DSA February 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief “T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .

he Indian Armed Forces inherited a very robust tradition of jointness, thanks to their large scale participation in World War II. That was the era of Admin Boxes in Burma where military garrisons cut off by Japanese infiltrating columns were kept supplied from the air and given fire support by the Royal Indian Air Force. No wonder, after independence, the British leadership heavily emphasised jointness, built the National Defence Academy (NDA) and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC). We thus started with a peak of jointness and synergy from which we could only retreat and come down.

The pre-1962 era was an unmitigated disaster for jointness and synergy. That came back by degrees in 1965 and we saw another peak in the 1971 War – which turned out to be a classic Tri-Service Campaign. We needed to formalise this synergy. We subsequently went in for the Defence Planning Staff and later the National Security Council. Post-Kargil War we raised the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) sans the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It still has rendered yeoman service by synergising our Long Term Integrated Perspective Plans of the Three Services and formalising our Joint Amphibious Forces and Special Forces Doctrines. It is now working on Joint Sub-Conventional Warfare, Joint Space and Joint Maritime Forces Doctrines. The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) have proved to be viable and effective structures with the ANC earning it’s spurs in the major Tsunami, when we surprised the world with our support to neighbouring countries in severe distress. The road ahead

Where do we go from here? Jointness and Synergy are the very key to success on the modern battlefield. A major power like India now needs to formalise and synergise the National Security Process. This must begin with the periodic enunciation of a National Security Strategy. This in turn should lead to the formulation of a Joint Strategy and the issue of Joint Operational, Intelligence, Training and Logistical Directives. We urgently need to formulate a Joint Doctrine for Limited War against a Nuclear Backdrop. The most recent fracas on the LC only highlights the need to formalise such a doctrine at the earliest. We urgently need to establish three new Joint Commands viz. the Space Command; the Special Forces Command and the Cyber Command. This issue debates the concept of a lead service for each of these joint commands – as the present Chairman COSC has proposed. The greatest service India can do to itself is to speed up its Arms Acquisition Plans. These are supposed to get completed over the next two five year Perspective Plans (12th and 13th) that end only in 2027. China is more or less ready for conflict and by 2020, will be fully prepared for any local conflict in Asia. Why are we opening up this major window of vulnerability? How can we decide the pace of our military build-up in a purely stand-alone mode and delink it from the pace at which China and Pakistan are proceeding ahead with their rearmament and military modernisation? Lastly, we need to rejuvenate the NDA. That is the keystone of our entire edifice of jointness. The NDA urgently needs a brand new civilian faculty of the country’s brightest and the best. In cussed cost cutting exercises our bureaucrats had cut the pays of the civilian staff on the plea that they were teaching undergraduates. This virtually destroyed the academic foundations of the NDA and till today virtually 70 per cent of the civilian teaching staff is ad hoc and temporary. That is not how a premier national institution should be run. The Navy wants its graduates to be BTechs. The Army needs a Non-technical stream also. Why can’t the NDA teach BA Hons courses in Indian Military History, Military Geography and International Relations? The Armed Forces also need to send their best. This is a foundational edifice and we cannot afford to see it go down under. It is an iconic and foundational institution and reviving it would be the primary task of the Chairman COSC.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

ndia with twenty-eight States and seven Union Territories having complex demographical situations; about a dozen Indian States share international borders and a long coastal belt in some States has made them quite vulnerable to security concerns. The threats and challenges have arisen multifold in the past twenty years.

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As the nation developed and grew in economic stature the challenges on the security front have also increased substantially but, unfortunately, our governments at the Centre and the States have not taken this matter seriously or sincerely. It is the sole responsibility of the governments to provide the best security to their people be it social security to food security, adequate infrastructure to the physical security for each citizen. In fact right from the day of independence, no one thought of visualising the requirements of a security culture in Indian society wherein a feeling and alertness on security issues could have been developed in the citizens. It has been taken for granted and never given any importance at all. What we see in the attitude and the aptitude of our citizens by and large is quite pathetic that most of us have a casual approach towards our own security concerns. We could not inculcate this concern among our people after independence at all and that is the reason we are always insecure. We have hardly seen any security awareness / education involved at any level in the Indian society. It has also been a matter of concern that we see the same casual approach in our police and security forces as how our police forces deal with a common citizen and their attitude within their own force is the result of this casual approach of our policy and decision-makers. They appear unable to visualise the need for good policing when in due course of time there will be enormous development and challenges and threats will increase in the security domain. Another flaw has been in laying down a clear road map between the Centre and States for the security requirements. I donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t understand how we can be so casual that in spite of the clarity in our Constitution on the rights and duties of Centre and the States we see so much of rift on various issues related to jurisdiction, permissions and in dealing with affairs related to security among the Central and State Governments. It defeats the purpose of providing a secured environment in the country. New States were crafted in the past few decades with the intention of providing a better over-all development in small States for progress, happiness and bright future of the people. Unfortunately not many States have managed to do that. I would like to draw attention to the example of Jharkhand which was created about a decade ago but what progress do we see â&#x20AC;&#x201C; nothing. When it comes to synergy and cooperation between the Centre and the States we see that there is hardly any on the issue of the growing security concerns which should normally have been at the top of the agenda. It is a matter that should be slated for immediate attention because it affects the progress and prosperity of their respective States. Unfortunately due to lack of this synergy between the two, our people are suffering and our police and security personnel are killed or badly injured. I sincerely believe that this is the sole reason why the Naxalite and jihadi movements have grown and become endemic in various parts of the country. It is with certainty that one can say that every citizen of the country wants that the Centre and the States forge a viable consensus among themselves about how to deal with the several security-related issues so that each citizen can expect peace for himself, his family and the nation as a whole.

he recent incident involving the damaged Indian Air Force Mi-17 helicopter and the crew members leaving behind a wounded Chhattisgarh Police radio operator as they went to seek help is a prime example of an absence of jointness in the functioning of security forces, security agencies and the various states vis-a-vis the centre. A thorough enquiry is required into the incident, especially the fact that an injured trooper and a radio operator at that, could be left behind by the IAF crew. This is a grave incident that deserves the most serious attention. The gravity of the incident is both on account of the fact that an injured colleague was left behind alone, even if the crew went looking for help. As also that it reflects poorly on the functioning of central and state forces and agencies.

A dispassionate investigation will prove the culpability, or innocence, of the IAF crew. But what it will not highlight is the poor procedures for jointness that operate in this country. Each service, force and agency believes it can operate on its own and that its troops can only be under its own organisation. That belief defies logic, just as it is in violation of human knowledge, growth and understanding. For success to be guaranteed in the shortest possible time and at the least possible cost, it is essential that the various players involved in the business of securing the country work together with honesty of purpose. There are many words said to this effect by many a senior functionary but they are not meant to be policy. Senior officers will voice platitudes that suggest a belief in jointness, but on ground there is no effort in that direction. Each wishes to retain his own service or force as an empire separate from the other. Many a times the competition is greater with the other services and forces in garnering public accolades and medals.

All this is allowed to persist because there is no concrete structure that is built on the basis of jointness. What does exist is merely on account of ad hoc decisions. Ad hocism never won a war for any country and never defeated an enemy, internal or external. Punjab was won because a structure was built around the capabilities of an individual in an appointment that oversaw all operations and coordinated with all services and agencies in the state. Kashmir was turned around because a functioning and coordinated structure was built into clearly demarcated operational boundaries between various state and central forces. And a unified command coordinated between the political, police and military forces in the state. But that is not the case with the anti-Naxal operations across a vast swathe of land in the heart of India. States seem to be functioning on their own and the central forces quite independently of local authority. That is not how this campaign can be successful. From the district or tehsil level, to the state capital, there will have to be joint structure of all forces and agencies operating in that area. And as the structure rises so should the vision and responsibility of those that are in position. For what is seriously lacking is a vision larger than the self. Once that were in place, jointness would fall into place in no time.

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February 2013 Defence AND security alert

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contents JOINTNESS: NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH Special Issue Februar y 2013

Centre-state synergy in counter-terrorism operations

A R T I C L E S civil-military relations: need to be more civil towards the military

c o n t e n t s

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Volume 4 Issue 5 FEBRUARY 2013

Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC (retd)

jointness continues to elude the Indian armed forces

E X C L U S I V E

Chairman COSC and CAS Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne

Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd)

jointness and synergy in the Indian context

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

unifying process-unified operations-united theatre

Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan (retd)

management of cyber, aerospace and special forces command

Maj Gen SK Choudhry VSM (retd)

air sea battle concept in Indian context

Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

poseidonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s long view across time

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

building jointmanship in the armed forces

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

police and paramilitary used as whipping boys by the Maoists

Joginder Singh, IPS (retd)

the new phase in proxy war

RSN Singh

line of conflicts

Colonel US Rathore (retd)

evasive national consensus

Cecil Victor

approaches towards countering terrorism in India: role of centre and state relations

Praful Shankar Adagale

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Pranay Sahay, IPS DG, CRPF

Dr A Sivathanu Pillai, CEO and MD BrahMos Aerospace

Reliance Industries Limited Advent of a leader

Afghanistan post-2014 and Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role

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F E A T U R E S

Maj Gen PK Chakravorty VSM (retd)

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I N T E R V I E W S

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jointness and synergy

CHAIRMAN COSC INTERVIEW

Defence and Security Alert: As Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, what is your vision for enhancing Jointness and Synergy of operations between the three services? Chairman COSC: In my view promoting Integrated operations amongst the three Services adds an important force multiplying dimension to our capabilities. We have covered a lot of ground in this regard however, I would also admit that there is still a lot that needs to be done. In my view, we already have a well established and operationally validated joint operations model. What now needs to be done is to fine-tune the existing model in consonance with the changed operational realities. We have identified three key areas where we feel a need to establish new joint structures ie Space, Special Operations and Cyber. Additionally, we also have to strengthen our two existing joint Commands of Strategic Forces and Andaman and Nicobar and we already have detailed plans in place for the same. Defence and Security Alert: Media reports indicate that you have recently proposed the establishment of three new Joint Commands â&#x20AC;&#x201C; viz. The Special Force Command, the Space Command and the Cyber Command with a lead service for each. Could you throw some light on this proposal? Chairman COSC: Yes, it is in tune with our objectives of building-up our capability response options for handling any future operational contingencies and for this, we have identified three key implementation areas. These are in Space, Cyber and Spl Ops. It is also relevant to note that each of these domains needs to be steered and headed by a single Service which has the predominant functional role in that domain whilst ensuring that the domain structure remains basically on a tri-Service model. It is for this reason that I believe in the need to have these three new Joint Commands.

Space Command The on-going developments relating to the increased use of military satellites in our neighbourhood provides a pointer to the future threats which are to be expected from this dimension. As you know, Air and Space technologies have a global reach and transcend national borders. Therefore, what we need is a suitable policy backed by organisational infrastructure and capabilities which would bring together all components of air and space power for the purpose of deterrence as also to ensure that we have full access to our Space assets and the envisaged medium. We need to keep in mind that in future the increased likelihood of space technology gaining a higher deterrence value is also relevant. Space power will slowly evolve as an important new dimension for calculating military and economic power of the nation. The COSC is presently discussing the modalities for creation of a Tri-Service Space Command to address all these important issues.

Special Forces Command

I N T E R V I E W

Establishment of a Special Forces Command as a joint structure with elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force is under active consideration. The roles and organisation of this joint command along with its linkages with the three services and other agencies such as NIA and NSG are also under formulation. The aim is to promote greater synergy in operations, training and equipping of the Special Forces which will increase our operational efficiency.

Cyber Command Considering the criticality of protecting our operational and information networks, we need to put in place an effective joint structure which would coordinate all its attendant issues. Formation of Cyber Command is presently under active consideration. The views of all three Services have been obtained and the case is being progressed further. Defence and Security Alert: In what way will the designation of a lead service for each Joint Command help in practical terms in establishing these new organisational structures? Will this be the new guiding principle for more Joint Commands that may come up in the future? What is the road map ahead? Chairman COSC: The Indian Armed Forces are cognizant of the enormous trust placed in them by the Nation. The evolution of joint structures, such as the Commands you just mentioned are a result of collective introspection to the emerging needs of the armed forces and based on a careful analysis of the past and ongoing military campaigns all over the world. The designation of a lead service which has an inherent domain expertise to handle such a Tri-Service Command is also a part of this analysis. As far as establishing additional joint commands is concerned, we will certainly consider these options based on the specific demands of those times but yes, we are open to the idea. However, our requirements and peculiarities are unique to our

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

e x c l u s i v e INTERVIEW

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne in conversation with Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi (retd) Editor-in-chief Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. environment and the solution to our challenges should also be in consonance with our needs and not based on some other examples elsewhere. Therefore, we need to guard against blindly copying existing structures that are in vogue in other nations. Defence and Security Alert: Practically, Jointness would translate into a Joint Strategy and Joint Directives on Operations, Logistics, Training and Intelligence. How far have we progressed in this vital direction? Chairman COSC: Ever since independence, the Armed Forces have undertaken joint operations in varied measures. HQ IDS has been established as a Tri-Service organisation to formulate various policy guidelines on joint operations and also to act as a coordinating agency between the three services and MoD on certain matters. HQ IDS has already formulated Tri-Services joint doctrines on many of the issues which you have just mentioned. We must remember that doctrinal revision is a periodic process which is undertaken keeping in view evolution of war fighting concepts and advances in technology. However, presently there are serious limitations to this construct due to the absence of an institutional permanent head who could guide the IDS. Defence and Security Alert: Do we need a Joint Doctrine for Limited Wars against a nuclear backdrop? Isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t that the most likely context of war fighting that we will see in South Asia in the decades ahead? Did not the recent stand off on the LC reinforce such a need? Chairman COSC: As I mentioned earlier, we have formulated joint doctrines to tackle threats across the spectrum of conflict. As CAS and Chairman COSC, I am fully confident that the Indian Armed Forces are competent and capable of dealing with any challenges to our national security.

The IAF is committed to promoting the indigenous design, development and manufacture of defence equipment and looks forward to a symbiotic relationship with the home-grown defence production industry in acquiring the desired capabilities

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

CHAIRMAN COSC INTERVIEW

defence and security

advent of a leader

Defence and Security Alert: The Naresh Chandra Committee has proposed the concept of a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff instead of the earlier CDS. Do you find this an improvement over the former concept? What will be the arbitration mechanisms for resolution of Inter-services disputes in this setup? The current dispensation is entirely based on consensus – where dissent by any one service chief kills the proposal. Do you see this changing in the transformed context? If so, how? Chairman COSC: The Naresh Chandra Task Force proposal to create the appointment of (Permanent) Chairman COSC has been concurred by Air HQ. It is definitely a step forward as compared to the existing mechanism. As per the recommendations, the Chairman COSC would be a four star officer with a fixed tenure of two years and he would be responsible for all the Tri-Service Commands. In addition he would be the single point contact between RM and three Services on matters of policy and training. He would As CAS and Chairman COSC, I am fully thus be the fourth four star officer. The Service Chiefs will continue to exercise operational control over their confident that the Indian Armed Forces are respective Service and have direct access to RM on competent and capable of dealing with any service specific issues. This set up will allow HQ IDS challenges to our national security under Chairman COSC to function as an effective advisory nodal agency to the government. In addition, for total integration of MoD and Service HQ, certain posts have been identified in MoD and at Air HQ where Service and civilian officers can be cross posted. This process will pave the way for full integration of MoD and Service HQ in the future and only then can the creation of a CDS be envisioned. As I mentioned earlier, the Services are also collectively working on the proposal of having new joint Tri-Service structures, so I don’t foresee any problems as far as taking joint decisions are concerned. With all the measures in place I am sure there will hardly be any instances of not being able to achieve consensus. So overall, the need for a permanent Chairman COSC is recommended by the IAF.

Dr Vivek Lall leads India into large scale aerospace manufacturing

Team DSA

Defence and Security Alert: The pace of our Arms Acquisition process, especially when compared to the blistering pace set up by China and even the failing state of Pakistan, is a matter of deep national concern. What can be done to enhance this pace so that no windows of vulnerability are opened? When do you see the Rafale deal getting finalised ultimately?

Indian business magnate Mukesh Ambani’s dream to manufacture aircraft has started taking shape. Ambani is known to pick globally best talent to spearhead his forays. About 2 years ago he picked Dr Vivek Lall in order to enter the homeland security and aerospace domain.

Chairman COSC: All procurements of IAF are processed as per the existing Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The DPP has not only streamlined the entire Capital Procurement Process; it has also catered to the ever increasing requirement of transparency in the procurement process. The new procedures at times, may appear to delay the procurement timelines rather than reducing them, but on the whole it will certainly lead to a better understanding of the processes involved and bring in the much needed standardisation and transparency amongst the procedures followed by all three Services. The DPP is also evolutionary in nature; feedback from the environment and stakeholders is regularly considered and procedures suitably amended so to include suggested improvements. The “windows of vulnerability”, if any, can be addressed through the Fast Track Procedure provided in the DPP for any urgent procurements. The procurement plans of the IAF are progressing in consonance with our long-term capability building plans and there are no immediate causes of concern.

Ambani’s new aerospace company, a diversification from current business of energy and materials, has taken off. RIL's vision is to make India a global hub of aerospace manufacturing.

The scope of the MMRCA project is very vast. The Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) has finalised the Technical and Offset related issues with the vendor. The Transfer of Technology (ToT) related aspects being complex in nature are being worked out and the contractual clauses will only be finalised with the vendor thereafter. We are hopeful that the contract will be finalised in the next few months. Defence and Security Alert: What can be done to establish a vibrant Defence Industrial Base in India, especially one that taps the dynamism of the Private Sector? Would raising the cap on FDI in defence help?

Space power will slowly evolve as an important new dimension for calculating military and economic power of the nation. The COSC is presently discussing the modalities for creation of a Tri-Service Space Command to address all these important issues

Chairman COSC: At present, the domestic defence research and production is largely confined to the Public Sector Companies with a very few private companies as of now. However, an increasing number of private companies are now getting involved as offset partners to the OEMs and sub-vendors to DPSUs. To give momentum to indigenous production and boost to private defence industries, a proposal to procure 56 transport aircraft as replacement for Avro aircraft through “Buy and Make” route has been accorded AON. In this proposal, 16 aircraft would be procured from the OEM while 40 aircraft will be manufactured by an Indian Production Agency from the Private Sector, nominated by the OEM. Further, RFP for 95 x micro-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for the IAF and IN has been issued on ‘Buy (Indian)’ basis to Indian Private Companies. These schemes would provide the much needed opportunity for the Private Sector to establish themselves in the complex Aerospace industry. The industry will need to capitalise on the available opportunities and come up to international standards with respect to supply chain management, quality control and other related aspects. 26 per cent FDI in defence sector is already in place and the decision to further open defence production to greater inflow of FDI is one that would be taken by the Government after due consideration to a large number of aspects, including our strategic imperatives. The IAF is committed to promoting the indigenous design, development and manufacture of defence equipment and looks forward to a symbiotic relationship with the home-grown defence production industry in acquiring the desired capabilities.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

Ambani’s Rs 76 billion Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) has formally incorporated a new firm to enter  aerospace ventures. The new company, Reliance Aerospace Technologies (P) Limited, has been registered with appropriate authorities, including the Registrar of Companies (RoC). As per the memorandum of articles, the objective is “to design, develop, manufacture, equipment and components, including airframe, engines, radars, avionics and accessories for military and civilian aircraft, helicopters, unmanned airborne vehicles and aerostats.” The company will also undertake research and produce new aerospace technologies, materials, components and equipment and test and carry out their certification. The company will also partner with global majors to bring in sophisticated civil and military aerospace technologies into the country. Research and development is part of its charter. Sources said huge funds were being earmarked for R&D purposes. Dr Vivek Lall (43), the country’s most respected aerospace leader today, is heading Mukesh Ambani’s new ventures. Lall earlier worked with the NASA and defence majors Raytheon and Boeing. Although the newly created company has not identified the hub for its activities, it already has several strategic tie-ups including with Dassault. On January 31, 2012, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale emerged winner in the “dogfight”, beating the European consortium’s Eurofighter Typhoon in over US$ 11 billion Indian Air Force deal for the 4.5 generation 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). As per a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Dassault Aviation, the RIL’s new aerospace company will be a technology and innovation leader in the country. According to Dassault Aviation, the firm has entered into an MoU with the RIL “for pursuing strategic opportunities of collaboration in the area of complex manufacturing and support in India”. Dassault manufactures Rafale combat jets and Falcon business jets and the proposed venture may be making a foray into both sectors. Industry experts feel the RIL may emerge as the biggest Indian player in various defence projects like combat aircraft, military systems and homeland security in near future. Mukesh Ambani’s new ventures of defence, aerospace solutions and homeland security may overtake his existing businesses in years to come. News is coming in that another very significant global major has formalised their relationship with RIL under Dr Lall's leadership. India's future in aerospace manufacturing has found an anchor.

jointness and synergy

GRAVITAS

S Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja PVSM, AVSM, VSM, ADC (retd) The writer retired as the A O C - i n - C o f Tr a i n i n g Command, IAF on 29 February 2012. A pilot by profession, he has flown various fighter and transport aircraft. In his long stint in the air force of about 40 years, he has held many operational and staff appointments. Prior to taking over as the AOC-in-C, he was the Deputy Chief (Operations) in HQ IDS. He has commanded a premier transport squadron in the Northern Sector, Air Force Station, Yelahanka – the main transport training base of the IAF and the Air Force Academy at Hyderabad. He is the first air force officer to have undergone an International F e l l owship at the National Defence University, Washington DC, USA. He is a postgraduate in ‘National Security Strategy’ from National War College, USA.

