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— Chanakya
editor-in-chief
DSA is as much yours, as it is ours!
T
he Arms Trade Treaty has been approved by the United Nations and received its predictable response in India. And a host of other arms importing nations, including Pakistan. India abstained from the voting process and hence conveyed a mixed signal as to what it thinks of the treaty. It isn't always that India and Pakistan find themselves in the same corner of a divide in the United Nations. Not that it portents positive things for the future between the two squabbling neighbours, but just the bizarre nature of international negotiations and agreements. While each country has its own reasons for the position taken on the vote, India's arguments follow a familiar pattern established in the past. The principal position taken by India centres on the issue of sovereignty and the country's right to use the weapons it has bought, where it wants, when it wants and how it wants, as long as they are used within the parameters of law. Indiscriminate and disproportionate use of weapons is not the position enunciated by India, rather a desire to deny anybody the right to tell it what they think India should be doing with the arms bought by New Delhi. Sovereignty is a touchy and sensitive issue in post-colonial societies like India and China. They bristle at the barest possible hint of anyone intruding into what is considered the sovereign domain. The end-use certification system adopted as a principle in the Arms Trade Treaty is something India finds unacceptable. It requires an importing, purchasing, country to provide periodical certificates which will suggest that the weapons are only going to be used within the parameters laid down by domestic concerns and policies of the supplier country. Domestic political lobbies of supplier countries have the power to override the interests of purchasing nations like India by laying down parameters and yardsticks for use. Granted that in the modern day world of inter-related economies and policies there is a blurring of sovereign rights, at least as it has been known to be over the centuries. But the levels of intrusive policies envisioned in the Treaty are unacceptable to India and those like it. And so the decision to abstain is a correct one, albeit lost on the public in the din of domestic politics in India. After all India has never reneged on treaties or agreements. Has never been found guilty of transferring technology to other nations not authorised by agreements and also not violating intellectual property rights of manufacturers. Unlike China, which has mastered the art of reverse engineering and then supplying countries like Pakistan, Indian research and development of whatever quality, suffices for the moment. Despite that for India to be put under the same conditions of end-user certification et al is unacceptable. There is, however, considerable time before the Treaty comes into force since a certain number of countries have to first ratify it in their domestic domain. Procedures vary from country to country depending on their structure of executive or parliamentary decision-making. This pushes the coming into force of the Arms Trade Treaty further down the road. Not that it matters to India. Either way the Treaty is a reality that it has to deal with and extract an opportunity from it that doesn't seem obvious. It is as clear as daylight that the only way out of this morass is to have a robust domestic defence sector, that can cater for Indian needs as well as compete in the international markets. This sector has been dominated for far too long by state run companies or organisations. It is time they faced competition, in the form of Indian owned companies or joint ventures. There is no better example than the Indo-Russian BrahMos cruise missile joint venture. Work has begun on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft together. Underlying both the durability of the Indo-Russian friendship as well as the opportunities that it offers in the future. The relationship has been tested over decades and has largely been found to be resilient, even in the non-defence sector like cooperation over Afghanistan. It is in the defence sector that the relationship has to be brought on an even keel which will benefit both nations. Both of whom have common interests, be it regionally or in opposition to the Arms Trade Treaty.
Manvendra Singh August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
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hough the Indian economy is struggling to establish prosperity for its people it is also a fact that in spite of this struggle India’s economy is far more resilient than many countries even in Europe where hardships have forced governments to collapse. The Eurozone, for instance, has been in a state of crisis from 2009 rolling from a banking crisis to sovereign debt squeeze and bailouts of one kind or another. India on the other has, by and large weathered the international crises sparked by high fluctuations in oil prices and, as during the Asian economic crisis earlier, it remained an island of relative economic stability.
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India has been dependant for its fuel and energy on the Middle East and some other countries and has been exploring new sites as far away as Sakhalin in the Russian Federation as well as off the coast of Vietnam and offshore wells in the Bay of Bengal. Given the UN embargo on Iranian oil, India like most other nations, will have to look for other, sustainable sources of energy and wind and solar power are being discussed with some earnestness. An overdependence on foreign oil is proving hazardous for all concerned. Apart from the large percentage of imports of petroleum and its by-products, India is one of the largest importers of weapons and equipment for self-defence. Unfortunately, even though many business houses have created impressive industries after Independence, we have for various reasons beyond our control not been able to create a viable military-industrial complex even though ambitious projects have been set afloat. We still, cyclically every decade or so, indulge in massive infusion of modern weapons. We are currently in the throes of one such splurge. It is quite unfortunate that although we have developed our own impressive industries in many sectors after Independence, but we are not able to create a defence industry that is able to deliver a 100 per cent indigenous weapons platform to the Indian armed forces. For all our requirements for our defence we are very largely dependant on Russia, US, France, UK, Israel and many former republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union who inherited its military-industrial spores. To add to India’s discomfiture is the recently adopted UN Arms Trade Treaty that contains clauses that undermine India’s sovereignty and the right to self-defence without diktat and dictation.
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This edition of DSA is dedicated to an analysis of this new geopolitical phenomenon with in-depth studies by eminent experts on arms procurement and its implications for the Indian defence scenario.
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Another sub-theme is the importance of the Russian connection in India’s security calculus. It is an introspection of the relationship of the two nation states that have stood by each other over the past few decades and our esteemed contributors have highlighted the importance, compulsions and need to continue this relationship.
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TM
DSA was visualised and conceptualised in 2008 in close association with our Editor-in-chief Mr Manvendra Singh to establish a strong platform in India to discuss and debate the challenges, threats and solutions to the defence and security issues within India and internationally. Team DSA launched its first edition in October 2009 by highlighting the Naxal menace; an effort which was very well noticed and appreciated by our readers.
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As we moved on and gave new dimensions to the magazine, DSA has evolved and become one of the most read and respected magazines in its genre with unstinting support and blessings of our long list of distinguished experts who have made stellar contribution in transforming our Passion into a Mission. During our eventful journey so far and the transformation of DSA many people have joined us and stayed on to share our vision and mission. Some have left us of their own accord and for their own reasons. But I value and respect the contribution of each one of them and wish them well. The zeal and effort of the current team is there for all to see. Jai Hind
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
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Contents
Arms Trade Treaty: Its Impact On Defence Sector In India
TM
India And Russia – A Critical Strategic Relationship
An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine
A R T I C L E S
Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 1 1 A u g u s t 2 0 1 3
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Arms Trade Treaty: A Wake-up Call For India Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (Retd)
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Arms Trade Treaty And India Dr Rajiv Nayan
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Arms Trade Treaty: Why India Abstained Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)
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Indo-Soviet Naval Trade And Transfers Arms Trade Treaty Analysis Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (Retd)
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Who Is Afraid Of The Arms Trade Treaty? Cecil Victor
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Indian Submarine Fleet: Transition To Nuclear Power And Declining Conventional Force Levels Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (Retd)
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Promoting Russia-India Cooperation In Military And Energy Spheres VI Trubnikov
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Indo-Russian Aviation Hug: Fifty Years And Counting Air Marshal Anil Chopra PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd)
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Battlespace Behaviour And The Cognitive Domain Dr Rupali Jeswal
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India-Russia Strategic Relations Lt Gen PC Katoch PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd)
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Limits Of India-Russia Partnership Dr Harsh V Pant
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India and Russia: The Partnership Redux Prof PL Dash
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Russia: A Difficult Global Player Dominika Cosic
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Galvanising India-Russia Relationship Dr Rajendra Prasad
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F E A T U R E S
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Air Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM A tribute
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SINISTER STRATAGEM
ARMS TRADE
TREATY A WAKE-UP CALL FOR INDIA
Surprisingly, an ominous development that impacts India’s security concerns gravely has gone unnoticed in the Indian media. Adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April 2013 has rendered arms importing nations vulnerable to the machinations of the exporting countries. As India is the largest importer of conventional weapons in the world and depends on foreign suppliers for nearly three fourths of its defence requirements, it is going to be affected the most. Unless vigorous counteractive measures are initiated urgently, the treaty has the disquieting potential of derailing all the modernisation plans of the Indian armed forces. The ATT is a multilateral agreement with the stated objective of regulating US$ 70 billion world trade in conventional weapons to prevent unauthorised diversion. It is a comprehensive and legally binding instrument. In addition to conventional arms, the treaty covers supply of the allied ammunition and spares as well. It establishes common international standards for export, import, transit, transhipment, brokering and transfer of conventional arms. Each member state is required to prepare and provide a national control list to the UN.
D
espite opposition from Iran, Syria and North Korea, the resolution received overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly. India abstained from voting along with 22 other countries. There are three clauses of the treaty that deserve special attention as far as India’s interests are concerned. These have been discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
End Use Monitoring
Article 8 of ATT states that each importing country should take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, to the exporting country, to assist the exporting country in conducting its national export assessment. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation. On the face of it, it appears to be a highly innocuous provision, but a deeper study shows that it effectively impinges upon a sovereign nation’s right to use the purchased equipment as it deems fit. End use verification is a highly intrusive and sensitive provision. Importing countries are
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MAJOR GENERAL (DR) MRINAL SUMAN, AVSM, VSM (RETD) The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world i.e., the Siachen Glacier.He was awarded a gold medal for being 'the most outstanding engineer of the year'. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry ofDefence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.
required to keep national record of weapons and ammunition purchased to be able to provide details of their end-use to a skeptical exporting country. Facilities may have to be provided for verifications as well. For India, the end use provision has serious implications. It will have to satisfy exporting countries as regards steps taken to prevent illegal diversions. In case not convinced, an exporting country can demand ground inspection to reassure itself. For that, India will have to provide access to its bases and operational depots. Many consider it to be a highly unfair arrangement that borders on humiliation. As end use verification can compromise operational plans and prevent optimum exploitation of a duly paid for weapon system, many aver that no self-respecting nation should be forced to submit to it. The treaty mandates that countries should consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application of the treaty. For that, it suggests
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SINISTER STRATAGEM
For India, the end use provision has serious implications. It will have to satisfy exporting countries as regards steps taken to prevent illegal diversions. In case not convinced, an exporting country can demand ground inspection to reassure itself. For that, India will have to provide access to its bases and operational depots. Many consider it to be a highly unfair arrangement that borders on humiliation negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means. Even nomination of arbitrators is recommended by mutual consent. As has been India’s past experience, arbitrations invariably go in favour of the powerful developed nations. As seen above, end use monitoring is a highly invasive, insidious and meddling provision. India will be hard-pressed to take care of national security concerns while satisfying prying exporters.
Embargoes And Suspension Of Contracts
Article 7 of the treaty empowers an exporting nation to disallow transfer of conventional arms, ammunition and spares if it has reasons to believe that the deal may violate its obligations under measures adopted by the UN, in particular arms embargoes. The treaty prohibits transfer of conventional arms that are likely to contravene relevant international obligations under international agreements, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in conventional arms. Similarly, conventional arms should not be transferred if likely to be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements. Worse, despite India’s persistent opposition, the treaty covers all bilateral arms supply contracts as well. As most Indian imports are through bilateral contracts, their reliability has become suspect. An exporting country can unilaterally and with impunity, invoke Article 7 of the treaty and suspend delivery of contracted arms, ammunitions and spare parts. A contract between a seller and a buyer imposes certain obligations on both the parties. Contracts between two sovereign nations acquire additional inviolability. As per the norms of fair trade practices, both parties must honour their commitments. Unilateral abrogation by one party makes a mockery of the sanctity of a contract. Unfortunately, powerful arms exporters have appropriated to themselves the right to abort / suspend and even cancel contracts that
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have been duly paid for by the buyer nations. Exporters can cite arms embargoes and human rights as criteria to stall arms exports. As most major military systems have long service life, extending up to 20 years, every supplier undertakes to provide spares and backup support for the entire period. Although such a provision is duly included in the contract, it is more of an article of faith between the two contracting parties, as it is the spirit of the undertaking which is of critical substance. The ATT provides an easy route to an unscrupulous exporting country to renege on its contractual obligations. After supplying complete quantity of contracted equipment and receiving full payment, it can invoke Article 7 to avoid responsibility for spares support. The exporters can play truant, hike the cost of ammunition / spares abnormally and even make unreasonable demands. Thus India will continue to be at the mercy of the exporters throughout
Undoubtedly, ATT is a matter of serious concern as its every single provision is unfavourable to India. On one hand, hostile nations can continue to fan unrest in India by supplying arms to insurgent groups and, on the other hand, the government can be held hostage by unscrupulous exporters, especially during crisis situations
the service life of the equipment. It is a most disquieting prospect for India as it makes India vulnerable to blackmail. Another far more worrisome aspect is the fact that most major defence companies are systems integrators. Following the concept of global village, they outsource sub-assemblies and critical components from various manufacturers spread over a large number of countries. Consequently, all countries where the producers of critical sub-assemblies / components are located can intervene to suspend supplies quoting the treaty, thereby rendering the whole equipment non-operational. It is the most unenviable position for India to be in.
Institution Of National Control System
As per the provision of Article 7 of ATT, each exporting country should, prior to authorising export of any
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SINISTER STRATAGEM constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organised crime.
Largest weapons suppliers
Morocco 10%
Bangladesh 7 %
China 12 %
Myanmar 8 %
Sinapore 21 %
Pakistan 55 %
Spain 8 % South Korea 10 % Greece 10 %
Algeria 14%
Other Countries UAE 7 %
China 15 %
Australia 10 %
As is obvious, obligations on the part of an importing country are far more severe. While providing extensive details regarding the proposed usage of arms to the exporter, it is also required to spell out measures instituted to ensure compliance of the treaty, especially with reference to the end use. For that, the importing country is expected to maintain records of such conventional arms to include quantity, value, description of model-type, details of exporting states, transit / transhipment state and end users. The exporting country can demand establishment of mutually developed programmes to establish mitigation measures for confidence-building.
Largest arms importers (2008- 2012) India
China
6%
12%
India
India 35 %
9% Others
62%
USA 30 %
Russia 26 %
Germany 7 %
France 6 %
China 5 %
Share of global arms export
UAE
2003 -2007
In addition to paying for the items, India will have to bear responsibility to reassure sellers that it has systems in place to prevent unauthorised diversion of the arms. In that process, it may have to share its plans regarding the envisaged usage and details of intended deployment areas.
The Way Forward
12% China
S Korea 12 %
MAJOR RECIPIENTS (Share ot supplier's total exports)
(2008- 2012)
Pakistan
5%
6%
5%
S.Korea
6% 5%
5%
Singapore
Greece
S.Korea
Others
68%
It is obvious that ATT has been evolved to protect the interests of the powerful arms exporting nations. Every single provision is loaded against the helpless importers. Whereas the exporters have been given the right to decide appropriateness of an export, buying countries have been assigned the onerous task of proving their credibility. Cleverly, defence cooperation agreements have been kept out of the purview of the treaty as the US has entered into a large number of such agreements with its allies. An arms contract is no more a statement of commitment between a seller and a buyer. It has become a bond between a mentor (dispenser of favours) and a protégé, wherein validity and sanctity of the contract depends on continued good behavior of the importer.
2008 -2012
Dominant countries like the US and the UK want to retain the right to support non-state actors like terror groups that target a regime that is considered inimical to their interests. Flouting all norms of international conduct, they have been supplying arms to opposition groups in Syria and Libya to unseat the current governments. Therefore, the drafters of the treaty were pressurised not to include an embargo on delivering weapons to terrorist armed groups and non-state actors. As a result, India’s unfriendly neighbours can continue to supply arms to the Maoists and other insurgent groups with impunity. Graph: PSG
conventional arm covered by the treaty, carry out an appraisal of the potential use of the said arm or items in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account information provided by the importing country. In other words, it is for the importing country to assure the exporting country that the arms being sought would not undermine peace and security.
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single provision is unfavourable to India. On one hand, hostile nations can continue to fan unrest in India by supplying arms to insurgent groups and, on the other hand, the government can be held hostage by unscrupulous exporters, especially during crisis situations.
Further, the exporting country has to be convinced that the items in question would neither commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law; nor commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law; nor facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism; or commit or facilitate an act
Further, another Machiavellian leeway has been provided to the exporting countries under Clause 2. It states that the treaty shall not apply to the exports if the exporting country claims control of such arms. Thus, diversions and illicit transfers by devious countries will continue to occur under different guises. Undoubtedly, ATT is a matter of serious concern as its every
The only way to minimise adverse effects of ATT is to reduce dependence on imports. For that the government must acquire courage to initiate dynamic reforms to kick-start indigenous defence industry. Continued dependence on an inefficient public sector and an unproductive Defence Research and Development Organisation is a sure recipe for disaster. Their incompetence is responsible for the current state of affairs wherein India has to import over 70 per cent of its defence requirements. Unquestionably, they have let the nation down. The solution lies in harnessing the untapped potential of the private sector and inviting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Rather than capping FDI limit at an unattractive 26 per cent, the government should adopt a flexible and technology-specific policy. All joint venture proposals should be assessed on the basis of nature, level and depth of technology involved and FDI cap fixed accordingly. Whereas the upper limit of 26 per cent should be retained for commonplace technologies, if an investor offers frontier and cutting edge technologies, even 100 per cent FDI may be acceptable. Indigenous production is the only option available to India to stay out of the clutches of the inequitable Arms Trade Treaty.
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BACK TO SELF-RELIANCE!
ARMS TRADE TREATY AND INDIA
binding instrument becomes balanced and effective. The resolution prescribed the convening of a ‘United Nations Conference’ on ATT in 2012, which met from July 2, 2012 for four consecutive weeks. During the period, the member countries were supposed to conclude ‘a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.’ Though the July 2012 Diplomatic Conference failed to agree on a treaty, a draft treaty was circulated. This draft treaty had provisions for control of select categories of weapons systems and their ammunition. Some proposals were also earlier made in the preparatory meetings as well. In 2012, several countries supported that draft treaty. The most important message that emerged out of the failed Diplomatic Conference was that the international community was in principle ready for an ATT, but not the detailed treaty which was circulated at that time. The situation seems to have changed in 2013. The treaty, which originally was conceived for a limited mandate, had its scope increased gradually.
Making Of The ATT
This is a clause by clause analysis. India actively participated in the treaty and evolved its position towards the ATT in the course of discussions in different committees and organisations. However, India was opposed to record-keeping, notification and discussion of denials, reporting, inclusion of technology in the scope of the treaty and so on. Pakistan and China were quite vocal about human rights, but India had maintained silence over the issue. The Indian representative maintained that “the draft treaty that is annexed to the resolution is weak on terrorism and non-state actors and these concerns find no mention in the specific prohibitions of the Treaty.” India will have to wait for six years before it can move for amendments to the treaty. There is a window of opportunity in that the big Indian market may force the relevant suppliers to revisit their outlook towards ATT. Already, negotiations for the treaty apparently witnessed several countries coming to India and promising to find a way out.
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O
n April 2, 2013, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed the draft text of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). 154 countries voted for the treaty, 3 voted against and 23 abstained. Earlier, on March 28, 2013, the passage of this treaty was blocked in the Negotiations Conference. Iran, North Korea and Syria blocked it in the Negotiations Conference and later opposed in the General Assembly. The treaty was opened for signature on June 3, 2013. As of July 11, 2013, out of 154 countries only 79 have signed the treaty and of 79, only 2 (Guyana and Iceland) have ratified. India abstained in the UN General Assembly. And in the near future, it does not seem ready to sign the treaty. The end game of the treaty was stormy and a new set of actors became active opponents of the treaty, but for several years the treaty could not be negotiated because of the active resistance of the United States (US). The US which opposed the treaty in 2012, supported it in 2013. However, the US wavering over ATT did not end after supporting the treaty in UN General Assembly in 2013. It has yet not signed the treaty. The US government marked some redlines such as upholding the second amendment of the American Constitution and no restrictions on legal and constitutional trade of firearms of civilians.
