DSA December 2009 by Defence and Security Alert

DECEMBER 2009

VOL 1 ISSUE 3

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DSA is as much yours as it is ours!

Anniversaries

are marked, or celebrated, in almost every culture and society. In some form or the other, anniversaries are observed everywhere. Some nations and peoples are largely personality obsessed, wherein their anniversary ritualisation revolves around, almost always, a famous person. Institutions of the state, or other historical events, pale in comparison to a birth or death anniversary of a significant leader. The reasons for this practice range from political evolution, and the prevailing participative culture. India could easily fall into this category. And this is in stark contrast to how some western democracies mark anniversaries of wars, and their memories. I recall a call made to the Ministry of Defence public relations office in 1995. The call was inspired by the fact that it was the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, in both the eastern and western sectors. Indian troops had played a significant role in the battle against German and Italian fascism, as well as against Japanese militarism. Thousands of Indians had laid down their lives, and as the then Defence Correspondent for the Indian Express I was interested in how the Ministry of Defence would mark the contribution by the predecessors of independent India's armed forces. There would be no events, said the MoD official, in a matter of fact sort of way. When I asked why, he said because India was not a country that marked military events.

That blunt remark has remained lodged firmly in my personal memory system. It bothered me then, and continues to till today. More so as the country struggles with the after blow of last year's terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The first anniversary has only just passed. And a few more such anniversaries will pass before memory lapses begin to play their part, after which the state and its society will move on in life. Memories of those days of terror slowly fading into sepia tones. All of these rituals being enacted currently will cease in a few years, leaving only the victimsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; families as the sole repositories of loss. The loss of human life is enough reason for the restructuring of state mechanisms and responses. Inaction on the part of the state machinery, and the inadequacy of its responses is sufficient cause to rethink the government and its instruments. But unfortunately human life has little value in India. And as a result of which significant events turn rather quickly into phenomena of temporary importance and declining observance. Consider how events relating to the 1971 war are performed, in comparison to when memories were more recent. Why, even the state seems to have seceded from its responsibilities. So the country witnesses the sad spectacle of various functionaries of the government making it clear that there would not be any observances for the 10th anniversary of the Kargil War. A war as significant, regionally as well as globally, can come to be treated not as a footnote, but a small index item, what then can be expected for Mumbai 2008!

manvendra singh

publisher’s view

Thanks for the response! Vol 1 Issue 3

December 2009

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As every new edition reaches you we have been made to realize that Defence And Security Alert (DSA) has become a microcosm of the India as we know it - diverse but unified, replete with potential waiting to be exploited and fulfilled. Your responses tell us that. We must congratulate you for the great support extended to us in our endeavour to make Indians aware of their security perimeter, the dangers that confront the nation and the ways and means of setting up defences. Your support encourages us to greater effort which will become apparent in the new year that is just round the corner. You deserve congratulations for being aware and receptive to the idea of Defence And Security Alert. The important thing for us is that your numbers are growing in consonance with our mission statement to spread awareness of national security issues both current and in the far horizon as widely as possible and to generate a feeling of nationalism and common endeavour. As we prepare to go to Press and put the edition to bed all Indians everywhere share the grief and shock of the Mumbai carnage of 26/11 last year. We relive those moments of horror nonetheless awed by the thought that in this past year there has not been a repeat of any spectacular terrorist strike anywhere in India. Our experts tell us that this is a sign of victory over the forces of evil that have been kept at bay by the strength of our national resolve, awareness and preparedness. We feel proud that we have made a small but significant contribution. There is still a great deal to be done as is evident from the unravelling of terror networks from the US to India to Europe and Africa, each beginning and ending in Pakistan. We are extremely receptive to your feedback by way of encouragement, suggestions and criticism that you have communicated to us. It is gratifying to see DSA flourishing and our readers joining the ‘family’ from all parts of India and around the world. Once again we appeal to our readers to send us defence and security-related photographs and videos which we will display on our website with due credit. This is an opportune moment to wish all our readers a very happy, prosperous and safe 2010.

pawan agrawal

MISSION The power of a king lies in his mighty arms… Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

—Chanakya

contents ISSUE DECEMBER 2009 VOLUME 1 ISSUE 3

cover story

nuclear warfare deterrence by Vice Adm (Retd.) Arun Kumar Singh

40 A

contents

counter terror payback time by Lt Gen (Retd.) V G Patankar

counter insurgency managing ceasefires by Jaideep Saikia

indian ocean

defence visions RMA: a synergetic change by Air Marshal (Retd.) S G Inamdar

benign interventions by Rear Adm (Retd.) Raja Menon

neighbour watch Pakistan: on the edge of a precipice? by K Subrahmanyam

air combat aerospace power by Air Marshal (Retd.) T M Asthana

engagement dragon on the prowl by Maj Gen (Retd.) Sheru Thapliyal internal security India: a soft state by K K Mitra IPS

72 75

internal security riposte to the maoists by Lt Gen (Retd.) Arvind Sharma

performance intelligence fiascos by Maj Gen (Retd.) V K Singh

F E A T U R E S

security tips smart and safe travel

cover story global conflicts by Lt Gen (Retd.) V K Jetley

red terror MAOISTS: the gravest threat by Dr S K Mishra

society vice curse of corruption by S Banerjee IPS

for online edition of Defence And Security Alert (DSA)

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jokes

by Udayshankar

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dsa inbox INAUGURAL ISSUE/NOVEMBER ISSUE

info@dsalert.org Our first two issues

■ I have seen two issues of the Defence And Security Alert. I have been very impressed both with the themes of these issues and the quality of articles which reflect knowledge as well as balance qualities not generally visible in many such journals which are now flooding the market. A journal on defence strategy and security has credibility only if its contents carry conviction and are related to facts and these stand out, at least in the first two issues of the DSA. I hope this will be a continuing feature of your journal. With all good wishes. Vice Admiral (Retd.) Premvir Das, Noida

■ DSA is indeed a high class journal which fills a void in the field of defence writing. I was delighted to go through its high quality of content and illustrations. Wishing you total success in this endeavour. Maj Gen (Retd.) Ashok Krishna, Director, Amity Institute of Competitive Intelligence (AICI), Noida ■ I am happy to see interest in security sector literature growing. I started Frontier India Strategic and Defence two years back for similar reasons. I will be happy to contribute to DSA in future. P Chacko Joseph, Publisher, Frontier India Strategic & Defence

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■ I have received the October issue of Defence And Security Alert. I must compliment you and your able staff for bringing out by any reckoning a very readable monthly journal of high quality and professional interest. It has an excellent look and getup. Indeed, in our country we do not have quality journals dealing with security issues. DSA fills that void. I am sure the informed reading public will appreciate and enjoy reading the articles of this serious journal. It is a serious professional journal. It will raise awareness level of the public regarding security and law enforcement issues. Sankar Sen, IPS, Gurgaon ....................

.................... ■ DSA in my hand, nice initiative. Go ahead, sky is the limit. Dr Girija Shanker Sharma, Head- Department of Journalism & Mass Communication, KMI- Dr BRA University, Agra .................... ■ Thank you for sending me the first issue of DSA. I must compliment you for a magazine which is going to fill a major void in our intellectual reading available on the stands. Apart from an excellent get up, the content is rich and well sifted. My personal compliments to you and your team. Lt Gen K M Seth (Retd.) Former Governor, Chhattisgarh and Tripura

■ I have received and gone through the contents of the Inaugural issue. I am deeply impressed. I wish the DSA magazine glory in the years to come. I am deeply impressed. All the best to all of you. O N Shrivastava, IPS, Former Governor of Nagaland and Manipur

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counter terror ELIMINATE

Lt Gen (Retd.) V G Patankar

payback

time

In planning counter-terrorism one can easily fall prey to a well-documented tendency to be moulded by past experience. However, to understand the terrorist mind one has, perforce, to revisit past experiences. A compendium of past experiences can give an insight into the working of a terror-prone mind because it is also a truism that the best way to counter a terrorist is to get into his thought processes.

n the Armed Forces it is common to hear a refrain that we tend to plan for the last war. Our thinking is subconsciously influenced by our experience. Experienced practitioners of the art of warfare will often tell you how things happen differently 'on the ground' and how disdainful chair-borne analysis could be. In essence what is implied is that while analysts are inclined to over-theorise recommended solutions, practitioners tend to over-use recent events as basis for planning for future also.

Retrospective Interestingly enough the aphorism holds good for situations and organisations outside the armed forces as well. Take, for instance, the case of our preparedness for countering terrorist attacks. Immediately in the wake of the dreadful events of 26-29 November 2008 in Mumbai, anyone who was in any position to influence policies, plans and preparations was climbing on the nearest soap box to opine on how the government or so-and-so agencies completely messed things up and how ill-prepared we were. They also went on to lay out theories and

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

concepts to set things in order. The shadow of 26/11 was omnipresent as studies of homeland security concepts in the US and the UK were undertaken expeditiously; some of those in the government even felt it necessary to visit the two countries to study the subject 'up close'.

Well prepared To be fair, we have not done too badly. We now have in place many a mechanism to deal with the Mumbai type attacks. The National Investigating Agency (NIA) is in place and more hubs have been created across the country for NSG units to be stationed. Concerned ministries of various State governments and the Central government have already streamlined procedures and acted upon some of the recommendations made by expert committees. So, what next? Do we now wait to see how it will all come together if, God forbid, another terrorist strike occurs? We sincerely hope that we do not have any terrorist attacks of any magnitude; lesser or greater than that of 26/11. But wishful thinking and prayers alone will not do much. What we need is to put in place a well-thought-out process to make certain that terrorist strikes are

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

counter terror ELIMINATE over-state success achieved. In fact it is better that such incidents should be reported as brief news items without elaborate details of methods, organisations involved and so on.

Identification

smothered before they are unleashed; and, should a strike take place, it is quickly defeated with as little damage or loss of life as possible. The process should be comprehensive and sufficiently dynamic to incorporate additions, deletions or modifications if and when required.

The victory In that sense States like Spain, the UK and USA, to name a few, appear to have succeeded in ensuring that the kind of horrific terrorist strikes that each one of them suffered, do not happen again. The way they have achieved it thus far is by developing a doctrine to fight the terrorist and then basing a concept of operations on it. In other words every nation has, over the years, prepared its own concept of 'homeland security'. We need one for ourselves; developed indigenously.

Indigenous doctrine To begin with the doctrine should clearly articulate how the likely threats will be confronted and defeated. It will facilitate selection of overall aims and objectives which in turn would make formulation of concept of operations unambiguous and focused. Although it will be a folly to blindly imitate doctrines of homeland security of any other country, there is no harm in examining them to identify the aspects that could be useful for our own doctrine and by implication, for putting together a concept

of operations for India. Any concept of counter-terrorist operations should generally follow a sequential process that includes detectionidentification-tracking-localising and finally neutralisation or destruction. It must take into account available resources and those that could be harnessed to bolster existing strengths. The latter should also consider new technologies, techniques evolved and means to counter any methods that may be adopted by terrorists. It is possible that terrorists may not strike any of the targets for which detailed defensive plans have been made. Even so, the overall scheme and systems should be so well geared that, with only few modifications, reaction to any terrorist attack would be swift; denying the terrorists the advantage of shock action through surprise.

Coordination Detection involves many different actions that should run concurrently. It involves continuous surveillance of geographical as well as human terrain. Information gathered thus should be augmented, among other things, by coordination with intelligence agencies within the country and across the globe to share information and intelligence. As a picture begins to form, narrowing and deepening of search of movements and transactions that appear suspicious, uncharacteristic or atypical would become necessary. The arrest of two Pakistani suspects in Italy recently is an excellent example of coordination and liaison work. This should serve to raise the morale of the agencies involved. Temptation should be avoided to

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Identification of persons or organisation detected is important to ensure that not only further steps are initiated in a timely manner but also to avoid wasteful effort. Once a target has been identified, it should be tracked continuously but with stealth without alerting the quarry. Simultaneously the process of gathering incriminating evidence should also commence. In fact it is no exaggeration to state that gathering clinching evidence to secure conviction in a court of law is equally if not more important as neutralising or eliminating terrorists. At the appropriate time the target should be localised (to minimise collateral damage and ensuring success) so that a final coup de grace can be delivered at the right time, the right place, using the right method.

Vigilance Preparations should be so thorough and continuous that when opportunity presents itself, it can be seized upon without delay and doubt with utmost speed. The waiting period may be very long and arduous. When after years of waiting, nothing happens; it could even be especially frustrating for those who toil silently over endless hours and days. They would do well to remember that absence of terrorist strikes could be an acknowledgment of the effectiveness of their vigilance and deterrence achieved by the system. From time to time when vital arrests are made or plots revealed, due recognition should be given without excessive publicity to keep the system and personnel highly motivated. The concept should be backed up by an effective organisational structure. Needless to emphasise that personnel comprising it should be well equipped and trained. Procedures and mechanisms should be put into place to minimise the need to issue detailed orders and instructions. The whole machinery should get activated by issuing of code words followed by key instructions. Procedures can be best perfected by practice; hence it is essential to hold mock drills and rehearsals regularly. Apart from testing the efficacy of the system, it also energises personnel in their duties and hones their skills.

Revision of plans Those in charge of countering terrorist attacks would, no doubt, know that

potential targets for terrorist attack are simply too numerous and that it is impossible to protect all targets at all times. They would, however, have identified high-value targets and the likely threats to them. Detailed appreciation of the prevailing security environment including appraisal of areas of strengths and possible weaknesses would, no doubt, have also been carried out. Intelligence assessments should be done periodically (and, one hopes, not 'routinely'). Similarly reappraisal and revision of plans should also take place when additional inputs become available. To sharpen that process further, it would be useful to carry out scenario building to war-game existing plans against them. Scenario building can be done in many ways. Though one should not expect a replication of previous events, it is possible to generate different situations by building on earlier situations or any recent ones that have happened elsewhere. This could be done by altering targets, methods, strength or devices employed and so on. After the basic scenario is decided, variations could be introduced as contingencies by using the 'what if?' technique. Both these aspects are briefly explained in the subsequent paragraphs. Since the 26/11 episode is still fresh in our minds, the illustration is based on Mumbai. Following similar technique, plans for other places could also be revised / improved.

â&#x20AC;&#x153;What-ifâ&#x20AC;? scenarios As an example, if we were to build on the episode of 26/11, we could argue that the terrorists did come via sea route but their targets were the Mumbai docks and the stock exchange. In such an event the objective would have been primarily socioeconomic and not politico-diplomatic as in the case of 26/11. Damage to one or both targets could have been potentially more devastating, causing mayhem in two principal hubs of activity of India's economic capital. Mumbai docks are among our most critical infrastructure assets. Any mishap there could result in substantial loss of life besides dealing a severe blow to commercial activity. (Fortunately 'Mumbaikars' observe a fire safety week each year in April to remind themselves of the catastrophic explosion in the SS Stikine on 14 April 1944. Such periodic reminders serve as warning against what must never be allowed to happen again.) Similarly realistic scenarios of a possible strike on the stock exchange building of the BSE could also be contemplated for war gaming as well as for contingency planning. The BSE would not be considered as a single point target. Sachivalaya and Mantralaya,

important hubs of the State's administration, located within shouting distance of the BSE could also be grouped with it. Sometimes the focus of our attention tends to be one-dimensional. This is unacceptable as ramifications of a terrorist strike could be far and wide. If the terrorists had hit an oil tanker at the mouth of the Mumbai harbour, the resultant oil spill could have enlarged the damage of the strike manifold. It would have been as much an ecological disaster as an attack on our critical infrastructure. The National Disaster Management Agency(NDMA) should, therefore, certainly be incorporated henceforth in our battle-plans against terrorism. (What if the recent fires at the Indian Oil depot at Jaipur were caused by a terrorist attack? Was it not equally an ecological disaster?)

Civil defence Although the overall responsibility of protecting people and property is that of the government, it can never do enough

must be dovetailed into the plans made by the local administration. Preparations should be so thorough and continuous that when opportunity presents itself, it can be seized upon without delay and doubt with utmost speed. The waiting period may be long and one hopes that even after years of waiting, nothing may happen but then that would only be an acknowledgment of the effectiveness of our vigilance. In conclusion, a note of caution. One of the negative outcomes of any catastrophic events is what Naomi Klein calls 'disaster capitalism' in her well researched book 'The Shock Doctrine'. Essentially her thesis is that following catastrophic events like wars, terrorist attacks, natural or manmade disasters and so on, there are vested interests within government and the corporate sector who take advantage of the situation for selfish gains. Sometimes situations are made to look more ominous than they actually are; people's fear psychosis is cleverly built upon to inflate requirements artificially to create business

WHAT THEN IS THE VICTORY THAT WE SEEK?

Simply put what we seek is to ensure that terrorists cannot and will not succeed in any strike in future. Victory should be seen in the absence of any incident of terrorist strike rather than defeating it after it occurs to completely rule out a possible terrorist strike. It also does not appear likely that we will come anywhere close to the desired ratio of policemen to citizens in the foreseeable future. Ordinary citizens would, therefore, have to form a part of the overall defence against terrorist attacks. People should be encouraged to participate voluntarily in the overall counter-terrorist mechanism. The wellknown 'neighbourhood watch' is a timetested and effective system. It is a useful trip-wire mechanism to alert the community concerned of any imminent danger. The local police should promote and assist in setting up such systems. The private and public sector industries too have a role. Their own security mechanisms should be geared to act as the first responders in the event of a terrorist attack. Persons in charge of security should prepare detailed plans for their respective organisations; primarily to prevent any attacks but also to defeat them, should the need arise. Such plans

opportunities. In India where the threat of terrorist strike has become ubiquitous, unscrupulous politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen could easily exploit the situation. This must be detected in a timely manner, exposed and ruthlessly nipped in the bud to prevent fraud and wasteful expenditure of public money. This is where the media's contribution could be truly patriotic and altruistic. The writer was the Quartermaster General of the Indian Army before he retired. He is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. During the Kargil war, he was commanding 28 Infantry Division on the Line of Control in J&K. For the role played by him in that war, he was awarded Uttam Yudh Seva Medal. Later he was the Corps Commander of the prestigious 15 Corps engaged in management of the Line of Control and counter terrorist operations in the Kashmir Valley.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

indian ocean SUPREMACY There should be no ambiguity that the Indian Ocean is the responsibility of the Indian Navy. The next decade must be dedicated to improving the airborne, surface and submarine platforms that will make it possible to fulfil that responsibility. There is no gainsaying that the Naval Design Bureau has led the nation's defence infrastructure in the process of indigenisation of naval craft. It's next challenge will be to set up a second production line for nuclear submarines, both the strategic deterrence platforms and the nuclear-powered hunter-killers.

Rear Adm (Retd.) Raja Menon

benign

interventions hen the British left India, they left behind quite a few Royal Naval officers to help lead the young Indian Navy until its own officers had grown into senior positions. It was they who defined what the area of operations were, of the new Indian Navy. It stretched from Hormuz to the Malacca Straits and from the Northern littoral to about 10oS latitude. Fifteen years later in 1968 the British announced their decision to withdraw from East of Suez and they carried it out by 1971.

W Vacuum

The littoral powers of the Indian Ocean were so small that it was easy for the Indian Navy to succeed to the position of being the premier Navy of the region. There was a problem. The cold war was on and almost every power in the region brought in either one or the other of the major powers to be their big brother to back them in regional disputes. Most South East Asian powers opted to support the United States, which was not surprising considering their freemarket economies. The former Soviet Union (FSU) found support only in the Arabian peninsula (Yemen), on the African coast line (Ethiopia) and partly in India. But the local superiority that India enjoyed was eclipsed by the presence of extra-regional navies. Peace was made between the Indian and US

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Navies when Admiral 'Chuck' Larson the C-in-C Pacific visited India in 1992. An attempt had been made earlier when Admiral Crowe the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff had been taken around Vishakhapatnam by the Indian CNS to show him that there was no Soviet base there, as depicted by the CIA during the cold war.

Indo-US entente From 1992, the US and Indian Navies have got on very well and led the strengthening of the military relationship. The underlying reason for the growing affinity has been that the politico-military objectives of military power in the Indian Ocean of the US and Indian governments have been identical. From safety of the smaller regimes, to the prevention of terrorism and the carrying of illegal cargoes including arms, drugs and people. The participation of India in international initiatives was not always so. During the long eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, the western coalition ran convoys through the Persian Gulf from which India was either excluded or opted to stay out. The result was that Indian flagged tankers were the largest number that were hit randomly by missiles. Fortunately none were lost. The Indian Navy sat out through the conflict, the reasons for which have never been fully researched or

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

indian ocean SUPREMACY PIRATES INCIDENT LOCATIONS 2006

GULF OF ADEN/RED SEA

Selective involvement REST OF THE WORLD

29%

INDONESIA

21% BANGLADESH

20% PERU

4% NIGERIA TANZANIA

explained. It was a poor demonstration of accountability by the Indian government and the Navy. One possible reason was that the mainstay of the Indian naval force structure, the Petya class ships proved to be quite useless as seagoing platforms and India's Naval Headquarters wisely decided to sit out the conflict.

MALAYSIA SOMALIA

4% 4%

MALACCA STRAITS

There have been other occasions when naval forces were required to be used internationally. In some cases the Navy responded admirably and in others the Navy was conspicuously absent. In 1972 after the Bangladesh war, and after the Kuwait war in 1991, minesweeping was required to be carried out. Bangladesh was India's own backyard and Kuwait was India's traditional neighbour. In both cases the Indian Navy was not utilized, but the reasons are now obscure. But when these international actions are planned in forums like the United Nations or a coalition headquarter, Indian Admirals are never present. Quite often the country's capability is badly represented by whoever is present from whichever bureaucracy. In 1988, the Navy responded magnificently to the need to restore Gayoom to power in the Maldives when he was temporarily deposed in a coup. The Navy came into its own in response to the Tsunami. In almost all countries the first succour to arrive with relief materials was the Indian Navy-from Sri Lanka to the Indonesian islands. It was not lost on foreign observes that the Navy had been able to surge to a maximum peacetime capability within 24-36 hours.

Watching littoral What challenges lie before the Navy in the 21st century? The first capability that the Navy has to demonstrate is that it can keep a watch in the area of its responsibility. This is being built up, primarily with the purchase of the latest maritime surveillance aircraft from the US. In the far reaches of the East Andaman Sea where no regular maritime traffic exists, illegal trade in small craft ply all the time. From running arms into Bangladesh, Myanmar and India's North East returning boats carry drugs from the golden triangle. In 2002, a strong force of Al-Qaeda even managed a transit from Karachi (Pakistan) to Chittagong

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

(Bangladesh) and onto Aceh (Indonesia). Today, of course there is the piracy problem off the Horn of Africa, which is growing, while the piracy problems in the Straits of Malacca are declining. The two areas are dramatically different. The Horn consists of countries which along with Yemen will have almost 300 million people by 2050. The problem is therefore indeed landward, but solutions don't exist where governance does not exist and pasture is becoming desertified. South-East Asia is another story. And with Indonesia's fundamentalisation coming under some control, the piracy problem will disappear. It is not that piracy and fundamentalism are linked, but the former is a manifestation of failing economic governance and job opportunities, and so is the latter.

