DSA December 2011 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

he Armed Forces Special Powers Act is once again in the news, albeit for the wrong reasons. Politics over the AFSPA continues unabatedly and as always, without any logic. The Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir has taken it upon himself to ask for its repeal from certain areas of the state that he believes are not affected by terrorist violence. This is not the first time he has taken this position and this is also not the first time he has been explained the true picture of the situation. Facts have been laid bare before him, as they will be every time he brings up this issue. The truce, when it happens, will be temporary for he is wont to raise the matter again. For that is the nature of politics and since that is the guiding principle behind his campaign to have AFSPA lifted from parts of the state. Things are not so simple, but before that some basics about the Act need to be understood.

The AFSPA is not a provision for the armed forces of India to run riot in affected parts of the country. It never was, and it never will be for the simple reason that the armed forces are not interested in running riot. And neither are they interested in being in an insurgency situation in perpetuity. It is only because the circumstances of an insurgency force them into such operations that they are deployed in affected areas. If there werenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t an insurgency the armed forces would not be there. But for that politics and administration would have to be so geared up that insurgencies donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t happen. For they are the principal reasons why people take up arms against the state. Those are issues that are conveniently glossed over by the practitioners of politics, of course. All that the AFSPA does is to provide an administrative, legal mechanism under which the army operates in an insurgency. The absence of an AFSPA was felt by the parliamentarians of yesteryears and hence its promulgation. It is simply an enabling mechanism for the army to operate in aid to civil authority; otherwise the constitution does not permit such operations. The AFSPA was promulgated to fill this legal lacuna.

To believe that some parts of the state are peaceful and hence AFSPA can be lifted is to live in a world of disbelief. The areas of peace are always a welcome development, but they do not exist in isolation. It is the success of the security forces that has created this situation. There is always a chance that militants, under sustained pressure elsewhere, could well turn to these islands of peace so as to divert attention. So does the promulgation happen all over again? The process would give enough time for militants to dig in before operations begin against them. And all the gains would have lost. The effort required would then be double of what it is today. But these are scant considerations in the game of politics, which has been the principal cause of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Army authorities have been convincing in their argument against repealing AFSPA and politicians must accept when they are tilting against windmills for the sake of a wind.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

publisher’s view

Samud ra Manthan

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Volume 3 Issue 3 December 2011 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales pranesh vadhera anupama singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari ranjeet dinesh e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

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s per Indian mythology, Samudra Manthan, the legendary churning of the ocean to create the nectar for the gods sparked off the conflict between the Suras (gods) and the Asuras (demons) for possession of the amrit (nectar). From this narrative comes the realisation that there is much that the oceans have to offer to improve the condition of man. Hence the emerging rivalry for control of sea lines of communications and for domination of strategic segments of the littoral be it for its natural resources, (some seen to be finite given the manner of their over-exploitation). Together they constitute what is come to be known as power projection of which sea control and sea denial are the emerging tactics. I feel that today the analogy of the Samudra Manthan is becoming more relevant by the day. The outlines of a modern-day Samudra Manthan are emerging in swift progression between some of the so called super powers in the world who are trying to capture portions of oceans for their exclusive exploitation and regimes of exclusion and denial of entry are being sought to be imposed in various regions in the oceans that lap the continents and their depleting resources. The Indian Ocean may become the centre point of this exercise very soon and I can see the threats posed by China on a regular basis here. China is trying to interfere in all the oceans in various ways and this time the major threat to India is from the seas that surround its peninsular geography. Pakistan is also trying to increase its power in the sea by inducting more and more Chinese frigates and warships. India having one of the longest coastal area faces more threats than any other country in the South Asian region and we have already seen a major attack recently in Mumbai which took place through sea route. We need to tighten the security of our sea shores at the earliest as I feel these are more vulnerable now than any land border in our country. Probably our government does not seem very serious in this regard and the delay in the appointment of the Director General in the Coast Guard Organisation proves it. Do we not have capable officers for this post or is there some other reason that government is not able to appoint someone immediately? Generally what we have seen in defence as well as security forces in the past is that an officer is selected for a given post even as the incumbent is preparing to retire and there is a ceremonial handing over and taking charge that adds to the dignity and authority of the post. But what is happening over this sensitive post is unseemly given that it has such a crucial role to play in India’s maritime security infrastructure especially after the Mumbai carnage. The entire naval community around the world is looking at the Indian Navy for its promised transformation from a conventional force to a totally reconfigured capability-based fighting force using cutting edge technologies. I am sure the Indian Navy, the Indian Coast Guard and new echelons that have been created since the Mumbai attack will be adequately equipped to meet the new challenges be it in counter-piracy operations or power projection not just in the Indian Ocean but also beyond the several choke points that characterise this huge body of water. Our present Chief of Naval Staff is a highly experienced officer and I believe that under his leadership our force is prepared in every manner to counter newer threats which have emerged very recently - be it the pirates, control and supervision of the shipping traffic in the Ocean or any intrusion along the Indian shoreline. We all at DSA salute the Indian Navy on the occasion of Navy Day which is celebrated for its momentous attack on Karachi harbour that contributed immensely to the famous victory in 1971 which was achieved within a 13-day blitzkrieg.

executive editor

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

Maritime India: A manifest destiny?

ndia is uniquely blessed by her geography as also by her demography. By 2026 she will have the largest and the youngest population in the whole world. People forget that this translates into the Largest Recruitable Male Population (RMP) factor on the whole planet. This, in simple terms means the ability to field the largest Armed Forces ever.

Historically, India has been a Continental Power with a deeply ingrained Land-centric mindset. In fact, the two great empires that unified India in the past, The Mauryan and the Mughal Empires, were both purely continental powers in military outlook. However, it was British Sea Power that established the Third Empire in India. The Current Republic is a successor entity of that colonial empire. The Indian peninsular juts into the Indian Ocean like an unsinkable Aircraft Carrier. Its 12 major and several minor ports and its strategically significant island territories put it in a unique position to dominate all the SLOCs in the critical Indian Ocean Region. Mahan himself had identified the Indian Ocean as the most critical water body that would determine the destinies of nations in the 21st century. Post-independence, despite severe resource constraints, India had built a strong Navy by the early 1960s (this comprised an Aircraft Carrier, 2 Cruisers and 17 Destroyers / Frigates.) During the 1971 war, President Nixon decided to tilt against India and sent in the US Aircraft Carrier Enterprise to coerce India. This led to a major Soviet-subsidised Naval build-up in India and by the 1990s India had achieved a near Blue water capability that was quite impressive. It had an impressive array of two Aircraft Carriers, some 19 Submarines and 19 Destroyers / Frigates along with three Fleet tankers and Missile Patrol Vessels and Corvettes. This was a high water mark from which we have slipped today due to the steady attrition of our fleet caused by a painfully slow replacement of our retiring ships and submarines. The Indian Navy has the best record in terms of indigenisation amongst all three services and has decided to build rather than buy a new Navy for the 21st century. It has accordingly embarked on a most impressive warship building programme. These however are being executed by our Public Sector Shipyards and there have been glaring time and cost overruns. Given the fast pace of the Naval build-up by China and other navies in the littoral, these delays could open glaring windows of vulnerability that could extend almost upto 2020. The Conventional Submarine building programme is badly behind schedule. There is the seminal debate about whether we need more nuclear or conventional AIP submarines? The Gorshkov Aircraft Carrier has been inordinately delayed and so is the production of our indegeneous Aircraft Carriers as well as Destroyers and Frigates badly behind schedule. Given the chronic inefficiencies of our Public Sector undertakings, is there a case for much greater investment and capacity building in our Private Shipyards and Multinational firms? To tide over this worrying vulnerability gap, is there a need to revisit some of our make or buy decisions to speed up our naval build-up towards a true Blue water capability? Some articles in this issue address this vital theme. We have some very highly respected Admirals and land warriors reflecting upon the seminal issues related to Sea Power in this issue that commemorates the Indian Navy. We also have a highly insightful interview with the Chief of Naval Staff himself. The critical Grand Strategic Question is, will Rising India be a Continental or a Maritime Power? The simple answer is, it will have to be both. The chances of conflict with China or Pakistan are highest on land. Limited wars could well erupt in our Continental theatre and spillover to the sea. However 80 per cent of India’s energy needs will come by sea by 2020. Its global trade (which is over US$ 600 billion currently) will grow to over US$ 2 trillion by that date. India will therefore have to invest heavily in Sea Power to secure its vital economic interests on the high seas and project power where necessary to safeguard Indian interests. This sea power investment however will also have to contribute majorly to the outcome of Air-Land battles on the land mass. The Indian Navy will therefore, have to develop capabilities to project power on land via the Littoral and execute Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea Flank. That calls for the creation of credible Marine landing capabilities and the adoption of Over the Horizon Beach Assault Techniques using a combination of Helicopters and Air Cushion Vehicles (ACVs) carrying Tanks and ICVs directly on to the beach. Stand-off beaching may have to be done from 80-90 Nautical miles from the coast and use of ACVs will make 70 per cent of the world’s beaches assaultable. In an era of short and quick Limited Wars, Sea Power must contribute directly and meaningfully to land battles ashore. The good news is the Indian Navy CAN and it will. As we go to press, the Indian Navy is celebrating its arrival as a major Sea Power to reckon with, by recalling its spectacular Raid on the Pakistani Navy’s Home Base of Karachi in the 1971 War. This spectacular strike on Karachi left the Port ablaze and several Pakistani warships at the bottom of the sea. It was a remarkable and superlative achievement for which our nation and our Sea Warriors can justly be very proud. India has tremendous power Potential. Let our leadership be cognisant of that potential which our economy and demography confer on us. Let us now outgrow the Munich Mindset of tamely and supinely surrendering to the asymmetric threats of a near failing state whose Military-ISI complex has severe delusions of grandeur. We must stop being so pussilanimous and call the bluff of this over-presumptuous state. We also need to be prepared to deal with an increasingly truculent China. The Indian Navy will have a very significant role to play in the days ahead.

Jai Hind!

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) December 2011 Defence AND security alert

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contents Sea Power Special ISSUE December 2011

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 3 December 2011

A R T I C L E S India as a sea power - some way to go

force planning to shape India's maritime space: the nuclear dimension

India: continental vs maritime destiny

rising power, growing responsibilities: building India’s 2020 navy

Vice Adm Premvir Das

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd)

Lt Gen H S Lidder PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM (retd)

Cmde Sujeet Samaddar NM (retd)

our “CASE” in point?

Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd)

dong feng 21–D: a game changer?

modernisation of the Indian navy: opportunities for the Indian industry

India's maritime future

look east policy: an appraisal

piracy: a merchant marine perspective

bay of Bengal: the new great game

sanitise the backyard

maritime profile of India

two decades of India’s look east policy: an assessment

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Features exclusive interview

SAAB remote tower

DSA Seminar

seaplanes: for safe and secure oceans

TINA: for national defence

Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma PVSM, AVSM, ADC the future of being present

limited wars in South Asia - against a nuclear backdrop DSA research team Steven Gentles

Rear Adm S Kulshrestha (retd) Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd) Dr Pankaj Jha

Sandeep K Kanwar Col R S N Singh Cecil Victor

Prof Hari Saran

Rahul Mishra

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December 2011 Defence AND security alert

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DSALERT December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

cns interview

DSA: Kindly share with us the vision you had for the Navy on taking over as the Chief. How much do you feel you have been able to achieve so far? Navy Chief: I had stated in my inaugural press conference in December 2009 that my focus would be “to consolidate and improve on all aspects of internal growth that shape the future Navy and contribute in every measure possible, towards strengthening maritime security”. We have put in efforts to sustain the growth trajectory of the Navy and have ensured that critical capability enhancements in all three dimensions are maintained apace. The fact that the IN spent more than the allocated capital budget in the FY 2010-11 stands testimony to the work put in by ‘Team Navy’. In the context of Coastal Security we have been able to formulate a most comprehensive plan for creation of a National Command Control Communication and Intelligence Grid that will exponentially enhance our Maritime Domain Awareness. Building a potent Navy is an ongoing process, one that gets even more challenging as we strive towards maximum indigenisation. We have been able to meet many of the goals we had set for ourselves but there is still more to be accomplished. I am confident that the Navy will continue to grow and attain its acme of operational excellence. DSA: What are the threats and challenges you perceive in the Indian Ocean Region in the coming decade? Navy Chief: The Indian Ocean Region is an amalgam of developed and developing countries on the one hand and some failed and failing states on the other. It is also a resource rich region across which much of the world’s natural resources are traded. Over the past decade, it has also emerged as a locus of global terrorism. Finally, it is essentially an oceanic region, with several issues carried over from its colonial past that could threaten peace and stability. India is the largest country in this region and its democratic credentials make it ideally suited to play the role of a stabilising power. In this regard, the Indian Navy is prepared to play its part in ensuring the maritime security of not just India, but also of the larger Indian Ocean Region. DSA: The Chinese have developed and deployed the DF-21D aircraft carrier killer missiles to target the US carriers as part of their anti-access (access denial) strategy. Do you see the DF-21D as a game changer? Will it be a serious threat to our aircraft carrier/carriers in the future? Do we need this capability? If so, what steps are we taking to acquire the same? Navy Chief: All navies regularly monitor developments in weapons and sensor technology that could have an impact on the nature of operations at sea. The Indian Navy is no exception to this rule. The reports of developments

of an anti-ship ballistic missile by the Chinese Navy are also being assessed on a regular basis. Any weapons system that aims to hit moving targets at sea to a range of around 2,000 km by using a ballistic missile would occupy the interest of maritime strategists. A successful ASBM programme poses difficulties for all navies and aircraft carrier operating navies in particular. The Indian Navy is continuously monitoring such developments and factors these into our long term modernisation programmes.

DSA: Media reports indicate a slowdown in our ship building and asset acquisition programmes. How much do these worry you? Navy Chief: There has been no slowdown as far as the Navy is concerned. Our preferred choice of inducting ships and submarines has been through the indigenous route and of the 49 ships and submarines presently on order, 45 are from Indian shipyards. The induction programme is continuing apace and over the next five years we expect to induct more ships / submarines provided the yards deliver as per expectations. These include aircraft carriers, stealth frigates, destroyers, corvettes, amphibious ships and submarines. IN is also in the process of inducting state-of-the-art aircraft and helicopters to augment our surveillance and integral aviation capabilities. However, there is no denying the fact that delivery times of indigenous warships and projects need to be speeded up.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

“The Offset policy is a clear reaffirmation in our self-belief in the inherent potential of the Indian defence industrial complex as a provider of the resources required by the Indian Armed Forces. Offsets in future defence procurements have the potential to transform our nascent defence industries to finally come of age and play a far larger role in the development of the Indian industrial base. Technologies that industrially-advanced countries are somewhat reluctant to share could be perhaps more easily sourced through the offsets route

”

DSA: The desirability of building a Navy rather than buying one is patently obvious. The Navy amongst all three services has possibly achieved the most in terms of indigenisation. How can the capacities of the Indian industry be exploited optimally for indigenising our Fleet? What is being done towards this end and what more needs to be done? Navy Chief: The Navy’s indigenisation drive over the last few years has resulted in achievement of a substantial quantum of indigenisation in the field of hull, machinery and electrical / electronic equipment. However, there is still much work left towards indigenisation of weapons and sensors. In conjunction with DRDO and industry, the Indian Navy has been making incessant efforts to increase the levels of indigenisation in our fleet. It is heartening to note that the IN’s consistent efforts in indigenisation have brought us to a point today where the indigenous content of the latest P 28 ASW corvette being built by the GRSE, Kolkata, is over 90 per cent. We have, over the last few years, taken a conscious decision to encourage other shipyards, including private yards, to enter the specialised field of warship-construction. Private shipyards have modern infrastructure and are being considered for naval auxiliary ships as per their capacity and capability. To start with, a few private yards have been awarded contracts for construction of survey ships, Naval Offshore Patrol Vessels and Cadet Training ships for the Indian Navy.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

cns interview

DSA: Offsets could give a fillip to our indigenous defence industry. Is there an overall design about the type of offsets we should seek? Navy Chief: Considering the volume of defence expenditures across many countries today, it is certainly fitting to debate methods and procedures that plough back this expenditure and contribute to both economic and technological development of the recipient country. Offsets were introduced in our Defence Procurement Procedure in 2005 based on the Kelkar Committee recommendations. The offsets policy has further evolved with the addition of the provision of offset credit banking in 2008. The issue of offsets has been addressed even more comprehensively in the current Defence Procurement Procedure - 2011 which allows an increased scope for discharge of offset obligations by inclusion of the Civil Aerospace sector and Internal Security products. The aim of the offset route is to enhance the country’s defence industrial capability by infusing both foreign technology and investment. To support this policy, there is a need to put in place various institutional and procedural mechanisms, which is presently under deliberation in the MoD. The Offset policy is a clear reaffirmation in our self-belief in the inherent potential of the Indian defence industrial complex as a provider of the resources required by the Indian Armed Forces. Offsets in future defence procurements have the potential to transform our nascent defence industries to finally come of age and play a far larger role in the development of the Indian industrial base. Technologies that industrially-advanced countries are somewhat reluctant to share could be perhaps more easily sourced through the offsets route. In any event, it is an option worth serious consideration in view of the large number of high value defence imports in the pipeline and also because of its potential to absorb sophisticated technology. DSA: Media reports highlighted Chinese threats against our attempts of oil exploration in the South China Sea? Do you visualise a clash of interests in this region and the likelihood of the Navy’s involvement in such an inadvertent / deliberate clash? Navy Chief: No, we do not visualise any sort of clash of interests in the South China Sea insofar as oil exploration by OVL is concerned. OVL has been in Vietnam for quite some time in offshore oil and natural gas exploration and they (Vietnam) are in the process of further expanding cooperation. Our cooperation with Vietnam or any other country in the world is always as per international laws, norms and conventions. DSA: Fortress Andaman is an invaluable asset in Naval terms. What are we doing to strengthen our presence / capabilities there? Navy Chief: The role of the Andaman and Nicobar Command has been defined by the Government of India and amplified by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, at the time of creation of the A & N Command. The capacity building of the Command in terms of assets and manpower is continuously being addressed and aligned with the role of the Command. Presently, we are in the process of setting up a few Operational Turn Round bases and Naval Air Enclaves in the islands, to cater for additional requirements of the Service, especially with regard to coastal security. Special focus is also being accorded to develop our operational, technical and administrative infrastructure and facilities in the island territories.

Further, the Indian Navy has proactively cooperated with other navies through the SHADE (Shared Awareness and De-confliction) mechanism and the web portal MERCURY, which is an initiative of SHADE. The proactive actions taken by Indian Naval ships for protection of merchant marine, has been widely appreciated and acclaimed by the international community. DSA: Chinese actions in the South China Sea seriously imperil the freedom of the Global Commons. How do you perceive this threat and what would be our reaction? Navy Chief: International norms of ‘Freedom of Navigation’, are enshrined in the UNCLOS and our units when deployed at sea abide by these international norms. We believe that all countries must also abide by these conventions. DSA: Till now our arc of interest focused on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) alone. Recent discussions in strategic circles hint at an outreach towards the Western Pacific Ocean. Do we have the capabilities for such an outreach? Navy Chief: The IN deploys units in the Western Pacific Ocean (South China Sea) when necessary. It is the endeavor of IN to engage with countries of this region to develop and strengthen friendly relationships and improve best operational practices. This is achieved through conduct of bilateral exercises with navies of friendly foreign countries in the region. The Indian Navy today operates a balanced force comprising large ships such as the aircraft carrier, multi-role destroyers and frigates, fleet tankers, amphibious ships and a multitude of other aviation and sub-surface combatants capable of blue water operations. The strategy adopted by the Indian Navy stems from its need to establish Sea Control, the ability to establish freedom of operation in a contested sea space, at prolonged ranges in the primary area of operations, which is the IOR. Towards that end, the present force levels are being further augmented for undertaking tasks defined for the Indian Navy. DSA: We have come much beyond a Brown Water Fleet. How far are we today from a true Blue Water capability? In what time frame could we achieve this?

DSA: Piracy has become a major menace in the last few years and the Somalian pirates have shifted their attacks to the Arabian Sea, very close to our shores. What steps has the Navy taken to ensure the safety of our merchant fleet and more of the vast number of Indian sailors serving other flags?

Navy Chief: As I have mentioned earlier, the Indian Navy operates a variety of ships, submarines and aircraft, all capable of deploying military power at large distances from our own country. The Indian Navy is very much a ‘Blue Water’ force and has indeed been so for many years.

Navy Chief: Piracy in Gulf of Aden, Somali coast, Omani coast and seas between the African coastline and Maldives has grown steadily over the years and has now assumed alarming proportions. This is a global menace, being fought not only by the Indian Navy, but also by numerous other navies of the World.

DSA: On the occasion of the Navy Day, what is your message to our countrymen and all hands of the Indian Navy?

India has been actively engaged in anti-piracy operations. The Indian Navy commenced anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden from October 2008. A total of 27 Indian Navy ships have been deployed in the Gulf of Aden since then. In addition to escorting Indian flagged vessels, ships of other countries have also been provided protection. Close to 1,900 ships, including over 1,600 foreign flagged vessels from different countries, have been escorted by Indian Navy ships in the Gulf of Aden since October 2008. 39 piracy attempts have been thwarted and no ship under Indian escort has thus far been hijacked by pirates. Following a few sporadic incidents reported West of Lakshadweep Islands in November 2010, Indian Navy and Coast Guard have increased surveillance and deployment of ships and aircraft in this area. This has resulted in the reduction of piracy incidents by more than 75 per cent and there has been no instance of hijacking within 500 nm

of Indian coast since December 2010. The Indian Navy also successfully intercepted four pirate vessels, in 2011 in the East Arabian Sea. Over 100 pirates were apprehended and 73 fishermen rescued by the Indian Navy in these two incidents.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Navy Chief: At the outset, I would like to compliment the ‘men in white’ for their professionalism, dedication, loyalty and patriotism. I am aware of the stress and hardships that they go through in sustaining a high tempo of operations to which have been added the additional requirements of coastal security and anti-piracy operations. Needless to say, they have risen magnificently to meet the challenges on every occasion and I remain focused in ensuring no stone is left unturned to ensure the well-being of our Service and civilian personnel as also their families. Indeed, even after our personnel retire from the Navy, they remain disciplined and loyal citizens, with the capability to contribute significantly to the growth and progress of our country. However, many of them, specially the old, disabled, widows and orphans, need our help. To recognise and support ‘Men who were once in White’, 2012 will be the ‘Year of the Ex-Serviceman’ for the Indian Navy.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Vice Adm Premvir Das (retd) The writer retired from the Navy as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has been Co-Chair of the Maritime Security Group in the Council of Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific. He writes frequently on strategic and security issues and is a regular speaker at War Colleges in India. He has served as member of the National Security Advisory Board.

India’s need to become a credible sea power should be seen. Clearly, we need capabilities that can be deployed at quite long distances. Platforms of adequate size and endurance are important as also logistics that can sustain them for the desired period. We need ships that can control the sea areas of interest and those that can deny their use to possible adversaries. We need both, surface warships and submarines, in some numbers. These have to be supplemented by effective intelligence provided by satellites and aerial reconnaissance and networked information and command and control systems. All of these will still not be enough unless supported by integral air power that only aircraft carriers can provide

Despite insufficient resources, the Navy had, by the early 1990s, acquired capabilities that would be considered ‘blue water’. Two aircraft carriers, 19 submarines and equal number of guided missile destroyers / frigates supported by missile patrol vessels and corvettes and a couple of fleet tankers comprised a well balanced fleet capable of being deployed in a wide spectrum of contingencies. Supplementing this force was a small but compact amphibious element. This force has suffered some degradation in the last decade and is unlikely to see substantive enhancement anytime soon. The underwater element has suffered the most. Augmentation of capabilities must be pursued more vigorously given the emerging scenarios at sea highlighted earlier. At the very least, we must aim to achieve a blue water force level of three each of aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines, two dozen destroyers / frigates and eighteen submarines by 2020. This is not impossible if an appropriate mix of outright purchase and build-underlicense is implemented. A capable Coast Guard and mercantile marine are also key ingredients of maritime strength.

t is ironical that despite its seafarers spreading India’s culture and religions to almost every country in Southeast Asia and its traders plying their wares in places as distant as Africa and the Middle East, several centuries ago, the country has never thought of itself as a maritime nation. Any other country with free access to the seas on both sides, dozens of deep water ports and harbours and with strategically located island territories to facilitate surveillance and sea control, would be a maritime power of consequence and many, with fewer of these attributes have become that, but India continues to be a nation that can only think landwards. Several centuries of land fixated Moghul rule followed by two centuries of British domination during which the colonial power retained exclusive control of affairs at sea, created that mindset. It is, therefore, to the great credit of the early Indian naval planners that despite inadequate attention by the government and paucity of resources, they thought strategically and in 1948 itself, a plan was drawn to develop a Navy centered on aircraft carriers and comprising cruisers, destroyers and submarines, all ‘blue water’ ships. Even more remarkably, by 1961, in just fourteen years, the Indian Navy had, actually, acquired an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and seventeen destroyers / frigates, an amazing achievement given the constraints. Yet, in 1965, when the country went to war with Pakistan, our leadership, in a display of great timidity, directed it to stay away from the conflict, its preoccupations focused entirely on the war on land.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

INDIA AS A SEA POWER

SOME WAY TO GO

The new security environment The global security environment has now shifted to Asia. By 2025, three of the four largest economies, will be Asian - China, India and Japan. The ASEAN group of countries will not be far behind and those of Central Asia, given their present and potential resources of oil and gas, will grow in importance even as those of the Middle East remain major suppliers of energy. In East Asia, conflicting claims on ownership of island territories and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), between China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei are potential points of conflict and instability. It is inevitable that China’s postures will become even more assertive as it enhances its sea power and seeks a dominating position in Asia. On a different note, most of the problem states, often referred to as ‘rogue, failing or failed’ by the Americans are Asian entities be they North Korea and Iran - for their nuclear geopolitics - or Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan for internal instability; the last is recognised globally as the epicentre of terrorism. The continent is also home to 70 per cent of all terrorist activity worldwide mainly comprising fundamental Islamic organisations. Finally, there are energy resources which provide sustenance to several major industrial powers, in Asia and beyond. This is a complex brew, much of it in the maritime domain. While the USA, despite not being a littoral, is clearly the most powerful entity in the region, China, with its burgeoning economic and military capabilities, especially at sea, has now become a major Asian power. India, itself, is on the road to becoming an important player in the continent. It has one of the largest Armies in the world and its Navy and

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Air Force rank among the top six. It is a nuclear weapon state. Geography has also been kind to India. With long coastlines on both sides, open access to the sea and outlying island territories, the country sits astride the important North Indian Ocean shipping routes through which much of the Gulf oil destined to the Pacific must transit. Its position, in the increasingly maritime Asia-Pacific geopolitics, cannot be underestimated.

It is inevitable that China’s postures will become even more assertive as it enhances its sea power and seeks a dominating position in Asia

Indo-Pacific region With energy life-lines of both China and Japan tied to the Gulf and several other countries dependent on it for their energy needs, the Indian Ocean (IO) needs to be viewed strategically along with the narrow channels of the Southeast Asian archipelago linking it to the South and East China Seas. More than half of global seaborne energy trade moves across the Indo-Pacific waters which host some of the most important shipping routes of the world. Not surprisingly, it is a region of considerable strategic importance. At the same time, there are vulnerabilities. All exits and entries out and into the IO pass through very restricted waters; the Gulf of Hormuz, Gulf of Aden and the Mozambique Channel in the western part of the IO and the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits in the South East Asia archipelago fall in this category. Pirates operating from shore are able to rob or hijack merchant ships with relative ease. Politically, many littoral states are ridden with ethnic and sectarian dissensions, quite a few are authoritarian and some, especially in the Gulf, dependent on single product economies viz. energy resources, all weaknesses which can result in regional instability as has been seen in Yemen and Bahrein in recent months. In the East and South China Seas the scenario is different. While piracy is not so rampant or threatening, there are maritime disputes between many countries primarily China on

one side and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines on the other. There have been several incidents of discord since one party claims ‘historical sovereignty’ over much of the water space while others rely upon the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), once again with different interpretations. Even within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), China has an interpretation of right of free passage which others do not have. The situation is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future and there is potential for escalation. Not surprisingly, several regional navies have begun to enhance their capabilities at sea.

India’s interests India’s interests are at two levels. First, as one of the two largest countries in the region and geographically located as it is, India has responsibilities in ensuring security of the commons, as well as its own legitimate concerns. While, its traditional security concerns centre mainly on China and Pakistan with the possibility of military conflict with one or both being at the core, developments which will retard its economic growth or impinge upon internal security and stability are no less important. Tranquillity, in its immediate neighbourhood and even beyond, is an essential prerequisite to the latter. India must also take note of the presence of external powers and their military forces in the IO which has its own impact on the geopolitics of the region. The island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles, sitting astride the southern entries to the northern IO, are equally important to its strategic concerns. The second dimension is more proximate. The country will import over 80 per cent of its energy needs by 2020. Safe movement of the ships at sea and speedy discharge of their cargoes in ports is vital. India also has offshore oil exploration and exploitation platforms on either coast spread across 50,000 square kilometers and it is likely that this area may double in the next decade; platforms in these waters which process oil and gas are very valuable assets which need to be safeguarded. A related concern is the security of seaborne trade. The country’s imports and exports have

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reached US$ 600 billion already and may well touch US$ 2 trillion by 2020. Almost all of this trade moves by sea, through the shipping routes and narrow channels mentioned earlier. Any adverse effect on the safe movement of this trade will impact on economic growth.

By 1961, in just fourteen years, the Indian Navy had, actually, acquired an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and seventeen destroyers / frigates, an amazing achievement given the constraints. Yet, in 1965, when the country went to war with Pakistan, our leadership, in a display of great timidity, directed it to stay away from the conflict, its preoccupations focused entirely on the war on land India shares maritime boundaries not just with three South Asian neighbours but also with three nations of Southeast Asia - Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia; there is close proximity with a fourth, Malaysia. This has its own complexities in terms of poaching or other criminal activity e.g. illegal movement of people. Smuggling of narcotics is another worrisome reality as it funds terrorism through procurement of illicit arms from the resources so generated. This, as is well known, was the methodology used by the LTTE terrorism in Sri Lanka to get arms and ammunition until neutralised, when the movement petered out. Explosives used in the 1993 bomb blasts in Mumbai were smuggled in by sea from Pakistan and landed at fishing villages on the western coast. The climax came with the very daring raid launched by sea on high profile targets in Mumbai on 26th November 2008. Such asymmetric attacks in which the initiative always rests with the attacker pose a very serious threat as their impact is widespread, at very little cost. Finally, there are the ASEAN and Gulf regions. Bilateral trade between the former and India crossed US$ 40 billion in 2009 and is expected to reach US$ 100 billion by 2015. As for the Gulf countries, they are not only the largest suppliers of energy, with a two way trade of US$ 100 billion in 2010, but are also home to nearly six million Indian

workers who sent back US$ 30 billion in remittances to their home country last year. Both regions, separated by the Arabian Sea on one side and the Bay of Bengal on the other are, therefore, of great importance and instability in either will be detrimental to India’s interests. In the same way, tensions resulting from disputes in the South China Sea would be of concern to India which also has energy exploration and sharing interests in Vietnam. In short, India’s maritime interests stretch from the Gulf on one side to the Southeast Asian waters and beyond; southwards they extend to the island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles. Its sea power must ensure that these are safeguarded.

Traditional threats Pakistan and China have been in military conflict with India, the former as many as four times and are the two countries which could pose a future military threat to India; no others are on the horizon. Even with these two, the probability that any of them may want to go to war is not high; however, it can not be ruled out. Pakistan might well find a short and sharp conflict advantageous in overall terms as this might serve to unite a country fast fragmenting under sectarian and ethnic pressures complemented by burgeoning fundamental Islamist forces. Till such time as the Army remains in control in Pakistan, in particular of India related policy, this possibility must be considered real even though asymmetric operations launched through non-state actors, will be seen to be more economical with little risk of retaliation. Therefore, a high state of preparedness to cope with terrorist threats, at and from the sea, is essential. China falls in a different category. Its reasons for initiating military operations against India, if that happens, will be largely strategic, to establish its unchallenged dominance in Asia. Nevertheless, in the last decade, relations with China have been tranquil. Bilateral trade between the two countries has crossed US$ 60 billion. The two countries interact at many multilateral forums. Meetings between leaders of the two countries have been positive.

At the same time, there are areas of discord. China’s continuing military and nuclear assistance to Pakistan, its reported presence in the Gilgit region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and its continuing involvement in India’s immediate neighbourhood, send a disturbing signal. There have also been actions in recent times including in the South China Sea which were clearly provocative. Still, China is a country that India needs to engage. Some ‘Ups and Downs’ in the relationship have to be taken in stride and a positive but watchful stratagey, based on capabilities rather than intentions, is necessary.

Asian waters; it may also seek a more comprehensive presence in the IO. For this to be credible, availability of permanent military bases, from where ships, surveillance and fighter aircraft can operate along with comprehensive repairs and logistics infrastructure that are needed to support them, are essential. China is building ports in three South Asian countries and there are apprehensions that one or more of these might be made available by the hosts to the Chinese for use as such military bases. While this may not be easy, its possibility cannot be ruled out and India must be watchful of the developing situation.

India’s interests are at two levels. First, as one of the two largest countries in the region and geographically located as it is, India has responsibilities in ensuring security of the commons, as well as its own legitimate concerns. While, its traditional security concerns centre mainly on China and Pakistan with the possibility of military conflict with one or both being at the core, developments which will retard its economic growth or impinge upon internal security and stability are no less important. Tranquillity, in its immediate neighbourhood and even beyond, is an essential prerequisite

Non-traditional threats

At sea, China is modernising its naval forces by building ships and submarines at a fast rate and induction of an aircraft carrier in the next few years, to be reinforced by another by 2020, is likely. The urge to have and exploit maritime power consistent with its growing stature is visible, as witnessed in East

With economic growth being a vital national interest and security of energy and trade being its two prime ingredients, safety of the IO commons has become critical. Piracy and maritime terrorism have become increasingly threatening to safe movement at sea in recent years and quite apart from safeguarding its own interests against both, India, as the largest and most capable regional maritime power, also has a responsibility in ensuring freedom of movement at sea. Piracy requires sanctuaries ashore from where the pirates can make their swift raids. It is only after deterrent measures against the criminals were taken ashore by the Malacca Straits littorals that piracy could be controlled. India carries out patrols in the approaches to the Malacca Strait in coordination with Indonesia and Thailand and similar arrangements with Malaysia should be worked out. The waters off Somalia have now become the piracy centre of the world. Lack of governmental

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authority ashore and widespread lawlessness has allowed this activity to continue unabated. India, along with several other countries, has been deploying its warships since November 2008 when a merchant vessel with a predominantly Indian crew was hijacked. China has also deputed ships, ostensibly to escort its merchantmen in the Gulf, but in passing, to proclaim its legitimacy as an IO player. Clearly, patrolling by so many high cost warships on a permanent basis is neither feasible nor even productive. The menace cannot be eradicated unless law and order are enforced in the coastal regions of Somalia with UN mandates if necessary. To piracy, should be added terror threats at and from the sea as manifested so visibly in the attacks on important civilian targets in Mumbai in November 2008. Apart from issues like piracy and maritime terrorism, there are others such as illegal poaching for fish in our waters that are not less important. Effective surveillance and patrolling of the EEZ and coastal approaches and ports by maritime forces is, therefore, necessary. To this list should be added capabilities to respond to natural disasters such as the Tsunami of December 2004 and oil spills, accidental or deliberate. Furthermore, in all of these, India’s maritime forces must also be able to provide assistance to other littoral nations.

