DSA February 2012

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25 FEBRUARY 2012

INDIA : ` 120 VOLUME 3

ISSN

ISSUE 5

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

AND CRAFTING A VIBRANT DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE

> VOLUME 3 > ISSUE 5 > FEBRUARY 2012

editor-in-chief

W

hen the Chief of Army Staff goes to the Supreme Court it reflects poorly on the functioning of the Ministry of Defence and in particular it’s Minister. The matter has been in public domain for the longest time and its details are available to all and sundry. The interpretation of the details, or facts, is, however, the issue that occupies most of the minds. Those inclined in a particular direction will choose to interpret them in their own peculiar manner. And likewise for those inclined in the other direction. What has remained sadly unaddressed is the long term erosion of Army institutions, their sanctity and significance in military governance.

By its actions, or inaction, the Ministry of Defence has demonstrated a scant regard for the primacy of Army functioning, the inviolability of practice and a deep motivation to achieve an end result no matter what the route taken. It is commonly known in militaries around the world that the sole custodian of personnel information is the Adjutant General’s Branch. And likewise, the sole authority for military promotions and postings is the Military Secretary’s Branch. The area of responsibility for both is clearly delineated and neither can encroach on the other’s domain. But that was until the Ministry of Defence and the Government of India decided otherwise. For it had a preconceived end result in mind and the methods employed to achieve that result notwithstanding. The result of all this machination is that the MS Branch is now regarded as the sole authority on personal information of officers, or in this case that of the Chief of Army Staff.

The Government of India would like the Chief of Army Staff to retire in May 2012. The Chief of Army Staff would like to have his year of birth clarified, for one document suggests 1950 and others have 1951. He is not the first officer to have this problem, and going by the actions of the Government of India he will not be the last. Instead of rectifying clerical and administrative errors in Army HQs, the Ministry of Defence has done everything in its powers to perpetuate the discrepancies. For all its actions have been motivated by one thought and one thought alone - retirement in May 2012.

If it was administrative efficiency and institutional sanctity, then the actions would have led to clearing up this mess and many others that exist.

The actions, on the other hand, have kept alive a malaise in the functioning of the Ministry of Defence that is detrimental to national security and military effectiveness. From the inexplicable cancellation of the Eurocopter contract, to the various 155 mm non-deals, to this extraordinary interest in a date of birth, the Minister of Defence is solely responsible.

His image of financial integrity notwithstanding, the actions and intrusiveness speak of a lack of sensitivity that is not expected of a minister of his exalted stature. The Chief of Army Staff may or may not get relief from the Supreme Court for that is a secondary matter in the larger picture. The image of military institutions has already taken a severe beating and for that the ministry is wholly responsible.

manvendra singh

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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executive editor

publisher’s view

Sy nerg y An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 5 F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales pranesh vadhera creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari ranjeet amit e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

L

ack of jointness among the family, team, society or in the defence forces may lead to defeat in any struggle we are confronted with. For success in the final outcome each individual has to join hands with others to strengthen the impact. This is a thumb rule and applies to every segment in every region, society, state or the armed forces. Our folk tale recalls the sage advice illustrated by a patriarch who explained to members of a family how unity makes for strength. He asked one of them to break a stick which he did very easily but when several sticks were made into a bundle none of them could break the bundle of sticks. It is a parable that needs to be replicated in this modern day and age particularly in defence and security of the nation state and the preservation of territorial integrity.

The Indian defence forces are a good example of this jointness. Right from the time of independence, our tri-force comprising the Army, the Navy and the Air Force have played a vital joint role, be it in times of war or the constitutional requirement of assisting civil authority in times of crises or calamities, natural or man-made. They have always extended their best support to each other and the results have been very encouraging for each Indian by and large whether they are directly associated with the three forces or not.

The world has seen how our three Services have worked hard for joint support to each other when we won our freedom in 1947 and were confronted with an invasion in Jammu and Kashmir. With very little resources but an abundance of valour our defence forces have fought the early wars with Pakistan and China and gave of their best. Apart from the wars, in peacetime the three Services have played a major role in ameliorating the effects of the many natural calamities that befell the nation. In the sphere of military diplomacy and UN peacekeeping operations the Indian armed forces have made acknowledgedly significant contributions in the Congo, Sri Lanka, the South East Asian states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Korea and the many UN peacekeeping assignments to tackle bushfires around the world and have won laurels for their management of crises.

It is pathetic and saddening to see occasional news reports in the media about the non-synergistic approach and differences between the armed forces. It seems that some anti-national elements are planting such stories in the media in a planned way to pose a wrong picture and demoralise the forces. But I am sure that the efforts by these anti-national elements are not going to succeed in any manner. Our forces are always in high spirits and they are very much united. However there could be certain points of difference among the three, but if it comes to defending the country from any invasion, they are very much united to counter any such attempts.

Team DSA salutes our valiant armed forces and we are sure that they will prove to be the best in the world in the times to come.

Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

This issue of the DSA is devoted to "Jointness, Synergy and Crafting a Vibrant Defence Industrial Base for India". The need for Jointness and Synergy could not be more paramount today. Synergy is needed not just between the three Services but perhaps even more between the Civil-Military interface. Civil-Military relations in India are currently at a nadir. Such a level of dissonance was last seen only at the time of the Thimayya-Menon spat, two years prior to the disastrous 1962 War. The Issues of contention then were a chain of succession and a lack of military preparation against the Chinese. History may not repeat itself but it certainly rhymes. Today once more there is an unseemly age row linked to a succession plan seemingly cast in stone. This could have been handled far more discreetly and with far greater sensitivity than allowing a few ministry mandarins to run berserk planting stories to humiliate a serving Chief in the media.

The Ministry of Finance has just thrown back the Army’s proposal to raise a Strike Corps for the Mountains. If media reports are right, the query that accompanies the returned document is a bit unnerving. Apparently the Finance Ministry wanted to know if the Chinese Threat will still be around post 2014! One hopes this one is not true because if it is - it borders perilously close to Alice in Wonderland. It is time now to snap out of it - we have serious challenges to manage.

All this theatre of the absurd only underlines the need for Synergy, Jointness and a whole of the government approach.

It is high time that we get down with a will to restore synergy, military respect and confidence and do everything in our power to generate Jointness in thought, word and deed. India has the economic wherewithal to be a major regional power. It has the potential to be a global player. It must however overcome its historic lack of coherence and synergy.

Culturally, Indians are highly individualistic and argumentative people. Synergy has been very difficult to generate in South Asia. That is why we have fallen prey to foreign invaders who were more coherent and united in their pursuit of plunder. Those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it.

Synergy is truly the need of the hour. Individual and institutional egos are secondary. The Country comes first - always and every time. There are some excellent articles in this issue that outline how we can achieve synergy and jointness.

Even with the CDS on hold (we hope not indefinitely like the medium guns that we need to fight in the mountains). We can make optimal use of the HQ IDS by giving it a lead role in the evolution of the Long-term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) that spans a 15 year time horizon and as lead agency in weapons acquisition. We can also explore a number of vectors of integration - upstream and downstream as Brig Bhonsle suggests. Lt Gen R K Nanavatty, one of India’s most respected Field Commanders, has penned down a brilliant Thesis on a “Joint Civil-Military Doctrine for Internal Armed Conflict”. We carry excerpts of that invaluable document. That is the way to go. The Mindset of Indian decision makers is largely indifferent to long term and anticipatory security planning. The “Tyranny of the Immediate” (as Admiral Vijay Shankar puts it) leaves little time or energy for such perspective thinking. A key requirement for autarky, is the creation of an indigenous Defence Industrial Base. We have failed to do so even 63 years after Independence. We have failed to involve the Private Sector in any significant way. The competition of the market place value-engineers the product and leads to efficient use of resources. The quick fix of licensed production caused our defense R and D and in-house production lines to atrophy. We need to revive them most urgently. Today we are going to spend some US$ 100 billion to replace our entire capital military stock of the Soviet friendship price era. Let us at least ensure that the next replacement cycle will not see us importing 70 per cent of our major weapon systems. We need to set to work now to ensure that end. The Indian Navy has shown the way by building instead of buying a new Navy. The Public Sector Shipyards seem to be slowing it down. We must privatise at the earliest and achieve economies of scale by an aggressive export drive. We will then be able to pay China back in its own coin in South East Asia and elsewhere.

We can do it. What is more is - we will, despite our squabbling and arguments. An external challenge could help us close ranks faster.

Would we, however, like to do it on our own - without a second, 1962 like prod? Or will Indians argue endlessly?

It is time we get over the shock of the 1956 military coup in Pakistan and integrate the Armed Forces with the Ministry truly (not cosmetically as is the case now) and make them a part of the National Security decision making process. It would help if we urgently mend the impression of a civil-military rift and restore synergy to the National Security Process.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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contents J o i n t n e s s , S y n e r g y ISSUE February 2012

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 5 February 2012

A R T I C L E S India’s defence production and research: need for transformational upgradation

6

Ajit Doval, KC

joint civil military doctrine for internal armed conflict

12

76

Nitin Gokhale

17 F E A T U R E S 24

Air Marshal B K Pandey (retd)

jointness and synergy: upstream and downstream strategy?

72

Col RSN Singh (retd)

attempted coup in Bangladesh

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

jointness and synergy for the armed forces: a vital imperative

68

Cecil Victor

Pakistan: the new script

Lt Gen R K Nanavatty (retd)

civil military relations in India: the quest for synergy

the end and the means

Defence and Security Industry Monitor Defence and Security Industry Monitor Defence and Security Industry Monitor Civil Military Relations in Pakistan Security Round-up

20 34 58 63 66

27

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (retd)

jointness for armed forces: cds and theatre commanders

30

Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd)

jointness and interagency synergy imperatives at strategic level

36

Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma (retd) Anshu Paliwal

generating civil military synergy

42

Col A G Thomas (retd)

‘green shoots’ of synergy the Indian naval experience

50

Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

dealing with Pakistan: time to face realities

54

Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd)

jointness for the armed forces - Indian perspective

60

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd)

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February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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jointness

HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL

E Ajit Doval, KC The writer is former Director of Intelligence Bureau. He is very highly regarded in professional circles and writes extensively on security issues. Currently he is the Director, Vivekanand International Foundation, a leading think tank on defence and security issues in India.

In a transformed setting the country enjoys advantages like availability of investible capital, accessibility to earlier denied dual technologies, willingness for cooperation and collaboration by defence production giants - particularly from the West in the wake of the economic downturn.

India today has a scientific community that is globally competitive and a pool of skilled manpower with long years of experience and knowledge relating to Defence industries. Politically, there is a bi-partisan consensus that India should reduce its dependability on imported weapon systems to the extent possible

6

arly January 2012, the US Defence Department came out with its Strategic Guidance Document, nineteen years after the last was brought out in 1993. Spelling out American “Priorities for 21st Century Defence,” this document delineates the future arc of competition and conflict extending from Asian Pacific to West Asia. Geographically, the median point of this strategically important region passes through India. This positions India in a setting that accentuates its strategic vulnerability as also provides openings for playing a more dominant and pro-active role in the region. To ward off impending dangers and play a power role commensurate to its size and potential, India needs continuing reinforcement of several elements of its state power - economic, military, technological, international leverages etc. In this pecking order, acquiring credible military deterrence and capabilities to inflict unaffordable losses on the adversaries will be critical.

India having the world’s fourth largest fighting force does not automatically translate into its having capabilities adequate to deter, defeat and degrade external enemies or tackle externally primed violent groups threatening internal security. Defence capability of a nation requires host of other ingredients like qualitative and quantitative superiority in weapons and equipment, leadership and high morale of the fighting forces, intelligence capabilities, a reliable defence industrial infrastructure etc.

It is indeed a sad commentary that 64 years after independence the world’s second fastest growing economy, one of the highest end users of defence equipment, a country having the world’s third largest pool of technical manpower and scientific talent and with a track record of indigenously excelling in high-end technologies of space, nuclear, information technology etc., is still dependent on foreign sources to meet 70 per cent of its defence requirements. Notably, being one of the major consumers of defence equipment, it not only has a readily available huge market and concomitant advantage of scale in production but even if a fraction of the large import bill is diverted towards indigenous production, the defence sector will be capable of generating large scale employment opportunities.

As strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney rightly observes, India “invests bulk of its defence modernisation resources not on strengthening its own armament base or deterrent capabilities but on subsidising the military industry complex of others.” Relying on large scale imports to equip the defence forces militates against our larger national interests as many of the imported items are not suitable for operation

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

under Indian climate and environmental conditions, their costs are prohibitive, continuity of supply and replenishment of spares is susceptible to political vagaries and the deals often trigger corruption and briberies in this vital area of national security. Besides, they often entail high costs and time overruns and the possibilities of sanctions, technology denial and vexatious conditionalities make them unreliable.

Being one of the major consumers of defence equipment, India not only has a readily available huge market and concomitant advantage of scale in production but even if a fraction of the large import bill is diverted towards indigenous production, the defence sector will be capable of generating large scale employment opportunities.

As strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney rightly observes, India “invests bulk of its defence modernisation resources not on strengthening its own armament base or deterrent capabilities but on subsidising the military industry complex of others”

India’s Defence Production and Research:

Need for Transformational Upgradation India urgently needs to strengthen and streamline the complex regimen of defence production and research comprising of 39 Ordnance Factories, eight Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), 50 laboratories under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), host of research units working in ordnance factories / DPSUs and widely dispersed private sector players. Some of the bigger private sector outfits like Larsen and Toubro, Mahindra Defence Systems, Pipavav Shipyard, Tata Advanced Systems Limited etc. have displayed willingness to get integrated with this eco-system and contribute their share to augment India’s defence preparedness. They are also willing to upgrade their manufacturing facilities and undertake research and development work provided they are assured of sustained orders and provided R and D costs are shared and international marketing opportunities are allowed to be created. Vision, convergence, speed and de-bureaucratisation of defence production and technology development should be the guiding Mantra of India in the coming decades.

Historical perspective India inherited a rudimentary defence production infrastructure from the British at the time of gaining independence.

Notwithstanding the fact that Indian Army was fighting only the wars of the British either within or outside the country - it was made to bear the costs of British imported weapons from India-generated revenue.

It thus sustained the defence industry of UK. The indigenous industrial activity was confined to the lowest spectrum of defence production mainly comprising of repair and overhaul facilities of the imported weapon system. Notable pre-independence defence industries included; (a) Walchand Aircraft Factory in Bangalore which was engaged in repair and maintenance of the aircraft. During the Second World War it was also employed by the US Air Force for servicing American Aircraft, (b) Mazagon Docks in Bombay that undertook repair of warships, (c) Garden Reach Shipyards in Calcutta which engaged in maintenance, repair and overhauling of Naval ships, (d) Gun and Shell Factory at Cossipore, Calcutta, established in 1801, (e) Ammunition Factory in Kirkee in Maharashtra established in 1889, (f) Rifle Factory at Ishapore established in 1901 (g) Gun Carriage Factory at Jabalpur established in 1904. In all, there were 16 ordnance factories, the cumulative value of whose production in 1947-48 stood at US$ 8 million.

The first ten years after independence were

the wasted years in the area of defence production and developing R and D facilities. No new ordnance factory was established or R and D capabilities developed leading to stagnation. During the Nehruvian era, India had no concept of forward strategic planning while expenditure on strengthening national security was seen as non-productive drain on scarce resources. Nehru thought that overall industrialisation of the country and establishing basic industries - the new temples of modern India - will automatically meet the defence requirements, a low priority item in his national agenda. While self sufficiency was the credo of those times, the basic approach was to develop self sufficiency in core industries completely neglecting either indigenous defence production or importing arms and equipment to keep the Army in high state of defence preparedness. What was lost sight of was the fact that defence production was

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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jointness

HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL

a highly specialised sector requiring heavy investments, a strong R and D back up and actual production, from design to production and eventual integration, had a long gestation period. With the impending threat from China, though Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was created in 1958, it was but a half hearted exercise and the DRDO was starved of resources, quality technical manpower and lacked high level strategic direction.

Reluctance of western countries to transfer defence technologies or agree to industrial collaboration clubbed with bureaucratic controls - bereft both of expertise and security sensitivity compounded the problem.

Though Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was created in 1958, it was but a half-hearted exercise and the DRDO was starved of resources, quality technical manpower and lacked high level strategic direction Following the 1962 Chinese debacle, the wisdom of expanding our defence production sector was realised, albeit at a heavy cost. New ideas were conceived and in course of time a number of new establishments and expansion of some existing units were undertaken. These corporations, commonly known as Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs), gave a quantum jump to India’s defence industry.

Working under the Ministry of Defence Production, eight DPSUs namely Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML), Mazagon Dockyard Limited (MDL), Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Limited, Goa Shipyard, Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MDNL) became the mainstay of India’s indigenisation programme.

During 2009-10, Hindustan Shipyard Limited was transferred from the Ministry of Shipping to the Ministry of Defence. Though they substantially contributed and continue to do so, their overall range of activities and upgradation capabilities leave large areas uncovered. These DPSUs have developed some useful research and development capabilities.

In the post 1962 scenario, India’s

8

doctrine of self sufficiency in defence items, besides indigenous production, practically meant having reliable foreign sources for acquisition of weapons systems, access to technologies and un-interrupted supply of spares and components. India’s first preference was to develop defence production relationship with the best European manufacturers - particularly Britain, France and Sweden. However, most of the western countries, as also the United States refused to come forward and increasingly, a view started gaining ground in India for justifiable reasons, that the West for political reasons could not be a trusted and dependable long term partner. This led to the entry of the Soviet Union as a major supplier of defence equipment to India and, till today their share is estimated to be over 70 per cent. USSR decided not only to supply the MIG-21 and other weapons but also agreed to licensed production. This ushered India into an era of licensed production. This arrangement, though it served India well for two decades; after the breakup of the USSR and the changed profile of India’s defence requirements, does not adequately address India’s needs any longer. This licensing system also tied India to production stereotypes, thwarting India’s indigenous growth and innovativeness to develop high-end weapon systems from design to production stage.

In the history of India’s defence production and R and D development acquisition of the Bofor’s guns is an important landmark. The irregularities and briberies, whose trail reached right up to then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s doors, rocked the nation. The nation has not yet been able to recover from its after effects. It continues to haunt India’s defence acquisition programme seriously undermining

India’s combat readiness. Since the infamous deal in 1984, the Indian Army has not been able to acquire any new artillery guns for more than quarter of a century leaving a big gap in our defence preparedness. The post 1998 Pokhran experience also had its adverse consequences on India’s defence industry and R and D effort.

The technology embargo slapped on India hit number of Indian defence programmes, development plans and scientific research.

In a transformed setting the country enjoys advantages like availability of investible capital, accessibility to earlier denied dual technologies, willingness for cooperation and collaboration by defence production giants - particularly from the West in the wake of the economic downturn. India today has a scientific community that is globally competitive and a pool of skilled manpower with long years of experience and knowledge relating to Defence industries. Politically, there is a bi-partisan consensus that India should reduce its dependability on imported weapon systems to the extent possible A month after the Chinese aggression, in November 1962 the Government of India established a Department of Defence Production for indigenous development of a comprehensive defence production infrastructure. As a consequence, besides nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings mentioned above, a large number of ordnance factories were commissioned. From 16 in 1947 their number increased to 39, with a total workforce of 1,75,000.

Considering India’s overall defence needs, their contribution is, however, still modest as will be evident from the production and turnover figures for last three years:

Year

Total sales ordnance Total sales public sector Grand total factories undertakings (Rs in Cr)

2007-2008

6937.82

16740.25

23678.06

2008-2009

7229.31

20403.64

27632.95

2009-2010

8715.26

25899.64

34614.90

2010-2011

11208.00

27407.00

38615.00

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Besides their overall share in meeting defence requirements, it needs to be maintained that they still, by and large, produce relatively low to medium technology items. Ordnance Factories are mainly producing (i) Ammunition and explosives, (ii) Weapons, vehicles and equipment, (iii) Materials and components, (iv) Armoured vehicles and (v) Clothings.

100 per cent investment by private sector is allowed in designated fields and 26 per cent through foreign direct investment.

Though the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion has so far issued 155 Letters of Intent to Indian companies no major breakthrough has been achieved in real production during the last 10 years. Bureaucratic delays and complicated procedures are reckoned to be major bottlenecks One major policy shift was brought about in May 2001 when the GOI allowed participation of private sector in defence production. Under the guidelines issued by the government 100 per cent investment by private sector is allowed in designated fields and 26 per cent through foreign direct investment. Though the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion has so far issued 155 Letters of Intent to Indian companies no major breakthrough has been achieved in real production during the last 10 years. Bureaucratic delays and

complicated procedures are reckoned to be major bottlenecks.

Another major policy shift came about in 2006 when the MoD brought about a change in procedures of defence procurement. Under the new policy 30 per cent offsets have been provided in respect of all contracts above Rs 300 crore. Specified goods or services to the tune of 30 per cent of the value of such contracts have to be procured from indigenous Indian industry.

Current setting The post-Pokhran technology denial came as a blessing in disguise. During the years that followed India increasingly focused on indigenisation programmes as also diversification of sources of import. The phase of modernising and upgrading that started in 1999 led to widening of product range as also accessing technology from new sources. Induction of the private sector was another welcome change. Outsourcing of many of their requirements by the Defence PSUs and ordnance factories has developed a wide vendor base that includes not only some of the big enterprises but also a large number of medium and small scale enterprises.

In 2010, government brought out a Defence Production Policy which had many positive features.

It emphasised achieving self reliance

in the design, development and production of weapon systems / platforms and equipment.

With the objective of achieving greater synergy in production of high-end products it was decided to encourage formation of consortia, joint ventures and public-private partnerships. Greater integration between technical and scientific research and production was also envisaged. However, while the laid down policy objectives are laudable, at the execution level nothing much has changed and most of the ideas have remained confined to the paper. The overall indecisiveness, lack of senior direction, gaps in planning of resources and poor executive skills of the UPA-II government have been quite visible in the field of defence production and R and D. The quality management also leaves much to be desired.

Major policy shift came about in 2006 when the MoD brought about a change in procedures of defence procurement. Under the new policy 30 per cent offsets have been provided in respect of all contracts above Rs. 300 crore.

Specified goods or services to the tune of 30 per cent of the value of such contracts have to be procured from indigenous Indian industry Setting up of 12 Development Centres with state-of-the-art CAD / CAM facilities to boost

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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jointness

R and D efforts in the ordnance factories is a positive initiative. In real battle conditions more than esoteric high-end technologies, the day to day usable technology and product upgradation helps the fighting forces more. The DPSUs have also embarked on intensification of their R and D effort - the initiatives taken by HAL (10 R and D Centres), BEL and BDL are particularly encouraging.

While highest standards of integrity and probity need to be ensured by bringing about systemic and procedural improvements it should not be allowed to become an alibi for indecision, procrastination and bureaucratic indifference In a transformed setting the country enjoys advantages like availability of investible capital, accessibility to earlier denied dual technologies, willingness for cooperation and collaboration by defence production giants particularly from the West in the wake of the economic downturn. India today has a scientific community that is globally competitive and a pool of skilled manpower with long years of experience and knowledge relating to Defence industries.

Politically, there is a bi-partisan consensus that India should reduce its dependability on imported weapon systems to the extent possible. The changing strategic landscape and China’s aggressive posturing with heavy investments on Defence (estimated to be over US$ 132 billion a year) and fast expansion of its defence production and R and D leaves India with no option but to bring about both a qualitative and quantitative transformation.

However, infirmities ranging from lack of timely decision making or avoidance of taking decision, vested interests of the corrupt, external pressures and security insensitivity of the bureaucracy often nullify these advantages. Unless the entire gamut of higher strategic policy guidance, integrated system of identifying long term defence needs, initiating focused and relevant research making right resources are available in real time the country may not be able to achieve its full potential. It is also important that right from the initial stage of

10

announcement

HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL conceptualisation, the end users are associated in decision making process - from design to production stage. While highest standards of integrity and probity need to be ensured by bringing about systemic and procedural improvements it should not be allowed to become an alibi for indecision, procrastination and bureaucratic indifference. It is a pity that some of our finest scientists in DRDO establishments have been handicapped in contributing their best due to a bureaucratic work culture, lack of incentives, poor leadership and coordination at the top, resource crunch etc. Whenever given better opportunities, freedom and incentives they have produced most outstanding results.

Denigrating the capabilities of our scientists, DRDO and DPSUs is a part of this campaign. With India’s estimated expenditure of US$ 100 billion on defence acquisitions during the next ten years, they see a great commercial opportunity in the offing. Often, their governments advance their cause and exert political pressures to support their cause There is a powerful lobby in the country supported by a still more powerful and cash rich network of arms manufacturers and their frontmen who have a vested interest in stemming India’s indigenous defence production programme.

Spurious arguments and distorted facts are advanced in a systematic manner to create doubts and suspicions that, at times, influence even the leadership of our armed forces. Denigrating the capabilities of our scientists, DRDO and DPSUs is a part of this campaign. With India’s estimated expenditure of US$ 100 billion on defence acquisitions during the next ten years, they see a great commercial opportunity in the offing. Often, their governments advance their cause and exert political pressures to support their cause. It is also true that India cannot and should not completely insulate itself from the international arms market as it will both be bad economics and bad security planning. India cannot insist on developing technologies or systems that can be internationally

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

accessed at much more competitive prices, without undermining our independence and decisional autonomy in critical sectors. The world is moving towards partnership - interdependence and India stands to gain from it if it positions itself in a commanding position by excelling in some high-end technologies and becoming globally competitive, in terms of quality and costs, for selected products.

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The Looming Crisis in Iran: Impact on India’s Energy Security?

India urgently needs to strengthen and streamline the complex regimen of defence production and research comprising of 39 Ordnance Factories, eight Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), 50 laboratories under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), host of research units working in ordnance factories / DPSUs and widely dispersed private sector players.

Some of the bigger private sector outfits like Larsen and Toubro, Mahindra Defence Systems, Pipavav Shipyard, Tata Advanced Systems Limited etc. have displayed willingness to get integrated with this eco-system and contribute their share to augment India’s defence preparedness. They are also willing to upgrade their manufacturing facilities and undertake research and development work provided they are assured of sustained orders and provided R and D costs are shared and international marketing opportunities are allowed to be created. There is also a new enthusiasm in India’s public sector enterprises. For acquiring self reliance – cutting across the barriers of public and private sectors, the Indian Defence Ministry can perhaps take a leaf from the experience of ISRO which outsources components, hardware and sub-systems for its launch vehicles and satellites from the Indian industrial units, both in the private and public sectors.

Vision, convergence, speed and de-bureaucratisation of defence production and technology development should be the guiding Mantra of India in the coming decades.

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Lt Gen R K Nanavatty (retd) The writer has commanded a Brigade in the Siachen Glacier, a Division on the LC in Jammu and Kashmir, a Corps in the north-east and finally the prestigious Northern Army at a time when death blows were inflicted on the Kashmiri terrorists. He is a highly regarded field commander and a thorough professional.

Unfortunately, in our country the Army categorises Internal Security as a Secondary role. It seeks to focus on external conventional conflict (which after nuclearisation is getting increasingly rare). By relegating Internal Security to a Secondary role the Army unwittingly relegates its crucial importance and it results in a lack of preparation and adhoc responses. A pernicious myth has been propogated that CI / CT operations detract from efficiency in the primary role.

Nothing could be further from the truth. 8 Mountain Division which has had near continuous involvement in CI operations, performed much better than 3 Mountain Division in the Kargil war and quickly adapted and switched to regular operations

The following article is selectively excerpted from a comprehensive thesis written by Lt Gen R K Nanavatty, a highly respected professional and former Army Commander Northern Command in the critical period when it dealt a death blow to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. A combat hardened veteran who also led CI / CT operations in Sri Lanka and the north-east, he brings to bear his considerable operational experience on to this study of a Joint civil-military doctrine for Internal Armed Conflict. He raises some extremely pertinent issues that merit serious reflection, namely: India has traditionally done Conflict Management and not Conflict Resolution in its CI / CT operations. Only two conflicts – Mizoram and Punjab were successfully resolved. The rest putter on. Should we now set higher aims that seek Conflict Resolution as the desired end state?

Given the rising lethality of internal conflict, should we change from the use of “Minimum force to Proportional force?”

Lastly, why should Internal Security be a secondary task, when most of the time the Army has to face this challenge? For the Chinese PLA, it is one of the tasks that carry equal weight. He highlights the imperative need for a “Whole of the Government Approach”. His thesis is an invaluable document that needs to be widely studied and disseminated.

I

n the post war period, the Indian Armed Forces have had the most extensive and wide ranging experience in regular Conventional Operations as well as the entire range of Internal Armed Conflicts. Unfortunately, sober reflection reveals that out of all the internal armed conflicts, only two – the Mizoram and Punjab insurgencies, have been successfully terminated.

The other conflicts have metamorphosed and persisted. The Ceasefire in Nagaland is now almost 14 years old. India therefore had been successful at Conflict Management and less so at Conflict Resolution. In recent times we have witnessed a far more aggressive approach to such conflicts in South Asia. Sri Lanka has terminated the LTTE insurgency by military force. That leads us to ask - Why has the resolution of Internal Armed Conflict proved so intractable in the Indian context?

Is it that our current doctrine sets its sights too low at conflict management and does not even attempt conflict resolution? There is a crying need for a Whole of the Government Approach in such conflicts.

Brief doctrinal overview There has been a new wave of writing on this subject that has invariably coincided with the involvement of the United States in small wars and many new terms have been added to the military lexicon. However, little has changed conceptually. The writings of the classicists, Tranquier, Galula, McCuen, Thompson and Kitson (deliberately listed in the chronological order) continue to be relevant. What has changed are the technologies, methodologies and with them, much of the language of discourse and terminologies. India has a legacy of civil disobedience which encourages the questioning and defiance of authority and has compounded internal security problems in the post-independence context.