Joint patrolling In South-East Asia, India is still the odd man out of joint patrolling. Although India has jointly exercised and patrolled the straits with Singapore and Indonesia, Malaysian objections still prevent Indian participation in MALSINDO patrols. In the Horn , India has once again been badly served by whoever represented the country in the London conference on Somalia piracy in Jan 2009. India again failed to join the coalition in Task Force 151, preparing to patrol in isolation at the Eastern end of the Transit

Corridor. Presumably India's nonparticipation stems from the Task Force not being commanded by the UN, a possibility that is plainly ridiculous in today's circumstances. The UN has already passed four resolutions asking nations to join together and deploy navies to fight piracy, which is what TF 151 is, so the Indian insistence on there being a UN command is unrealistic and absurd. The tragedy of it is that while a coordinated action is called for in the Indian Ocean, the operational aspects are bring handled by the British Royal Navy and the legal aspects by Denmark. This is a great pity and undoes much of the good work done by the Indian Navy in bringing all navies together at IONS 2008, as the regional coordinator.

Pre-eminence Today, there are only two navies that are still growing substantially - the Indian and the Chinese. The other navies are all declining. Clearly the growing navies reflect the growing economic power of these two countries which must come to a balance eventually. Hopefully this balance will occur in the Pacific and not in the Indian Ocean. This ocean is an area where

IT IS ALREADY WELL KNOWN IN INDIA THAT INDIGENISATION HAS BEEN TAKEN THE FARTHEST BY THE NAVY. THE SHIPS BUILT IN INDIA ARE TRULY IMPRESSIVE, EVEN IF MUCH OF THE WEAPON PACKAGE COMES FROM ABROAD.

the Indian Navy has to maintain its local superiority as part of the defence of India. It is this aspect that the Navy still has to concentrate on in the next quarter century. India's force levels to preserve its superiority in the Indian Ocean will primarily be achieved by ● Aircraft Carriers ● Nuclear Submarines ● Data Networking run on Satellite Communications. ● Maritime Domain Awareness achieved by space, air and surface sensors.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

indian ocean SUPREMACY

request To fund these capabilities the Navy's share of the budget had gone to 17.7 per cent in 2008, but may see a precipitous fall to 13.5 per cent again in 2009 owing to the pay commission handouts. Presumably the strategic deterrence platform will come from outside the Naval Budget.

Bluewater reach The big problem for the Navy in the next

THE NAVAL BUDGET IS ACTUALLY SUBSIDIZING DEFENCE PSU INEFFICIENCY. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE APPEARS TO BE ACTING MORE ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE PSU THAN ON BEHALF OF AN ECONOMICAL DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY! THE NAVY ALSO SUFFERS, AS DO THE OTHER TWO SERVICES FROM HIGHLY DELAYED DECISION MAKING OF THE MOD. IT RESULTED IN THOUSANDS OF CRORES OF UNNECESSARY ESCALATION.

decade will remain its ability to harness the techno-industrial capacity of the country to commission a second production line for nuclear-propelled submarines (SSN). These will remain the supreme arbiter of seadenial and will give India an unbreakable defensive capability on which can be built the other more visible aspects of sea control. The 2010-2020 period will be decisive in the shift of the Indian Navy to a bluewater force. It is already well known in India that indigenisation has been taken the farthest by the Navy. The ships built in India are truly impressive, even if much of the weapon package comes from abroad. As often happens in India the Navy has paid a steep price for having its ships built in India owing to terrible inefficiencies of the shipyards run by the defence PSUs. The first of the Delhi class destroyers came out at about Rs. 700 crores. The last ship of this class cost over Rs. 2500 crores. The greater part of this cost has risen from amortising the cost of running the yard to the cost of the ship. In India the man-hours required to build a destroyer is 12,000,000. The comparable man hours for the US is 5,000,000 and for Japan it is 25,00,000. So the naval budget is actually subsidizing defence PSU inefficiency. Added to this is the attitude of the defence production in the Ministry of Defence which appears to be acting

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more on behalf of the Defence PSU than on behalf of an economical defence of the country! The navy also suffers, as does the other two services from highly delayed decision making of the MoD. This factor alone has often resulted in thousands of crores of unnecessary escalation, which has been particularly bad during this regime . One of the most innovative steps naval headquarters has taken is to create the post of Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (foreign cooperation). As a result, the Navy's standing is much stronger with the smaller Indian Ocean states because naval headquarters is able to react quicker to requests from them. This branch of the service could do great wonders if it was given a substantial corpus to address the problems of the Indian Ocean without going through government red tape. Institutionally, however, the Navy could do much more as an instrument of State policy if it could react directly with the MEA rather than go through the MoD as a post office when it comes to dealing with other countries. The writer was a career officer and a submarine specialist in the Navy and retired in 1994 as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations). He has also served as Chairman of the Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation in the National Security Council, and is a distinguished fellow in the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and the National Maritime Foundation.

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neighbour watch PAKISTAN CRUMBLING

PAKISTAN: The cards are on the table (and they have been there for several decades) - a nuclearised military establishment with a penchant for jihad and now freelance jihadis hovering around nuclear facilities. Islamabad is waiting for the US to fall to battle fatigue and leave the region to Pakistani geopolitics. The coming spring will be the moment of truthâ&#x20AC;Ś

K Subrahmanyam

on the edge of a precipice? n India, understandably there is a lot of pre-occupation with Pakistan. That country has waged four wars against us, has declared its nuclear arsenal developed with Chinese help as India-specific and it has a proclaimed strategy of first use of nuclear weapons. It has been waging a covert proxy war against India since early eighties, first in Punjab using the Khalistanis and from 1989 onwards in Jammu and Kashmir.

Foxy jihad From 1993 that covert war has been extended to other parts of India and terrorism has been used as one of the crucial instrumentalities of Pakistani strategy vis-a-vis India, using its nuclear arsenal as a protective shield against retaliation. What is often overlooked is Pakistan has been waging a similar war of terror against the US since early nineties, again, behind the protective nuclear shield. Even as Bombay riots of 1993 supported by Pakistan broke out in March, Pakistanis struck at US. In January 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi shot three CIA operatives at the gates of CIA headquarters, Langley in US and escaped to Pakistan. In the same year in February, Yusuf Ramsey attempted to blow up the World Trade Centre. It was a failure but six people died and there were a number of wounded. In 1998, Osama bin Laden formed the International Islamic Front for jihad against Jews and crusaders. And the following Pakistani organisations, Harkatul-Mujahideen (HUM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HUJI), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkatul Jhangvi (HUJ) among others joined alQaeda to form the front. They were all organisations financed and trained by the Pakistan Army's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for operations in Kashmir and elsewhere in India. In 2001 came 9/11 attack on the US. During her recent visit to India, US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton admitted that 9/11 plot was hatched in Pakistan. The mastermind was a Pakistani,

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After six years of Bush Administration's permissiveness of the double game of General Musharraf of pretending to hunt with the US hounds, and running with the Taliban and jihadi hares, the charade was brought to an end by President Obama when he announced his Af-Pak strategy towards the end of March, 2009. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the uncle of Yusuf Ramsey who tried to blow up the World Trade Centre in 1993. There is an evidence that US $100,000 were wiretransmitted by Omar Sheikh, a Pakistani terrorist exchanged against the hostages during the Kandhahar hijacking of IC-814, to Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker in 9/11 attack, just days before the attack. Pakistanis have claimed that they were able to

lobby by spending a lot of money in the US to have the 9/11 commission report diluted in respect of adverse observations against Pakistan.

Safe havens Though Pakistan agreed to provide facilities for US forces to operate against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in September 2001, General Musharraf

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

neighbour watch PAKISTAN CRUMBLING ensured that the leadership of al-Qaeda and the Taliban would have safe havens in Pakistan and continue to survive. Presumably this was necessary to milk US aid - both civil and military. If the terrorist threat had been totally eliminated, US would have had no more interest in financing Pakistan generouslyâ&#x20AC;Ś A few alQaeda people were captured including the mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Pakistan mostly due to US technological Intelligence efforts. They were captured in the cities and not in tribal areas. Pakistan denied the presence of bin Laden and Zawahiri in its territory. Again it denied the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar's functioning in Quetta. The Bush administration imprudently outsourced the operation to locate al-Qaeda and Taliban leaderships and fighting against terrorism to the Pakistani Army under General Musharraf. Pakistan collected billions of dollars both as military and economic aid and produced, in the words of President Obama, very mixed results over a period of seven years. While Pakistan economy performed very well because of the generous US aid, in dealing with terrorism the situation worsened. Osama bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri continued to inspire alQaeda plots in various parts of the world from their safe havens in Pakistan. As the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown said: in 75 per cent of the cases of terrorist plots in the UK the trails led back to Pakistan. Though US did not have a successful terrorist plot on its soil, it continued to uncover plots and most of them had Pakistani links, by way of plotters going to Pakistan for training. There is a current case of Afghan-Pakistani Zazi in Denver, Colorado, US, plotting to make explosives with liquid cosmetics, a technology he learnt in a Pakistani terrorist-training camp. The Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar had a resurgence, regrouped, reequipped and started operating on even wider scale in Afghanistan with the Afghan Shura functioning in Quetta.

Pak-jihad nexus The Americans overlooked the basic fact that Pakistani Army had a vested interest in sustaining the anti-western jihadi groups and in staging periodic terrorist operations to continue to extract US aid and they considered the Afghan Taliban as their strategic assets to keep a hold on a Talibanised Afghanistan when the Americans would tire out and withdraw from that country. The other jihadi groups were their strategic assets against India to bleed it through a thousand cuts (terroristic acts). The Pakistanis were confident that

pledged his support to democracy in Pakistan. He made it clear that there would be no more blank cheques and there would be strict accounting of the aid given. In pursuance of this warning the aid legislation, the Kerry-LugarBerman Act has incorporated conditionalities for the military aid to avoid its diversion and misuse. The latest military offensive is under US pressure. Though a lot of furore is seen in Pakistan about the conditionalities of the aid legislation it will be accepted as Pakistani economic condition does not afford them the luxury of rejecting it.

Af-Pak recast

take military action first in Swat valley and now in South Waziristan. In retaliation, the TTP has launched terroristic attacks in several Pakistani cities against the personnel and establishments of the Security Services including the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Army. A major offensive of the Pakistani Army involving 30,000 men, heavy artillery and combat aircraft and helicopters is under way in South Waziristan and is meeting with strong resistance from TTP.

Meanwhile the operations in Afghanistan against Taliban are continuing and the plan for a surge of 40,000 troops submitted by the US commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal is being reviewed in a series of high powered meetings by President Obama. Two strategies: a counter-insurgency and a counterterrorism are being considered. If Pakistani Army is able to eliminate the dominance of the TTP on its side of the border, it will improve the chances of US and allied forces on the Afghan side of the border being able to succeed in their counterinsurgency operations. That will also call for action to eliminate the Mullah Omar's Taliban Shura from Quetta. This has been referred to by the US ambassador in Pakistan, though the Pakistanis deny the existence of the Shura in Quetta. It is too early to speculate what will be the US attitude towards the jihadi groups patronized by the ISI which are allied to al-Qaeda. President Obama has demanded they should also be disrupted, dismantled and defeated. The US aid legislation specifically mentions them.

Bush complicity

Pak game plan

After six years of Bush Administration's permissiveness of the double game of General Musharraf of pretending to hunt with the US hounds and running with the Taliban and jihadi hares, the charade was brought to an end by President Obama when he announced his Af-Pak strategy towards the end of March, 2009. He identified Pakistan as the central theatre in which al-Qaeda and its allied organizations were to be disrupted, dismantled and defeated. He warned Pakistan that it should eliminate terrorism or the cancer of terrorism would be fatal to Pakistan. He

Pakistan has put forward the argument that with an India-friendly Karzai in power in Kabul and if Taliban is neutralised, Indian influence in Afghanistan will increase jeopardizing Pakistani security. This argument finds a mention in General McChrystal report. For Pakistanis, jihadi groups still amenable to their control are strategic assets vis-a-vis India. It is therefore obvious that the US strategic objectives and Pakistani Army's objectives clash with each other. The Pakistani Army hopes that Americans will tire out and exit from Afghanistan in a couple of years. Thereafter

Pakistan has put forward the argument that with an India-friendly Karzai in power in Kabul and if Taliban is neutralised Indian influence in Afghanistan will increase, jeopardizing Pakistani security neither US nor India could take any punishing action against them as they had nuclear weapons and they could further blackmail the Americans and the world if they were not supported, the nuclear weapons and materials would fall into the hands of the jihadis. That was no doubt an extremely clever plan. But they overlooked the nature of terrorists. History of terrorism tells us it is very difficult to hold a large number of terrorists together as a formation and keep them idle. Under those circumstances they tend to splinter, each group seeking its own parochial objective. Conditioned to act beyond law and civilized norms leaders of terrorist groups tend to develop delusions of their own power and importance. Especially having at their disposal robotized teen-aged suicide bombers, give them a sense of power. And they tend to resent authority. Therefore it was no surprise that various groups have regrouped to form Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which in the name of imposing Sharia rule tried to carve out their own emirate. Pakistan Army tried to put them down and initially lost out. They arrived at a truce which did not last long. Finally they had to

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The Pakistanis were confident that neither US nor India could take any punishing action against them as they had nuclear weapons and they could further blackmail the Americans and the world that if they were not supported the nuclear weapons and materials would fall into the hands of the jihadis the Taliban will win over in Afghanistan giving Pakistan dominant influence over it. If they can eliminate the anti-state jihadi groups like TTP and bring the other groups under tighter control then it will be back to business as usual. The only problem is about continuing to threaten the world on Pakistan-based terrorism and collect money in the name of fighting it. Already Foreign Minister Qureshi blames US for having created the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan to fight the Soviet Union and having turned its back on the region after the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistanis have been successful in selling this story to the US, including its Secretary of State.

Pak-China-US N-collusion The truth is the Pakistanis defied the US and conducted a nuclear test in China with

Chinese help on 26th May 1990, as revealed in the book "Nuclear Express" by two American Nuclear scientists, Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman. Since the US was permissive of China's nuclear proliferation to Pakistan through the eighties as price for their support in the anti-Soviet campaign the Americans do not disclose the real reasons for their break with Pakistan in 1990. The Interior Minister Rehman Malik blames India for all terrorist occurrences in Pakistan. It is obvious they cannot even agree on one story to explain their terrorism except to deny their own responsibility for it. If their Swat valley military campaign is an example, the world has to be prepared for an inconclusive and prolonged counter-insurgency campaign with the possibility of its spilling over beyond South Waziristan and increased retaliatory attacks on the cities. Nor is it beyond possibility that jihadi groups, with or without the approval or knowledge of the ISI may stage terrorist attacks on India, and elsewhere in the world. Snow will fall on the mountains from mid-November and the counter-insurgency campaign will have to slow down. By spring, the US facing the Congressional elections in November 2010 will be reviewing the results of Af-Pak strategy of a year and Pakistan record.

ISI under scrutiny Meanwhile US intelligence agencies will be subjecting Pakistani Army and ISI to intense surveillance and monitoring. Coming spring will be the moment of truth for US and Pakistan with their fundamentally opposed aims and goals - US wanting to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan and Islamabad wanting to continue to blackmail the world through terrorism. The complicating factor will be impact of terrorism on Pakistani domestic scene, ability of the Army to control the diverse criminal jihadi groups, and on the economy. President Obama compared the extremist groups to cancer. Here the patient, the Pakistani State, civil society and the Army continue to be in a state of denial. How can a patient be treated when he refuses to admit his disease? The writer was Director Indian Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He served as Secretary, Defence Production; worked as Convenor, National Security Advisory Board; Chairman, Kargil Review Panel and Consulting Editor, Times of India.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

air combat DOMINANCE COURTESY: US AIR FORCE

aerospace

Air Marshal (Retd.) T M Asthana

power

The symbiosis of dual-use assets in space and of the flying machine in the air give to warfare a dimension hitherto lacking. It pushes the envelope out of reach of the infantry until now considered the “Queen of the Battlefield” because of the need to capture and hold territory; or of the navy which in the middle ages helped carve out overseas empires. Logically, the warrior of the 21st century must be a 3-dimension man. 24

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he art and science of warfare through the ages have made serious attempts to resort to technological excellence. Exploiting the military capabilities of the third dimension had seemingly matured in World War II. General Eisenhower had emphatically stated "The Normandy Invasion was based on a deep-seated faith in the power of the Air Force in overwhelming numbers to intervene in the land battle. Without the Air Force, without the aid of enemy Air Force out of the sky, without the power of enemy air to intervene in the land battle, that invasion would have been catastrophic and

criminal." Ever since, airmen have tried to argue that Air Power should hold center stage.

together provides rich dividends. It is hence argued that Aerospace Power has to be unmistakably meshed into one.

Master of medium

Human pre-eminence

Over six decades have elapsed since Lord Trenchard wrote: “A strategic force can be defined as a military force capable of assuming the command of its own medium by its own combat resources. Until the advent of the airplane, the Army and Navy were valid expressions of the nation's ultimate military power on land and sea respectively. With the development of aircraft, however, that ceases to hold true. No longer the masters of their own mediums, those forces have lost their strategic significance. Conversely, the surface forces cannot on their own initiative interfere decisively with the functions of the Air Force. Consequently, the Air Force is the only strategic force, because it is the only force that can attain command of its own medium by its own combat resources. Thus the Air Force has become the primary instrument of the nation's military strength.” Military operations have progressed from land, to land and sea, to land, sea and air, and now, we need to factor in space power, which has demonstrated its immense potential in an incremental manner. Indeed we will continue to witness increments in land, sea and air power as well. Military operations will be compelled to synergistically employ them to advantage along with space power. It is important therefore, for us to absorb the fact that space, or rather, Aerospace power to promote military operations is here to stay. With the launch of the Sputnik on 04 Oct 57 we entered the space age. Actually the terminology "Aerospace Power" was coined in 1958 to encompass the continuous medium including air and space. The true contributions of Aerospace Power were first demonstrated in Op Desert Storm (Iraq) and the intrusive visual media made millions by spreading the awareness worldwide. Simultaneous engagements of strategic, operational and tactical target systems restricted the enemy's ability to recoup, realign or offer a counter. From this day onwards it dawned that the integration of air and space powers

If technological excellence provides the asymmetry it is the human interface at all levels that needs perfect synchronization to deliver the goods. So, if your objective is Aerospace Power supremacy do not ignore this major factor. Only then, will the salience of Aerospace Power befriend you. India is the second most populous country of the world. To our credit, India is the most populous functional democracy that has traditionally demonstrated two brilliant attributes, i.e. resilience and hospitality. Also history tells us that the inhabitants of this nation are valiant fighters for all causes that threaten our national security. We already have elements of aerospace defence in place. The sub-continent of India covers 32, 87,590 square kilometers in area. It extends 3,000 km from North to South and 2,647 km from East to West. If we consider aerospace above this landmass, as well as, the aerospace above our international waters and littoral interests the areas and volumes reach mind-boggling figures. Just like we read in teachings of air power, so also, the basic Aerospace defence criteria is to detect, identify, classify, track, intercept and destroy.

Capabilities upgraded Perhaps the first responsibility of any Air Force to the nation is to prevent the enemy's Air Force from attacking one's own surface forces, population, and support facilities in rear areas. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has historically been quite successful in this regard, such that, we now largely take the ability to operate in sanctuary from enemy attacks for granted. Since the recent upgradations, accretions (SU-30 and radars inclusive) and modifications to the IAF's inventory the capabilities to defend against air attacks have nearly overmatched the Air Forces of our potential adversaries. Nevertheless, such regional powers as China are modernizing their air attack capabilities,

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

air combat DOMINANCE

and new systems such as cruise missiles and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles are available, that, if employed competently, could challenge the capabilities of the present IAF to defend vital assets.

Impenetrable defence In my personal opinion, the art, science and execution of defence are far more complex than offence. This is so because it is generally believed that defence is reactive to an aggressor's posture or action (however, I don't whole-heartedly support this view since I believe that Aerospace defence can also be offensive). The world has today increasingly shunned offensive action primarily because witnessing our own brethren in body bags is a stigma attached to the nation as also conserving our hard-earned economy is the topmost priority, and lastly, offensive action is costly.both in terms of equipment and resources. In the interest of the nation, therefore, development of an impenetrable defence should remain the main agenda of military defence hence must form the essence of all military actions (including Aerospace Power). That will ensure a nation-State's least intervention in offensive action. Aerospace defence will be a top priority mission as long as an enemy has the ability to threaten us with air, missile or space systems. Invariably, offensive operations will be conducted with Aerospace defence operations to terminate any conflict as early

as possible on favourable terms to us. Aerospace defense operations should be continuous and MUST NOT be conducted in isolation. Active Aerospace defence measures are direct defensive actions. Passive aerospace defence measures include all measures other than active aerospace defense taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air, ballistic missiles, and space systems.

Aerospace power Today, active Aerospace defence operations are conducted using an assortment of weapon systems supported by secure and highly responsive C4I systems. It has become popular to disparage airpower / Aerospace Power and to argue, â&#x20AC;&#x153;It is not decisive in warâ&#x20AC;?. We do not claim either that Aerospace Power will be decisive alone in every instance, BUT it is the hardest hitting, longest reaching, capable of rapid response, and most flexible force that the nation possesses. It is difficult to imagine a future conflict of any major scope in which land or sea power could survive - much less be decisive - without Aerospace Power.

