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Russia Special

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Majestic recognition to

Global aspirations?

editor-in-chief

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here is nothing predictable about Russia. Things are never going to happen as they are meant to in other countries of the world. For in the country that straddles more time zones than any other, things will always happen in their own way, in the Russian way. It is a world, in a sense, by itself and over there things will happen in ways

perplexing to most in the world, but par for the course for most of its citizens. There are, of course, those who are on the other side of ‘the way things happen’. And they sometimes pay a particularly wicked price. But that is Russia, an enigma in itself.

There is something extraordinary about a country that barely registered on the reformation, enlightenment, industrialisation and invention maps. Even as the rest of Europe was swept, to varying degrees admittedly, by these humankind changing phenomena, Russia went about in its own way, at it own pace. It still does and that has a lot to do with the country not being limited to a continent. Even as Europe is incomplete without Russia, Russia is incomplete without its Asia landmass and psychological impact. Even as Russia covers both continents, it also reflects in its psychological make up. There are distinctly European and Asian traits in the Russian way of doing things. And that only makes the country and its people mindboggling for most that try to follow and comprehend it.

The Russian people made some of the most gut wrenching sacrifices in the face of foreign conquest and not once, but twice over. If they stopped Napoleon from becoming the emperor of Europe, they also beat back Hitler’s war machine ranged against them. There has been enough written and documented about these two episodes in Russian history and their impact on the world. For both contributed in no small way to changing the course that had been predicted for the world. Just as the Russian Revolution had an impact on the world for decades after the tragedy had struck the vast country. It was an event that shook the world for many decades after it happened. That revolution also transformed the Russian mind in many ways and at a cost that is still being extracted in some form or the other. Despite not being in the core of all those changes happening in Europe, Russia still produced some of the most remarkable literary works of all time. And in its revolutionary mode, Russia produced some of the most brilliant physicists in the world. Some also very brave.

All of these contrasting features make up the vastness that is Russia, also seemingly adding to its contradictions. But that is Russia, doing it in its own way. An enigma of sorts. And a country that is always going to be there, making a mark on the world stage. The once upon a time spoiler, now contributing to stability and status quo. With a distinctly Russian flavour.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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publisher’s view

announcement

India - Russia: Friends Indeed!

Volume 2 Issue 5 Febr u a r y 2 0 11 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications monika kanchan ad-sales manish upadhyay sanjaya kr. prusty representative J&K salil sharma creative vivek anand pant correspondent (europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution vijay bhatia ranjeet, amit kumar, amit sharma system administrator vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscri ption: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002(India) t: +91-011-23243999,23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence And Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

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ussia, erstwhile USSR, made a great contribution in enriching the literary world and had given many marvellous writings

by Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, Maxim Gorky, Turgenev and Dostoevsky to name a few. The Russian classics were translated in various international languages and were highly appreciated and read by literature lovers. Our group published the works of these Russian writers in Hindi on the initiative of our present Chairman Mr. Shyam Sundar which was lauded by the Hindi book lovers in India. The idea behind publishing the Russian writers by our group was to highlight and disseminate their thoughts among the Hindi readers and it was a hugely successful venture.

Literature is not the only field where Russians have excelled. Even in the fields of defence, science, technology, space exploration, oil and gas and many other futuristic human endeavours their contributions have been pathbreaking. Russia has a long and golden history over many centuries and has seen many ups and downs. After the disintegration of the USSR, the successor State, the Russian Federation, is rising like a phoenix in various spheres of development.

The introduction of Glasnost and Perestroika by Mikhail Gorbachev was a turning point for the contemporary world. The new policies introduced proved to be a boon for the western States but the bane for the Russians. The economy was shattered completely and more and more bankruptcy was seen in erstwhile USSR. Due to the downslide in the economy the State was compelled to grant independence to many smaller affiliated States which also proved to be another setback to Russia. Russia is trying to overcome many odds and we are sure that very soon it is going to regain its lost glory.

A N N O U N C E S March 2011 Issue as

Europe Special Covering European Union and other European States fortifying for the New World Order

Just now on my way back to India from a business tour to London I heard at Heathrow airport the news of blasts at the Domodedovo airport in Moscow causing more than 30 deaths and injuring hundreds of innocent people. I have seen the level of security at the airports and tubes in London which I think is of its own unique kind. In spite of regular threats by many terrorist groups, UK has taken all necessary measures to safeguard its people and infrastructure throughout the country. It is quite pathetic that in spite of a similar massive attack in its Metro rapid transport system just last year it has not elicited the kind of response that one notices in London. A graphic account of the genesis and escalation of terrorism in USSR and now Russia may be read in an article Caucasus: terror cradle? of this issue of DSA. The so called Black Widows and the Chechen extremists are suspected to be behind these dastardly attacks. This may continue if the State is not more vigilant in creating a failsafe security architecture using the latest technology available in the international market.

I just visited one of the most important business hubs of London, the Canary Wharf and I was quite impressed by the security systems installed there. While visiting London I was surprised that there were no security personnel deployed in the busiest commercial hub of Oxford Street and surrounding areas and it was the same in the entire network of the train system. This shows that physical deployment is not very important. It is the systems and the technology which plays a vital role in securing the people and the national infrastructure.

I am sure that the Russian government must be very serious in its stated resolve to bring the culprits of the Domodedovo airport carnage to book and, taking into account the persisting threat of more such attacks in future, will deploy adequate technical and other means of ensuring the safety of the lives of its people and prevent destruction of its infrastructure.

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Russia and India have been great friends for decades supporting each other in various national endeavours and international fora and I wish this partnership continues for a long time especially in the domain of strategic alliances and new emerging threats like terrorism.

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February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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contents RUSSIA SPECIAL ISSUE FEBRUARY 2011

contents

Volume 2 Issue 5 February 2011

A R T I C L E S

Caucasus: terror cradle?

Prof. P. L. Dash

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Russia-Vietnam: amazing amity

60

Rahul Mishra

Medvedev visit: new impetus

14

unique collaboration

63

Russia: global aspirations

18

the Skolkovo stratagem

68

Russia's policy: implications for India

22

Russia: the energy tsar?

71

India and Russia: new realities

25

Russia-US: reset relationship

74

Russia and US: adversaries or future allies? 30

Russia China accord: new vision

77

the Russian renascence!

35

Russia in Asia-Pacific

80

Medvedev doctrine

38

the IED menace

84

India-Russia strategic relationship

43

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dhruv Katoch Dr. Arvind Gupta Dr. Rajiv Nayan

Prof. Nalini Kant Jha

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi Dr. Arun Mohanty

Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

Dr. Jagmohan Meher Rajorshi Roy

Rai Mahimapat Ray and Rajeev Lala Dr. Nivedita Das Kundu

Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy Rohit K. Mishra Aditi Malhotra

F E A T U R E S

Interview: Manoj Chugh 66 President, EMC, India and SAARC

Russia and Mongolia: recent upsurge in ties 46 Dr. Sharad K. Soni

Reclaiming lost glory

50

nuclear zero: Russia’s options

53

Indo-Russian military cooperation

56

Shebonti Ray Dadwal Kapil Dhanraj Patil Cecil Victor

for online edition of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) log on to: www.dsalert.org

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February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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mission

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms‌ Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

— Chanakya

resurgent Russia

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C

arnage returns to Moscow as evidenced by the mayhem at Domodedovo airport on January 24, 2011, which left 35 dead, around 300 injured and 20 battling for life. This gruesome attack is too outrageous and raises question marks about the efficacy of the Russian security system in place at such crowded transport hubs as airports, rail stations and metro. The roots of this terror lay once again in North Caucasus, where Russia has been battling Chechen rebels for nearly two decades. The attack is convincing enough about the tentacles of a terror network operating right from North Caucasus to Moscow and beyond.

International terrorism is a global phenomenon that affects all countries of the world, particularly after 9/11.

Ever since Al Qaeda targeted the economic, political and military might of the United States by launching savage attack on the Pentagon, White House and the World Trade Centre, it is almost a decade since the world has been pulling all-out efforts to fight this menace. Two major powers of the world - USA and the Russian Federation - have been jointly fighting terror ever since Putin became the first world leader to have telephoned then US president George Bush soon after crash of the twin towers on 9/11/2001.

But Russia’s trail of terror is a unique story, largely under-reported and mostly targeted at Moscow. However it certainly forms a part of global terror. Since the vast swathe of land constituting Russia and the CIS countries cannot be isolated from the fight against international terror, it is worthwhile addressing the core of Russian terrorism - the terror trails from the Caucasus because it is in the periphery of the Caucasus the interests of the US and Russia converge.

Cancerous growth The autumn bombing of the Chechen parliament in Grozny shattered the tranquil of Caucasus, once again throwing open to debate the very issue of untamed terror, emanating from Chechnya and travelling right up to the Kremlin in Moscow. Two decades of persistent peace efforts by the Kremlin, alternating between peace, political mediations, negotiations, discussions, orchestrated pro-Moscow elections and use of brutal force by Russian security

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forces have yielded too little positive outcome to consider the Chechen issue finally resolved and the terror trail from there stopped. Time and again terror from Chechnya thrusts its ugly head at the Russians, forcing them to search for a remedy, largely unavailable. The parliament bombing reminds this writer of the gory event of Beslan, where school children were massacred on the reopening day of their school and parents laden with tears, were helplessly pleading with security forces to free their kids taken hostage by terrorists.

Communist terrain The Islamic terrorists have brought Russia to its toes. Last year, Moscow had suffered five more blasts: two inside the Metro rapid transport system in Moscow at the Lubyanka and Park Kulturi stations and three blasts a day later in Dagestan. Had Moscow blasts taken place inside the running train and not on the platforms of stations, the impact of the blast could have been severe and casualties far more. The blasts occurred around the All Fool’s Day, as if the terrorists have befooled Russian security forces once again on that day. At 9 am in the morning as workers were rushing to their offices and work place, two suicide bombers went off in blaze, killing 38 people instantly and injuring scores of others, who were airlifted to nearby hospitals. The State did all it could to assuage the plight of the sufferers, providing them with medical care, giving compensations, tightening security drills to avert further blasts in Moscow and many usual police measures to stem the rot.

Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev had visited the sites of the blasts, humbly kneeled before the memorial erected on the spots and prayed for the departed souls to rest in peace, while laying the wreaths. However, from laying wreaths to expressing wrath, it was a different president, who vented his resolve publicly by vowing to adopt harsh measures to combat terrorism in Russia, particularly those emanating from Caucasus and Central Asia and focusing on urban targets. The president’s determination is as telling as the unswerving resolve of teenaged terrorists, who wished to take revenge on the State for their husband’s killing by the Russian security forces in December, 2009.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Who are they?

The fact that one of the two suicide bombers - Dzhennet Abdurakhmanova, 17 was a teenaged girl, who had become revengeful to carry out such a heinous attack at Lubyanka station near the FSB headquarters at the heart of Moscow, speaks volumes about how the terrorists’ tentacles must have spread between the time her husband, Umalat Magomedov, was killed on 31 December 2009 and now. One year plus is a small time to establish coordination required to carry out a blast, but now that it has taken place it would let us safely assume that the terrorists are deeply entrenched all across Russia and more particularly in Moscow, to do their act of jihad. Secondly, 17 years is no ripe age to be terrorists. They could be called babies of terror because they remind us of populist terrorist Sofiya Perovskaya, who had engaged in the Tsar killing mission against Alexander II of Russia in the 1860s or even that of Stephan Khalturin, a young soldier, who stockpiled tons of dynamite inside his personal Sandook to blow it off to kill the Tsar at appropriate time in the Winter Palace itself. It was then that the seeds of terrorism were sown in Russia and it was since, all through seventy plus years of Soviet rule, that dissent and terrorists’ plans have never dissipated from the Russian scene. When children become determined to take revenge, the situation assumes seriousness because a future generation of terrorists is already bred. Their grievances need to be addressed. Harsher measures will hardly yield tangible results. If at all they do they would quickly evaporate.

The memory of harshness would continue to cast a longish shadow of sordid memorabilia as was the case with Dzhennet Abdurakhmanova in Dagestan.

Jihad factory Thirdly, from Moscow to Dagestan the tentacles of terror have been neatly knitted by thousands of Islamic sympathisers, who may not be on the State’s radar soon enough to be caught and questioned. They are free, they are formidable, they roam everywhere, they are trained, they have weapons and they know how to handle these weapons effectively. From the apartment bombing in Moscow to taking spectators of a theatre hostage in the heart of the

Caucasus: terror cradle?

Prof. P. L. Dash

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has finally admitted to America’s role in creating jihadi terrorists to fight the former Soviet Union. It is part of the problem and should be a major part of the solution. That the jihad against the Soviet Union is continuing to plague the successor Russian Federation would not be the total picture. Caucasian killers have grown roots in the Afghan-Pak tribal belt and when Pakistan talks of killing “foreign terrorists” it usually refers to those of Caucasian origin of which the Chechens are hyperactive. capital to striking terror in a school in Beslan to second time engaging in terror act in the Metro in Moscow - this is the brief breadth of terrorists, operating in Russia. Is the State prepared to take them on? A decade ago a woman was giving an interview to a TV journalist on NTV channel, who frankly said: “who will prevent or catch me if I go to the toilet and plant a bomb with a digital device in the dustbin and exit? Half an hour later you have an explosion.

This could happen inside the airport or a rail station or anywhere else.” She was right because the State, whatever may be its anti-terror preparations, is always caught on the wrong foot. While making a surprise visit to Makhachkala, Medvedev admitted: “we are able to take the heads off the most notorious gangsters. But apparently it was not

enough. In due time we will find and punish them all, just like their predecessors.”

More worrying for Moscow is the ‘Black Widow’ phenomenon. The terminology connotes widows of slain rebels, who are determined to avenge their husbands’ death. Their number is sizeable because the data is staggering. At least 3,00,000 people have been killed by Russian forces alone in Chechnya; some 2,00,000 have fled bombardment and war ever since it started in 1992-1993. Moscow has not addressed the core issue of Chechen rebels; it has found a via media to put Kadyrov junior in power after his father was eliminated by the Russian forces.

There is a Russian proverb that says: “Found the goat to guard cabbage.”

In the parlance of Chechnya, after years of warfare with gangsters, rebels and terrorists, Putin had found junior Kadyrov as the befitting choice to take care of Chechnya. Kremlin even had to wait for more than a year until Kadyrov junior was constitutionally eligible to be elected president of the breakaway Chechen republic. But has the Kremlin ever asked itself whether president Kadyrov Jr., a Muslim leader by inheritance supported by the Kremlin, could ever forget the brutal death of his father?

Insensitivity Harking back to the past one could recall that beginning this millennium, as Vladimir Putin piloted Russia from uncertainty and chaos to stability and

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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prosperity, he was darling of many a Russian heart. The first term of his presidency passed off well, setting the ball roll for the second term. By then the Chechen war entered into a decisive phase with most leaders eliminated. The Kremlin struck a deal with Kadyrov Jr. to saddle him with the State responsibility through an election, purportedly orchestrated by the Kremlin. The Kremlin conducted the elections, got Kadyrov elected and the arrangement has sustained.

When the acts of terrorism began to diminish, the Kremlin thought the Chechen problem has died down because relative peace prevailed in Chechnya. However, now the problem is thrusting its head once again, spreading beyond the boundaries of Chechnya and Caucasus right up to the capital, Moscow. There could not be more sinister and worrisome news than this for the Kremlin.

That Putin had effectively bought peace through the rebel leader ruling the republic was a fact, but it was temporary. He bought peace for Russia and peace of mind for himself for a few years until the rebels regrouped their women brigade called ‘Black Widows’ to wreak revenge as suicide bombers across Russia against the atrocious elimination of their husbands by Russian security forces.

Dostoevsky’s analysis Finally, the second terrorist of the Moscow Metro bombing was a lady suicide bomber. She is Abdullayeva, a 20 year old member of the Black Widow brigade, who had blown up herself at the Park Kulturi station. The 2010 spring attack on metro is the most gruesome attack since 2004, when a bomb in the metro had killed 41 and wounded 250 people. Abdullayeva was also avenging her husband’s death.

Suicide bombers are notorious in a sense that they do not care for their life, have become determined to volunteer to end their lives themselves. The State will never get hold of them because they eliminate all traces of their deeds.

It is therefore well nigh impossible to catch them. And it is also unfair to go after their relatives because they are at no fault. Hounding the innocent has always been Russian effort. Harking back to Dostoevsky’s character, Rashkolnikov in his Crime and Punishment, one could place well the

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hounding of terrorists in the aftermath of their attack. Dostoevsky’s hero in Crime and Punishment, Rashkolnikov, had committed the crime by axing the old lady who was giving money on exorbitant interest. Thereby he committed the crime and the Tsarist justice system was looking for the culprit, but in vain. They were not suspecting Rashkolnikov because he was a law student and belonged to the high society. The police was calling for interrogation everyone they suspected, but not the real culprit. Such action on the part of the State often elicits strong reaction and discontent in the public.

The anti-terror activities of the Russian State are hardly any different from those of the Tsarist era. Dostoevsky, the brilliant writer himself, was standing before a death squad; and only timely arrival of a messenger on the scene of the execution had saved his life.

Suffering of the innocents in the hands of the police or homeland security forces echoes in a negative manner on the society and the echo generated in a given place, reverberates across the country.

Miles-long tentacles The terror attack on Moscow metro assumes seriousness in the context of repetition. Year after year, such attacks have been happening from time to time. Moscow Metro, one of the finest transportation systems in the world, has been repeatedly the target of terrorists, particularly Islamic terrorists. The worrisome aspect of the March attacks signals a sinister design because the perpetrators have come over a long distance to commit the crime. Travelling around 3,000 kilometers from Dagestan or Chechnya from north Caucasus to Moscow to perpetrate the crime is no easy job. It is not an isolated act. It is a network of terrorists along the way from Caucasus who coordinate such action. The tentacles of this nexus, their sources of inspiration and finance, their promoters and patrons, their masterminds and leaders are all responsible for this crime and all of them have to be probed and investigated. The State has apparently failed in unearthing the nexus point to point. From Gorno-Badakhshan to Chechnya to Moscow and from Georgia to the Tyanshan range of mountains, the space is vast. This area is in close proximity to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the region is full of

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

treacherous terrains. Therefore it is highly impracticable to have in place counter-terrorism measures for effective combat operations.

Caucasian cradle All of them come from Caucasus. It is this area Moscow’s agony of facing terror has sprung from. Repeated strikes have pointed fingers of accusation at Islamic terrorists from this region. In the recent memory, what was perturbing for everyone is the frequency and ferocity of the attacks. Russia has witnessed several of them, both targeting Metro transport system and other crowded places.

But the emphasis is always on most crowded places, apparently because of their vulnerability that would yield high casualties. Moscow is the likely target because of the high demographic density. Of the 144 million people of the Russian Federation, some 12 million live in the city, some 4 million in the neighbourhood suburbs and a million and half people are floating population, entering and exiting the city every day for work, for shopping, for engaging in trade or some other activities. They all come from Moscow Oblast which is vast. The capital and its proximity region are the most developed and crowded areas of the country. The cases of terror in these crowded areas are thus too camouflaged, hence too impossible to handle. The attacks have become systematically periodic. Just a couple of days after the Moscow metro bombing, when Moscow launched a massive manhunt for nabbing 21 black widows, a suicide attack followed at Kyzlar on the Dagestan-Chechen borders in southern Russia. In Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetiya and other contiguous regions of southern Caucasus, explosions have become routine as their daily life. Interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliev reported to the press from Makhachkala that when the local police chased a vehicle, they were about to catch it when the jeep with suicide bombers went up in blaze. A man in police uniform soon approached the scene and he blew up himself, killing the town police chief and few others. A total of 12 policemen were killed.

A few days later, barely had Moscow recovered from the metro blasts, another attack took place at the police headquarters in the Karabulak town of Ingushetiya, thereby clearly implying that apart from the common people,

the targets are invariably police and security forces. There are governments in all Caucasian States, but apparently there is no governance. Relative to the messy situation with Islamists aligned with separatists, the nexus is too intricate to be handled instantly.

Facets of terror In the post Soviet two decades, without fear of repression by the State, terrorists and separatists from southern Russia have pushed the country as much into chaos as to a terrorist cauldron.

Islamists have joined hands with money launderers and drug traffickers to profiteer from the messy situation and launch terrorist attacks against the Russians in the name of jihad. Often billboards and death graffiti are pasted on the walls of city Metro, thus scaring and spreading panic among people with their announcements: “Allah Ho Akbar and death to the Russians.” They have taken a democratising Russia too much for granted and possibly rendering a disservice to the nation by serving as tangible impediments to the process of democracy. The problem is further compounded by the involvement of jihadists from all across the world to launch attack on the Christians, who they consider as ‘infidels’. For Russia under the Putin-Medvedev dispensation and even beyond, Islamism would continue to pose a paramount challenge to overcome. A glimpse through the following incidences will provide ample evidence as to how and where things stand today.

■■ June 11, 1996: Home-made explosive devices go off in a running train, while it was passing through the tunnel between Tulskaya and Nagatinskaya stations in the extended suburbs of Moscow that killed four people and injured many.

■■ New Year’s Day in 1998: A home-made bomb explodes in the vestibule of Tretyakovskaya station, wounding three people.

■■ February 5, 2001: Explosive devices placed under a bench on the platform of Berorusskaya station go off, injuring 15 people.

■■ July 2003: A Chechen woman detonates a suicide belt at a rock concert that killed over a dozen spectators. The

police said a second woman’s bomb, waiting nearby, failed to explode or else the casualties could have been higher.

■■ December 2003: The widow of a Chechen guerrilla commander blew herself up in Moscow, killing six and injuring many others. Since women in large number have taken recourse to terrorist strikes, the terminology “black widow” came into vogue.

■■ February 6, 2004: A suicide bomber from north Caucasus sets off a device in the morning rush hours on a train travelling between Avtozavodskaya and Paveletskaya stations, killing more than 40 people and injuring over 100.

■■ August 30, 2004: A Chechen female suicide bomber blew herself up outside Ryzhsky Bokjal, killing 10 people and injuring more than 50 others. An unknown Islamic group supporting Chechen rebels claimed responsibility.

■■ September 1, 2004: On the reopening day of the Russian academic year, armed terrorists took more than 1,000 school children and teachers hostage for three days in Beslan, North Ossetiya. The hostage taking led to intervention of Russian security forces and the result was over 300 children and adults killed.

■■ November, 2009: A bomb blast derails a train in rural European Russia travelling between Moscow and St. Petersburg. It killed 26 people.

■■ 29 March, 2010: Suicide bombers bring their terror acts close to the Kremlin and explode bombs at two major Metro stations: Lubyanka close to the FSB office and Park Kulturi. Varying figures say between 38-40 people were killed and hundreds were injured.

The list is endless. The above examples are only those that concerned trains or metro bombings. Russia has witnessed numerous other serious acts of terror. A good example is the theatre hostage taking in Moscow a few years ago, when security forces used the tunnel ventilation system in the metro to spray Pentanol gas on the terrorists inside the theatre and after paralysing them, flushed out dead bodies and freed the spectators. All terrorists and some 200 spectators were dead in the process. Moscow has also witnessed bombing of residential apartments.

In all these terror acts, Moscow is the main target because the Caucasian terror groups, encouraged by leaders of world Jihad, wish to send a clear message to the Kremlin. As Chechen leader, Doku Umarov put on his blog in February 2010: “if the Russians think that the war is happening only on TV and it will not touch them, we are going to show them this war will return to their homes.” The statement is indicative of the determination of Islamic terrorists to teach Russia a lesson so that Russia never forgets what is Islam, what is jihad, who are Muslims and what is their commitment to the cause of jihad.

All these put together bind Russia in a knot with the Muslim world. Thus the crescent will forever clash with the cross through jihad.

Definite pattern Undoubtedly, terrorism in Russia has been following a definite pattern.

First, it is one directional, emanating from the southern Muslim prefectures of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Secondly, in its movement terror trails are one directional too: they all target Moscow and largely not other Russian cities.

Thirdly, the perpetrators of terror are largely women, supposedly an innocent and innocuous section of the society, who normally do not engage in risky business such as terrorism. The involvement of women suicide bombers in terrorist acts in Russia compounds and complicates the anti-terror activities of the State. Fourthly, ring leaders of the Caucasian terror acts are located in foreign countries of Europe, mostly in England. They direct, fund, encourage and provide moral support for execution of horrible acts. Fifthly, the terror acts of Russia are intricately interwoven with separatist demands: separation from Russia to the point of secession is demand they pursue for Chechnya. Simmering discontent based on ethno-nationalism is the sixth reason that ferments anti-Russian feelings of the Caucasian population.

Pak connection Seventhly, Russian terrorism is closely linked with many nefarious activities of smaller terror groups operating across the Muslim world, including in such hot spots as Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is why we hear assertion of Russian authorities about Pakistan being the breeding

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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ground of terrorists and participation of Pakistani terrorists in the Chechen movement. Eighthly, it is foreign funds that fuel Russian terror. Thus the separatist movements, spearheaded by terrorists, are in no way an indigenous offshoot of native nationalism, rather a nationalism patronised and nurtured by extraneous motives. That it has a clear anti-Russian connotation is evident in the means and methods of attack to target the Russians. And this is ninth pattern that terrorists juxtapose their native nationalism vis-a-vis Russian supra-nationalism. The tenth factor that singles out terrorism in Russia is the nefarious nexus the terrorists have established with Russian business mafia. Therefore, there is no attack on crowded business establishments; it is the government institutions and personnel, who are always the target.

For causing maximum destruction and casualties, bombing is the pattern Russian terrorists follow is the eleventh aspect.

Jihad as alibi Twelfth, they all take the alibi of jihad and Islam and commit acts that are purely un-Islamic. Terror has no place in Islam because Islam means peace.

Finally, Russian terrorism has proved to be Kremlin versus the periphery, Moscow versus the regions, Slavism versus Islamism and modernity versus archetypal and archaic mores in society.

So other ingredients around these elements go to cement the bond between those who launch jihad against Russia.

The Russian terrorism is home grown, but foreign funded, rooted in Islam, but un-Islamic, fundamentally shaky but aggressively truant. Russia needs time and tact to handle this peculiar phenomenon in the years to come.

Centuries of coexistence of Slavism and Islamism ought not be forgotten and best features of both isms must be harnessed to address the woes brought about by terrorism.

Soft targets Whenever a terrorist attack has happened in Russia, the finger of accusation has barbed at Islamic hub of Caucasus and Central Asia. Similarly, wherever terror struck India, the attention is invariably drawn to the terror hub in Pakistan and the culprits are mostly Muslims. Thus the area from Russia to India via Caucasus and

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through Central Asia is a vast swathe of land riddled with the challenge of terror. It is from this area the terrorists of Russia have largely originated, it is from this area, the attackers of Indian parliament had come from. It is this area 9/11 in the US and 26/11 in Mumbai had emanated from. It is this area terrorism breeds terrorism and in recent times as Pakistan struggles in its tumultuous journey to democracy, terror strikes in that country have become almost a regular occurrence. Therefore, the region has riveted the attention of the world on issues of international terrorism and how to combat it. Since terrorism of this region, whether in Chechnya or Kashmir or Moscow or Ahmedabad, has been linked to two more nefarious phenomena - narcotic trade worldwide and destructive bombings of thickly populated areas - it has been posing a challenge for the State to handle terrorism that has taken shelter under Islamic jihad. The concerns are accentuated further because it is linked to and executed on behalf of a world religion whose followers are scattered the world over.

Jihad and drugs In a recent interview to Anna Nemtsova of the Newsweek, Russia’s main terror fighter and Putin’s point man on anti-terror activities, Viktor Ivanov detailed how Islamic terrorism in close alliance with drug traffickers amass money to execute their pernicious plans to protect their narcotic business along the routes it pervades the continents. The more the State becomes stringent, the more variegated become the forms of executing terror.

Indeed it has varied from train blasts to metro bombings, from theatre hostage taking to a school siege, from bombing parliamentary institutions to attacking religious shrines, from crowded bazaars to hospitals and residential buildings. It is well nigh impossible to put in place an effective anti-terror mechanism simply because you never know when, where and in what form it is going to come. In order to protect their business interests, terror groups work in tandem with their network supporters who spread across international borders.

This business interest is too deeply entrenched into the economy of every country where it is operational. Ivanov averred that “a kilo of heroin is worth US$ 1,50,000 on the streets in Russia.

And a Kalashnikov costs US$ 1,000 in

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

the Afghan market and in some other neighbouring countries just US$ 300 in the black market. And a Stinger missile costs US$ 20,000 and you know what it is for - to shoot down airplanes.” Thus the tentacles of terror spread from narcotic business to threatening the citizens to illegal arms trade and the tentacles are too deep to combat this menace.

Terror has one more lethal combination - the political fluidity and economic uncertainty of the country of its operations. Unstable regimes are not only breeding grounds of terrorists but are ineffective centres of anti-terror mechanism. Russia has the highest incidences of drug trafficking in the world and it all emanates from its southern fringe spanning across an area from the Black Sea through Caspian Sea to the Hindu Kush and Tyanshan ranges of mountains that includes such populous countries as India and China as well as countries of the CIS. In the contemporary context, the connotation of terror is largely and singularly Islamic. Nobody is talking about Christian or Confucian terror or Buddhist terror. However, given the religious connotation of recent trends in terrorism, it is assumed that Islam is misused to foster terror activities, misinterpreted to pull public sympathy and hoodwink the public to support a cause that is highly anti-Islamic.

The writer is former Professor and Director, Centre for Central Eurasian Studies at the University of Mumbai, India and is currently a visiting Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has authored and edited 11 books and published over 130 articles. His area of interest includes Russia and the post-Soviet space, ethno-national problems in the CIS, security and Indo-Russian relations.

resurgent Russia

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

Relationships evolve when nations want them to. In India / Soviet / Russia relations there has always been an attempt to double trade and commerce over a ten-year span. The process was interrupted with the breakup of the former Soviet Union into 15 successor States. It now appears to be back on track and leaders of both nations cannot but perceive a congruence of interests and geopolitical aims.

One of these is that India become an important node in the multipolar matrix that is emerging.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dhruv Katoch

T

he acceptance by the international community of India’s status as an emerging global player was underscored in 2010 by visits of top leaders of all the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council the P5. The last of these visits was by Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, which began on December 21 and culminated with the signing of MoUs worth billions of dollars. The Russian President had earlier visited India in 2008.

Sea change What exactly is the significance of the visit? Indian ties with the Russian Federation have historically been very close and in the current visit, India’s Prime Minister affirmed that ‘ … Ours is a very special and strategic partnership ... it will continue to develop’. India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson echoed this view, stating … ‘India has a very special strategic partnership with Russia, which has stood the test of time over the last half a century’. This however was not the status which existed at the time of India’s independence and the relationship also saw a dip when the Soviet Union disintegrated.

While Nehru was an admirer of the Soviet Union’s rapid economic transformation, India was regarded by the Soviets as a “tool of Anglo-American imperialism.” But things changed after Nehru visited the Soviet Union in June 1955, the visits being reciprocated later in the same year with Premier Nikolai Bulganin and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev visiting India in November and December respectively.

The Soviet leaders supported India’s position against Pakistan on

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Kashmir as also India’s position vis-à-vis Portugal on Goa.

Convergence of interests What emerged over the next three decades was a strategic convergence of interests. Though the relationship was circumscribed by wide differences in domestic and social systems and the absence of substantial people-to-people contact, India’s non-alignment suited Soviet interests as it constricted the efforts of the Western bloc in containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. At the same time, New Delhi accepted Soviet support in areas of strategic congruence, as in disputes with Pakistan and China, without subscribing to Soviet global policies or proposals for Asian collective security. The relationship was hence driven by strategic security concerns which in turn led to Soviet assistance in India’s industrial development and defence production and purchases.

This helped considerably in India’s industrial development especially since bilateral arrangements were made in non-convertible national currencies, India’s scarce foreign exchange holdings thereby ceasing to be an inhibiting factor. The Twenty Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971, further strengthened the strategic relationship.

The Treaty benefited India as the Soviet Union came to support its position on Bangladesh and at the same time acted as a deterrent to China. New Delhi also received accelerated shipments of Soviet military equipment in the last quarter of 1971. The friendship treaty notwithstanding, Indira Gandhi did not alter important principles of Indian foreign policy. By repeatedly emphasising the non-exclusive nature

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

of its friendship with the Soviet Union, India kept open the way for normalising relations with China and improving ties with the West. While Indo-Soviet ties were driven by security concerns and cut across ideological and political conditions, the economic impact was not inconsiderable. By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union was India’s largest trading partner.

Collapse of Soviet Union The breakup of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War created a different set of dynamics.

While India had to also deal with the fifteen Soviet successor States, it was Russia which took on the mantle of the erstwhile Soviet Union. When Boris Yeltsin visited India in 1993, a new emphasis on economic cooperation in bilateral relations emerged. The rupee-rouble trade agreement gave way to trade using hard currency and the 1971 treaty was replaced with the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which dropped security clauses that in the Cold War were directed against the United States and China. However, a defence cooperation accord ensured the continued supply of Russian arms and spare parts to satisfy the requirements of India’s military and at promoting the joint production of defence equipment.

But the post Cold War era saw a flagging in the relationship. This was sought to be corrected with the signing of the India-Russia Strategic Partnership in October 2000 between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Putin signifying that the strategic components of India’s ties with Russia were still important.