The uncivil treatment meted out to the military over the decades since independence has to change and for it, the civil-military relations needs to improve. Late K Subrahmanyam, has very aptly described the civil-military structure as one where “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without any direction”

trategy is the creative element in the exercise of power. It is the search for the most favourable relationship between available military means and desired political ends. Strategy, then, is the key domain of civil-military interaction. It is the area where theoretical notions of civilian supremacy and military subordination can be tested most closely in practice; but it is not surprising that most discussions of civil-military relations in India amusingly bypass the environment of strategy. Fears of growing militarism in the American society prompted studies and produced influential readings from renowned authors as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Even as this piece is being written, it has been reported in the media that the issue of Pakistan violating the ceasefire at the LoC and the inhuman mutilation of two soldiers of the Indian Army, being discussed in the media, has been briefed to the Prime Minister, not by the Chairman COSC or the Army Chief, but by the NSA and the Defence Secretary!

“It’s the Soldier, not the Reporter who has given us freedom of the Press. It’s the Soldier, not the Poet who has given us freedom of Speech. It’s the Soldier, not the Politicians that ensures our rights to Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. It’s the Soldier, who salutes the Flag, who serves beneath the Flag and whose coffin is draped by the Flag.” – Anon.

ivil-Military relations are normally discussed as a general structure with limited discussion on professionalism, rather than a discussion as an institutional structure; institutional structure consists of the role of Parliament and Bureaucracy, following with other institutions, such as the military. Effective civil-military relations are normally connected to the strength of democracy. India has always been considered as a nation that has followed democratic norms, even in a crisis and has been routinely lauded as an example for being one of the few post-colonial states where the military has remained strictly apolitical and has not intervened in political issues. An important study claims that, “The Indian military, despite growth in its geostrategic importance, increased technological and organisational sophistication and use in internal security operations, stands firmly subordinate to civilian leaders of all parties and ideologies.”1 The role of military has been changing with time. Its challenging duty is to serve the nation in responding to the needs of security and other functions, as may be assigned to it. In this day and age, however, it is obvious that the role of military is not solely to protect and maintain national security, thus adding to the complexity of the civil-military relations. The

phenomenon of terrorism has brought forth new challenges with unjust and aggressive actions, thereby blurring the boundaries and relations between military, bureaucracy and political leadership. Nonetheless, there is a distinction between the mature democratic countries and the rest of the world with regard to the civil-military relations. Strategy is the creative element in the exercise of power. It is the search for the most favourable relationship between available military means and desired political ends. Strategy, then, is the key domain of civil-military interaction. It is the area where theoretical notions of civilian supremacy and military subordination can be tested most closely in practice; but it is not surprising that most discussions of civil-military relations in India amusingly bypass the environment of strategy. Fears of growing militarism in the American society prompted studies and produced influential readings from renowned authors as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, also considered as the two founders of the modern-day Civil-Military Theory. Certain aspects were defined as traditional literature based on their scholarly works and other contemporary scholars. Currently, however,

1. Harsh V Pant, India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for Civil-Military Relations in India, Armed Forces and Society 33(2), January 2007, p. 243.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:

NEED TO BE MORE CIVIL TOWARDS THE MILITARY changes in the world stage make these theories less applicable. As a result, debates have continued even after the end of the cold war and turn of the century, with the increased incidents of military coups d’état in various parts of the world; discussions revolved around whether the power of the state was in a decline and a certain level of civilian control over the military was essential.

Today most people see war as 'outsourced' to their soldiers, to whom they are prepared to pay lip service in times of need, but otherwise do not really want to recognise or know about them. Historically, India does not value its military and that is the reason that we have been subjugated by every invader in the sub-continent

Indian history of higher defence management Prior to gaining independence, Indian military was directed by British. The history of dysfunction in the higher defence management in India starts with the country’s independence and has been more than adequately influenced with the happenings in the world at that time. The Indian Civil Service played its role in keeping aside the police and the military with the making of a draft for higher defence organisation, which over the last 65 years has been fine-tuned and effectively

practised to suit the requirements of the bureaucrats of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and others. Irrespective of the wars fought, recommendations of various Committees, including the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, the IAS has stubbornly managed to keep the Indian Armed Forces out of the higher decision-making loop, acting as an insulation for the politicians to exercise proxy civil control of the military. There is a segment of the Indian population that is averse to see the defence forces playing their role, as they should be doing, in decision-making in security issues; this segment seems to forget that once every few years when wars occur, the course of history also tends to change; there are many examples but it would be adequate to mention just two – the Battle of Plassey in 1757 that marked the beginning of nearly 200 years of British rule in India and the conflict with Pakistan on the Kargil heights, in 1999, that brought into focus the need to fix up the defence management system and modernise our Armed Forces. Some half-hearted coming-and-goings have been initiated in this regard, but the attempts have not been followed to their logical conclusion; the armed forces continue to be effectively sidelined. In establishing the norm of civilian supremacy in the republic, Jawaharlal Nehru played a key role. He realised

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

GRAVITAS

the importance of keeping the military subordinate to the political authority. There are numerous incidents which demonstrated his thought process on this delicate issue, leading to frayed edges of civil-military relations and culminating in the disastrous China-India conflict of 1962.

The existing strong, procedural and bureaucratic control over the armed forces is not unique or problematic per se; the armed forces of USA are also controlled by a massive and effective bureaucracy. There is a difference, however, between the two; the bureaucracy here lacks expertise in matters of the military; a state inherited from the colonial era with its emphasis on a generalist cadre as compared to a specialist cadre

The aftermath of Kargil

A major flaw in the recommendations of the Task Force and GoM was that mere changeovers were advised, but did not amplify any mechanism for the change, much to the annoyance of the armed forces and to the satisfaction of those manning the desks of MoD. As a result, a notification issued by the government on 23 May 2002, ‘designated’ the Service HQs as ‘integrated’ departments of MoD with a view to show to the general public, that the military is fully involved in any security policy formulation. Given the apprehensions, in the minds of the bureaucracy, associated with the type of integration recommended by the Task Force, no major alterations were expected; small steps, however, to indicate a beginning towards partial integration at the functional ranks with the lateral exchange of appointments at the Jt Secy / Dy Secy levels, could have been taken. Such a move would have provided the senior bureaucrats with professional advice from the military officers and vice versa; sadly, nothing such was initiated. As of now, the mechanism and working relations between the MoD and the Service HQs have maintained a status quo over the years, though necessity-driven arrangements have been put in place, whenever and wherever required.

In an interview published in the CLAWS Journal (Summer 2009), Late K Subrahmanyam expressed his disappointment that neither the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) nor the Group of Ministers (GoM) Reports were tabled or discussed in Parliament, the reasons are too

Despite five wars, continuing insurgencies and separatist movements in various parts of the country, an increase in cross-border proxy war by Pakistan, Revolution in Military Affairs, the end of the cold war, the American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan going nuclear and an increasing belligerence shown by China, the Indian defence establishment and the national security system, has more or less, remained static and impervious to the changes in the world and in the country. Why, even as this piece is being written, it has been reported in the media that the issue of Pakistan violating the ceasefire at the LoC and the inhuman mutilation of two soldiers of the Indian Army, being discussed in the media, has been briefed to the Prime Minister, not by the Chairman COSC or the Army Chief, but by the NSA and the Defence Secretary! It is, therefore, time to take a relook at the security structure of the country and see what needs to be done to face the balance of the 21st century.

obvious to be repeated; neither were the Findings and Recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force and the Advani led GoM addressed the way they should have been. An important clause from the GoM was on restructuring the Indian higher defence organisation so as to provide professional and high quality military advice to the Prime Minister. While some of the recommendations of the GoM were accepted and implemented, albeit half-heartedly, the appointment of a CDS was delayed by the then Prime Minister, Vajpayee, for reasons that are only for the gullible.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

here lacks expertise in matters of the military; a state inherited from the colonial era with its emphasis on a generalist cadre as compared to a specialist cadre. It is no surprise then that one finds an individual from the Ministry of Agriculture taking over an important portfolio in the Ministry of Defence, thus leading to a lack of in-depth knowledge and information asymmetries and making the hapless bureaucrat focus more on the decision-making rather than the end result.

In establishing the norm of civilian supremacy in the republic, Jawaharlal Nehru played a key role. He realised the importance of keeping the military subordinate to the political authority. There are numerous incidents which demonstrated his thought process on this delicate issue, leading to frayed edges of civil-military relations and culminating in the disastrous China-India conflict of 1962 Current developments in conflicts and conflict-management clearly indicate the changing nature of war. Real time intelligence, flawless communications, accuracy and lethality of weapon systems and an increasingly automated battlefield demand that the Services need to be structured, trained, equipped and brought to bear on the adversary, in an integrated manner. These intricacies also demand carefully thought of decisions and sound advice to the government, across the entire spectrum of military issues and war-making. This can be achieved only through reforms in the higher defence management – one of which is the integration of the Service HQs with MoD. The armed forces are normally consulted by the political leadership prior to making decisions on the use of force; but the armed forces are not invited to be a part of important inter-agency discussions, so crucial to the security decision-making process. Year after year, the armed forces have been given a raw deal. They are downgraded with regular periodicity and denuded of power due to them. Enough has been said about their dwindling status. The Sixth Pay Commission, once again,

brought to the fore the variance of thought between the bureaucracy and the armed forces with the self-centred bureaucracy having its way, once again, to ensure that the Pay Commission did not include a member from the armed forces. The ensuing anomalies in the recommendations of the Commission, running in triple figures, were set to be resolved by a Commission of Secretaries – yet again with no representation from the armed forces! The anomalies are still to be resolved and the country has seen some scenes of annoyed ex-Servicemen returning their medals to the President of India, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Such actions on the part of the political leadership-bureaucracy combine, have an adverse effect on the military in areas of strategic planning, threat perception, weapons acquisition and human resources development.

The soldier has never been considered as a vote-bank, rather he has been considered as an expendable, who is only doing his job that he was recruited for when he makes the supreme sacrifice. Hence the political and bureaucratic disdain for the soldier. The least that can be done to correct the situation is to take the military officers at various levels into the Ministry of Defence, involve them in defence policy and strategy matters and use the military leadership in discussing and planning national security issues A Task Force on National Security was set up by the Prime Minister, headed by Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary and the Indian Ambassador to USA till 2001; other members of the Task Force included former Chiefs of the three Services, former heads of various government departments, retired bureaucrats and police officers. It was considered as another sincere attempt to review the set-up of national security after the Kargil conflict and had sub-committees to focus on internal security, defence and intelligence issues; the mandate of the Task Force was to review the existing processes, procedures and practices in the national security system and recommend remedial measures.

The Task Force submitted its report to the government on 23 May 2012; some of its content, as was expected, found its way into the media, even before the report could be examined; it is yet to be perused by the cabinet! While the defence forces have a lot of hopes pinned on this report, delay in examining the report shows that the government neither has the sense of urgency nor the political will to accept and implement the recommendations. Mid-2012 saw some very unpleasant and disturbing incidents occur in the Army forcing the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri (RM) to write to the PM, in July 2012, on the ‘growing discontent’ amongst the serving and retired members of the armed forces. On 12 July 2012, The Prime Minister appointed a high-level Committee, headed by the Cabinet Secretary, with five other senior Secretaries as members – the Committee, once again, did not include any member from the armed forces despite the three Chiefs writing separate letters to the RM to do so. Lame-duck excuses were offered to not include any, citing that it would delay the submission of the report scheduled for 08 August 12 – has it been submitted – the media has not yet reported it and no one is the wiser of the outcome; if something does come out, it will only be some cosmetic changes to appease the military.

Concluding thoughts Today, living as we currently do, in a longer period of comparative peace than any in history, it is but natural for people to think differently of war. They no longer need to be ready to fight to survive and no longer see war as everyone’s business. Today most people see war as ‘outsourced’ to their soldiers, to whom they are prepared to pay lip service in times of need, but otherwise do not really want to recognise or know about them. Historically, India does not value its military and that is the reason that we have been subjugated by every invader in the sub-continent. If India survives today, despite the deep sociological, organisational and institutional divides between the political leadership and a manoeuvring bureaucracy on the one side and the military on the other, it

is only due to the apolitical stance and the unquestioned loyalty of the military and enormous sacrifices made by the soldiers. The soldier has never been considered as a vote-bank, rather he has been considered as an expendable, who is only doing his job that he was recruited for when he makes the supreme sacrifice. Hence the political and bureaucratic disdain for the soldier. When Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals, with long years of management and leadership experience, knowledge of world affairs and of attitudes and capabilities of other nations, can answer media questions relating to the military and plans, why do the bureaucrats and politicians, themselves having far less experience and knowledge on the subject, protest and deny them the opportunity to help formulate national security policies, to put forth their views and keep the country informed? The least that can be done to correct the situation is to take the military officers at various levels into the Ministry of Defence, involve them in defence policy and strategy matters and use the military leadership in discussing and planning national security issues. Military leaders are not war-mongering, trigger-happy autocrats; a military leader fully well realises the realities and costs of war and sees war as a last resort where failure is not an option. Civilian control over the military means political control and not bureaucratic control; but does the public and our political leadership really understand this; there is a lack of understanding leading to discontent in the military. The uncivil treatment meted out to the military over the decades since independence has to change and for it, the civil-military relations need to improve. Late K Subrahmanyam, has very aptly described the civil-military structure as one where “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability and the military assumes responsibility without any direction.” Sometimes it is necessary to look into the mirror for some introspection.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

internal security

DG, CRPF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEW It is All India in character, both in deployment and in its composition. Due to its unique capability to quickly adapt to various situational requirements and also, to work in perfect harmony with the State Police, CRPF has, over the years, acquired the distinction of being perhaps the most acceptable Force, by the people and the state administrations. The Force is capable of dealing with all types of Internal Security problems.

The Director General of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Mr Pranay Sahay IPS in an exclusive interview to Defence and Security Alert expounds his views and shares with our readers his vision for the premier Paramilitary Force.

DSA: There were recent reports that troops of the CRPF, deployed extensively for anti-Naxal and counter-insurgency operations, are suffering from a “lot of stress” because of long periods of deployment. What measures are you planning to take to counter this problem?

DSA: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is considered the largest paramilitary force in the world. Since its inception in 1939, what transformations has CRPF gone through to reach this pre-eminent position?

DG, CRPF: Measures to counter stress because of long periods of deployment in LWE areas:

DG, CRPF: 1st Bn CRPF then known as Crown Representative’s Police came into existence on 27th July 1939 with its Hqrs at Neemuch with a strength of 1,008 personnel. The Force kept on increasing following incessant demands for its service from all over the Country and the Force rose in numbers as per need.

The Force is commanded by Director General with its HQr at New Delhi. As on date, the Force has 4 Zones, 20 Adm Sectors, 2 Ops Sectors, 43 Adm Ranges, 7 Ops Ranges, 40 Group Centres, 194 Executive Bns, 3 Mahila Bns, 10 RAF Bns, 10 CoBRA Bns, 3 NDRF Bns, 5 Signal Bns, 1 Special Duty Group and 1 Parliamentary Duty Group. In order to meet the medical, training and maintaining requirement the Force has Four 100 Bedded Composite Hospitals, Seventeen 50 Bedded Composite Hospitals, 4 Central Training Colleges, 5 Recruit Training Centres, 2 CIAT Schools, 1 Internal Security Academy, 1 CRPF Academy, 1 CTC (T&IT), 3 Central Weapon Stores, 7 Arms Workshops, 3 Static / Mobile Workshops and 1 Dog Training and Breeding School. Further, as per approved raising plan, 22 Executive Bns, 1 Mahila Bn, 4 Group Centres, 4 Adm Range HQrs, 1 Adm Sector HQr have to be raised upto 2018-19 in phased manner.

To meet the demands of emerging complex situations, the Force had grown in numbers and in terms of modernisation of weaponry, equipment and transport. All this has made the requirement for continuous expansion of the Force with professional attitude to keep this Force in pre-eminent position in the world. Presently the Force is having an overall strength of 2,96,804 posts of various ranks.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

CRPF has always lived up to its motto of “Service and Loyalty” and has served the nation as a catalyst for peace. I firmly believe that in future, the Force will not only keep the flame burning, but also outdo its own performance and assist the government to dissipate and quell violence and establish lasting peace in the country

Liberal leave policy and planning of leave in such a way that after every 3-4 months Force personnel are able to visit their families. Rotation of troops deployed in LWE area with softer slots after regular intervals. Extensive recreational / sports facilities. Regular briefing and interaction with Jawans by officers and visits by the senior officers. Prompt remedial measures to the grievances of troops.

DSA: The latest thinking around the world is that training regimen for police and security forces must now include psychological stress management modules in addition to the mandatory physical, professional and combat trainings. What are your views on this? DG, CRPF: It is a fact that considering continuous deployment of CRPF personnel in the sensitive areas and long separation from their families, causes severe stress in the personnel. To overcome this problem, training curriculum of the personnel has been revised and various subjects like yoga, Tai-Chi and stress management etc have been incorporated. Besides, personnel have been put through the various training programmes like ‘stress management’ and ‘art of living’ etc.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

internal security

DG, CRPF INTERVIEW

It is a fact that considering continuous deployment of CRPF personnel in the sensitive areas and long separation from their families, causes severe stress in the personnel. To overcome this problem, training curriculum of the personnel has been revised and various subjects like yoga, Tai-Chi and stress management etc have been incorporated. Besides, personnel have been put through the various training programmes like ‘stress management’ and ‘art of living’ etc

DSA: Do you think that the modern training procedures and tactics need to be introduced considering the present threats and challenges prevailing in the country and being faced by CRPF personnel?

DSA: The CRPF has three battalions staffed entirely by women. Could you elaborate on their role in CRPF?

DG, CRPF: In view of fast changing internal security scenario, training of personnel of security agencies needs a regular review. Considering this fact, all training syllabi in CRPF have been revised and modified with a view to bring them in line with the needs of present threats and challenges like Left Wing Extremism, Urban Terrorism and other law and order problems prevailing in the country.

They present a different face before common public. Are able to interact with rural women and develop rapport. Are also very helpful in conducting searches in villages and persons where women folks are involved. Mahila Bns are deployed all across the Country and are doing various sensitive duties including Parliament Security, Airport Security, Security of Shrines in Ayodhya etc, besides providing security of vital installations in Kashmir.