Terrrorism: The new feature is the rise of terrorism at the global level. Terror is defined in the dictionary as extreme fear. It is also said to be a potent form of persuasion, also Armed propaganda or the propaganda of the deed. Terror is typically carried out by an organised group and directed against non-combatants. It seeks publicity. It is an act of violence against non-combatants to influence an audience beyond the victims of the attack. Religious fanaticism is the cause of much contemporary terror.

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Insurgency: Insurgency, on the other hand is armed conflict below the level of conventional war. It combines political thought, guerilla warfare and mobilisation of the masses. Insurgents may resort to the use of several instruments e.g.

Taxation, dispensation of justice, etc. Terrorists only resort to the use of violence. Paradoxically, the homogenising trend of globalisation is engendering the desperation to preserve local identities and cultures. A brief survey of the writings of the main theorists on such conflicts would be very instructive.

Roger Trinquier (1964): Roger wrote that an insurgent organisation must be destroyed through offensive action. He endorsed the Counter Strategy of support for insurgency in the territory of the external sponsor.

David Galula (1964): He was the first to articulate principles of a CI campaign. He suggested an approach based on an understanding of communist revolutionary war. “The population”, he said, “will only extend its support to the Counter Insurgent if the latter demonstrates the will, the means and the ability to win.” He recommended a step by step approach and stated that effective military-police operations must precede political, social and economic action and that the Counter Insurgent must always negotiate from a position of strength.

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Out of all the internal armed conflicts, only two – the Mizoram and Punjab insurgencies, have been successfully terminated.

The other conflicts have metamorphosed and persisted.

The Ceasefire in Nagaland is now almost 14 years old. India therefore had been successful at Conflict Management and less so at Conflict Resolution

• Importance of political primacy

John McCuen: He enunciated the five principles of communist Revolutionary War as:

• Restraint on the use of force

• Preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy

• Achieve unity of effort

• Establish secure base areas • Mobilising the masses • Seeking outside support • Unifying the effort In his writings, McCuen insists on Unity of Effort. Like Tranquier, he lays great stress on counter organising the population.

Roger Thompson (1966): Roger put together the five basic principles of a government approach to counter insurgency. These include:

• Overall plan • Function in accordance with the law • Need to build democratic process from grass-root levels Julian Paget (1967) and Frank Kitson (1971): Both Paget and Kitson endorse the views of Thompson.

Kitson emphasises that the four aspects that constitute the framework of a Counter Insurgency campaign are: • A coordination machinery • Appropriate political atmosphere • Proper intelligence

Cassidey

US Army and Marine Corps Counter Insurgency Field Manual FM-3-2: This largely reflects the approach of Cassidey and Kilcullen.

Gen David Petraeus was instrumental in the formulation of this doctrinal approach and putting it into practice in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

These spell out the five overriding requirements for COIN operations and stress the protection of the civilian population as the primary task rather than the destruction of the Insurgent Organisation.

The British Approach: Was equally driven by the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan. It lays emphasis on:

(2008)

• Close cooperation between the government, police and military • Selective use of force without causing unnecessary casualties and alienating the people The RAND Corporation: The American RAND Corporation sums up the American approach to CI in its five steps of doctrine: • Isolating the insurgents from population • Adopting an operational grid for the deployment / employment of forces • Physical domination over areas of operation

• Strict adherence to law Robert

• Adopt a population-centric approach

• Political and economic reforms to win hearts and minds of the people

• Clear political aims

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David Kilcullen: With these writers we approach the era of the Iraq War and there is a discernible shift from destruction of the Insurgent organisation to Protection and Control of the civilian population.

Both lay emphasis on the legitimacy of the host government and a regional strategic approach to the conflict.

Both stress the following aspects:

and

• Restraint on the use of force

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• Military-Civic action for winning hearts and minds • Unity of effort through unity of command

The problem with the present Indian doctrine is its minimalist approach that seeks to manage a conflict rather than aim for a more comprehensive conflict resolution (as had been achieved in Mizoram, Tripura and Punjab). Just taming the insurgent organisation adequately to help initiate talks is a less than optimal approach and leads to the needless prolongation of conflict. This needs to change The Indian Army Doctrine as issued

by ATRAC discusses Foundationary and Restoratory Measures.

Foundationary Measures: These are long term measures directed towards eradication of insurgency and the civilian administration plays a predominant role in this.

Restoratory Measures: These are short term measures aimed at containing the insurgency, where the Security Forces supported by the civilian administration play a predominant role.

The problem with the present Indian doctrine is its minimalist approach that seeks to manage a conflict rather than aim for a more comprehensive conflict resolution (as had been achieved in Mizoram, Tripura and Punjab). Just taming the insurgent organisation adequately to help initiate talks is a less than optimal approach and leads to the needless prolongation of conflict. This needs to change.

Some legal aspects The Laws of War are a body of International agreements.

These include the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

The additional protocols define Armed Conflict of a non-international character where the rebel group has organised military force which has control of a part of its territory, wears a uniform with distinctive insignia and carries arms openly. India has deliberately refrained from signing these. Human rights issues are increasingly being used by the Western powers to

intervene militarily in such civil war situations in weak and backward states especially in Africa. (This is a worrying interventionist trend and Libya is the most recent example).

Why has the resolution of Internal Armed Conflict proved so intractable in the Indian context?

Is it that our current doctrine sets its sights too low at conflict management and does not even attempt conflict resolution? There is a crying need for a Whole of the Government Approach in such conflicts President’s Rule: At the domestic level we need to understand the difference between Law and Order and Maintenance of Public Order. The Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia vs the State of Bihar (1966) specifies that the degree of extent of the contravention of law is such that it disturbs the current life of a community and public tranquillity.

Article 352A of our Constitution talks of Armed Rebellion and Internal disturbance. It is for consideration that in such conditions, it may be better to impose President’s Rule till the situation is brought under control or at least for the initial period of six months. The state governments usually are badly compromised out of fear in such situations of armed rebellion and it may be far more effective to impose President’s Rule to enable optimal conduct of CI / CT operations.

Based upon our experience of CI / CT Operations, a series of legal enactments have been put in place. These include the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 (as amended in 2004) and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (11 September 1958).

• The problem is the presence of external actors which impedes the collection, preserving and providing for the continuity of evidence.

• Dysfunctional state police forces.

• Breakdown in the legal and judicial system in the disturbed area.

• Sympathy and support for insurgents, intimidation etc. paralyse the courts and effect the judiciary.

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act

is an important enabling legislation for the Military to act effectively. It includes the power to declare an area disturbed. It empowers the Army personnel to detain and arrest suspected persons without warrant, to search such persons, vehicles and premises and seize banned items.

It permits them to use force against persons who resist apprehension / arrest to the extent of causing death.

It empowers them to destroy hostile premises / fortifications and protects them against prosecution for acts done in good faith except with the prior permission of the Union government.

This Act has been labelled draconian.

It is not. It merely gives the Army the basal Police powers and protection under sections 76, 79, 80, 96 and 106 of the IPC. The Army cannot be expected to function where the Police and CPOs have failed without the basal legal cover available to the former. Despite this calls to withdraw the Act are heard at the first hint of a return to normalcy.

The Indian experience India has a rich fund of experience of handling insurgencies and terrorist movements. However, only two have been successfully resolved (Mizoram and Punjab). The rest have been merely managed.

Nagaland: The fundamental problem here has been the fractious nature of the insurgency. Mizoram had ethno-religious homogeneity of population and unity within the MNF. This facilitated negotiations and an end to insurgency. The Church and Civil society also played a sobering role in Mizoram and helped accommodation. The fractious nature of the Naga insurgent groups, polity and people on tribal lines has hindered the resolution process.

The Indian government’s short sighted policy of exploiting Internal differences between Insurgents may afford a tactical / short term advantage but at the Strategic level it seriously hampers the process of arriving at a lasting political settlement. Despite over 13 years of Ceasefire, there is no outcome. NSCN (IM) wants the establishment of Nagalim by incorporating Thangkhul areas of Manipur. NSCN (K) does not want this but wants to incorporate areas of Myanmar instead.

Pacified areas must experience the peace dividend. Ballot box is the Coffin of insurgencies.

However, experience has shown that the early and premature restoration of civil rule can hamper operations and drag out the resolution of the insurgency for years Manipur: The key aspect there is that the arterial surface communications, both rail / road must come directly from south Assam without having to run the gauntlet of passage through Nagaland. This must be done expeditiously to save needless harassment of prolonged blockades to the people of Manipur.

Tripura: Mostly a brigade strength of the Army, alongwith the excellent role of 21 Sector Assam Rifles pacified this state. The state police has put in a spectacular performance and Tripura is one of the success stories of our CI campaigns.

Assam: For long this state was a victim of vaccilation. The stop-start nature of the CI campaign hampered resolution. The large scale influx of Bangladeshi migrants has caused drastic changes in the demography.

The Royal Bhutan Army provided excellent support and contributed significantly to the success of the Indian Army. This was further facilitated by the fatigue of the local population and the insurgents. A very important recent development has been the extensive and unequivocal support provided by the Sheikh Hasina government of Bangladesh. This has enabled the ushering in of peace in Assam.

Left wing extremism: This is a significant threat emerging to our internal security. The Union government has failed to issue Policy directives to states on essential socio-economic reforms. The Centre failed to achieve the necessary levels of coherence, coordination and cooperation between the Centre and the various states in such insurgencies that span many states. The Centre must issue policy directives and share best practices and overall ensure a “Whole of the government approach”.

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Some lessons learnt for joint civil-military aspects Pacified areas must experience the peace dividend. Ballot box is the Coffin of insurgencies. However, experience has shown that the early and premature restoration of civil rule can hamper operations and drag out the resolution of the insurgency for years.

The start-stop nature of ceasefire dialogues prevents conflict resolution. It provides the insurgent opportunities to rest, refit, refurbish, reorganise and drag out the campaign. Every dialogue does not necessitate a ceasefire.

Unfortunately much of the Central economic assistance ends up funding the insurgents.

The Security Forces are compelled to accept the long term political nature of the campaign. Their operations are people centric. They are conducted in accordance with the law of the land and despite overwhelming numbers, kinetic force is applied judiciously.

The Union government unfortunately does not feel compelled to bring Final Closure to the Conflict.

focus on external conventional conflict (which after nuclearisation is getting increasingly rare).

By relegating Internal Security to a secondary role the Army unwittingly relegates its crucial importance and it results in a lack of preparation and adhoc responses. A pernicious myth has been propagated that CI / CT operations detract from efficiency in the primary role. Nothing could be further from the truth. 8 Mountain Division which has had near continuous involvement in CI operations, performed much better than 3 Mountain Division in the Kargil war and quickly adapted and switched to regular operations.

The Chinese PLA has four roles that include Internal Security. The PLA however accords equal importance to each role and does not relegate internal security to a secondary status. Suggested roles for the Indian Army therefore could be listed as under: Counter the external military threat by deterrence or by waging war.

There is an overwhelming need for a whole of the government approach and a joint Civil-Military doctrine.

Assist the government to counter the internal armed threats to national security whenever called upon to do so.

Internal conflict is protracted. Short term goals can obscure the aim and discourage the government from adopting the long term approach.

Provide other forms of assistance to the government whenever called upon during exigencies.

Joint civil-military doctrine

Facilitate the government to international military obligations.

Doctrine: Doctrine is generic and applies to a particular type of conflict and / or environment. It outlines concepts, fundamentals and principles. It helps to prepare, inform, educate and train persons and organisations for their role.

An understanding of the doctrine helps in the formulation of Strategy.

Strategy: Strategy is adversary and situation specific. It consists of a broad plan of the sum of resources available to achieve a specific aim. Detailed policies and plans flow out of Strategy.

There is a need to ensure that Police Reforms are enforced in our country. This is badly overdue and despite a Supreme Court Ruling has still not been implemented. Samuel John quotes the very first report of the National Police Commission in 1904 “The police force is far from efficient, it is defective in training, organisation, it is inadequately supervised and is generally regarded as corrupt and oppressive.” A hundred years down the line little has changed. The CPOs often perform tasks outside their remit. It is based on expediency – on what is available rather than what is suitable. This may be unavoidable but is certainly not optimal (e.g. use of ITBP for protecting and securing the personnel and premises of our embassies abroad).

Primary and secondary roles of the Army The Army’s role in countering internal threats to law and order / public order and security of the state is implicit in Article 355 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, in our country the Army categorises Internal Security as a secondary role. It seeks to

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fulfil

its

SYSTEMIC MALAISE

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDIA:

THE QUEST FOR SYNERGY

The last time around that such high levels of dissonance had been seen in the civil-military interface, was just prior to the 1962 War with China. The Thimayya-Menon spat was the outer symptom of a far deeper systemic malaise. The problem in India has been that the state had tried to craft for itself a narrative of exceptionalism at the time of its inception. Even though it joined the Westphalian system of nation states based on hard power, it tried to craft for itself a soft-power narrative that said it was a state with a difference; that it had been formed by a non-violent struggle based on Ahimsa and peaceful non-cooperation. The armed forces and their hard power was simply not needed. This neglect resulted in the disaster of 1962. All that changed radically in the Indira Gandhi era when the Indian state returned to realism and achieved a peak of synergy and coordination. This yielded the most spectacular victory in the last two millennia. Some 40 years after that peak we are seemingly back to the pre 1962 era of a new neo-liberalism, this time based on an “economy is all outlook” and a conviction that post nuclearisation, armed forces and conventional wars are just not needed.

All these roles carry equal weightage and cannot be graded as primary or tertiary roles.

(The simple fact is that around 98 per cent of the time most armies are engaed in internal security roles and the same is true of india).

Minimum versus proportional force Currently the guiding principles of Aid to Civil Authority are a legacy of the British period when the Army was at times called upon to deal with Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent agitation.

These were “Minimum force, Good Faith, Necessity and Impartiality”. Unfortunately, in the post-independence period, the levels of violence encountered have escalated exponentially.

External support has led to an inordinate rise in the availability of sophisticated weapons and powerful IEDs with the insurgents / terrorists and the consequent quantum jump in the lethality and scale of violence. The insurgent / terrorist organisations today have become highly militarised. In such situations relying upon the colonial era concept of using Minimum force in response could be a prescription for disaster. We need to seriously consider replacing the concept of Minimum force with Proportionate, discriminate or requisite force.

S

ynergy between the various components of our National Security Architecture is a sine qua non for success. Managing the complex process of inter-state conflict requires a great deal of coordination and harmony between the various components of the state. Lack of synergy unfortunately has been a singular failing of the Indian polity. Culturally, the Indian is argumentative and individualistic by nature. Hence generating synergy has historically been a very difficult task in South Asia. This lack of cohesion and systemic dissonance has been fully exploited in the past by foreign invaders and conquerors.

Today, synergy is needed not just between the three Services, but even more between the civil and military components of the state per se. This is why it is so distressing to see the current Nadir in civil-military relations in India. The last time around that such high levels of dissonance had been seen in the civil-military interface, was just prior to the 1962 War with China. The Thimayya-Menon spat was the outer symptom of a far deeper systemic malaise. The problem in India has been that the state had tried to craft for itself a narrative of exceptionalism at the time of

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.

He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts.

He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals.

He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

However, it is equally essential that economic prowess be translated into hard and usable military power.

Otherwise India will end up as an effete economic giant like Germany or Japan, who have little power to influence outcomes in the real world.

They are pathetically dependent upon the hard power umbrella of the USA. Despite our big power pretensions, Pakistan has been pushing us around South Asia. It has subjected us to a vicious asymmetric assault now for three decades that has gone unpunished, so far. It wants Kashmir settled on its own terms; and it wants India to be completely marginalised in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

It wants to reduce Afghanistan to a colony and it expects India to give it a free hand to shape the post-American withdrawal dispensation in Kabul

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its inception. Even though it joined the Westphalian system of nation states based on hard power, it tried to craft for itself a softpower narrative that said it was a state with a difference; that it had been formed by a non-violent struggle based on Ahimsa and peaceful non-cooperation. The armed forces and their hard power was simply not needed in the new state. It was a clever piece of self-deception. The British actually had left because of the fear that the INA hard power legend could have instigated mutinies in the mass of 2.5 million trained men of the British Indian Army, who were being demobilised after the World War-II. The INA trials had already caused mutinies to break out in the Royal Indian Navy and the Indian Army. Frankly, the stark historical fact is that Bose and his INA had far more to do with the British decision to quit than all the non-violence of our freedom struggle.

The Nehruvian narrative of an exceptional state based on soft power alone therefore was a contrived lie. It could not survive the shock and reality check of 1962. The Nehruvian state abhorred and distrusted its Army. It was increasingly belittled and marginalised from the national decision-making process. The coup in Pakistan in 1956 added to the civilian paranoia. It led to the Strategic Planning Space being usurped by the Police bureaucracy manning the Intelligence Services.

The Intelligence Chiefs had stability of tenure and direct access to the political masters. Intelligence operations per force have to be strictly compartmentalised on a need to know basis. This style of working at the apex level, further eroded inter-departmental synergy, coherence and coordination. The need to know culture at the apex which was specifically designed to keep the armed forces in particular, outside the national decision making process, destroyed what was left of civil-military synergy. The disaster of the 1962 war cruelly highlighted these systemic failures and shortcomings.

The problem today is that the Nehruvian soft power narrative has re-emerged in a new economic Avatar. It once again seeks to aggressively sideline and marginalise the military from national decision-making. There is a new culture of civilian control that seeks to keep the Service Chiefs in line by routinely castigating them and humiliating them in the media, whenever they allegedly speak out of turn. The ministry has insisted on treating them like errant school boys who routinely need to be slapped across the wrists. A lobby of foreign funded NGOs has taken to lambasting the Army for its alleged human rights violations. These seek to demonise the Army and delegitimise its operations. The government seems to step back and tacitly encourage this military bashing in the media Post 1962 there was a rapid return to realism in the Indian state. The Soviets subsidised our hard military power build-up in the 1960s and 1970s.

Mrs Indira Gandhi proved to be a ruthless practitioner of realpolitik and enforced top-down synergy. Synergy, jointness and inter-organisational coordination reached their systemic peak in the 1971 War and resulted in a historic and

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magnificent victory. Pakistan was broken into two in a classic tri-Services campaign that saw a high level of civil-military synergy and inter-Services cooperation and coordination at its peak.

Return of the Nehruvian narrative Why then this relapse to ultra neo-liberalism almost half a century after 1962? Unfortunately, the source of our subsidised hard power, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 and the Indian economy came close to collapse in 1991. The Indian elite were forced to open and liberalise the Indian economy and postpone by two decades, our military rearmament programmes. This decline in our hard power was fully exploited by Pakistan to wage unrestricted asymmetric warfare against India for 30 long years. The problem today is that the Nehruvian soft power narrative has re-emerged in a new economic Avatar. It once again seeks to aggressively sideline and marginalise the military from national decision-making. There is a new culture of civilian control that seeks to keep the Service Chiefs in line by routinely castigating them and humiliating them in the media, whenever they allegedly speak out of turn.

The ministry has insisted on treating them like errant school boys who routinely need to be slapped across the wrists. A lobby of foreign funded NGOs has taken to lambasting the Army for its alleged human rights violations. These seek to demonise the Army and delegitimise its operations. The government seems to step back and tacitly encourage this military bashing in the media. We have never once heard the Ministry or the Minister himself defending the exemplary record of the Indian Army in terms of human rights. All this has been breeding considerable resentment in the military.

The present Army Chief’s spat with the ministry is only symptomatic of this deeper malaise. When the present Army Chief had taken over, he had vowed to clean the Augean stables of corruption and taken stringent action against very senior officers. The defence minister too has a reputation for probity and it was felt that the two would get on famously. The sudden antipathy to the current Chief is therefore baffling and unfortunately sends a very wrong signal not just to the rank and file but to the entire nation at large.

The political elite today seems convinced that post nuclearisation there are no chances of a conventional conflict and that the armed forces are an irritating insurance policy that they do not intend to cash ever.

Personalised diplomacy was the panacea for all problems in the Nehruvian era. Now, economy is touted as the prescription for all ills. There is just one problem. It is a fact that economic strength alone can be the basis of hard power. However, it is equally essential that economic prowess be translated into hard and usable military power. Otherwise India will end up as an effete economic giant like Germany or Japan, who have little power to influence outcomes in the real world.

They are pathetically dependent upon the hard power umbrella of the USA. Despite our big power pretensions, Pakistan has been pushing us around South Asia. It has subjected us to a vicious asymmetric assault now for three decades that has gone unpunished, so far. It wants Kashmir settled on its own terms; and it wants

India to be completely marginalised in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It wants to reduce Afghanistan to a colony and it expects India to give it a free hand to shape the post-American withdrawal dispensation in Kabul. All these vaulting Caliphate ambitions in Islamabad are in sharp contrast to its economy, which is near collapse and its polity that hovers on the brink of state failure.

Unfortunately, apart from mouthing peace platitudes ad infinitum and proclaiming its unwillingness to raise costs for Pakistan’s terrorist depredations, India has done little else to assert its credentials as a regional power.

As Ashley Tellis commented, “India seems prepared to absorb terrorist casualties endlessly and ad infinitum - like a sponge”.

To return to the realism India had displayed in the Indira Gandhi era, India will first have to jettison the contrived Nehruvian narrative of itself as a state that exists solely to usher in global peace and harmony.

These universalist pretensions, without a basis of hard power, had brought us to grief and ridicule in 1962.

The agricultural revolution thereafter, gave us autonomy from a ship to mouth situation and the Soviet Union subsidised our military build-up that led to the spectacular victory of 1971. Some 40 years after the 71 victory, we have once again fallen back to the Nehruvian rhetoric of the pre-1962 era, where the pursuit of peace had become an end in itself. We need to return to the hard-headed realism of the Indira Gandhi era that gave total primacy to our National Interests.

Today, we have the economic prowess to effect a significant military build-up. We have decided to do it by importing some US$ 100 billion worth of foreign weapons by the end of this decade. Most of our weapon acquisition programmes however are suffering from huge time and cost overruns of over a decade and more.

Post 1962 there was a rapid return to realism in the Indian state. The Soviets subsidised our hard military power build-up in the 1960s and 1970s.

Mrs Indira Gandhi proved to be a ruthless practitioner of realpolitik and enforced top-down synergy. Synergy, jointness and inter-organisational coordination reached their systemic peak in the 1971 War and resulted in a historic and magnificent victory. Pakistan was broken into two in a classic tri-Services campaign that saw a high level of civil-military synergy and inter-Services cooperation and coordination at its peak We have failed to create our indigenous MilitaryIndustrial complex that would provide us true autarky / autonomy. The quick fix of licensed production stultified our indigenous Research and Development and prevented the harnessing of our civilian industry into the production of armaments. These would have generated the much needed employment and revenue by exporting weapons to other countries.

Manpower is India’s greatest asset. By 2026, India will have the world’s largest population of 1.4 billion. Over 68 per cent of it will be young people in the working age group. This youth dividend however translates into the need to create a billion jobs. India also has the young manpower to generate a huge Army that can put boots on the ground and would be ideally suited for the pursuit of manpower intensive operations in the mountainous environment of the Himalayas. The Finance ministry however has turned down the Army’s proposal for a new strike corps for the mountains. In fact it made jaws fall with its astounding query - “Will the Chinese threat still be around after 2014?”

Jointness and synergy The Kargil Review Committee had asked for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and an HQ IDS. The IDS staff has been set up sans its head. This needs to be corrected at the earliest. One possible solution to the ugly spat between the Army Chief and the Ministry that has been suggested is the elevation of the Army Chief to the post of CDS. The country will at least gain from such a denouement. If at long last we are able to get a CDS, that may be the only good that could possibly emerge from this unseemly row. However given the bad blood that does not seem feasible today and there doesn’t seem to be any other option but to let the courts decide on matters of fact.

There is a need to integrate the Service HQs with the Ministry. For this, it is imperative that the IDS be permitted to play a lead role in harmonising the long term Integrated Acquisition Plans of the Three Services and provide the Ministry with Net Assessments of the threat, as also Draft Defence Planning Guidance documents and regularly update the Raksha Mantri’s Op Directive every four years. We need to optimally exploit the IDS which has already been set up and give it a lead role like the German Oberkommando der Whermacht (OKW) of the Second World War. We also need to establish a joint command each for Jammu and Kashmir and for our Chinese Front. We also need a Special Forces Command and a Cyber-Space Command. There is a need to promote the culture of jointness as an imperative. We need to harmonise the functioning of various organs of state to serve the national interests. “The country comes first always and everytime” has to be the guiding mantra.

There is no place anymore for turf wars, institutional egos and games that people play to score brownie points over one another in the media or on the files. The needs of the nation far override the petty egos of individuals and institutions. The armed forces must, at long last, be truly integrated with the national decision-making process and given their due. This has been put off for too long. Synergy works best when it is a top-down process enforced by a leadership with commitment and a national vision. We had that in 1971 and the results were there for the world to see.

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Rafale MMRCA

T

he mother of all recent defence deals has just been concluded. French major Dassault Rafale has bagged India's biggest-ever multi-billion dollar deal for procuring 126 MMRCA combat aircraft for the Indian Air Force. The deal is worth nearly US$ 20 billion (Rs 76,000 cr) 'The French firm Dassault Rafale has emerged as the L1 (lowest bidder) and cheaper than its European rival EADS by almost 10 per cent in the tender to finally bag this mother of all defence deals.

European EADS Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale were in the final race for the global tender for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA).

The Eurofighter Typhoon bid was backed by four partner nations including Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom while the Dassault Rafale was backed by the French Government.

According to the Request for Proposal (RFP), the winner of the contract will have to supply 18 of the 126 aircraft to the IAF in fly away condition within 24-36 months from its facilities and the remaining would be produced at HAL facilities in Bangalore after complete TOT. Six companies were in the fray. The aircraft included the American F-16 and F-18, Russian MiG 35, Swedish Saab Gripen, along with Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, which were in the race.

In April last year, the Defense Ministry on the basis of technical evaluation by the IAF, rejected the American, Russian and Swedish aircraft as not being QR compliant and shortlisted Dassault and Eurofighter for the final phase. The deal has now been finally won by Rafale. This makes eminent sense as the IAF is already flying the Mirage-2000 which it was very satisfied with in the Kargil conflict. As such the support infrastructure already exists. The IAF had initially asked for more Mirage aircraft but the French were then phasing out these aircraft and had offered the Rafale instead. To avoid a single vendor situation the MoD had insisted on a global tender. The French have so far proved to be very dependable arms suppliers. France has consistently been very supportive of India and had exhibited great understanding of the Indian decision to carry out nuclear tests. It was the only western country that did not impose sanctions on India post Pokhran. It has sold high quality arms in the past as also supplied civil nuclear reactors for power generation. It has promised to share technology and source codes for the software and electronic components. France is also selling India the Scorpene submarine, upgrading the Mirage aircraft and providing air to air missiles. The Rafale deal underlines the close strategic partnership between the two countries and shared mutual interests.

The Americans were deeply miffed about losing out on this deal. However buying the US planes entailed signing of a series of rather restrictive agreements and the US record of past sanctions and enforcing domestic legislation had engendered deep apprehensions in the collective memory of the Indian armed forces. Besides the F-16 and F-18 represented relatively older technology compared to the more recent European aircraft. The MMRCA deal is designed to give a boost to the indigenous arms industry through transfer of technology and the offsets that are part of the deal. Some Rs 38,000 cr worth of offsets are expected to be pumped in as part of this deal.

70 Per Cent Tanks Out Of ‘Night-Blind’ Category

“W

e have been able to do away with night-blindness of 70 per cent of our tanks and they can fight 24X7,” Army Chief Gen V K Singh said recently.

The Army has managed to fit night vision devices including thermal imagers and infra-red equipment in 70 per cent of its tank armada to counter “night blindness” and set aside more than Rs 5,000 crore for procurement of night vision devices, surveillance and battlefield support equipment.

Night vision devices including thermal imagers and infra-red equipment enable the tank crew to negotiate rugged terrain and acquire and then destroy a target at night. Tanks are usually deployed to smash enemy

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defences and then dash into its territory at a fast pace and denying him to regroup and launch a counter-assault.

Realising that “night blindness” was a crucial “operational gap” India started the process of equipping its tanks with night vision devices more than 15 years back and invited global tenders. Israel, Russia and France emerged as the main contenders.

Contracts were signed with the successful companies for night vision devices.

The Army has three classes of frontline tanks including T-72, T-90 and Arjun. While the first two tanks are of Russian origin, Arjun main battle tank is indigenously designed and manufactured and the Army at present has 124 Arjun tanks and may order for another 120.

India To Buy 42 ‘Upgraded’ Sukhoi SU-30 MKIs

A

fter negotiating for more than a year, India has firmed up an order with Russia for the purchase of 42 upgraded Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft to strengthen its aging fleet.

While the Cabinet Committee on Security had taken a decision on buying 42 additional Sukhoi MKIs last year, negotiations have taken longer because India was also keen to include some of the features found in fifth generation fighter aircraft. Finally, the Russian side agreed to upgrade the SU-30 MKIs to its latest version known as ‘Super Sukhoi’ with additional characteristics.

The new version is expected to include a new cockpit, upgraded radar and certain stealth features to avoid radar detection. Significantly, the upgraded Sukhoi-30 MKIs will be able to carry a heavier weapons load, especially the airborne version of the BrahMos cruise missile. India is also looking to upgrade most of its SU-30 MKIs in the long run.