Enlarged Scope
Though the UN General Assembly passed resolutions for an ATT on many occasions, yet it was the 2009 resolution that set the process for negotiations of the current Treaty. The resolution had asked for the convening of four sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 2010 and 2011 so that the legally
The December 2006 resolution of the General Assembly asked the UN Secretary General “to seek the views of Member States on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.” Over 100 countries submitted their national positions for an ATT. In general, countries favoured “a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.” The UN General Assembly Resolution also asked the Secretary General to set up “a [G]roup of [G]overnmental [E]xperts to examine the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.” The Group was formed on the principle of equitable geographical distribution. Research and studies undertaken by different UN bodies helped the countries in understanding intricate issues of the proposed treaty. A number of earlier UN initiatives also helped in the making of an ATT. Though the 1978 “First Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly” had discussed conventional munitions problem, some measures taken in subsequent years addressed the issue of conventional arms trade more precisely. The “United Nations Standardised Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures” (1980) and the “United Nations Register of Conventional Arms” (1991) gave early support for the idea of bringing conventional arms trade into a transparency and control framework. In 1991, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council espoused “Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers” and later, in 1996, the Disarmament Commission accepted the “Guidelines for International Arms Transfers”. Earlier in 1992, too, the UN Disarmament Commission issued the
“Guidelines and Recommendations for Objective Information on Military Matters”. In May 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted the “UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition”, supplementing the “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime”. In the same year, in July, the United Nations adopted the “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”. In 2005, the international community through the UN measures – the “International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons” – tried to intervene in disturbing illicit transfer. The preamble of the ATT recognises the contribution existing rules and guidelines.
DR RAJIV NAYAN
The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he published his monograph Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia.
made by all these
The Final Treaty
The final treaty, as passed in the UN General Assembly in April 2013, has preamble, principles and 28 articles. The treaty promises to follow principles and objectives of the UN Charter. In the preamble, the treaty maintains that Article 26 of the UN Charter devoted to international peace and security will be promoted by the treaty. At the same time, in the section on principles, the treaty shows its commitment to Article 51 of the UN Charter underlining a country’s right to individual and collective self-defence. To balance the two articles of the UN Charter laying down two different objectives, the preamble of the treaty mentions the importance of ‘the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources’. Besides, the principles of the treaty discuss Article 2 of the UN Charter. These principles are settlement of international dispute by peaceful means, non-indulgence in the threat or use of force against the
The most important message that emerged out of the failed Diplomatic Conference was that the international community was in principle ready for an ATT, but not the detailed treaty which was circulated at that time. The situation seems to have changed in 2013. The treaty, which originally was conceived for a limited mandate, had its scope increased gradually
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BACK TO SELF-RELIANCE! weapons to kill innocent people. In Africa and some other areas, illicit arms fuel internal conflict destabilising society and state. The preamble and Article 1 point out the need for preventing and eradicating this kind of trade by targeting ‘unauthorised end use and end users’. Article 11 of the treaty deals with the issue of diversion in detail. Similarly, the concern expressed in a section of the US – its Riflemen Association and others – that the right to carry arms will be adversely affected seems to have been allayed by the preamble by “reaffirming the sovereign right of any state to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system.’ By laying down this provision, the treaty also reassures the national authority for licensing in Article 5 of the treaty. It allayed the apprehension that the treaty will create any supra-national body regulating arms transfers in the world. Apparently, ammunition lobby in the US opposed the treaty.
The NGOs Have It
territorial integrity or political independence of another state and non-intervention in internal affairs of another state. Article 6 of the treaty asks the member countries to respect chapter VII of the UN Charter regarding arms embargo. This was opposed by Iran during negotiations and possibly, became one of the reasons for its active opposition. The treaty also reflects concerns for different countries or groups of countries. India and many other countries, in fact, supported negotiations for ATT to thwart the illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms, especially small and light weapons. In India, terrorists use these
As the treaty was driven by the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the preamble of the treaty recognised their role and some of the humanitarian issues such as taking care of women and children adversely affected in armed conflict and armed violence raised by some of the NGOs. Principles of the treaty also ask its members to respect international humanitarian law. Even Article 1 of the treaty talks of ‘reducing human suffering’ and Article 7 talks about other humanitarian issues raised by the NGOs.
Article 2 of the treaty is on scope and covers 8 categories of weapons. These are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers and small arms and light weapons. Small arms and light weapons, of course, were In the preamble, the treaty maintains that basically the weapons for which a large number Article 26 of the UN Charter devoted to international of countries and NGOs pushed the treaty. Other categories are basically weapons covered peace and security will be promoted by the treaty. 7under UN Arms Register. Articles 3 and 4 At the same time, in the section on principles, the of the treaty have ammunitions / munitions treaty shows its commitment to Article 51 of the and parts and components of major weapons listed in the treaty.
UN Charter underlining a country’s right to individual and collective self-defence. To balance the two articles of the UN Charter laying down two different objectives, the preamble of the treaty mentions the importance of ‘the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources’
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The ATT in different Articles includes the leading issues which dominated during negotiations and preparatory meetings. The dominant regulatory mechanisms of export controls such as transit or transhipment and brokering have been included in the treaty. Record keeping, reporting, international
assistance, secretariat, entry into force, dispute settlement, provision for reservations and the right to withdraw were the issues, which witnessed contentious discussions and exchanges among member states and hectic lobbying by NGOs during negotiations are in the treaty. The treaty may be amended six years after it becomes operational or enters into force.
Implications For India
India wanted a balance between obligations of exporters and those of importers in the treaty. It did not find the balance between the obligations of both the sides. This became one of the reasons for its not supporting the treaty. Article 7 of the treaty carries Export and Export Assessment. This Article gives enormous power to the licensing authorities of exporting countries. These authorities may deny licenses on highly subjective criteria which have been provided in the different subsections and clauses of Article 7
India actively participated in the treaty and evolved its position towards the ATT in the course of discussions in different committees and organisations. As discussed, India’s primary interest behind supporting this treaty was to have a legally binding mechanism to address the problem caused by illicit arms transfers through its neighbourhood. However, discussions of the treaty threw several issues on which India was forced to react and take a position. Gradually, it started supporting expansion of the scope of the treaty. It also supported provisions such as brokering control and transit and transhipment control. However, India was opposed to record-keeping, notification and discussion of denials, reporting, inclusion of technology in the scope of the treaty and so on. Pakistan and China were quite vocal about human rights, but India had maintained silence over the issue. India wanted a balance between obligations of exporters and those of importers in the treaty. It did not find the balance between the obligations of both the sides. This became one of the reasons for its not supporting the treaty. Article 7 of the treaty carries Export and Export Assessment. This Article gives enormous power to the licensing authorities of exporting countries. These authorities may deny licenses on highly subjective criteria which have been provided in the different subsections and clauses of Article 7.
Article 8 asks importing countries to take obligations. Importing countries have to provide ‘appropriate and relevant information’. Importing countries may have to give end use or end user documentation. The treaty gives some positive provisions to importing countries such as following its own national laws when providing information and information about ‘pending and actual export authorisation’. Article 26 of the treaty is about grandfatherly clause. It is entitled ‘Relationship with other International Agreements.’ Para 1 of the Article lays down: “the implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.” The Paragraph 2 of the Article also gives safeguards by restricting, “this Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defence cooperation agreements concluded between States Parties to this Treaty”. However, it is not enough if it is compared to the rights and obligations export countries have got. To further deal with the uncertain security situation in its neighbourhood, propelled by massive military modernisation of China,
India is paying attention to its defence preparedness. For this, India has to import arms, especially major platform systems as well as develop strategic weapons and some major weapon systems. It cannot take obligations which may make it vulnerable during the period of crisis.
Non-state Actors
The Indian representative also maintained that “the draft treaty that is annexed to the resolution is weak on terrorism and non-state actors and these concerns find no mention in the specific prohibitions of the Treaty.” She was right in her submission because the treaty does not have detailed provisions for any ban on transfer of arms to non-state actors. The preamble of the treaty discusses illicit transactions, but the preamble is non-binding. Can India’s objections be included? As the treaty can be amended only six years after it enters into force, there is no scope for inclusion of India’s concerns. India may have to wait for at least six years after the operationalisation of the treaty. Treaty needs ratification of fifty countries for entry into force. Just now, there are only 2. The United Kingdom, France, Sweden and some other European countries which have strong defence industry have signed the treaty, but yet not ratified it. It may even take time to enter into force. So, the real action may take possibly up to seven years or more. By all the indications, it appears that major actors of global arms trade are finding difficulties with the treaty. The large number of important absentees may affect the functioning of the treaty. The US is already wavering. European arms sellers will find mechanisms to protect their business interests even if they were seen active for the treaty. India may temporarily suffer the setback. However, the big Indian market may force the relevant suppliers to revisit their outlook towards ATT. Already, negotiations for the treaty apparently witnessed several countries coming to India and promising to find a way out. Even the language of the treaty was amended at a few places for India. Indian diplomacy was right in taking the position to guard its national interests. Certainly, it is not a ‘meaningless posturing’ as some motivated people briefed by vested interests may find. The best way out is focusing on indigenous defence industry. If India can develop strategic weapons such as nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, with little more efforts it can easily develop high quality conventional weapons.
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
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tricky treaty
INEQUITABLE Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). India’s defence exports are less than two per cent of the total production of weapons and equipment and were valued at US$ 191 million (Rs 859.60 crore) in 2008-09. These are mainly indigenously produced surplus small arms and light weapons that have been supplied to some of India’s neighbours BRIG GURMEET KANWAL as a goodwill gesture. However, (RETD) the new Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) and the new The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst. Defence Production Policy (DPrP) are encouraging the formation of joint ventures with 26 per cent foreign direct investment (FDI). This is expected to go up to 49 per cent in future. This will gradually result in an increase in arms exports as MNCs will begin to use their Indian joint ventures as hubs for sourcing weapons and equipment components for their factories abroad. India is likely to spend approximately US$ 100 billion for the import of weapons and defence equipment over the next 10 years.
ARMS TRADE TREATY WHY INDIA ABSTAINED After the unpleasant experiences of the NPT and the CTBT of the past, India is once again confronted by a global Arms Trade Treaty that has failed to address Indian concerns about the illegal transfer of arms to terrorist organisations, insurgent groups and other non-state actors who oppose democratically elected governments. Pakistan is still the primary source of small arms that are India bound. It uses small arms and light weapons as political and military tools against New Delhi and facilitates smuggling of these both through sea and land routes to ISI-supported terrorist organisations and sleeper cells across India. China is also the prime official supplier to Sri Lanka, Myanmar and, significantly, large numbers of weapons of Chinese origin have been seized in Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh intended for use against India by ISI-supported Islamic fundamentalist groups based in Bangladesh. As with the NPT and CTBT, China covertly proliferated to Pakistan nukes and missiles. The Arms Trade Treaty brings on a sense of déjà vu in New Delhi.
O
n April 2, 2013, the United Nations General Assembly passed the global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), aimed at laying down common international standards and limiting the illicit sale of conventional arms, by an overwhelming majority of 154 votes. Once again India was forced to abstain from voting in favour of a discriminatory treaty – after its unpleasant experience with the NPT and the CTBT in the past. Iran, North Korea and Syria voted against the treaty while China, India and Russia abstained.
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India’s Pacifist Strategic Culture
As the largest importer of arms in the world, India objects to the ATT in its present form on several counts. India finds it difficult to accept that the treaty will enable arms exporting countries to impose unilateral conditions on the countries that import arms. The treaty has failed to address Indian concerns about the illegal transfer of arms to terrorist organisations, insurgent groups and other non-state actors who oppose democratically elected governments. The treaty does not ensure
Foreign Inspired Insurgencies
a “balance of obligations” between arms exporting states and the importers of arms. Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary, has written, “We found the final text lacking in balance between the rights and obligations of exporters and importers, containing carve outs for some select countries and failing to specifically prohibit arms transfers to terrorists and unlawful non-state actors. As one of the largest importers of arms India has legitimate concerns about exporters taking unilateral force majeure measures against importing states without cost. And, as a country that has long been the target of state-sponsored terrorism, India had reason to object to a text that skirts this universally recognised threat to peace and stability.” Countries exporting arms have a responsibility to ensure that they do not provide weapons without strict end user verification or else SALWs may be diverted to wage intra-state conflict by non-state actors. The ATT should have refrained from imposing new norms; it should have reinforced the existing obligations and responsibilities of all countries under international law and should have provided a mechanism for their effective application to the trade in SALWs. As a country with a pacifist strategic culture, India has traditionally abhorred the export of arms and itself resisted the temptation of doing so for several decades after independence. India has 39 Ordnance factories, which are wholly government owned, and eight Defence Public
One of the major reasons for instability in South Asia is the large-scale proliferation and easy availability of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). India has witnessed around 152 militant movements since independence, of which 65 are believed to be still active in one form or the other. Pakistan is still the primary source of small arms that are India bound. It uses SALWs as political and military tools against New Delhi and facilitates smuggling of SALWs both through sea and land routes to ISI-supported terrorist organisations and sleeper cells across India. Since 1989-90, Indian security forces have seized huge stocks of arms and ammunition along the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir alone. Large-scale recoveries are still being made. The Chinese angle to SALWs proliferation in South Asia also cannot be ignored. The Chinese weapons pipeline has permeated into Myanmar’s underground markets along the Thai border. China has produced and offered for sale five different varieties of rifles, allied light machine guns and sub-machine guns. China is also the prime official supplier to Sri Lanka, Myanmar and, significantly, large numbers of weapons of Chinese origin have been seized in Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh. The Chinese supplied small arms to Indian insurgent groups in Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura for many years up to the late-1970s. The Maoists have been acquiring weapons through Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal. The government of India accords immense importance to compliance with arms control, non-proliferation and export control regimes, even though India is not a signatory to some of them. Hence, an initiative like the ATT, that seeks to establish a global benchmark, would under normal circumstances have been welcomed and supported, but the Treaty has turned out to be discriminatory. India ensures that no arms are exported to countries that are involved in conflict, or to non-state actors
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tricky treaty
Countries exporting arms have a responsibility to ensure that they do not provide weapons without strict end user verification or else SALWs may be diverted to wage intra-state conflict by non-state actors engaged in intra-state conflict. Despite repeated requests from the government of Sri Lanka and at the risk of driving it into Chinese or Pakistani arms, India had steadfastly refused to supply offensive weapons when the Sri Lankan armed forces were engaged in fighting the LTTE. Only
non-offensive equipment like air defence guns and radars were supplied. The present treaty is also deficient on monitoring and verification. While initially monitoring may have to rely on the good practices of the member states, viable technical means need to be developed over time. Subsequently, the treaty must make provisions for intrusive international monitoring of sources, means of transportation of weapons and, where possible, their end use based on formal complaints being launched by affected state parties. Such a system can only be implemented by constituting an international body like the IAEA. Then there is the question of human rights violations. The treaty
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obituary
INEQUITABLE
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
prohibits the transfers of arms that may lead to the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. According to Kanwal Sibal, “The application of this unexceptionable provision to specific cases will be highly contested politically. For instance, for the West the supply of advanced weaponry to the Syrian government enables it to commit such crimes. Russia would argue that such arms transfers to a legitimate government are licit and that it is the illegal arms transfers by the Western and Gulf countries to insurgents that are responsible for the spiralling violence on the ground.” Elaborating
on
the
complexity
of
small
AN ACE AIR WARRIOR
AIR COMMODORE (RETD) JASJIT SINGH AVSM, VrC, VM A TRIBUTE
arms
proliferation, former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan had stated perceptively, “Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development.” The moral argument for an ATT, one that underpins human security, social and economic development is overwhelming. However, if it is viewed through the prism of disarmament or arms control instrument, it will not find much support. While India has not voted in favour of the ATT, it will undoubtedly adhere to all its provisions, much as it has done in respect of the NPT and the CTBT.
A
ir Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh, one of India's leading strategic thinkers, passed away on August 04, 2013. He was 79. Born in 1934, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh joined as a fighter pilot in Indian Air Force in 1956. He took part in the China War of 1962 and was awarded a Vir Chakra for gallantry in 1971 Indo-Pak War. He retired as Director Operations in Air HQ. For many years he was the Director of prestigious Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He was one of the leading analysts of Indian military and strategic thought and had published more than two dozen books covering strategy, nuclear deterrence, air power and the Indo-Pak Wars. He was instrumental in setting up the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) and was its director till his last day. He was member of the International Commission for a New Asia, a consultant to the Standing Committee
of Defence of the Parliament; Advisor and Member of National Security Advisory Board. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh was a 2006 recipient of the Padma Bhushan. He was hospitalised for a chest problem before he passed away. He was cremated at the Brar Square in Delhi Cantonment with full service honours. His passing away is a great loss to the strategic community and the followers of Air Power. Team DSA was honoured to have Air Commodore Jasjit Singh as key speaker at a DSA seminar on “Limited Wars in South Asia” in November 2011 at New Delhi. We all in team DSA salute a great Air Warrior and doyen of Air Power theorists and strategists. May his soul rest in peace!
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
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tricky treaty
PATHBREAKING TIES
INDO-SOVIET NAVAL TRADE AND TRANSFERS
INS Vikrant
ARMS TRADE TREATY ANALYSIS On 2 April 2013, the UN General Assembly passed a landmark Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) under resolution 61/89, to regulate international trade in conventional weapons, including small arms (guns and rifles), large weapon systems, tanks, combat aircraft and warships, hoping to foster peace and security by putting a stop to destabilising arms flowing into wrong hands and conflict regions. The treaty aims to deny warlords, pirates and terrorists deadly weapons and track transfers. This treaty is yet to be brought into force and will it succeed? The writer’s preamble.
I
nternational arms trade in the world is estimated to be around US$ 55 billion per year and predicted to escalate to US$ 70 billion a year by 2020, as per estimations discussed in the UN General Assembly. Many arms transactions world over are shady and kept under wraps. This state of affairs has led to arms being sold to parties who have used them to destabilise regimes and threatened security in many regions of the world.
Intended Openness
In an attempt to regulate the world’s arms trade with more openness, the UN General Assembly has opened the UN’s book for ratification of an arms treaty for reporting of arms transfers (ATT), which treaty includes model instruments of adherence as per Article 18, of the Law of Treaties (Vienna 1969) as binding, for deposit with the Secretary General of the United Nations. As a safeguard the treaty will not interfere with a nation’s domestic arms
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commerce or the right to bear arms by nation member states or ban the export of any type of weapons. The states’ legitimate right to self-defence and make national arms regulations is not curtailed. Seventy seven nations which include Germany and UK have signed the treaty which is yet to come into force (after ratification by fifty states) and India and Pakistan as of writing have not signed the treaty. Other nations, especially the larger exporters like USA, Russia and China which will be affected are still debating the effects it will have, before ratifying ATT. This calls for an analysis of the Indian experience which keeps arms purchases classified and restricted.
Kautilyan Dictum
In recent times with the information revolution and information warfare (IW) to mislead and misinform, and rising talk of nuclear disarmament, a more open discussion on defence trade between nations came up for discussion
in the UN. It was Kautilya in Arthashastra and Adam Smith the economist, who stated that the Sovereign's first duty is to ensure the security of the nation state. This is paramount for growth and stability. It therefore follows, every government must equip its national armed forces with military systems and weapons to ward off threats and protect the nation’s security interests, by buying arms if it cannot produce them in the country. This incentive to become selfsufficient encourages nations to manufacture military systems, carry out R&D and build-up the nation’s Military Industrial Complex (MIC); and then sell defence and military wares to friendly countries which is a big and challenging business and has political ramifications. The cold war saw the of evolution of the NATO and WARSAW pacts wherein camps and nations were forced to choose sides dictated by ideological aspects of choice between communism, capitalism, socialism or non-alignment which India chose. The world's balance of power equations played out in the sale and transfers of weapons with an escalating cold war between USA and the Soviet Union which provided arms as aid to states and kept details of transfers classified. USA and Western countries legislated the need for political approval for transfers in many cases and made them public.
