliban government. The interests of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE converge in Afghanistan as all three want conservative, hardliner and puritan Sunni government in Afghanistan.

CARs: Arena of Great Game Central Asia is the original arena of the Great Game, which has now engulfed Afghanistan as well. Three Central Asian States viz. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan share common border and ethnic affinity with Afghanistan. It is because of ethnic considerations they support Northern Alliance which consists of their own ethnic groups of Tajiks and Uzbeks. Tajik is the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan next only to Pashtuns. Uzbeks come after them. These tribes get both moral and material support from the Central Asian governments. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan though not having common border with Afghanistan are impacted by the developments in Afghanistan. All the five Central Asian Republics provide the vital alternative route to NATO led ISAF for logistical support to sustain their operation in Afghanistan. NATO led ISAF receive the bulk of their lethal and non-lethal supplies through Pakistan. But Pakistan

is sulking and moreover because of the turmoil on Pak-Afghan border the route has become too risky. The Central Asian Republics want stable and strong government in Afghanistan, which can check the radicalisation of the region, which might threaten their own regimes. Central Asian Republics are also victims of drug trafficking. The vast populations of these countries are victims of drug abuse. Like Iran, CARs also want checks on trafficking of narcotics from Afghanistan to their countries. The use of money generated through narcotics trade for Islamic extremism to destabilise the governments of the CARs has created the dangerous mix of narco-terrorism in the region. Stable and strong Afghanistan will pave the way for transportation of Central Asian energy resources to energy starved South Asia. This will also fetch remunerative prices for their energy assets as CARs will be able to reduce their dependence on Russia and China for the sale of their energy resources.

Russia: Bitter memories Present Russia is not having common border with Afghanistan. However, Russia’s predecessor Soviet Union which consisted of five Central Asian Republics shared common border with Afghanistan. Through Soviet Union, Russia has the bitter experience of being trapped in Afghan quagmire and now must be feeling happy at the plight of the United States in Afghanistan as it was the US because of which the Soviet Union was humbled in Afghanistan. Like Soviet Union, Afghanistan has become graveyard for the sole super power, which is waging a battle which can never be won. Russia has twin objectives in Afghanistan. First, it wants to prevent the export of Islamic extremism to its own Muslim population particularly in Chechnya. Taliban government in Afghanistan has radicalised the Chechen youth, who even went to the extent of fighting with Taliban insurgents against the US-led forces in Afghanistan. Russia is also worried about the radicalisation of the CARs Muslim population, which will undermine pro-Russian CAR governments. Second, Russia is the victim of Afghan drugs as Russia is one of the very heavy consumers of

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the Afghan opiates, which reach Russia through CARs. Russia is so much threatened by the Afghan narcotics that it has put condition of eradication of drugs in Afghanistan, while providing alternative route for the supply of non-lethal cargo to NATO led ISAF. Only stable and strong Afghanistan can prevent the radicalisation of Afghanistan, CARs and Muslim populations of Russia and put an end to drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Russia, though it wants the US to succeed in stabilising Afghanistan but it is opposed to the permanent presence of the American troops in Afghanistan as their presence will be detrimental to Russian interests in the Central Asian Region, which Russia treats as its sphere of influence. To achieve this objective, Russia has created Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) consisting of the former constituents of the Soviet Union. Along with China, Russia has floated six nation Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan apart from China and Russia. SCO is also opposed to the permanent presence of the US troops in Afghanistan. Both Russia and China want the quick exist of NATO-led ISAF from Afghanistan.

China: Pak mentor China has a very small narrow strip of inaccessible border with Afghanistan in the Wakhan Corridor in the northeastern mountain ranges of the country. China has tied its strategic interests with its all-weather friend Pakistan. However, China though not openly opposing Taliban because of Pakistan backing to it want the stable and strong Afghanistan as China itself is facing the problem of Islamic extremism in its Xinjiang province. Return of Taliban to power in Afghanistan might embolden Uyghur nationalists to intensify their secessionist movement in Xinjiang bordering Afghanistan and Central Asia. The main interest of China, however, in Afghanistan is economic. China has succeeded in winning the bid to extract the copper from Aynak mines, which is world’s largest copper mine. To exploit the natural resources of Afghanistan, China is investing in the improvement of Afghan infrastructure. China is fast emerging as significant stakeholder in Afghanistan. However, its interests

are mainly economic related to trade and commerce and not military. China wants Afghanistan to be a source of raw materials and market for its products. In military sphere it has allied itself with Pakistan, which wants to deny any space to India, which is also a rival of China; and with Russia, which is opposed to any long term presence of the US troops in Afghanistan, this is also in the interests of the rising China which is threatening to challenge American power globally.

Two contending groupings On the basis of the above mentioned analysis of individual States’ interests in Afghanistan, all the nations can be broadly divided into two groups on the basis of the commonality of the interests. One group consists of India, Iran, Central Asian Republics and Russia and the other group consists of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China. The first group consisting of India-Iran-CARs-Russia wants a stable, strong, independent, prosperous Afghanistan, which is capable of beating back Taliban; preventing Afghanistan to become the safe haven for the global jihadists including Al Qaeda and developing Afghanistan as major trade, transport and energy hub of the region acting as a bridge between South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. This kind of stable, strong prosperous and democratic Afghanistan will prevent the descent of Afghanistan into chaos; will put Afghanistan on the development trajectory; enforce the rule of the law; protect the human rights and dignity of the people particularly the dignity of the women; reduce the role of narcotics in the Afghan economy; restrain the warlords and drug barons and put an end to poppy cultivation and drug trade. The second group consisting of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and China wants the return of Taliban to power in Afghanistan through the process of reconciliation and reintegration, which means co-option of Taliban in the governance of Afghanistan. They want the return of orthodox, conservative, intolerant, hardcore Sunni government in Afghanistan which will create havoc in the Afghan society and will take it back to the medieval period where the country will be run by the Sharia law and women will have no

rights. This will lead to re-emergence of Afghanistan as the safe haven for global terrorists. This will radicalise the whole Muslim world and destabilise the whole region and chaos will prevail. Though it might serve the narrow short term interests of Pakistan and China against India and interests of Saudi Arabia against Iran but it will have disastrous consequences for the region and the world. Radicalisation of the Muslim world even might destabilise the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. China also will face heightened Islamic militancy in Xinjiang and the Muslim dominated western China might come under the grip of Islamic insurgency.