DSA: The CRPF is arduously combating Maoists and Naxalites in all the affected states. What challenges are they facing to fight this problem? What extra support do you require from the central and state governments? Do you think CRPF is well equipped with state-of-the-art weapons to counter this menace? What measures have been taken so far to modernise the CRPF. What do you propose to do in the coming months and years to equip CRPF with state-of-the-art weapons and technology? DG, CRPF: Problems faced in combating LWE: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Terrain and thick vegetation. No local support. Poor means of communication. Inadequate infrastructure. Better coordination and support required from State Police. Reluctance on part of contractors to build infrastructures in remote areas. CRPF has vastly improved its weaponry and firepower. Latest communication protocols have been developed. State-of-the-art surveillance system is also being used to track Naxal cadres.

DSA: Is CRPF planning for expansion? If yes, how many battalions does CRPF plan to raise in the next five years? DG, CRPF: As per approved raising plan 18 GD (Male) Bns and 01 Mahila Bn are to be raised in next 5 years as per details given below, alongwith their support and supervisory establishments.

Year 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 Total

Executive Bn 04 02 04 04 04 18 GD (Male) Bns

Mahila Bn 01 01

Total 04 03 04 04 04 19

DSA: What strategies and campaigns CRPF is proposing to unleash to woo more and more youngsters to join CRPF? DG, CRPF: to join CRPF:

The following strategies are being proposed to be unleashed to woo more and more youngsters

Motivating the prospective candidates through village headman, sarpanch etc by word of mouth through our representative at the lowest formation of Force deployed in left wing extremism and militancy affected areas ie Northeast, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh and other border areas. Providing photocopies of application format to the candidates free of cost at the lowest formation of Force after downloading from SSC / CRPF website. Providing assistance in filling up the application form properly. Efforts will be made to set up booths with staff and infrastructure for assisting candidates to fill application online. Issuing directions to subordinate offices to approach regional directors recruitment in specific areas in local language. of SSC for publishing short notice of subject

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

DG, CRPF:

DSA: Your vision for CRPF that you will like to share with DSA readers and the security universe? DG, CRPF: CRPF, the largest paramilitary of the world, is also In view of fast changing internal security laden with huge responsibilities in the scenario, training of personnel of security agencies strife-torn internal security scenario of the needs a regular review. Considering this fact, all country. It is not only battling the Naxals, termed as the biggest internal security training syllabi in CRPF have been revised and threat, but also fighting militancy in two modified with a view to bring them in line with more action theatres ( Jammu-Kashmir the needs of present threats and challenges like and Northeast), besides performing Left Wing Extremism, Urban Terrorism and other law assorted duties all over the country. The and order problems prevailing in the country rules of engagement have changed in modern days and a technical edge over the adversary, coupled with a motivated workforce can be a game changer in a conflict situation. A well-trained and well equipped Force can work wonders in operations. Advanced arms and ammunitions are being procured and a regular upgradation is being done on this front. A special emphasis has been laid on training. Morale of the force is directly proportional to its performance on field. It depends heavily upon the welfare measures available for its personnel, living conditions being provided in form of accommodation, among other factors, such as logistic support. To address the problem of accommodation in remote locations, we are making giant leaps and a number of family quarters are being constructed to address this issue. In remote locations, where built-up accommodation is scarcely available, CRPF has purchased 985 PF huts during 2011-12 and 366 in 2012-13. CRPF has always lived up to its motto of “Service and Loyalty” and has served the nation as a catalyst for peace. I firmly believe that in future, the Force will not only keep the flame burning, but also outdo its own performance and assist the government to dissipate and quell violence and establish lasting peace in the country. Prominent focus areas Operational excellence and domination. Enhancing housing satisfaction . Improving training standards. Equipping Force with modern aids of technology to combat Naxalism. Technological upgradation, modernisation and computerisation. Transparency in service matters, postings, promotions etc. Welfare of Force personnel.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

LONG OVERDUE

T Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world ie, the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being 'the most outstanding engineer of the year'. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

True jointness in military operations entails reforms at three levels – structural, procedural and attitudinal. Although structures and procedures are extremely important, they do not generate real jointness unless accompanied by an attitude of collaborative solidarity

The concept of jointness is still evolving and is central to the emerging Network Centric Warfare, wherein real-time information is made available to all components of a force. The United States considers joint operations integrated by common information networks to be of paramount criticality in its domination of the global war zones

he word ‘jointness’ does not appear in most English dictionaries. It is of recent origin and to the United States goes the credit for coining this expression which implies ‘the integration of the strengths of at least two limbs of the military in a coordinated effort to achieve a common goal’. It is often mistakenly considered to be synonymous with integration and unification. Whereas unification implies merger of separate entities into an amalgamated organisation with a single chain of command, integration allows entities to retain their separate identity while operating as a single body with well spelt-out hierarchy. While joint operations have become the standard form of waging war by all the armed forces, Canada is the only major country to attempt integration / unification of the three services. Through the enactment of the Canadian Forces Reorganisation Act of February 1968, the navy, the army and the air force were merged into a single service called the Canadian Armed Forces. Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA) is generally considered to be the harbinger of the currently ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The act aimed at achieving optimum operational effectiveness by ensuring cross service cooperation in all stages of the military processes. RMA precludes segregated service-wise operations. The concept of jointness is still evolving and is central to the emerging Network Centric Warfare, wherein real-time information is made available to all components of a force. The United States considers joint operations integrated by common information networks to be of paramount criticality in its domination of the global war zones. Jointness in military operations validates the well-known principle of war ‘economy of effort’, implying thereby that a balanced force with the optimum punch should be concentrated at the most vital point. It precludes wastage of resources by using an appropriate mix of force capabilities contributes to achieving the necessary leverage against the opponent. Jointness means conducting integrated military operations with common strategy, methodology and conduct. It entails evolution of joint equipment policy and acquisition plans; joint planning, development of doctrine and policy-making; joint training; integrated preparation of budget and monitoring of expenditure; and joint operational commands and staff structures.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

Achievement of jointness in services has been a challenge for every nation. Although all military commanders are professedly staunch proponents of the concept of jointness, the reality on ground is diametrically opposite. Every step towards jointmanship is fought fiercely by the obstructionists. This dichotomy has been the bane of the Indian armed forces as well. As a matter of fact, the problem gets compounded in the case of India, as discussed subsequently.

Jointness is an attitudinal trait True jointness in military operations entails reforms at three levels – structural, procedural and attitudinal. Although structures and procedures are extremely important, they do not generate real jointness unless accompanied by an attitude of collaborative solidarity. Attitudes are usually defined as a disposition or tendency to respond positively or negatively towards a certain thing (idea, object, person or situation).

Egotism of some top commander is proving to be the biggest hindrance. They support a proposal only if it suits them personally. Else, they cook up innovative justifications for obstructing it. It is a pure and simple case of according primacy to personal interests Attitude is an attribute of human behaviour and defies cogent reasoning. Attitudes are affected both by implicit and explicit influences. Attitudes can be positive, negative, neutral and even ambivalent (possessing both positive and negative hues at the same time). Even the degree or severity can vary. Attitudes are formed by observational learning from the environment, individual judgments, personal beliefs and peer influences. They encompass, or are closely related to, our opinions and beliefs. As military is a hierarchy based organisation, attitudes are influenced by precedents as well. Response to jointness is an attribute of underlying attitudes. Although every military commander swears by jointness, their response varies from unstinted support to vehement opposition. Advocates and supporters of jointness are willing to subordinate service and personal interests to national interest. Neutralists or the fence-sitters accept criticality of jointness but need assurance as regards safeguarding of their own interests. Interestingly, even the obstructionists do not deny need for jointness. However, due to their overwhelming concern for their selfish interests; they invent most untenable and even ludicrous reasons for their opposition.

Resistance to jointness Although, Joint Planning Committee was formed after Independence, it took close to four

continues to elude the Indian armed forces

lthough, Joint Planning Committee was formed after Independence, it took close to four decades for a proper Defence Planning Staff to come into being in 1986. On the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on reforming the National Security System, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff was set up in 2001 and the first unified command established at Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India's first joint doctrine was issued only in May 2006. Even Comptroller and Auditor General of India has faulted the three services for a total lack of coordination and jointness in their functioning, buying the same equipment from the same source at different prices. Creation of the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff was attempted in 2002-03. It was to be the start-point of genuine jointness in the Indian services. As is India’s misfortune, a handful of self-seeking commanders ganged up to sabotage the most radical reform ever attempted. Their impediment will go down as the darkest chapter in India’s quest for upgradation of its war potential.

decades for a proper Defence Planning Staff to come into being in 1986. On the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on reforming the National Security System, Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff was set up in 2001 and the first unified command established at Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India’s first joint doctrine was issued only in May 2006. India’s track record in respect of jointness is terribly poor. Ex-Naval Chief Admiral J G Nadkarni described the true state of jointness in India when he said – “Jointmanship in India exists to the extent of the three chiefs routinely being photographed backslapping each other, but not much more beyond that. We mistake backslapping in public, playing golf together and stating that they all

belong to one course in the NDA as jointmanship”. Similarly, affiliation of a few naval warships with army regiments can at best be termed as a display of ceremonial interfacing. It is not jointness at all. Even Comptroller and Auditor General of India has faulted the three services for a total lack of jointness in their functioning, buying the same equipment from the same source at different prices, thereby resulting in failure to obtain best value for money for the country through economies of scale. It found that items (like Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Sniper Rifles and Underwater Diving Equipment), which were common to the three services, were procured by them independently without reference to each other.

There are three major reasons for the tardy introduction of jointness in the Indian services. Foremost of all, jointness or unity is alien to our way of life. We lack a culture of synergistic relationships and mutually accommodative demeanour. Our approach, attitude and practices have always been directed towards remaining disunited. We have a knack and penchant for generating innovative issues to keep ourselves embroiled in petty bickering and internal dissentions. The Indian armed forces are no exception. Two, whereas joint warfare is team warfare, the Indian services are afflicted by the concept of regimental / corps / branch affiliations. Fierce factional loyalties result in parochial mindset and inhibit development of

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

LONG OVERDUE

broadmindedness. Infantry officers resent induction of non-infantry officers in the general cadre. The disagreeable equation between the flying branch and the other branches; fighter pilots and transport pilots; and fighter pilots and helicopter pilots of the air force has been a cause for concern. A helicopter veteran’s elevation to head the air force became an issue of factional posturing. Military leaders who fail to rise above petty prejudices within their own service can never be expected to support inter-services jointness.

The obstructionists let the nation down and showed themselves to be unworthy of the high appointments they held. National security is too serious a matter to be permitted to be held hostage to petty inter-service squabbles of parochial commanders Three, despite all public bonhomie, there is a deep rooted mistrust existing between the services. They guard their turf with fanatic zeal. The level of distrust can be gauged from the fact that the army prepared performance parameters for helicopters without consulting the air force lest they torpedo the whole procurement proposal. Similarly, it never consulted the navy while seeking deep sea diving equipment. Every proposal that curtails a service’s sphere of control faces strident resistance. Besides, due to the large strength of the army, the smaller services are wary of jointness, fearing loss of their independent identities. Finally and most regretfully, egotism of some top commander is proving to be the biggest hindrance. They support a proposal only if it suits them personally. Else, they cook up innovative justifications for obstructing it. It is a pure and simple case of according primacy to personal interests. They swear by nationalism as long as it does not clash with their own interests. Their apathetic deportment towards jointness shows their total lack of concern for national security. Dreading loss of exclusivity and privileged standing in the hierarchy-conscious organisation, they stoop to unimaginable depths of self-seeking behaviour. All brouhaha by the obstructionists about safeguarding national and service interests is sheer baloney.

Government must step-in

into a unified whole.

Kelkar Committee Report has also drawn government’s attention to the pressing need for jointness – “Unless, our ‘Joint’ capabilities are substantially and in a focused manner enhanced with a clear vision for harnessing the existing and the emerging core technologies, the gap between the ‘capability’ and our ‘ability to undertake assigned missions’ would continue to grow.”

Jointness means conducting integrated military operations with common strategy, methodology and execution. All Indian military leaders recognise that jointness is central to national security and swear by it. They concede that no future war can ever be won without total jointness in letter and spirit. Despite all rhetoric in favour of jointness, the reality on ground is diametrically opposite. It is a highly intriguing and paradoxical situation.

If the services continue their quibbling and jointness remains stalled, the government must intervene. It cannot let the drift to continue. As consensus is the most preferred option, all efforts should be made to remove dissonance between the three services. All conflicts of interest – real or perceived – must be resolved in a spirit of mutual accommodation. The services should be directed to adopt collaborative conflict resolution methodology and achieve total jointness in a time-bound manner. Should the facilitative approach fail to yield the desired consensus, the government should adopt a more pro-active approach. The services must be told in categorical terms that the government would intercede compellingly in case the services fail to respond positively. It is for the government to handle the skeptics in a more persuasive manner to put their reservations at rest and convince them of criticality of jointness. If handled with firmness, finesse and empathy, most military leaders will come on-board. In case persuasion also fails, the government should fulfill its obligation to the nation by issuing clear-cut orders to enforce jointness. No disagreement thereafter should be tolerated. Dissenting and obstructionist commanders should be given option to quit honourably.

Conclusion Jointness does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders may choose the capabilities they need from the forces at their disposal. Jointness means integration of all force capabilities

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Creation of the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff was attempted in 2002-03. It was to be the start-point of genuine jointness in the Indian services. As is India’s misfortune, a handful of self-seeking commanders ganged up to sabotage the most radical reform ever attempted. Their impediment will go down as the darkest chapter in India’s quest for upgradation of its war potential. It was an anti-national act of grave magnitude. Such elements need to be named and shamed. The obstructionists let the nation down and showed themselves to be unworthy of the high appointments they held. They made themselves the object of ridicule and derision when they brazenly claimed that their opposition was in national interest. Most disheartening was the stand taken by a few retired Chiefs who wrote to the Prime Minister against the proposal. Instead of guiding the current incumbents, they got carried away with narrow service parochialism and brought ignominy to their own standing. Finally, although consensus is desirable, it is clear that the selfish elements in the services will continue their resistance to jointness. The government will have to force the issue. Delay or wavering can cause irreparable damage to national security imperatives. Whereas genuine concerns of all must be addressed, unjustified obduracy should not be tolerated. National security is too serious a matter to be permitted to be held hostage to petty inter-service squabbles of parochial commanders.

Unique. Ahead Ahead of of the the Art. Art. Unique. Unique. Ahead of the Art.

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I Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

The disaster of 1962 was a result of this self-inflicted dissonance that had so thoroughly destroyed the military synergy and habits of coordination we had inherited from our World War II experience. The 1962 War was just a tactical engagement, but it highlighted such basal levels of dissonance in the Indian National Security Process. The Armed Forces were thoroughly excluded from the decision-making process. The Police Bureaucracy that ran the Intelligence Bureau now took over the functions of National Security Planning and providing strategic advice to the political leadership. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) created by Lord Ismay had worked so well in the 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir War as also in Op Polo in Hyderabad, fell into complete disuse and disarray. The whole national security process was now characterised by ad hocism and knee-jerk responses

ndia emerged from the war with an excellent tradition of joint air-land and sea operations in Burma and South East Asia Theatre against Japan. The British senior leadership, post-independence, laid the foundations of a Tri-services National Defence Academy (NDA) at the entry level; and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at the mid-tier level. The Indian Armed Forces thus inherited a very deeply ingrained tradition of jointness. The sad fact is that in the years after independence, we retreated from this peak of jointness and synergy and regressed progressively into insular attitudes and stovepiped responses. In the post-1971 years, much greater thought was given to institutionalise the imperatives of jointness. The Defence Planning Staff came up in the 1980s. In the 1990s, we had the National Security Council set up. The Kargil Review Committee thereafter recommended the creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Integrated Defence Staff. Two joint commands – the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) were created in this period and jointness was more formalised and institutionalised. The Naresh Chandra Committee has now come out with a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff to replace the CDS for single point advice. The critical issues are what will be the arbitration mechanisms in the enlarged COSC? The current Chairman COSC has recommended creation of three new joint commands viz. the Space Command, the Special Forces Command and the Cyber command. As a very practical suggestion, he has recommended that each of these be mid-wifed by a particular service.

he modern nation state is a highly complex orchestra of many diverse components. Making it act in a coherent and cogent fashion requires a tremendous amount of coordination and synchronisation. War is the most complex expression of a nation state’s coherent activity and hence needs even greater levels of synergy and coordination. The Second World War saw the harmonisation / synthesisation of torrents of tanks with Stuka dive bombers to create the Blitzkrieg. Radio communications synthesised the action of the two services. The Japanese pioneered the use of aircraft carriers, which synthesised the power of naval platforms with naval aviation assets to get a devastating increase in range and lethality. Thus, the greater the coordination and levels of synergy, the greater the cumulative impact on the battlefield of this ability to coordinate diverse capabilities in space and time and mass effects on the battlefield. The acme of jointness came at the end of the war in the form of large scale amphibious landings – which brought to bear the capabilities of all three services in a single, unitary operation. India emerged from the war with an excellent tradition of joint air-land and sea operations in Burma and South East Asia Theatre

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against Japan. The British senior leadership, post-independence, laid the foundations of a Tri-services National Defence Academy (NDA) at the entry level; and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at the mid-tier level. The Indian Armed Forces thus inherited a very deeply ingrained tradition of jointness. The very way of war fighting developed in the Burma theatre against Japan, was based on this tradition of Admin Boxes – where British Garrisons cutoff by Japanese enveloping columns, were maintained entirely by air supply and close air support, till they turned the tide. Procedures for air support and cooperation were so well tied up, rehearsed and perfected that they had become a part of the service ethos per se. This synergy was so very evident in our initial operations in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48 as also in the liberation of Hyderabad in 1948. The sad fact is that in the years after independence, we retreated from this peak of jointness and synergy and regressed progressively into insular attitudes and stovepiped responses. The problem was largely with the political leadership that laid claim to a legacy of soft power and barely tolerated the Armed Forces as an expensive insurance policy. The Nehruvian leadership relied upon personalised diplomacy to secure

JOINTNESS AND SYNERGY IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

national interests and had it not been for the threat of an American-armed Pakistan, would have severely reduced our armed strength. The bureaucrats had very little knowledge of matters military, but by instinct, decided to prevail by playing the three services against each other. The coup in Pakistan in 1956 had a very negative impact on India. The Indian civilian leadership became paranoid over the chances of a military coup and in its quest for a pliable military leadership, grievously hurt professionalism in the Army. Self-serving psychophancy was misconstrued as loyalty and the Army dealt with the deepest suspicion. Civil-Military relations reached their nadir before the 1962 War with China, when Gen Thimayya was forced to resign. The disaster of 1962 was a result of this self-inflicted dissonance that had so thoroughly destroyed the military synergy and habits of coordination we had inherited from our World War II experience. The 1962 War was just a tactical engagement, but it highlighted such basal levels of dissonance in the Indian National Security Process. The Armed Forces were thoroughly excluded from the decision-making process. The Police Bureaucracy that ran the Intelligence Bureau now took over the functions of National Security Planning and providing strategic advice to the political leadership. The Defence Committee of the

Cabinet (DCC) created by Lord Ismay had worked so well in the 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir War as also in Op Polo in Hyderabad, fell into complete disuse and disarray. The whole national security process was now characterised by ad hocism and knee-jerk responses.

Today some 70 per cent of the civilian faculty at the NDA are temporary or ad hoc appointments as no good instructors want to come for the peanuts that the MoD wants to throw to the monkeys. The MoD thus succeeded in destroying the very central basis of the academic excellence of the NDA at one fell stroke and so far the Armed Forces have tamely gone along. The NDA is now in urgent need of resuscitation. It now needs to be revived and the Armed Forces need to send their best officers to this foundational institution The shock of 1962 induced Realism in the Indian Foreign Policy and Security establishments. That war was a complete disaster. We failed to employ airpower in an offensive manner and thereby lost any chance of prevailing against the Chinese who were logistically much better served by land communications in Tibet. The 1965 War caught us in a process of expansion

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and transition. Once again the coordination levels between Land and Air power left much to be desired and the Navy was left totally out of the picture in the interests of avoiding escalation. Fortunately, both 1962 and 1965 proved to be very educative lessons for our commanders and staff and by 1971, the learning process was complete. A large number of professional officers had risen to the top echelons in these periods of continual combat.