Military satellites The contributions of space are good today, but they can reach unimaginable levels. Space offers immense potential in terms of information, surveillance and consequently intelligence. We have satellites that give us information, but we do not have dedicated defence satellites. It may be argued that

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dedication may be gross underutilization of a satellite. I believe that between the three military services, we are in a position to load the transponders of a satellite to capacity. If necessary, we may launch smaller satellites but they must be dedicated to the military. Today we have satellites in orbit with the capacity to transmit intelligence data. In the near future we will also have satellites capable of transmitting sub-meter resolution data. Space will ultimately be the largest repository of surveillance and intelligence information, which is the common denominator to ensure positive Aerospace defence. It must be mentioned here that surveillance of the areas of interest is of paramount importance. Surveillance does not demand surgical and / or submeter resolution. Any doubts and suspicions that may arise after interpreting the surveillance inputs can always be verified by accurate reconnaissance either by air or space power before initiating any defensive or offensive action. Geo-stationary satellites (GEO) have been criticized for not being adept enough to provide meaningful inputs for surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and targeting information, but there is no dispute that they are good communication facilitators. I am however convinced that GEO satellites will also be good enough for surveillance when it can be ensured that the quality of inputs provided by the interpreters is enhanced. Developing skills

It may be argued that dedication may be gross underutilization of a satellite. I believe that between the three military services, we are in a position to load the transponders of a satellite to capacity. If necessary, we may launch smaller satellites but they must be dedicated to the military. We need two geostationary satellites aloft to cover all areas of interest to identify and spotting minor alterations, and mass relocations or movements can enhance this. They will always be good for early warning of all kinds and a special tool for Aerospace defence. Above all, GEO satellites will provide continuous cover. We should hence, also provide a fillip to our space-based assets by ensuring at least two geo-stationary satellites on station at pre-designated locations to provide surveillance cover for all our areas of interest in the West, North and East, 24 hours a day throughout the year. These may be launched either together or in tandem, but, at the earliest. Preliminary research establishes that the cost of these two geo-stationary satellites will be in the region of $1.4 bn. It is natural for us to be concerned about the safety and survivability of these satellites, and hence, space defense assumes

significance. Whether we resort to active or passive or both forms of space defence only time will tell, BUT we must ensure that space defence is in place in an efficient manner. Above all, the plans must cater for adequate redundancies and alternates. I have no intentions of elaborating on the subject of (BMD) Ballistic Missile Defence, except to say that BMD must also be factored into the overall plan of Aerospace defence. No single mission area is capable of providing complete protection from a determined Aerospace attack against India. A combination of active and passive defense measures from all mission areas, integrated and coordinated by a robust and efficient command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system is required to meet the stringent performance requirements for

aerospace defence of India. If you want to live in peace create an impenetrable Aerospace defence.

Offensive action Offence is the best form of defence, and hence in this section there will, at times, be reference to both these actions. Just as surveillance and reconnaissance along with detection are considered pre-requisites for defence, so also, they are the pre-requisites for offensive action. The Jane's Defence Weekly of 29 Aug 2007 carries a cover headline "Russian long-range reconnaissance assets return to the fray". Russia had stopped combat duty flights in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. It explains that the resumption was intended as a finale to the Shanghai Co-operation Organization's counter terrorism exercise 'Peace Mission 2007'.

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air combat DOMINANCE A small word of caution here - today there are any number of agencies with their associated technologies collecting information that it has created a situation of 'information overload'. In its raw form information is of no use to aerospace responsive actions. It has to be converted to useful and meaningful accurate intelligence before any offensive or defensive action can and should be taken. We are all aware of this fact, but there are occasions when actions are initiatated in haste without proper intelligence evaluation. A lot has been accomplished by automation with digitization, but the human element that does the final vetting holds the key to efficient and appropriate pro-active and responsive actions. The primary objective of offensive actions (including Aerospace offensive) is to ensure that there are no collateral damages. If that cannot be ensured due to prevailing circumstances all attempts should be made by a responsible nation to ensure the minimum collateral damage.

Expertise update Education remains a continuous stimulant for all activities, including military action. In the initial 40 years or so of Air Power application it had become apparent that Air Power would effectively contribute not only to the air operations but to land and sea operations as well. This basic tenet must be further analyzed and plans must be generated to remain ahead of our potential adversaries in technological excellence. This would require dedicated and special munitions for specific tasks. Aerospace Power practitioners need to be constantly involved in educating themselves and the concerned agencies in terms of the pros and cons, in order to select the most appropriate option from a variety of options that can be made available. The destructive power of an explosive is a linear function of its explosive and a squared function of its accuracy. Recent major changes in the accuracy of airdelivered weapons have enabled quite dramatic changes in their effectiveness. During WW II, the typical long-range bomber could deliver its load of bombs with a circular error probability of around 1,000 m. This meant that it took upwards of 240 bombs to be confident of destroying a single 'hard target' such as bridge or a command post. It also meant that aerial attacks on military targets would, perforce, result in heavy damage to people and facilities in the general vicinity of the targets. The situation was changed little in Korea, or indeed, ten years after that in the early stages of the war in Vietnam. Only the invention of laser-guided bomb, first used in Vietnam in 1970, brought a

marked improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of aerial attacks on fixed targets.

weapons, as also, to deploy satellites. In addition, UAVs too are making a niche for themselves through miniaturization and advanced propulsion techniques, enabling them to operate at near LEO levels with enhanced endurance and loiter. A major factor that had troubled the Air Power platforms was survivability. Today assisted by stealth technology, Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) measures on board and long-range cruise missiles munitions permit a far greater survivability to modern combat aircraft. Thus we see that Aerospace Power will not only comprise air breathing and space platforms, but also, near-space platforms. Indeed Aerospace is set to grow into a more and more potent asset for military power. Consequently, it follows that the Offensive component of Aerospace Power will emerge as the major contributor to the overall military power of a nation in offensive actions.

Precision munitions Today, laser guidance for air-delivered munitions has become both more accurate and more robust. Circular error probable (CEP) is now down to about 3m for most modern platforms, and automation allows the pilots of single-seat aircraft to deliver laser-guided bombs. Perhaps more importantly, the advent of weapons guided by signals from Global Positioning System means that a modern aircraft can attack fixed targets with accuracies approaching those of laser guided bombs in virtually all weather conditions. And the attack can be undertaken with little risk to people and facilities in the surrounding areas i.e. least collateral damage. In 1971, a million pounds left the runway, and it cost about $10 million to destroy a bridge. In 1991, destroying a bridge took 2 Tomahawks with the same range as a F4 - 6,000 pounds left the runway, and it cost about $2.5 million. You saved money, no one was at risk, and you actually hit the target hard enough to destroy it. Today, the IAF has this capability, which will only get better with fresh accretions and better munitions in the pipeline. The Iraq operations visually demonstrated (via the media) the incremental value of space power. Although space power remained a major facilitator to Air power offensive as well as defensive actions only, it is actually capable of much more. I have no intentions to introduce militarisation of space in this paper, but it is a fact that we need to respect. What is important to note is the fact that the continuum of air and space have provided dividends well beyond expectations. Today there are nearly 600 satellites in orbit and it has been predicted that in another 5 to 6 years the figures will cross well above the 1,000 satellites in orbit figure. Internationally it has dawned that exploitation of space assets is not only the monopoly of civilian facilities in terms of communications, information etc, but has formed a major asset to militaries around the world in the form of Aerospace Power. The numbers of satellites in orbit used in recent wars have exceeded 100 in number in each case. Hence, in any future, conflict reliance will be heavy on use of satellites and Air power by itself will always graduate to Aerospace power.

Anti-sat weapons The Outer Space Treaty is still respected wherein only soft kills are visualized at the interference levels only in respect of the

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Mission of deterrence

adversary's satellites. The day is not far when hard kills of satellites will become the norm and we have seen that ASAT weapons have been developed. There are frantic efforts to develop nano and micro satellites and provide almost similar facilities by resorting to miniaturization. Whenever this converts to reality the hard kill option is also likely to be developed. In addition by launching small satellites in numbers there will be dispersion of space assets, as well as, the clear possibility of catering to redundancies. Above all the cost of launching smaller satellites will be far more affordable. We therefore see that just as for Air Power terminologies like 'air defence' and 'counter-air operations' have matured, so also, terminologies of 'Aerospace defence' and 'counter-Aerospace operations' will materialize. In a similar fashion "Aerospace Superiority" will be bandied around. It is an established fact that offensive action has remained the first option of all military operations, and will also remain the first option for Aerospace operations.

Space-trek On 21st June 2004, another first of

It has become popular to disparage airpower / aerospace power and to argue, â&#x20AC;&#x153;It is not decisive in warâ&#x20AC;?. But it is the hardest hitting, longest reaching, capable of rapid response, and most flexible force that the nation possesses. It is difficult to imagine land or sea power can survive - much less be decisive - without aerospace power humanity was achieved when a 62 year old American called Michael Melville reached an altitude higher than 62 miles and became the first citizen to fly a craft into, what is technically, space. The vehicle he piloted - 'Space Ship One' was designed to win the US $10 million Ansari X Prize. The concept of hypersonic aircraft seems like an unlikely dream today but research is in progress. Theories suggest that rockets will

propel aircraft into, and out of space. 'Scramjet' or 'Supersonic Combustion Ramjet' could provide the propulsion in space, which are basically "Pulse Detonation Wave" engines utilizing liquid methane directed onto hot fuselage. This would permit hypersonic aircraft to attain speeds up to Mach 10 at lower levels of low earth orbit (LEO). These aircraft could be used as weapon platforms including ASAT

The security of India will depend (to a large extent) on the effective execution of Aerospace Power in both defensive and offensive operations against an assortment of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The principal objective of Aerospace Power is the protection of our country, it's people and other valuable assets. For it is not profusion of riches or excess of luxury that can influence Our enemies to court or respect us. This can only be effected by fear Of our arms. â&#x20AC;ŚVegetius, De Re Militari, circa 4th century. Aerospace forces accomplish several purposes in conflict and peace. The introduction of aircraft and space systems has provided revolutionary changes to a nation's ability to fight. One needs to understand specific missions that aircraft and spacecraft can accomplish or support before employing them. Aerospace forces can conduct deterrence, denial, coercion, decapitation and humanitarian missions. Perhaps the most important mission of these missions is the mission of deterrence. These forces make a potential enemy think twice before launching a preemptive, be it a nuclear or conventional strike. The speed, range and flexibility of Aerospace forces give a nation a decided advantage in achieving conventional deterrent value. Aircraft that are ready to bomb targets at a moment's notice also help to stop another nation from taking certain action because of a swift, decisive reaction. Aircraft can demonstrate deterrent value by providing a visible display of combat power if they fly near an enemy's border or conduct training

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air combat DOMINANCE exercises in plain sight of an adversary. Once combat action starts, Aerospace forces can coerce an offending nation to adopt a certain course of action. Coercion involves the use of force to punish the transgression of a foe in the hope of altering the nation's will. Although coercion may use attacks on physical targets, its mission goal is to change the behaviour of the nation, organization, or group of people through psychological means. However, a significant issue regarding coercion is the problem of escalation. Does the coercive power increase the level of attack? Is there a ceiling to the escalation of force? All these factors need to be considered and the lesson to be learnt is "If deterrence fails apply coercion of the aerospace forces." It is for certain that deterrence will have an impact in the future also. Aerospace forces can and have also contributed immensely to humanitarian needs like evacuation, supply of food, medicines etc. The more effectively such operations are conducted in a swift and efficient manner makes a potential adversary pause and think seriously. If a nation can provide humanitarian aid in quick time, at relatively large distances, in quality and quantity, the nation is also capable of inflicting punitive action at a moment's notice. Such a capacity for humanitarian aid is a clean, decisive and telling demonstration of aerospace forces to any potential adversary of the nation's deterrent value, which, if not respected could well be converted to coercive value. We may safely arrive at the conclusion that the IAF will certainly be superior to PAF in Aerospace power capability for quite a few years given the present trends. The deterrent value of India's aerospace power would hold since Pakistan has virtually no indigenous space capability. In respect of our other potential adversary China, suffice it to say that only the IAF can provide dissuasive deterrence.

Network centricity No missive on any military subject can be complete today without mention of NCW. Recent successful wars have given birth to some terminologies. It is not as if, we, in this profession did not practice these aspects, but now we have terminologies to go by. Op Desert Storm (Iraq) produced Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); Kosovo - Effects Based Operations (EBO) and Information Warfare (IW); Iraq (2003) produced Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The objective of NCW is to ensure that the combined operational picture (COP) is available at all levels, which is relevant and real time. The basic principle of NCW is to

ensure continuous availability of relevant, timely, and accurate information, which is converted to applicable Intelligence. This real time intelligence is today the backbone of all military operations including aerospace operations. EBO in the 21st century enabled by NCW is a methodology for planning, executing and assessing military operations designed to attain specific effects, which translate information advantage into combat power to achieve the desired national security outcomes. Intelligence superiority is the central theme. This is of utmost importance to Aerospace operations, and hence, the world over there is a race to better the reaction timeframes. The NCW has a war winning and war deterrent capability reducing the OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) loop. There is a demand for Aerospace dominance to achieve reliable, efficient and survivable NCW capability.

Human capital Much of this paper has focused on hardware. While the aircraft, spacecraft, missiles, satellites, munitions, and other equipment that the IAF operates are the most visible manifestations of capability, they are not the most important. Rather, the most significant factors determining the capabilities of the force are the qualities of the people who operate and maintain the equipment and who command the units the force comprises. Without doubt the people serving in the IAF today are highly capable. Nevertheless, sustained and deliberate efforts will always be needed to maintain this. A nation may have all the physical elements necessary to organize and function as an Aerospace force, but it is useless if it is not given the right direction. Piloting a combat aircraft is a complex task. Maintenance of an Aerospace force requires the existence of a technological base. The people involved must have sufficient motivation, education and training to keep aircraft and space systems at their optimum performance levels. The nation must also maintain a sound educational system to instill the proper levels of knowledge to produce engineering technicians and individuals capable of operating and maintaining advanced technology for exploiting it. Aircraft and satellites cannot function by themselves. Although crew can fly the aircraft, it relies on a number of diverse complex support systems while in the air or on ground. Aerospace Power is not just about platforms. A nation could use its Aerospace Power for independent military actions. Better still, the country could use this Aerospace

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Power as a catalyst in support of its surface forces as an equal partner to all of its sister forces' objectives. Before the nation decides to use its Aerospace Power it needs to provide direction and guidance. It is generally agreed that, absence of this clear perspective may make a country acquire attractive but unnecessary aircraft and space systems that might not give it the appropriate forces to win a war in the national interest.

Aerospace dominance To support and achieve India's goals the nation must have a force able to deter and / or decisively defeat a range of potential adversaries. Forces, inclusive of Aerospace Force must be lethal and flexible and must have strategic reach, yet must also protect the nation against potential attacks, large and small. Personally, I am convinced that the IAF has some of these assets, and for those that are not on its inventory, plans are in the advanced stages. With such an envious contribution on offer by Aerospace Power it would indeed be foolish to ignore this asset. We need to not only plan for 'Aerospace Superiority', but for 'Aerospace Dominance'. Only a precise, wellconceived plan will deliver Aerospace Dominance, for which, we need to create the hardware and software of Aerospace assets. Viewed practically or even pessimistically, if Aerospace Dominance cannot be achieved, at least, Aerospace Superiority will be ensured. Building up the Aerospace Power capability that we visualize is a multi-pronged task, which needs a multi-pronged approach. It is imperative that a single agency handles this aspect with total dedication. We need to ensure that we gain the prescribed Aerospace capability (and with gradual efforts to continuously improve on it) in a systematic and practical plan. I propose the obvious i.e. "The Indian Air Force (IAF) must assume the total responsibility as the executing agency for the nation to establish the requirements (assets) and stipulate priorities for a well honed Aerospace Power for the nation". Acquiring such an offensive, defensive and deterrent capability of Aerospace Power must be transparent internationally and to our potential adversaries in particular. The writer, a fighter pilot, was appointed first Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command in January 2003 with responsibility for India's nuclear weapons and held this post till retirement in June 2004. He was Assistant Chief of Operations, ACAS (Ops) at Air Headquarters in January 1999 during the Kargil Operations.

performance ACCOUNTABILITY

Maj Gen (Retd.) V K Singh

Rudyard Kipling described it as “The Great Game” in his opus on the British Raj and its sphere of influence at the north-western end of the Grand Trunk Road. Intelligence gathering is the name of that game. The art of spying was totally in keeping with what Chanakya would have recommended. Yet it does sound strange that the agency which Lord Mountbatten described as the best in the world could fail to warn of the Pakistan Army invasion of Jammu and Kashmir disguised as tribals a few months after the attainment of independence. Instead of scoring victories in their own archane world, albeit unsung and unrecorded, our spies make history for the wrong reasons like the one in the cyber security organization who gave it all away to an American woman or the man from RAW who just packed and left. Into the cold or some warm embrace? 32

fiascos

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n recent years, Indian intelligence agencies have been in the news for all the wrong reasons. This is unfortunate, considering their unimpeachable past. During the British Raj, the Criminal Intelligence Department (CID had a formidable standing. In recent years, their reputation has taken a beating. Apart from several major intelligence failures at the international level, they have not been able to prevent a single terrorist attack. It is necessary to examine the reason for their dismal performance and institute suitable remedial measures.

Afghanistan fixation There is no official record of the creation of the intelligence department in India. However, until the beginning of the 20th century, the primary role of intelligence agencies was to gain information about the adversary's military potential. In 1885, Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor was appointed Quartermaster General and head of the Intelligence Department for the British Indian Army. The objective then was to monitor Russian troop deployments in Afghanistan, fearing a Russian invasion of British India through Central Asia. Russia had strong imperial ambitions and a special interest in South Asia. Soon after Independence, the IB (Intelligence Bureau) was set up, with Sanjivi Pillai as its first Director. After Mahatma Gandhi's assassination in 1948, Sanjivi was replaced by BN Mullick, who remained the head of the organisation for an unprecedented 17 years. During his tenure, the IB became an extremely powerful organization, looking after external as well as internal intelligence, in addition to playing a major role in deciding foreign policy. Mullick's proximity to Nehru added to his clout, and during the 1962 conflict with China, he even decided the location of border outposts manned by the Army, with predictable results. During the 1962 and the 1965 conflicts the Army complained that it did not get adequate intelligence, and demanded its own foreign intelligence agency, on the lines of the CIA in USA and MI6 in UK. Based on directions of the Army Chief, General JN Chaudhuri, a paper on the subject was prepared by Major General MN Batra, the DMI (Director of Military Intelligence).

“Kao-boys” MN Batra's paper, which proposed the establishment of a foreign intelligence agency under the Ministry of Defence, was put up to the Prime Minister. After she came to power, Indira Gandhi approved the creation of the agency, but decided to keep it under her own control instead of the Ministry of Defence, as recommended in the paper. The new organization, known as the Research & Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, was established on 21 September 1968. Rameshwar Nath Kao was selected to be

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performance ACCOUNTABILITY the first head of the RAW, with K. Sankaran Nair as his deputy, both being from the IB. In 2001, the roles of IB and RAW were formalized as a result of the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on National Security, which was set up after the Kargil Review Committee submitted its report in 2000. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was also set up at the same time, with control over all military assets for gathering intelligence. The roles of the three agencies - internal, external and military - are different, but some overlap still exists. Lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence, the bane of intelligence agencies in India, remains as before. This appears to be the major lacunae in the functioning of Indian intelligence agencies, the others being lack of accountability and parliamentary oversight. During the British Raj, the intelligence agencies did excellent work. Intelligence operations were then handled by the CID, staffed almost completely by Indians, except for a few British officers in senior appointments. Not surprisingly, when Lord Mountbatten took over as Viceroy, he remarked that he had inherited one of the best intelligence services in the world. The present IB and RAW are progeny of the same CID of the British Raj. With such an impeccable pedigree, why can't they do half as much? (1)

Intelligence failures The first major intelligence failure after independence was the intrusion of Pakistani tribesmen in Kashmir in October 1947, known as Operation 'Gulmarg'. Though indications of the Pakistani design were available through several sources, these were not taken seriously. The political leadership waited until the Maharajah signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, before flying in Indian troops. Srinagar was saved in the nick of time. Had they reached even a day later, it is possible that Kashmir would not be part of India today. The next major intelligence failure occurred in Aksai Chin in 1954-57 when the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was then in charge of foreign intelligence, failed to find out that the Chinese had built a strategic road through Indian territory linking western Ladakh with Xinjiang. This was followed soon after by the Chinese intrusion in NEFA, which resulted in the ignominious defeat of the Indian Army in 1962. Indications of the Chinese build up were obtained from local sources, but these were either ignored or not taken as seriously as

they should have been. During Operation 'Gibraltar' in 1965, the IB failed to correctly interpret evidence and warn of Pakistani plans to send thousands of infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley to spark a rebellion. Later the same year Pakistan launched Operation 'Grand Slam' using the new armoured division which she had raised. The IB, still in charge of foreign intelligence, failed to detect the raising of the armoured division that was launched in September 1965, with disastrous consequences.

RAW in â&#x20AC;&#x2122;68 After the creation of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 1968, the IB was divested of its responsibility for external intelligence. Since then, external intelligence has been almost the exclusive preserve of RAW, whose successes in the 40 years of its existence have been more than matched by its failures. According to a Pakistani author, the major 'successes' of RAW were the

creation of Bangladesh (this is debatable - on page 47 of his book Surrender at Dacca, Lt Gen JFR Jacob, who was the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command in 1971, writes "The Research and Analysis Wing gave us next to nothing"); the assassination of General Ziaur-Rahman; Project Poornima (Pokharan nuclear explosion); the Kahuta Blueprint (the Indians were on the verge of obtaining it, but Morarji Desai refused to sanction the $ 10,000 demanded by the RAW agent, and informed Pakistan, who caught and eliminated the RAW mole); induction of Sikkim into the Indian Union; engineering a revolt in the Maldives (to increase India's influence); and monitoring Pakistani telecommunications. Among RAW's 'failures' are the promulgation of Emergency in 1975 (Kao supported it, whereas the IB had advised against it); Operation Blue Star (RAW failed to assess the strength of Bhindranwale's forces); Mujib-ur-Rahman's assassination (RAW had advance information about Mujib's assassination but failed to prevent it); defeat of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam in Mauritius elections (Indira Gandhi wanted him to win); and support to LTTE, which later turned against it.(2)

Kargil default There are several other failures of external intelligence which can be added to the Lack list. One is the blowing up of Air India of coordination Flight 182 in 1985 by Khalistani terrorists, which RAW failed to and sharing of prevent. This was followed by the intelligence, the bane of Kargil war in 1999, when RAW was severely criticised for intelligence agencies in India, inadequate intelligence about still exists. If anything, it has the Pakistani intrusion that had been taking place for become worse. This appears to be several months. One reason the major lacunae in the for this failure was the lack of functioning of Indian intelligence coordination between the intelligence agencies, which agencies, the others being lack zealously guard their turf and of accountability and resent sharing intelligence with other agencies. parliamentary This was clearly brought out by oversight the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K. Subrahmanyam, which pointed out several lacunae in the existing intelligence set up in the country, the chief being the existence of multiple agencies reporting to different heads. It decried the virtual monopoly of RAW in respect of external intelligence, and commented adversely on the wisdom of saddling one agency alone with multifarious responsibilities of human, communication, imagery and electronic intelligence. The recommendations of the Kargil

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Review Committee were examined by the Group of Ministers (GoM) established in April 2000. Home Minister LK Advani chaired the GoM, the other key members being Defence Minister George Fernandes, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha. The GoM constituted four task forces, which studied intelligence, internal security, border management and defence. The GoM completed its task in February 2001 and submitted its report to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) considered the Report on 11 May 2001 and accepted all its recommendations, except the one dealing with the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).(3)

Intelligence deleted The GoM report was formally made public with much fanfare at a ceremony on 23 May 2001 when it was discovered that the entire chapter on intelligence had been deleted. The intelligence agencies felt that the deleted parts pointed to specific shortcomings that people inimical to the country's security could have exploited. A few omissions pertained to observations that could have had adverse diplomatic implications.(4) The Government claims that most of the recommendations of the GoM Report have

IT IS UNDERSTAN DABLY DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP MOLES IN G ROUPS BAS ED ABROAD. BU been implemented, such as the T WHAT ABO setting up of the Defence UT THOSE BASE D IN INDIA Intelligence Agency (DIA) and ? THERE IS N the National Technical O DEARTH O Resources Organisation F FUNDS WIT (NTRO). However, insiders feel H T H E AGENCIES. that little has changed on the WHAT THEN ground. If anything, the situation I S T H E PROBLEM has become worse. ? The NTRO was the brainchild of former President Abdul Kalam, who was at that time heading the DRDO. It was intended to bring the technical resources of all agencies under one roof, to avoid duplication and improve coordination. However, RAW refused to part with the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), while all military SIGINT, TECHINT and IMINT (Imagery intelligence) resources went to the DIA. The NTRO naturally had to create its own assets, resulting in considerable expense and aggravating the duplication. The most recent instance of failure of our intelligence agencies was the terror strike in Mumbai on 26 November 2008, which has now entered our lexicon as '26/11', just as the strikes that brought down the twin towers in New York are universally known as '9/11'. A terror strike of the magnitude of 26/11 cannot be executed without months of meticulous planning. The actual perpetrators

may have been foreigners, but surely there must have been locals who were responsible for providing intelligence, guidance, weapons, ammunition, explosives, transport and other logistics. At a rough estimate, the numbers involved in such support services are five to ten times the number of those who carry out the actual strike. In other words, there may be between 50 to 100 persons who worked behind the scenes, the back room boys, as it were. How is it that IB and RAW failed to detect a single one? What happens to the hundreds of crores that the tax payer gives them to pay agents and informers? Of course, after the event, intelligence agencies tried to cover their backs, claiming

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performance ACCOUNTABILITY that they had given information to the Coast Guard, Navy, Police and everyone else under the sun. Some even committed gross impropriety by leaking to the media photocopies of 'Secret' and 'Top Secret' letters exchanged between them and the Police.