Role of US It is very strange that the closest allies of the United States viz. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are pursuing policies in Afghanistan, which are against the US stated objective of the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Pakistan-Saudi Arabia, who also enjoy the tacit support of China are pursuing a shortsighted policy of having a pliable Islamic government in Afghanistan, which will dance to their tune. This type of government will be dangerous for the region and the world and will result in the regional and global turmoil. It will be against global peace, stability and security. If the US wants to stabilise Afghanistan, it must distance itself from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China who favour the return of Taliban to power. Their advocacy of making distinction between good and bad or hardcore and soft Taliban is preposterous. This division is arbitrary and contradictory. There is no such thing as good or soft Taliban. They are by nature hardened criminals and so their integration is fraught with dangers. It is ironical that American interests are closer to the countries, which are not very friendly with the US. For America Iran is still a rogue State, part of the evil empire, which has to be isolated. Russia is still not trustworthy and India though friendly cannot be befriended at the cost of Pakistan. America knows that it is mainly because of Pakistan its ‘War On Terror’ and ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ has not succeeded in its mission of stabilising Afghanistan despite being there for a decade. The US treats Pakistan as indispensable for the stabilisation of Afghanistan.

Whereas Pakistan has vested interests in perpetuating the instability in Afghanistan as only then it can have strategic depth in Afghanistan and can preserve its strategic assets in the form of Islamic insurgents, who can be used as tools to advance the foreign policy objectives against its arch enemy India. To succeed, the US has to dump Pakistan-Saudi Arabia and China and extend full support to India-Iran-Central Asian Republics-Russia efforts in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Iran might be an adversary of the US in Middle East and its nuclear weapon programme has created grave threat to the security of the US and its allies but in Afghanistan there is complete convergence of the US-Iranian interests. At least for Afghan stabilisation, Iran must be engaged by the US. In case of India, the US is ambivalent. It appreciates the Indian contribution in the reconstruction of Afghanistan but under Pakistan pressure demands transparency from India in its developmental projects and suspects the motive of India in Afghanistan. The US wants the involvement of Central Asian Republics in the stabilisation of Afghanistan but because of being weak economies, these States are marginal players in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Russia can be a significant player but the US does not want to give important role to Russia in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. The US still has not been able to come out of cold war mindset. The United States has to actively engage India, Iran, Central Asian Republics and Russia to stabilise Afghanistan; to prevent the return of Islamic extremists and Al Qaeda to Afghanistan and return of Taliban to power. Since the US, India, Iran, CARs, Russia all are seeking the same objectives in Afghanistan; they should coordinate and combine their efforts in Afghanistan to achieve their common objectives.

The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India. He has been awarded Faculty Research Fellowship by Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, (SICI) and Charles Wallace Visiting Fellowship by Cambridge University. He is also Salzburg Global Seminar Fellow.

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drugs and instability

conundrum Dr Prem Mahadevan

An excellent, informative article on the opium and heroin trade that finances the Taliban’s war in Afghanistan. During the 1980s, opium grown in Pakistani frontier regions accounted for 30 per cent of global heroin supply. By the end of the decade, drug money constituted 25 per cent of Pakistani GDP. Post the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan became a giant opium-growing hinterland for Pakistani drug lords. This division of labour, with Afghanistan being the supplier and Pakistan the managerial hub, has persisted ever since. The only change has been the emergence of new supply routes across Central Asia. In terms of volume, the bulk of Afghan heroin still passes through Pakistani territory (40 per cent as opposed to 25 per cent for Central Asia and 35 per cent for Iran). The Afghan drug trade poses a significant, albeit indirect, threat to India. It is a key source of funding for Dawood Ibrahim’s D Company, which in turn, works closely with Lashkar-e-Toiba.

popular cliché among security commentators is that Afghanistan under the Taliban was not a terrorist sponsoring State. Rather, it was a terrorist-sponsored State. Osama bin Laden, with his prodigious wealth, is thought to have seized control of the country through bribes to Taliban leaders and turned it into a base for international terrorism. Although this view is not completely wrong, it is too simplistic. Osama bin Laden did provide financial aid to the Taliban, but its scale was not that significant. Having been bankrupted by a series of disastrous investments in Sudan, he went to Afghanistan with just a fraction of his already modest fortune of US$ 7 million; hardly enough to buy a country. Instead of terrorist funds, what sustained the Taliban occupation of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001

was drug money – the same factor that is fuelling the current Taliban resurgence. Opium and its main derivative, heroin, are the currencies that fill the Taliban war chest. While extortion and donations from wealthy Arab patrons buffer Taliban finances, the single-largest share (between 40 and 60 per cent according to most reports), comes from taxes levied on the drug trade. This trade is a crucial factor in the instability of Afghanistan and its controllers sit on both sides of the Durand Line.

Cross-border problem Like radical Islamism, the drug economy of Afghanistan is partly indigenous and partly imported from Pakistan. During the 1980s, it was the latter country that was by far the bigger producer of drugs. Opium grown in Pakistani frontier regions accounted

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for 30 per cent of global heroin supply. By the end of the decade, drug money constituted 25 per cent of Pakistani GDP. However, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War shortly thereafter dramatically changed the situation. Afghanistan became a giant opium-growing hinterland for Pakistani drug lords, most of whom had cross-border contacts due to a common Pashtun ethnicity. Furthermore, the end of US-Pakistani collaboration against the communist menace led to new tensions in bilateral relations. Washington, which had previously been unwilling to confront Pakistani officials over the drugs issue, now took a hard line. Under its pressure and partly to discredit the army and ISI, who were involved in the trade, Benazir Bhutto launched a counternarcotics drive. An ambitious

campaign of crop eradication and substitution led to opium cultivation in Pakistan falling sharply. Heroin laboratories were pushed into Afghanistan and Pakistani drug lords henceforth concentrated mostly on the transportation of drugs, rather than their production. This division of labour, with Afghanistan being the supplier and

Pakistan the managerial hub, has persisted ever since. The only change has been the emergence of new supply routes across Central Asia, towards Russia and Western Europe. However, in terms of volume, the bulk of Afghan heroin still passes through Pakistani territory (40 per cent as opposed to 25 per cent for Central Asia and 35 per cent for Iran). Given that the value of drugs shipment increases the farther

it travels from its source, Pakistani smugglers make much more money than do their Afghan counterparts. The latter are the poorest beneficiaries of the global drugs economy, receiving just three per cent of total turnover. Even the Taliban, who sell protection to Afghan drug smugglers, receive just seven per cent of domestic drug revenue. Rather than running the trade, they are being run by it and have long been.