While Russia may have lost out in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal because of not being able to offer certain additional features, officials said, Moscow has assured New Delhi that it will roll out its best in upgraded SU-30 MKIs. The deal, estimated at over Rs 20,000 crore, will be operational in three years with the first delivery expected in 2014 and the last by 2018. Once the 42 aircraft are inducted, the total strength of SU-30 MKI fleet will go up to 272.

It may be noted that by 2017, India plans to phase out 120 MiG 21s and with the MMRCA still not a done deal, the SU-30 MKI fleet will be the mainstay.

Year End Defence Review (India) New weapons The successful test launch of the 3,500 km range Agni-IV Ballistic Missile on Tuesday, November 15, 2011 was the highlight of the year. A press conference was organised the next day, for DRDO chief Dr V K Saraswat, which was widely covered by the media, on the launch of Agni-IV from Wheeler Island off Orissa coast.

Sixth successful test launch of Agni-AI Ballistic Missile from Wheeler Island on Thursday, December 1, 2011 by Armed Forces.

Successful launch of Dhanush and Prithvi Missiles by the Strategic Forces Command from Interim Test Range, Chandipur, Orissa and a warship off Orissa coast on March 11, 2011.

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Successful launch of new Surface to Surface Tactical Missile Prahaar by DRDO on Thursday, July 21, 2011.

Successful flight testing of Surface to Surface Strategic Missile Agni (A-II) on Friday, September 30, 2011, from Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, Orissa coast.

Successful flight testing of Surface to Surface Strategic Missile Prithvi (P-II) on Monday, September 26, 2011, from ITR, Chandipur. In collaboration with DRDO, DPR also organised a press briefing on the strategic significance of the event on the same day.

Successful flight test of the 700-km range Shourya Missile from Launch Complex III of Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur off Orissa coast on Saturday, September 24, 2011.

The DRDO conducted the 5th successful flight of UAV Rustom I near Hosur, Karnataka on Friday, November 11, 2011.

Initial Operational Clearance Ceremony to LCA (Tejas) at Bangalore on January 10, 2011. Defence Minister Shri A K Antony formally handed over the release to service certificate of Tejas Aircraft to the chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal P V Naik.

Successful Engine Ground Run of LCA Tejas (Navy) at Bangalore on Tuesday, September 27, 2011.

Kaveri engine being developed by the DRDO for the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft successfully completed the first phase Flying Test Bed trials mounted on a modified IL-76 aircraft in Russia during April.

Defence Minister Shri A K Antony inaugurated the DRDO’s state-of-the-art composite propellant processing facility – ACEM (Advanced Centre for Energetic Materials) at Nasik in Maharashtra on Wednesday, June 29, 2011.

Indian naval crew began training in Russia in April aboard the new Aircraft Carrier Admiral Gorshkov, being rechristened INS Vikramaditya, to be inducted into the Indian naval fleet.

Indian Mirage Aircraft To Have 500 Air-To-Air Missiles

T

he government on Wednesday cleared a proposal to equip the French Mirage ground attack aircraft with 500 air-to-air missiles that would be procured from a western consortium.

The 950-million euro (about Rs. 6,600 crore) deal was cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security at a meeting here chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The decision entails procuring the MICA interception and aerial combat fire and forget missile manufactured by MBDA, sources in the Defence Ministry said.

The government earlier cleared a proposal to upgrade 51 Mirage 2000 aircraft under a 1.47 billion euro agreement signed last year.

French manufacturer Dassault Aviation and weapons systems integrator Thales are to carry out the midlife upgrades.

Two aircraft were flown to France to carry out the work, while the rest would be modernised at the HAL facilities in the country.

K-152 Nerpa

I

ndia added teeth to its submarine fleet and became the world’s sixth operator of a nuclear-powered submarine when Russia’s K-152 Nerpa nuclear-powered attack submarine was handed over to the Indian Navy at a ceremony in the far Eastern Primorye territory of the Russian Federation on January 23, 2012.

The submarine, with NATO codename Akula-II, will be on a 10-year lease with Indian Navy till 2022 under a contract that was signed between the two countries worth over US$ 900 million, according to Indian Navy sources.

The Project 971 Shchuka-B class vessel will be renamed INS Chakra once it reaches the Indian shores - with home base as Vishakhapatnam - in February and a formal commissioning ceremony will be conducted in March this year, sources said.

Russian submariners had trained the Indian Navy submariners for over a month in the Pacific Ocean on how to steer the Nerpa. With a displacement of 8,140 to 12,770 tonnes and a maximum speed of 30 knots, the vessel can operate at maximum depth of 600 metres and has an endurance of 100 days. The submarine is operated by a 73-member crew and is armed with four 533 mm torpedo tubes and four 650 mm torpedo tubes.

The other submarine operating naval powers in the world are the US, Russia, Britain, France and China.

Fourth Airbus Military A330 MRTT Handed Over To RAAF

T

he fourth Airbus Military A330 MRTT multi-role tanker transport for the Royal Australian Air Force has been formally handed over to the service, leaving just one aircraft of its order still to be delivered.

Known as the KC-30A in RAAF operation, this particular aircraft is the only one for the RAAF to have been converted from the basic A330 in Madrid, the others having been converted by Qantas Defence Services in Brisbane, Australia. It took part in the A330 MRTT development programme and has been extensively renovated prior to delivery in Madrid.

Following the handover the aircraft will remain in Spain for continued test work and will be transferred to RAAF Base Amberley, Queensland later in the year. The fifth and final aircraft will be delivered in the third quarter of the year.

The A330 MRTT recently underwent successful refuelling trials in Australia with a RAAF F/A-18 fighter and earlier this month was displayed by the RAAF at the LIMA Air show in Malaysia.

It is the world’s most advanced air-to-air tanker and the only certified and flying new generation tanker / transport aircraft in existence. It will substantially increase the aerial refuelling and logistical capabilities of the RAAF.

The French firms will modernise the navigation systems, mission computers, electronic warfare systems and radars.

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jointness

SYNCHRONISATION

Air Marshal B K Pandey (retd) The writer is former AOC-in-C HQ Training Command, IAF, Bengaluru and served for three years in a Diplomatic Assignment at the Indian Embassy during the years of turmoil (1989-1992) in war-torn Afghanistan.

He was responsible for setting up the only English Medium School in Kabul at that point in time. He has also been Operations Manager at ARC, an intelligence organisation.

An incisive article on Jointness that examines our own and the American experience in this regard. He defines jointness as a process that serves to enhance the effectiveness of military operations by synchronising the efforts of the different components of the Armed Forces to achieve perfect synergy and produce maximum impact against the enemy forces. To fight any war in the twentyfirst century or beyond, the armed forces will need a profound attitudinal change and congruence of vision that can only be possible though a truly joint approach.

JOINTNESS AND SYNERGY FOR THE ARMED FORCES:

A VITAL IMPERATIVE

T

he United States of America is undoubtedly the most modern and potent military power in the world today and since the end of the Second World War, holds the record of having engaged in the maximum number of wars. Unlike many other nations that usually have three major components of the military the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, the US has the Marines as the fourth arm positioned in the second slot in the order of precedence.

Apart from the four components listed above, the three other uniformed services in the US of which the Coast Guard is a part, have relatively lower critical role in the projection of national military power and hence are excluded from the subsequent discussion on Jointness in the armed forces.

Jointness in the US armed forces It was only in the Bangladesh War of 1971 that there was some evidence of integration amongst the three wings but the level of Jointness achieved was somewhat rudimentary. However, it was the war in Kargil of 1999 that laid bare the complete and shocking lack of Jointness between the two components involved, the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force

Over the years, while the major components of the US armed forces have evolved individually, they have also developed doctrines and operating procedures to achieve exemplary cooperation among the four different components leading to a high level of synergy to deliver devastating impact on the enemy in frontal wars. This capability was amply demonstrated by the US in the two wars in the recent past, Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox carried out in the decade of the 1990s against Iraq. In these two campaigns, the elements of military power of the US whether on land, sea or in the air combined seamlessly towards the success of operations. However, the fact that the opposing forces were not evenly matched, the two wars waged against Iraq were closer to being in the nature of an exercise. However, they did serve a useful purpose i. e. to validate the concept and the crucial importance of Jointness in the armed forces. Undoubtedly, the Indian armed forces would have imbibed some valuable lessons in Jointness from the US experience.

While the major components of the US armed forces have evolved individually, they have also developed doctrines and operating procedures to achieve exemplary cooperation among the four different components leading to a high level of synergy

The concept of jointness The highly developed war doctrine of the US describes the spirit of cooperation or “Jointness” in the armed forces as “To coordinate the combat capabilities of the Services to achieve the greatest possible military advantage through the formulation and execution of plans which maximise the unique capabilities of each of the Services.” In other words, it is a process that serves to enhance the effectiveness of military operations by synchronising the efforts of the different components of the Armed Forces to achieve perfect synergy and produce maximum impact against the enemy forces. In the American scheme of things, each component of the armed forces continues to maintain its unique identity but for operations, are integrated at all levels in the chain of command to ultimately operate as a one entity under a single Commander in Chief. Positioned as the head of a unified command structure, the appointment is designated as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The equivalent in the UK is the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Apart from the US and the UK, the armed forces of Australia, Canada, China, France, New Zealand, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka are also similarly integrated though in some cases there are minor and inconsequential variations in the designation of the senior most commander. But perhaps among all nations, Canada is clearly ahead in this respect as it has achieved the highest level of Jointness with total unification of the three components

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into a single service. This is the ultimate goal envisaged under the concept of Jointness. However, the efficacy of the Canadian achievement is yet to be validated as the Canadian armed forces are yet to be involved in a full scale war in recent times. The indisputable advantage however is that unification eliminates the need for coordination of the different components of the military thus simplifying the process of planning and execution of offensive and defensive operations involving two or more components.

Jointness in the armed forces is to coordinate the combat capabilities of the Services to achieve the greatest possible military advantage through the formulation and execution of plans which maximise the unique capabilities of each of the Services

Limitations of jointness Success in modern warfare to a large extent hinges on teamwork. However, while it enhances total effectiveness, Jointness alone may not guarantee success in all situations. Despite the effective integration of the diverse components and even with the advantage of overwhelming technological superiority, victory may not automatically be assured. For example, the US has not always been successful in situations of guerrilla warfare such as in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. The reasons for such failures however ought to be sought more in the domain of politics than in flawed military strategy or in the lack of cohesion amongst the different components of the armed forces. As such, these reverses ought not to be regarded as militating against the argument or logic in favour of Jointness. The enduring lesson of wars fought over the last two and a half centuries across the globe is that behind every military failure, there has invariably

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been flawed political direction. In the history of military conflict in the Indian context, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 is the supreme example where leave alone the problem of coordination, air power was not employed at all to the serious detriment of ground forces.

Training for jointness in India Following independence in 1947, the post of the Commander in Chief of the Indian armed forces was abolished by the newly installed government, effectively steering the armed forces away from Jointness. The decision taken at that point in time, in hindsight, reflects not only lack of understanding among the political leadership of the day of the concept of Jointness and its relevance to the armed forces, but also reveals an innate fear that a unified military command could become much too powerful and could possibly pose serious threat to the civilian government. Lack of clarity, consistency and incongruity in the thinking at the highest levels of the government of that time is evident from the fact that while Jointness in the top echelons of the armed forces was effectively diluted through the abolition of the post of Commander in Chief, a new institution called the National Defence Academy (NDA) to train together the young entrants to the officer cadre of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force was established at Khadakvasla near Pune. The ostensible purpose of the three-year joint training at NDA was to sow the seeds of Jointness. To what extent the experiment has been successful in fostering the spirit of Jointness in the armed forces has been a subject of intense debate both within and outside the armed forces. Many believe that the bonhomie and camaraderie developed during the three years spent by the young officer trainees at the NDA is effectively smothered in the ruthless and ugly turf wars amongst the three Services, lofty rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. A number of other institutions such as the Defence Services Staff College, National Defence College and College of Defence Management for joint training at different levels of command and staff were established with the same objective. These institutions have definitely served to improve awareness amongst the officer cadre of the capabilities and limitations of each service as also helped foster the spirit of camaraderie.

However, these institutions have not impacted Jointness in operations.

CDS: A distant dream Post independence, the Indian armed forces were called upon a number of times to respond to challenges to national security. However, it was only in the Bangladesh War of 1971 that there was some evidence of integration amongst the three wings but the level of Jointness achieved was somewhat rudimentary. However, it was the war in Kargil of 1999 that laid bare the complete and shocking lack of Jointness between the two components involved, the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force.

This experience not only reinforced the realisation within the armed forces of the need for a joint approach, it also seemed to jolt the government into action. Thus a Task Force under Arun Singh, a former Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence was set up to examine India’s higher defence organisation. The Arun Singh Committee

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recommended the appointment of a CDS. However, the undercurrents of resistance from some sections within the armed forces as well as from the bureaucracy and even the political leadership for reasons already stated, has managed to successfully thwart the implementation of the recommendation of the Committee for the appointment of a CDS. Instead a highly diluted entity known as the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was created.

This organisation is neither structured nor empowered to function as CDS. Its role and span of responsibility are eloquently reflected in the manner in which the designation of the head of this organisation is coined - Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC). Apart from the rather convoluted designation of his appointment, plainly stated, the Chief of IDS merely performs staff functions for the Committee consisting of the three Service Chiefs. In the current disposition, the IDS is not in a position to contribute in any way to Jointness in operations.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Jointness and Synergy: Upstream and Downstream Strategy?

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (retd) The writer is an Army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt. Ltd., a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, “Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities”.

There are however, some positives too. A number of institutions to cover areas such as Intelligence, Defence Procurement, Training and Planning have been created to breathe new life into the spirit of Jointness. These institutions do not have any impact on operations for which two joint commands are now in existence, the Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic Force Command. Formation of the Space Command, the third such joint effort, is understood to be on the anvil.

However, these have a long way to go before they are mature enough to be operationally relevant.

Progress in jointness would have to be achieved despite the CDS coming into play, which is no doubt likely to be a major challenge but may not be insurmountable. This is by no means an argument against a CDS; however given the time taken in likely acceptance of the proposal by national leadership looking beyond has assumed greater importance

To fight any war in the twentyfirst century or beyond, apart from major organisational revamp, the armed forces will need a profound attitudinal change and congruence of vision that can only be possible though a truly joint approach

Jointness: An imperative While the armed forces of India may have given a reasonably decent account of themselves in the wars fought since independence, it is necessary for them to prepare for wars in the future the nature of which is bound to be radically different from that experienced thus far. A full scale conflict or even a limited war in all likelihood, will involve space-based assets as also may have the ominous possibility of crossing the nuclear threshold. As a nation, India needs to be fully prepared for this eventuality which cannot be contended with by each of the three services separately. These considerations by themselves would make a unified command structure and a single point contact with the government an inescapable necessity and a vital imperative. Besides, driven by the dramatic developments in technology and human ingenuity, the envelope of a war in the future would expand to cover multiple fronts involving several other non-lethal areas such as information and cyber war.

To fight any war in the twentyfirst century or beyond, apart from major organisational revamp, the armed forces will need a profound attitudinal change and congruence of vision that can only be possible though a truly joint approach.

An excellent and thought provoking article on jointness and synergy. Most such articles begin and end with the CDS. The writer however points out the need to look beyond the CDS at a number of vectors of integration upstream and downstream that seem to be languishing and many of which are within the purview of the Ministry of Defence and Service HQs. He highlights the imperative to create Joint Regional and Functional Commands. Geographically, the Indian terrain is so vast and varied that it needs such Regional Commands which are Joint.

He provides concrete ways of doing this. Jointness at the apex level can be engendered by making better use of the HQ IDS by going beyond the lead service and parallel track approach that is currently being followed. HQ IDS can then perform the role of the Oberkommando der Whermacht (OKW) of Wartime Germany. This should become the functional arm of the MoD.

Jointness is as much about coordination in the cognitive and human domain, this aspect does assume importance.

Institutionalising existing quasi command arrangements in Northern Command in the form of AOC Jammu and Kashmir into a theatre command as the ANC may provide an option which needs examination

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jointness

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

T

he jointness construct in India commenced a decade ago in real terms with transformation of the Joint Planning Staff into Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) and formation of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). These have evolved into viable establishments denoting progress towards this essential facet of armed forces modernisation.

There is also a common view that this is not enough and more needs to be done with the debate generally focusing on the issue of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Beyond the CDS a number of vectors of integration upstream and downstream seem to be languishing many of which are within the purview of the Ministry of Defence and Service HQs. Notably what has been touted as jointness recently with reference to transformation may lead to flawed conclusions on our achievements particularly in the operational field. The absence of further progress in jointness is detrimental to modernisation, leading to gaps in future preparedness and also result in resource effluence in an era of constricting budgetary allotments for defence. Some of the key issues to rejuvenate the process are therefore flagged as per succeeding paragraphs.

The CDS has proved to be a red herring for the political establishment apart from differences within the services which have been publicly aired by various luminaries from time to time. This apart given recent shenanigans across the Western border in Islamabad over Memogate amongst other issues, CDS is unlikely to find favour in India in the near future. Thus progress in jointness would have to be achieved despite the CDS coming into play, which is no doubt likely to be a major challenge but may not be insurmountable. This is by no means an argument against a CDS; however given the time taken in likely acceptance of the proposal by national leadership looking beyond has assumed greater importance.

The issue of intransigence of civil bureaucracy for upstream integration of the Ministry of Defence and Service HQs has also been frequently debated.

A lot may already have been achieved in this sphere without of course physical placement of officers in various appointments which is unlikely to come about given deficiencies in civil and foreign service and focus on other areas normally considered of greater national importance particularly in no-war scenarios. Here systemic streamlining of procedures and processes would play a major role. This can happen only if the service HQs and HQ IDS are willing to be on the same page in a manner that the Ministry feels comfortable in dealing with the latter rather than adopting the lead service approach as at present.

Service HQs have yet to recognise benefits of joint functioning at the apex level that may accrue to organisational efficiency and

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economy thereby providing relief from non-essential aspects to focus on areas such as modernisation. The parallel track approach that is being followed so far of same issues being dealt with by the Service HQs and HQ IDS is wasteful. Senior service hierarchy would have far greater time to focus on important aspects related to modernisation if they divest themselves of day to day matters which are the bane of any bureaucracy at the national level to HQ IDS. Obsession with minutiae is hardly an admirable quality in a military commander at whatever level and therefore can be excised from the portfolio giving more time to the gigantic challenge of transformation faced by our armed forces the path to which is not single service but joint.

into a theatre command as the ANC may provide an option which needs examination. Asset allocation models to avoid distribution of aircraft in penny packets can be evolved to fit into such a command arrangement and is perhaps lesser of the evil.

The Ministry of Defence can play a major role by relying more on HQ IDS where it is obvious that there is possibility of establishing single point contact. These would have to be identified and progressed with a degree of urgency.

Absence of jointness was also evident in conduct of major exercises by the Army during 2011.

Exercises Vijayee Bhava and Sudarshan Shakti were corps level manoeuvres of operational formations on the Western and Southern front. Media reports indicate separate air and Army stages culminating in the final phase where hopefully some synergy would have been achieved. Surprisingly in the exercise in the Southern theatre where the Indian Navy which will have a major role to play was possibly not involved, at least there were no reports in the media. Hopefully this was keeping in view security of operational plans rather than lack of involvement of the Navy.

Downstream integration is of even greater import and can achieve operational efficiency by restructuring present service to theatre commands. India’s geographical configuration and terrain panorama naturally segregates operations in compartments with limited overlap Downstream integration is of even greater import and can achieve operational efficiency by restructuring present service to theatre commands. India’s geographical configuration and terrain panorama naturally segregates operations in compartments with limited overlap. The desert, semi-desert, plains, hills, mountainous and high altitude blocks are separated with natural barriers which create operational divisions. The coastal and island territories are emerging as a separate region which has been covered by ANC in the East but may also require due attention in the West. Division of these blocks into commands is relatively easier for the Army. The Air Force faces a somewhat difficult choice and has only two commands for the West.

Given flexibility of air assets this may perhaps be viable. Kargil 1999 demonstrated however that valuable time was lost in synergy and the flaws continue to be debated. For the Army the large number of fatalities due to this delay continues to rankle.

The question posed therefore is can a command HQs located in Delhi provide the degree of intimate support required in high altitude areas of Ladakh notwithstanding relative irrelevance of physical proximity for conduct of modern air operations?

As jointness is as much about coordination in the cognitive and human domain, this aspect does assume importance. Institutionalising existing quasi-command arrangements in Northern Command in the form of AOC Jammu and Kashmir

The jointness construct in India commenced a decade ago in real terms with transformation of the Joint Planning Staff into Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) and formation of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). These have evolved into viable establishments denoting progress towards this essential facet of armed forces modernisation

Evidently if the aim was to validate Army transformation, this was also a good opportunity to incorporate how this could be implemented through a joint approach. Hopefully this has been achieved, but reading between the lines it is evident that joint planning of exercise aims and objectives followed by execution has not received the degree of importance that this deserves.

Theatre command is not a new concept in the Indian context. This has been suggested two decades ago by former Army Chief General K V Krishna Rao in his seminal work on national security, Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security. Apparently the issue has not received due attention so far and apart from the ANC progress has not been forthcoming and should in fact be the focus of future deliberations as it entails the cutting edge of operational effectiveness of the armed forces.

Possibility of creation of a Northern Theatre Command has already been outlined though this will require greater deliberation by a body of in-service experts, which can evolve an incremental plan for integration of commands in other theatres.

A number of arguments against evolution of theatre commands have been put across, including relevance of the concept in the American context for out of area contingency operations in a global environment.

Vastness and variation of terrain panorama in which our armed forces have to wage combat do denote similar complexity.

Concomitantly functional commands as Strategic Forces would have to be given the required, “teeth” and space, cyber and Special Forces commands which need to be joint would have to be organised. These are obvious joint disciplines which will have an integrated and a service component to be developed simultaneously.

Special Forces capabilities may need a larger debate to bring it in line with that of modern armed forces as the United States. Clearly there are greater expectations from the Indian armed forces by the World. For instance recent US Strategic Guidance issued on 3 January 2012, has very clearly singled out India as a security provider in the Indian Ocean region. Will we be able to carry out such a role without reorganising our key assets as Special Forces for joint operations to include covert would need deliberation?

The Indian armed forces are on the cusp of an opportunity which can pitchfork the country into regional [if not global] prominence by expanding capacity to be a force of good for such contingency operations. However lack of jointness may be a major impediment to such a role which may have to be carried out in conjunction with other like-minded forces. Given that most advanced armed forces are operating jointly, they will be unwilling to deal separately with the Army, Navy and Air Force components when undertaking emergency operations such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Some issues reinforcing the argument for jointness particularly at the theatre and functional level as well as upstream integration with the Ministry of Defence have been highlighted herein. These are by no imagination new arguments but reinforce existing home truths with contemporary examples from recent events.

It is also a truism that transformations in armed forces the world over have occurred due to external circumstances such as painful loss during a war or a legislative direction as the Goldwater Nichols Act in the United States. The focus of our national leadership is on issues which engage most developing countries, poverty alleviation, economic growth and bringing positive change to lives of multitudes. Under the circumstances there is greater responsibility on the strategic community to chart the course of military transformation.

Thus the onus for jointness and synergy rests as much on the armed forces and thought leaders supporting change through a structured debate on how this should come about. Greater impetus for this is necessary for our peer competitor the People’s Liberation Army, Navy and Air Force are adapting to jointness at a feverish pace and with a determination characteristic of China of the 21st century.

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T Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd) The writer specialises in Defence Economics and is a former Director of Naval Operations and Intelligence and has served in Missions in South East Asia.

The centre-piece of the report on Defence, tabled by Mr Arun Singh, was a recommendation that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), senior to the three service chiefs should be appointed to represent the collective views of the three services and provide single-point advice to the political leadership. The report stated a CDS and his staff would also seek closer integration between the Ministry of Defence and the Services headquarters, while simultaneously promoting ‘jointness’ within the armed forces. Additionally, the report recommended that the CDS, be assisted by a Vice CDS and would directly administer the joint commands for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India’s nuclear forces, coordinate planning activities and relieve the Chairman Chiefs of Staff who is already burdened to run his own service

hirty two leading nations of the world operate their Armed Forces with a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the head of the three or four fighting arms and designate the post variously as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as in USA, Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) in Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand which is a legacy adopted for commonality, handed down from the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). The FPDA is a security treaty entered into by these two South East Asian nations in a series of defence relationships established by bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore and signed in 1971. The five states’ CDFs and staff consult each other regularly and the FPDA successfully completed 40 years in existence last year. Malaysia and Singapore have even permitted stationing of foreign military assets on their soil and the CDF system has proved very beneficial for ASEAN in creating favourable conditions for dialogue and relieving political leaders of solving security issues between neighbours in ASEAN. There are lessons for India and it is admitted that each nation creates the position of a Chief of its Armed Forces for unity of the arms based on its needs, culture and strategic goals. In democracies the Armed Forces work under civilian control, so the fear of coup d’états, is invariably absent and hence many functionary and fiduciary powers are sublet to a Chief of Defence Force and to the staff provided under him. Many nations have gone ahead and even have set up a unified Chief of Logistics under the CDS for the advantages it accrues in procurement as the private sector more and more, provides hardware, systems and maintenance which in many cases is common to all the three services and will be applicable in India too. This also provides the buyer power to negotiate and stock common spares jointly.

An incisive article on Jointness by a former Director Naval Intelligence and Operations. Thirty two leading nations of the world operate their Armed Forces with a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the head of the three or four fighting arms and designate the post variously as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as in USA, Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) in Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand. Other nations have even set-up a unified Chief of Logistics under the CDS for the advantages it accrues in procurement.

A joint theatre commander with all three arms under him is a logical corollary that evolves and flows from the CDS system at the centre.

The functions and advantages of the CDS system The function of a CDS is therefore to bring the Armed Forces under a single uniformed head and a CDS is supported by the organisation under him and is recognised as expedient, all over the world. This via-media enhances the operational efficiency of the Armed Forces which are individually capable entities with traditions of their own and in today’s age heavily armed, with long and short range missiles including nuclear capability which calls for a good and reliable command and control structure to assist the leadership in swift decision making. The imperative need for cohesive command for the synergy that a CDS system generates, is unquestionable and stands the nation’s security in good stead, both in peace and in war. This is referred to as ‘Jointness’, a word still to find its place in English dictionaries but employed in the Armed Forces lexicon.

A CDS system if well managed, can bring about economy in procurement, training and operations to bear fruit for the nation and provide ‘Inter-Operability’ as even friendly nations in pacts like NATO strive to plan their forces for inter-operability. India too, especially the Navy which is a strategic arm of the nation has attempted to have inter-operable forces which can co-operate in Human Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations like earthquakes, floods and tsunamis. In the ‘2004 Tsunami’ the operations for relief to the Andamans, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives were coordinated by India’s Integrated Defence Staff with success as the Indian Air Force airlift and Army units were also involved when 32 ships were put to sea by the Indian Navy on the Sunday the Tsunami struck.

Those well versed in ‘Defence Economics’ explain that the Armed Force of a nation with all its paraphernalia is like a ‘Bucking Horse’ and if corralled and trained can be like a lead winning horse and the nation’s asset for development. The studies are termed ‘Linkages Between Defence and Development’. Defence forces provide security and stability for a nation to prosper, help a nation generate employment, produce skilled manpower who join nation building when they finish colour service and if a nation develops a thriving defence industry it can earn foreign exchange and revenues through exports to friendly countries to propel national economies.

In earlier times a CDS was even designated as the Commander-in-Chief and derives from the Latin word, imperator, Imperatores of the Roman Republic and in Roman times possessed Imperium (command) powers. However this has slowly changed in democracies where control of the Armed Forces is vested with the civilian authority and the nation’s head of state invariably holds the position of a Commander-in-Chief or is designated as the Supreme Commander. This, even when the effective executive power is held by a separate head of government, as in India. Colonial governors were often appointed as Commander-in-Chiefs of the military forces in their colonies but now the practice is to appoint a Commander-in-Chief as theatre commanders of the regional forces they command and examples are the NATO designation like Allied Forces Europe or Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic. A joint theatre commander with all three arms under him is a logical corollary that evolves and flows from the CDS system at the centre.

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JOINTNESS FOR ARMED FORCES: CDS AND THEATRE COMMANDERS

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

The Indian experience to appoint a CDS In 1990 late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s close colleague and Deputy Defence Minister Arun Singh was tasked to look into India’s defence expenditure which was under strain after venturing into a foray in Sri Lanka in 1987 in Op Pawan and payment for large defence orders at a time when the world’s oil price had spiked. The report known as the ‘Arun Singh Report’ ended up undertaking a full-scale review of India’s defence structure, which co-incidentally has once again in 2011 been given as a similar task to another high powered committee under former Ambassador Naresh Chandra. The centre-piece of the report on Defence, tabled by Mr Arun Singh, was a recommendation that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), senior to the three service chiefs should be appointed to represent the collective views of the three services and provide single-point advice to the political leadership. The report stated a CDS and his staff

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would also seek closer integration between the Ministry of Defence and the Services headquarters, while simultaneously promoting ‘jointness’ within the armed forces. Additionally, the report recommended that the CDS, be assisted by a Vice CDS and would directly administer the joint commands for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India’s nuclear forces, coordinate planning activities and relieve the Chairman Chiefs of Staff who is already burdened to run his own service of the duties being thrust on the incumbent.