Actionable intelligence As the then Naval Chief bluntly put it, none of the inputs given by the intelligence agencies was 'actionable' intelligence. To be actionable, the intelligence must give two specific bits of information - time and place. Saying that an attack is imminent means nothing - it can be after a few hours, days or months. Similarly, saying that terrorist will attack well known landmarks is of little use, since it is almost impossible to prevent a terror attack once the countdown has begun. In the case of 9/11 attack on the twin towers in New York, what could have been done even if the information was known a couple of hours earlier? The same applies to the attacks in Mumbai. At the most, perhaps the buildings could have been evacuated and lives saved. But the attacks would still have taken place. The only way to prevent a terror attack is to gain intelligence when it is being planned or at the stage when preparations are being made. This is the job of the intelligence agencies, not the security forces such as the Navy, Coast Guard or the Police. And this our intelligence agencies have consistently failed to do. This state of affairs will continue unless the intelligence agencies are made accountable and held responsible for their lapses. I recall the incident in the THE eighties when a foreigner landed a small aircraft on Red Square in INTELLIGENCE Moscow. There was an uproar E BECOME and the Defence Minister SERVICES HAV resigned, while the Chief of ND LAZY. SOMNOLENT A Air Defence was sacked. T BE SHAKEN OU This happened in India THEY NEED TO HIS IS too after the 1962 debacle, IR SLUMBER. T E H T F O when the Defence Minister BY MAKING and the Army Chief both ONLY POSSIBLE AND had to go. After the ACCOUNTABLE M E H T Mumbai attack, none of the HEM TO SUBJECTING T persons responsible for the AND intelligence failure - the NSA ERFORMANCE P or the Chiefs of RAW and IB DIT FINANCIAL AU were touched. Instead, the Home Minister was made a scapegoat and groups given marching orders. such as the Naxalites and Create Moles Maoists. Many of these If Indian intelligence agencies continue to were serial blasts, involving dozens of muddle along as they are doing now, things saboteurs. There must have been many more can only grow worse. The ineptitude of our who provided the funds and the logistics. intelligence has been proved beyond doubt How is it that not one of these groups was by their failure to prevent the large number infiltrated and information obtained? It is of terrorist attacks that have occurred in understandably difficult to develop moles in recent times, including many by domestic groups based abroad. But what about those

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) that is appointed by and reports to the Prime Minister. Canada has a Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) that oversees the functioning of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and reports to the Canadian House of Commons. In addition, there is an IG, CSIS who carries out functions similar those of the IG, CIA in the USA.(6)

external checks and balances. There is no desire on the part of the political leadership to make the agencies accountable for their performance." The only attempt to introduce an oversight mechanism was made during the tenure of Prime Minister VP Singh. The suggestion had reportedly come from Jaswant Singh, who was then Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Lok Sabha. When the RAW chief convened a meeting of senior officers to seek their views on the proposed measure, he was surprised to find that most of them favoured such a measure as it would make them less vulnerable to undesirable pressures from the executive. Interaction with Members of Parliament would also give them a chance to acquaint the public with the work being done by them, removing from their minds many wrong impressions about intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, before the exercise could be completed the VP Singh government fell due to withdrawal of support by the BJP.

Parliament scrutiny

Locus puzzle

The demand for parliamentary oversight has been made several times in the past, even by officers who have served in intelligence agencies. The need for accountability and parliamentary oversight is accepted by several officers who were once part of RAW, including B. Raman. According to him, "India is amongst the countries. …which continue to follow the dictum that the intelligence agencies are the most patriotic, can do no wrong and hence don't need

The irrelevance of the obsessive secrecy that envelopes RAW and its activities was brought about by Shashi Tharoor, the present Minister of State for External Affairs, during the first RN Kao memorial lecture on 20 January 2007. Tharoor, then Under Secretary General for Communications and Public Information at the United Nations, stressed that the facelessness of RAW may be working to its disadvantage, since its personnel were not

parliamentary oversight. In USA, the CIA

Kargil has not one but four levels of oversight the Senate Select Committee on Review Intelligence; the House of Committee chai red by Representatives Permanent Select K Subrahmanya Committee on Intelligence; the m, which Inspector General (IG, CIA); and pointed out se veral lacunae in the President's Foreign Intelligence the existing in Advisory Board, which comprises telligence set u p trustworthy and eminent citizens in the country, the chief being with experience whose job is to see the existence o that intelligence agencies do not f multiple violate laws of the land or indulge in agencies report ing to unethical practices. different heads In UK, oversight is exercised by the spend large amounts of money to 'buy' or cultivate agents. Where does the money go? One only has to read The Kaoboys of RAW written by B. Raman, a retired additional secretary of RAW, for the answer. He writes that most RAW officers posted abroad had a fancy for Mercedes cars. PV Narasimha Rao, who was then the Foreign Minister, once remarked that he had noticed that officers of RAW and IB posted in foreign embassies had the largest and most expensive cars. "How do they manage to find the money," he asked..(5)

No accountability The main reason for the misuse of so called 'secret' funds is lack of accountability and financial audit. India is perhaps the only democracy in the world where the intelligence agencies are not subject to

based in India? There is no dearth of funds with the agencies. What then is the problem? The excessive dependence of intelligence agencies on technical sources has bred a sense of complacency. If one can get information sitting in his office why should he risk his life outdoors. At present, almost 90 per cent of the intelligence comes from SIGINT, with HUMINT accounting for just 10 per cent. One reason for the excellent performance of intelligence agencies during the British Raj was the almost total dependence on HUMINT. The only way to gain intelligence was through spies, agents and moles. While it is true that the richest sources of intelligence today are the Internet, satellite links, mobile phones and radio, human sources can never be discounted. Spying is a dying art and is visible today only in James Bond movies. Unless the art is revived, the intelligence agencies will not be able to deliver the goods. Everyone knows that intelligence agencies

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performance ACCOUNTABILITY

getting the recognition they deserved for their valuable contribution to India's foreign policy. Noting that the agency was not accountable to Parliament and its funds were subject to only a limited scrutiny, Tharoor felt that RAW was being distrusted and criticised by the media and the public, without it having any chance to defend its actions. "RAW's exact locus within the Indian strategic establishment has remained a puzzle", he said. He went on to add: "I think it is a great pity if it is true that, as I am told, secrecy has gone to the point where many who serve in RAW themselves do not have a sense of their own history." (7) The cloak of secrecy that an external intelligence agency such as RAW covers itself with hides little else than its faults, which remain uncorrected. Unlike the defence forces or the DRDO, it has little that can be of interest to a foreign country. Yet it treats all information it gathers as highly secret. The only reason for keeping such information under wraps is to protect the source. In case such information is made public, accidentally or otherwise, it is only the source which is compromised, with little effect on national security. An example was the tape of the famous Musharraf-Aziz conversation during the Kargil war, which was made public to show Pakistan's complicity. It did result in the drying up of the source of the intercept, but there was certainly no effect on

our national security. There are glaring anomalies between the functioning of our intelligence agencies, even at the grass roots level. In the armed forces, information about the enemy is always sent in clear terms. It is not encoded since that would weaken the code, as the information is already known to the enemy. However, information about own troops and plans is always sent in code. This basic rule of security is violated every day by RAW, which insists that all information in its possession is secret. At many places along our borders, where Army and RAW stations are located next to each other, the same information is being sent in clear by one agency and in code by the other. Can there be a more obvious example of lack of coordination between our intelligence agencies? The future of India's external intelligence does not appear to be very bright. The intelligence services have become somnolent and lazy. They need to be shaken out of their slumber. This is only possible by making them accountable and subjecting them to performance and financial audit. Like all public institutions, including the armed forces, they must be subject to parliamentary oversight. Their existence must be sanctified by an Act of Parliament, and not by an executive order. Most important of all, they must be given a formal charter, so that the tax payer knows whether they are doing what they are paid

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for and not merely tilting at wind mills. If this is not done soon, the country is likely to face serious threats to its security and social fabric, which once torn, will be difficult to mend. The writer served in the Army for 35 years, his last appointment being Chief Signal Officer of the Western Army Command. In November 2000 he joined the Cabinet Secretariat, (R&AW), where he served up to June 2004, when he retired from government service. He has authored five books including India's External Intelligence - Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2007.

References 1. VK Singh, Terror lessons from the Raj, New Indian Express, 04 Nov 2008. 2. Group Captain SM Hali, 'RAW at WarGenesis of Secret Agencies in Ancient India', Pakistan Defence Journal, March 1999. 3. Group of Ministers' Report on "Reforming The National Security System", PIB release, May 23, 2001 4. Editorial 'Security Counsel', Times of India, 24 May 2001. 5. B Raman, The Kaoboys of RAW - down memory lane, New Delhi, 2007, p.119. 6. B Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 364-377 7. The Indian Express, New Delhi, 21 January 2007

cover story PEACEKEEPING: GRIM REALITY Lt Gen (Retd.) V K Jetley

global conflicts 40

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It is not for nothing that India is being so strenuously wooed to join Multi National Force (MNF) groupings in various parts of the world. We have just signed an agreement with Japan for antipiracy operations in the Pacific Ocean. We are deeply involved in similar anti-piracy operations off the east coast of Africa and in policing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to prevent the clandestine movement of nuclear weapons and components across the Indian Ocean. Our popularity grows from having conducted eminently successful peacekeeping / peacemaking operations under the UN flag in Somalia and Sierra Leone in recent times and Korea and Indochina before that. Our mantra that the UN must prevail could find converts in odd places. Afghanistan and Iraq for instance. December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

cover story PEACEKEEPING: GRIM REALITY hen World War-II came to an end in 1945 there was general optimism that peace had finally dawned and that trouble and strife were over. At about this time two seemingly unconnected events were taking place viz decolonization of the world and a race for supremacy and world domination by the victors of World War-II. Decolonization resulted in many failed States which created a vacuum in their part of the globe. It also resulted in physical division of many countries e.g. IndiaPakistan, North and South Korea with drastic consequences, which posed a challenge to the nascent United Nations Organisation.

Blue berets It may surprise the readers to know that the term peacekeeping was not in the lexicon of the UN and there were no existing concepts and practices to serve as role models. This notwithstanding the UN evolved peacekeeping doctrines literally

from scratch and set about bringing peace to the troubled States. Initially, peacekeeping had to be resorted to in inter-State strife. The problem between India and Pakistan is one of the oldest examples of this. However, subsequently, intra-State strife also came to the forefront, especially in newly decolonized States, which failed or were on the verge of failure, where internecine fighting and rule of the jungle were the norm rather than the exception.

US unilateralism In most cases the UN rose to the occasion, however, due to acute paucity of resources, difficult choices had to be made. In the light of this many Regional Peacekeeping Forces were born such as NATO in Europe and ECOMOC, ECCAS, EAC, SADC, UMA in the African continent. The UN in conjunction with these Regional Peacekeeping Forces has managed to keep the peace in most troubled spots. However, post 9/11 and the US-led wars on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new trend has

emerged of cobbling together MultiNational Forces from like-minded nations. More often than not such forces act in foreign countries without the approval of the host nation and this has serious legal ramifications. Increasingly, overtures are being made to India to form part of such MNFs. It will be appreciated that opting to become a part of such MNFs has many complications that need to be understood before taking a conscientious decision to participate. In the backdrop of emerging trends in global conflicts, it is endeavoured to analyse deploying as part of a Multi-National Force with particular reference to Command and Control Issues.

Enforcing peace UN Peacekeeping Operations have undergone a sea change since their conception in the early years of the raising of the UN when they were simple classic peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War period, peacekeeping operations were relatively on a low key due to the vested

(TOP) A member of the UN Military-Observer Group in India and Pakistan on his way to a field station on the Kashmir cease-fire line, January 1955.

interests of the Big Five (Permanent Members of Security Council) who exercised vetoes, wherever their interests were in conflict. However after the end of the Cold War, there has been an exponential increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. While many of them remained peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, many others became peace enforcement

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

ones under Chapter VII. Again the underlying and important issue always was that these operations were conducted under the UN umbrella.

Regime change Second generation peacekeeping operations, in many cases, took the form of enforcement actions, wherein the consent of the parties to the conflict was either

In most cases the UN rose to the occasion, however, due to acute paucity of resources, difficult choices had to be made. In the light of this many Regional Peacekeeping Forces/ Multi National Forces were born

partially or wholly ignored. But what is being witnessed in the current international conflicts is a trend that has transgressed beyond the laid down UN Charter. Whereas Gulf War I had some sort of UN approval for the "liberation" of Kuwait, the recent conflicts have seen a unilateral decision of a few nations to form a "coalition" and undertaking "peace enforcement" and "change of regime" operations such as in Iraq. Actions of these coalitions have not had the express approval of the UN Security Council. These recent conflicts have exhibited a total lack of control of the UN. This is being done ostensibly to bring about peace and stability in these regions by ushering in democracy. Using a MultiNational Force of their liking points towards a new trend in international conflict resolution. The factors therefore that have a direct bearing on the Peace Operations of Multi-National Forces within or outside UN umbrella are: Limited Role: In the current world order with the dominance of the sole super power, USA, over the UN, the latter is sidelined, so are Regional Organisations if any are operating in area of conflict. This has drastically affected the impartial and unbiased approach towards conflict resolution. It would not be wrong to state that many of these situations actually amount to conflict creation and then its resolution in their own way, though many

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

cover story PEACEKEEPING: GRIM REALITY decides to intervene in any part of the world at its own accord, without justification, without moral support and authorisation of the international community, basically to serve their own interests, they can do so. To illustrate this further, if a coalition of such nations decides to resolve the long festering Indo-Pak Kashmir problem, would we as a nation be very happy having an invasion by a self appointed coalition Force in our part of the sub-continent? Needless to say, no nation would, and hence, before any nation decides to join such a coalition it must keep in mind such sensitivities. Some of the important internationally sensitive issues are: Humanitarian Laws: Inescapable awareness and exhibition of respect for International Humanitarian Laws. Laws of Armed Conflict: Giving due consideration to internationally accepted Laws of Armed Conflict and respecting them during the conduct of operations. Sensitivity towards Casualties: Extreme care to minimize the casualties specially the civilian casualties and avoid collateral damages, and, of course, avoid casualties from so-called “friendly fire”.

people would think differently. Master Players: It is clear therefore that a few major nations have become the master players in the conflict resolutions. These nations take control of such situations without international consent. Credibility of Principles: Decision of armed intervention and methods of conflict resolution in the present environment are violative of principles of Consent, Impartiality and use of Minimum Force as laid down in the UN Charter. Command of Multi-National Forces: In most conflicts it has been observed that the over-all command of Multi-National Forces has remained with the major power. Such a situation is invariably a sticky one as it may not be in the best interests of the rest of the coalition partners. Thus the evolution of Conflicts Resolution has grown from Traditional Peacekeeping under UN umbrella to Peace Enforcement again under UN umbrella, towards Peace Keeping or Enforcement by Regional Forces such as ECOWAS in Liberia and Seirra Leone, Haiti and Kosovo to a Unilateral decision for regime change by superpowers as in deTalibanisation of Afghanistan and change of regime in Iraq.

Pre-requisites

In the current world order with the dominance of the sole super power, USA, over the UN, the latter is sidelined, so are Regional Organisations if any are operating in area of conflict. This has drastically affected the impartial and unbiased approach towards conflict resolution

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

In times to come many more conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to erupt in the world that would demand military intervention for conflict resolution. Allowing few nations to undertake this unilaterally sometimes in contradiction of world opinion is a situation fraught with a lot of danger. However, situations requiring the creating of Multi-National Coalition will remain inescapable. The question that remains is under which Flag, with what Composition and what Mandate should such Multi-National Forces operate. Let us touch upon few Pre-requisites for a MultiNational Coalition, which must be considered before hand. These can broadly be summed up under two sub-heads viz: ● Sensitivities to International Concerns ● Pre-conditions of Force Coalition

Global sensitivities The foremost is Sensitivities to International Concerns. Notwithstanding what has been done by the US and UK coalition forces in Iraq, it would be prudent to be aware of international sensitivities towards such operations not only because of sense of international fair play that exists but also for the lurking fear that exists, that if a super power or coalition of powers

Transparency: Necessity of transparency of operations especially under the continuous glare of Embedded Media. The End State: The need to have a well defined End State both in military and civil terms as no intervention, however peaceful it may be, can be left open-ended is one of the most important consideration.

legitimacy.

Fear exists, that a super power or coalition of powers could intervene in any part of the world at its own accord, without justification, without moral support and authorisation of the international community, basically to serve their own interests

Regional Acceptance: Regional acceptance of the Multi-National Force is also important for obvious reasons, including sustenance of Force requirements. Mandate: A well-defined and accepted mandate by the coalition partners is absolutely mandatory because without it there can be little success of the Mission. This needs to be drafted after due consultation of members of the coalition. The mandate must also have a clearly defined End State for operational planning and conduct of military and civilian operations. Joint Doctrines: The coalition needs to come together at planning stage itself to prevent subsequent differences of opinion. Thus it is mandatory that the coalition partners formulate a Joint Doctrine before actual coalition is formulated on ground. Unity of Command: This assumes great significance for a Multi-National Force of diverse nations. As such a Force can only be successful if there is a sense of understanding and cooperation. This is expected at all levels of Command from strategic level down to the tactical level.

UN pre-eminent India has so far always been deployed under the UN flag. Deployment under UN has well laid out organisation and SOPs under

Precautions In any application of Force for resolution of conflicts, it is important that before constituting a Multi-National Force, certain preconditions are met. Some of these are: Consent of Host Nation: It is ideal to attain the consent of Host Nation because only after this is done can a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) be worked out. This may or may not be forthcoming especially in situations like Iraq and Afghanistan which are left bereft of a Government. In the future environment consent of host nation(s) may not be forthcoming and in such cases the decision of intervention must be a well thought out one. International Recognition: Formulation of any Multi-National Force must have the support of the UN, failing this, it must have the support of at least a large section of the international community for its

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

cover story PEACEKEEPING: GRIM REALITY

Some of the important internationally sensitive issues are: International Humanitarian Laws; International Laws of Armed Conflict; Sensitivity towards Casualties; Transparency and the End State (final desired outcome) 46

the overall directions of UN-DPKO. However, deployment of Indian troops outside the UN flag or as part of coalition formed by a group of nations like the one in Iraq has its own ramifications. Important issues to be kept in mind before taking this decision are: International Opinion: The international opinion towards the conflict situation would need to be respected keeping in mind our national interests and international relations with affected nation state.

in tune with our policy and overall acceptance. Our adversaries as one of the partners, may not be agreeable to us.

Consent of Host Nation: The consent of the Host Nation must be the most important factor for our deployment.

Command and Control: Command and control arrangements must be clearly spelt out and agreeable to us. Our deployment must be under the UN Flag or the National Flag.

National Opinion: The overall National Opinion may need to be generated for a wider acceptance domestically, which may be difficult to bring about. National Policy: This will also demand review of our National Policy and may set a precedence. Thus a general consensus would be mandatory among the Ministries of External Affairs, Defence, Finance and the Defence Services. Coalition Partners: The selection of coalition partners and their mission must be

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Availability of Troops: The affordability to milk-out the required troops under prevailing security situation in our country is an important factor for us to remember and must be given due consideration. The Mandate: The deployment must be with a clear-cut and mutually agreed and achievable mandate.

Structure of MNF No two Multi-National Forces will have similar organisations as conditions under which they are likely to operate, the nature of conflict, availability of trained troops, the availability of political and civilian infrastructure in the conflict zone and a host of other factors will determine the strength and the composition of a MultiNational Force. Thus a suggested organisation of a Multi-National Force outside the UN

umbrella must be on the similar lines with one additional chain of command i.e. the National Command. This would provide a national representation at all levels and also grant a coalition partner a degree of independence and guard the interest of participating nations against any undue pressure from the lead nation. Key issues of this proposed structure are:

the power of veto.

● The Multi-National Force HQ integrates Staff Representatives from each of the Coalition members into the planning process itself. ● The Tactical Commanders must have their say in the planning process including development of courses of action, and rest of priorities of efforts. ● Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be equally applicable to all coalition members. ● Intelligence sharing must be done as a matter of routine. ● Each Tactical Commander must be independent in his decisions for his tactical planning to accomplish the required mission. ● Each of the Force though loyal to the coalition, must either serve under a common internationally recognized flag like UN or under their respective National Flag. ● National Command chain should have

Resistance to Command: Notwithstanding the Command and Control structure proposed it is felt that the Multi-National Force HQ and its staff is going to be de facto the headquarters, which will be calling the shots. In such situations the predominant partners are likely to thrust coalition partners with additional tasks, including those, which may not be desirable for them to perform. Notwithstanding the fact that coalition partners are not obliged to carry out all tasks entrusted to them, it is felt that reluctance to carry out such tasks would lead to a bad working relationship. The solution to this is:

Tackling macro issues From experience it emerges that in spite of well defined organisation, there can be many macro level problems and contentious issues such as Command and Control that will continue to dog such coalitions. Let us dwell upon some of these problems.