Need for sea power It is in this context that India’s need to become a credible sea power should be seen. Clearly, we need capabilities that can be deployed at quite long distances. Platforms of adequate size and endurance are important as also logistics that can sustain them for the desired period. We need ships that can control the sea areas of interest and those that can deny their use to possible adversaries. We need both, surface warships and submarines, in some numbers. These have to be supplemented by effective intelligence provided by satellites and aerial reconnaissance and networked information and command and control systems. All of these will still not be enough unless supported by integral air power that only aircraft carriers can provide. Each of these

elements is a key ingredient of credible sea power. Interestingly, despite insufficient resources, the Navy had, by the early 1990s, acquired capabilities that would be considered ‘blue water’. Two aircraft carriers, 19 submarines and equal number of guided missile destroyers / frigates supported by missile patrol vessels and corvettes and a couple of fleet tankers comprised a well balanced fleet capable of being deployed in a wide spectrum of contingencies. Supplementing this force was a small but compact amphibious element. This force has suffered some degradation in the last decade and is unlikely to see substantive enhancement anytime soon. The underwater element has suffered the most. Augmentation of capabilities must be pursued more vigorously given the emerging scenarios at sea highlighted earlier. At the very least, we must aim to achieve a blue water force level of three each of aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines, two dozen destroyers / frigates and eighteen submarines by 2020. This is not impossible if an appropriate mix of outright purchase and build-under-license is implemented. A capable Coast Guard and mercantile marine are also key ingredients of maritime strength. Ultimately, credible power can only come from the ability to build it indigenously. Until now, we have depended entirely on the public sector or on imports to meet military needs, treating the private sector as pariahs. A small beginning has now been made in inducting the latter into the defence acquisition infrastructure. Every effort must be made to enhance its capabilities through placement of orders, permitting collaboration with suitable foreign manufacturers, where necessary. Offsets available through major defence imports should be utilised for this purpose. Greater emphasis should also be placed on exporting defence products as its competitive nature will promote development of better technologies and higher productivity. The Navy’s responsibilities have become more complex and are no longer limited just to combat. Both piracy and maritime terrorism can only be countered through concerted

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action by several maritime forces including the Navy and it can not shy away from these traditionally constabulary functions apart from its primary business of being ready for war. Additionally, the non-traditional threats need engagement and sharing of information and intelligence with other navies. This can only come about if there is mutual trust and confidence which, in turn, requires frequent and wide ranging interfaces through exchange and visits of personnel, port visits by ships, joint exercises and patrols. All of these consume time and effort but have become inescapable in the new security environment. This also means that, to be cost effective, the Navy must no longer be just high profile ‘blue water’ but also capable of coping with contingencies nearer home. This is a new challenge that present naval planners face.

Conclusion India’s security interests, in the changing environment, stretch across a broad spectrum which covers geo-strategic considerations arising from the country’s size and location, its energy and trade security, traditional threats posed by nation state adversaries; many of them are centered on the sea. To this menu should be added the ability to respond to natural disasters which visit the IO region more often than they do elsewhere. A mix of capabilities is needed, ocean going as well as coastal. Ability to withstand sophisticated levels of hostile cyber warfare is equally important as also a vibrant merchant marine served by ports that are both quantitatively and qualitatively capable of coping with the escalating need. Finally, no capabilities, blue or brown water, can be of much use if the nation’s diplomacy and its maritime strategies do not function in sync with each other. Equally important, more than other forms of military capabilities, sea power, which can be applied away from one’s shores in graduated scales, requires the political leadership to first, understand its nature and then, take appropriate steps to build and exploit it to further the national interest. We have come some way but there are many miles to go before India can be reckoned as a credible power at sea.

Remote Tower

THE FUTURE OF BEING PRESENT The System Remote Tower - Remote Tower control solution - is a revolutionary initiative for airport stakeholders and Air Traffic Control. For the first time, there is a real possibility to combine a dynamic use of resources, information sharing and safety enhancement features at a preferred and safe location. A number of Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and airports have already recognised the potential of System Remote Tower. With parallel deployment activities worldwide, the Saab System Remote Tower product is consolidated as unique market leader. Saab is very proud to be the prime system Remote Tower concept developer. Having cooperated closely with all stakeholders, the product has a high degree of standardisation and usability. Vital parameters such as cost-effectiveness and safety are guaranteed. New worldleading technology gives positive effects The Saab System Remote Tower can be presented and adapted in many forms and is the ideal solution when seeking a primary ATC location for airport and approach operations. In key performance areas such as safety, cost reduction and interoperability, system Remote Tower represents the perfect solution for: • Replacement of outdated system Remote Tower facilities • Provision of system Remote Tower services at new airports • Merging two or more existing ATC sites into one • Contingency plan to guarantee continuity of ATC service provision The cost-saving potential of not needing to build a new system Remote Tower facility is immense. System Remote Tower enables an ATC facility to be activated on demand, thereby guaranteeing continuity of airport operations at maximum cost efficiency. The system Remote Tower platform is fully scalable, permitting operational views of up to 360 degrees. The Information sharing process, vital for the modern airport CDM (Collaborative Decision Making) initiative, is also maintained through system Enhanced safety opportunities Several small ATC facilities can be merged in the system Remote Tower to form a centre, allowing small and isolated ATC units to benefit from technology sharing and support capability. In the system Remote Tower centre, all safety-enhancing technologies, such as runway incursion monitoring and low-visibility operating procedures, can be deployed to support the ATCO (air traffic controller). By being given the opportunity to work in a safer and more rewarding environment, the ATCO’s sense of well-being is more easily maintained, thus promoting good health. The technology is always designed to support the controller and increase situational awareness. Maintenance costs are reduced and personnel allocation can be optimised. The system Remote Tower Centre solution meets the requirements of high-efficiency, cost-reduction and staff allocation. For ATC personnel, the r-TWR centre enables a flexible and stimulating working environment. Multiple ATC ratings can be obtained and rosters can be more efficiently administered. If system Remote Tower is to be deployed as a contingency, some of its built-in technology e.g. camera monitoring and enhancement can also be used in the day-to-day operations of the traditional TWR. Additional features such as the ability to maintain traffic identification in low visibility conditions via infrared camera, motion detection to alert for anomalies and on-screen label presentation will assist the ATCO greatly. This brings extra surveillance capability and enhances safety. Additional benefits When traffic levels permit or the contingency role is not activated, the system Remote Tower can be used for numerous additional activities and provide other benefits: • Perform proficiency training and evaluation • Conduct emergency training • Simulate traffic patterns to eliminate bottlenecks in airside infrastructure • Conduct record-and-replay for investigative purposes • Maintenance of several ATC sites is reduced to just one • Location of system Remote Tower can be decided based on required security level

sea power

VISION AND MISSION

FORCE PLANNING TO SHAPE INDIA'S Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command,Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

The surge of nationalism that sweeps China has led it to formulate an affordable military strategy of asymmetric weapons (the ‘assassin’s mace’ is part of such a strategy) This unorthodox strategy has set into motion three areas of rapid modernisation in the military establishment; firstly the most active land based ballistic and cruise missile programme in the world, secondly an enlarged nuclear attack and nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet and lastly a concentration on what China calls “informatisation” an active and passive method of waging information warfare

A former FOC-in-C of our Western Fleet and head of the Strategic Forces Command, reflects upon the “Intimidation of the immediate”, that has hampered our long term planning and execution of the force structure. In this brilliant and thought-provoking piece, he covers a wide canvas and looks in detail upon the nuclear dimensions of our required fleet structure. He defines the Strategic Maritime Space we need to look at in terms of surveillance, denial and where needed, to establish control over selected sea spaces. He then examines the challenges we face there and proceeds to look at the Indian Nuclear doctrine and the Naval forces we need to give it effect. He avers that the nuclear powered submarine by virtue of its stealth, speed, long endurance and near invulnerability provides the ultimate platform for strategic deterrent missions when armed with nuclear missiles (SSBN). He laments the fact that each of the three armed forces, the Indian Army, the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force have formulated separate declared strategies often in contradiction with each other. A thought-provoking essay based upon an experiential context.

oth Julian Corbett and Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov had an astute perspective of the importance of a theory of war. Such a hypothesis, they advocated, provided a context to formulate and enable a strategic policy to deter war and, should the need arise, to wage that war. Corbett suggested that “by maritime strategy we mean the principles that govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor” he went on to add “Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided - except in the rarest cases - either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do”. Gorshkov on the other hand enlarged the scope and of sea power and placed it within the framework of comprehensive national power. In his seminal book, The Sea Power of the State he emphasises that “the essence of sea power of the state is how far it is possible to make effective use of the World Ocean or, as it is sometimes said, the hydrosphere of the earth, in the interest of the state as a whole”. India’s armed forces have traditionally evolved to cope with operational scenarios. At genesis, this may have been attributed to the military’s role in creation and upholding colonial empire, however, post-independence; to have deliberately brought about a separation between the armed forces and the strategic decision making process was a paradox that defied norms

MARITIME SPACE THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

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of nation building. The American strategist, George Tanham incisively argued, that India had problems developing a robust security policy including a strong military force because the country was bereft of coherent strategic thought. This operational canvas is a transient that abhors futuristic force planning. It was, therefore, the ‘immediate intimidation’ of the changing global scenario that drove plans and consequently resulted in the accretion of forces. Unfortunately, this inspiration of the instantaneous intimidation was and continues to be the pretender that serves to fill the strategic space. The case of our strategic maritime posture as a function of declared ‘Look East’ policy is a study in point.

The strategic approach It is interesting to examine the Chinese case not just to view how international events catalysed a strategic approach but also how their inabilities worked to bring about a transformation in their strategic posture. To China, two events of the 1990s had significant impact on the shaping of their military strategy. The first of these is the Gulf War of 1991. China took home not lessons or answers but, a reason for strategic preemption. In the words of General Liu Jingsong “allowing a modern military opponent unfettered access to land, sea and air territories in which to build-up and employ forces, as well as regional bases and logistic hubs to sustain them, was a recipe for defeat”. He pointed out that “the very assembly and positioning of coalition forces constituted first firing and justified action to preempt or deter actual war”. The second event was during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, which to the Chinese was a humiliating experience of their sovereignty being violated when the US deployed two carrier groups in the Straits with impunity. These

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two events were the primary causes for them to formulate and enable their ‘Access Denial’ strategy. China has never publicly acknowledged this stratagem; however force planning and structuring that we are currently witness to, whether it is the ASAT programme, the missile modernisation, the thrust on ‘informatisation’ and cyber warfare or indeed, of focus to the article, the nuclear submarine build and replacement agenda; should leave none in doubt of the course which their force planners have charted.

Gorshkov enlarged the scope of sea power and placed it within the framework of comprehensive national power. In his seminal book, The Sea Power of the State he emphasises that “the essence of sea power of the state is how far it is possible to make effective use of the World Ocean or, as it is sometimes said, the hydrosphere of the earth, in the interest of the state as a whole China did not follow the course set by the US and USSR in the cold war. Influenced more by Chairman Mao’s belief that nuclear weapons were paper tigers took a more realistic approach to its military nuclear programme and adopted no first use and limited its arsenal. Admittedly, substance of the geo-political context that India found itself in was markedly different from that of China or the cold ‘warriors’ in terms of its own aspirations, national character, historical baggage, challenges that it was confronted with and the economics of building a credible conventional and nuclear arsenal. Yet, the need to adopt a strategic approach and to articulate a cogent theory which integrated the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of force with a convincing contract for use remained much the same. It is the understanding and practice of this imperative that has persistently eluded India. Enabling of nuclear capabilities in the maritime sphere is a specific case in point. The history of nuclear militarisation particularly in the Indian maritime context is dogged by secrecy, the lack of open archival information, decision making being left to a politico-techno-bureaucratic

enterprise bereft of critical military participation and, significantly, in spasms operational considerations overwhelming the strategic. The essence of the debate that now unfolds is a deeper understanding of the maritime space of interest, its correlation with policy, the challenges that it contains and the essentials of force planning including nuclear forces to fill and shape the strategic space.

The strategic maritime space This discussion begins by defining the geographical contours within which the impact of the now apparent global power shift will be most felt and within which maritime strategy will operate. In this context the sea space between the 30 degree East Meridian and the 130 degree East Meridian extending to the Antarctic continent provides the theatre within which the strategy will function. This sea space includes the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea Ocean and may be termed the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Ocean (IOEO). The IOEO hydrospace, bound by landmasses on all sides except the 130 East Meridian, has some unique features. Its weather is dominated by the monsoons and tropical systems, the hydrology of this Ocean makes it difficult for underwater surveillance operations between the 30 degrees north south parallels. Widespread clouding impairs domain transparency. Small ship operations, other than in the littoral seas, are particularly inhibited during the 6 month monsoon period. Density of traffic through the narrow passages and straits makes surveillance without identification incoherent. This Oceanic body is dominated by ten important choke points and narrows. From west to east these 10 critical choke points may be identified as follows: The Cape of Good Hope: The Strait of Babel Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz (this is a key energy corridor shipping 40 per cent of seaborne oil traded globally), Dondra Head (which provides the passage which connects SLOC from the 9 degree channel to East Asia); 6 degree channel (is the primary route that feeds into the Strait of Malacca); the Malacca Straits

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(which links the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean (being the most commercially viable sea route with considerable depths, it offers the most cost efficient SLOC); The Sunda Strait; Lombok Straits: Makassar Strait and finally, the Luzon Strait which provides the Pacific passage into the South China Sea.

The eventuality of a US drawback from the region, while of a low probability, remains a contingency that will leave a vacuum which has the potential for friction between China on one side and India and Japan on the other with the littorals going by interests In essence the ocean space of interest the IOEO, with its ten choke points and narrows, provides the strategic context in general to global trade passing through these waters and in particular to Indian maritime forces that would seek to surveill, deny or control these waters.

Policy, power and vision An analysis of the current state of international relations and the developments in the region will demand continuity in growth and continuity in modernisation of regional militaries. This continuity in military affairs will most affect China, India and Japan. While the littorals of the IOEO may well develop denial capabilities with their focus on individual interests in these waters, their effectiveness can only be assured through co-operative engagements with like minded nations whose combined presence in the region would better serve individual as well as collective interest. Within such a co-operative group it is reasonable to assume that individual friction would be subsumed to the larger denial objectives, the expansion of the ASEAN and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are suggestive of the littoral’s aspirations to counter-balance the looming presence of China in their grouping. USA’s presence will dominate activities in the region in the immediate and mid-term future. Flash points such as territorial claims both in the maritime and continental domain

will remain a source of friction that would necessarily demand military capabilities and a strategic orientation that serves to assure restraint. Where American interests differ with the three major players the latter will demand a role in order to assure its own interests. The eventuality of a US drawback from the region, while of a low probability, remains a contingency that will leave a vacuum which has the potential for friction between China on one side and India and Japan on the other with the littorals going by interests.

●● The challenge of a rising China: Unfortunately, in its relationship with India it has shown no propensity to establish co-operative stabilising arrangements nor has it taken any measures to resolve long standing boundary disputes. Its collusion with reprobate states further pushes relationships downhill, the nuclear tie-up both in the weapon and civilian field with Pakistan along with possible doctrinal links; and in March 2010 failure to issue a condemnation when North Korea sank a South Korean warship does not suggest a pacific approach to relations. Its disputes with Japan and its forceful reassertion of claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands and to sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea are very serious ulcers in current relationships in the Eastern Oceans (see Map 1). This conundrum continues to push affected parties and like minded states into countervailing arrangements.

the links that USA enjoys with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the other littorals of this region? The noises that currently emanate would seem to suggest that the war of words is just a few turns away from a conflictual situation.

Challenges

Richard Behar, draws our attention to the “parasitic relationship” between China and the sub-Saharan nations.” These are strategic moves which are more than likely to cause friction between powers and demand an approach that embraces cooperation. Powers can coexist peacefully only when their rise is seen as one that does not hinder the other.

Contemporary challenges in the IOEO in context of Policy are dominated by three currents. These are:

●● The hyper power: Is the American posture in the South China Sea intrinsically antagonistic and would it break out into a hot conflict given

inevitable strategic competition”. It is also apparent that the surge of nationalism that sweeps China has led it to formulate an affordable military strategy of asymmetric weapons (the ‘assassin’s mace’ is part of such a strategy) This unorthodox strategy has set into motion three areas of rapid modernisation in the military establishment; firstly the most active land based ballistic and cruise missile programme in the world, secondly an enlarged nuclear attack and nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet and lastly a concentration on

India’s strategic nuclear policy is articulated in her nuclear doctrine made public on 04 January 2003. The doctrine presents two perspectives; the first deals with ‘Form,’ nuclear war avoidance is the leit motif. It reinforces the belief that nuclear weapons are not for use, so ‘No First Use (NFU)’ is a natural choice Since the declaration of India’s Look East Policy, the ASEAN-India relationship has grown in leaps and bounds from the limited sectoral partnership in 1992 to a full dialogue venture in 1995 and subsequently to a summit level collaboration in the first ASEAN-India summit held in 2002. India and China along with ASEAN are set to become the world’s largest economic bloc. The grouping is expected to account for about 27 per cent of Global GDP and will very quickly overtake the EU and USA economies. The ASEAN Regional Forum provides a critical stage for promoting stable relationships between major powers and is a useful complement to bilateral activity which is accepted to be at the heart of the security construct in the ‘Eastern Ocean.’ The buoyancy of the Indo-ASEAN relationship is backed by surging trade figures which in 2007 was US$ 15.06 billion and is slated to hit US$ 60 billion in the current year and is billed for US$ 100 billion by 2014. With such burgeoning stakes in the region, the reason to establish strong and stable security ties now becomes a core issue.

●● The mixed blessings of globalisation and the rise of nationalism: The impact of globalisation and the inability of the state to reconcile with the stresses that it places on the very concept of sovereignty, ought to be the focus. Nationalism which was the underlying force that sparked off the wars of the 20th century has today, become the source of China’s confidence. According to Yuan Peng of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations “many Chinese scholars suggest that the govt. give up the illusion of US partnership and face squarely the profound and

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what China calls “informatisation” an active and passive method of waging information warfare. China’s carousing with maverick nations such as Pakistan and North Korea does not in anyway enthuse confidence for the prospects of a stable future.

Whatever force structures are developed should cater for the dominant three challenges. In the broadest of terms our vision would be ‘to create and deploy such forces which would establish and contribute to stability within these waters and should the need arise to deter hostile action, deny access to waters and littorals of interest or establish control over selected sea spaces’

Indo-US strategic framework Of the three dominant currents discussed above, what direction China’s rise will take will be influenced by both internal as well as external factors. With the coming

of the Third Island Chain (see Map 2); the maturing of the long range access denial strategy and the cultivation of the string of pearls, what is of relevance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture in the IOEO that serves to stabilise and should the need arise to deny or control. On the ‘globalisationnationalism’ non-state actor conundrum, clearly plural societies with decentralised control are more likely to transform, adjust, adapt and tweak their systems, than monolithic centrally controlled states such as China which are intrinsically brittle; and as cracks begin to show, the fallout on the region can only be traumatic. Since Independence, Indo-US relations have seen dizzy highs and plummeting lows. It began with the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1940s and 50s) pumping in massive funds to build infrastructure without giving too much thought to building a strategic relationship. By the 1971 war relations had touched rock-bottom and remained there through Pokhran 1, the break up of the Soviet Union and into the 1990s. The period was marked by a state of knee-jerk ‘drift and sanction’ and in the absence of a strategic locus, left the relationship rudderless. It was after the 1998 nuclear tests that the two countries awoke to the realities that an engagement suggested. The consequence was

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the inking of the ‘Next Step in Strategic Partnership’ an agreement that identified and formalised areas of bilateral cooperation in January 2004 which included civil nuclear enterprises, civil space programmes, missile defence and high technology deals. Of critical importance was the opening of technology doors which culminated in the watershed Indo-US nuclear agreement of 18 July 2005. The larger significance of this deal was the arrival of India on the global stage as an equal and an acceptance of its potential to play an influencing role. India today stands as a strong society that provides an oasis of stability amidst a clutch of disintegrating and failing states in a rough neighbourhood that hosts two inimical nuclear armed nations with close military and doctrinal links. Robust Indo-US relations provide the means to bringing about balance in the region. While it remains premature to translate these ties to deeper involvement, it is the maritime dimension, that opens up the maximum possibilities. India has shown itself; through restraint, pluralistic and popular form of governance to be a responsible state that upholds the status quo yet invites change through democratic forces. Its rise, in the main, is not only welcomed in Southeast Asia but is seen as a harmonising happening that could counterpoise China. Given the objective realities of the situation, the next step would logically be to establish an Indo-US strategic framework in the maritime domain.

The Indian nuclear doctrine India’s strategic nuclear policy is articulated in her nuclear doctrine made public on 04 January 2003. The doctrine presents two perspectives; the first deals with ‘Form,’ nuclear war avoidance is the leit motif. It reinforces the belief that nuclear weapons are not for use, so ‘No First Use (NFU)’ is a natural choice. And yet the logic of self-preservation and of foreseeable power equations demanded that relations not be held to ransom on account of an inability to respond in a manner to deter convincingly. The existential nuclear challenges demanded credibility

of the deterrent resting on the three pillars of surveillance, readiness and survivability. Given these settings the arsenal provides for alternatives and a guarantee that the second strike would cause unacceptable damage without any suggestion of a calibrated response.

A major infrastructural centre in the Andaman Sea must be accompanied by establishing base support facility arrangements in Indonesia, Vietnam and Japan in the Southern islands (Kyushu / Shikoku). To the west, the Indian Ocean littorals such as South Africa, Malagasy, Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles will have to be cultivated The second part of the doctrine deals with ‘Substance’, with operationalising the deterrent and Command and Control as the main themes. Development and deployment of the ‘Triad’ are so structured that the three pillars of credibility are neither compromised nor readiness undermined. Command and Control is arranged in a manner that there exists clear division between Control and Custodian with multiple redundancy and dual-rule release authorisation at every level. Separation of Control from Custodian, effectively rules out conventionalising the deterrent. Command of the arsenal under all circumstances remains a political prerogative with comprehensive ‘hot stand-by’ provided in the Nuclear Command Authority. To recapitulate, salients of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine are listed below: ●● Nuclear weapons are political tools. ●● The nuclear policy would be steered by a ‘Punishment Strategy’ its guiding principle would be No First Use. ●● India would develop and operationalise a credible minimum deterrence with the necessary flexibility, mobility and mass. ●● Retaliation to a first strike would be massive and would seek to cause unacceptable damage. Unacceptability of damage is directly

linked to the credibility of deterrence. It would be of such magnitude that a-would-be ‘first-striker’ is dissuaded from contemplating the strike. ●● The use of Chemical, Biological or any other WMDs will invite the nuclear option. ●● Nuclear weapons will not be used against non-weapon state. ●● India declared a unilateral moratorium against nuclear testing. It also assured the world of continued stringent controls over proliferation. ●● The goal of global disarmament remains.

nuclear

Force planning Whatever force structures are developed should cater for the dominant three challenges. In the broadest of terms our vision would be ‘to create and deploy such forces which would establish and contribute to stability within these waters and should the need arise to deter hostile action, deny access to waters and littorals of interest or establish control over selected sea spaces’. While our focus would be to concentrate on maritime forces, it would also be necessary to recognise that the other elements of national power would be required to realise such a vision and contend with the shape that challenges may take in the long term within these Oceans. When dealing with the problem of means, a balance is necessary between objectives that are identified with available resources. Force planning must be driven by three overarching considerations. In the first part clear understanding of what the articulated national policy is with respect to the Look East policy, the IAFS and the Antarctic Treaty; in the second part what challenges may arise in the short and long term to this policy and the nature of friction which conflicting interests may degenerate into. The last part must include an estimate of potential loss / harm that may occur to our national interests if forces were not developed to address the first two parts. Infrastructure and logistic planning to deploy in the IOEO must

factor not just the expanse of this region but also the ability to reach and sustain operations between 3,000-4,000 nautical miles from Indian ports / bases that may be provided by like-minded littorals. Ideally the potential for development of infrastructure for such long range operations towards the east lies in the Andaman and Nicobar islands which offers the necessary springboard into the Eastern Ocean and for the South Indian Ocean and forward operating bases in like-minded East African littorals cultivated through the IAFS. Such focused development endows us with the Mahanian logic of being able to provide the very unity of objectives directed upon the sea. A major infrastructural centre in the Andaman Sea must be accompanied by establishing base support facility arrangements in Indonesia, Vietnam and Japan in the Southern islands (Kyushu / Shikoku). To the west, the Indian Ocean littorals such as South Africa, Malagasy, Tanzania, Mauritius and Seychelles will have to be cultivated. Such infrastructural back up would serve the Policy admirably. It would also call for diplomacy of a nature that we have not thus far seen practiced. The types of military maritime missions that the Navy may be tasked with in the IOEO encompass the following: ●● War fighting which includes Sea Control, Access Denial operations and littoral warfare. ●● Strategic deterrence which would be a feature that would be persistent and consistent with our nuclear doctrine. ●● Coercive maritime deployments may include deployments in Straits and along Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). ●● Co-operative missions including intervention, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. ●● Diplomatic missions, policing and benign role. Forces that would be required at all times to fulfill these missions in area would comprise of one carrier group for control tasks at all

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VISION AND MISSION

times with an amphibious brigade group attached with suitable fixed and airborne ASW and seabed and airborne surveillance assets. Units for marking high value opposition forces would have to be designated and propositioned in probable areas. SSNs, may be deployed for denial operations in select areas while the SSBN nuclear deterrent would be on patrol at all times. Shore based long range maritime strike aircraft with air to air refuelling facilities at forward bases must be deployed. ASAT batteries for disabling command and control networks should be on alert as deemed necessary. Auxiliaries required to sustain forces would have to be attached or be taken up from trade

of sustaining 20-25 knots.

The nuclear powered submarine by virtue of its stealth, speed, long endurance and near invulnerability provides the ultimate platform for strategic deterrent missions when armed with nuclear missiles (SSBN)

●● In future, constraints on fossil fuel use in transport may bring marine nuclear propulsion into more widespread use.

Nuclear forces Given the missions that maritime forces may be tasked with; the vast and dense nature of the waters that comprise the IOEO; the probability of friction arising as competition for cornering scarce resources mounts; and the need to ensure that should a hot conflict arise strategic nuclear deterrence is not breached, the need to deploy and maintain balanced maritime forces both conventional and strategic becomes vital. The nuclear powered submarine by virtue of its stealth, speed, long endurance and near invulnerability provides the ultimate platform for strategic deterrent missions when armed with nuclear missiles (SSBN). With a conventional payload the nuclear submarine (SSN) can very effectively operate in cooperation with air and surface platforms in execution of the missions identified earlier. Salient characteristics of a nuclear submarine are enumerated below along with an overview of the Indian programme: ●● The first nuclear-powered submarine, USS Nautilus, put to sea in 1955. This marked the transition of submarines from slow underwater vessels to warships capable

●● Some 140 ships are powered by more than 180 small nuclear reactors and more than 12,000 reactor years of marine operation has been accumulated. ●● Most are submarines, but they range from icebreakers to aircraft carriers. ●● Nuclear submarines can transit at speeds in excess of 25 knots and dive to depths beyond the crushing depth of most conventional torpedoes. ●● In tropical and deep waters the nuclear submarine is practically invisible to conventional sensors.

India launched her first nuclear submarine in July 2009, the 6,000 dwt Arihant SSBN, with a single 85 MW PWR driving a 70 MW steam turbine. It carries a suite of 12 SLBMs. It is reported to have cost US$ 2.9 billion and the production line for several more Arihant class SSBNs has been enabled. The SSN construction programme is also underway. India is, in addition, leasing a 7,900 dwt Russian Akula-II class nuclear attack submarine for ten years from 2010, at a cost of US$ 650 million. It has a single 190 MWt VM-5/ OK-650 PWR driving a 32 MW steam turbine and two 2 MWe turbogenerators. While much of the programme remains under wraps the direction in which force structures are evolving is clear - the third leg of the triad of strategic nuclear forces is in the offing and a long overdue commitment to realising effective denial forces is at hand. In dealing with strategic nuclear forces the principles of control, deployment, targeting and weapon states are laid down in the doctrine. Three issues are of significance, firstly, is the availability of an SSBN on deterrent patrol persistently which would suggest a force level of 4 SSBNs; secondly, that strategic nuclear forces conform to the doctrinal principle of separating

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custodian from control thereby ruling out the option of ‘dual tasking’ and lastly control, tasking and targeting is Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) function. In our context the Arihant class of SSBNs with its suite of submarine launched ballistic missiles will primarily discharge this role. The option to rig other platforms with nuclear weapons will be weighed against considerations of survivability, vulnerability and control. The nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) with its suite of conventional payload and stealth features requires special mention. Its inception has reoriented and transformed the war at sea by its ability not only to deliver long range precision strikes but also to execute tasks over vast sea area with speed and utmost discretion. Their utility in denial operations, control tasks and marking of high value units such as carrier groups and SSBNs (all core missions in the maritime domain) is unparalleled. In Gorshkov’s words (on SSNs) “The plans, building programmes and practical measures carried out by the military-political leadership … is intent on stepping up the nuclear missile potential and strike power of its naval forces, raising the combat and mobilisational readiness of all branches of the Navy”.

Conclusion The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. The strategy to implement maritime missions identified earlier are power tools available to a nation provided it nurtures and develops capabilities that serve to ‘contest, control and deny’. China takes the comprehensive national power approach; where it sees the effect of an event on its own endowment and its ability to control the occasion and its outcome as a primary virtue. In articulating its strategic objectives it has unambiguously identified three canons the first of which is internal and external stability; the second is to sustain the current levels of economic growth and lastly to achieve regional preeminence. Gone is the ‘power bashfulness’ that

marked the Deng era, in its place is a cockiness that is discernible. In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range power projection and access denial strategy is its blindness to recognise that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons”. The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

Indian Air force have formulated separate declared strategies often in contradiction with each other; they are subject to Acts of Parliament that are different in form and content and have articulated doctrines for war fighting independent of each other. It would, to an observer, almost appear as if the three are preparing to fight three different wars. This malaise remains so to this day. There is an urgent need to remedy this fragmented and often dysfunctional scheme.

The hazard of the operational canvas is that it is driven by the immediate intimidation which is the pretender that fills the strategic space rather than an endeavour to shape the future.

Contemporary challenges in these waters suggest the attainment of a strategic posture centered on a deployed force structure of a carrier group, nuclear attack submarines backed by a strategic deterrent force, all of which serve to balance out influences that provoke tension and effectively fill the strategic space through the ability ‘to contend, control and deny’. India’s relationship with the USA, the article has argued, should take the next step, which would logically be to establish

Unfortunately, India’s armed forces have traditionally evolved within this paradigm, that is, to contend with operational scenarios. The problem is confounded by the fact that each of the three armed forces, the Indian Army, the Indian Navy and the

an Indo-US strategic frame work in the maritime domain taking on board like-minded in region states, in order to contend with the challenges that the IOEO presents. The face of the 21st century is that of an Assange while its voice ranges from a Gandhi to an Osama; against this backdrop is a global power shift which has unchained strong and unrelenting socio-politico-economic forces that have shaken the status quo. Technology in its turn has stirred matters to an extent when traditional paradigms of sovereignty look a trifle moth eaten. This milieu has opened up strategic opportunities to knowledge societies, nations endowed with youthful demography and an advantageous geography. The maritime domain is central to these changes and provides prospects of accelerated growth; the question remains how best India can strategise, shape and fill the strategic maritime space and in doing so propitiate Kronos.

BRAHMOS In a Historic Function on 9th November 2011, the second regiment of Ground Systems with Mobile Launchers, Command Post, Replenishment Systems, Fire Control Systems with sophisticated electronic hardware and software and with multiple communication systems was delivered to the Indian Army. The systems were handed over by Shri M M Pallam Raju, Honourable Raksha Rajya Mantri to Lt General Vinod Nayanar, Director General Artillery in the presence of Dr A S Pillai CEO and MD, BrahMos Aerospace. Among the other Dignitaries present were Director DRDL Mr P Venugopalan, Brig Mehta, Deputy DG Military Operations, other senior officers from the Armed Forces, Scientific Community and Chiefs of Industries.

Second Regiment of BRAHMOS handed over to Army

Hon’ble Raksha Rajya Mantri while addressing the gathering said that “BRAHMOS is a versatile system and is now available in multiple versions. I am glad to know that this regiment is being delivered, ahead of schedule. This shows BrahMos’s commitment to its customer. Industries must go in a big way producing the systems as the production requirement is large in order to meet the demand of the Indian Armed Forces.” DG Arty in his speech said “The universal weapon system due to its versatility and user friendly operation has emerged as the most reliable system for the Indian Armed Forces which has been demonstrated in the successive successful launch trials. We have guns for near range and Smerch Rockets for range of 75 km. But beyond 75 km range, BRAHMOS is the only system which has added tremendous fire power capability to Indian Armed Forces for targets as deep as 300 km.” Dr Pillai said that “We have formed a Missile Industry Complex with a network of public and private sector industries who are tirelessly working for producing BRAHMOS missiles for meeting the demand of all the three Services. He also said that the capabilities of the Indian Army have multiplied manifolds with the induction of BRAHMOS. While describing the system, he added that the supersonic Speed of Mach 2.8 all through its 290 km range, Precision of near zero circular error probability and devastating Power - nine times more kinetic energy than sub-sonic cruise missiles, has made BRAHMOS World leader in cruise missile technology and the preferred First strike weapon of the Armed Forces.

sea power

geopolitical realities

Is India a Continental or a Maritime Power?