Thirty two leading nations of the world operate their Armed Forces with a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the head of the three or four fighting arms and designate the post variously as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as in USA, Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) in Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand Post the K Subrahmanyam Kargil report and following the Group of Ministers’ report ‘Reforming the National Security System’ released in February 2001, it was agreed that the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would be the primary step in the structural reforms suggested for the MoD and the post of a Vice CDS was to be created. But, for the Select Parliament Committee on Defence, the appointment of the Vice CDS became untenable. Finally, the Vice CDS office was renamed and the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) came into being in September 2001. The CISC, who heads the IDS now, has two responsibilities. He is answerable to the MoD like any other department in the MoD; and on the military side he is answerable to the Chairman of the COSC. Unfortunately, there are two fundamental limitations to both of these roles. For unlike the four departments of the MoD namely Defence, R and D, Production and Supplies and Finance - the IDS has not been designated as the MoD’s fifth department. A nebulous state exists.

The Group of Ministers’ (GoM) report in 2001 also recommended the replacement of the Naval Fortress

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Commander (FORTAN) at Port Blair by a joint Commander-in-Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN) to command and control the assets of the three services and the Coast Guard in the islands. The GoM had recommended that in due course the Commander of this Joint Command would report to the proposed Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Recently CINCAN Lt Gen N C Marwah flew his flag alongside Naval Flag Officers on board landing ship INS Airavat during the President’s Fleet Review held at Mumbai on 19th December, 2012 and is functioning. Such an inter-service set-up does not exist on the mainland.

As the CDS is considered the titular head of the Armed Forces and is the single point contact for the government the appointment can be held by an Admiral, General or Air Marshal with the requisite stars. Those appointed to the position of CDS have also been known to have been elevated to the most senior rank in their respective service, a five-star officer. After the victorious 1971 Bangladesh war the government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided in 1972 to elevate General Sam Manekshaw MC (1914-2008), popularly known as ‘Sam Bahadur’(lit ‘Sam the Brave’) to the rank of Field Marshal of the Army. It was considered to appoint Manekshaw as India’s first CDS. Manekshaw was the then Chairman Chief of Staff Committee who is the seniormost chief in office and had acted like a CDS in the 1971 war.

The benefits of Manekshaw’s actions in preparing and conducting the 1971 war as a CDS were evident and appreciated.

Whilst the Chief of Naval Staff late Admiral Sardari Lal Mathuradas Nanda when consulted in Mumbai by Defence Secretary Govind Narain, stated he had no objection to any one getting any number of stars as long as his were not taken, Air Chief late Air Chief Marshal Pratap Chandra Lal had reservations and tabled a note objecting to the appointment of a CDS and is recounted is his autobiography, My Years With The Indian Air Force.

The Armed Forces and India lost an opportunity to have a CDS and the decision has been held in cold storage despite it being recommended

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

by late K Subrahmanyam in the Kargil Report and supported in the GoM report.

Each Chief safeguards his own turf and cooperative steps in India's security architecture have been slow to come about, as they fear that the Chief’s role would be threatened. This has been consistently depicted by the Indian Air Force in decision making for CDS and their fears have never been allayed, as bureaucracy too has vested interests in not having a CDS An attempt to appoint a CDS during the BJP / NDA government found political favour.

However the then Chairman COS Committee Admiral Sushil Kumar could not get the Air Force to agree to the COS’s paper. The IAF’s stance has been unbending and utterances by Air Chiefs have been against a CDS. This is understandable, as world over, Air Forces are threatened services that feel they may lose their assets and their control. Even when the Indian Navy offered to take over the role of the Maritime Aircraft in the 70s, it was objected too and today the issue of control and command of attack helicopters by the Army ruffles Air Force feathers.

India’s defence budgets have grown and choices for weapons and systems need a tri-service outlook for synergy which brings about ‘jointness’ and unity of command of the various services It has to be admitted with the Revolution in Military Affairs called RMA, net centricity an essential mode of warfare with space applications and instantaneous digital communications in the backdrop of a nuclear South Asia, a lot has changed in warfare and management of the Indian Armed Forces. India’s defence budgets have grown and choices for weapons and systems need a tri-service outlook for synergy which brings about ‘jointness’ and unity of command of the various services, a prerequisite for cohesion in any Armed Force structure of a nation, especially a rising power like India. A CDS system of command and control under civil authority is the need of the hour.

Little has been done, however, towards developing a joint operational doctrine, joint training and planning programmes. Some movement without doubt, been done by setting up a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and a Strategic Force Commander (SFC) under the Chairman COS Despite the GoM reports there has been no movement on the appointment of a CDS. A half-hearted and less than optimal but large Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) organisation has been set up within the Ministry of Defence, but its linkages with the Ministry of Defence and Services Headquarters remain tenuous. The belief is rife among the senior rank and file that a posting in the IDS is only a stop-gap appointment before a more worthwhile posting becomes available or is a final posting of comfort. Similarly, ‘jointness’ was expected to ensure effective combined arms operations and an Integrated Defence Headquarters exists more in name and does assist, in planning but little has been done, however, towards developing a joint operational doctrine, joint training and planning programmes. Some movement without doubt, been done by setting up a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and a Strategic Force Commander (SFC) under the Chairman COS but till India gets a CDS the benefits of the post for India’s security and more bang for the buck is unlikely to be attained.

The current state of affairs for jointness and inter-operability appears dysfunctional without a CDS and has in turn adversely affected the force modernisation programmes of the Armed services as well. The HQ IDS has attempted to inject an element of jointness and discipline into the military procurement system by coordinating the procurement of equipment for the Army, Navy and the Air Force in long term procurement plans but has not largely succeeded. A good example was the Light Utility Helicopters (LUH) to define commonality, still to be procured. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) could do little being a three-star officer junior to the four-star armed services chiefs, who naturally guard their own turfs

and prefer to table their own needs.

A joint appreciation of the needs and inter se priorities by an empowered CDS in the Integrated Defence HQ will help MoD plan and appreciate the procurement process better.

Conclusion A CDS by the merits outlined is inescapable for a rising India with a very large and capable Armed Forces with nuclear capability. Indians by large are emotional and the heads of services and their thinking cannot be too different. Each Chief safeguards his own turf and cooperative steps in India’s security architecture have been slow to come about, as they fear that the Chief’s role would be threatened. This has been consistently depicted by the Indian Air Force in decision making for CDS and their fears have never been allayed, as bureaucracy too has vested interests in not having a CDS. The three Armed Forces Headquarters have now been redesignated as Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence but there is little change in functions of MoD as such and the desirability for integration needs to be publicised among the political spectrum as the final decision lies in their hands.

It may be relevant to say a similar situation existed in USA in the 1980s.

The Goldwater-Nichols named after two senators introduced a bill for change in Congress. The Department

of Defense Reorganisation Act of 1986 Public Law 99-433, signed by President Ronald Reagan came into being by a political edict and majority vote in Congress. The law made sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense which was established by the National Security Act of 1947 by reworking the command structure of the United States military. It increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and implemented some of the suggestions from The Packard Commission, commissioned by President Ronald Reagan in 1985. Among other changes, Goldwater-Nichols Act streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense (Minister in India’s case) directly to unified combatant commanders (CCDRs), bypassing the service chiefs.

The service chiefs were assigned to an advisory role to the President and the Secretary of Defense, as well as given the responsibility for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands.

This article does not recommend such structure but to evolve the first step is to have a CDS and then theatre commanders will follow. It is the need of the hour and may be a Barry Goldwater and a William Fry Nichols will emerge in India’s Parliament, or good sense will prevail.

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Exelis Tests Advanced Electronic Warfare System On International F-16

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TT Exelis has successfully installed and tested a pod-mounted, advanced self-defence electronic warfare system on F-16 aircraft operated by an international customer.

The Airborne Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare System, or AIDEWS (ALQ-211), completed several F-16 sorties and was tested against a wide variety of RF (radio frequency) threats.

While this testing verified the effectiveness of the pod-mounted version, the system can be internally integrated as well. Either configuration offers nextgeneration integrated radar warning and electronic countermeasures capability with greatly reduced integration cost.

Northrop Grumman And ITT Exelis Team For Army Vehicular Radio

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orthrop Grumman and ITT Exelis have teamed to compete for the US Army’s new vehicle-mounted, software-defined radio. The Army issued a draft request for proposal on November 4, for the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR), which replaces the cancelled Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radio.

Raytheon Books 50 Million In Electronic Warfare Contracts

If selected for the MNVR programme, Northrop Grumman will lead the team and provide its Freedom 350 multifunction radio system. Exelis will support radio development, manufacturing, vehicle installation and integration and logistical support services.

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Lockheed Ships First Mobile User Objective System Satellite To Cape For Launch

aytheon booked US$ 50 million this month in new contract awards related to its electronic warfare (EW) business.

Raytheon’s industry-leading electronic warfare portfolio includes airborne and shipboard jammers, towed decoys and radar warning receivers in use on strategic and tactical aircraft, helicopters and surface ships of the US Air Force, US Navy and international customers.

Raytheon To Provide Radars and Services To UAE In THAAD Missile System Deal UAE becomes first international customer to gain the advanced AN/TPY2 radars

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aytheon Company will provide AN/TPY-2 radars, associated spares, training and other services through 2018 to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the radar component to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system. This US$ 582.5 million contract for the radars is part of the first sale of THAAD missile systems to an international customer.

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February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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ockheed Martin delivered the US Navy’s first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite to Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla., on December 15, where it will be prepared for a February 16, 2012 liftoff aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle.

The MUOS constellation is a next-generation narrowband tactical satellite communications system that will augment and replace the legacy Ultra High Frequency Follow-On system, providing significantly improved and assured communications for the mobile war fighter.

The MUOS satellite will now undergo post shipment testing, fuelling, payload fairing encapsulation and mate atop the Atlas V launch vehicle in preparation for launch.

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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jointness

EVOLVEMENT

Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma (retd) Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma is an honorary Joint Director with Institute for National Security Studies and Director SA in the University of Petroleum and Energy Studies (UPES).

There are constraints galore in India’s current so called integrated defence structure. When HQ IDS was established, it was to be headed by the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose tasks would include ensuring intra and inter–service prioritisation of defence plans and serve as a system of providing single window military advice to the government.

Existing system is a compilation of perspective plans prepared by individual services and DRDO. Budgetary allocation is a result of individual service threat and capability assessment. In the absence of an integrated system, it is to an extent proportional to the size of the service. It is a via media alternative and not the optimal solution.

Countries, armed forces and systems, which show a markedly superior learning dominance, move ahead and stay ahead. A well researched article on the details of the jointness process.

JOINTNESS AND INTERAGENCY SYNERGY

IMPERATIVES AT STRATEGIC LEVEL

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ince nineties, India’s comprehensive national power has grown manifold, particularly in the 21st century. Configuration of India’s economic, demographic and technology instruments steered by democratic plural and secular policy has catapulted us into a major and emerging world player. Armed forces have provided formidable assurance against powerful detrimental forces. India’s growth and changing geo-strategic challenges call for dynamic transformation in our Defence capacities and capabilities. Imperatives are as follows:

Anshu Paliwal Anshu Paliwal is working as honorary Research Associate in the team headed by Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma for research in Strategic Management.

Jointness essentially entails effective utilisation of combat power and maximising of resources. This aspect needs to be looked at in terms of overall defence strategy and consequent operational synergy. This article looks at the jointness and synergy in the armed forces as a consequence integrated planning, conceptualisation, employment, development and procurement of resources at the grand strategy level

Military / strategic capabilities should assure attainment of national interests with or without fighting.

Our major levers of power - military, economic and technological should lend themselves for complementary and concurrent use for politico-diplomatic objectives.

Protection and security of energy and economic interests is going to be as crucial as defending the territory.

Paradigm shift is taking place in the nature of future conflicts. Irregular wars, maritime competition and exploitation of outer space has become centre of focus. There is need for joint, inter-agency, interoperable and complementary capabilities backed by real time networked surveillance and intelligence system across the national grid.

In an ever shrinking world, attaining all ends of our complex security interests in stand alone mode is unaffordable and unworkable. Thus strategic and regional partnerships (bilateral / multilateral) are the way out. Based on the transient or enduring nature of our interests, partnerships could be strategic or tactical in nature. We should strive for developing economic and defence dependencies in competitive partnerships.

Technology restrictive regimes should be got around using strategic partnerships and robust cum dynamic indigenous dual use technology development using private sector in big way.

There is sync with agencies.

need for dynamic transformation of reorganisation underway in other

India’s defence enterprise in ministries and government

Jointness essentially entails effective utilisation of combat power and maximising of resources. This aspect needs to be looked at in terms of overall defence strategy and consequent operational synergy. This article looks at the jointness and synergy in the armed forces as a consequence integrated planning, conceptualisation, employment, development and procurement of resources at the grand strategy level. Not only is it the need of the hour but is prerequisite for creating jointness among the three services as also other agencies of the defence enterprise like DRDO and procurement and production system. The outlines of the imperative to formulate an integrated National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review for integrated force development system have been enunciated in the succeeding paragraphs.

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Challenges of joint force development Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) is charged with the responsibility of drafting the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), which covers a 15-year period. Based on this the armed forces, force structure, equipment profile, training, logistics etc. would develop. Currently, this is only an amalgamation of the perspectives and doctrines of each of the three services. To ensure a truly integrated plan, an indepth study of the US and other European countries’ Quadrennial Review process to bring out imperatives and lessons in the Indian context needs to be undertaken

and processes introduced with due modification. China has very closely structured its national security system on the US lines and has been bringing out white papers and putting them out in the public domain.

National security implies not only safeguarding territorial boundaries but also that the nation is able to build a cohesive, egalitarian, technologically efficient and progressive society with a good quality of life. In comparison, defence strategy is more focused, concerned with the protection of the state and its citizens from direct and indirect military threats and actions of other states.

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jointness

EVOLVEMENT

It would be important to reiterate some of the gaps and voids in our security planning architecture identified by the Subrahmanyam Committee as early as in 2002 in the aftermath of Kargil war.

The mindset of Indian decision makers is largely indifferent to long-term and anticipatory security planning processes.

The structure and processes of the executive functioning of Ministries prevents focus on long-term planning and encourages a sectoral approach.

A mismatch between the generalist nature of the bureaucracy (both civil and military) and the knowledge-based requirements of long term policy planning.

There are constraints galore in India’s current so called integrated defence structure. When HQ IDS was established, it was to be headed by the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose tasks would include ensuring intra and inter-service prioritisation of defence plans and serve as a system of providing single window military advice to the government.

Existing system is a compilation of perspective plans prepared by individual services and DRDO. Budgetary allocation is a result of individual service threat and capability assessment. In the absence of an integrated system, it is to an extent proportional to the size of the service. It is a via media alternative and not the optimal solution There are constraints galore in India’s current so called integrated defence structure. When HQ IDS was established, it was to be headed by the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose tasks would include ensuring intra and inter-service prioritisation of defence plans and serve as a system of providing single window military advice to the government. Existing system is a compilation of perspective plans prepared by individual services and DRDO. Budgetary allocation is a result of individual service threat and capability assessment. In the absence of an integrated system, it is to an extent proportional to the size of the service. It is a via media alternative and not the optimal solution. Lessons from the deficiencies in India’s defence long term perspective planning experience are enumerated as follows: ¡ The Long Term Perspective planning in the Armed Forces is a complex process. For it to be effective and realistic, it would necessarily have to be collaborative in its approach as there would invariably be a number of agencies that would contribute towards the final product. ¡ The LTIPP should aim to build joint force structure and capabilities that would be relevant for the next 15-20 years and not for the present scenario. ¡ Starting point in the process of formulating an LTIPP is the articulation of a national security strategy (NSS).

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¡ NSS requires to be followed by articulation of defence / military strategy in the form of Strategic Defence Review (SDR) similar to US-QDR and other strategic guideline documents to synergise the entire defence enterprise chain.

Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) is charged with the responsibility of drafting the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), which covers a 15-year period. Based on this the armed forces, force structure, equipment profile, training, logistics etc. would develop.

Currently, this is only an amalgamation of the perspectives and doctrines of each of the three services ¡ The time frame within which a particular capability is required to be developed must be clearly spelt out.

Once missions have been identified, the capabilities needed to accomplish the mission need to be enumerated in LTIPP. These capabilities are then weighed against existing capabilities and capacity ‘Gaps’ arrived at. Once the gaps in capability are known, it needs to be established whether such gaps can be plugged through doctrinal or tactical means. If not, only then should we resort to material acquisition.

Organisational and functional challenges For the lessons outlined above to be implemented, there is a need for institutionalised linkages between National Security Council (NSC) and HQ IDS. The existing Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is only military specific and does not have any institutionalised civil interface. In our case, it is recommended that formal linkage be established between CDS or Chairman (COSC) and National Security Adviser (NSA) and between Chief of Integrated Staff to COSC (CISC) / HQ IDS and Dy NSA / NSCS level.

An integrated national security system leading to force development parameters would comprise five major steps in Integrating National and Military Security Systems.

One is an exploration of the geo-strategic environment through net assessments, bringing out strategic and military balance in comparative terms. This would encompass present and future international security setting and conflictive national interests of global, Asian and South Asian. There is a need to review the internal scene to identify internal contradictions and need for providing multifaceted security. Two - outline contours of future threats and challenges in all its dimensions emanating from the environmental scan. Three - formulate national security strategy, its perspective and defence / military strategy. Four - responding to / tackling non-wartime crises, competition or irregular war challenges by implementing the strategy and its operational derivatives. Five - evolving future military strategy, force development imperatives and concepts constituting threats and capability evaluation, resource allocation and restructuring road map.

The nuances In the sphere of defence planning, the main lacunae lie in the lack of evolution of an integrated higher defence organisation and management system. The existing system is unable to cope with current and emerging security complexities. LTIPP as capability and security investment programme for the next 15-20 years from which, each of the services could draw their schemes / project programmes on long term, five yearly and annually has not been put in place in the true sense.

The mindset of Indian decision makers is largely indifferent to long-term and anticipatory security planning processes The starting point in the process of formulating an LTIPP is the articulation of strategic guidance. The system of generating strategic guidance in the form of national security / defence / military strategies, strategic defence review (SDR) and RM’s planning guidelines is not institutionalised in India. The efforts made by HQ IDS in this regard have failed to get across Byzantine bureaucracy and turf battles between various agencies of the government and within the MoD and service HQs.

strategy based on past experience, current realities and future assessments, with a view to shape the environment to achieve the National Security Objectives. Inter alia, it will lay down guidelines for the development of the military, diplomatic and economic levers of power and the mechanism to synergise them. It should be developed

by NSC with inputs from MoD (IDS), MEA, MHA, Economic Ministries, Departments of S and T, DAE and ISRO. In all this we will need to examine threats and vulnerabilities as emerging from integrated perspective analysis. Threats should be distinct from vulnerabilities.

These are often identifiable, requiring an understandable response, mostly application of force, covert or overt.

Vulnerability is only an indicator, often not clearly identifiable. Challenge of implementing NSS also lies in preventing vulnerabilities transforming into threats using all elements of national power, as also shaping them in a positive direction.

The NSS should state the following: India’s political aims / goals in terms of power projection or promoting / securing strategic / security, economic, technology and environment / bio-diversity interests.

In increasingly complex and interdependent imperatives of a modern nation state, defence / security planning dimensions are required to be processed through an integrated system comprising; security concept, NSS, defence / military strategy, strategic defence review, Raksha Mantri’s (RM) defence planning guidelines, defence capability strategy and technology development strategy / plan.

India’s interests in other countries and regions extending from South Asia outwards.

The nuances involved in developing two key guideline documents are worth highlighting in this context.

Winning the competition - strategy to deal with competition and challenges by setting time bound objectives in diplomatic, economic, technology and defence / security fields vis-à-vis the competitors.

Evolving NSS The foremost need is to enunciate a national security strategy (NSS) or a fundamental

Interests and relationship matrix with major powers and UNO. Threats, challenges and competitors to our interests in respect of above paradigms.

Identify economic, strategic, military and technology leverages. Inter-se priorities of countries will be given out.

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EVOLVEMENT

Lay down strategic choices for entering strategic / security partnership in short, mid and long term context.

Form a joint working group along with representatives NSCS, MEA and MHA. Core group should be coordinated by IDS and it should endeavour to solicit best ideas from outside MoD, armed forces and government agencies Review of internal dynamics of India, its linkages with transborder threats and challenges posed for the security forces will be given out.

Degree of expected involvement of armed forces in the internal dynamics will be assessed.

Such an analysis would bring out the inter-dependence and inter-play of the various organs of the state. It will clearly flag the overlapping role of various ministries which need to be understood and synergised.

A critical process to prepare NSS could be as follows: A core group may be formed coordinated by NSCS. Representatives of all major ministries and HQ IDS are to be included. This must be at two layers - staff and deputies.

Papers available with MEA, MHA, HQ IDS, service HQ, other government agencies and think tanks could be used to frame a draft NSS. Initial draft is circulated to concerned agencies for comments and further updating. However, it should carry authenticity as policy guideline for all other agencies.

Developing SDR The SDR will state present defence / military strategy as derived from NSS as also evolve its future continuum.

Because there must be a projection into the future, an innovation or we would indeed always be fighting yesterday‘s wars. In order to make it broadly relevant up to next 15 years and the thinking into period beyond,

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that may be termed as vision. The sequential process to arrive at this strategy is as follows:

protecting / securing vital or survival interests like energy, water and food security.

An analysis of present military strategy and the changed goals, if any, set in the NSS.

These two documents would comprise joint capabilities as also service wise capabilities of the individual services. Latter will be developed by each service and coordinated by the HQ IDS in sync with joint capabilities strategy

Relating emerging technologies and consequent revolution in military affairs (RMA).

Meshing future conflict spectrum and battle space milieu.

These when compared with the role and responsibilities of each service would provide a mosaic to develop joint capability of the armed forces to meet future military missions.

Future military perspective (short, mid and long terms) or joint military vision and military missions would lead to formulation of LTIPP based on integrated systems dynamics and force development imperatives.

There is need to note the word joint - in today’s warfare, there is nothing that is not joint.

The SDR should invariably identify future: Adversaries / countries of security competition, cooperation and friends.

Comparative evaluation of the nature of threats / competition.

Threat from competing strategic / security alliances.

Goals and objectives of bilateral / international defence cooperation.

Policy on role of armed forces in asymmetric threats and internal conflict dynamics.

Integration, networking and inter-operability requirements to cover inter-agency, joint force and with allies and friends as and when applicable.

Strategy for protection of critical infrastructure from cyber attack and defence related aspects of perception / information warfare.

Military elements of strategy for

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

SDR would also cover all defence diplomacy related actions required to be undertaken to further our national aims and objectives. In conjunct with economic and strategic cooperation, security cooperation should be used as an instrument of India’s NSS to secure and further our national interests by supporting formal agreements, strategically weakening or denying defence related technologies to those confronting us or our future competitors.

For preparing SDR, following is suggested: Form a joint working group along with representatives of NSCS, MEA and MHA. Core group should be coordinated by IDS and it should endeavour to solicit best ideas from outside MoD, armed forces and government agencies.

Prepare a frame-work based on interim inputs from draft NSS. Outsource studies required for in-depth research of certain facets.

Use ongoing net assessments.

Formulate a future defence / military strategy and joint vision 2025.

Evolving LTIPP Flowing out of the above Strategic Guidance Documents (SGD) will be the defence capability strategy followed by a long term defence capability plan or interim LTIPP (ILTIPP). These two documents would comprise joint capabilities as also service wise capabilities of the individual services. Latter will be developed by each service and coordinated by the HQ IDS in sync with joint capabilities strategy. SGD and defence capability strategy (DCS) and ILTIPP need to

be synergistically drawn-up and shared with the DRDO and through it with the National S and T system and relevant industry to concurrently work on a long term integrated technology development plan (LITTDP). This can be considered as enunciation of the development parameters to the technology creation system.

Countries, armed forces and systems, which show a markedly superior learning dominance, move ahead and stay ahead LTIPP can also be termed as capability and investment programme.

From LTIPP, each of the services will draw their schemes / programmes and projects on long, five yearly and annual basis and submit the same for approval. Each of these milestones in developing a truly responsive defence plan will lead to Integrated Force Development Guidelines. Then finally, LTIPP will emerge.

The LTIPP could then be evolved by: HQ IDS in consultation with service HQs and DRDO. The existing draft to be reconciled with initial draft of NSS and SDR. Implementation of macro policy aspects to commence after due consensus or as authorised by competent authority.

Only such an analysis would allow us to develop all encompassing Defence Planning Guidelines.

The LTIPP would emerge from the joint military vision and force development imperatives brought out in these guidelines. This would also include technology requirements for the DRDO, as also capability and organisational imperatives of newer concepts in war fighting like asymmetric / net centric / perception wars.

estimates should be provided by the financial planning and budgetary organisations available at various levels in order to work out outcome budgeting estimates.

To make this possible, the budget format needs to be modified into modular format from unit level upwards into various functional types of formation / force types, thus making aggregation at the top meaningful and related to programme output / outcomes.

Current reality Formal documents like NSS, defence/military strategy, SDR do not exist. Even more importantly there is no active participation from NSC, MEA, MoD (Defence Production), Office of the SA / RM, DRDO and academics / think tanks, without which a system based process cannot commence. HQ IDS does not even have a mandate for such a task. Finally with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) not in place military policy formulation and coordination also suffers.

In practice today the LTIPP has little relevance to the five year plans and the annual acquisition plans (AAP) have in them, schemes not quite related to the five year plan and as a matter of fact a number of changes are incorporated even in the AAPs with standby schemes inducted to utilise the budgeted amounts in the course of the year and even so there are shortfalls.

DRDO does not have inputs to develop LTTP in accordance with LTIPP and also a database of technologies available within country to maximise indigenisation.

Worse still its role is being further marginalised for greater systemic disaster to befall our country.

The budget connect

Force employment and force development systems along with budgetary constraints remain non-integrated for want of integrated force development guidelines.

Once capabilities are translated into technology, modernisation or upgradation programmes, cost

Defence production and procurement system remains faulty at very many decision and

implementation points like material solution analysis and decision mechanism.

Conclusion The QDR examples of nations of consequence and its success so far, bring out the challenges and imperatives for Indian defence planners. No sooner had the cold war ended that the US had within a year or two revised its NSS and QDR, which led to transformational processes in place.

Clearly, there is a need to genuinely think out of the box and understand the need to revamp the functioning and organisation of the National Security Apparatus to respond to the dynamics of a coming new global order. The Americans and other evolved major powers believe and practice that countries, armed forces and systems, which show a markedly superior learning dominance, move ahead and stay ahead. It is point worth deliberation.

Lastly, meaningful jointness and synergy in the armed forces is and will remain the function of integrated security enterprise at the apex. It is a top down process. As a consequence of the integration and synergy absent at the top, every player keeps working under the impression that it is serving the country well, without knowing what service our country actually needs and how it is to be delivered.

It is therefore, not surprising that at every crisis our defence capabilities are found wanting, with major voids continuously left uncovered. Be it 1962, 1965 and 1971, Kargil 1999, Operation Parakram 2002 or Mumbai 26/11, every time it became apparent that critical capabilities / weapons were ex import and these were delayed / denied for political or strategic reasons, we were short of critical spares which only led to logistic delegations, urgent contracts and so on which have been criticised in many an official and non-official forums of India.

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Col A G Thomas (retd) The writer was commissioned in EME prior to the ’71 war and later seconded to DRDO. He served DRDO for 22 years in various capacities in different establishments.

He was posted to the HCI London in a diplomatic assignment as Deputy Technical Adviser (Defence) – accredited to most west European countries and USA. Subsequently he was posted at CVRDE, Avadi and also as Registrar Academics and head of General Staff (GS) branch at the Institute of Armament Technology (IAT), Pune, India.

Today a Defence Minister would like to avoid or delay the decision on procurement of any major weapon systems like Battle Tanks, Aircraft, Battle Ships etc. as it involves very large sums of money and all the allied problems that will invariably follow. Ghosts / skeletons of such deals can resurrect even after many decades and haunt these ministers and their political parties. In the past two / three decades MoD has tried out several procurement methods, mechanisms and committees but a reliable and foolproof system has not arrived as yet.

Delay in procurement of such weapon systems is a definite disadvantage to our forces

The writer was seconded to the DRDO and has served on the staff of luminaries like Dr Raja Ramanna. He is well qualified to talk of ways and means to enhance synergy between the civil and military components of our state. He talks of creating a defence industrial base and mentions how we did away with our first echelon R and D at the level of the Armed Forces themselves and disbanded our in-house design teams which had designed the 75/24 Pack Howitzers and 105 mm Field guns etc. He recommends merger of the R and D with the Production Agencies. He thus recommends the nearly 1,500 strong CVRDE (Tank R and D) should be merged with the approximately 8,000 strong HVF (Tank Factory). Similarly LRDE (Electronics and Radar R and D) can be merged with BEL. DRDL (missile R and D) should be merged with BDL (DPSU earmarked to manufacture missile systems), both are in Hyderabad. ADE and GTRE (Aircraft Systems and Gas Turbine R and D) should be merged with HAL. He also offers ideas on restructuring the MoD to have greater integration and representation of the military. After all the MHA has IPS officers in very senior positions. The same should now be done for the MoD.

P

rior to independence, we had a Civil Service (ICS - Indian Civil Service and IP - Indian Police) and a Military Service (KC - Kings Commission). After independence ICS and IP became IAS and IPS and KC became IC - Indian Commission.

In UK, Prince Charles and both his sons William and Harry - all three direct heirs to the British Throne did not join their equivalent of IAS and IPS but have opted instead for the Armed Forces and have also shown their willingness to serve in dangerous places like Afghanistan. They take pride in their military services. But in India today our Armed Forces have lost this pride of place and their honour (izzat).

Air Chief Marshal Latif was the last service person to occupy the prestigious Bombay Raj Bhavan. Today the troubled states like Jammu and Kashmir, Assam or other peripheral states are given to men in uniform.