Good, Bad And Ugly Arms Bazaar
country manufacturing, adaptation of technology through research and development and employment of the youth in the armed forces in numbers can benefit the nation. Correlli Barnett also cites the Japanese model of security, which outsourced its self-defence and security to a US umbrella of forces including assurances for nuclear deterrence against China.
CMDE RANJIT BHAWNANI RAI (RETD)
USA stationed its troops, aircraft The writer is a former and ships on Japanese soil at Japan’s cost and concurrently Japan took up Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval manufacturing of US weapon systems, Operations. Presently he aircraft and warships under patents is Vice President of Indian in Japan but was restricted from Maritime Foundation, exporting. Manufacturing of defence New Delhi. goods in country requires technology and additionally helps a nation to become a seller of defence wares, earn FFE and influence buyer nations. It is also a fact that lethal arms do reach wrong hands through the open market, despite the need for an End User Certificate (EUC) warranted by governments to prevent misuse. EUCs have been misused and at other times led to delay of arms sales and transfers. In a recent case the Indian Coast Guard imported Hovercraft from Griffon of UK and fitted some equipment in the vessels from UK itself. Surprisingly UK’s MoD asked Indian government to supply an EUC. This unfolds how dual use items can get supplied as commercial items even for nuclear uses and be employed for military purposes. China and Iran have successfully used this mode for transfers and used dual use items for reverse engineering of weapons. The ATT hopes to reduce misuse of dual use items.
Defence spending as Correlli Barnett has defined in his book, The Death of An Economy, is like a bucking horse which if not corralled and controlled can run amuck and bankrupt the nation. Yet reasonable defence spending that Correlli Barnett limited to a maximum approximate of 5 per cent of GDP, is an essential and unavoidable expenditure. The experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union by overspending on defence is a case in study. India’s foray into Sri Lanka in Op Pawan (1987-91) and defence spending in the same period USA, Russia, China, France, UK, Germany and Israel are the under the stewardship of PM and concurrent Defence world’s leading arms suppliers while smaller countries like Minister Rajiv Gandhi, rose and included the Bofors and Singapore have specialised in small arms, systems and vehicles INS Viraat purchases with onboard Sea Harriers and of world standard. The seller nation earns handsomely from MIG-29s. It was estimated by this writer from open sources selling while the buyer nation tends to become dependant and published that India spent around US$ 4 billion (equal to on the seller nation, for its needs and continued support. US$ 14 billion at todays prices). The United Nations has mooted Many analysts have attributed to track and to keep a register The study of how and why India ATT this amount to why India ran out of transfers. reached this state of becoming the of Free Foreign Exchange (FFE) in 1991. The escalation in the In India’s case, it has been a largest importer is discussed with price of oil and India’s oil bill also buyer nation since independence special reference to the trade and and in 2012-13 SIPRI reported, contributed. The government support the Indian Navy received India became the largest importer and armed forces to support Op Pawan used oil and petrol from the erstwhile Soviet Union in of military goods and services with abandon and prolificacy. in the world and if it accedes the cold war and since from Russia in to ATT, India will be obliged The official data and details of this era of globalisation. It is also the to report all arms transactions, Op Pawan and illegal supplies of arms to the LTTE is not story of Indo-Soviet political relations which at present especially those India’s largest arms supplier officially available. and friendship which commenced in by Russia are kept classified in the late 60s thanks largely to India’s an agreement between the two There are lessons in the book by Correlli Barnett that military imports which contributed to parties. The current large transfers include the supply of the Charlie only responsible spending on India’s success in 1971 war class nuclear submarine INS Chakra defence by way of some in
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
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PATHBREAKING TIES
INCORPORATING WITH
(Ex Nerpa) on lease with missiles and the import of machineries to build the INS Arihant and the two follow-on nuclear submarines at the Ship Building Centre (SBC) at Visakhapatnam Russia and India will have to disclose all transfers.
Indo-Soviet Collaboration
The study of how and why India reached this state of becoming the largest importer is discussed in this article with special reference to the trade and support the Indian Navy received from the erstwhile Soviet Union in the cold war and since from Russia in this era of globalisation. It is also the story of Indo-Soviet political relations and friendship which commenced in the late 60s thanks largely to India’s military imports which contributed to India’s success in 1971 war. Despite 67 years after independence some 60 per cent of the Indian Navy’s ships, aircraft and submarines are still imported from and supported by Russia. This makes India highly dependent on Russia. At Independence the Royal Indian Navy ships and establishments were divided between India and Pakistan and Lord Mountbatten helped script an Outline Plan for the Development and Re-organisation of the Royal (till 26th January, 1950) Indian Navy, with ships and aircraft which inter-alia helped Britain to repay the war dues to India in exchange as repatriation. The navy received the cruisers INS Delhi on 16th September 1948 with INS Mysore in 1958 and the aircraft
22
carrier INS Vikrant in 1961 with Sea Hawks and ASW Alize aircraft as major carrier-based platforms. The newly built three Bs of the Brahmaputra class with the FPS 5 gunnery system and CPP propellers, three ASW frigates Ks of the Khukri class and two T’s of the Talwar class came by the early 1960s. The Indian Navy looked to acquire submarines and turned to Britain. The navy sent officers and sailors to UK, in anticipation of placing an order for Oberon class submarines. But submarines and much technology was denied by UK and only in 1965, collaboration agreements were concluded commercially with Vickers Yarrow of Britain for the indigenous construction of three Leander class frigates at Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL). Britain offered a special defence credit of £ 4.7 million to cover the external cost of the Frigate Project for the first four years, as well as for the expansion of MDL but refused to supply submarines. Pakistan had acquired PNS Ghazi (Ex USS Diablo). Lord Mountbatten wrote, I was very impressed with the quality of the Indian Navy and was disappointed that we were not able to accede to India’s request for supply of submarines. This was a turning point in denial of technology weapons to India by the West in preference to Pakistan. India turned to the Soviet Union and its military industrial complex for supplies. The bilateral relations between the Republic of India and the Soviet Union (USSR) were based on a strong strategic,
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
military, economic and diplomatic arrangement which even included a security treaty of peace and friendship in 1971 and large supplies of arms on credit. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has inherited the traditional Indo-Russian strategic partnership which has been built on five major components including politics, defence, civil nuclear energy, anti-terrorism co-operation, but defence has been the driver. These components were recently highlighted in a speech given by the Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai in Russia. The Indian Navy has been the greatest beneficiary since the 1970s of supply of nuclear, Foxtrot and Kilo class submarines with a support ship INS Amba and a tanker INS Jyoti, Petya class ASW ships, minesweepers, Kashin Rajput class destroyers, Krivack frigates, Il-38 and Tu-142 maritime reconnaissance aircraft with a variety of missiles and systems and Ka-28 / 29 / 31 helicopters. The navy has ingeniously adapted many systems on the destroyers of the Delhi class Type 15s, the Type 17s Shivaliks and the Type 15A Kolkata class and Type 17A follow-on Shivaliks. The navy opted for the BrahMos missile which has been the most successful joint venture with Russia and has been a harbinger for other missile projects and adaptations for the other services. In the near future the Indian Navy will receive the 45,000 ton INS Vikramaditya, now on trials with MiG 29Ks. India and Russia will have to discuss how to accede to the ATT.
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tricky treaty
MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY
WHO IS AFRAID OF THE
ARMS TRADE TREATY?
India, which has borne the brunt of restrictive regimes both government-to-government and multilateral from the moment of its birth need not be overly concerned by the new UN Arms Trade Treaty. As in the past, it should use the ambiance created by the new international legislation to create and build a higher percentage of the requirements of its armed forces, central armed police forces and paramilitary organisations within the scores of laboratories and factories that have been created in the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Ordnance Factories Board. It needs to be remembered that several of the weapons systems that are now, although belatedly, entering active operations most are products of indigenous genius be it in missile technology, space research or nuclear capabilities both for weapons and peaceful purposes.
T
he UN Arms Trade Treaty is intended to control the proliferation of conventional weapons including small arms and light weaponry. India is not a proliferator. It has assiduously resisted the temptation of providing weapons to belligerent nations and has deliberately restricted its arms sales policy. It did not provide lethal weapons to Sri Lanka in spite of the possibility of losing political mileage in the island-nation to arch-rivals Pakistan and China. The End Use Monitoring clause is particularly pernicious because it gives the arms supplier a veto against whom it can be used and the right to curtail paid for supplies and withhold spare parts. This is a situation that India has confronted before when arms producing nations delivered the latest weaponry (aircraft, tanks and warships – not just small arms) and tried to placate India by insisting that the weapons would not be used against it. Nonetheless India fought two wars with Pakistan in less than a decade given that Islamabad had only one enemy in the region. What is being proposed this time around is that India will have to give a commitment not to use the weapons bought from abroad against either Pakistan or China if the supplier nation fears losing influence with these countries.
Open To Blackmail
Since about 70 per cent of weapons required for the defence of its territorial integrity are bought from foreign sources, India is particularly vulnerable to all the conditionalities that supplier nations can impose.
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The UN treaty has legitimised what currently is done through national legislation of all the arms producing nations. Waivers are given to friendly nations and that is why over the years since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty came into force one has seen how secret conduits were created to allow China to proliferate nuclear knowhow to Pakistan and the latter to North Korea in return for the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the missiles. Pakistan’s nuclear Walmart headed by scientist Abdul Qadir Khan
included clients Iran, Libya, the White racist regime of South Africa and several others who later vehemently denied having anything to do with AQ Khan. What happened in nuclear weapons is now being done in conventional weaponry as well. India will have to find ways and means of being able to defend itself without becoming a victim of insulting intrusive monitoring and denial of technology that have been part and parcel of discriminatory practices enshrined in the NPT, the CTBT, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.
Be Indian, Buy Indian
India came out of this maze of restrictive technologies by dint of its own inner strengths and the farsightedness of its founding fathers led by Jawaharlal Nehru who laid the base for research and development in frontier technologies to create “new temples” in nuclear energy and space. The Defence Research and Development Organisation with its 50 laboratories and eight Defence Public Sector Undertakings backed up by 41 factories of the Ordnance Factories Board and scores of specialised academic institutions contributing to the defence effort has gained vast stores of “capabilities” which can now be used to circumvent the UN Arms Trade Treaty by producing in-house more of what the defence services need for the security of the nation. The huge amount of competence that it has built-up over the years must now be put to good use when the nation needs it most.
in that the concepts of selfreliance and self-sufficiency are becoming peripheral to defence preparedness instead of central. If the UN Arms Trade Treaty induces a return by India to a military-industrial complex based on these concepts it would, in the long term, be doing more good than harm.
Redesign Military Doctrine
CECIL VICTOR
The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.
What is happening, finally, in the case of the Bofors howitzer could set the tone for the creation of the types of weaponry required by and large for mountain warfare where India has to face both Pakistan and China. The Kargil experience has shown the usefulness of both the Bofors howitzer and the indigenously designed and developed Pinaka 214 mm multibarrel rocket launcher in such terrain. Sense has finally prevailed on the government of India and it has dusted out the designs and drawings of the Bofors howitzer that it had paid for and put in cold storage under the barrage of opposition criticism of the deal. The Ordnance Factories Board has been asked to create indigenous prototypes of the foreign weapon in its original length of 45 calibres (155 X 45 = 6.98 meters length) plus one with a barrel length of 52 calibres (155 X 52 = 8.6 meters), an additional length of 1.52 meters to achieve a range beyond 40 km.
Though it gained the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest importer of arms and increasingly feels the Simultaneously and seperately the Tata group need to diversify its sources of weapons acquisitions India of companies has produced a truck-mounted has created a bedrock of indigenous technologies on which 155 mm howitzer that fires six rounds in three it needs to raise new weapons platforms and, equally minutes (one every 30 seconds) and can shoot importantly, upgrade and modernise what it has already and scoot to avoid enemy counter-bombardment. provided to the armed forces over the past three decades Conjointly this makes for a happy situation where when products of its laboratories met the qualitative staff India can break out of the vacuum created by failure requirements of the users. Unfortunately, in recent times to import any artillery guns for nearly 25 years and be it is noticed that basic trainer systems, especially in the able to field four different types of artillery through the Indian Air Force have been Public-Private Partnership replaced by foreign equipment concept. By this India will Though it gained the dubious not be dependent on any instead of following the route distinction of being the world’s other nation for components of indigenous upgradation. There is no gainsaying the largest importer of arms and and spare parts which can immense contributions that produced in ancilliary increasingly feels the need to be successive Scientific Advisers industries within the country. diversify its sources of weapons Given that India is lagging to the Minister of Defence and Directors General of the DRDO acquisitions India has created a behind in infrastructure along have made to the process of Line of Actual Control bedrock of indigenous technologies the indigenisation yet it has to facing China, these new on which it needs to raise new weapons in conjunction with be recognised that instead of improvement as required weapons platforms and, equally the Pinaka system the range by the users becoming the which has been improved importantly, upgrade and modernise of mainstay of new acquisitions from 60 km to 120 km can be what it has already provided to the pre-located at points where outright purchase has marked the replacement of ab initio as armed forces over the past three a concentration of Chinese well as jet trainers in the field of can be decimated decades when products of its troops air warfare. The shift from the even as the weapons are laboratories met the qualitative staff located far to the rear of concept of incremental growth to outright replacement with Indian lines because of the requirements of the users foreign goods is disturbing paucity of roads.
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MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY
155 mm Bofors howitzer
Hopeful Signs Of Public-Private Partnership
There are two weapons platforms that appear to lend themselves as eminent candidates to prove the public-private partnership concept in defence production. One has already proved its worth as a weapon in Kargil as a viable and effective artillery and the other has the potential of fulfilling India’s indigenous replacement for future infantry combat vehicle (FICV), 2600 of which will be required to replace the ageing ex-Soviet era BMP-2s by 2017. The first, the Pinaka multibarrel 214 mm rocket launch system is a product of collaboration between the Defence Public Sector Undertaking’s specialised laboratories and Tata’s defence subsidiary and Larsen & Toubro. The Ordnance Factories Board making the 214 mm calibre munition that is carried and fired from a 12-barrel, double-layered launch system mounted on a heavy duty Tatra truck. In Kargil in 1999 after some ineffectual initial firing at entrenched Pakistan Army Northern Light Infantry personnel in high-trajectory mode Indian gunners decided to shoot in line-of-sight configuration that saw the huge warhead smash into rock breastworks (sanghars) and making it impossible to stay or run; many Pakistani intruders were killed in the barrage.
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square kilometers can be saturated with heavy metal wrecking complete destruction on the enemy. A longer range version of 120 km will have a heavier warhead (of 250 mm) that will fire the shell to an altitude of 40 km to generate a huge kinetic energy as it drops and explodes on impact with the ground destroying personnel and tank concentrations. To improve its accuracy DRDO intends to incorporate a GPS-guided fuse that will make midcourse corrections. The other weapon platform based on an indigenous design is the Abhay Future Infantry Combat Vehicle developed by the Vehicle Research and Development Establishment of the DRDO. Here too Tatas and Larsen & Toubro have bid for the contract. The VRDE design incorporates an amphibious capability to the vehicle which will carry three crew and seven infantrymen. The intention is to retain battle momentum even while crossing water obstacles in the heat and fog of war. Based on the VRDE’s technology demonstrator the contenders have to produce two prototypes, one incorporating a steel hull and another using the composite Kanchan armour created for the Arjun tank to give the Indian Army a choice to see which is better for its requirements.
The Pinaka multibarrel rocket launch system is a collaborative project based on a DRDO design largely inspired by the existing Russian Grad-P MBRLs but with a larger-calibre warhead. Tata and Larsen & Toubro assisted in creating launchers and have won contracts to make 40 systems each making it a very lucrative contract for all concerned.
There is one other weapon that has the potential of being produced indigenously – a copy of the 155 mm Bofors howitzer gun bought from the original Swedish company. The drawings that were gathering dust in the Ordnance Factories Board have been taken out and government has ordered that prototypes – one towed and one self-propelled – be manufactured at the Ordnance Factory, Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh for evaluation by the army.
The current system has a range of 40 km and with 12 rockets being fired simultaneously an area of nearly four
After nearly three decades of not acquiring a single artillery weapon things appear to be moving, finally.
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
In the context of other weapon platforms that have, finally, been delivered by the DRDO laboratories to the armed forces – tanks, LCA, light combat helicopters, radars, torpedoes and a comfortingly long list of other equipment – there will no longer be the luxury of placing orders in small numbers and farming out the rest to foreign arms manufacturers Since we do not have any territorial ambitions against China except to be able to hold on to what is ours stopping China in its tracks could have greater geopolitical effect throughout the region by demonstrating that the Chinese are unable to cow India down. Both the government factories and the private sector which is showing increasing interest in diversifying into the defence market can now work to produce what is of great relevance to mountain warfare – ultralight howitzers of 155 mm and more – that can be carried underslung on helicopters or in the hold of heavy lift helicopters
like the Mi-26 and the soon to be acquired Chinook from the US.
Munitions
Ammunition of every type of gun in the Indian arsenal must be produced within the country. It should now not be expected that one can depend on imports if and when own war reserves have been consumed. We must be able to replenish it so as to sustain a war of more than two month’s duration at any given point in the Himalayas. That is the benchmark set by the Kargil War. In the context of other weapon platforms that have, finally, been delivered by the DRDO laboratories to the armed forces – tanks, LCA, light combat helicopters, radars, torpedoes and a comfortingly long list of other equipment – there will no longer be the luxury of placing orders in small numbers and farming out the rest to foreign arms manufacturers. The full requirement must be met from Indian factories and improvements worked upon from the moment it is created so that the next generation is already on the drawing board with improvements as suggested by the users. Rejection should now be out of the question “You will have to make do with what you have” should now be the new mantra.
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CAUSE FOR ALARM
INDIAN SUBMARINE FLEET TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR POWER AND DECLINING CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS
submarine Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), apart from exposing our navy to a "nuclear submarine operating and maintenance culture", which required a change in the existing mindset. The excitement was even more palpable, with the induction of long range sonars, new types of torpedoes (wire guided and wake homing) and lethal underwater launched heavyweight anti-ship cruise missiles (the latter launched from the SSGN INS Chakra). The INS Chakra, was returned after three years lease in 1991, but the navy would still continue to operate three classes of conventional subs, till 2010. Greater underwater dived endurance and lower indiscretion rates resulted in a transformation in the manner which our submariners thought, trained and operated.
The Kilo Class Mainstay
The period 2000 to 2010 could be termed as phase three of the submarine force transition. The modernised SSKs (German type 1500 subs) had new sensors, while the modernised Kilos (Russian 877 EKM subs) had Tube Launched Missiles for both the anti-ship and land attack roles. Unfortunately, the induction of new indigenous conventional submarines (Projects 75 and 75 (I)), Air Independent Propulsion System for conventional submarines and a viable submarine rescue capability has got terribly delayed.
While there has been a steady transition and incremental growth in the capabilities and technical prowess in the Indian Navy’s submarine arm, there has been a steady decline in the numbers of platforms required to preserve national security and maintain the promised minimum nuclear deterrent. Even within the conventional weapons paradigm obsolescence could outpace acquisitions leaving wide gaps in submarine warfare capabilities and an unacceptable void in deep submergence rescue capabilities. This article is one more urgent alarm bell the government can ill-afford to ignore.