As far back as the 1980s, the Chinese had come to the clear-cut determination that Limited or Local Wars would be the norm now instead of a generalised and large scale conflicts like the two World Wars. The Indian Ministry of Defence has persisted with the need to prepare for a large scale war in the mistaken belief that it will cater for any lesser contingency. This is a highly flawed concept. A Limited War has its very distinct dynamics, its specific pace and rhythm and the preparation for a generalised war can in no way suffice to meet the specific needs of a sharp and short Limited War. One of the key aspects of jointness therefore is defining a joint doctrine for Limited War against a Nuclear Backdrop. The recent fracas on the LoC has once again highlighted the need for such a Doctrine on Limited Wars In 1971, the Indian politico-military leadership was not just brilliant – it was inspired. The result was a very well synergised tri-service campaign which led to a brilliant Blitzkrieg in Bangladesh. In just 14 days, Pakistan was broken into two and a new nation state created with the force of arms. 93,000 prisoners of war (POWs) were taken. It was a spectacular and decisive campaign that entailed a march on the enemy capital and regime change. The simple fact was that strong and decisive political leadership had enforced top down synergy in this conflict. We had eight months to get our act together and coordinate aspects like setting up an Advance Air HQ in Eastern Command at Calcutta and rationalising the Air Command boundaries etc. The Navy was brilliant in its offensive and proactive strategy and struck the very home base of the Pakistani Navy at Karachi. It cut-off the two wings of Pakistan and isolated the battlefield in Bangladesh. This jointness and coordination however emerged in the final months preceding the conflict and not as a result of inherent organisational dynamics and structures. Jointmanship was largely a personalised affair and the outcome of interaction between the various personalities involved in the time of a national crisis. In the post-1971 years, much greater thought was given to institutionalise the imperatives of jointness. The Defence Planning Staff came up in the 1980s. In the 1990s, we had the National Security Council set up. This really became functional in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime, when the National Security Advisor (NSA), Mr Brajesh Mishra wore two hats as the Cabinet Secretary and the NSA. He stopped the direct access of the Intelligence Chiefs to the Prime Minister. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) thereafter, developed direct access to the Home Minister while the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) was progressively sidelined. The Armed Forces now had much greater

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access to the Political Authority. The Kargil War saw a high degree of jointness and coordination (despite initial hiccups). It was a limited war that was fought against a nuclear backdrop. The response of the Indian nation state was very well synergised and coordinated. The Kargil Review Committee thereafter recommended the creation of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Integrated Defence Staff. Two joint commands – the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) were created in this period and jointness was more formalised and institutionalised. Parochial and turf considerations however, soon set in and prevented the installation of a CDS that was evidently needed. The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) however did generate a lot of coordination and synergy and was able to weld together the Perspective Plans of the Three Services to create a Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan of acquisitions based on threats and capabilities needed.

CDS to chairman chiefs of staff (COSC) The Naresh Chandra Committee has now come out with a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff to replace the CDS for single point advice. The critical issues are what will be the arbitration mechanisms in the enlarged COSC? Will it rely on pure consensus (wherein dissent by any one Chief can kill a proposal) or will it be able to legislate on Inter Services disputes (say like the allocation of Attack Helicopters to the Army). Whether we call it CDS or Chairman COSC, the institution will have to be vested with the authority to arbitrate inter-services disputes and take decisions. This cannot be left to generalist bureaucrats who may have just moved in from the Ministry of Dairy produce or farming. One of India’s singular failures has been the failure to produce a Competent and Professional Defence Bureaucracy. This is a specialist function and lack of knowledge cannot allow it to be relegated to a Book Keeping function. The financial control stranglehold has been assumed by a bureaucracy that is totally ignorant of matters military and worse, refuses to own up the responsibility for its obstructionism. The Naresh Chandra Committee has also recommended a more meaningful integration of the Ministry with the three services HQ. So far, this had been done in a very cosmetic and perfunctory manner by a mere change of designation. This is being reattempted in a more meaningful manner now with cross postings upto the level of Joint Secretary hopefully.

Three new joint commands Meanwhile the current Chairman COSC has recommended creation of three new joint commands viz. the Space Command, the Special Forces Command and the Cyber command. As a very practical suggestion, he has recommended that each of these be mid-wifed by a particular service. Thus the Air Force could be the lead service for the Space Command; the Army for the Special Forces Command and the Navy for the Cyber Command. The ANC clearly showed up the reluctance of the three services to commit their resources to this very vital front

command and this has kept it grievously under-resourced and under-funded. If we have a lead service for each command, it is felt that there will be greater ownership and willingness to share resources.

The sad fact is that in the years after independence, we retreated from this peak of jointness and synergy and regressed progressively into insular attitudes and stovepiped responses. The problem was largely with the political leadership that laid claim to a legacy of soft power and barely tolerated the Armed Forces as an expensive insurance policy

Joint doctrine for limited war As far back as the 1980s, the Chinese had come to the clear-cut determination that Limited or Local Wars would be the norm now instead of a generalised and large scale conflicts like the two World Wars. The Indian Ministry of Defence has persisted with the need to prepare for a large scale war in the mistaken belief that it will cater for any lesser contingency. This is a highly flawed concept. A Limited War has its very distinct dynamics, its specific pace and rhythm and the preparation for a generalised war can in no way suffice to meet the specific needs of a sharp and short Limited War. One of the key aspects of jointness therefore is defining a joint doctrine for Limited War against a Nuclear Backdrop. The recent fracas on the LoC has once again highlighted the need for such a Doctrine on Limited Wars.

In the post-1971 years, much greater thought was given to institutionalise the imperatives of jointness. The Defence Planning Staff came up in the 1980s. In the 1990s, we had the National Security Council set up. This really became functional in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) regime, when the National Security Advisor (NSA), Mr Brajesh Mishra wore two hats as the Cabinet Secretary and the NSA. He stopped the direct access of the Intelligence Chiefs to the Prime Minister. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) thereafter, developed direct access to the Home Minister while the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) was progressively sidelined. The Armed Forces now had much greater access to the Political Authority. The Kargil War saw a high degree of jointness and coordination (despite initial hiccups)

Joint strategy and joint directives The National Security Process is set into motion by defining a National Security Strategy document. India did experiment with such a document with its Non Alignment 2.0 Paper. However such a policy document for a Grand Strategy, lays down the desired end states we wish to pursue and defines the path to that normative future. Non Alignment 2.0, unfortunately starts with a basically flawed premise that we are heading for a new bipolar order dominated by the USA and China and India as a bit part player, must strive to stay non-aligned / neutral between the two new super powers. The seminal question is – are we not heading for a

multi-polar world order; and instead of being neutral, should India not strive to be a pole of power in its own right? Its geographic location, size, demographics, economic and military capacities give it that potential. Multi-polar orders are characterised by quick alignments and realignments based on a determination of national interests. Hence the Chairman COSC along with the IDS must contribute to the formalisation of such a National Security Strategy and infer the Joint Strategy from this base document. It will also have to be translated into a series of Joint Operational, Intelligence, Training and Logistical Directives. These would enable the three services to chart out their individual strategies and particularised directives.

Rejuvenating the NDA Lastly, we must return to our origins. The foundation stone of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces is the NDA. It is this institution that today needs to be rejuvenated and resuscitated most urgently. The Navy wants its alumni now to do a BTech course. The Air Force has gone along. However, the NDA always had a very strong Non-technical Stream, which attracted boys from the Humanities stream who had the right outdoor mindset for soldiering. We do not need Nerds but warriors. Today we need to replace the current BA course with a BA (Honours) course that specialises in Military History, Military Geography and International Relations. The NDA must become the premier institution in this country for the study of Indian Military History and Military Geography. Above all, the NDA urgently needs a permanent civilian academic staff of the very best quality. That was the foundation of the greatness of the NDA when it was formed. Then a cussed bureaucrat in the MoD reduced the pays of the civilian faculty on the plea that they were just teaching undergraduates and did not need the high salaries that Mr Gibson the first British principal of the NDA had instituted to get the best civilian instructors in the country to the NDA. Today some 70 per cent of the civilian faculty at the NDA are temporary or ad hoc appointments as no good instructors want to come for the peanuts that the MoD wants to throw to the monkeys. The MoD thus succeeded in destroying the very central basis of the academic excellence of the NDA at one fell stroke and so far the Armed Forces have tamely gone along. The NDA is now in urgent need of resuscitation. It now needs to be revived and the Armed Forces need to send their best officers to this foundational institution.

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he first warning that all was not well in the present “Management of Military arrangement”, was during the ill-fated 1962 Sino-India conflict. Despite the lasting trauma of that battle, The Indian establishment continues in the same ilk. We also did not learn the positives of the 71 ops where the Military, MoD and the PMO worked planned and worked together!! Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan (retd) The writer is former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. He also served as Indian Naval Attache in Washington DC, USA.

Our Nation symbolises “Peaceful Co-existence” in spirit, thought and letter. Hence defence of the Sovereign realm is the core of our Military construct. In military language, it means Holding our Ground, Seas and Skies

New security realities, an assertive China, a highly probable Sino-Pak collusion, the emergence of non-state actors, possible implosion in Pakistan, the Afghanistan turmoil, internal security issues; all call for India to review and revamp its management of our Military. Governance and Military equity are intrinsic facets of a country’s suzerainty. Hence the polity needs to be aware, understand and drive the process. The Politico-Civil-Diplomatic-Military and Security combine must also suitably integrate and have institutionalised consensus on the National Security construct

We are a great civilisation that has absorbed many centuries in its stride. Now our Nation is poised to reach out in peace. It takes wisdom and strength to influence and also deter our enemies

This is a relevant essay on Unified operations in the Indian Context. The writer talks of the need for three unified Commands – the Northern (Army-Air) the Eastern and Western (tri-service). From unified operations will stem Joint Operations and Individual service missions. This will strengthen our combat capability in synergy. The IDS Headquarters under the CISC – Chief of Integrated Staff Committee is gamely trying to pull the services together. Over the last 7 years or so, it has proved to be useful. The IDS is the harbinger of what things can really be! This vindicates the need for a CDS. The writer suggests periodic workshops for Joint Secretary and above level officers of all services and agencies to foster “Unified Operations.” “When the terror and the tumult of hate shall cease And life be refashioned on anvils of peace, And your love shall offer memorial thanks To the comrades who fought on the dauntless ranks, And you honour the deeds of the dauntless ones, Remember the blood of my martyred sons! From a poem “the Gift of India” – by Sarojini Naidu Jai Hind

riter’s note ”This article symbolises the spirit and essence of the poem “the Gift of India” by Srimati Sarojini Naidu, the nightingale of India. Readers should read the full poem to recognise the greatness of our land and the value of unity in diversity. To be combat efficient, effective is the very sine qua non of the Armed Forces. This again behoves vertical expertise and experience. It also calls for fusing this exclusivity into an inclusive, integrated, mutually complementing force. An entity that is able to go above and beyond jointness and reach a state of unity of action (Ekeekrit Sainya Abhiyan एकीकृत सैन्य अिभयान). This has to be a process evolved in peace, exercised in operations and executed in battle. Our Nation symbolises “Peaceful Co-existence” in spirit, thought and letter. Hence defence of the Sovereign realm is the core of our Military construct. In military language, it means Holding our Ground, Seas and Skies. In comparative terms Defending is always less expensive as opposed to Invading! Defending connotes defeating the Invader and making it also costly for him. This Life and Cost saving imperative can be optimally achieved through a “unifying process for unified operations in a united theatre.”

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Simultaneously preserving Individual Service culture, identity is integral and sacrosanct to this process. New security realities, an assertive China, a highly probable Sino-Pak collusion, the emergence of non-state actors, possible implosion in Pakistan, the Afghanistan turmoil all call for India to review and revamp its management of our Military. Governance and Military equity are intrinsic facets of a country’s suzerainty. Our polity needs to proactively participate and drive the process. The Politico-Civil-Diplomatic-Military and Security combine must also suitably integrate and have institutionalised consensus on the National Security construct.

UNIFYING PROCESS-UNIFIED OPERATIONS-UNITED THEATRE in place to optimally approach “National security and Military readiness". This has to be politically understood, accepted, absorbed and be top down with sense of ownership, accountability and authority. Indian leadership must make India learn the science and the art of “UNIFYING PROCESS-UNIFIED OPERATIONS IN A UNITED THEATRE”.Wherever relevant the paramilitary and police forces also need to be integrated. This in effect, means consensus on policy, strategy, doctrine, tactics, logistics, communications, information technology between politico-civil-military-diplomatic-internal security -paramilitary and police forces.

"Power relationships between Nations are constantly changing and unless a country understands and adjusts itself to the changes that are taking place around it, its own Security will be seriously endangered." An extract from Sardar K M Panikkar’s Annual Day address to the Indian School of International Studies on 13 February 1961.

Higher defence decision-making

Examination of our Higher Defence Decision-making Organisation, readily reveals a witting / unwitting "Six decade status quo syndrome" perpetuated by the way we are as Indians; fatalistic about our independence and also being Indian! The implications of this on our sovereignty, security, stability, status as a secular Democracy can be understood and be acted upon only if the top leadership grasps this with firmness and dynamism.

Understanding and managing the Military and Security scenario is dependent upon the quality, quantity of ownership by the Political-Civil-Military combine in Higher Defence Decision-making. This has direct correlation with India's security calculus, effective military preparation and readiness. Internal security strategies too, are contingent on the construct of Civilian-Military-Security equations and equity.

The prescient Panikkar statement is of priority relevance to India today. The first step towards Unified operations is creating a top down homogenous holistic mechanism in the highest defence decision-making organisation.

From unified operations will stem Joint Operations and Individual service missions. This will strengthen our combat capability in synergy. Study of the American example shows significant salutary effects on combined combat readiness Our bureaucracy has the sagacity, expertise and eclectic experience to optimise civil control mechanisms under political guidance. Our military and security forces have the commitment and wisdom to perpetuate democracy and secularism. Ours is a democracy wherein civil control of the military is absolute. We have mechanisms

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Higher direction schematic and actuality The above schematic is the writer’s imagination. In practice the circles exist but are mostly in separate orbits. At best there are some committees of secretaries and the CCS who deliberates upon important issues on a need based continuum. The military may or may not be called in all deliberations. The National Security Advisor has no institutionalised set up, nor military participation to obtain macro / micro inputs. The National Security Advisory Board is virtually a club / NGO that deliberates without any real power to influence courses of action. Resultantly the process tends to be mostly tentative and even vacuous at times. Who is responsible for readiness? The Government of India rules of business are distinctly vague on responsibility, accountability of military preparation and readiness. Extracts from the rules of business and MoD website reproduced below, clearly highlight this: ‘Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation’. MoD website also reads “The Defence Secretary functions as head of the Department of Defence and is additionally responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the four Departments in the Ministry.” The above extract does not mention "preparedness or readiness" even in passing not to speak about the much needed deliberation. It is silent on "Accountability and Answerability." Responsibility of military readiness Security, Sovereignty, Stability of a Nation is clearly a leadership mandate – how it chooses to exercise and execute this, is its prerogative. Why it remains passive has not been questioned either by the establishment or by the people.

The Indian Air Force is central and critical to both land and sea operations. It is a Force multiplier of strategic and tactical value. Air Power is the deciding factor in outcome with land power being the holding force and sea power the shield of sustenance The Army, Navy, Air Force are engaged individually. There is neither integration nor coordination between the Ministries of Defence, Home, Finance, External Affairs with the armed, paramilitary and intelligence forces, even as a concept, let alone in practice. Guarding the turf is a solemn obsession. What started as a practice became a habit and is now an addiction. The divide on the concept and role of the Chief of Defence Staff within the three services is sharp enough for the polity to justify its passivity. The IDS Headquarters under

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the CISC – Chief of Integrated Staff Committee is gamely trying to pull the services together. Over the last 7 years or so, it has proved to be useful. This vindicates the need for a CDS. However, the Naresh Chandra Task Force has recently recommended a permanent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) which is a climb down from the CDS. It is also not very clear as to what powers would the CJCS have to enforce / enable integration, joint operations let alone unified operations!

security. Realignment and introduction of Constitutional provisions is the imperative step.

What are fault lines within the Military that need speedy remediation?

Lack of political direction and a loose limbed hands off approach, queers the pitch of military readiness. Consequently civil military bureaucratic relations exist under best conditions of polite detached, "Us versus Them” and diffused accountability

Why has India not set up a Defence Industrial Base to strategically reduce Import costs?

Army green, Navy white and Air Force blue must become purple as is obtaining in the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The IDS is harbinger of what things can really be and also very much needed

The military within

Political direction Lack of political direction and a loose limbed hands off approach, queers the pitch of military readiness. Consequently civil military bureaucratic relations exist under best conditions of polite detached, "Us versus Them” and diffused accountability. The first warning that all was not well in the present “Management of military arrangement”, was during the ill-fated 1962 Sino-India conflict. Despite the lasting trauma of that battle, The Indian establishment continues in the same ilk. Despite all the conflicts with Pakistan and the imposing Chinese posture, the whole Political-Bureaucratic-Diplomatic-Military-Intelligence -Technology-Industrial community has not been able to get its act together! Working in watertight silos is both style and form today. We also did not learn the positives of the 71 ops where the Military, MoD and the PM worked planned and worked together!! “The quality and value of our Civil-Military bureaucratic relationship reflects our inability to internalise India in terms of National perspectives. Consequently our externalisation tends to be tentative and confusing to us and outsiders. Drifting along with events as they occur seems to be our preferred option" the writer.

Constitutional provisions The Indian Constitution needs provisions and articles to ensure that there is top down authority, accountability, responsibility for National Security and Military Readiness. The Parliament too has to be made aware and ensure answerability through due process. Presently, direct, institutionalised, formalised communication between National Leadership, Parliament and the executors of the country's Defence and Security policies and processes is more in absentia. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence is notional, ineffective and powerless by design and organisation. Even in this, the armed forces only tag along with their civilian counterparts. The time, attention and energy devoted to the whole exercise are ad hoc, cursory and mere formality. India is a mature democracy. There is robust organisation and infrastructure already in place. It is time for the Indian polity to take onus for Nation management and

Colour purple Pride of service, in uniform is a primal facet of the military. This is needed, understandable and acceptable. Modern warfare however requires a mindset acceptance that, unified operations are a mandate. It is a mandate that needs doctrine, policy, procedures, training, debriefs, remediation, re-training and operational practice. Exclusivity, experience of Professional expertise is an asset. Making this inclusive in the scope of Unified operations is the needed mandate. Army green, Navy white and Air Force blue must become purple as is obtaining in the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The IDS is the harbinger of what things can really be!

Unifying imperatives Security scenario Sino-Pak collusion is a certainty of the current security scenario. The Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh are strident. Its build-up in the NE, rail, road heads and airports, logistics support is considerable even without going into statistics. The slow insidious string of pearls maritime strategy cannot be wished away. PLA General Logistics Director says, “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean, only as an Ocean of Indians ... We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.” That brings Pakistan into the equation, whose strategic location close to the oil rich Persian Gulf, keeps China positively involved in ensuring its affiliation with the former. “India cannot afford to be governed by intentions of its neighbours but needs to be guided by National interests. The perspective of Peaceful co-existence has to be viewed in the context of holding ground” the writer. Crucial strategic asks The crucial asks are: Who is responsible, for combat and security readiness? Is the present civil-military arrangement workable? Does India have overall National capability to handle both the neighbourhood as well as internal security issues? Does defence budgeting require a different dynamism to make military management and acquisition cost-effective?