Similarly it is seen that Col. Wahi was probably the last one to head a major PSU like ONGC. Both these cases occurred in the 1980s. Today even the MoD PSUs like HAL, BEL and BEML are not headed by men in uniform. Whereas, during the 1970’s Maj Gen Samson was the head of HVF, Avadi. If Military officers of the 70s and 80s could do a good job, why were the subsequent generation of officers denied these opportunities?

Even in the Sixth Pay Commission, the

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February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

GENERATING CIVIL MILITARY SYNERGY

Army, the Navy and the Air Force were discriminated against in the beginning but with the intervention of the Defence Minister some parity was brought in. In the process it was decided at the cabinet level to have a separate pay commission for the armed forces in future.

Power sharing The relationship between the MoD and the Armed Forces HQ has never been cordial since independence. A group in the Armed Forces felt that purely from the management point of view the authority and responsibility are not shared in a balanced way. They felt this is the root cause of the problems in South Block.

Administrative and financial power delegation and sharing in MoD at present are totally skewed in favour of civilians and date back to the era of independence when the Armed Forces were viewed with suspicion as the last out-posts of the Raj and great efforts were made to keep them in check.

Generally the services felt that they are even denied free access to the Defence Minister. It is seen that only two Ministers had service men as part of their personal staff - private secretary or staff officer.

First, K P Singh Deo (MoS when Mrs Gandhi was PM and R Vekatraman was the Defence Minister) had Col E V Krishnan. Later

Dr Raja Ramanna (MoS when V P Singh was PM, holding Defence portfolio) had Col Ravi Pillai as staff officer. This provides an elementary comfort zone to the services. But the real solution lies in meaningful sharing of authority and responsibility.

Let us have a look at how administrative and financial power delegation is done in certain other government departments headed by non-bureaucratic persons like Atomic Energy, Space, Science and Technology etc.

The heads of these departments are given full financial powers as government secretaries in addition to their technical responsibilities. The power delegation in these departments is as under.

Atomic Energy Space Science and Technology DRDO within the Ministry of Defence

100 100 100 100

per cent per cent per cent per cent

Thus we can see that the Armed Forces are singled out and denied these executive powers under the cover that ‘they might take over the country.’

Council of defence ministers Today a Defence Minister would like to avoid or delay the decision on procurement of any major weapon systems like Battle Tanks, Aircraft, Battle Ships etc. as it involves very large sums of money and all the allied problems that will invariably follow. Ghosts / skeletons of such deals can resurrect even after many decades and haunt these ministers and their political parties. In the past two / three decades MoD has tried out several procurement methods, mechanisms and committees but a reliable and foolproof system has not arrived as yet. Delay in procurement of such weapon systems is a definite disadvantage to our forces. Therefore, if all the previous Defence Ministers can sit together and discuss issues of

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EMPOWERING THE SOLDIERS

national importance above politics and the political divide, pooling their own experience, that will be an Optimal Solution in terms of a non-partisan approach to vital issues of defence!

Such a forum could be called the Council of Defence Ministers. It should function not only like a long term think tank but also act like the brain of the MoD and the Armed Forces. This council will be on the lines of a permanent super GoM (Group of Ministers). Modernisation of weapon systems, welfare measures of soldiers including empowering them, welfare of ex-servicemen and other problems relating to MoD, Services and soldiers should be taken up in this Council of Defence Ministers.

This is a newly created post to be filled up by a man in uniform. The officer has to be an outstanding three star general of more or less similar seniority as that of the Vice Chief of Army Staff. About 75 per cent of the routine coordination work performed by the earlier Defence Secretary will be handled by this new secretary in uniform. He will be the main conduit between Defence Minister and the rest of the MoD The next question is who should be members of such a Council of Defence Ministers?

1) All previous Defence Ministers belonging to major national political parties. For example A K Antony, Pranab Mukerjee, Sharad Pawar and Mulayam Singh Yadav etc.

2) All former members of the Union Cabinet or ministers of state at the centre or a senior politician in state politics who have been in uniform earlier, but have been in politics for at least 10 years.

For example Jaswant Singh, Brig K P Singh Deo, Maj Gen Khanduri, Capt Amarinder Singh, etc.

Below the Council of Defence Ministers there should be a Council of Defence Officers which should work like the conscience or voice of the Armed Forces. The membership to this Defence Officers Council should have distinguished officers who have contributed in

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some way for the betterment of the Services.

Certainly no member of this Defence Officers Council will be either nominated by the Defence Minister or the Defence Ministry and also these posts are not on a rotation between the three services. This council need not be filled up in one go but can be evolved over a period of time

Defence industry India is a country with large territory, extended borders and a long sea front to guard and protect.

With a reasonably good industrial infrastructure and a large population of educated and skilled workforce, she should have a strong, efficient and vibrant defence industry. It will not only reduce our dependence on foreign suppliers of arms, ammunition and other military equipment but that is the only way we can achieve self-reliance in this critical area. An efficient defence industry should be able to translate the requirement of the services and produce them in large numbers in the shortest possible time. Ordnance factories, defence PSUs, DRDO, Inspection and Quality Assurance Organisation form India’s Defence Industries. Together they are supposed to be the fourth arm after Army, Navy and Air Force. Today they function under two government secretaries - Secretary Defence Production and Secretary Defence R and D. DRDO was created in 1958, the youngest among its counterparts in our defence industries. It got some life when eminent scientist Dr Nag Choudhury took over its reins during the early 70s. He initiated major activities in the field of battle tanks and missiles. Mukherji was in charge of battle tank R and D and Air Vice Marshal Narayanan was heading missile R and D. Dr Nag Choudhury was followed by Prof M G K Menon and subsequently Dr Raja Ramanna in 1979.

The service chiefs seldom visited government secretaries in their office as a thumb rule. However Gen Malhotra, Adm Pereira and Air Chief Marshal Latif, the then chiefs were frequent visitors to

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Dr Ramanna. They had mutual respect and maintained a warm and cordial relationship. The strong trust between the services and R and D led to cohesive thinking and their discussions took shape as multi-disciplinary mega defence projects. Dr Ramanna appointed Vice Adm Roy to head the Navy’s ATV, Air Marshal Gole the AWACS, Dr Velluri the LCA and Kalam to head the IGMP missile programme.

At MoD, Dr Ramanna was ably assisted by four CC R and D (Chief Controllers R and D). They were Lt Gen S G Pyara, Lt Gen D Swaroop, Dr M Krishnamoorthy and Dr A K De (former Director, IIT-Bombay). Dr Ramanna left MoD in early 1982.

At present there is one SA to PM and there is another SA to RM. Both these posts can be merged and elevated to the rank of a Principal Secretary dealing not only in the Defence aspects but also the Nuclear aspects DRDO has celebrated its golden jubilee in the year 2008 but has lost the credibility it enjoyed earlier with the services. R and D is an important and vital part of any industry. The real growth or the development of the industry takes place through R and D. Today DRDO has to report more delays and failures in comparison to success stories.

Therefore it is time for us to think of revitalising the defence industries in general and R and D in particular.

All over the world R and D is an integral part of the industry.

Therefore, DRDO should occupy its natural place in our MoD set-up too. In other words DRDO should be merged with Defence Production under one secretary - Secretary Defence Production. This will bring in better integration and transform the new organisation into an efficient, productive and more accountable unit. Such a merger will generate synergy and will help both the groups to give their best.

For example the nearly 1,500 strong CVRDE (Tank R and D) should be merged with the approximately 8,000 strong HVF (Tank Factory).

Though CVRDE has been under fire for some time it has certain inherent strength, competence and expertise

which can be better utilised after the merger. The employees of both these establishments are paid from the same Defence Accounts. Both are located in the same locality Avadi. No worker is uprooted and no worker will lose their jobs during this merger. Similarly LRDE (Electronics and Radar R and D) can be merged with BEL (A defence PSU earmarked to manufacture Radar and other electronic equipment.) Both are in Bangalore. DRDL (missile R and D) should be merged with BDL (DPSU earmarked to manufacture missile systems), both are in Hyderabad.

ADE and GTRE (Aircraft Systems and Gas Turbine R and D) with HAL (The largest defence PSUs earmarked to manufacture Aero subsystems and complete aircraft). Both are in Bangalore and so on. Recently IAF has made a bid that a three star officer be posted as the CMD of HAL for better control and coordination in view of the colossal sums that are proposed to be spent on behalf of the Air Force in the next 10-20 years. This is a welcome move.

Young Military officers posted in remote rural districts as collectors and police superintendents can work as Ambassadors of the three services – Army, Navy and Air Force The services still require a first echelon R and D to support their complex weapon systems and also a pool of highly qualified and skilled technicians. The cadre of the permanently seconded service officers used to provide this pool. Now, in the past two decades this cadre has almost been done away with.

From history it is seen that DRDO was created by merging Technical Development Establishment (TDE) of the services and the Defence Science Organisation (DSO). Therefore at the time of the merger of the R and D and Production, some place and some facilities are to be left and earmarked for the new TDEs - a first echelon R and D exclusively at the disposal of the concerned services like what we had prior to 1958.

In times of war, some not so complex modernisation and upgradation of certain weapon systems carried out quickly and in large number can alter the course of the war in

our favour. Israel and South Africa have been clever and quick in doing this. US defence industries have a civilian part called DARPA - Defence Advanced Research Project Agency and a service dominated part called the Weapon Systems Command, like the Missile Command, the Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) etc. TACOM is headed by a Major General and Abrams Tank Factory also comes under him. We can study the defence industries in the following democratic countries - USA, France, Germany, UK, South Africa and Israel and pick and choose the best aspects that suit us, to make an efficient and effective defence industry.

The views and approach of the three services are different towards defence industries. The Army feels that their job is to fight the war only.

Procuring / developing weapons and other equipment is somebody else’s job (like defence supplies, production, DRDO, MoD etc.) The Indian Air Force also has more or less similar views. Whereas the Navy feels that they have to play a proactive role in procuring / developing weapon systems right from the beginning through development stages. Army had almost lost the chance of making our own Battle Tank. Ultimately it is in our larger interest to have an industry capable of developing and manufacturing our own Battle Tanks.

It is for the Indian Air Force to take extra care and initiative with HAL and get LCA expedited even if there are reasonable delays and problems.

Procurement of Russian aircraft could continue, but LCA must be pursued to its logical conclusion. he country and our Armed Forces cannot afford not to have industries capable of making battle tanks, missiles, naval ships, submarines and fighter

aircraft etc.

Why do Carriappas and Thimayyas not join our Army anymore?’ The outcome was an interesting eye opener. “They join, but they are forced out as Majors and Colonels.” Today our services do not want Carriappas, Thimayyas, Manekshaws, Latifs, Pereiras and so on. As a large organisation we should be able to train and groom junior officers who can hold on to their values and march ahead in life. Leaders with values and principles are the need of the hour and we need them in large numbers

Defence procurement The Planning Commission had approved an expenditure of US$ 142 billion for the MoD to procure new weapons and equipment for the Army, Navy and Air Force for the 11th Five Year Plan 2007-2011.

This shopping list includes ultra light gun (heli-portable - probably 100 mm), 155 mm Medium Gun Towed, 155 mm Self Propelled Wheeled and Tracked, 35 mm and 20 mm AD guns, Quick Reaction AD missiles, Small Arms (mainly Carbines and Assault Rifles), Helicopters, light, medium and attack versions for the Army. Aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, Amphibious Landing Crafts and other Ships, Anti-Submarine Helicopters, Submarines, Maritime Recce Aircraft for the Navy. Strategic Heavy Lift Globemaster III with a lift capacity of 75 tons, C-130 Hercules Transport Aircraft, more AJT’s, Helicopters - light, medium, heavy and attack versions, Light Multi Role Transport Aircrafts, Multi Role Combat Aircraft

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EMPOWERING THE SOLDIERS

(MMRCA), additional Sukhoi-30MkI, Fifth Generation Stealth Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), AWACS etc. for the Air Force.

Let us see what the contribution of our defence industries has been.

The Planning Commission has approved an expenditure of US $ 142 billion for the MoD to procure new weapons and equipment for the Army, Navy and Air Force for the 11th Five Year Plan 2007-2011 During the mid 80’s we bought the 155 mm Field Artillery Gun from Swedish company Bofors after elaborate discussions and negotiations. As part of the transfer of technology to manufacture these guns in India, they supplied us with the entire set of engineering drawings.

The Ordnance Factory Board has kept these drawings for the last 25 years but never attempted to make this gun!

We had a ‘Gun Development Team’ of a small number of hand picked DRDO officers and staff attached to the Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur since the 1960s. They started their activity in a humble way. They attempted to make a relatively small mountain gun which can be transported up difficult mountain terrains on mules by dismantling it into 3 or 4 pieces and then assembling it at the top. This was done purely by crude reverse engineering. On completion they made an improved version of the same gun. This was the ‘75/24 Pack How’ Mark I and Mark II. After this by early 70s the Gun Development Team, the Ordnance Factory and the User (the Artillery Regiment) gained some mutual confidence. They attempted an ambitious project, the 105 mm Indian Field Gun (IFG). This project was also completed successfully. Soon a more ambitious project was taken up - the Light Weight Heli-Portable Mk II version of the 105 mm IFG. They tried out different types of high strength light weight steels for the gun carriage; in order to reduce the weight of the barrel they used improved manufacturing techniques with the willing cooperation of the Ordnance Factory. By the late 70’s they had completed this project successfully.

The team leader, then Brig Mukherjee

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and Lt Col Kannan were awarded medals for their contribution. The 105 mm IFG Mk I and Mk II were both introduced into service. DRDO brochures carried glossy pictures of IFG Mk II and many remarked that this gun was fit for export. A proud moment for our defence industries DRDO, Ordnance Factories and the users working together in harmony producing good results. This success story was to be followed by two tragedies. Firstly by mid 80s MoD issued thoughtless orders to wind up and close down the Gun Development Team. Second, soon afterwards they got rid of the people who made this gun as well - the permanently seconded service officers (PSSO’s to DRDO). The reason quoted was that “the parent services cannot spare officers as there is an acute shortage of technical officers.” They stopped permanent secondment of service officers in the bargain. They literally threw out the baby with the bath water. All this happened over the 80s and 90s.

Now they want to buy Ultra Light Heli-Portable Gun (probably 100 mm calibre) as part of 11th Five Year Plan 2007-2011 Procurement Plan. This could easily have been done by our own Gun Development Team if it had not been disbanded.

Like the closing down of the ‘Gun Development Team’ the MoD has witnessed several such thoughtless decisions. During the 60s HAL with the help of a German consultant designed a fighter aircraft called ‘Maruth’- HF 24 (Hindustan Fighter).

Prototypes were made; flight trials started, then abruptly the project was called off.

During the same period HAL made another aircraft - named Kiran - a Jet Trainer. This went through the full development cycle and then was introduced into the IAF. This project also was abandoned without any justifiable reason all of a sudden.

MoD has already procured some Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT), now they want more!!

Interestingly the Navy has always kept a tight control and close watch on all their projects right from the beginning. With the result in spite of delays most naval projects have

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

been successful. Today they have a world class indigenous sonar system, INS Delhi class battleship, a stealth vessel and their ATV is limping forward with delays.

Instead of abandonment had all these projects been nurtured and progressed carefully, the respective production / development agencies would have gained a lot of confidence, skill and expertise to handle bigger projects later on.

Probably all these together would have reduced the shopping list of today by a considerable number and also the costs from US $ 142 billion.

The Army feels that their job is to fight the war only. Procuring / developing weapons and other equipment is somebody else’s job (like defence supplies, production, DRDO, MoD etc.)

The Indian Air Force also has more or less similar views.

Whereas the Navy feels that they have to play a proactive role in procuring / developing weapon systems right from the beginning through development stages

Grooming experiment Before we talk about grooming future leaders, let us look at the Army, Navy and Air Force today.

Can we find officers of Latif’s class, calibre and rank today? Rank yes, but not class and calibre. This brings to mind an essay competition, ‘Why do Carriappas and Thimayyas not join our Army anymore?’ The outcome was an interesting eye opener. “They join, but they are forced out as Majors and Colonels.” Today our services do not want Carriappas, Thimayyas, Manekshaws, Latifs, Pereiras and so on. As a large organisation we should be able to train and groom junior officers who can hold on to their values and march ahead in life.

Leaders with values and principles are the need of the hour and we need them in large numbers.

It is time for men in uniform to sit together - a General and a Captain and talk about regaining the lost honour. One has to chalk out a strategy to get out of the present tight spot and take the organisation ahead.

Only honest and upright leaders can

do this. Many more Thimayyas and Latifs can be produced if there is a strong will.

The grooming experiment is expected to have three different results in one go.

India has more than 600 districts in the country. Earmark about 5 per cent of these, which works out to only about 25 districts. Post good, mature military officers in the rank of Colonels as District Collectors and a similar number in the rank of Majors / Lt Colonels as District Police Superintendents. 2-3 years of experience and exposure at the district level civilian administration will firstly groom them to shoulder bigger / different responsibilities.

US defence industries have a civilian part called DARPA – Defence Advanced Research Project Agency and a service dominated part called the Weapon Systems Command, like the Missile Command, the Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) etc. TACOM is headed by a Major General and Abrams Tank Factory also comes under him Second it is going to help them to have a better understanding of the problems of civilian administration in their future career.

The third benefit of the experiment is that these young Military officers posted in remote rural districts as collectors and police superintendents can work as Ambassadors of the three services - Army, Navy and Air Force. The rural public especially the youth will get an opportunity to see these men in action in the proper light. This visibility in the rural areas will have a great publicity value and this could motivate the youth to join the Armed Forces. This is likely to pay far better dividends than the advertisement campaign undertaken by the three services costing crores today. Alternately we could revive the scheme of Short Service officers joining the IAS with a more simplified entrance procedure. One has only to look at the sterling performance of our Emergency commissioned officers who joined the IAS and IFS. Many of them have risen to the ranks of Foreign, Defence and Home

Secretaries as also ambassadors and made sterling contributions.

Empowering the soldiers ‘Charity begins at home’. The empowering of the soldiers has to start ‘at home’ first. It has to start from the MoD and it is their responsibility to project the men in uniform in the right light. It has to be a deliberate and committed decision not necessarily implemented at one go. It was a done thing till the 70s and was discontinued only after the 80s.

The lost prestige on this count has to be restored as soon as possible. (i) 50 per cent or more of the Ordnance Factories which manufacture major weapon systems should be reserved to be headed by men in uniform. (ii) 80 - 90 per cent or more Defence PSUs should be reserved to be headed by men in uniform. (iii) 100 per cent of the DGQA establishments should be headed by men in uniform. (iv) 100 per cent of the Flag ranks of Coast Guards should be reserved to be held by men in uniform. (v) First echelon R and D will be part of the respective services as TDEs.

This is part one of the empowering within MoD. The next part is the grooming cum empowering or the actual sharing of power within the Defence Ministry in South Block and its immediate surroundings. Military officers are posted at the MoD to perform the duties of Deputy Secretary, Directors and Joint Secretaries. To begin with 30 per cent of each of the posts of

Deputy Secretaries and Directors be earmarked for military officers and 25 per cent of the posts of Joint Secretaries should be reserved for military officers.

It is part of an attempt to share the legitimate power that is long overdue to the services, for an efficient, fair and balanced management of the authorities and responsibilities between the MoD and the AFHQ and also grooming men for this new job.

This power sharing should be done in a reasonable and amicable way.

Coming to part three which is empowering of the soldiers outside MoD. Until the 70s, serving / retired corps commanders, Army commanders and chiefs were routinely posted to prominent places as Ambassadors / High Commissioners, Governors and heads of large PSUs etc. During the early 80s former naval chief Admiral Dawson was posted as the High Commissioner of New Zealand - an insignificant posting. Then all this stopped. This article urges that the Armed Forces should get these posts back, separately earmarked as their fair share. Honest and efficient senior service officers could be appointed as Ambassadors / High Commissioners in one important country like USA, UK, Canada, Australia etc. a second post as Governor in any one of the metros (Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, etc.) and a third post as head of one of the Navratna PSUs.

Rearrangement at the top Managing the affairs of the soldiers in MoD is drastically different from managing other ministries and projects. For example the delay in the implementation of a giant infrastructural project will lead to cost escalation and inconvenience

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EMPOWERING THE SOLDIERS

to the public and so on. But MoD activities are very different; apart from the death of soldiers sometimes it can cause death of innocent civilians and can even be a National Shame like in 1962. Indifferent, impersonal, inhuman management style has no place in MoD. It has to be with utmost sincerity, in the most efficient manner and with a lot of human touch. Managing style showing an ‘air of superiority’, ‘arrogance’ or ‘high handedness’ has no room in MoD management.

‘Fairness’ should become the trademark of the MoD management style.

An efficient defence industry should be able to translate the requirement of the services and produce them in large numbers in the shortest possible time.

Ordnance factories, defence PSUs, DRDO, Inspection and Quality Assurance organisation form India’s Defence Industries.

Together they are supposed to be the fourth arm after Army, Navy and Air Force. Today they function under two government secretaries - Secretary Defence Production and Secretary Defence R and D All out effort is to be made to avoid friction and to bring about better understanding between the Soldiers and the civilians. These civilians who have chosen a career under MoD in AFHQ, DGOF, DRDO etc. need to have a compulsory attachment with the Territorial Army. This will give them an opportunity to stay in tents and have a feel of military camp life. In addition it will also give them an opportunity to interact with some of the Territorial Army mates.

Others like super sportstar Gp Capt Sachin Tendulkar, filmstar Lt Col Mohan Lal, former cricket captain Lt Col Kapil Dev etc. are holding honorary ranks and are expected to act as Ambassadors for the Armed Forces.

Today the MoD is headed by four government secretaries (3 Star)

1. Defence Secretary 2. Secy Defence Production 3. Secy Defence R and D 4. Secy Defence Finance and AFHQ is headed by three Service Chiefs (4 Star).

The main function of the present Defence Secretary is coordination between the 3 services and departments within MoD. Also the coordination with Parliament and other ministries like Finance, Home, Environment etc. Often this function is misunderstood by some civilian bureaucrats who think it is to control the Armed Forces. In order to eliminate this confusion it is suggested that the defence coordination function be given to a 3 Star Military Officer as Secretary Defence Coordination and the existing Defence Sectretary’s post may be elevated to the Principal Defence Secretary (4 Star).

In addition the post of Secretary Defence R and D (SA to RM) can also be elevated to the rank of Principal SA (4 Star).

It is proposed to bring the power sharing level to 75 per cent for civilian and 25 per cent for the military. In order to achieve this it is further suggested to create separate departments for the Army, Navy and Air Force with a civilian Government Secretary each like in the US MoD under the respective Chiefs.

Therefore with the creation of 3 new Government Secretaries plus the existing 4 Government Secretaries, the MoD will have a total of 7 Government Secretaries. Out of these, 1 post of Govt. Secretary can be given to men in uniform. In addition we have already earmarked 1 post of Secretary Defence Coordination for the military. That makes 6 Government Secretaries - civilians including 2 Principal Secretaries and

2 Government Secretaries for the military. Thus we have achieved a 75 per cent - 25 per cent power sharing. This is not a snatching of power by one group but a negotiated solution, with mature discussions based on give and take. A healthy, mature power sharing taking place for the first time in independent India. It is noteworthy that IPS officers serve in key positions in the Home ministry.

Power sharing in MoD at present Civilians 100 per cent

Military 0 per cent

Proposed Power sharing in MoD Civilians 75 per cent

Military 25 per cent

The details of the 6 Government Secretaries - civilians holding 75 per cent of the power are as under: The Principal Defence Secretary The Principal Scientific Adviser The Secretary Army The Secretary Navy The Secretary Air Force The Secretary Defence Finance.

The details of the balance 25 per cent are given to the military: The Secretary Co-ordination (Military)

Defence

The Secretary Defence Production (Military) The remarks given below each of these posts are not the administrative job descriptions but are purely some pointers.

Existing Structure Army Chief

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Navy Chief

Air Force Chief

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Def Secy

Secy DP

SA

Secy Fin

Proposed Structure Army Chief

Secy Army

Navy Chief

Secy Navy

Air Force Chief

Secy AF

Principal Def Secy

Secy Def Coord

Principal SA

Secy DP Secy Fin

The Principal Defence Secretary The present Defence Secretary’s post will be elevated to the Principal Secretary’s rank. At present there is an anomaly that the court martial approved by the Service Chiefs (4 star rank) is confirmed by the Defence Secretary which is only a 3 star rank. By this elevation the Principal Defence Secretary also becomes a 4 star rank and this anomaly is eliminated.

Today DRDO has to report more delays and failures in comparison to success stories. Therefore it is time for us to think of revitalising the defence industries in general and R and D in particular. All over the world R and D is an integral part of the industry. Therefore, DRDO should occupy its natural place in our MoD set-up too. In other words DRDO should be merged with Defence Production under one secretary - Secretary Defence Production. This will bring in better integration and transform the new organisation into an efficient, productive and more accountable unit The Principal Scientific Adviser At present there is one SA to PM and there is another SA to RM. Both these posts can be merged and elevated to the rank of a Principal Secretary dealing not only in the Defence aspects but also the Nuclear aspects.

The Secretary Army The Secretary Navy The Secretary Air Force It is suggested that posts for three new Government Secretaries be created so that each of these services with the help of Defence Finance

can plan and implement their projects like independent departments as in the US Military set-up.

The Secretary Defence Finance No change.

Same function will be continued.

The Secretary Coordination (Military)

Defence

This is a newly created post to be filled-up by a man in uniform. The officer has to be an outstanding three star general of more or less similar seniority as that of the Vice Chief of Army Staff. About 75 per cent of the routine coordination work performed by the earlier Defence Secretary will be handled by this new secretary in uniform. He will be the main conduit between Defence Minister and the rest of the MoD. The Secretary Production (Military)

Defence

When Morarji Desai was the Prime Minister he ordered a committee to go through, identify and segregate certain departments in the Government of India to be headed by bureaucrats and certain other by technocrats. The above committee identified the department of Defence Production to be headed by a technocrat under the MoD. Accordingly an engineer from the Indian Railways, Mr Menezes was the Secretary Defence Production in South Block during the late 1970s. If an engineer from the Indian Railways can become the Secretary Defence Production, an outstanding engineer in a senior 3 star rank in uniform will be more appropriate for this post in the present scenario.

Conclusion This article, ‘Empowering the Indian Soldiers’ discusses about regaining the lost honour, prestige and glory of the Indian Armed Forces. It was all not lost overnight but a gradual sliding down through the 50s, 60s and the 70s. By the 80s

almost everything was lost. Attempts to bring down the Services in the order of precedence or protocol has been well resisted and status quo maintained. To get a separate pay commission for the Armed Forces is a result of this continued resistance. But the erosion of the image of engineers in uniform which took place in the Defence industries is not fully understood by the soldiers in the field.

This has also diminished the image of the Forces. Practically no action has been taken to correct this erosion so far. Thoughtless actions to close down several defence projects in the budding stage are briefly listed. One doesn’t know whether it was a simple thoughtless action or part of a larger long term deliberate conspiracy to sabotage our efforts to be self reliant in this critical field. “…any new idea or proposal for the improvement of the defence mechanism could be certain of meeting with immediate opposition.” This is what S S Khera ICS, a former Defence Secretary said in 1959. Things are not much different even in 2011. Today we are left with not many options but to empower our soldiers. This article tries to harmonise and integrate the top echelon defence apparatus: MoD-AFHQ as one integral, effective and efficient body. It is hoped this could be achieved by sharing of authority and responsibility in a mutually agreed proportion. It is visualised, once this is implemented we will have a well oiled and matured MoD, efficient and vibrant defence industry with a ‘Council of Defence Ministers’ and a ‘Council of Defence Officers’. The former council will act like the brain and the latter will act like the conscience or mind.

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SELF RELIANCE

Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer has held the post of Director General Naval Armament Inspection at the NHQ prior to his superannuation. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation and self reliance in the field of military weapon systems and armament.

Enhanced participation of the Indian private sector industry in the design and development of defence equipment would also be encouraged to build a robust defence industrial base.

Further to achieve synergies and increase capabilities in producing state-of-the-art Defence equipment; formation of consortia, joint ventures and public private partnerships etc. will be encouraged

“....developing critical technologies and capabilities is vital to enhancing the nation’s strategic flexibility and developing indigenous armament systems will not only give our armed forces a competitive edge, but also strengthen the nation economically and industrially.”Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of the Naval Staff, 24 November 2010.

‘GREEN SHOOTS’ OF SYNERGY – THE INDIAN NAVAL EXPERIENCE

The sale and purchase of arms, is not just a matter of price negotiations but involves complex strategic foreign policy considerations, economics and a host of other issues, meaning thereby that, sufficient buying capacity alone may not get the buyer the desired armament or the assurance for spares and maintenance. Therefore it is imperative for a country like India to develop indigenous armament capability and strive for self reliance in this field. The Indian Navy has been committed to its goal of self reliance and indigenisation also in the field of armament and ammunition. It has been providing active support, at all stages namely design, development, production and induction of armament by laying down achievable SQRs and positioning high calibre officers to DRDO Laboratories and production agencies to assist during development and production.

T

he government in its Defence Production Policy has highlighted the following objectives:

(i) To achieve substantive self reliance in the design, development and production of equipment / weapon systems / platforms required for defence in as early a time frame as possible; (ii) To create conditions conducive for the private industry to take an active role in this endeavour; and (iii) To enhance the potential of SMEs in indigenisation and to broaden the defence R and D base of the country.

The aim of this article is not to highlight problems in defence acquisitions, bring out policy deficiencies or inadequacies of public /private industry in delivering a quality product on time, but to seek ‘green shoots’ of synergy specific to the Indian Navy in an otherwise grim procurement and outfitting scenario.