I
vividly remember the period 1967 to 1971, which could be considered the first phase of Indian Navy's transition to a modern blue water submarine capability. Our first submarine the INS Kalvari was commissioned at Riga on 8 December 1967 and we were amazed with its blue water reach of 20,000 nautical miles and its outfit of 22 torpedoes which could be fired from 10 torpedo tubes. In the initial period the excitement was palpable, as these new sharks of steel routinely did extremely well in various ASW exercises and the “dolphin pioneers” laid the foundations of a very professional submarine force. Our initial training with the British Royal Navy
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and the Soviet Navy, had also contributed to the best values being amalgamated and imbibed.
Preparations To Sail Chakra
The period 1983 to 1988 could be termed the second phase of transition, as Indian submarine crews and maintainers trained in three different locations for three different modern platforms, the Russian Kilo (project 887 EKM) class, the West German SSK (project 1500) class and the Russian Charlie (project 670 Chakra) class, which was India's first nuclear submarine. The 30 month Chakra training at Vladivostok, was particularly useful and enabled the introduction of new
1980. A submarine disaster would have serious repercussions on morale. Presently, the Indian Navy has a rescue arrangement with the US Navy, whereby they will "fly in" a DSRV for rescue in the event of a submarine disaster.
Indigenous Nuclear Submarine
In early 2012, the submarine force VICE ADMIRAL commenced the fourth phase of ARUN KUMAR SINGH transition, with the multi-role Akula class SSN (tactical nuclear (RETD) The writer retired as attack submarine) INS Chakra, being commissioned in Russia Flag Officer Commandingin-Chief of the Eastern and joined the Indian Navy on a Naval Command, 10 year lease. This third generation Visakhapatnam. His key SSN, is one of the most silent, high appointments included speed and deep diving submarines Director General of the in the world. The US Navy has a Indian Coast Guard healthy respect for this stealthy (during the Tsunami of submarine since they find it very 26 December 2004) and difficult to detect, as was proved a Commander-in-Chief of few months ago, when a Russian the Tri-Service Andaman Navy Akula SSN did a prolonged and Nicobar Command. deployment in the Gulf of He is also a prolific writer Mexico and was never detected on maritime, strategic and by the US Navy. However, nuclear issues. one SSN is not enough and the navy urgently needs to import a second and also commence building its own SSNs, since 6 to 12 such units would be needed, given the vast areas of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and also China's growing blue water navy and new generation of Chinese nuclear submarines.
Hopefully again, if the media reports are proved correct, this year (2013) may see the commencement of sea trials The repercussions are serious because: and subsequent commissioning of India's home built SSBN (INS Arihant), which was launched by the prime minister on The ageing Kilos and SSKs are 27 July 2009. The INS Arihant, nearing the end of their operational will usher in the era of sea based lives and only two SSKs and two The ageing Kilos and SSKs are nuclear deterrence. But here too Kilos will remain after 2015 and needs at least four SSBNs nearing the end of their operational India these too will decommission by each capable of launching 2025. The six French designed lives, and only two SSKs and two nuclear tipped ballistic missiles Scorpene subs of Project 75, Kilos will remain after 2015 and with ranges of 4-6,000 km slated for delivery (one per year) that the third leg of our these too will decommission by so commencing 2012 are delayed strategic deterrence posture is to beyond 2016 onwards, while 2025. The six French designed made operational. the case for six larger and more Scorpene subs of Project 75, advanced Project 75(I) submarines slated for delivery (one per year) As the Indian Navy re-enters is locked up in the bureaucratic the nuclear submarine era, it commencing 2012 are delayed will undoubtedly face new maze of South Block. to beyond 2016 onwards, while challenges, but given the core The Indian Navy has a primitive the case for six larger and more values on which our submariners submarine rescue system based are brought up, I have no on one ship, which uses a 1939 advanced Project 75(I) submarines doubts that these challenges design for rescuing submarine is locked up in the bureacratic maze too will be met professionally crews from a sunken submarine of South Block and overcome, with traditional at depths below 150 metres. The fortitude by the "silent arm case for modern DSRVs (Deep of the silent service". But the Submergence Rescue Vessels), which can rescue submarine government needs to step in and stop the declining force crews from depths greater then 400 metre is pending since levels and submarine rescue capability.
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Indo-Russian entente
RIAC POSTULATES
PROMOTING RUSSIA-INDIA COOPERATION
IN MILITARY AND ENERGY SPHERES
1
The strategic partnership between Russia and India is an evident and natural phenomenon. The two countries’ national interests either coincide, or at least do not contradict each other. Fortunately enough, Russia enjoys great competitive power in the spheres that are of mutual interest for the two states – energy and military technology. It is quite obvious that reinvigorating these traditional approaches to cooperation can boost trade and economic relations. It is also important to participate in India’s electrification. It appears quite reasonable to sign in the coming year an agreement on creating joint ventures to supply gas to Indian brown coal to generate electricity powered by gas turbines.
enhanced competitiveness and a degree of protectionism with regard to their own production. The proximity of two countries’ approaches to the fundamental problems of global development is especially evident.
Special Relationship
To maintain the “privileged” status of Russian-Indian relations, it is important to outline guidelines for our foreign economic activities. Practice shows that good economic and socio-political motivation providing a positive impetus for maintaining bilateral relations at a high level can be achieved at minimum trade turnover of at least US$ 17-18 billion. Fortunately enough, Russia enjoys great competitive power in the spheres that are of mutual interest for the two states – energy and military technology. It is quite obvious that reinvigorating these traditional approaches to cooperation can boost trade and economic relations. In the power industry, the greatest hopes have been related to the development of nuclear energy. However, cooperation in this area has failed to achieve the desired goals: after the Fukushima disaster anti-nuclear sentiment was running high in the Indian population, nourished by Russia’s competitors (primarily the United States). In effect, India adopted a law on nuclear power station builders’ responsibility for any damage incurred during the facility’s operation. Taking into account the volume of contracts undertaken by Rosatomstroi, Russia must adopt a firm stand and temporarily suspend cooperation in this area thus encouraging the Indian party to demonstrate more flexibility. Given the volume of contracts operated by Rosatomstroi, both parties have much to gain from this cooperation.
I
ndia has undoubtedly entered the 21st century alongside the United States and China as a country that can rightfully claim the status of being a centre of global influence. There is a good chance that the world’s future will be largely determined by developing relations in the United States-China-India triangle. India’s position in the global political and economic system makes it even more important that Russia
In the meantime, there is a clear need for Russia to build partnerships with Western companies (Germany’s Siemens is probably the best choice in this respect) and major Indian private businesses, as India will soon pass a law allowing private capital investment in this sphere (Indian companies such as Larsen & Toubro and Tata could be potential partners). In the medium-term it would be advisable to start cooperating with India in the area of building fast neutron reactors, as Russia so far has no competitors in this area. Russia’s position on India’s nuclear market could be strengthened by vigorously stepping up production within Russia of small
attaches particular significance to the development of bilateral relations with this Asian giant. The strategic partnership between Russia and India is an evident and natural phenomenon. The two countries’ national interests either coincide, or at least do not contradict each other. Geopolitical considerations dictate the need to strengthen mutual relations. Similarities between the two
countries’ objectives in the foreign policy domain cannot be ignored. Russia and India should seek further integration in the global economy,
1. This article is a review of the main provisions of the RIAC Postulates on Russia-India Relations on the issues of energy cooperation and arms trade (the paper is available for download here: http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/WP_RussiaIndia_En.pdf). The main aim of the paper was to present viable recommendations for both Russian and Indian policy makers and to expose these ideas to the scrutiny of the two states’ experts.
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Russia and India should seek further integration in the global economy, enhanced competitiveness and a degree of protectionism with regard to their own production. The proximity of two countries’ approaches to the fundamental problems of global development is especially evident
and medium capacity plants (for large Indian cities) in cooperation with Indian partners. It would be equally important for Russia to continue efforts aimed at expanding gas supply systems in India. According to existing estimates, gas consumption in the country will increase 70 per cent by 20202, thus creating great opportunities for Russian enterprises. It is also important to participate in India’s electrification. It appears quite reasonable to sign in the coming year an agreement on creating joint ventures to supply gas to Indian brown coal to generate electricity powered by gas turbines. Such projects are equally important for the social development of India as for the economic cooperation of the two states.
VI TRUBNIKOV
The writer is team leader of the authors of RIAC Postulates on Russia-India Relations on the issues of energy co-operation and arms trade. He is a member of Russian International Affairs Council and board of directors of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN), General of the Army, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation. The RIAC Postulates on Russia-India Relations have been abridged by Dr Andrey Kortunov, Nikolay Markotkin and Anton Tsvetov.
Hydrocarbon supplies to India are unlikely to yield many benefits due to the considerable delivery distances involved. There is therefore a need to identify new supply patterns. One such pattern involves creating new hydrocarbon production joint ventures in Russia (based on Sakhalin-1 example) and in third countries (chiefly in Central Asia). The hydrocarbons received via these channels could be sold by India to its partners. It would also be advisable to review swap deals in this sphere.
Armament Industry
Shifting to the prospects of military cooperation it is necessary to point out that India is one of the world's largest national arms markets, behind the United States, Saudi Arabia and (until recently) China. However, India’s military-technical cooperation (MTC) with foreign countries pursues the exclusive aim of strengthening its own security and therefore is unlikely to have a negative impact on regional security in South Asia. India’s elites (supported by a significant proportion of the society) are keen to continue substantial "supplementary arming" of India, considering it a deterrent to the "geopolitical expansion" of China, a country that has experienced troublesome relations with India following the border conflict in 1962 and as a means of implementing the military-political doctrine of India that aims to transform the country into a leading force in the area from "Suez to Singapore." India is diversifying the products supplied on the Indian market by a variety of foreign manufacturers,
2. Release. Alexei Miller and Ajai Malhotra discussed questions of LNG supplies to India. http://www.gazprom.ru/press/ news/2011november/article123401/
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RIAC POSTULATES India imported armaments from 14 countries in 2008-20113.
Effect Of Diversification
In 2012-2015, Russia's share in the Indian arms market will fall to 37.5 per cent4, whereas leadership in absolute figures will be maintained. This is related to several factors: India’s diversification policy; Russia's inability to compete with other countries on a full range of purchased AME (while India increases the number of areas for MTC); working towards saturating its defence-industrial complex with science and technology capacities, including broadbased "naturalisation" of foreign ideas and R&D. The main purpose of this is to stimulate the creation and development of domestic original ideas and solutions. The main feature of India’s MTC is the trend aimed at purchasing weapons systems that are manufactured in accordance with individual requirements of Indian customers. Almost all newly-purchased air and sea platforms feature cockpit equipment and armaments from various manufacturers. As a result, India has enjoyed access to the maximum number of technologies that are available on the market. In addition, due to the stable trend in India’s MTC towards focusing on the quality and technological prowess of purchased products the importance of price factors has declined.
No Military Self-reliance
For several decades, India has been
purchasing large consignments of armaments together with licenses allowing domestic production. However, the Indian industry is currently experiencing considerable difficulties as it tries to develop licensed production of high-end weapons systems. Since the early 1980s, India has been attempting to implement its own national programmes to manufacture major weapons systems. To date, most projects have not entered production, with the serial results India has demonstrated in creating an advanced national defence-industrial complex being far from encouraging. Limited success has been achieved only in ballistic missiles production. Therefore, the country’s defence industry does not seem able to substitute arms imports in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the practice of organising tenders for arms and military equipment purchase as a means of internal political struggle has emerged in India. The domestic political opposition invariably declares that tender results do not
serve the country’s best interests and has accused the ruling party of corruption. This practice has now resulted in extreme delays around tender procedures: the bidding process can last a very long time due to fears it could trigger a political crisis or that tender results could be cancelled and the tender re-opened. Russia is a major exporter of arms and military equipment (AME) to India. Russia accounts for 55.3 per cent of all purchases made by India in this area in 2008-2011. Overall the portfolio of orders contracted for March 2013 amounts to US$ 10.3 billion. For reference: The United Kingdom was the second-largest exporter of military equipment to India in 2008-2011 at US$ 2.007 billion. Orders booked in 2003-2010 comprise US$ 4.094 billion. Israel ranks third at US$ 1.839 billion and has an order book of US$ 3.452 billion. The United States ranks fourth with US$ 1.144 billion (and US$ 3.986 billion on order), while Italy comes fifth with US$ 690 million (and an order book of US$ 4.23 billion). Overall,
Antey-2500
Tor-M2E-2
Criticism consistently levelled by the Indian side over delays in spare parts delivery for imported Russian military equipment is largely caused by the Russian side’s cumbersome bureaucracy … The time schedules followed by Western competitors should be used as benchmarks (replacing a unit should normally take 3-4 days). There is also a clear need to align servicing operations and provide technical maintenance for Russian equipment through to the end of service life, as other vendors do when dealing with India
Our main competitors’ consent to supply licenses for military production and the most advanced weapons to India (which they often refused to do previously); Indian armed forces’ efforts to acquire the most combat-effective systems with payment issues being moved to the background. The Indian party has consistently raised issue of state control over the quality of products and after-sales services exported expressing dissatisfaction with the "superfluous" (intermediary) links in the Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation. MTC with India may have a favourable effect on the industrial structure of Russia’s economy due to the programme’s long-term nature and consistently significant purchase volumes. There is a clear need to approach the Indian market with unique solutions and technologies on operations and sub-strategic levels (in the area of missile defence, missile warning systems, nuclear-powered submarines and missile technology) along with the opportunity to link these deliveries with conventional arms procurement. Russia may also join the Indian programme to build INS Arihant class of nuclear submarines (multiple flaws were identified after the first submarine was built).
Missile Defence System
It is necessary to find a breakthrough branch in military-technical cooperation with India. This could be a major project for a national missile warning system and air defence development (the Indian system is based on outdated Soviet technology). The Indian party is very interested in developing a modern anti-missile defence (AMD) system. This is an area in which the Russian Federation is in a position to offer India new developments, particularly in long-range air defence systems demonstrating extensive anti-missile potential, such as the Antey-2500 military air defence system, the Tor-M2E-2 and Buk-M2E anti-aircraft missile systems and
new modifications such as the C-400 (C-500 for the future). Moreover, the Russian party could facilitate joint design and production of a light fifth generation fighter, given the future aviation ventures that already exist in the national defence complex. The two countries’ participation in joint projects involving third countries (chiefly Israel) seems a promising and profitable avenue for both parties to explore.
Spare Parts Problem
Criticism consistently levelled by the Indian side over delays in spare parts delivery for imported Russian military equipment is largely caused by the Russian side’s cumbersome bureaucracy. Claims to Russian enterprises go through Rosoboronexport, resulting in delays that may last several months. Reputable companies should be selectively allowed to perform independent operational interventions. The time schedules followed by Western competitors should be used as benchmarks (replacing a unit should normally take 3-4 days). There is also a clear need to align servicing operations and provide technical maintenance for Russian equipment through to the end of service life, as other vendors do when dealing with India. It would also be advisable to establish and finance an adequate and active information support strategy for military cooperation, neutralising the negative propaganda funded by Russian companies’ competitors. Particular attention should be paid to Indian professional defence and technology sector magazines, while special emphasis should be placed on working with them. These magazines play a crucial role in shaping the opinion of the national military elite and that of the individuals that make decisions on MTC. Both arms trade and energy are spheres where Russia-India interaction has been and still can be quite fruitful. The key to making bilateral cooperation mutually beneficial is shifting the focus from old-fashioned trade to implementing joint projects in Russia, India or third countries. Collaboration in the two areas mentioned above lies in the domain of the strategic partnership as it fulfills the two states’ need for fundamental security, thus enabling them to safeguard their position as emerging powers and new centres of global development.
3. CAWAT. http://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2012/0815/105514316/ detail.shtml, http://armstrade.org/includes/ periodics/news/ 2011/1027/ 164510149/detail.shtml
Buk-M2E
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4. Ibid.
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Indo-Russian entente
STEADFAST ALLEGIANCE
AIR MARSHAL ANIL CHOPRA PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (RETD)
The writer has been a fighter pilot who has grown up flying Russian aircraft. He is experienced on all variants of MiG-21, MiG-23 and Su-30. He has also flown the An-32 transport aircraft. He was the Team Leader of MiG-21 Bison Upgrade Team in Russia for over four years.
The US approach was to form formal alliances through treaties. ‘You are either a friend or a foe’ was the choice. Soviets wanted to take into their fold developing countries to prevent American grand plans. The USA chose to support Pakistan as a key partner positioned at a strategic location near Central Asia. In the late fifties USA started arming the Pakistan Air Force initially with Sabre F-86 and later with Starfighter F-104. This literally delivered India into the Soviet camp. India was offered MiG-21 aircraft. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971 sealed the two countries into a high bonding relationship. Immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union in the 1990s, there were uncertainties and confusion. The geopolitical situation took time to stabilise and today initiatives have been taken to transform the buyer-seller relationship to that of partnership based on joint research and co-production as epitomised by the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft. The FGFA and the BrahMos supersonic missile projects signify the direction in which the two nations are going.
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B
y mid-nineteen fifties, as part of nation building, young India had launched a massive basic infrastructure programme. India was dependent on the British in the initial transition. It needed finances and technological support. The USA was heavily engaged in containing the spread of Communism and was keen to mentor Nehru’s India. However, the US approach was to form formal alliances through treaties. ‘You were either a friend or a foe’ was the choice. Soviets wanted to take into their fold developing countries to prevent American grand plans. Indian films which signified victory of the underdog had become very popular in communist Soviet Union and movie stars Raj Kapoor and Nargis and their movie Awara were household names. India remained a champion of non-alignment. The Indo-Soviet relationship was mainly anchored on shared interests and mutually beneficial cooperation and not based on ideology. The slogan “Hindustan-Russia Bhai Bhai” soon started reverberating across the two nations.
The Strategic Embrace
Post Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were more empathetic to India’s needs. Khrushchev's speech in Srinagar in 1955, unequivocally declared that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a part of India. Support from Soviet Union resulted in setting up of Bhilai and Bokaro steel plants among other infrastructure. The USA chose to support Pakistan as a key partner positioned at a strategic location near
Central Asia. In the late fifties USA started arming the Pakistan Air Force initially with Sabre F-86s and later with Starfighter F-104s. This literally delivered India into the Soviet camp. India was offered MiG-21 aircraft, which had proved itself in Vietnam, as a counter to the F-104. India was very pleased to see Soviets not take sides with Communist brother China in the 1962 Sino-India conflict. Soon was to start one of the most resilient relationships between the two countries. In 1965 the Soviet Union served successfully as peace broker between India and Pakistan after an Indian-Pakistani border war. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971 sealed the two countries into a high bonding relationship. The initial Indo-Soviet military cooperation could be summarised as determined by India’s basic military needs, Soviet’s seeking-out and Western ambivalence.