But the increasing impact of economic factors on the Indo-Russian relationship is a reality which will continue to gain increasing significance.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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resurgent Russia

STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

Strategic-economic paradigm President Medvedev’s December 2010 visit strengthens both the strategic and economic aspects of India’s relations with Russia. The Joint Statement reaffirms the strong bonds which unite the two nations and give out a vision of the future areas of cooperation both in the economic sphere as well as on issues relating to security concerns. Significant aspects of the Joint Statement relate to the following:

Trade and investments The commitment to achieve the strategic target of bilateral trade volume of US$ 20 billion by 2015 was reaffirmed.

Cooperation at the government as

joint research manufacturing activities.

and development, and marketing

Strategic concerns The Joint Statement spoke of coordination while dealing with international and regional issues, Russian support for India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, promoting disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and support for India’s full membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR) and the Wassanaar Arrangement.

The aspect of strengthening security cooperation in Asia and the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions was highlighted.

Russia also affirmed that it will

were signed of which eleven were in the presence of the Prime Minister Singh and President Medvedev including the Joint Statement. Eighteen additional agreements were signed on the sidelines of the summit. Besides one agreement each on the nuclear and defence categories, the rest pertained to commercial, technology and energy issues.

The nuclear agreement aimed at broadening scientific and technical cooperation in nuclear energy.

Discussion also took place on the construction of additional Russian designed nuclear reactors at Kudankulam where two units are nearing completion and will shortly be commissioned. The first of these, built by Atomstroyexport, the Russian

Geopolitically India sees Russia as a counterweight to China and a political ally in Afghanistan. Russian support to India to be a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could also be viewed as Russian counter to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Central Asia. While there is a congruence of strategic interests in this and other spheres, India will not allow it to get in the way of deepening its relationship with the US and on continuing to normalise its relationship with China well as the private sector level was stressed to include issues related to investments, trade and simplification of visa procedures. Both sides also agreed to consider the possibility of a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement taking into account the implementation of the agreements on constituting the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, after due consultation with all parties involved.

Energy This remains an important pillar in the strategic partnership as India is energy deficient and the Russian Federation a major energy producer.

Further cooperation in the nuclear energy field and joint ventures in the oil and gas sectors were emphasised.

Military technical cooperation Emphasis has shifted from a buyer-seller format to a more substantive engagement that includes

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consider the possibility of establishing cooperation with SAARC and extended support to India’s intention to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a full member as also the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). India on its part welcomed Russia’s joining the East Asia Summits (EAS). In addition there was a convergence of interests on combating terrorism, stabilising the situation in Afghanistan and countering climate change.

Space, science and technology There was agreement to intensify cooperation in a broad range of flagship cooperation projects in the space sector, including lunar exploration, human space flight and Youth Sat projects.

Progress made in bilateral scientific and technological cooperation was also reviewed.

Focus on nuclear energy A total of 29 bilateral agreements

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Federation’s nuclear power equipment and service export monopoly (A subsidiary of Rosatom, the regulatory body of the Russian nuclear complex headquartered in Moscow) is likely to become operational by April this year and the second reactor by the year end.

For the additional reactors, Russian concerns about the liability clause in case of an atomic accident have still to be addressed and may impede further progress. India needs the reactors in its bid to achieve 63,000 MW of nuclear power by 2032. As the economic benefit to Russia is also immense, it will be interesting to see how the issue of the liability clause is handled. Other countries like France are also in the fray to provide reactors to India and they too have expressed concern over the clause. But the deal is lucrative and if India stands firm, all of them are likely to come around.

Fifth generation fighter The largest and perhaps most important deal was

the the

multi-billion dollar contract for preliminary design of the fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) which envisages joint design and development by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport.

Each FGFA is estimated to cost US$ 100 million and as India will be buying 300 aircraft to meet its defence requirements, the value of the deal is pegged at US$ 30 billion. The FGFA is likely to be as advanced as the F-22 Raptor and will provide India the much needed conventional edge to safeguard its interests.

But of significance is the fact that India now expects not just to buy weapons from Russia but also share in the technology of their production. There have been negative voices stating that India is subsidising Russian research and is spending billions on buying an aircraft that has not been tested. As a futuristic weapon system, there is an element of risk in its purchase but it is one well worth taking. Comparative aircraft from the US will be exorbitantly priced and will come without technology transfers.

The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile tie-up has worked well and there is no reason to suggest that the deal to build the aircraft jointly will flounder. The successful production of BrahMos is an apt pointer that in future, defence deals are likely to have components of transfer of technology imbedded into the contract.

Other agreements Majority of the agreements signed were on commercial ventures and on technology agreements. MoUs were signed for simplifying visa procedures, exchange of information on foreign trade, banking sector cooperation and for setting up joint ventures and exchange of technology in pharmaceuticals and bio-pharmaceuticals. Pacts were signed between Indian and Russian firms for cooperation on pharmaceuticals and joint production of oncological medicine, setting up an integrated steel plant in Karnataka, joint venture to set up butyl rubber manufacturing facility in India and for joint production of master batches for polymers. The technology agreements signed were in the telecom sector and navigation

information systems. With respect to energy, a framework agreement between ONGC Videsh and Sistema for setting up joint projects and an inter-governmental agreement for enhancement in oil and gas sector was signed. Agreements on exchanging expertise on conducting elections, capacity building in disaster forecasting and cooperation to check illegal immigration completed the vast array of pacts signed during the visit.

Diversification Viewed in totality, what stands out is that Indo-Russian ties have diversified enormously. While defence remains a strong component of the relationship, India will increasingly be exercising the buyer’s clout to get cutting edge technology. Civil nuclear energy forms another important component of the expanding relationship. The Indo-US nuclear accord has paved the way for other countries to get into a mutually beneficial relationship with India for power generation and Russia will be a major player in this respect once aspects related to the liability clause are satisfactorily addressed. Other areas which will see greater cooperation in the years ahead are in the field of hydrocarbons, pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, space research and science and technology.

The commercial aspects of the visits will give an impetus to set a two-way trade target of US$ 20 billion dollars by 2015, which is about double the trade figures which presently exists.

While this is a big task, the fact remains that even a volume of trade at US$ 20 billion falls far short of what could be achieved. India’s current trade with China is close to three times the projected figure for trade with Russia in 2015. Even Russia’s present trade with China stands at close to US$ 60 billion which simply highlights how much further India and Russia need to go on the commercial front.

Perhaps the most positive aspect of Medvedev’s visit is that it has moved bilateral relations between India and Russia to a completely new level, which can be called a favoured strategic partnership. Geopolitically, India sees Russia as a counterweight to China and a potential ally in Afghanistan.

Russian support to India to be a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could also be viewed as a Russian counter to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Central Asia.

While there is a congruence of strategic interests in this and other spheres, India will not allow it to get in the way of its deepening relationship with the US and on continuing to normalise its relationship with China. Indian foreign policy will remain independent to provide it the flexibility to balance its relations with both the US and Russia which is in line with India’s economic growth and its emerging status as a major global player.

The writer is the Additional Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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resurgent Russia

MULTIPOLARITY

The post-Gorbachev years saw the former Soviet Union and its inheritor nation-State, the Russian Federation, in shambles. By a strange alchemy Vladimir Putin stepped into the breach and is perceptibly reshaping the world from the unilateralism of the triumphant US to one of stable multi-polarity in which, significantly, India plays a major part. India-Russia relations are characterised by a benign aura that precludes any possibility of “if you are not with us, you are against us” syndrome largely because both peoples have traversed revolutions that have changed the course of history – the Russians in their passage through Communism and the Indians in their overthrow of colonialism. Some say this makes them “natural allies”.

R

ussia’s foreign policy has seen two major watersheds in the last few years – US invasion of Iraq (2003) and the Georgian conflict (2008). In the runup to the Iraq war Russia reversed the policy of getting closer to the West. Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference in 2006 gave vent to Russia’s deep anguish at the US’s growing unilateralism and the way the West treated Russia.

President Putin, speaking at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 delivered a remarkable speech in which he harshly criticised the US for unilateralism. He said, “We are seeing a greater disdain for the basic principles of international law… One State and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?”

He confidently predicted that the emerging powers had the means to rectify the situation and bring about a multipolar world. The world took note of Putin’s open criticism and wondered whether that heralded the beginning of a new cold war. Fortunately, cold war predictions did not prove right but Russia since then has become ever more confident in crafting a multipolar world in which US hegemony is challenged by the emerging powers.

Russian resurgence Russia’s hour of reckoning arrived in

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August 2008. Russia showed its deep unhappiness with NATO expansion programmes in its backyard. It took military action against Georgia when the latter, in defiance of Russian interests, tried to use force against the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There was also talk of Georgia joining NATO at some future date. Russia, quite unexpectedly, flexed its muscles and took strong military action against Georgia. The Georgian forces were routed. NATO did not come to Georgia’s assistance. The war gave unequivocal notice to NATO and the countries of the region that Russia would brook no interference in its backyard. Russia and NATO interaction was completely stopped after the six-day long military conflict.

Russia appeared isolated but it did not flinch. The global financial crisis hammered Russia yet it did not make a compromise on Georgia. Clearly this was a resurgent Russia trying to regain its position in global affairs.

Assets leveraged Russia’s foreign policy has become firmer and more assertive in the last decade. It has not hesitated to leverage its vast energy resources in pursuit of its national interests. Europe depends on Russia for a quarter of its energy needs.

Russia is set to become major supplier of hydrocarbons to Japan and China.

Rising oil prices have helped boost Russia’s confidence and capabilities. It still remains a major nuclear power, has a seat at the UN Security Council and is building partnerships and alliances

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Arvind Gupta

to bolster its international profile.

Russia has adopted a robust foreign policy concept and a matching military doctrine in recent years to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Russian foreign policy objectives have been stated quite explicitly in the foreign policy concepts adopted in July 2008 under President Medvedev’s watch. These are: “… to ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve strong positions of authority in the world community that best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of influential centres in the modern world… to create favourable external conditions for the modernisation of Russia… to influence global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world order… with a central and coordinating role of the UN as the key organisation governing international relations… to promote good neighbourly relations with bordering States… to establish, on that basis, a system of bilateral and multilateral partnerships aimed to ensure stability of the international position of the country in the face of international foreign policy volatility… to provide comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad… to promote an objective image of the Russian Federation globally as a democratic State committed to a socially-oriented market economy and an independent foreign policy…

Russia:

global aspirations to promote and propagate, in foreign States, the Russian language and Russian peoples’ culture constituting a unique contribution to cultural and civilisational diversity of the contemporary world …”

The modernisation of Russian economy, defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, protection of the interests of Russian nationals abroad and promotion of Russian culture and values stand out

clearly as the objectives of Russia’s foreign policy.

Proactive defence In the changed global security environment, Russia sees a variety of threats to its national security. The military doctrine adopted by Russia in February 2010 updates the previous documents and follows the National Security Strategy adopted in 2009.

Primarily, these threats are perceived

to arise from NATO’s eastward expansion and its effort to become a global security provider, terrorism, drugs, vulnerability of energy supply lines, weaponisation of space, etc. In order to meet these threats, Russia is modernising its armed forces. Having given up its no-first use doctrine way back in 1993, Russia continues to place increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in providing for security. Russia is conscious that its conventional military strength pales in comparison with

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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resurgent Russia

MULTIPOLARITY

The new directions in Russian foreign policy indicate that Moscow is trying to recover its role as a major global power. But in order to become a global power it needs deft diplomacy, a strong economy and a strong military. Russia has still some way to go to achieve these strengths. Nevertheless, despite several weaknesses, Russia has played its cards well and is certainly recognised as one of the major powers in the world that of the US and NATO. Therefore, it relies on nuclear weapons including the tactical nuclear weapons. Russia’s new military doctrine states, “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear arms in retaliation for any use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies and in cases of using conventional weapons which pose a direct threat to the State.” It is significant that Russia has widened the circumstances in which it will use nuclear weapons.

There is a hint of pre-emptive strikes in the updated military doctrine to ward off emerging threats to its security.

SCO

It is in the above backdrop of Russian perceptions of its foreign policy objectives and national security that we should examine the latest trends in Russia’s foreign policy.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a grouping of Russia, China and Central Asian States, is another organisation to which Russia attaches great importance. Russia cooperates with China and other Central Asian countries within the framework of SCO, an organisation that has succeeded in keeping US influence in the region to the minimum.

Foreign policy trends

Global role

Russian position in global affairs has strengthened over the last few years.

This is partly because of the fact that the US and NATO are deeply involved in Afghanistan and are looking for an exit desperately. They have sought Russia’s help in dealing with Afghanistan.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars have weakened the West. Russia has been the gainer.

Russia has become active in the East. It has developed summit level interaction with ASEAN and has become a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS). It has been a member of the Six Party Talks on North Korea.

These linkages give Russia a chance to project its influence at the regional stage.

In order to increase its bargaining position vis-à-vis the West, Russia has strengthened ties with China. Both Russia and China, while maintaining their independent relationships with the US, have sought to create a multipolar world. Multipolarity is the code word for a world in which US hegemony does not run. China has found ties with Russia equally useful. It has gained critical military equipment and technology from Russia. It is also going to get energy from Russia on long term basis and also an entry into the Russian markets.

CIS The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the former Soviet space, is

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a critical area of influence for Russia.

It seeks “privileged” position in this area. Russia has taken several steps to strengthen its regional position. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), sponsored by Russia, is a security organisation to serve Russia’s security interests in the Central Asian region.

Russia remains a key player at the global stage, particularly through such institutions as the UN Security Council and G-20. The US seeks Russian cooperation on the Iran nuclear issue all the time.

Russia has sought to rejuvenate its relations in Africa and Latin America.

Some anti-US regimes like Venezuela have forged close ties with Russia. In the Middle East, Russia is a member of the Quartet which seeks a resolution of the Palastine-Israel question. In Africa too, Russia is rebuilding its ties.

US reset Recognising the importance of Russia and the value of its cooperation on Iran and Afghanistan, the US has sought to

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

“reset” its relations with it. The reset has resulted in the signing of START 2 on nuclear arms reduction which has been ratified by both sides. The reset was caused by the US desire to engage with Russia on critical issues. Even so, US-Russia antagonisms have not disappeared. Russia remains concerned with US conventional arms superiority and its missile defence plan in Europe.

In the recent Russia-NATO summit, NATO decided to step up their cooperation within the framework of NATO-Russia council. NATO, overlooking the Georgian crisis, has reached out to Russia. It is willing to discuss missile defence systems in Europe with Russia. This is a major change for NATO. This has come about because of NATO’s weaknesses in Afghanistan. The most important outcome of NATO-Russia summit meeting in Lisbon in November 2010 was that NATO would no longer regard Russia as an enemy.

Challenges for Russia Russia’s problems are not going away in a hurry. Russia is still not a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Without this Russia’s economic modernisation dream will not be realised. Russia is facing major difficulties on the economic front. It has launched a modernisation programme which requires close cooperation with the West. However, Russia has made some gains in Europe as it has managed to forge close energy ties with Germany through the Nord Stream gas pipeline.

France and Italy are also for close relationship with Russia.

Russia’s foreign policy in the near future will be influenced by domestic developments. Presidential elections are due in 2012. Putin is likely to contest the elections. It remains to be seen how Putin-Medvedev tandem develops in 2011. Internal power adjustment may have an effect on Russia’s foreign policy.

Russia’s irreconcilable problems are

with the West. This is a historical fact.

Mutual suspicions do not go away even though both sides find a way of working together on some issues. Russia is openly challenging US hegemony but also knows it has to maintain a working relationship with the West. Thus managing its complex relationship with the West will remain a major objective of Russia’s foreign policy.

Chinese threat Russia needs to be wary of China as well. China’s influence in Russia’s far east is growing rapidly. Russia is suffering a demographic decline which leaves too few people to populate a large area in Siberia and the far east. The vacuum is being filled by the Chinese population. Russia for the moment underplays the issue of growing Chinese influences in the Far East. But, it can become a major problem in bilateral relations in the distant future. Russia is also aware that China has reverse-engineered some of Russian technologies to produce advanced defence systems. Some of this equipment can be potentially used against Russia. Russian exports of defence equipment to China are decreasing. Russian or Chinese relations could also become adversarial in the SCO when both countries vie for influence in distant future. Russia will have to contend with a rising China.

Russia is crafting a role for itself in the East. Paradoxically, its relationship with Japan to whom it is set to supply large amounts of energy is deteriorating over the Kurile islands issue.

Islamic terrorism Russia is facing a serious threat of terrorism. The North Caucasus region of Russia is unstable and vulnerable to the depredations of the Islamic radical groups. The incessant flow of drugs from Afghanistan has also destabilised the Russian society. Russia so far has not come out with any effective plan for an Afghan settlement. Although its engagement with Afghanistan is increasing, it still remains a peripheral actor there. Russia is trying to improve its relationship with the Islamic world.

It has become an observer member of the OIC. However, Russian policies in dealing with its large Muslim population will have an impact on its relations with the Muslim world.

New frontier A relatively new dimension to Russia’s foreign policy is its newly articulated policy on the development of its Arctic north. The melting of the Arctic Sea due to global warming has given Russia an opportunity to develop its own resources in the north. Russia has already staked its claims on the North Pole. It is eying the hydrocarbon and other resources of the Arctic once the ice melts and new lands and waters become accessible.

The new directions in Russian foreign policy indicate that Moscow is trying to recover its role as a major global power. But in order to become a global power it needs deft diplomacy, a strong economy and a strong military. Russia has still some way to go to achieve these strengths. Nevertheless, despite several weaknesses, Russia has played its cards well and is certainly recognised as one of the major powers in the world.

Indo-Russian relations In Russia’s foreign policy priorities India occupies a high place. India is seen as a major pole in a multipolar world. India is also a major buyer of Russian defence equipment. India has invested over US$ 5 billion in Russia, mostly in the hydrocarbon sector. Indo-Russian relations are set to achieve an upward trajectory following President Medvedev’s visit in December 2010. Russia and India have a close and strategic relationship in the area of defence, space, nuclear energy, hydrocarbons, etc. Russia is

the only country with which India has defence cooperation which extends to the manufacturing of high tech defence equipment. Russia is also setting up several new nuclear power plants in India which will help bolster India’s nuclear power production. Even though Indo-Russian relations are somewhat weak in the economic area, the position might change if mutual investments increase. There is interest in Indian investments in the pharmaceutical sector.

Russian companies are interested in the telecom sector. There is a great deal of possibility in stepping up cooperation in the research and development sector. India and Russia are also cooperating with each other in several multilateral fora like the UNSC, RIC, BRIC and the G-20.

Indian and Russian geo-strategic interests converge at several levels.

They have forged a strategic partnership which is deepening as well as expanding. India is also interested in a multi-polar world in which it can pursue its independent foreign policy.

In the years to come our relations with Russia are set to grow further.

The writer an IFS officer is presently on deputation to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India as Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair in Strategic and Defence Studies. Prior to joining the IDSA, he was Joint Secretary at the National Security Council Secretariat.

At the IDSA he heads the South Asia and Internal Security Clusters and edits the Institute’s flagship bi-monthly journal Strategic Analysis.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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resurgent Russia

DISARMAMENT

It is a truism that neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation have ever sought to bring pressure on India to toe a particular line as did the other signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both did drag their feet on an issue close to India’s heart - complete and universal disarmament - because of their own national interest compulsions. The signing of the New START revives hopes that disarmament can happen at some future date. An area of worry is Russia’s failure to stamp out the proliferation network consisting of China, North Korea and Pakistan.

T

he end of the Cold War was followed by the end of the Soviet Union and the birth of Russia.

Although Russia became a successor of the Soviet nuclear weapons, yet it was under no pressure to continue the entire Soviet’s nuclear policy. It was a free sovereign country to amend the policy and renegotiate the treaty obligations.

However, Russia accepted most of the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union.

Russia supports non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It has accepted the membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The membership of the NPT makes it accept obligations of both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. As it is recognised as a successor State of the former Soviet Union along with its nuclear weapons, it is supposed to take the NPT obligations as a nuclear weapon State.

NPT strictures Article 1 of the NPT lays down: “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.”

The article is crucial for global non-proliferation.

As India does not seek any assistance from Russia for its nuclear

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weapons programme, the Article 1 is meaningless for it. India has developed its own indigenous nuclear weapons programme. Russia, too, does not have any blemish on this front. True, it has been quite assertive in extending civil nuclear energy cooperation to non-western countries, including those countries which are or have been hostile to the western world, but there is no indication that it ever willingly transferred nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or any item for development of these weapons or devices.

Changed stance However, the changed Russian stand on export controls worried India. The Article 3.2 of the NPT prohibits its member country to transfer source and special fissionable material as well as any equipment or material helpful in producing special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State without safeguards. The members of the NPT found the language of the treaty vague and insufficient to guide any transfer.

This resulted in the formation of an informal export controls grouping.

The name of the grouping was the Zangger Committee and its objective was to interpret the mandate for permitted transfer under the NPT. During the Cold War, the Zangger Committee emerged as a cartel of the developed countries, though the end of the Cold War saw new countries joining it. Once many of these countries were targets and thus hostile to the grouping. The successor State of the Soviet Union also joined another group for nuclear export controls. This group was Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

The NSG was formed to bring some important non-NPT suppliers of nuclear item under the control framework. France was the main country of concern which was frequently coming into the limelight in 1970s for entering into civil nuclear energy cooperation with many of the nuclear energy development aspirants in developing countries. Gradually, the NSG overshadowed the Zangger Committee because the control list and guidelines of the former became more comprehensive than the latter.

New NSG members Many other former socialist countries and even the countries which emerged out of the former Soviet Union joined the NSG. Initially, no serious problem surfaced between India and Russia on civil nuclear energy cooperation in the post-Cold War period, though some finance-related problem regarding Kudankulam reactors did come up. The agreements of Kudankulam 1 and 2 were signed in 1988. Later, the Protocol of Intent was signed on construction of additional units at Kudankulam. It seems the provision for additional units at Kudankulam was in the original 1988 agreement, but India signed an agreement for them later. The work on Kudankulam reactors started despite the Russia membership of the NSG. Russia was able to work to proceed on the desired way and speed on the project because the agreement was signed before April 3, 1992.

Delayed commissioning The groundbreaking ceremonies of the first two units took place in 2001.

Although the first unit was supposed to go for commercial operation in

Dr. Rajiv Nayan

Russia's policy: Implications for India December 2007, it may go operational in June 2011. Similarly, the second unit was supposed to go into commercial operation in December 2008, but has now been rescheduled for March 2012.

The dummy fuel assemblies have been loaded in the reactor core. The dummy fuel was made of lead, not uranium.

It is required for testing. However, in 2008, the Nuclear Power Corporation India Limited had received uranium fuel for the Kudankulam reactors.

NSG restrictions The real problem of the Russian membership of the NSG started for India whenever Russia wanted to supply fuel to Tarapur and other items to the Indian civil nuclear energy programme. Other member States asked Russia to follow the guidelines of the NSG. One of the provisions of the NSG was restriction of the items listed on the annexes of the Group. Since 1992, the NSG wanted the member countries to supply any item listed on its technology annexes only after ensuring that a non-nuclear weapon country adopts full scope safeguards.

As Russia is a member of the NPT,

it has to accept the NPT category of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons countries. The NPT divides the world on the basis of going nuclear

by January 1, 1967. All the five countries which went nuclear on January 1, 1967 are enjoying privileges in global nuclear commerce as nuclear weapon countries. As India did not conduct test on or before the NPT cut-off date, it is still being called a non-nuclear weapon country. The problem on nuclear commerce was somewhat rectified through 2008 India-specific exceptions in the NSG. Russia, once again, is unshackled to enter into nuclear energy cooperation with India. In fact, after the NSG waiver, Russia has become very active. Even before the waiver, Russia never took any pro-active role to campaign against India and its nuclear energy programme. The pre-agreed cooperation continued even after 1998 nuclear tests when the US and Japan imposed sanctions on India. Russia also campaigned for waiver in the NSG guidelines for India. Though the US took the initiative, the waiver became possible because of the active role played by several friendly countries

like Russia.

Other control regimes With Obama’s endorsement for the Indian membership of the four multilateral export controls regimes, a new wave of diplomacy has begun. The French President, too, supported the American move when he was in India.

When the Russian President visited India in December 2010, a joint statement was released. The joint statement recorded that “India and the Russian Federation are interested in strengthening multilateral export control regimes as an important component of the global non-proliferation regime. In this regard, the Russian side expressed readiness to assist and promote a discussion and positive decision in the NSG on India’s full membership in the NSG and welcomed India’s intention to seek full membership.

India underscored its determination to actively contribute to international efforts aimed at strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia also took into positive consideration India’s interest in full membership in Missile Technology Control Regime and the

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resurgent Russia Wassanaar Arrangement.”

The Indo-Russia statement was different on the Indian membership of the four multilateral export controls regimes. The most obvious difference was that the Russian silence over the Indian membership for the Australia Group. The reason for it is that Russia itself is not a member of the Australia Group. It supported India for its membership quest of all the other three regimes. The second stark difference is that unlike other two countries, it did not insist on inserting annoying clauses of meeting all the requirements for the membership. The tone and tenor, as always, is positive and cooperative.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) are other two major non-proliferation initiatives in the world. Russia signed and ratified the CTBT. It has also been appealing to other countries to do so. It is also ready for negotiations for an FMCT after de-linking it to weaponisation of space.

It had already called for moratorium on fissile material production. India too is in favour of negotiations for an FMCT; so, the Russian stance will have no negative fallout for India. Even the Russian posture on CTBT should not be worrying India. Unlike the US, Russia has never used coercive diplomacy to promote its non-proliferation policy. It is not bringing any pressure on India.

The Russian support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is quite significant. It has been supporting strengthening of the safeguards system. Once its predecessor State - the Soviet Union - had called the safeguards system a spider’s web suspecting it to throttle the scientific and technological development of the non-Western world in general and the developing world in particular, though gradually it too supported the system. Under the NPT, it embraced a voluntary model.

Nuclear terrorism Similarly, after the break up of the Soviet Union, the Western world in general and the US in particular targeted Russia because of the apprehension that Russian loose nukes may feed nuclear terrorism. Russia now is an active global partner in the fight against potential nuclear terrorism.

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resurgent Russia

DISARMAMENT India should not have serious problem from the Russian policy. It has been receiving nuclear energy partnership in its safeguarded system for a long period. It has enhanced the scope for safeguards after the Indo-US nuclear deal and before the exemptions in the 2008 extended NSG plenary meetings.

India, too, is an important international partner in the fight against nuclear terrorism.

Russia supports incentive-based model for non-proliferation. It has been highly active for nuclear energy promotion under ‘proliferationresistant architecture’ in recent years.

It has been proposing different models for multilateral nuclear fuel cycle. It never opposed the inherent right to nuclear energy of countries irrespective of the NPT. It was always accused of soft pedalling on Iran, though it never endorsed that Iran should go nuclear. It is emerging as an honest broker. India may work with Russia for resolution of the Iranian conundrum. Similarly, India and Russia in the December 2010 joint statement supported the multilateral nuclear fuel cycle.

Proliferation network Russia is also an important member of six-party talks on North Korea nuclear weapons. It did not succeed with other countries in taming North Korea. In fact, on the issue, it seems to have delegated the responsibility to China. As a result, Russia is not able to target the proliferation network which has covert blessings of China.

The soft Russian attitude towards the proliferation network may cause security complications for India.

Disarmament For nuclear disarmament, Article 6 of the NPT demands: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Like any other NPT nuclear weapon country, Russia has been reluctant towards global nuclear disarmament. Through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty it may give an

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impression that it is working towards nuclear disarmament. But in reality, it is planning to have a leaner and modern nuclear force structure by discarding old and redundant weapons.

In one of the statements of the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, nuclear disarmament was linked to ‘the principle of equal and indivisible security’ and ‘all factors capable of affecting strategic stability.’ The statement elaborated, “In particular, such factors include the development of regional missile-defense systems without taking into consideration the security of neighbouring States, possibility of placing weapons in outer space, development of strategic delivery vehicles in non-nuclear configuration, unilateral build-up in strategic missile-defense capabilities, growing imbalance of forces in the area of conventional arms, deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear States etc.”

India and Russia in their December 2010 joint statement emphasised the “need for all States possessing nuclear weapons to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to global nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all.” Thus, India should have little difficulties in a nuclear weapon free world. Actually, it has for long been a champion of nuclear disarmament.

Even in a world with nuclear weapons, India and Russia may have a better understanding to make the world safer and stable. Some of the elements of Russian non-proliferation policy may have posed temporary problems for India, but Russia always tried to help India overcome the problem arising out of its policy. With the incremental integration of India with the global non-proliferation regime, negative implications of the Russian non-proliferation policy are on the wane.

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control.

He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he published his monograph - Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia.

EQUILIBRIUM

India and Russia: new realities

Prof. Nalini Kant Jha

It is recognised to be one of the world’s most unique relationships. It was not for nothing that at moments in contemporary history observers tended to describe them as “natural allies”. Nevertheless, the world is evolving at a faster rate than ever in living memory. New fusions are taking place and attempts at reviving old defence-related blocs could impinge on regional perceptions. India has improved relations with the US way beyond anything there ever was and a resurgent Russia has been quick to pick up the severed strands from the Soviet era. The near horizon is rosy.

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resurgent Russia

EQUILIBRIUM

I

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ndia’s relationship with the former USSR and its successor State, Russia, has been one of the rare examples of enduring friendship in the history of international relations.

This relationship had, of course, to encounter great turbulence after the crumbling of the former USSR in December 1991, for, this signalled an end of an era when India could count on the Soviet politico-diplomatic and military support. India had reasons to be worried over the fall of Kremlin as Soviet hardware constituted about 70 per cent of India’s weaponry and the supply of military spare parts was seriously disrupted. Russia reduced its 260 strong Trade Mission in New Delhi by half and spares, which were supplied earlier on deferred payment for three to four years, were discontinued.

Compounding the problem was the fact that facilities required by India were scattered throughout the former republics.

a historic Declaration on Strategic Partnership, which revived the depth of India-Russia friendship. Both sides made it clear that the strategic partnership is not a new alliance; rather it can be traced back to the close linkages that existed between the two countries for the last 50 years. The declaration clearly said the strategic ties were based on a broad convergence of long-term interests and goals and the complementarities of their economies in the absence of any antagonistic difference or rivalry. The two countries have since streamlined and expanded defence cooperation, with Russia offering India unlimited access to cutting-edge military technologies and helping it set up a strong diversified defence industry. India and Russia have revitalised political contacts, establishing a mechanism of annual bilateral summits, as well as regular Foreign Ministry and Security Council consultations.

Revolutionary change

Factors for convergence

India though renewed the Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971 with Russia for a further period of twenty years in 1991, yet it became evident soon that Russia, which was reduced to a shadow of the erstwhile Soviet Union, was no longer in a position to continue to extend material support to India as earlier done by Soviet Russia. It appeared that a pro-Atlantic approach in the postSoviet Moscow’s foreign policy sidelined the strategic character of its ties with New Delhi. This was vividly reflected in Russia’s refusal to supply cryogenic rocket technology to India in 1993 due to American pressures. For 10 years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, New Delhi-Moscow ties were thus in a state of overall drift, notwithstanding exchanges of visits and declarations etc. as Russia struggled with the economic meltdown and President Boris Yeltsin’s government was not very enthusiastic about what it considered an ideology-driven special relationship of the Soviet times.

Putin turnaround

Several factors have pushed both countries towards cooperation. First, the post-Yelstin Russia has given up its submissive policy, tried to revive Russia’s international role and move the world towards multipolarity. This has brought Russia closer to India and China, who too desire a multipolar world. Secondly, India and Russia have realised that their strengthening of military and strategic relations would help them to reduce dependency on other countries in terms of security, energy and influence in the international system. Thirdly, Russia’s position on Kashmir and cross-border terrorism against India has been consistent over time despite of changes of system and regimes. This has made Russia a reliable friend of India. While the US is more concerned with terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia and India are more concerned with Kashmir and Chechnya. On the issue of terrorism, therefore, the threats perceived by Russia and India are more unique then others. Hence, both the countries feel more convenient to cooperate on this issue.

The turning point in India-Russia relations came 10 years after the collapse of the USSR, when Vladimir Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin. During his first visit to India in October 2000, India and Russia signed

Besides, as a fast developing economy and energy hungry country, India’s interests in the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are increasing continuously because of

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

availability of gas and natural resources in these countries. Strategic location of these counties, bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan and West Asia, make them vital for India’s security. As Russia is an undeniable power in the region, which has challenged an increasing US influence in the area in the guise of ‘colour revolutions,’ India needs Russia for strengthening its ties with CARs, Finally, India is dependent on Russia for almost 70 per cent of its military hardware. During the Cold War period, Indo-Russia relations were mostly dominated by supplier-client relations.

After the Cold War, however, India’s import from Russia has helped sustain the economies of the Russian military industrial complex and 800 Russian defence industries have kept working on Indian orders. India is one of the world’s most lucrative arms markets, where Russian share is US$ 4.8 billion.

Russia is not willing to leave the arms market in India, which is increasingly chased by the US and other countries.

India wants checks and balances for continuing its relations with Russia.

A mutual dependency between India and Russia in the defence sector is thus determining their relations.

Areas of cooperation As the above discussion suggests, the first and foremost area of cooperation between the two countries has been strategic and military cooperation.

Both countries signed the Indo-Russia Strategic Agreement of 2001, which gives Indo-Russia relations a multiple direction and establishes strategic and political sub-systems within a bilateral framework. Convergence of views on Kashmir, terrorism and moving the world towards multipolarity apart, they share views on various global issues. Hence India and Russia established ‘Joint Working Group on Global Challenges’, where the countries have agreed to work together on global issues. The establishment of the ‘Eminent Persons Group’ in 2000, with the objective of ‘rendering assistance’ and ‘preparing recommendations’ indicates the essential cooperation between the countries on global issues.