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Instead of terrorist funds, what sustained the Taliban occupation of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 was drug money – the same factor that is fuelling the current Taliban resurgence. Opium and its main derivative, heroin, are the currencies that fill the Taliban war chest. While extortion and donations from wealthy Arab patrons buffer Taliban finances, the single-largest share (between 40 and 60 per cent according to most reports), comes from taxes levied on the drug trade. This trade is a crucial factor in the instability of Afghanistan and its controllers sit on both sides of the Durand Line Taliban connection When Mullah Omar and his rag-tag bunch of students swept across southern Afghanistan in the winter of 1994, few could anticipate that he would become the country’s ruler. Official Pakistani backing for his group was evident at the local level, but even then, policymakers in Islamabad were less than clear about their assessment of the group. It posed a threat to Islamabad’s traditional favourite, the Afghan Islamist and drug lord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. According to some accounts, initially the Taliban were even viewed with suspicion by the Inter Services Intelligence, largely because they were assisted by its rival agency, the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau. From leaked Western intelligence reports, it now appears that before the IB and ISI stepped in, the Taliban were originally sponsored by a regional drug cartel based in Baluchistan. Known as the Quetta Alliance, this group of smugglers controlled the private road haulage system of Pakistan. They had taken heavy losses in Afghanistan from extortion demands since the start of the country’s civil war in 1992. In order to bring their operating costs down, they opted to bankroll the Taliban and gain control of Afghanistan’s road network. Using their funds, the Taliban simply bought off local warlords and paid their soldiers three times the wages that other Afghan militias paid. In return for this support, upon coming to power the Taliban retreated from their initial promises to shut down the drug trade. Instead, they taxed it. Farmers who grew opium poppy were made to pay 10 per cent of their earnings

to the regime; transporters who trucked the opium to heroin labs near the border and thereafter to Pakistan, paid 20 per cent. Considering a lack of alternative income sources, widespread participation in the drug trade was inevitable. After nearly two decades of conflict, Afghanistan’s infrastructure had been shattered. Only 12 per cent of its land was arable. Moreover, under an exploitative system of local credit, the economy had become drug-dependent.

Agro-credit system (Salaam) Originally introduced as a way of gaining control over the means of drug production, the Afghan agro-credit system (known as Salaam) had enslaved millions of farmers during the 1990s. Drug smugglers would make advance payments to farmers for undervalued opium crops, which would have to be repaid at exorbitant rates of interest. Since repayment would be made in kind, this meant that farmers were locked into a never-ending debt trap that forced them to keep growing opium and selling it below market price in order to pay off their loans. As international hostility against the Taliban regime mounted over its willingness to shelter Osama bin Laden, drugs became one of the issues used to pressure Mullah Omar. UN officials promised him US$ 250 million in developmental aid if he agreed to shut down opium farms. Desperate for funds, he agreed. Both sides however, reneged on the deal. The UN did not make the payment and Mullah Omar, before ordering a total ban on opium cultivation, allowed top Taliban officials to buy up massive buffer stocks. The idea was to

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sell these at inflated prices once global opium supply – of which Afghanistan contributed 90 per cent – plummeted as a result of the ban.

while avoiding action against those affiliated with government ministers. For three years after 9/11, the international community remained relatively sanguine about the threat posed by drug cartels to Afghanistan. Only from 2004 onwards was an effort made to seize opium stockpiles leftover from the Taliban era and dismantle heroin refining and transportation infrastructure. Given that most of this infrastructure was ad hoc, operating out of the back of vehicles or in mud huts, counter-narcotics operations met with limited success. Upon US advice, great emphasis was put on eradicating opium crops, with disastrous effects.

The cultivation ban was in effect during July 2000-August 2001. Within this period, Taliban leaders made money hand over fist even as Afghan farmers languished in unprecedented poverty. Unable to pay off their loans, many fled to neighbouring countries. Others talked of rebelling against the regime and symbolic protests were mounted in some provinces. Although the regime was aware of the unpopularity of its decision, it remained committed to enforcing the ban, having amassed buffer stocks equivalent to two years’ supply. Crucially, no efforts were made to interfere with the refining and transportation of heroin - drug cartels that had supported the Taliban carried on as normal.

Firstly, the crop eradication programme seemed to confirm Taliban propaganda that the West was out to destroy Afghanistan’s economy and subjugate its people. Secondly, it pushed drug farming out of government-controlled areas and into insurgent strongholds, providing the latter with a steady source of revenue. Thirdly, it drove up opium prices by creating a supply shortage, thereby adding to Taliban funds. Finally, it placed a premium on the ability to defy law enforcement agencies through armed action. Together, these four factors allowed the Taliban to bounce back as a politically viable and militarily cohesive force inside Afghanistan. Flush with drug money, the group contracted local mercenaries to fight on its behalf, paying them 3.5 times the average annual Afghan wage.

posed to Afghanistan itself. Drug economies thrive in regions with four characteristics: An impoverished agricultural population, a weak State presence, high levels of official corruption and persistent armed conflict. Between them, these conditions generate a conflict cycle which cannot be broken even through extraneous intervention and developmental aid. Xenophobia and nationalism combine to ensure that any ‘solutions’ imposed by outsiders are summarily rejected, while corruption and banditry ensure that aid money never reaches those it is intended for. Having suffered three decades of instability, Afghanistan has become habituated to political violence and, with the devastation of its economic infrastructure, reliant on drug money.

9/11 and after

Impact on regional security

To some extent, the US invasion of Afghanistan came as a blessing to the Taliban, since it relieved them of having to continue enforcing the unpopular opium ban. Many Afghans welcomed the regime’s collapse not because they were enamoured of the West or the Northern Alliance, but because they were being financially squeezed by rapacious moneylenders and were desperate for a source of income. Understandably, the new government led by Hamid Karzai did not interfere when opium cultivation resumed on a massive scale across the country. Henceforth, Afghan counter-narcotics policy would instead be focused on targeting those criminal groups and drug farms affiliated with the Taliban,

The Afghan drug trade poses a significant, albeit indirect, threat to India. It is a key source of funding for Dawood Ibrahim’s D Company, which in turn, works closely with Lashkar-e-Toiba. Militarisation of drug smuggling, as well as corruption among law enforcement personnel in both India and Pakistan increase the prospects of a successful crime-terror convergence. If the events of the last two decades are anything to go by – the 2008 Mumbai attacks being one example – the Pakistani establishment will attempt to deflect domestic security threats posed by this convergence, in the direction of India.

The United States, for all its domestic rhetoric about a ‘war on drugs’, is decidedly ambivalent about the threat posed by Afghan heroin. This is because heroin addiction is not a serious problem in the United States; the big concerns for US policy-makers and law enforcement agencies are cocaine, marijuana and synthetic drugs. Whatever little heroin is consumed in the United States mostly originates from Mexico. Thus, Washington has tended to go slow against Afghan drug smugglers, unless they are believed to be linked to the Taliban or Al Qaeda. In cases where such a link is suspected, the US preference has been for crop eradication; a counterproductive option that it has recently distanced itself from due to local resentment. Instead, more focus is now placed on interdiction

The biggest threat is of course,

American ambivalence

of heroin shipments and pursuit of specific drug lords. More significant is the position taken by Russia. With around 30,000 citizens dying annually from heroin abuse, Russia has been proactive in declaring drugs a national security threat. It receives 21 per cent of the 375 tons of Afghan heroin produced every year, thus forming the drug’s single-biggest market. Already facing a demographic crisis caused by falling birth rates, Russia is a natural partner for India in the fight against drugs. Both, Chechen and Kashmiri separatist groups, are known to partake from drug revenue through low-level cooperation with smugglers. Many radical Islamists, being ideologically nihilistic, see drugs as a legitimate weapon of warfare, capable of bringing down their ‘decadent’ enemies. Therefore, institutionalising intelligence sharing on drug cartels, as well as conducting focused long term studies of the conflict economies that sustain political instability in Afghanistan, is essential if that country is to be prevented from becoming a terrorist sanctuary again.