Aviators’ Dream
The Indo-Russian aviation relationship started in late 1950s when India purchased, Il-14 utility transport aircraft, Mi-4 helicopters, four-engine An-12 transport aircraft and the SA-2 Pechora missiles for groundto-air defence of own vital interests. But the real landmark event was the purchase of first combat aircraft, the Mach 2 fighter jet MiG-21 in 1962 from the Soviet Union, something they had earlier denied to China. Starting with the 28 Squadron, also called the ‘first supersonics’, in 1963, the next five decades were to see over a 1,000 MiG-21 inducted into the Indian Air Force (IAF). India was to be the largest MiG-21 operator outside Soviet Union. The aircraft also brought the first air-to-air missile into IAF inventory. Among the pioneers were Wg Cdr Dilbagh Singh and Sqn Ldr SK Mehra both of whom rose to be Air Chiefs and others like MSD Wollen and
BD Jayal became Air Marshals. At least 27 IAF units operated the MiG-21 sometime in their history. “The MiG-21’s invaluable contribution towards moulding IAF’s operational psyche cannot be matched by another fighter – past or present. This fighter literally nurtured generations of fighter pilots. IAF fighter pilots swear by the combat versatility of this delta-wing marvel” said Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne to commemorate 50 years of MiG-21 in the IAF. The 575 MiG-21 aircraft of different variants were produced under licence by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) in India. “The MiG-21 manufacturing project changed the technological and manufacturing capability of aerospace sector in the country and also the industrial landscape of Nasik”, said HAL Chairman, Dr RK Tyagi. The MiG-21s finest hour was the Indo-Pak War of 1971. It not only achieved many kills in the air, including downing many F-104 Starfighters, but also brought a sudden end to the war when a MiG-21 formation attacked the government house at Dacca. Inducted shortly after the MiG-21, were 90 swept-wing Su-7 aircraft from the Sukhoi design bureau. It supplemented the MiG-21s in the 1971 war by making air-to-ground strikes against targets in the western sector. The 101 Squadron at Adampur was christened ‘The Falcons of Chammb’ for its outstanding support to the ground forces. MiG-23 BN swing-wing tactical support aircraft was the next fighter aircraft to be inducted in January 1981. Four squadrons were formed. Its air defence variant, with an airborne radar the MiG-23 MF, was in two squadrons. A more advanced swing-wing aircraft with much greater load carrying capacity, the MiG-27 was inducted in large numbers and its upgraded version continues to fly even
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STEADFAST ALLEGIANCE
The Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, had been trusted and reliable partners in defence cooperation. Despite occasional differences in perceptions, defence cooperation has been free from any attached strings. It has never ever been interrupted. Initiatives have been taken to transform the buyer-seller relationship to that of partnership, based on joint research and co-production today. Late 1970s, IAF also chose to diversify by procuring the deep penetration strike Jaguar aircraft from UK. Just as the French Dassault Mirage 2000 was being inducted in mid 1980s, its Russian competitor and next from the MiG stable, MiG-29 was bought in large numbers for pure air defence role. This deadly combination of Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 tilted the balance in South Asia clearly in India’s favour. MiG-29s are currently under upgrade in Russia under a US$ 900 million contract.
Transport Fleet
The transport fleet saw the induction of over a hundred medium lift twin-engine An-32 cargo aircraft. These were to become the workhorse of IAF. The 40-ton payload carrying Il-76 came in early 1980s. These were to replace the smaller An-12s. Indian Navy inducted in small numbers Il-38 and Tu-142s for maritime reconnaissance and attack. The rotary wing fleet had the Mi-8 and its later versions Mi-17, Mi-17 1V, and Mi-17 V 5 bought in
very large numbers and they have been the backbone of IAF’s support to the army and the civil authorities. The induction of Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopter gunships also changed the sub-continental dynamics. The 20-ton Mi-26, the world’s biggest helicopter gave real heavy lift capability which has been used extensively even by power, telecom and rail ministries to move heavy equipment to remote places. Mi-26 and Mi-17s were extensively used in the recent Himalayan tsunami. Indian Navy also bought the Kamov Ka-25, Ka-28 and Ka-31 helicopters.
Brief Slow Down
Immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union in the 1990s, there were uncertainties and confusion. For nearly a decade there was a loss of public enthusiasm in both the countries. After being generally perceived as the loser in the cold war, low self-esteemed Russia had started behaving subservient to the USA. Russian economy had gone into a free-fall. Flight of capital abroad and hyperinflation resulted in slowdown in defence production. With the Indian Navy and IAF heavily equipped with Russian systems, these were trying times for the relationship. India faced unprecedented problems of product support which seriously affected our defence preparedness. Thousands of suppliers were dispersed over Soviet Union. About 80 per cent of defence industries remained in Russia, as well as almost all design bureaus for major weapon systems. In the meantime Russian state export agencies acted essentially as intermediaries retaining high unspecified service charges, while not making payments to their defence enterprises to enable timely supplies. Under US pressure, Russians slowed down supplies and put restrictions on nuclear technology and critical cryogenic engines for the Indian space industry. All these were
BrahMos Missile
Sukhoi-30MKI
Sukhoi PAK FA T-50 Prototype
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short term hiccups not with standing, many aircraft orders came through mid-1990s onwards. The project for the upgrade of 125 MiG-21 Bison aircraft went to Russia. The initial requirement of two squadrons of Su-30MKI aircraft for which the agreement was signed in 1996 gradually grew to orders for 272. Beginning of the new century saw induction of six Ilyushin Il-76 AWACS, with Israeli Phalcon radar and that changed the entire power equation in South Asia. The Il-78 air-to-air refuellers gave the IAF a global reach and soon started dominating the Indian Ocean littoral states. Order of 80 Medium Lift Helicopters Mi-17 V 5s boosted IAF heli-lift capability very substantially.
Bright Future
The Soviet Union and subsequently Russia, had been trusted and reliable partners in defence cooperation. Despite occasional differences in perceptions, defence cooperation has been free from any attached strings. It has never ever been interrupted. Initiatives have been taken to transform the buyer-seller relationship to that of partnership, based on joint research and co-production. A new treaty was signed in Moscow in 1994 by Narasimha Rao and Yeltsin. It highlighted continuity in Indo-Soviet relations and included post-cold war threats posed by religious extremism, terrorism, separatism etc. Navy ordered the MiG-29s along with the long delayed Aircraft Carrier Admiral Gorshkov (Indian name INS Vikramaditya). These aircraft may also one day be modified to the IAF MiG-29 upgrade standard. The second lease of an advanced Russian nuclear submarine would dove-tail with the commissioning of the jointly developed nuclear submarine Arihant. The decision in December 2010 to give unlimited access to high precision military grade signals from the GLONASS Global Positioning System is a positive development. Reactors for the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Station (NPS), joint development of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile cemented the relationship further. BrahMos will one day cruise at Mach 6 and have sea, air and surface launch variants. The Russians were somewhat unhappy with MiG-35s early exit from the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft contest. However, in December 2012, during President Putin’s visit to India, defence deals worth US$ 2.9 billion were cleared. These included additional Su-30s and Mi-17 V5s. The major step in Indo-Russian defence
The major step in Indo-Russian defence collaboration has been the signing of the Preliminary Design Contract for the stealth Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). This Sukhoi-HAL joint project which is a derivative from the PAK FA (T-50 prototype) under development for IAF may one day dwarf all other defence deals MiG 29
collaboration has been the signing of the Preliminary Design Contract for the stealth Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). This Sukhoi-HAL joint project which is a derivative from the PAK FA (T-50 prototype) under development for IAF may one day dwarf all other defence deals. The R&D contract for FGFA is pegged at US$ 11 billion, to be shared equally by the two countries. Aircraft is already under flight testing in Russia. Flight testing in India will begin in 2014. Induction into IAF is planned 2022 onwards. If India inducts over 200 aircraft as per plan, the overall cost of this gigantic project for India will come to around US$ 35 billion. The other futuristic programme is the Ilyushin-HAL Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA). The framework agreement for this 15-20 Ton payload aircraft was signed between India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and Russian United Aircraft Corporation in October 2012. Joint development reduces development costs and risk to both partners. With existing and envisaged projects, Russia's share in India's defence sector for years to come may well remain more than the rest of global suppliers combined. To sustain such defence collaboration, Russia would need radical modernisation of its manufacturing sector and India to ensure much greater private sector participation. The non-military trade imbalance in favour of Russia grew from 2:1 in 2000 to almost 4:1 in 2009 mostly on account of hydrocarbons. Including defence deals, the actual imbalance in favour of Russia would be significantly higher. This trend needs to be addressed. Yet India’s trade with Russia at roughly US$ 5.3 billion a year, vis-à-vis US$ 42 billion with China and US$ 36 billion with USA, is very low. The Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan is jointly operated by India and Russia. Russia, India, China (RIC) dialogue mechanism is in place. Russia has actively proposed close coordination in the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) framework. Russia has also supported India’s full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It has supported India becoming a UN Security Council permanent member. Russia has overcome its hesitation in naming Pakistan as the major source and safe haven of terrorism. Yet Russia cannot continue to take India’s defence orders for granted. There is a need to work on the basis of international best practices and of competitive bidding and look at lifecycle costs and lifetime product support for ensuring high serviceability. India being the largest importer of arms for last five years is being sought by many arms exporting countries. The US$ 50 billion modernisation kitty for next five years puts India in a position of strength to bargain the best deals. For a change, all the state-of-the-art systems are on offer. Initial cost of Russian systems has always been two-thirds of the western counterparts. Now the Russians are also ready to compete in lifecycle costs. They are conscious of the commitment to indigenisation and technology transfer. With so many systems in the pipeline, the evergreen Indo-Russian aviation relations will continue to blossom for decades to come.
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AIR POWER the key to ensuring the national security of the country. A future aerospace leader must be effective in life and death decisions, choosing between conducting planned mission, weighing their mission objectives against if pursued another alternative path or supporting another mission, this needs supreme skills to be able to gather, analyse and synthesise the flow of information. No leader works alone, so the future aerospace leader needs an in-depth buy-in through joint coordination and collaboration. Current and future battlespace is dominated by technology, however technology is a support system and the groundwork relies on the “human factor” and the efficacy of the ground force team. Aerospace power is a quantitative and qualitative asset for a nation’s security when balanced with clear, transparent Humint collaboration. The human element is influenced by perspective; views are a reflection of their background comprised of culture, value, education and experience. To rise above these set rules requires that we understand fully what are the capabilities of aerospace power, what it has to offer and what are its limitations and when and how it should be used for achieving optimum results.
BATTLESPACE BEHAVIOUR AND THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN
T
he Indian Air Force today is the Air power is the strength of any fourth largest air force in the world. Air Force applying parallel forces at It has a position in the world and all levels. Non-linear, high mobility, capabilities that can only progress and multidimensional is the fabric develop further in the coming years and decades. of battlespace today. However aerospace power cannot replace The nature of the battlespace has changed since “ground presence”. Ground support the 9/11 attacks in the USA and Mumbai attacks on is crucial and this means that we link 26/11. Battles of today are fought with unknown or several battlefield functions together, invisible adversaries. The battlespace environment not only involves physical volume of areas of all this begins with Intelligence, interest and influence but success in battle means Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). controlling space, time, cyber space and above all the ISR tasks and integration of CAS (close human factor. A small force or a one-man operation take on a formidable structure. In these times air support) mission brings intrinsic can foresight on prevention and national disaster flexibility of airpower / aerospace power. preparedness and resiliency is a component of the Reliance on ground support is what aero battlespace environment. makes the aerospace forces operate. Air Warrior Of 21st Century Integration of various sectors for In the classic sense, air power is the total ability of joint operations is a must for modern a nation to assert its will through the medium of air / urban warfare. An enemy does not including, existing and potential, civil and military In the modern sense, air power, which have to attack a satellite directly, just aviation. has evolved into aerospace power, is defined as disable and destroy the ground control the product of aerospace capability and aerospace doctrine. Developing future aerospace leaders is to thwart the operation.
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We are aware of airpower and it’s enormous potential and unlimited flexibility to exert influence through coercion. It can be used across multiple theatres of operations and platforms on mobile and static targets. Although it is how the weapons systems are used and in what context that matters, not the range or reach of particular aircraft type.
Airland Battle Scenario
Engineering technology used in small diameter bombs and limited blast radius warheads increases the precision of an attack, giving better control of direct effects to minimise collateral damage. The irregular warfare environment makes air weapons a significant utility even in identifying and attacking IEDs, defeating trigger mechanisms and even pre-detonating the IEDs. However aerospace power cannot replace “ground presence”. Ground support is crucial and this means that we link several battlefield functions together, all this begins with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR tasks and integration of CAS (close air support) mission brings intrinsic flexibility of airpower / aerospace power. The flow of Intelligence works both ways, in modern campaigns airpower capabilities give advantage to
on-ground missions delivering intelligence of the battlespace faster to analyst and commanders and air missions rely on the Intel delivered through “on-ground” installations for accuracy and precision of the targets. This enables the forces in “smarter resourcing” and force-planning decisions. Evolving ISR into ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisitions and Recon) is seeing the battlespace with a holistic view where sum of all parts make a complete picture plus knowing the clear status of different parts assists a combat force, in the air or on the ground to move as sensors gathering, managing information and tackling the situation collectively and to advance with accuracy for target-set missions. The ISTAR improves a Commander’s situational awareness and consequently the decision-making process. The importance of taking information and processing it to applicable Intelligence from all sensors cannot be over-emphasised in shaping battlespace behaviour and action for operations through the cognitive domain.
DR RUPALI JESWAL
The writer is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Operational Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a senior fellow at IACSP-CSS and a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association),APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.
Aircraft and space systems can patrol areas around the world but are limited in actions as they are no substitutes for the presence of soldiers for example or local Police, be it occupation of territory, peacekeeping operations or assisting in natural disaster rescue operations. Pilotless long duration vehicles and space systems like geosynchronous satellites, provide “coverage” but at equatorial regions. These systems do allow surveillance of surface activities but weather, enemy deception and geographical demarcation, camouflage, to name a few are its limitations.
Aerospace power cannot replace “ground presence”. Ground support is crucial and this means that we link several battlefield functions together, all this begins with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR tasks and integration of CAS (close air support) mission brings ISR intrinsic flexibility of airpower / aerospace power
Space As Defining Factor
Space is vital to all terrestrial activities (political, economic and military) and provides situational awareness. Space assets are necessary to enhance war-fighting capabilities as they can attack adversary forces directly, thus increasing the accuracy. Much more than that, it is still a tool and can only be used through insertion of limitless capability of the human element. The future will bring independent space forces that will not be linked to airpower and the nation needs to fully understand the capabilities, limitations and de-limitations of what and how it might develop and be utilised.
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AIR POWER
Superior airpower is systems of systems; intelligence collection does go through tribal / territorial divisions, competing for the same resources needed for kinetic action. Intelligence and operations are a part of each other and when combined enhance the airpower capabilities, level of agility leading to multiple effective activities during the same mission at the same time Reliance on ground support is what makes the aerospace forces operate. Integration of various sectors for joint operations is a must for modern / urban warfare. An enemy does not have to attack a satellite directly, just disable and destroy the ground control to thwart the operation. The human element needs to be re-designed in a way that it functions at the highest performance level, as it is the core, which refers to existence and evolution. The key to targeting is Intelligence and targeting is a key to aerospace power. The information/knowledge of adversaries’ ‘Centre of Gravity’ is provided through good synchronised
on-ground Intelligence. A force needs precise Intelligence to employ precision weapons and also Intelligence directly affects “managing change”. A joint Intelligence centre routes information accurately and precisely, infusing collection through Humint and other intelligence disciplines. Air and space Intelligence must be combined with Humint. Aerial surveillance and Recon assets can determine that there is an exodus but will not be able to decipher the cause of it without Humint.
Humint As Enabler
Humint is a key enabler to airpower in the strike role, that is,
optimum strike times, details on OE (operational environment), presence of sensitive sites, important data on collateral damage considerations, initial battle damage assessment. For a thorough debriefing Humint source can provide an accurate assessment of the functional and psychological effects of the targets and also give Commanders a thorough view to assess restrike options. Superior airpower is systems of systems; intelligence collection does go through tribal / territorial divisions, competing for the same resources needed for kinetic action. Intelligence and operations are a part of each other and when combined enhance the airpower capabilities, level of agility leading to multiple effective activities during the same mission at the same time. Operational execution is buried deep into training habits. Phenomena associated with low involvement decisions (often called routinised response behaviour) include habit, indifference to risk and lack of search. As the level of involvement
grows through limited problem solving to extended problem solving, other phenomena such as brand perceptions and evaluation rules become important. ISR tasks should be integrated into the formal standard trainings of aircrews and ISR tactics, techniques and procedures for non-traditional collectors be infused through reality based trainings. Ultimately the goal is that collection tasks become routine objectives. An ISTAR mission mind-set builds synchronicity between the commanders’ Intelligence needs and the operational objectives, providing tactical flexibility in today’s dynamic situation. The strategic and operational level requires AIPB (aerospace intelligence preparation of the battlefield to be used as a support for local commanders, than at the tactical level, which requires greater level of details over a small area. The AIPB is used to create threat situation awareness
and understanding of adversary movement and manoeuvres. At the tactical level the AIPB process is used to create threat situation awareness and understanding of how the adversary fights – all key to effective mission planning. Thus the battlespace environment on the foundations of Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) at the strategic level influences available COA (Course of Action) or command decisions. Human systems innately incorporate base rate fallacy that should be taken as a component of planning and decision-making. Early integration of aircrews and wing-level Intelligence personnel should be involved in Intelligence planning and directional process
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to harness the full capabilities of ISR functions. Realising this vision requires the intellectual agility to blend roles and functions into the same mission overcoming traditional roles and missions, which limit the development of capabilities. The modern era calls for “multirole” in a multi-operational theatre. Superior airpower with ISTAR brings 4-D comprehension of the battlespace environment (including abstract elements, independent of the physical space we live in, which are products of information age and advanced technology) and the relationship that exists within – a hypercube with deep multiple corners interlinked and with its own sets of cause and effect independent yet supportive of each other.
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Indo-Russian entente
THE RELIABLE ANCHOR
INDIA-RUSSIA
defence, civil nuclear energy, space, technological, cultural and anti-terrorism cooperation – primarily overseen by the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC) besides other bodies. The 2012 bilateral trade of US$ 10 billion marked a 30 per cent increase and the target for 2015 is to reach US$ 20 billion. A bilateral free trade agreement is being looked at. Both countries are members of many international bodies where they jointly collaborate closely on matters of shared national interest, examples being the UN, BRICS, G20 and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) where India has observer status and has been asked by Russia to become a full member. Russia has publicly supported India for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat and has backed it in joining the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and Asia-Pacific Economic Conference. In addition, Russia has expressed interest in joining SAARC with observer status in which India is a founding member.
STRATEGIC RELATIONS
It is no secret that during the cold war and certain period beyond, it was only Russia that offered India advanced weapon systems and new technologies. The strategic partnership encompasses politics, defence, civil nuclear energy, space, technological, cultural and anti-terrorism cooperation. Russia has publicly supported India for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat and has backed it in joining the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and Asia-Pacific Economic Conference. The North-South Transport Corridor, a sea-land route for moving freight from South Asia to Europe through Central Asia, Caucasus and Russia is expected to reduce the cost of movement of goods between India and Russia and beyond. China could also have given a push to the North-South Corridor with its influence over Pakistan to open the India-Afghanistan land corridor but has refrained from doing so in a bid to keep India constrained. Notwithstanding the closeness of the past there is a feeling amongst a cross-section in Russia that India has neglected its friendship with Moscow because of befriending the US. This impression needs to be dispelled.
I
ndia-Russia relations over the years have been much more than only a military hardware sale-purchase relationship. Relations have remained strong even when geopolitical realities made India switch to diversify its export base to include other countries. The relationship saw through the breakup of Soviet Union and downturn in Russian economy which is now looking up. Developments and likely future events in this Asian century merit that India-Russia bonds be cemented even more for mutual benefit of both countries.
Evidence Of Reliability
It is no secret that during the cold war and certain period beyond, it was only Russia that offered India advanced weapon systems and new technologies. India is the second largest market for the Russian defence industry after China. In 2004, 70 per cent of military hardware imported by India came from Russia. Joint production of BrahMos supersonic missile, plus its successful underwater launch from a submarine platform in March this year are significant milestones. Other major joint ventures are the 5th generation fighter jet programme,
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The writer is a third generation Army officer who retired as DG Info Systems in 2009 after 40 years service. He participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, commanded a Special Forces Battalion in Sri Lanka, a Brigade on Siachen Glacier during Kargil Conflict, a Division in Ladakh and a Strike Corps in Semi Deserts. He is former Colonel of The Parachute Regiment. A leading defence expert, he is a visiting fellow in foreign Think Tanks and contributes regularly for Indian and foreign publications.