Lt Gen H S Lidder PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM (retd) The writer was commissioned in Indian Army in December 1967 in the elite Parachute Regiment. A Special Forces officer, he has extensive experience of Sub-conventional Warfare. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College and National Defence College. He has experience of multifarious instructional, staff and command assignments. He has been Military Liaison Officer in Indian Embassy at Colombo and was Defence Military Adviser in Embassy of India at Washington DC when momentous changes in Indo-US relations began to take shape. He hung his uniform as the CISC, IDS. Today one finds that the US is seeking to build its preeminence upon Continental-Maritime supremacy and not on maritime supremacy as it had done in the past. US actions in Africa, West Asia, CARs, Mongolia, East Europe and ASEAN should all be seen in this light. Russian discomfort in this regard is all too visible. Primakov’s suggestions for a Russian-Chinese -Indian security relationship stems from this discomfort. Russian discomfort has been accentuated by the lack of any concrete response from both China and India. Chinese and Indian relationship with Russia however exists based on a need for Defence Technology and Armament

A former CISC and a formidable land warrior examines the future Grand Strategic trajectory of a rising Indian state. He avers that India is a threshold power which has the potential to impact geopolitics in a major manner. India’s security challenges emanate both from the continental shelf as well as from the ocean. Economically India’s future lies towards the Indian Ocean and not towards the Continental Shelf. Since all capabilities take time to build, India should commence forging its instruments to make the coming century into a truly maritime one, both economically and militarily. With this, the direction of India’s eventual swing would also become evident to a discerning eye.

irst the “Necklace of Pearls” articulation of Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean so succinctly done by the US strategist and analyst Juli McDonald, followed by the Indian Navy’s glowing account of itself in the anti-piracy campaign off Somalia and the Arabian Sea, ending in a confrontation with the PLA navy off the coast of Vietnam, in what China calls as its backwaters and core interest areas of South China Sea. It has been a momentous period for our Navy - with our warriors in white constantly being in the news. With the success of Indian navy initiative of hosting multilateral naval exercises with various countries, including US, Australia, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN countries, the message that the Indian Navy has finally arrived and is at a point, where it is in a position to shake off its “brown water navy” tag and venture into the “blue water arena” with the wherewithal that power projection calls for, seems to have been articulated to all concerned. With our naval dockyards designing a full range of warships from fast attack crafts, to minesweepers, frigates, cruisers, destroyers, submarines including nuclear ones and aircraft carrier, the stick is slowly getting to be visible. HAL and DRDO are extending full support and are in the process of replacing the old Alouette helicopters with the ALH variety and developing the naval vision of the LCA Tejas. Missile development for BVR purposes and AD is keeping pace with the expansion and modernisation plans of the Navy. Unnamed UAVs and helicopters will extend the range of observation of our naval flotillas. With this capacity, India not only would be in a position to migrate between “Sea Denial” and “Power Projection” effortlessly, but also field a survivable third leg of our nuclear

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INDIA CONTINENTAL VS MARITIME DESTINY

triad. Not withstanding this, there is a need to examine whether this naval expansion is episodical, personality based or is based on a well thought out strategic and doctrinal underpinnings. It is this aspect which would make the growth sustainable one or just a one time event. Some of the issues listed below would be able to demystify somewhat the Indian state's unfolding interest in the oceans.

Military geography Sitting atop the Indian Ocean India qualifies to be called the “Jewel in the Crown” (as the British called it). Its size and location qualifies India to be both a “Continental as well as a Maritime power. Jutting out the way it does into the Indian Ocean it is in a position to exert intimate influence over the Northern part of the Indian Ocean and over the entire Indian Ocean with friendly and mutually beneficial relationships with the Indian Ocean Rim countries. The Indian Ocean Rim is home to 80 per cent of the world energy and India sits astride the sea lanes carrying energy and other trade passing from the Mediterranean to the Far East and vice versa. India positioned the way it is, is automatically a major stakeholder in the global quest for stability in the Indian Ocean. As the world enhances its economic engagement with India, Australia, Africa and Antarctica, this stake in stability will only increase. India’s own economic growth is intimately tied to the economic linkages with Indian Ocean Rim countries and through the Indian Ocean to other regions. On the Continental Shelf India shares 7,581 km of border with Pakistan, China and Myanmar. The Hindu Kush and the Himalayas are formidable mountain ranges which have provided both a sense of

security as also a sense of isolation from the continental shelf. India’s trade across these two mountain ranges was over well identified passes though the volume was small due to difficult terrain. Linkages to the erstwhile silk route and Southern Tibet made India an indispensable component for mutually beneficial trade. India’s tranquillity, isolation and economic well-being, brought military incursions into the South Asian region. A Greek and Muslim invasions over several centuries over the Hindu Kush, was the defining feature of the military onslaughts India faced. The Ocean going European powers pried open India from the Ocean side between 16th to

middle of the 20th century and this led to a sharp decline of the land based Silk Route.

Another articulation that Makinder made was that Great Empires / powers have arisen around a Captive Water body. The Indian Ocean is clearly one such body. There are a number of powerful and strong countries who can grow stronger by establishing mutually beneficial economic linkages with IOR countries. As India recognises and designates the IOR as its principal strategic Region, the merchant fleet will become indispensable and its protection a vital role for the Navy

Having secured India and given the history of invasions from the North-west as well as the pressures exerted from the North by Czarist Russia, the British set about protecting its Jewel by securing Afghanistan and Tibet as buffer states. Once this was done India’s strategic boundaries resting on Russia (CARs) and China and its operational boundaries rested upon the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges. At the time of independence, India which did not have Britain’s economic or military muscle, quickly lost both the buffer areas. The British on their part had carved out a Muslim state (Pakistan) to the West of Indus

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geopolitical realities

and handed this area to the settlers of the very people who for centuries had vied for control over South Asia. The independent status of Tibet was removed by the Chinese in 1959. Thus by 1959 Indian borders on the continental shelf rested on the Indus plains to the West and the Himalayas to the North. India’s strategic frontiers no longer rested on Russia / Soviet Union / CARs to the West and Chinese mainland in the North. Economically the connection to the prosperous Silk Route was physically severed.

Lessons from Makinder-Mahan power construct The British Foreign Minister Makinder's articulation of the centrality of power resting with whosoever controlled the Eurasian landmass has affected the thinking of Geo-strategic thinkers upto the present times. Historically empires have instinctively understood this power of this Geo-strategic insight. The Marauding hordes of Chengis Khan, Czarist Russia, the Germans followed by the America have all attempted to create indisputable Empires / Coalitions based on the Eurasian landmass theory (also called the Heartland theory). US Admiral Mahan however conversely argued that power flowed from the control of the Seas over which men and material flowed. Power struggle in a way was converted to a power struggle at global level between interior and exterior lines. Zones where the continental and maritime power struggle took place, was later to be called the “Crush Zone”. This was the scene of maximum geopolitical activity and was synonymous to coastal areas. India falls in this zone. Another articulation that Makinder made was that Great Empires / powers have arisen around a Captive Water body. The Indian Ocean is clearly one such body. There are a number of powerful and strong countries who can grow stronger by establishing mutually beneficial economic linkages with IOR countries. As India recognises and designates the IOR as its principal strategic Region, the merchant fleet will become indispensable and its protection a vital role for the Navy.

India’s swing status When one looks at the world powers from the Heartland-Maritime prism, in the post Soviet era, one finds the situation is weighed against the Eurasian Continental powers. West Europe has assimilated East Europe. NATO has expanded into what constituted erstwhile Warsaw Pact countries and now rests on the Russian borders. At present the three major powers (which are not homogenised constitute the Continental Powers. These are US led Europe, Russia and China. Maritime Powers that impact the world are the US, Britain, Japan and Australia. China and India are threshold powers, while EU is a recessed maritime entity. Today one finds that the US is seeking to build its preeminence upon Continental-Maritime supremacy and not on maritime supremacy as it had done in the past. US actions in Africa, West Asia, CARs, Mongolia, East Europe and ASEAN should all be seen in this light. Russian

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discomfort in this regard is all too visible. Primakov’s suggestions for a Russian-Chinese-Indian security relationship stems from this discomfort. Russian discomfort has been accentuated by the lack of any concrete response from both China and India. Chinese and Indian relationship with Russia however exists based on a need for Defence Technology and Armament. Russia seeks to build upon this linkage for ensuring that the US incursion into the Eurasian land mass is stymied and eventually stopped. Chinese dependence on Russia has grown beyond defence technology and armaments to include energy, which it is planning to source from Russian Siberia and CARs which still are under the influence of the Russians. Of the three major countries listed above as part of a possible continental construct, India has been the one which has been severely impacted by the break-up of the Soviet Union. Gone was a tried and tested relationship which helped India weather many storms generated by the US, Pakistan and China. Gone also was the Rupee trade and deferred payment paradigm. Denial of Cryogenic engines by Russia to India, under US pressure along with Russian insistence on dollar payment for arms, adversely impacted Indo-Russian relations. Thus India geopolitically, was truly adrift.

India’s linkage along the land route to ASEAN via Myanmar has not developed to the extent desired largely due to the underdeveloped condition of Myanmar as well as the strong Isolationist policies that this country practiced since its independence. The troubled status of India’s own north-east has also substantially contributed to the lack of coherent developmental activity in that region and worked against the establishment of strong external linkages from that area The adrift status of India after the demise of the USSR has bequeathed to India many positives which flow from the Unipolar world. Threats were no longer the sole drivers and arbitrators of national security, global integration was the new reality. The US had quickly adjusted to reintroduce Bretton Wood formulation for global control. Globalisation was the main security strategy and WTO the main economic integrative platform. Human rights, democracy and climate change all have since become global instruments driving towards a regime of ultimate global management. India long denied adequate economic linkages during the cold war, now has an opportunity for rapid economic growth and expansion through integration. The question then that begs resolution is; with whome does India integrate; continental powers symbolised by Russia and China or maritime powers led by the US. The day India, which is home to 1/6 of humanity, the largest population of youth in any country in the world and a fast growing and vibrant economy, decides, the world will be quite a different place. This reality is also India’s biggest guarantor of strategic independence, since no country can push it hard enough without running the risk of pushing the Indian swing in the opposite direction. Realising this, India has chosen to wait and watch,

postpone its swing and await multipolarity by establishing symbiotic strategic partnerships and build its own economic and technological capacities. A delayed swing is therefore in India’s strategic interest for the present.

India has traditionally enjoyed commercial connectivity overseas with Southeast Asia, China and Japan to its East as well as to West Asia and East Coast of Africa. Infact the spread of India’s cultural values has also been the result of its maritime trading capacity

Geopolitical realities When we examine the military geography of India and couple it with economic security, we find that India has been boxed in by a hostile Sino-Pak linkage to the North and North-west. India’s linkage along the land route to ASEAN via Myanmar has not developed to the extent desired largely due to the underdeveloped condition of Myanmar as well the strong Isolationist policies that this country practiced since its independence. The troubled status of India’s own North-east has also substantially contributed to the lack of coherent developmental activity in that region and worked against the establishment of strong external linkages with that area. With no ability to access the traditional silk route over the land route in the north-west and underdeveloped linkages with Myanmar, India is boxed in and isolated from the

continental terms.

shelf

economic

Infact India’s territorial integrity is under acute pressure from both Pakistan and China. India’s national security and defence concerns are likely to remain focused on warding off joint pressures from the Sino-Pak relationship which has come to the fore in recent times. Thus bereft of any alluring economic connectivity and faced with hostility, India’s continental integrative picture is bleak. When we examine India’s maritime frontiers, the picture changes considerably and becomes rosier. India has traditionally enjoyed commercial connectivity overseas with Southeast Asia, China and Japan to its East as well as to West Asia and East Coast of Africa. Infact the spread of India’s cultural values has also been the result of its maritime trading capacity. It is the same capacity that India needs to exploit in order to achieve rapid economic progress and be counted amongst the leading nations of the Indian Ocean region. With such a secure economic base, India would stand a fair chance to be counted as a strong player in the global arena. Thus, seaward orientation of India in the present geopolitical scenario is natural and securing peace in the Indian Ocean region constitute a vital security interest for India. For this, India will have to work with other friendly maritime powers operating in the Indian Oceon. A tri-service power projection

capability would be the power instrument on which India will have to structure its deterrence and security structure in the future. Since the economic well-being of India is closely linked with the maritime frontier and it takes time to create military capability, our merchant fleet, naval expansion and power projection capability will all have to be coaxially carried out, if peace and prosperity is to be ensured. A seaward orientation of India’s economic activity is the great Indian Geo-political reality of the coming century and we need to be prepared for it. Besides expansion of our merchant shipping, our naval assets, our ports need to be modernised to handle the huge volume of trade that will symbolise India’s economic and military might. Our ports also need to be connected to the hinterland by A class roads, rail and air.

Conclusion India is a threshold power which has the potential to impact geopolitics in a major manner. India's security challenges emanate both from the continental shelf as well as from the ocean. Economically India’s future lies towards the Indian Oceon and not towards the Continental Shelf. Since all capabilities take time to build, India should commence forging its instruments to make the coming century into a truely maritime one, both economically and militarily. With this, the direction of India’s eventual swing would also become evident to a discerning eye.

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TRANSFORMATION

Rising Power, Growing Cmde Sujeet Samaddar NM (retd) The writer retired as the Principal Director Naval Plans. He served NOVA Integrated Systems- A TATA Enterprise as Vice President (Operations) until October 2011. He is presently Director and CEO, ShinMaywa Industries India Limited.

Though self reliance must indeed be the final objective but that does not mean that every item of a system is sourced only from indigenous vendors. Self reliance, in today’s context, means a mixture of global buy and localised “buy or make” decisions that synergise the competitive advantage of each participating vendor for the common benefit of reduced costs, faster deliveries and most importantly, superior quality and system performance

Building India’s 2020 Navy The Indian Navy has been very fortunate to have had visionary leaders. From a minor littoral force of hand-me-down frigates, sloops and craft at independence, the Navy has now emerged as the fifth largest naval power. However in view of the daunting challenges we face we need to do a lot more and ensure this is actualised in an operationally viable time frame. A brilliant and very well informed article on the Force Structuring needs of the Indian Navy. This article conducts a top level gap analysis between requirements and possessions and recommends an action plan to transform the Indian Navy into a force of the future. The writer addresses the major slippages in delivery schedules by our DPSUs and response options that ensure that the Indian Navy does not get into a situation of “too little too late”. Building the 2020 Navy may require some prompt and focused course corrections and re-alignment with the forecast operational scenario of 2022 and beyond.

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MODERNISATION OPTIONS RENOVATION (MODERNISATION) APPROACH •

REPLACE LEGACY EQUIPMENT WITH CURRENT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY

UPGRADATION (MODERNISATION +)

TRANSFORMATION (MODERNISATION ++)

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CURRENT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY ON EXISTING PLATFORMS INFUSION OF NEXT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY IN NEW PROJECTS

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NEXT GENERATION TECHNOLOGY ON EXISTING PLATFORMS INFUSION OF GEN AFTER NEXT TECHNOLOGIES IN NEW PROJECTS

OBJECTIVE

PRESERVE STATUS QUO

PREVAIL IN CONFLICT

PREVENT CONFLICT

CAPACITY

CONVENTIONAL

CONVENTIONAL NON-CONVENTIONAL

CONVENTIONAL, NON-CONVENTIONAL, UNCONVENTIONAL.

RISK

TENUOUS BALANCE

FAVOURABLE ODDS

GAIN COMPETITIVE EDGE

CAPITAL BUDGET REVENUE BUDGET

R&D BUDGET CAPITAL BUDGET REVENUE BUDGET

Indian Navy’s Vision Document

he Indian Navy has been very fortunate to have had visionary leaders. From a minor littoral force of hand-me-down frigates, sloops and craft at independence, the Navy has now emerged as the fifth largest naval power. This journey has been neither smooth nor easy. The tenacity of purpose and the overall corporate conviction that the charted path of force development would be mainly through indigenous capacity has not wavered, is a clear testimony to the navy’s sound leadership and rank and file consensus on its identity and self belief.

Responsibilities

FINANCIAL MINIMAL / REVENUE SUPPORT

Force levels: A gap analysis advantage of each participating vendor for the common benefit of reduced costs, faster deliveries and most importantly, superior quality and system performance.

The modernisation challenge Much has been debated about modernisation and transformation of the Indian Navy. It is therefore

important to develop a common understanding of modernisation. A model that has been developed by the writer suggests that modernisation can be visualised as a three tier activity as summarised in Figure above. The Navy has to clearly balance the three tier options in the light of the complexities and procedural requirements of the Defence Procurement Procedure.

Ships and submarines Naval force level requirements, expressed as a capability statement, has been defined in terms of a Bottom Up-Top Down capability centric perspective plan that defines the platforms that the Indian Navy would require to fulfil its missions until 2022 and the associated organisation that would support

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it. The Indian Coast Guard has also drawn up a plan envisaging tripling force levels in a decade. Not surprisingly the foremost mission is to combine forces to win decisively in war and ensure adherence to the constabulary and custom laws of the state. However, conflicts are not always won by force alone but paradoxically force level disparities set the stage for conflict.

The Indian Navy has long prided itself to be a builder’s Navy. It has been the pioneering service promoting indigenous industry to deliver it the finest ships in the region. Integrating cutting edge weapons, sensors and sophisticated communications with advanced propulsion and power packages from diverse sources to make state-of-the-art ships designed by the Navy is a splendid achievement and the Indian Navy can be justly proud of this heritage. However, doggedly pursuing an indigenous only agenda at the cost of major time overruns is risky The challenge for force level planning experts has always remained the uncertainties of the future strategic environment; the technological advances that could change the nature of warfare at sea; and, its consequent implications on structure and composition. First, there is no agreement on what the next war might look like, although China by all accounts would definitely constitute the main opposition to Indian interests in the region. Secondly, out of area contingencies in support of national policy and protection of Indian interest and assets - rapidly diversifying and distributed across the world - is a new phenomenon posing additional challenges to force planning. Thirdly, the perennial debate between the submarine arm and the surface Navy on whether the future lies in submarines or aircraft carriers has to be addressed. Within submarines also, the merits of conventional versus nuclear-powered submarines are still debated and within the aircraft carrier constituency the size and type are always a source of controversy. Finally, sub-regional conflicts that may arise out of 26/11 scenarios and boundary disputes cannot be wished

away. Hence, conceptualising a force for the future is truly a challenge since acquisition decisions taken and commitments made cannot be easily reversed. Force levels have essentially two components viz. force structuring and force composition. In all force structuring decisions the key element is of budgetary provisions and indigenous capability. Basic principles of force structuring have remained steadfast over the last 60 years. The abiding constants have been the need for a two Carrier Battle Group (CBG), Local Naval Defence (LND) forces for the major naval bases, a well defined submarine force, shore-based long range anti-submarine and patrol aircraft and ship-borne integral aircraft / helicopters. This would mean a surface fleet of three aircraft carriers, about 40-42 frigates and destroyers, four afloat support ships, 80-100 minor LND forces and about 24 submarines. Estimates on requirements of nuclear submarines vary. In addition, force projection would require commensurate amphibious ships of the Landing Platform Dock (LPD) supported with island hopping Landing Craft. The Navy and increasingly the Coast Guard, true to its character of being a builder’s force, has sourced these platforms to the extent feasible from Indian shipbuilders which have so far been predominantly DPSUs. This is a fatal mistake. If force levels and systems cannot be procured in some reasonable time frame the Navy must find wisdom in its own advice to its Captains - “Swallow your pride, take a tug, save the ship’s side”. Whether the time has come to swallow pride and source from outside only a capability gap analysis will reveal. Deliveries are faster, quality is superior and costs are lesser. The three Talwar Class frigates, under procurement from Yantar Shipyard, Russia at a total cost of Rs 5,400 crore have been made available at only about 40 per cent of the cost of the three P 17s being built at MDL for Rs 8,800 crore and with equal if not better capability. These three ships would be inducted in five years whilst domestic shipyards, on their own, may possibly deliver them

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over not less than 10-13 years. That capacity building is more important than local sourcing is evident from the fact that even Russia is procuring the Mistral Class Landing Ship Docks (LPD) and building additional ships in technical partnership with France. So far as force composition is concerned a faithful balance needs to be struck between littoral and open seas requirements within the likely budgetary support that may be anticipated. This is not a difficult task. Allowing for an 8 per cent growth in GDP, an allocation of about 1.8 per cent towards defence expenditure of which about 17 per cent would be the Navy’s share and finally a mix of 60 per cent towards capital and balance 40 per cent towards revenue will give a fair idea of the anticipated budgetary support. However, creating the balance is a very tricky issue and to have it perfect is a tall order for any force planner. Augmentation in force levels and technology to hedge against all forms of conflict in open sea and provide the teeth to aggressive diplomacy is a given. Nevertheless, the first requirement would be to secure the maritime frontiers at the coastline and in the islands and offshore structure holdings of India. This would require that Indian maritime forces are not only modern but are also of contemporary relevance to the Indian state. Lofty declarations of power projection may be music to a sailor’s ear but coastal surveillance and protection from wanton acts of violence is the citizen’s first priority. For a three carrier navy in service by 2022 it is logical that the supporting ships - 24 frigates and destroyers - should be available by then. In addition, six to eight destroyers and frigates are required in any operational environment for Convoy protection operations and littoral warfare requirements. Considering even 30 per cent of these forces are under refit / maintenance the total requirement works out to 40-42 destroyers and frigates. Against this requirement about six frigates and five destroyers would have reached the end of their already much extended service life by 2022. Five frigates and three destroyers are under construction which would

enter service by 2016. Seven frigates and four destroyers have been approved by DAC for induction by 2022. The net accretion would, therefore, be only seven frigates and two destroyers which would at best provide a force level of 29 frigates and destroyers. Therefore, the navy would still require another 11-13 frigates and destroyers provided the existing orders are delivered on time. The net deficiency that needs corrective action now is for a capability gap of about 4-5 destroyers and 7-8 frigates. In addition, about 6-8 corvettes would be required for Local Naval Defence (LND) functions. Considering that the DPSU shipyards are already fully booked to capacity the gap of 11-13 destroyers and frigates and 6-8 corvettes must be bridged by Indian Private Sector Shipyards as a Buy and Make Indian project with some strategic imports. One option would be to build another 8 frigates of the proven Talwar Class in India as a collaborative venture between an Indian Shipyard and Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad.

China so that conventional options remain the predominant choice in dealing with SLOC disruptions and other sovereignty encroachments. There is, therefore, a gap of about 8-10 nuclear submarines to retain a credible second strike capability. Again, credible nuclear deterrence is firmly provided by ship borne Anti Ballistic Missile Defence systems. The recent success of the Advanced Air Defence Missile programme of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) augurs well for the Navy. Future Indian Destroyers, quite like the Arliegh Burke, Kongo or KDX-III all of which have the Aegis System, should be equipped with the indigenous Advanced Air Defence System. At a minimum, this would require a Ballistic Missile Defence Fleet of 6 Destroyers. The P75 project for the indigenous construction of DCNS designed Scorpene submarines required that first delivery commences in 2012 and the balance five submarines delivered at one-year intervals to complete by December 2017. Now, the first Scorpene will only be ready in August 2015 and MDL will deliver the balance five by May 2019. The cost overrun is about Rs 4,700 crore. For the second line of submarines, Project P75I, the RFI was issued in September 2010 and the global firms that have responded to it are Russian Rosoboronexport, French DCNS / Armaris, German HDW, Kockums and Spanish Navantia. The initial plan (September 2010) required that three submarines would be made by

Similarly, whilst the National Nuclear Doctrine advocates no first use, it is anchored on a capacity to respond punitively through a second strike capability. The second strike capability is universally vested in the nuclear propelled and nuclear armed submarine force. As per media reports only four nuclear submarines may be on order and this itself may take us upto 2022 to induct. Calculations by many experts suggest that the delivery capacity should be at least a minimum of 4 missiles per value target and two per force target. It is not in the scope of this article Platform to derive the Megaton requirements but by most Vikramaditya professional estimations the IAC1 total riposte capacity should be at least ½ that of initial 4 x NOPVs strike capability. Together, this would translate to 3 x P17 a requirement of about 60 ‘suitable’ weapons. This 3 X P15A would require 10 nuclear armed operationally 4 x P28 deployed submarines or a force level of 14 submarines. 3 x P15 This capability needs to be developed rapidly 3 x P16A to redraw the deterrent diagram with Pakistan and

MDL, one by Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) and Larsen & Toubro and Pipavav Shipyard were to compete for building the balance two submarines. Under the new plan (February 2011) India would order two submarines from a collaborating foreign shipyard and the other four will be built indigenously under transfer of technology with three constructed at MDL and the fourth built at HSL. The point is that the total requirement of the Navy’s submarine fleet is 24. Of this only 6 have been ordered, so far, after more than 8 years of approval of the 30 Year submarine construction Plan which entailed construction of 24 submarines until 2030. Ordering another 6 has already taken more than three years and the production is distributed over three shipyards which, to say the least, is a completely uneconomical model of submarine construction. It would appear that greater economy and efficiency would be obtained had the entire balance of 18 submarines been ordered in one tranche rather than go through this process in small increments of six each every six-seven years. This would require the Navy to freeze the staff requirements for all 18 submarines and then perhaps distributing it in three shipyards may make some sort of economical sense. However, the key consideration and the divisive issue that dominates the discussion on categorisation / nomination is of timely induction. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been quite scathing in his comments on the tardiness of the Defence Public Sector Shipyards in

Nominated Year

Delivery Period

Cost Escalation

2004

270%

2003

13-15

260%

2006

TBD

1998

260%

2001

226%

2003

162%

1985

188%

1986

686%

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delivering on time and cost the ships that the Navy had ordered. It is not as if only the DPSUs are to be blamed for these delays but the malignance is systemic. Cognisance must also be taken of the continued revision of staff requirements to get the best and the latest; and, in the bargain getting too little too late.

Sl No

Type and Nos

Country of Origin

Ordered

Delivery Period

9 x Murasame Class Destroyers (4,550 t)

Japan

1992

Mar 1996 - Mar 2002

8 x Maestrale Class Frigates (3,500 t)

Italy

1980

Feb 1981 - May 1985

2 x Luzhou Class Destroyers (7,100 t)

China

2004

Oct 2006 - Mar 2007

4 x Akixuki Clas Destroyers

Japan

2007

Oct 2010 - Nov 2014

3 x KDXII Class Destroyers (7,700 t)

South Korea

2007

May 2007 - Mar 2011

3 x P17 Class Frigates

India

2003

One delivered in Aug 2010, second in Sep 2011.

3 x P15A Class Destroyers

India

2003

2013 - 2015

4 x P28 Corvettes

India

2003

2012 - 2014

4 x P15P Class Destroyers

India

2011

2018 - 2022

World warship building schedules To put matters in perspective the Table below compares the world standard for warship production of sophisticated warships.

Head

05-06

06-07

07-08

08-09

09-10

Aviation

1,071

366

410

538

3,603

Fleet

4,477

7,080

6,162

5,404

7,460

Aviation

218

240

177

211

309

Fleet

361

514

301

255

199

Acquisitions

Maintenance

Expenditure towards acquisition and maintenance In this time, China and our other competitors would march ahead and garner the resources and corner the markets of the world whilst our ships and submarines continue to be built at an elephantine pace. Regrettably, neither China nor other competing nations will allow a strategic ‘time out’ to India for sorting out its warship production schedules in order to build indigenous capabilities. Therefore, nominations to DPSU shipyards must no longer be automatic and a system of synergistic shipbuilding using the capacity in the private shipyard with the expertise in the DPSU shipyards need to be conceived to hasten the shipbuilding programmes. But, Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers have been nominated, as late as October 2011, to build eight 800 Ton Landing Craft (Utility) at a budgeted cost of Rs 2,100 crore with the first LCU to be delivered after 35 months !! In comparison, M/s Fincantieri delivered two 27,500 ton Fleet Tankers in three years. Possibly, the requirements of LCUs are higher and the Navy could have ordered its entire requirement in one tranche on both DPSU and Private shipyards on a competitive basis to reduce costs and improve delivery schedules. On the other hand, a recent RFI for shallow water ASW craft has been categorised under the Buy Indian Route which is a heartening development for Indian shipbuilders. The second concern is of budgetary support. For the record the five year expenditure on induction and maintenance of fleet and aviation assets is as follows: Therefore, the Navy has averaged only about Rs 1,200 crore per year for aviation inductions and about Rs 6,200 crore for ship construction over the past few years. Going by public domain data the order book on warships and submarines is about Rs 2,25,000 crore to be inducted by 2022 or nearly Rs 22,500 crore per year. Aviation orders would be worth about Rs 18,000 crore for the ongoing programmes and another Rs 32,000 crore or nearly Rs 5,000 crore per year for new inductions to be achieved by 2022. The obvious conclusion is that unless budgets increase significantly and the

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capacity to absorb these allocations or the Navy designs and build much cheaper ships and aircraft, the induction targets will not be achievable.

As per media reports only four nuclear submarines may be on order and this itself may take us upto 2022 to induct. Calculations by many experts suggest that the delivery capacity should be at least a minimum of 4 missiles per value target and two per force target

Surveillance systems Maritime Domain Awareness is a key requirement for successful operations. Sustained and uninterrupted surveillance is the key to maritime domain awareness. This can be achieved through a variety of systems. The first is of course space based satellite surveillance. The Indian Navy is on course to acquire its own communications and surveillance satellite capability with a 1,000 Nm footprint. The second category is airborne surveillance. In this category are the shore based options of Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Aerostats and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the ship based options of Airborne Early Warning Helicopters and aircraft and VTOL UAVs. A third way is through coastal and offshore surveillance systems consisting of a chain of Radar, AIS and Electro-Optics sensors with a sophisticated command and control software that enables generation of a single composite picture. This segment is with the Coast Guard. Since all of them have inherent advantages and disadvantages therefore an optimal fusion of these three systems is the way ahead. No clear advantage would accrue unless these systems are interconnected and networked to provide differentiated and specific actionable intelligence and presented as a single holistic and composite operational picture. Surveillance systems for coastal security are under acquisition. A report stated “An indigenously built coastal surveillance system would be deployed in 46 strategic western and eastern locations in the country from this November 2010 to check intrusions from sea and counter such threats, officials said

today. Being developed by the Bangalorebased defence PSU Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), the system includes radars and electro-optic and meteorological sensors and would be mounted on lighthouses or towers.” In this complex system, “The cameras and radars are Israeli,” admit BEL operators ... but we are working on developing them indigenously.” It also states that this indigenous system would “give complete operational picture of the sea up to 20 km deep into the sea.” For phase two of the programme the options of better technology such as High Frequency Surface Wave Coastal surveillance Radars or even “X” Band over the Horizon Radars that provide detection and identification ranges in excess of 200 km with reaction time of more than 3 hours combined with Long Range Optronic Sensors of about 50 km range should be inducted.

Aviation Technology provides the best solution if one is inclined to appreciate it. High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerials Systems (HALE) with highly sophisticated multifarious payloads supported with multi-spectral data fusion engines is the way forward for oceanic surveillance. The lower capital cost of acquisition, faster deliveries and the near equivalent operating cost must be the dominant consideration for rapid augmentation of surveillance capabilities. These informational inputs must again be dovetailed into a national maritime intelligence grid. Integrating the HALE with Long Range Maritime (armed) Patrol aircraft would provide an efficiency dividend. The Navy has on order 12 Boeing P8I maritime patrol aircraft. Considering that the generally recognised area of interest of the Indian Navy extends from the East Coast of Africa to the South China Sea this force level is clearly inadequate particularly when nuclear submarines are the dominant threat of the future. These would be delivered by 2015. In addition, an RFI has been issued for another 6 Medium Range Maritime Aircraft and these may only be ordered in 2014-15 going by the normal time lines of procurement. So far as

UAVs are concerned the Navy’s present force levels of 8 Searchers and 4 Herons is woefully inadequate to meet even a fraction of the surveillance requirement. The Navy has issued an RFI for Long Range High Altitude UAVs only in December 2010 and induction is therefore clearly a very distant proposition. It is also understood that the services are putting together a single proposal for their combined requirement of Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAVs, though no RFI has been issued as yet. Rotary Wing UAVs for shipborne applications are at the development stage at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and these may only be inducted no earlier than 2016-17. This is questionable acquisition since Vertical Take Off and Landing UAVs are available using multiple technologies such as Tilt Rotors and Ducted Fan also. Noting that there are now at least four major Indian companies with licences to manufacture UAVs and the total requirement may be in excess of a 100 systems the future induction of UAVs must be through the Buy and Make Indian procedure. The other area of interest is Seaplanes. This technology has been resurrected with several manufacturers across the world notably in Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. Seaplanes can provide much needed island support and offshore assets protection, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) Operations, Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, countering small arms and drugs trafficking, human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping etc. Unlike conventional helicopters and aircraft seaplanes can land at the location and enforce the will or the law of the country. It is worth noting that Iran already has a strong flying boat squadron of ten crafts. In India, whilst an RFI has been issued for induction of seaplanes the difficulty would be to avoid a single vendor situation. Assuming a Maintenance Reserve of 20 per cent, a Strike Off and Wastage Reserve for a 15 year period as 20 per cent and an assured ability to launch two simultaneous missions from the four coastal

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commands, 12 operational seaplanes and two training seaplanes would be required. These must be built in India and taken up as a Buy and Make Indian or as Buy Global acquisition. However, since the substance of the seaplanes are its engines it may not be possible to achieve 50 per cent indigenous content. Seaplanes also have civil applications and thus a national capability can be created in niche sector.

However, the key consideration and the divisive issue that dominates the discussion on categorisation / nomination is of timely induction. The Comptroller and Auditor General has been quite scathing in his comments on the tardiness of the Defence Public Sector Shipyards in delivering on time and cost the ships that the Navy had ordered So far as integral aviation assets are concerned the key determinant must be the future of the Fleet Carrier. The present capability is to be able to work within a 200 Nm bubble and going into the future the bubble should grow to a sanitised space of about 350 Nm. For this the requirement would be for “medium” fighters of the Mig 29K profile or better. With a Combat Air Patrol of four fighters and a turn-around time of 90 minutes, detailed calculations aside, the minimum force level would be two and half fighter squadrons (40 aircraft). In addition, two squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of HALE Early Warning UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of communication and utility helicopters should be the minimum embarked Air Group for the future carrier to be considered a potent force. Both the Sea king and the Chetak helicopters are due for replacement. A case for 16 Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) and an RFI for Chetak replacement is under process. Another RFP for 91 Naval Multi-Role Helicopters is awaiting approval. The requirements for these helicopters are in the range of 80-100 MRH and about 70-90 twin engine utility helicopters. The Navy could have consolidated its total requirement of MRH instead of inducting in a piecemeal manner. Both these inductions, had they been

taken up as bulk acquisitions, could have been through the Buy and Make Indian Route and thus help develop a national competency in helicopter manufacturing. Be that as it may, the option clause (8 MRH) and the repeat order option (16 MRH) should be availed so that induction can reach 40 MRH without retendering. Similarly, Coast Guard requirements for utility helicopters can also be merged to make a very attractive proposition for foreign OEMs to establish manufacturing facilities in India. Even now, further inductions should be explored under the Buy and Make Indian category to help build an alternate to HAL for indigenous manufacture of helicopters. However, licenced production must be taboo and the business model should be developed by the Indian and foreign OEMs on the basis of co design, co-development and co-production as partners not as licenced producers. No OEM will ever transfer enough know-how to its licenced production partner for fear it may become its competitor and therefore Joint Ventures and profit sharing collaborations is the way to go in the future.