Hence, both countries are forging favourable strategic networks. Without affecting India’s relations with the US, New Delhi is trying to coordinate with both Russia and China on issues of common concerns such as trade and

climate change through groupings like BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and RIC (Russia, India and China). In other areas, however, Beijing is competing with New Delhi, whereas Moscow is cooperating with it.

Moscow and New Delhi are concerned about growing clout of Taliban and therefore have set up a ‘Joint Working Group, (JWG) on Afghanistan. In the case of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), while Russia is backing India to get its membership, China is backing Pakistan.

In the field of defence, both the countries concluded an accord on the transfer of Admiral Gorshkov to India by 2004. The value of the deal was US$ 1.5 billion. It was stipulated to allocate US$ 974 million for the modernisation and refurbishment of Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier and US$ 530 million for the delivery of 16 MiG-29K multi-role carrier-based fighters and Ka-31 and K-27 maritime reconnaissance helicopters. In October 2007, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in Moscow on joint development of an advanced multi-functional fighter aircraft of the fifth generation.

The project is the largest collaboration between India and Russia on the military technical issues. The data provided by Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), the Military Technical Cooperation with India till 2010 comprises around 200 projects.

Military knowhow During the New Delhi visit of Russian President Medvedev in December 2010, both countries agreed for the joint development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft, the Sukhoi T-50. The total cost of this project alone, which includes production of 200-250 jets, stands at over US$ 30 billion. It has implications that extend beyond the immediate deliverables for the armed forces. Indian Air Force will eventually acquire a technologically advanced aircraft as good as any being developed in the US or Europe.

Besides, by inking such deals, New Delhi has enhanced its market’s

cooperation in each other’s country as well as in third countries. Russia is the traditional partner for India in electricity production.

In this respect, Russian participation in mini-hydro projects is significant. India is also eager to take help from Russia in the modernisation of its coal and metallurgy industry.

competitiveness with regard to other players that are currently reluctant to share sensitive technology. Care must however be taken to keep development and manufacturing costs down and ensure sufficient diffusion of knowhow so that India’s own capabilities in aircraft design and manufacturing are enhanced through this process.

GLONASS breakthrough Both countries are coordinating in the areas of space exploration, industrial accelerators, high-temperature synthesis, earth sciences and semi-conducting materials.

The Russia-India space cooperation is mainly related to space navigation, lunar exploration and man-controlled space flight programmes. In 2008, during the visit of Vladimir Putin, an unparallelled Agreement on Long-Term Cooperation in Joint Development and Use of Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) was signed. Both the countries have agreed to send an Indian astronaut on a space mission on a Russian space vessel tentatively in 2013.

Energy cooperation In the energy sector, India has invested US$ 1.7 billion in the Sakhalin energy project from where the first oil shipment has reached India. India is thinking to import 50 million tons of oil annually from Russia. Russian gas giant Gazprom has entered into a strategic cooperation agreement with Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) and has also signed an MOU with Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh Ltd. for projects to supply gas and hydrocarbons. Gazprom and GAIL have also signed MOU for joint

Nuclear energy is yet another vital area of Indo-Russian cooperation.

The Kudankulam nuclear plant with two reactors is under construction in Tamil Nadu state of India with Russian help. During President Dmitry Medvedev’s first visit to India in 2008 both countries signed an agreement for the construction of four more reactors with Russian technical assistance. Russia is likely to be involved in building several more nuclear plants in the east coast of India.

Experts talk about construction of about 20 nuclear reactors in India with the help of Russia. In the civil nuclear field, Russia has been the fastest off the block ever since the Nuclear Suppliers Group voted to exempt India from its export restrictions.

Other sectors Both countries are collaborating in several other areas as well. For instance, Russian companies are successfully taking part in India’s huge highway constructions. Russia is very keen to take help from the Indian Information Technology (IT) industry.

President Putin visited India’s IT hub in Bangalore in 2004 and expressed intention to develop cooperation with India in the sector. To boost bilateral trade and investment, Moscow and New Delhi have signed mutual investment protection and avoidance of double taxation. The opening of banking facilities, facilitating shipping arrangements, ensuring insurance coverage and solving the visa problems are under consideration of both countries. Both sides have set up a Joint Study Group (JSG) to finalise a roadmap for increasing the bilateral trade turnover.

Limitations of cooperation But the glass of Indo-Russian strategic

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resurgent Russia

EQUILIBRIUM

partnership is still half full. Economic ties are too weak to sustain further strengthening of strategic relations.

Bilateral trade, which was at only US$ 7.5 billion last year is expected to reach US$ 10 billion during the current financial year (2010-11). Compositions of the Indian exports to Russia are dominated by tea, coffee, rice, tobacco, textiles and pharmaceutical products constitute almost 80 per cent. Similarly, the Russian exports to India are limited to metals, newsprints, chemicals and fertilizers. Areas of growth potential - diamonds and IT, etc. - are routinely identified but without significant progress. The target of raising the two-way trade turnover to US$ 20 billion by 2015 seems unachievable, because Russia’s GDP fell back around 8 per cent last year due to recession and more importantly, given the structural problems in India-Russia trade, including in banking ties.

New regional tensions The relatively weak economic foundation makes Indo-Russian relations sensitive to quickening shifts in regional power equations. India seeks close partnership with the US to deal with the challenge of a rising China.

But Moscow believes that the new US strategy of containing China is fraught with new tensions and security risks in the Asia-Pacific region. Contours of the US strategy were outlined last November when President Obama and his colleagues toured the region.

They revived the Cold War-era Pacific Security Pact, ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US), strengthened defence alliances with Japan and South Korea and vowed to beef up US military presence in the region. Russia voiced a strong opposition to bloc-building.

Russia and China have put forward their own security plan for Asia. During Russian President Medvedev’s visit to China last September, the two sides unveiled a “joint initiative” to build “an open, transparent and equitable architecture of security and cooperation based on international law, non-bloc principles and respect for the legitimate interests of all sides.” India, however, refused to sign the initiative, striking down the reference to “non-bloc” principles for Asia-Pacific security in the joint communiqué of the RIC meeting of Foreign Ministers in Wuhan, China, which came on the heels of President Obama’s visit to India. India’s refusal to

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support the Russia-China security plan was seen in Moscow as having been prompted by its unwillingness to rub the US the wrong way.

Hiccups The delay in delivery schedule of the Russian aircraft carrier Gorkshov and doubling its price created turbulence in India-Russia relations. While the issue has hopefully been resolved by settling the final cost at US$ 2.3 billion, this controversy has seriously dented Russia’s credibility in honouring contractual obligations. Hence, New Delhi must take care to diversify and wean its armed forces from over-reliance on Russian equipment.

New Delhi too cannot be absolved from blame for limiting cooperation.

The construction of Russian nuclear reactors at Kudankulum, for instance, has run afoul of New Delhi’s stringent liability laws. The government will need to review these laws at some point, or else lose out on the fruits of nuclear power. There are issues with further investment in Russia’s Sakhalin oil and gas projects. These are symptoms of a glaring shortfall in economic ties outside the defence sphere.

There has of course been goodwill between peoples of both the countries.

But for the younger lot, exposed much more to the West than their parents, India is a fading, distant memory.

Awara and the Kapoors have no name recall among them. Visitors from Russia say that most Russians were not aware of the celebrations of “Year of India in Russia” in 2009 just as not many in India knew that 2008 was celebrated in India as the “Year of Russia in India.”

Special partnership The above mentioned limitations on Russia-India ties notwithstanding, New Delhi and Moscow have kept up a special partnership that has lasted more than half a century and is perhaps unique in the annals of world diplomacy.

Barring the barren years of the Yeltsin period soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India has had a greater and more sustained comfort level in political dealings with Russia than with any other world power. For the Russian side too, India has been a dependable partner whose value has been both political and economic.

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In commercial terms, the recent visits to India of US President Barack Obama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao may have yielded a bigger and more immediate harvest. But the 30 agreements signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Dmitry Medvedev during the latter’s visit to New Delhi last December, will, if fully implemented, pave the way for full-spectrum progress across a range of key sectors from nuclear energy and hydrocarbons to research and development, pharmaceuticals and information technology. The latest visit also produced a welcome first in easing visa restrictions for business and transit travellers.

More significantly, by endorsing India’s bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and other technology control regimes, SCO and APEC as well as by calling upon Pakistan to bring to justice the perpetrators of 26/11 attack on Mumbai, President Dmitry Medvedev re-confirmed the time-tested friendship with India.

He also put to rest the doubts that had begun to creep in - defence ties at a time of increasing US, European and Israeli presence in the Indian defence market, as well as Russia’s increasing security cooperation with Pakistan.

For India, relations with the US and with Russia are not a zero-sum game.

Improvement of our ties with the US has coincided with the deterioration of Russia’s ties with it. India should not lose sense of its strategic direction with the compass now pointing steadily towards the US. In turn, Russia should be ready to woo India more than it is habituated to. Its decision-makers need to evaluate better the phenomenon of India’s rise as an economic power and the wider options it now has.

In the new scenario, expanding the relationship would require dedicated effort, but even maintaining it at the current level would not be a lesser challenge.

The writer is Professor and Head of Politics and International Studies, Center for South Asian Studies and Director, UNESCO M. S. Institute for South Asia Cooperation at Pondicherry (Central) University. He is a prolific writer and has published many books on Foreign Policy, Nuclear Synergy, Peace and Security etc.

resurgent Russia

PARADIGM SHIFT

Because the world is in a state of flux and the, as yet, hazy outlines of multipolarity show that it has not totally emerged from the debris of the Cold War the relationship between the undisputed “Super Powers” remains undefined. They are not friends if one is to make a judgement based on events in Europe. And they are not rivals as when Communism was set in implacable confrontation with Capitalism. Communism isn’t dead yet and Capitalism looks as if it has shot itself in the foot. It is because of this dichotomy that there is the shadow-play of multipolarity. Hence the flux.

T

he state of Russia-US relations has undergone considerable transformation after the Cold War in general and since the terrorist attacks on the American symbols of sovereignty on September 11, 2001 in particular.

Relations between Russia and the United States have been in constant flux since 1991. Lingering Cold War attitudes in both capitals have lent themselves to an environment of restrained cooperation visible in the tentative nature of each country’s relations with the other. After 9/11, however, relations between Moscow and Washington appeared to improve considerably.

Many scholars and politicians heralded a new era of friendship between the two former enemies and there was optimism about the direction this new relationship would take; Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin seemed to have been able to forge a congenial relationship between Russian and American presidents where their predecessors had failed.

Relationship of convenience What exists between the two States currently is neither enduring partnership nor inherent hostility.

Instead, Presidents Medvedev and Obama have a relationship of convenience and this, arguably, is the most positive one can reasonably expect from the two leaders given the realities of the post-Cold War era. But it will not be an understatement to say that the relations between the two countries are passing through a critical phase when they have followed a rough course with

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glimpses of smooth patches in between.

Russo-US tension Although, there is no endemic reason for Russian-US relations to be as tense as they have been over the past several years. This situation is largely due, on one side, to mishandling of Russian affairs by both the Clinton and Bush administrations and on the other by the obvious manipulation of anti-Americanism for domestic gain by the Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev administrations in Russia. Unfortunately, this means that only unilateral rather than combined actions can determine the policies of the respective countries and restore dynamism to the Russian-US relationship.

It is sometimes argued that weapons and nuclear weapons in particular, were the source of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons are what keep cold wars “cold”- they do not cause them.

This point about arms races should be obvious, but often is ignored: if nuclear weapons caused cold wars, then the US would right now be in a “cold war” with any other nuclear power.

The prime issues in Russo-American relations - apart from economic and political reform - remain arms control (or nuclear security) and cooperation in the UN Security Council. Firstly, there is an incomplete congruence of interests. Both nuclear super powers wish to reduce and / or redeploy forces for reasons of cost and effectiveness and the signing of the New Strategic

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Arms Reduction Treaty that builds on a previous agreement is a case in point. Yet their interests differ owing to different force postures and perceived threats and there is an inequality of interest. Secondly, Russia facing pressing domestic problems cannot fully share US concerns about weapons proliferation, especially since arms and related exports are a major tenet of its economic and national security strategies. Finally, the Duma has an important voice owing to its ratification powers. Initially regarded in Washington as a short-lived or reformable atavism, the parliament showed great staying power on behalf of its view of Russian interests.

UN Security Council cooperation offers a weaker Russia a lever of influence less affected by the Duma (yet still subject to its restrictive impact through domestic politics). Russia’s ‘veto’ - like those of China or France - is a fact that cannot be ignored by Washington in making policy, although it may sometimes be circumvented through other channels for action. Taken together, though, the factors in the relative balance of political power are not as unfavourable to Moscow as might be imagined. Despite its control of the international lending institutions, Washington cannot dictate to, nor even shun, Moscow owing to Russia’s nuclear arsenal, UN veto, an obstinate Duma, as well as to lesser levers.

Energy super power Russia’s re-emergence has been more as an energy super power than one in the traditional political and military

Russia and US:

adversaries or future allies?

sense. Putin formally declared fairly early on in his presidency that he has rejected the ‘Eurasian’ option in favour of ties with the West. Some liberal analysts in Russia during this period hoped that this would eventually lead to Russia becoming effectively part of a ‘Greater Europe’. Putin indeed

strongly supported the United States following the 9/11 attacks and sought a dialogue with NATO. But, the main focus in Russian foreign policy in this period was not so much anti-Western but pluralistic in the sense that it sought to challenge US unipolar domination of the global system and build alliances

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

with a range of States that could secure the return of a balance of power in the international system. It was in many ways (and somewhat ironically) the George W. Bush administration in the US which chose to play geopolitics by attempting to exercise its hegemonic position in international politics

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resurgent Russia

PARADIGM SHIFT

Today Russia and the US are still unable to define what their relationship is: Are they allies or adversaries, partners or rivals (or a mixture of all of this)? The distrust and inadequate understanding of each other, accumulated during the past twenty years have certainly contributed to this condition of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Given current international economic and political realities, both countries view each other as powers which do not have the same old status through a global ‘war on terror’.

Russia strongly opposes US interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The United States has three pillars in its global strategy: military security, economic interests and democracy and human rights.

The unipolar environment has led the United States to feel more confident and more likely to interfere in others’ internal affairs. As a consequence, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs has been a constant source of tension between the two countries and continues to be so.

US unipolarity?

For the United States, Russia and China are the two main barriers to the realisation of unipolarity and its dominance in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States continues its dual policy towards Russia. On the one hand, the United States will keep on squeezing Russian strategic space, reducing the Russian sphere of influence and weaken its military power. On the other hand, the United States will try hard to keep Russia on the track of democracy, neither retreating to the communist past nor leaning towards nationalistic authoritarianism.

Despite the fact that the United States is the only super power in the world today, it is unable to realise its goal on its own. It needs both allies and the co-operation of other parties. In Eurasia, the United States needs Russia’s co-operation and in the Asia-Pacific region the United States needs China’s co-operation. On global issues, such as non-proliferation, environmental protection and countering terrorism and organised crime, the United States, Russia and China have many common interests.

Renewed cooperation Both sides have deep incentives to cooperate as they share common concerns. The two countries embarked

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on a new and uncharted path to replace the expiring START Treaty with a new agreement reflecting progress in arms control and the changes in the world and in the US-Russian relationship over the 20 years since START was negotiated.

By sheer numbers this deal may not be as impressive as previous treaties. But it exhibited that both were now trying to restore the consistent framework of arms control cooperation and interaction designed to bring them closer.

The treaty sanctions Russia its status of a first-rate power and the US recognises the need to establish a cooperative relationship based on equality.

The fact that the US signs such a treaty with Russia and not with any other power reinforces the role of Russia in world affairs and confirms that it is still one of the leading centres of power in the international arena and that its interests should be taken into consideration.

Following the signing of the New START both Presidents pledged to boost economic ties. This suggests perhaps a new, more pragmatic, realist and constructive dimension of bilateral relations.

The New START Treaty is not just about Washington and Moscow. It is about the entire world community.

While the treaty is bilateral, it has big implications for global security.

The United States and Russia control more than 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear arsenal and the world looks to these two countries for leadership in securing nuclear materials globally and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, the new treaty sets the stage for engaging other powers in fulfilling the goals of the NPT.

Pressure on US Fresh from signing a strategic nuclear arms agreement with Russia, the

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

United States is parrying a push by several NATO allies to withdraw its aging stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Hillary Clinton

said the Obama administration was not opposed to cuts in these battlefield weapons, mostly bombs and shortrange missiles locked in underground vaults on air bases in five NATO countries. But Mrs. Clinton ruled out removing these weapons unless Russia agreed to cuts in its arsenal, which is at least ten times the size of the American one. And she also appeared to make reductions in the American stockpile contingent on Russia’s being more transparent about its weapons and willing to move them away from the borders of NATO countries. “We should recognise that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” Mrs. Clinton said.

“As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental.” So, there is recognition that the key to a successful US-Russia policy is the renewal of America’s transatlantic alliance with Europe and hence the need to engage Russia.

The United States and Russia have also signed a deal to dispose of tons of weapons-grade plutonium, a sign of increased cooperation between the two former Cold War foes toward their joint goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed the agreement, which calls on each side to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium by burning it in nuclear reactors.

Paradigm shift Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stressed the need to cooperate and said - “In our bilateral relations, we need more successful investment projects, joint research and development efforts, greater volume of high-tech trade. This would strengthen the material foundation of our partnership and make it much less vulnerable to the temptations to play the old geopolitical zero-sum games, which nowadays have nothing to do with the fundamental national interest of our two great nations.”

In economic and trade relations, these two countries need each other. This is the one area where the countries share more commonalities than differences.

Nevertheless, trade has grown rapidly in recent years and there is room to

further strengthen economic ties. It has been pointed out that closer economic relations may also stabilise the political relationship between Russia and the US.

Outstanding issues These two countries differ greatly in political and ideological perspectives.

They disagree on what kind of new international order should be built and on the justification of interfering in others’ internal affairs. They often argue about the applicability of western values in other parts of the world. However, the United States and Russia share common interests in scientific and technological co-operation, economic complementarities and trade.

On the one hand, political differences keep them from greater diplomatic intimacy, on the other, their economic interests will preclude them from moving further apart.

All in all, these two factors set limits to turbulence in their relationships.

The United States has pushed hard for further political and economic reforms in Russia, while Russia bristles at what they see as meddling in internal affairs. The United States and it allies in NATO have invited new, former Soviet nations to join the alliance in the face of deep Russian opposition.

Russia and the United States have clashed over how best to settle the final status of Kosovo and how to treat Iran’s efforts to gain nuclear weapons.

Russia has one strategic goal that fully coincides with those of America and Europe: Russia does not want a new nuclear-armed State on its borders,” said Alexander Konovalov, Head of the Institute of Strategic Assessments in Moscow. “It is a much more immediate problem for us than for the United States.” Although, Kremlin faces a delicate balancing act as it tries to slow down Tehran’s nuclear drive while maintaining a workable relationship with Iran, which lies less than 200 kilometers from Russia’s southern border. Notably, Moscow has refused to endorse western proposals

for “crippling sanctions” such as a ban on gasoline exports to Iran.

Full-fledged sanctions will not get Russia’s support. Russia’s position is that the objective of a fourth round of UN sanctions should not be to punish Iran but to “strengthen the nonproliferation regime.” Diplomats have said that this means Russia favours any new UN measures to focus exclusively on Iran’s nuclear and missile industries.

So, there is limited convergence of interest with the United States.

Rifts exist Russia’s military action in Georgia highlighted the rift in US-Russian relations. Washington launched a stinging attack on Russia for the scale of force used against Georgia, saying Russia’s actions were designed to “punish” Georgia for daring to integrate with western organisations, such as NATO, which are outside Russia’s influence. Russia opposes NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, fearing the expansion of a potentially hostile military alliance along its borders.

Russia and the United States differ on the Chechen issue as well. The United States has attacked Russia for its military action against the Chechen rebels as a violation of human rights.

Russia has responded by arguing that their action against terrorism in Chechnya was fully justified.

Furthermore, Russia points out that by opposing the Russian operation in Chechnya the United States aims to make trouble in order to control the Central Asian and Caspian Sea region.

Resentment against unilateral US action has pushed Russia by default into closer relations with China in what has been termed a ‘strategic partnership’.

Russia recently surpassed Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil producer. It is home to the largest known natural gas reserves on earth. With those resources under their control, the Russian government has a significant interest on keeping the price of oil high and it is also in a good geo-strategic position to exert its influence on price in divergence with the US interests.

On the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence plans to locate parts of an anti-missile defence system in central

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resurgent Russia

resurgent Russia

PARADIGM SHIFT

GREAT POWER

the Russian renascence!

Europe which requires interceptor missiles to be deployed in Poland, with radar detector installations in the Czech Republic, there is a rift. President Bush says the system is designed to protect against missile attacks from countries such as Iran. Russia opposes the plan, saying it would upset the strategic balance in the region by putting Russia at a military disadvantage. Though, Moscow is interested in cooperation with NATO on this issue it remains an unfinished task to arrive at any consensus.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

So, both the countries have many outstanding issues to address which will be a challenge for the diplomatic acumen and maturity of both Russia and the United States.

Road ahead For the United States instability in Russia is even more dangerous than a hostile Russia. While addressing a meeting in Russia US president said that America needs a powerful, peaceful and prosperous Russia. But Russia in turn also needs a responsible, peaceful, recognised and dynamic developing America - an America that enjoys the respect of the entire international community, that develops partnership with other countries on an equal footing and that develops its position towards the development of a new system of international relations.

That would be a great thing to achieve.

The US Ambassador to Russia, James Collins, has stated that a weak and unpredictable Russia would be a major source of instability in Europe and Asia. The United States believes that the weakening of Russia could bring unthinkable consequences concerning the disposal of nuclear weapons, control over strategic nuclear missiles, organised crime both inside and outside Russia and the spread of pollution and infections. Former American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once said that three-quarters of US aid to Russia is used to reduce the threat of nuclear war and to avoid weapons of mass destruction falling into hostile hands which remains a prime worry for the United States.

Dmitry Medvedev while addressing a meeting at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC after the April treaty made an important admission

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worth taking note, that, “I am glad that, over the last year, we managed to change the atmosphere of the Russian-American relationships. That doesn’t mean that our relations have become cloudless and everything is perfect, but the environment has been changed and there are direct results. But we should not try to find differences; we should build a long-time pragmatic relationship for the future based upon democratic values and economic freedom and common goals to counter global threats. We will cooperate with the United States on the most important issues like countering terrorism, trans-border crime and piracy.” This sums up the present state of the relationship where we can hope to see cooperation in non-controversial areas but the sources of conflict still remain which will continue to have the propensity to create turbulence in their relationship.

Confounding relationship Today Russia and the US are still unable to define what their relationship is: Are they allies or adversaries, partners or rivals (or a mixture of all of this)? The distrust and inadequate understanding of each other, accumulated during the past twenty years have certainly contributed to this condition of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Given current international economic and political realities, both countries view

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

each other as powers which do not have the same old status. The US does not fully trust the future of Russia; Russia too, often reminds that the era of US domination is not going to continue eternally. Thus clarity with regard to Russia-US relations is still far off.

In the coming twenty years, the world will further evolve in the direction of multi-polarity and globalisation.

The new revolution in science and technology centred on information, biotechnology and new materials will change not only people’s mindsets but also international relations. The correlation of forces between these two countries will continue to develop in an unbalanced way. Contradictions and differences are natural and should be expected. The two nations will have to readjust mutual relations. Although the future is filled with expectation, uncertainty and unpredictability, these changes and readjustments create opportunities. After all, to strive for a safer world and a better life is the common wish of humankind. To this extent at least, we have reason to be cautiously optimistic that relations between these two countries would drift from adversarial overtones to being pragmatic allies.

The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Allahabad Central University, Allahabad, India.

The world may be moving towards multipolarity but even within the new emerging structure there are seeds of future instability. A resurgent Russia and an emerging India will need to find more stable political / economic / military equations than those that are on the near horizon. An undependable America and a reassertive China have to be managed with great sagacity. It is fortunate for India that the one stable pole is Russia just as it has been through the highs and lows of contemporary history.

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or the past five decades Indo-Russian relations have been characterised by a strong congruence of national interests.

Post the Chinese attack on India in 1962, India had panicked and sought Western military intervention and aid.

Very little was forthcoming (besides small arms for a Mountain Division).

There was a lot of western pressure however to settle the Kashmir issue

with Pakistan. It was at this juncture that the Soviet Union had come forth to assist India. As the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, the Soviet Union took a conscious decision to build up India as a military counterweight to China. The Soviet Union heavily subsidised the Indian military build-up in the 1970s and 1980s and provided us valuable diplomatic and military support that enabled India to break Pakistan into

two in the 1971 war.

Great power The Soviet Union was once the greatest empire of history. It stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific and straddled two continents. It had more or less defeated Nazi Germany single handedly and paid a terrible price in terms of 25 million casualties. The titanic

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resurgent Russia

GREAT POWER

struggle with Nazi Germany had largely drained this empire. The end of the war however saw it at its peak of power as it conquered East Europe and reached Berlin. The Cold War competition with the West brought imperial overstretch and overreach. It was not so much the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as the oil glut and collapse of the oil prices in the 1980s, that brought about a sudden collapse of the Soviet economy.

The Soviet empire disintegrated. Chaos was generated in its vast territories.

Overnight the familiar bipolar world order was transformed forever.

Ups and downs The Soviet Union’s share of the world’s military expenditure in 1990 was 17.8 per cent. Today it has fallen to 2.9 per cent. The former Soviet Union posed the most credible military threat of an overland invasion to China.

The lessons of the 1967 clash on the Damansky Island in Ussuri river had been salutary for the Chinese. Worried about Soviet power and assertiveness, China had made its peace with America in 1971. The West and China had joined to oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union had freed China of its most worrisome military threat.

Deng Xiaoping said the era of large scale wars was now over and began to demobilise the 3.5 million strong Peoples Liberation Army and revamp its war theories of drawing the invader deep inside China to annihilate him.

The West rejoiced and hailed the demise of the USSR as the “End of History”. Russia however had been written off many times earlier. It was written off during the First World War. The Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War followed. Just before the Second World War, a German sting operation had made Stalin paranoid. He purged his military chief (Marshal Tukhachevsky) and thousands of Soviet army officers.

The Red Army was reeling from this devastating purge even as the Second World War began. The Soviet invasion of Finland (before World War II) was a disaster of sorts. In the war, Hitler launched Op Barbarossa and almost reached the gates of Moscow. The world had written off Russia then (even as it had done so at the time of Napoleon’s invasion).

The tenacious Russians however

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fought back fiercely. From the Gates of Moscow, the Red Army steamrolled into eastern Europe and then Berlin - the capital of Nazi Germany itself and became a super power. It remained one for nearly five decades after the War. The sudden collapse of the USSR in 1991 had once again prompted the world to write off Russia forever and consign it to the dustbin of history.

The revival However once again Russia has staged a remarkable revival. It took over a decade to stabilise from the chaos unleashed by the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. However the advent of Putin brought in an element of strong and decisive leadership. The Russian revival was largely underwritten by the steep rise in the price of oil and gas in the first decade of the 21st century.

It is noteworthy that the oil glut of the 1980s had torpedoed the Soviet economy. The Russian revival was largely the result of its energy exports as also the export of Russian weapons to China and India.

Russia has recorded economic growth of over 7.2 per cent in the last five years – a buoyancy imparted by high oil prices. The coming decade is likely to witness a resurrection of the Russian defence industry. Increased outlays on defence research and development are clearly visible and the Russian defence budget has grown by more than 19.8 per cent in the years 2006-2008. The remarkable turnaround was visible in the much better performance of the Russian army in the second Chechnya campaign. It was characterised by typical Russian ruthlessness. Historically the Russians have never recognised the distinction between conventional war and insurgencies. Their use of force has always been unrestrained and lethal.

The fact is that it worked once again and Chechnya is largely pacified.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had steadily expanded its influence in Eastern Europe.

America firmly has a foot in the door in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Ukraine and Georgia were seeking NATO membership when Russia struck back fiercely in Georgia in 2008. Its swift blitzkrieg and rout of the Georgian forces left the world stunned. Georgia

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signified the Russian turnaround and reassertion of its will and military capacity.

Russia and China A key foreign policy construct of the Russians (to create a new power balance to checkmate the emergence of America as the world’s sole super power), was to try and orchestrate a Russia-China-India triangle.

The Chinese took the fullest advantage of this Russian phase of weakness.

While India was desperately seeking spare parts for its Russian weapons, the Chinese shopped for Soviet aircraft designers, engineers and scientists. They had modernised their economy with western help. Denied western arms after Tiananmen, they turned to Russia and purchased Mig-29, SU-27, SU-30 jet fighters, Sovermeny class destroyers and Kilo class submarines as also the hulks of old Soviet era aircraft carriers (ostensibly at scrap prices as floating casinos).

The Chinese and Indian military purchases shored up the Russian military-industrial complex through its phase of economic collapse and have contributed towards reviving the Russian economy. However unlike the Indians, the Chinese purchased only small quantities of Soviet fighters. They quickly reverse engineered them with the help of hired Soviet designers and began to mass produce their copies called the J-10 (A Mig-29 variant with Israeli Lavi features) and the J-11 (a clone of the SU-27). Not only that, they developed the JF-17 with Pakistan based on the Mig-29 engine. This has worried the Russians. The Chinese clearly are hedging for a future in which the Russians could once again become adversaries.

Long-term threat?

Despite the Russian resurgence, demographic factors and low birth rates put upper limits on Russian military power. An ageing population cannot sustain a military revival. At 1.4 billion the Chinese population is now the largest in the world. Former Chinese Defence Minister Xi Haotian has been openly talking of the need for lebensraum - for living space for China’s vast population. It is noteworthy that the levels of Chinese illegal migration into Russia’s Siberia and Far East

are reaching alarming proportions.

Haotian’s diatribes on lebensraum for the Chinese sound eerily like Nazi rhetoric on racial superiority and the need for “living space” for the master race. Water scarcity and environmental degradation are bound to put severe pressure on the Chinese landmass and could trigger outward migration / expansion. In the long-term, the Russians are acutely aware of this threat. However in the short term, they still seem focused on the concept of the Russia-China-India triangle and the BRIC framework to balance the power of the US and nudge a unipolar world order into a multi-polar one.

Second paradigm shift There is however a significant paradigm shift now taking place in the global order. Iraq and Afghanistan have sharply highlighted the limits of American power. In 2009-2010, the Chinese suddenly jettisoned their “Hide your capabilities, Bide your time” stance and have turned highly assertive and aggressive. This has sent shock waves through East, South East and South Asia. Even the Americans were shaken by the Chinese virulence over the Yellow Sea naval exercises. The PLA’s modernisation is accelerating and is specifically tailored towards countering US power projection capabilities. It is focused on anti-access / access-denial strategy and countervailing capabilities like the aircraft carrier killer Dong-Feng-21D missiles, anti-satellite missiles and cyber warfare capabilities.

The Chinese unveiled their fifth generation stealth fighter during US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates's visit to Beijing.

The Europeans have also noted the rise of an assertive China and concluded that it would not pay to incur Russian hostility in such a scenario. In November 2010 the NATO-Russian dialogue has gone a long way to mitigate hostility. Western truculence towards Russia has been significantly watered down.

India's pivotal role The US, Europe and Russia have all recognised the pivotal role that India can play in counter balancing a rising and assertive China. India is the most critical key swing state of the 21st

century. It is the only country in Asia with the demographic and economic resources and military potential to stand up to an aggressive China.

To do so it will have to transform its economic strength into viable military power. That is why there was a stream of important heads of state from the United States, France, UK, Russia and China making a beeline for New Delhi in 2010. The highly adversarial equation between the west and Russia post-Georgia had put India in a cleft-stick. The simple fact is that Russia is still India’s most trusted and reliable military partner.

Indo-Russian relations have stood the test of time. Russian weapons are rugged and reliable. The most critical fact is that it is only Russia that is willing to offer absolute cutting edge technologies to India, to include fifth generation stealth fighters, nuclear submarines, space rocket technology and GLONASS - navigation and situational awareness satellite support.

The US has never offered to sell us such technologies.

New equations With the Chinese turning aggressive - a US-India strategic partnership makes the greatest geo-political sense.

Both sides realise this. Once again, however, the Pentagon’s penchant for shoring up a sinking Pakistan seems to be coming in the way of actualising the potential of such a partnership.

Though the Americans have offered to sell a host of weapons to India, most of these deals were complicated by a slew of restrictive legal requirements.

The assasination of Salmaan Taseer in Pakistan has shaken the USA. If this is the reliability index of even Barelvi (not Wahabi) security guards, how safe is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? For once the Pentagon has been advocating punitive measures against a Pakistan that refuses to act against Taliban sanctuaries in its territory. The State Department however has chosen to shower more economic and military support to Pakistan. To fight the spread of jihadi cancer in Pakistan, the Americans want India to undergo an operation. It must, it appears, give up Kashmir to placate the extremists in Pakistan. Bruce Reidel recently had this to say “President Obama will need to signal our determination to subtly help broker a rapprochement between India and Pakistan with the help of key brokers

like Saudi Arabia and China to remove the rationale for extremism in Pakistan and undermine the Afghan Taliban’s justification for jihad.”

However desirable a US-India strategic partnership may be in the face of a truculent China – it cannot be held hostage to an erratic Pakistan which is demanding Kashmir on a platter as its price for support to the Americans in Afghanistan.