The writer is Senior Researcher for Intelligence, Sub-state Conflict and Organised Crime at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, Switzerland. Between 2002 and 2009, he completed an undergraduate degree in War Studies and postgraduate and doctoral degrees in Intelligence Studies from King's College, London. He has written extensively on Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies and his articles on Indian counter-terrorism have been made recommended reading for military officers in North America and Western Europe.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

With President Obama’s announcement of the accelerated schedule of withdrawal of the US-NATO forces from Afghanistan, a key factor for analysis is the state of readiness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to take over and step into the breach. Is it prepared to undertake stand alone operations in the post withdrawal scenario? It is so far a largely straight-legged infantry force. Pakistan has been insisting that it should have no armour and artillery and India should have no role whatsoever in its raising or training. The writer points out that in 2009 only 34 units of the ANA were deemed fit to operate in a stand alone mode. A very perceptive evaluation of the current state of readiness of the ANA which does raise question marks over the pace of the current troop draw down.

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s the US President made his speech on 22 June 2011 stating the timeline of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, voices have become stronger on the issue of transfer of authority to Afghan National Security Forces and the ‘Afghanisation’ of war. In 2009, Afghanistan’s former foreign minister, Rangeen Dadfar Spanta had stated that investment in the army, police and other security entities would be a precondition of Afghanisation of the security sector in the country.

At this stage, it is important to undertake an objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan National Army (ANA). It is also essential to valuate if the force is presently efficient enough to enable the process of withdrawal and duly replace the coalition forces successfully. Before assessing any performance of the ANA, it needs to be realised that the present army was created only nine years ago and should not be expected to perform as other armies in the subcontinent that have been in existence for numerous decades. Undoubtedly, it is the Afghan military that remains indispensible for stabilising Afghanistan in the long run. However, there are structural flaws that retard the military’s ability to perform independently without the international backers.

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Ethnic imbalance While the numbers of the ANA troops swell up every year (as of March 2011, the ANA had 1,59,000 troops) there are serious problems in terms of quality of the force. A major impediment to a successful army is the ethnic imbalance in the ANA. There are varied statistical breakdown of the ethnicities in ANA and some numbers appear to be pregnant with falsity. According to a Crisis Group report, 42.6 per cent of the army represents the Pashtuns, while Tajiks represent

40.98 per cent. Hazaras comprise of 7.68 per cent, Uzbeks remain at 4.05 per cent and other minorities remain underrepresented, comprising of only 4.68 per cent of the force. The Pashtun presence is maximum owing to their proportion to the overall population; however, Tajiks largely dominate the officers and NCO ranks. An illustration of the imbalance is in Zabul, where the population is almost 95 per cent Pashtun, but ironically 70 per cent of the officers in the province are Tajiks. The ethnic imbalance is a source of factionalism because of

contesting communities, diluting any possibility of a truly ‘national’ army. It also poses serious problems for the policy of winning hearts and minds (WHAM) of the people. The other most highlighted weakness of the ANA is the logistics system. This weakness crops up from the conscious decision of the coalition forces to build an infantry-centric army. In order to cover up for the inadequate numbers of combat forces previously, the international community focused on building the fighting force and initiated

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

Any hasty draw down of troops without strong planning and execution will result in turmoil in the country. This would further jeopardise every effort made by the allied forces till date and revert the country to a post-Soviet era, thus having serious implications for Afghanistan and the regional stability at large their interest in the logistics system only in 2008. Considering that it would take many more years to put a strong indigenous logistics system, ANA would continue to rely on NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/ Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) for their fielding and sustainment requirements. Additionally, NTM-A/ CSTC-A have averred that poor logistical system and supply chains have resulted in operational paralysis. It would be imprudent to continue to ignore the area of logistics system, as it would affect the ANA’s performance and would be inadequate to support the growing numbers, making it increasingly dependent on its international supporters.

Attrition Apart from the above stated issues, lack of training and high attrition rates are also sources of concern when assessing the capacity building of the ANA. As reported by Time, Lt Gen William Caldwell, commander of NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan stated that even though 1,10,000 men were recruited in 2010, high attrition rates led to a total increase in manpower by only 70,000 men. Also, these rates make it tougher for the international forces to transform a recruit into a leader. Due to lack of leadership, poor salaries and bad working conditions, there are numerous cases of soldiers going (AWOL) absence without leave. It is important to note that 98 per cent of the soldiers going AWOL hail from critical field units with intense fighting. The lack of training has also been responsible for high casualty rates which spread fear and hamper the morale of the soldiers, leading to a higher degree of attrition. Other issues involve lack of discipline, use of hashish and heroin, which are cheap and readily available. Other problems in the serving troops are rampant corruption and lethargy, as periodically asserted by US and allied soldiers in journalistic

interviews. These trends disprove the claim that the force will be ready to handle the responsibility of defending the widespread insurgency in the near future. Considering the soldiers that continue to serve and undergo training, illiteracy impeded the desired progress. Only 14 per cent of the Afghan army is relatively literate. The remaining are unable to read maps or road signs correctly and are also unable to read training manuals. These problems restrict their ability to learn beyond a certain basic level of soldiering skills. In 2005, the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) adopted the use of “capability milestones” (CM) to assess the performance and preparedness of the army units and their respective departments. The levels of assessment range from CM1 (fully capable of undertaking primary military operations with some external support) to CM4 (incapable of undertaking primary operational missions and competent to conduct only certain aspects of the mission with external assistance from coalition forces). According to a Crisis Group report, by 2008, only 2 of 105 ANA units were rated CM1, 38 needed regular international assistance and 65 required full international assistance to operate. Moreover, speedy expansion has led to decline in the operational capabilities of fielded units. Statistics show that 47 units were regarded as capable of undertaking independent operations in May 2009, but the number plunged to 44 in September 2009 and fell further to 34 units in December 2009. Despite ANA’s active involvement in the security sphere of the country, the predominant role in majority of combat operations is played by coalition forces. Operations in Afghanistan have reflected the difficulties that international forces have faced in dealing with the Taliban. Expecting

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an embryonic army to handle the operation solely in a matter of few years is highly idealistic.