Weapons and sensors Indigenous capability to make maritime radars exist but these do not match the technologies that are available worldwide. With only one monopolistic producer Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) there is little incentive to improve matters. Fortunately, with the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri’s direction that in future acquisitions no more nomination would be permitted and given that there are at least 6 top class Indian companies granted licences and with collaborative arrangements with global technology leaders in place all future radar requirements should be through the Buy and Make Indian route. Regrettably, this has not completely succeeded with the Navy winning its case for Buy and Make Indian categorisation for two radar projects and the Indian Air Force going the DRDO / BEL way for their Mountain Radars. Time will tell which was the better decision. So far as sonars are concerned the NSTL and NPOL combine have been able to bring in good technology in

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

the form of the HUMSA sonars. But the technology pointer is towards software defined sonars and towed array sonars for which capacity does not exist. Here again there are several private players who can provide these solutions through a collaborative partnership with world leaders in this sector. Of course, the caveat must remain Buy and Make Indian.

inquiry into the procurement process. WASS had earlier received a contract for upgrades and life extension of 128 A244-S lightweight torpedo systems to Mod 3 WASS. It has been partnering with Bharat Dynamics Ltd. for production of the C303, an anti-torpedo counter-measures system since 2005. Indigenous development of the Advanced light weight Torpedo and the Varunastra is also at an advanced stage.

Electronic warfare systems technology has also matured in India but these are nowhere near the performance threshold that already exists across the world. This is a sector that needs the combined effort of the DPSUs / DRDO and the private sector to achieve the next higher level of sophistication.

Personnel

So far as weapons are concerned the Indian record is not good. To provide the right incentive for production of naval guns the Navy needs to freeze its basket of requirements. First for Force Protection Measures the 12.7 mm stabilised remote operable optro-electronic weapon should be the standard. Whilst the RFP has been issued, nominating the Ordnance Factory as the ToT partner is a retrograde step. This is well within the capacity of Indian private sector. The AK 630 should be the standard 30 mm CIWS for all ships and would be sourced from OFBs as licence production with growing indigenous content. For the mid-range the OTO Melara 76 mm Compact, sourced from BHEL as licenced production should be the standard fit for corvettes. For heavier calibre guns the Navy must decide on the 127 mm or the 100 mm to be the main gun and retrofit it for the destroyers and frigates. The weight of argument clearly favours the 127 mm, though installing this weapon on older platforms may be challenging. If accepted as a concept then the total requirement could be for about 30 systems by 2022 including retrofits and hence may be suitable for a Buy and Make Indian categorisation. Recently the Navy has awarded the contract for 98 Heavy Weight torpedoes on Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) and will enter into industrial partnerships with Indian companies. However, the contract has been put on hold pending a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

For Surface to Surface Missiles the Navy has frozen its choice on the BrahMos. For the Surface to Air missiles there exists a range of systems though the Barak and the Barak NG is without doubt the best weapon in the quiver. Air weapons and avionic systems, for the foreseeable future, would still need to be import dependent since there are not adequate order quantities.

No force level acquisition programmes can be efficiently inducted unless the commensurate infrastructure for storage and maintenance, testing and training are also in place. Now that the broad equipment required for the next two decades have been identified commensurate build-up of infrastructure must also begin. In effect every induction programme must concurrently seek sanction for the associated infrastructure and the human resources. The Standing Committee of Defence Report mentions that the Navy has a deficiency of 1,439 officers (15 per cent), 7,183 sailors (15 per cent) and about 6,000 (15 per cent) civilians. Clearly, the manpower to man for the force levels envisaged for the future Navy, even allowing for lean manning, would need to be factored now so that by the time these acquisitions have entered service the trained and experienced manpower is also available. Assuming the force levels that have been identified above are accepted then the total requirement of personnel would be as shown in the table below. A more detailed exercise could be carried out by the Navy but it would be appropriate to obtain the appropriate sanction, even if required at the Cabinet Committee on Security level, for the final HR requirements on a not exceeding basis. This would allow for better planning and focused skill development.

Sl No Category

Present for a 130 ship Navy and associated Air Arm (2011)

Future for a Remarks 160 ship Navy and a larger Air Arm (2022)

Officers

9,293

12,500

Sailors

54,317

82,500

Annual induction at 7.5 per cent to reach the ceiling limit by 2019

Civilians

40,100

75,000

Increase civilian component in all maintenance, stores and technical training establishments by 2019

Annual induction at 5 per cent per annum to reach the ceiling limit by 2019

Personnel requirement for the future navy Therefore, whilst, as the top level analysis reveals, India has developed some capability in shipbuilding aeronautics, sensors and weapons it is not yet at the level where it could be termed “Indian”. Since the requirements are limited establishing a plant for serial production would not be viable unless there is clarity on the volumes and a commitment to stay with the programme by the Navy and there are also opportunities for exports. Simultaneously, associated infrastructure for stores, maintenance, test and calibration equipment and trained and qualified personnel must also be seamlessly addressed.

Recommendations In sum, if the Navy is to realise its required force levels there is a clear case for greater participation of the private sector in the naval acquisition plans. Particularly, ships such as the Landing Platform Dock, Fleet Support Ships, Corvettes and Patrol vessels and interceptor craft should all be built only by private shipyards and thus release capacity for building (integrating) complex platforms such as destroyers and frigates at DPSU shipyards in co-ordination with private shipyards. The MDL and Pipavav teaming was a great move but it has got enmeshed in controversy. In the event that private sector is able to forge collaborations with technology leaders the scope can be enlarged. The newly declared Defence Production Policy is an excellent step in this direction though the finer details are yet to

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be firmed up. The Ministry of Heavy Industries, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Shipping and Transport should contest every nomination by the MoD of a Defence PSU for building warships, tanks or aircraft or electronic systems such as missiles and radars where the private sector has indicated willingness and intent to participate. Worldwide, these war machines and systems are built by the private sector competitively and there is no reason why that should not apply to India.

The Indian Navy is on course to acquire its own communications and surveillance satellite capability, with a 1,000 Nm footprint. The second category is airborne surveillance. In this category are the shore based options of Maritime Patrol aircraft, Aerostats and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and the ship based options of Airborne Early Warning Helicopters and aircraft and VTOL UAVs From the foregoing gap analysis, essential risk reduction towards maintaining a balanced force level to offset any regional imbalances and to maintain credible capability the following force structure initiatives need to be contemplated: ●● Over and above the P15A, P17 and P17A and P15B programmes which need to be accelerated additional acquisition of 4 destroyers and 8 frigates from foreign and Indian private sector shipyards under the Buy and Make Indian procedure is inescapable to achieve the three Carrier Battle Group force levels by 2022. At least the eight frigates could be the proven Talwar Class hull form - with minor changes in weapons and sensors - but built in India in collaboration with an Indian shipyard. The four destroyers, frozen on the P15B requirements, can be procured under the Buy Indian category. This way there would not be undue proliferation of several types of hull forms, weapons and sensors. ●● Begin the process of designing the “generation after next” Destroyer equipped with the DRDO Advanced Air Defence System. This force level would comprise 6 destroyers.

●● Induct additional 6-8 Anti-Submarine Warfare corvettes, over and above the P28 programme, for Escort and LND duties under the Buy and Make Indian categorisation. ●● Bring up the amphibious force levels by accelerating the LPD and the LCU programmes for deliveries by 2022. ●● Review the P75I programme and instead of piecemeal construction of 6 submarines in three different yards as is presently proposed the way forward is to go firm with 18 Air Independent Propulsion submarines ordered in one lot of a modular design with allowance for expansion and obsolescence and distributed between the three shipyards on a competitive basis with international delivery standards of the first delivery in three years and thereon one submarine inducted every 9 months. This programme should also be categorised as Buy and Make Indian. ●● Immediate acquisition of additional two nuclear submarines over the contracted two submarines from Russia as an effort to tide over the interlude of indigenous nuclear submarine construction which envisages a fleet of five nuclear submarines. This would bring up force levels to nine nuclear submarines, still inadequate, but ensuring that at least three submarines can be on station at any one time. ●● Begin the process of creating the staff requirements for the next Air Defence Ship. At a minimum the ship should be able to embark 2 and ½ squadrons of fighters, 2 squadrons of Multi-Role Helicopters, one flight of AEW / Surveillance UAVs, one flight of loitering missiles and one flight of utility helicopters. This carrier should be in service no later than 2022 and procured through competitive bidding from an Indian shipyard. ●● Convince the Government / MoD to exercise the Option clause (50 per cent) and the Repeat order clauses (100 per cent) allowable under the DPP to bring up the order quantity to 40 MRH and negotiate a better price and delivery schedule. This would still leave more than

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

50 per cent of the total requirements unfulfilled. Future induction of these helicopters should be processed under the Buy and Make Indian Route to develop a national capability in helicopter manufacture. ●● Commence the process of identifying the alternate fighter to the Mig 29K, the Multi-Role Helicopters for the future Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, destroyers and the frigates and the heavy lift helicopter for the LPD. ●● Review the Staff Requirements of the Light Utility Helicopter to bring in contemporary technology of electro-optics, laser designators and UV scanners together with suitable armament and self-protection devices for low intensity operations. Now that there are a plethora of JV agreements between Indian private sector companies and foreign aviation majors such as Augusta Westland, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin the categorisation should be Buy and Make Indian. ●● Energise sophisticated long range coastal surveillance with state-of-the-art technologies using a mix of network of High Frequency Surface Wave Radars, X Band Over the Horizon Radars and coupled with sophisticated Visual / Infra Red / Laser Designated Optronic systems to enable 24x7 simultaneous staring surveillance of the Indian EEZ is mandated. ●● Build-up maritime air surveillance through extensive use of indigenous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in technology partnership with world leaders. Indian defence forces already operate 78 UAVs manufactured by a world leader with the Navy holding 12 UAVs only. A production base in India for the Unmanned Aerial System should be the next step. This may entail an investment of about Rs 12,000 crore over six years to bring up force levels to a fleet of about 40 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for continuous EEZ surveillance. This force would be coupled to the coastal surveillance chain of radars to present an integrated composite picture to the war room. ●● Seaplanes can provide much needed island and offshore assets

access and support, surveillance, long range SAR and CASEVAC, ultra long range fleet logistic support, long range VBSS operations, civil operations including anti-piracy, small arms and drugs trafficking operations, prevention of human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping and humanitarian assistance etc. Seaplanes would not only be an asset for the Indian Navy but also provide regional ocean safety of the SLOCs. This would be in keeping with India’s rising status as a responsible regional power. ●● Rapidly build-up a strong and efficient rapid reaction force of fast interceptor crafts using the most ultramodern propulsion and optical stabilisation technologies available across the world. With about 200 ports in India the requirement for effective surveillance and rapid reaction forces would be about 900 such boats at an investment of about Rs 8,100 crore but with a major benefit of securing Indian ports and harbours from catastrophes of the 26/11 kind forever. This should be again procured under the Buy and Make Indian category. ●● Position similar Fast Interceptor Craft in the Island territories. The requirement for these areas would be met by about 120 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Andaman and Nicobar island chain and about 90 Fast Interceptor Boats in the Lakshadweep island. This would require a total investment of about Rs 900 crore. The benefits would be enormous. ●● Create a sophisticated and networked Multi-Spectral Data Fusion Command and Control Engine that enables real time maritime domain awareness. This would be dovetailed with AIS, LRIT and other SIGINT technologies to analyse and plot cargo movements by source and destination. This would be expensive but it is completely within the capability of the Indian software giants to deliver in a few years time. ●● Obtain government approval for increasing the personnel strength to 12,500 officers, 80,000 sailors and 80,000 civilians by 2019 to man the future Navy.

In conclusion, naval acquisition plans would be best served by reviewing existing rationale for force structures and force composition so that the entire threat and vulnerability spectrum of barbaric / hybrid / state ignited maritime violence and resource and market accessibility are seamlessly addressed. Such an exercise would be more about Force Transformation as different from Force Modernisation within available resources that such reprioritisation of maritime threats require. To operationalise the procurement plan naval and maritime capability building programmes must set its sight on the future operational missions that the Navy would need to fulfil in the future and thus derive the force structure and force composition of the future Navy. This requires the Navy to: ●● Coherently articulate a rationale for the overall force levels based on a well defined concept of operations. ●● Derive a convincing architecture for fleet structure and composition. ●● Calculate the aviation component large enough to support the concept of operations. ●● Dexterously manage the ongoing programme costs whilst seeking additional funding for new projects. ●● Build-up commensurate infrastructure through shared arrangements with industry to reduce costs. For example all

refits should be undertaken by the shipyard / aircraft manufacturer / weapon / sensor supplier. ●● Link the manpower induction plan to force levels. It would, of course, make better sense if all maritime force structure planning is centrally organised so that not only are duplication and overlaps definitely addressed between the competing maritime agencies but more importantly voids overlooked by the individual maritime agencies are determined and subsequently filled as a national exercise in ensuring comprehensive maritime security. For this both the Navy and the Coast Guard need to sit together and produce a blueprint for transforming maritime security. In conclusion, building the 2020 Navy may require some prompt and focused course corrections and re-alignment with the forecast operational scenario of 2022 and beyond. Ultimately no matter what the force levels, force structure and force composition, IN must deliver on the simple objective of defeating barbaric, hybrid or state forces in the area of our maritime interest. The Indian Navy must also take early baby steps to provide safety of the SLOCs, at least in the North Indian Ocean as a regional commitment and affirmation of the Indian national responsibility as the NAVAREA Coordinator. To borrow from the Royal Navy - India’s Navy must clearly be seen as a Force for Good.

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NATIONAL SECURITY

Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd) The writer is former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. He also served as Indian Naval Attache in Washington DC, USA.

Isolated functioning of the Military, Paramilitary, Security and Police forces is the first fundamental flaw of our CASE and duplication in functioning, training. Differing standards, duplication in functioning, training, disparate relationships due to a Compartmentalised Higher Defence and Security set up are the collateral consequences. A time has arrived for the CCS - the Cabinet Committee on Security affairs to be supported by a National Combat and Security Authority set up. This has to be all inclusive with organisation and charter for all the stakeholders in a formalised manner. Setting this up through an act of Parliament would also give it Legislated authority and accountability

A prime example of creative and out of the box thinking on issues of National security. In his inimitable style Admiral Bharathan calls for a need to introspect on the mechanics of the highest decision organisation. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Ministries of Defence, Home, External Affairs need institutional synergy through functioning mechanisms. Civil control of the military is a given. However compartmentalised functioning and exclusion of the armed forces from proactive participation can only yield sub-optimal combat and security preparedness. Security also requires perspective planning akin to defence. Like the MoD annual report there has to be a broad yearly assessment. Its budgeting needs to be holistic and inclusive based on threat perceptions. The Ministries of Home, Defence, External Affairs all have an egregious relationship at worst and a standoff relationship at best. We have an Integrated Defence Staff but no Chief of Defence Staff. The concept of unified command which began with setting up of the Andaman Nicobar Joint Command (ANC), the Strategic Forces Command is yet to mature into acceptance and operability. We should have a Parliament approved National Combat and Security Authority in place. This authority should have charter, structures and organisation with formalised representation by all concerned, reporting to the Cabinet Committee on Security. An impassioned plea for a whole of the government approach.

n overview of the status of our Combat and Security equity shows disjointed diffidence with consequent defensiveness. Isolated functioning of the Military, Paramilitary, Security and Police forces is the first fundamental flaw of our CASE. Differing standards, duplication in functioning, training, disparate relationships due to a Compartmentalised Higher Defence and Security set up are the collateral consequences. A time has arrived for the CCS - the Cabinet Committee on Security affairs to be supported by a National Combat and Security Authority set up. This has to be all inclusive with organisation and charter for all the stakeholders in a formalised manner. Setting this up through an act of Parliament would also give it Legislated authority and accountability. It may be noted that the above could be facilely instituted within the existing arrangements and resources. Our Human Resource talent, qualifications, organising abilities, regulatory discipline, crisis management experience and overall capabilities as a secular democracy can make this happen. Perhaps in more ways than one we are just one step up from elevating the first Ds of disjointed diffidence with consequent defensiveness to the second Ds of direction, development, determination, delegation, dissemination and didactics to optimise our CASE. This only requires collective synergy

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Our “CASE” in point?

and will of the Politico-Bureaucratic-MilitarySecurity-Intelligence combine. HOW “INDIA INTERNALISES AND EXTERNALISES ITSELF AS A NATION STATE IN THE COMING TWO DECADES WOULD BE THE LITMUS TEST FOR IT’S SUSTENANCE AS A SOVEREIGN SECULAR STABLE DEMOCRACY”.

Defence-combat-security Defence denotes “protection”. Combat connotes fighting. Security is a “state or feeling of being safe. Intelligence is the critical key to open the locks of information. HUMINT (Human Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), RECCONNAISANCE INTELLIGENCE and DI (deductive Intelligence) are integral to this. Effective communication and a sound Management Information System (MIS) are essential. This is the classical C4I3 structure called Command, Control, Communication, Coordination along with Intelligence, Information and Integration. All have a linear and exponential relationship. This is well known to the Indian system in theory. The biggest Achilles heel is our culture of having and being happy with stove pipe setups. “Information is power” is the mantra that is still operative. Even a cursory glance at the Nation State of India would highlight indifference, indolence, insolence, insouciance and insensitivity at

the macro, middle, micro levels of governance and the general public. That this is mostly by default rather than design in our democracy is possibly a saving grace. There is hope that we could correct these as is beginning to happen in fits and starts. Technology plays a key role in any “CASE”! Cyberspace is also gaining ground and needs to be added to the C4 and made C5. This continues to be an aspect that has not been given any serious operational thought by the leadership.

Calculus of combat and security combat Combat involves classic war and low intensity conflicts. It would entail both high and low technology. It includes operational as well as domestic logistics. The former covers ordnance, protection, transport and the like. The latter caters for hygiene needs of people, administrative requirements, mass

transportation of stores, shelter and storage.

The advent of technology and the rapidity of information exchange has to be maximised in each situation. Most importantly the system has to understand that what is urgent may not be important and what is important may not be urgent. Simple as this may seem, often times so much organisation energy is consumed in searching for trivia Combat involves more than the military. It includes political, bureaucratic involvement as well as Paramilitary forces. Home, External Affairs, Finance, Railways and Road Transport ministries have a major role to play. Combat also connotes the Nation being involved in a holistic manner.

Security Security offers protection by way of effective guarding

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NATIONAL SECURITY

or warding off threats. It is defensive by nature. Its core philosophy is one of never being surprised. This requires organisation, readiness, weaponry, surveillance, training and constant alertness. Security by its very nature is sporadic.

Preparation In both cases training, exercises, preparation are always essential. Intelligence and communication are the keys each time. Domain awareness in synergy is a critical element along with proper mission briefing, delegation, good command and control. The element of trust and team spirit has to evolve along with esprit de corps.

Control, really means connectivity between all teams with flatness of command whenever and wherever required. Communication connotes listening to and understanding the ground situation on the field. The 26 November Mumbai attack is a grim example of how many of the above were either ignored, or not followed either in letter or in spirit.

Equity

Equity implies fair, just and equal treatment. A look at the security status and its management would reveal involuntary inequity in concept, practice, monies and most tellingly in the absence of a perspective planning continuum as well as holistic security budget akin to the defence budget. The existing Centre-State arrangements do need both macro review and micro arrangements to bring in standardised procedures and practices for all security forces. Legislation by parliament would go a long way in ensuring unity of concept, optimal understanding and effective management practices.

Command, Coordination.

India seems to be somewhat more focused on combat and distracted

actually

means

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

by matters security. Defence being a central subject and security being a state subject while understandable need not be subjected to involuntary inequity. Security also requires perspective planning akin to defence. Like the MoD annual report there has to be a broad yearly assessment. Its budgeting needs to be holistic and inclusive based on threat perceptions. Equity entails a serious review of the reactive and obtuse duplication in the continuum of Combat and Security. Duplication is cost prohibitive, functionally inhibitive and restrictive. The rapid action forces created in haste are good examples of good money spent impulsively rather than improving and consolidation of existing entities. “INDIA NEEDS TO ACCEPT THAT IT IS INEFFICIENT IN ITS FOCUS ON COMBAT CONTINUUM AND INEFFECTIVE IN ITS SECURITY STRUCTURE”. The above schematic is perhaps needed in concept and practice. It would also be clear to even laymen that there is need to introspect on the mechanics of the highest decision

organisation. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Ministries of Defence, Home, External Affairs need institutional synergy through functioning mechanisms. Civil control of the military is a given. However compartmentalised functioning and exclusion of the Armed forces from proactive participation can only yield sub-optimal combat and security preparedness.

body to submit a six monthly/annual assessment to the Parliament in camera. This in turn would sensitise the leadership in the government and opposition as befitting a mature democracy.

There is need to introspect on the mechanics of the highest decision organisation. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Ministries of Defence, Home, External Affairs need institutional synergy through functioning mechanisms. Civil control of the military is a given. However compartmentalised functioning and exclusion of the Armed forces from proactive participation can only yield sub-optimal combat and security preparedness

Composition and charter of NCASA

We have an Integrated Defence Staff but no Chief of Defence Staff. The concept of unified command which began with setting up of the Andaman Nicobar Joint Command (ANC), the Strategic Forces Command is yet to mature into acceptance and operability. We have a National Security Advisor who as the designation suggests has an ephemeral role that is also heavily personality dominated. We should have a Parliament approved National Combat and Security Authority in place. This authority should have charter, structures and organisation with formalised representation by all concerned, reporting to the Cabinet Committee on Security. It would also be salutary and accountable for this

“HIGHER DIRECTION OF PLANNING FOR COMBAT AND SECURITY EQUITY IS NO LONGER A LUXURY BUT AN IMPERATIVE”.

In our democracy the primacy of civil control is well established, completely accepted and fully absorbed into the system. In six decades the Armed forces as well as the security forces have lastingly acquitted themselves in conduct, discipline and total commitment to democratic principles of government and governance. We have been exemplary both in the region as well as in the world. This can only be strengthened and embellished if the polity and its leadership learn to maximise this, through collective participation. The composition of the NCASA (National Combat and Security Authority) and its charter needs to be through legislation by Parliament and ratified by both houses. The NCASA would bring all the stakeholders into a coordinating mode, through an accounted check and balance reporting system. This would be well within our reach and capability. The system must be made to shed its turf protectionist syndrome. Autonomy and existing rules of business need to be only modified to bring macro synergy and micro cooperation across all echelons. This needs to be replicated at the state levels too. The charter of the NCASA should have autonomy, authority, accountability with inbuilt checks and balances towards managing the matrices of Combat and Security

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while ensuring Equity. The Armed Forces, Paramilitary Forces, The Coast Guard, the Indo Tibetan Border Forces, the Rapid Action Forces of various states, etc. need to be cohesively coordinated to optimise their functioning. Bringing different agencies like RAW, NTRO, NRSA, ISRO, IB, important ministries together in one synchronised system for supporting the CASE would be a prime task of NCASA. Tiered structures and tweaking up the present processes inherent in every entity would ensure that it becomes wieldy and well oiled. The major advantages would be: The emergence of Combat and Security sound understanding National Interests. This participation.

Strategic appreciation of the scenario. There would be a of Threat Perceptions and in turn would bring in effective

We have a National Security Advisor who as the designation suggests has an ephemeral role that is also heavily personality dominated. We should have a Parliament approved National Combat and Security Authority in place. This authority should have charter, structures and organisation with formalised representation by all concerned, reporting to the Cabinet Committee on Security An Optimal fiscal management to ensure combat and security equity, Unity in standards of assessment, training and information sharing. Overcoming the devils of duplication. Examples of this are the Armed forces, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Research Analysis Wing (RAW) and other intelligence agencies. There is neither a Parliament mandated matrix of functioning nor any promulgated process. It continues to be formally informal. Reporting chains are vertical and file fostered. There is no networked connectivity for information sharing or a National Crisis coordination arrangement that can rapidly assemble or institutionally meet. Diffused accountability, a touchy feely approach, political passivity, bureaucratic stalling, military muddling are commonplace. Op Parakram is perhaps a good example of this. The continuation of the “WHITE HALL” filing system is the biggest bane. Unless this is changed, to wired network management system, CASE administration would continue to lag behind action! The Ministries of Home, Defence, External Affairs all have an egregious relationship at worst and a standoff relationship at best. Secretary level and coordination meetings being held regularly need to be converted into integrated systems that are responsive instead of being reactive. Analysis post Parliament attack, the Kargil conflict, the 26 November 2008 attack in Mumbai and even the IPKF fiasco in the late 80’s would reveal infirmities, inherent weaknesses and inequity in the overall “CASE”.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

National combat and security equity strategy The lack of a National “CASE” strategy while perhaps understandable thus far, can no longer be a valid option in an unstable security environment of an inimical neighbourhood. The country needs to accept and acknowledge that, as a polity, we are Pakistan centric and Sino deferential. There are serious internal and external threats that require constant priority response. All this has to be spelt out. A CASE strategy would awaken us to the need of internalising well to optimally externalise our diplomatic, security and combat postures. The leadership must be made to sit up and put pen to paper and make public, a strategy for India’s “CASE”. In more ways than one India and the sub-continent are in a state of constant tension and occasional confrontation. That this is not of our making is neither material nor germane. There has to be resolute response as opposed to the cacophony of pronouncements by the politicians and the sensation seeking media in every emergent situation.

The government and the “CASE” paradigm All complex issues need simplified processes broken into manageable portions. Combat and Security equity is very manageable if viewed as a holistic challenge that needs to be converted into a strategic opportunity.

The Ministries of Home, Defence, External Affairs all have an egregious relationship at worst and a standoff relationship at best. Secretary level and coordination meetings being held regularly need to be converted into integrated systems that are responsive instead of being reactive Sixty years of Independent India has enabled birth and growth of several sensible systems, entities and concepts in the field of Combat and Security. We have what it takes, in place and ready to go. We now need to move into the next level of making parliament, state legislatures and people aware of what Combat and Security is all about. It is alright to discuss these in the open while maintaining the needed classified aspects in their niche. Promulgation and creating a National Combat and Security Authority would be a prudent, futuristic step. It would strengthen democracy and enable the leadership to be focused and aware of Combat and Security linkages to Nation Governance and Management. India is progressing well on the economic front. The country is poised for growth. Yet there are many in rural and urban India requiring uplifting. Security in basic essentials is the key to their survival and sustainment. In this critical juncture paying priority attention to Combat and Security aspects is an imperative, lest the Nation gets sidetracked from its core developmental goals due to emergent preoccupation with internal security issues as well as dealing with external threat situations. India has to believe and let it be known that it knows how to look after its “CASE” in the first or second strike.

sea power

aircraft carrier killer missiles

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Though as yet untested in combat, the DF-21 Missiles have significantly enhanced the threat to the carriers. Any American decision to parade these carriers in any future confrontation over Taiwan would be seriously hamstrung by the fear of losing these carriers to a barrage of DongFeng 21Ds fired in multiple salvos. The carriers could thus be sunk some 2-3,000 kms out at sea while their tactical on-board aircraft and cruise missiles would be well out of range of the Chinese mainland. The enhanced accuracy of these intermediate range Ballistic missiles has therefore posed a serious threat to the slow moving aircraft carrier armadas. How significant is this threat? Is it a game changer in the annals of naval warfare that will render this class of ships obsolete? Is the long era of the Aircraft Carrier finally over?

The era of the mighty Battleships became history during the Second World War with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The US became the foremost protagonist of the Carrier Battle Group (CBG) as the prime instrument of power-projection. The 11 CBGs of the US Navy actually make that country a super power. In 1996, the dispatch of two US CBGs forced China to back down over Taiwan. This humiliation forced the Chinese to seek a novel and out of the box solution to the threat of US aircraft carriers. In the Dong Feng 21 D Anti-Ship missile it now seems to have found a very cost-effective answer. Though as yet untested in combat, the DF-21 Missiles have significantly enhanced the threat to the carriers. Any American decision to parade these carriers in any future confrontation over Taiwan would be seriously hamstrung by the fear of losing these carriers to a barrage of Dong-Feng 21 Ds fired in multiple salvos. The carriers could thus be sunk some 2-3,000 kms out at sea while their tactical on-board aircraft and cruise missiles would be well out of range of the Chinese mainland. The enhanced accuracy of these intermediate range Ballistic missiles has therefore posed a serious threat to the slow moving Aircraft Carrier armadas. How significant is this threat? Is it a game changer in the annals of naval warfare that will render this class of ships obsolete? Is the long era of the Aircraft Carrier finally over? The issue merits serious debate and analysis.

足足B

attleships like the Hood, Repulse, Bismarck etc. had ruled the seas almost till the midpoint of the Second World War. These mighty battleships however were completely eclipsed by the advent of the Aircraft Carriers which have emerged since as the primary platform for power projection across the globe. The era of the Aircraft Carrier had dawned with the brilliantly successful Japanese attack on the mighty American Naval Base at Pearl Harbour. So eminently successful was the Japanese Fleet's attack that Pearl Harbour has become a historical synonym for shock and surprise in war or any conflictual activity. Surprisingly it was the Armed Forces of the Totalitarian states like Germany and Japan that did out of the box thinking in the Second World War and came out with highly innovative solutions to counter the industrial and quantitative superiority of the Allied Powers. The Allied Powers were all, (with the exception of Soviet Russia), liberal democracies, who theoretically should have fostered more creative thinking and innovation. It was the Germans however, who synthesised the Stuka Dive Bombers with the fast moving Panzer Tank columns to generate shock and awe and effect deep and paralysing penetrations of the blitzkreig in land warfare. It was the Japanese who synthesised Tactical aviation with Sea Power to pioneer the advent of Aircraft Carriers. The Americans, till Pearl Harbour, had relied primarily upon the traditional gigantic Battleships to effect sea-control. By a curious

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coincidence, almost the entire American Battleship fleet was sunk at Pearl Harbour. The American Aircraft Carriers were not in harbour on that particular day and hence survived. It was natural therefore, that given the spectacular Japanese success with this class of ships, the American Carriers would lead the US Counter offensive across the Pacific. The Americans simply had no other option. The Americans began their relentless island hopping campaign across the Pacific chain of islands as they inched closer to the Japanese mainland. The turning point of the war came in the Battle of Midway, when the American and Japanese fleets of Aircraft Carriers fought a fierce engagement without the two fleets coming in sight of one another. US technological superiority turned the scales in this relentless battle of attrition via the Manoeuvre of the Carrier Battle Groups. The Aircraft Carrier Group has since then firmly established itself as the primary instrument of power projection. Post the Second World War, the US enhanced its dependence on the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group as the primary tools of Power Projection. Today, the US Navy boasts of 11 Carrier Battle Groups. Today such a US Nuclear powered Aircraft Carrier Battle Group can traverse 5-700 nautical miles in a day and cover some 5,000 Nautical miles in a week. With its Fleet of F-18 Hornet aircraft, it can reach out another 3-400 nautical miles and more and decisively mass effects at very long distances from the American mainland.

A Game Changer?

The Soviets were a traditional Continental power and the Soviet Navy therefore focused more on Sea-denial than Sea-control. This it did through a vast armada of nuclear and conventional submarines. However, towards the heyday of the Soviet Empire in the 1970s the Soviet Navy began to emulate its American counterpart and went in for a series of tactical to mid-sized Aircraft Carriers like the Gorshkov (now the Vikramaditya of the Indian Navy), the Veryag (now the Shelang of the Chinese PLA Navy) and the Kuznetsov. The Aircraft Carrier had proved its utility and efficacy as an ideal platform for Power Projection.

The DFs mark a significant paradigm shift that could make the strategy of sending giant aircraft carriers more dangerous because it could give China the option of firing warning shots if the US ships sail too close for Chinese comfort says Toshi Yoshiwara, Prof of Strategy and Policy at the US Naval War College During the cold war the Aircraft Carrier played a lead role in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. After the collapse of the mighty Soviet Union, the US Carrier Battle Groups ranged virtually unchallenged over the global seas. They played a lead and decisive role in Gulf War I and Gulf War II as also Op Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and also behind the scenes in Libya. Unchallenged Naval power and sea-lift capabilities alone enabled America to defeat Iraq and pulverise Afghanistan, Kosovo and Libya.

The Taiwan confrontation In 1995, China had embarked on a rather aggressive military exercise to coerce and intimidate Taiwan. It fired a barrage of short ranged Tactical Ballistic missiles over Taiwan to overawe that state into calling off its Pro-independence agenda.

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sea power

aircraft carrier killer missiles

The Americans retaliated by dispatching two Nuclear Carrier Battle Groups to the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese were forced to back down. It was a significant humiliation and loss of face for the Chinese. They resolved to ensure that this would not happen ever again. The Chinese Navy determinedly set out to find an out of the box and innovative solution to the threat of the US Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups. The solution they have come up with is novel and quite cost-effective.

“The rise of Chinese Naval Power is unstoppable. Instead of trying to counter it the US should accommodate itself with it by accepting the new reality in the Western Pacific as a result of the rise of the Chinese Navy”. Beijing now has an expanded list of core sensitivities that go far beyond Taiwan and Tibet The PLANs response to the coercive threat of the US Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups came in the form of the Dong-Feng 21D Intermediate range, conventional tipped, Carrier Killer ballistic missiles. With their recent increase in accuracy and lethality these Anti-Ship Missiles have emerged as a highly significant new threat to the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group. Though as yet untested in combat, the DF-21 Missiles have significantly enhanced the threat to the carriers. Any American decision to parade these carriers in any future confrontation over Taiwan would be seriously hamstrung by the fear of losing these carriers to a barrage of Dong-Feng 21Ds fired in multiple salvos. The carriers could thus be sunk some 2-3,000 kms out at sea while their tactical on-board aircraft and cruise missiles would be well out of range of the Chinese mainland. The enhanced accuracy of these intermediate range Ballistic missiles has therefore posed a serious threat to the slow moving Aircraft Carrier armadas. How significant is this threat? Is it a game changer in the annals of naval warfare that will render this class of ships obsolete? Is the long era of the Aircraft Carrier finally over? Will the next major conflict at sea see them go the way of the earlier Battleships? Is the Dong-Feng 21D therefore a significant game changer? This merits serious debate and analysis and in part explains China’s highly truculent behaviour in 2010.