In the field of energy cooperation, joint gas exploration is ongoing in the Bay of Bengal. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project of 2000 MW indicates growing cooperation in this field. As part of the Co-operative Civilian Nuclear Energy Roadmap 2030, sixteen to eighteen new reactors will be constructed with installed capacity of 1,000 MW each. Construction of two more nuclear power units at Kudankulam is under discussion. In 2013, a joint space mission is planned with an Indian Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) carrying a Lunar Orbiter and a Rover made in India and a Lander built by Russia. The ongoing strategic dialogue includes terrorism and Afghanistan besides other issues.
Sukhoi Su-30 MKI programme (230 plus to be built in India) and Ilyushin / HAL Tactical Transport Aircraft. In addition to purchase of T-90 tanks from Russia, 1,000 are to be built in India. Two Akula-II nuclear submarines are being leased and four Tu-22M3 bombers have been ordered. The bilateral R&D contract pegged at US$ 11 billion is to be shared equally by the two countries. In July 2013, Russia delivered last of the three frigates built for Indian Navy, armed with eight BrahMos missiles, other armament and an ASW helicopter, like the earlier two of same Talwar class category. The aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya is to undergo final sea trials and delivery to the Indian Navy later this year albeit the delivery is delayed by five years and the price has doubled to US$ 2.3 billion. The IAF plans to arm 40 Su-30MKI (NATO name Flanker-H) fighters with BrahMos missiles. Russia and India recently agreed to develop hypersonic BrahMos 2 missile capable of flying at speeds of Mach 5-Mach 7. Then, India’s Perspective Multirole Fighter (PMF) variant of the Russian T-50 fifth-generation combat aircraft is to have avionics similar to Russia’s
LT GEN PC KATOCH PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (RETD)
UN Arms Trade Treaty
version of the plane. A joint venture to assemble Russian Mil and Kamov helicopters in India has been agreed.
Strategic Ambiance
During his December 2012 visit to India, President Putin said “the deepening of friendship and cooperation with India” was among Russia’s top priorities in foreign policy. The strategic partnership encompasses politics,
The US sponsored UN Arms Treaty regulating the US$ 70 billion conventional weapons trade was approved by the UN General Assembly on 2nd April 2013. The treaty is heavily skewed in favour of arms exporting countries and aims to link sales of arms to a country’s human rights record, prohibit states from exporting conventional weapons in violation of arms embargoes, or weapons that would be used for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or terrorism. India’s chief negotiator Sujata Mehta said, “India cannot accept that the Treaty be used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to
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THE RELIABLE ANCHOR
The UN Arms Trade Treaty is heavily skewed in favour of arms exporting countries and aims to link sales of arms to a country’s human rights record, prohibit states from exporting conventional weapons in violation of arms embargoes, or weapons that would be used for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or terrorism. India’s chief negotiator Sujata Mehta said, “India cannot accept that the Treaty be used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take unilateral measures against importing states without consequences.” take unilateral measures against importing states without consequences.” Besides complete absence of verification and implementation, farce of its justification is exposed by the massive US aid and arms supply to countries like Pakistan, the mother of terrorism whose proxies are worst offenders of human rights. Then there is use of proxies by the US itself against Al Qaeda in Libya and Syria and now the plan to hand over Afghanistan to Taliban-Haqqanis-Al Qaeda in part or in totality, not to mention indiscriminate US / NATO bombings with utter disregard to collateral damage and civilian casualties. What more proof of human rights violations or abuse is required? Naturally, India and Russia abstained from voting on this treaty. Other countries that abstained included China.
North-South Transport Corridor
The North–South Transport Corridor comprises the land and sea route for moving freight from South Asia to Europe through Central Asia, Caucasus and Russia. Total length of the International North-South Transport Corridor is 7,200 kilometres and it aims to transport passengers and
cargos from the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to North and West Europe through Azerbaijan and Russia. For India, this implies moving goods by sea to Iran, beyond by road / rail / sea to Caspian Sea or Southern Russia, and beyond by road / rail to Northern Europe. The "North-South" Transport Corridor Agreement (INSTC) has been ratified by India, Iran and Russia (three original signatories) and has come into force since 16 May 2002. This route is expected to reduce the cost of movement of goods between India and Russia and beyond. The last meeting of the Coordination Council of the INSTC was held in Baku in May 2013.
China Factor
The breakup of Soviet Union drove Russia to develop a deep relationship with China. There is convergence between both countries in opposing the United States. Russia-China economic relations have become strong with China supplying capital and products needed by Russia and Russia exporting arms, military technology, gas and oil to China. Russia places India next to US and China and perceives US, China and India would mould global geopolitics. Significantly, it was Russia that had put across the idea of the Russia-China-India Tripartite talks. However, the latter has not made much headway because of China’s lukewarm interest. China could also have given a push to the North-South Corridor with its influence over Pakistan to open the India-Afghanistan land corridor but has refrained from doing so in a bid to keep India constrained. US-Russia relations remain strained but Russia has developed close economic relations with the EU, resulting in the latter’s growing dependence on Russia’s hydrocarbons. The fate of Afghanistan, especially post 2014, will continue to be intimately linked with the Central Asian Region and Russia and India share common concerns here. Conversely, China and Russia already appear conflicting in CAR. Russia is determined to maintain interests and access in CAR by dominating the security framework through Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and controlling major pipelines that allow resources to enter and exit the region. In addition to economic, labour and stability interests, Russia is the major arms supplier
to CAR countries and sees these interests threatened by China. Russia is now aiming to integrate CAR countries into the Eurasian Union. A Eurasian Union would have negative effect on investment China has made on both sides of its border. Erection of Russia-controlled tariff barriers will adversely affect China’s trade with CAR. The ultimate destination for China’s Silk Road politics is Eurasia across Central Asian steppes or the heartland of the Turkic region and the former Eastern Europe is therefore threatened. Significantly, there is growing belief of China’s economic hegemony in CAR countries with the Chinese squeezing out competitors through liberal bribes. But the bigger resentment is the fear of China’s demographic invasion including illegal Chinese migrants. This is also relevant to Russia’s Far East where despite Chinese investments in development projects, presence of large number of Chinese is being increasingly looked at in anger. As per a report titled ‘China’s Central Asia Problem’ by the International Crisis Group released on 27 February 2013, Russia continues to seek military influence in CAR but is increasingly distrustful of SCO and Chinese intentions. China has not been able to match its ambitious economic moves with political and military muscle because of strong Russian influence in the CAR security structures. Russia continues monopoly of arms sales to CAR. Relations between CSTO and SCO remain uncertain and potentially competitive but both have proved ineffective in crisis. In case of power vacuum in region, even if either China or Russia is willing to intervene militarily in CAR, China may take the lead – reason being state of the Russian economy.
Af-Pak Region
US moves to virtually subcontract post 2014 Afghanistan to Pakistan has led Russia to adjust relationship with Pakistan, which is not surprising considering the sensitive Afghanistan-CAR region is Russia’s underbelly. Russia-China relationship also would have influenced rapprochement with Pakistan despite terror factories within Pakistan supporting Chechen rebels. Russia endorsed Pakistan’s full membership of SCO in 2011. Analysts feel Pakistan’s strategic devaluation by the US is offset by Russian strategic revaluation of Pakistan. With China-Pakistan ‘higher than the mountains,
With the US exit from Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself best placed with China and Russia both on her side – a situation she would like to exploit to the hilt. India needs to calibrate its policy in close relationship with Russia, optimising on the historic bilateral ties so that existing military and strategic balance in the region does not get disturbed deeper than the ocean’ relationship and Chinese embedded in Gilgit-Baltistan, Gwadar with Baluchistan to follow, the growing Russia-Pakistan relationship has caused anxiety in India but Russia has signalled unequivocally that this would not be at the cost of Russia-India strategic partnership and Indian interests. Russian initiative to entice Pakistan into a substantial relationship with Russia is essentially focused on Afghanistan. Further strengthening of Russia-Pakistan relationship is very much on the cards with Pakistan’s regional pre-eminence and Chinese backing post US exit. At the same time there is good chance of Afghanistan increasingly integrating with CAR and SCO assuming greater role in Afghanistan post 2014. Despite mutual mistrust, possibility exists of greater CSTO-NATO cooperation because China realises it needs security for investments in the region and Russia understands adverse effects of radical dispensation in Kabul.
Future Outlook
India-Russia strategic partnership is historic with both countries always having stood by each other. There is convergence of views on many contemporary issues including Syria, Afghanistan and Central Asia. If bilateral trade is still at low level despite recent spurt, it is perhaps because of the long route that Indian businessmen have to adopt. This needs impetus albeit when the North-South Transport Corridor gets fully operational with better transportation, an exponential increase in trade can be expected. On the other hand, despite cultural cooperation, there is a feeling amongst a cross-section in Russia that India has neglected its friendship with Russia because of befriending the US. This impression needs to be negated not only through government-to-government parleys but also pursued in think tank dialogues, business transactions and people-to-people contacts. With the US exit from Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself best placed with China and Russia both on her side – a situation she would like to exploit to the hilt. India needs to calibrate its policy in close relationship with Russia, optimising on the historic bilateral ties so that existing military and strategic balance in the region does not get disturbed. The Russia-Pakistan relationship should be leveraged to prevent establishment of a radical government in Kabul and negating Pakistani obsession of keeping India out of Afghanistan. This should not be too difficult considering that both India and Russia need each other in the backdrop of the increasingly aggressive China, who at a future date most likely will head towards conflict of interests with Russia as is becoming apparent in the Central Asian Region.
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EMERGING DICHOTOMY Delays And Cost Escalation
Yet this defence partnership is not entirely free of wrinkles. There is the issue of inordinate delays in the delivery of Russian defence systems, which result in considerable cost escalation. India is paying Russia US$ 2.34 billion for the delivery of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, now finalised for the end of 2013, compared to the original US$ 974 million agreed to in 2004. India was also supposed to receive an Akula II nuclear-powered submarine in 2009, but its delivery was postponed to 2011.
LIMITS OF INDIA-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP Despite the momentous changes in the international environment after the end of the cold war, there remains a continued convergence of interests that makes it advantageous for both India and Russia to maintain close ties. But more recently this relationship is coming to terms with its limits more significantly than at any time in its history.
I
ndia-Russia relationship is a unique one in the Indian foreign policy matrix that just refuses to become a marginal one and was only marginally affected by the unprecedented structural changes ushered in by the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. Though there was a brief period of neglect in the 1990s, a convergence of regional and global interests soon brought the two together again. There are few examples of a relationship between countries that has been as stable as the one between India and Russia. Despite the momentous changes in the international environment after the end of the cold war, there remains a continued convergence of interests that makes it advantageous for both India and Russia to maintain close ties. Barring a fleeting hiccup during Boris Yeltsin’s term as Russia’s president, New Delhi and Moscow have been extraordinarily successful in nurturing a friction-free relationship that harks back to the Soviet era.
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But more recently this relationship is coming to terms with its limits more significantly than at any time in its history. Every year, the Russian leaders come to India for a few hours and go back with defence deals worth billions. Much like 2011, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was in India in December 2012 for less than 24 hours and the two nations ended up signing deals worth US$ 4 billion. Moscow and Delhi signed contracts for delivery of 71 Mi-17V 5 helicopters and 42 technological kits for Su-30 MKI aircraft licensed production. The Indian Prime Minister was quick to once again underline Russia’s centrality in Indian efforts in defence modernisation. Russia’s role is indeed significant with the two nations jointly developing fifth-generation fighter aircraft and multirole transport aircraft over the next decade. These are Flagship Indo-Russian joint development projects, building on the success of the BrahMos cruise missile programme as a model.
Since the end of the cold war, with the rules of international politics in a state of flux and the terms of global commerce being reset, both India and Russia struggled for several years to define their relations with other major players on the global stage. Even as India’s global stature and influence began to rise, many in India continued to rely on Russia as an ally in resisting the “unipolar world order.” The most visible manifestation of this tendency was an attempt to carve out a Russia-China-India “strategic triangle.” The idea was originally proposed by former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov during a 1998 visit to India. Primakov argued that such an arrangement would be a force for greater regional and international stability. But as every state in the proposed triangle depended on the US to further its own interests, the project never moved beyond platitudinous rhetoric. With the US now in relative decline, Russia and India are struggling with the implications of possible Chinese hegemony over the Asian strategic landscape. While not discussed openly, this is the subtext behind the rapidity with which the two states are trying to reinvigorate their relationship. Defence, of course, remains central to the two countries’ bilateral relations, with Russia being India’s biggest supplier of weapons systems. But the defence relationship also encompasses a wide range of activity, including joint research, design, development and co-production. India is now locally producing several Russian defence products, including the BrahMos supersonic missile, the T-90 tank and Sukhoi fighter aircraft. Russia has agreed to further expand defence ties with India, both in content and range and has also given its nod to cooperation in sophisticated spheres of technology that the United States and other Western nations have seemed reluctant to share. Despite these successes, Russia’s privileged position as India’s defence supplier of
choice has come under pressure as India has shifted its priorities to the purchase of smart weaponry, which Russia is ill-equipped to provide. Already, India’s increasing defence ties with Israel and the gradual opening of the US arms market has diminished the appeal of Russian-made weapons systems. The Indian military has also been critical of relying too heavily on Russia for defence acquisition, especially in light of the lengthy dispute over the Admiral Gorshkov refit.
DR HARSH V PANT
The writer is reader in International Relations at King’s College, London and an affiliate with the King’s India Institute.
Nevertheless, Russia remains the only state willing to share defence technology of a strategic nature with India, including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. It is equally significant that Russia is the only major global power that has not sold defence technology to Pakistan. Civilian nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries has also gathered momentum, highlighted by their comprehensive nuclear deal and a pact to build two power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, on top of the four reactors Russia is already constructing. The rapidly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has also been instrumental in bringing India and Russia closer in recent years. Moscow has repeatedly underlined that the situation in Afghanistan impacts the security of both India and Russia underscoring their convergence of views and interests on the matter. Their stepped-up cooperation on Afghanistan comes at a time when India is worried about the departure of Western troops from Afghanistan in 2014. As New Delhi looks at alternative policy options to secure its interests, the partnership between India and Russia is likely to strengthen.
Unsettled Questions
But as the last trip of Putin underlined, the two nations are not really putting in an effort in giving a momentum to this partnership and continue to evade tough issues. There was no clarification as to how the two nations plan on boosting their abysmal economic ties. Bilateral trade is struggling to cross the US$ 10 billion mark. Russia remains concerned about Sistema as it has 56.68 per cent stake in Shyam Sistema Teleservices (SSTL), 21 of whose 22 licenses were cancelled by the Supreme Court as part of its 2G spectrum order. India’s nuclear liability law is also preventing greater Indo-Russian civilian nuclear energy cooperation. At the strategic level, as India has moved closer to the West, in particular the US, Russia is also making overtures to Pakistan. Russia’s growing closeness with China is also troubling for India which is facing an aggressive China on its borders every day. There has been no indication that any of these vital issues is receiving a serious consideration by the policy makers in New Delhi and Moscow. Unless there is some real effort from both sides to navigate these tough issues, there is a danger that India-Russia ties will soon become devoid of any substance and turn into a pale shadow of their glorious past.
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POTENTIAL AND REALITY buy weaponry and spares and in the process, contacted 135 production units in the CIS and East European countries. Yeltsin’s Russia was not in a mood to help India and coolly took more than a year to decide for a visit of Yeltsin to India. Meanwhile, Russia’s defence industry was too shattered and mismanaged to meet any foreign order for supply. PROF P L DASH Workers in the Russian defence The writer is Professor industry were not getting their of International Relations monthly wages. As wage arrears and ICCR India Chair, University of World piled up, many employees deserted Economy and Diplomacy, jobs; those highly skilled among Tashkent, Uzbekistan. them migrated to foreign countries. Those left behind in the Russian defence industry did not know how to do business with a foreign country without Moscow.
THE PARTNERSHIP REDUX
As events unfolded through the cold war years, it became evident that the West indulged in block politics and India followed non-alignment. India’s defence dependence on former Soviet Union had steadily grown since the 1960s to an extent of over 70 per cent. In the 1990s, India had no other choice but to rely on Russia for supply of arms, weaponry and military hardware after the Soviet collapse. India has a diversified need of modern weapons and equipment which Russia apparently alone cannot provide. From the mid 1960s India has been suffering the pangs of keeping all eggs in the Russian basket for weapons. Now, despite strategic partnership, India is seriously reconsidering the inevitability of putting its defence eggs in different baskets. India has been preferring weapons systems other than of Russian origin; and this has nonplussed the Rosoboronexport, caused acute heartburn among the Russian planners and made them to recast their India policy. Where is the Indo-Russian strategic partnership heading?
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T
he diplomatic relations between India and the former Soviet Union were formally established by the Provisional Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru on April 13, 1947 – four months before India gained independence. This event ushered in an era of close mutual relationship between the two countries and evidenced the trust reposed by Nehru on the Soviets. Humongous Soviet Union decided to befriend huge India as its anchor in South Asia was heartening at a time when many Western countries were virtually shying away from India with their unfriendly geopolitical calculations. Two factors brought the Soviet Union and India further closer: Nehru’s idealism to build an egalitarian society on Soviet model in India and the Soviet planned economy that he espoused for India. A factor that coincided to further cement mutual ties was the monopoly of power enjoyed then by the Congress Party in India and the CPSU in the Soviet Union. In Nehru’s scheme of things, the West was not completely eschewed, while the East was not entirely embraced. Nehru first turned to the Western capitalist world to help India build its economy; when turned down, he turned to the Soviet Union for help that readily came to build India’s edifices of friendship in the public sector. This was the beginning of historic partnership.
Cold War Years
As events unfolded through the cold war years, it became evident that the West indulged in block politics and India followed
non-alignment. The US anchored Pakistan in South Asia against the Soviet Union that chose to befriend India. For nearly five decades the bipolar stand-off continued, the systemic divide widened and the US and the Soviet Union looked red at each other. In the post-Soviet two decades what has happened is a partnership redux, based on strategic calculations and national priorities of both India and Russia. By the time the Soviet Union passed into nothingness in December 1991 India was tied to the Russian Federation for defence supply along with a huge accumulated debt of more than Rs 35,000 crore and Russia was tied to India in a binding relationship that mandated so many obligations few of which Russia could not fulfill. These unfulfilled obligations included spare parts supply to Indian defence and supply of cryogenic engines. Despite these wrinkles, in the larger strategic interest, both countries chose to bury the hatchet and jointly tread a path to strategic partnership. Regional moorings such as Russia, India, China (RIC) and Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) were the offshoots of this decision.
Why Strategic Partnership?