How should India go about This Ownership of readiness The military will always fight with what it has – (COAS, Gen VP Malik during OP Vijay in Kargil). Lack of "Ownership of Readiness" is behind this soldierly lament. Fixing Ownership of Readiness is the first step. It should be the Defence Minister who should be made answerable for military readiness and sovereign security. Similarly the Home Minister should be responsible for Internal security. Once ownership is defined with authority, the whole chain would be galvanised into a channelised process of achieving stated objectives. Able and workable systems Process and authority in capability based capital acquisition is paramount. It has to rest on a single point authority along with an empowered Organism. A pre-audited collegiate decision matrix with autonomy and assurance that "Ghosts of Inquiry" do not unwittingly haunt the decision-makers. Only then can the system become collectively capable to handle Combat and Security management. Military fault lines repair Concept of unified operations is an operational imperative. Training and learning to fight together should become part of our blood stream. This can and must be done through retention of individual service identity. From unified operations will stem Joint Operations and Individual service missions. This will strengthen our combat capability in synergy. Study of the American example shows significant salutary effects on combined combat readiness. Integration of Military with MoD, DRDO, DPSUs and institutionalised relations with Intelligence agencies, private industry will go a long way towards self-reliance. Personnel management, selection of Commanders-in -Chief and Heads of Services must be done on an informed, participative basis that includes the politico-bureaucratic setup. Serving Military-Bureaucratic-Diplomatic, Intelligence, senior leadership from joint secretary upwards must attend regular participative workshops of short durations. It has to be formalised, structured on the determinants of national management and consequent military matrices. The CCS Ministers and National Defence Council members must address these gatherings and gain critical inputs. It must become a regular feature that would bring synergy in civil-military participation.

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jointness and synergy

COMBAT CAPABILITY

Appointing Joint / Additional Secretaries from MEA / MHA to all critical commands that contend with sensitive issues must become policy. Similarly having service officers and MoD representatives in MEA / MHA must be mandated. Creation of a common information highway should be taken up as the first dynamic. Informed collegiate decision processes must follow suit. Defence budgeting revamp This revamp is a top priority. The New management strategy introduced in the late nineties has to be further revised. Budget roll over, getting rid of the year ending frenzy of deadlines, assured funding of money and no return of unspent money have to be considered by a council of military expenditure appointed by the CCS. Only then can the acquisition become cost and operationally effective. Military industrial complex We are nowhere near becoming “Indian” in terms of becoming reasonably self-reliant across the spectrum of Indian battle order needs. Civilian and military participation has to enable creation of a Military Industrial Commission. This could be set up from existing entities like CII, FICCI, DRDO, DPSUs, Armed Forces, Private and Public Sector companies. Oversight could be by the Defence Acquisition Council. The Military Industrial Commission charter could be created from the findings and recommendations of the various committees set up by the Government within the last two decades. The Political-Civil-Military combine also needs to institutionally focus on the critical aspect of self-reliance and reduce rising import costs. Three Unified fronts – Northern-Eastern-Western

Over the centuries India’s threats were from the North. Today that has expanded to the sea. The Indian Ocean is our only Lifeline for sustenance, survivability and sovereignty. It is also a security cauldron as well as a haven for low intensity asymmetric maritime operations. The map above is to highlight the geographic realities of India being both an Island nation as well as a landlocked state. The threat now being from the “Sea, Land and Air”, our defensive strategy, has to be predicated upon designated united fronts. In effect India has to formally create the: Northern Front which would be Army-Air Force centric. Western and Eastern tri-service concentric.

front

which

would

The Army, Navy, Air Force are engaged individually. There is neither integration nor coordination between the Ministries of Defence, Home, Finance, External Affairs with the armed, paramilitary and intelligence forces, even as a concept, let alone in practice. Guarding the turf is a solemn obsession. What started as a practice became a habit and is now an addiction The creation of the three fronts would enable combine “Interests and Threats” assessment, consequent force planning, operational, logistics, HR and administrative requirements. The current arrangements and infrastructures do cater for joint operations but in a narrow and restricted context. Tri-service combines for the unifying process The battle of today needs a tri-services combine even in holding ground. The Indian Air Force is central and critical

to both land and sea operations. It is a Force multiplier of strategic and tactical value. Air Power is the deciding factor in outcome with land power being the holding force and sea power the shield of sustenance. Unifying these in energy, synergy is a timeless Clausewitz principle of war called “concentration of forces”. This unifying process has to be the principle focus of India.

In comparative terms Defending is always less expensive as opposed to Invading! Defending connotes defeating the Invader and making it also costly for him. This Life and Cost saving imperative can be optimally achieved through a Unifying process for unified operations in a united theatre. Simultaneously preserving Individual Service culture, identity in the process is integral and sacrosanct to this process Joint to unified training Some basic elements of Joint training are already in practice. The next steps would be to conceptualise and actualise the unfied training requirements in the unified theatres. Every Command of every service is well established with robust structure and capability. The present exercises need to be suitably adapted for unified operations. War gaming, operational assessments are well known. These only have to be melded into pragmatic standard operating procedures. There has to be time, effort and investment. At every stage, Political-Civil-Diplomatic participation must get included.

Unified ops by armed forces Simple steps There are simple steps that are well known only needing the polity to direct the Military-Security-Intelligence -Civil-Diplomatic-Financial entities to evolve plans. These entail: Defining responsibility and accountability by office and making them as well defined rules and regulations. Creation of a National Defence Council that would be independently briefed together by designated Responsible and Accountable authorities. This briefing would be on; Military evaluation and assessment of Force levels Military equity of preparedness and readiness Single service holistic op status

Concluding imperatives Higher Defence and Security Decision-Making Robustness can be achieved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It must mandate institutionalised mechanisms between the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Ministries of Defence, Home, External Affairs. Civil control of the military is a given. Integrated, inclusiveness of the armed forces through proactive participation will optimise combat and security preparedness. Creation of a Chief of Defence Staff and defining Unified Commands like SFC, ANC should be carried out immediately by legislation. Unified Areas of operations, defining national interests, military and security threats have to be on priority in the reporting and preparation mechanisms.

PLA General Logistics Director says, “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean, only as an Ocean of Indians ... We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.” That brings Pakistan into the equation, whose strategic location close to the oil rich Persian Gulf, keeps China positively involved in ensuring its affiliation with the former The Standing Parliamentary Committee on Defence needs to be elevated to A National Defence Council (NDC). It should have leaders of the ruling party and opposition. It must be empowered and organised to monitor military readiness formally, in camera. Joint review by CCS to validate this must be mandated. The CDS / the Chiefs of Services must annually report the state of military readiness to NDC regularly.

“SI VIS PACEM PARA BELLUM – IF YOU WANT PEACE PREPARE FOR WAR” The above is a 390 AD Roman Military quote attributed to Plubius Flavius Vegetius, a writer of the once great Roman empire. We are a great civilisation that has absorbed many centuries in its stride. Now our Nation is poised to reach out in peace. It takes wisdom and strength to influence and also deter our enemies. Our land has much enlightenment. We have managed to blend the ancient and modern. Both gave us unity amidst diversity. Our military is now intrinsic and integral with our Growth and Security. However there has to be balance between Economy and Defence spending. To be cost-effective, the Military too must absorb “Unifying processes for Unified operations in a United Theatre”. This is the only way that would preserve our “Sovereign Realm.”

Operational inspection through independent agency Review of logistics, infrastructural assets Promulgating MoD / Service HQ operational directives for defining Unified theaters, Unifying processes and Unified Operations.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

BETTER THAN THE BEST

Dr A Sivathanu Pillai, CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace sharing his vision for BrahMos with DSA. Dr Pillai, a distinguished Scientist was recently conferred country's second highest civilian award, Padma Bhushan by the President of India. Our heartiest congratulations to Dr Pillai. launcher has been released at our Thiruvananthapuram complex. Currently the modification of the aircraft is in progress at HAL after different stages of testing and proving the systems one-by-one including the electronic and software integration, simulation, we expect, in a year’s time, the missile will be flight tested from the Aircraft. We will start the induction of our missile in IAF from 2015 for which a contract has already been signed. DSA: When will the hypersonic version of the BrahMos-II missile come out?

Defence and Security Alert: Brahmos represents the fusion of great scientific minds of India and Russia that has helped to design and develop a world-class weapon system with unparalleled capabilities. Kindly enlighten us on the success story of this joint venture? BrahMos Aerospace: Indians have created a distinctive hallmark worldwide of having possessed a glorious past. Based on our inherent strengths, we need to reiterate to the world that we are remarkable. In the present scenario, to retain our supremacy of the ancient time, India formed a joint venture organisation with Russia in the name of ‘BrahMos’ between DRDO of India and “NPO Mashinostroyenia” of Russia through an Inter-Governmental Agreement signed on February 12, 1998. The combination of the capabilities and competencies of both institutions gave birth to a world class product – BRAHMOS, in the shortest possible time. The success of BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile as a world-class weapon system having unparalleled capabilities has emerged due to the shared strength of great scientific minds which has led this fusion to fructify. Conduction of number of flight trials, continuous technological upgrades and regular interactions with the users for the implementation of desired enhancements and enormous support from the two governments led to the realisation of highly reliable and unique Missile System. DSA: India has become the world’s largest importer of the arms and ammunition. Many countries are in the race to supply their state-of-the-art weapons and cutting edge technologies to the Indian armed forces. Do you see this as a challenge to BrahMos? BrahMos: BRAHMOS Supersonic Cruise Missile with multi-platform, multi-mission and multi-target capabilities has no competition to it till date. Its Speed, Precision and Power and above all the realisation and product support are superior to any weapon system in the world. Even though there are powerful import lobbies for dumping their low-technology weapons to India, the fact that India possesses a very superior missile system whose technology will defeat them. In fact BRAHMOS is ready to be exported to other countries, giving tough competition to importer nations. DSA: What role did the private sector play in BrahMos success? Did private sector companies contribute to a great extent in the success of this JV? BrahMos: Tremendously; this is for the first time that private companies have invested in India. They have participated not just for profit; instead they have put their heart and soul in realisation of this world-class missile system. BrahMos Aerospace has become a role model by integrating public-private industries both from India and Russia to form a consortium of “Missile Industry Complex”. The company has seamlessly integrated and produced high technology defence products through this consortium of industries. DSA: India and Russia have signed a deal for working together to develop the air-launched version of the 290 km-range BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, which would be fitted to the Su-30MKI combat aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF). Kindly elaborate on this. Also, when is it expected to be inducted? BrahMos: The time when BRAHMOS Supersonic Cruise Missile will get integrated with Su-30, the lethality of our armed forces will be multiplied manifolds. The modified version of the missile will have new booster, reduced weight, high altitude engine operations, stabilisations and many other related alterations. All these changes have been tested. Similarly, universal

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

BrahMos: Our focus is to develop the basic technologies and modules for the hypersonic BRAHMOS. This will include new materials such as nano-materials, sensors, scramjet propulsion, advanced guidance system and algorithm. These building blocks are being progressed and we hope that in five years time we will be able to realise a system which can fly to a speed of Mach 5 and beyond. DSA: Recently India successfully test-fired a highly manoeuvrable version of the 290 km range supersonic cruise missile BrahMos from a naval warship off the coast of Visakhapatnam in Bay of Bengal. This is the 34th launch of BrahMos after the successful October launch from INS Teg in the Arabian Sea. Kindly tell us more about this. BrahMos: The naval version of BRAHMOS has recently witnessed two successive successful test firings from Indian Navy warships. While the Navy’s newest Talwar-class guided missile frigate INS Teg successfully test-fired BRAHMOS – which is its prime strike weapon – in October last year from the Arabian Sea, the missile underwent another successful test on January 9, 2013 from the Bay of Bengal. During the latest test, the missile blasted off in a pre-designated war scenario taking a “double-manoeuvre in S-form” and hit the target ship just one meter above water line. The enormous speed and power of the missile ripped through the ship’s hull and destroyed it completely. In both cases we have used UVLM. Universal Vertical launcher Module (UVLM), a next generation system is far superior to the design concept followed worldwide, this is being used for the ship installation in vertical configuration for BRAHMOS. DSA: Would you kindly give an update on the programme that how many missiles (squadrons) have the Indian Army and Navy inducted? BrahMos: The mobile land-based configuration of BRAHMOS has achieved several advancements over the years in the form of Block I, Block II and Block III variants with each having its own distinct potentiality to hit and destroy enemy target. The Indian Army and the Indian Navy have inducted the weapon system in numbers based on its perceived operational requirements. The induction has been phased so as to ensure longevity of the system and is ongoing till such time the operational necessities are fulfilled. The ship-based configuration of the tactical BRAHMOS missile, which is the prime strike weapon for the Indian Navy, has been deployed on several of its frontline warships. The naval variant of BRAHMOS has been successfully test-fired in both vertical and inclined launch configurations from moving warships. This powerful missile can be launched in solo or salvo mode from a warship and completely destroy single or multiple targets within a fraction of few seconds. Many Naval warships have been fitted with BRAHMOS missile and the future ships will have BRAHMOS Supersonic Cruise Missile as the first strike weapon. DSA: Are you thinking of supplying missiles to foreign countries as well? BrahMos: Yes, the Inter-Governmental Agreement stipulates the use of this advanced missile system in Indian and Russian Armed Forces as well as export to friendly countries. Yes, we are progressing with our marketing strategy for exporting BRAHMOS to certain Nations. DSA: What is your vision for BrahMos? Where do you see BrahMos in the next ten years? BrahMos: We have prepared “BRAHMOS vision 2050” document approved by the joint-government committees. This envisages the future variants of BRAHMOS, advancements in performance and capabilities, product support and BRAHMOS-II. After testing the underwater pontoon, our target is for fitment with submarines. Later, the missile to be made compatible for the 5th generation aircraft MiG-29K and also for more stealth features.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

W Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was comissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attache to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects. He is the consulting editor for Brahmand 2012 and is compiling a monograph for CLAWS, Firepower-2030. To have the Commands placed under a lead service would deter the advantage of jointness which is extremely important in the specialised areas of aerospace, cyberspace and special forces. Op Geronimo which was conducted by the US to raid on Osama bin Ladenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s hideout was a joint operation which had participation of elements from all components of the US Armed Forces. The inventory comprised of four satellites, Electronic Warfare equipment, jet fighter escorts, state-of-the-art helicopters, aircraft carriers and Seals from the Navy along with Joint intelligence which included an active role by the CIA

e are currently in an era of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). In this specialised form of warfare there is a requirement for total coordination between the three services in the field of surveillance, issue of orders for engagement and precision fire by platforms. To date our processes have not undergone transformation and need updating. The need for jointness was acutely felt during the Kargil conflict in 1999. Accordingly a committee under Late K Subrahmanyam was set up which submitted its report and the same was reviewed by a Group of Ministers in 2000. To improve jointness, there was need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and integration of the three services. In the 11 years that have elapsed we have established a tri-service Headquarters of Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), a tri-service command Andaman and Nicobar theatre command and a Strategic Forces Command. There is no jointness of command and control and the three services are operationally independent with limited coordination being undertaken by the Ministry of Defence. To find an answer to the current impasse, the government appointed a 14 member task force headed by Naresh Chandra a former bureaucrat on 14 July 2011 to review the unfinished tasks of the Kargil Review Committee and suggest a plan of implementation. The panel has submitted its report. The report has not been published in the open domain.

Experiences

MANAGEMENT OF CYBER, AEROSPACE AND

SPECIAL FORCES COMMAND T

he current era of Network Centric Operations demand our forces are organised to tackle threats in cyberspace and aerospace dimensions. Special Forces have proved their efficacy in the new generation of warfare. There is a need to raise the Aerospace, Cyberspace and Special Forces Commands at the earliest. The organisations would be unified and it is proposed that the C-in-C of the Aerospace Command be from the Air Force, the Cyberspace Command be from the Navy and Special Forces Command be from the Army. Raising of these organisations will improve our operational preparedness.

The HQ IDS is functioning for over 11 years and has undertaken a few issues which merit importance. First of all the Defence Planning Process is being formulated. It is indeed creditable that certain Joint Doctrines for Defence Forces to include Joint Amphibious Forces Doctrine and Joint Special Forces Doctrine have been released. Other doctrines in their final stages of release are the Joint Special Forces Doctrine, Joint Sub-conventional Warfare Doctrine, Joint Space Doctrine and the Joint Maritime Operations Doctrine. Space has been given its due importance. The Defence Space Vision 2020 document has been evolved and an Integrated Space Cell has been established to coordinate space issues and formulate a Space Doctrine. The most important achievement of the IDS has been in the field of acquisition. At the outset the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) for the three five year plans up to 2027 has been approved by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC). Further in the Defence Procurement Procedure, HQ IDS has currently been given an enhanced role. Its Categorisation Committees now examine and make recommendations to the DAC on Acceptance of Necessity, Quantity Vetting, Categorisation, Single Vendor Clearance, Nomination of Production Agency, Transfer of Technology and Trials. In the Make procedure the IDS is required to carry out feasibility studies for projects to be given to the private sector. The Defence Intelligence Agency is able to provide strategic intelligence inputs to defence planners and a number of joint committees have been instituted as also joint exercises have been conducted. AMPHEX 07 was a major tri-service exercise undertaken to validate the Joint Amphibious Doctrine. A UN Peace Support Operations Exercise (UNPSO) involving officers from the Armed Forces of 13 countries was conducted at the College of Defence Management under the aegis of HQ IDS in May 2008. The IDS has suitably carried out a review of the tri-service training and enhanced jointness at the Armed Forces Training institutes. HQ IDS is responsible for ensuring a coordinated response for disaster relief and plays an important role in constituting the Defence Crisis Management Group (DCMG) to deal with disasters and other crises on the directions of the National Crisis Management Committee.

There is no jointness of command and control and the three services are operationally independent with limited coordination being undertaken by the Ministry of Defence. To find an answer to the current impasse, the government appointed a 14 member task force headed by Naresh Chandra a former bureaucrat on 14 July 2011 to review the unfinished tasks of the Kargil Review Committee and suggest a plan of implementation Currently we have two unified commands, the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Operationally both of them have gained strength and are performing their tasks creditably. These unified commands have been functioning in the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff and are presently staffed by the three services with the Commander -in-Chief rotated between the three services. As each service is exclusive, appointments in the unified commands are not given adequate importance. Accordingly the urge though not publicly expressed is to return to the parent service rather than stick to the unified commands. In the profession of arms pride and self-esteem while occupying a post is extremely important and possibly our awards and selection boards need to give emphasis to posting to these inter-service establishments to enable a feel good factor while serving in these setups.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

Raising of new commands Reports in the media from September 2012 have indicated that the Services are pitching for three specialised unified commands. These are the Cyberspace, Aerospace and Special Forces Commands. It is learnt that there would be a lead service linked to each command. Possibly the Army would handle the Special Forces Command, the Navy the Cyber Forces Command and the Air Force the Aerospace Command. The proposals are presumably being considered and it would be appropriate to analyse these proposals in their correct perspective.

Currently we have two unified commands the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Operationally both of them have gained strength and are performing their tasks creditably. These unified commands have been functioning in the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff and are presently staffed by the three services with the Commander-in-Chief rotated between the three services It would be of interest to examine how these Commands are being operated by other countries. Many countries have these commands but viewing our force structure it would be rational to understand the manner in which the USA handles these organisations. The US Department of Defence employs 3.2 million servicemen, servicewomen and the civilians who support them. The Secretary of Defence who could be equated with our Raksha Mantri. The Secretary of Defence has a Joint Chief of Staff who is his military adviser, military departments which constitute the Army, Navy, Air force and Unified Operational Commands. The Commands are the US Northern Command, the US Southern Command, the US Central Command, the US European Command, the US Pacific Command, the US Africa Command, the US Strategic Command, the US Special Operations Command and the US Transportation Command. The Aerospace elements are coordinated for US and Canada in terms of North American Aerospace Defence Command located in

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

close proximity of US Northern Command. The Cyberspace Command is placed under the US Strategic Command and is closely linked to the National Security Agency. The Special Forces are under the US Special Operations Command. During operations the chain of command runs from the President to the Defence Secretary onwards to the Commander of the Combat Commands. This is the manner in which direct implementation takes place between the President, Defence Secretary and the Commander of the Unified Command. The Aerospace and the Special Forces component have been tried, tested and fine-tuned over a considerable period and is optimised to undertake effective operations. The Cyberspace component is a recent introduction and has reached full operational capabilities by 2011 and is currently being optimised by the Strategic Forces Command.