India-Russia-Europe axis In such a situation a much closer Indian military partnership with Russia and Europe seems to be the answer. Since American policy towards India is still held hostage to Pakistani tantrums – it would be prudent for India to rapidly develop its own military-industrial complex in the private sector to attain genuine autarky. This is where the BrahMos and FGFA deals with Russia point to the optimal solution. We could also explore similar defence deals with a cash-strapped Europe. We need to go beyond the simple purchase of weapons relationships, to one of jointly developing new systems. The new NATO-Russia thaw makes this approach quite viable and attractive.

At the very least our experience with Russian and French weapons has been highly satisfactory. Their reliability of supplies and spares factor is far higher than with American weapons. India could fund defence R and D jointly in cash strapped Europe and seek Russian, European and Israeli support for the rapid establishment of an Indian military-industrial complex in the private sector. That is the key requirement of this new era and provides the most viable strategic route to weapons autarky. This would be the key characteristic of a regional or even a global military power.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in J&K and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the RajouriPoonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and nonmilitary and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals.

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resurgent Russia

MODERNISATION

As long as oil prices are buoyant the Russian economy will thrive but basing the future of the nation on such ephemeral indices is a recipe for disaster. Much of Russia’s post-Soviet development has happened because of the high price of energy which the Putin presidency exploited with a firm hand. Between them Putin and Medvedev have created a broadbased consensus on how to achieve future growth. Medvedev has pitched for public-private partnership in areas that complement what India is also attempting to achieve.

In atomic energy and pharma sectors there is huge potential for mutual growth.

A

fter the decade of degradation and decline in 1990s under Yeltsin, Russia enjoyed a robust annual GDP growth of nearly seven per cent during eight years of Putin presidency. Thanks to this, the objective of doubling country’s Gross Domestic Product in ten years looked quite feasible. Russian economy became 7th largest in the world with a GDP worth US$ 2 trillion on the basis of public-private partnership. This is important in the backdrop of President Putin’s declaration in his millennium speech in 2000 that it would take 20 years for Russia to catch up with Portugal, Europe’s poorest country, if it develops at the then growth rate.

Russia’s GDP during eight years of Putin’s presidency grew by 70 per cent, industrial production - 75 per cent while investment increased by 125 per cent.

Russia’s GDP in 2007 reached the 1990 level, which means the country overcame the consequences of the economic crisis that devastated it in 1990s.

Rising from the debris During the eight years of Putin’s leadership, accumulated foreign investment grew by seven times while foreign investment into Russian economy reached US$ 82.3 billion in 2007. Capitalisation of the stock market

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grew by 22 times compared to 1999.

While capitalisation of Russian stock market was mere US$ 60 billion in 1999, it reached US$ 1 trillion 330 billion in 2007. Russia’s trade turnover with foreign countries grew by five times during this period. Russia’s foreign debt constituted three per cent of the GDP, which was one of the lowest in the world while foreign currency reserves touched more than US$ 500 billion in 2008. The real income of the population during the period grew by 2.5 times while people living below poverty line dropped to 13 per cent.

Long term development While in the initial years of the 21st century some economists were stressing that the growth that Russia witnessed in the beginning of the century was merely recovery growth, Russia sprang a surprise by maintaining the high growth rate for the 9th year in succession. However, almost all economists were unanimous in their opinion that Russia will not be able to maintain this growth rate any more unless it diversifies its economy, highly dependant on energy and raw-material.

One of the major achievements of President Vladimir Putin was that under his leadership Russia attained political as well as economic stability.

Country’s leadership since then has been repeatedly emphasising that

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Medvedev Doctrine

Dr. Arun Mohanty

country’s next move is diversification from stability. In spite of repeated call for diversification from stability, little was achieved in practical terms. The country once again found itself in midst of an intense debate as to the strategy for achieving diversification of the economy and high economic growth.

Economists believe that there are only four possible economic development strategies before Russia: rent-driven strategy, mobilisation strategy, inertia-led strategy and modernisation strategy.

Rent-driven strategy The essence of this strategy rests on the fact that source for development would be rent, collected from natural resources. Active support would be provided to poor people and poor regions under the strategy.

The strong side of the strategy is a rise in the domestic demand and reduction of poverty while the weak side lies in dependence on unreliable, unpredictable and unsustainable source of financing.

Modernisation is not a priority under this strategy. In case of decline in energy and raw-material price, the risk of conflict stemming from redistribution is fairly high under this strategy.

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resurgent Russia

MODERNISATION

By establishing itself as a leading economic power, Russia plans to raise the living standards to the level of developed countries and safeguard its national security. The broad objectives of the strategy are to increase country’s GDP to a level that would ensure US$ 21,000 per capita income by 2020 and to place 60-70 per cent of the population in the category of middle class and reduce the poverty level to that of developed countries Mobilisation strategy This strategy is based on concentration of resources in State sector and its re-distribution for development of priority sectors like energy, infrastructure, etc. The coalition that supports the strategy includes bureaucrats and players of ‘breakthrough’ sectors. This strategy stipulates significant role for State budget, State companies and institutes of development and to some extent, coercive public-private partnership.

The strong point of the strategy is that it facilitates accelerated modernisation of branches, known as ‘breakthrough sectors’ while the weak point is low effectiveness of the extremely large State sector and lack of sustainability of financing.

Inertia-led strategy This strategy stipulates tactical manoeuvring between various groups of interests and solution of the problem as it gets acute. This strategy envisages consistent manoeuvring between populism with subsidy given by the State and partial mobilisation and also attempt to reform market institutions in order to satisfy interests of different groups while resolving most important tactical issues. This strategy does not provide opportunity for long term strategic success but helps in meeting the short term requirements of the coalition or repeals immediate threats. The elite end part of the population, satisfied with the status-quo lend support to this strategy. This strategy is convenient for the ruling elite.

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the weak point lies in excessive time required for bringing about the transformation and the necessity to form a broad coalition to support the strategy.

The strategy requires significant sacrifice from certain actors and would take a long time to produce desired result. So this strategy needs patience from the citizens and the ruling elite as well. Modernisation is not possible without some sort of consensus in the society and strengthening of civil society that supports the strategy. Since a whole generation has to wait for this strategy to produce results, there is a necessity for building a broad-based coalition that would function in course of long time. Emergence of such a coalition would form a reliable basis for modernisation.

Conscious choice

Modernisation strategy

Russia’s ruling elite in principle has made a conscious choice in favour of a modernisation strategy since 2008.

The central element of the strategy is innovation-based development.

In order to transfer the economy to the rails of innovation, the strategy sets the tasks for increasing the innovative and investment activeness. This strategy requires to raise the level of accumulation to 30 per cent of the GDP and achieve the levels of developed countries in the sphere of budget policy.

This means the level of financing of education has to reach seven per cent of the GDP, healthcare - six per cent, science - three per cent. In other words, budget allocation for these sectors in Russia has to be doubled from the current level.

This strategy envisages institutional modernisation of the society, State and business. In principle this strategy does not have opponents as such, but there are different versions of this strategy. Strong point of the strategy is substantial long term outcome in the sphere of socio-economic development while

For the first time in the post-Soviet Russia, the State has decided to keep the strategic initiative under its control.

So far this initiative was in the hands of international financial organisations, raw-material exporters, transnational corporations, natural monopolies etc.

Each of these organisations imposed its own strategy over the country as a result

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of which the economy faced serious degradation. Country’s development in the recent past took place on the basis of inertia of these initiatives.

Innovation-driven Russia for the first time in its post-Soviet history drafted in 2008 a long-term economic development strategy up to the year 2020. The long term development strategy was approved by the State Council after thorough discussion. The central thrust of the development strategy up to 2020 is to transfer the economy from the rails of raw-material export to innovation-driven development. The strategy has been approved by the Medvedev-Putin tandem.

The main problem with the Russian economy is that while it remains extremely dependent on energy exports, the global economy is becoming increasingly competitive, driven by a shifting balance of financial power in favour of developing countries, regional economic integration and technological innovation.

Heavy dependence predominantly on revenues collected from energy and raw-material resources leaves Russia in an unstable and unenviable economic and financial situation. If Russia wants to be a global economic power, it must move towards innovationbased development. The strategy based on Russia’s current competitive advantage in energy, transport and agriculture aims at creation of a scientific and technological complex to promote specialisation in hightechnology and diversification of the structure of the economy. It gives importance to creation of economic and social conditions that would facilitate development of best human capital and democracy in the country.

Significant differences While the strategy assumes identical external economic conditions, it offers three alternative scenarios:

1) Inertia-based development, 2) energy and raw-material-based development through increasing investment in energy and raw-material sector and 3) innovation-based development.

The growth forecasts for the stipulated period up to 2020 differ from scenario to scenario. Though both energy and raw-material based strategy and innovation-based strategy ensure doubling of GDP during the stipulated period, the increase in case of innovation-based strategy is 21 per cent more than that in the energy-raw-material based strategy.

Moreover, volume of investment in innovation-based scenario would be 59 per cent more than the energy-raw material-based scenario.

The authors of the development strategy up to 2020 have planned four-fold increase in investment during the stipulated period. This confirms the assessment that Russia is not fully utilising its investment potential as a result of 50 per cent decline in accumulation rate compared to savings rate and massive capital flight estimated to be US$ 1 trillion during the reform period. Along with massive investment, the strategy envisages sharp rise in innovative activities. The strategy stipulates that share of industrial enterprises executing technological innovation, would increase to 40-50 per cent compared to 9.3 per cent in 2005 and share of innovative products in total industrial production would rise up to 25-35 per cent from 2.5 per cent in 2005.

Top five The ultimate goal of the strategy is to make Russia one of the top five economies of the world and along with this to establish Russia as a leader in technological innovation and global energy infrastructure as well as a major international financial centre.

By establishing itself as a leading economic power, Russia plans to raise the living standards to the level of developed countries and safeguard its national security. The broad objectives of the strategy are to increase the country’s GDP to a level that would ensure US$ 21,000 per capita income by 2020 and to place 60-70 per cent of

the population in the category of middle class and reduce the poverty level to that of developed countries.

The original long term development strategy was to be implemented in two stages and the first stage was to be completed in the year 2012. Russian GDP was to grow up by 37-38 per cent by the year 2012 compared to 2008 while labour productivity was to increase by 40-41 per cent during the period. The end of first phase of the strategy was to ensure reduction of energy-intensity of the GDP by 17-19 per cent. The strategy aimed at increasing the expenditure on education and healthcare to 5.6 per cent and 5.3 per cent respectively by 2012.

Global crisis However, this strategy drafted under President Putin and subsequently accepted by his successor President Medvedev, faced its funeral before it could barely take off the ground as a result of the global financial crisis in 2008. Russia which believed that it would be a safe haven by insulating itself from global economic crisis soon found itself to be one of the most affected economies in the world by the crisis. Russian GDP shrank by 8 per cent and its industrial production declined by 12 per cent in the year 2009.

It had to implement serious anti-crisis measures to save its economy and banking system instead of executing the long term development strategy.

Correctives The government had to bring substantial corrections in the indicators of the long term strategy though its broad parameters and objectives remain the same. According to GOSKOMSTAT, Russia’s National Statistical Committee, the GDP growth in 2010 is around four per cent while the growth for 2011 is forecast to be about 5 per cent. Russian GDP can reach the level of 2008 only in the year 2012 in the best case scenario.

Though the planned growth indicators of the long term development strategy have been buried as a result of the global economic crisis, Russia as a whole has not abandoned the major directions and objectives of this strategy.

Innovation-driven development remains the key objective of President Medvedev’s economic modernisation programme.

However, he has shifted priorities to certain new areas, focusing attention on certain concrete directions of the modernisation programme .

Medvedev doctrine Medvedev’s economic agenda was discovered first in his article titled “Go Russia”, in which he formulated the strategic objectives of his modernisation programme. He criticised Russia’s economic ‘backwardness‘, deploring its ‘humiliating’ dependency on energy and raw materials. Describing Russian society as ‘archaic’ and ‘paternalistic’ he said the country can no longer rely on the achievements of the past to secure a prosperous future and stressed that Russia should aim at building a modern, diversified economy based on high technology and innovation. His economic agenda includes making rouble an international reserve currency, turning Moscow into an international financial centre envisages further privatisation of Russian economy. While the hallmark of President Putin’s economic agenda was to bring strategic assets under State control through building of mega State corporations, President Medvedev plans to reduce their number by five times.

Elucidation of policy Medvedev’s modernisation agenda

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finds further elaboration in his annual addresses to the nation in the year 2009 and 2010. His modernisation programme emphasises five key directions that include: ■■

Energy efficiency and new fuels

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Medical technologies pharmaceuticals

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Nuclear power engineering

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Information technologies

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Space and telecommunications

and

Energy efficiency Russia controls 30 per cent global gas and 15 per cent of global oil reserves. At present energy intensity of Russian economy is 2.5 times more than the global average. Under the modernisation strategy government has set a goal to reduce energy intensity of the economy by 40 per cent by 2020. It has been identified that the main potential to achieve this goal lies within the housing sector and budget organisations.

Medical and pharma tech Notwithstanding certain achievements to its credit, Russia lags behind world leaders in medical technology and pharma production.

Russia meets almost 80 per cent of its domestic requirements in medicine through imports. President Medvedev has set a goal to revamp country’s pharma industry through joint ventures and substantially reduce imports from the current 80 per cent to 50 per cent in the foreseeable future.

Though no concrete major projects have been identified, the government aims at augmenting production of the most-required medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.

Nuclear technology Soviet Union was the first country to develop civilian nuclear power and to construct world’s first nuclear plant. Russia has a strong industrial and scientific base in the area of nuclear technology. However, much needs to be done in order to make full use of technological potential that had been built during Soviet era.

Russian government plans to allocate

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MODERNISATION US$ 5.5 billion through a federal programme aimed at development of next generation nuclear energy technology. Nearly US$ 43 billion is earmarked for development of nuclear power and industry development by 2015. The programme seeks to establish secure, cheap and long term nuclear energy supply in Russia as well as increase in Russian exports of nuclear energy and technology abroad.

Information technology Russia is a leading nation in software development and the country has a large pool of IT talent. Russian youth dominate international technology competitions like the ACM International Collegiate Programming Contest.

Despite this Russia faces a shortage of IT specialists due to high demand. In 2009, Russian companies employed more than one million IT specialists, making up 1.34 per cent of country’s total work force, which is much lower than in other major economies.

The government is making serious efforts to create an information society in Russia for which it has initiated several large projects.

Space and telecom Russia that launched the first satellite and sent the first cosmonaut to the orbit remains a leading nation in space technology. Currently, Russia is the largest satellite launcher and the only provider of transport for space tourism services. However, much of the potential developed in the sphere needs wide commercialisation.

This can be achieved through combination of space technology and telecommunications. Massive projects aimed at space-based navigation, space-based monitoring and search, space-based targeting systems, space-based telecommunications in the broadband access systems, etc. would help achieving the goals set in this sphere and provide tremendous impetus to socio-economic progress.

research centres in the country. Major concrete thrust of his modernisation programme lies in creation of first world class innovation city at Skolkovo, situated in the Moscow suburb.

Skolkovo innovation city, for which US$ 4 billion has been earmarked for building its infrastructure alone, is President Medvedev’s dream project.

This is planned to be Russia’s silicon valley, which would enjoy a special status with huge tax concessions for 10 years. Special laws are being passed by State Duma in order to ensure its special status and attract foreign specialists as well as investors to the centre. Top class foreign specialists including several Nobel laureates are to be invited to the innovation city. An elite business school where internationally famed specialists would impart training has been set up at the upcoming city.

The executive council of the centre consists of global leaders in science and business, representatives of high tech companies from Silicon Valley. Many famous foreign as well as eminent Russian scientists would work here.

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Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

Skolkovo seedbed Skolkovo’s experience would be used to build innovation centres elsewhere in Russia. Moscow is planning to build 20 such innovation centres across the country. In spite of degradation, Russia’s fundamental science still is one of the best, if not the best in the world. Stalin had built special cities called ‘Sharaskas’ and Brezhnev had built new cities called ‘Naukagrads’ for development of science in the former Soviet Union.

Medvedev’s attempt to create these innovation cities now nicknamed as ‘innocities’ looks like a pattern of Soviet science cities. There are economists who are skeptical about President Medvedev’s modernisation programme in Russia. They say this is nothing but repetition of Soviet experience to create special research centres and can hardly be successful in an atmosphere that is completely different from the Soviet one.

Super innovation cities President Medvedev plans to implement his modernisation programme not only through the promotion of scientific research in existing centres but by creating exceptionally world class new mega

TESTED N TRUSTED

The writer teaches at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He is the editor-in-chief of the research journal Eurasian Report.

He has published 7 books. He specialists in Russian foreign and security policy, Russian economy, Indo-Russian bilateral relations.

Being wooed simultaneously by Russia and the US and its allies for its vast Defence market is a heady feeling but there are still great differences in their respective attitudes. The US has laws that obtrude on national sovereignty; Russia has in the 2005 agreement safeguarded its intellectual property rights in a manner that leaves wide space for the “special relationship” that has permeated Defence arrangements between the two countries. Having once shunned “equidistance” Indian diplomacy must now learn to use the new opportunities for its best national interests.

P

resident Dmitry Medvedev’s December 2010 visit to India has given a fresh lease of life to a floundering albeit time tested relationship. During the Cold War the Soviet Union voted repeatedly in favour of India on UN resolutions on

Jammu and Kashmir. Russia was the first major power to support India’s candidature for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and has for long supported the removal of restrictions on civil nuclear energy cooperation with India. It is the only country so far

to have built and handed over nuclear power reactors to India. However, it is in cooperation in the field of defence sales and manufacture that must rank as the primary factor in sustaining and nurturing the India-Russia strategic partnership.

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resurgent Russia

TESTED N TRUSTED

Defence cooperation During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s December 2005 visit to Moscow, India and Russia signed landmark agreements to further cement their defence cooperation that dates back to almost half a century.

These include an agreement on the defence of intellectual property rights that prevents either side from using technologies received from the other without special permission, joint construction of a multi-purpose transport plane, plans for joint R&D work on a fifth generation fighter jet and joint development, operation and use of the GLONASS (GPS) System for peaceful purposes. It was also reported by the media that Russia is planning to lease two Shchuka-B nuclear submarines to the Indian Navy and had agreed to extend its cooperation to the Indian plan to build the country’s first nuclear submarine. However, the Indian Defence Minister denied this.

Ongoing joint arms projects between India and Russia include the manufacture of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, the building of Su-30 MKI fighter jets, the manufacture of T-90 tanks in India under licence and the re-furbishing of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. Current defence contracts between the two countries are worth over US$ 10 billion.

The armed forces of the two countries have been regularly conducting joint air and naval exercises in both the countries. The two armies recently conducted the third in a series of battalion-level counter-terrorism exercises at Chaubatia in Uttarakhand in which 600 Indian and Russian soldiers participated. All of these exemplify the high degree of mutual confidence built over the years.

India-Russia defence cooperation, which goes back to the Soviet era had been shaken by but had survived the death throes of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the USSR shortly before the 1971 war with Pakistan.

When that treaty had run its course after 25 years in 1996, it was mutually agreed to let it lapse. However, the relationship remained warm and friendly to the extent that former Russian Prime Minister Primakov had proposed a

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China-India-Russia triangle for geo-political and geo-strategic cooperation, an idea that was promptly cold-shouldered by the Chinese.

During the Cold War, India-USSR cooperation had not gone much beyond a patron-client arms supply relationship.

At the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, over 70 per cent of the weapons and equipment in service with India’s armed forces were of Soviet origin. About 55 per cent of Russia’s defence exports are to India. Over the last two decades there has been increasing realisation in Russia that India is not only an important trading partner but also a prospective R&D partner. India is still among the largest purchasers of defence equipment from Russia. In the years ahead, India is likely to become Russia’s foremost partner in jointly developing future weapons systems. “Our defence cooperation will be expanded and deepened as we will be moving from ‘sellerbuyer’ relationship to organising joint designing, development, production and marketing. BrahMos missile is a perfect example of what India and Russia can achieve when they jointly work on producing high quality armaments,” Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said in an interview with Alexander Lomanov, published in Vremya Novostei on November 18, 2005. Now that an agreement has been signed for the joint design and development of 250300 fifth generation fighter aircraft, the former defence minister’s words are ringing true. The fighter deal is worth around US$ 35 billion; the aircraft will be designed and manufactured over 10 years.

BrahMos example In this era of strategic cooperation and interdependence for defence production, the BrahMos is a path-breaking example of a cooperative design and development venture that optimally synergises the strengths of the R&D and production agencies of both India and Russia. It is the story of a successful collaborative effort between high-end Russian missile technology and Indian excellence in developing sophisticated software solutions in a short period of time and at a low cost.

The BrahMos is a true force multiplier for the armed forces of India and Russia.

This missile has also been adapted for

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ship-to-ground, submarine-to-ground, air-to-ground and surface-to-surface launch platforms. The Indian Artillery is in the process of inducting this missile to destroy targets deep inside enemy territory.

In the past India has imported naval ships and submarines, the MiG and Sukhoi series of fighter-bomber aircraft and air defence radars from Russia, T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP fighting vehicles, 100 mm, 122 mm and 130 mm artillery guns, 122 mm BM-21 Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers and almost its entire inventory of air defence artillery equipment. The Russian equipment was mostly tried and tested, rugged, suitable for Indian conditions and was purchased against soft loans, which were to be repaid over long periods under special Rupee-Rouble arrangements. These conditions suited India well, especially as it had meagre foreign exchange reserves for many decades and could ill afford to buy defence equipment with hard currency.

Technology transfer India has for long been importing Russian military equipment either as fully assembled systems or in SKD/ CKD form. While some projects like the MiG series of aircraft, T-72 tanks and BMPs have involved local manufacture under license, there has rarely been any real transfer of technology. During then Defence Minister Jaswant Singh’s June 2001 visit to Moscow, special emphasis was laid not only on technology transfer but also on the joint development and production of future weapons systems. That this was a mutually acceptable position was confirmed by Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Ilya Klebanov when he said, “Our co-operation has turned toward the joint development and joint production of weapons, which is very important in the relations of the two countries.” Joint development was expected to synergise the specialised capabilities of the two countries to the mutual benefit of both. Due to the burgeoning costs of the development of major weapon platforms, the trend the world over is to undertake joint or multilateral development in which costs as well as technology are shared in a transparent manner.

Air defence system Under the June 2001 defence cooperation agreement, the two countries had agreed to work together for the joint development of several major weapon platforms, including a fifth-generation combat aircraft, IL-214 transport aircraft, submarines and frigates. Russia also offered to upgrade the Indian fleet of Mi-8 and Mi-17 transport helicopters by extending their service life and technical capabilities. MiG-AT, the Russian advanced jet trainer (AJT) aircraft was also in the reckoning for selection along with a few other West European AJTs. The 2001 agreement was also reported to include a plan to create an air defence system, which would cover the whole of India’s territory. It was also expected that India would consider the acquisition of some squadrons of the S-300V or S-400 air defence and anti-missile defence system to integrate them into its existing surface-to-air defences against enemy aircraft and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), while simultaneously undertaking indigenous development of the system.

N-submarine technologies Konstantin Makienko of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), Moscow, said before the 10th meeting of the India-Russia Inter-governmental Commission on Military-technical Cooperation held at New Delhi in October 2010, “Growing international competition for the Indian defence market will push Russia to expand its cooperation with India into new sectors where it has no rivals, such as strategic weapons and technologies.” Makienko also suggested that the two countries could diversify their defence ties into nuclear submarine technologies despite continuing international restrictions against India. Russia had leased a nuclear-powered submarine to India in the late 1980s and is now completing preparations to lease an Akula II-class nuclear-powered attack submarine to India for 10 years. India could not have obtained such a vessel from any other major power.

Cost and time overruns The acquisition of defence equipment

from Russia has not been completely free of problems. Time and cost overruns have been commonplace, particularly in the case of the refurbishment of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov; and, soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union, there were major problems with the supply of spares.

Kanwal Sibal, former ambassador to Russia, has written, “… there have been problems with regard to adherence to delivery schedules, price escalation and inadequate product support, leading to calls for reducing our over-dependence on it and diversifying our sources of defence procurement. Until recently, Russia has believed political reliability, price advantage and technology access guaranteed its hold on the Indian market. But now with the expansion of the India-US defence ties, including important defence acquisitions, its concerns are mounting.” However, the Russians are gradually getting their act together and it is expected that their internal processes will soon be better streamlined.

New parameters The export controls imposed by the US-led West, military technology denial regimes, weapons, equipment and spares supply agreements that are hostage to unilateral sanctions and the impact of non-proliferation policies, had made Western companies unreliable suppliers of defence equipment to India till very recently. Hence, it was logical for India to hedge its bets and continue to rely on Russia for its major weapons platforms, even as it diversifies its sources of acquisition of weapons and further enhances its vigorous efforts to develop and manufacture maximum defence equipment indigenously.

There is increasing realisation that

no country can afford to plough a lonely furrow in developing military hardware. The future of defence equipment modernisation lies in joint development followed by joint manufacture and, eventually, a joint approach to marketing.

At present, India enjoys warm relations with both Russia and the US; both appear to be eager for a long-term strategic partnership with India, even though the concepts underlying such a partnership and the aims and objectives may be different in either case. Being simultaneously wooed by two of the three major world powers of the early 21st century is recognition of a militarily self-confident India’s gradual emergence as a future economic, industrial and military powerhouse.

However, in the prevailing era of strategic uncertainty, it would be wise for India to retain its strategic autonomy and create its own space in the emerging geo-strategic environment. Towards this end, joint defence equipment R&D and production ventures, particularly in the area of critical technologies, must be vigorously pursued for mutual benefit with all strategic partners.

The writer commanded an infantry brigade on the Line of Control (Operation Parakram, 2001-03) and an artillery regiment in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir Valley (Operation Rakshak, 1993-94). At present he is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India. He has authored several books including Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal; Indian Army: Vision 2020; Pakistan’s Proxy War; Heroes of Kargil; Kargil '99: Blood, Guts and Firepower and Artillery: Honour and Glory.

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REALISM

There is no better word than pragmatism to explain Mongolia’s return to the Russian fold. It is in many ways Ulaanbaatar’s ‘look west’ policy. The immediate benefits of assured energy supplies have been whetted by the possibility that Russia’s European policy would open up avenues for Mongolia as well. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation too has the potential of opening up markets in the former Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union which, being landlocked, look forward to greater economic ties with their immediate neighbours. There is a mutuality of interest that is only just being explored.

L

ast visit of Mongolian Prime Minister, Sukhbaataryn Batbold to Moscow from 13 to 16 December 2010 has been hailed by several quarters as the most constructive visit in recent times that resulted in signing of nine bilateral agreements on economic and energy cooperation including those settling the Soviet-era Mongolian debts to Russia, besides agreeing to set up a joint Russian-Mongolian uranium ore mining company. Such a visit by the Mongolian Prime Minister has become a tradition particularly since 2007, when S. Bayar became the new Prime Minister and did everything possible to bring Mongolia closer to Russia in order to balance China’s already strong economic presence. On its part, Russia has traditionally viewed its relations with Mongolia with much seriousness that signifies their growing ties in the 21st century. Russian policymakers are fully aware of the historical record of its geostrategic motives in the Mongolian plateau and such reminiscences are still significant while developing policy towards its Mongol neighbour.

Historical ambiance The background story of Russia-Mongolia relations reveals that throughout the 20th century, Russian and Soviet influence over Mongolia has been a predominant factor in the latter’s national development. But this influence owes much to the Sino-Soviet / Russian rivalry for dominating the Mongolian borderlands. First of all it was the Tsarist Russian government that helped Mongols in their struggle against the Manchu-Chinese and then the Soviet Russia which aided Mongolian revolutionaries both diplomatically and militarily to win the battle against not only the Chinese

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but also the anti-Bolshevik white Russian forces in order to achieve an independent status. In the post-Soviet period or more precisely in the Putin era, one of the main aims of Russia’s Asian policy has been to make its strong presence felt in Mongolia, which was once a staunch Soviet ally and is now one of Asia’s most vibrant democracies.

Lately, both the political-strategic as well as trade and economic interests have enthused Russia to reemerge in Mongolia. This article highlights the recent trends in overall relationship between Russia and Mongolia, which is indicative of fast growing bilateral ties leaving behind the initial stagnation in the post-Soviet period.

For many centuries Mongolia has been a geopolitical entity, widely seen as a buffer between Russia and China. Today the country has assumed a greater level of global economic importance as it possesses strategically important raw materials like uranium.

Having just a 2.9 million population, Mongolia has the distinction of becoming Asia’s first communist State and the world’s second after Russia following its independence from China in 1921 and the formation of a People’s government in 1924 under the name of “Mongolian People’s Republic.” Since then Mongolia continued to be a close ally of the former Soviet Union, a status that began to change more concretely when Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost and perestroika had its inevitable impact over Mongolia. The introduction of Mongolian version of glasnost and perestroika through Iltod and Orchilan baigalalt led the country into economic stagnation and demands for further social reforms were raised.

Democratic movement began to grip the country and in 1990 the first multi-party

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Russia and Mongolia:

recent upsurge in ties

Dr. Sharad K. Soni

elections paved the way for Mongolia’s renunciation of Communism and a centrally planned economy after almost 70 years of Communist rule. Further the Soviet collapse in 1991 and the end of the Cold War suddenly changed the geopolitical environment of Mongolia and left the country in a “great power vacuum.” The southern neighbour China thus found an opportunity to fill this vacuum at least in the economic and trade field. It was more so because during the initial years of the post-Soviet period, Russia was caught in deep political and economic crises so much so that it remained busy in setting right its own problems and hence it had little time to pay attention to its old allies like Mongolia.

Decline in Soviet influence In the meantime, in 1992, a major review of Mongolia’s foreign and security policy took place which demonstrated a departure from traditional mooring of dependence on Russia, besides making commitments to internal changes through democratic reforms and market economy. Both Russia and Mongolia affirmed their equality as sovereign States whose new relationship would be based on bilateral cooperation in accordance with the Treaty of Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourly Cooperation signed in 1993. However, the two sides witnessed a low in their relationship largely due to the fact that they could not agree upon how Mongolia’s Soviet time debt payments would be made.

Russia-Mongolia relations further became stagnant, mainly for political reasons following the first ever landslide victory of the Democratic Coalition in the 1996 Mongolian elections. Various measures adopted

by the Democratic government in Mongolia were regarded by Moscow as an anti-Russian move intended to curb Russian influence in Mongolia, especially in bilateral trade. Particular mention may be made of the

action programme that gave much importance to Mongolia’s relations with the United States. Besides, over the decade of the 1990s another aspect of Russia-Mongolia relations which bothered Moscow too much was

the decreasing level of bilateral cooperation in the defence and military spheres, while at the same time there had been a surge in such cooperation of Mongolia with other countries like China, the United States, South Korea,

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REALISM

Japan, India and Germany. Russia also found lessening of its influence in the Mongolian market as its share there had dropped from 85 per cent in the early 1990s to nearly 25 per cent in 1999.

Putin initiative Nevertheless, encouraging signs emerged at the turn of the 21st century when Russia and Mongolia realised that good neighbourly cooperation between them was necessary to keep away the Chinese from exercising any dominant role in Mongolia. The revival of relationship between the two sides began to take a definite shape when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Mongolia in 2000, the first since 1974 visit of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. Putin’s visit signified the implementation of Russia’s equal and mutually beneficial foreign policies towards Asia in general and Mongolia in particular. The event culminated with adoption of a joint declaration, named as the Ulaanbaatar Declaration, which laid a legal groundwork for the restoration of bilateral ties between the two countries. Significantly in 2006, bilateral political relations entered into a phase for an all-round resumption when Moscow Declaration was issued during the state visit to Russia paid by the new Mongolian President Nambaryn Enkhbayar. In the same year, Russian Prime Minister Fradkov paid a visit to Mongolia with a large business delegation, thereby giving a boost to developing ties at the political level. In April 2008, Mongolian Prime Minister S. Bayar paid an official visit to Moscow, which opened up what has been described as “a new era for comprehensive cooperation between the two nations.” The following month, i.e., in May 2008, President Enkhbayar met in Moscow with President Medvedev and discussed a range of political and strategic issues.

Since Moscow now sees Mongolia as a special subject in its foreign affairs development, the year 2009 witnessed both the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visiting Mongolia. More recently in December 2010, several important agreements were concluded following negotiations between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Mongolian counterpart Sukhbaataryn Batbold during the latter’s visit to Moscow.

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Mongolian concurrence That Russia-Mongolia political relations have ascended to a new historical stage in recent years also owes much to Tsakhia Elbegdorj, the current Mongolian President, who is considered to be a big supporter of forging closer ties with Russia despite his being a Democrat. While talking about the prospects of cooperation with Russia during an interview with the Russian information agency Interfax, he gave strong indications of making changes in Mongolia’s external and internal policy which would be oriented more towards developing Mongolia’s overall relations with Russia. The idea is that both countries could be able to use their long, friendly relationship to maintain and strengthen peace and stability and create an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation in the Asia Pacific region to extend cooperation and interactions in the areas of politics, economy and security. Mongolia has already joined the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum on security, besides having an observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). There have been indications that Mongolia would now seek full membership in the SCO, so that it could get further incentives to forge closer ties with not only China, Russia and Kazakhstan but also with other Central Asian member countries of the SCO.

Energy politics Initially in the wake of the Soviet collapse bilateral economic and trade relations were somewhat over shadowed by Mongolia’s huge Soviet-era debt to Russia. But in December 2003, the Russian government wrote off 98 per cent of this debt, once valued at US$ 11 billion.