The carrier killer: DF-2ID missile To recapitulate, in 1995-96 China was forced to back off when the US dispatched two Carrier Battle Groups to the Taiwan Straits at the height of the Chinese generated crisis. The approach of the Carrier Battle Groups forced China to back down. China had thereafter toned down its rhetoric and truculence for over 10 years. However its military and naval brass was intensively engaged in finding an answer to the challenge of US Carrier Battle Groups. The response has now come in the form of the DF-2ID Ballistic Missile. This is a mobile land based missile of 1,800-2,000 miles (approx 3,000 kms) range, specifically designed to engage and destroy the giant nuclear powered carriers. The DF-2ID has US naval strategists clearly worried. The US Navy concedes privately that they have only theoretical counter measures against the DF-2ID because its trajectory and other capabilities are largely unknown. As per US Naval Intelligence sources the DF-2ID is nearing operational capability. It could rank as the worlds first

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

mobile land based missile capable of hitting a moving aircraft carrier nearly 2,000 miles away. The basic design of the DF-2ID is quite similar to the US Pershing II Missile of the cold war era. The missile is a two stage solid propellant missile with a CEP of 100-300 meteres. It was developed by China’s Chang Feng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy (also called Second Space Academy). This missile was developed from the Julang (JL-1) submarine launched ballistic missile. However it is a land based platform. Its payload and the capability of a ballistic missile to redirect in mid-flight is what especially worries US strategists. What drives the recent aggressive assertiveness of the Chinese navy? Is it its confidence that it finally has an answer to the US Carrier Battle Groups? The US Navy 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Adm John Bird was clearly worried when he said, “We have some concerns over the very aggressive weapons the Chinese are processing”.

Sattelite support system China has built the recce support system for its Anti- ship Missiles in terms of an elaborate Satellite system and ground based Over the Horizon radar facilities. On 05 March 2009 the Chinese launched Yangon-1X Naval Ocean Surveillance Satellite (NOSS). This is equivalent of US White Cloud NOSS and consists of three small satellites that orbit in close formation and are dedicated to the task of detecting enemy Aircraft Carriers. It is a first generation Chinese Surveillance system with millimeter wave Radars to help stay in good orbital formation. Infra red sensors help spot the ships and antennae pick up electronic emissions. This has serious implications for US Aircraft Carriers due to their potential ability to find and track them. China launched two other such satellites in December 2009 (an electro-optical satellite and a synthetic aperture satellite) to complete the detection triad that will work together to locate and track US Aircraft Carriers. The advent of the Chinese NOSS however is a watershed in terms of actual, precise and real time targeting capability. China is likely to have some 80 DF-21D type ASBMs by 2015. “Individually”, said Paul Giarra (a former Navy Cdr and now a Defence Dept Analyst) “the technological capabilities are not unprecedented but it is a revolutionary combination of capabilities”. The missile would be formidable during battle and its consequences go beyond any hypothetical cataclysmic wars. The Chinese would use the missile as leverage to try to weaken US Security pledges to Taiwan and other Asian allies, establishing vast no-go zones in the West Pacific. An active Dong-Feng 21D Missile arsenal could prove to be a significant threat to the massive nuclear powered aircraft carriers. This “carrier killer” could usher in a major revolutionary change in naval warfare which had moved from the era of Battleships to the era of Aircraft Carriers in World War II. The DFs mark a significant paradigm shift that could make the strategy of sending giant Aircraft Carriers more dangerous because it could give China the option of firing warning shots if the US ships sail too close for Chinese comfort says Toshi Yoshiwara, Prof of Strategy and Policy at the US Naval War College.

A small dose of well placed missiles they believe might persuade the enemy to back down or cease and desist. Such escalation could lead to miscalculation. If fired upon, the US might perceive what is intended as a warning shot or demonstration of resolve - as a prelude to all out attack. The DF-21D therefore constitutes the high end Chinese asymmetric threat. US Admiral Robert Willard said in a testimony to the US Congress that such a missile could change the strategic equation and dramatically diminish American power projection.

Current US defensive measures The current US missile defence systems are based on the US Aegis class cruisers / destroyers that form part of an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group. These carry the SM-3 interceptor missiles. However Giarra noted that the interception capability of Aegis equipped ships is not enough to reliably defend against a volley of well placed Anti-ship missiles. The US option therefore would be to rely more upon submarines or else keep its surface ships out of missile range. This seems to explain the surprising rise in Chinese naval assertiveness. B Raman has rightly pointed out that China seems to be asserting itself more and more with respect to the kinds of territorial claims. They seem to be taking a much more aggressive approach to near sea areas recently. This has serious implications for the freedom of navigation on the high seas. It virtually amounts to the enforcement of maritime exclusion zones. What is highly surprising is what precisely impelled America to back down and hold its Naval Drill in the Sea of Japan, instead of the Yellow Sea. Was it the threat of the DF-21D? A Chinese military analyst wrote lately that “The rise of Chinese Naval Power is unstoppable. Instead of trying to counter it the US should accommodate itself with it by accepting the new reality in the Western Pacific as a result of the rise of the Chinese Navy”. Beijing now has an expanded list of core sensitivities that go far beyond Taiwan and Tibet.

Admiral Mike Mullen’s concern During his visit to India in early 2010, US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen clearly articulated his growing concern over China’s recent Naval assertiveness and muscle flexing. Beset with a financial crisis and bogged down with ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama Administration’s first impulse after coming to office, was to seek accommodation with China at the global level and alliance with Pakistan at the regional scale. India was completely marginalised from its world view and pilloried to make peace with Pakistan. Obama’s visit to China however was a significant come down. Chinese assertiveness in the climate change negotiations further convinced the Americans that China only respected strength. They retaliated by providing US$ 6 billion worth of arms to Taiwan. This entrained a negative cycle that is now manifesting in the crisis in East Asia and the increasing naval muscle flexing by China. Things changed suddenly in 2010. With the Beijing Olympics China threw its coming of age party. The global financial crisis found America considerably weakened. China sensed its break out opportunity and in 2010 there

has been a dramatic turn around from its “Hide your capabilities bide your time” phase. Its military build-up has given new confidence and assertiveness to the PLA, the PLAN and the PLAFF. The DF-2ID seems to have exorcised the threat of American Carrier Battle Groups and introduced a significant game changer in the naval arena of the Western Pacific Ocean. China is now flexing its muscles. China’s recent attempt to virtually enforce maritime exclusion zones in the South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea forms a very disturbing precedent. It has obvious implications for the freedom of navigation on the high seas. This obviously worries the USA and it equally has implications for India. The Global Financial Crisis is being seen by the Chinese as a significant game changer that has hastened its coming of age party. The pattern shift in Chinese state behaviour has serious implications for Asia and the World in general and India in particular. Indian National Security experts need to take serious note of these tectonic plate shifts and speed up our inordinately delayed military build-up. We cannot afford to postpone the completion of our military build-up to 2025. The crisis situations are building up far quicker than anticipated in Asia. We cannot afford to be overtaken by events once more. The Americans are clearly concerned and Admiral Mullen articulated this concern unambiguously during his visit to India. He stated inter alia “I have moved from being curious about what they are doing to being concerned about what they are doing”. He elaborated “I see a fairly significant investment in high end equipment, satellites, ships and anti-ship missiles and high end aircraft. They are shifting focus from ground forces to a focus on their navy and air force”. He also stated significantly that “China is massing expeditionary maritime and air capabilities which seem oddly out of step with their stated goal of territorial defence”. He was of the view that “Every nation has a right to defend itself and spend as much as it deems fit for that purpose. But a gap as wide as what seems to be forming between China’s stated intent and its military progress, leaves me more than curious about the end result”.

Paradigm shift in naval warfare The Dong-Feng 2ID Ballistic Missile as a carrier killer could generate a naval RMA. It could have a huge impact on the way navies fight. India has invested in a major way in acquiring tactical to midsized aircraft carriers. It must factor in the impact of the DF-2ID threat to its CBGs. India has developed considerable expertise in developing autarky in missiles. The DRDO must rapidly produce such Carrier Killer Ballistic Missiles as also defensive systems against such attacks on our own CBGs. It is ushering in a new era in naval warfare and we cannot afford to be left behind. The Carrier Killer Ballistic Missile is a significant game changer. It is also cheap and affordable and the earlier we acquire this capability the better it will be for us. We also need to invest in countering this new threat - otherwise our own CBGs will have to be confined to harbours in future naval battles. The rate and pace of change is accelerating in our times. We have no option but to keep pace.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

LIMITED WARS IN SOUTH ASIA -

Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine Anniversary Seminar

very interesting Seminar on the theme of Limited Wars in South Asia – Against a Nuclear Backdrop was organised at the Constitution Club on 04 November, 2011 to commemorate the second Anniversary of the Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. Its aim was to kick-start a debate on this seminal issue of great concern to our national security. With the nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998, India’s political class seems to have convinced itself that conventional war in response to Pakistan’s asymmetric provocations is no longer a viable option. Accordingly India has been self-deterred into complete impotence. During Op Parakram, it mobilised it’s entire armed forces in response to the attack on the Indian Parliament. However the “all or nothing”, nature of this massive military deployment caused the political class to blink and no combat action was initiated across the LC / IB. This has greatly emboldened Pakistan and dented India’s stance of conventional deterrence. Post Mumbai 26/11, India failed to take, or even threaten any military action whatsoever. The result has been a series of low level terrorist attacks in various cities of India. India’s tolerance thresholds are being stretched beyond limits and the next mass casualty terror strike could only be a matter of months away. Post Kargil, there was considerable discussion on the concept of Limited Wars in South Asia. There was intense debate to establish that there was space between the spectral ends of Nuclear war and sub-conventional conflict for a limited conventional war of fairly high intensity. Unfortunately, this petered out and by the time of Op Parakram, we were back to the concept of initiating hostilities with our ponderous strike corps. These took inordinately long to mobilise and the fleeting window of opportunity was closed. Post Parakram, there was much talk of a Cold Start doctrine of attack by combat groups from the line of march. The use of land forces to initiate hostilities however, can generate considerable fog of war and confusion. Land forces once commited cannot be easily disengaged / recalled. This would lead to an erosion of escalation dominance / control. The cold start doctrine has therefore been widely criticised.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

04 November 2011 at the Constitution Club, New Delhi Is there a space for waging conventional war in South Asia between the spectral ends of all out nuclear war and sub-conventional conflict? If so should such a conflict be initiated by land forces or by air and naval forces? Air power can inflict precise and controlled punishment to raise costs for the aggressor. Air power is flexible, precise, focused and could be the ideal instrument to retain escalation dominance at the outset of a limited war. The use of air power and / or naval power to initiate the response to asymmetric provocations can methodically set the stage for a limited / punitive war. What should be the aims and desired end states in such a war? Should it be simply to raise costs for asymmetric adventurism? Should this simply aim at acquiring territory for post war bargaining or aim to bring to battle and severely degrade the adversary’s operational and strategic reserves? There is an urgent and pressing need to devise a limited war doctrine in the Indian context. The highlight of the function was the presence of three former Service chiefs of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, each of whom had contributed in a significant way to this genre of war. General Malik and Admiral Sushil Kumar had been Chiefs of the Army and Navy during the Kargil war. Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major had been the Air Chief at the time of Mumbai 26 /11. There was Air Cmde Jasjit Singh who is regarded as the chief theorist on limited war in India. A most interesting and insightful civilian perspective was provided by Dr Kanwal Sibal, India’s former Foreign Secretary. General Malik and Admiral Sushil Kumar accentuated interesting accounts of their experiences at the helm of decision making during Op Vijay. Admiral Sushil Kumar highlighted how he had received the political instructions for Op Parakram in 2001. And his reactions thereto. Op Parakram, he felt had been a huge mistake. A large contingent of serving and retired service officers, members of Delhi’s think tank community were there in strength to participate in these exciting deliberations to chart out resonse options and viable escalation ladders in response to mass casualty asymmetric provocations by our adversaries. The issue of a Limited war with China was also discussed in detail. There is an urgent need for wide ranging debate and discussion on this vital subject, which this timely seminar sought to fulfill. The aim was to kick-start a debate on this vital issue and crystallise a doctrine for Limited wars in the South Asian context. December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

INDIGENISATION

Rear Adm S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer was Director General Naval Armament Inspection at the NHQ prior to his superannuation. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation and self reliance in the field of military weapon systems and armament.

The armament fit required for these platforms are being acquired through the route of import / TOT or through Consortium / Joint Ventures. For example Barak missile system was imported. The LR SAM is being jointly developed between DRDO, IN and Rafael of Israel and Surface to Surface BrahMos Cruise Missile system has been developed by way of Consortium approach between India and Russia. Anti-Submarine Warfare is another critical capability area where indigenisation has been a success. Airdropped torpedo TAL, developed by NSTL and being produced by BDL and various types of Sonars for underwater applications successfully developed by NPOL being produced by BEL are some examples

The Navy’s long term commitment supporting indigenisation has been often reiterated as it believes that indigenisation is fundamental to its growth plans. This not only reduces foreign dependence while minimising costs, but also assists in the capacity build-up of the local industry. A 15 year indigenisation perspective plan forecasting Navy’s requirements in new and emerging technologies to aid modernisation and act as capability multipliers were highlighted in the Indian maritime strategy. Navy’s past experiences of sourcing military hardware from abroad have been varied, depending on the relationship between the source nation and India at different points in time. However, the common strain running through each and every experience has been, one of ‘technology denial’ and ‘post-procurement dependency’. Navy’s material preparedness has received setbacks due to these reasons. The only long-term solution to this problem is a much greater thrust towards indigenisation and transfer of technology. The ‘bottom line’ of ‘operational readiness’ should remain the determining factor for Navy’s ‘Buy’ or ‘Make’ decisions, Navy would need to pragmatically consider some present-day compromise for a more secure future.

he vision for Indian Navy is fashioned by many factors, some of which are fairly constant and others dynamic. The fragile peace that prevails in India’s extended neighbourhood, the geo-strategic significance of India as a rising world power and a stabilising power in the Indian Ocean is globally accepted. One of the contributing factors of this recognition is undoubtedly Indian Navy, which has developed into a potent and capable maritime force, thanks to the vision of naval planners.

that the sea lines of communication are open at all times, are Navy’s constant endeavour. The formally stated vision, therefore, is ‘To create and sustain a three-dimensional technology-enabled and networked force capable of safeguarding our maritime interests on the high seas and projecting combat power across the littoral’. Apart from the combat role IN is also responsible for diplomatic role by using navy for building bridges of friendship and benign roles such as anti-piracy, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, search and rescue.

Today, Indian Navy faces a challenging operating environment due to a variety of factors which include geo-politics, emerging technologies and continuously evolving capabilities in India’s maritime neighbourhood. Notwithstanding scenario-building exercises and other instruments of prediction, it is difficult to foretell with any degree of certainty, the challenges that the future may have in store. As a nation however less than adequate attention has been paid to the significance of sea power and its relation to broader strategic, diplomatic and operational objectives.

Thus, India’s naval power and its evolving maritime profile and strategy are predicated on three significant trends. These are the process of globalisation in new economic technological order, the accrual of strategic technological strengths and finally the vision of enhanced military prowess in the Asia Pacific region.

Vision Indian Navy’s responsibilities include safeguarding a wide spectrum of the country’s maritime interests. These include a coast line of 7,516 km and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over two million sq km over which the country has the sovereign rights to explore and exploit economic assets. Therefore, maintenance of stability, security and safety at sea in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and ensuring

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Opportunities for private sector Navy’s past experiences of sourcing military hardware from abroad have been varied, depending on the relationship between the source nation and India at different points in time. However, the common strain running through each and every experience has been, one of ‘technology denial’ and ‘post-procurement dependency’. Navy’s material preparedness has received setbacks due to these reasons. The only long-term solution to this problem is a much greater thrust towards indigenisation and transfer of technology. The Indian defence industry is gradually coming of age and India must, in due course of time, wean away from foreign dependencies. Measures to enhance

MODERNISATION OF THE INDIAN NAVY:

OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE INDIAN INDUSTRY

the efficiency of DPSUs as well as putting much greater premium on time and cost consciousness amongst all agencies concerned are long overdue. Whilst the ‘bottom line’ of ‘operational readiness’ should remain the determining factor for Navy’s ‘Buy’ or ‘Make’ decisions, Navy would need to pragmatically consider some present-day compromise for a more secure future. Private Industry thus has a host of avenues open for participation in the defence production related to Naval Armament either independently or through constructive engagement with the PSUs and Ordnance Factories

To undertake the maritime security tasks and safeguarding the country from external aggression, the Indian Navy has an aircraft carrier, fleet of ships, submarines and aircrafts. These are fitted with various types of missiles, torpedoes, mines, depth charges, rockets and guns. The Indian Navy is in the process of major modernisation through acquiring latest state-of-the-art platforms like the Russian aircraft carrier ‘Vikramaditya’. Though most of these platforms are imported, orders have been placed on the Indian shipyards for indigenous manufacture of about 40 ships which include stealth frigates, destroyers and ASW ships and Scorpene Class submarines being manufactured in India through

TOT from France. Naval Aviation is undergoing a huge revamp with MIG-29K aircrafts providing the requisite airpower and US state-of-the-art P8I with multi-mission Long Range Maritime Surveillance capabilities. To support these platforms, procurement of a huge inventory of armament is being undertaken. The armament fit required for these platforms are being acquired through the route of import / TOT or through Consortium / Joint Ventures. For example Barak missile system was imported. The LR SAM is being jointly developed between DRDO, IN and Rafael of Israel and Surface to Surface BrahMos Cruise Missile

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

INDIGENISATION

system has been developed by way of Consortium approach between India and Russia. Anti-Submarine Warfare is another critical capability area where indigenisation has been a success. Airdropped torpedo TAL, developed by NSTL and being produced by BDL and various types of Sonars for underwater applications successfully developed by NPOL being produced by BEL are some examples. In the field of mine warfare, the present mine counter measures capability has been outdated. Therefore, the existing minesweepers are being upgraded into mine hunters through Thales, France. Orders have been placed on the Indian shipyards for indigenous manufacture of about 40 ships which include stealth frigates, destroyers and ASW ships and Scorpene Class submarines being manufactured in India through TOT from France. Naval Aviation is undergoing a huge revamp with MIG-29K aircrafts providing the requisite airpower and US state-of-the-art P8I with multi-mission Long Range Maritime Surveillance capabilities Navy is also building-up its surveillance endurance through NCW capability to achieve real time Maritime Domain Awareness in the entire Indian Ocean Region. A Combat Management System is an integral part of the weapon suite of any modern platform. The future CMS, developed by the Navy with the assistance from ‘Centre for Development of Telematics’ is being manufactured by BEL. This will form an important part of the C4I2SR. Private Industry thus has a host of avenues open for participation in the defence production related to Naval Armament either independently or through constructive engagement with the PSUs and Ordnance Factories. Speaking of volumes involved, the Defence outlay for capital expenditure for the year 2010-11 was budgeted at Rs. 60,000 Crore, that is basically procurement. This figure indicates that there is a substantial outflow from defence budget for importing weapon platforms, systems and

equipment and if India does not indigenise defence production it would remain forever dependant on foreign sources. Not only would the prevailing scenario impact India’s foreign exchange reserves, it would also have a crucial bearing on nation’s strategic autonomy and economy.

Incentives for the industry Ever since the defence sector was opened for private participation with 26 per cent Foreign Direct Investment and the offset policy enumerated in the Defence Procurement Policy 2006 (Now DPP 2010), the required impetus has been given and the stage set for Industry to contribute to the development of the defence sector on a large scale. A word about the Offset policy enumerated in DPP. It stipulates a reinvestment of 30 per cent of the total purchase amount in terms of components and services from India. The offset policy applies to imports by defence PSUs, ordnance factories and private participants of the industry. In case of joint venture where the bid is made by the Indian vendor, it will be for the foreign vendor to discharge the offset obligation. This has acted as a driver to create market-entry opportunities for mid-rung companies, which are looking at investing in research and development and manufacturing of defence goods.

production. With the defence industry gradually opening up to the private sector, many large corporate houses like Tata Group, Mahindra Group, Kirloskar Brothers Ltd, L&T have begun contributing significantly in the past few years.

Naval indigenisation plan The Navy’s long term commitment supporting indigenisation has been often reiterated as it believes that indigenisation is fundamental to its growth plans. This not only reduces foreign dependence while minimising costs, but also assists in the capacity build-up of the local industry. A 15 year indigenisation perspective plan forecasting Navy’s requirements in new and emerging technologies to aid modernisation and act as capability multipliers were highlighted in the Indian maritime strategy which include: a) Information and communication technology b) Nano technology c) Emerging power sources d) Propulsion e) Space f) Weapons g) Precision navigation and targeting

Indigenous production

h) Modern materials and stealth

In our country, even today, armament production remains largely confined to Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and Ordnance Factories with design and development responsibility completely resting with DRDO. The private participation is miniscule and relates, by and large, to supply of raw material and low technology produce save a few high-end technology items. However, whilst the indigenous content may not be very significant in terms of percentage, OFBs and DPSUs, jointly procure materials, sub-assemblies and components from the private sector worth over Rs 3,100 Crore. Thus there is a need to harness the core competence and capabilities of Indian private sector to realise indigenous armament

i) Unmanned vehicles combat capable

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

including

j) Computing k) Simulation

Global outlook Foreign firms are now looking at India as an attractive destination to forge alliances for more cost-effective production of Defence items. Global players are outsourcing work orders to Indian companies given the latter’s high degree of skill and cost competitiveness. Sadly, the state-of-the-art technology which gives the cutting edge is not available in India and

import is the only option for meeting the operational requirements of the services. Since, a very significant portion of the Naval Defence Budget is spent on imports, even a 10-20 per cent reduction in imports will not only help in saving precious foreign exchange but also have a spiralling effect on the economy. This will increase growth rate in the manufacturing sector and create job opportunities not only in large industries but also in small scale ancillary industries that are supporting the units.

Modernisation plans The Indian Navy requires long range air defence and anti-missile defence (AMD) capability, long range anti-surface warfare capability using precision guided weapons including land attack capability; Anti-submarine warfare capability to counter potential submarine threat both from conventional and nuclear with a capability mix for operations in deep waters and littorals, amphibious capabilities for provision of security to the inland territories and also for power projection role and mine warfare through augmentation of mine sweeping and mine hunting operations. The Government of India has shown keenness in allowing international collaboration for the production of these weapon systems. The production of the following weapon systems are expected to be promoted in the future:

capacity expansion, technology transfer and modernisation of defence infrastructure. As the armament production is a state-of-the-art technology, the involvement of the industry in the development and production of armament could be basically in following ways: (a) Specification and design by services and R&D organisations and production by industry. (b) Specification by Service / R&D agencies, design and production by industry. (c) S p e c i f i c a t i o n , design and production undertaken by industry and offered to the services.

Public private partnerships

(a) Technologies / equipment for Counter terrorism

The IN has therefore taken a three pronged initiative towards realising self reliance in the field of armament. These are:

(b) Surveillance, communication equipment and sensors for border management

(a) Development of indigenous technology for strategic self sufficiency.

(b) Collaboration with vendors in production.

(d) Devices to neutralise improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Suppliers and manufacturers of the above-mentioned weapon systems are expected to be some of the chief beneficiaries of the increased indigenisation of the production process in the Indian defence industry. Key areas of growth identified within the industry are expected to arise from the upgradation of the production

foreign

Outsourcing The Indian Navy, by decentralising financial powers, has been able to outsource many activities for the purpose of inducting modern technology and increasing levels of synergy and co-ordination. At

present, these areas broadly include: operational requirements like ship refit and overhaul, ship engineering and engine overhaul; technical support related to maintenance of equipment, building conservancy, IT and dredging of channels; administrative support for ferry service, etc. The areas which the Navy would want to see some progress being made are weapons and sensors production, the entire gamut, including R&D, trials and testing of the equipment.

Conclusion Based on the aspects brought out above, it is apparent that there are numerous opportunities for Indian Industry to contribute towards high degree of Maritime Preparedness of the Nation. However, the maritime services need to be assured that the Industry would provide guaranteed product support for their systems, in terms of logistics as well as technological upgrades, over a period of its specified operational utility. The Industry also needs to allay the fears pertaining to specified Quality Controls, which are quite stringent and would be implemented throughout the production process. Further, in order to augment the participation of private industry in development of indigenous weapon systems, there is a need to make conscious efforts towards a paradigm shift from the “Buyer-Seller” relationship to a healthy “Partnership” between the Industry and the Maritime Service. Since the end product of this joint venture is vital to both, there is a need to share the responsibilities equally too and meet up half-way.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

CAPABILITY LED NAVY

Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd) The writer is a former Director of Naval Operations and Intelligence and Vice President Indian Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

Identification of manufacturing sectors which have potential for global competitiveness. Shipbuilding has to be a major component of India’s manufacturing. The Government has recently nominated members to the Council who are from various fields of private industry and include Mr Ratan Tata, Mr A N Naik of Larsen & Toubro Ltd and Mr Baba N Kalyani of Bharat Forge Ltd who have interests in steel, shipbuilding and forging to push for private shipbuilding which is a capital intensive industry and only big corporates (examples of Mitsubishi Daewoo, Hyundai) can enter the ship building sector and is an essential industry if India is to also build the number of warships it needs

“We see the Indian Navy as a significant stabilising force in the Indian Ocean region, which safeguards traffic bound not only for our own ports, but also the flow of hydrocarbons and strategically important cargo to and from the rest of the world across the strategic waterways close to our shores … And so, the safety of SLOCs will always remain a priority for India in the foreseeable future” … Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of Naval Staff at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 2009. Presently India’s High Commissioner in New Zealand.

The Indian Navy is poised to expand and has set a target of 167 modern warships and submarines and 300 aircraft, helicopters and UAVs in what the Navy terms a ‘Capability Led Navy’ by 2022. Shipbuilding has to be a major component of India’s manufacturing. The Indian Navy has a healthy order book of 25 major warships at government owned shipyards. Another 16 warships for building in India under the ‘buy design from abroad and build in India’ have been cleared by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). This is good news, but thus far warship building in Indian yards has been slow and government shipyards are full of orders. It is however the commissioning rate of new warships and submarines and increase in the Navy’s Order of Battle (ORBAT) with replacement of the older platforms that matters and that is not being achived at the desired rate. The cost of ships built in government owned shipyards (PSUs) have been escalating and time lines of construction are poor by world standards.

his article must begin with an oft quoted phrase on Navy’s attributes and why a maritime nation like India needs to possess a strong Navy. The sea is not occupied like territory, yet, it is to be used by a maritime nation to advantage as territory and as naval historian Julian Corbett explained, the essence of sea power is sea control and sea denial and hence the need for a strong Navy for any self respecting nation. Historically, British imperial power and later American global power and influence were built on sea power, maintaining sea control by a form of extended, existential deterrence. This lesson has not been lost on maritime China which is swiftly building-up its PLA(N) called Peoples Liberation Army (Navy) with expeditionary platforms including aircraft carriers, conventional and nuclear submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and a powerful maritime Air Force. China has also built-up competent warship and merchant ship building and allied manufacturing facilities which has earned China’s exchequer large revenues and also provided much needed employment for China’s 1.3 billion population. The leading economies of China and Japan heavily depend on energy supplies through the Hormuz and Malacca Straits which transit on to the South China Seas and

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

look to safe passage and a steady train of energy supplies from the Middle East. India too, looks to the same routes for its rising economy and population which is growing at 8 per cent and 1.3 per cent respectively, adding one Australia annually. The free flow of globalised trade makes possible the creation of prosperity and depends prominently upon the presence of naval units at sea, unseen and silent and therefore easily forgotten. India’s capital is also 800 km removed from the sea and many attribute that to India’s ‘Sea Blindness’ in its political hierarchy and decision making in New Delhi. Manufacturing is an essential ingredient for a nation’s growth and shipbuilding provides manufacturing jobs and outlets, which India will need for its burgeoning youth bulge. This experience was not lost on Japan and South Korea in the last three decades and both maritime nations have become leading shipbuilders and that has contributed to their improved economies. India can learn lessons from that and PM Dr Manmohan Singh with personal interest has set up the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC) to provide a continuing forum for policy dialogue to energise and sustain the growth of manufacturing industries in India under Dr V Krishnamurthy as Chairman of the NMCC in the rank of Cabinet Minister. The NMCC is expected to suggest various

INDIA'S MARITIME FUTURE ways and means for enhancing the competitiveness of India’s manufacturing, including identification of manufacturing sectors which have potential for global competitiveness. Shipbuilding has to be a major component of India’s manufacturing. The government has recently nominated members to the Council who are from various fields of private industry and include Mr Ratan Tata, Mr A N Naik of Larsen & Toubro Ltd and Mr Baba N Kalyani of Bharat Forge Ltd who have interests in steel, shipbuilding and forging to push for private shipbuilding which is a capital intensive industry and only big corporates (examples of Mitsubishi Daewoo, Hyundai abroad) can enter the shipbuilding sector and is an essential industry if India is to also build the number of warships it needs. Mr V Govindarajan has been appointed as Member Secretary of the NMCC, which has already tabled a report on submarine shipbuilding in India not made public yet.

India’s maritime aspirations and challenges It is predicted that in the coming two decades Indian economy will rise to become the third largest economy in the world which will bring with it rising aspirations and challenges for the government and its peoples. Rising China is India’s neighbour and India’s largest trading partner with whom India has an unresolved land border and differences of opinion on the status of Tibet.

China has challenged the freedom of the seas inscribed in the United Nations Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS 1982) in the South China Seas with claims, to obstruct India from exploring in that area. The world worries as China’s rise on the world stage could make it hegemonic and India needs to take up insurance with its Navy in case China’s rise is not as peaceful and as harmonious as it claims in its rhetoric. Nearer home in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Pakistan is perpetually hostile towards India and China considers Pakistan its all weather friend and has provided nuclear and missile technology to arm Pakistan. China is also building a ‘String of Pearls’ to surround India with friendly ports of refuge it can use in time of need. China’s Harbour Engineering Company has invested US$ 200 million to complete Phase One of the Gwadar deep water port in Pakistan which is adjacent to Chahbahar in Iran which port India has offered to construct jointly. India already uses the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas for transit of goods to Afghanistan, since Pakistan has denied transit. China, in the long term will seek additional facilities in the IOR and has also contributed to the construction of the port of Humbantota in Sri Lanka and has similar projects in Bangladesh and Myanmar and may even assist Pakistan to build a naval facility near Gwadar which Pakistan desires. ‘The String of Pearls’ comes off as encirclement of India, but China explains, that all it is doing is helping nations in

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

CAPABILITY LED NAVY

need with small change to build ports. Maritime India has to take all aspects of ‘String of Pearls’ into consideration.

In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) the Indian Navy is accepted as the pre-eminent Navy in the East which is tasked to provide stability and safety of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the IOR for the annual traffic of 90,000 merchant ships that transport 60 per cent of the world’s energy and 70 per cent of the goods that fuel and sustain the world’s economy The centre of gravity of the world and economic power is moving from the West to the East and in this era of globalisation, every trading nation with a large coastline is necessarily a maritime nation and India falls in this category. In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) the Indian Navy is accepted as the pre-eminent Navy in the East which is tasked to provide stability and safety of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the IOR for the annual traffic of 90,000 merchant ships that transport 60 per cent of the world’s energy and 70 per cent of the goods that fuel and sustain the world’s economy, as articulated above by former CNS Admiral Mehta in the presence of PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian. The volume and value of sea-transported goods vastly exceeds that of goods carried by other means and any major disruption along the SLOCs would be catastrophic. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard are mandated to ensure safety of SLOCs. They are also the nation’s constabulary and diplomatic arms to show the flag, assist littoral nations of the IOR in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) which it did with acclaim during the 2004 Tsunami. It is little known that Indian Navy’s large and competent Hydrographic Branch of 8 survey ships is India’s unsung strategic arm which has built for India close affinity by surveying the shores of Island and littoral nations in the IOR, at low costs and even gratis, displacing the traditional Western Navies’ dominance. Six 500 ton Catamaran survey ships of a revolutionary Australian design are being built at Alcock and Ashdown shipyard in Gujarat to augment the number of Navy’s survey platforms and being fitted with latest survey systems. India’s peacetime needs and future fleet strength of its Navy and Coast Guard are based on the assessment of threats to India’s 12 government owned and 4 private major ports and 187 minor ports along its 7,517 km long coastline in need of security in this age of terrorism which afflicts this region. Then, there is the responsibility to safeguard India’s large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and offshore assets besides the national maritime security projections to be prepared for war; to keep the peace. In recent years the scourge of piracy in the Horn of Africa has put demands on the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to protect merchant shipping and Indian Navy has successfully carried out convoy escort duties in the IMO recommended 450 mile long ‘Internationally Recommended Transit corridor’ (IRTC) from Aden towards Mumbai. The Coast Guard has been patrolling to ward off piracy off the Lakshadweep group of islands.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Nuclear deterrence from the seas Post India’s successful 1998 Shakti nuclear tests, the Indian Navy is tasked to provide missile based undersea nuclear deterrence in India’s ‘Triad’, of ‘no first use’ doctrine. Till the Navy achieves this with a train of nuclear submarines, for the interim the Indian Navy has converted two Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) INS Subhadra and Sukanya to carry and be capable of firing the DRDO produced 300 km Dhanush nuclear tipped missile. For this capability Larsen & Toubro Ltd designed the vertical universal launcher system which is used also to launch the 299 km supersonic BrahMos missile and all lead ships of the Navy will be progressively fitted with the sea and land attack BrahMos missile and speaks volumes of the manufacturing capability of civilian sector. India’s first true nuclear deterrent, the nuclear propelled submarine INS Arihant is undergoing harbour trials at the Ship Building Centre (SBC) at Vishakhapatnam and will be equipped with the 700 km long range nuclear tipped K-15 missiles which has been prototype tested and fired from underwater pontoons in preparation. Nuclear propelled submarines are ideal for this role, and INS Arihant is expected to be operational in the next two years and it is reported two more larger nuclear propelled submarines are on order at SBC under DRDO’s programme ‘Akshanka’ (hope) The Indian Navy is leasing the 9,000 ton nuclear propelled Akula submarine (Nerpa) as a training platform for Arihant’s crew and will join in early 2012. The advance crew are in Russia for acceptance trials. This silent aspect of national security and deterrence is harder to explain to the public than the active evidence of going, doing, winning and coming home. There is freedom to roam the seas called Mare Liberum, a term in Latin coined by Hugo Grotius and enacted in to the United Nations Laws Of The Seas (UNCLOS 1982) which needs to be safeguarded in India’s areas of interest.