Positives Apart from all the structural and operational weaknesses attributed to the ANA, one cannot ignore the many positive factors inherent in the army. US troops have regularly praised the Afghan troops for their fierceness, valour, ability to spot the IEDs before time, thus reducing numerous casualties and their ability to identify the enemy from ordinary people. The linguistic and cultural advantages that they enjoy are crucial for WHAM and help instill people’s confidence in the government. There are reasons for optimism with regard to special units like the commando battalions which are adept and skillful in their operations. In June 2008, post-Kandahar prison break incident, almost one ANA kandak (battalion) was airlifted from Kabul in order to retake some villages overrun by the freed Taliban fighters. Within a day, ANA units restored security in the area along with ISAF units. A similar operation involving the ANA succeeded in October 2008 in Helmand province after a Taliban attack on Lashkar Gan, when an ANA kandak was airlifted to ensure people’s safety against the Taliban. The ANA also played an important role in the February 2010 “Operation Moshttarak” in Marjah of Helmand province. However, despite the deployment of almost 2,000 ANA troops in the operation, it was almost 10,000 coalition forces that took the lead in the operation. Furthermore, many of the ANA units were partially operational, therefore reflecting the inadequacy of the force in the current times. Recent reports have stated that the ANA forces are considered to be “in the lead” on more than half of the

operations, but it is important to note that such operations include tasks like patrolling and maintaining presence at security checkpoints. Even though ANA has improved to a high degree in carrying out combat operations with support but are not competent enough to lead operations and support itself in logistical terms. A regrouping Taliban makes the task more challenging.

Taliban revival The recent attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul of 29 June 2011 is a testament to Taliban’s revived strengths and emboldened attitude. The attack came within a week of Obama’s declaration of troop withdrawals and transfer of responsibility to local forces. The attack was a litmus test for how would the Afghan security forces fare in handling security without NATO assistance and the performance has been regarded as dismal by numerous analysts world over. As attackers managed to enter the hotel, the assault began at 10 pm. Reports aver that Afghan forces were reluctant to engage the militants and few personnel also fled the scene. Dozens of ANA soldiers entered the hotel at 2 am to evacuate the guests but were not very successful. The fight with the militants and the chorus of gun fires ended only after NATO helicopter gunships arrived to provide aerial surveillance and cover for Afghan forces around 3 am. The incidence speaks volumes about the precarious nature of security and the preparedness of the Afghan forces to handle operations independently. Airpower has been a major contributor to the success of many other operations as well in Afghanistan. ANA’s reliance on the international

units for airpower will prove to be detrimental in the long run, therefore affecting their performance and operational capabilities. The goal of recruiting 8,000 men and having 84 fixed wing and 62 rotary wings aircraft by 2016 seems to be unachievable. The Afghan National Army Air Corps by January 2010 had only 2,800 men and 46 aircraft in service. Added to the challenges of achieving their goal, it remains challenging to fully train pilots within a short period. By January 2010, only one Afghan pilot had been fully trained and graduated from the NTM-A-led training programme. Adding numbers to the ANA without adequate means of sustenance and in the absence of a clearly defined model of civil-military relations would be damaging in the long run. It is common knowledge that the government of Afghanistan may not be able to sustain the security sector independently after the exit of international forces. The need is to develop the forces in accordance to what the government would be able to maintain without external help. As the international money dries up, the security apparatus of the country may cripple down having a destabilising effect. Any transition towards fighting the insurgency would require a balance between competing priorities and demands of the security sector. Additionally, for any security force to perform efficiently, it is important to achieve a basic degree of law capacity. Without sufficient rule of law, any transition is likely to fail and the ANA may become unproductive over a period of time. Looking at a holistic picture, a pivotal aspect of any army is the need of a comprehensive strategy that is formulated with consideration of the geopolitical position of the country. For the country to embrace stability, ANA would have to act as a credible deterrent and become self-reliant in the long term. Afghanistan has had an acrimonious history with Pakistan, specifically due to its border issues and Pakistan’s policy of employing jihadi proxies as tools of foreign policy. Pakistan continues to adopt a double-faced attitude towards Afghanistan, therefore, the ANA would need to be strengthened to not only combat the Taliban, but also counter Pakistan’s attempts to

gain strategic depth in the region. It is unlikely that the army would be able to handle the threat of safe havens along the porous Afghan-Pak border, without any external assistance like intelligence and operational support. The aim should be to formulate a strategy and develop the force according to the strategic framework. The regional compulsions would obstruct ANA’s ability to respond to threats independently within the timeframe specified.

Regional stability Finally, a gradual transformation that does not hamper the basic security fabric of Afghanistan is the need of the hour. Any hasty draw down of troops without strong planning and execution will result in turmoil in the country. This would further jeopardise every effort made by the allied forces till date and revert the country to a post-Soviet era, thus having serious implications for Afghanistan and the regional stability at large. Right sizing the ANA would also be a critical facet. Current plans are to bring the ANA to an overall strength of 1,71,000 by this year end. However given the size of the country and the strength of the opposing Taliban, this force sizing is wholly inadequate. It may be recalled that the Afghan army left behind by the Soviets in 1989 was 5,50,000 strong. This had fought well and held off the Mujahideen for three years after the Soviet withdrawal. It fell only once Gorbachev stopped paying this army. The Pakistan Army Chief Gen Kayani has been insisting that the ANA must not be raised to a level where it can pose any threat to Pakistan. As such he has insisted with the Americans that the ANA be kept low in numerical terms and it be only a straight legged infantry force with no tanks and artillery and only a miniscule air corps. Pakistan therefore wants to dictate the size and composition of the Afghan army that Afghanistan will be allowed to have. This is an amazing situation and turns Afghanistan into a virtual colony of Pakistan and seriously infringes upon its sovereignty.

The writer is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India.

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

Analysts in Europe are looking at the renewed Russian involvement in Afghanistan with trepidation. They recall the ignominy of the withdrawal of troops of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and see no prospect of success even in a purely peacekeeping role for Russian troops in the near future. Nonetheless, none of the nations on the Afghan periphery can afford to remain mute spectators to the very likely return of the Al Qaeda / Taliban combine to Kabul and the relaunch of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists on a global scale more so the Russia of today. If the Chechens receive the military and ideological backing of a Taliban regime in Kabul it could well mean the further fragmentation of the extant Russian Federation as its Muslim-dominated segments fall prey to the pulls and pressures of the new Caliphate.

ussia is set to return to the war in Afghanistan 21 years after its forces were driven out of the country. Is it a good decision of Moscow? For Russian people Afghanistan is still a symbol of trauma and lost war. From the other side, what will be the reaction of the Afghan people? For them Russians were - even more than the Americans - occupants. All these reasons make Russian presence in the region even more fragile and difficult. It can be “mission impossible” says

against Soviet forces. New Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev promises to withdraw Russian troops from Afghanistan, while rebels continue to be assisted by the West. As a result of this declaration, from January 1987 to February 1989 Soviet forces slowly withdrew from Afghanistan. Between December 25, 1979 and