This was considered to be an apparent attempt by Russia to give bilateral ties a much-needed boost, though the move appeared to have a little help to encourage bilateral trade and investment ties. It was hydrocarbon the supplies of which from Russia then became a key factor in reviving economic relations of the two countries.

When Putin visited Mongolia in 2000, an agreement was signed to build an oil pipeline from Siberia to China through Mongolia. Such a project would not only secure lucrative transit fees, but

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also guarantee stable oil supplies for Mongolia. However, this project, which was delayed due to problems in negotiations among the parties involved, is expected to kick off soon as today in Russia’s closer ties with Mongolia, energy supplies provide the main leverage over Mongolia.

In March 2009, the two sides signed three interdepartmental documents including an agreement between the Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation and the Mongolian Department of Nuclear Energy on cooperation in nuclear power generation and uranium production.

More recently, on 14 December 2010, the two countries signed several key agreements including formation of a Russian-Mongolian uranium ore mining company, Dordon Uranium.

The product output of this joint venture is planned at 2000 tons per year, which will be a major boost for Mongolian economy given the fact that Mongolia has uranium reserves of some 62,000 tons, placing it among the top 15 countries in terms of reserves.

But it has neither a nuclear power plant nor the nuclear weapons. Russia is the first country to have signed such an agreement with Mongolia on joint uranium operations.

Economic cooperation Both Russia and Mongolia have been doing much in recent times to enhance their economic cooperation mainly through Russia’s participation in the development of Mongolian mining resources and infrastructure construction. Mongolian-Russian joint ventures built in early years have all along been the backbone firms in Mongolia and the newly-formed railway venture and Mongolia-Russia uranium production joint venture have created conditions for Russia’s future involvement in tapping mineral resources and going in for infrastructure development in Mongolia.

The petroleum products Mongolia badly needs have all been practically imported from Russia. It is to be noted that Russia has a 49 per cent stake in Mongolia’s major copper producer, Erdenet and Mongoltsvetmet joint ventures. The two companies contribute to almost 20 per cent of Mongolian GDP, while Erdenet provides nearly 40 per cent of the Mongolian national budget.

There are more than 250 smaller joint ventures in Mongolia, with combined

Russian investments totalling over US$ 20 million. At present, the Russian interest to invest in Mongolia has become unprecedented due to the fact that unlike the Soviet period when it was a State investment, now it is mainly the interest of Russian businesses with the backing from the Russian Government.

Improvement in trade As regards trade cooperation, the negative downward trend of the early and mid 1990s has been diminishing particularly since the year 2000 and the Russian big business has already begun to turn its eyes to Mongolia.

While in 2006, bilateral trade turnover reached some US$ 500 million or nearly 75 per cent up from 2000, it grew in 2007 to register a figure of US$ 670 million, an increase of some 28 per cent over the previous year. The trade figure showed further growth in 2008 when it reached to US$ 1 billion but it was an imbalanced trade because Mongolia has been heavily dependent on Russian energy and pays lot of attention to Russian investment and trade cooperation. According to statistics released by the Mongolian Ministry of External Relations, the volume of trade between the two sides increased sharply to reach at US$ 1.6 billion in the January-May period of 2009, attaining ahead of time the US$ 1 billion objective for the year 2010. In the first nine months of 2010, it has been revealed that the bilateral trade further grew by more than 50 per cent. The extent of recent trade turnover especially in the last five years indicates that Mongolia is currently restoring relations in the Russian orbit, largely for economic reasons. With Russia already having a share of about 20 per cent in Mongolia’s overall external trade, it appears that Moscow will continue to remain one of Ulaanbaatar’s most important foreign trade partners.

Security ties Russia has shown keen interest to assist in the modernisation of the Mongolian military without binding to a pro-Russian alignment or treaty and there are ample signs that military cooperation is increasing as part of strategic partnership the two countries declared to carry out. Russia is helping Mongolian servicemen receive training in Russia and providing technological

support and assistance in modernising their weapons.

It was during Putin’s 2000 visit to Mongolia that a military pact was endorsed committing to a peaceful future between the two sides.

Earlier, defence cooperation between Mongolia and Russia was initiated by concluding two agreements in 1993, i.e., “Agreement on military cooperation between the Ministry of Defence of Mongolia and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation” and “Agreement on military and technical cooperation between the Governments of the Russian Federation and Mongolia.”

These two agreements serve as the legal basis for defence relations and cooperation between the two sides.

Another agreement on defence cooperation was concluded when the Defence Minister of Mongolia visited Russia in 1997.

The 2008 visits of Russian Defence Minister and the new chief of general staff to Mongolia is further evidence of growing security ties between the two sides. Besides, various agreements concluded between the two sides show that military-technological cooperation is on the rise. After 20 years during which Russia-Mongolia military cooperation was broken off, there have been joint military manoeuvres for the first time since 2008. A joint Russian-Mongolian military training called “Darkhan-I” also took place in the same year to teach Mongolian military experts to repair and restore military equipment in field conditions.

Further a training programme to prepare Mongolian soldiers for international peace-keeping duties and upgrading weapons has also been planned. Of late, in December 2010, both sides pledged for regular military exercises besides discussing the ways for modernising the Mongolian armed forces including training of Mongolian students at Russian military schools as well as delivery of Russian air defence systems to Mongolia. Such cooperation in the security field is considered by the Mongolians as their geostrategic needs of balancing relations with the two

neighbours.

To sum up, following the Soviet collapse economic crisis in Russia weakened its financial and resource supply to Mongolia, which led to rapid deterioration in Mongolia’s socio-economic status. However, in times of relatively stable economy, both countries have shifted their focus to mutually beneficial cooperation without compromising national interests. In the past decade, especially since 2000, developing comprehensive cooperation with Russia has become a natural choice for Mongolia in pursuing its national interests in the political, economic and security fields.

The three key aspects that motivate Mongolia to come closer to Russia despite China being the former’s largest trade and investment partner include, (a) geopolitical relationship with Russia that has always been an important element of Mongolia’s security; (b) Mongolia needs Russia for the supply of energy and many other daily commodities, such as sugar and edible oil; and (c) Russia’s forceful role in Eurasia is of great significance to Mongolia as it seeks to be connected to Europe. On the other hand, Russia prefers to see Mongolia as a special subject in its Asian policy, particularly to counter Chinese and US influences.

Whatever the motives of the two sides, recent trends suggest that pragmatism would continue to be a key factor in growing relationship between Russia and Mongolia.

The writer teaches at Central Asian Studies Division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

He has specialised in Mongolian and Central Asian Studies with particular focus on Mongolia, Kazakhstan as well as Tibet and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regions of China, besides Mongol culture areas in Siberian Republics of Tuva and Buryatia.

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TURNED AROUND

Using its energy resources as a weapon, Russia appears to have stopped NATO in its tracks. Its multipronged diplomacy has traversed the compass from inviting investments from the European Union, to helping the US War on Terror in Afghanistan with logistics supply routes from the former Soviet Republics on its southern flank to re-integrating Mongolia in the east and reinforcing claims to the Arctic energy resources and trade routes laid open by global warming. Between them Putin and Medvedev have much to preen about.

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decade ago, a crisis-ridden Russia was being written off as a near economic basket case and despite its move towards democratisation under Boris Yeltsin, was being treated as a defeated enemy rather than a new partner by the US. The neo-conservatives under the newly-elected Bush administration were pushing NATO at Russia’s doorstep and announcing deployment of missiles in eastern Europe as well as supporting “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet Union (FSU) States.

Its former satellite States were openly veering towards the West and worse still, NATO. Even within the Russian Federation, insurgency was on the rise, with Chechen separatists carrying out guerilla-style hits.

Coped with recession Ten years later, the picture has changed radically, with indications that Russia is not only militarily stronger but is also coping better than expected on the economic front. Despite the recent economic recession, the World Bank has forecast a growth rate of around 5.5 per cent in 2010 for Russia, a remarkable feat given that during the mid-1990s, Russia’s GDP had dropped by 50 per cent. Little wonder then that a debate is revolving around whether a resurgence is taking place in Russia, with the former super power getting set to once again wield the immense power and influence it enjoyed during its Soviet years.

Military in focus The pointers are certainly there.

Resources are being directed, after the lull in the 1990s, toward strengthening the armed forces, with indications that this would continue to be a focus.

That the Kremlin sees a strong military

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necessary not only for power projection near and beyond its neigbourhood, but also to discourage domestic and foreign elements who were prone to challenge the State, is clear. Moreover, Russia has also expanded into cyberspace and now has some of the most well-developed cyber-warfare capabilities in the world.

Reintegrating with republics Today, the Kremlin’s sphere of influence once again stretches into former satellite States such as the Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan, with the latter two countries entering into Customs Union, designed to reintegrate the industrial and strategic economic sectors of the old Soviet network, with Russia recently.

How did the turnaround take place and is it sustainable? More importantly, can a “resurgent” Russia succeed in resuming its place at the global high table, or will it be confined to retaining its erstwhile clout only in its neighbourhood and what role does Russia see for itself in the current fast-changing international politics?

Putin factor Much of Russia’s resurgence can be attributed to the former President Vladimir Putin, the hand-picked heir of a post-Soviet Russia Boris Yeltsin and a former KGB intelligence officer, who took over as President in 1999-2000. Within a few months of taking over the leadership, there were no doubts that he intended to re-establish Russia as a respected global power on par with other powers such as the United States of America, China and the European Union (EU) and the ability to once again exert its influence and leverage on the international system.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Reclaiming lost glory

Shebonti Ray Dadwal

Though he initially continued with the Yeltsin-era liberalisation process, announcing that “there is no alternative” to market democracy, this was soon belied by his subsequent actions, which resembled a kind of controlled democratisation. Maintaining that the country’s greatest threat was its internal economic and social situation, Putin focused his attention on the issues he saw were the most critical.

He first targeted the media - who he perceived as being the mouthpieces of a few oligarchs who became empowered during the Yeltsin era and sought to control the State - by taking away their licences, thereby reducing criticism against his policies. This was followed by the slow purging of the powerful group of business-oligarchs who enjoyed access and power under Yeltsin by scrapping gubernatorial elections and established government control over major industries, particularly the energy sector.

Controlled energy resources Targeting the energy sector oligarchs was crucial as energy resources, mainly oil and gas, were the weapons he chose to accomplish his task of re-establishing Russia as a force to reckon with in the international arena.

Learning from its Cold War experience and realising that economic muscle was as, if not more important as military strength in the long run, particularly in the current international scenario, Putin realised the importance of energy as a powerful strategic weapon.

In fact, as Professor Goldman, an expert on Russia at Harvard University, said, “The key reason for (Russia’s) rebirth is oil and natural gas. Thanks to these natural resources, Vladimir Putin has stabilised the Russian economy, recentralised power in Moscow and

reasserted Russia in world politics.”

Gas as weapon Being the owner of one of the world’s largest oil reserves, top two exporters and having the largest known natural gas reserves in the world, the revival of the Russian energy sector has not only allowed Moscow to pay off its international debt and refurbish its depleted foreign currency reserves, but has allowed it the leverage to use it as an effective foreign policy weapon, to bring recalcitrant neighbours to heel.

More importantly, it was the vast Soviet-era gas pipeline network that was seen as the means for his energycentric strategy. Hence, starting January 2006, Moscow cut off supplies to Ukraine and Belarus, but also affecting deliveries to 13 other European States,

causing these countries to freeze and underlining the fact that as a 40 per cent supplier of Europe’s natural gas and 30 per cent supplier of oil, it has an effective tool which it will not desist from using if it felt justified. Though pricing difference were cited as the reason behind Moscow’s action, Russia made no secret of its anger towards States like Ukraine and Belarus which were moving closer to the West as well as NATO.

Debt-for-assets deals Neither does Russia have any intention of relinquishing its energy super power status to competitors.

Attempts by other FSU gas-producing States to find alternative markets have been effectively stymied, either by engineering conflicts in and around

these States or by buying stakes in their energy sectors and infrastructure through debt for asset swap deals, thereby providing Moscow with the requisite influence in these countries’ domestic sectors as well as future energy deals.

Arctic bonanza Moscow’s Arctic policy is another indicator that Russia means to hold on and even expand its reach to other areas. Besides the fact that the Arctic has enormous energy reserves, it has other strategic values for Russia. By 2030, Russia’s Arctic shelf is expected to yield 30 million tonnes of oil and 130 billion cubic metres of gas. Little wonder therefore that a strategy paper current President Dmitri Medvedev signed in 2008 said the polar region would

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become the country’s “main strategic resource base” by 2020. Moreover, its nuclear submarine fleet is based in the Kola Peninsula. Hence, ever since global warming rendered this region as accessible, Russia has been trying to restore its military capability there to ward off potential threats, including plans to deploy warships in Russia’s Arctic ports to protect polar sea routes.

At the same time, it is trying to resolve the territorial disputes arising from a scramble for ownership by other Arctic nations, by signing a border pact with Norway over conflicting claims in the Barents Sea and agreeing to jointly develop seabed oil and gas in the region. But despite such conciliatory actions, Moscow has plans to increase its military activity in and around the region, apparently to stave off potential US-NATO attempts to get hold of the natural resources there.

State control of energy The policy of acquiring energy resources is not restricted only to the international arena, but is reflected in Russia’s domestic energy sector as well.

Putin well understood the importance of setting his own house in order if energy was to become the instrument of power. But first, he had to ensure the State’s control over the energy sector was consolidated. He thus embarked on a policy of taking back energy assets from private owners, such as Yukos and Sibneft and by limiting the role of foreign ownership of energy production.

Around the end of his first presidential term, Putin ensured that the State regained control of domestic energy companies. The most significant example was the manner in which he dealt with the private oil companies, Yukos and Sibneft. In 2004, just prior to a planned merger between Yukos and Sibneft, which would not only have led to the creation of Russia’s and one of the world’s largest oil companies, Yukos chief, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested, leading to the suspension of the impending deal and the subsequent acquisition of the company

by Rosneft, a State-owned company.

However, according to some analysts, the real reason for the attack against the company was its lobbying to privatise the country’s oil pipeline monopoly, the only hold the government retained on the oil magnates and hence allowing

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TURNED AROUND it to export freely.

Wooing the west

Pre-emptive strikes

Hence, Medvedev has embarked on a strategy which seeks to harness Western investment and technology, reduce its dependence on volatile energy sales and promote technological innovation.

Given the West’s supremacy in technology, Russia is currently playing down its hostility towards the West and is pursuing alliances with the United States and major EU States, whereby these countries are offered investment opportunities and greater political cooperation in exchange for capital and know-how. In order to create a more attractive investment climate, he is leading a high-profile campaign to improve corporate governance in Russian companies and to choke off corruption, while the recent ratification of START with the US, as well as cooperating on sanctions against Iran and opening new supply lines for US troops in Afghanistan are indicators to less conflictual relations with the West.

According to reports, Khodorkovsky proposed to build private pipelines to the world’s two biggest powers - the US and China - which in turn would have prompted these countries to exert pressure on the government to free up the pipeline network.

The Yukos campaign not only served to caution businessmen from going against the State’s interest, but also underlined the importance the Russian president accorded to oil as a lever for the country’s resurgence.

Though the Yukos experience came in for severe criticism by the Western media, leading to speculation about the possible return to Soviet-style autocracy and re-nationalisation, it did succeed in an environment of improved corporate governance, greater financial transparency and more economic competitiveness. It also sent out the message that the economy would not be left completely to the initiative of the private sector, domestic or foreign and the focus would now be on balancing private profit making with the broader national interest.

Army back as fulcrum By 2007, Putin had achieved much of what he set out to do, with the Kremlin controlling around 30 per cent and 87 per cent respectively of Russia’s oil and natural gas production. He also appointed trusted State officials in key positions in vital enterprises and gave the army the task of ensuring the country’s energy security, thereby linking the economic and military aspects of State power. In fact, when Putin completed his term in 2008, the verdict was that Russia had become stronger than ever since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Russia still has to overcome a number of challenges before it can regain its former stature, with the economic one the most formidable.

Putin’s successor Dmitri Medvedev, who has by and large continued with and reinforced Putin’s policies, realises that economic prowess is as important as military might and the economy is Russia’s chief challenge today, with a rising China at its doorstep.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

CONSTRAINTS

Kapil Dhanraj Patil

At the same time, Russia is also building close economic, diplomatic and military ties with other powers, including China and India. It is working through groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to counter US influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States region, while strengthening traditional ties with India to balance China in its near abroad. As Medvedev said recently in an interview to a Chinese daily, Russia’s foreign policy was based on pragmatism aimed at promoting its national interests and galvanising its multi-directional diplomacy.

All in all, one can expect a new Russia in the coming years - a country determined to be a dominant regional and world power.

The writer is a Research Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Specialising on energy security and climate change-related issues. She has worked as Senior Editor in The Financial Express and has also served as Deputy Secretary at the National Security Council Secretariat. She was awarded the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Chevening Fellowship on “The Economics of Energy” in April 2009.

By accepting China’s pre-eminent role in the North Korean nuclear dilemma, Russia has tended to undercut its own impressive non-proliferation record. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia recovered all the bomb-capable highly enriched uranium from all the former Soviet satellite States as well as those with nuclear ambitions like Libya (which saw the writing on the wall and understood February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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CONSTRAINTS

the consequences of playing nuclear footsie with the notorious Pakistani Dr. A. Q. Khan’s clandestine nuclear network) and voluntarily shut down its nuclear facilities. China is a major player in the A. Q. Khan network (he was peddling Chinese miniaturised nuclear warheads as part of his network’s wares).

North Korea can best be described as a “registered nuclear rogue”. Going soft on North Korea could cost the world dearly.

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he vision of a nuclear weapon free world is as old as that of the weapons themselves. Many world leaders have repeatedly called for a world free of nuclear weapons, not only out of moral but also for political obligations. Over a couple of years, the disarmament discourse was invigorated with US President Barack Obama and four statesmen pledging serious steps to make the world free of nuclear weapons. The change in US nuclear thinking is based on three fundamental premises. First, nuclear disarmament is essential since there is a genuine threat of nuclear weapons falling in wrong hands and that is growing exponentially. The Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recognises for the first time that the threat from terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon (or the fissile material to make one) is greater than that of a nuclear strike by an adversarial State. Secondly, nuclear disarmament is essential for a global nuclear order which is equitable and does not perpetuate disparity between the States that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. Thirdly, there is also growing realisation within the US strategic community that nuclear weapons do not guarantee security against 21st century asymmetric threats and need to be de-legitimised in security doctrines.

Though disarmament discourse is immensely popular within the US society supported by its wide network of think tanks and policymakers arguing for it; the idea of nuclear disarmament is completely absent from Russia’s political and professional sphere. The arms control negotiations have often been affected due to concerns over conventional imbalances vis-à-vis US forces and the US missile defence potentially limiting Russia’s strategic space. Russia’s security thinking arguably failed to transcend the spectre of classical

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arms control arrangements in the post Cold War world.

Institutional constraints Russia’s leadership regards nuclear arms control as a strategic prerequisite to be pursued as part of its broader security policy. President Dmitri Medvedev and his key officials in national security apparatus assess the various proposals and initiatives and set the negotiating agenda for arms control. On the other hand, Russia being one of the founding members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is legally bound to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Though nuclear disarmament is one of the key components of Russia’s political obligations, its broader security strategy requires it to pursue strategic arms reduction in a phased manner.

Within Russia’s national security decision making, the two key important institutions have varying perspectives on nuclear disarmament. While the Foreign Ministry is favourable to the idea of nuclear disarmament, Defence is visibly reluctant and opposed to the idea. Though the Foreign Ministry under Minister Sergey Lavrov has played a key role in aggressively pursuing non-proliferation measures and bilateral arms control with US; on the issue of nuclear disarmament many high level officials are unwilling to challenge the military’s control over that issue.

Russia’s official stance on global nuclear zero reflects, in Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s speech at a Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 2009, where he stated that, “progress towards ‘global zero’ can only be achieved through strengthened strategic stability and strict adherence to the principle of equal security for all.“ The principle of strategic stability linked with global zero is fundamentally problematic in

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Russia’s official thinking. The principle of strategic stability assigns an important mission to nuclear weapons in national security strategy. Thus, Russia’s disarmament policy ironically concentrates on the near-term goal of maintaining a stable strategic balance with the United States at reduced levels of nuclear weapons. It is inherently rooted in a deterrence that underscores, rather minimises, the security logic of nuclear weapons.

Imperatives of securitisation Russia’s security strategy is explicitly linked to three fundamental concerns.

Firstly, Moscow perceives the US conventional superiority as potential strategic destabiliser and nuclear weapons are the only guarantee against deterring US intervention in the region.

The Russian military doctrine released in 2010, regards a large-scale conflict with the US or NATO as extremely unlikely. The doctrine assigns nuclear weapons to regional and large-scale wars, regarded as “an important factor in the prevention of nuclear conflicts and military conflicts that use conventional assets”. The Russian doctrine rationalises nuclear forces to deter conventional challenges due to its limited ability to equip military with modern weapons at a time when the US and other leading powers are integrating information technologies and high-precision weapons into their militaries. Secondly, there is a widely shared opinion that, in case of a large-scale military conflict between the Russian Federation and China, Russia would not be able to guarantee the security of its Far East without nuclear weapons. Thirdly, Moscow is acutely concerned about the US missile defence plans, which could potentially reduce their ability to deter US strike. Kremlin does not accept the US logic that missile defence is for intercepting the missiles launched by “rogue” States such as Iran

and North Korea due to the classic “use them or lose them” dilemma.

In order to deal with the perceived threats and correcting the conventional imbalances, Russia’s national security concept assigns high priority to the large scale modernisation of conventional forces to be completed by 2020. Some of the latest modernisation plans in Russia include developing GLONASS, a Russian analogue of the Global Positioning System (GPS); precision-guided air- and sea-launched conventional cruise missiles; short-range land- and sea-launched ballistic and cruise missiles; and precision-guided bombs. Thus for the foreseeable future Russia is likely to rely on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter the conventional strike.

Arms control agenda Russia’s national security concept also advocates negotiating new arms-control and disarmament agreements in line with changing international relations for enhancing confidence and security building measures. The New START enabled Russia to gradually move towards a minimised nuclear posture and not a step towards nuclear disarmament.

Russia’s negotiation strategy was intended to enhance the strategic stability and the predictability of the bilateral nuclear balance. During the New START negotiations, Russian negotiators chose to limit not only warheads, but also strategic delivery systems: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy (long-range) bombers. The Russians specifically aimed at limiting strategic launchers as US continues to have them in far excessive numbers. The New START therefore does not constrain the US deployment of precision-guided conventionallyarmed land and submarine based ballistic missiles, which many experts argue neutralise Russia’s deterrent.

US Ballistic Missile Defence plans are other crucial concerns for Russia in negotiating future arms reduction agreements with Washington. In the new treaty Russia could not elicit US commitment on limiting missile defence capabilities that could render the Russian strike forces ineffective.

During the treaty negotiations Russians

remained completely silent on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) as they are linked to the withdrawal of US TNWs from Europe.

Ensuring non-proliferation On the FMCT front, Moscow’s proposal for international verification of an FMCT involves monitoring nuclear fuel cycle facilities, not all civilian nuclear enterprises. Russia has huge stocks of fissile materials but has never officially released information on how much HEU and weapon-grade plutonium it produced. Russia has confirmed its continuing commitment to the moratorium on fissile materials. While Russia has not produced weapon-grade uranium since 1989, by the end of 2010 Russia was to fully end its production of weapon-grade plutonium. Russia’s government has undertaken a host of measures to deny the accessibility of nuclear materials to global terrorists’ groups. To enhance security and safety, it repatriated about 700 kg of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Libya, the Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Vietnam and East Germany. Spent fuel has been removed from research reactors in Uzbekistan, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary. Russia has also agreed to set up the world’s first nuclear fuel bank in collaboration with International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure supplies of low enriched uranium (LEU) for nuclear fuel to new nuclear States.

In accordance with this agreement, Russia will establish a stock of 120 tons of LEU at the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) in Angarsk and the IAEA will provide this material to countries whose supply of nuclear fuel is interrupted.

After New START Though Russia has successfully negotiated a New START agreement with the US and is leading many important non-proliferation activities, ideas regarding subsequent steps toward nuclear disarmament in Moscow are not clearly formulated. Russia believes that the post New START arms control process should become multilateral so as to incorporate other nuclear weapons States like UK, France and especially China with its growing strategic capabilities. France and the United Kingdom have already started

unilateral reductions of their nuclear arsenals. Though China is not building new warheads, it is substantially modernising its nuclear forces.

China is probably one of the reasons behind Russia’s initiative (now a joint US-Russian proposal) to make the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) multilateral. The initiative to multi-lateralise the INF treaty has prevented Russia from abrogating the treaty, however, there is no progress on the proposal and it is likely to re-emerge in the coming years.

While there is an increasing realisation within US strategic community that nuclear weapons are losing their strategic relevance, it will take time for Russia to start a serious (or any, for that matter) discussion on whether it really needs nuclear weapons. US political support for a nuclear weapon free world also needs to be followed by concrete measures to bring in fundamental shift in its security postures which will help assuage a number of security concerns of Russia and many other emerging powers across the globe. Although Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons has increased over the decade, due to slow pace of its conventional modernisation, the prospects for moving Moscow toward nuclear zero are not completely bleak.

Despite its security compulsions, Russia is fully aware of its legal as well as normative obligations to the non-proliferation regime, at least at the level of rhetoric.

The writer is a Research Associate at the Indian Pugwash Society and specialises in Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control and Disarmament issues. He is currently working on a DAE project on “Emerging Nuclear Order in Asia: Implications for India’s National Security”. He received the ‘University of Pune’s Special Certificate’ for academic excellence during the MSc programme in Defence and Strategic Studies.

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TELLING SUPPORT

After much trial and error India appears to have hit on the right methodology to shift from dependence on foreign sources for weaponry for national defence to self-sufficiency as envisaged by Jawaharlal Nehru when he created the Defence Research and Development Organisation in 1958. All the accumulated “competence-building” is beginning to pay dividends in that Indian Defence laboratories and scientists are able to interact with foreign firms on an equal basis to jointly create new weapons platforms. The Russian connection and the BrahMos missile have shown the way.

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f late Indians have been charmed by the bewildering speed with which foreign Heads of States, whose stature has been built on their respective military-industrial complexes, have arrived in New Delhi peddling their military wares. There was a time when we begged them for weapons to defend our territorial integrity and they turned their noses up either refusing point-blank or suggesting such conditionalities that India’s hard-won freedom from colonial rule would have been pawned for generations to come.

Cold war syndrome For most of India’s existence it was never like it is today. We could not buy the weapons we wanted from anyone either for love or money. Those were dark days, indeed. Half of Kashmir had already been gobbled up by Pakistan and the volume and sophistication of the weaponry that were being poured into Pakistan was such that, with good generalship, it could have delinked the whole of the former princely state from the rest of India – which, indeed, it tried several times very unsuccessfully.

Indian military thinking, thus, was totally Pakistan-centric and our early search for weaponry was intended to counter whatever Pakistan had acquired ostensibly to defend the world from advancing Communism and all our protestations that no guns had yet been created that would shoot only in one direction fell on deaf ears.

What was held against India was that soon after attaining Independence it chose Non-Alignment as the pillar of State policy so as not to be sucked into the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the western bloc led by

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the US. Pakistan, on the other hand, wallowed whole-heartedly in all the military pacts that were created to “contain Communism” so that it could get all the latest weaponry to complete what was for its rulers the “unfinished business of Kashmir”.

Military pacts India became a free nation two years after the end of World War II and to some extent because of it. But the World War itself engendered what came to be called the Cold War. During the war the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was part of the western Allied forces arraigned against Fascist Germany but in its vision of world domination after years of isolationism and a desire to “fill the vacuum” created by what was generally seen as the impending demise of the British Empire, the US began to set up a chain of military bases governed by military pacts intended to create a phalanx against the USSR and Communist China.

General “Ike” Eisenhower, the former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, having failed to ditch his Communist ally in the middle of the war, set about “containing” it by the enunciation of the “Eisenhower doctrine” soon after he became President of the USA. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was strengthened and the foundation stones were laid for the creation of the Baghdad Pact (renamed Central Treaty Organisation ‘CENTO’ after Iraq withdrew) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation ‘SEATO’ intended to surround Communist China. Of both of these military pacts Pakistan was a member, roped in by Secretary of State

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Cecil Victor

John Foster Dulles.

One other factor that obtruded on India’s efforts to military equipment from western sources was the ongoing agitation in Goa for the overthrow of Portuguese colonialism and a return to Indian suzereignty. Portugal was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and just as the US would pander to Pakistani predilections because it was a member of CENTO and SEATO so also Washington refused to see the anachronism of a “metropolitan area” of Portugal on Indian soil. John Foster Dulles never tired of pointing out that “the whole world knew” that Goa had been a part of Portugal for the past four hundred years. Thus the US had two reasons to hesitate to sell arms to India or help in any way to achieve its stated goal of achieving self-reliance in the production of equipment needed for the defence of its borders.

Soviet support Such was the geopolitical mélange in the first decade after India attained Independence. In 1957, the Soviet Union which had very consistently vetoed attempts within the UN Security Council to move resolutions favouring Pakistan, especially the abrogation of the resolution demanding the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the areas occupied by it before any plebiscite could be held for determining the “will of the people”.

In 1957 the Soviet Union sent one of its most decorated warriors, the man who led the charge into Berlin and at the time held the post of Defence Minister Marshal Georgy Zhukov to India and

Indo-Russian

military cooperation he was immediately responsive to our requests for military hardware. In late 1960 an Indian delegation visited Moscow and signed a deal for Mi-4 helicopters and Antanov and Ilyushin transport aircraft to improve logistics support to troops posted in the mountainous terrain of Jammu and Kashmir.

Licenced-production Given the nascent nature of the Defence production sector (there were only a few ordnance factories manufacturing .303 rifles, ammunition, gun carriages and the like and only the Walchand Industries had any

experience of repairing fighter airplanes and Mazagon Docks Ltd. in its avatar before nationalisation is credited with manufacturing the Trincomalee training ship and did repairs of Allied warships during World War II. A naval dockyard at Mumbai and a shipyard existed at Garden Reach, Kolkata) the Government of India decided that the only practical way to lay a solid foundation of self-reliance in major weapons platforms was to secure licenced-production rights from supplier nations.

the situation was highlighted when Pakistan was given the supersonic F-86 Sabrejets and efforts by India to buy the F-104 Starfighters from the US were rejected. Britain agreed to give us the Folland Gnat fighter aircraft only because the production line was to be dismantled. In the hands of Indian pilots the Gnat proved a match for the Pakistani Sabrejets in both the 1965 and the 1971 wars. Britain parted with the Leander class frigates and the ageing aircraft carrier Hercules (renamed Vikrant).

That was easier said than done because no one was willing to part with technology. The poignancy of

MiG contract Early in 1962 the Soviet Union

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TELLING SUPPORT

It needs to be recalled here that after the War Council in which Chief of Army Staff General Manekshaw sought time till weather conditions turned favourable for a campaign in East Pakistan Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took the precaution of ensuring total Soviet support by signing a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow so that spare parts and replenishments of Soviet-origin weaponry and ammunition was assured and its veto in the UN would keep at bay any attempt by foreign powers to force a ceasefire till the mission was completed. That was in August 1971 four months before Pakistan forced India’s hand by launching a pre-emptive strike on nine airfields in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir agreed to not only supply the MiG-21 fighter-interceptors but to set up factories in India to produce the aircraft.

India became the first Non-Aligned nation to receive the MiG-21s which since then have been the mainstay of the Indian Air Force. A MiG complex was set up at the Hindustan Aircrafts Ltd. (later renamed the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.) at Nasik where the airframe would be manufactured; Koraput where the engine would be fabricated; and Hyderabad where the avionics factory would be located.

There was, of course, a hue and cry both within the country and around the world at what was described as India having gone over to the Soviet camp.

Washington, trying to make capital of India’s predicament, suggested that India should remain “equidistant” in its relationship with the two Super Powers as a measure of “true Non-Alignment”.

Translated into practical terms it meant that if India bought a weapons system from the Soviet Union it must also place an order for military equipment with the US or NATO in show of evenhandedness. Nehru rejected this “doctrine of equidistance” and pointed out that no sovereign, independent nation could agree to the proposition that its purchase of aircraft or other equipment could be vetoed by another country.

US game in 1962 In 1962 came the Chinese aggression and while the US did help substantially in equipping Indian regiments raised for deployment in the Himalayas it tried to use the opportunity to draw into a permanent military arrangement with base facilities and regular port calls. It set up radars and air defence facilities in the Himalayas in a project known as Omega and offered India an “umbrella” with nuclear connotations similar to that with Japan but Nehru would have none of it and American

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(and western) interest tapered off.

Telling support Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan visited the Soviet Union in 1964 and came away with a deal for more MiG aircraft to be paid for in Indian rupees generated through the export of Indian goods over a period of ten years and at two per cent interest. Since then, the MiG Complex at HAL has been producing improved versions of the whole series of MiG aircraft. The Indian Air Force has flown the MiG-23 fighter-interdictors; the MiG-27 for tactical strike and close air support; the MiG-25 Foxbat a mach-3 plus reconnaissance aircraft that could outfly most surface-to-air missiles of that generation even as it took razor-sharp photographs of the battlefield and its hinterland.

Apart from the fighter component of the IAF the Soviet Union bolstered the transport fleet with An-12 aircraft and Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters. The Mi-24 / Mi-34 helicopter gunships improved the combat mobility of mechanised forces on the ground. The transports and helicopters maintained air-bridges to forward outposts to provision which drop-zones were created all along the Himalayas from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh - a deployment which kept the Chinese quiet except for a brief encounter in 1967 at Nathu La in Sikkim where the Chinese got a bloody nose. In the 80s in a major upgradation of the transport fleet the Soviet Union specifically designed the An-32 to operate in the hot and high conditions that the transition from the plains to the mountains entailed.