We are currently in an era of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). In this specialised form of warfare there is a requirement for total coordination between the three services in the field of surveillance, issue of orders for engagement and precision fire by platforms In our context both the Strategic Forces Command as also the Andaman Nicobar Command have been operationalised and are performing creditably with the handicap of not having a Chief of Defence Staff. Yet they are critical as far as strategic operations are concerned and therefore the new specialised Commands need to have correct specialised composition of the three services and possibly the Commander-in-Chief to be from the Air Force for the Aerospace Command, from the Navy for the Cyberspace Command and from the Army for the Special Forces Command. To have the Commands placed under a lead service would deter the advantage of jointness which is extremely important in the specialised areas of aerospace, cyberspace and special forces. Op Geronimo which was conducted by the US to raid on Osama bin Ladenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s hideout was a joint operation which had participation of elements from all components of the US Armed Forces. The inventory comprised of four satellites, Electronic Warfare equipment, jet fighter escorts, state-of-the-art helicopters, aircraft carriers and Seals from the Navy along with Joint intelligence which included an active role by the CIA. We need to change and there is a definite need for the government to bring about a political consensus to go ahead with the proposals outlined post-Kargil and vetted by the Naresh Chandra committee to ensure force multiplication on the battlefield. By putting under a single service we would not evolve while undertaking this Revolution in Military Affairs.

Way ahead The proposal for establishment of the Cyberspace, Aerospace and Special Forces is justified and needs to be approved by the authorities. The structure and composition of these Commands will involve all the three services and scientists as also engineers who would propel these organisations to keep pace with ongoing technological developments. The Ministry of Defence and the three services have to put their best foot forward to ensure that these three unified organisations complete their process of raising expeditiously. The recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya have demonstrated the use of missiles, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, intelligence inputs from satellites, use of Special Forces and cyber equipment.

Reports in the media from September 2012 have indicated that the Services are pitching for three specialised unified commands. These are the Cyberspace, Aerospace and Special Forces Commands. It is learnt that there would be a lead service linked to each command. Possibly the Army would handle the Special Forces Command, the Navy the Cyber Forces Command and the Air Force the Aerospace Command China is reported to have numerous options in commencing a conflict. The Taiwan Strait Crisis was purely testing of missiles in 1995 by the Chinese and the standoff lasted for over a year. As per current reports PLA plans to fight a limited war using high technology. This could be usage of ASAT weapons for destruction of satellites, in conjunction with cyber warfare followed by use of conventional missiles against purely military targets. Meanwhile using its ABM systems for defending against retaliatory missiles, thereby demonstrating its prowess. Viewing this threat raising of these Commands is an operational necessity. These commands would be unified and the C-in-C would be from a single service.

Conclusion The current era of Network Centric Operations demand our forces are organised to tackle threats in cyberspace and aerospace dimensions. Special Forces have proved their efficacy in the new generation of warfare. There is a need to raise the Aerospace, Cyberspace and Special Forces Commands at the earliest. The organisations would be unified and it is proposed that the C-in-C of the Aerospace Command be from the Air Force, the Cyberspace Command be from the Navy and Special Forces Command be from the Army. Raising of these organisations will improve our operational preparedness.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

DRDO

EXPLORING NEW FRONTIERS IN THE REALM OF CUTTING EDGE DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES Making India Stronger with 55 Years of Innovation, Research & Development dedicated to the Nation DRDO has placed India among elite group of : - 4 countries to have multi-level Strategic Deterrence capabilities - 5 countries to have its own Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program - 6 countries to have developed a Nuclear â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Powered Submarine - 7 countries to have developed own Main Battle Tank and 4th generation Combat Aircraft. DRDO has established 52 laboratories with over 7500 scientists and around 20,000 support staff and exhaustive infrastructure for testing and comprehensive evaluation of weapon systems and military equipment. DRDO continues in its march over path of excellence exploring new frontiers in the realm of cutting edge defence technologies.

DEFENCE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India www.drdo.gov.in

Issued by Directorate of Public Interface

jointness and synergy

DEVELOPING SCENARIO

T Maj Gen SK Choudhry VSM (retd) This writer is MPhil Defence and Management Studies and former Commandant Millitary Intelligence Training School. He has also been Defence Advisor, Embassy of India, Kabul, Afghanistan. He has practised in the Supreme Court of India and is presently a practising lawyer in Kolkata.

There is a geo-strategic convergence of interests among India and Afghanistan as Pakistan is inimical to both countries. India’s strategic interests in Afghanistan are: any external interference in Afghanistan must be stopped, Afghanistan should have a broadbased government involving all ethnic groups and the territorial integrity of Afghanistan must be maintained. Indian security concerns stem from the narco-trafficking that emanates from Afghanistan, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and security threat to the Sikh and Hindu population in Afghanistan. India is involved in a big way in capacity building and reconstruction of Afghanistan

The recently concluded Indo-Afghan strategic partnership agreement is being viewed by Pakistan as treaty against its national interests and directed at Pakistan per se. UK, owing to its historical baggage, continues to support Pakistan in its Afghan policy in an effort to provide legitimacy to the nation created by UK

he failure of US and NATO forces leads to the conclusion that this management of security in Afghanistan has of necessity to be regional. The centrifugal forces in Afghanistan comprise ethnic, racial, tribal, linguistic and topographical divisiveness. Presence of large quantity of hydrocarbons in CARs affects the security of Afghanistan. The system will once again be put to test in the next Presidential elections scheduled in 2014. USA has granted major non-NATO ally status to Afghanistan thereby providing adequate security safeguards to the country post 2014. There is a geo-strategic convergence of interests among India and Afghanistan as Pakistan is inimical to both countries. There is a vast area of opportunity for India in capacity building of the ANA. India lacks the strategic reach to provide security to Afghanistan in the event of an internal conflict in the country post-2014. Committing troops to the Afghan War will provide Pakistan and China an opportunity to defeat Indian troops on foreign soil.

fghanistan has had a chequered history which has witnessed a large number of invasions from the north, west and the east. This explains the multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-lingual composition of present day Afghanistan. These factors also result in divisiveness among the people of Afghanistan. The country is economically shattered due to external invasions and internal conflicts for over three decades. The geo-strategic location of Afghanistan is extremely important as it is situated at the crossroads of Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia. The centrifugal forces in Afghanistan comprise ethnic, racial, tribal, linguistic and topographical divisiveness. Presence of large quantity of hydrocarbons in CARs affects the security of Afghanistan. Large mineral reserves detected in Afghanistan recently, enhances the interests of external powers in the region significantly. Afghanistan has been a beneficiary of the cold war from both USA and erstwhile Soviet Union. The US was involved in Afghanistan since the early 1950s. It constructed strategic roads and large airfields in Afghanistan during the cold war period but abandoned Afghanistan post the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UK supported the Mujahideen war against the Soviet Union. Ahmad Shah Massoud played a major role in containing the Taliban brand of fundamentalism from 1995 to September 2001. The new political system of Afghanistan post Bonn Declaration is evolving gradually; the system will once again be put to test in the next Presidential elections scheduled in 2014. Corruption in the judicial system and police is of serious concern. State of law and order in rural areas remains critical. Narco-terrorism is prevalent in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

Drugs from Afghanistan are exported to Iran, Pakistan, Russia, UAE and India. There has been considerable improvement in school admissions in the country particularly of the girl child. ISAF, UN and other international agencies have brought substantial peace and progress to Afghanistan. Use of excessive force and disrespect for women has also led to alienation of ISAF troops in many areas. Terrorist attacks by Taliban continue unabated with support from Pakistan. Southern and South Eastern Afghanistan remain the main bastions of Taliban.

Present situation In the political system of Afghanistan the President has sweeping powers along with its adverse fallout on governance. Political parties are ineffective, election of mayors and heads of district councils have not been held due to lack of funds. Afghanistan is the second most corrupt country after Somalia. Governance in rural areas is particularly weak. Aid from international donors has not been used optimally; yet there is considerable progress in reconstruction of Afghanistan. ANA and ANP are not strong enough to withstand combined attack by Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan created the Taliban in 1992 to establish a pro-Pak fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan. Pashtuns straddle both sides of the Durand line. This porous border enables free movement of terrorists from Pakistan into Afghanistan and vice versa. FATA has become a staging area for terrorists to wage asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan and India. Pak strategy for external security vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan has seriously undermined its own internal security. There has been a shift in Pakistan, related to its policy

AFGHANISTAN

POST-2014 AND INDIA’S ROLE of strategic depth. Pakistan now realises that a radical Taliban regime in Afghanistan will be detrimental to its own national security interests. Pakistan has signed a peace deal with the radical elements in North and South Waziristan. Owing to its strategic location Pakistan continues to be in position to dictate terms to the international community on aid, transit facility and measures to bring peace to Afghanistan.

USA has granted major non-NATO ally status to Afghanistan thereby providing adequate security safeguards to the country post-2014. China primarily has economic interests and its eyes are focused upon the trillion dollar mineral wealth of Afghanistan Post 9/11 USA has been involved in a big way for rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Approximately, 68,000 US troops and 34,000 troops from 49 other

countries are presently deployed in Afghanistan. In addition to the ongoing stabilisation operations in Afghanistan ISAF is also in the process of gradually handing over responsibility for security operations to the Afghan National Security Forces. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have made considerable contribution for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. India, USA, NATO, CARs, Russia and Iran share common goals in Afghanistan. India has also made a policy shift, in that it has veered around to accommodate the Taliban in accordance with stance of the Karzai government. Economic interests of Iran are affected by the presence of US troops in Afghanistan and the region. Sharing of Helmand River waters has been a perpetual problem between Afghanistan and Iran. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are also wary of the Taliban brand of fundamentalism. Iran and CARs

continue to be muted in their approach to the Afghan imbroglio. China is presently averse to India’s efforts at expanding its sphere of influence into Central Asia. Improvement of relations with China and Pakistan is likely to enable India to make inroads into Central Asia. Russia is wary of the Taliban support to Chechnyan rebels. Russia is unable to safeguard its strategic interests in Afghanistan perhaps due to its weak economic condition. The Pashtun and the Taliban have acknowledged India’s constructive role in Afghanistan. India enjoys a lot of goodwill among all sections of the Afghan populace, particularly with those people who received education in India. Indian films and TV serials are popular in Afghanistan because of the cultural similarity. Pakistan is highly sensitive to Indian presence in Afghanistan as it undermines Pak economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan. The recently

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

DEVELOPING SCENARIO

concluded Indo-Afghan strategic partnership agreement is being viewed by Pakistan as treaty against its national interests and directed at Pakistan per se. UK, owing to its historical baggage, continues to support Pakistan in its Afghan policy in an effort to provide legitimacy to the nation created by UK.

Post-2014 scenario President Obama announced on 22 June 2011 that beginning July the US would withdraw 10,000 troops by end 2011, another 30,000 troops would be withdrawn by summer of 2012 and by 2014 the process of transition will be completed. He also acknowledged that peace could only come through a political settlement and that the US would join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including the Taliban. While the drawdown of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan is now underway accompanied by efforts at dialoguing with the Taliban, the outcome is uncertain. The US is likely to retain about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan post-2014. Although USA has announced withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan by 2014 yet it is likely to put in place adequate measures to obviate China-Pak inspired upheaval in Afghanistan. USA is wary of a repetition of 9/11 tragedy. USA has granted major non-NATO ally status to Afghanistan thereby providing adequate security safeguards to the country post 2014. China primarily has economic interests and its eyes are focused upon the trillion dollar mineral wealth of Afghanistan. China-Pak nexus is likely to play a dominant role in the region in future. Pak considers the militant groups as its “strategic arsenal”. As a consequence Islamabad maintains close relationship with Taliban and other associated groups, which are attacking US and ISAF forces within Afghanistan. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan would remain tense till such time Pakistan revamps its Afghan policy. Post-2014 Pakistan is likely to step up its political, economic and military interference in Afghanistan. China has Pakistan firmly on its side and, by inference, the Taliban. Post-2014 China has no choice but to undertake major security

responsibility in Afghanistan. The SCO led by China is likely to play a major role in Afghanistan post-US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

China is presently averse to India’s efforts at expanding its sphere of influence into Central Asia. Improvement of relations with China and Pakistan is likely to enable India to make inroads into Central Asia. Russia is wary of the Taliban support to Chechnyan rebels. Russia is unable to safeguard its strategic interests in Afghanistan perhaps due to its weak economic condition Presence of external powers in Afghanistan adversely affects the sovereignty of Afghanistan, security of India and the entire regional security. Ironically exit of US and NATO forces in 2014 is likely to have an identical impact on Afghanistan, India and the region. A high degree of security interdependence exists among the peripheral countries of the Af-Pak region that is, between Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. China will be constrained to expand its responsibility in the Af-Pak region to fill the gap which will occur once NATO forces leave Afghanistan in 2014. On the other hand, it is also clear that the establishment of a stable regional order in the Af-Pak region is hampered by China’s open support to Pakistan in its orchestration of terrorism in India as well as Afghanistan. Further, Pakistan will readily accept a China driven security order in the Af-Pak region. Pak may attempt to forge a Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey alliance with the patronage of China to counter Indian presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan with support from China is likely to play a major role in Afghanistan post-withdrawal of US and NATO forces in 2014. China is not inclined to take up security responsibility in Afghanistan post-withdrawal of the US and NATO forces by 2014. However, the successful management of regional security externalities would reduce their negative fallout for China. The failure of US and NATO forces leads to the conclusion that this management

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

of necessity has to be regional. Why would China prefer a regional arrangement although this would likely place the burden of granting security on its shoulders? The most convincing answer to this question refers to two major preferences in the Chinese grand strategy; firstly China wants to exclude external powers from its immediate neighbourhood and secondly China aspires to become a super power. If these assertions are correct, China will not be able to avoid taking on responsibility for security and stability in its exclusive sphere of influence. Whether they are correct and how they relate to one another – whether they are co-constitutive or whether one is actually only a means to achieve the other – should be the subject of further investigation. Unless the international system returns to bipolarity, the structural conditions are favourable to the realisation of benign unipolarity in the Af-Pak region. Both China that aspires to be a super power and India which aspires to be a major power have competing geo-political, economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan. Post-2014 China and India would have the collective responsibility to enable and ensure stability in the Af-Pak region. Since both countries have high economic aspirations cooperation in gaining access to the Central Asian region is a prerequisite.

India’s role There is a geo-strategic convergence of interests between India and Afghanistan as Pakistan is inimical to both countries. India’s strategic interests in Afghanistan are: any external interference in Afghanistan must be stopped, Afghanistan should have a broadbased government involving all ethnic groups and the territorial integrity of Afghanistan must be maintained. Indian security concerns stem from the narco-trafficking that emanates from Afghanistan, terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and security threat to the Sikh and Hindu population in Afghanistan. India is involved in a big way in capacity building and reconstruction of Afghanistan. India has undertaken to construct the Parliament building in Kabul, early completion of the

project will strengthen the fledgling democracy in Afghanistan. India has a range of interests in Afghanistan that it would like to preserve and enhance, notably containment of Islamist extremism, the use of Afghanistan as a gateway to the energy-rich and strategically important Central Asian region and assertion of its regional pre-eminence. There is a vast area of opportunity for India in capacity building of the ANA, this aspect needs to be addressed with speed and alacrity. India has the support of USA, NATO, Iran, Russia and CARs for its Afghan policy. Special effort is required to garner the support of China and Pakistan also. India is currently supporting the development of democratic institutions in Afghanistan and building critical infrastructure in aid of the Afghan economy. India has a close relationship with Afghanistan. Although India can continue to provide aid to Afghanistan for reconstruction and rebuilding yet it lacks the strategic reach to provide security to Afghanistan in the event of an internal conflict in the country post-2014. Committing troops to the Afghan War will provide Pakistan and China an opportunity to defeat Indian troops on foreign soil. India has won considerable goodwill amongst the Afghans with its aid programmes. This must not be frittered away. The political alignments in Afghanistan have far reaching security implications for India. India should make special efforts to improve bilateral relations with China and Pakistan. India should strive to create a China, India, Afghanistan, Iran, CARs and Russia consensus which will ensure that Pakistan is contained effectively. India should be prepared to take on a larger role in Afghanistan post-2014. Indian policy makers will have to take bold initiatives to develop a regional mechanism to effectively deal with terror activities in the region.

Recommendations Given the history of defeats suffered by the British, the Soviets and the US in Afghanistan no country may perhaps venture to occupy Afghanistan in future. One

of the viable options is to deploy UN peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan, to offset the power vacuum as a result of de-induction of US and NATO forces in 2014. Effective UN involvement in reconstruction, rebuilding and ensuring stability in Afghanistan is a sine qua non in the foreseeable future.

Pakistan now realises that a radical Taliban regime in Afghanistan will be detrimental to its own national security interests. Pakistan has signed a peace deal with the radical elements in North and South Waziristan. Owing to its strategic location Pakistan continues to be in position to dictate terms to the international community on aid, transit facility and measures to bring peace to Afghanistan It is in China’s interest to ensure peace and stability in the Af-Pak region. India also has a similar interest in the region. However, China has the military and economic prowess to play a bigger role in the region. Thus other regional players including India should support China to take the centrestage in the Af-Pak region post-withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. Pakistani brand of terrorism can be checked only by China and China needs to reorient its policy accordingly. The international community has to work on China to act more responsibly. Iran has strategic interests in Afghanistan. It has been supporting the Shias in Afghanistan. While it is in Iranian interest to keep the Taliban at bay, presence of US troops in Afghanistan is also an anathema

for Iran. Iran must provide aid for development of entire Afghanistan and not be biased towards Shias only. It is also in Iranian interest to involve itself more actively in Afghanistan, so that it emerges as a dominant player in the region. The recently concluded Turkmenistan-Afghanistan -Pakistan-India gas pipeline project is likely to bring economic and security bondage to the region. India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan need to make maximum effort to ensure early completion of the project. Afghan nation building is essential to effectively solve its problems. The international community should take effective steps towards this direction. India can play an important role in this process. Too much reliance on Pakistan in the Afghan war is not the right approach. Regional players such as India, Iran, Russia and China should be given more space in order to seek an Afghan solution. However, a solution can only come from within Afghanistan. Global and regional players can help them achieving it. Domestic opinion in USA has supported President Obama’s policy on Afghanistan. Having won a second term in office he is likely to provide continuity in US policy in the Af-Pak region. The Obama administration should come out with a clear and determined Afghan policy and spell out the shape of politico-economic and military dimensions in Afghanistan post-2014. This will enable the regional players to put their act together to fill the power vacuum as also put an end to the prevailing uncertainty.

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DEVELOPING SCENARIO

BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Ahmed, Rashid, Descent into Chaos, Penguin Group, USA, 2008. Anne, Mary Weaver, Pakistan in the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, Farrar, Status and Giroux, New York, 2002. Bajpai, Kanti, “Managing Conflict in South Asia” in: Diehl, Paul F / Lepgold, Joseph, ed., Regional Conflict Management, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Banting, Erinn, Afghanistan: The Land, Crabtree Publishing Company, 2003. Bird, Tim and Marshall, Alex, Afghanistan How the West Lost its Way, New Delhi, 2012. Brig Mohammad, Yousaf, Major Adkin, Mark, The Bear Trap, Lahore: Jang Publisher, 1992. Buzan, Barry, and Wæver, Ole, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. Chopra, VD, Afghanistan and Asian Stability, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1998. Diehl, Paul F “Conclusions: Patterns and Discontinuities in Regional Conflict Management” in: Diehl, Paul F / Lepgold, Joseph, ed, Regional Conflict Management, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Dr Singh, Sudhir Kumar, Post 9/11 Indian Foreign Policy Challengers & Opportunities, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, First Indian Edition, 2009. Frieden, Jeffry, Strategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999. Goodson, Larry P, Afghanistan’s Endless War, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001. Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan the Imperial Dimension, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008.