The Wikipedia defines the arms industry as a global industry and business which manufactures and sells weapons and military technology and equipment. It comprises government and commercial industry involved in research, development, production and service of military material, equipment and facilities. Arms producing companies, also referred to as defence companies or military industry, produce arms mainly for the armed forces of states. Departments of government also operate in the arms industry, buying and selling weapons, munitions and other military items. Products include guns, ammunition, missiles, military aircraft, military vehicles, ships, electronic systems and more. The arms industry also conducts significant research and development. However the sale and purchase of arms, is not just a matter of price negotiations but involves complex strategic foreign policy considerations, economics and a host of other issues, meaning thereby that, sufficient buying capacity alone may not get the buyer the desired armament or the assurance for spares and maintenance. Therefore it is imperative for a country like India to develop indigenous armament capability and strive for self reliance in this field. In the indigenous armament arena, synergy amongst the procurement agency, the designer and developer and the production agency is of great importance, this is a lesson that our armed forces have learned with experience.

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A strategic ‘Green Shoot’ A very prominent strategic ‘green shoot’, which has perhaps not got due attention is synergy achieved by Indian Navy with DRDO, SAIL and private industry, resulting in development and production of strategic steel for all indigenous warships.

The sale and purchase of arms, is not just a matter of price negotiations but involves complex strategic foreign policy considerations, economics and a host of other issues, meaning thereby that, sufficient buying capacity alone may not get the buyer the desired armament or the assurance for spares and maintenance.

Therefore it is imperative for a country like India to develop indigenous armament capability and strive for self reliance in this field The Indian Naval fleet consists of ships of both eastern and western origin, which use different grades of structural steel, leading to import of various grades of steel for maintenance and repair. This had led to obvious problems in timely procurement, inventory management and non-availability with foreign vendors etc. Further even for the ships under construction in Indian shipyards, a large component of steel used had to be imported. The Indian Navy felt compelled to seek indigenous development of Warship Building Steel if it wanted to remain a builders navy and ensure timely induction of warships without depleting its operational fleet.

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IHQ-MoD (N) partnered with Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL), Hyderabad and HQATVP in development of DMR 249A steel plates, bulb structural sections etc. for ships and submarines.

Messrs Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL) and Messrs Essar Steel have been successful in rolling DMR 249A steel plates and Messrs Krishna Industries, the bulb bars. The Indian Navy has also associated with Naval Materials Research Laboratory (NMRL), Ambernath (Thane) in developing indigenous weld consumables, in various weld categories for welding of DMR 249A steel.

The Indian Navy has been committed to its goal of self reliance and indigenisation also in the field of armament and ammunition. It has been providing active support, at all stages namely design, development, production and induction of armament by laying down achievable SQRs and positioning high calibre officers to DRDO Laboratories and production agencies to assist during development and production. The Indian Navy has put in place a three pronged strategy to achieve the goal of self reliance in armaments and ammunition The Indian Navy, on successful completion of this project, has decided to use DMR 249A grade steel for all its warship building / repair activities. Further this indigenously produced DMR 249A grade steel will by and large replace all other steels in use in the Indian Navy.

It is understood that orders for over 45,000 tons of such steel have already been executed by SAIL alone.

‘Green Shoots’ in naval armament The Indian Navy has been committed to its goal of self reliance and indigenisation also in the field of armament and ammunition. It has been providing active support, at all stages namely design, development, production and induction of armament by laying down achievable SQRs and positioning high calibre officers to DRDO Laboratories and production agencies to assist during development and production. The Indian Navy has put in place a three pronged strategy to achieve the goal of self reliance in armaments and ammunition.

The ab-initio approach The Indian Navy started positioning its officers at DRDO laboratories for naval projects since the late seventies. This effort resulted in a synergy which has borne fruit in development of an indigenous air launched torpedo system “Torpedo Advanced Light” (TAL).

Encyclopaedia Britannica defines torpedo, as a ‘cigarshaped, self-propelled underwater missile, launched from a submarine, surface vessel, or airplane and designed for exploding upon contact with the hulls of surface vessels and submarines’. It goes on to explain that a ‘modern torpedo contains intricate devices to control its depth and direction according to a preset plan or in response to signals received from an outside source, as well as a device that detonates the explosive-filled warhead when it strikes its target or comes close to it’. Thus it can be appreciated that the torpedo, is a highly complex underwater

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weapon, utilising a synergetic mix of technologies like hydraulics, electronics, acoustics, explosives, mechanics, power systems, computers, structural engineering etc.

It is associated with its underwater sensors, fire control systems, launchers and test benches. On completion of the development process of TAL the design has been transferred to public and private industry for production.

Spinoffs of this synergetic effort between the Indian Navy, DRDO and associated private industry have resulted in development of several front-end technologies for the first time. Composites, titanium alloys, compact high power sea water activated batteries, contra rotating DC propulsion motors, hybrid control and guidance motors, sensor instrumentation packages etc. were developed and produced indigenously. The TAL torpedo consists of 95 per cent of indigenous components and sub-systems.

This synergetic approach of the Indian Navy has also led to design, development and production of various types of mines, propulsion batteries, torpedo decoys and a spectrum of explosive stores such as boosters, sustainers, pyrotechnics and pyro charges as import substitution and also for use in indigenous armament.

Non-availability of certain critical technologies has been an area of concern for the Indian Navy, to overcome this, the Indian Navy and DRDO have commenced joint design development and production with reputed international manufacturers, the Long Range Surface to Air missile project is one such example, which would significantly increase participation by Indian industry. A word about the BrahMos supersonic missile would not be out of place here, as it is a unique joint venture between the Indian and Russian governments. The basic reasons for its success can be pegged to mutual sharing of core competencies, continued support of both governments, special arrangements in the JV for its management and functioning, integration of public-private industries as a consortium and most importantly involvement of the Indian Navy from the very first trial launch onwards.

The Indian Naval initiative in fast-tracking the trials by providing INS Rajput as a trial platform enabled Messrs BrahMos to leapfrog the development / technical / user trial cycle, leading to signing of the first contract with Indian Navy just after about 10 firings as against over 20 trial firings which had been planned initially. Needless to say ‘Green Shoots’ in synergy have led to an enviable success story. This is, perhaps the most impressive of synergies that the Indian Navy has generated.

TOT route The government’s Defence Production Policy has the following objectives: To achieve substantive self reliance in the design, development and production of equipment / weapon systems / platforms required for defence in as early a time frame as possible; To create conditions conducive for the private

industry to take an active role in this endeavour; and To enhance the potential of SMEs in indigenisation and to broaden the defence R and D base of the country.

As per the policy, indigenous design, development and manufacture will be given preference in order to achieve these objectives.

Enhanced participation of the Indian private sector industry in the design and development of defence equipment would also be encouraged to build a robust defence industrial base. Further to achieve synergies and increase capabilities in producing state-of-the-art Defence equipment; formation of consortia, joint ventures and public private partnerships etc. will be encouraged.

Indian Ordnance Factories Organisation is more than 200 years old, with the first factory at Cossipore having been established in 1801. The organisation has 39 Ordnance Factories with two more being set up at Nalanda and Korwa. The organisation has over the years progressed from labour intensive manual operations to Highly Automated Computer Based manufacturing systems and the emphasis has shifted from production of basic and intermediate inputs to production of finished stores and the organisation has emerged as the system integrator.

The Ordnance Factories along with Defence PSUs have been periodically modernising and upgrading their capabilities whilst widening their product range. They have acquired capabilities in various fields through transfer of technology and have also developed a large number of major products (like Kavach for the Navy) on their own. Over a period of time, Defence PSUs and Ordnance Factories have developed a wide production base, through outsourcing, in the private industry which includes a large number of medium and small scale enterprises, apart from large scale industries. To capitalise on this, the Navy decided to actively support TOTs with international OEMs, which has resulted in building of indigenous capabilities, optimum utilisation of created facilities and better cost effectiveness.

The successful production of AK630 and SRGM guns, heavy and light torpedo tube launchers, ammunition for naval guns of various calibres bears testimony to the correctness of this approach. It is hoped that the in-house R and D efforts of the Defence PSUs and Ordnance Factories would provide value additions and upgrades in near future and give the required impetus to the indigenous effort.

Supporting private industry Indian Navy has directly developed various vendors for its requirement of fast moving armament components by providing direct design and engineering solutions.

Notable amongst these are hi-tech silver zinc and sea water activated batteries for torpedoes and missiles through indigenous battery manufactures.

These are no ordinary batteries. They are complex systems propelling torpedoes weighing above 1.5 tons underwater at very high speeds and endurance.

Quality parameters In the armament world, it is of vital importance that the armament and ammunition function as designed, over the specified environmental conditions, throughout the life of the armament. In view of the peculiar harsh environment which the Indian Navy encounters at sea, it is very particular about the quality parameters of armament it procures and for this it has a quality component in Director General of Naval Armament Inspection, (DGNAI) with its integral team of quality professionals, reporting directly to the service (VCNS). DGNAI, under the Indian Navy is the only QA agency, amongst the three Services, that is responsible to the user for assuring quality of naval armament through its entire life, from “Womb to Tomb” i.e. from the design, development, manufacture, in-service usage and finally to disposal. The role of DGNAI is specific to in-service inspection, quality assurance, testing and proof of naval armament stores such as, all types / versions of missiles, torpedoes both heavy weight and light weight, mines, bombs, depth charges, Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) rockets, Chaff, torpedo

decoys, guns ordnance, various pyrotechnic stores, torpedo tubes and rocket launchers. These tasks are performed by DGNAI during the course of development, production in India and abroad and in-service maintenance, repair, exploitation and failure investigation.

The Indian Navy has this integral component of trained quality professionals in all relevant ordnance factories, DRDO laboratories and also assisting the private industry manufacturing naval armament components by giving timely and constructive inputs and resolving technical issues through the local Naval Armament Inspectorates.

A few representative examples covering a broad spectrum of technologies have been presented in this article to highlight the ongoing efforts of the Indian Navy. Efforts in the fields of general engineering areas are numerous as they cover items necessary for running and maintenance of a fighting platform, it only strengthens the view that sprouting of abundant ‘Green Shoots’ are going to convert the barren fields into fertile indigenisation green lands soon.

The synergy ‘Green Shoots’ owe their success to the involvement and commitment of the Indian Navy to self reliance and indigenisation from the grass-roots levels.

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Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world i.e., the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being ‘the most outstanding engineer of the year’. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

A proactive policy should be followed to make friends with the countries who feel threatened by the growth of terrorism in Pakistan.

Simultaneously, leveraging its enormous economic clout, India must convey its displeasure to countries that help Pakistan pass anti-India resolutions in various comities of nations. No nation that supports Pakistan’s anti-Indian motions can claim to be India’s friend. It is time India asserts itself

India’s policy of extending a hand of friendship and accommodation has been a total failure. On the contrary, it has emboldened Pakistan into considering India to be a soft state and increased its intransigence and hardened its anti-India attitude. How to deal with an unreasonable and hostile neighbour continues to be a convoluted dilemma for India. Every Indian Prime Minister has made liberal conciliatory gestures in the mistaken belief that he could make a place for himself in the history of the sub-continent as the harbinger of peace. One went to the ridiculous extent of banning Indian secret agencies from operating in Pakistan.

All were doomed to fail for the simple reason that they were based more on hope than hard ground realities.

O

ver the last six decades India has tried various policies to make Pakistan see the benefits of a rancour-free relationship. Every Indian Prime Minister has made liberal conciliatory gestures in the mistaken belief that he could make a place for himself in the history of the sub-continent as the harbinger of peace. One went to the ridiculous extent of banning Indian secret agencies from operating in Pakistan. All were doomed to fail for the simple reason that they were based more on hope than hard ground realities. In the end, the Indian leadership had to throw its hands up in sheer frustration due to Pakistan’s anti-India intransigence.

A few years ago a group of Indian ladies visited Pakistan under a social exchange programme. One of the ladies sustained a wrist fracture in an accidental fall and was taken to the nearest medical facility.

The orthopaedician on duty treated the lady diligently and to the best of his ability.

While bandaging the wrist, he engaged the lady in small talk. When the lady referred to commonality of Indian and Pakistani cultures, the doctor flared up and blasted the lady for her ‘flawed views’. “What is common between us? We eat cows and you worship them. We asked for a separate nation only because we are totally different in all respects. I suggest you Indians should stop fooling yourselves”, he thundered.

The above incident has been recalled here to show the extent to which Pakistani citizens have been brainwashed. Their deep-rooted hatred and venomous mindset defies logic.

When some well-meaning enthusiasts talk about Track-II diplomacy and initiatives like ‘Aman Ki Asha’, they forget the fact that Pakistan lives and thrives on anti-Indian policy. The day Pakistan sheds hostility towards India and adopts a conciliatory stance, it would amount to negating

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Dealing with Pakistan: Time to Face Realities

two-nation theory, the raison d’être for its very existence. Therefore, it will be naïve to expect Pakistan to have a change of heart.

‘Be patient with a bad neighbour: he may move’ is a famous Egyptian proverb.

Unfortunately, such hopes cannot be entertained with respect to a bad neighbouring country. It is a great misfortune that India has been cursed with a neighbour like Pakistan which does not mind harming itself only to harm India. Kashmir is merely a manifestation of Pakistan’s infinite hostility towards India.

Were India to handover Kashmir to it on a platter, Pakistan will invent newer issues to keep the pot boiling. Discord and acrimony would continue as always.

India’s policy of extending a hand of friendship and accommodation has been a total failure. On the contrary, it has emboldened Pakistan into considering India to be a soft state and increased its intransigence and hardened its anti-India attitude. How to deal with an unreasonable and hostile neighbour continues to be a convoluted dilemma for India.

Ground realities Before embarking on a fresh initiative, Indian policy makers will do well to analyse underlying reasons for Pakistan’s anti-India stance and antagonistic attitude while keeping the following ground realities in mind: Negative core values: Every nation has certain core values. These are fundamental traits that provide sustenance to it for its existence. Normally, these are positive attributes which are considered non-negotiable and unalterable. In many countries, the core values are enshrined in the opening chapter of their written constitution. In India’s case, it is to secure for all its citizens justice (social,

economic and political); liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship); equality (of status and opportunity); and fraternity while assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation.

Rogue countries like Pakistan do not believe in international conventions and shamelessly flout them. The only language they understand is of strength and retribution. India must make it amply clear to Pak government that every anti-India mischief would invite immediate reprisal and that no transgression will go unpunished

On the other hand, despite high sounding assertions in its frequently rewritten constitution, Pakistan’s core values are based on the warped political principles of ‘hate and hurt India’ at all costs, even if its own existence gets jeopardised in the process. Pakistan was created on the ideology that the ‘pure’ cannot coexist with the infidel. A nation born out of hatred needs hatred to feed itself on for continued sustenance and to justify its existence. Anti-India stance fulfills this need and cannot be shed.

text books, Pakistan’s existence is claimed since the time Qasim captured Sindh province in the 8th century. Muhammad-bin-Qasim and Mahmud Ghori are portrayed as great heroes who were instrumental in the establishment of Muslim rule in India. When a leading Pakistani paper claims that Pakistan is destined to defeat India because Pakistan’s ‘horses in the form of atomic bombs and missiles’ are far better than Indian ‘donkeys’ and boasts of re-conquering India, the level of percolation of anti-India venom can well be gauged.

Deep rooted prejudices: Bhutto’s ‘1,000 year war’ and Zia’s ‘bleeding India by 1,000 cuts’ are indicative of innate prejudices. In its school

In the wake of 1962 Indo-China conflict, Pakistan tried to fish in troubled waters to extract concessions from India. Subsequently, it decided

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to befriend China to spite India.

Today, it swears by its camaraderie with China. It is an unprincipled marriage of expediency against a common adversary. Anti-India attitude has compelled Pakistan, a nation owing its existence to religious fundamentalism, into embracing communist China.

Pakistan’s core values are based on the warped political principles of ‘hate and hurt India’ at all costs, even if its own existence gets jeopardised in the process.

Pakistan was created on the ideology that the ‘pure’ cannot coexist with the infidel. A nation born out of hatred needs hatred to feed itself on for continued sustenance and to justify its existence.

Anti-India stance fulfills this need and cannot be shed Even a casual visitor to Pak websites and blogs gets shocked to see venality of comments against India. There is hardly a sane voice that advocates need to promote amity. Strangely, every comment considers India and Hinduism to be synonymous. India bashing always degenerates into Hindu bashing by painting every issue with communal colour.

History of deceit and duplicity: One may not fully agree with former Australian Test umpire Darrell Hair’s description of the Pakistani cricketers as ‘cheats, frauds and liars’. But the fact is that the whole world considers Pakistan to be an untrustworthy and deceitful nation. Independent Pakistan started its track record with treachery. Starting with the Kashmir betrayal; Pakistan has made deceit and duplicity to be its national policy.

Despite having signed a ‘standstill agreement’ with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan unleashed Pashtun marauders on the hapless Kashmir valley with the active participation of Pak Army.

Breaching undertakings given to the US, it surreptitiously used American equipment to launch a surprise attack on Kutch in April 1965. Even before the ink had dried on the Kutch agreement, Pakistan was back to its treacherous ways. Covertly, it infiltrated its

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forces into Kashmir, expecting a local uprising against India. Under the Tashkent agreement, India agreed to return the strategic Haji Pir pass to Pakistan, in exchange for an undertaking by Pakistan to abjure the use of force to settle mutual disputes and adherence to the principles of non-interference.

However, Pakistan continued its proxy war through its notorious secret agencies.

Sanctuaries and safe passage were provided to underground elements of north-eastern India.

Without learning from the past experience, India agreed to release 96,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War (PoWs) after 1971 war. In exchange, India accepted a solemn verbal undertaking by Bhutto that Pakistan would accept LOC as the de facto border. India once again let Pakistan bluff its way through. Bhutto never intended to abide by his word.

Worse, to avenge its defeat, Pakistan redoubled its efforts to create turmoil in India.

Under the Simla agreement, all PoWs were to be exchanged. Whereas India kept its word, Pakistan, true to its nature, dishonestly kept back 54 Indian PoWs out of 617 PoWs held by it. It is apprehended that they are still rotting in various Pak jails.

While the Indian leadership was trying to break ice through ‘bus diplomacy’ in 1998-99, Pakistani military brass was busy planning the notorious Kargil incursion. Thus, Pakistan remains incorrigible as a devious and cunning neighbour.

Anti-Indian streak: Due to decades of indoctrination and brainwashing, all Pakistanis suffer from an extremely brutal and vicious anti-Indian streak.

While dealing with India, a strange sadistic instinct gets aroused that takes control of their thinking and behaviour.

Despite India’s honourable treatment of 96,000 Pak PoWs, the treatment meted out to the patrol led by Lt Saurabh Kalia in May 1999 by the Pakistan Army will put even barbarians and animals to shame for its sheer cruelty. Defying all conventions and norms of humanity, Pakistanis pierced their ears with hot rods, removed their eyes before

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puncturing them, broke most of the bones and chopped off various limbs and private organs of the hapless Indian soldiers. After 22 days of torture, the brave soldiers were ultimately shot dead. A detailed post-mortem report is with the Indian Army.

The way forward It is often said that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. India has been repeatedly duped and cheated by Pakistan but continues to entertain hopes of a change of heart while Pakistan has made India the whipping boy for all the ills that it suffers. India is blamed for every terrorist strike in Pakistan, whether on their military academy or on the Sri Lankan cricket team. People are told that evil India was responsible for causing floods. Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Education, Sardar Aseff Ali accused India of stealing Pakistan’s waters and threatened to wage war with India. Anti-India propaganda goes to the ridiculous extent of accusing India of extracting electricity from the river waters flowing into Pakistan, thereby rendering the waters worthless.

India’s policy of extending a hand of friendship and accommodation has been a total failure. On the contrary, it has emboldened Pakistan into considering India to be a soft state and increased its intransigence and hardened its anti-India attitude. How to deal with an unreasonable and hostile neighbour continues to be a convoluted dilemma for India It is time India stops living in a fool’s paradise and reformulates its Pakistan policy, keeping the following facts in mind: Pakistan was born on an anti-India plank and it is its only identity. Shedding of anti-India posture would amount to questioning the logic of its very creation.

Therefore, Pakistan cannot afford to shed its antagonism towards India.

Pakistan can never be India’s friend as the venom of anti-India

feeling is too deeply ingrained and it will take generations for it to abate.

India’s unilateral offer of friendship will always be rebuffed.

Deceitfulness and duplicity is its state policy and it can never be trusted. Trust deficit is the anti-thesis of amity and it cannot be bridged easily.

Harming Indian interests is the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Attacks on Indian parliament, IT hub Bangalore and commercial centre Mumbai show calculated selection of objectives. It never misses an opportunity to embarrass India in every world forum.

Every Indian Prime Minister made liberal conciliatory gestures in the mistaken belief that he could make a place for himself in the history of the sub-continent as the harbinger of peace. One went to the ridiculous extent of banning Indian secret agencies from operating in Pakistan.

All were doomed to fail for the simple reason that they were based more on hope than hard ground realities India should stop claiming that a united Pakistan is in India’s interests. There cannot be a more blinkered view. Nations born out of a persecution complex can never rid themselves of bitterness of history.

Their break-up is the only way out and India must encourage that in its own security interests. Having failed to make Pakistan see reason, India has no reason to be apologetic.

Repeated assertions of being a peace loving state are invariably misconstrued as impotence of a soft state.

A proactive policy should be followed to make friends with the countries who feel threatened by the growth of terrorism in Pakistan.

Simultaneously, leveraging its enormous economic clout, India must convey its displeasure to countries that help Pakistan pass anti-India resolutions in various comities of nations. No nation that supports Pakistan’s anti-Indian motions can claim to be India’s friend. It is time India asserts itself.

To hate and cheat India is Pakistan’s national obsession. It is time India accepts this bitter fact and modifies its approach accordingly. Affable statements made by a few retired cricketers and singers are of no import as they visit India only to make money, they have to be professionally correct. Their masquerading as ambassadors of friendship is of little consequence.

As a matter of policy, India should never trust Pakistan’s word. It has been taken for a ride for far too long.

Pakistan is adept at playing double

game and has mastered ‘cloak and dagger’ policy. Under world pressure it may be forced to wear a mask of reasonableness and friendship, but the irrefutable fact is that India will always remain Pakistan’s eternal enemy.

Were India to hand over Kashmir to it on a platter, Pakistan will invent newer issues to keep the pot boiling. Discord and acrimony would continue as always Therefore, India should stop dreaming of having a friendly neighbour in Pakistan. The history of past 64 years has amply proved the futility of entertaining such hopes. Therefore, it will be in India’s own interests to get reconciled to an antagonistic Pakistan and tailor its approach accordingly. India should aim at minimising and if possible neutralising, Pakistan’s threat to Indian security and national interests by aggressive measures.

Rogue countries like Pakistan do not believe in international conventions and shamelessly flout them. The only language they understand is of strength and retribution.

India must make it amply clear to Pak government that every anti-India mischief would invite immediate reprisal and that no transgression will go unpunished.

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Transforming the battlefield - Saab RBS 70 NG VSHORAD The development studies for the RBS 70 started over 40 years ago and by 1978, Generation 1 was in service. In that era, with an intercept range which was effective against incoming targets at 5 kilometers and altitude coverage of more than 2,000 meters, the RBS 70 was a unique product. The unjammable guidance with laser beam riding missiles of the RBS 70, was one of the first military laser applications and ensured its performance in cluttered environments.

Cyber Warfare Market Worth US$ 15.9 billion

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nalysis indicates that the cyber warfare market will reach a value of US$ 15.9 billion in 2012, as governments around the world continue to invest in a range of cyber warfare systems and solutions designed to offer protection against a wide range of cyber threats including protecting information and infrastructure from hostile states, as well as non-state actors both at home and abroad.

Spending on cyber warfare has been ring-fenced from the massive cuts being initiated in the defence sectors of a number of major markets. Despite this, sales may suffer a little, but are likely to remain relatively high, especially whilst the threat to national security posed by a successful cyber attack remains an important point of interest for both the public and private sector.

The cyber warfare market is likely to be driven by increasingly networked systems requiring increasing levels of protection from a continuing, persistent threat.

Cassidian Unveils New Spexer 2000 Coastal Radar

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assidian, the defence and security division of EADS, introduces a new security radar into the market which opens up completely new opportunities for the wide-area protection of coastlines, maritime infrastructure and harbours against asymmetric threats. As part of Cassidian’s Spexer security radar family, the new Spexer 2000 Coastal has been launched during the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace (LIMA) exhibition in Malaysia.

The second generation of the RBS 70 was developed in 1982 and had increased area coverage. 1990 saw the introduction of the third generation. The Mk II missile, Clip-On Night Device (COND) and Battlefield Management Terminal set it apart from earlier versions as well as from the enemy.

In 2004, the last generation presented a major capability enhancement, entering the digital era with non-cooled laser diodes (No Freon), the BOLIDE all-target missile, BORC Thermal Imager, Digital IFF Interrogator, Target Data Receiver, PC-based Weapon Simulator and external power supply.

Saab’s all-new RBS 70 NG VSHORAD system with integrated 24/7 all-target capability has been developed for any combat situation. Its integrated sighting solution, enhanced missile operator aids, unbeatable range and unjammable laser guidance combine to produce a system with world-leading capabilities.

The new generation Lars Liljegren, Project Manager for the RBS 70 NG explains the reasons behind the development of the New Generation model: “We wanted to develop a new and better sight that fits the battlefield requirements of today, whilst also making the weapon easier for the operator to handle.”

Its integrated thermal imager and night sight capability combine to provide true 24/7 performance. Three-dimensional target designation and automatic target detection improve reaction times, while the auto-tracker aids the missile operator during engagement, increasing hit probability throughout the missile range.

Battlefield advantage Bill Forsberg, Director, Product Management, Saab explains why the RBS 70 NG’s sighting system has a unique advantage on the battlefield: “The NG sight is software-based: the auto-tracker and visual cueing have ultimately resulted in ease of use and increased precision for small - and large - targets, even at maximum range.”

With the latest generation of missile - the BOLIDE - the RBS 70 NG is directed at the complete air and ground threat spectrum, from fixed and rotary wing aircraft and helicopters down to small targets such as cruise missiles, UAVs and armoured ground targets like APCs.

Best-in-class defence system The RBS 70 NG has an effective intercept range of 8 km, with altitude coverage in excess of 5,000 m, making it a best-in-class air defence missile system.

It is capable of operating in complex environments such as urban terrain and is well equipped for all environments, including tropical, desert and arctic conditions.

The RBS 70 NG can be vehicle integrated and used to support manoeuvring troops. The modularity of the system also allows it to be used in a remotely controlled configuration. Specifically aimed at the long-term static air defence of strategic assets, these deployments can last several weeks or more in around-the-clock operations. The RBS 70 NG is also the optimal solution for event protection in peacetime, at high-profile sporting events, for example.

Versatile and accurate Emil Holm, gunner of the RBS 70 and RBS 70 NG, shares his experience using the system: “It’s easy to use, quick to reload and fast to deploy. In my opinion the main advantages of the RBS 70 NG are the auto-tracker and integrated night sight capability.”

Most missiles in this category, with a few exceptions, use an Infrared Homing system which has its own disadvantages. The missiles are susceptible to deception by counter-measures dispensed by targets such as flares. They are ineffective within 20 degrees of the position of the sun, leaving a cone of ineffectiveness from the position of the operator with an angle of 40 degrees, which would create a circle of ineffectiveness of around 13 square kilometers in the sky around the position of the sun (assuming conical side distances of six kilometers).

An accurate, unjammable missile system, the RBS 70 NG is unaffected by countermeasures, heat sources and clutter. Utilising state-of-the-art components and technology, the RBS 70 NG provides a highly versatile air defence system, changing the rules of the battlefield.

The Saab promise The Saab Group intends to make India a “home market” by leveraging India’s manufacturing strengths for exports to world markets. Equally important, for all major future programmes, Saab will partner an Indian company either through a teaming agreement or through a joint venture. It will share technology with these companies, localise production and offer it to both Indian and global customers.

Says Inderjit Sial, Managing Director of Saab India Technologies Pvt. Ltd, “Saab and India are a perfect fit. Sweden is a small country with extremely high technology. It needs partners just as India is looking for partners in technology. Together, we believe that over time India could be the biggest market for Saab.”

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Saab is well supported by Swedish government in efforts to form new international partnerships and export of technology. Saab and Sweden have an established track record of Technology Transfer, including critical areas. With new Offset policies stipulated by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, well in place, the Saab group is all geared up to explore the opportunities for Long Term Industrial Cooperation with both the public and private sector players in India.

jointness

INTEGRATION

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College.

He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters.

He has also served as the Defence Attaché to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects.

The US Congress passed the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986. The act reorganised the US Department of Defence (DoD), placing more authority with the Secretary of Defence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theatre commanders. The aim was to bring all forces under the theatre commanders to ensure unified application of the full range of military power to meet national objectives. General Colin Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff of USA stated through a message on 11 November 1991 that, ‘Joint Warfare is team warfare. When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win

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Gen Chakravorty talks of Synergy and Jointness in the Indian context. He cites extensively, examples from recent global history. We must look at the American and the UK experience of integrating their armed forces. The first step is the issue of Defence Policy Guideline. The US Secretary of Defence issues a Defence Policy Guideline which includes national security objectives. The Congress passed the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986. The act reorganised the US Department of Defence (DoD), placing more authority with the Secretary of Defence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theatre commanders. The aim was to bring all forces under the theatre commanders to ensure unified application of the full range of military power to meet national objectives and policies, the priorities of military missions and the availability of resources.