India’s maritime future To fulfill national responsibilities and to be the principal guardian of India’s maritime aspirations and national security and to assist its rise in the 21st century the Indian Navy is poised to expand and has set a target of 167 modern warships and submarines and 300 aircraft, helicopters and UAVs in what the Navy terms a ‘Capability Led Navy’ by 2022. For this, the strategy, doctrine, vision and a capability plan of the Navy has been articulated in documents to guide naval planners and strategists, to achieve the goals. The reading of these documents in parts resemble Kautilya’s Arthashatra to protect the security, wealth and prosperity of sovereign India and to ensure India is considered a respected player in the region. The Indian Navy has a healthy order book of 25 major warships at government owned shipyards. The build list includes one Type 17 Klub fitted Shivalik class, three Klub/ BrahMos firing Type 17A guided missiles frigates (FFGs), three Type 15A Kolkata class and three 15B BrahMos missile firing destroyers (DDGs), and six Exocet firing Scorpene

submarines at Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL); four Naval OPVs at Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL); a 37,500 ton aircraft carrier at Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) and four Type 28 ASW Corvettes at Garden Reach Shipyard and Engineers Ltd at Kolkata. A very first order for five Naval OPVs has been awarded to the private yard of Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering Services Ltd for around Rs 2,200 crore but the design is still to be frozen. In addition four warships are on order abroad including the 42,500 ton aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in Severdonsik in Russia which will fly the powerful MIG-29Ks from 2013. Three 4,600 ton BrahMos firing Krivack (FFGs) INS Teg, Tarash, and Trikand are progressing at Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad in Russia and the Teg will join in next year. Eleven MIG-29Ks which have powerful weapon fits and mid-air refuelling capability have already arrived at INS Hansa Goa for flying familiarisation and the pilots have been trained at Naval Air Station Pensagola in USA and on US aircraft carriers and with attachments with the Indian Air Force. Till the Vikramaditya is made operational in 2013, the fighters will be worked up to operate from shore in support of the fleet which has the aircraft carrier INS Viraat with Sea Harriers. Most lead ships including Viraat are fitted with the new Israeli Anti-Missile Defence Radar (AMDR) EL/M 2238 which comes with the Barak system. The radar and its software provides excellent interception capabilities. The Sea Harriers which fly off the Viraat have been fitted with the Israeli Elta EL/M 2032 radars and capable of firing the Derby BVR missiles. Interestingly another 16 warships for building in India under the ‘buy design from abroad and build in India’ have been cleared by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) which include six second line submarines of the Project 75 (India), eight minehunters from Korea’s Kangnam Shipyard and four Mistral class Landing Ship Docks (LPD). This is good news, but thus far warship building in Indian yards has been slow and government shipyards are full of orders. It is however the commissioning rate of new warships and submarines and increase in the Navy’s Order of Battle (ORBAT) with

replacement of the older platforms that matters and that is not being achived by the government yards alone. The cost of ships built in government owned shipyards (PSUs) have been escalating and time lines of construction poor by world standards. The PSU shipyards in congested metros have been building ships in the slow traditional mode of complete hulls in dry docks which is now antiquated. Today to achieve speed and economy in shipbuilding the modular system of building large blocks of around 300 to 500 tons ashore even inland and transporting them to the yards for joining is the preferred mode. MDL and GRSE are getting ready for this with new large buildings for block making and wet basins for fitting out. Royal Haskoning is assisting MDL for the facilities and Fincantieri the leading shipbuilder of Italy which is assisting CSL for the Navy’s aircraft carrier has bagged the order as the ‘knowledge provider contractor’ for modular construction of Type 17A at MDL. Another selected foreign shipbuilder will assist GRSE. Four large private greenfield modern modular construction shipyards in the private sector have been set up by Larsen & Toubro Ltd at Tuttapulli near Ennore, Pipavav in Gujarat, ABG and Bharti on the West Coast. One yard has even bought out Swan Hunter of UK and brought equipment to India in anticipation of government orders. Former Indian naval architects and engineers and foreign experts have been employed by private yards and urgent steps must be taken to make full use of the benefits the private sector has to offer to reverse this slow pace of shipbuilding trend and managerial adjustments before it is too late.

Conclusion and remedies It is evident that the slow momentum in naval construction in PSU yards and abnormal costs requires decisive action to reverse the trend with competition which in turn will not occur without a compelling and clear understanding of the reasons to do so. The private shipyards so far are surviving on civil and very small naval and coast guard orders and were set up, poised to compete on a level playing field for

the large naval warship and submarine orders. A route called Joint Venture (JVs) between PSU yard and partner private yards has also been mooted to outsource and build modules as that too will speed up construction, but the guidelines are yet to be put in place for fruition. This JV and even risk sharing route is common abroad and was taken up in India to build the INS Arihant’s hull as the submarine builder DRDO has limited facilities. A large building shed was leased to L&T Ltd at SBC which has built-up expertise in design, internet inspections and special welding with Russian inputs so critical for submarine construction. Decisionmaking is punctuated by financial and strategic uncertainty and an industrial policy for shipbuilding which could include subsidies and tax incentives needs to be explored. Japan and South Korea followed that route. Even today 60 per cent of the weapon systems in Indian Navy’s warships are imported as only 26 per cent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is permitted in India’s defence industry. This is not attracting foreign military industrial complexes to set up manufacturing facilities in India to take advantage of India’s work force and lower wages and to leverage exports as India’s car industry has done. If India is to match up to China’s ‘String of Pearls’ and take on its various responsibilities the government has to encourage private shipbuilding and joint ventures with private shipyards to accelerate the speed of construction and contain costs. The increasing use of the sea and its importance to India’s national interests within the world economy, with growing threats to good order and security in the maritime domain a rapid building of the naval fleet to achieve the set targets is essential for the present and likely core future strategic security needs of India in the IOR and Asia Pacific region and afar where India’s has taken up exploration contracts, has a diaspora and legitimate interests. As the Indian Navy goes on to celebrate Navy Day on 4th December, 2011 DSA wishes the nation’s Navy fair winds and following seas as they chant Shan Nau Varuna, may the Gods of the Seas bless the Indian Navy!

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

ALIGNMENT A topical article on India’s Look East policy. The writer asserts it must graduate from Look East to Go East or Orient East and focus more on relations with Vietnam and Indonesia as also with Japan, South Korea and Australia to balance the power of a rising China. It also needs to woo back Myanmar and counter Chinese designs in the north-east.

Dr Pankaj Jha The writer is Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. He has done his PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His areas of interest include Southeast Asia, terrorism, defence industry and related economic issues. He has written extensively on the issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia, including issues pertaining to radical Islam and counter terrorism policies.

The biggest challenge for India now is to upstage the Chinese influence in its neighbourhood. This is a truth that India gets too much engaged to its western borders that thinking about the east gets deferred. The insurgency in India’s northeast and the violation of ceasefire agreement between the government and northeast insurgents do not infuse confidence for prolonged peace settlement. China is hobnobbing with these insurgents to keep India engaged and so thwart any attempts by Indian military establishment to build military capabilities and mobilisation of troops along the northeastern border

number of articles, commentaries and even books have been written enumerating the sustained economic growth and resultant rise of India and how it is very vital for the rise of Asia. Few Western writers have fervently pegged India against China, both in economic growth and military power and stated that the relations between these two nations would determine the Asian century. But the fact of the matter is whether India is willing to take up the mantle of Asian leader or would incapacitate its policy to avert responsibilities and enjoy the global benefits. Though this might be a very unyielding statement but then history itself demonstrates that after the resolution of Cambodian crisis and the success of the ASEAN summit in 1992, India was at the crossroads of policy predicament. It was then that “Look East” policy term was coined and it was meant to show that India wanted to emulate the Southeast Asian growth trajectory. Even after two decades of such a policy announcement, it is still at the crossroads to decide sequel of the policy and how India should map it. This can be argued in terms of muted stance in most of the multilateral forums and the incessant burden of Chinese phobia working in the minds of Indian decision makers. A sizeable section of both print and electronic media is singing paeans in favour of India’s alignment with US interests in the region. The foremost question which comes to the mind is whether India has sabotaged its strategic autonomy and wants to play strategic hedging from both sides of the power bloc politics or it is just a stop-gap arrangement. While with countries like China it has still to resolve issues like Tibetan refugees, border demarcation and dams on Brahmaputra to list a few. The reluctance about whether to ‘move east’ or ‘act east’ depends on dividends it is going to accrue to India in case it subscribes to US interests in East Asian region. It is not the end of the story; India suffers from shortage of diplomats and also lacks in coordinating with media to project its positive image in the countries of concern. More importantly, India gets locked in terminology like “Look East” policy which needs serious introspection and audit, in order to micro structure approach and looks for long term leverages. India needs to put its house in order both in terms of policy and structure so as to have fruitful interactions with Asia and

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

subsequent elevation as an accepted leader. The article would argue that for policy to be effective in the Asian context, with particular emphasis on Southeast Asia, there is need for systematic approach which should address the laggardness in decision making and develop greater understanding of issues and leverages for the Southeast Asian region.

Look East Policy : An Appraisal

Usually, whenever there is a debate about the Indian foreign policy three terms highlight the opening paragraph; anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). But, the predicament is that all these three pillars of Indian foreign policy have become outdated, even in reference and the world has adopted new template of multi-alignment and issue based negotiations at the global stage. Indian foreign policy mandarins had been using outdated terms for long like NAM because of lack of adaptation and visionary approach. Nevertheless, it is a well accepted fact that the above three had helped India gain an international stature without the crutches of major power affiliation during the cold war years. But, now the times have changed and India as a global leader is a historical anecdote. Even the edifice which had been created about two decades back has undergone a change and there is a need for serious restructuring and rethinking on the possible role of India at the global stage. India has acquired major power status but to become relevant it needs commitment and necessitates undertaking of responsibilities. This major power status has been accorded to her because of sustained economic growth, political stability and democratic norms. As per the IMF reports, India is destined to take over China both in terms of population and growth percentage by 2025-2030 (time period varies according to different reports by ADB, World Bank and IMF). Even in the April 2011, World Economic Outlook published by IMF it was stated that India’s GDP growth would overtake China marginally in 2011 with India having economic growth of 10.6 per cent while China pegging 10.4 per cent. India’s military expenditure is nearly one third to that of China while foreign reserves are less than one sixth of that of China. Nevertheless, India is increasingly seen as the swing state and also with its inclusion in major multilateral

forums like BRICS, East Asia Summit and the role in UN Security Council as non-permanent member, India’s statements and policy highlights are increasingly been sought after. India, once again, has been seen as the valuable player, which must not sit on the reserve benches. Increasingly in the Asian context India’s strategic partnerships and bilateral ties with

all the Asian countries are monitored. The tenor of engagement has been diverse and the level of engagement being different. For some strategic partners, political and economic aspects are stressed more while for others strategic and security aspects are given extra consideration. Taking into account the strategic partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia and comparing it with that of China,

it is quite apparent that defence and security dialogue with Vietnam and Indonesia takes precedence over economics because the two countries have not yet signed bilateral Free Trade agreements with India. In the case of China it has more to do with political, economic and diplomatic issues. Strategic partnerships give flexibility in engagement but with increasingly assertive China and US

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

ALIGNMENT

cajoling India to take active steps in Southeast Asian region, India will have to do some pragmatic thinking and apparent deterrent moves to thwart any moves of intimidation by any adversary. In such a context Southeast Asia comes as a priority region and the time is opportune for review and audit of Look East policy.

The two most important nations are Vietnam and Indonesia. Fifthly, India should build better strategic ties with Japan and Australia, without getting too much concerned about Chinese response. Lastly, India should conduct regular naval and army exercises with countries like Vietnam, South Korea and Japan so as to get better acquainted with the regional security situation and geographical terrain

India in Southeast Asia Kripa Sridharan in his book on ASEAN in Indian Foreign Policy writes that “India’s interest in Southeast Asia is not direct but rather it is a derived formulation” showcases the lack of direct influence that it has on Indian foreign policy formulation. This template has been carried on for years and despite the fact that India is growing and would need to take on the policy of international responsibilities and meeting global challenges, it is trying to see the getaway route. There are problems in policy formulation. Whenever there is a problem and if a solution emerges from a region, the policy takes shape only then. This had been witnessed after the Nehru era when Indian policy was anchored, to a certain extent, on the Soviet Union’s priorities. However, it would not be pragmatic to say that Indian foreign policy was oscillating in Soviet orbit. Subsequently, with the end of cold war India restructured its foreign policy so as to project its strategic autonomy and multilateral alignments. This boosted India’s image and acceptability. But, with changing times, India now is also increasingly being seen as in US orbit and its decisions are increasingly being seen as an influence of US advice and interests. This should be avoided at all costs. India needs to

build allies without any formal treaty or agreement but should show its interest and strategic capability in all Sea Lanes of Communication for safe passage and deter any domination by China for that matter. Countries like Japan, Australia are willing to come on board and therefore trilateral exercises can be conducted and better interactions between navies can be done. There is need for high level interactions with Australia also on the matters of regional security and developing peace and tranquillity in the strategic Southeast Asia. Any major power domination would upstage the development applecart of the region. There is also need to revamp the foreign policy decision making and the trade and defence issues should be dealt with separate ministries without being too much monitored by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though, at a later date Trade and Commerce Ministry could be merged with Foreign Ministry with separate Ministers of State for Foreign Affaairs and Trade under the Cabinet Minister. This practice has been adopted in countries like Australia and New Zealand for better decision making and effective policy projection. Indian foreign policy establishment has been divided into various desks and divisions and incidentally the southern division along with the multilateral economic relations looks after the region of Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian division has been looked after by three under secretaries along with one director and an overall in charge of the southern Asian division which also is in charge of the South Asian division which looks after all the SAARC countries; barring Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hence, in terms of workload the southern division is next only to international security and disarmament and East Asian divisions. The problem can be attributed to the not so clear demarcation of Asia into southeast, southwest and northeast Asia. This can be attributed to the legacy of Soviet time when the Soviet influence was clearly seen in the foreign policy establishment. Within southern division the staff strength should be increased and at least it should be 12/15 core officials to do micro analysis of relations and do full justice to the vast region. The problem is

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

not only in the decision making and foreign policy establishment but it has more to do with policy inertness and mute button as the easy function.

Policy inertness The lack of constructive and clear policy formulation is based on the feedback that the foreign office receives from the Indian high commissions / embassies abroad. More importantly on important policy matters the foreign ministry either receives the input very late or the policy suggestion is to keep tight-lipped. In the Look East policy paradigm, it has been the major four countries which have gained form India endeavours in its extended neighbourhoood namely Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. But the interesting part is that the countries of mainland Southeast Asia particularly Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and lastly Philippines have not received much attention. With Myanmar, India has failed to live up to the expectations and had held on to the promotion for domestic norms and ethics while China was seducing the military junta. The biggest challenge for India now is to upstage the Chinese influence in its neighbourhood. This is a truth that India gets too much engaged to its western borders that thinking about the east gets deferred. The insurgency in India’s northeast and the violation of ceasefire agreement between the government and northeast insurgents do not infuse confidence for prolonged peace settlement. China is hobnobbing with these insurgents to keep India engaged and so thwart any attempts by Indian military establishment to build military capabilities and mobilisation of troops along the northeastern border. So, exactly what have been the fallouts of such an approach? Firstly, on important issues like oil and gas exploration China’s good offices have reaped benefits. Secondly, due to differences with previous Bangladeshi government the oil and gas pipeline from Myanmar could not fructify. Thirdly, In the case of Cambodia and Laos, the two countries have fallen under heavy Chinese influence even though India

had the advantage both in terms of being a benign power as well as historical and cultural linkages but even after the restoration of Angkor Wat temple and regular training to Cambodian troops, the policy predicament and lack of visionary approach have failed us. Now, even US is trying to inveigle Cambodia into its fold because of oil and gas potential in Gulf of Thailand and the economic potential of the nation which is very low on labour costs. In the case of Vietnam, India has failed to reap the benefits of good relations and has shied from taking up other joint oil and gas exploration projects in South China Sea; though India has one offshore oil and gas exploration project run by ONGC, while China has reached Indian Ocean to do sea bed minerals exploration and even building infrastructure projects in India’s neighbouring countries. Sudden knee-jerk reactions are always expected from the foreign policy establishment. But then why India cannot build Vietnam as a strategic partner, very analogous to what China has been doing with Pakistan in all these years. Unfortunately, either India lacks the political resolve for the national security or is too paranoid about Chinese reactions, so much so that it feels that even building national military and security capabilities would annoy Chinese. Fourthly, with regard to coordination between Trade and Commerce Ministry and MEA, there is complete lack of awareness

about the need for tailoring trade and commerce agreement to build partnerships. In fact, during the signing of India-ASEAN Free Trade Area, Vietnam has made it conditional that ratification of FTA would be done only after India accorded her market economy status. The negotiations and deliberations lasted for two months before India budged. During this period Indian foreign ministry and trade and commerce ministry failed to understand the leverages and fine distinction of India’s ties with Vietnam. India’s so called Look East policy has benefited the top four countries of Southeast Asia and therefore there is need for a micro structured approach about the CLMV countries and for that there is need for high level visits to the region and also greater interaction at business to business meetings and trade fairs. While, India calls for the cultural diplomacy as the main instrument for furthering its policy in the Southeast Asian region but it has slyly failed to use religion as the binding factor. In the case of integrating the Buddhist circuit, it needs to integrate Myanmar and Thailand into one network both by roads and railways as well as promote tourism in India’s northeast. China has been influencing the political class of almost all the nations through it cheque book diplomacy but the Southeast Asian nations are wary of Chinese intentions. While mainland Southeast Asia can act as

the wall against Chinese intentions of reaching out to Indian Ocean, peripheral countries like Indonesia need to be taken into confidence so as to thwart any attempt of China to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion After this discourse about Look East policy and the lack of visionary approach, the question that still needs to be answered is what should India do? Firstly, India could change its policy nomenclature from “Look East” to “Go East” or “Orient East” policy, thereby showing more commitment and doggedness to be part of extended neighbourhood. Secondly, the foreign and trade office should be merged together. Thirdly, India should look for disaster relief bases for effective relief and support for these nations as during Tsunami. Fourthly, India should look for countries of priority and make efforts for greater engagement with these nations. The two most important nations are Vietnam and Indonesia. Fifthly, India should build better strategic ties with Japan and Australia, without getting too much concerned about Chinese response. Lastly, India should conduct regular naval and army exercises with countries like Vietnam, South Korea and Japan so as to get better acquainted with the regional security situation and geographical terrain.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

RESURRECTION

This technology has been resurrected with several manufacturers across the world notably in Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. Seaplanes can provide much needed island support and offshore assets protection, surveillance and intelligence gathering, transoceanic SAR and CASEVAC, extended fleet logistic support, long range Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, countering small arms and drugs trafficking, human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping etc

A nation's security surplus status is the real measure of the credentials of a great power. From a maritime perspective this power surplus contributes to burden sharing towards protection of global public goods and the oceanic commons to achieve firstly, freedom of navigation and safety at sea; secondly, promote regional stability through an open and participative security architecture; thirdly, proactively alleviate suffering during disasters in the littorals

A nation’s security surplus status is the real measure of the credentials of a great power. From a maritime perspective this power surplus contributes to burden sharing towards protection of global public goods and the oceanic commons to achieve firstly, freedom of navigation and safety at sea; secondly, promote regional stability through an open and participative security architecture; thirdly, proactively alleviate suffering during disasters in the littorals; and, finally a constabulary capacity to maintain order at sea for the common good. Whilst ships, submarines and aircraft are all qualified in some way or the other for fulfilling the above missions each of these platforms are limited by some capability gap or the other. In addition, vulnerabilities of assets to attack by enemy forces or by natural forces pose a real problem to timely and opportune deployment in crisis.

magine a situation where deployment is not impaired by enemy action or natural elements. Imagine an asset that is deployed over the entire expanse of the planet - be it earth, water or aerospace. Imagine delivering several tonnes of food and provisions, spares and even repair expertise to a fleet at sea or a unit ashore in the hinterland combating terror or for troops engaged in HADR missions with equal dexterity. Imagine evacuating patients from isolated islands or ships at sea or offshore platforms with equal ease. All of this imagination is true with the coming of age of modern seaplanes. The Wikipedia defines a seaplane as a fixed-wing aircraft capable of taking off and landing (alighting) on water. Seaplanes that can also take off and land on airfields are a sub-class called amphibian aircraft. Seaplanes and amphibians are usually divided into two categories based on their technological characteristics: floatplanes and flying boats; the latter are generally far larger and can carry far more.

Seaplanes made their debut in the aviation world on March 28, 1911 when “the first successful seaplane, named the Hydravion, piloted by Mssr Henri Fabre took-off from water at Martinque, France and accomplished a flight of 1,650 feet over water.” That operating aircraft from water had several advantages for military applications was evident from the success of the combat mission flown during the Balkan Wars when “on January 24, 1913, the seaplane with two Greek pilots flew at 1,200 meters over the Dardanelles from the European to the Asian coast, did a reconnaissance of the Turkish fleet, dropped 4 bombs and after 2 hours flight landed at sea near the island of Imbros. The plane was targeted by canons and rifles unsuccessfully.” Thus, seaplanes have played an integral part in aviation history. World War I spurred the development of these machines and, by the 1930s, flying boats and seaplanes had become pioneers in transcontinental flight and in some instances even refuelled by ships and submarines at sea. After World War II seaplanes lost their charm.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Seaplanes For Safe and Secure Oceans

DSA Research Team A nation's security surplus status is the real measure of the credentials of a great power. From a maritime perspective this power surplus contributes to burden sharing towards protection of global public goods and the oceanic commons to achieve firstly, freedom of navigation and safety at sea; secondly, promote regional stability through an open and participative security architecture; thirdly, proactively alleviate suffering during disasters in the littorals Technological advances have now made it possible to undertake numerous other missions. This technology has been resurrected with several manufacturers across the world notably in Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. Seaplanes can provide much needed island support and offshore assets protection, surveillance and intelligence gathering, transoceanic SAR and CASEVAC, extended fleet logistic support, long range Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, countering small arms and drugs trafficking, human migration, poaching, toxic cargo dumping etc. Unlike conventional helicopters and aircraft, seaplanes can land at the location and enforce the will or the law of the country. The unique feature of the seaplane is to combine the capabilities of rapid surveillance and prompt response whether for relief or arrest. Under the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) “Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for this purpose.” Seaplanes fit this purpose completely. As regards Piracy, one of the more pressing international problems facing seafaring community today, the UNCLOS states “ [A] seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorised to that effect.” This is another function that military seaplanes can easily do with greater speed and far lesser cost. The Right of Visit and Right of Hot Pursuit is mutatis mutandis also applicable to military aircraft and once again seaplanes are a very suitable vehicle for this task. Thus, even under UNCLOS seaplanes are an efficient, effective and economic option for safe and secure seas.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

RESURRECTION

By the 1930s, flying boats and seaplanes had become pioneers in transcontinental flight and in some instances even refuelled by ships and submarines at sea. After World War II seaplanes lost their charm The Indian navy has issued an RFI for induction of seaplanes. However, the difficulty would be to avoid a single vendor situation since the available options are each unique. The major contenders are Bombardier, Beriev and ShinMaywa. Of them the most advanced and versatile aircraft and the only aircraft in-service by any Navy and built to military specifications is the US-2. The chart below summarises the respective capabilities and it is clearly evident the US-2 is the best in class product. Also, the US-2 uses the same Engines and propellers as the C130J and common maintenance to reduce operational costs are possible.

Item

ShinMaywa US-2

Bombardier CL-415

Beriev Be-200

Engines

Turboprop×4

Turboprop×2

Turbofan×2

Length

33.3 m

19.8 m

32.1 m

Width

33.2 m

28.6 m

32.8 m

Height

9.8 m

9.0 m

8.9 m

Max take-off weight

47.7 ton

19.9 ton

37.2 ton

Max range

4,500 km

2,300 km

3,600 km

Cruise altitude

9,000 m

2,400 m

7,900 m

Normal cruise speed

480 km/h

280 km/h

610 km/h

Max cruise speed

560 km/h

380 km/h

700 km/h

Stalling speed

107 km/h

150 km/h*

155 km/h*

Take off from water

280 m

808 m

1,000 m

Landing to water

330 m

665 m

1,300 m

Operational wave height

1.2 m

From the foregoing data table it is clear that the number of options for acquisition of amphibian aircraft is very limited. Putting these aircraft all together in a single basket would not be an apple to apple comparison. No matter how intelligently the Staff Qualitative Requirements are structured the Navy would either have to accept a low end option (which would be commercially favouring the least capable aircraft) or be faced with a resultant single vendor situation to obtain a best in class product but may result in cancellation of the RFP. In both cases the Navy would lose. It is therefore very important for the nation to explore a method by which the best in class aircraft can be inducted in an objective and rational manner utilising the provisions of the Defence Procurement Policy 2011 effectively. No matter what the approach, since seaplanes also have civil applications, the acquisition must be structured to promote Indian industry and thus a national capability can be created in this high technology niche sector.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

MENACING TRANSGRESSION

Sandeep K Kanwar The writer is a qualified master mariner currently sailing in the capacity of Chief Officer with a Germany based Firm Bernhard Schulte Shipmanagement (BSM). He has been sailing the high seas for over a decade on post Panamax Container vessels. He has traversed through piracy infested areas innumerable times and has first hand knowledge of the mental and physical preparation required for these voyages. He has voiced his opinion on various issues regarding shipping by writing for internationally recognised magazines like 'Safety At Sea International' (SASI)" and other journals

Why did piracy stage such a successful comeback and where exactly do acts of piracy take place? First it should be pointed out again that piracy had never completely been eliminated – it continued to exist, albeit on a low, sporadic and opportunistic level, in some backwaters of the world’s oceans. These opportunistic attacks form the backdrop to an early international attempt to come to grips with the menace: the League of Nations, formed after the First World War, chose piracy as one of the first offences to be codified

Piracy reports from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) indicate that nearly 50 per cent of such acts are being committed in an area which is known under the name “Maritime Asia” – a maritime region stretching from the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal through the straits of Malacca all the way to the South China Sea and even the East China Sea. This maritime region formally known as the Maritime silk road, is home of some of the world’s busiest sea lanes of communication. In the past 12 months alone, “there have been 286 piracy-related incidents off the coast of Somalia. They have resulted in 67 hijacked ships, with 1,130 seafarers on board – whilst, at present, 714 seafarers are being held for ransom on board 30 ships scattered at various points of the country’s extensive coastline. ”Mr David Cockroft Secretary of the International Transport Workers Federation representing the seafarers said “many crew members were at breaking point because of the stress of passing through the area frequented by Pirates” .

irtually all oceans of the world have a long history of maritime piracy, from the early days of seafaring in small, coast-hugging vessels, all through the age of oar propelled and sail ships up to the heydays of imperialism, when British, French, Dutch and US frigates gave battle to pirate vessels along the East Africa coast, in the Sulu Sea, or in the Caribbean. With the advent of steamships, which usually outran and massively outgunned any pirate ship around, maritime piracy finally met its fate around the nineteenth century when the last pirate ship had been sunk - or so it seemed. In the twentieth century nobody was talking about acts of piracy any longer. However now, roughly fifteen years after the end of the cold war, the demise of the Soviet Union and the inauguration of a new world order of peace, we have to grudgingly accept that maritime piracy is back with a vengeance. Since the middle of the 1980s, the number of pirate attacks and their victims keep on rising and - all the new security mechanisms hastily installed under the impact of 9/11 notwithstanding - there is no end in sight to these attacks. At any given time, more than a dozen ships and their crews are under the control of pirates, being held for ransom. Most of the victims will be released, but some will suffer torture and all will be emotionally scarred by the experience for the rest of their lives. The devastating impact of piracy on mariners and their families has, unfortunately, been a hallmark of this timeless and highly resilient form of crime. Piracy directly affects only a small percentage of international shipping, but indirectly the crime impacts thousands of vessels through increased insurance premiums and changed trade

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

PIRACY: A MERCHANT MARINE PERSPECTIVE

routes. Satisfying the demands of the pirates has historically resulted in the payment of billions of dollars in tribute and ransoms and this money provides support to illicit organised crime syndicates. Ransoms have been paid, in part, because doing so has been expeditious and appears to be cost beneficial. This shortsighted approach, however, has enabled piracy to continue and at times thrive, for generations. Why did piracy stage such a successful comeback and where exactly do acts of piracy take place? First it should be pointed out again that piracy had never completely been eliminated - it continued to exist, albeit on a low, sporadic and opportunistic level, in some backwaters of the world’s oceans. These opportunistic attacks form the backdrop to an early international attempt to come to grips with the menace: the League of Nations, formed after the First World War, chose piracy as one of the first offences to be codified. However the full force of the new “pirate wind” came in the mid 1980s following a global sea change: after the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union, most countries of the world shifted their focus from security relations to trade relations. The trend towards globalisation and liberalisation brought about a tremendous increase in international business and trade, especially in sea trade, (since the bulk of all goods transported goes by ships). It is only logical that licit forms of international business and trade are accompanied by their illicit spin-offs, which basically means various forms of business crime including organised crime. In an opportunistic and sometimes in an organised fashion, in close cooperation with organised crime syndicates, emerged

the phenomena of the revival of maritime piracy. It is noteworthy that it had close symbiotic linkages with the phenomena of failed states that started emerging in the wake of the cold war. (Somalia is the prime example)

“The attacks are not only attacks on ships, but also attacks on the global supply chain in one of the world’s most vital sea lanes. They threaten a supply line of vital interests to the international community” For a considerable period of time, the re-emerging phenomenon of piracy was largely ignored especially by ship owners. In many cases, ship owners explicitly ordered their ship masters not to report on

pirate attacks - neither officially nor unofficially - for fear of rising protection and indemnity (P&I) premiums on the one hand and lengthy official investigations on the other, during which the respective ship would have to remain in the harbour, thus losing money for the owner - roughly US$ 25,000 per day. From the ship owner’s perspective, piracy related losses simply appeared to be negligible transaction costs, amounting to less than one per cent of the total income generated by maritime trade, while measures to harden their ships would have been rather expensive. Of course from a crew’s perspective, the costs were not so negligible: their lives and their property were (and still are) at stake. It is not surprising, therefore that professional shipping associations

like the British National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport officers (NUMAST) or the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) were among the first to put piracy on the international agenda. Now piracy is an international and global phenomenon, impinging on the security of maritime traffic in African, Indian, Asian and American waters but the weekly and annual piracy reports from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) indicate that nearly 50 per cent of such acts are being committed in an area which is known under the name “Maritime Asia” - a maritime region stretching from the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal through the straits

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

MENACING TRANSGRESSION

of Malacca all the way to the South China Sea and even the East China Sea. This maritime region formally known as the Maritime silk road, is home of some of the world’s busiest sea lanes of communication. This sorry fact could again be explained from a global perspective by pointing at the huge traffic there. On the rims of the Arabian Sea, we find trouble spots like Somalia, a failed state and a new pirates paradise; we find the current hot spot for all kinds of maritime crime, including piracy in the Persian Gulf; and last but not least we find a “cold war at sea” still going on between the navies of India and Pakistan which greatly hampers attempts to establish meaningful measures for governance at sea.

Piracy directly affects only a small percentage of international shipping, but indirectly the crime impacts thousands of vessels through increased insurance premiums and changed trade routes. Satisfying the demands of the pirates has historically resulted in the payment of billions of dollars in tribute and ransom and this money provides support to illicit organised crime syndicates In 2008, the United Nations Security Council turned its attention towards combating piracy, calling on flag, port and coastal states to cooperate in actions off the Somali coast. One of the provisions in the United Nations Security Council was resolution 1816 (2008) which called upon states to cooperate in determining jurisdiction and in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia ... and to render assistance by, among other actions, providing disposition and logistics assistance with respect to persons under their jurisdiction and control, such victims and witnesses and persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this resolution. The Security Council provision did not compel a state to accept suspected pirates, victims, or witnesses from a warship, but it provided political support to help to solve a vexing operational challenge. For many states, the resolution filled a critical policy void, providing a

political basis for greater action. More broadly, the resolution set the tone for increased international partnership and cooperation.

the decision of IMO to pay special attention to piracy during the year ahead. “This is a timely and important initiative,” he said.

counter-piracy programme focuses on supporting regional prosecutions and on rebuilding Somalia’s criminal justice capacity.”

The United Nations Security Council would approve six additional resolutions over the next three years condemning piracy off the Somali coast, more than on any other maritime issue. Counter piracy operations foreshadow a new period of diplomatic and operational collaboration and regional meetings that address legal and jurisdictional challenges.

IMO has been combating maritime piracy for some time and a series of measures, developed with the co-operation of the littoral states and the support of the industry, helped significantly reduce piracy in the hot spots of the late 1990s and the early 2000s: the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Ms Sheeran focused on the humanitarian aspect of the problem. Acknowledging the success of naval escorts in protecting food aid for Somalia, she also highlighted new challenges created by the worsening situation. “The presence of Somali pirates in an ever expanding area is of great concern because they threaten not just food bound directly for Somalia, but our food transiting through the ports of Mombasa (Kenya), Dar es Salam (Tanzania) and Beira (Mozambique) for vital operations in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and other places with great humanitarian needs.”

Alignment within a government is equally critical. The dramatic rescue of Captain Richard Phillips, the master of M/V Maersk Alabama, by US Special operations forces in 2009 was a seminal event in countering maritime piracy. The attack on the Alabama was the first successful hijacking of a US flagged vessel by pirates in more than 150 years. The response to the attack on the ship involved coordination among multiple departments within the US government and was conducted under the procedures sets forth in the presidentially approved maritime operational threat response (MOTR) plan. The plan has been used more than 750 times since its inception to integrate federal agencies and departments in the response to maritime threats, which could include, in addition to piracy, drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal fishing and terrorism. Following the Maersk Alabama incident, plans were developed to create an office to manage the MOTR process, culminating in the establishment of the Global MOTR Coordination Centre in 2010.

IMO and piracy The escalating problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia is “completely unacceptable” and requires an urgent and coordinated response, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said at the launch (on 3 February 2011) of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)’s action plan to promote the 2011 IMO World Maritime Day theme: “Piracy: Orchestrating the response” Speaking at IMO’s London headquarters, Mr Ban welcomed

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

However, the problem has lately manifested itself in other parts of the world, most notably - but not exclusively - off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. Agressive patrolling and escort action by the navies of the world have only served to push the piratic attacks deeper into the Arabian Sea, almost hugging the coast of India. IMO Secretary General Efthimios E Mitropoulos said “piracy and kidnapping have blighted the maritime community for too long and it is seafarers who bear the brunt.” He added, “we believe that we can use the experience gained and the successes achieved in reducing piracy elsewhere to good effect in the current arena as well, but to do so requires a well orchestrated response.” Mr Mitropoulos and Mr Ban were joined at the launch by Ms Josette Sheeran, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP); Mr Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Mr Robert Lorenz-Meyer, President of BIMCO, representing the shipping industry; and Mr David Cockroft, General Secretary of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), representing seafarers. All echoed their support for this latest IMO initiative. Mr Fedotov said, “It is clear that the only viable long-term solution to the Somali piracy problem is to restore law and order in Somalia, including in its waters. It is also clear that this solution is some years off and will require concerted and coordinated international effort. UNODC’s

Speakers at the launch of IMO’s action plan also spoke of the economic cost of piracy. Mr Ban said, “ransom payments adding up to hundreds of millions of dollars have created a ‘pirate economy’ in some areas of Somalia that make them more resistant to efforts to develop alternative livelihoods. Economies throughout East Africa and beyond are experiencing the fallout.” Representing the shipping industry, Mr Robert Lorenz-Meyer, President of the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) said, “The attacks are not only attacks on ships, but also attacks on the global supply chain in one of the world’s most vital sea lanes. They threaten a supply line of vital interests to the international community.” Mr David Cockroft, General Secretary of the International Transport Workers’ Federation, representing seafarers, said many crew members were at breaking point because of the stress of passing through the area frequented by pirates. “If the risks cannot be eliminated, then seafarers will demand not to sail into the area at all and responsible ship owners will support them,” he said. Secretary General Mitropoulos said IMO’s action plan aimed to make some genuine inroads into what, to date, has been an escalating problem.