National Representative: It is a considered opinion that the Senior National Representative should be a three star General for a country contributing a force of a division size as part of the Multi-

National Force. This is essential as dealing with a Commander who would probably be a four star rank, would require a sufficiently senior officer with experience, vision, perspective and tact. This officer should obviously be senior to the Divisional Commander. Integrated Staff: In addition coalition partners should have a say in operational tasking, intelligence gathering, etc. as also on the political and logistic side of the Headquarters and they should have their officers holding senior appointments in all the branches. Tendency to Disobey: In spite of a welldefined mandate and ROE, there is tendency to remaining tied to peace keeping vis-a- vis peace enforcement. Thus, coalition partners if asked to enforce peace tend to disobey such orders. This needs to be handled with tact and firmness. Resistance to Change: Once worked out and mutually agreed to deployment of forces must not be changed, as it has serious implication. However, a tendency always persists among dominant partners to affect changes. These will invariably be resisted and in turn lead to problems of command and control.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

cover story PEACEKEEPING: GRIM REALITY

Contentious issues Some other contentious issues are: Peace-Keeping vis-a-vis Peace Enforcement: In the understanding with Multi-National Force HQ it should be made clear whether troops will have to operate under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Only then would coalition partners be prepared for the use of force if a situation develops. There should be no ambiguity on the conduct of operations. Status of Force Agreement (SOFA): Not having a Status of Force Agreement with the host nation, as in Iraq, is a contentious issue. In fact all coalition partners, no matter what their interest would be guilty of transgressing on foreign soil and forcing their will. This has major International legal implications even retrospectively. Intelligence Sharing: Intelligence sharing has been defined as one of the pre-requisite in planning process with coalition partners and must be stressed in all circumstances. Nevertheless one must plan to create ones intelligence set-up. Exit Clause: While becoming a part of a Multi-National Force, the MultiNational Force HQ needs to put into place an exhaustive exit clause for all the

troops deployed in the conflict zone. In the absence of this, one must have ones own exit plan and get the same approved by the Strategic Planning Group (SPG). Depending upon circumstances, one must retain the option to withdraw at ones own accord. Rules of Engagement (ROE): Rules of Engagement have to be very carefully worked out, as the slightest mistake is likely to land coalition partners in an embarrassing situation. The Army Headquarters should draft the same, and, senior officials from the MoD and MEA should be incorporated in the drafting. Communication with Home Country: Before joining a Multi-National Force, one should make it amply clear that all actions will be vetted and approved by home country, it is essential to be able to communicate / carry out confidential communications with the home country on matters that affect the contingent and there should be no restrictions imposed on this account. Logistic Support: This aspect is generally left vague by the major coalition players. In a country ravaged by sanctions spreading over a decade and which has witnessed two wars, including the recent one, resources are going to be at a premium. Hence logistics are going to be a

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

nightmare and this issue cannot be taken lightly. In conclusion it would be pertinent to add that in the present form the UN itself has its own limitations and MNFs have become a fact of life. Whether, we as a nation choose to be part of such MNFs is a decision that has to be taken at the national level after a lot of deliberation. It is also felt it is time to continue to press for restructuring of the Security Council by giving a larger role to other nations rather than limiting it to Permanent Five. As far as we are concerned this is an opportunity where India can play a meaningful role in the international politics and strive further to attain its rightful place in the world. The writer retired as Master General of Ordnance, Army Headquarters. A fourth generation officer, who was commissioned into the Infantry in 1965. During 40 years service in the Indian Army he has held various prestigious command and staff appointments which include command of a Brigade deployed in the highest battlefield in the world, a division in the desert and a corps in active insurgency areas. As UN Force Commander in Sierra Leone November 1999 to October 2000. He executed the highly acclaimed "Operation Khukri" which broke the back of the rebels.

red terror MOUNTING MENACE

MAOISTS:

Dr S K Mishra

the gravest threat It is a problem that has been creeping up on the nation since Naxalbari happened on May 25, 1967. West Bengal managed to contain it for a time with some admirable land reforms but without concomitant development it has proved to be a half-measure. Many other factors have now been identified as symptoms to describe the urge to break out of a dehumanized existence. Like all solutions there are always hurdles between the thought and the act. The NREGA programme, for example, has had to be modified in mid-stride. The surrender policy too has some loopholes that will need to be plugged. Nonetheless, as the ground realities indicate, the time to act with an iron fist is overdue. December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

red terror MOUNTING MENACE

Naxal attacks

1431

1591

1600

1509

1608

1800

Civilians killed

1565

Security forces killed

1400 1200 1000

2008

251 273

231

2007

157

200

236

460

521

600

490

800 400 0 2005

2006

2009 (15 Oct)

YEAR

Ruthless approach We should follow a ruthless approach towards Naxalites who commit heinous crimes. National security should be our top priority. If the police are unable to tackle Maoists, what is the harm in deploying the armed forces? There is no doubt that the Naxal insurgency is the gravest threat to our internal national security. Issue of national security concerns all of us. The first question that arises regarding the concept of security as the most important element of national interest is, security of what? The most popular answer is that security means preservation of the territorial integrity, or, in other words, the boundaries of the States. But this answer is inadequate for several reasons. Sovereignty can be surrendered or compromised through treaties, agreements, alliances or simply the domination of a small State by a big and powerful one, without the loss of territorial integrity. Neither territorial integrity without full sovereignty nor sovereignty without full territorial integrity can be considered to be true security. But problem does not end there when faced with the threat of hopeless war against a much more powerful State, some States surrender both territorial integrity and sovereignty without any resistance in order to save the life and property of the people1. The other aspect that comes to the fore is that the external security of the State is closely interlinked with its internal security. This is almost a truism, but the difficulty arises

Red Terror incidents of last five years

524

Unfortunately, in India, we have an unhealthy obsession with secrecy, particularly when we deal with affairs of the State. That is why most of the thinking about national security issues have been by and large, confined solely to the relevant government departments and various security and intelligence agencies. In most other countries security issues are regularly discussed in various think-tank groups and educationists and these discussions provide the authorities with fresh ideas and new insights that help them in tackling these problems. Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh has dubbed the Maoists the biggest threat to India's internal security, a fair point since jihadis, the more discussed threat, have not yet succeeded in taking over an Indian city the way Maoist did last year in Jehanabad on

153

because there are two different connotations in which term “internal security” is generally used. First, it is understood sometimes to mean the stability and performance of a particular Constitution or a particular government or form of government, which is to be safeguarded against violent opposition to it. Secondly, by internal security is meant the stability, viability, and performance of the State itself as an international personality, which is to be defended against violently anarchical or disorderly forces which threaten its very existence directly from within or by so weakening it that it falls an easy prey to external aggression or domination2. The problems of internal security cannot be treated as a mere law and order issue. They have a much bigger dimension and should be recognised as such. Complacency towards

DAMAGE

he spate of Maoist attacks in West Bengal, Jharkhand and Bihar is shocking. Maoist atrocities are on the increase and the governments at the Centre and the States appear ineffective. Despite the joint operations launched by the security forces, the wave of attacks by the ultras continues unabated. Their actions cause heavy damage to public property and infrastructure, and lead to a loss of human lives. It is as if we are in a war-like situation. The Centre should consider deploying the armed forces to combat the Naxal menace as the police forces seem unable to put an end to it. In September 2009, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh had called the Naxalite insurgency the single greatest threat to the nation's internal security. Maoists should be put down with an iron hand as almost all efforts to engage them in a dialogue have failed. They obstruct government agencies from undertaking development work. But the other statement of Prime Minister that he is not in favour of using the armed forces against Naxalites is shocking. What are we waiting for - “more bloodbath”? Do we want Naxalism to spread its tentacles in the same way as terrorism?

and appeasement of anti-social and violent movements will only generate enormous instability and insecurity for the society at large.

External dimension All of us have been involved in maintaining national security i.e. the integrity and sovereignty of the nation, which, in the current environment is threatened by internal as well as external security threats. The dividing line between internal and external security challenges is getting blurred day by day, since the possibilities of armies of any country invading others' frontiers are rather remote. Instead, the external threat has acquired new form in which it is being replaced by cross border terrorism, global terrorism, illegal infiltration and migration, narco-terrorism or even the looming threat of chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism. These together with prevailing internal environment in the country pose a serious threat, a serious challenge to our security3.

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

the night of 13 November4. Dr Singh is right in saying that response to the Maoist threat must be two-legged. The left insists it is a political problem while the right approaches it as a law and order issue - the truth is that it is both. A democratic society must operate on the basis of norms that preclude violence.

Huge ambience The Naxalite Problem, till date has not found favour for serious discussion, primarily because it has never been treated as an issue which deserved national attention and was treated as a socio-economic problem or at best law and order problem of the concerned State government. Unfortunately, the threat to internal security from Naxalites has acquired dangerous proportions and can no longer be wished away. A new challenge to our national security is fast emerging on the country's horizon in the shape of Naxalite problem, its phenomenal growth and spread to 223 districts of 20 Indian States. These make up roughly a quarter of the country. In

several States, like Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh, they are still insignificant. In West Bengal, where the movement began, it went into eclipse for almost two decades and has only recently shown signs of revival. The Naxalites are believed to be well equipped to fight security forces and strike at will anywhere using sophisticated weapons. Naxalite activities have acquired considerable strength in terms of geographical reach and intensity to strike in the last few years5. We must know who are Naxalites and when and how did the Naxalite movement originate. Naxalites, also sometimes referred to as Naxals, is an informal name given to revolutionary Communist groups waging a violent struggle to establish a people's government through a people's war. They claim to represent most oppressed people like the adivasis, dalits and poor, who work as landless labourers, against those wielding power like landlords. The Naxalite movement takes its name from a militant

peasant uprising that took place in 1967 at Naxalbari village in Darjeeling district, West Bengal. On May 25, 1967, local goons attacked a tribal youth, who having obtained a judicial order went to plough his land. In retaliation, the tribals attacked landlords and started capturing back their lands. From this Naxalbari uprising came the word Naxalite6.

Deprivation the cradle It is also significant that the Naxals have their presence in a broad zone within the heartland of India, in what is considered the least developed region of the country. They are active in Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, eastern Maharashtra, the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, and western Orissa. They mostly operate out of jungles, which are continuous in these regions. The erstwhile PWG's main sphere of influence was in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and eastern Maharashtra, while the MCC was active in Bihar, Jharkhand and northern

The problems of internal security cannot be treated as a mere law and order issue. They have a much bigger dimension and should be recognised as such. Complacency towards and appeasement of anti-social and violent movements will only generate enormous instability and insecurity for the society at large

Chhattisgarh. As many as 223 districts in these States are officially listed as affected by Naxalite violence. This area shares several common features: First, it is one of the country's poorest parts not only in terms of income but in the quality of governance. The people are not merely poor, they have also been virtually abandoned by the State. Second, it is relatively rich in both mineral and forest resources. Third, its agriculture is, for the most part, rain-fed and precarious (the southern Gangetic plain in Bihar is an exception). Last, as in the original homes of the movement in Mayurbhanj, West Bengal, and Wyanand, Kerala, a disproportionately high share of the population is tribal. Put these features together and one begins to get an inkling of where the Naxalite movement draws its sustenance from. It is not poverty; it is not even political disempowerment. It is the victimisation of an identifiable segment of Indian society by the forces of capitalist development7. The need is to identify the root causes of Naxal problem and evolve a comprehensive plan to check it. Naxalites are composed primarily of youth, and through them they carry out their operation and activities. Is it not important to find out why the youth, particularly the tribals join Naxalite outfits? After all the life of a Naxal is not a bed of roses. The youth seeing no hope of improving socio-economic condition are alienated from the mainstream society. They are disenchanted and share a feeling of discontent against the society, a society which is nothing but the creation of the State. A society which has offered them nothing. Naxalites are not foreigners and they, like any Indian citizen, are part of the same country in which we live. The Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh mentioned that lack of development as one of the reasons for Naxalism. He does not understand that it is not the lack of development but the type of development that is the cause of Naxalism. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister's meeting ended by treating Naxalism as a serious internal security issue to be dealt with by security forces. But the PM did not realise that this solution will create many more Naxalites in future. Fact is that in the name of development, large number of people are being turned into refugees. They have nowhere to go. Losing everything in their villages, when they reach cities, desperate to find employment and start a new way of life, they are hounded out by the police and branded as a criminals. Their jhuggis are again destroyed by the State in the name of development. Their very existence on earth is illegal. No one wants them. Solutions cannot be found through

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

red terror MOUNTING MENACE stipend will be discontinued. Besides, an immediate grant of Rs. 1.5 lakh will be kept in a bank in the name of surrenderee as a fixed deposit which may be withdrawn by the surrenderee after completion of three years, subject to good behaviour to be certified by the authorities designated for this purpose by the State concerned.

15000

Detonators (electronic)

Detonators (others)

500

1000

5000

3000

Myriad threats 3000

5000

1000

10000

1000

10000

15000 5000

Rate (Rs)

20000

3000

25000

20000

30000

25000

Surrender offer by government

India faces so many internal threats from (i) insurgency inspired by ethnic and tribal identities and a desire to achieve some kind of autonomy from the centre; (ii) Left-wing radicalism and extremism motivated by a dissatisfaction with the prevailing socioeconomic order which it desires to overthrow through armed revolution and guerrilla activities; (iii) communal conflict, fomented by religious fundamentalism; and (iv) caste conflicts including attacks against scheduled castes and tribes11. These threats pose a grave challenge to the unity and development of India as a nation-State and impinge on our national security. For a change there is determination to fight the menace with all means available to the government. The battle against Maoists is total and must be fought to the only conceivable end - the end of the Maoist insurgency.

violence. But what would you have done if you were put in such a situation? Almost every city, town and village in our country is fertile for Naxalite activity. The manner in which jhuggies are being mercilessly destroyed by government even cities might become a hot-bed for Naxalites. Centuries back, the Pandavas demanded just five villages from Kauravas. The Kauravas refusal led to Mahabharata, one of the bloodiest battles ever fought. Today the poor are just demanding to retain their homes and livelihood. Another Mahabharata would be fought if government continues rendering them homeless and jobless8.

Rural neglect The roots of the problem are in the bleak socio-economic conditions of our country, especially the deep rural areas which have been neglected, and have seen either no or very little developmental activity. Development of not only the Naxal infested areas but the other interior remote parts of the country should be given its due attention. Perhaps then only this age old problem will gradually disappear as it once appeared. Till this happens the slogan "Lal Salam" will continue to inspire fear even in the strongest of hearts9. Unfortunately, the threat to internal security from Naxalites has acquired dangerous proportions and can no longer be wished away. Today Naxalites are involved in killing, kidnappings, abduction, extortion, improvised explosive device (IED) blasts and

Grenades/Hand and stick grenades

Rockets

VHF/HF Communication sets

Pistol/Revolver

Mines

Ammunition of all types (per round)

Arms

AK 47/56/74 rifle

Explosive material (per kg)

Remote control

Satellite phone

Wireless set (Short range)

Wireless set (Long range)

Missile

Sniper rifle and LMG

destruction of property. In 2001, nine Naxal outfits of India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka came together to form an umbrella organisation, the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations with the aim of coordinating activities in south Asia. Nepal is currently in the grip of Maoist insurgency with most of its districts under their control. Intelligence agencies claim that Naxals in India have close links with the Nepalese Maoist outfits10.

China factor Next to China and sharing a porous border with Nepal, the Himalayan State of Uttaranchal is giving jitters to the security establishment. A warning has been sounded that the State has emerged as the catchment region for Maoists. Singled out as an area of concern in the Coordination Centre on Naxalism, it is now touching the expanding Red Corridor. Jolted out of its slumber, Uttaranchal has sent its police into the rugged terrain to comb out any Naxalites in hiding, after being warned of such a possibility. The outlawed Red leadership in its stronghold of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh recently decided to give a special thrust to Uttaranchal after finding it lagging in revolutionary activities. The information has sent warning bells ringing in the intelligence establishment. With Pithoragarh, Champawat and Uddham Singh Nagar districts serving as a gateway for men and arms from Maoist strongholds in

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Nepal, it is felt if surreptitious armed activity gains root, the tough terrain, with forests and isolated hills, would make it virtually impossible to control. Uttaranchal is also seen as a transit route for Naxalites from Nepal to other States. India is at war with its own people. It does not sound nice; it may even smack of exaggeration. But truth is that under the flag of an extremist ideology, various factions of Naxalism had declared a war against the Indian State quite some time ago. Despite this assessment, no government in the concerned state and centre has been able to chalk out a meaningful strategy, to tackle what officials call the Naxal / Maoist menace. Naxalites and Maoists are a group of extremists with no belief in parliamentary democracy and in our Constitution. Naxalites and Maoists believe that power comes out of the barrel of the gun. Tough terrain, forest, isolated hills could become catchment region for Maoists and Naxalites. The government has been following a flip-flop policy regarding the Naxalites. This policy has contributed to the growth and expansion of the groups. Failure of governance, effective policy and apathy of various State governments have enabled the scattered dalams (units) and groups of the past to become efficient fighting groups sometimes operating in units of hundreds. The Naxal menace, if not checked well in time, will eat into India's body politic because Naxalism has already spread to 20 States and 223 districts in India, has serious

The writer is Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at Government Post-Graduate College, Hissar (Haryana). He has written 29 books and more than thousand articles and research articles on Defence Studies and allied subjects published in national and international magazines and newspapers. Awarded the First and Third Prizes for Original and Quality writing on Defence related issues in Hindi by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, continuously for two years.

References implication for our security concerns and needs to be controlled on priority.

Surrender policy The Centre, which usually remains tightlipped about the kind of weapons the Maoists have, has in its new guidelines for surrender-cum-rehabilitation of Naxalites indicated that the Red ultras' arsenal no longer consists of only looted police weapons. They could, in fact, also have deadlier one - sniper rifles and surface-to-air missiles - which the ultras might have procured from outside. The government, through the guidelines for the Naxal-affected States, offer different amounts as â&#x20AC;&#x153;additionalâ&#x20AC;? incentives to those ultras who may surrender with such weapons. Sniper rifles, rockets, missiles and light machine guns which can even target low-

flying helicopters and other long distance targets attract higher incentives to Naxalites if they surrender with such weapons. "The incentive given for surrender of the arms will be deposited in the form of a fixed deposit in the joint names of the surrenderee and a State government nominee and may be given to the surrenderee at the time of completion of three years after surrender, subject to good behaviour by the surrenderee," said the guidelines. The guidelines are applicable to even those Naxalites who surrender without arms. Under the scheme, the government will impart training to surrenderees in a trade / vocation of their liking or aptitude. They will also be paid a monthly stipend of Rs. 2,000 each for a maximum period of 36 months. However, if the surenderee secures any employment in the government or any gainful self-employment, the monthly

1. J Bandoypadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy. 2. J Bandoypadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy. 3. Lt Gen KM Seth, Naxalite Problem, USI Journal, Jan-March, 2005. 4. Editorial, Times of India, April 17, 2006. 5. Arvind Kejriwal, Times of India, June 2, 2006. 6. Times of India, Nov. 21, 2005, New Delhi. 7. Sahara Times, Sept. 24, 2005, New Delhi. 8. Arvind Kejriwal, Times of India, June 2, 2006. 9. Times of India, Nov. 21, 2005, New Delhi. 10. Hindustan Times, April 21, 2005, New Delhi 11. Annual Defence Report, 2005-06, Government of India

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society vice PARALYSING SCOURGE All postulates about corruption be it the greased palm or speed money or chacha-batija affiliation need to be trotted out and reexamined. Could it be that there are so many tomes on police reforms because nobody really understood the problem? Or has it become a way of life that everyone wishes would go away but nobody is able to find out how? Here are some suggestions… autilya in his Arthashastra says, “Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the King’s revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants employed in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money for themselves.” This is the legacy that we have inherited. This mindset prevailed not only in the Middle Ages during the Pathan-Moghul period but also continued during the British times. While the higher echelons of the bureaucracy in the British days remained more or less free of corruption, it was the lower functionaries who were found to be very corrupt. This was particularly so in the police hierarchy and this has been recorded in the Police Commission appointed at the turn of the 20th century. The British rule which was totally an alien dispensation, had nothing to do with the democratic aspirations of the people and as such, did not pay much attention to the wrong doings by the lowest strata of the administration.

curse of corruption

Money reigns It was unfortunate that even after the country gained Independence, things did not improve much. The political bosses who came to rule the country failed to infuse values which would have created an accountable and transparent system. There were several causes for this. The social systems that prevailed laid over-emphasis on money value as the measure of one's importance in the society. Further, over the years elections have become more and more expensive in the sense that the candidates have to spend crores of rupees in their campaigns before they can be elected. This is in spite of the fact that there are set rules which limit the spending by the candidates

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during the election process. This is however easily by-passed by spending in various indirect methods. This is a huge price which we have to pay for sustaining our democracy. At the same time it calls for very stringent reforms in this regard so that the rules already in place cannot be S Banerjee IPS subverted by the corrupt elements.

Nepotism Another social factor that directly leads to corruption is the prevalence of the caste system throughout the country which supports nepotism and thereby promotes corruption. The caste system also casts its dark shadow over the elections and tends to favour candidates of particular castes in various pockets at the cost of the more deserving ones. This is a direct loss to the society and militates against the values that help to introduce a more transparent and accountable system. Complicated rules and red tape also come to the aid of the corrupt elements

Re-do legal framework One way out of the stranglehold of this vicious system would be to re-visit the underlying principles of the legal framework dealing with the cases of corruption. Under the prevailing system, the level of proof that is required is, "beyond reasonable doubt". This causes problems as more often than not it is difficult to provide water-tight cases against the corrupt elements, who as stated earlier, take advantage of the legal cushions and are protected by the "tribalism" amongst the corrupt elements. The way out would be to

Transparency must be brought about hand in hand with the reforms to bring about accountability. The Right to Information Act 2005 was a very important step in this direction who ask for speed money for even doing their normal duties. Added to this are the legal cushions of safety which go in favour of the corrupt. This happens because under the prevailing laws one is presumed to be innocent till one is proved guilty. Thus, very often, the corrupt elements and particularly the kingpins in the chain, go scot free not only because of the loopholes in the legal system but also because of the "tribalism" amongst the corrupt elements. This causes a very serious concern.

adopt the principle of "preponderance of probability", as the level of proof in cases of corruption which could be more easily provided by those who deal with cases of corruption. The Transparency International conducted a study entitled, 'India Corruption Study - 2005' which was released by Admiral (Retd) RH Tahiliani in July 2005. According to this study, Indians pay Rs. 21,000 crore as bribes. This figure would have definitely gone up in the subsequent years. In this the police tops

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society vice PARALYSING SCOURGE society? So far as accountability is concerned, it has two aspects, the “broader” and the "narrower" ones. The "broader” aspects cover primarily the expenditure of public funds in respect of various public expenditure. This covers the accountability of the managers, the parliamentary control over various ministries, etc. The "narrower" aspects deal primarily with the rules, regulations, laws, procedures, and so on. These must be simplified and red-tapism cut to the minimum.