N

apoleon was probably the first military commander who understood the need for a combined arms battle. He synergised the employment of cavalry, infantry and artillery while conducting operations which resulted in victory for the French in many battles. The First World War witnessed the introduction of the tank and air power. Possibly the war was the harbinger of jointness between the services.

The Second World War was the occasion for joint operations. Operation ‘Over Lord’ was possibly the biggest joint operation launched in the history of warfare. The operation commenced on 6 June 1944 with the landings at the beaches of Normandy by Allied Forces operating under General Dwight Eisenhower.

The amphibious assault was preceded by an air assault by 12,000 aircraft, the flotilla comprised of 7,000 ships and the landings involved 1,60,000 troops. The countries which participated in the operations were Canada, UK, USA, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands and Norway. The beach heads were secured and the break out resulted in the capture of Paris on 25 August 1944 and the German retreat across the Seine River. Post World War II peace lasted for about a decade and a half. The year 1950 saw the North Koreans attacking South Korea. During this campaign, General Douglas McArthur launched the famous Inchon landings which was again a joint operation executed with military precision leading to the victory of US forces in September 1950. The Vietnam War heralded the era of Air Land battles. The striking comparison between the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and the battle of Khe Sanh brings out how jointness can make a determined force victorious in operations. The battle of Dien Bien Phu was fought between the French and the North Vietnamese from 13 March to 07 May 1954. The French were defeated as they made limited use of their

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joint firepower resources. On the contrary in the battle of Khe Sanh (21 January to 08 April 1968), the Marines held on to the position due to the joint use of fire power from the air and ground. Apart from the artillery US forces had 377 sorties per day being undertaken by 2,000 airplanes as also attacks by 3,300 helicopters (UH-1, Hueys). This devastating firepower resulted in extremely heavy casualties which compelled the North Vietnamese to call off the offensive on Khe Sanh.

Despite the need for operational jointness each service in the US to guard their turf preferred to remain as individual entities.

Being a nation where strategic think tanks are respected for their dispassionate views, the Congress passed the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986. The act reorganised the US Department of Defence (DoD), placing more authority with the Secretary of Defence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theatre commanders. The aim was to bring all forces under the theatre commanders to ensure unified application of the full range of military power to meet national objectives.

General Colin Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff of USA stated through a message on 11 November 1991 that, ‘Joint Warfare is team warfare. When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. So it is when the Armed Forces of the United States go to war. We must win every time. Every soldier must take the battlefield believing his or her unit is best in the world.

Every pilot must take off believing there is no one better in the sky. Every sailor standing watch must believe there is no better ship at sea.

Every marine must hit the beach believing that there are no better infantry men in the world.

But they all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to

JOINTNESS FOR THE ARMED FORCES - INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

win. This is our history, this is our tradition, this is our future.’

Need for jointness The need for jointness has arisen due to the current dynamics while undertaking operations. Technology has revolutionised warfare by providing us real time Battlefield Transparency as also enhancing range and precision of weapon systems.

The current battle space is filled with advanced surveillance and target acquisition devices like Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS), Battle Field Surveillance Radars (BFSRs), Weapon Locating Radars (WLRs), Sound Ranging Systems, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), Reconnaissance, Communications and Navigation Satellites which provide an increased degree of transparency to the battlefield. These devices could be providing inputs to all three services and thereby need to be integrated. This has been further accentuated by long range and precise Firepower. The Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired against

Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan as also against targets in Libya and Sudan. These surgical strikes were carried out from naval platforms, passed through the medium of air, were guided by space based assets and struck targets on land. These missiles were procured by the Navy, guided by the assets of US Air Force and contributed to land warfare against unconventional adversary.

Further currently we are operating in a network centric environment where there is integration between the sensor, the command elements and the shooter. This entails coordination of all elements of the three services to degrade / destroy targets. By jointness we are able to successfully fight Air-Land battles, Sea-Air battles, Sea-Air and Land battles digitally thereby attaining seamless application of land, sea and air power.

Indian perspective The need for jointness was felt in all operations undertaken by our Armed Forces. In the First War with Pakistan after Independence, Dakota aircraft were utilised to land our first battalion into Srinagar. Further tanks

were air dropped at Zozila pass. In the 1962 war against the Chinese, we did not use our Air Force despite our superior flying skills and aircraft. The 1965 war was fought with the Army and Air Force fighting in a coordinated manner. However, 1971 conflict with Pakistan saw the jointness being optimised, thereby resulting in the liberation of Bangladesh. The credit must go to the Indian Air Force for achieving air superiority over East Pakistan in 48 hours, thereby providing the Indian Army the freedom to undertake offensive operations relentlessly.

Aircraft from our aircraft carrier INS Vikrant flew effective missions destroying Pakistani patrol boats making their flotilla ineffective. Further the Navy undertook a raid with missile boats on Karachi causing damages to the port and oil installations. The Air Force in conjunction with the Army undertook heliborne operations at Sylhet and across the Meghna river as also paradropped a battalion at Tangail which hastened the liberation process. The surrender of Pakistani forces in Dacca in 14 days can be attributed to joint operations.

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jointness

1971 conflict with Pakistan saw the jointness being optimised, thereby resulting in the liberation of Bangladesh. The credit must go to the Indian Air Force for achieving air superiority over East Pakistan in 48 hours, thereby providing the Indian Army the freedom to undertake offensive operations relentlessly However post 1971 there have been problems in executing joint operations. This was felt particularly during Op Vijay (Kargil conflict) in 1999. Though these were professionally resolved, there was a requirement of modifying our organisations to improve jointness in conduct and execution of operations. Accordingly a committee under K Subrahmanyam was set up which submitted its report and the same was reviewed by a Group of Ministers in 2000. To improve jointness, there was need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and integration of the three services.

In the 11 years that have elapsed we have established a tri-service Headquarters of Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), a tri-service command, Andaman and Nicobar theatre command and a Strategic Forces Command. There is no jointness of command and control and the three services are operationally independent with limited coordination being undertaken by the Ministry of Defence. To find an answer to the current impasse, the government has appointed a 14 member task force headed by Shri Naresh Chandra a former bureaucrat on 14 July 2011 to review the unfinished tasks of the Kargil Review Committee and suggest a plan of implementation. The panel has been given six months to complete the task.

It may be pertinent to note that we must look at the American and the UK experience of integrating their armed forces. The first step is the issue of Defence Policy Guideline. The US Secretary of Defence issues a Defence Policy Guideline which includes national security objectives and policies, the priorities of military missions and the availability of resources. This document is prepared with the advice from the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff. In our case the National Strategic Policy is not issued. At best a generic chapter on National Security Environment is included.

Today there is no single point military guidance on strategic matters to the Defence Minister and Prime Minister. On most of the occasions it is the Defence Secretary who is coordinating military issues. This is certainly incorrect for a country fighting insurgency and dealing with sensitive borders. Presently there is no unified action and a lot depends on individual perception of a situation which often leads to lack of optimisation of resources in dealing with critical situations.

Structure required in the present environment The present organisational structure is not suitable from the security point of view. Our nation is fighting insurgents and in a worst case scenario should be prepared for a conflict on two fronts. With each service viewing from its own perspective, the nation will not be able to take a unified pro-active stand with panache and precision. To respond effectively to any situation there is a need for a unified Command Headquarters under a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). All of us should look at national objectives,

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INTEGRATION

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NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

rather than guard our turf and procrastinate on this critical subject. While the task force will be submitting its recommendations, it is incumbent on the government to take this step to provide strategic equilibrium to our nation at this critical juncture. The organisational structure should have the CDS with the joint commands responsible for the operations and the Service Headquarters would be responsible for acquisition of equipment and training.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi

The role and mission of the CDS would be the principal military advisor to the Government of India.

He would have direct access to the Raksha Mantri and the Prime Minister. The three Service Chiefs would function under him. There would be broadly two types of theatre commands. Northern, Western and South Western Commands would comprise of Army and Air Force units whereas Eastern, Southern, Andaman and Nicobar, Strategic Forces and Training Commands would be tri-service in composition. This will enable us to undertake network centric warfare with speed and precision. The inter service structure would improve our logistics and improve our acquisition of equipment which would enable us to modernise and thereby enhance our capability development. This process has to be undertaken by Parliament as the services would try and guard their turf.

SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.

He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts.

He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals.

He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Conclusion Operations against state or non-state actors need to be meticulously planned and executed in most cases by more than one service. Our country today has one of the biggest armed forces in the world. In a network centric environment, there is a need for speedy response from the command elements to inputs received from sensors. This would be possible in an integrated services environment.

Further in a full spectrum war with a nuclear backdrop decisions would be needed at the highest level with regard to use of critical weapons. On such occasion there would be need of a single point military advice to the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister.

While the CDS and three Service Chiefs would synergise the operations, acquisitions and training the Defence Secretary would be concerned with policy, budget, personnel, infrastructure, civilian management and administration. He would continue to be responsible for coordinating the functions of the department of defence, department of defence production and the DRDO. He would be the interface of all departments of the Ministry of Defence and Parliament. As a matter of fact the CDS, Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary, Secretary of Defence Production, the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister have responsibilities to evolve a common defence perspective.

This will pave the way for strategic equilibrium in our force structure. We are confident that Shri Naresh Chandra with his team will suitably recommend measures on issues critical to our national security. We are confident that the long pending issues would be decided expeditiously.

The three A’s that dominate the destiny of Pakistan are the Army, Allah and America - not necessarily in that order.

Today the power play in Pakistan is between the declining Super Power of the USA and the rising power of China. In looking too closely at the tactical level details of who said what within the Supreme Court of Pakistan and outside its walls, we are losing our focus on the larger geo-strategic scenario.

This will be shaped by the new cold war in Asia between the USA and China. That may well shape the outcome in Pakistan.

The logical question that follows is where is India in this equation?

The Pakistani Army now has a pivotal position in Pakistani politics. In a very perceptive piece - Hasan Rizvi writes that while the Army does not rule directly it controls key aspects of state like National Security, foreign policy and key domestic issues. Direct rule is simply replaced by a covert behind the scene Role that usually reduces the civilian governments to a democratic facade. The civilian governments have an acute identity crisis. They wish to appear autonomous and yet bank heavily on the support of the Army Chief to survive.

None of them have been able to complete their terms

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jointness

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

E

ven as we evaluate the state of Civil-Military and Inter Services synergies in India, recent events have made it imperative that we take a close look at Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. It is crucial for us to evaluate where these are headed and calibrate our responses accordingly.

Pakistan has been singularly unfortunate that it lost its towering political leader Mohd Ali Jinnah so soon after Independence. It was ill served by its squabbling bunch of politicians that followed, as also by the vaulting ambitions of its military men and bureaucrats. This resulted in over 30 years of direct military rule in Pakistan.

Over militarised states tend to overreach and overspend on weapons. This imperial overstretch causes the state to collapse. Pakistan has been close to economic collapse twice in the last 10 years. It has been kept afloat by some US$ 30 billion worth of doles by the USA and its allies.

Musharraf left only after the Americans had scripted an alternative arrangement wherein the NRO was used to strike a bargain with Benazir Bhutto’s PPP. She was a charismatic and popular leader. The Military-ISI complex saw that and killed her brutally. Her husband Zardari simply lacked credibility and had a severe image problem. His Prime Minister Gilani strove to work out a compromise by kowtowing to the Army and making himself acceptable to the Chief and the Chinese The Pakistani Army now has a pivotal position in Pakistani politics. In a very perceptive piece Hasan Askari Rizvi writes that while the Army does not rule directly it controls key aspects of state like national security, foreign policy and key domestic issues. Direct rule is simply replaced by a covert behind the scene Role that usually reduces the civilian governments to a democratic facade.

The civilian governments have an acute identity crisis. They wish to appear autonomous and yet bank heavily on the support of the Army Chief to survive. None of them have been able to complete their terms. Gen Musharraf’s decade long rule had floundered badly once he caved in to Chinese pressure and attacked the Lal Masjid. It was his Blue Star. The ISI itself possibly had a covert hand in stoking this dispute with the Supreme Court that led to his exit and exile. Musharraf left only after the Americans had scripted an alternative arrangement wherein the NRO was used to strike a bargain with Benazir Bhutto’s PPP. She was a charismatic and popular leader. The Military-ISI complex saw that and killed her brutally. Her husband Zardari simply lacked credibility and had a severe image problem. His Prime Minister Gilani strove to work out a compromise by kowtowing to the Army and making himself acceptable to the Chief and the Chinese.

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The entire edifice of Civil-Military relations in Pakistan however unravelled abruptly with the US Seals raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden.

This raid created a severe crisis that highlighted the limits of Pakistan Army’s highly duplicitous policy of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. In 2001 Gen Pervez Musharraf had been coerced into joining the Global War on Terror on pain of being bombed back to the Stone Age. However by 2005, the American attention had shifted entirely to Iraq and Pervez and the ISI used this period to revive the Taliban and do all in their power to ensure that Mullah Omar and Haqqani would rule in Kabul once the Americans left. This strategic overreach has backfired. The imperatives of a state sponsored Jihad have so thoroughly radicalised the Pak military and society that the facade of being US allies in the War on Terror is no longer even remotely credible. There is a seething cauldron of Islamist rage against America in the Pak Army and populace in general.

Gen Kayani who was constantly being lionised by the Americans as their man in Islamabad realised that his position was becoming dangerously untenable.

There was seething rage in the military cantonments and he nervously went about placating his command.

Gen Kayani is relatively junior and his distance from his Corps Commanders is far less than that of Ayub and Musharraf. As such he is far more susceptible to the peer group pressure. The Collegium of Corps Commanders has thus emerged as a key institution in Pakistan and by extension shapes the national policies. Post Abbottabad the image of the Pak Army has reached a new low after the 1971 War. This post Laden image of ineptitude was made worse by the Mehran raid which clearly indicated the level of Jihadi penetration in the armed forces. The Pak military now tried to align itself in tune with the popular anti-American mood in its rank and file. They came out in the open with increasingly hostile stances towards America that bordered on brinkmanship.

They sensed the relative weakness of America and banked rather heavily on the rise of China. The key battle in Pakistan is now a new cold war between an America in decline and a China, which the Pakistan Army is desperately hoping, is in the ascendant. The nervous civilian leadership meanwhile was now terrified of a military coup and approached the US to save it. In a strange series of developments and leaks thereafter, this led to “memogate”.

In any normal state, it is the military that would have been on the back foot. Not in Pakistan.

The civilian regime seemed guilt ridden and red faced that it was trying to save itself from a military coup! Pakistan’s Military-ISI complex now decided on a soft coup to get rid of the Zardari-Gilani duo. The twin pincers of this bloodless coup were to be the highly egoistic Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court and a move to get Parliament to call for early elections. The ISI was now busy building-up its newest democratic poster boy in Imran Khan. He would be the new democratic

facade far more in tune with their Jihadi agenda. Besides, Imran is also a Pathan and to that extent can help the Punjabi-Pashtun biradari of the Army to keep its flock together. A Net Assessment would indicate four Alternative futures for Pakistan:

Gen Kayani who was constantly being lionised by the Americans as their man in Islamabad realised that his position was becoming dangerously untenable. There was seething rage in the Military cantonments and he nervously went about placating his command. Gen Kayani is relatively junior and his distance from his Corps Commanders is far less than that of Ayub and Musharraf. As such he is far more susceptible to the peer group pressure. The Collegium of Corps Commanders has thus emerged as a key institution in Pakistan and by extension shapes the national policies A hard military coup: This is unlikely as the Army was fairly discredited during Musharraf’s long rule. Besides the economy is in shambles and the international situation quite unfavourable for military intervention. The military needs a civilian buffer to stave off direct foreign pressure.

A soft coup: This is what the Pak Army is attempting via the Supreme Court.

A street revolution: If the Supreme Court fails to get this government’s scalp, ISI’s latest poster boy Imran Khan could be used to whip up an Arab Spring in Islamabad.

The present government survives: This is a wild card scenario. This is the first civilian government that is fighting back. It could sacrifice Gilani and possibly survive but only for a while. Early elections are now very likely.

Meanwhile the exiled General Musharraf announced grandly that he was coming back but then had second thoughts about the timings. The Eagle could land shortly on the shores of Pakistan. Is there an underlying grand American design? Who is scripting a new scenario? The US was extremely unhappy with the Pak Army and its brinkmanship of choking their logistics supply line to Afghanistan. Could we be seeing a new script being enacted wherein the Supreme Court would pressurise an early exit of the Zardari government? Early elections could see the installation of Imran Khan - the poster boy of the ISI. Musharraf may well be hoping to be the new President in this dispensation. The Pakistan Army meanwhile is pulling back from its brinkmanship with America and has restored logistical conduits to Afghanistan. It has pushed the Americans far enough. The Americans have in turn split the Pakistani civil-military dispensation wide apart and made that state dysfunctional. The situation however is highly fluid and touch and go. What is quite certain however is that the days of the present dispensation are most definitely numbered. The Zardari-Gilani duo knows this and has mustered the courage for grandstanding against the Army to gain popular sympathy before the inevitable vote. In the end, the three As that dominate the destiny of Pakistan are the Army, Allah and America - not necessarily in that order. Today the power play in Pakistan is between the declining Super Power of the USA and the rising power of China. In looking too closely at the tactical level details of who said what within the Supreme Court of Pakistan and outside its walls, we are losing our focus on the larger geo-strategic scenario. This will be shaped by the new cold war in Asia between the USA and China. That may well shape the outcome in Pakistan. The logical question that follows is where is India in this equation?

India’s stance In retrospect therefore India’s most recent initiative to push for peace with Pakistan was singularly ill timed. We were told Gilani was a man of peace and the Pakistani Army was fully on board. It now transpires that civil-military relations had never been so bad in Pakistan’s entire history. How then did we fail to see it? The Pakistan Army wants a quiet Eastern Front so that it can focus unhindered and undisturbed upon hanging Karzai. That is why perhaps it had given its nod to the peace parleys. It is common knowledge that these peace talks were held under American pressure. Bruce Reidel has gone on record to state that India must be pressurised to negotiate with Pakistan. Our subservience to these pressures was fully on display in Maldives. There is a school of thought that as a democracy, we must support the democratic forces in Pakistan. We may have to be more circumspect in that case. Our open support to Gilani could be the kiss of death for the PPP in its democratic battles with Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif. Outwardly at least India must be seen as being completely hands off in the internal struggles in Pakistan and must be prepared to deal with whosoever comes to power. Covertly can we do more to shape the outcome in Pakistan? In theory we should. In practice do we have the capabilities? Mr Gujral, in his quest for peace at any cost (mostly at our cost) we believe had wrecked these capabilities of the R&AW.

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MHA plans school to train cops, spies

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s part of the Union government’s attempt to strengthen security infrastructure and equip personnel with sophisticated gear, the home ministry has approved several proposals for paramilitary forces, ranging from setting up a detective training school to procuring huge numbers of high-tech radio sets. It also plans to buy helicopters for internal security duties.

A school to train spies Central Detective Training School (CDTS) will be set up in Ghaziabad in UP by the home ministry’s Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D). The ministry has already released Rs 2.18 crore to BPR&D for acquisition of 8.37 acres of land for establishment of the school.

India’s GI Joes

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he Delhi police have set up a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team as part of their renewed counter-terror measures. Created some months ago in the wake of the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai, the team has been participating in mock security drills being carried out in the city as part of its training. The unit at present comprises about 40 young recruits, mostly in their early 20s. The SWAT commandos have undergone rigorous training in handling of sophisticated weapons and most have been armed with AK assault rifles. The SWAT members, who will be armed with sophisticated light-weight weapons in future, are also being trained in hostage and crisis negotiation techniques. They are being taught ways to access a target, conduct searches and rescue operations and carry out close combats. In the recently conducted mock drills in the city, the unit headed most of the operations.

Apart from the specialised unit, newly recruited and young constables from all the districts are being imparted 45-day commando training at the Police Training College as part of the counterterror initiatives. A 10-day refresher course in commando training is also being conducted for others.

Trained to tackle hostage situations, these men are deployed during VIP movements and at key government functions.

MP5: A 9 mm submachine gun of German design manufactured by Heckler and Koch. One of the most widely used submachine guns in the world, the 3 kg assault rifle fires around 800 rounds per minute and has an effective range of 200m.

Bulletproof knee and elbow pads: Protect the knees and elbows from injuries.

Headgear: Same as the one used by Black Cat commandos. It’s fire-resistant and helps to conceal the identity of the commando.

Glock 17 pistol: The 9x19 mm, low-weight pistol, with above-average magazine capacity of 17 cartridges, is used for its reliability. It is safe, easy and quick to use.

Advanced audio communication set: Same as the one used by the SPG. Wireless headset and receiver allows the commando to talk to other unit members during operations, while his hands are free to work the weapon.

CRPF DG exhorts his men to become “Junglee”

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iving a new mantra to over 70,000 CRPF troops engaged in anti-maoist operations, its chief K Vijay Kumar has asked them to turn ‘junglee’ (inhabitants of forests) and hit the maoists “hard” before elimanting them. CRPF suffered its biggest ever setback in Chattisgarh’s Dantewada where Naxals ambushed 75 men in 2010. Kumar who took over the reins of the force, asked his men to be like hunters, who hide in the area of the hunt and ultimately neutralise it. “Your adversary is far too inferior than you, wether it is training, equipment, physical strength, tactics, weaponry, number and food he takes”. He exhorted his men to modify the tactics - “be like hunters, hide in his area and hit him hard. Learn to be a junglee” he said.

National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)

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dditional director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) D P Sinha is likely to head the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which is expected to be established in the next few weeks. After much wrangling between the stakeholders over the NCTC, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) cleared a much watered down version of the proposed body. The new version of NCTC will have permanent secretariat headed by Sinha who is 1979 batch officer of Manipur-Tripura cadre. Sinha is heading operations wing of the IB at the moment. The NCTC chief will be assisted by at least three joint director rank officers from the IB. The main task of NCTC will be to collate intelligence gathered by a host of agiencies, analyse the data and coordinate with agencies leading counter-terrorism efforts to act on the intelligence. It will also maintain a database of terrorists. NCTC will be more of a coordination authority than an overarching anti-terror body.

NCTC will interact and coordinate with the following organisations and forces: National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO): Specialises in technical intelligence gathering.

Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW): India’s external intelligence gathering agency. Also specialises in covert operations.

Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA): Controls Army’s Directorate of Signals intelligence, Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre and Defence Information Warefare Agency.

Financial Intelligence Unit: Receives, analyses and disseminates data related to suspect financial transactions.

State police intelligence: Various state police forces will feed intelligence to NCTC. Paramilitary forces: Paramilitary forces such as the BSF, CRPF and the ITBP, they all specilalise in human-intelligence gathering.

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID): Links databases of 21 ministries or departments to improve counter-terror efforts.

State polices forces: The NCTC can ask the police forces of various states to act on actionable intelligence.

Central police forces: NCTC can also direct central police forces to act on terror inputs.

National Security Guard (NSG): NCTC can also direct the NSG, which played a key role during the Mumbai terror attacks, for follow-up action.

National Security Guard (NSG)

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t’s an offensive force, specialising in anti-terror operations and giving protection to VIPs. The Black Cats played a major role during the 26/11 anti-terror operations.

Headgear: Fire-resistant balaclava also helps conceal the identity of the officer during anti-terror operations. The name ‘Black Cat’ comes from their black nomex coveralls and balaclavas.

Light-weight bulletproof vest: High grade, level-3 Kevlar bulletproof vest. It can withstand a 7.62- caliber bullet fired from 10 m from an AK-47.

Binoculars: Equipped with night vision devices and are mainly used for surveillance. The range of the binocular is at least 1 km.

Utility commando dagger: Manufactured in the USA, it is very effective in close combats.

Glock 17 pistol: The 9x19 mm, low-weight pistol, with above-average magazine capacity of 17 cartridges, is used for its reliability. It is safe, easy and quick to use Advanced audio communication set: Same as the one used by the SPG. Wireless headset and receiver allows the commando to talk to other unit members during operations, while his hands are free to work the weapon.

Special Protection Group (SPG)

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hese elite commandos protect the PM, former PM and their immediate families.

It’s a defensive force as the commandos’ primary task is to protect the VIP. Tactical Eyewear: Ballistic shield protects eyes from splinters and other foreign objects.

Light-Weight Bulletproof Jacket: High grade, level-3 Kevlar bulletproof vest. It can withstand a 7.62- caliber bullet fired from 10 m from an AK-47.

F-2000 Assault Rifle: A 5.56x45 mm NATO caliber, Belgium-made rifle. The 3.5 kg rifle fires 850 rounds per minute and has an effective range of 500 m. Bullpup design places the magazine behind the trigger, making it easier to manoeuvre and reload.

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A historical survey of synergy in our operations from the 1971 war onwards. It contrasts the very high levels of synergy reached in the 1971 war due to a nearly 10 months long period of prepration and coordination. The same was evidently missing in the Kargil conflict when we were caught by surprise.

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

In the first week of 2012 it unveiled a new tactical doctrine under which Pakistan “reserves” would be moved to the borders whenever a terrorist attack takes place in India. In bald terms it means that a signal has been sent out to sleeper cells in India to become active and attack soft targets and their actions would be fully backed up by the jihadi terrorists trained in Pakistani camps as well as the Pakistan Army with its conventional weaponry and its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to prevent any massive reaction from India

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n the constraints imposed by the “limited” nature of a war that would be circumscribed by the threat of First Use of nuclear weapons or what has come to be known as the “nuclear overhang”, military synergy has taken on greater urgency and has become an imperative of sorts. Even more so given the possibility that the next subcontinental confrontation could involve a two-front war given China’s growing assertiveness in the exercise of hegemony and the safeguarding of its so-called “core interests” – the protection of its proxy in this part of the world Pakistan being one. Given the manner in which Beijing came forth to assert that any attack on Pakistan by the US would be considered by China as an attack upon itself at the height of the US-Pak contrempts after the Osama slaying it should be expected that China will intervene in any military confrontation between India and Pakistan. Hence the need to prepare for a “two-front” war with every means at India’s disposal.

Ambience of synergy An example of military synergy of a very high order is available in the archives of India’s operations during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Pakistan had been bottled up in the western sector (except for the scare in the Chhamb sector of Jammu and Kashmir where the Pakistanis managed to capture 120 sq km of territory which, if exploited further could have threatened Indian lines of communications to the whole of Jammu and Kashmir). However, in the eastern sector around what was then known as East Pakistan Indians had laid a beartrap during Operation Cactus Lily that eventually led to its liberation and the creation of a sovereign independent nation named Bangladesh.

This happened through close coordination between the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy in conjunction with the indigenous Bengali forces known as Mukti Bahini. The INS Vikrant was posted off the coast. Air superiority was quickly achieved by the IAF first by air-to-air combat in which one of the Keelor brothers shot down a Pakistan Air Force fighter and later through destruction of airstrips and aircraft on the

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The end and the means

ground. Carrier based aircraft from the Vikrant made daily sorties into Pakistani territory in support of the ground operations till a missile through a window where the Pakistani High Command was holding a meeting hastened its surrender on 16 December 1971.

However, it needs to be remembered that India had sufficient time to prepare for the riposte for the influx of up to 10 lakh Bengali refugees fleeing the genocide perpetrated by the Pakistan Army. Things happened smoothly at all levels of command and control. The same cannot be said about what happened in Kargil in 1999. For one, the Indian Army had been caught napping by the Pakistan Army Northern Light Infantry as it infiltrated into a ten kilometer deep and sixty kilometer long salient overlooking the Highway to Leh and thereby threatening the supply line to the Siachen Glacier. The IAF lost one aircraft and one helicopter to shoulder-fired Stinger missiles supplied to the Afghan Mujahideen to counter Soviet airpower in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This series of untoward occurances muddied the relations between the Army and the IAF with the former making known its unhappiness over the latter’s commitment and competence to aid the effort to dislodge the Pakistani intruders.

The fact of the matter is that neither the Indian Army nor the Indian Air Force knew how to tackle such a situation. The latter lost two flying platforms because they were not fitted with flare and chaff dispensers to decoy the heat seeking Stinger missiles – something it should have learned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and prepared for it.

The dispensers were retrofitted well after the Kargil war ended. The Indian Army also was on a learning curve about the efficacy of its several artillery weapons against infiltrators ensconced in sangars made of rocks where high-trajectory weapons were not as effective as direct-fire weapons (even the controversial Bofors 155 mm howitzers produced better results when deployed in direct fire against the entrenched infiltrators). Also, the IAF doctrine of priority to securing air superiority before assisting in the ground effort under a credo that categorically states: “ … in the doctrine of the Air Force the fight for the control of air-to-air superiority gets first priority in

every case” was galling for the Army which was taking heavy casualties at the hands of the entrenched intruders who had the advantage of high ground.

Kargil experience Kargil was an object lesson in having to fight a “limited war” beneath the “nuclear overhang”.

The decision not to cross the Line of Control was dictated by

this factor. Had it not been for US President Bill Clinton’s unequivocal advice to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during whose tenure Kargil happened that Pakistani troops must withdraw from Kargil and that no attempt should be made to activate Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal the picture in Kargil would have been dismal indeed. Musharraf would have succeeded in internationalising the Kashmir issue and he could claim victory by nibbling away another

chunk of J and K because territory is what Pakistan wants.

It needs to be remembered that it took the Army and the IAF two months and 2,50,000 shells of calibres ranging from 105 mm to 214 mm to clear the small area of intrusion by the Northern Light Infantry. Such time, space and ammunition expenditure militates against the very concept of “limited” ways of achieving national goals worth fighting for. If one is to

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fight a war of any kind – “limited” in time and space by conventional means; an insurgency that has external dimensions (politico / military support, sanctuaries etc.); an intrusion of the Kargil kind that needs to be cleared up in a hurry; the neutralisation of nuclear missile sites discovered by satellites or other means of intelligence gathering then the synergy will have to be practiced in advance. And air-land assets be apportioned accordingly for quick achievement of aims and objectives with the Navy ready with maritime operations of its own kind.