“In the past 12 months alone”, he said, “there have been 286 piracy-related incidents off the coast of Somalia. They have resulted in 67 hijacked ships, with 1,130 seafarers on board - whilst, at present, 714 seafarers are being held for ransom on board 30 ships scattered at various points of the country’s extensive coastline.” IMO’s action plan for 2011 has six prime objectives: ●● Increase pressure at the political level to secure the release of all hostages being held by pirates; ●● Review and improve the IMO guidelines to Administrations and seafarers and promote compliance with industry best management practices and the recommended preventive, evasive and defensive measures ships should follow; ●● Promote greater levels of support from and coordination with navies; ●● Promote anti-piracy coordination and co-operation procedures between and among states, regions, organisations and industry; ●● Assist states to build capacity in piracy-infested regions of the world and elsewhere, to deter, interdict and bring to justice those who commit acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships; and ●● Provide care for those attacked or hijacked by pirates and for their families. Among other things, during 2011, IMO will focus on promoting further co-operation between and among states, regions and organisations in reducing the risk of attacks on ships through a variety of mechanisms including information-sharing; coordination of military and civil efforts; and development and implementation

of regional initiatives, such as the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct. IMO’s action plan will build on efforts to tackle the problems that have been underway for some time. Through the Djibouti Code of Conduct, for example, information-sharing centres are being established in Yemen, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as a regional training centre in Djibouti. In partnership with the UNODC, IMO is helping to develop the legal framework necessary to prosecute pirates. Mr Ban took the opportunity to emphasise where the real source of the piracy problem lies. “Although piracy manifests itself at sea,” he said “the roots of the problem are to be found ashore. This is a complex issue. But in essence, piracy is a criminal offence that is driven by economic hardship and that flourishes in the absence of effective law enforcement.” “The only truly successful way to address the problem in the long term,” said Mr Ban, “is through a strategy that focuses on deterrence, security, the rule of law and development. Our common goal must be a sustainable solution.” In conclusion, Mr Mitropoulos said: “This year, we are resolved to redouble our efforts and, in so doing, generate a broader, global response to modern-day piracy. More needs to be done if the ultimate goal of consigning piracy to the realms of history is to be achieved. We hope that our choice of theme for 2011 will provide an appropriate rallying point around which all those who can make a difference can focus their efforts.”

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

he Indian Navy currently employs 55,000 personnel and operates a range of sophisticated weapon system assets including over 170 ships and 250 aircraft. Although the Navy’s primary objective is to secure India’s maritime borders, the Indian Navy’s assets are heavily leveraged to enhance international relations through joint exercises, port visits and humanitarian missions. It’s obvious that these mandates can only be achieved with Safe, Available, Mission Ready assets - docked ships and grounded aircraft are of no use in times of need. What’s not so obvious are the considerable efforts required by Indian Navy engineering support teams who work behind the scenes to answer questions such as: Should we repair or replace a broken part on INS Viraat? What needs to be inspected, repaired and replaced during the next scheduled maintenance event for INS Sindhushastra? Is the preventive maintenance programme currently optimised to maximise BAE Sea Harrier operational availability? Is a system upgrade required to reduce the Delhi class destroyer’s long term support costs? When will the Khukri class Corvettes become too costly to support?

Clearly, engineering support teams can only function at a high level if they have access to a vast array of accurate asset Steven Gentles data and information and a way and means of managing President & CEO, AwareBase Corp. it. AwareBase has been providing asset information Edmonton, Canada management solutions to the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) Lockheed C-130 Hercules fleet since 2006 allowing support engineers to make rapid, fact based decisions. Over the past 6 years, AwareBase’s solutions have been rolling out in a planned manner to meet the priorities of the engineering support team. Says President and CEO, Steven Gentles: “In 2006, before designing and implementing any solutions, we first took stock of the C-130 Hercules Information Management landscape. We interviewed all key engineers on the support team, identified information gaps and determined where all pertinent data resided, assessed its quality and reviewed the utility of the systems being used to manage it. The outcome was a C-130 Information Management Strategy and Work Plan – a living road map to the future that is updated once a year.” AwareBase’s next step was to implement Tina – an asset management solution that starts with document management. Says Steven Gentles: “The engineering world is very document centric – CAD files, PDF drawings, reports and much, much more. Without the right tools, engineers can spend a huge amount of time simply looking for the information they need to do their jobs. And when they find it, more time is wasted checking to make sure that it’s the right version

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

because the consequences of using the wrong version can be disastrous. There are presently over 2,00,000 C-130 documents in Tina; everyone can find what they need in seconds and there is never any question about it being the right version.” AwareBase then turned its attention to management and control of parts and bill of material information. Says Steven Gentles: “Engineering and logistics groups who support complex in-service assets, face big challenges managing and controlling changes to approved parts data. During maintenance, technicians rely on this information, which is usually published in Illustrated Parts Catalogues, to order and install the right parts. Depending on the asset, the implications of stocking, ordering and installing the wrong, or non-optimum, part can have serious economic, safety and asset availability consequences. Many of our customers have legacy data that needs to be prepared and transported into Tina.” In the case of the vparts data, over 90,000 parts records were eventually migrated from legacy systems into Tina. Along the way, AwareBase enriched the data by unifying parts information from numerous sources – this improved data quality and streamlined engineering processes. AwareBase then turned its attentions to the preventive maintenance programme, maintenance planning and maintenance records collection. Says Steven Gentles: “Assets such as ships and aircraft are delivered from the factory with an OEM recommended preventive maintenance programme. The programme is often made up of thousands of discrete maintenance requirements - activities that must be performed at various intervals such as calendar time, hours and cycles. Many of these requirements apply to assets of a specific configuration which usually changes over time due to repairs and system upgrades. Compiling a list of the maintenance checks that need to be performed the next time a specific asset is coming in for maintenance requires an understanding of how it’s configured, how it’s being used and what checks have been done on it since new. Maintenance planning is a huge challenge - especially as assets mature.” In the case of the C-130, AwareBase has consolidated all maintenance requirements from numerous sources (including paper) within Tina. Individual asset usage information and inspection histories were confirmed and imported into Tina from legacy systems and asset configuration statuses was determined and migrated. Finally, all maintenance records documenting what has been found during each check have been migrated to Tina and linked to the discrete maintenance requirements – engineers now have the ability to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance programme as a whole and continuously optimise it. Says Steven Gentles: “One of the bigger challenges we had to overcome was joining the two data islands that reside on two segregated network systems – industry and the Department of National Defence (DND). Both systems contain overlapping sets of asset data that need to be synchronised with one another. We developed and implemented an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to do this automatically – the first of its kind in the Canadian Forces. If an Air Force technician changes a serialised component on an Air Force base he enters the information into the DND maintenance system and the EDI automatically updates the AwareBase solution to reflect the configuration change.” A common theme across all long life assets is continuous change – newer parts, system upgrades, maintenance programme improvements, modifications, repairs and the list goes on. AwareBase Tina has the ability to link anything to anything in the system – these relationships help engineers assess the true impact of a proposed change and ensure that expensive changes are being approved at the right level. AwareBase Tina also includes fully integrated Problem Reports, Change Requests and Change Notices which, when combined with workflow, provides engineers and management with quick and clear answers to questions beginning with who, what, where, when and why. Says Steve Gentles: “AwareBase solutions have greatly improved Canadian C-130 safety and availability and have played a role in lowering life cycle support costs through the efficient delivery of superior engineering support services. We’re currently exploring potential opportunities with the Canadian Navy.” Feedbacks may be sent to: info@awarebase.net

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

CHINA’S INTRAnSIGENCE

Col RSN Singh The writer is former R & AW officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects. He is also an Associate Editor of Indian Defence Review magazine.

The South China Sea is the busiest maritime highway in the world. It supports the movement of nearly 50 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet and oil tankers. 40 per cent of India’s trade with the US is through the west coast of that country, which must pass through the South China Sea. In 2007 the Malabar series of exercises was for the first time since I992 conducted in the Bay of Bengal wherein 24 warships from India, US, Japan, Australia and Singapore had participated. With 13 warships, the US had largest presence. It included aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Kitty Hawk as also the nuclear powered submarine USS Chicago. China was incensed over this largest Exercise in Bay of Bengal and issued demarches to all the participating nations. Today, the Bay of Bengal is serving as a unifying force not only between India and the regional countries, but South Asia and Southeast Asia as such

There is great historical awareness about the Great Game between the British and Russian empire in Afghanistan and Northwest Frontier of India in the 19th century. But it is little known that there was another Great Game being played on the Eastern frontiers of the British Empire that led to the annexation of Burma in 1885. Today there is another Great Game being played out between India and China in the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea. The South China Sea is the busiest maritime highway in the world. It supports the movement of nearly 50 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet and oil tankers. 40 per cent of India’s trade with the US is through the west coast of that country, which must pass through the South China Sea. In 2007 the Malabar series of exercises was for the first time since I992 conducted in the Bay of Bengal wherein 24 warships from India, US, Japan, Australia and Singapore had participated. With 13 warships, the US had largest presence. It included aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Kitty Hawk as also the nuclear powered submarine USS Chicago. China was incensed over this largest Exercise in the Bay of Bengal and issued demarches to all the participating nations. Today, the Bay of Bengal is serving as a unifying force not only between India and the regional countries, but South Asia and Southeast Asia as such.

he world is witnessing a new type of maritime rivalry ensuing for the past few years, the impetus being the scramble for undersea energy resources by fuel hungry economic powers. Nearly, 30 million barrels of oil per day, which constitutes one-third of global production, is coming from offshore fields. The posturing of the contending parties over rival claims over maritime resources is therefore becoming increasingly belligerent.

Flashpoints The scramble is growing rather hostile in the Mediterranean Sea (Atlantic Ocean), Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in the Pacific. Even the Arctic Ocean is not being spared, as the melting polar ice has attracted maritime powers like Russia, Canada and US in search of what is believed to be huge oil and gas reserves under the ocean (estimated more than 238 billion barrels). The US Geological Survey estimated in 2008 the areas north of the Arctic Circle to be pregnant with 90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, constituting 13 per cent of the undiscovered oil in the world. Similarly it is believed that the huge offshore energy reserves on the Eastern Mediterranean is fast turning into a flashpoint in which the principal contestants are Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon and even Syria. There are commentators who feel that the so-called uprisings in Syria and other countries have been engineered

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Bay of Bengal: The New Great Game

by external powers, vying for stakes in the offshore undersea energy resources in the Mediterranean region.

India and South China Sea In the South China Sea the quest for offshore energy resources is fuelling aggressive military posturing and a naval arms race, the provocation being China’s claim over the entire water body. China’s intransigence over the claim was very much in evidence when it confronted the Indian Naval Ship Airavat in the Vietnamese EEZ (45 miles off the Vietnamese coast) in July this year. In the ongoing 6th East Asia Summit in Bali (Indonesia) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has tried to dispel China’s misgivings with regard to India’s maritime ambitions in South China Sea but did not fail to reiterate that India’s interests were purely commercial. The principal focus of the Summit is on maritime issues related to ‘freedom of navigation’ and offshore rights. Ever since Manmohan Singh and the Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang signed an agreement on oil exploration during the latter’s visit to India in October this year China has started considering India as another adversarial, possibly inimical, player with regard to South China Sea. As per the agreement ONGC’s foreign arm, OVL and Vietnam’s Petro Vietnam will carry out joint exploration, notwithstanding Beijing’s festering dispute with Hanoi over sovereignty over islands in South China Sea.

Undoubtedly the safety and security of the vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the South China Sea is of critical concern to regional countries and extra regional countries like India and the US. The South China Sea is the busiest maritime highway in the world. It supports the movement of nearly 50 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet and oil tankers. 40 per cent of India’s trade with the US is through the west coast of that country, which must pass through the South China Sea. While the US is seen to be adopting tough posturing on ‘free access’ and ‘freedom of navigation’, it is the offshore energy resources which is accentuating matters. It is primarily for this reason that the US is increasingly becoming a strident player with regard to the South China Sea. As per one estimate the water body has 213 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet gas

reserve. The American quest for a permanent military base in Australia should be viewed in this backdrop.

In the South China Sea the quest for offshore energy resources is fuelling aggressive military posturing and a naval arms race, the provocation being China’s claim over the entire water body. China’s intransigence over the claim was very much in evidence when it confronted the Indian Naval Ship Airavat in the Vietnamese EEZ (45 miles off the Vietnamese coast) in July this year The US has been backing American Corporations like Exxon Mobil that are developing energy projects in Vietnam. China has been demanding that US firms stop their exploration. Most of the ASEAN countries and Japan, as also Australia view the increasing US involvement in

South China Sea as the most effective counterpoise to China’s energy driven maritime thrust. Countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei have developed hundreds of wells around the Spartly Islands over which China lays claims and favour a multilateral approach in dealing with China in concert with the US.

The watery great game This maritime rivalry for offshore energy resources is being referred to as the ‘Watery Great Game’. This game is very much ensuing in the Bay of Bengal between China and India but remains generally imperceptible. In the overall perspective there is linkage between China’s maritime thrust in Bay of Bengal and India’s tentative maritime footprints in South China Sea. The maritime

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

CHINA’S INTRAnSIGENCE

concerns accentuated by quest for offshore energy is the overriding factor in determining strategic partnerships and groupings.

Ever since Manmohan Singh and the Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang signed an agreement on oil exploration during the latter’s visit to India in October this year China has started considering India as another adversarial, possibly inimical, player with regard to South China Sea. As per the agreement ONGC’s foreign arm, OVL and Vietnam’s Petro Vietnam will carry out joint exploration, notwithstanding Beijing’s festering dispute with Hanoi over sovereignty over islands in South China Sea It may be recalled in 2007 the Malabar series of exercises was for the first time since I992 conducted in the Bay of Bengal wherein 24 warships from India, US, Japan, Australia and Singapore had participated. With 13 warships, the US had largest presence. It included aircraft carriers USS Nimitz and USS Kitty Hawk as also the nuclear powered submarine USS Chicago. Significantly, the operational area of the exercise extended from Vizag on eastern sea board to Andaman and Nicobar islands. China, an extra regional maritime power as far as Bay of Bengal is concerned, was incensed over this largest Exercise in the Bay of Bengal. It issued demarches to all the participating nations. This Exercise was also a watershed development in evolving maritime equations, as from a bilateral US-India engagement it assumed a multilateral profile. Japan’s participation was a strategic surprise, unthinkable few years back. Malabar 2011 took place east of the Luzon Strait and east of Okinawa coast in Japan. The Japanese Navy could not participate in the exercise, as the country is still recovering from the devastating tsunami in March this year. It is China’s growing energy hunger and the acute vulnerability of its energy lifeline i.e. SLOCs in the Indian Ocean that is dictating its maritime posture in South China Sea. It is using this Sea as a bargaining water body and maritime highway to address its vulnerability by calibrating

Sea bridge

Consequent to Myanmar joining the grouping in December 2007, the grouping was called BIMSTEC. Presently, the grouping comprises seven members, i.e. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In July 2004, the members agreed to change the nomenclature of the grouping to Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation as an expanded form of abbreviation BIMSTEC. The last BIMSTEC meeting was held in Myanmar’s capital Naypyidaw in January 2011. The grouping addresses sectors such as trade, investment, technology, energy, transport, communication, agriculture, fisheries, tourism, culture etc. The grouping represents one of the most diverse regions of the world. In fact, it links South Asia and Southeast Asia, some 1.3 billion people, 21 per cent of the world population. There is an estimated US$ 50 to 60 billion trade potential between the members of the block.

Historically the Bay of Bengal was extensively used for spread of Indian influence in Southeast Asia. It was called the Chola Lake, during the Chola dynasty rule (9th-12th century). The Bay of Bengal is of great strategic importance. It is centrally located between Middle East and Philippines Sea. Even from strategic aviation angle, it enjoys centrality. It is close to China’s southern landlocked region. One out of five people in the world is part of Bay of Bengal community. Most importantly, it lies at the centre of two major economic blocks, i.e. SAARC and ASEAN. In fact, in recent years, particularly after India embarked on the ‘Look East Policy’, the distinction between South and Southeast Asia is blurring with the Bay of Bengal serving as the sea bridge. In the year 2005, when the Tsunami struck some countries in Southeast Asia and Asia, the Indian Navy responded by sending a hospital ship to Indonesia (Op Gambhir) and a flotilla and helicopters to Sri Lanka (Op Rainbow).

The Bay of Bengal is therefore serving as a unifying force not only between India and the regional countries, but South Asia and Southeast Asia as such. For India, the Bay of Bengal was not an area of maritime concern, especially after the creation of Bangladesh. One of the biggest advantages of the emergence of Bangladesh was that Pakistan ceased to pose any serious maritime threat to India’s eastern seaboard. Nevertheless, there is a new element in form of China, which has registered presence in the Bay of Bengal in quest for energy resources and to obviate the vulnerability of its oil supply-lines from Middle East and Africa through the choke point Malacca Strait, which Chinese President Hu Jintao referred to as ‘Malacca Dilemma’. To address this vulnerability, China is also considering to fund US$ 20 billion canal project to penetrate the Kra Isthmus, the narrow land bridge which connects the Malay Peninsula with the mainland of Asia and is popularly known as ‘The Devil’s Neck’.

At the initiative of India and in consonance with its ‘Look East Policy’ Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand formed regional grouping called BIST-EC in 1997.

The economic rise of India and China is influencing the maritime order in South China Sea and Bay of Bengal. To address the Malacca Dilemma, China is making thrust

its position from a maximal position. In that endeavour, euphemistically speaking, it has been treating South China Sea as its Lake. Thus the great game in Bay of Bengal and in South China Sea is linked as pressure and counter-pressure in maritime arenas with respect to China. The Bay of Bengal is the largest bay in the world, having a maximum length of 2,090 km and maximum width of 1,600 km. In contrast to the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal has been relatively tranquil. India has settled its maritime borders with most countries in the 70s and 80s in the wider Bay of Bengal community. These countries include Indonesia (1974 and 1977), Thailand (1978), Myanmar (1987), tri-junction of India, Thailand and Indonesia (1978) and Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976). There is, but one minor dispute with Bangladesh with regard to the New Moore Island.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

into the Bay of Bengal with Myanmar providing as the land bridge. It reckons the Bay as critical for development of its southern region, which is located far away from its eastern coast.

In 2008, Myanmar did a balancing act by permitting India to ‘build, operate and use’ Sittwe port on Arakan coast and make the Kaladan River navigable to Mizoram. In April that year, India signed an agreement with Myanmar for Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project China is engaged in construction of 1,500 km oil and 1,700 km gas pipeline (around 800 kilometers across Myanmar) from Kyaukpyu deep sea port on Myanmar’s western coast in Bay of Bengal to Kunming in China’s Yunan province. The oil and gas pipelines will cost China US$ 1.5 billion and 1.95 billion respectively. Myanmar is likely to earn as transit fee US$ 150 million annually. A railroad running adjacent to the pipelines has also been planned. In two years time, the pipeline will supply gas from Shwe gas-fields, i.e. offshore Myanmar. These gas-fields are bigger than any gas-fields in India. China and Myanmar have signed a 30 years lease in this regard. Once operational, it will reduce China’s dependence on Malacca Strait through which 80 per cent (4 million barrels) of its oil imports pass. Chinese tankers will dock at Kyaukpyu and transport 0.6 million barrels of oil every day, while the pipeline will transport 12 million cubic meters of gas annually.

India’s ONGC and GAIL have nearly 30 per cent stake in the Shwe gas-fields. Myanmar had indeed offered India to tap gas from these fields (A1 Block) and transport to India’s northeast states through Bangladesh. No sooner Dhaka refused permission, China seized the opportunity. Was the posturing of Bangladesh influenced? Nevertheless in 2008, Myanmar did a balancing act by permitting India to ‘build, operate and use’ Sittwe port on Arakan coast and make the Kaladan River navigable to Mizoram. In April that year, India signed an agreement with Myanmar for Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project. The project is being implemented in three phases, i.e. Phase-1: redevelopment of the Sittwe Port, Phase-2: Dredging of 158 km Kaladan River between Sittwe and Paletwa in Chin State (Myanmar), and Phase-3: Construction of a 129 km highway between Paletwa and the Mizoram border. There is a segment in Bangladesh, which is of the strong opinion that Bangladesh should balance India and China’s maritime thrust and ambitions in the Bay of Bengal. The anti-India lobby in the country feels that China should be wooed as a maritime counterweight to India. During the visit of Sheikh Hasina to China in March 2010, Beijing agreed to cooperate with Bangladesh in construction of a US$ 8.7 billion deep sea port in Chittagong and building of road link from Chittagong to Kunming in Yunan. Bangladesh plans to increase the port capacity three fold, i.e. from 30.5 million tonnes

to 100 million tonnes and act as a maritime hub for India’s northeastern states, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. However intended Chinese thrust into South Asia through Bangladesh has disconcerted India.

Conclusion There is great historical awareness about the Great Game between the British and Russian empire in Afghanistan and Northwest Frontier of India in the 19th century. But it is little known that there was another Great Game being played on the Eastern frontiers of the British Empire. This great game was scripted by none other than Churchill’s father Lord Randolph. Lower Burma, i.e. the area surrounding the mouth of the Irrawady River along with a strip of coastline on the eastern shore of Bay of Bengal was annexed in 1826 and was administered from Kolkata. The Upper Myanmar remained independent. In the years to follow, the French having taken Indo-China were pressing westward and signed a commerce agreement with King Theebaw in 1883, who ruled upper Myanmar, thus, challenging British monopoly and interests. To preempt French western thrust Lord Randolph prevailed on the British authorities and Upper Myanmar was annexed in 1885. The move was driven both by commercial and strategic interests. Similarly there is the great watery game ensuing between India and China in the Bay of Bengal, which is primarily driven by quest for energy and its supply routes. This has reverberations in other maritime domains as well.

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sea power

stable defences An analysis of our responses to the vastly enhanced threats of piracy and terror directed from the sea flank. It critiques the measures taken so far and suggests some concrete measures to control this rising menace that include the use of undersea sensors and Flying Boats.

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in Southeast Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

It needs to be appreciated that the achievement of a top speed of 63 kilometers per hour is no mean achievement but given the vast spaces in the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean that need rapid deployment to prevent the fast-growing nexus between Islamic jihad and piracy either a faster speed or a larger number of fast attack craft will be required in the future for failsafe anti-piracy / anti-smuggling / anti-terrorist operations. Instead of being paralysed by the possibility that the pirates could target Indian seamen the Indian Navy must adopt a pro-active role

t was a measure of the frustration of the nation as a whole that characterised Defence Minister A K Antony’s exhortation to the Navy and Coast Guard commanders not long ago when he said “keep the faith of the nation intact”. It came after several untoward incidents not far from the Indian coastline that showed that pirates were operating freely less than 100 km from the Indian coastline; that foreigners had landed on the Gujarat coast without anyone being the wiser; and, worst of all, the sinking of the Indian Naval Ship Vindhyagiri after a collision with a foreign cargo vessel in the channel leading out of Mumbai harbour. All this happened after massive investments made in maritime security post-Mumbai carnage of 2008 when a team of Pakistani jihadi terrorists entered the harbour and perpetrated mayhem on the seafront till one terrorist, Ajmal Kasab was caught alive and the whole threat from the sea unravelled.

Cracks in maritime defences All these events and many others unlisted, show up individually and collectively the huge gaps and loopholes that remain to be plugged in what is known as “inshore defence” of the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, the 12-mile territorial waters and all the vital areas and vital points that exist along India’s peninsular coastline of 6,100 km plus the island group of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands off the east coast and the Lakshadweep off the west coast bringing the total to 7,517 km and the contiguous Exclusive Economic Zone of 23 lakh square kms. Major ports such as Kandla, Mumbai, Nhava Sheva, Mangalore, Cochin, Chennai, Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Paradip are situated all along this periphery. The strategic importance of the island territories is only just being appreciated given that the last point in the Andamans group is just 60 km from Indonesia and guards the entrance to the Malacca Strait from the western approach. For the effective defence of Indian coastline, a separate force known as Indian Coast Guard was formed on February 1, 1977, but over the years it has proved to be inadequate to ensure that poaching of depleting stocks of fish does not occur anywhere under its jurisdiction nor can it control effectively the parallel

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

economy called smuggling; or even ensure swift neutralisation of oilspills as happened recently in the MV Pavit case that polluted the Mumbai hinterland.

New internal security manpower Recently it was decided to raise a special force, Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB) comprising 1,000 personnel (98 Officers and 902 Sailors) and 80 Fast Interceptor Craft (FIC). The force is being raised by the Navy for force protection, security of naval bases and co-located vital areas and vital positions. SPBs have been set up in all commands. Eleven Officers and 257 Sailors have been positioned and patrolling has commenced using hired boats.

SANITISE THE

BACKYARD

A Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) report for procurement of 80 FICs has been finalised. The first four boats are likely to be delivered within the next six months. Thereafter, four boats would be delivered every three months. In addition, a contract of 15 FICs (not as part of SPB case) has been concluded. First three crafts have already been delivered. Three crafts will be delivered next month. Thereafter, three FICs will be delivered every four months.

Inappropriate tools However, all these new assets will be of little avail if India’s maritime security strategy remains ad hoc and not well thought out. A case in point is the draw down from the proactive (and overly publicised) anti-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea where such large Indian naval assets like the INS Delhi were deployed in what was very obviously the equivalent of using a sledgehammer to swat flies. The pirates, most of them Somalians, began retaliating by targeting ships with Indian crew on board and holding them hostage for exchange with pirates arrested by the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy announced that it would no longer take prisoners. More alarmingly the pirates began operating closer to Indian shores. In very quick succession pirates were intercepted off the Lakshadweep coast; a group of Somalians landed on the Gujarat coast; the MV Pavit drifted from the Oman coast on the other side of the Arabian Sea and sank off the coast of Mumbai. Freelance pirates or organised jihadis

encouraged by their handlers to operate under the camouflage of pirates so as to extend to the Indian coastline the same kind of proxy war as is extant along the land frontiers are watching our maritime mistakes, accidents and acts of omission and commission to look for chinks in our sea power citadel. Some are pretty obvious – the sinking of an Indian Navy ship inside Mumbai harbour. It is something that can be replicated by a deliberate act. It could give our enemies ideas of how to block the channel in and out of the very Mumbai port that was the homebase of the naval task force that blasted Karachi on 4 December 1971 – a day we now celebrate as Navy Day. Can there be any better revenge? It needs to be recalled that in 1971 the Pakistan government sent the PNS Ghazi submarine as far away as Vishakhapatnam on the eastern seaboard of India to try and ambush the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant

which was managing the blockade and carrier-borne aerial attacks on East Pakistan. It was waiting outside Vishakhapatnam (which was Vikrant’s replenishment base) for the carrier to either enter port or leave it and choose the moment of attack. That the PNS Ghazi blew up while laying mines was fortuitous.

What India needs is a failsafe network of sensors and weapons platforms to be able to detect threats of all kinds - pirates, smugglers, non-state actors in plain clothing and even conventional naval forces both surface and submarine - and be able to deal with them autonomously as and when they appear. Allowing inimical elements to get too close to the coastline is inviting unnecessary complications

Pirate-jihadi nexus What is emerging in the Indian Ocean Rim (some parts of which

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has just visited and addressed the issue of piracy) is the nexus between piracy and waterborne jihad. The David Coleman Headley trial in America has revealed evidence of Coleman being the common factor in the Mumbai attack and the meeting in Mogadishu, Somalia, with an Al Qaeda operative. It now turns out that the Indian Navy has been instructed not to bring arrested pirates to the mainland for trial because Indian sailors are being targeted and taken to Somalia and not being released even after ransom is paid by the victim shipping company. Given the density of commercial traffic through the Gulf of Aden as well as the Malacca Strait and south of Indonesia it needs to be reconsidered whether the projected ten water jet-propelled fast attack craft will be sufficient to ensure adequate time on station and rotation of ships to deal with a problem that brooks no

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sea power

stable defences

half-measures. This is because one failure can unravel the whole skein of past successes by hostage-taking and swapping of prisoners as India has just learned to its chagrin.

The role and capabilities of flying boats that can land and take off from the sea unfettered by landstrips. They allow several times faster interception / deployment than the surface-bound attack boats and are more flexible in that they can operate both as attack aircraft as well as surface interceptors

Fast sea-skimmers Which brings us to the other well-trumpeted achievement – the creation of capabilities to design and manufacture fast offshore patrol vessels with ranges capable of policing larger, piracy-prone areas of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal by the Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited (GRSE). The indigenous water jet-propelled fast attack craft with a top speed of 63 kilometers an hour and cruising distance (at about 35 kilometers an hour) is 3,600 kilometers. Properly based with the help of satellite imagery and Global Positioning System communications a fleet of four to six such craft can intervene within hours if a ship has been hijacked. Given its girth the water jet-propelled fast attack craft has both “green water” as well as “brown water” capabilities. This factor alone can ensure that pirates cannot attack commercial shipping in the most important choke points on the map (the Red Sea-Suez Canal opening into the North Arabian Sea through which most of the world’s oil is shipped eastwards) and the Malacca Straits / passage south of Indonesia or flee into shallow waters after taking hostages because the Indian vessels can ply in five meters water depth. With the possibility of a jihadi-piracy nexus becoming solidified in both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal India needs to accelerate the manufacture of this particular type of fast attack craft. It needs to be appreciated that the achievement of a top speed of 63 kilometers per hour is no mean

achievement but given the vast spaces in the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean that need rapid deployment to prevent the fast-growing nexus between Islamic jihad and piracy either a faster speed or a larger number of fast attack craft will be required in the future for failsafe anti-piracy / anti-smuggling / anti-terrorist operations. The Indian Navy must adopt a proactive role. Its suggestion that ocean-going ships must reconstruct the bridge area (citadelisation) so that an automatic shutdown can occur and the Captain and navigating crew cannot be captured by the pirates is not immediately possible. It will require the ship to come to dock so that the suggested improvements can be incorporated which is time-consuming.

Multiple transponders More appropriate would be to instal transponders on every ship that is registered anywhere in the world so that in the event of an attempt at hijacking an alarm is triggered from any one of several points on the ship so that both the shore control room as well as the Indian Navy ship in the vicinity are alerted simultaneously and counter-piracy operations can be launched. That is why it is suggested that more than the projected 10 fast attack craft will be needed and standard operating procedures so designed that the commercial ships are either escorted in convoys or that Indian ships patrol in packs in a pattern that allows swift deployment to any point within an hour so as to intercept the pirates / jihadis before they can attack a ship. The miscreants can then be disarmed, their vessel disabled and they should be set adrift.

Undersea sensors India should learn the advantages of such force-multipliers as undersea array of sensors that can record the presence of ships in its vicinity, create a register of signatures of engines (which are as unique as fingerprints) and transmit the data to land and airborne assets to launch search and attack operations. As part of its inshore defences the Indian Navy can utilise the gentle

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slope of the continental shelf on the western seaboard to lay such arrays as part of its early warning network. Undersea acoustic arrays can be tethered to the ocean floor where the depth of the seabed allows it.

Flying boats Defence and Security Alert (DSA) has in October 2010 issue highlighted the role and capabilities of flying boats that can land and take off from the sea unfettered by landstrips. They allow several times faster interception / deployment than the surface-bound attack boats and are more flexible in that they can operate both as attack aircraft as well as surface interceptors. These have been used extensively by colonial powers to keep in touch with their overseas territories. Both the Indian Coast Guard and the Indian Navy can be equipped with appropriately scaled flying boats – the former with medium range aircraft fitted with appropriate calibre weapons, search and rescue sensors, pollution control gear and all the appropriate chemicals to disperse and neutralise pollutants. The Navy should have the longer-range flying boats capable of reaching as far as Cape Town in South Africa in the west and Java in Indonesia on the east. These should be equipped with both anti-piracy weapons as well as for full-scale conventional warfare and thus be multi-purpose in their mission profile.

BHARAT DYNAMICS LIMITED KANCHANBAGH, HYDERABAD – 500 058

harat Dynamics Limited (BDL), an ISO 9001:2008 Company was established in the year 1970 as a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) under Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Over the years the Company has progressed to become a multi-product and multi-location entity and is now the Prime Production Agency for missile systems, manufacturing a wide variety from Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) to Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). The Company has also diversified into Naval and Aerospace products and has commenced production of the indigenous Light Weight Torpedo (TAL), under water and aerial Decoys. In the year 1992, the Company was upgraded to Schedule ‘B’ and, in 2000, was accorded Miniratna status. The Company has made rapid strides and from a ` 450 crore Company in 2007, it achieved a record turnover of ` 939 crore in 2001-11, a growth of 50% over the previous year’s turn over. The order book position of the Company has also increased simultaneously. In 2011, BDL received an order from the Indian Army for the Akash Weapon System (AWS) valued at over ` 14,000 crore, the largest ever order between the Indian Army and a defence PSU. The Company has a dedicated team of engineers and professionals and is recruiting more manpower and acquiring additional real estate to cater to the large orders in the pipeline.` The Akash Weapon System (AWS) was indigenously developed by DRDO as part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) and is an all-weather medium-range, surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. It provides multi-directional and multi-target area defence. The Akash missile can be launched from static or mobile platforms providing flexible deployment. The system can handle multiple targets and destroy manoeuvring targets such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), fighter aircraft, cruise missiles and missiles launched from helicopters. It can operate autonomously and engage and neutralise different aerial targets simultaneously. The kill probability of the missile is around 90%. The Weapon System is considered as the Indian “Patriot”. It has certain unique characteristics like high mobility, all-the-way powered flight till target interception, multiple target handling, digitally-coded command guidance and fully automatic operation. The AWS consists of a Launcher, a missile with a 25 - km range, control centre, multifunction fire control radar and supporting ground equipment. The missile has a launch weight of 720 kg and measures 5.8 m in length, 350 mm diameter with a 1,105 mm wing span. The missile can fly at a speed of upto Mach 2.8 - 3.5 and has a height ceiling of 18 km. The 55-kg payload consists of a warhead with pre-fabricated tungsten alloy cubes.