Apart from human victims, the political impact of the involvement in Afghanistan was very important. Immediately in 1979 United States President, Jimmy Carter claimed that the Soviet incursion was “the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War”. Carter later placed a trade embargo against the Soviet Union on shipments of commodities such as grain and weapons. The international diplomatic response was severe,

The first steps of Russian involvement in Afghanistan have already been taken. After many months of negotiations between Kremlin and NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rassmusen, Moscow has agreed to help train the Afghan army and anti-narcotics troops. Earlier, Russia allowed the transportation of non-lethal supplies across its territory for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan Mikhail Gorbachev, former President of the USSR as the Soviet Union was also known, who had decided to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Soviet Union’s ‘Vietnam’ Writing on the future role of Russia in Afghanistan we have to return to the past, to the end of 1970s and beginning of 1980s. As we know very well, in 1979 Soviet Union sent in troops at request of the Afghan government but falls out with President Hafizullah Amin, who is executed. With the backing of Russia, Babrak Karmal, leader of the People’s Democratic Party Parcham, was installed as ruler. From March 1980 to April 1985 - anti-regime resistance intensified as various mujahideen groups clashed with Soviet forces. Some Western countries, including the United States and Britain, supplied the rebels with arms and money. From April 1985 to January 1987 we observed a new chapter of conflict - Mujahideen unite in Pakistan to form an alliance

February 15, 1989, a total of 6,20,000 soldiers served with the forces in Afghanistan (though there were only 80,000-1,04,000 serving at any one time): 5,25,000 in the Army, 90,000 with border troops and other KGB sub-units, 5,000 in independent formations of MVD Internal Troops and police forces. A further 21,000 personnel were with the Soviet troop contingent over the same period doing various white collar and blue collar jobs. For the Soviet Union it was one of the most traumatic disasters, with around 15,000 soldiers killed and more than 53,000 seriously wounded. Very soon journalists started to write about Soviet Union’s ‘Vietnam’. Many veterans returned from Afghanistan with horrible trauma, without protection and support of State, they became unemployed and drug addicts. Even today in all former Soviet Republics, specially Russia, a very strong “Afghan syndrome” exists.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dominika Cosic

ranging from stern warnings to a US-led boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow (in which Afghanistan competed). The increased tensions, as well as the anxiety in the West about tens of thousands of Soviet troops being in such proximity to oil-rich regions in the Persian Gulf, effectively brought about the end of détente. Last but not least, this war had ruined the Soviet Union’s budget. However no one has said how expensive it was. As a result the Afghan war was indeed - as stated by famous former dissident, Vladimir Bukowski - one of the most important reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union.

What of now? After almost ten years of US / NATO military mission in Afghanistan unfortunately there is still chaos and

role of Russia

anarchy. It is very hard to find some stable positive results. In the face of frequent terrorist attacks, more and more Western countries are withdrawing their troops. If United States really leaves Afghanistan, only one country will be big enough and strong and experienced enough to replace America - Russia. Conversely, it would be the worst possible solution for the situation. The first steps of Russian involvement in Afghanistan have already been taken. After many months of negotiations between Kremlin and NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rassmusen, Moscow has agreed to help train the Afghan army and anti-narcotics troops. Earlier, Russia allowed the transportation of non-lethal supplies across its territory for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Russia has agreed to the request of the very same Western

countries who helped remove Russia from Afghanistan in the late 1980s. It is an obvious paradox of history. As famous German philosopher from the beginning of XIX century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel wrote: “History repeats itself. First time as a tragedy. Second time as a farce”.

Victory impossible Unfortunately it seems to be very true in a case of Russian return to Afghanistan. Why? I won’t even try to analyse the reaction of Russian citizens on this decision. More important is what will be the reaction of Afghan society. For these people the Soviets and now the Russians, are still the living symbols of aggression, occupation and violence. Russia has lost once in this region. There is no prospect that this time it will win. I am afraid that even the presence of a Russian peacekeeping mission troops there can be for the local people

a provocation. Mikhail Gorbachev, who understands the situation much better than any other Russian politician, has warned NATO that victory in Afghanistan is ‘impossible’. He said that American President Barack Obama is right to start withdrawing US forces from the country. But he warned failure to do so would result in the Americans suffering another defeat on the same scale as Vietnam. ‘Victory is impossible in Afghanistan,’ Mr. Gorbachev said. ‘Obama is right to pull the troops out. No matter how difficult it will be.’ He did not want to even comment on the Russian decision to return to Afghanistan. The writer is European correspondent of Polish weekly magazine Wprost. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs and also the Balkans issues. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine from India.

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GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

A populace that had been under the thrall of the intolerant Taliban regime is grateful for the kind of assistance that India has provided even in the worst of conditions of intimidation and violence. The Afghan people of any of the several ethnicities that prevail in Afghanistan see in India’s presence in their country a benign and selfless entity. By comparison Pakistan in its rapacity for “strategic depth” and undeserved sphere of influence is seen as the causal factor for the state of penury that exists across every province in the land. No wonder Pakistan feels threatened.

ndia’s relations with Afghanistan go back to pre-historic times and the warmly cordial relations have continued despite so many changes in the geopolitical scenario mainly concerning Afghanistan and also the repeated efforts of an intolerant Pakistan to thwart such cordial relations. The drawing of the Durand Line (dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan) in 1947 saw the NWFP being clubbed with Pakistan even while people from that region played a major role in India’s war of independence. After the freedom of India in 1947, despite the new geopolitical scenario, there have been regular economic and cultural ties between the two countries. Till date Indian films are very popular in that country despite the severe censor efforts during the time of the Taliban control. With the coalition forces starting military action in 2001 and the subsequent overthrow of the fundamentalist Taliban regime and the installing of the Hamid Karzai-led government; there has been very strong involvement of India in the economic reconstruction of that country. India’s assistance right from day one was in the areas of humanitarian aid in the form of medicines and food, infrastructure building across roads and power lines, funding community based projects across the country that had an impact in a short time and most importantly training the Afghans on various fronts like civil aviation, capacity building in administration, vocational activities etc. Till date India has offered aid of over US$ 1.3 billion and an additional amount of US$ 500 million was announced by the Indian Prime Minister in May 2011 when he visited Kabul. India is the sixth largest donor and the largest regional donor for Afghanistan. Today India is the most popular country among the Afghans as many surveys have shown in the last few years. Even the

international community directly admits how India played a key role in a post-conflict situation with its development aid and support.