Khosla, IP,“India and Afghanistan” in: Sinha Atish / Mohta Madhup, ed, Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007. Kupchan, Charles, The New World Order: Contrasting Theories, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000. Lake, David A and Morgan, Patrick, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1997. Lepgold, Joseph, Regional Conflict Management, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003. Litvinsky, BA, History of Civilisations of Central Asia, Volume III, UNESCO Publishing, 1996. Maj Gen (Retd) Nath, Rajendra, PVSM and Late Lt Col Ludra, KS, Flashpoints in South Asia, Lancer’s Books, New Delhi, 2009. Maley,William, Fundamentalism Reborn – Afghanistan and the Taliban, Hurst & Company, London, Edition 2, 1999. Maley, William, The Afghanistan Wars, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Siddique, Abubaker, Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 176, 2006. Smiths, Word, Afghanistan, Things Fall Apart, Delhi, First Edition, 2002. Sreedhar, Taliban and the Afghan Turmoil, New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1997. Sreedhar and Vaid, Mahendra, Afghan Turmoil : Changing Equations, New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1998. Starr, Fredrick S “A Regional Approach to Afghanistan and Its Neighbours” in: Tellis, Ashely J (et al), ed, Challenges and Choices (Strategic Asia 2008-09), Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008. Tanner, Stephen, Afghanistan, A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, Da Capo Press, New York, 2009. “The Indian Diaspora (Chapter 2),” Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran. Waltz, Kenneth N, The New World Order: Contrasting Theories, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000.

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Mohammad, Amin Wakman, Afghanistan at the Crossroads, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1985.

Adam Bennett, “Reconstructing Afghanistan,” International Monetary Fund, 15 April 2005.

Morrow, James D, Strategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999.

Afghanistan Study Group (2008), “Revitalising our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies”, Washington, DC: Centre for the Study of the Presidency.

O’ Balance, Edgar, Afghan Wars 1839-1992, Brassey’s London, New York, 1993. Reddy, LR Inside Afghanistan, End of the Taliban Era? APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi. Saikal, Amin, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, I B Tauris & Co Ltd, New York, 2006. Samad, Ghaus Abdul, (Former Dy Foreign Minister of Afghanistan) The Fall of Afghanistan, PergamonSathasivam, Kanishkan, Uneasy Neighbors. India, Pakistan and US Foreign Policy, Hampshire: Ashgate, Chap 1, 2005.

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Ahmad, Rashid “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs 87(6), 2008, p. 31. Air Marshal Pandey, BK “Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership”, Indian Defence Review, Vol 27.1, March 2012, p. 28. Arvind Gupta and Vishal Chandra, “Policy Brief Post 2014 Afghanistan and India’s Options”, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 18 July 2012. “Debate-Afghanistan: Post-US Drawdown and India”, Indian

Foreign Affairs Journal Vol 6, No 3, July-Sept ,2011.

76% of Deaths in Afghanistan”, The Weekly Standard, 10 August 2010.

Fair, Christine C “India and Iran: New Delhi’s Balancing Act”, The Washington

Report- USGS Afghanistan Project / US Geological Survey / Afghanistan Geological Survey, Fact Sheet 2007–3063.

Quarterly 30(3), 2007, p 145. India Review, A Publication of the Embassy of India, Kabul, 2007, p 5. Joint Working Group Report, “Towards a Stable Afghanistan: The Way Forward”, Dialogue, Vol 13 No 3, p 55. Journal of Alternative Perspective in The Social Sciences, Vol I, No 3, 2009, pp 1003-1009. Julian E Barnes, “US Seeks Larger Role for India in Afghanistan”, The Wall Street Journal, 05 June 2012. Menon, Rajan , “The New Great Game in Central Asia”, Survival 45(2), 2003, p 199. Norling, Nickolas, The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship, CACI Analyst, May 2008, p 38. Pellerindate, Cheryl, Afghan Security Forces Grow in Numbers, Quality, American Forces Press Service, United States Department of Defense. 23 May 2011. “Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistans Opium Industry”, The Washington Quarterly. Rubin, Barnet R / Ahmad, Rashid, “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs 87(6), 2008, p 37. Singh, Sinderpal, “Framing South Asia: Whose Imagined Region?”, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, Working Paper No. 9, 2001, p 8. Tellis, Ashley J “Pakistan’s Impending Defeat in Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment Publication, 22 June 2012. “Towards a stable Afghanistan: The Way Forward” Dialogue Vol.13, No.3, Jan – March 2012. “UN: Taliban Responsible for

“US-Afghan Relations”, United States Department of State.

Internet h t t p : / / w w w . c f r . o r g (India-Afghanistan Relations-Council on Foreign Relations). http://www.cia.gov www.icasualties.org:operation Enduring Freedom, 22 December 2012. http://www.idsa.in (IDSA Strat Comments India’s Role in Afghanistan). www.isaf.nato.org, 22 December 2012. www.mea.nic.in http://mod.nic.in Defence, India).

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Muzhary Fazal,“Landmark trade pact inked with Pakistan”, Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul, Afghanistan, 28 October 2010. “Pakistan rebuffs Karzai warning”, BBC News,16 June 2008. Reuters, 8 June 2010. The Guardian , 30 November 2010.

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The New York Times, 19 June 2010. The New York Times, 25 July 2010. “There is more to than Taliban”, Asia 12 January 2012.

www.un.org. www.understandingwar.org. Afghanistan-National Army, 22 December 2012. www.unodc.org, 20 November 2012.

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The Times of India, 18 April 2010. The Times of India, 21 July 2012.

The Times of India, Kolkata, Healy, Jack, “Afghanistan Favours 27 November 2012. India and Denigrates Pakistan”, New York Times, 4 October 2011. The Washington Post, 1 July 2010.

“Iran warns of US stay in Afghanistan”, Pahjwok Afghan News, 25 November 2011. “Karzai issues warning to Pakistan”, BBC News,15 June 2008. Klapper, Bradley, While US talks withdrawal, Afghan corruption soars, Associated Press. June 2011. Mazzetti, Mark and Schmitt , Eric “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, US Officials Say”, New York Times, 1 August 2008.

The Washington Post, 26 July 2010. The Washington 16 December 2010. The Wall 18 July 2010.

Street

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Interview Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi (retd), Defence and Strategic Analyst.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

CROSS DOMAIN CONCORD

C Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and was awarded Silver Medal at the Naval Academy, the Telescope and the Sword of Honour for being adjudged the best Naval Officer during initial training. He did his specialisation in Quality Assurance of Naval Armament and adorned various key appointments at Naval Command Headquarters, DRDO establishments, Ordnance Factories and finally rose to become the Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy). He is an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC). He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation.

It may be worthwhile for India to examine and analyse the changing nature of neighbouring maritime environment and assess the extent of synergies that may be required to maintain a significant presence in waters of India’s interest. This is a required preparatory step, as once ASB starts playing out in the Pacific, India would have to, at least ensure the safety of the SLOCs leading to its shores and may also be required to contribute in an international ASB effort west of Malacca

hinese writings have carefully articulated that Dong Feng 21D is not only meant to target the Carriers but also the Aegis class Cruisers and Destroyers which protect the carrier! Since these missiles are road mobile it would be time consuming and very difficult to neutralise their batteries without sailing in to harm’s way. Accordingly the US 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review announced Air-Sea Battle (ASB) initiative to support the mission of “Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments”. “The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains – air, sea, land, space and cyberspace – to counter growing challenges to US freedom of action.” In the Indian context the need to share the capability plans and integrate them doctrinally is as integral to the success of ASB missions as the setting up of an effective joint command and control structure. The HQ IDS is ideally placed to come out with guidelines and time frames for achieving the same. “JOAC describes in broad terms my vision for how joint forces will operate in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial security challenges. Its central thesis is Cross-Domain Synergy – the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others – to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission.” – General Martin E Dempsey, in Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012) January 20121.

hina and Pakistan constitute two adversaries of India whose capabilities need to be periodically assessed keeping in view the changing maritime environment in the IOR and the Pacific region. Both the countries do not operate credible aircraft carriers, (China is rapidly catching up with commissioning of its lone aircraft carrier the Liaoning last year) and therefore are unable to project formidable power across the seas. But both appear to have greatly strengthened their offensive capabilities by acquiring potent submarine fleets which can easily deter any opportunistic foray in their waters and also force the adversaries to chart their courses only after factoring in the lurking submarine threat.

Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2 / AD) capabilities of India’s neighbours Pakistan Navy has fortified its helicopters and MR aircraft with Exocet anti-ship missiles and has procured 70, C802 Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles from China for its Zulfikar class frigates and Zalalat II class FACs. Further the PAF has ordered 50 C802s for JF-17s. The C802 missile is 6.9 m long, weighs 715 kg, has a range of ~200 km and a 165 kg time delayed SAP warhead. It is supposed to have a very low RCS with a speed of 0.9 Mach and has credible anti-jamming capabilities. The cruise altitude is 10-20 m with terminal altitude at 3-5 m. It has inertial guidance in cruise phase with active radar homing in the terminal phase. This missile is also fielded by Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia. Pakistan Navy already has AIP Augusta submarines which can fire Harpoon missiles without having to surface. It is acquiring 3 Type 214 submarines with AIP from Germany and also 3 Song class submarines from China. Both of these diesel electric types of submarines can fire torpedoes and missiles.

China has come to accept that a maritime route is imperative for the growth of its economy and the only power that can make it stumble if not cripple, is the US. Accordingly, China has progressed adding capabilities not only to its navy but also to its shore based assets such that it can deter the blockade at sea or make it very expensive for the US to do so.

The ASB has yet to be embedded in US national strategy and indoctrinated and practised by the US Navy and the USAF before it can be completely implemented. This may take some time as the other components, like additional and modernised space and ISR capabilities, long range strike aircraft and UCAVs, UUVs etc are still under development

China’s National Defense in 20082

Neutralising Dong Feng 21D anti-carrier ballistic missile continues to be a severe irritant in countering A2 / AD strategies by the US. Chinese writings have carefully articulated that Dong Feng 21D is not only meant to target the Carriers but also the Aegis class Cruisers and Destroyers which protect the carrier! Since these missiles are road mobile it would be time consuming and very difficult to neutralise their batteries without sailing in to harm’s way. The US response has been to revert to constructing blue water BMD destroyers and relocate BMD capable ships to the Pacific. BMD is being extended to all Aegis cruisers along with increased procurement of SM-3 BMD missiles.3 Admiral Willard has said that the new Chinese weapon was not fully operational and would probably undergo testing “for several more years.” The key remaining step is a test of the entire system at sea.4 This also implies that the US has sometime on its hands to put up its act together for countering the Dong Feng 21D threat.

1. Gen Martin Dempsey, Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf 2. China’s National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2009).

3. Ronald O'Rourke, China Naval Modernisation: Implications for US Navy Capabilities–Background and Issues for Congress 26 August 2010. http:// assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33153_20100826.pdf 4. Thomas PM Barnett, “TIME on PACOM versus WAPO on PRC's DF-21D,” Thomas PM Barnett’s Globlogisation, entry posted December 29, 2010 http://thomaspmbarnett.com/globlogisation/2010/12/29/time-on-pacom-versus-wapo-on-prcs-df-21d.html#ixzz2ILir2djK

“China is faced with the superiority of the developed countries in economy, science and technology, as well as military affairs. It also faces strategic manoeuvres and containment from the outside while having to face disruption and sabotage by separatist and hostile forces from the inside.”

Air Sea Battle Concept in Indian Context

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

CROSS DOMAIN CONCORD

China has a good submarine fleet with Russian as well as home built diesel electric submarines capable of firing Klub ASCMs. In addition it has nuclear attack and nuclear missile submarines. China has maritime strike aircraft (Su-30 MK2, FB-7 etc) which can carry ASCMs, it has a large number of patrol craft which carry C-803 SSMs with a range of ~350 km and it has Russian destroyers which carry ASCM (Moskit). Apart from the above China has a formidable air defence capability on shore as well as on ships. As far as other areas directly affecting ISR and targeting at sea are concerned the US Department of Defense’s 2010 Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China notes: PLA writings emphasise the necessity of “destroying, damaging and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance ... and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among initial targets of attack to “blind and deafen the enemy.” The A2 / AD capabilities of China have been assessed and accordingly the US 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review announced Air-Sea Battle (ASB) initiative to support the mission of “Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments”. “The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains – air, sea, land, space and cyberspace – to counter growing challenges to US freedom of action.” The ASB has yet to be embedded in US national strategy and indoctrinated and practised by the US Navy and the USAF before it can be completely implemented. This may take some time as the other components, like additional and modernised space and ISR capabilities, long range strike aircraft and UCAVs, UUVs etc are still under development.

Both the countries do not operate credible aircraft carriers, (China is rapidly catching up with commissioning of its lone aircraft carrier the Liaoning last year) and therefore are unable to project formidable power across the seas. But both appear to have greatly strengthened their offensive capabilities by acquiring potent submarine fleets which can easily deter any opportunistic foray in their waters and also force the adversaries to chart their courses only after factoring in the lurking submarine threat Contra views about ASB have been expressed in blogs and seminars. It has been said that ASB treads a razor’s edge, as on one hand ‘cooperative engagement’ with China has to be vigorously pursued and on the other hand, think tanks like Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments bring out their outline of ASB replete with maps of target locations; which would be required to be bombed across interior of mainland China. Thomas PM Barnett in his article “TIME on PACOM versus WAPO on PRC’s DF-21D,”5 has brought out that “I don’t think it’s particularly “provocative” for the Chinese to develop weaponry (which they most certainly are, even if it’s taking them time) to prevent our carriers from sitting off their coast with the capability of launching attacks across the breadth and depth of their mainland. I don’t find that counter odd at all. I would find it odd if a rising power sat idly by while another nation (that wants a different political system for it) has the capability of unleashing such military strikes and routinely floats that capability along its shoreline – especially when that same country has a record of toppling regimes.” Ever since this concept has been articulated and the Asia-Pacific shift has been announced China has taken it as an eventual threat to its energy lifelines.

The Indian context It may be worthwhile for India to examine and analyse the changing nature of neighbouring maritime environment and assess the extent of synergies that may be required to maintain a significant presence in waters of India’s interest. This is a required preparatory step, as once ASB starts playing out in the Pacific, India would have to, at least ensure the safety of the SLOCs leading to its shores and may also be required to contribute in an international ASB effort west of Malacca. India’s areas of concern are freedom of operation in the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. Large swathes of which, even currently, lie under the Chinese missile umbrella and may prompt Pakistan to pre-empt misadventure in the areas which would critically affect oil supplies / oil production. The Indian ASB battle zone involves; Space (ISR satellites and BMD), cyberspace (eg Networking nodes), Island territories and inland areas (launch pads, AD systems, airfields etc), littorals in case of amphibious operations (may even include own areas which may need clearing in case of clandestine ingress), surface and sub-surface for naval operations of ships, submarines and unmanned vehicles and air space for aerial operations (both for IN and the IAF). A glance at the battle zone reveals existence of overlapping capability areas between IN, IAF and to a lesser extent the Indian Army, even in acquiring preliminary ‘awareness’ prior to launching into the preparatory and operations phase. As operations will progress, requirement for integrated effort will keep on increasing with the levels of networked forces being brought to bear on the adversary. The need for joint training, joint doctrines, joint preparedness exercises and ‘awareness’ sharing in the future are thus an imperative. Space, air, surface and sub-surface have to be secured for the duration of operation by both the IN and the IAF for the potent Indian Army to carry out the ground operations if required.

While it is for each service to build-up its capabilities and doctrines for tackling the unfolding scenarios – closer to Indian shores in the Bay of Bengal or further away in the Arabian Sea / Indian Ocean – as far as the ASB is concerned, the need to share the capability plans and integrate them doctrinally is as integral to the success of ASB missions as the setting up of an effective joint command and control structure. The HQ IDS is ideally placed to come out with guidelines and time frames for achieving the same. Specific to the IN two aspects – other than the emergent need for joint operations and training with IAF – which need attention at the highest echelons are the gaps in defences of own littorals and o v e r a r c h i n g domain awareness. Strengthening defences of own littorals: There is an apparent gap in the defences of India’s own littorals, ports and harbours which needs to be plugged6. It can be done by procurement of midget / miniature submarines, UAVs / USVs for operations as swarms, Unmanned Underwater Sensor and Weapon Carriers (UUSWC), cable controlled mines, extended reach coastal ASCMs and gun batteries. Overarching domain awareness: The coast and Open Ocean are critical domains for the security of a nation with sea as boundaries, both at home and abroad. National-security operations in the oceans take place globally and often require continuous, near-real-time monitoring of environmental conditions using tools such as autonomous sensors, targeted observations and adaptive modelling. The core of Marine Domain Awareness, however, is applying the vessel tracking process to a layered defence model centred on the coastline of India, the ultimate goal of which is to detect potential threats early and as far away from the Indian coastline as possible. In order to derive a comprehensive MDA picture, information needs to be fused, correlated and analysed and for it to be relevant to national security it must be designed to operate cohesively at tactical, regional and strategic levels. The MDA capabilities, synergised with improved understanding of the ocean environment, enabled by other ocean science research activities, will support accurate ocean-state assessments and allow future forces to conduct joint and combined operations in near shore and deep-ocean operating environments, anywhere and at anytime.7 India has to evaluate the ASB with reference to its own geo-strategic position, threats and resources; however enhancing IN-IAF jointness would accrue gains to both the services and increase preparedness for an ASB like operation in Indian waters. 6. Kulshrestha S, Matters Littoral Defence, Defence and Security Alert, December 2012. 7. Kulshrestha S, ODA: An Imperative, Geo Intelligence November-December 2012.

5. Ibid.

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Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

mphibious warfare has long been placed in the category of one of the more complex operations of armed conflict. Its knotty nature derives from its demand for intricate planning; a situation of full spectrum dominance; integration of every conceivable dimension of warfare; stealth in the contradictory environment of managing large forces with their huge logistic train; setting aside of some of the key principles of conventional warfare such as flexibility, economy of effort and mobility; transition of Command responsibilities at critical points in the operation; and most perilously, operating under conditions that are favourable to the enemy. Given that the deck tilts against success, it will be interesting to examine the nature of this combat manoeuvre through the lens of two historical battles that occurred with a time interregnum of more than two millennia. The intriguing reality of these episodes was that they were played within the same geographical constraints of the Dardanelles and the essential struggle was between a maritime and a continental power. In both events the continental power prevailed.

Poseidon’s Long View Across Time

“The Fleet and Army, acting in concert, seem to be the natural Bulwark of these Kingdoms … We don’t mean to lessen the dignity of the Army, but to encourage it to make the Conjunct War their great Object … ” – Molyneux 17592 Episode I: An Enactment from the Past-Aegospotami 405 BCE

To the minds of many Indian military leaders, amphibious warfare remains a lesser known mystery; to merit theoretical examination at the Staff College and thereafter to be set aside as a costly conjecture that has little chance of success in the real world of operations. This is based on the premise that a frontal military assault out of the water with all the complications of forming up in and disembarking from boats, moving through surf and landing on a hostile beach with neither overwhelming force nor stealth nor saturation firepower by air and sea that could suppress shore defences was futile

Thessalic versus Continental Strategy, Powers of Antiquity Face Off

he Peloponnesian War, waged from 431 BCE to 404 BCE, between Athens and Sparta was a seminal amphibious operation. The conflict’s scholastic significance lie in the discipline with which its proceedings were recorded. The strategies developed by the two warring States and their confederations were studies in contrast for Thessalic Athens, war plans were largely driven by a maritime strategy that strove to vanquish the Spartans through attrition, sanctions and peripheral campaigns waged from its far flung coastal bases in the Mediterranean, Aegean and the Black seas; while the Spartans fought to their strength and adopted a continental strategy that centred on invasion, armed alliances and striking at the heart of the enemy homeland. The historian believed that what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.3 The theatre of warfare extended from Sicily in the west to the Black Sea in the east, a span of 2000 kilometres across the Mediterranean and into the Black Sea. Ten major maritime engagements occurred during the 27 years of war each having a disproportionate impact on the progress of war on land. However our focus is on the last engagement which involved an amphibious operation at Aegospotami across the Dardanelles (Hellespont) in September 405 BCE the outcome of this engagement saw the crumbling of Athenian sea power and the consequent severance of all sea lines of communication to its empire and its eventual capitulation within the year.