Failsafe maritime defence

The salient features of the AWS are:

It is on the strength of this first line of defence that India will be able to counter such strategies as the Chinese “string of pearls” and, conversely free the Indian Navy for operations in the South China Sea and beyond into the Pacific Ocean.

Weight

720 Kg

Length

5.78 Mts

Diameter

35 Cms

Warhead

55 Kg Pre-fragmented Warhead

Detonation Mechanism

RF Proximity Fuse

Propellant

Integrated Ramjet Rocket Engine

Range

3 – 25 Kms

Flight Altitude

18 Kms

Speed

Mach 2.8 – 3.5

Targets

Helicopters, Aircraft, UAVs and Cruise Missiles

Manoeuvrability

High against tactical strike aircraft, bombers, high altitude airplanes and armed helicopters.

Kill Zone

The operation altitude is from 30 Mts upto 20 Kms covering the operational climb limit.

Kill probability

88% on single shot and 99% on 2 shots.

A versatile and wholly indigenous weapon system, the Akash SAM systems will be the mainstay for air defence of the Country upto the 2030s and beyond.

sea power

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Prof Hari Saran The writer is Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur, India.

Some naval exercises take place annually like Varuna with the French Navy, Konkan with the UK, Indra with the Russian Navy, Malabar with the US Navy and Simbex with the Republic of Singapore Navy. The IN also conducted exercise with the People’s Liberation Army Navy in 2003. In 2007, IN conducted naval exercise with Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force and US Navy in the Pacific. The first Atlantic Ocean deployment of the IN happened in 2009. During this deployment, the Indian Naval fleet conducted exercise with the French, German, Russia and British Navies

Independent-India was called by Admiral Katari in his book A Sailor Remembers as a maritime nation without a mercantile marine or a navy. Since then, the picture has changed drastically. India’s regional maritime identity has undergone a major change during the past decades. Former Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash has aptly said that “The Indian Navy is the largest and the most capable resident navy in the Indian Ocean Region and is seen by most maritime powers as a stabilising force. As India grows economically, our stake in the seas around us will also grow and our maritime power will also increase commensurately”. Our challenges are great but so are the opportunities.

Maritime

ndia had a maritime tradition since Vedic period. There are sufficient historical evidences to prove that India was one of the oldest maritime powers of the world. India had been a sea-faring country and had developed social and economic relations with other maritime countries acroreoss the seas such as Africa, Arabia, Persia, Greece, Rome, China and a number of kingdoms in Southeast Asia. Then, as now, the wide-ranging nature of this seaborne trade required the assurance of a well defined maritime strategy. Indeed, up to the end of 12th century, several South Indian Kingdoms possessed strong sea-going naval power of their own.

Maritime interest The Indian Ocean has been the most ancient trading waterway of the world. Geographically, it provides shorter and more economical routes for transportation and communication between

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Profile of India

Europe and the East. It provides a connection between Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. At least 40 per cent of the world’s seaborne trade, 50 per cent of its container traffic and 70 per cent of the traffic in Hydrocarbon products transit this ocean annually. Almost two-third of the known reserves of the world’s strategic raw materials lies in the IOR. The developed world has two interests in this region - natural resources and market. The new ‘Silk Route’ originates from the

Persian Gulf and passes through the Indian Ocean, around Indian Peninsula through the Malacca Strait to the Pacific Rim countries. In this century, the IOR is slowly taking centre stage on the global maritime map. Independent-India was called by Admiral Katari in his book A Sailor Remembers as a maritime nation without a mercantile marine or a navy. Since then, the picture has

changed drastically. India’s regional maritime identity has undergone a major change during the past decades. In the context of changed international scenario, Indian policy makers have recast the policies to place India into the group of major maritime powers by 2025. In the past two decades we have witnessed an impressive growth in this field. Now, India has become a regional maritime power by all means. Former Naval chief Admiral Arun Prakash has

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sea power

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

aptly said that “The Indian Navy is the largest and most capable resident navy in the Indian Ocean Region and is seen by most maritime powers as a stabilising force. As India grows economically, our stake in the seas around us will also grow and our maritime power will also incroreease commensurately.” Maritime power and naval power are not synonymous, the later being a sub-set of the former. Indeed, maritime power includes the following factors: ●● The degree of dependence upon the sea for economic well being ●● The maritime bent of mind of the government ●● The size of sea-faring population ●● Ship-building capability ●● The size of merchant shipping fleet ●● Maritime trade - export and import enterprises ●● The functional efficiency of ports and harbours

2. Boundary definition: Maritime boundary delineation and demarcation with Pakistan and Bangladesh 3. Communication choke point protection / trade protection: For free trade, commerce and energy security 4. Sea food procurement: Coastal and deep sea fishing 5. Marine resource excavation: Mining of seabed resources like alginates, calcium, gypsum, oil and gas along with deep sea mining 6. Offshore infra-installations: Manmade offshore infrastructures 7. Investment protection: Nationals and investments abroad. India has successfully bid in Myanmar etc. 8. Vessel repair and construction: Development in the field of vessels building and associated repair industries

●● The coastal and deep sea fishing fleet

9. Assisting UN peacekeeping operation: For regional peace, security and development

●● Ocean infrastructure

and

10. Participation in disaster relief operation: For human security

●● Science and technology, human resource

11. Travel destinations: Development of marine tourism and recroreeation

●● Naval power

12. Sea-life protection: Controlling oil related sea pollution for the protection of living resources by Marine Security Policy 2001

resources

India’s maritime interests range from the oil rich Persian Gulf in the North, to snowcapped Antarctica in the South and from the Cape of Good Hope in the East Coast of wild Africa in the West, to the Straits of Malacca and enchanting Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in the East. Economic growth and International role are the two sides of the same coin, India being no exception. One should take the example of ONGC. For future energy security, ONGC Videsh Ltd. has made huge investments in energy rich areas such as Sakhalin, Sudan, Nigeria and Venezuela during the past years. India’s primary maritime interests are as follows:

1. Territory protection: Security of coastal area and EEZ

13. Maintenance of nuclear Deterrence: Development of nuclear submarines and aircroreaft carriers 14. Diplomacy for cooperation: Naval diplomacy to promote regional cooperation and security

Maritime achievements The salient features of India’s maritime achievements during the past years are as follows: ●● India has maritime boundary disputes and demarcation challenges

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

with Pakistan (Sir Croreeek) and Bangladesh (New Moore). It has signed twelve maritime boundary agreements with five of its neighbours, nine of them bilateral and three trilateral. Bilateral agreements have been concluded with Indonesia (1974 and 1977), Maldives (1976), Myanmar (1987), Sri Lanka (1974 and 1976) and Thailand (1978 and 1993). The trilateral agreements are with Sri Lanka and Maldives (1976), Indonesia and Thailand (1978) and Myanmar and Thailand (1993). Several rounds of bilateral talks with Pakistan and Bangladesh have taken place in the past years, but to no avail.

Former Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash has aptly said that “The Indian Navy is the largest and most capable resident navy in the Indian Ocean Region and is seen by most maritime powers as a stabilising force. As India grows economically, our stake in the seas around us will also grow and our maritime power will also incroreease commensurately” ●● India has a modest but rapidly growing merchant shipping fleet of 756 ships (8.6 million gross registered tons, 15th largest in the world). The largest shipping company is Shipping Corporation of India. There are also between fifty to sixty private companies operating a total of 443 vessels amounting to 6.3 million gross registered tons. Indian tonnage represented 1.7 per cent of the world total. Overall the share of Indian vessels in total Indian trade is around 35 per cent. Some 77 per cent of India’s foreign trade in value and 90 per cent in volume is seaborne. However, in terms of mercantile marine, India’s capacity is woefully inadequate. One thing is very important that one-sixth of the workers of the global maritime industry are Indian. ●● India has 13 major and 185 notified minor and intermediate seaports. In order of gross weight tonnage conveyed annually, Mumbai, Vishakhapatnam, Channai and Marmagoa are the most important ports in India. These ports handled over 80 per cent of all cargo traffic in 2007. Other important major ports are Haldia, Kandla, Kochi, New Mangalore, Paradip and

Tuticorin. Mundra port is the largest private port in India (Gujarat). Under Project Sagarmala the 32 ports have been modernised by 2005. Some 60 per cent of India’s container traffic is handled by the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, Mumbai. The Gangavaram Port in Andhra Pradesh, inaugurated in July 2009, is India’s deepest port, with a depth of 21 m. India was one of the only two countries of the Indian Ocean Region that became fully compliant with the provisions of the International Ship and Port Security Code by the stipulated deadline of 01 July 2004, the other being Singapore.

India has fourth largest blue water three dimensional naval force in Asia (after Russia, China and Japan) and seventh largest in the world after US, Russia, China, UK, France and Japan. It has the largest presence in the IOR ●● India has 7 shipyards (4 big and 3 medium) under the control of central government, 2 shipyards controlled by state governments, 35 privately owned shipyards and 18 dry docks for major ship repair needs. Now, India has become self sufficient in the field of shipbuilding and repair of almost of all sizes. The Cochin Shipyard in Kochi, Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (HSL) in Vishakhapatnam and Hooghly Dock and Port Engineers in Kolkata are the most important shipbuilding enterprises in India. In December 2009, the Central Government has transferred the HSL from Ministry of Shipping to the Ministry of Defence. Now, MoD will have four dedicated shipyards - GSL, GRSE, MDL and HSL for submarine and other shipbuilding activities.

●● Since 1981, India maintains an active programme in the Antarctica region. The first Indian research station in Antractica “Dakshin Gangotri”, commissioned in 1983, was replaced five years later by a permanent station, “Maitri”. In 1987 India became the first developing country to be given by the UN, the status of a ‘Pioneer Investor’, which provided it an area of 1,50,000 sq km in the central Indian Ocean area for deep sea-bed mining, which have yet to be fully exploited. It is over 1,000 nautical miles - that is, some 1,850 kilometres - from the southern tip of the Indian mainland and about 3,000 kilometers from Mumbai. ●● In April 1996, India ratified the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctica Treaty. Antarctica region is not only important for the environment but it is a treasure house of potential mineral resources, including petroleum. ●● India has attained fourth position in the field of Oceanography in the world. Indian naval personnel have provided hydrographic survey facilities to small neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka, Oman and Mauritius also. The National Institute of Oceanography has developed the Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) that has applications in Oceanographic research. ●● India is now self-sufficient in making offshore infrastructure and oil platforms. The worth of India’s offshore hydrocarbon platforms are more than 2,00,000 croreore. Bombay High and Krishna-Godavari basin have become a vital asset of the country. Hydrocarbons from the

Bombay High fields are transported to shore by over a thousand kilometers of submarine pipeline. India’s energy consumption is growing rapidly. ●● India has fourth largest blue water three dimensional naval force in Asia (after Russia, China and Japan) and seventh largest in the world after US, Russia, China, UK, France and Japan. It has the largest presence in the IOR. IN is one of the most modern and well respected in the region. It is capable of long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction and strategic airlift. It has played a croreucial role in incroreeasing maritime security through policing, diplomacy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in IOR in the past decades.

Maritime security The Indian Coast Guard is also the largest coastal security force in the region. India has a long coastline along with 2.2 million sq km EEZ (which is set to incroreease to 2.54 million sq km) and Islands territories hundreds of miles away from the mainland. New dimensions of challenges in guarding the coastal frontiers have emerged in this century. It became apparent in India after the series of bomb explosions in Mumbai in 1993 and 2008 Mumbai incidents. For this, tonnes of RDX (high explosive) were reportedly landed on Konkan coast, south of Mumbai by the terrorists armed with highly sophisticated weapons came from Karachi via sea route

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

and carried out a series of attacks acroreoss Mumbai on November 26, 2008.

The defence establishment is eager to induct INS Arihant, armed with 12 nuclear tipped missiles by 2012-13, because it will constitute the most effective and difficult-to-detect leg of the nuclear triad. Having a nuclear submarine will add to great national and international prestige also India has world class naval engineers and architects. Construction of aircroreaft carrier under project IAC - Indigenous Aircroreaft Carrier at Cochin Shipyard is in full swing. It will be ready by 2012 for trials and will be inducted into IN by 2015. There are only six other countries in the world, which build such ships. Construction of Nuclear Submarine under project ATV has croreossed a major milestone on 26th July 2009, when its first submarine INS Arihant became operational for trials. Russian consultancy support to this project is widely acknowledged. The Navy designed and built the hull. Larsen & Toubro contributed to its fabrication. The BARC unit at Kalpakkam designed the nuclear reactor while the enriched uranium was contributed by the Rare Earth Material Project at Ratnahalli near Mysore. Navy built other components of the power plant and the propulsion system. DRDO developed the missile capable of being launched even while the vessel remained submerged. This opens a new chapter in the context of indigenous designing, development and production of new generation of sophisticated platforms in India. The 6,000 tonnes submarine will first be put on sea trials for two years before being commissioned into full service. Only five countries - US, Russia, China, France and the UK in the world have this capability. All these countries have strategic nuclear deterrence capability primarily based on SSNs. The defence establishment is eager to induct INS Arihant, armed with 12 nuclear tipped missiles by 2012-13, because it will constitute the most effective and difficult-to-detect leg of the nuclear triad. Having a nuclear submarine will add to great national and international prestige also. By 2012-13, if all goes well, India may have three nuclear submarines in operation.

India is the only country in the IOR, to have an operational knowledge of nuclear submarine. In January 1988, India leased for three years a Soviet Charlie class nuclear powered submarine. It was commissioned into IN as INS Chakra. Nuclear submarines (SSNs - Submersible Ship Nuclear) are the core of nuclear deterrence. The ATV project was begun in the mid 1970s by the then PM Indira Gandhi, who envisioned the strategic importance of such a programme for the Navy and the country. ●● The proposal for the lease of two Akula class nuclear powered submarines is in the pipeline. About 200 Indian naval officers have also received necessary training in Russia in October 2005. By 2011-12, it will be in Indian Navy. ●● The Indian Navy’s ambitious project Seabird (Asia’s biggest naval base) an integrated strategic naval base in Karwar has been commissioned on May 9, 2005 as INS Kadamba, 100 km from Goa. This is the third operational naval base after Mumbai and Vishakhapatnam and the first to be controlled exclusively by the Navy. The other bases share port facilities with civilian shipping, but this one is for purely naval use. When fully completed, it would be perhaps the biggest naval base in the Asia-Pacific region. ●● India’s first joint command Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) was formed in October 2001. The ANC headquarter is at Port Blair. Earlier the ANC had a very limited asset at its disposal. However, the force levels were progressively augmented in the past years. In a phased manner, India also plans to beef up its forcelevels in the islands which include the ramping of army, navy, air force and coast guard infrastructure, including a radar network. The plans also include deployment of Su-30MKI aircroreaft, extending the length of existing runways for heavy transport aircroreaft operations, including the strength of personnel and amphibious warfare capabilities. ●● India’s seafood production has incroreeased manifold since independence and is a major foreign exchange earning industry

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

now. About 10-15 per cent of the populations of India living in the coastal areas are engaged in fishing as their sole means of livelihood. However the catch of marine fish in India is far less than the estimated sustainable yield in the EEZ, in which 90-95 per cent of living resources are found. According to the provisions of Maritime Zones of India Act 1981, the foreign fishing vessels could operate in Indian Maritime Zones, but not in the territorial waters. About 3.9 million tonnes of fish is available in the Indian EEZ of which 2.5 lakh tonnes are Tuna alone. ●● There are nearly 34,000 mechanised and 2,00,000 non-mechanised fishing boats. Presently our fish production by marine capture is about 2.2 million tonnes annually. Now, India ranks sixth in the list of fish producing countries of the world. Export of marine products reached an all time high in 2008-09. It touched Rs 8,607.94 croreore in value terms and 6,02,835 tonnes in volume. The European Union remained the largest market for Indian seafood. It can be estimated that about 250 million people are directly dependent on the sea for their livelihood. In the last 60 years, the marine fishing industry in India has developed considerably on modern lines, but great potential exists for expanding the nation’s marine fishing industry in future. Keeping in view the size of EEZ, it would be essential to invest huge money in upgrading our fishing capabilities from the present levels and technology. For the growth of fish catch, we have to improve our long-range fishing with the help of self-contained fleets for catching, processing and supply of fish. ●● Tourism has become a major industry along the sea coast for recroreeation and holiday making in the past years. One of the most common uses of the sea all over the world is recroreeation. India has a large potential in this sector. Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep are growing as popular destinations for foreign and Indian tourists, but marine tourism on a large scale is yet to come up on these islands. The other regional countries like Singapore, Thailand, Maldives and Mauritius have now become

the popular destinations for marine tourists. Here, tourism has become a major revenue generating sector during the past decades. Government of India has also decided to develop marine tourism in Lakshadweep coral islands on the Maldivian pattern.

The IN has croreeated three important organisations Directorate of Indigenisation, Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation and Directorate of Foreign Cooperation and Transformation for policy making. In addition, the Indian Maritime Foundation (IMF) was established in December 1993 in Pune. The National Maritime Foundation (NMF) has been set up in New Delhi in 2005 ●● India has developed close contacts through naval cooperation with almost all the IOR countries in the past two decades except Pakistan. In a major forward movement in bilateral ties between India and Bangladesh, the latter has finally granted access to Mongla and Chittagong ports for movement of goods to and from India through road and rail. ●● India’s naval policy has been changed completely in the post cold war era. To foster goodwill and eliminate suspicion amongst the littorals and external powers and to develop a climate of mutual confidence and understanding, Indian Navy (IN) has ended her age old policy of isolation and incroreeased her diplomatic role manifold in the field of joint naval exercises with regional as well as external powers, naval assistance, disaster relief operations, material and training assistance in the IOR. Some naval exercises take place annually like Varuna with the French Navy, Konkan with the UK, Indra with the Russian Navy, Malabar with the US Navy and Simbex with the Republic of Singapore Navy. The IN also conducted exercise with the People’s Liberation Army Navy in 2003. In 2007, IN conducted naval exercise with Japan Maritime SelfDefence Force and US Navy in the Pacific. The first Atlantic Ocean deployment of the IN happened

in 2009. During this deployment, the Indian Naval fleet conducted exercise with the French, German, Russian and British Navies. The IN is incroreeasingly used in international diplomacy also. To quote an example, in April 2007, the Indian Navy undertook Operation SUKOON to evacuate 2,280 persons from Lebanon. They rescued not only Indian nationals but nationals of Sri Lanka, Nepal, Lebanon and Greece also.

Maritime cooperation Indian Navy has initiated MILAN (Hindi word for an informal meeting to get acquainted) biennial naval exercises at Port Blair in 1995, with an aim to play a coordinating role and foster closer cooperation among navies of the Bay of Bengal countries. The first ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was organised by IN, in 2008, with an objective to provide a forum for all the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean to cooperate on mutually agreed areas for better security in the region. The IN has croreeated three important organisations - Directorate of Indigenisation, Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation and Directorate of Foreign Cooperation and Transformation for policy making. In addition, the Indian Maritime Foundation (IMF) was established in December 1993 in Pune. The National Maritime Foundation (NMF) has been set up in New Delhi in 2005. The IMF is a non-profit making organisation and has branches in Delhi and Mumbai. The aim of IMF is to raise awareness of our seas and rekindle maritime consciousness and pride in our people. The major maritime economy sectors identified by IMF and NMF are as given below: ▌▌ Maritime transportation ▌▌ Shipbuilding and repair ▌▌ Salt and marine resources living and non-living ▌▌ Marine tourism ●● IN has unveiled its first ever unclassified 148 page ‘Naval Doctrine’ on 23rd June 2004. In this doctrine India clearly declared

that it is now a regional power and the arc from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca as a legitimate area of political, economic and military interest. The doctrine emphasised the need to incroreease naval power, sustainability and reach by adopting the following measures: ●● Modernisation acquisition ●● Submarine deterrence ●● Land capability ●● Network capability

and based

operation centric

new nuclear

assistance warfare

●● Surveillance and reconnaissance ●● Naval diplomacy during peace time

Conclusion and suggestions One should always remember what Admiral W E Parry once said, “India’s geographical position should enable her naval and air force to dominate the Indian Ocean.” India’s regional maritime identity has undergone a major change during this century. Its size, resource potential and strategic location is being incroreeasingly seen as a regional maritime power poised on the threshold of emerging as a centre of power in the near future. Now, Indian Navy and Coast Guard are playing a modest and significant role in cooperation with other regional navies to deal with both traditional and non-traditional security threats. The time has come to chart a new road map. India has all the essential ingredients to be a major maritime power of this part of the globe by 2020-25. Government should provide heavy incentives to maritime related sectors like - ports, shipping, shipbuilding, fishing and tourism, which has made Japan, China and South Korea world class powers. Keeping in view the future economic and strategic requirements of the country, the need of the hour is to look more seawards than inwards.

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

NEW PERSPECTIVE

Rahul Mishra The writer is a researcher at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India.

“We can change history but not geography. We can change our friends but not our neighbours.” The same seems to be realised by ASEAN, Australia, People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea. In order to overcome the past and reshape the future of their relationship with one another, the countries of the East Asian region, particularly the Asian giants including China, India and Japan have seemingly redesigned their foreign policies in the post-cold war era

India needs to widen and deepen its engagement with countries like Indonesia, Japan and Thailand and work on betterment of ties with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. Upgrading defence ties with countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, especially in repairing and refurbishing of defence equipment purchased from Russia, would add value to strategic aspects of the Look East Policy

A historical survey of the trajectory of India’s Look East Policy. Ever since its formation in 1967, ASEAN is the only organisation in the developing world that has lasted this long. India’s Look East Policy (LEP) comprises of two phases. The first phase lasted till 2002 when former external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha announced the beginning of phase two. The phase one of LEP was primarily aimed at initiating political and institutional dialogue with the countries of the region. The second phase, starting in 2002, aimed to focus on establishing economic ties while attempting to partner with countries on strategic front realising the utility of sub-regionalism, India engaged the countries of Indo-China and Bay of Bengal region, through Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Scientific and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

he year 2011 holds considerable significance in India’s diplomatic and foreign policy journey, as one of its most successful policies in the foreign relations arena, the ‘Look East Policy’ is completing two decades of its fruitful life. India’s comprehensive engagement with the Southeast Asian region started with the Look East Policy, officially flagged off by the then Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao in 1992.

by ASEAN, Australia, People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea. In order to overcome the past and reshape the future of their relationship with one another, the countries of the East Asian region, particularly the Asian giants including China, India and Japan have seemingly redesigned their foreign policies in the post-cold war era. Southeast Asia, manifested as a unit in the form of ASEAN stands at the core of it.

In the past two decades, while Southeast Asian countries have fashioned themselves as a unit i.e., the ASEAN, in a more comprehensive way, India renewed its engagements with them, shedding historical baggage in the process. Altered geo-political and geo-economic realities of the post-cold war era encouraged India to engage ASEAN as an organisation and its member countries as well. During this time, India has been able to overcome past tensions, renew and revitalise its engagement with the ASEAN member countries.

One of the most striking features in that regard has been what is popularly called as ‘regionalism’. Regionalism, as Kripa Sridharan puts it, “represents the wisdom of hanging together howsoever difficult that may be for states within a given geographical space. The different sides of their existence are played out within a regional context since their conflicts and confabulations are mostly within their immediate neighbours.” She further observes that interestingly states are convinced that unless they relate well to their neighbourhood they are unlikely to make an impact in the wider world.

A multitude of opportunities have been provided by ASEAN as well, through numerous fora, which has led to the strengthening of dialogue and mutual understanding amongst the countries of the region, thereby leading to greater management of relations in the East Asian region as a whole.

Geographical exigency Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in one of his famous speeches on foreign policy, once said, “We can change history but not geography. We can change our friends but not our neighbours.” The same seems to be realised

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

Twenty years have proved it beyond doubt that ASEAN members have found a congruence of interests with India, given its dramatic economic growth in recent years, its potential for further significant growth, growing global economic and strategic footprint and its implicit potential to balance - if not rival China. India’s increasing presence in the South China Sea and Indian navy’s joint patrolling operations with Singapore and Vietnam are cases in point here The point to be noted here is that ever since its formation in 1967, ASEAN is the only

Two Decades of India’s Look East Policy:

An Assessment

organisation in the developing world that has lasted this long. Considering the diversities and multilayered differences among the constituents, it has indeed defied the popular belief and has proved to be a success (at least on few issues, particularly during the Cambodian crisis). ASEAN has successfully weathered a number of challenges, emerged out of crises and has refashioned itself to suit the new geo-political and geo-economic realities of the new millennia. And that precisely has attracted India towards it. A closer look at the historical traditions - both oral and written shows that India has not only been ‘Looking East’ for the past two millennia, but has also engaged the East during this period, though intermittently. India’s cultural footprints and its diaspora stories tell us about India’s robust presence in the past. Even during its freedom struggle, Indian leaders tried to engage with Southeast Asian countries as India and many countries were under colonial yoke at that time. For instance, Nehru organised and celebrated ‘Southeast Asia Day’ at Lucknow on October 24, 1945 expressing solidarity with Indonesia. The relationship got a fillip when Asian countries became independent, with Nehru playing a key role in developing Asian solidarity. The Asian Relations Conference 1947, the Conference on Indonesia, 1949 and the Bandung Conference, 1955, served as important milestones on the path of Asian solidarity. In these conferences India played a predominant role.

Sadly, geographical proximity and cultural linkages could not sustain the systemic and sub-systemic pressures of the international politics and as a result close interactions of immediate post-colonial period dissipated over time, leading to a long period of mutual neglect. As a result, India did not figure much on ASEAN’s strategic radar and vice versa.

Strategic manoeuvre When India renewed its ties with the ASEAN with the formal launch of its ‘Look East Policy’, it was, as C Raja Mohan says, “not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it was about reaching out to our civilisational Asian neighbours.” India’s Look East Policy (LEP) comprises of two phases. The first phase lasted till 2002 when former external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha announced the beginning of phase two. The phase one of LEP was primarily aimed at initiating political and institutional dialogue with the countries of the region. Multilayered engagements between the ASEAN and India were formulated and executed. In that context, several fora can be identified through which India got proactively engaged with the region. The dialogue platforms India entered at during the first phase, were continued in the phase two as well. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+1 Framework (summit level meetings between the ASEAN and India), East Asia Summit (EAS) and lately, the ASEAN Defence

Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus are to name a few. The second phase, starting in 2002, aimed to focus on establishing economic ties while attempting to partner with countries on strategic front. Going a step ahead in already existing institutional engagement also figured in the phase two. Also, the phase two had linking of northeast India, popularly known as the ‘seven sister states’, with the neighbouring Southeast Asian countries as one of its prime objective. This was a decisive break from the position India earlier had. Fears of insurgency and drug trafficking in northeast India were the reasons behind such an inward looking isolationist approach. The move turned out as a key strategic move in not only curbing insurgency in northeast but also in boosting the region’s economy. Closely intertwined with the linking of northeast was a greater focus on CLMV countries. Realising the utility of sub-regionalism, India engaged the countries of Indo-China and Bay of Bengal region, through Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Scientific and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC). India’s strategic compulsions and calculations also played a vital role in this endeavour. India had compelling reasons to focus on its eastern borders as Myanmar, positioned at the tri-junction of India, China and Southeast Asia, was falling in the Chinese lap. Subsequently,

India

deepened

December 2011 Defence AND security alert

sea power

NEW PERSPECTIVE

its relations with key Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam while at the same time it broadened the geographical horizon and scope of LEP. Widening of the horizon led to India’s growing ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand with the aim of realising the arc of advantage and stability across Asia-Pacific.

New vistas On the economic front, now operational, the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed in 2008, opened up new vistas of regional cooperation and is aimed at institutionalising trade and commerce relations. In a move to ease regional level free trade hassles, India has been inking bilateral FTAs (CECA, CEPA) with a number of countries including Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand. Adding substance to strategic dialogues, India signed a number of defence and strategic partnership agreements with countries like Japan, Singapore and Indonesia since the beginning of phase two. Last twenty years have proved it beyond doubt that ASEAN members have found a congruence of interests with India, given its dramatic economic growth in recent years, its potential for further significant growth, growing global economic and strategic footprint and its implicit potential to balance - if not rival China. India’s increasing presence in the South China Sea and Indian navy’s joint patrolling operations with Singapore and Vietnam are cases in point here. Additionally, India has been conducting joint military exercises with a number of countries including Indonesia, Japan and Singapore. High-level defence exchanges with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have helped India and the countries of the region understand and appreciate India’s rising military prowess. Evidently, New Delhi’s perspective on Southeast in consonance with the ASEAN views of the security milieu. India’s

strategic Asia is US and regional security

approaches to the regional players juxtaposed with growing regional insecurity vis-à-vis China. For one, the recent encouragement from the Obama Administration (underscored in Obama’s speech to a joint session of the Indian parliament during his visit to India in November 2010 and Hillary Clinton’s speech in 2011) for India not just to ‘look East, but to engage East’ indicates towards the efficacy of India’s attraction as an emergent power amongst the East Asian countries. Furthermore, countries like Australia, Japan, Singapore and the Philippines rely on the US for their security. US-India bonhomie helped them take India in a more positive way and they were not disappointed in that. India’s entry in EAS proved to be a major achievement in terms of its projection and approval of a power of consequence. Additionally, India’s prompt post-tsunami rescue and relief operations and successful anti-piracy mission in Southeast Asian waters proved its naval efficiency and also that it’s a power to count on when it comes to transnational issues in the Southeast Asian region. One may argue that the world community in general and ASEAN and its member countries have taken India’s image as a ‘benign power’ positively in particular. India’s cultural interconnections, policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs of other countries coupled with the fact that India never had any kind of disputes with any country in the ASEAN region established its robust benign power image.

India - missing in action? However, there are many problem areas in India’s Look East Policy. For example, as Dr Ralf Emmers said during a conversation with the writer, India is perceived as somewhat ‘absent minded’ in the region. It has sensible policy but lacks commitment. Its obsession with South Asian affairs is damaging it a lot as also the chaos in domestic politics. India probably has the best cards to play in the region; sadly it is playing it badly. India’s

lack of comprehensive economic engagement with the region is the biggest impediment to its power projection. Despite the signing of several agreements, the total volume of trade is abysmal, which is not going to lead India far in terms of regional politics. Curiously, on India-ASEAN FTA issue, it was India which was a bit too hesitant to get into such kind of agreement. Indian businessmen and farmers were afraid that with the implementation of India-ASEAN FTA Indian market would be flooded by Southeast Asian (and Chinese goods coming via ASEAN route) products. Such kind of apprehension proves that India is still not sure of its economic power and geo-economics is yet to play to its fullest'.

The Complete Commercial, Homeland Security & Fire Technology Show

ur o k Y Now o Bo ace Sp

08 – 10 December 2011 | Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India

East Asian financial crisis and the global economic slowdown have helped China project its image of a global and regional leader. Conspicuously, India has been missing in action. This is important in the light of the fact that India has been one of the very few economies, which have weathered the crisis without getting badly bruised, while countries across the world were struggling with the economic slump.

Some of the Participating Exhibitors: Security. Lifestyle. Technology.

C : 100 / M: 0 / Y:0 / K:0 C : 0 / M: 20 / Y:100 / K:0

Apart from taking corrective measures on assuming the rightful leadership role in regional theatre, India needs to widen and deepen its engagement with countries like Indonesia, Japan and Thailand and work on betterment of ties with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. Upgrading defence ties with countries like Vietnam and Malaysia, especially in repairing and refurbishing of defence equipment purchased from Russia, would add value to strategic aspects of the Look East Policy. In the final analysis, one may argue that while India’s efforts in terms of engaging the East through its Look East Policy have been remarkable, it has miles to go in order to achieve its objective of being a responsible and reliable stakeholder in the region. Such a cherished goal would see the light of the day only if India gives a concrete shape to the idea and practice of Look East Policy while not losing sight of its strategic vision and national interests.

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Introducing the leading forum for border security professionals in the Asia Pacific region Following the success of the European series, SMi Group is delighted to present the launch of its inaugural Border Security Asia conference and exhibition. This must-attend event will offer invaluable insight into the latest threats posed to the border security community, faced with issues involving international terrorism, transnational organised crime, drug trafficking, weapon smuggling, theft and immigration. Join leading experts to examine and debate the latest developments in key border security issues. Delegates will have the opportunity to hear about the latest regional Maritime Border Protection Programmes and assess how different regional agencies from across Asia Pacific are securing maritime borders and coastlines. Key presentations and case studies will provide attendees with insight into the latest Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance programmes for enhancing border security. Border Security Asia Pacific is being organised in partnership with Borderpol, the World Border Organisation. This partnership will explore the current threats and challenges facing the regional border management community - from the experiences of national border agencies to the problems and solutions facing policy makers. The conference will also run parallel with a vibrant exhibition where vendors will have the opportunity to showcase their latest products, technology and solutions for the Border Security community. Hear keynote presentations from industry experts The conference will feature a first-rate programme with keynote addresses by industry professionals, including an opening keynote address by Julia Sng, Commander (Coastal), Immigration and Checkpoint Authority, who will introduce Border Security - The ICA Way. Professor Rohan Gunaratna, Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research will give his keynote presentation on the challenges of border security in ASEAN Countries. Tony Smith, Senior Director, London 2012 Olympic Programme, UK Border Agency will also present a special address about managing international events, focusing on the UK Border Agency London 2012 Olympic Programme. They will be joined by Vice Admiral Ramon Liwag, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, who will give his keynote presentation on the challenges of maritime border security in the Spratly Islands in Philippines. Commodore (Ret’d) Seshadri Vasan, Head, Strategy and Security Studies, Centre for Asia Studies, India and Director Asia Secretariat, World Border Organisation will chair the conference and will be joined by a stellar line-up of leading experts from major organisations from within the border security community, including New Zealand Immigration Service, National Defence University, Pakistan, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Sri Lanka Air Force and European Biometrics Forum. Visit www.bordersecurityasiapac.com to view the conference agenda and full speaker line-up. Interactive panel discussions and workshops The conference will feature 2 interactive panel discussions. Day One will focus on the topic of “Integration of Technology for Safe and Secure Borders - Human vs Technology” and Day Two will highlight the subject of “Transborder Legal Issues and Human Rights”. This conference also presents an exclusive post-conference workshop on 1st February. Developing Intelligence Led Security Solutions will allow participants to develop an initial action plan for how they can begin to make better use of intelligence in their own operations, particularly (but not exclusively) in the maritime / border security environment. As part of SMi Group’s expanding Asia-Pacific portfolio, Border Security Asia Pacific serves as a platform to meet and network with a diverse mixture of international experts from the Border Security community. Delegates will rest assured that they are kept up-to-date with the latest challenges, threats and solutions. This conference will bring together decision makers, influencers and those involved with current operations from Europe, USA and the rest of the world to give you crucial feedback and insight of present issues in the industry. Don’t miss out and register today by visiting www.bordersecurityasiapac.com or contact Laura Green on: +65 664 990 95 or email: lgreen@smi-online.sg for more information.

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