It was backed up by the Ilyushin-76, the Il-78, the tanker version for air-to-air refuelling (and enhancement of the range of fighter aircraft); and one that has been converted into an airborne warning and command system (AWACS). Ten Mi-26 helicopters - the

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

heaviest helicopter ever built - were acquired to airlift heavy equipment up to altitudes of 10,000 ft. The list of air defence systems will not be complete without the Pichora surface-to-air missiles and the Kwadrat quick-reaction missiles that followed. In providing the Indian Army a massive punch and great mobility Soviet equipment plays a crucial part. Since the sixties the T-54, the T-55s and the amphibious PT-22 and PT-76 bolstered by the indigenous Vijayantas formed part of the strike corps. The T-72 and the T-90s are the backbone of the armoured corps.

In conjunction with the tanks is a large phalanx of artillery weapons ranging from the 130-mm medium field guns for long-range bombardment and the multi-barrel rocket launchers for saturation of targets in the near range. The earlier supplies of armoured personnel carriers were upgraded with infantry combat vehicles of the BMP class for which a factory was set up in Medak. And to maintain the forward momentum of a task force protection is provided against air attacks with the Schilka tracked four-barrel rapid-fire air defence guns complemented by the SZU twin-barrel towed guns. The combination of the Mi-24 helicopter gunships and the ICVs of the mechanised units imparted to the Indian Army all the capabilities required for the swift execution of military missions in modern-day fighting where mobility is crucial in what is known as the air-land battle scenario.

On the sea too Soviet equipment were crucial components of the infrastructure for maritime defence. The Indian Navy which since Independence was mainly British-oriented, received a fillip with the purchase from the Soviet Union of submarines which neither Britain, France or the US were willing to give at that point of time. Nothing has been more potent than the inclusion

of OSA class of missile-boats into the Indian Navy - it helped achieve the massive destruction of Karachi port on 3 December, 1971. The larger Nanuchka corvettes were marginally slower than the OSA class of boats but had a longer reach. For many years Petya class patrol boats were accompanying British frigates (the Leander class vessels were licence-produced by Mazagon Dock Ltd.) destroyers and cruisers and Kashin class destroyers, the Soviet component encompassed the entire range from inshore defence to bluewater capabability. The acquisition of Il-38 maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft imparted to the Indian Navy an over-the-horizon capability whch allows for optimum utilisation of a fleet which in size is not commensurate with the length of the Indian coastline and its strategic prominence in the Indian Ocean but has acknowledged capabilities of attack and defence to handle any danger from the air, the surface and underwater with much competence. The crowning act of cooperation before the Soviet Union collapsed was the lease of the Victor class nuclear propelled submarine INS Chakra for a three-year period to enable Indian sailors to train in handling the nuclear power plant and man-management for long-range patrols that only nuclear power can provide.

Peace and friendship treaty It needs to be recalled here that after the War Council in which Chief of Army Staff General Sam Manekshaw sought time till weather conditions turned favourable for a campaign in East Pakistan Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took the precaution of ensuring total Soviet support by signing a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow so that the supply of spare parts and replenishments of Soviet-origin weaponry and ammunition was assured and its veto in the UN would keep at bay any attempt by foreign powers to force a ceasefire till the mission was completed. That was in August 1971, four months before Pakistan forced India’s hand by launching a pre-emptive strike on nine airfields in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. It was on the strength of Soviet-supplied equipment that the Indian Army conducted one of the swiftest campaigns in the history of

warfare, creating a new nation named Bangladesh in place of East Pakistan and taking 93,000 prisoners of war in 14 days flat.

By 1990 the preponderance of Soviet-supplied military equipment was as high as 80 per cent and when the Soviet Union collapsed under President Mikhail Gorbachev, India was confronted by a massive disruption in supply of spare parts and components. Things became so bad that the newly acquired MiG-29s had to be cannabalised to ensure that the fleet remained operational. The same with An-12 aircraft.

Co-production It took some years for the Russian Federation and the successor States to emerge from the debris of the Soviet Union. Issues of patents and payments had to be sorted out and the first casualty was the rupee trade.

Yet some things remained constant as was the Indo-Russian cooperation in India’s “Advanced Technology Vessel” project which was a euphemism for a nuclear submarine. For 25 years from the mid-80s first the Soviets and then the Russians kept in constant touch exchanging ideas on hull design and, more importantly, the miniaturisation of a nuclear reactor to 80 mw scale to power India’s first nuclear submarine.

The Arihant was finally launched in July, 2009. In many respects it marked a transition from “licenced-production” to “co-development” and is the first example of it. The strengthening of the Indo-Russian cooperation has also resulted in a new lease arrangement for two Akula II class of Russian nuclear submarines. The first, the Nerpa was

to have joined the Indian Navy but was delayed by the accidental release of Freon gas in a firefighting system killing more than a dozen Russian sailors and injuring many others. It will soon be arriving in India.

Another thundering success of co-production is the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile which has been adapted to specific uses of the Army, Air Force and Navy in both surface attack and submarine-launched attack. It is nuclear capable.

The signing of the agreement during Russian President Medvedev’s recent visit to New Delhi for the co-development of the fifth generation fighter aircraft will ensure that the Indian Air Force will have a markedly improved fighter over the already impressive capabilities of the Sukhoi-30s that are being produced under licence in India.

In the midst of all these positives much time and media space has been taken up by the contratemps over the delivery of the aircraft-carrier Gorshkov (renamed Vikramaditya). While the hull had been offered for free the cost of refurbishing and modernising the carrier has touched US$ 2.3 billion. It is expected to be delivered by early 2013.

In totality India-Russia military cooperation has been a win-win arrangement.

The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

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resurgent Russia

PRAGMATISM

This is a relationship, to borrow an Americanism, that has been through hell and highwater, through war and into peace. It is a relationship that has been marked, as in the case with India, an equalness that transcends blocs and military pacts. Its presence has provided the bridge that now links resurgent Russia with Southeast Asia in bonds that are as vibrant as those between Russia and Europe, giving Moscow a geopolitical ambiance far beyond what the Soviet Union did.

T

he history of world politics tells us that countries across the world show a pattern, if not an element of consistency, in their foreign policy behaviour. The foreign policy of India, Pakistan, China, the UK and even the US are a few cases in point. Russian case in that regard has been quite curious. It is believed that unpredictability has been a landmark feature of Russian foreign policy, so much so that scholars have even gone to the extent of saying that ‘randomness defines the Russian foreign policy’.

The argument holds water and proves itself to a certain extent. For instance, the Russian position during the first and the Second World Wars and Euro-Atlantic vs. the Asianist debate has always lingered in the minds of foreign policy mandarins of Russia. The debate is alive even today and as a result Russian approach towards Europe and Asia keeps shifting.

Russia-Vietnam-India In contrast to those who call Russian foreign policy ‘random’, there are those who find consistency in Russian foreign policy. The point made by this set of scholars is that, ‘what is random for the West is consistency to Russia; it has maintained the revisionist approach to the global order since the inception of modern Russia (and the Soviet Union).

Nevertheless, there have been a number of cases where not only Russia has maintained a consistent approach, but has also kept the engagement growing. Russia’s relationship with Vietnam has been remarkable in that regard. In fact Russia’s relationship with India and Vietnam has been among the most profound cases which argue well for the consistency in Russian foreign policy behaviour.

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Looking eastwards The consistency and robustness of Russia-Vietnam and Russia-India relationship, coupled with the rising bonhomie between Russia and China has indeed encouraged Russia to not only look at but also engage countries across Asia. This is substantiated by the fact that over the past 20 months, the Russian leaders President Dmitry Medvedev and the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have made high profile visits to the continent no less than ten times.

Asian century Like all other nations, Russia has realised that the twenty-first century belongs to Asia, which is home to several rising powers and four fastest growing economies. The shift of politico-economic epicenter to Asia has made Russia make mid-course corrections in its foreign policy. Also, Russia seems to have understood very well that compared to China, Japan and the US it is less influential in the region.

That seems to be one of the reasons why Russia has made all the efforts to keep India and Vietnam with it, despite the fact that both are seemingly getting closer to the US. Russia is keen to project its military cooperation with India and Vietnam as classic case of symbiotic relationship, which could be repeated with many more countries of Asia in general and that of the east Asian region in particular. Military diplomacy is used to strengthen its relatively weaker politico-diplomatic position, as at the forefront of Russian policy has been weapon trade and military cooperation with countries across the continent.

In order to comprehend the Russian approach towards the region a closer look at the Russo-Vietnam relations is pertinent. This article doesn’t intend

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

to delve into the details of Russo-India relations as that has already been discussed elsewhere in this issue of DSA.

War and peace Sixty years back, on 30 January 1950, when the erstwhile Soviet Union and Vietnam were laying down the foundation of their bilateral relationship, they would not have imagined that together they would go this far. Throughout these years, the two countries supported each other and stood by each other in difficult times. The first challenge that tested this set of bilateral relationship was the US war on Vietnam. Soviet Union was among the first countries which reacted swiftly to the American intervention in Vietnam and asked the US to stop military hostilities and supported the Vietnamese government’s stand. Not only did the Soviet Union extend the politico-diplomatic support, but it also helped Vietnam bolster its military capabilities. In fact, from July 1965 to the end of 1974, more than 6,000 Soviet military officers and over 4,500 soldiers of the Soviet Armed forces helped Vietnam with military training. It not only strengthened Vietnamese army in fighting strongly against the US but also helped in making the Vietnamese army in the league of most efficient armed forces of the world. The following table on Russian arms supplies to Vietnam gives a clear picture as to how big a role Russia has played in shoring-up Vietnamese military capabilities (Table 1).

As is evident from the table, of late Russia has given licences to Vietnam for production of BPS-500 / Type-1241A and Tarantul / Type-1241 FACs. This proves that Russia is willing to take the military cooperation and bilateral arms trade to new heights. However, a few scholars believe that the Russian

Russia-Vietnam: amazing amity Rahul Mishra

military engagement with Vietnam in recent years has gone down. The oft cited example in that context is that of Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet navy is believed to have kept the base under its control for long before finally handing it over to Vietnam. In the Cold War years, Vietnam also found it necessary to have the forces of its strongest ally in close proximity. The Russian troops started withdrawing troops in 1990s, but the process went on as late as 2002.

In analysing the Russian position on Cam Ranh Bay, one must consider the altered realities of the post-Cold War world which suggest that it was pertinent on Russia’s part to take such a move.

Soviet-Vietnam treaty The Soviet-Vietnam relationship reached new heights with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries.

It was agreed that in the event of an attack on any of the two countries, both would immediately enter into mutual consultations to remove such threats and take most effective measures to ensure the security of the two nations.

In less than a month’s time of signing of the treaty in December 1978, Vietnam attacked the Pol Pot regime of Cambodia and as a consequence, China retaliated by attacking Vietnam.

The Treaty proved its salt when under the Soviet Union’s pressure, China withdrew from the Vietnamese territory it had occupied.

Over the years, the scope of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam also expanded. The two countries not only cooperated militarily and economically but also in other fields such as science and technology. For instance, on July 23, 1980, the Soyuz-37 spaceship was launched into orbit.

This was piloted by V.V. Gorbatko and Pham Tuan, the Soviet and Vietnamese

astronauts, respectively.

Post-Soviet collapse The turbulent years of collapse of the USSR and its aftermath affected the Russo-Vietnamese relations also.

However, the two didn’t take much time to get out of the idle phase of the relationship and in 1994 Russia and Vietnam signed the Treaty on the Foundations of Friendly Relations.

The relationship got a fillip in 2001, when Vladimir Putin visited Hanoi to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Russia-Vietnam relations. During Putin’s visit, Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed. The uniqueness of the Treaty lies in the fact that Vietnam is the only country in the region with which Russia has such a partnership.

Interestingly enough, Russia also got the distinction of being the first country in the world to have inked such a treaty with Vietnam. The treaty formulated the long term objectives on a range of issues including education, defence, science and technology and trade. The Treaty has been strengthened through regular bilateral visits and meetings which are held annually and is regulated by over 50 intergovernmental agreements.

Expansion of trade Bilateral trade also has received tremendous growth over the years.

From US$ 300 million in the mid 1990s, it crossed the US$ 1.5 billion mark in 2009.

According to the reports published in Rossiiskaya gazeta in September 2009, 59 projects are implemented in Vietnam with the participation of Russian capital and with a total sum of investments amounting to US$ 370 million, which excludes the investments in energy sector. Russia has also helped Vietnam set up thermal and hydropower plants with a total capacity of over 4,000 megawatt. According to the Vietnamese

officials, these plants generate more than two-third of electricity in Vietnam.

The two economies complement each other as Russia exports finished goods, while Vietnam’s principal exports mainly include agricultural products and raw materials.

Debt amortisation Issue of Soviet era debts on Vietnam had been among the prickly issues, hampering the prospects of cooperation. In order to resolve the differences, Russia and Vietnam, in September 2000, agreed to cut the Soviet-era debt, previously estimated at US$ 11 billion, by 85 per cent and allowing for repayment of the rest over 23 years. According to reports, Vietnam is to repay nearly US$ 100 million in cash every year, while the remainder will be repaid in kind or re-invested in joint ventures in Vietnam.

Cooperation in energy Russia is also assisting Vietnam in its atomic energy programme. The atomic energy agencies of the two countries have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding in that regard. In 2008, Vietnam approved the use of atomic power for civilian purposes, thereby opening new vistas for cooperation with Russia. The Russian side has also been keen to help Vietnam construct nuclear power plants, train specialists and set up new Nuclear Research Centres.

Additionally, in other sub-sectors of energy there are many signs of positive development. Joint exploration of energy field is one of them. Vietnam’s President Triet, on a visit to Moscow in October 2008, signed a pact for Vietnamese and Russian firms to develop energy fields off the Vietnam coast. Russia continues to take part in upgrading and constructing hydro

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resurgent Russia

resurgent Russia

PRAGMATISM

HIGH-TECH WEAPONS

Table 1. Select list of major conventional weapons transferred from Russia to Vietnam No. odered

Weapon Weapon designation description

Year Year(s) No. Comments of order/ of delivered/ Supplier-Russia licence deliveries produced Recipient (R)-Vietnam

16

P-15M/SSN-2C Styx

Anti-ship missile

(1994)

1996

(16)

For Tarantul-1 FAC

75

R-73/AA-11 Archer

SRAAM

(1994)

1995

(75)

For Su-27SK combat aircraft

6

Su-27S/ Flanker-B

FGA aircraft

(1994)

1995

6

Deal worth US$ 200 m; incl 1 Su-27UBK version

2

Tarantul/ Type-1241

FAC (M)

1994

1996

2

Vietnamese designation HQ-371

(40)

Kh-35 Uran/ SS-N-25

Anti-ship missile

(1996)

2001-2005

(40)

For BPS-500 (Ho-A) FAC; status uncertain

6

Su-27S/ Flanker-B

FGA aircraft

(1996)

1997-1998

6

Incl 4 Su-27UBK

(20)

P-15M/ SS-N-2C Styx

Anti-ship missile

(1998)

1999

(20)

For Tarantul-2 FAC

4

Mi-8/Mi-17/ Hip-H

Helicopter

2002

2004

4

Mi-17 version

(75)

48N6/SA-10D Grumble

SAM

2003

2005-2006

(72)

Part of US$ 200-380 m deal

2

S-300PMU-1/ SA-20A

SAM system

2003

2005

2

Part of US$ 200-380 m deal

4

Su-30MK/ Flanker

FGA aircraft

(2003)

2004

4

$100-120 m deal; Su-30MK2V version

2

Gepard

Frigate

2006

2

K-300P Bastion-P

Coast defence system

2007

2009

(1)

Part of US$ 300 m deal

(40)

Yakhont/ SS-N-26

Anti-ship missile

2007

2009

(20)

Part of US$ 300 m deal; for Bastion coastal defence system

8

Su-30MK/ Flanker

FGA aircraft

2009

US$ 400-500 m deal; Su-30MK2 version; option on 12 more; delivery 2010-2011

6

Type-636E/ Kilo

Submarine

2009

US$ 1.8-2 b deal

(2)

BPS-500/ Type-1241A

FAC (M)

1996

2001-2005

(2)

Licencer-Vietnam Assembled from kits in Vietnam; Vietnamese designation Ho-A; status of second uncertain

(10)

Tarantul/ Type-1241

FAC(M)

(2004)

2008

2

Licencer-Vietnam Tarantul-5 version; status uncertain of 8 to be produced in Vietnam

Part of US$ 300 m deal; delivery probably 2010-2011

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. and thermal power plants, notably the Son La Hydropower plant.

East-west bridge Vietnam, on its part, has played its role of ‘bridge between Russia and east Asia very well. With the support of Vietnam, Russia finally became a member of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) and participated in the first ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting - Plus (ADMM+).

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While one cannot deny that the decades-old Russo-Vietnam relationship has not grown rusty and has stood the test of time, one may argue that the two countries have to deal with the trade issues carefully, as the US entry in the Vietnamese market has shown its impact. Russia needs to go beyond the government-to-government cooperation and catch up with the US on that front too. As Russia is trying to rediscover its role in the 21st century, it has to rediscover its relationship with

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Jagmohan Meher

key partner countries as well. Injecting more pragmatism, which is in tune with their respective national interests in the relationship while ensuring huge stakes in each other’s diplomatic, military and economic sphere would ensure that this unique partnership remains lasting.

The writer is a researcher at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India.

The usual crib is that there is an over-dependence on the Russians for weapons for national defence. It is also an immutable fact that there is no one else who has been willing and able to supply India with the latest military technology even as it is assaulted time and again with weapons supplied to Pakistan. India has much to be grateful for to the former Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, for forging and retaining such unique links.

D

efence cooperation is the most dynamic aspect in the advancement of multi-pronged Indo-Russian relations.

Almost five decades of close military collaboration starting from the early 1960s have witnessed the time-tested unique partnership between the two countries. This relationship is unique in the sense that no other country has

ever offered India such deals in defence sector as it gets from Russia. The current trends of Indo-Russian defence ties are characterised by the smooth transition from the “cash and carry” mode to equal joint participation in the long-term research and development projects, which comprise transfer of Russian technologies to the Indian side and joint production of sophisticated

military equipment.

The most striking feature of this relationship is perhaps Russia’s readiness to share its most sensitive and newest defence technologies with India and which are not available for any other country. As India spends billions of dollars on Russian arms, which is still the main source for the Indian armed

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resurgent Russia

HIGH-TECH WEAPONS

forces, it is necessary to understand the distinctiveness of bilateral military technology cooperation. This article, however, makes a humble attempt to identify the shades of grey in such a venture.

BrahMos paradigm Perhaps the most shining example of this area is BrahMos joint venture which manufactures the world’s best supersonic cruise missiles on the basis of Russia-supplied exclusive technologies. BrahMos, which flies at speeds of 2.8 Mach, i.e., more than twice the speed of sound and performs supersonic manoeuvring, is considered a ‘precision strike weapon’ capable of hitting small targets in cluttered urban environment. With vertical launchers, the missile can be fired at any target in the entire 360 degree spectrum. It can be fired from various platforms such as ship, land, submarine and air and can carry a payload of 200-300 kilograms of conventional warheads, depending on the version, to target 290 kilometers away. Although fitted with a preset trajectory, it has a sensor in its head to change the course of the missile to target and strike 20 kilometers from the predetermined range. India takes pride in the BrahMos because it is the only supersonic cruise missile in the world; the rest of them in operation in various countries are subsonic. The Indian Navy has already inducted the 290-km range BrahMos missiles on some warships; few of these variants are to be fitted in Kolkata-class P-15A destroyers being built at Mazagon Docks. BrahMos will also arm the Talwar-class ‘stealth’ frigates being built at Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad, Russia. The supersonic missile will also be launched from submarine and talks with Russia are now in the final stages for BrahMos’ integration with Sukhoi-30MKI fighters.

Russia’s sharing of such technologies with India is unquestionably unique and it illustrates the special bilateral military cooperation.

Fighter technology Similarly, aircraft engineering has long been a vital component of Indo-Russian defence cooperation. It is well known that for a long time the Indian Air Force has been dependent on the Russian supplied fighter planes.

When Mig-29 fighter / interceptors were supplied to India (first country

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outside Soviet Union to get this aircraft) in mid-1980s, the defence cooperation between the two countries was termed “cemented.” Today, that relationship has become multifarious. Su-30MKI fighters, known as one of the best in the world, are not only supplied to this country, but are also assembled under license here. India has signed a contract of US$ 8.5 billion with Russia for the supply of 230 Sukhoi-30MKI fighters out of which 105 jets have been already inducted to the Indian Air Force. A deal for another 50 jets is likely soon.

The Sukhoi Su-30 MKI is a variant of the Sukhoi Su-30, jointly-developed

by Russia’s Sukhoi Corporation and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited for the Indian Air Force. It is a heavy class, long-range air superiority fighter which can act as a multi-role, strike fighter aircraft. The development of this variant started after India signed a deal with Russia in 2000 to manufacture 140 Su-30 fighter jets. The first Russian-made Su-30MKI was integrated into the IAF in 2002, while the first indigenously assembled Su-30MKI entered service with the IAF in 2004. In 2007, the IAF ordered 40 additional MKIs. As of July 2010, the IAF has 124 MKIs under active service with plans to have an operational fleet of 280 of them by 2015. The Su-30MKI is expected to form the backbone of the Indian Air Force’s fighter fleet to 2020 and beyond. The aircraft is tailor-made for Indian specifications and integrates Indian systems and avionics as well as French and Israeli subsystems. It has abilities similar to the Sukhoi Su-35 with which it shares many features and components.

Fifth generation fighter The Indo-Russian project on joint designing and manufacturing of the fifth-generation jet fighter and the agreements on multipurpose transport aircraft boost the confidence of two countries. The most significant aspect of this relationship is the Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA fifth-generation fighter project; pegging the development cost at US$ 10 billion.

Apart from sharing developmental costs, India hopes to order 250-300 of these supersonic stealth fighters over 10 years, reported to be worth US$ 35 billion. As per the agreement signed in December 2010, India’s State-run Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. will work alongside Russia’s Rosoboronexport

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

MiG-29KUB fighters which were to be operated from INS Vikramaditya. In January 2010, India and Russia signed a US$ 1.2 billion deal under which the Indian Navy would acquire 29 additional MiG-29Ks, bringing the total number of MiG-29Ks on order to 45. The MiG-29K will be equipped with anti-aircraft beyond visual range missiles, guided anti-ship missiles, ‘smart’ guided-bombs and rockets.

The pilot’s helmet is equipped with advanced features permitting the pilot to shoot a target by merely looking at it. With all these systems, the MiG-29K is indeed a fighter to reckon with and is arguably one of the best in the sub-continent today.

The naval fighter fraternity has been heard referring to the MiG-29K as ‘Game Changers’ and ‘Foe Busters’. Be that as it may, the MiG 29K squadron is fondly called the Black Panthers.

and is expected to begin delivery of the fighter by 2017. Analysts believe that India will remain the main purchaser of Russian-made combat aircraft for the next 15 years under existing and future contracts, as the country desperately needs to upgrade its fighter fleet, which includes Su-30MKI and MiG-29 fighters, but mainly consists of obsolete Soviet MiG-21 models.

MiG-29s The MiG-29 is a 4th generation jet fighter aircraft designed in the former Soviet Union for an air superiority role. The MiG-29, along with the Sukhoi Su-27 was developed to counter new American fighters such as the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon. India was the first international customer of the MiG-29. The Indian Air Force (IAF) placed an order for more than 50 MiG-29s in 1980 while the aircraft was still in its initial development phase.

Since its induction into the IAF in 1985, the aircraft has undergone a series of modifications with the addition of latest avionics, turbofan engines, a sophisticated radar system capable of deploying high-accuracy air-to-air missile and air-to-ground missiles, equipped to enhance beyond-visualrange combat ability, new weapon control system, cockpit ergonomics, “smart” aerial bombs, etc. enhancing its multi-role capabilities. The upgraded Indian version forms a crucial component of the second-line offensive aircraft-fleet of the IAF after the Sukhoi Su-30MKI.

The controversial but a high profile result-oriented defence deal between India and Russia was the US$ 1.5 billion agreement signed in January 2004 to deliver the aircraft carrier Gorshkov, currently being retrofitted in Russia for the Indian Navy and to be re-named INS Vikramaditya.

The contract was inclusive of the supply of 12 single-seat MiG-29Ks and four two-seat MiG-29KUBs. India signed this contract with the crimson hopes of possessing the strongest Asian navy in the Indian Ocean. Gorshkov is a huge facility, a floating mini world in the blue waters of ocean, a launch pad for many aircraft to attack the enemy and supposedly, the pride of the country that owns it. It is a gigantic ship with a huge displacement of 44,500 tons that can carry 30 MiG-29K fighter aircraft and 10 Kamov helicopters.

Undoubtedly, this is a rare commodity in the arms market. Few countries in the world produce aircraft carriers; still fewer are ready to sell it to other countries. But there is genuine disquiet among the Indian armed forces about the Russian behaviour over Gorshkov, especially about Moscow not sticking to delivery schedules and increasing costs midway. The bitter wrangling over the huge escalation in Gorshkov’s refit cost, in fact, even led to a distinct chill.

However, over a recent agreement, India agreed to pay an additional amount of US$ 2.34 billion for the refit of this carrier and expects its induction in the Indian Navy by 2013. Experts feel that the cost, however, is worth it.

Indian MiG-29s were used extensively during the 1999 Kargil War by the Indian Air Force to provide fighter escort for Mirage 2000, which were attacking targets with laser-guided bombs. It is well known that MiG-29s from the IAF’s No. 47 squadron (Black Archers) gained missile lock on two F-16s of the Pakistan Air Force which were patrolling close to the border to prevent any incursions by Indian aircraft, but did not engage them because no official declaration of war had been issued. The Indian MiG-29s were armed with beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles whereas the Pakistani F-16s were not.

In January 2004, the Indian Navy signed a contract for the delivery of 12 MiG-29K and 4

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Akula nuclear submarines At the same time there is realisation that only Russia is ready to supply India with some sensitive stuff like the K-152 Nerpa Akula-II nuclear-powered attack submarine, which the country has already inducted under the name of INS Chakra. India has reportedly paid US$ 650 million for a 10-year lease of this 12,000 ton submarine. India is expected to pay US$ 50 million annually to the Russian Navy for its lease. Indian Navy hopes to train its personnel on board the Russian submarine, as it expects to operate an indigenously developed nuclear-powered vessel. In July 2009, it had launched nuclear-powered INS Arihant, which is at present under construction in Vishakhapatnam and is expected to join the fleet in about two years. Akulas are definitely one of the best attack sub-classes in the world. Akulas are extremely quiet. They are also very fast underwater and can dive deeper than conventional subs.

Pakistan’s Agosta 90B can go a max of 12 kts submerged (that too for a short time) and has a maximum dive depth of 350 m. Akula can run at 33 kts submerged for a long time (days) and has a dive depth of 600 m. Akulas can be deadly against surface warships / ships. India can use them to impose a blockade of Pakistan or interdict oil supplies to China.

Stealth frigates India is also procuring six Talwar-class stealth frigates (for Rs. 8,514 crore) out of which three - Talwar, Trishul and Tabar - have already been inducted in the Indian Navy. Deliveries of the other three – Teg, Tarkash and Trikand will be made from 2012 onwards. This class frigate has deadweight of 4,000 metric tons and a speed of 30 knots and is capable of accomplishing a wide range of maritime missions, primarily hunting down and destroying large surface ships and submarines. All of the new frigates will be armed with eight BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise missile systems.

T-90 MBT Another important milestone in bilateral defence cooperation is the supply of T-90S Main Battle Tanks (MBT), rechristened ‘Bhishma,’ which the Indian Army considers as its

front-line defence. Initially India purchased 400 of these tanks which have already been inducted, but subsequently, through a technology transfer regime, another 1000 MBTs are being manufactured in this country. Amid all this, the Army has also launched the hunt for a futuristic ‘smart’ main-battle tank for the wars beyond 2020. Russia has already proposed a joint project for a next-generation MBT, with a much higher speed, greater firepower, sophisticated armour protection and a new hunter-killer fire control system.

Transfer of skills In addition to the above, India is procuring various other weapon systems and latest defence technology from Russia. It is the only country that is willing to share technology at the strategic level of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines with India and it is also the only major global power that has not sold defence technology to Pakistan. One must understand that when a particular technology is transferred to India, the Russian specialists not only bring their technology to this country, but also train their Indian counterparts on the technological know-how, production or construction methods etc. And the acquired skills remain in India forever.

Over the years, defence relations between India and Russia have evolved from a simple buyerseller relationship to a broad-based partnership, in which both the countries are involved in joint design, development and production of defence equipment. As per a recent protocol signed between the two countries, both sides reiterated the commitment of their governments to extend the ongoing programme of military technical cooperation from 2011 to 2020.

The writer teaches Political Science, International Relations and Area Studies at National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, Pune, India. He is a former Fulbright Fellow at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and author of the books, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success That Failed and Afghanistan: Dynamics of Survival (edited).

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Mr. Manoj Chugh, President, EMC, India and SAARC spoke to DSA expounding on EMC's India operations.

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Defence and Security Alert: As a known and international name in the field of Information Technology, please enlighten us what prompted EMC’s foray into Indian defence arena?

Manoj Chugh: Globally, the Defence vertical is amongst the biggest consumers of technology. We see a similar trend in India as well. India has the world’s 10th largest Defence budget. In the Union Budget 2010-11, the Government had allocated Rs. 1,47, 377 crores (US $ 31.9 billion) for the country’s Defence Services that include three Armed Forces (i.e., the Army, the Navy and the Air Force), and two Defence departments - Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Ordnance Factories. This allocation is apart from Rs. 28,427.85 crore that is made available to defray the ‘secretariat-general services’ of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its affiliated organisations (primarily the Coast Guard and the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry), and for Defence Pensions (Rs. 25,000 crore). In other words, the total outlay to MoD and its organisations amounts to Rs. 1,75,771.85 crore (US$ 38.1 billion).

Currently, the Indian Defence is undergoing a massive expansion and refresh in mainstream equipment where there are projects valued at tens of billions of dollars. Similar expansion and upgrade projects are happening for Network Centric Projects, Datacenters, enhancements in Information Security and Protection and ERP projects for inventory management among other areas. There is an enormous opportunity for EMC to address Information Technology specific projects where we have a vast range of solution offerings for the Indian Defence Forces.

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DSA: Please elaborate about the solution range in the defence and homeland security genre being offered by EMC? MC: EMC has a diverse solutions portfolio for the Defence - right from Information Storage, to Information Protection, to Information backup and Recovery and finally Information Security. The

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combination of EMC solution offerings align perfectly with the Defence Force’s core business objectives of consolidating resources, mitigating risks and maximising potential efficiencies. Our solutions deliver these capabilities by helping to organise, integrate, modernise and automate the technology information infrastructure that the Defence has so that they can improve services and respond quicker to challenges.

(GIS) data more intelligently for defense and coalition forces.

Grants Management — Increases responsiveness, visibility, collaboration and accountability across the entire grant management process.

Security and Compliance

Solutions that EMC offers for the Defence vertical:

Information Security for Public Sector — Takes an “information-centric” approach, as opposed to the traditional perspective of “perimeter security”; it’s not just about firewalls, it’s about protecting information.

Physical Security Solutions — Captures and consolidates realtime and historical images from video surveillance to protect critical government facilities and ensures public safety.

Records Management for Public Sector — Complies with legal and regulatory requirements for document retention and integrate with Microsoft Outlook to scale Outlook capabilities from simple e-mail record declarations to full content management.

Records, Regulatory Compliance, and Governance — Meets compliance challenges and minimise legal risk for all business applications and documents.

Administrative and Business Solutions

Information Infrastructure

Collaborative Case Management — Accelerates case resolution and improves worker productivity across departments and agencies by leveraging an integrated content management platform.

Constituent Communications — Efficiently creates, tracks, manages and distributes personalised, accurate outbound communication across physical and electronic channels to agencies, citizens and businesses.

Crisis Management — Enables Defence organisations to leverage vast stores of data by sharing information and making decisions in a collaborative environment.

Data Capture and Forms Processing Solution for Indian Defence — Automatically and accurately captures paper or electronic source and transform it into usable, business-ready content.

GIS Information Solutions for Defence Sector — Stores, protects, optimises, and leverages geographic information systems

Business Continuity and Availability — Matches levels of protection to business value with a wide range of offerings— from simple, low-cost back-up-to-disk solutions to local and remote replication capabilities.

Backup, Recovery and Archiving — Strengthens data protection, ensure regulatory compliance and simplify your entire backup, recovery and archiving infrastructure with policy-based management of information retention and deletion.

Infrastructure Consolidation and Optimisation — Optimises your computing assets, including data centres, applications, databases and servers, to improve efficiencies and increase service levels - all while reducing costs.

Solutions for Microsoft — Accelerates and streamline deployments, upgrades, and migrations of Microsoft Exchange, SQL Server, Office System and SharePoint

Key benefits of EMC’s Defence solutions portfolio: Grid Computing — Supports defence computing within a grid environment.

Security — Meets the highest level of governmental data security requirements.

Operational Efficiency — Streamlines data flow within the information domain.