Strategic partnership However it has to be noted that India had stayed away from direct military participation in the war against the Taliban and has rightly done so considering the sensitivity in the region. However a lot of support for the emancipation of the peace loving Afghans was always there from the Indian side and so India came in from day one with its aid for all the gaps that needed to be filled up with this development assistance programme. The regular visits by the leadership of both countries, the residing of skilled Indians in that country for building their infrastructure despite targeted attacks has been acknowledged by the people who draw direct benefit from these schemes. Besides strengthening the bilateral tie-up over the last decade, India has also ensured the greater international involvement of Afghanistan and helped secure the entry of Afghanistan as the eighth member of SAARC in April 2007. During the May 2011 visit, Dr Manmohan Singh along with President Hamid Karzai announced the intent to forge a Strategic Partnership and this would be implemented under the framework of a Partnership Council which will be headed by the two foreign ministers.

Humanitarian assistance It is pertinent to dwell on the nature of the Indian aid so that the magnitude of the support can be better realised. One of the first things with which India aided Afghanistan was to send protein fortified biscuits in the winter of 2001-2002 under the

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World Food Programme’s School Feeding scheme, which ensured that over 2 million children in 33 out of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan got the necessary food nutrients and thus could attend schools in various parts of Afghanistan. India also provided 2,50,000 metric tons of wheat in January 2009 when Afghanistan battled with food crisis despite the hardship in transporting it there because of the non-availability of the Pakistan land route. India also provided medical assistance in the form of doctors and

paramedical staff and supported their work with medicines and artificial limbs during the early days of the war. Five Indian medical missions have been running in Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif and thus facilitating quality treatment to poor Afghan patients and in many cases also referring them to hospitals in India for further treatment. Doctors have been regularly trained and still being trained in India particularly at AIIMS, New Delhi. An indicator of the success of these efforts is that over 3 lakh Afghans, particularly women and children have trekked long distances to avail of free medical treatment offered by Indian camps in the year 2009 itself. The Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health (IGICH) in Kabul built by Indian assistance

India: intrepid benefactor is the largest pediatric hospital in Afghanistan.

Communications network However the most significant role was the building of strong communications and power infrastructure across Afghanistan by India despite constant threats and also occasional fatal attacks on Indian nationals working on these projects. The 215 kilometres long Zaranj-Delaram highway executed at a cost of US$ 150 million involving more than 300 engineers and workers from India and many more from Afghanistan offers connectivity to the Chabahar port in Iran. This road gives Afghanistan a much shorter access to the sea - the almost 12 hour bumpy ride has become a smooth 2 hour ride. Besides this highway, significant stretches of inner-city roads have also

near Kabul. This line apart from its high altitude lying also traversed through heavily snowed-in areas and has been recognised by that country as an engineering feat. This project allowed transmission of electricity from Uzbekistan and thus Kabul was lit up with electricity in 2009. India is also constructing the Salma Dam Power project on river Hari Rud east of Herat and this will be commissioned later this year and provide 42 MW electricity.

Focus on community Besides these large projects, Indian assistance for many “small and community-based development projects” or SDPs spread across some of the worst militancy-affected districts in Afghanistan is very significant and recognised by the people there. SDPs

Subimal Bhattacharjee

authorities to reorient their democratic infrastructure. Administrative systems and processes are being helped by many Indian bureaucrats who have been situated in various parts of Afghanistan. Afghan educational institutes are being supported significantly and teachers and students are being trained and also provided with assistance to complete higher education either in that country or in Indian institutions. More than 1,300 scholarships under various programmes are being offered annually to Afghans in different disciplines.

Uzbek power link

are small-scale, quick-impact projects in social sectors like agriculture, rural development, education, health, vocational training having budgets of less than US$ 1 million. While Indian funds and technical assistance are provided, the ownership of both conception and execution remained with the community. Most of these projects have been undertaken in the provinces worst hit by terrorist violence - Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Nimroz, Nuristan, Badakshan, Balkh and Kandahar.

Thus the role that India has taken is very significant and the global community is appreciative of this position. Particularly the areas of participation by Indian government and the agencies are significant as they went and helped the Afghans in their greatest areas of need. All these despite the constant attempt by Pakistan to keep India away from Afghanistan. Further the constant threats, kidnappings and killings have not had their dampening effect as far as India was concerned. The two deadly attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul first on 7 July 2008 killing 58 people and injuring 141 and then again the car bomb attack on 18 October 2009 which saw 17 casualties are a reminder of how hostile a situation it was for India to participate in reconstruction and development work in that country.

In the power sector too significant contribution has been made and mention may be made of the 202 kilometre stretch double circuit transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a sub-station in Chimtala

Besides these there are other areas like institutional development where the Indian government and Indian agencies are playing a significant role. The Election Commission of India has been working significantly with the Afghan

The writer is currently Country Head for India of General Dynamics, one of the top five US defence corporations. He is a well known strategic thinker and columnist on issues of cyberspace and security. The views expressed are personal.

been built. The highway has resulted in the land prices shooting up and also doubling of the population of Zaranj town today from the meager 55,000 in 2004. Traffic mostly commercial has been good on this highway resulting in increased taxes for the government and also Afghanistan’s potential as a trade and transit hub which India has been always suggesting for that country, has increased manifold.

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China has so far chosen to get minimally involved in the security sector in Afghanistan. Yet, to the great chagrin of the western States, it has managed to win the most lucrative US$ 3.5 billion contract for the Aynak copper mines, that includes a thermal power station and a railway line to Xinjiang and Pakistan. China is on track to win further contracts for the mining of iron ore and possibly gold and rare earths and metals. Even if the Taliban comes to power post the US withdrawal, Chinese investments would still be safe, courtesy its close relations with Pakistan, the primary mentor of the Taliban.

hina’s policy in Afghanistan could be described as one wherein it has sought to and to a large extent, managed to, secure substantial gains primarily at the expense of the security cover provided by the ISAF / NATO allies. As opposed to the ISAF and NATO forces, China has chosen to assume a minimalistic role in the security sector, refusing to get involved in direct military operations. Given China’s refusal to contribute troops or monetarily assist military operations in Afghanistan, there is considerable umbrage in the West with Beijing getting hold of lucrative investment deals whose continued development rests with the security cover provided by the ISAF.1 Chinese involvement in Afghanistan was negligible through the 20th century. However, with Beijing’s growing appetite for energy and natural resources and consequent opening up of Afghanistan’s energy, mineral and raw materials to foreign investors, an escalatory pattern in the graph of Sino-Afghan ties has been established in the past decade. From being among the first few nations to establish official ties with the Karzai administration and the Afghan Transitional Authority post 2001, China has emerged as Afghanistan’s singlelargest foreign investor garnering practical advantages that it sought for. Although Chinese investments in Afghanistan have ignited considerable debate, it needs to be underlined that in the span of the past eight 1 2

years, the total foreign aid granted by Beijing to Afghanistan is rather petite at US$ 200 million. This constitutes a miniscule fraction of its global foreign aid which amounts to approximately US$ 25 billion. Chinese figures appear insipid in comparison to the near US$ 48 billion spent by the US in foreign assistance on Afghanistan since 2001. Thus, while Washington by far remains the single largest provider of foreign assistance to Afghanistan, China ranks twenty-fourth, behind donors such as Finland, Turkey, and Italy.2

Economic game plan According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ever since signing the Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations, Beijing and Kabul have subsequently signed multiple bilateral agreements to advance overall relations and facilitate closer and deeper economic and technical cooperation. These include the Chinese companies ZTE and Huawei partnering with the Afghan Ministry of Communications to implement digital telephone switches, providing roughly 2,00,000 subscriber lines. China is also contributing in Afghanistan’s Parwan irrigation project, restoring water supply in the Parwan province, as well as reconstruction of the public hospitals in Kabul and Kandahar. Moreover, the European Union (EU) has hired Chinese firms for various construction projects in Afghanistan, including road restoration activities.