Police objectivity

same time, we must evolve systems which would militate against corruption throughout the criminal justice system, be it the legislature, executive, judiciary, or the jails. Accountability and transparency in all our dealings, both public and private, must be our “mantra” so that it has a cascading effect in the society. So how do we bring about accountability and transparency in the

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Amongst all the government departments, the role of the police in public life is perhaps the most important. This is because the police deals with all sections of the society and is often misused by the powers that be to meet their own ends. The accountability of this department is therefore of great importance to public life. Investigations by the police are in the nature of adjudications on various issues between individuals and groups. It is therefore necessary that the police procedures have an in-built arrangement so as to maintain objectivity in their dealings with the public. This state of affairs cannot be attained unless and until reforms are brought about in the police system. It would be pertinent to note that even today the police in India is governed by the Police Act of 1861. This was an Act put together by the British after the events of 1857 with the sole purpose of perpetuating their alien rule. It had nothing to do with meeting the democratic aspirations of the people, involving the people in the police administration, or of introducing the kind of accountability and transparency which are essential in a democratic system of governance.

Police reforms Police reforms are therefore the crying need of the day. Although several attempts have been made by various States and the Government of India to bring about police reforms, in fact, very little has been achieved till now. Ten States, namely Kerala (1959), West Bengal (1960-61), Bihar (1961), Punjab (1961), Maharashtra (1964), Madhya Pradesh (1966), Uttar Pradesh (1970-71), Assam (1971), Tamil Nadu (1971) and Andhra Pradesh (1984) had set up Police Commissions but little or nothing came about by way of police reforms. The Government of India had also set up the following commissions for police reforms: 1) Gore Committee on Police Training (1971-73), 2) National Police Commission (1977-81), 3) Ribeiro

Committee on Police Reforms (1998), 4) Padmanabhaiah Committee on Police Reforms (2000), 5) Group of Ministers on National Security (2000-2001), 6) Malimath Committee on Reforms of the Criminal Justice System (2002-03), 7) Review Committee on Reform of the Criminal Justice System (2002-03), 8) Review Committee on Police Reforms (2005) and 9) Soli Sorabjee Committee to draft a Model Police Act (2006). Even after so much of work, nothing concrete has been achieved. Even the draft submitted by the Soli Sorabjee Committee to replace the Police Act of 1861 is yet to be formalised. Here it may be noted that in 1996 a PIL was filed in the Supreme Court requesting for directions to the State Governments to implement the recommendations of the National Police Commission. It took the Supreme Court ten years to deliver its verdict in 2006 that reforms must take place. The Government of India and the States were asked to implement the following seven directives of the Court in this regard: (i) Set up a State Security Commission (SSC). (ii) Ensure two years' tenure for DGP and introduce a transparent selection procedure. (iii) Ensure two years' tenure for police officers on operational duties. (iv) Separate Law and Order from Crime Investigation. (v) Set up a Police Establishment Board (PEB). (vi) Set up a Police Complaint Authority (PCA). (vii) Set up a National Security Commission (NSC).

Supreme Court directives It is distressing to note that the States have found ways and means of by-passing these directives and while some have passed Acts which have actually not been implemented on ground or have simply not adhered to the directives to bring about the reforms. This is a great tragedy because if we now miss this opportunity then it is quite likely that the police reforms would be put permanently on the backburner and the corrupt elements would be encouraged further. In this scenario the media in the country, which fortunately is very vibrant

and is in a position to influence public opinion, needs to take the lead role. Debates on the various aspects of the police reforms and the ways and means of implementing the Supreme Court directives must be activated both in the print and the electronic media so that a public consciousness emerges to bring about the much needed reforms. In this the civil society and particularly the NGOs who deal with human rights and are concerned with the level of corruption within the society, must take the lead and

work towards building up a national consciousness through whatever means at their command, including publicity through the media to bring about the desired results.

Accountability and transparency If we consider accountability in public life to be one arm of the anti-corruption drive, transparency in public life must be considered as the second arm. Transparency must be brought about hand in hand with the reforms to bring about accountability. The Right to Information Act 2005 was a very important step in this direction. This Act envisages that

democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and in containing corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed. While speaking on the Right to Information Act in Parliament on May 11, 2005, the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, said, "I believe that the passage of this Bill will see the dawn of a new era in our processes of governance, an era of performance and efficiency, an era, which will ensure that benefits of growth flow to all sections of our people, an era which will eliminate the scourge of corruption, an era which will bring the common man's concern to the heart of all processes of governance, an era which will truly fulfill the hopes of the founding fathers of our Republic". Although the scenario with regard to corruption seems to be grim at present we must take heart from the strengths within our society. We have already discussed about the key role that our vibrant media can play in arousing the national consciousness against corruption. We must also take cognizance of the fact that the top level of our bureaucracy, police personnel, technocrats, managerial experts and others are of the highest quality and rank amongst the best in the world. It is important that this set of leaders lead by their personal examples of integrity and transparency. Such examples would inspire their juniors to follow their paths. This would also help in deterring the corrupt elements from pursuing their nefarious activities. We must also recognise the fact that today we have a very well educated and talented young political class who are now trying to come on their own and play a leading role in the political system of the country. It is extremely important for the civil society to support such young talent who have a vision for India, to enable it to take a lead in world affairs. At the end of the day, it is we the people who have to change ourselves. No one else can. The writer was Director General of Police and Director, Anti Corruption Bureau. He is recipient of President's Police Medal for Meritorious Services.

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nuclear warfare HEADWAY

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Arun Kumar Singh

deterrence

Nuclear deterrence is a mind-game. It works if you are able to convince the enemy that going beyond a point in conventional warfare could invite retaliation with weapons of mass destruction with consequences that should be unacceptable for any sane nation to put its people to that kind of imperilment. Pakistan is using the threat of “First Use” of nuclear weapons if India tries to use its superior conventional warfare capability to resolve the Kashmir issue once and for all. India says our nuclear weapons will be used only in retaliation but would Pakistan, with only a sliver of strategic depth, be able to survive as a nation-State? One way to ensure that deterrence really works is by putting nuclear weapons on nuclear-propelled submarines. he Indian Navy, which commissioned its first conventional submarine, the INS Kalvari on 8 December 1967 (8 December is celebrated as Submarine Arm Day), briefly entered the nuclear submarine age on 5 January 1988, with the induction of INS Chakra on a three year lease. Now if media reports are to be believed, the Navy may re-enter the exclusive nuclear submarine club in 2010. As the Indian Navy celebrates Navy Day on 4 December 2009, it may be worthwhile examining the intricacies of nuclear subs, their roles and weapons.

Underwater endurance Most people are aware of the advantages of a nuclear propelled submarine, and believe that it has "unlimited endurance" underwater, and indeed the only limitation is human endurance (estimated at 90 days, though in the Falklands war, a British SSN, returned to harbour after 116 days at sea, with its rations practically finished). The world's first SSN, the USS Nautilus was commissioned on 30 Sep 1954, and commenced nuclear propulsion on 17 January 1955. Its reactor required refuelling after two years, with the Nautilus having steamed 62,000 nautical miles (nm), thus catering for about 100 days at sea in a year at economical speed. This was because the reactor of the Nautilus was fuelled with LEU (Low Enriched Uranium). Uranium 235 (U235) is used as reactor fuel, because it provides enormous flexibilty of operations. Indeed all new generation of shore based nuclear power plants being imported from Russia, France, USA, Canada etc after the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, also use LEU, which is relatively “safe”.

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In the last two decades the 2300 ton, French Amythest class SSNs, have an improved reactor design (with better metallurgy and "Medium Enriched Uranium" or MEU), which enables them to sail for 240 days in a year, and refuel every seven years.

Headway The present generation of US Navy SSNs and SSBNs use HEU (High Enriched Uranium) with advanced metallurgy, which enables a refuelling cycle of 33 years, and sailing one million nm. The next generation of American submarine reactors, of the same size, will have 30 per cent more energy, thus permitting even higher transit speeds and greater operational availabilty cum flexibilty, since reactor fuel change takes about one year. Use of HEU in submarine reactors requires complex safety measures to be in place, since in all reactors constant neutron bombardment makes metal brittle. Hence any leak in the reactor system could lead to LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident), which in a HEU reactor could be catastrophic, if superior “leak proof” metallurgy and inbuilt fool proof safety “reactor cooling” measures are not incorporated in the fuel and reactor design. Very high standards of crew training are essential. The world’s first SSBN, the USS George Washington was commissioned on 30 December 1959, and it carried 16 Polaris A1, nuclear missiles (known as SLBM or Submarine Launched Ballastic Missiles) having a range of 1200 nautical miles. Fortyone such SSBNs were built and the USS George Washington fired the world's first SLBM submerged on 20 July 1960. Indeed

all subsequent nuclear submarine building nations (USSR, UK, France and China) first built SSNs and then SSBNs. India is the first nation, to have built the SSBN, before building an SSN, indicating that it had confidence in building SLBMs.

Arihant A large number of “experts” have written numerous articles after India's strategic nuclear submarine, Arihant was launched on July 26, 2009 by Mrs Gursharan Kaur, wife of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Also, nuclear scientists proudly unveiled the “half boat” or the shore-based miniaturised nuclear reactor at Kalpakkam on July 29, 2009. Earlier, in February 2008, the Defence Research and Development Organisation made an unprecedented announcement in the press about the testing of an SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile). In my opinion, the unnecessary publicity given to these three events should have been avoided. The nation - in keeping with worldwide practice - should have announced only the commissioning, post-successful sea and weapon trials of the Arihant which is the first in its class.

“Fizzle” controversy Unfortunately, in a hurry to get individual achievements lauded, a lot of premature and needless publicity was given. Hopefully, no “short cuts” were taken, and this project will fructify as planned, without being affected by the recent “fizzle” controversy surrounding our 1998 thermonuclear test. Indeed, in my opinion the needless controversy over the Pokharan II thermonuclear tests, has degraded the

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nuclear warfare HEADWAY credibilty of our nuclear deterrent, since deterrence is essentially a mind game. I have visited five cities in China, four in Pakistan and all our major cities in India. I have also visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki. My opinion is that given our overcrowded Asian cities, and massive populations, a 15 to 20 KT fission device will more than suffice to deter, though higher yield fission boosted and thermonuclear weapons, would give the country an "equal seat" on the nuclear weapons high table. This article tries to explain, in simple terms, the unclassified, but misunderstood mysteries of a nuclear submarine. Let us begin with the miniaturised reactor (known as PWR or pressuried water reactor, similar to the Light Water Reactors, being imported for civilian power plants post the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008). I have already discussed the reactor fuelling cycle, and will now clarify other aspects. Common sense dictates that with a submarine crew living, eating and working within 20 to 50 metres of the submarine reactor need to be “safe” from radioactive materials, that is, alpha and beta particles, and gamma radiation. Hence, the submarine

produce the least noise. Another issue repeatedly mentioned by the “experts” is the reactor power and why we need an SSBN to have higher reactor power to transit at 30 knots speed. Reactor power as indicated is thermal and not electrical (eg 100 MW is 100 megawatts of thermal power). Most SSBNs need a transit speed of below 20 knots since their task is to avoid contact with enemy warships and submarines and launch their SLBMs when ordered, for a second strike.

Unfortunately, a lot of premature and needless publicity was given. Hopefully this project will fructify as planned, without being affected by the recent “fizzle” controversy surrounding our 1998 thermonuclear test. My opinion is that given our overcrowded Asian cities, and massive populations, a 15 to 20 KT fission device will more than suffice to deter reactor must be safe, simple, rugged and capable of operating in all situations that a nuclear submarine encounters on surface and underwater. Secondly, it must be silent and this stealth is achieved by ensuring that the number of pumps, specially the PHT pumps (Primary Heat Transfer pumps), that re-circulate the “closed” first loop radioactive water between the reactor core and the steam boilers, are reduced to a minimum or, in some cases, not used at low submarine speeds by having a “convection system” which does the work of the PHT pumps.

Single reactor Till the 70s, nuclear submarines used two reactors, each with steam boilers and PHT pumps for redundancy though these added to the radiated noise. But once reactor reliability was established, most advanced nations now use a single reactor for more silent operations. Theoretically, a single reliable PWR reactor, with a single steam boiler and a single PHT pump, would

Stealth Given our geographical location vis-à-vis our two nuclear-armed adversaries, an SSBN with a 20 to 24 knot speed, but with SLBMs of about 5,000 kms range, should suffice. It should be noted that SSNs (or tactical nuclear attack submarines), which are required to search for and sink enemy warships and submarines, would need higher speeds (over 30 knots, which depending on the SSN size, would require a single reactor of 160 to 200 MW or two reactors, each of about 80 to 100 MW). There are few other factors which decide submarine stealth - improved shock mounts, “rafting” (where the reactor and machinery are not in direct contact with the pressure hull), hydrodynamic hull shape, skewed propellers or the new pump jet propulsion system, “static” electrical machinery, anechoic tiling, silent weapon and garbage discharge systems among others). Similarly, greater diving depths are a combination of metallurgy, pressure hull thickness and frame spacing (steel frames are the inner skeletons

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counter insurgency SEQUESTRATION which, along with the keel, provide support to the pressure hull). For example, an expensive titaniumhulled submarine can dive to twice the depth of a modern steel-hulled submarine. Also, in case of two “similar” steel-hulled submarines, the one with a thicker pressure hull and “closer, thicker frame spacing” would dive deeper, but would pay a penalty in loss of some speed. Diving depths of submarines are a closely guarded secret, as are noise figures and weapon firing depths. A nuclear submarine also needs a system of generating oxygen and absorbing carbon dioxide and other gases, to enable human beings to live and operate in demanding conditions underwater. Production of drinkable sea water and the ability to get rid of garbage (food and human waste) are equally important and technologically demanding. Our scientists and the Navy personnel involved in work on the Arihant have indeed achieved a major milestone. However, much more needs to be done, and I hope it will be done without any unwise and unnecessary publicity.

Indigenous SSNs

Jaideep Saikia

managing

ceasefires

In addition, India now also needs to begin work on a faster, deeper-diving SSN (tactical nuclear attack submarine) to provide our Navy with a major sea denial capability in the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean. If media reports are to be believed, the Indian Navy may receive a 9,800 ton, 30-knot, deep diving, silent third generation, Russian Akula SSN in 2010. While the need for an SSBN force of about six units is self explanatory, given India's “No First Use” nuclear weapons policy, India urgently needs SSNs for area sea denial, choke point control (at the Indian Ocean choke points of the straits of Sunda, Lombak, Malacca, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden, through which all incoming and outgoing sea traffic must pass), and shadowing Chinese Navy warships and submarines, once they begin their ingress into the Indian Ocean Region after 2020. The SSNs would also be needed to disrupt Chinese sea trade (including Middle East oil), in the unlikely event of hostilities erupting. We are beginners in the field of nuclear submarining and have a long way to go, before we start celebrating. The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in -Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakhapatnam. He was Director General of the Indian Coast Guard during the Tsunami of 2004 and Commander-in-Chief of the Tri-Service, Andaman and Nicobar Command. He is also prolific writer on maritime, strategic and nuclear issues.

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counter insurgency SEQUESTRATION In the management of counter-insurgency in the North-east it is seen that prolonged ceasefires and holding surrendered militants in “designated camps” is beginning to prove counter-productive in that terrorist groups are beginning to “network” their cadres into more potent kill machines. Dispersion of past hegemonies and affiliations must be the strategy. n important aspect that New Delhi must bear in mind when it enters into a ceasefire agreement with insurgent groups is that unresolved ceasefires over long durations could witness the emergence of an “over ground movement” with an anti-India agenda. This was witnessed in the case of National Democratic Front of Bodoland when an important section of the organisation, led by its erstwhile chairman, Ranjan Daimary, set off serial explosions in Assam on 30 October 2008.

Parallel governments It must, therefore, be understood that mere cessation of hostilities does not necessarily mean cessation of violence. Indeed, apart from taking to violent activities, insurgent groups under ceasefire indulge in antisocial activities as well. The NSCN (IM), for instance, a group that has been in ceasefire mode for over 12 years, runs a parallel government in Nagaland. It flouts ground rules, collects tax and maintains camps in Bangladesh, where it regularly sends its cadres on long-range-patrols to keep them in fighting fitness. The organisation also trains and aids other insurgent groups in the region. The security forces are helpless in the face of such subterfuge by the Naga organisation. It is my considered opinion that ceasefires should not be prolonged. The path, which a peace process normally takes after a ceasefire is instituted should be less unwieldy than the one that precedes a ceasefire. Whereas the dynamics that could govern the pre-ceasefire stage can be a long-drawn-out affair, with protracted in-camera parleys, entry and engagement of intermediaries, mediators and intelligence agencies, an ably managed postceasefire situation should result in early resolution. But, most ceasefires in the North East have been prolonged affairs-leading to a slew of problems that the government is later unable to tackle.

UN observation). The ideation is to not allow a group coming into ceasefire to have access to their earlier bases of operations, where they would have certainly left a part of their arsenal. Away from others: The distance of one designated camp should be at least 500-700 kms from another. The State should ensure that the camps are not in one another's proximity - preventing easy communication, and that it is, at least, not possible for cadres to “march” from one camp to the other. Away from commercial areas: The designated camps and access from such

Away from highways: The designated camps must be away from National Highways and roads that provide easy passageway to such highways. An aspect that is noticed in Nagaland is the “collection” of “taxes” from truckers / tankers and commercial vehicles. The establishment of designated camps away from the highways would not only prevent this, but also make their movement into the heartland difficult. Camps should be located in areas where they would have to perforce pass security installations. A designated camp should be located in an area where all the approaches

Whereas the dynamics that could govern the pre-ceasefire stage can be a long-drawn-out affair most ceasefires in the North East have been prolonged affairsleading to a slew of problems that the government is later unable to tackle

Devil’s workshop mechanism must be evolved by which such activities are monitored and stopped.

Furthermore, if the policy that New Delhi wishes to advocate regarding insurgency in the North East is to enter into ceasefires after ceasefire without due process, establish designated camps and await a time when the cadres “billeted” in such camps will peacefully disperse, then it must think again. The danger of establishing back-to-back designated camps across the region, from Moreh in Manipur to Kokrajhar in Assam, could well witness the emergence of a “coalition of the willing,” and a calibrated anti-India exercise from within the region. In fact, the disillusioned insurgent groups (ceasefire instituted or non-instituted) in the region could, regardless of their intrinsic differences, construct an identity around the hostility they have towards New Delhi. Prolongation of ceasefires also leads such groups to engineer cross-organisational linkages, and if the common target of ire continues to be New Delhi, then the coalition as aforesaid is a matter of time. This would be a particularly undemanding affair given that forces such as the ISI, DGFI are all set to aid the agenda.

Inventory of arsenal: A full inventory of the arms and ammunition that an insurgent group possesses should be made by comparing the data of various intelligence agencies. Such an inventory should be given to the insurgent group coming in for ceasefire and a condition should be made at the time of the ceasefire that the holdings should be displayed. ULFA’s 28 Battalion's, “A” and “C” companies and DHD (J) have hidden a sizeable part of their arsenal. Demand for a declaration of the camps in Myanmar / Bangladesh Demand for a declaration of the list of the cadres Delink ammunition from arms: A clause should be inserted in the ceasefire guidelines that the arms and the ammunitions (duly enumerated) would be kept separately. The Ministry of Home Affairs has recently instituted a good system, by way of the double-lock system.

Blueprint for camps But in the absence of any immediate alternative, Designated Camps have to be set up after a ceasefire. However, the establishment of such camps can be laced by certain fortifications. I have studied the "Designated Camps post-ceasefire" concept and have come up with a few suggestions. These are: Inter-mixing of cadres: One of the most important strategies, which the State should evolve, is to ensure that the insurgents postceasefire do not get an opportunity to regroup-it is analysed that one of the primary objectives of any insurgent group would be to do this. To that end, the fact that should be borne in mind is that there should be multiple Designated Camps accommodating not more than 75-100 cadres per camp-the accent

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would be to not allow a togetherness of strength in any particular camp. Also, with the institution of ceasefire, the various “battalions / companies” of a particular insurgent group should be done away with, and a centralised manner of designation should be adopted. Whatever the strategy, the accent must be to separate the cadres that have grown up and trained together. Also, cadres should not be kept under the commanders they have normally worked / trained with. Away from borders: Groups such as NSCN (both factions) continue to have camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar, and some liaison camps in Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh. New Delhi should insist on the declaration and closure of such camps (if possible under the

camps must be far from commercial belts. This would drastically reduce extortion. Away from areas of socio-political influence: The designated camps should be either away from areas of socio-political influence or in places where these are not easily accessible. There should be minimal contact between the local populace and the cadres. Indeed, the non-Dimasa population of Jatinga in NC Hills has protested about the Red Cross Hospital being converted into a Designated Camp. One of the agendas of the ULFA, for instance, if and when it comes into a ceasefire, would be to reach out to the people and interact with them in order to not only indoctrinate, but wean them from the influences of the Indian State.

either pass via an army or a police camp, or has the potential for properly monitoring it. It is important to keep a strict vigilance on the comings and goings of the designated camp inmates. Distinct ground rules: New Delhi must understand that different insurgent groups should be dealt with differently. To that end, the ground rules should be group specific and not carbon copies of the ones that were prepared for the NSCN. Monitoring: It has been witnessed that cadres inside Designated Camps are not only in contact with their erstwhile or active comrades utilising mobile phones, but are also making extortion demands. A

Delink other militant groups: Groups such as NSCN should be kept away from other groups entering into ceasefire agreements. If these suggestions are implemented we may have a peaceful, vibrant and progressive North East. The writer is Security and Terrorism Analyst. Has penned a number of books and numerous academic papers on security and strategy. Has served as a Security Advisor and worked as an “Expert on North-East” in the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India. Was also member of the Indian delegation for Track II Dialogue with Bangladesh in 2007.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

defence visions FUTURE IN FOCUS

RMA: a synergetic

change In many ways, the Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA exploits the vulnerabilities of the human condition - you can paralyse the mind without recourse to violent means, you can still the striking arm before it can be raised. Warriors in all echelons of the military establishment must be encouraged to cerebrate and contribute to this new way of warfare.

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Air Marshal (Retd.) S G Inamdar

he very process of collecting, storing, processing and disseminating information now being described as Information Technology and its denial to the enemy lies at the heart of RMA. It will have its collateral beneficial fallout and significantly increase combat effectiveness by spawning four types of changes. These are: (a) Technological change (b) Systems development (c) Operational innovation, and (d) Organisational adaptation Each of these four changes is simultaneous and mutually supportive. Together, these get the RMA to impact the business end of the application of military force in four different ways.