As long ago as the 70s special study groups have recommended that the combat strength of the IAF be raised to 45 squadrons.

This was done in the context of a single front against Pakistan with little or no intervention from China. It has worked thus far. No more. China has made it abundantly clear that it will protect Pakistan, its most strategic ally. India must thus have at least 45 combat aircraft squadrons to be able to deal with a two-front war with some hope of success

What’s the endgame?

Also, the nation and its fighting men must be clear about what they intend to achieve and what national objective is to be secured. It is a total waste to capture Pakistani territory to ease pressures in Jammu and Kashmir and then return it at the negotiating table as we did with the strategic Hajipir Pass (which, incidentally, is in Jammu and Kashmir and supposedly an atoot ang of India) under the Tashkent Agreement of 1965. Some sense of national interest was shown

by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when she refused to return any territory that was captured during the “holding action” along the western front in 1971 in Jammu and Kashmir in keeping with the principle that the whole of the state is an integral part of India. Much of Kargil was recaptured in 1971 in a very calculated manoeuvre to straighten out the UN-sponsored Ceasefire Line and remove the threat to the National Highway to Leh. While this act illustrated that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral

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part of India but the promise of peaceful means to secure a settlement of the Kashmir issue gave rise to the concept of “you keep what you have grabbed and we keep what we have reclaimed” in the mistaken notion that this would buy peace for India.

Nothing of the kind has happened.

The Ceasefire Line nomenclature was discarded and in its place came the Line of Control. General Musharraf deployed the Pakistan Army Northern Light Infantry into Kargil in 1999 in the hope of readjusting the Line once again but ended up with egg on his face with the amazingly brave manner in which Indian troops dislodged the Pakistanis and recaptured posts at heights beyond 16,000 ft.

All this happened under what has now come to be known as the “nuclear overhang”. The government of the day ordered the Indian armed forces not to cross the Line of Control so as to prevent an escalation of the conflict. Meanwhile, troops all along the international border with Pakistan as well as the Line of Control were put on alert to prevent any attempt to launch diversionary attacks. The Navy too was readied for operations.

At the time it sounded sagacious but it was being done so as not to provoke a Pakistani resort to nuclear weapons. The larger Indian core interest - the reclaiming of the rest of Jammu and Kashmir - went abegging.

Pak nuclear deterrence Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are intended specifically to try and grab the Muslim majority Kashmir Valley using both its regular troops as well as Islamic jihadi infiltrators and to prevent India from taking any steps to liberate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir which is the only legitimate politico-military objective for the Indian armed forces to aim for.

In the context of what happened during the Kargil conflict it is clear that the Pakistan nuclear deterrent worked. Our own “minimum nuclear deterrent” was still in the process of being erected. Nevertheless even after the command and control system has been put in place there are no signs that Pakistan is being deterred from using “non-state actors” and jihadi terrorists trained, armed, assisted in infiltrating into India at various

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points in Jammu and Kashmir. It has attacked India at places of its choice the Indian Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008 not to mention the several terrorist attacks in various parts of the country.

It needs to be remembered that it took the Army and the IAF two months and 2,50,000 shells of calibres ranging from 105 mm to 214 mm to clear the small area of intrusion by the Northern Light Infantry. Such time, space and ammunition expenditure militates against the very concept of “limited” ways of achieving national goals worth fighting for In the first week of 2012 it unveiled a new tactical doctrine under which Pakistan “reserves” would be moved to the borders whenever a terrorist attack takes place in India.

In bald terms it means that a signal has been sent out to sleeper cells in India to become active and attack soft targets and their actions would be fully backed up by the jihadi terrorists trained in Pakistani camps as well as the Pakistan Army with its conventional weaponry and its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent to prevent any massive reaction from India of the Parakram kind that was launched immediately after the attack on Parliament. This means that the so-called “reserves” are being moved closer to the borders with India with two objectives – one to signal the terrorists already inside India to launch attacks in the different parts of the country and the other to contain the Indian armed forces and prevent them from making deep inroads into Pakistan’s vital points and vital areas.

It is a counter to India’s “cold start” doctrine.

Concept validation At the recently concluded three month long Exercise Sudarshan Shakti in the Rajasthan desert where joint air-land tactics were practiced a redistribution of air assets was effected and the concept validated. Given that it is not always possible for the IAF to provide close air support to an advancing mechanised infantry and tank formation in a fast-moving battle the Indian Army has obtained sanction

to create Army Aviation Brigades that will bring helicopter gunships, hitherto the preserve of the IAF, under its command and control. This means that the Army Aviation Corps hitherto deployed for air observation post duties to direct artillery fire at targets on the forward edge of battle area (FEBA); for resupply of arms, ammunition and food; and medical evacuation will henceforth have an integral helicopter gunship brigade with every armoured formation.

Kargil was an object lesson in having to fight a “limited war” beneath the “nuclear overhang”.

The decision not to cross the Line of Control was dictated by this factor The conceptual framework of this arrangement is that with such a platform aloft there would be a wider field of view and the armed helicopter (which would also carry eight infantry soldiers on board) would be able to engage targets of opportunity well before the main body crosses the forward edge of battle. This would make for greater combat mobility and an incisiveness in operations. It would help cut through enemy defences, seek new axes of penetration with greater firepower that the helicopter gunship carries. This kind of redistribution and management of military assets will not require a distraction of the IAF from its role of deep penetration and long-range interdiction of enemy infrastructure as well as securing air superiority at the shortest possible time so that there is no enemy interference in the armoured thrust

by Indian forces.

The Indian Air Force currently has 35 combat squadrons with a mix of air superiority fighters (dogfights) and ground attack aircraft. Given a canvas of a two-front war from the Gujarat coastline in the west up to Jammu and Kashmir in the north, across the whole length of the Himalayas up to Arunachal Pradesh in the east down to the Bengal border.

As long ago as the 70s special study groups have recommended that the combat strength of the IAF be raised to 45 squadrons. This was done in the context of a single front against Pakistan with little or no intervention from China. It has worked thus far.

No more.

China has made it abundantly clear that it will protect Pakistan, its most strategic ally. India must thus have at least 45 combat aircraft squadrons to be able to deal with a two-front war with some hope of success.

The excision of the helicopter gunship from the IAF (currently the fleet consists of Mi-24/ Mi-35 attack helicopters and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd is testing its indigenous armed light helicopter) and its inclusion in the Army Aviation Corps will improve the strike capability in an air-land battle scenario in the desert, plains and the foothills but its efficacy will reduce substantially in mountain terrain at heights above 10,000 ft where our real core interest lies in Jammu and Kashmir. This is because, as the Afghanistan experience of the Soviet Army has shown, the helicopter gunship becomes vulnerable to lateral attacks by men armed with shoulder-fired missiles hiding in crevices and caves in the mountains. That is how we lost one fighter aircraft and one helicopter in the first surge of war in Kargil. The Mi-17 that was shot down in Kargil has a service ceiling of 19,000 ft but it got caught in a cusp because it had to get close to the target (less than five kms) for its weapons to be effective.

Ditto with the ground attack aircraft in the IAF fleet which need to release their bombload and peel away to get out of range of shoulder-fired SAMs.

Air-land synergy To be able to create an effective air-land synergy in J and K which is India’s core area of interest, the Indian Air Force should be able to gain air superiority over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to allow other fixed wing aircraft to disrupt the nexus between China and Pakistan the Karakoram Highway. The Indian Army should be in a position to induct troops to cut off the garrisons

located in Gilgit, Skardu and several points along the Highway. China will not want that to happen and will intervene in strength across a wide front stretching from J and K to Arunachal Pradesh. It would be in India’s interest to keep the Chinese at bay along the northern foothills of the Himalayas. It will not be easy to transport artillery over humps above 15,000 ft to do the job.

For India to be able to do this effectively it should induct air-mobile artillery mounted on heavy transport aircraft. It is a feasible technology and problems with recoil have been taken care of as long ago as its deployment in Vietnam in the 70s.

It is still being used in Afghanistan.

India has the heavy lift aircraft and the 105 mm indigenous Indian field gun. The DRDO should exercise the “innovation” that it talked about recently and marry the two and create a weapon that has a good stand-off range of about 12,000 ft to be out of reach of shoulder fired SAMs and an accurate direct fire weapon which if fired from a bank of six aircraft can create the same effect as a battery of ground-based artillery with greater surety (no need for corrections from a heliborne air observation post) and greater saturation.

Finally, there can be no better example of air-land synergy than IAF pilots flying heavy lift aircraft with Indian Army gunners operating 105 mm from its passenger cabin to fight a common enemy from the air instead of from tortuous, restrictive territory on the ground. They can surprise the enemy time and again by crossing the Himalayas at any point of their own choosing and break up Chinese human wave tactics before they can enter Indian territory.

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Col RSN Singh (retd) The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects.

To the US, the current dispensation in Pakistan, both political and military has outlived its utility, rather it is now counter-productive and an embarrassment as such. The alleged memo has triggered the process of realignment of political forces as various institutions in Pakistan including the military. The Zardari - Gilani dispensation has only got a temporary reprieve from the assertive Supreme Court. In the ultimate analysis the current political dispensation will be compelled by the judiciary to step down, thus paving the way for elections

Pakistan’s description as the fulcrum of Asia is most eminent, as it is located at the junction of South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and China. Since its inception Pakistan has been traumatised by the weakness and bitter rivalry between its state institutions. Its leaders invariably have relied on external powers to enforce or restore institutional balance. An oft quoted remark attributed to the Americans is that oil is too important commodity to be left to the will of the Arabs. Similarly the Af-Pak region is too important to be sacrificed at the altar of the ‘sovereignty of Pakistan’. Pakistan is at a critical crossroads of its history. A very incisive analysis of recent developments there by a former R&AW officer and military analyst.

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ince its inception Pakistan has been traumatised by the weakness and bitter rivalry between its state institutions. Its leaders invariably have relied on external powers to enforce or restore institutional balance. The current instability in Pakistan therefore should not come as a surprise because the institutional balance between the President, the Prime Minister and the Army in the first place had been forged by the US as part of war against terrorism.

Even then, the deal between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto was hammered by the US after a series of meetings in Dubai. General Kayani, who was then the ISI Chief under the Musharraf dispensation, played a crucial role as a mediator. It is pertinent to mention that General Kayani as a junior officer had served as the Staff Officer to Benazir Bhutto during her first term as prime minister. It is another matter that the script was briefly interrupted by an imponderable (some say by design) i.e. assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

2013 deadline It may also be recalled that in July 2010, it was Prime Minister Gilani, who gave a three year extension to General Kayani. He is the first four-star general to receive such an extension from a democratic government. Gen Kayani is due to retire in November 2013, which almost coincides with the end of presidential tenure of Zardari. Also the Director General of ISI Lt Gen Shuja Pasha is to retire in March this year and from all indications emanating from Pakistan, is not likely to get any further extension. He is considered very close to General Kayani and was also on extended tenure since 2010. By next year therefore the entire governing structure of Pakistan is due for change. It is obvious that given the critical strategic exigencies the American establishment cannot just afford to leave Pakistan in the realm of imponderables and walk into a geo-political vacuum.

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Pakistan: The New Script

Judiciary the fourth pillar The standoff between the judiciary, i.e. the Chief Justice Iftikar Chaudhary and Musharraf was considerably responsible for decline of Musharraf and his consequential exit from the power structure of Pakistan and the country as such. Even at this critical juncture, the judiciary is playing the spearhead role in eroding the present dispensation of President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani.

In fact, there are commentators, who opine that power play in Pakistan is no longer confined to the machinations of Troika, i.e. the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief, but there is yet another pillar which has emerged and that is the ‘Judiciary’.

In the past, there have been indications about growing US leverages in the Pak judiciary as well. In March 2000, when an angry Bill Clinton visited Pakistan for less than five hours, one of the persons that he met was the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Irshad Hasan Khan. Hasan Abbas in his book Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism writes: Interestingly, the Pakistani team that met Clinton also included Justice Irshad H Khan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, who along with other judges was conducting a hearing to decide whether Musharraf’s coup in October 1999 was legitimate and lawful.

It was unprecedented that the head of the judiciary was attending such a meeting. It is believed that Clinton briefly conversed with him in private during this short visit, but what was discussed is not known. … Interestingly, a few weeks later, a twelve-member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan validated the military takeover of October 12, 1999, on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity and graciously gave Musharraf three years to accomplish his agenda and hold general elections.

Has the present crisis in Pakistan engendered by a re-scripting process of the Pakistani dispensation by and in favour of the strategic agenda of the West particularly the US, set in motion consequent to the killing of Osama bin Laden?

Strategic agenda The greatest asset that Pakistan has is its geo-strategic location. This asset has so far been singularly responsible for Pakistan’s militarised nature of its national discourse and its survival as a state. Pakistan’s description as the fulcrum of Asia is most eminent, as it is located at the junction of South Asia, West Asia, Central Asia and China. It has been at

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the crossroads of various ‘isms’ that these regions have spawned from time to time. In the ensuing era it is the Islamic terrorism.

The deal between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto was hammered by the US after a series of meetings in Dubai. General Kayani, who was then the ISI Chief under the Musharraf dispensation, played a crucial role as a mediator. It is pertinent to mention that General Kayani as a junior officer had served as the Staff Officer to Benazir Bhutto during her first term as prime minister It is an eternal aspect of geography that power seeking influence in Asia have had to either traverse through the land or region of present day Pakistan or contend with it as a strategic interlocutor. It was actively courted by the US in the early 50s and even as its importance to the US started to decline since the mid 60s, it once again assumed the status of a frontline state after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Such was the criticality of that period, that the US was compelled to ignore Pakistan’s many misdemeanours, including its clandestine nuclear programme.

The free flow of weapons and the encouragement and support that the Islamic fundamentalists received from the US, imbued Pan-Islamism with militant shades. The smug belief of the US that their distance from the epicentre of Islamic terrorism afforded them relative immunity was shattered on 9 September 2001.

Thus the USA’s military and strategic machinery had to revisit Pakistan in the form of ‘war against terror’ to defang the Islamic terrorists.

The job is far from over and the strategic retreat of the US and its allies from the Af-Pak region at this juncture is unthinkable.

In fact, the geopolitical scenario in the region has become even more complicated. Apart from concerns of global terrorism, the Af-Pak region has strident resonance in West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, in respect to China and the Indian Ocean. West Asia is under the grip of political upheaval, which threatens to shake the very

74

foundations of most countries in the region. The Iranian nuclear crisis is getting serious by the day with increasingly belligerent postures by the US and the Iranian leadership. The chasm between the Shia and Sunni populations is getting dangerous.

Islamic terrorism in form of Taliban continues to inhibit the restoration of civilisation in Afghanistan. An oft quoted remark attributed to the Americans is to the effect that oil is too important commodity to be left to the will of the Arabs. Similarly the Af-Pak region, at least in the foreseeable future, is too important to be sacrificed at the altar of the ‘sovereignty of Pakistan’.

This is the benchmark. Therefore, the developments in Pakistan must be viewed in this backdrop.

Even at this critical juncture, the judiciary is playing the spearhead role in eroding the present dispensation of President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani

Calibrated leak The immediate trigger for the current crisis in Pakistan is the alleged communication between the Pakistan Ambassador to US, Hussain Haqqani (allegedly on behalf of President Zardari) and the then US Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, widely known as the ‘Memogate Scandal’. In this memo, fears were expressed of a possible military takeover and the Obama administration had been urged to prevent it. Further, as a quid pro quo for US military and political help, the current Pakistan dispensation under President Zardari had promised to carry out a complete revamp of the security apparatus of Pakistan to include the nuclear establishment and policy setup and provide carte blanche for the US in conducting military strikes within Pakistan.

The conduit who delivered this memo is one Mansoor Ijaz, a US based businessman of Pakistani origin.

Ijaz is no ordinary businessman.

He is also a well-known media commentator and international negotiator. He was steadfast in his support to neo-conservative

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

policies of George Bush on American television. He had also been involved in unofficial negotiations between US and the Sudanese governments with regard to extradition of Laden. He has all along been a fierce critic of the Pakistan Army.

In the past, there have been indications about growing US leverages in the Pak judiciary as well. In March 2000, when an angry Bill Clinton visited Pakistan for less than five hours, one of the persons that he met was the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Irshad H Khan Hussain Haqqani is also known for his pro-US and anti-Army beliefs. This is more than apparent in the book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military authored by him.

Therefore, the sudden admission by Mansoor Ijaz about the said memo is rather intriguing. Even more intriguing is the Admiral Mullen’s admission that he knew of the Memo, but “thought nothing of it”.

Admiral Mullen cannot be so naïve so as not to factor the upheaval that his admission could cause within Pakistan. In the field of diplomacy such admissions of secret communications are considered blasphemous. It appears to be a deliberate and calibrated leak.

US wish list The contents of the alleged memo are significant. It clearly indicates that Pakistan’s approach in ‘war against terror’ has been contrary rather inimical to the US and is tacit admission that the military-intelligence establishment has been abetting terrorism and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is unsafe in military hands. Sample these (directly quoted from the alleged memo): President of Pakistan will order an independent inquiry into the allegations that Pakistan harboured and offered assistance to OBL and other senior Qaeda operatives …

The inquiry will be accountable and independent and result in findings of tangible value of the US government and the American people …

The new national security team will implement a policy of either handing over those left in the leadership of Al Qaeda or other affiliated terrorist groups who are still on Pakistani soil …

An oft quoted remark attributed to the Americans is to the effect that oil is too important commodity to be left to the will of the Arabs. Similarly the Af-Pak region, at least in the foreseeable future, is too important to be sacrificed at the altar of the ‘sovereignty of Pakistan’ One of the great fears of the military-intelligence establishment is that with your stealth capabilities to enter and exit Pakistani airspace at will, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are now legitimate targets. The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government - initially civilian but eventually all three power centres - to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear programme. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan’s nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.

The new national security team will eliminate Section S of the ISI charged with maintaining relations to the Taliban, Haqqani network, etc. This will dramatically improve relations with Afghanistan.

We are prepared to cooperate fully under the new national security team’s guidance with the Indian government on bringing all

perpetrators of Pakistani origin to account for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, whether outside government or inside any part of the government, including its intelligence agencies …

This alleged memo rather reads like the wish list of the US with the aim to circumscribe the military in Pakistan. It clearly indicates that world’s security can no longer be traded with sovereignty of Pakistan. It is an indirect and open caution to all future dispensations of Pakistan about the irreconcilable strategic concerns and interests of the US.

The new script To the US, the current dispensation in Pakistan, both political and military has outlived its utility, rather it is now counter-productive and an embarrassment as such. The alleged memo has triggered the process of realignment of political forces as various institutions in Pakistan including the military. The Zardari - Gilani dispensation has only got a temporary reprieve from the assertive Supreme Court. In the ultimate analysis the current political dispensation will be compelled by the judiciary to step down, thus paving the way for elections.

It appears that in the new political restructuring Imran Khan and Musharraf will have domineering roles, with possibly the former as Prime Minister and the latter as President. The fact cannot be overlooked that all these years since his exit from power, Musharraf’s home has been in United Kingdom.

There are no free lunches.

In few months time we may see a new political and military setup in Pakistan at the helm.

This new dispensation will be under constant US pressure to deliver on critical issues like ‘terrorism’ and ‘safety of nuclear weapons’. Of course, the new script too is fraught with imponderables. Nevertheless, its intent is beneficial to India. The memogate prominently refers to bringing to book the perpetrators of Mumbai attack Musharraf is the best man to deliver on ‘terrorism’ and ‘nuclear’ concerns of the West, as he knows their nuts and bolts. Imran’s international image and more so his Pathan extraction could prove to be of great advantage given the current nature of religious, regional, social and ethnic chasms in Pakistan. The bias of Pakistan politics may move away from overwhelming Sindhi-Punjabi domination. In all probability, the current Army leadership too would be circumscribed by the judiciary latter.

Conclusion In few months time we may see a new political and military setup in Pakistan at the helm. This new dispensation will be under constant US pressure to deliver on critical issues like ‘terrorism’ and ‘safety of nuclear weapons’. Of course, the new script too is fraught with imponderables. Nevertheless, its intent is beneficial to India. The memogate prominently refers to bringing to book the perpetrators of Mumbai attack.

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

75

jointness

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

Nitin Gokhale The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTV’s Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

The signs and symptoms of this vice plan of turning this country into another ‘Sikkim’ at national level are: giving away transit facilities to India without any financial benefits by destroying many of the river channels and road systems, reducing the presence of the Army at the Chittagong Hill Tracts, erasing ‘bismillah’ and ‘reliance upon Allah’ from the constitution, security operations of Indian security forces in Sylhet and elsewhere inside the country denying the rights of an independent state, formulating women and education policies against the religious customs and norms of mass population, saving the culprits of share market scandals, zero resistance against illegal ‘Tipaimukh’ dam, no resistance against regular killing of innocent Bangladeshi population by Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) and destroying the whole economic system of the country … ”

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with most of his family members, was assassinated in August 1975. The tragedy reverted the nation's normal course from secular democracy, which was the guiding force of the 1971 War of Liberation.

The coups and counter-coups following the 1975 bloody changeover for two decades were instrumental in the destruction of democratic institutions and the rehabilitation of the fundamentalist elements that were defeated in the historic national war. The most recent failed coup attempt in Dhaka highlights the need to keep up one's guard against such Jihadi elements in our neighbouring country. A blow by blow account of this attempted putsch.

T

hat secular, liberal democratic forces in Bangladesh are far from well-entrenched was once again proved in the past two months when a small group of mid-level officers in the Bangladesh Army with extreme religious views tried to instigate a coup against the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina.

In a rare occurrence, the Bangladesh Army came out with a public statement on the abortive attempt. Making the announcement, its spokesman, Brig Gen M Mashud Razzak, said 14-16 mid-level Army officers might have been involved in the bid.

The spokesman said retired officers Lt Col Ehsan Yusuf and Major Zakir had been arrested.

The main plotter of the coup was identified as one Major Zia (Syed M Ziaul Huq), now on the run, had been actively engaged in plotting and executing of the conspiracy through social media networks and mobile phones.

A day after the announcement, Bangladesh’s elite counter-terrorist force, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested five members of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir from Dhaka, after the Army said it had foiled a coup attempt. Sources said Major Ziaul-Haq was linked to the extremist religious group.

A detective of the RAB was injured during the arrests, some media reports said.

The Bangladesh Army had said in its announcement that Major Haq’s links with Hizb ut-Tahrir are proved, as the extremist outfit distributed leaflets reading the ‘Tale of Major Ziaul-Haq’ soon after his remarks about his ‘detention’ were posted on Facebook.

Major Haq was posted at the Mirpur

76

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Attempted coup in

Bangladesh

Cantonment, near the capital Dhaka. Sources say plotters belong to an anti-India group and felt Dhaka was getting too close to New Delhi.

According to the Bangladesh Army, Major Haq met a senior officer on December 22 and tried to provoke him into using the Army against the state. The officer immediately informed the appropriate authorities and his leave and transfer orders were cancelled.

In a rare occurrence, the Bangladesh Army came out with a public statement on the abortive attempt. Making the announcement, its spokesman, Brig Gen M Mashud Razzak, said 14-16 mid-level Army officers might have been involved in the bid Major Haq sent an email late last month alleging, among other charges, an Indian plot to turn Bangladesh into a client state. Maj Haq and his fellow plotters have been against the recent growing closeness between Dhaka and New Delhi.

Email and Facebook posting circulated in Bangladesh by this group of disgruntled and fanatic officers is both scary and revealing for its anti-India stance. It said in part: “The BDR carnage was a planned massacre on the Army to eliminate many of the bright, upright and capable officers to render it unable to defend the independence of Bangladesh anymore.

Some of the corrupt political leaders including few of the Generals and Senior Officers were the local players beside the neighbouring foreign Intelligence Agency, RAW. This is an open secret to all ranks of Bangladesh Military Forces and the mass population by this time. The collaborators of BDR massacre are now trying to save its key planners by hiding the real issues, launching mass cases against BDR soldiers, killing those who know the facts. The whole massacre

was about a step ahead to make the country a surrogate state of India like ‘Sikkim’. These patriotic martyred officers were one of the major obstacles of this vice (sic) plan.

Some of the top brass of Bangladesh Army e.g. present CGS, Gen Moinul, DG DGFI, Maj Gen Mamun Khaled, Logistic Area Commander Maj General Reza Noor, Brigadier General Motiur, ADG, DGFI and many others have sold their loyalty to RAW to serve their purpose in this country. DGFI has become, by this time, an active tool of neighbouring Intelligence

Organisation, RAW to achieve this objective of making this country a surrogate state. Some of the senior officials of DGFI are in fact receiving regular salaries and benefits from RAW for doing the job on their behalf.

The coup attempt was in fact unravelled by the combined efforts of Indian operatives and Bangladesh intelligence, highly-placed sources in both countries said.

The Facebook rant was in fact prompted by the fact that top RAW officials were in Bangladesh helping their counterparts to solve the

mystery and get to the root of the conspiracy.

Bangladesh's elite counter-terrorist force, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested five members of the banned Hizb ut-Tahrir from Dhaka, after the Army said it had foiled a coup attempt. Sources said Major Ziaul-Haq was linked to the extremist religious group The email and facebook entry had this to say: “Every week 2/3 officers are being arrested / abducted by

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

77

jointness

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH

DGFI with different plea. Recently, Maj Zia … was arrested and now he is fleeing with his life here and there. On the other hand, some of the serving officers are interviewed by joint team of RAW and DGFI in Chittagong and elsewhere. Nobody knows, how many officers are arrested and abducted in different divisions till now as they have successfully created a mistrust among the officers to not to share these kinds of information.

The coup attempt was in fact unravelled by the combined efforts of Indian operatives and Bangladesh intelligence, highly-placed sources in both countries said Investigators said the coup plotters believed that Indian agents and their collaborators were bent upon erasing the Muslim identity in Bangladesh. “ … They have a plan to erase the Muslim identity of this Army and the mass population at large. Specially, within Army, the Generals and senior officers who are with the ‘RAW controlled group’ have demonstrated unbecoming attitude towards many of the Muslim practices. Some of those Generals forcefully made young officers to shave their beards,” the plotters said in the email.

The conspirators cited recent Indo-Bangladesh agreements to enhance their mutual cooperation to point towards an Indian conspiracy to subsume Bangladesh’s identity.

“The signs and symptoms of this vice plan of turning this country into another ‘Sikkim’ at national level are: giving away transit facilities to India without any financial benefits by destroying many of the river channels and road systems, reducing the presence of the Army at the Chittagong Hill Tracts, erasing ‘bismillah’ and ‘reliance upon Allah’ from the constitution, security operations of Indian security forces in Sylhet and elsewhere inside the country denying the rights of an independent state, formulating women and education policies against the religious customs and norms of mass population, saving the culprits of share market scandals, zero resistance against illegal ‘Tipaimukh’ dam, no resistance against regular killing of innocent Bangladeshi

78

population by Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) and destroying the whole economic system of the country … ”

Investigators said the coup plotters believed that Indian agents and their collaborators were bent upon erasing the Muslim identity in Bangladesh. “ …

They have a plan to erase the Muslim identity of this Army and the mass population at large. Specially, within Army, the Generals and senior officers who are with the ‘RAW controlled group’ have demonstrated unbecoming attitude towards many of the Muslim practices. Some of those Generals forcefully made young officers to shave their beards,” the plotters said in the email Therefore, the plotters said: “The mid-level officers (Lt Col and below) have decided to rise up in this grave situation of the Army and the motherland itself. Otherwise, the Bangladesh Army and the independence of this country are at a stake.”

tragedy reverted the nation’s normal course from secular democracy, which was the guiding force of the 1971 War of Liberation. The coups and counter-coups following the 1975 bloody changeover for two decades were instrumental in the destruction of democratic institutions and the rehabilitation of the fundamentalist elements that were defeated in the historic national war.

Cleary, unlike in Pakistan, India’s Western neighbour, the Army in Bangladesh is not interested in reversing the democratisation of its country’s polity

As Haroon Habib, veteran journalist and a Mukti Yodha, wrote in The Hindu: "Bangladesh is no stranger to military interference in state affairs.

It has endured many coups and mutinies in its 40 years ofexistence, as well as long spells of military rule.

Ambitious generals have used the Army to implement their designs. As it was part of Pakistan for 24 years, Bangladesh also has the passed-on legacy of the military meddling in politics.”

That the coup attempt was ‘nipped in the bud,’ as a senior Awami League functionary described it, has come as a big relief to both New Delhi and Dhaka. But what is more significant is the stand taken by the Bangladesh Army. In a statement announcing the abortive coup, the Army said in a rare statement: “In the past, different evil forces banked on [the] Bangladesh Army which grew out of victory in the Liberation War to create disorder and gain political advantage.

Sometimes, they succeeded and, on some occasions, they failed. Even so, as an organisation, the Bangladesh Army has been carrying the burden of the disrepute such forces have earned in the past. The professionally efficient and well disciplined members of [the] Bangladesh Army would like to say, ‘We do not want to bear this liability on the shoulders of our organisation’.”

In the first such intrusion, the founding father of the country, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, along with most of his family members, was assassinated in August 1975. The

Cleary, unlike in Pakistan, India’s Western neighbour, the Army in Bangladesh is not interested in reversing the democratisation of its country’s polity.

Clearly, resentment against India and the decision of the Awami League government to return to secular, democratic norms in governing the country, have a section of middle-level Army officers up in arms.

February 2012 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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