India’s defence dependence on former Soviet Union had steadily grown since the 1960s to an extent of over 70 per cent. In the 1990s, India had no other choice but to rely on Russia for supply of arms, weaponry and military hardware after the Soviet collapse. However, there were stupendous difficulties on the way amid post-Soviet chaos. Post-Soviet Russia could not fulfill its commitments to supply spare parts and meet the defence requirements of India, India did not exactly know where to approach for meeting its needs. Moscow was earlier coordinating the supply chain, which suddenly vanished. Wading through the muddy tumult across post-Soviet space India was frantically searching for production centres where to
It was a telling moment of uncertainty. Crime was reigning across the country and every deal with Russia had a mafia connotation. It was a hard lesson for India to learn from her defence overdependence. It was also a moment of hiatus. Forward movement in relationship was not happening. Russia was verbally interested but practically lethargic. At the same time it was unwilling to give up the huge Indian arms market. For the Russians that would have severed the strategic equilibrium in South Asia and for India an impasse. Unclear about how to move ahead with economic and military relations with Russia in the backdrop of India’s defence overdependence, then Indian ambassador to Russia, Ronen Sen, came up with the idea of India paying the salary of employees in Russian defence industry and keeping them engaged in spare production so they meet Indian requirements. The employees lauded the idea, but Moscow abhorred it. The employees supported Sen, while the Russian and Indian administration looked gingerly at him. Finally, the idea worked and ambassador Sen could sow the seeds of strategic partnership between the two countries for the years to come. It was at that point of time India could have thought to tap the migrating talents from Russia’s defence and nuclear industry and engage them in Indian research institutions, including DRDO, ISRO and so on. Over the years Russia – Soviet or post-Soviet – has considered India as a strategic anchor in South Asia. In the bygone years of bilateral relations, the Russians had headquartered the KGB in their embassy in New Delhi to oversee the ongoing political process in all South Asian countries. India was of extreme strategic importance in the cold war years and that geostrategic and geopolitical importance has not diminished even in post-Soviet times. Instead, the growing economic prowess of India has catapulted the country to an engaging position in Russian thinking. There are at least five schools of thought driving Indo-Russian strategic partnership. The politicians, foremost among them, Vladimir Putin, come first. All constructive ideas for betterment of mutual ties in the past fifteen years have come from Putin himself. He has ensured that the sordid shenanigans of Yeltsin era and the shabby imprints of the cryogenic engine deal are wiped off from the memory of the present generation. It is Putin who had
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POTENTIAL AND REALITY
Currently Russia’s relations with India are grossly lopsided with too many military items and too little of anything else. The driver of partnership would be desirably an equilibrium approach which is absent proposed the strategic partnership at the dawn of the millennium. It was he who had signed the strategic partnership treaty in October 2000 during his maiden visit to India. It is Putin who has ensured that apex level talks between the Russian President and Indian Prime Minister take place every alternate year in the capitals of our countries and so far continuum has been ensured. Opposed to Putin is a section of bureaucracy. Majority of the bureaucrats, educated through Yeltsin and post Yeltsin years, are largely averse to close ties with India. They continue to consider India as a laggard nation of the 1960s. They aver that Russians can still come and set up
educational institutions in India. They look to the West for everything. They go for treatment and tourism alike to the West. They grossly underestimate the growing potential of an emerging India. This section of people is now in the upper and middle echelons of Russian bureaucracy and they put unconstructive proposals about Indo-Russian relations. Political master Putin, often advised by Soviet era counsellor, Yevgeny Primakov, has been overriding this bureaucratic influence. The viability of India is the verity of its visible growth is understood by the Russian politicians, but the bureaucracy fails to fathom India’s depth. The third school is academics,
both pro-India and pro-Russia. Most Indologists in Russian Academy of Sciences are pro-India and they advocate close bilateral ties and strong strategic partnership. To their dismay: trade volume between the two countries has been hovering around a low horizon and virtually refusing to pick up. And sans military cooperation, the bilateral ties are jejune. The fourth school – the military generals – understands this very well and avidly advocates that in no case the Russian defence industry should give up India. In their military and strategic calculations India is the Russian forepost in South Asia and the primacy of India in Russian strategic mindset should not be altered; India should not be underestimated. The sum total of all these debates and discourses bring to the fore the strategic viability of a relationship fostered in the ethos of BRICS in the last two decades. The fifth school is a diehard anti-India lobby headed by Yeltsin era oligarchs, some of whom have
died, others hailed and still others have petered out in their opposition to Putin.
Demand-supply Asymmetry
Russian weapons system for the Indian military continues to be the mainstay of the partnership. In the past two decades India’s overdependence level has been reduced only by roughly ten per cent. India has a diversified need of modern weapons and equipment which Russia apparently alone cannot provide. Therefore there is a need for India to diversify the procurement sources of weapons system from other producers. The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is unprepared and unwilling to withstand India’s foray into other arms markets. Much as Russia wishes to be the monopoly partner in defence relationship with India, there are concurrent competitors in arms markets worldwide. The irony of the fact is that all five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the largest arms producers and exporters in the world. Thus, it is inevitable that once on the way to diversification India would not rest for long with Russia to buy all the weapons systems it requires or all that it used to buy earlier.
2010. This included the British Prime Minister, the US, It was a telling moment of Russian and French Presidents. Every defence item India uncertainty. Crime was reigning The Chinese Premier, who buys from Russia has two across the country and every deal was not invited, requested Manmohan Singh to invite types of cost: an upfront with Russia had a mafia connotation. him. The purpose of their India cost for supply of weapons It was a hard lesson for India to learn visit was to wean away India which is low and a life cycle cost for maintenance of the from her defence overdependence. from the Russian arms market. is logic behind their weapons system which is high. It was also a moment of hiatus. There efforts. India is changing; so The difference is huge and Forward movement in relationship does her choice for arms. India this makes Russian weapons uncompetitive in world should go where arms are was not happening markets. Russian weapons cheap and quality better. Since systems are cheaper on India lands up paying more in nominal face value than the long run for the Russian slowly deviating from the Russian similar systems produced by France, path to choose French weapons made weapons systems, there is a Great Britain or USA. However in systems or buy from Israel which is demand-supply asymmetry. Indian exhibitions costlier non-Russian as good as buying from the US. demand side is high, the Russian weapons systems are preferred by supply side is low. Therefore, Russia India because their life cycle costs are From the mid 1960s India has been has been making assiduous efforts low. In recent years, India has been suffering the pangs of keeping all eggs to retain India as her prime market preferring weapons systems other in the Russian basket for weapons. for arms. India has signed strategic than of Russian origin; and this has Now, despite strategic partnership, partnership not only with Russia but nonplussed the Rosoboronexport, India is seriously reconsidering the also with the US, China and others caused acute heartburn among the inevitability of putting its defence that sends a message to Russia that Russian planners and made them to eggs in different baskets. In 2010 an the exclusivity of partnership would recast their India policy. In recent interesting episode overwhelmed depend on the litmus test of fair play years India has been citing the India. Leaders of arms producing instead of monopoly in arms deals. asymmetry between the upfront and countries visited India one after the Russia however has an advantage. life cycle costs of weapons system and other between June and December
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POTENTIAL AND REALITY
The state is the trader and negotiator of the arms deal. And the final price tag depended on the state negotiator. This was why despite the chaos that visited Russia in post-Soviet years, Russia continued to remain the second largest exporter of arms in the world. Unable to compete with the rapidly proliferating weapons market worldwide, Russia has been changing its tactics to tackle the situation in its favour: from earlier browbeating of its clients as monopoly supplier to often softening stance in negotiations and appropriate pricing. For instance, if prices of a particular weapons system are far too high in exhibitions, Russia reduces it for its favoured clients to an amazingly low level to offset its competitors. This has been happening in case of India, when prices are not fixed competitively, but by mutual political dialogue between India and Russia. Evidences are stashed to prove or disprove this fact; but deals are signed through only after political dialogues. As a result, India lands up getting Russian weapons system cheap, albeit with high life cycle cost, partly thanks to the glory of past friendship and partly due to strategic partnership, but largely due to political decisions.
NASA's Earth Observing System
Russia's Soyuz Spacecraft globalising products from Russia. However they alone cannot sustain a strategic partnership. Russia as a partner has been refusing to open up for labour and capital flow to that country. Russia’s financial institutions are so laden with restrictive regulations that no private bank from Russia operates across India and this is happening at a time, when the world is moving towards a global village. The country remains away
from interfacing with global financial institutions; if at all it interfaces, it is through public institutions and rarely through private initiatives.
This is not a scenario that can sustain itself for too long. Breadth Of Partnership Thomas Friedman in his book The strategic partnership between India The World is Flat has raised a pertinent and Russia is not limited to arms trade point that says: “countries do not alone. In September 2008, Russia and change when you ask them to India had formally decided to extend change; they change when they feel the tenure of Inter-governmental they must.” Russia must understand Commission on Military and that the world has become intensely Technological Cooperation for competitive. The world is too another ten years. During his asymmetric a place to live If a private company like the SpaceX visit in 2010 Medvedev had in and trade with. The gross domestic product of poorest in California can be outsourced by finally approved this extension, implies that Secretary 48 nations put together is less NASA, why not a private company in which level talks in various crucial than the cumulative wealth Russia or India to do similar jobs for areas of cooperation between of the world’s three richest countries; among which Glavcosmos or ISRO? A change in the two strategic partners will continue. Two of Russia does not figure. But mindset and approach is required. regularly the fields where vital future it is an indomitable power. Finally, India and Russia must veer cooperation is on the anvil are: India’s relations with the Soviet Union have had many their partnership in the direction of nuclear cooperation and space In both these defining moments. The present removing the mismatch between exploration. areas, Indo-Russian ties are strategic partnership is shorn potential and practice and do away intensely pervasive. Rosatom of those defining moments. Chief, Sergey Kirilenko had Kalashnikovs, MiGs, Sukhois, with the fragility of their partnership announced on the eve of frigates and T-series tanks are
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Medvedev’s visit to India in 2010 that in near future, Russia would help India build a total of 18 nuclear reactors at three locations across India: Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, Haripur near Kolkata in West Bengal and at Jaitapur in Maharashtra despite having knowledge about involvement of French Areva and Finnish Olkilioto, in construction of Jaitapur plant. In May 2013 the Supreme Court of India dismissed a public interest petition challenging the Kudankulam expansion, thereby clearing the way for collaborative Indo-Russian nuclear project to go ahead. In the parlance of India’s energy security, Russia has firmly tied India as a strategic partner by supplying India with oil and gas and engaging India in the Sakhalin 1 project, in hydroelectric sector by helping India build hydropower stations and in the nuclear realm collaborating with India in various upcoming and ongoing nuclear power stations. Similarly the Indo-Russian space collaboration is expansive. For
many years now there has been solid cooperation between the Russian space agency Glavcosmos and Indian space agency, ISRO. This cooperation is a bequeathal from the Soviet era, The Chandrayan-2 programme is the most recent example of Indo-Russian joint endeavour in space. India is the only country with which Russia has shared Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) to help India explore the outer space. As space research acquires greater importance in the strategically significant areas and geological mapping, weather forecasting and overall security, cooperation in this realm is unlikely to have secondary importance. The strategic partnership has seven major pillars: politics and diplomacy, defence, civil nuclear energy, space, anti-terrorism and economy. Of these areas defence cooperation occupies a primary place, space and civil nuclear energy a secondary position, anti-terrorism a tertiary slot and economic cooperation the last place. Indo-Russian strategic partnership is overshadowed by joint collaborations of many defence or space related programmes: The BrahMos, fifth generation fighter jets, Sukhoi or Su-MKI, Illyushin- HAL tactical transport aircraft,T-90 tanks, Akula-II nuclear subs. Tu-22M3 bombers, INS Vikramaditya, Mi-17 Helicopters, joint operation of Farkhod airbase in Tajikistan and so on. Indo-Russian economic cooperation in 2006-07 was hovering around US$ 3 billion, scheduled to be upped by 2010 to US$ 10 billion, which did not happen; and now rescheduled to reach US$ 20 billion by 2015 which is unlikely to be achieved. There is a tangible mismatch between the potential of both countries and practice in bilateral trade. Even the projected Indo-Russian trade of US$ 20 billion compares poorly to India’s current trade with others: US$ 65 billion with China, approaching US$ 100 billion with the US and poised to be US$ 15 billion with France by end of this year. The absence of private sector ethos in trade coupled with few items Russia could offer to India for sale is the singular roadblock in trade partnership in which metal, oil, defence items and nuclear deals overwhelm bilateral ties. The Indian private sector majors have been recently foraying into the Russian and post-Soviet space in search of business. India’s Reliance Industry and Russia’s Sibur Holding have entered
into petrochemical agreements. Dr Reddy Pharmaceuticals and R Pharma of Russia have signed a joint venture, Tatas are readying themselves to get involved in the IT sector in Medvedev’s brain-child – the Skolkovo Technology Park near Moscow. Russia’s Systema telecom and India’s Shyam Teleservices have been cooperating on a Russian stake of 20 per cent in SSTL that would help the later take a loan of US$ 200 million from Russia to roll out world-class telecom services.
Overview
Given that 3 million Indian Americans and 1,00,000 Indian students engaged in obtaining higher education in the US will be the future locomotive of Indo-US strategic partnership as a tangible counterweight the Indo-Russian one, it would be impossible to imagine strategic partnership sans private sector participation. While India provides well established culture of private business houses, contributing to the prosperity of the country, Russia does not have them. The way Russian oligarchs have appropriated state wealth for themselves was too selfish to benefit either the country or its private business. Restrictive state control and cumbersome visa procedures are not allowing Russia to open up and build capitalist economy. Secondly, Indian efforts at diversification will wash away monopoly, thereby redefining the priorities of partnership. Currently Russia’s relations with India are grossly lopsided with too many military items and too little of anything else. The driver of partnership would be desirably an equilibrium approach which is absent. Thirdly, the state sector alone cannot create a competitive milieu. The Indo-Russian strategic partnership has been crafted and sustained by the two states where the state is the owner, producer and seller of most items transacted. If a private company like the SpaceX in California can be outsourced by NASA, why not a private company in Russia or India to do similar jobs for Glavcosmos or ISRO? A change in mindset and approach is required. Finally, India and Russia must veer their partnership in the direction of removing the mismatch between potential and practice and do away with the fragility of their partnership.
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MANAGING BALKANISATION United States and Britain, supplied the rebels with arms and money. From April 1985 to January 1987 we observed new chapter of conflict in Afghanistan – the mujahideen unite in Pakistan to form an alliance against Soviet forces. New Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev promises to withdraw Russian troops from Afghanistan, while rebels continue to be assisted by the West. As a result of this declaration, from January 1987 to February 1989 Soviet forces slowly withdrew from Afghanistan. For the Soviet Union it was one of the most traumatic disasters, with around 15,000 soldiers killed and more than 53,000 seriously wounded. And as eminent dissident, Vladimir Bukovsky said, this war was one of the crucial reasons for the collapse of Soviet Union. So this specific return of Russia to Afghanistan in a new role looks like a paradox of history.
Serbia And Kosovo
Russia was always an advocate of Serbia in western Balkans region. Both the countries (Serbia and Russia) shared the same Christian orthodox religion. Russia usually appeared to protect and support Serbia even during the Turkish occupation. Honestly speaking it was just vocal support rather then real material help but it was a base for reinforcing friendship. Thanks to Serbia, Russia was able to play a role in the Balkans game. When in 1991 Yugoslavia started to collapse and Croatia and Slovenia declared independence, Russia politically supported Serbia. In 1999, when NATO decided to attack so called New Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Russia promised to help “Serbian orthodox brothers”. However, even a Resolution proposed by Russia condemning the bombing was defeated in the Security Council with only Russia, China and Namibia voting in favour. Voicing disagreement with the continued bombing of Yugoslavia, Russian President Boris Yeltsin called it an attempt to establish a ”dictatorship of force.” He complained that the air campaign, which was launched
RUSSIA
A DIFFICULT GLOBAL PLAYER With Russia, keeping global security and order is difficult but without Russia it is impossible. Certainly Russia is still one of the global players. But the role which Russia is playing is hard to describe. On the one hand Russia is helpful in solving of complicated international situations, but on the other hand Russia is creating problems. A visible example was war in Georgia in 2008, when Russia strongly supported two separatist regions: Ossetia and Abkhazia and later attacked Georgia.
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W
ithout Russia NATO and American presence in Afghanistan would be not possible. Russia is a key country to at least guarantee security of transport. But for Russia, Afghanistan for many years was dramatic trauma for the Coalition Forces. In 1979 Soviet Union sent in troops at request of the Afghan government but fell out with President Hafizullah Amin, who was executed. With the backing of Russia, Babrak Karmal, leader of the People's Democratic Party Parcham, was installed as ruler. From March 1980 to April 1985 anti-regime resistance intensified as numerous mujahideen groups clashed with Soviet forces.
The Afghanistan Case Some
Western
countries,
including
the
Russia was always an advocate of Serbia in western Balkans region. Both the countries (Serbia and Russia) shared the same Christian orthodox religion. Russia usually appeared to protect and support Serbia even during the Turkish occupation. Honestly speaking it was just vocal support rather then real material help but it was a base for reinforcing friendship. Nonetheless, the Russians made a surprise early entrance into Kosovo by taking control of the Pristina airport where the NATO command post was to be established and block passage of British forces into the airport. It was the only one real, not political, Russian action
without approval from the United Nations, “has trampled upon the foundations of international law and the United Nations Charter”. What was quite an interesting curiosity, in a vote that could have led to the revival of a form of the old Soviet Union, the Russian Duma voted then, by an overwhelming margin, to bring Yugoslavia into a Slavic union with Russia and Belarus ... In reality it was just a political statement. Nonetheless, the Russians made a surprise early entrance into Kosovo by taking control of the Pristina airport where the NATO command post was to be established and block passage of British forces into the airport. It was the only one real, not political, Russian action.
DOMINIKA COSIC
The writer is a journalist and political correspondent based in Brussels. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.
War In Chechnya
The crucial question is: Why Russia was against this war and later on independence of Kosovo? Of course not only because of orthodox brotherhood. Russia was afraid that it will be dangerous exemption which would be used by some regions in former Soviet Union. Like Chechnya for example. Following long resistance during the 1817-1864 Caucasian War, Russia finally defeated the Chechens and annexed their lands in the 1870s. The Chechens’ subsequent attempts at gaining independence after the fall of the Russian Empire failed and in 1922 Chechnya was incorporated into Bolshevist Russia and later into the Soviet Union (USSR). In 1936, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin created the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1944, on the orders of NKVD chief Lavrenti Beria, more than half a million Chechens, the Ingush and several other North Caucasian peoples were deported to Siberia and Central Asia, officially as punishment for alleged collaboration with the invading German forces during the 1940-1944 insurgency in Chechnya; the Chechen-Ingush Republic was abolished. Eventually, Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev granted the Vainakh (Chechen and Ingush) peoples permission to return to their homeland and restored their republic in 1957. In 1991, militants of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (NCChP) party, created by the former Soviet Air Force general Dzhokhar Dudayev, stormed a session of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR Supreme Soviet with the aim of asserting independence. This effectively dissolved the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union. In the following month, Dudayev won overwhelming popular support (as evidenced by the later presidential elections with high turnout and a clear Dudayev victory) to oust the interim administration that was supported by the central government. He was made president and declared independence from the Soviet Union. In November 1991, Russian president Boris Yeltsin dispatched Internal Troops to Grozny, but they were forced to withdraw when Dudayev's forces surrounded them at the airport. After
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Indo-Russian entente
MANAGING BALKANISATION
Chechnya made its initial declaration of sovereignty, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic split in two in June 1992 amidst the Ingush armed conflict against another Russian republic, North Ossetia. The newly created republic of Ingushetia then joined the Russian Federation, while Chechnya declared full independence from Moscow in 1993 as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI). In reaction Russia launched military intervention in Chechnya. In fact there were two wars in this republic: 1994-1996 and from 1999-2009. In the first war it was estimated that tens of thousands to more than 1,00,000 people died. The exact death toll from the second war is unknown. Unofficial estimates range from 25,000 to 50,000 dead or missing, mostly civilians in Chechnya. Russian casualties are over 5,200 (official Russian casualty figures and are about 11,000 according to the Committee of
Soldiers’ Mothers. Chechnya which allowed Vladimir Putin to come to power, was disaster for the people of the region. But, coming back to the initial point: Kosovo, Russia did not want to recognise Kosovo because Chechnya would use this argument to fight again for her own independence.