Precision strikes Assassination of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 is a fine example of well-coordinated and wellexecuted missile strike carried out by America. Firstly, there will be an alteration in the relationship between accuracy and distance…irrespective of the Service involved. Traditionally, accuracy has diminished with distance. However, technology has progressively and significantly changed all this by extending the distance at which fire could still be very accurate. To some extent, accuracy still degrades with distance but emerging technology has made long distance stand-off strikes increasingly precise. Stealth and longdistance precision strikes will undoubtedly become the dominant dimension of air power applications, with sub-metre accuracy, even at inter-theatre distances rapidly entering the realm of possibility. Having said that, it must be admitted that in reality, such conventional strikes, however complex they may be to orchestrate, are the least radical dimension of the current RMA. That credit goes to information warfare. Secondly, therefore, what comes to the

fore is the ascendancy of information warfare which possibly represents the greatest departure yet from conservative military ethos and tradition. Information has always been a vital part of war, whether in the form of intelligence or psychological operations. Technology will increasingly impact C4ISR (Command, Control Communications, Computerisation, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) area of warfare hugely…it is already doing so…while altering the traditional relationship between operational complexity and effective command and control. Electronic and space-based methods for acquiring, analysing and disseminating information, while these will no doubt make military activity much more complex than it is today, will confer a hitherto unimaginable upgrade with regard to timeliness, synchronisation and controllability of combat at sea, on land and in the air. Information has graduated from being more than just a handmaiden of operational control - it is now a strategic asset which is both crucial and discrete. This is a seminal change reflecting the Toffler contention that information is becoming the basis of economic strength, especially in what the Tofflers call the 'Third Wave' states.

Just a “force multiplier”? Let me amplify. According to Alvin and Heidi Toffler, during the 'First Wave' of human development, production was primarily agricultural, so war sought to seize and hold territory. During the 'Second Wave', industrial production dominated, so war was often a struggle of attrition where belligerents wore down each other's capacity to feed, clothe and equip armies. 'Third Wave' warfare in the present context will seek to erode or destroy the enemy's means of collecting, storing, processing and disseminating information. But closer home, no matter which cutting edge technology is employed, for most nations like India information warfare is likely to serve only as an adjunct to conventional

strikes, more as a force multiplier than as a stand-alone method of warfare, at least for the next ten years or so. Thirdly, there will be a reduction in both casualties and collateral damage, usually associated with military combat operations. While ultra-precision conventional strikes will no doubt play a role in this, the more radical change will be the use of non-lethal weapons or the socalled 'Weapons of Mass Protection' or WMP. These would be electro-magnetic, kinetic or non-lethal chemical devices that can be used in the initial stages of a conflict to deter by denial. The aim would be to support diplomacy, to limit enemy aggression, to non-lethally disarm or dissuade him. WMP will also destroy his lethal capability with minimum damage to his non-combatants and the environment. Examples of such weapons are acoustimass sound frequency bursts, laser beams, hi-power microwaves, power-grid short circuiting tapes, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulses, hi-power jamming, obscurants, foams, glues, slicks, supercaustics, magneto-hydrodynamics, information warfare and soldier protection. Non-lethal weapons would seem to have the greatest applicability in conflicts that are just short of an all out war. Fourthly, and possibly most importantly, RMA will catalyse a rejuvenation of the political utility of military power. Due to instantaneous global communications, the pervasiveness of the electronic media and the increasingly low national tolerance for casualties (read 'body bags'), military force, as we have known it, will become less and less usable. If intolerance of war casualties becomes a key national factor, non-lethal weapons may be just the solution. These weapons would allow the world community to intervene earlier on in a crisis when a solution is more attainable or, at least, attainable at a much lower cost. Falling somewhere between a show of force and conventional military intervention,

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

disabling non-lethal weapons would either provide the necessary deterrent before the crisis develops or could defuse a crisis before it implodes.

Information supermacy Information superiority comes from successful integration of offensive and defensive information operations. With the support of an advanced common C4ISR backbone, it will be possible to respond rapidly to any conflict. Forces operating in close concert will be able to achieve a state of information superiority in near real-time that will be pervasive across the full spectrum of military operations, enabling them to dominate the conflict situation. An enunciated prognosis of the six principal components of the evolving C4ISR architecture, for the period 2010 to 2020 is: ● A ruggedised, multi-sensor information grid which will provide high fidelity situation pictures of the battle zone on a

● A sensor-to-shooter grid to enable widely dispersed joint forces to engage in coordinated targeting, cooperative engagement, integrated air defense, rapid battle damage assessment and quick follow-up strikes. ● An info-security system to protect widely distributed sensors, communications and processing networks from interference or exploitation by an adversary. ● An info-warfare capability to either penetrate, manipulate or deny battle space awareness to the enemy, on the one hand, and to make unimpeded use of his own assets, on the other.

Indian imperatives Our national leadership and strategists attempting to pursue and master the current RMA, would face the following key decisions: ● Should the RMA be pursued at all? ● What is the appropriate pace of

change? Which path of change should be

Second, a military force built around stand-off and precision weapons and disruptive information warfare capability would, because of markedly decreased enemy civilian casualties and reduced collateral damage, be more politically employable than our traditional sledgehammer military. Third, by thus removing some of the fetters on the use of military power, the RMA could augment our non-nuclear deterrents. Fourth, we need to pursue the current RMA if only to avoid sliding first into strategic inferiority and then into strategic oblivion. What we will do well to remember here is that technological development is relatively the easy part of a RMA; reshaping attitudes and adapting organisations, indoctrinating, educating and training can be extraordinarily difficult and can take eons to accomplish. Fifth, with credible evidence of China pursuing the current RMA fairly actively

A new, autonomous RMA organisation composed of analysts rather than advocates can predictably do what the RAND Corporation did for nuclear strategy in the US in 1950s. While remaining affiliated to the Indian Ministry of Defence, this RMA organisation should be staffed by a mix of civilians and armed forces officers continuous basis. A joint Army-Navy-Air Force communications network capable of realtime transmission of information to and from concerned Commanders with the necessary resilience and network management capability. ● Advanced command and control mechanisms and processes that allow employment and sustenance of globally deployed forces faster and more flexibly than what the adversaries have. ●

taken? ● How can the culmination point of the revolution be recognised and what should be done when it is reached? ● How can increased combat effectiveness be translated into strategic gain? Why should India actively pursue the current RMA? For five good reasons: First, it can significantly enhance our combat effectiveness in the immediate neighbourhood.

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

and Pakistan stirring to look in that direction, India with its very significant and cutting-edge IT and English language advantage, would be committing military hara-kiri if it did not plunge headlong into the RMA and stayed ahead at least of its neighbours.

Nodal RMA organisation So long as they are part of a conventional institution, the armed forces for example, personnel are constrained in their

creativity. A new, autonomous RMA organisation composed of analysts rather than advocates can predictably do what the RAND Corporation did for nuclear strategy in the US in 1950s. While remaining affiliated to the Indian Ministry of Defence, this RMA organisation should be staffed by a mix of civilians and armed forces officers (serving as well as retired) on short-term deputations / contracts as also those who will spend the remainder of their career / active life in the development and implementation of the RMA. The Air Force's vision of air and space warfare, through 2020, calls for "developing core competencies built on a foundation of quality personnel and integrated by battle-space awareness and advanced command and control. A favourable air and space situation or superiority will allow us freedom from attack and freedom to attack, while the Air Force's ability to attack rapidly anywhere in the region will continue to be decisive. It could make for: Rapid intra-and inter-theatre mobility and multi-role aircraft will help us respond quickly and effectively to unexpected challenges. Precision engagement will enable the Air Force to reliably apply selective force against specific targets simultaneously to achieve desired effects with minimal risk and collateral damage. Information superiority will allow the Air Force to gain and exploit information, defend own and attack enemy's information systems while denying him the ability to do the same to us. Pursuit of a genuine RMA lies at the heart of the crucial need to prepare today for an uncertain tomorrow. It also has not-so-subliminal an air power content. As air forces and navies the world over see it, 'RMA' could well be termed as a 'Revolution in Military Aviation'. If long reach, rapid response, speedy advance and quick results are the heart of the military matters in a fast and decisive engagement, military aviation, irrespective of which Service is called upon to meet that need, would seem to be the more appropriate repository and tool of the RMA!

Ideation as driving force RMA is recognised and nurtured typically by those armed forces that tolerate and, at the right time, empower the visionaries in their rank-and-file to do the needful. The decision to do so marks a vital juncture in RMA. Such a juncture cannot be legislated or ordered: it has to naturally germinate from the

structure, culture and psyche of the armed forces as well as the nation as a whole. For that to occur in India, some groundwork is in order to create the necessary pre-conditions. We need to realise that Training alone won't hoist us to that state; we would also increasingly need to Educate our men and women in uniform, for training tells you 'How' and 'What' to do while education tells you 'Why'. And that alone is suitable ground for the germination of visionaries. We need to get our Air, Flag and General Officers (such of them who do) to stop working and thinking like Flight, Ship and Company Commanders. This has often been the biggest brake on individual creativity and the biggest dampener on cerebral fertility in our middle and junior level military leadership. Individuality, out-of-the-box thinking and informed dissent must be substantively nurtured (and not merely mouthed as platitudes) without tossing basic military discipline out the window. Having said that, a word of caution may be in order here: 'Tolerating eccentricity is not the same as cultivating vision', to quote Voltaire. Unless we usher in these preconditions, the juncture that was mentioned above will not occur. A major impediment here could be our deep seated, straitjacket concept of military discipline rooted in the Victorian era. While we cannot, and also must not, jettison it overnight and mindlessly, we would need to honestly and boldly apply our mind to redefining and recasting it to bring about a smooth transition to serve the needs of RMA driven armed forces. The writer was Fighter Pilot, retired from IAF as Air Marshal in 2003. He has flown over 4700 hours on 28 different types of aircraft and commanded No 7 Squadron (The 'Battleaxes'). Disclaimer: It pertains to the original authorship or otherwise of this dissertation. All of the italicized text and some of the itemized formulations have appeared earlier in some form or the other in various books and journals on military affairs and in the official, public-domain publications of some air forces, including the IAF. These have been excerpted here verbatim to either buttress an argument or to amplify a point. To that extent, this article is more of an anthology.

PHOTOS COURTESY: DRDO

defence visions FUTURE IN FOCUS

Weapons of Mass Protection (WMP) are electro-magnetic, kinetic or non-lethal chemical devices that can be used in the initial stages of a conflict to deter by denial. The aim would be to support diplomacy, to limit enemy aggression, to non-lethally disarm or dissuade him

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

engagement FOR CONCORD

Maj Gen (Retd.) Sheru Thapliyal

Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s â&#x20AC;&#x153;four modernisationsâ&#x20AC;? have borne fruit and in the past decade it has cleared the decks of border disputes with nearly all its neighbours except India. With military and economic power at hand it has been leaning on India through a hardening-of-ties attitude, all the while making it appear as if India is the provocateur. There is method in the madness and there is a feeling that we have seen this happen before. he economic and military power of a State when coupled with factors such as its technological prowess, resources, geopolitical and geo-strategic positioning, size and quality characteristics of its population, the orientation of its foreign, domestic, and military policy, all comprise the basic constituents of Aggregate State Power (ASP) and some of the components of the relatively newer concept of Comprehensive National Power (CNP). The Chinese feel that ASP reflects "a State's capability to mobilize all of its forces and resources for social development, international influence."

Halfway there The Chinese, with an innate desire to enhance their CNP, seem to be able to match their growing military power with that of its economic strategy and successfully link it to the direction of

their foreign policy. A unique feature has been the contradictory manner in which the Chinese political elite perceive the world. On the one hand it is the concept of a unipolar world, which is viewed through the prism of a perpetual struggle against the hegemonistic forces of a super power (which would mean US in common parlance) as well as the aspiration for regional leadership in a region dominated by major emerging powers like India, Japan, and Russia ( despite the relationship of strategic partnership with the latter). On the other hand, is the humbling realization that presently - despite its double digit growth and overall growing influence, China is not in a position to viably compete with these States in all spheres. This undoubtedly imposes certain constraints on its foreign policy necessitating certain rearrangement in its foreign policy objectives / priorities.

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

engagement FOR CONCORD Although we keep harping on our 8 per cent growth rate and feel that we can give the Chinese a run for their money and compete with them to become an Asian power in the short term and a world power in the long run, the fact remains that we are far behind the Chinese in all spheres of development and military modernisation. The Chinese are determined to see to it that India remains confined to South Asia and pose no threat to the Chinese ambition of dominating first Asia and subsequently challenge the US for world domination.

Strategic encirclement The Chinese believe in a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia. Their policies are still influenced by the Middle Kingdom syndrome. The only nation which can challenge their concept of a unipolar Asia is India. The Chinese with their ancient culture of strategic thought inspired by Sun Tzu have evolved a unique method of keeping India confined to South Asia and not allow it to break out from there and even nurture any thoughts of competing with China for dominance of Asia, let alone become a world power in future. This is being achieved by the concept of strategic encirclement. China has created a ring of hostile or inimical States all around India which keep India in the quagmire of South Asian cesspool. We have a hostile Pakistan, a rogue nuclear power in the West, a sullen Nepal in the Centre and unfriendly Myanmar and Bangladesh in the East. Sri Lanka does not openly oppose us due to other reasons but also does not defer to us. Attempts are also being made by China to force Bhutan to break out of its treaty obligation with India. Apart from this, the border issue is being kept alive like a festering sore to keep us unhinged and unbalanced. Our foreign policy mandarins and policy makers do not seem to have got over the trauma of the humiliating defeat in 1962 war and continue to follow a policy of appeasement and keep under wraps all Chinese transgressions and hostile acts. This bodes ill for the future. No lessons have been learnt from fifties and sixties when appeasement of China only whetted its appetite.

Infrastructure in Tibet The Chinese infrastructural development in Tibet is a cause of serious concern to us. It gives the Chinese the capability to mobilise forces in one campaigning season which was not the case earlier. The infrastructural development has come about in the following areas: ● Upgradation of all airfields especially Lhasa, Hoping and Pangta. This has been done to offset the disadvantage of taking off

from high altitude airfields with reduced loads. ● Completion of Gormo-Lhasa rail link and plans to take it South to Nepal border. ● Upgradation of Western, Central and Eastern Highways. ● Enhance capacity of Gormo-Lhasa pipeline. ● Construction of subsidiary roads right upto Indo-Tibet border. ● Enhancement of warehousing capability and missile storage sites. By all estimates, missiles which could be nuclear tipped are deployed in Tibet.

Military modernisation It must be remembered that unlike us, Chinese military modernisation has been taken up as a doctrinal issue. It was rightly put at the end of the Four Modernisations enunciated in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping. Military modernisation has now taken the centre stage. Impetus to it was given by the

superior firepower that is to be utilised to destroy the opponent's retaliatory capabilities through pre-emptive strikes employing long-range artillery, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and precision guided munitions. The new doctrine and the strategy and tactics associated with it have been influenced by the lessons of Gulf War I in 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003, both of which have been extensively studied by Chinese scholars. The doctrine requires the creation of a capability to project force across China's borders through rapid deployment, conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles, information warfare, electronic warfare, precision-guided munitions, night fighting capabilities and other advanced military technologies. PLA analysts have called the ongoing RMA an “informationised military revolution” the thrust being that informationisation “is directly linked to PLA's ability to adopt information technologies for command and control, intelligence, training and weapon systems. More importantly the PLA has capabilities in the information battle space with its new anti-satellite systems, space-based systems, airborne, naval and ground-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems, electronic warfare and information warfare systems - hence there is increasing 'information content' for new weapons of all types.

Naval priorities

Deng Xiaoping

two Gulf wars when the Chinese realised how far behind they were when compared to the dazzling array of weapons and technology of the Western nations. The Chinese have thus evolved their concept of a “local war under high tech conditions.” In the current scenario the PLA expects to fight the next war under conditions of what it calls “informationisation” or “informationalisation”. In the White Paper on National Defence issued in 2004, informationisation was explained only in generic terms, but needs reiteration: “To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide,” China adheres to the military strategy of active defense and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics. The ‘active defence’ doctrine calls for integrated, deep strikes - a concentration of

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

The Chinese fully realize that for their energy security, domination of Indian Ocean is vital for them. They also know that a resurgent Indian Navy can choke off their oil supplies from West Asia and Africa in Nine and Ten degree Channels of Andaman and Nicobar Islands even before their ships reach the straits of Malacca. It is therefore crucial for them to modernize their navy. Contextually it was in 1987 that the PLA(N) formally put forward a three phase strategy extending over a period of fifty years to turn the navy from a coastal defence force into a blue water maritime force. According to the outlined projection, as a part of the first phase, the PLA(N) wanted to acquire seacontrol power within its coastal waters by 2000. In the second phase it was expected to have acquired a degree of sea-denial capability within the first island chain in the West Pacific in 2010-2020. However during the 1990s the relatively unimpressive and constrained development and modernisation programme of the PLA(N) delayed the suggested targets of the first phase by several years. The US bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy and the worsening situation in the Taiwan Straits set the top gear for naval

ECONOMIC ASYMMETRY

INTERNATIONAL Poverty Line

POPULATION BELOW $1/ DAY

same line as an imperialist treaty forced on Tibet by the British and refuses to negotiate. It claims the entire State of Arunachal Pradesh of nearly 90,000 sq kms; it has created a fresh dispute in Sikkim where the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim was defined by the treaty of 1890 and has always been free of any dispute. In the Western Sector, it is in illegal occupation of nearly 36,000 sq kms and its claim lines keep changing on a daily basis. As has been said earlier, the aim of keeping alive this festering sore is to keep India unsure, unhinged and unbalanced.

India’s diffidence CHINA 16.6% INDIA

PROSPERITY INDICATORS Availability per 1000 Telephones (Landlines) Cellular phones Personal Computers Electricity production (bln kwh)# Electricity production (kwh) Air passengers Electricity generation (MW) Energy use Steel production* Cement production* Food grain production* Crude oil* Coal*

CHINA

INDIA

167 161 28 1427 893 83,672 2,58,000 960 163 650 418 165 1300 #per

capita

development. The modernisation of the PLA(N) and its transformation had already reached to visibly higher levels by the beginning of year 2000. For example during the first half of the decade, the number of new major combatants has more than doubled that of the entire 1990s ensuring a frantic pace of growth. If the trend of transforming the navy continues, the PLA(N) may well attain its Second and Third Phase objectives according to the plan. The Navy's sharp upwards trajectory in modernization is due to several reasons. Firstly, China's rapid economic expansion can now provide greater material and technological support for a speedier naval modernization. Secondly, the PLA's perception that China's future war will be fought in its maritime regions has given a tremendous boost for naval development in terms of budget allocation and foreign procurement. Thirdly, for about 20 years the PLA's R&D guiding principle has been

40 12 07 577 379 18,225 89,000 513 29 109 210 34 300

34.7%

POPULATION BELOW $2/ DAY

CHINA

46.7% INDIA

79.9%

*(million tons)

India's China policy has been characterised by timidity, an irrational fear of the Chinese might and a humiliating desire to please Chinese at all costs. All negotiations whether by the Joint Working Group, NSA and at political level are kept out of public purview and lack transparency. As a nation we are yet to recover from the trauma of the '62 defeat. The Armed Forces have got over the defeat but it seems the policy makers are yet to do so. India does not look China in the eye but behaves more like a supplicant. Occupation of Tibet by China in 1950-51 brought the two major powers of Asia in an eyeball to eyeball confrontation. What was applicable to the British is equally applicable to India today. "A frontier of hundreds of miles between two powerful nations, holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point at anything but peace". - Dr Buchanan Hamilton, Advisor to Lord Hastings on Himalayan Matters.

“more research and trial, less series production and equipment”. This was a period of technological foundation-building which is now being built upon. Fourthly, after 20 years of study the PLA(N) has obtained a better understanding of deep ocean warfare and this helps it to address its doctrinal defects of the past in tune for a true blue water navy. The PLA(N) has also mastered the best naval ideas of the western powers, and embraced the IT-RMA concepts especially when it rightly identified the network-centric warfare as the type of war it has to fight in the future.

Border question The Indian policy makers need to ponder over the fact that the Chinese have resolved their border problem with 11 out of 13 countries with whom it shares a land border. Why is it that it has accepted the McMahon Line as the border between China and Myanmar whereas in case of India it calls the

A major policy overhaul is needed as far as China is concerned. China only respects power. There is a need to enhance our strategic capability together with rapid infrastructural development in border areas if at all we have to halt the Chinese juggernaut. There is today a trust deficit in Sino-Indian relations brought about by Chinese perfidy in the past and its hardening-of-ties-with-India posturing in the last couple of years. We have to be on our guard, build up capabilities and use our leverages. We need to beware of the dragon. The writer is working for a multinational information technology company after his premature retirement from the Army. He is PhD in Sino-Indian Relations and contributes regularly to magazines, periodicals and newspapers on Strategy, Security and Defence related issues.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

internal security MULTIPLE CHALLENGES

India:

a soft state? he internal security scenario in the country today is grim. The Indian State seems increasingly incapable of protecting the life and property of its citizens. The long drawn cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, repeated terrorist strikes in crowded city centres in different parts of the country, growing ethnic insurgency in several States in the North-East and above all, the reign of terror unleashed by the Naxals in 13 Indian States have jeopardised India's internal security. The threats from various non-State actors have posed severe challenge to the State overshadowing the traditional military threats to India's territorial integrity from Pakistan and China.

Troubled waters

There is much that can be learned from the common experience of 9/11 in the US and of 26/11 in Mumbai in the methodology of pre-emption of terrorist strikes. The pannational nature of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, is the envy of the Indian National Investigation Agency. The multifarious nature of the threats to the Indian nationState be it cross-border terrorism, economic sabotage through fake currency, passage of drugs and arms and a networking of criminal gangs, religious and ethnic separatist groups tend of show India up as a “soft State”. Yet not all experiences and lessons therefrom are interchangeable. The recent shooting by a Muslim American in a military base has all the hallmarks of the POTA effect on the human psyche.

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

What is at stake today is the stability and integrity of the nation. The ISI of Pakistan with covert assistance from Bangladesh and Nepal, has been training, funding and equipping the separatist groups in Kashmir, various home grown jihadi terror cells in different parts of the country and the insurgents in the North-East. There are reasons to believe that the so-called 'left extremists' are also receiving arms, equipment and support from our neighbourhood. These persistent security threats are core issues needing urgent attention from the Government because India's much vaunted march forward as a regional power will depend on whether or not we succeed in overcoming the challenges. It is important to note that nearly all our internal security problems have external dimensions, one way or the other. A large multi-ethnic, multi-religious, diverse country with hundreds of castes and tribes has inherent potential for intra-State conflicts. The problem has become all the more acute because the State, even sixty years after freedom from colonial rule, has failed to deliver social and economic justice to vast majority of its citizens despite tall promises made in the Constitution. The resultant alienation and despair amongst sizeable segments of the population have provided huge window of opportunity to hostile neighbouring countries to foment trouble by supporting various disgruntled groups and neglected elements in the society.