Continuity of Operations (COOP) — Achieves government-mandated requirements for COOP. Security Assurance — Validates EMC security controls, meet procurement requirements via Common Criteria Certification.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

solutions to get the levels of protection and access you need Solutions for Oracle — Simplifies the complex process of deploying Oracle database and applications on EMC networked storage with pre-tested solutions to speed implementation, reduce risk and ensure optimal performance.

Solutions for SAP — Reduces complexity, drive down operating costs and maximise current technology investments with a flexible infrastructure to unlock the value of information in SAP NetWeaver and SAP applications.

We already have several large Defence wins in India and worldwide. Our most recent win is with New Zealand Defence force where we won a multi-million dollar contract to provide a turn-key data backup, recovery and archive solution for The New Zealand Defence Force. EMC hardware, software and professional services will be utilised to implement a backup solution designed to simplify and improve the way information is backed up, archived and retrieved – delivering improved operational efficiency and cost savings for the Defence Force.

DSA: How do you foresee the business potential for EMC in the Indian market?

MC: Indian Defence is undergoing expansion and upgrade projects for Network Centric Projects, Datacentres, enhancements in Information Security and Protection and ERP projects for inventory management among others.

There is an enormous opportunity for EMC to address Information Technology specific projects where we have a vast range of solution offerings for the Indian Defence Forces.

DSA: What are the marketing plans of EMC to reach out to the defence establishments, homes, offices and factories in India?

MC: EMC will participate extensively at all the important Defence events and

conferences. Additionally, we are running a ‘Customer Briefing’ program at our India Centre of Excellence in Bangalore.

As a part of the program, we plan to take all Defence Commands including Army, Navy, Indian Air Force and all DRDO Organisations to showcase and demonstrate our latest technology and solutions to them at our India CoE.

MC: The primary reason for participating at these events is to engage and educate different people in the Defence on EMC’s solutions portfolio and its relevance in their communications infrastructure.

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DSA: What kind of market share have you been able to achieve in the defence sector in India?

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DSA: What according to you is the biggest challenge for EMC solutions in the Indian market?

MC: As per company policy, EMC does not share country or vertical specific marketshare information. What we can say is that we are well positioned within the Defence organisations especially the R&D units. There are several projects where EMC is engaged which are undergoing technical evaluation currently and there are several projects coming up where we would participate through our channel partners.

MC: While we have been a leader in the Government sector, the focus on the Defence sector was limited. Now, we are actively focusing on the defence sector in India.

The early results are very encouraging and we are confident that 2011 will be landmark year for EMC in terms of Defence business.

DSA: Do you have any products / solutions for the LFRs (Large format retail) market in India?

MC: Yes, we have Iomega, a global leader in innovative storage and network security solutions for small businesses, home offices, consumers and others.

The company has sold more than 410 million digital storage drives and disks since its inception in 1980.

Today, Iomega’s product portfolio includes industry leading network attached storage products, external hard drives, multimedia drives and our award-winning removable storage technology, the REV® Backup Drive.

DSA: Who all can be your potential customers?

MC: EMC potential customers specifically for Ministry of Defence would be Indian Army, Indian Navy, Ordinance Factories and all Defence production units.

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DSA: Indian defence sector and defence budget allocations are growing every year. What role do you see EMC playing in the coming years?

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MC: EMC is extremely focused on the Defence sector globally, as it is one sector that does not get affected by an economic slowdown. In case of India, the strong economic growth is resulting in the country’s Defence budgets growing rapidly. Indian Defence Forces are currently upgrading their Network and IT deployment significantly. There are several large multimillion dollar Defence projects where EMC is engaged strongly, they vary from ERP, Enterprise Content Management System, Data Warehousing, Network Centric, Datacentre and Information Security projects.

Over the long term, we hope to see EMC play a key role in helping the Indian Defence forces build a state of the art information infrastructure.

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DSA: What benefits do you anticipate after participating in any defence or security exhibition / event?

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resurgent Russia

INNOVATION HUB

Some say that the Medvedev gambit is just medicine as before, something taken out of Soviet history. That may be right up to a point because the world has changed since the Soviet Union collapsed and while a replication would be disastrous, that it should be part of the foundation of a new system should be expected. The manner in which it has been planned indicates that Medvedev wants to take off from where the rest of the world has reached.

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ussia has emerged in the twenty first century as a self determining and self governing country. One of the primary objectives of the policy makers in Russia is to initiate steps for the resurgence of a strong Russia with a view to regain its lost position in global politics. In recent years Russia has been looked upon as a “Resurgent Bear”, a formidable power which is now trying to regain its past glory. It is a significant producer of weapons and maintains a nuclear arsenal to boot. And it is also a major producer of oil and gas. High oil and gas prices and an exponential increase in the sale of weapons during the period 2005-2008 had enabled Russia to play a more assertive role in global affairs.

Pitfalls However, the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008 and the onset of the global economic crisis have adversely impacted the Russian economy. Russia witnessed a massive outflow of capital on account of the war and this was further aggravated by the financial crisis sweeping the world. Russia was unable to get international support for the declaration of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia. Russia’s GDP fell by eight per cent in 2009, while the stock market plummeted by almost 90 per cent from the peak achieved in the summer of 2008 and foreign direct investment also fell by a whopping 45 per cent.

Russia’s influence in global affairs today is restricted on account of its lack of global economic competitiveness. Its economy is still primarily a resource based one and therefore highly dependent on prices of commodities like oil, gas and metals. Despite being a major defence equipment producer involving high technology, Russia

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is also plagued by the problem of “monocities” i.e., cities that rely on one or a few Soviet-era outdated businesses.

This is an indication of the inability of the State to achieve seamless diffusion of military technology into the civilian sphere.

Exploiting human resource Therefore, President Medvedev has chalked out a diversification plan that would enable the economy to successfully combat future economic crises and foster enhanced technological cooperation with the developed world, especially establish ‘modernisation alliances’ with the United States and the European Union. The development of a robust national innovation system and a knowledge based economy with the help of the world’s smartest money has been accorded top priority in the economic planning. Russia is home to some of the best engineers and scientists in the world and therefore the State seems to be in a better position to implement radical ideas in collaboration with foreign capital and technology.

Modernisation will be accompanied by a thorough integration of cutting-edge dual use technology, maximising the human and intellectual potential of the country, capacity building and creating entirely new areas of world-class technology.

Innovation hub In February 2010, President Medvedev announced the establishment of a modern technological innovation centre in Skolkovo (on the outskirts of Moscow) for research and development, with an area of 1.5 million square meters, dubbed as Russia’s own Silicon Valley after its namesake in the United States. The innovation hub will have

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

its own police department, tax and customs services and patent authority.

Individuals involved in research activities in Skolkovo will be exempted from VAT, property and land taxes until their annual sales reach 1 billion roubles (US$ 34 million) and eventually until their accrued profits amount to 300 million roubles (US$ 10 million).

The centre will focus on research in five priority areas: energy, information technology, communication, biomedical research and nuclear technology. These include research on nuclear energy, satellite technology (communications and the GLONASS system), medicine (diagnostics systems and new drugs) and information technology (software and supercomputers).

Scientific research premises along with graduate schools, laboratories, housing, offices, kindergartens, schools and hospitals will be built in Skolkovo. Highway infrastructure has been earmarked for completion within four years.

There will be no local authorities and the Skolkovo Board itself will take care of lighting, plumbing and street naming. This is an exception to the law of local governance in a country which is otherwise infamous for being over-centralised and excessively State controlled.

Well strategised While figuring out a strategy for Skolkovo, the Yaroslavl Roadmap Report 10-15-20: “10 Years to Implement, 15 Steps to Take, 20 Pitfalls to Avoid - International Experience and the Path Forward for Russia,” was released at the Global Policy Forum 2010, hosted by President Medvedev in September 2010 in Yaroslavl. It aims to accomplish the transition to an innovative economy by sharing the experiences of some of the most successful countries that have treaded

Rajorshi Roy

the Skolkovo stratagem the path of modernisation.

One must not forget an Indian contribution to this roadmap.

Mr. Vivek Wadhwa1 had come up with some very interesting suggestions (later incorporated in the Yaroslavl roadmap) for Russia to overcome the initial teething problems. These included suggestions for investing

more resources in the education sector, forging alliances with universities across the world, recruitment of international faculty, creation of conditions conducive for skilled international workers to showcase their talent by making use of their diversity and taking advantage of the patent free zone in Russia to come up with solutions that patent restrictions

prevent from being conceptualised in the United States.

Indian example The roadmap prominently cites India’s IT sector and useful lessons have been derived from it. It also calls for the establishment and codification of intellectual property laws, ownership

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Mr. Vivek Wadhwa is an entrepreneur turned academic. He has been a visiting scholar at the School of Information at University of Berkeley, Senior Research Associate at the Harvard Law School and Director of Research at the Centre for Entrepreneurship and Research Commercialisation at Duke University.

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resurgent Russia

for government sponsored research and mandating international standards and regulations.

President Medvedev has roped in eminent personalities in the Skolkovo Board whose members include Eric Schmidt, chairman and CEO of Google, Ratan Tata, chairman of Tata Sons, Peter Loescher, president and CEO of Siemens and John Chambers, Chairman, Chief Executive Director, Cisco Systems Inc., among others. Cisco has pledged investments to the tune of US$ 1 billion and other big multinational companies like Motorola and Siemens have shown keen interest in participating in this project. President Medvedev visited and negotiated deals at the Silicon Valley and the Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger led a return visit of a big business team to Skolkovo.

China, whose economic and political rise can be significantly attributed to the country’s commitment to the strategy of modernisation, has pledged support for the Skolkovo project during the September meeting of the two heads of states in Beijing. German, French and Swiss companies have also expressed their desire to be a part of the project.

Stress on education Steps have been initiated to enhance cooperation between universities globally. A pilot project ‘EURECA’ (Enhancing University Research and Entrepreneurial Capacity) was launched to bring together several of Russia’s newly designated “national research universities” to work with teams from four American institutions. Last year Russia adopted its own version of America’s 30-year-old Bayh-Dole Act, giving its universities the right to own and commercialise the findings arising from their research.

Focus has been on utilising State resources to fund peer-reviewed work.

This is something India can learn from.

Concerns Despite the wave of optimism sweeping across the Kremlin there are issues that may act as impediments in attracting the best talent and investment: ■■ The possibility of over involvement and micro management of affairs of Skolkovo by the Russian government.

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INNOVATION HUB ■■ C o r r u p t i o n is endemic and continues to plague all walks of life in Russia.

Russia is ranked 146th out of 180 in the Transparency International 2009 index.

■■ F o r e i g n investors have expressed concern that Russia lacks strong and transparent legal protection for businesses and investors.

■■ Although innovation is best created by research universities, till date the only educational institution that has been discussed and that has come up in Skolkovo has been the management school. Given that Silicon Valley, Cambridge (MASS) and Beijing’s Zhongguancun all have close links with nearby research universities, this concern seems well placed.

Synergy Modernisation alliances and Russia’s increased cooperation with the West bodes well for the international system.

Not only does it allow Russia to be a bigger stake holder in the conduct of international affairs but also enables the country to forge alliances and partnerships with States which have hitherto viewed Russia with deep skepticism and concern. The new scenario has manifested itself at various levels: Russia’s Lisbon agreement with NATO to cooperate on antipiracy, drug trafficking, Afghanistan and working together for a common missile defence for Europe, Russia’s voting for UN sanctions against Iran, a New START treaty with the US and inviting NATO soldiers to march on Red Square on Victory Day, is a clear indication of Russia’s recent détente with the West.

India’s place Where does India stand in this changing scenario in Russia? Can it benefit from being a part of the Skolkovo initiative?

The competitive advantage of a

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

DEMAND GLUT

Rai Mahimapat Ray

Rajeev Lala

country can be achieved through a diffusion of sophisticated military and civilian technologies. However, the track record of both Russia and India in this sphere is at best modest especially when one compares it with the experience of China.

However, Russia has some of the best scientific talent in the world. Even in the Silicon Valley, team leaders in companies are frequently from Russia. Similarly, India’s information technology prowess is comparable with the best in the world and Russia’s patronage and expertise in science and technology is legendary even today.

Creation of favourable conditions should bring about synergy in research and development and innovation of new technologies which should give a fillip to the modernisation mantra of both countries.

Consequently, it becomes imperative for both India and Russia, two traditional friends, to come together to explore and cooperate in new areas of high technology. Both India and Russia could examine the role of the Chinese government in terms of its support for modernisation programmes. Moreover, emphasis should be more on research in the civilian rather than defence sector which can be put to the better use of increasing productivity and efficiency.

After all in today’s globalised world where focus is more on economic ability rather than military might advanced technology is the key to power.

The writer is a Research Assistant, Eurasia Cluster, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India and his area of specialisation is Russian studies.

Russia: the energy tsar?

Post Soviet collapse the Russian resurgence is due largely to the steady rise in oil / gas prices and sustained by the demand for arms by China and India. That it had to be ruthless in the protection of its best resources was highlighted by the manner in which it dealt with Ukraine for failing to pay its dues. It also explains why it insisted on a massive escalation of costs to modernise and refit the Gorshkov aircraft carrier for India. Both incidents left a bitter taste because of the previous Russian record of being a dependable supplier and, in India’s case, of a hitherto shining example of “special relations”.

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ussia is the largest producer and exporter of energy (oil and gas combined) in the world. However, this tag conveys as much as it hides. Russia’s energy scenario remains an enigma much like the country’s other aspects – politics, economy and the like. Energy retains an overarching influence over every aspect of the Russian kaleidoscope with fluctuations in its prices being felt by average citizens as well as those in power in the Kremlin. The status of oil and gas reserves has become

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resurgent Russia

DEMAND GLUT

a matter of speculation as well as leading to a profusion in the number of ‘Doubting Thomases’ as the publication of official statistics has forever been in doubt, a part of official propaganda to stop any further discussion on an issue that the political establishment considers sensitive. With the global economy showing no signs of reducing its thirst for oil and gas, even during recession and the fact that oil prices have resumed their upward trajectory, the debate over the energy resources of Russia has been reignited.

Access to consumers Even with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia remains the largest country in the world geographically with a North-South span from the Arctic to the Caspian, the Urals to the west and the Pacific to the east. As Mackinder understood in the beginning of the 20th century, the vast Russian landmass allows it to supply energy globally without being dependent on or being played upon by transit States, which especially in the case of gas exports can hold any supplier to ransom.

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1970s meant that dollars flowed east in exchange for oil and gas thus allowing both sides to profit from each other – Europe’s need being energy and the Soviet Union’s desperation being hard currency.

Undersea pipeline This mutually beneficial relationship continued in the post-Cold War era though with caveats. As energy pipelines ran through former Soviet States like Ukraine and Belarus who were either benign holders of historical grudges or passionate collaborators with the west, Russia realised that the creation of direct energy pipelines connecting the lucrative and vast western European energy markets was in its own interests. This has been the basis for the creation of the 2012 scheduled 55 billion cubic metres per annum Nord Stream undersea pipeline connecting Russia and Germany.

Ukraine episode

Russia’s largest neighbour is the insatiable dragon – China. This fact is reiterated by the increasing cooperation being witnessed between the two countries. A recent example of this cooperation is the newly commissioned 3,00,000 barrels per day (bpd) oil pipeline between Siberia and Daquing, which amazed many Russia watchers who believed that such cooperation between troubled neighbours was highly unlikely. The geographical expanse further allows Russia a unique ability to pander to the demands of the USA, Japan, South Korea and India, in addition to China, all of which lie in its nearly immediate neighbourhood.

The country remains, to its critics, a moody energy supplier especially after the last skirmish in January 2009 with Ukraine whereby a dispute on gas supply payments led to Russia cutting supplies. This move was countered by Ukraine which consumed supplies meant for Europe and created a flutter especially in Germany which has historically prized uninterrupted energy supplies and has paid a premium to ensure the same. This picture, of a recalcitrant supplier, belies the reality of Russia having always been a stable supplier to Europe even amidst the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia’s unwillingness to be a part of the OPEC ensures that it does not resort to the arm-twisting tactics of the oil cartel and has historically acted as a counterpoise.

First wells

Energy and geopolitics

Russia’s love affair with oil started with the development of the oil industry in early 18th century in what is now the capital of Azerbaijan viz Baku. Europe, as the largest consumer of Russian energy exports, remains one of its most important partners. This fact cannot be emphasised enough when one recalls how the Soviet Union for the first time traded with the capitalist West Germany, which ironically the Soviet Union refused to recognise. The construction of gas supply lines in the

Russian energy, in all its aspects critically affects the internal political working of the Russian State, which shows its characteristic nature in its dealing with the country’s most important natural resource – oil and gas. Whence we reflect upon the heavy-handedness with which the nationalisation of Yukos took place.

There could be no disputing that Yukos, a company run by a mafia-turned oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, needed to be reformed. Yet his imprisonment and

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

the nationalisation sans reform, showed how communist era bureaucratic styles continue unabashed. Gazprom, the largest gas producer and exporter in the world, is a prime example of Russian nepotism, with Putin’s ex-KGB buddy, Alexei Miller as its chief running the company as his political masters’ personal fiefdom. The nationalisation of the Sakhalin-II LNG project was no better than Venezuela’s nationalisation efforts, with the fig leaf of environmental regulation being the modus operandi.

The government with its steam-roller attitude belies the Tsarist mindset, where opposition to the Kremlin is silenced through brute force or bribes in the form of lucrative positions in various oil and gas ventures.

Oil-fuelled resurgence Russian foreign policy in the past two decades has been defined by its energy reserves in ways unlike any other factor. Many would like to believe that it was Putin’s modernising zeal that gave Russia its voice, which it had lost during the Yeltsin years. However, deeper analysis reveals that this logic is doubtful at best, for in reality what gave Putin’s Russia its heft was the rise in oil prices which hit their nadir in 1999 at US$ 8 a barrel and then rose gradually in 2003 and finally galloped in 2006, both years which saw Russian influence abroad rise sharply. As any economist will explain, more money relatively in any society translates into a greater say – this remains true in the international forum as well. Energy as a political weapon is like a dog whose bark is scarier than its bite. Russia discovered this to its own disadvantage during the Ukraine affair where its reputation as a reliable supplier suffered damage which outweighed the potential benefits to its interests. Energy in Russian foreign affairs has helped it to cement relationships which a century ago seemed impossible to imagine.

Germany, Russia’s great competitor in the early 20th century, is now its greatest supporter in European circles, driven by their mutually beneficial energy relationship.

Gazprom mismanaged Energy politics gives Russia a tool not always useful for political gain but one which allows the country to pay for the modernisation of its armed forces, upkeep of its burgeoning

bureaucracy, paying off foreign debt and even allowing it to emerge as a future donor on the world stage. The country’s economic core is built around money being derived from high energy prices and though this allows the State to declare surpluses in good times, the opposite is true when prices nosedive.

Energy receipts make up for nearly 40 per cent of the economy officially.

Gazprom, the polaris of Russian energy sector, remains a mismanaged public sector enterprise and is a microcosm of what ails the economy at large – corruption, mismanagement and malfeasance.

Arms exports Energy resources ensure that Russian arms have been modernised and thus can be competitively traded. Energy export earnings contribute nearly 70 per cent of Russia’s total exports thus allowing the country to have a stabilisation fund with a corpus of nearly US$ 150 billion. This was the source of the stimulus package the country had to enact in 2008 to prevent further damage to the economy during the global financial meltdown. Yet the efficacy of the package was diluted by Russian preponderant dependence on energy export, the prices of which collapsed and made the country the weakest of the BRIC countries.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that the ‘R’ in BRIC would not have been possible at the low prices of energy in 1999. However, no resource can ever be an unmitigated boom and so it is with energy which causes repeated bouts of the ‘Dutch Disease’ and leads to a lopsided national economy.

Problems galore The Dutch Disease is merely one among many of the problems that stare Russia and its energy sector in the face.

Europe, historically the most lucrative market for energy exports, has embarked upon a strategy of diversifying its energy imports. The historic Russian monopoly of being the sole route to transit oil from the Caspian region has been broken by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and Europe is already a large consumer of output from the BTC. Russian bickering with its central European neighbours over gas prices has boosted anti-Russia propaganda in Europe. Diversification by Europe is in fact a silver lining for Russia which will

see rising Russian supply commitments to buyers like China, for if both Europe and China were to increase their energy demand off Russia, the problem of supply constraints which threaten will greatly exacerbate the shortfalls expected. The possibility of drawing from Central Asian energy resources to fulfill Russia’s own commitments to Europe diminish with each passing day as these States bypass Russia to reach markets directly.

Corruption China, touted as the next big Russian oil and gas market, will never be able to match the lucrative European markets. With increasing interest in and exploration of Shale Gas resources, the role of Russia as an energy giant is further threatened. Dominance in the gas market is being eroded by increasing Liquefied Natural Gas projects which remove the need for trans-national pipelines and bring a greater fluidity to what essentially is a buyer’s market. Corruption, the overarching phenomena in all aspects of the Russian State, has the potential to bleed even the fat cows of oil and gas, white. Proof of the same was recently seen in the alleged but hushed up US$ 4 billion fraud in Transneft, the Russian State-owned pipelines major.

Resources These gloomy prospects are likely to be hyperbolised by the lack of innovation and scientific development that ails large parts of the Russian industry. With little by way of capital investment in both upstream and downstream aspects of the energy sector, the risks of a large scale collapse remain high. A shrinking population in a xenophobic society will translate into a drying pool of qualified and equipped human resources. The informal freeze on technological transfers in the energy sector post Sakhalin nationalisation has been made worse by Russian insistence on the promotion of Gazprom which suffers from serious technical lacunae.

Russia in spite of its many pitfalls, has always defied its detractors; right from Napolean’s Moscow campaign, this historical tenacity is reinforced by many factors that if capitalised upon, will lead Russia from strength to strength. With promised resources in the process of being discovered in the

eastern Siberian region, the problem of shortfall in future supplies, may be mitigated. Russia remains one of the few countries that shall benefit from rising global temperatures since the major component of its domestic consumption of oil and gas is used in keeping its citizens warm during the harsh winter. A less severe winter will free resources and thus boost exports.

Another corollary to global warming is the prospect of an ice-free Arctic Ocean, translating into greater use of Russian ports for energy supplies and new oil and gas reserves. Whereas most energy producers are threatened by internal security issues, Russia has almost all its energy resources in zones of political tranquillity thus remaining an exceedingly valuable alternative to politically unstable Middle East and African suppliers.

Indian contribution Medvedev’s initiatives at reform through technological and innovational development are a step in the right direction. This is an area that presents great opportunities for India, as India’s help is sought to provide the technological know-how in areas ranging from Information Technology to cutting-edge research. India would seek to gain stakes in various Russian energy projects in its bid to secure its energy supplies. The Sakhalin island project is an example of how far this cooperation is mutually rewarding.

In conclusion, it would be apt to remark that Russia’s potential as a whole is based to a great extent on its energy potential, the assessment of which requires more than just a cursory analysis of numerical values. On the contrary, an analysis of Russia’s energy potential requires a holistic insight into all aspects of the Russian State and society with its prospects, pitfalls and promises for what the future holds.

Rai Mahimapat Ray is Junior Research Fellow, pursuing his Doctoral Research in the field of Central Asian Energy Studies, from the School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Rajeev Lala is pursuing his Doctoral Research in the field of Central Asian Energy Studies, from the School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

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MUTUALITY

The global situation is such that there is no alternative to a convergence of interests between the US and Russia to deal with the problems that the world-wide recession, climate change, Afghanistan and an assertive China pose. While welcome, the ‘reset’ relationship still leaves room for ambivalence and it would do the world a lot of good if more concrete steps for dealing with Pakistan are forthcoming. Generalisation of terrorism and drug peddling only tends to obfuscate the issue.

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ussia and the US mutually ‘reset’ their relationship for a comprehensive revival of cooperation on security and economic issues as well as for establishing a framework to manage working-level partnership between the two countries. Though the concrete results of the ‘reset’ relationship are so far modest, both the sides sense mutual ambivalence about what the ‘reset’ should mean or how far it should go.

However, a realistic expectation of moving the US-Russia partnership forward is visible in both the countries.

Brief history The end of Cold War revived the relationships between US and Russia.

US under the Clinton Administration and Russia under Boris Yeltsin in the mid-1990s became friendly towards each other. However, since Vladimir Putin came to power in December 1999, the relationship between the two nations reverted back to the Cold War era. Moscow began asserting itself by strengthening its military industrial sector and through a resurgent economy, which regained its confidence mainly due to Russia’s energy-based wealth. This made Russia reassert its foreign policy and over a period of time the differences with US started becoming visible.

During the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo, Russia and the US found themselves on opposite sides. The US and majority of the European nations advocated independence for Kosovo, while Russia supported its traditional allies the Serbs, in Kosovo. The US and Russia were once again on the opposite sides during Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003 and in Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004. During the ‘Coloured Revolutions’, US supported leaders like Mikhail Saakashvili and

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Viktor Yushchenko, who were anti-Russian leaders. Here, Moscow saw US support for these leaders in these States as an attempt to prevent pro-Russian governments coming to power in these former Soviet States.

Russia also viewed the continued expansion of NATO, specially the inclusion of Baltic States in its fold, as NATO / US’s intention of moving military front-lines closer to Moscow. Furthermore, NATO's insistence on deployment of Europe-based missile defence systems very close to Russia in the Czech Republic, the US / NATO-Russia relationship further deteriorated; though the US administration then insisted that Europe-based missile interceptors were directed toward terrorist regimes and not Russia.

Nonetheless, the then Russian President Vladimir Putin was explicit on the issue and firm that a missile defence programme was absolutely not favourable for Russia and viewed it as an aggressive act by the US administration. The US-Russia relationship once again reached the Cold War tension era during the conflict between Russia and Georgia (Georgia a close ally of the US and an applicant for NATO membership), during August 2008.

Thus, the tension between both nations continued even in the post Cold War years over again on one or other politico-security concerns and issues.

Renewed relationship Today Russia has strategically arrived on the global power stage and intends to play a significant role in the global affairs. US is also trying to improve its relationship with Russia and the Obama administration is specially looking into the matters which can increase the

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bilateral cooperation and can take the relationship towards a new direction.

In the recent past, US and Russia have both signed the New START treaty and the 123 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Both countries have implemented a firm multilateral response to Iran’s continuing defiance of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both countries have also decided to cooperate on security issues and concerns and on improving the situation in Afghanistan. In the meantime, US has also advanced the process of Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and both countries have worked cooperatively to address the global financial crisis. In order to strengthen bilateral relations, both US and Russia agreed that the economic dimension should receive significantly enhanced attention. Completion of Russia’s WTO accession is required to build a framework to resolve perennial trade disputes, develop future Russia-US cooperation and expand the bilateral economic and trade relations to the level of their potential. This will also require engagement in both government sectors as well as in the private sectors. Russia has the world’s eighth-largest economy but ranks 25th among US trading partners.

Therefore, the two countries have reached an agreement to lift restrictions that have been hindering bilateral trade and economic relationship.

Institutionalised linkages The heads of states of both nations i.e., President Obama and President Medvedev and their respective administrations have institutionalised the US-Russia relationship by establishing the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC). In the meantime, BPC has made substantial progress by establishing working groups to engage

Dr. Nivedita Das Kundu

Russia-US: reset relationship in various activities. Overall both sides have made a good beginning. But both sides need to move beyond the lingering uncertainty and suspicion that still remains in the US-Russia relations and which will require sustained efforts to overcome. To strengthen the relationship there is also a need to put away once and for all Cold War stereotypes and there is also a need to rethink how US-Russia relations can place cooperation and not competition at the centre of this shared relationship. Therefore, it is essential to have bold and creative polices as well as readiness to resolve and reconcile issues and deep-rooted disputes.

Both sides agreed that future bilateral cooperation should focus on three principal areas: ■■ Completion of work on the essential building blocks for the new foundation of revived relations.

■■ Creation of a permanent structure for the BPC and use of its working groups to address an expanded agenda of cooperation building.

■■ Quick movement towards the US-Russia reset relationship, which will permit both nations to

cooperate effectively in addressing the increasingly globalised issues of the 21st century.

Both countries agreed that the ratification of the New START treaty and completing the steps to bring 123 agreement into force remains essential for preserving the agenda on strategic arms control and the position of global leadership in efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Seeing eye-to-eye Continuation of constructive cooperation on Afghanistan will meanwhile strengthen a qualitatively new capacity to work jointly on the issues, which are of vital importance to the security of both nations. To maintain strategic arms control as a source of strength for US-Russia relations will require both countries to address new and controversial subjects, including negotiation of further significant reductions of operational strategic arms, the role of ballistic missile defence and the possibility of inviting other nuclear weapon States to join the ongoing nuclear arms control process.

Both countries also believe that it is timely to build further defence cooperation on Afghanistan.

Both countries’ mutual interest in Afghanistan’s stable and peaceful development impelled both governments to develop joint approaches toward the issues of narcotics and preventing terrorism emanating from that region.

Russia-NATO relations With the reset US-Russia relationship came into prominence the development of Russia's NATO relationship. During the recent NATO-Russia Council (NRC) meeting the reset relationship became visible; however, there is a need to see whether this is going to be more of confrontation, cooperation or bargain?

During the NRC meet, the joint statement contained some important decisions including the undertaking of the “first ever Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges” (CSC) and ways to address them through practical cooperation; a joint ballistic missile threat assessment and the future framework for broader missile defence cooperation. Broadened transit arrangements through Russian

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territory for non-lethal ISAF goods and counter-narcotics training and about the NRC helicopter maintenance trust fund in 2011, were also discussed intensively.

The newly adopted NATO’s strategic concept says “NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security.”

This is a marked change in NATO’s approach towards Russia, although NATO has not yet given up its core principle of collective defence. NATO has also not closed its doors for admitting new members; Russia is also unlikely to be totally convinced that NATO would cease further encroachment on Russia’s near abroad.

Conducive atmosphere Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev also gave a positive assessment of the NRC summit. Addressing a press conference after the summit, he spoke of a conducive atmosphere for cooperation between NATO and Russia. While acknowledging that there remained differences of perception on a number of important issues, he said, “Now we are starting to build up our cooperation and so I would agree overall that this is indeed an important stage in building a full and productive partnership between Russia and NATO.” Medvedev also said that Russia was willing to discuss all issues with NATO which cause concern to both the sides. In particular, these relate to the European missile defence plans of NATO and the differences over the Caucasus crisis of 2008.

Transparency on BMD On European missile defence, Medvedev categorically stated that in its present shape NATO’s ballistic missile defence plan was targeted at Russia and that is why this is unacceptable. Russia will participate in a missile defence plan as an equal partner on the basis of complete reciprocity and transparency.

Thus, Russia very clearly indicated that it wants an equal participation in NATO’s decision making process in so far as European ballistic missile defence plan is concerned. Russia is skeptical that NATO’s missile defence plan will change the nuclear deterrence equation which it finds unacceptable. Medvedev

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MUTUALITY also warned that if the US Senate failed to ratify the New START treaty that would be counterproductive for peace.

Afghanistan perspective Russia has decided to step up cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan and signed several agreements with NATO on the supply of non-lethal materials to Afghanistan and also agreed to discuss the transit of military equipment. In an important development, Russia will also allow reverse transit from Afghanistan to other countries. These arrangements will help NATO maintain its supplies to Afghanistan which have come under repeated attacks in Pakistan.

The NATO-Russia Council meeting also promised to start a new phase in their relationship. But things are still complex and setbacks in future cannot be ruled out. It is unlikely that NATO will recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries.

While Germany, Italy and France are for closer cooperation with Russia, countries like the Baltic States are still skeptical in this regard. Even on European missile defence, the ideas are not fully formed and discussions could prove tough. It seems Afghanistan is a major factor in improved NATORussia relations. As NATO needs Russia, Russia also needs NATO’s help. Cooperation between the two in Afghanistan will give Russia an opportunity to reduce an unceasing flow of drugs from there. Russia is also considering selling arms to Afghanistan, which will help to boostup its economy. The NRC summit meeting marks a promising beginning, however, future cooperation will depend on what transpires during the difficult negotiations on European missile defence that lie ahead.

Recent reports mentioned that US / NATO-Russia thaw is going to be beneficial in dealing with new challenges including the threats posed by the international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, cyber attacks and drugs trafficking. The foreign policy initiatives by the governments of both States will allow pursuing goals of common interest with win-win outcomes for both US and Russia.

In parallel to the engagement with each other at the government level, both countries have started engaging

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directly with other’s society; facilitated greater contacts between US and Russian business leaders, interactions between the civil society organisations and students as a way to promote the bilateral cooperation have also started for enhancing mutual understanding between the two nations. It is important to get the relationship right between two powerful countries and two diverse societies during a time when common challenges like nonproliferation, climate change, energy security, the struggle against terrorism and many more such issues demand common actions. It seems the United States and Russia can gain a lot by working together rather than working apart.

The US-Russia relationship will remain complex however the cooperation between the United States and Russia will develop smoothly if the two governments and societies make efforts to understand each other. Emphasis should be placed on institutional cooperation and societal engagement. There is a need for a relationship that will connect societies and especially increase the people-to-people contacts, which can help in shaping a more hopeful future for both nations. However, many challenges still remain to be sorted out. Progress in the relationship is still uncertain. The establishment of a strategic relationship between both countries will not be easy, but now the time is such that the possibilities for cooperation before both nations have outnumbered the problems. It is still very early to confirm whether the ‘reset’ relationship is making any difference on the issues that are difficult to resolve like Georgia, the missile defence and the nuclear technology sharing issue, where the countries still remain far apart. Tensions are still continuing between Russia and NATO over the latter’s expansion. Nonetheless, closer cooperation in US-Russia relations is also aimed at restoring trust to resolve further conflict of interests. Though, there are promising signs in certain spheres, as long as the two countries do not get adamant over certain rigid issues, future prospects look promising.