War In Georgia
But Russian diplomacy is a real global masterpiece. The trick was that war in Kosovo in both cases (recognition of independence or not) was useful for Russia. First case I have already explained. But the second one? Russia used casus belli of Kosovo to encourage two rebellious provinces of Georgia: Ossetia and Abkhazia to proclaim independence. They did it just few months after declaration of independence of
Kosovo, in summer 2008. The 1991-1992 South Ossetia War between ethnic Georgians and Ossetians had left slightly more than a half of South Ossetia under de facto control of a Russian-backed, internationally unrecognised government. Most ethnic Georgian parts of South Ossetia remained under the control of Georgia with Georgian, North Ossetian and Russian Joint peacekeeping force present in the territories. A similar situation existed in Abkhazia after the War in Abkhazia (1992-1993). Increasing tensions escalated during the summer months of 2008. In August Russian spokesman said Russia would defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia if they were attacked. Russia looked for excuses for intervention. During the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale military offensive against South Ossetia, in an attempt to reclaim the territory. Georgia claimed
throughout South Ossetia for a few days. It was evident that Russia was It was evident that Russia was supporting Abkhazia supporting Abkhazia and Ossetia and Ossetia and even provoking them. It was not and even provoking them. It was not a war on Ossetia and Abkhazia only a war on Ossetia and Abkhazia – main goal only – main goal was independence of was independence of Georgia. Thanks to quick and Georgia. Thanks to quick and brave brave political engagement of president of Poland, political engagement of president Poland, Lech Kaczynski who Lech Kaczynski who established pro-Georgian of established pro-Georgian coalition coalition and encouraged European Union to take and encouraged European Union to take some political decisions, some political decisions, Georgia survived Georgia survived. Independent and pro-American Georgia headed by that it was responding to attacks on its peacekeepers and Mikheil Saakashvili who came to power thanks to the villages in South Ossetia and that Russia was moving so-called Rose Revolution was big obstacle for Russian non-peacekeeping units into the country. Russia reacted presence in Caucasus region. This war proved that Russia by deploying units of the Russian 58th Army and can also play a very destabilising role. Russian Airborne Troops into South Ossetia one day later and launching airstrikes against Georgian forces in Concluding, I can only repeat – with Russia it is quite South Ossetia and military and logistical targets in Georgia difficult to keep order, but without Russian support it is proper. Russia claimed these actions were a necessary impossible. Because Russia is powerful enough to block humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement. political decision process and even support the military or Russian and Ossetian forces battled Georgian forces ethnic groups in certain countries.
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Indo-Russian entente
STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE
GALVANISING
INDIA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP There are undeniable reasons why India will need to make a quest for even closer ties with Russia. The first and foremost is Russia’s core capabilities and recovered competence from the difficult phases in its polity and economy to reasonable spaces. An indispensable reality that has attained primacy in recent years is Russia’s emergence as the world’s ‘first energy super power’. A country which is the world’s largest gas producer and the second largest oil producer is bound to entice India for the fulfillment and promotion of its ‘energy security needs and interests’.
Strategic Convergence
Given the unique geopolitical and geostrategic position that Russia holds in Eurasia, Moscow remains enormously significant to New Delhi’s overall strategic calculations, replenishment of defence hardware of Soviet / Russian origin, joint defence R&D and production, energy security and its ambitious search for major power ascendency. Russia concedes India’s primacy in the South Asian region in particular and its growing role in world affairs in general. It does not hamper India’s relationships with its neighbours. In the Indian strategic calculus, Russia will remain an essential ally, despite its diversified quest for new choice of weapon systems and state-of-the-art technology from other sources in the West, especially the United States of America. There are undeniable reasons why India will need to make a quest for even closer ties with Russia. The first and foremost is Russia’s core capabilities and recovered competence from the difficult phases in its polity and economy to reasonable spaces. The ample availability of natural resources, including strategic ones, scientific and technological know-how, defence potentialities, predominantly in the field of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), naturally position Russia to retain itself as a world-class power performer. It would be a lopsided view to assess and gauge India’s closeness with the Russian Federation merely through the prism of post-cold war global politics. This has been based mainly on a substantial domain and range of commonality of interests. An indispensable reality that has attained primacy in recent years is Russia’s emergence as the world’s ‘first energy super power’. A country which is the world’s largest gas producer and the second largest oil producer is bound to entice India for the fulfillment and promotion of its ‘energy security needs and interests’. In the preceding decade, the two countries had concluded as many as six agreements, the most significant being a civilian nuclear energy agreement under which Russia would set up more nuclear reactors in India, transfer the entire range of nuclear energy technologies and supply nuclear fuel even after the deal is called off. This deal is far better than the much-trumpeted one with the United States of America. Russia has also promised India for facilitating enrichment and reprocessing privileges.
W
here does one posit the Indo-Russian strategic relationships in the changing geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic permutations and combinations of contemporary situations in 21st century? To say that the two countries are time-tested friends has become a volatile clinch over the passage of time after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and collapse of bi-polarism. Historically, following the establishment of diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union with independent India on 13 April 1947 and moving beyond with the timelines of the cold war, the strategic mutuality with the Soviet Union had prevailed for long as a key priority in India's foreign policy calculations. Russia, the successor of the erstwhile Soviet Union, has been recognised as a key collaborator and friend of India, but constrained to reset the mutuality of relationship in prime strategic areas and defence sector during the
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post-cold war era, especially with the onset of globalisation and its commanding trends. The India-Russia special and privileged strategic collaboration, which had been initially unique and multi-dimensional, has undergone acute characterisation of mutual stress and strains, being marked by fragile unsteadiness and indecisiveness. Viewed in retrospect, from Soviet support in India's early industrialisation and defence preparedness, to a strong symbiotic relationship in joint design and development of weapon systems and in strategic matters, the India-Russia strategic partnership demonstrated outstanding convergence of interests in bilateral fields as well as in the global arena, especially after the end of Russian hibernation and gradual recovery of its economic capability from the onslaughts of Perestroika and Glasnost in the recent years. The 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Russia was celebrated on 13 April 2012 to set the tone for the foreseeable future.
Looking at the evolving strategic proximity of India and the United States in the changing regional and global scenario, it can be argued by some strategic analysts that the US is cultivating democratic India as a natural counterweight to rising China, but it is equally true that India will not bear any deleteriously conceivable surrogate responsibility. Can Russia play any significant role in offering fillip to India in such conditions? Given the geopolitical realities of Asia and the phenomenal rise of China, India will require promoting even stronger strategic relationship with its time-tested ally Russia and take more timely provable confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) with China, especially after the intrusion and crossing of the Line of Actual Control by the Chinese troops in the DBO sector of Ladakh in April 2013, enabling for purposes of strategic insurance and greater stability of the South Asian region in general and solving India-China tangle in particular. Being at the cross-roads of modulating the India-US and the
India-Russia relationships, India will need simultaneously to take transparent, verifiable practical mechanisms in dealing with China, especially for peaceful resolution of boundary dispute between the two countries. Given their past history of strategic proximity and cooperation, DR RAJENDRA PRASAD Russia and India have to walk extra The writer is Professor miles to accommodate India’s in the Department of aspirations and requirements of Defence and Strategic defence, transfer of technology, Studies (DDSS) and Dean, energy security, trade etc. Both Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, India and Russia should revitalise UP, India. new strategies and mechanisms for forging big politico-strategic ideas that could now bind them together for safeguarding common national interests. Russia too has changed a lot with the passage of time. ‘Energy and defence’ remain the harbinger of Indo-Russian proximity. This is where profound attention is irrevocably necessitated. Both are major powers operating rather independently in the global arena. It makes profound sense for them to galvanise their mutually advantageous defence relationship. As Defence Minister Mr AK Antony emphasises, “Russia remains India’s number one strategic partner and, in many respects, there are no alternatives to cooperation with Russia in the foreseeable future.” Also, after appreciating the state of affairs between India and Russia in diverse fields of mutual interests, President Mr Pranab Mukherjee clearly stated during his address to a Russian parliamentarians’ delegation in February 2013 that “in fact, India-Russia bilateral relations are progressing in diverse areas such as energy, defence, space, trade and economics, science and technology, culture and people-to-people ties. The level of bilateral trade and investment between India and Russia still remains below its potential. Both countries need to make sincere and concerted efforts and to take specific measures including thrust areas to achieve the target bilateral trade figure of US$ 20 billion by 2015”. This is possible only when India and Russia remain tied up as partners and allies in the entire domain and range of strategic mutuality and simultaneously enjoying substantial autonomy.
Basic Constraints
In the entire domain and range of international relations, there are certain basic circumstantial parameters and constraints that remain to play critical roles for timely forging of strategic relationships or discarding them under adverse situations. This could find ample room to signify the practicability of India-Russia strategic relationships in the wake of intense East-West confrontation. India and Russia substantiated the enormity of their mutually beneficial strategic proximity for many years during the cold war periods. Non-aligned India enjoyed a proximate relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union and received large-scale political, economic, defence and
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Indo-Russian entente
STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE
articles from the original treaty, which were intentioned at the USA and In the preceding decade, the two countries had China. After the disintegration of the concluded as many as six agreements, the most Soviet Union, successive Russian significant being a civilian nuclear energy agreement Foreign Ministry sources have consistently emphasised that Russia under which Russia would set up more nuclear will adhere to all past agreements reactors in India, transfer the entire range of nuclear and treaties. But this rhetoric could energy technologies and supply nuclear fuel even not conceal the reality that the treaty was no Indo-Russian after the deal is called off. This deal is far better than more compatible to the evolving the much-trumpeted one with the United States of circumstances in which India would America. Russia has also promised India for facilitating be in a confrontation mode with either China or Pakistan, which credibly was enrichment and reprocessing privileges India’s principal raison d’etre in the first instance and further that Article 9 of the strategic cooperation as and when required. This strategic Indo-Soviet Treaty, which facilitated military cooperation cooperation reached its zenith in August 1971 with the in the eventuality of a military danger to either party signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship had, therefore, now remained a gain of questionable and Cooperation, along with the inclusion of security price for India. clauses aimed at the adversaries of both India and the erstwhile Soviet Union. India’s dependence for military supplies on Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, can be observed to By and large, the basic parameters and constraints that be nearly total since 1965 in terms of military hardware prompted and promoted the multiplicity of India-Russia contracted for the Indian Army, Air Force and Navy. strategic proximity were visualised by the Indian side The stock of Russian weapons and equipment existing with underlying factors, such as the formation of the in India’s arsenals and the large scale orders given in the US-Pakistan military alliance and the US arms and preceding years are well-documented. Some inescapable economic aid to Pakistan, widened Indo-US estrangement, realities that need to be marked are that after three the Sino-Pakistan strategic relationship and the decades of reliance on Soviet supplied military hardware, Sino-Pakistan-US strategic convergence. On the Russian India finds itself in a state where its military potentialities side, the basic tenets of such parameters and constraints are critically dependent on Russian weapons, equipment could be identified in terms of the Sino-Russian military and spare parts tending to the estimated benchmark confrontation, the Sino-US quasi-strategic relationship of Army – 75 per cent, Air Force – 80 per cent and from 1975 to the 1980s and the Russian adventure to Navy – 85 per cent. carve out spaces of Soviet influence in the Third World countries through the supportive plank of Non-aligned In the first-half of sixties and seventies, India’s major India in particular and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) military imports were from the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, in general. weapon systems and equipment from different foreign sources were acquired by India and efforts were also made The aforesaid circumstantial parameters and compulsions underwent phenomenal shift, readjustment and transformation with Gorbachev’s critical incumbency as Russian President. He supported the idea of what could be labelled as the operationalisation of Russia's 'China First' precedence-giving policy vis-a-vis India in Asia. In turn, Russia's strategic shift in its foreign policy articulations enfeebled the foundation-stone on which was based the entire bulwark of India-Russia strategic cooperation.
Problems And Limitations
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to gear up one’s own defence industrialisation especially Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), along with enhanced R&D investment by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for future needs. One of the main factors for this kind of Indian venture was the outcome discerned by the acquisition of hi-tech weapons including F-16 warjets, Harpoon anti-shipping missiles and C3I computers by Pakistan from the US which altered the security parameters for India. India’s initiatives to purchase Mirage 2000 from France followed by MiG 29s from the erstwhile Soviet Union, for example, were prompted by the impetus embedded in such long-term strategic compulsions. Over the years, the major weapon systems contracted from Russia, could be listed as 230 Su-30MKI multi-role fighter plane, Il-78 midair tanker aircraft, Il-76 aircraft to be employed as platform for Israeli Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft (AWACS), Mi-17-IV military transport helicopters, R-77 air-to-air missiles, Kilo class / Type 877E submarines, frigates, Ka-31 Helix airborne early warning helicopters, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, MiG-29K carrier aircraft and Ka-31 helicopters, T-90 tanks, fire control radars, air and sea surveillance radars, combat radars, aircraft radars, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, along with other mixed military hardware. The repercussions of this kind of India’s dependence on Russia culminated in its over-reliance on Russian weapon systems and equipment and naturally proved so counter-productive that, for a considerable period, it has indirectly added to profound sluggishness in India’s indigenous defence production capability, self-reliance needs and overall developmental plans, programmes and new projects of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) required for increasing India’s defence potential. It has also caused circumstantial lack of Indian efforts to diversify sources of military procurements especially in the changing global politico-strategic
scenario. Further, India’s overwhelming dependence on Russian weapons systems and equipment augmented its difficulties to unwarranted limits under Russia’s coercive overtures during certain critical circumstances. Later on, as a consequence of disarrayed Russian defence production in the post-Soviet era, production-lines for contracted military hardware have been delayed and time-consuming, thereby causing harmful effect on India’s battle readiness. Quality and performance ratios of Russian weapon systems and equipment in recent past have also been noticed as ‘substandard and flawed’. This problem has been further complicated by the reality that some of the military hardware supplied became ‘obsolete’ a few years after its supply and closing down of the manufacturing plants, eventually culminating in the non-availability of spare parts. In addition to these factors, the Indian armed forces have raised the problem of maintenance support for the weapons and equipment of Soviet / Russian origins. All these have germinated serious concerns in the hearts and minds of Indian defence planners and the three Armed Services. However, a fraction of the accountability can also be imposed on the shoulder of the Indian negotiators for not appreciating the need of the hour and losing sight of life-cycle support of the equipment, while dealing with contractual arms supplies. Huge wear and tear of equipment due to changing climatic conditions, adverse weather and operational constraints in India and at times real stakeholders not being adequately consulted in negotiatiating process are the other intertwined shortcomings for poor maintenance. Since the year 2000, the state arms monopoly Rosoboronexport has started functioning to exercise control over nearly all the Russian arms exports and supply of spare parts. However, devoid of transparency regarding prices, poor quality of spare parts and other lingering practices have often produced contentious issues between the Indian and Russian sides for product support in connection with the weapons and equipment of Soviet / Russian origin. In addition to the aforesaid difficulties and underlying repercussions, another disturbing factor that has gained ground in this area is the large-scale supply of Russian military hardware to China during the preceding years, multiplying India’s security challenges in the foreseeable future.
Transit To Arms Co-producers
More prominently, the harbinger of India-Russia strategic relationship – the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation – itself was questioned by the Russian side as early as 1992. It could be speculated that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had germinated the seeds of gradual departure from the Indo-Soviet special relationship. To fill up the gap, both the Russian Federation and India decided to sign a new political treaty to substitute the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, which was extended for another twenty years in 1991. But according to Indian press reports, the Russian side has asked for deletion of security related
It is now important to note that, following the end of the cold war and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian military-industrial complex was deprived of almost 80 per cent of its financial investment from the Russian government. Simultaneously, various defence plants had lost their export benefits due to the non-availability of the conventional Soviet bloc arms markets, along with the overall downfall in the global arms market. During the decade of 1990s, the Russian defence budget declined to levels that were a small portion of those seen in the period of Soviet supremacy and evidently inadequate to sustain all or even many of the existing defence plants established as components
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STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE
Of late, India and Russia have decided to extend the term of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) till 2020. As a consequence, particular focus is expected to be made towards scientific researches and joint development, joint production of systems and platforms and increased interface between Indian and Russian armed forces. As proclaimed by Indian Defence Minister AK Antony, “the Indo-Russian relationship has now reached from buyer-seller to that of co-producers in the field of design, development and scientific research” of the different military-industrial complexes run during the Soviet era. These developments overshadowed and eventually diminished the market capture of the Russian defence industry in the world arms market, including in India. Of late, India and Russia have decided to extend the term of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) till 2020. As a consequence, particular focus is expected to be made towards scientific researches and joint development, joint production of systems and platforms and increased interface between Indian and Russian armed forces. As proclaimed by Indian Defence Minister AK Antony, “the Indo-Russian relationship has now reached from buyer-seller to that of co-producers in the field of design, development and scientific research”. Numerous proposals for joint projects, including the modernisation of the INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov) for the Indian Navy, the transfer of technology for the licensed assembly of T-90 tanks in India, the production of BrahMos missiles and the purchase of Smerch MLRS by India have been discussed between the two sides, while the Indian Air Force looks ahead for the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), developed largely with Russian contribution, to be availed by 2016-17. The FGFA is expected to be in the same class as the US F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter of the US. Russians tremendous
62
have demonstrated expertise in aircraft
design, but with some glaring shortcomings in avionics. Nonetheless, India is resolutely involved in this project and once success is achieved, Russia will enjoy a sizeable share of the military aircraft – Su 30 MKIs and FGFA. Then, there are many other co-production projects, such as MiG 29Ks for the Navy, helicopters for the Air Force and essentially required large number of tanks. An ambitious project for Multi-role Transport Aircraft (MTA) was also agreed to for co-production and the Indian Air Force is rightly considering this aircraft as a substitute for its An 32s. This will provide leverage to the production of next generation tactical airlifter with a payload capability of 20 tons. India has accepted to directly invest worth US$ 300 million for work to be completed by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Additionally, both the countries have concluded an agreement on the applicability of Russia’s global space navigation system. GLONASS, a Russian version of the US Global Positioning System (GPS), is designed for both military and civilian purposes and provides the ability to its users to identify their positions in real time. At present, the Indian Air Force is using both the GPS and GLONASS for its purposes. An Indo-Russian joint venture, which is considered as a role model, is the famous BrahMos Aerospace, which produces cruise missiles usable for land, sea and air-based launch platforms. At present, it is the only supersonic cruise missile and is also under further improvement.
August 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT
The Road Ahead
While Russia has enjoyed overwhelming domination in the entire domain and range of military supply intertwined with the Indian arms acquisition scenario in the 70s, 80s and early 90s, India’s imperatives, alternatives as well as needs are currently more formidable than ever before. While Russia will remain a major partner and ally of India in the forthcoming years, the Russian defence industry requires irrevocably to learn to compete with the West, especially the US, Israel and now India’s fast growing indigenous defence industry, supported by research and development led by the DRDO. India is also aware of the fact that no country is likely to share with it the state-of-the-art technologies without a price to pay in some mode or the other. Some strategic technologies may not be shared with any country at all. Despite having Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) agreement with Russia, it seems impossible that some of the cutting edge technologies would be transferred to India unless there is a comprehensive, full-scope understanding at the politico-strategic levels. Truly speaking, having appreciated the nature of supplier-recipient patterns, the Russian Federation, the US and Western suppliers would always be inclined to ensure that their technologies should not be transferred to any country which is technically detrimental to their interests. India has always shown its willingness to follow suit. Nonetheless, most defence agreements for the supply of highly advanced weapons systems are likely to be politico-strategic in nature, irrespective of the cost paid. In the present scenario indomitable allurements of only purchasing advanced weapon systems and equipment are gone and weapon platforms will only get nearer if there is transfer of technology (ToT). India’s Defence Procurement Procedure-2008 along with the offsets clause is important in this perspective. The offsets clause is to enable transfer of technology, joint production and co-development towards enhancing indigenous competence and to become self-reliant to the best possible level in the foreseeable future.
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JULY 2013
Indo-Russian entente
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