Vulnerabilities A democratic, free, liberal country like ours is especially vulnerable because it offers endless opportunities to terrorists and insurgents to operate, establish bases, raise funds, procure weapons, communicate and mobilise support from the civil society. The ruling political elite and corrupt, inefficient bureaucracy have not only failed to govern and deliver the core services, they have also demonstrated lamentable lack of will and courage to adopt strong measures and tackle head-on the growing threats to security. The political leaders in power have politicised the response to terror. They remain ever reluctant to adopt strong legal measures for fear of losing at the hustings because tough terrorism-specific laws, though passed in many democratic countries in the west, would be unpopular among a section of India's population. According to the US State Department's latest annual report on terrorism, India ranks among world's most terrorism afflicted countries. The report also notes that despite the government's official pronouncements, its counter-terrorism efforts remain hampered by its outdated law-enforcement and legal systems. While briefing the US Senate's Committee on Homeland Security, RAND Corporation analysts have observed that India has turned out to be a “terribly soft State” neither able to prevent terrorist acts nor capable of effectively combating its terrorists on account of poor intelligence and inadequate counter-terrorist training and equipment. India, it may be added, has also received very poor rating in G-20 (group of 20 most powerful countries) report in respect of measures taken to combat terrorism. Our security architecture, both at the Centre and the States, needs thorough radical reforms. What has been done so far is in the nature of cosmetic change. The government at the Centre has taken certain measures following huge public outrage and media outbursts after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. But these measures are not enough. Unless the civil society demands fundamental changes, the security scenario cannot be reversed in the foreseeable future. After every major terrorist strike, hue and cry is raised and the government engages itself in mainly fire-fighting operations to mollify the people. But public memory is

K K Mitra IPS

notoriously short and people soon forget what happened and live their daily lives hoping for the best. A sense of complacency inevitably sets in and as a result, no substantial change takes place in the security management apparatus. The UPA government was reelected back to power inspite of its poor record in prevention and detection of terrorism related cases partly because terrorism received low priority for those who went to the polling booths to cast votes and partly because no major terrorist strike took place after 26/11.

Pak preoccupation One reason for this bit of luck is of course Pakistan's own hopeless internal security problems and non-stop terror attacks from the extremist groups it had bred and nurtured for years to destabilize India. But India's luck can run out any time and it surely will. Prime Minister Singh has himself observed recently that there are regular intelligence reports warning about the possibility of terror attacks. In India's hinterland, the Naxal terror continues to kill thousands posing the biggest internal security threat the country has encountered so far. After years of refusing to acknowledge its severity, the Union Home Ministry has finally sat up only recently and announced its intention to fight 'red terror' which has engulfed 170 districts in 13 Indian States. What has been done during last one year and what needs to be done? The government has set up a National Investigation Agency (NIA) with much fanfare. It is just another Central Investigation agency empowered to investigate certain specified offences under eight laws including the 'Atomic Energy Act' and 'The Anti-Hijacking Act'. It has no role whatsoever in prevention of terrorist acts. Indeed, it can be wound up or merged with the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) which needs greater authority and power to promptly take up investigation of cases without waiting for concerned State government's consent and concurrence. The NIA is yet to become fully operational. Besides being duplicate agency, it will take a long time to become effective investigation agency. We have seen but failed to draw lessons from the USA where unified single Department of Homeland Security was created after 9/11 attack bringing together

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

internal security MULTIPLE CHALLENGES multifarious security organisations in four Divisions under one umbrella. In India, we are heading in the opposite direction by creating new additional institutions. The government has taken credit for giving greater teeth to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 which replaced the tough Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). There is no doubt that the UAPA has been strengthened but it still lacks the special enforcement provisions which POTA had, such as, admissibility of confession before a police officer, burden of proof of innocence on the accused, tougher bail conditions and so on. The fight against terror must focus on external and domestic networking and financing of terror which remain beyond the scope of routine legislation such as the UAPA. It is time that the logic of overriding national interest finally prevailed over petty short-sighted electoral politics.

Anti-terror database The need of the hour is an apex body like National Counter Terrorism Centre which will have the database relating to all terrorist incidents and terrorism related information with powers to tackle all aspects of terrorism - right from prevention and pre-emption through collection of inputs / intelligence from Central and State agencies, coordination and sharing of intelligence between Central and State agencies to monitoring investigation, prosecution and trial of cases. In her recent address to the Parliament, the President has announced that highest priority will be accorded to internal security. The government must live up to popular expectation that it means business by undertaking the task of radical institutional reform of the National Security Management System. Another urgent long pending task is police reforms and modernisation of the police in the States. Internal security cannot be maintained unless the States discharge their constitutional duty to secure peace and public order. The political leaders in the States have neglected and politically exploited the police and their intelligence apparatus. This has, over the years, adversely affected the discipline, morale and efficiency of the police. The much-discussed longawaited police reforms have yet to take place due to reluctance on the part of the political leaders in the States cutting across party lines. The directives issued by the Supreme Court in September 2006 have so far been complied with by only a few States - mostly in the North East.

Replace Police Act There have been repeated demands since long for replacing the outdated police Act of 1861 by a new Act to ensure greater

accountability of the police and insulate the force from political manipulation by giving them greater autonomy. The government at the Centre is still sitting over a model Bill which was drafted by the Soli Sorabjee Committee. The State police forces and their intelligence branches are grossly unprepared to deal with the challenges facing them. They are under-staffed, under-equipped, ill-trained and poorly paid. India has one of the lowest police population ratio in the world (142 per 1,00,000). The ratio is 315 in the USA, 290 in Australia, 300 in Germany and 200 in the UK. The problem is further compounded by huge chunk of the force wasted for protection of the so-called VIPs. Side by side with police reforms, the

Alienation and despair amongst sizeable segments of the population have provided huge window of opportunity to hostile neighbouring countries to foment trouble by supporting various disgruntled groups and neglected elements in the society entire Criminal Justice System needs a thorough overhaul. The number of cases pending trial - many of them for decades - is simply mind boggling. If this trend is allowed to continue, people will lose all faith in the ability of the Indian democratic polity to deliver justice. Finally and most importantly, we need to examine our intelligence set up and revitalise the Indian intelligence mechanism. The performance of our agencies came under sharp scrutiny of the Kargil Review Committee. The government appointed a task force following the report and its recommendations were accepted by the group of Ministers. However, nothing changed substantially since then. The MultiAgency Centre hardly took off the ground. The National Security Council and the Joint Intelligence Committee have become almost disfunctional. Neither the Kargil Review Committee Report nor the report of the group of Ministers were discussed in the parliament unlike the Butler Committee Report in the UK or the 9/11 Commission Report in the

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

internal security TRAINING CRUCIAL

USA. The obsession with secrecy has been the bane of Indian Intelligence. The basic reform must begin with a new multidiscipline futuristic approach to collection and dissemination of intelligence. With rapid advances in technology and information revolution, the agencies will more and more need talented experts, scientists, engineers, IT professionals etc. in order to collect, analyse and interpret vast quantity of complex data from variety of sources. The effectiveness of our national intelligence effort will be directly proportional to the quality and skill of men and women recruited by the agencies. This calls for sufficient career incentives to attract and retain qualified individuals from the universities, private sector, corporate world and institutes of excellence. In other words, there is need for a paradigm shift in national security culture so that lateral recruitment of experts at all levels could be done as and when necessary.

User feedback While structural reforms are essential, any rethinking about intelligence will no doubt focus on what kind of intelligence should be or needs to be collected. As there is no institutionalized system of tasking by the consumers of intelligence and performance audit, the agencies disseminate whatever they collect, process and analyse. Their typical product is treated as free goods. In the absence of regular feedbacks from consumers, there is excessive reliance on reportorial current intelligence because what is easy to read is most likely to be read. Further, the policy maker is often reluctant to accept information that challenges past experience and conventional wisdom. As a result, the analysts in the agency work under constant pressure for conformity and shun innovative, outside the box conclusions. They seldom anticipate scenarios that appear low in probability but high in consequence. Since there is no accountability, heads do not roll when disaster strikes. It is time we had legislative oversight of intelligence activities to ensure accountability of our agencies. The writer took his master's degree in economics from Calcutta University and joined the Indian Police Service in 1960. He served in Orissa in the early years of service and joined the R&AW in Cabinet Secretariat. He was Director, Aviation Research Centre and retired as Principal Director, DG Security. After retirement he has kept himself busy in strategic studies and writing on security related issues. He is closely associated with a number of Think Tanks.

Lt Gen (Retd.) Arvind Sharma

riposte to the

maoists

Maintenance of internal security is the product of realistic assessments of manpower requirements for law and order, VVIP security, intelligence gathering, criminal investigation and prosecution so that sacrosanct guidelines can be laid down for turnover of forces, leave, unexpected deterioration in law and order and training. It is a totality of this that expectations of success in counter-insurgency / internal security operations are predicated. Within this framework the elite National Security Guard becomes the fist of the State to deliver the coup de grace. December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

internal security TRAINING CRUCIAL n the first week of October, preceding the State assembly elections in Maharashtra, the Maoists (Naxalites) struck again killing 18 policemen at Laheri in Gadchiroli district, close to the Chhattisgarh border. A few days prior to that they had abducted and beheaded a police intelligence officer, Inspector Francis Induwar in Jharkhand. The manner in which the Naxalites have been killing policemen and personnel of the CRPF indicates that they do not intend forsaking violence in pursuit of their avowed goals, in fact, barbarism a la Taliban is now coming to the fore. In this calendar year alone the Naxalites have killed approximately 250 policemen. The continued violence has eventually forced the Prime Minister to state that the Naxalite violence is the greatest internal security threat to the nation. It is also a fact that the Naxalite today is better trained, equipped and motivated than his predecessor of the late 1960's.

providing an opportunity to ISI of Pakistan and DGFI of Bangladesh, in concert, to implement their diabolical plans in the NE States of India. Poor governance, deprivation, increasing gap between the lower and upper class of society, lack of development, political opportunism, ingrained corruption in our system(s) and religious fundamentalism are some of the

Emerging threats Over the last few years, the issue of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) has been discussed at various fora on a number of occasions; no strategy or plan was ever formulated except for advice to State Governments by the Centre to take necessary action to tackle this threat. Consequent to the incidents mentioned above, after deliberation in concert with the States, a decision was taken by the Centre to launch an all-out offensive against the Naxalites with Police, CRPF and the BSF viz the Security Forces (SF). It had also been decided that Army will not be employed to tackle the Naxalites. The decision is indeed laudable, however, it would be prudent to consider whether the State police(s) are capable of neutralizing the Naxalites militarily. Is it a realistic assessment that the police backed by the Para Military Forces (PMFs) / Central Police Organisations (CPOs) will be able to crush the movement a la early 1970s? Or is it a matter of time, before the Army is called to take over once the situation has deteriorated considerably? Alternatively, what other options do we have? The country is besieged by proxy war in J&K, insurgency in the North East (NE) and the burgeoning threat of LWE. This is further exacerbated by illegal migration from Bangladesh and mushrooming Muslim Fundamentalist Organisations, which have taken root in the States bordering this neighbouring country

A decision was taken by the Centre to launch an all-out offensive against the Naxalites with Police, CRPF and the BSF viz the Security Forces (SF) however, it would be prudent to consider if it is a realistic assessment that this arrangement will be able to crush the movement a la early 1970s? The Naxalite today is better trained, equipped and motivated than his predecessor of the late 1960’s

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

issues which have led to emergence of LWE; these portend ill for the security situation in the country, over the next decade or more.

Quality parameters It would thus be prudent to assume that LWE or internal strife requiring use of SF, would prevail in the foreseeable future. In view of the decision not to employ the Army, the need for well trained and equipped SF is undisputable. It also merits reiteration that 'quality is more important than quantity' and therefore, rather than allowing unbridled proliferation of CPOs and PMFs, we must have well trained SF. An analysis of Naxalite attacks in the last few months indicate that such large number of SF casualties took place mainly due to poor reaction and non adherence to basics of fighting a guerilla war by the latter. The unpalatable truth is that the standard of training of police and PMFs / CPOs is not up to the mark and training is treated as more of a chore rather than an imperative. Investigations of 26/11 revealed that the Mumbai armed policemen had not fired their weapons at even the practice range for months on end (a sad reflection on training)! It thus emerges that the present training standard and the prevalent functional environment of the SF is not conducive to tackling the Naxalite, as the latter is better trained, armed and highly motivated. It is also known that the Naxalites are procuring better weapons, enrolling more cadres and preparing for a long war, as wresting power from the State, is their avowed aim. This underscores the fact that the battle with the 'Naxal' is going to be a protracted affair; we must therefore, evolve our plans for training the SF both in the 'immediate' and the 'long term'. The adage that it is 'not only the gun but the man behind the gun that matters' is relevant; it is therefore imperative that personnel earmarked to tackle the Naxalites, must be well trained and equipped. This cannot happen overnight, as training takes time and dedicated effort, besides time and money for procurement of weapons and equipment.

addressing socio economic issues to alleviate problems of the masses and a transparent governance model are essential to tackle this problem. The strategy evolved should also aim at strengthening and rebuilding institutions of the state and ensuring that the writ of the state runs in interior areas also. As for training, in the last few years the Army has been providing training to units of the State police, personnel of SF, at local levels in various locations. Regrettably, the feedback from this training has not been very encouraging because of a variety of reasons, viz, junior leaders of the forces undergoing training do not train with their men; there is thus lack of interest amongst trainees and standards set are seldom achieved. The ethos of the Army, is fundamental to soldiering, whereas the same cannot be said of other SF. How can the ethos of the Army be imbibed by a policeman, who is born and brought up in an entirely different environment? This leaves him inadequately prepared to tackle the Naxal. As per the Government decision, the State armed police personnel backed by CRPF, BSF, ITBP and others are being launched in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand to tackle the armed Naxalite and restore civil administration in areas dominated by the Naxal today. As stated previously, the battle against the Naxalites will eventually be a long drawn affair. It implies that there will be a need to relieve units which have now been deployed, as counter insurgency operations are very taxing and turnover of personnel is essential to maintain operational ascendancy over the Naxalites. In the

long term therefore, training of SF personnel to meet this requirement will have to be a continuous process. There is also a felt need that the police and SF personnel should be given better basic and initial in-service training, an exposure to army discipline and its ethos.

New model It is possible to achieve the above only if we deviate from the existing procedures and adopt a different model. In view of the foregoing, a radically different model for training of SF personnel is suggested below: ● New entrants for CPOs / PMFs and policemen of States continue to be recruited by the parent organisations, as heretofore. ● All new entrants of CPOs / PMFs and at least 25 per cent of policeman of LWEaffected States, be sent to Army Regimental Training Centres for 44 weeks of Basic Training, as is done for Army recruits. ● On termination of Basic Training, these personnel will be posted to different Infantry Units of the Army for a minimum 3 year period (ideally, it should be a 4 year tenure, as this would ensure that every one serves in a 'Field' and 'Peace' profile). They will be employed as soldiers of the Indian Army (Ad hoc allowance(s) may be granted to them for their duration of attachment with

the Army, so that they are at par with the latter). ● On completion of the Army tenure, they revert to their parent organization(s) and continue to serve as per the Terms and Conditions of service of that force; their tenure with the Army be reckoned as with their own service in matters of promotion and pay and allowances, at par with their contemporaries. ● For the duration of the 'Basic Training' and 'Army Employment' period, the Army will hold these personnel against its authorized establishment. ● Modus operandi, allotment of vacancies to various SF for training, financial and other aspects are matters of detail and can be resolved once the proposal is accepted, in principle. ● Implementation may entail minor

Training It is an accepted fact that the Naxal problem cannot be solved through mere military means. A multi pronged approach with development and security being the two major ingredients of the strategy,

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

cartoon

internal security TRAINING CRUCIAL changes in the proposal, which can be resolved in consultation with the Army. Once this proposal is adopted, in the next few years, a majority of personnel of the CPOs / PMFs and State police would have been imparted basic training as to an Army soldier and gain experience of functioning in the Army. They would be better disciplined, imbibed the ethos of the Army and be highly motivated.

the normal human response, this proposal therefore, is likely to be summarily rejected by those affected viz CPOs / PMFs and the Ministry of Home Affairs, considering it 'sanctimonious', 'intrusive', requiring legislation, besides a host of seemingly cogent reasons. However, a dispassionate analysis would dispel fears of the antagonists, as it neither impinges on the authority of the parent organisation for

Long-term goal In the 'long term', there would be better mutual understanding and improved cooperation between the Army and CPOs / PMFs, enhance the training standards of the latter resulting in overall improved functional efficiency. Synergy between the Armed Forces and SF managing law and order in the country, will contribute immensely to defeat the nefarious designs of forces inimical to the interests of our country. Resistance to change is

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

'recruitment', nor curb the 'training facilities' in their institutions. The sole aim of the proposal is to enhance the training standards of the SF and deliver a riposte to the LWE, alongside preparing for neutralizing similar threats in the future. Initial training and a short stint with the Army would definitely stand the SF in good stead professionally, with concomitant positive fallouts of human resource development and greater synergy between forces responsible for internal and external security of the nation. The writer is former General-OfficerCommanding, Eastern Army Command. His operational responsibility encompassed borders with China, Myanmar and Bangladesh; all troops including Assam Rifles deployed in the North Eastern States for Counter Insurgency operations were part of his command.

December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

security tips WOMEN ALERTED

DO NOT TAKE LIFT FROM STRANGERS. Do not share an auto-rickshaw or a cab with unknown people. Never give responsibility of your luggage to any strangers nor accept.

There is nothing scarier than using public transport for women. Still every day majority of women - college girls, professionals and housewives have to use them, risking their safety. The following tips will ensure your safety while travelling by bus or train.

ALWAYS DRESS MODESTLY WHILE TRAVELLING IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT. ● Always avoid boarding an over-crowded bus / train unless it is necessary. ● Always try to avoid isolated bus or train stops. ● Always Know your route and bus / train schedule, to limit waiting time at the terminal or bus stop. ALWAYS WAIT IN A WELL-LIT AREA FOR A PUBLIC TRANSPORT. ● Always stay ALERT. Don't doze off in a bus or distract yourself by playing music, texting or talking on cell phone. ● Always be VIGILANT and CONFIDENT. Look and act as you know where you are going and what you are doing. This will prevent you from looking like an easy target. ● Always keep police / women helpline numbers or your trusted friend’s number on speed dial. ● If a rowdy gang boards the train or bus, don't hang around. Try and get down at the earliest.

smart and

safe

● WHILE TRAVELLING AT NIGHT IN A TRAIN, DON'T HESITATE TO ASK YOUR WOMAN CO-PASSENGER TO ACCOMPANY YOU TO THE WASHROOMS. ● Always take care of your luggage.

NEVER TOUCH AN UNATTENDED ARTICLE AND INFORM THE CONCERNED AUTHORITIES.

travel 80

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Do not let your children get attracted to any unattended article such as toys, sweets etc. Do not accept any eatables from any strangers, not even from co-passengers even if offered as Prashad (GOD’s blessings) December 2009 D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T

jokes LAUGH N RELAX! jokes of the month

he Russians and the Chinese are at the peak of political conflict. Both countries threaten each other militarily. A big package arrives at the Russian camp. Brezhnev opens it. It's a big bag of beans. And a note from Mao: "This is how many we will come to crush you!" Brezhnev scribbles a reply, orders for a big bag of flour to be sent to Beijing. Mao receives it with the note: "... And this is how we will send you back!"

military exercise is carried out at a Pakistani airbase. The paratroopers have jumped out of the aircraft. Suddenly, a soldier screams desperately to his officer! Soldier: "Sir! My parachute doesn't open!" Officer: "Don't worry soldier! This is just an exercise!"

Russian citizen is trying to protest against the communist regime. Therefore he throws leaflets, papers around Red Square in Moscow. KGB agents arrest him and question him, then they observe that there was nothing on the papers, they were all plain white. The KGB agents ask him why the papers are white. The prisoner replies: "It's obvious anyway, why should I write it down?"

retired sergeant was asked: "Well, how do you like civilian life?" "Terrible," he said gruffly, "All those people around and nobody in charge!"

here was this General-intraining, and his superior was asking him questions. Superior: What happened on June 6, 1944? Trainee: “We stormed the beach at Normandy, which later became known as D-Day, sir!” Superior: What was the turning point of World War II? Trainee: "Battle of the Bulge, sir!" Superior: What is the importance of May 12? The man thought and thought: "I don't know, sir!" The superior then said, "Well, I will tell your wife that you forgot her birthday."

t a lesson on topography, a soldier was asked, "What is farther away - the moon or that object on this map?" Soldier: "That object, naturally." Trainer: "What makes you think that?"

D E F E N C E A N D S E C U R I T Y A L E R T December 2009

Soldier: "Because we can see the moon any clear night, but we cannot see that object even at day time."

uring an army basic training, the lieutenant asked each of them where home was. After everyone had answered, he sneered and said: “You are all wrong, the army is now your home”. Back at the barracks, he read the evening duties, then asked the first sergeant if he had anything to say. The sergeant replied, “Men, while you were gone today, I found beds improperly made, clothes not hanging correctly, shoes not shined and footlockers a mess. Where do you think you are? Home?”

INAUGURAL ISSUE

request We request all academicians, thinkers, policy makers and authors to write for DSA for a safe and secure India and world.

info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

We invite you to send the synopsis of your esteemed works for book publication related to defence and security.

We intend to publish research based, authentic, interesting and thought-provoking writings, exclusive photographs and art works on defence and security issues in India and abroad.

NOVEMBER ISSUE

DSA Inaugural issue was very informative and useful. I particularly liked its contents, presentation and attractive looks. Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) SP Tyagi, Gurgaon

Awareness level involving the security of the country are extremely limited in India particularly among those who are at the helm of decision making. The country of our size and growing importance has to correct this anomaly. DSA will contribute substantially and meaningfully towards that end in the months and years to come.

about

DSA inaugural issue provides an overview of the internal security scenario in the country. Ashok Parthasarathi’s lines are a revelation of the hitherto little known views of Jawaharlal Nehru on the Chinese. The story on Maoists is exhaustive, it could have been more brief and direct. The articles are well researched and the journal provides a good medium for critical appraisal of the Nation’s Security. Ajit Doval’s insight into the Valley’s situation is a valuable contribution. K Vijaya Rama Rao (IPS), Hyderabad

Lt Gen (Retd.) Shantonu Chowdhry, Noida

DSA is truly a world-class magazine. The articles are well researched, well written, topical and thought provoking. And the fact that articles are written by known experts gives stature to the magazine. DSA will surely be a leader the Defence Field in the times to come. Lt Gen (Retd.)VK Jetley, Gurgaon

DSA is indeed a serious professional journal. Maj Gen (Retd.) SS Nair, AVSM

DSA is very well-produced. It certainly has some “heavy hitters” contributing to it! Shiv Aroor, Headlines Today, TV Today Network, New Delhi

DSA is very impressive and admirable magazine. Anurag Pandey, Senior Research Scholar & Assistant Professor, University of Delhi, New Delhi