The writer, PhD in International Relations is a Foreign Policy Analyst and Research Fellow at the Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi, India.

ENTENTE

Russia China accord:

new vision

Prof. Anuradha M. Chenoy

Between them, they epitomise the truism that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Relations between the Russian Federation and China have risen from the dumps of the Soviet era to new heights in the 21st century and yet the full potential is only just being tapped. Both profess multipolarity as the new glue in international relationships.

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ENTENTE

R

ussia-China relations shape the destinies of both these countries and they impact the international system. Since the beginning of the 20th century, whether these two countries supported each other, or in periods when they were antagonistic, or currently when they are strategic partners, they make a difference to international politics.

Russia-China relations have had sharp variations in history: from supporters in revolution and systemic change to bitter rivalries and geopolitical adversaries to new partnerships and shared visions. A common international vision, political will, trade and economic collaboration, defence dependency and energy security are all inputs in the Sino-Russian partnership.

This article analyses the current nature of the Russian-Chinese partnership and its impact on international geopolitics.

Politics and vision Russia and China advocate the multi-polar concept as core principle of their foreign policy doctrines. Russia since the mid-1990s has argued that the international system is characterised with multiple poles that are important centres of economic and political power that can act as independent actors. The Russian multipolarity construct is based on collective security and a politics of inclusion; opposed to any one single ideology - for example, liberal market and State-guided policies are both acceptable to it. The multipolar vision emphasises non-military solutions to international problems. (Russian National Security Concept, 1998; Joint Indo-Russian Communiqué, 2010).

For China the multipolar world is an extension of the five principles that form the official basis of their world view. These are mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territory; non-aggression and peaceful coexistence. This multipolar vision advocates: Co-existence of multiple powers and collective security that is inclusive of all powers concerned; greater regionalism to foster common regional interest; negotiated settlements; independent foreign policy; and that international decision be made through bodies like the UN that should be strengthened, democratised and empowered.

The sub-text of the multipolar vision challenges a unipolar power system

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and unilateral policy decisions on matters of interest to Russia and China.

They seek to increase their role in the international system by opposing hegemony. But at the same time, seek hegemony in their regional spheres which they see as spheres of their national interests. Multipolarity gives room for contesting and collaborating with the dominant super power the US and the West while asserting Russian and Chinese interests. Multipolarity provides several checks and balances to both these countries and allows them to retain an independent foreign policy while working towards some common agendas and yet competing with each other on some issues.

Historically speaking, multipolarity has some continuity with past Russian and Chinese traditions where they have wanted to: ‘catch up with the West’ (from Stalin to Khrushchev and Mao); to be counted in international decision making in international bodies like the Security Council and in other forums; have maintained a military balance and strategic parity with the West and in their own regions have the ability to push for their perceived national interests internally and externally.

The Chinese argue that multipolarity is an irreversible trend and as more countries adhere to it (like India and European Union) others like the US are beginning to realise its inevitability.

The multipolar agenda is common denominator in Russian-Chinese strategic dimension.

Strategic dimensions Russia and China strategic partnership rests on multiple interests, values, perceptions and projections of power. They have constructed a strategic partnership based on several factors of common interests. First, both countries have decreased the contradictions that they had with each other during the Soviet period in a systematic way. The ideological differences are a matter of a commonly rejected past. Currently both want to evolve market-based capitalism where the State has a clear and purposeful role. Both have accepted globalisation and want it to serve their agenda.

Russia recognises the big strides made

by China as a military and nuclear power and support Chinese defence ambitions, while balancing these with Russian defence support of India.

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Russia sees the former Soviet space, but especially Central Asian States (CAS) as a sphere of its interest, but is willing to co-ordinate with China on security and economic issues within this region. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was constructed and developed precisely for security and economic development but not as a military alliance. The Chinese President argued that the SCO would deal with the ‘three evils – terrorism, separatism and extremism’.

Areas of common interest Russia and China have had common interests in North East Asia and taken common positions on talks with North Korea. Both oppose nuclear proliferation in Iran but want the West to engage with Iran and oppose further sanctions. They are part of new plurilateral organisations like Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC).

Russia and China have had common understanding of the Kosovo bombings

by NATO, they have cooperated on several areas of international relations from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, where they would like to have a regional approach where they are also engaged.

Both have a policy that opposes intervention in third States on account of human rights abuse, that Western States take up. Both States thus want to engage with Iran, North Korea and others.

three, but outstanding issues between India and China have prevented closer alliance.

In Central Asian States too Russia has some underlying strategic fears of Chinese expansion undercutting their influence, as Chinese trade and investment increases in this region.

Both Russia and China have a fear of NATO expansion and being contained

by US military alliances. This threat perception brings them together as Russia does not want NATO on its borders and the Chinese oppose US military alliances with Japan, Australia and countries of the Pacific region.

Russian Chinese strategic relations today have more in common than they have had in the Soviet past. They moved from constructive partnership in 1994 to strategic relations in 1996 and then to the 20 year strategic and cooperation Treaty signed by President Putin and Jiang Zemin in 2001, that became the basis of long term defence, strategic and economic cooperation.

Defence relations

Areas of divergence

Russian defence exports are key to Russian strategic as well as economic relations with China like they are with India. China and India have been leading customers for Russian military technology through the 1990’s, each purchasing more than US$ 1 billion of Russian arms each year. Russia is engaged with both India and China in joint production and export to third countries.

Areas where they go separate ways are their policies towards India and Pakistan. Russia has a stable, long term special relation with India, while China has an ‘all weather’ relation with Pakistan. Russia has vocally supported Indian positions on its borders and territoriality. But it has also supported the territorial claims of the Chinese, while urging for peaceful solutions.

Russia’s engagement with Pakistan is new and specific to controlling drug trafficking from Afghanistan and threat of international terrorism. Overall, Russia has kept the sensitivities of both India and China in dealing with them and been able to manage good relations with both, while trying to develop trilateral cooperation between all three.

The idea of triangular relations between India, Russia and China proposed in the 1990’s has led to meetings between the

Russia and China signed a defence cooperation agreement in 2000 that led to a sharp increase of Russian exports to China, from SU-27 fighter jets to submarines. Between 1992-2006, Chinese bought Russian equipment worth US$ 26 billion. The Chinese also manufacture SU fighter jets under Russian license. (Russia has sold more advanced jets to India, SU-30). Russia has so far not sold them advanced ballistic and long range missiles, so as not to change the defence balance in Asian region. China has increased its manufacturing capacity, but still remains dependant on imports. The EU is the main competitor of Russia, since they have lifted sanctions on defence trade with China. China is focusing on manufacturing rather than imports.

This development is likely to hit Russian exports that are gradually declining.

Trade and energy China is Russia’s biggest trading partner and the volume of trade between the two is US$ 30 billion. It has been increasing in 2010 after a fall earlier in 2008-09 (70 per cent more in 2010 than 2009) and both are investing in each other’s economy.

The next phase will include a Yuan-Rouble trade between the two, as they shun the dollar and the controversy over the rate of the Chinese currency. This will diminish the influence of the dollar as an international exchange and stabilise the Yuan and the Rouble. Russia has a trade surplus on account of its oil and mineral exports to China. Its imports are cheap Chinese manufactured goods.

Russia wants to rope in China into its modernisation and re-industrialisation drive.

China is a major importer of Russian gas and hydrocarbons. A direct pipeline from Russia’s East Siberia to China’s Daqing became operational in January 2011 and has boosted energy exports and intertwined the two economies even further. This pipeline shows the turn of Russian oil toward the east. China will both use this energy and re-export it. Providing millions of barrels of crude through this pipeline, the attempt is to increase it further in the future. Russia and China also have had joint enterprise on electricity in Russia, which is then exported to China. They plan to have joint nuclear energy and other projects.

Russia is the key to Chinese energy security, as China’s oil demand has increased to 5.8 million barrels a day and its domestic production is low. India also wants to be part of Russia’s energy security interests as evident from the ONGC investments in Sakhalin I and II. Russia is thus a common card between India and China on the energy and several other issues.

Meetings of the three foreign ministers from these countries are taking place on a regular pattern.

Both Russia and China have a complex relationship with each other and to third countries based on the

past history of the two States. The history of Russia-China relations that have ranged from Russian support to the Chinese Revolution, followed by the contradictions that developed between the two in the early 1960’s resulting in competition, hostility and border skirmishes, besides splitting the international communist movement and new engagement of China with the US. The post-Soviet phase witnessed resolution of Russian-Chinese border differences, a series of bilateral meetings and emergence on common understanding on several international issues and finally a strategic partnership.

In the past decade Russian-Chinese relations have extended from the strategic to defence export-import and joint manufacture. Beginning with large amount of trade relations both countries are investing in each other’s economies. The Russian-Chinese energy cooperation and the construction and operation of a new pipeline binds both the countries in multiple ways. There are few conflicts of interests between the two that cannot be sorted out on negotiating tables.

It is clear that the major strategic partnership between these two countries is going to shape the future socio-economic positions of both.

These relations have a deep impact on the international system and the shape of globalisation. Clearly, the foreign policies of other countries will have to take this partnership into account.

The writer is Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

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NEW VISION

If there is any country in the world that is riding the rise in oil prices with an opportunistic eye and a deft finesse it is Russia. Rising out of the debris of the Soviet empire it has made the proverbial Phoenix of Egyptian mythology look like a slow coach given the rapidity of its transition from the ashes of 1990 to a new pinnacle in less than two decades. With visionary leaders like Putin and Medvedev it is crafting a worldview that spans the globe with Russia as the fulcrum.

E

mergence of the Asia-Pacific as the epicentre of global politics and geo-economics has drawn the attention of countries across the globe and Russia is no exception. Since the end of the Cold War, the epicentre of global politics has shifted from Europe to Asia Pacific; which comprises of the rising great powers China and India among others. In geo-economic terms, the region assumes special importance in view of the fact that it has overtaken the Atlantic basin as the centre of global economic activity. This region’s growing clout is highlighted by the fact that it is home to four great economies of the world and is the most populous geographic entity. Even during the period of global slowdown, economies of Beijing, Brisbane and Bangalore are going up and up, leaving many in the West, shocked.

Violence in the air?

All of these, put together, have led to speculations by foreign policy pundits, who believe that the Asia Pacific Region (APR) is on the verge of witnessing a power-struggle, which might turn violent, if not managed on time. What is also evident is that all major powers have started reviewing and renewing their strategies vis-a-vis the emerging security situation in Asia. It is in this context that this article seeks to examine Russia’s role in Asia Pacific and its engagement with the affairs of the region.

Russian raison d’etre Russian approach towards the region is quite evident from the views of a noted scholar, Milan Hauner, who, in his classic ‘What is Asia to us’?, explains the how and why of Russian policy towards the region. It is evident from the foreign policy documents of the Russian Federation that the region has lately gained prominence in the foreign policy priorities of Russia. It has taken the

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Asia Pacific as a zone of opportunity, where many of its interests also lie.

For instance, not only a great part of Russia lies in the Asia Pacific and many important Russian ice-free ports like Vladivostok lie there, but it is also seen as one of the biggest potential markets

by Russia for selling its vast natural resources and military technology.

Duality Double headed eagle the Russian emblem, depicts the dilemma Russia has been facing over the debate on Eurasianism vs. Asianism. The differing shades of self-perception have led to two sets of images. The first depicts Russia as a European country which will remain European forever. The understanding that Russia is as European as Europe itself prevails in places like St. Petersburg and Moscow. It is Culturally European, most of its population lives in the European part of the nation. Major cities like Moscow, Volgograd are there and decisions are taken from there only. However, the situation is in complete contrast in other places.

Through most part of the Russian history; from the time of Peter the Great to Ivan the Horrible, Catherine and Lenin to Yeltsin, it is Europe and not Asia that has been central to the self-perception and therefore the focus of the nation’s attention. Peter wanted to ‘cut a window’ to the warm waters of Baltic. Tzar Alexander was more than keen to participate in the events of Napoleonic Europe. Asia to them was of barbarians and uncivilised people during the 18th and 19th century, China and Northeast Asia was ‘Yellow Peril’.

In the mind of comrades of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the Asian countries were the colonies (and later the developing world) to be freed by the USSR.

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Russia in Asia-Pacific

Rohit K. Mishra

The other side of the debate is populated by those who believe that Asia is a land of philosophy, Asian landmass to which Russia belongs, has always been Asian. Russia was never European, they opine and it was made European only by Peter the Great.

Europe never accepted Russia as its part, they believe, citing many arguments to prove their case. A few of them have been mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs. Asia in general and Asia Pacific in particular is increasingly becoming important for Russia. A renowned scholar Koji Watanabe argues that any State which aspires to be a great power, needs to be considerably large in terms of its north-south expansion.

He adds that compared to the US, China and India, Russia’s north-South expansion has gone down massively and the only way by which it could be improved is; to have good strategic and economic ties with countries of Asia.

Neo-Eurasianists, therefore, argue that Russia’s future lies in Asia. Additionally, it is said that the West must not be trusted by Russians. A careful analysis of the two sides would tell us that the truth lies somewhere in between these two schools of thought. Nevertheless, the fact that remains relevant is that for Russia Asia is ‘central’ anyway.

Emerging perceptions Scholars have identified and developed three major perspectives to analyse the Russo-Asia Pacific relations.

The first is an identity-based perspective based on the perceptions of Russia as a Eurasian country. It argues that Moscow uses its unique geographical presence and proximity, historical significance and sense of mission in East Asia, to justify its right to play a role in this region.

Second is that economic perspective in which dynamism of the region is put to use to rationalise Russia’s interests in the region. This perspective highlights the development of Siberia and the Russian

Far East (RFE) and its integration into the Asia Pacific economy as the prime reason. Third is what is called as the multi-polarity perspective; Russian views of regional security informed by balance-of-power thinking. Russia has sought to enhance its influence and status in the region by developing bilateral ties and participating in multilateral institutions, while seeking to preserve a stable external environment for Russia’s internal development. A careful study

of the evidences tell us that the three streams of thought, i.e. Eurasianism, economic rationalism and multi-polarity perspective, put together, have reflected Russia’s aspiration to reassert itself as a great power in Asia Pacific.

Putin slant The Asia Pacific vector gained much more prominence than the Euro-Atlantic factor, when

Vladimir Putin came to power. It was Yevegenii Primakov, who first insisted on close cooperation with the Asia; Vladimir Putin substantiated it with his idea of “multi-vector” foreign policy. The main tenets of the policy are: Facing up to the fact that Russia’s national power is in a downward trend, therefore it is in the Russian interest to define its diplomatic strategy in line with its national power and ultimate interests, that matches up to

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NEW VISION

Russia is striving hard to enhance its stakes, widen its reach and thereby raise its stature as a major player in the Asia Pacific. Russia’s geopolitical importance is also evident from the fact that on many issues Russia has successfully rediscovered itself in terms of finding a prominent role. For instance, in North Korean nuclear crisis four party talks was expanded in six party talks to accommodate Russia and Japan the reality; to end the long history of confrontation with the US and other western countries; meanwhile insisting on seeking partners and alliances in the world; and finally to seek for material benefits for the development of Russia.

countries recently inked an agreement on nuclear cooperation. Russia’s nuclear potential has allegedly been realised by countries like Myanmar also.

Multilateral dialogues

Considerable attention is also being paid to strengthening the innovation component and tapping investment reserves in relations with the Asia-Pacific Region. In July 2010, Khabarovsk Region hosted a conference on the theme of “The Economic and Social Development of the Far East and the Strengthening of Russia’s Position in the Asia-Pacific Region” chaired by President Medvedev.

Russia is engaged in a series of productive dialogues with the Asia-Pacific; particularly with the major countries such as China, South Korea and Vietnam. It is strengthening politico-military ties with the countries of Asia Pacific due to the realisation that Russia is as Asian as a European power.

Friendship with China reached new heights with idea of Russo-Chinese Axis. Russia has tried to solve the border problem with Japan over the Northern territories but without surrendering the national interest. Medvedev became the first president who visited Kunashir islands to assert Russia’s control over the Kurile Islands which led to the stagnation of territorial negotiations with Japan.

South Korea-ASEAN entente Normalisation of relationship with South Korea is a major foreign policy success Russia has had, in the last twenty years. South Korea has emerged as a major trade partner and buyer of natural resources of Russia in the region providing an alternative to the large southern neighbour. Russia’s relations with the ASEAN member countries are marked by a new-found warmth.

One may recall that till the end of the Cold War, Russia’s sphere of influence was restricted to Indochina only. In the first decade, Russia had almost no presence in the sub-region, however, gauging the promising future of ASEAN, it swiftly brought the relationship to an all time high level.

In terms of Russia’s relationship with the member countries of ASEAN, Vietnam stands out as a unique case.

It has been a time-tested partner of Russia. In 2010, Vietnam chaired the ASEAN. It also hosted the 2nd Russo-ASEAN Summit and the ADMM+ involving Russia. The two

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Development with innovation

In order to energise its relationship with the neighbourhood, Russia is making full use of its energy resources.

Moreover, Russia considers ‘energy’ as an effective foreign policy tool to ensure its re-emergence as a Great Power.

Russia is perhaps the only country in the world the oil and gas reserves estimates (both proven and probable) of which continue to increase. Russia’s energy cooperation is not only with China but also with Japan, ASEAN and India. In order to reduce its overdependence for oil supply to Europe as a market it has aggressively pushed for diversification toward Asia. On the very first day of 2011 Russian oil from Nakhodka started flowing to China. Russia is also in consultation with South Korea for exporting gas.

East-west corridor Russia sees bright prospects of emerging as a transport and communication corridor as the shortest route from Europe to Asia lies through Russia. The prospects are high and hold a great many promises as it might lead to the realisation of Russia’s Eurasian dream of becoming a bridge between Europe and Asia.

Russia has played hugely successful multi-lateral diplomacy in Asia Pacific.

Prof. Robert Legvold’s view seems true when he says that the multilateral dimension in Russian foreign

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policy has not only been a prudent diplomatic move, but has also helped it in furthering its interaction with the Asia-Pacific countries. Russia has gained membership of various configurations of ASEAN thus achieved a place in the East Asia region. For instance, not only the East Asia Summit, but it is a partner in ARF, APEC and Six Party Talks on North Korea also. Russia became a full member of international non-governmental organisations through the Russian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (RNCPEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1992 and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1994. Russia sought greater engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1991. By July 1996, Russia was elevated to a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN at the 29th Annual Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta. Russia has participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its inception in 1994.

Russia’s acceptance as a member at the Vancouver meetings in November 1997 of APEC can be seen as an important achievement of Russian diplomacy in pursuing its new foreign policy. The APEC summit in Yokohama in November, consolidated the approaches of member countries to deepening economic integration and endorsed the APEC Growth Strategy in the post-crisis period. This shows mutuality of interest between Russia and the APEC which might reach its zenith in 2012 when Russia hosts APEC summit in Vladivostok.

After the Asian Financial crisis of 1997, economic cooperation was strengthened based on the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). When, East Asian countries started seeking a way to create an East Asia Community, Russia expressed its willingness to become a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and it was decided in Hanoi summit of ASEAN to include Russia in EAS along with the US. In recent years, Russia upgraded relations with ASEAN by inaugurating

the annual Russia-ASEAN Summit (2005). The Hanoi Summit of ASEAN held on October 30, 2010 also hosted the 2nd Russo-ASEAN Summit, wherein the leaders of Russia and countries of the ASEAN discussed the possibility of elevating the relationship to a higher level.

Russia’s engagement with the region and its recognition as a responsible major power was further strengthened in the wake of the North-Korean nuclear crisis. Russia actively participated in the six party talks, since 2004, on multilateral dialogue with North Korea on its nuclear programme. This is one of the main aspects of post-Cold War Russian foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.

New security architecture However, security in Asia Pacific region is dominated by the US and its allied forces. The US has recently revived its old military alliance of ANZUS and engaging countries like India and New Zealand. In the light of these facts, it is natural for Russia to Look East, where there is complete absence of comprehensive security architecture. Russia, therefore, joined the ASEAN Regional Forum representative forum for discussion of Asian security. But ARF proved to be a toothless organisation. In 2010, a meeting of Defence Ministers of China, Russia, other major powers and countries of the ASEAN named ADMM+ was held. Russia along with China has proposed to set up security architecture in Asia-pacific region.

During President Medvedev’s official visit to China on September 26-28, 2010 a joint Russian-Chinese initiative for security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region was put forward.

Vietnam connection One of the greatest geopolitical achievements of Russia in the post Cold War years is it’s carefully crafted and strategically designed alignment with both China and Vietnam; something which the US has failed to achieve in several decades, as China and Vietnam are perceived as potential adversaries. Vietnam is Russia’s time-tested partner. The two countries signed strategic partnership agreement in 2010 and Russia kept on siding with Vietnam on issues of critical importance.

Russia signed strategic partnership agreements with China and India.

Along with China, it set up the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, known as Asian version of NATO to counter terror and sort out border problems with the neighbouring Central Asian Republics.

It is trying to expand the security umbrella provided by SCO to eastern Asian countries.

Russia has put its feet firm in Asia Pacific through its deals with Vietnam, providing arms to Myanmar, Indonesia and Malaysia and not to forget China and India; its largest buyers. Secret behind success of Russian arms sales strategy is no strings attached policy of Russian arms supplies. Russia provided arms to Indonesia worth US$ 3 billion. Russia, in 2010, bagged biggest ever arms contract with India with any country and received huge military weapons supply orders from China to build fighter planes by the end of year 2010. Jeanne Wilson in her book titled ‘Strategic Partners’ has considered Russo-China relationship as a special relationship which has the potential to alter the course of history.

The duo became Strategic Partners in 2000 and elevated it to the level of Alliance Partners in 2008. With the tacit understanding and subtle support of China, Russia confronted Japan on the Kurile issue this year giving primacy to its national honour over everything.

Pacific fleet Soviet Union had a huge fleet in the Pacific. During the initial years due to economic constraints, Russia had to cut down its Pacific fleet and close down its military base in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Now, this gas guzzling nation filled with petro-dollars is negotiating with Vietnam for revival of its military base. Russia has in the recent past conducted joint military exercises with friendly countries like China (Peace Mission) and India (Indra).

Conclusion Russia is striving hard to enhance its stakes, widen its reach and thereby raise its stature as a major player in the Asia Pacific. Russia’s geopolitical importance is also evident from the

fact that on many issues Russia has successfully rediscovered itself in terms of finding a prominent role. For instance, in North Korean nuclear crisis four party talks was expanded in six party talks to accommodate Russia and Japan. Similarly, Russia along with the US has entered the East Asia Summit member group. Russia now has the capability to actively participate and mould the multilateral talks and therefore has a pivotal role in resolution of conflicts. However, its membership in numerous regional forums might not translate into real influence in the region, if it keeps on riding the Chinese back in matters concerning the Asia Pacific. Excessive dependence on China, coupled with overlooking of the Russian provincial reservations on the Chinese demographic invasion, might prove detrimental to the long-term Russian national interests.

Russia must also strike a balance between economic development of its Far East region and Siberia, with preserving the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region. In the final analysis, it can be argued that the Asia Pacific region has realised the importance of Russia and vice versa. Russia is bound to keep the influence intact and one may say that considering the trends, it may grow, both qualitatively and in quantitative terms in the region. The speed and substance of its adjustment to the changing realities of Asia Pacific will have long term implication for Russia’s future posture and evolving regional and global balances.

The writer is associated with the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. His areas of interest include Russia, Central Asia and the Asia Pacific region.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

NAXALTECH

T

he Naxal menace continues to haunt the country with periodic attacks that persistently bleed the hapless security forces and the civilians.

While the tactics employed remain similar to the past, the techniques of the latest attacks reflect a new chapter in the Naxal warfare. One aspect that clearly stands out is the sophistication of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / roadside bombs / landmines employed in the latest attacks. Police figures from January 2008 to March 2010, reveal that IEDs are responsible for 70 per cent of casualties borne by security personnel.

The increased reliance of the Naxals on IEDs coupled with greater accuracy and disastrous effects showcases that this tactic is here to stay.

Wide employment IED can be defined as an explosive device that is planted or customised in an improvised way. It comprises of destructive and lethal chemicals or explosives and is prepared to devastate, cripple, harass or spread fear. The usual trend states that mostly IEDs incorporate industrial or agricultural components and rely less on military supplies. The history of IEDs can be traced back to the World War II, when IEDs were used by the Belarusian guerrillas against the German Army. It reached a new level, when it was effectively used by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Britain.

The tactic remained prominent in the Vietnam War, was utilised by the Mujahideen in the Afghan-Russo war and remains an overriding factor in the insurgent attacks of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mass destruction In India, IEDs / landmines have dominated the insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east and now constitute an important part of the Naxal strategy.

Also, the armed forces of India have faced the menace of these explosives during the operations in Sri Lanka. IEDs give more dividends to the guerrilla warriors and ensure minimum casualty on their side. A threatening change in the techniques of the Naxalites can be traced to September 21, 2004, when Naxalites consolidated with Left Wing splinter groups. Particularly, with the merger of major Left wing groups, namely Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC) and the Communist Party

84

of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War (also known as the People’s War Group or PWG), Left Wing Extremism opened a dangerous chapter for India’s internal security. Improved techniques of warfare, accuracy and enhanced sophistication of weapons marked a change in the Naxal violence. While the number of incidents of Naxal violence have decreased over the years, the casualties have increased exponentially.

The existence of IEDs has been felt in almost all states in the Red Corridor.

Their effect and presence is more prominent in the northern region of Naxal-infected area as compared to its southern region.

Weapon of choice Naxals have reportedly set up four units to manufacture weapons and arms, where they are developing remote-controlled IEDs that can be set off with the push of a button. Other activities include making small bombs, mortar shells and ‘Claymore Mines’ or ‘directional IEDs’. Apart from this sophistication, Naxals have become innovative by employing bamboo sticks as IEDs or can bombs. Such devices usually are not easily detected.

Considering the pervasiveness of IEDs in Naxal attacks, it is important to delve into the reason for it to remain a guerrilla’s weapon of choice. An IED is extremely lethal, inexpensive to produce and can be paired with numerous detonation techniques (like detonation through mobile phones or remote controls) that pose minimum risk to the rebels. Additionally, the perpetrator can control the fatalities by deciding the detonation time and position of the bomb. IEDs can be produced at any place, with commercially-available-materials such as agricultural and medical supplies.

These bombs are portable and don’t need any prescribed or specific environment for storage. Captured ‘IED makers’ in Afghanistan testified to learning IED-making techniques from manuals distributed by terrorist organisations or the ones available online. This clearly illustrates that producing an IED does not demand high technical expertise. The placements of explosives are asymmetric in nature and possess idiosyncrasies, as the method of improvisation is not static and depends on its maker.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

LTTE trainers?

The most recent blast was in the Sheohar district in Bihar on October 23, 2010 when five cops succumbed to death. The effectiveness of the landmines used by the Naxals can also be attributed to their alleged external links. Tracing the use of IEDs / landmines, it is important to take into account the attack of May 17, 2010, when Naxals detonated the IEDs coupled with gelatine sticks and blew up a bus killing almost 40 people, including 12 Special Police Officers (SPOs). Experts consider the attack noticeably similar to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacks against Sri Lankan soldiers, therefore stating that Naxals have been trained by the splinter group of LTTE. The bomb was placed days prior to the attack and was planted by digging a tunnel from the side of the road to reach the crust of the road. The concrete top remains undisturbed therefore attracting no attention. A similar attack took place when an IED blew up an armoured vehicle killing eight CRPF personnel on a National Highway, close to a CRPF camp.

Aditi Malhotra

Easy access It is important to note that Naxals rely on Gelatine sticks rather than exploring the RDX option primarily because of the easy availability of gelatine sticks within India. Besides this, ammonium nitrate is an asset which is munificently used in the production of IEDs. On May 20, 2010 Naxals hijacked a truck in Bastar which was carrying 16.5 tonnes of high-grade ammonium nitrate explosives. A similar incident took place in the same area, when Naxals ransacked a truck carrying detonators, which was never traced by the police force. In March 2010 Naxals waylaid a truck in north Gadchiroli which bore ammonium nitrate mixture. The frequency of these incidents implies that dependency on IEDs would increase with greater intensity and Naxals would continue to utilise indigenous materials to prepare them.

Owing to the fact that Naxals control most of the mining activities in ‘their’ region, they have a strong hold on the industrial explosives too. This is another overriding concern that needs to be tackled by policy. Also, other

Improvised Explosive Devices are as devious as the minds of the persons who create them. Over the years, like with conventional weaponry, this method of warfare has also evolved to achieve greater assured destruction. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka, before it was decimated with frontal military assaults had earned for itself considerable notoriety in the use of IEDs and belt bomb triggering tactics used by suicide bombers were said to be its creation. India has learned two lessons: 1) The dog is the best detector of explosives and 2) Counter-insurgency is a manpower intensive warfare.

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

85

internal security

NAXALTECH

rudimentary form of explosive is the mixture of urea and diesel. It is rather essential to highlight that most of the Naxal-placed landmines discovered weigh in tonnes and not kilos.

Reportedly, Naxals have planted IEDs and mines in forests of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal to inflict greater casualties to security personnel undertaking operations in the area. Even National Highways in the worst affected districts have been mined by the Maoists. The government intends to include army personnel to detect the bombs, as the paramilitary forces have limited experience in such operations.

Although the Indian government persists to intensify its operations against the Naxals, it continues to maintain a slipshod attitude towards the issue of IEDs. The government has failed to legislate the Draft Ammonium Nitrate Rule, 2009, which was drafted to regulate the accessibility and supply of ammonium nitrate in India. The step was undertaken after the assertion that ammonium nitrate (used as fertiliser) was the main material used by Naxals in their IEDs. According to the Draft Rules, a consignment of ammonium nitrate passing through sensitive areas should be escorted by armed police personnel and the vehicle should be equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS).

Counter-measures Naxals seem to be relentlessly evolving their IEDs, seemingly inspired from the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike the Indian police or paramilitary forces, Naxals are not restricted by legalities and therefore can adapt faster to the changing scenarios and nature of warfare. The need of the hour is to arm the security forces with the latest technology and equipment needed to undertake Counter Insurgency Operations. As evident in J and K and north-east, Road Opening Parties (ROPs) have proved to be effective in neutralising the area before the security forces embark on operations, therefore reducing casualties. Prudently, ROPs should be conducted in Naxal infested areas before security personnel advance for operations. The army can train the security forces with a solid training programme in order to acquaint them with counter-IED technology.

86

Procuring equipment would be futile if not coupled with appropriate training.

It is imperative for the security forces operating in Maoist-infested areas to revamp their strategy and tactics to counter the landmines. More emphasis should be laid on movement by foot, rather than using vehicles in mine infested kuchha roads. This would render the massive landmines sometimes weighing in tonnes, ineffective. Simultaneously, a better network of intelligence gathering should enable security forces to clamp down on IED manufacturing units in forests and villages. The cadres having expertise in bomb making should be identified and targeted. Effective area domination and improvements in road opening procedures inculcated from the army, would help in detecting mines on highways and other metalled roads prior to vehicle movements.

Another way of limiting the menace of IEDs would be to restrict the easy availability of industrial explosives from reaching the Maoists. As earlier brought out, enabling trucks carrying explosive materials with GPS and better security at their storage areas, identifying agents who siphon off explosives to the Maoists would help in this regard.

Most IED attacks turn out successful because paramilitary personnel tend to step on the bombs / landmines.

In order to act swiftly and safely, the security forces require Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles.

Additionally, electronic jamming systems can prove effective as a countermeasure to the IED menace. The system can be placed on the vehicles operating in the Red Corridor. This system would block the signals of radio guided initiators, like cell phones, long-range cordless sets. Another countermeasure can be to propose procurement of the PING (a Pentagondeveloped microwave project) from the US administration, which successfully locate insurgent weapons. Further, the government can also employ Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), which is equipped with a mechanical arm to inspect and relocate suspected IEDs. Moreover, the global market offers an IED standoff detection system based on lightweight, mobile ground-penetrating radar which can be

February 2011 Defence AND security alert

installed on a vehicle. The system can detect metallic objects placed beneath the road-crust or at the roadside; these include mortar bombs or artillery shells rigged as IEDs. The radar has the ability to detect an IED / landmine from a distance of 300 ft, offering standoff safety and early warning for diffusion and neutralisation. Apart from these, the global market has numerous other weapon locating systems to order. It is important to point that the system of procurement is dominated by numerous procedures that remain both fruitless and ineffective. Rather than considering these procedures as gospel, the government needs to pull up its socks and equip the security forces with at least the basic equipment that ensure protection.

Control it now The success of guerrilla operations greatly depends on IEDs, a threat that will continue to haunt India and the world at large. On June 10, 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that “countering the improvised explosive devices have become a high priority for NATO and that the United States has already begun to put training for IED detection high on its list.” The statement mirrors the gravity of the IED menace and the seriousness with which it is being acknowledged in this era of turbulence. Undoubtedly, the sophistication of IEDs harming the US forces is more deadly as compared the ones harming the Indian forces. For India, now is the right time to counter this threat before it transforms into an unmanageable threat like the Naxalites themselves. More than technology, a better grip on the area by the security forces possible only by an increase in the number of better trained and equipped personnel for anti-naxal operations who follow the correct road opening and movement drills in landmine infested belts of the Maoist hinterland will bring about a change in the situation.

A comprehensive and well crafted strategy to counter the lethal IEDs and landmines that combines better training and technology would bring down the number of security forces casualties suffered in left wing extremism considerably.

Aditi Malhotra is a Research Assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, India.

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