Going by the visible trends, it appears increasingly likely that China shall harvest maximum benefits by concentrating in the economic investment sector. On road to seizing a substantial share of Afghanistan’s natural resources, the China Metallurgical Group Corp, Jiangxi Copper Corporation and Zijin Mining Group Company won a joint bid worth US$ 3.5 billion in 2008 to explore and process what is touted to be the largest undeveloped copper field in the world - virtually untouched since the Soviet invasion in 1979. The Aynak copper field situated in the Logar province in centraleast Afghanistan became the largest foreign direct investment in the history of Afghanistan, although the deal was marred by reports of corruption and bribery. This in turn, underlines the findings of a study conducted by Transparency International citing the Afghan government as the second most corrupt in the world.3 According to estimates, the 28-square-kilometer Aynak copper field could contain up to US$ 88 billion worth of ore in addition to other vital copper fields situated in Jawkhar and Darband in the relatively stable northern and north-western regions. The Aynak copper field project has resulted in the flagging off of a few advanced projects that come as a prerequisite for copper extraction to become fully operational. A substantial part of the Chinese bid includes a cost of US$ 500 million to build a 400 MW, coal-fired power plant and a freight

For more details see, Monika Chansoria, “China’s Expanding Footprint in Afghanistan,” The Sunday Guardian, July 10, 2011.

Dr Monika Chansoria

China’s conticent presence railroad passing from western China through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan. This comes in the absence of a power plant in the area capable of generating enough electricity for mining and extraction purposes coupled with the need for a railroad needed to haul away tonnes of copper that could be extracted. A significant environmental concern arising out of the extraction and production of copper lies in its processing with toxic dust and gases. The Chinese firms are expected to prevent these toxins from seeping into the underground water table or else the threat of drinking-water supplies becoming contaminated threatens areas as far as Kabul. The issue of unemployment in Afghanistan is expected to receive some relief with Chinese-funded projects, in that as many as 10,000 Afghans are bound to receive employment. According to a recent United Nations Development Programme report, an increasing portion of the Afghan population cited unemployment as the single greatest source of insecurity in Afghanistan.4 Therefore, despite harsh criticism against China’s getting hold of lucrative investment deals at the cost of the continued security cover provided by the ISAF, Afghanistan’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mohammad Yalaqi, placed an added emphasis on development by stating, “The Chinese contribution is as important as that of Western troops.”5 4

For further details see, United Nations Development Programme-Afghanistan, “Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective,” UNDP-Afghanistan

For more details see, Thomas Lum, et al., “China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for Congress,

and the Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ASCOR) Surveys, Kabul, October 2009.

February 25, 2009; also see, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Donor Financial Review Report, 1388, November 2009.

As cited in, Matthew Nasuti, “Afghans Credit China with Bringing Prosperity, While US State Department Fumbles,” Kabul Press, July 19, 2010.

Transparency International Report available at, Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2009,” Transparency International CPI 2009 Table.

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan

GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES

July 2 011

China has circumspectly aimed at projecting itself as a responsible player on the international stage to bolster its global ambitions. Going by this argument, the Afghan case provides a test for Beijing to play a far more crucial and balanced role as a regional player which simply does not limit / concentrate upon economic benefits, but also engages far more conscientiously while contributing towards the overall socio-political stability in the war-torn nation In all likelihood, China is not likely to keep itself limited simply to the copper mining projects in Afghanistan and this has been amply manifested with growing Chinese interests in Afghanistan’s large iron ore deposits stretching across Herat and the Panjshir Valley and gold reserves in the northern provinces of Badakshan, Takhar and Ghazni. It would be interesting to note that China’s iron-ore demand had increased close to 15 per cent during the first half of 2007, while copper demand surged by almost 35 per cent in the same period. Additionally, in the wake of natural gas demand also on the rise, Beijing continues to seek overland energy supply diversification in the neighbouring States in Central Asia and potentially in Afghanistan. In a recent interview to Business Standard in June 2011, Afghanistan’s Minister for Mines, Wahidullah Shahrani, stated that in a follow up to the upcoming Hajigak project - a two billion-tonne deposit of high-grade iron ore in the central province of Bamiyan, Kabul is expected to additionally place three copper, two gold deposits and a huge oil basin in Mazar-e-Sharif up for tender. Shahrani further underscored the economic advantage of most of Afghanistan’s deposits being open pit deposits

and being viable commercially. Envisioning Afghanistan as a secure channel for roads and energy pipelines, China would likely be eyeing the unexplored Afghan oil reserves now standing at 1,596 million barrels and natural gas reserves placed at 15,687 trillion cubic feet.

Securing western flank Based on these facets, Beijing’s placement in Kabul’s strategic calculus and vice versa comes across lucidly. The present Chinese leadership has placed greater emphasis on the Western Development Strategy and the ongoing and upcoming projects in Afghanistan supplement Beijing’s plans for the development of western China and its regional trade links. With America putting to plan its decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, China would be weighing its options vis-à-vis its consequent role and strategy in Afghanistan given its discomfort with long-term American presence in the region. However, post the US’ withdrawal, a plausible scenario of the Taliban capturing areas such as Kandahar cannot be negated altogether, resultantly hampering Chinese plans for an energy and commodities passage through South Asia. In order to secure its western front by providing limited training to the Afghan police forces

August 2011 Defence AND security alert

and mine-clearing teams, Beijing eventually seeks a safer border along its restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. So even if, for the time being, Chinese economic investments in Afghanistan are being viewed as a step in the direction towards the long-awaited reconstruction of Afghanistan, their limits vis-à-vis longterm security of the projects in the backdrop of a futuristic ISAF/NATO force reduction need to be accounted for. China has circumspectly aimed at projecting itself as a responsible player on the international stage to bolster its global ambitions. Going by this argument, the Afghan case provides a test for Beijing to play a far more crucial and balanced role as a regional player which simply does not limit / concentrate upon economic benefits, but also engages far more conscientiously while contributing towards the overall socio-political stability in the war-torn nation.

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The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India where she heads the China study project and is the author of books namely, Chinese WMD Proliferation in Asia: US Response (2009) and China: Military Modernisation and Strategy (2011).

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