Run-up to battle The two sides spent the early part of the year maintaining, logistically and materially preparing and honing the fighting potential of their fleets. Eventually in September Lysander, the Spartan fleet commander, decided to move into the Hellespont, partly to try and regain 1. From Greek mythology, Poseidon the God of the Seas had the power to stop time. 2. Molyneux, Thomas More, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare published by RJ Dodsely, 1759, London as quoted by Aston GG Brigadier General in Letters on Amphibious Wars. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1911 p 2. 3. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Books Ltd, England 1986, p 23.

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control of a number of cities lost in recent years and partly to try and block the Athenian logistic and economic lifeline emerging from the Black Sea. His first success came at Lampsacus (4 to 5 kilometres north of Lapseki, see Map 1), across the Hellespont, on the Asian shore which fell to a land assault.

The intellectual framework provided by Molyneux when he first propagated ‘Conjunct Warfare’ and the idea of a ‘strike by an invisible hand’ placed amphibious operations in the context of a ‘Manoeuvrist Approach.’ The key lay in the ability to project force from the sea in a manner that lends itself to such manoeuvrist precepts as surprise of time and place and out-flanking movements. As would be apparent from the narrative, the amphibious campaign to seize the Gallipoli peninsula and lay control of the Straits fell far short of the attributes that make for manoeuvre warfare despite the obvious advantages that weighed with the maritime power When the Athenians discovered that Lysander had moved into the Hellespont, they followed with a fleet of 180 ships. They sailed up the Strait and took up position at Aegospotami four to five kilometres across the Strait west of Lampsacus, where they established a base to progress operations. On the next morning the Athenians put out to sea and formed up in line of battle outside Lampsacus. Lysander did not oblige to come out of his haven and engage the enemy. Frustrated, the Athenians returned to their base on the beach at Aegospotami. Lysander sent some of his fastest ships to follow the Athenians for surveillance and intelligence gathering. For the next three days the same rite was replayed only with great tactical shrewdness, the Spartans through their intelligence effort reconnoitred the coastline, earmarked potential beaches for landing and significantly built a tactical picture of the Athenian fleet’s pattern of operations. On the fifth day Lysander manoeuvred into the operational area keeping a discrete distance from the Aegospotami beach.4 4. Xenophon’s Hellenica 2.1.17-32 and Diodorus’ Library, 13.104.8-106.8.

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Fragmented command versus Spartan unified plan The Athenian fleet was led by six admirals who in turn rotated command of the 180 ships of the fleet.5 The Commander for the day was the relatively inexperienced Philocles, disjointed Command and an almost daily change in the methods and the graphics of control would have undoubtedly imposed unnecessary stresses on both man and material to the detriment of operational efficiency. Considerably less is known on the size of the Spartan fleet, it is assumed that the Spartan fleet was similar in size and capabilities to the Athenian fleet. Lysander’ plan envisaged a frontal engagement of the Athenian fleet at their moorings with a simultaneous amphibious landing to the north. The landing force was to move in a coordinated scything pincer manoeuvre which would crush Athenian forces between the land and the maritime prongs. It is this amphibious landing which is of particular note to our study since it involved a major surprise assault.

The selected beaches were appropriate for landing operations, however their geographic spread of less than 10 miles provided inadequate manoeuvring space for, what eventually amounted to, seven Divisions. The cramping of the invasion front permitted the Turkish defenders to operate on inner lines and concentrate there efforts which eventually stalled the invasion practically on the beaches

Events of the engagement

The Dardanelles, formerly known as Hellespont is a narrow strait in present day north-western Turkey connecting the Aegean Sea to the Sea of Marmara. It is located at approximately 40°13′N 26°26′E. The Strait is 61 kilometres (38 mi) long but only 1.2 to 6 kilometres wide, averaging 55 metres deep with a maximum depth of 103 metres. Plutarch mentions that Aegospotami lies directly across the Dardanelles, opposite the Spartan camp at Lampsacus. He describes the site as nothing more than a beach, the river which gave its name to the battle drains into the Strait about 6 kilometres south west of Gallipoli. Furthermore, according to Xenophon, the Hellespont was fifteen stades (approximately 2¾ kilometres) wide between Aegospotami and Lampsacus. It is commonly accepted that the name Aegospotami (literally ‘Goat Rivers’) refers to the earlier mentioned river.

Unable to appreciate intentions of the Spartan Fleet, Philocles, put to sea with thirty triremes and ordered the rest of his armada comprising of 149 ships still at their moorings to follow. His vanguard of 30 ships, analysts suggest could have been a part of a deception plan to seduce the Spartans into ambush by the waiting main fleet or a phased move to Sestos.9 The state of preparedness of the main fleet would, however, negate both theories and would insinuate confusion and ineptitude rather than a deliberate plan. Lysander decided to take advantage of the split Athenian force. The entire Peloponnesian fleet joined battle and in a rapid head on engagement defeated Philocles before his ships could find deeper soundings and the manoeuvring space that the centre of the Straits offered. Having overwhelmed the vanguard, he then attacked the unprepared Athenian fleet. While Lysander engaged the Athenian ships and towed the Prizes out to sea, a coordinated Spartan amphibious landing of an army comprising 3000 infantry and 360 cavalry10 led by the Spartan General Etionicus was effected on the beaches south of Gallipoli (Turkish Gelibolu). Surprise was total and while the landing force broke out of the beach head, raced southward and routed the Athenians on the Aegospotami seashore; Lysander closed the pincer on the main body of the bewildered Athenian fleet still at their moorings, 170 Athenian ships were captured, their embarked army lay devastated and victory was complete.11 In the aftermath the Athenian position crumbled. Hellespont came under Spartan control and the strangulation of Athens was to end the War within a year.

Choice of mounting port and operational underpinning

Analysis

What is perplexing is the Athenian choice of an in-theatre operational base that lacked ready source of logistics; particularly so when good friendly mounting ports existed at Sestos (about 12 kilometres south) and Gallipoli upstream to the north (about 4 kilometres; in the days of the oar being upstream had its tactical advantage). While it provided for relatively close surveillance of the Spartan fleet at Lampsacus it was to pose an awkward provisioning as well as a critical operational problem for the Athenians who were forced to travel some way to forage for food and water and had got into the routine of disembarking from their ships at the end of each sailing for this purpose.6 In the event, tactical proximity to the enemy proved to be one of the causes of the eventual Athenian debacle. The Spartans, on the other hand, were not only in an operationally superior position but also the early capture of Lampsacus offered them an excellent mounting port. The city provided a safe haven and was well stocked with materials and stores. At the same time, its location threatened the Athenian grain shipments from the Black Sea. These operational comforts gave to the Spartans considerable flexibility. Lysander could afford to initiate aggressive action at a time of his choosing. It was also clear to him that the logistic situation and the morale of the Athenian fleet would force them to offer battle sooner rather than later for it was common knowledge that by then Athens’ treasury was running low. To the Spartans it was the decisive battle that was being sought, for victory at Aegospotami would mean the end of Athens’ command of the seas and with it the beginning of the end of war.

Any analysis of this campaign will invariably sacrifice objectivity for want of precision in the records available. These underscore the character and nature of amphibious warfare and the planning salients that provide a theoretical foundation for embarking on such operations. The attributes that contributed to success of Lysander’s amphibious assault may be distinguished as follows:12

Lay of the strait

Planning factors In planning the amphibious prong of operations, Lysander had chosen time of landing astutely; based on natural conditions, the weather (September from weather point of view provided ideal conditions for the campaign) and the operational situation7. The mission for the amphibious landing force was clearly defined ‘to execute a coordinated enveloping manoeuvre to block the landward escape of the Athenian embarked army as their ships were being engaged by the seaward prong’. Past surveillance and intelligence gathering had established pattern of operations along with critical inputs that determined selection of landing beaches about 4 to 6 kilometres north of Aegospotami which not only ensured security of landing but also provided the necessary discretion by remaining clear of ‘foraging routes’ which would have alerted the Athenians of the impending sea-land operation. In terms of his personal virtues, Lysander unlike his Athenian counterpart combined in his person a very experienced admiral 5. C Ehrhardt, “Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami”, in: Phoenix. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada 24 (1970), p 226; G Wylie, “What really happened at Aegospotami”, in: L’Antiquité Classique 55 (1986), p 125-141. 6. JF Bommelaer, Lysandre de Sparte, Paris 1981, p 112. 7. Deductions and inferences of the planning process based on reconstruction of events by the writer.

commanding the Spartan fleet for the second time, with an influential statesman. In his first command he had led his fleet to several victories and achieved political acclaim; notable amongst these was his triumph at Notium and winning Persian economic, political and material support for the Spartan cause. He also enjoyed the unreserved confidence of his people and his men8. His appreciation of the impending battle being decisive in the outcome of the war must have greatly influenced him in selecting a Course of Action that would deliver the coup de grace. To summarise from the Spartan standpoint the run up to the campaign was marked by focused planning and preparation, leadership had displayed an acute strategic sense of awareness of the impending engagement and had rapidly ascended the operational high ground, morale was high and most significantly intelligence and surveillance had made transparent Athenian pattern of operations and their weaknesses. While from the Athenian perspective the campaign was poorly planned and desperate in its manoeuvre and to cap it all, low morale pervaded the fleet and fragmented leadership assured a complete lack of battle coherence in execution.

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Clarity of objective against the backdrop of the larger strategic situation. Nature and characteristics of the campaign at hand, enemy to be fought and precision in mission definition. Precise assessment of the balance of forces. Perceptive choice of mounting port. Focused intelligence gathering and development of a best course of action. Judicious appraisal of natural elements and selection of landing beach. Adroit and single minded leadership supported by meticulous planning and coordination. 8. Plutarch’s Life of Lysander. Turnbull and McNamara, Agathon Associates, 2005. http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Lysander_-_ Lysander_establishes_himself 9. D Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire Ithaca, New York and London, 1987, p 391; C Ehrhardt, “Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami”, in: Phoenix. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada 24 (1970), p 227; JF. Bommelaer, Lysandre de Sparte (Paris, 1981), 110. The tactic was supposed to work as follows. One part of the fleet was used as bait in order to entice the enemy to battle. It was reckoned that the enemy would not be able to resist such a seemingly weak adversary. Shortly after impact the fleet would then retreat and entice the enemy into following. The remaining part of the fleet, which would be in waiting, would subsequently surprise the enemy by attacking them in their flank. 10. Connolly, Peter. Greece and Rome at War. Greenhill Books 2006, p 40. 11. Diodorus Silicus, Library. Book 13. Chapter 106 Sections 1-6. Translated by Oldfather CH, Harvard University Press 1989. Available at www.perseus.tufts.edu 12. These attributes are based on deductions and extrapolations made by the writer; what is remarkable is how well these would fit into the planning of modern amphibious operations.

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jointness and synergy

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Map 1. The Strait of Dardanelles (Hellespont)

Source: This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Geographic locations in red have been inserted by the writer, they are approximate. The Commons is a freely licensed media file repository.

Episode II: The Amphibious Campaign at Gallipoli 1915 Conjunct warfare To the British Admiralty, amphibious operations were hardly a novel discipline of warfare. In fact as early as 1759 a theory of what was termed ‘Conjunct Warfare’ had been propagated in a treatise entitled “Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare.”13 As the treatise so eloquently puts it “the conjunct armament goes against the enemy like an arrow from a bow. It gives no warning where it is to come and leaves no traces where it has passed. It must wound too where it hits, if rightly pointed at a vulnerable part. When this is done a new aim is directed. The enemy in the meantime, like a man in the dark labouring under an unwieldy shield, moves slowly to and fro, distracted and at a loss which way to guard against the stroke of the invisible hand.”14 Molyneux understood that a nation with superior sea power possessed the advantage of initiative and therefore could bring powerful forces against an enemy at a time and place of its choosing. He emphasised that surprise was a key element to an amphibious attack (obviously the author implied surprise of time and place rather than surprise of intent), calling it a “terrible sort of war that comes like thunder and lightning to some unprepared part of the World.” Despite his high opinion of the potential of amphibious landings, Molyneux recognised that they failed more often than they succeeded.15 He insisted that the main reason for failed amphibious missions, or miscarriages, in his words, was mismanagement of planning and execution. The most important aspects of this mismanagement were the lack of cooperation between navy and army commanders, want of application, deficiency of a system on which the operation is founded (‘doctrine’ in present day parlance) and significantly, the attitude of relegating this form of warfare to a lesser priority.16 What is remarkable is how contemporary this analysis is.

Grand strategy and the flawed campaign instructions In 1915, the Western Allies sent a massive invasion force of British, Indian, Australian and New Zealand troops to attempt to force and control the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits. Of all the campaigns of the First World War, perhaps the one that inspires the most lasting grisly fascination was this attempt to break through the Turkish Straits invest Constantinople (modern day Istanbul) and establish control of shipping in and out of the Black Sea. Originally 13. Molyneux, Thomas More, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare published by RJ Dodsely, 1759, London as quoted by Aston GG Brigadier General in Letters on Amphibious Wars. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1911 p 4. 14. Ibid. Molyneux’ treatise contains an exhaustive history of littoral warfare, its nature and value. Of equal importance is its analysis of the principles that govern the planning and execution of amphibious campaigns. Time has neither diminished its contemporary relevance nor provided an alternative to the theory that it develops. 15. Ibid Part I, 3-4 and Part II, 5-8. 16. Ibid Part I, vii, 3-4, Part II, 8,46 and the general theme of Part II.

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conceived by then – First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, the Dardanelles initiative was intended to open a supply line through the Black Sea to the beleaguered Russians and simultaneously drive Ottoman Turkey out of the war with one decisive blow. Even today there is little doubt that in term of a grand concept the idea of relieving Russia, rallying the Balkan States to the side of the Entente and bringing about the fall of the Ottoman Empire – with the consequent accession of the oil rich Arabian Peninsula and Persia, all in one assault was, debatably, the only far reaching strategic thought of the First World War. That it failed, when in an analogous situation of two global powers of antiquity at war two millennia earlier, an amphibious operation in the same theatre with similar strategic objectives brought to termination a 27 year war, would suggest the need for any serious student of military history to weigh in balance the two campaigns. After a combined fleet of French and British warships were thwarted in their bid to force their way through the Straits in an all-out assault on 18 March 1915, losing three capital ships in the process (the sinking of the ships, disproportionately influenced the subsequent decision), the British War Council whose decision it was to seize control of the Straits through a purely naval expedition17 elected to abandon the naval bombardment concluding that systematic longer range blitz of the Turkish shore batteries and forts by naval gunfire would not in itself bring about control of the narrows and that the only way to breach the Straits was by seizing the entire Gallipoli Peninsula. The awkward irony was that the change of strategic heart comes at a time when the defenders had resigned to defeat. Also this pivotal decision was contradictory to the Campaign Instructions dated 13 March 1915 (Establishing Directive in contemporary amphibious warfare lexicon) passed down to the Commander-in-Chief General Sir Ian Hamilton by Kitchener the Secretary of State for War.18 Intriguing and at the same time uncharacteristic was the Instruction’s ambivalence at places, lack of intelligence at others, contradictory in matters of intent and perhaps most seriously the inability to appreciate the need for close and precise coordination and fatally so the absence of a declared strategic context and an umbrella system within which the campaign was to be anchored. Paragraphs 3, 6, 7 and 9 of Kitchener’s Instructions are particularly indistinct, contrary and imprecise; they bear mention for clearly they would have contributed to the ‘miscarriage’ of the campaign:19 Paragraph 3. “Having entered on the project of forcing the Straits there can be no idea of abandoning the scheme. It will require time, patience and methodical plans of cooperation between the naval and military commanders. The essential point is to avoid a check, which will jeopardise our chances of strategical and political success.” In the event within a month of issue of the Campaign Instructions this crucial strategic impulse which lay at the heart of the engagement was to be discarded. Paragraph 6. “Under present conditions it seems undesirable to land any permanent garrison or hold any lines on the Gallipoli Peninsula.” What changed circumstances led to turning this Instruction on its head is not entirely clear but by 13 April 1915 Instructions to the same Commander-in-Chief was to seize the Peninsula through military action. Paragraph 7. “... The occupation of the Asiatic side (eastern side of the Straits) by military forces is to be strongly deprecated.” While Paragraph 9 in direct contradiction suggests that “… it may be necessary to land parties to hold entrenched positions on the east side (Asian) of the Bosphorus …” Kitchener’s initial Instructions had envisaged a quick breakthrough by Allied warships to Constantinople, whereupon Hamilton’s Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) would rendezvous with Russian forces in occupying the city and its hinterland and then withdraw to deploy as required elsewhere. The role of the MEF was delineated to a concentrated offensive on the European side of the Straits to overwhelm any Turkish ground forces hindering the passage of the Allied navies.

Forcing the straits Consider, once again, the geography of the Dardanelles (see Map 1), the narrow, southwest-northeast strait that connects the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmara, with Asia to the south and the European Gallipoli Peninsula to the north. From its entrance between Cape Helles and Kum Kale, the Dardanelles stretches for 61 kilometres to the town of Gallipoli (Gelibolu in Turkish), where it widens into the Sea of Marmara. Constantinople lies at the far end of the Marmara, 200 kilometres to the northeast. For the most part, the strait is several kilometres wide, but 25 kilometres upstream at the Narrows opposite the town of Canakkale on the Asian shore, the passage necks down to only 1,600 metres and veers sharply north, then east again, with a depth of approximately 50 metres. Complex and unpredictable cross currents and the layering of salt and fresh water further complicate a transit. In 1915, the Narrows were well protected by formidable masonry forts on the European and Asian shores, as well as multiple minefields, searchlights and both fixed and mobile artillery. German military advisors to the Turkish Army had trained the gunners and the overall defence was under German command. The attempt to force the straits made in February and March 1915 and was purely a naval affair. It was instigated at the insistence of Churchill who was 17. Cassar, George H Kitchener’s War, British Strategy 1914-1916. Potomac Books 2004, Chapter 5. 18. Aspinall-Oglander CF History of the Great War Military Operations Gallipoli Vol I Appendix 1 Lord Kitchener’s Instructions to Sir Ian Hamilton. William Heinemann Ltd London 1929, p 1 to 3. 19. Weigley, Russell F The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 257.

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convinced that naval gunfire supported by selective landings would be adequate to secure the straits. The first of three attacks was made on 19 February with twelve capital ships (the French ships Bouvet, Charlemagne, Gaulois and Suffren; the British ships HMS Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Inflexible, Vengeance, Albion, Cornwallis, Irresistible and Triumph) and while initial operations were successful, bad weather halted the expedition. Vice-Admiral Robeck commenced a second attack on the 25 February and managed to overpower the main batteries. Landing parties were put ashore at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr and disabled the remaining guns. The mobile batteries could not be put out of action and they thwarted mine clearance attempts. The third and final naval assault was made on 18 March with eighteen capital ships (two in reserve) formed in three waves. The first and second waves met with success but as the third wave advanced and the second started to withdraw, they ran into an unexpected minefield. This resulted in Bouvet, Inflexible, Irresistible and Ocean hitting mines, all but Inflexible sinking.20 The attack was called off. Faced with the loss of four capital ships in the Straits Admiral Robeck was reluctant to resume operations until the military had landed to neutralise the Turkish guns and allow safe mine clearance operations.

A nation with superior sea power possessed the advantage of initiative and therefore could bring powerful forces against an enemy at a time and place of its choosing. He emphasised that surprise was a key element to an amphibious attack (obviously the author implied surprise of time and place rather than surprise of intent)

Change in strategic impulse At a conference on the fleet’s flagship, the Queen Elizabeth, on 22 March 1915, Hamilton concurred with the assessment of the naval commander and ordered his forces to Egypt. Here they resupplied and prepared in public view, for the invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula. The strategic dilemma that an amphibious campaign to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula posed was reflected in the Minister for War ambivalence towards it despite the War Council having given it a green signal; the fact was that “Kitchener could never quite decide whether to support fully or not.”21

The amphibious assault Meanwhile Hamilton and his staff planned amphibious landings on six beaches around the south of the peninsula. He prepared his four divisions comprising Anglo-French troops for the assault, only one of which, the 29th was a regular formation. The landings took place on the 25 April 1915 and an invasion force of Australian, New Zealand, British and French troops landed at three points on the peninsula itself and at one location on the opposite Asian shore to continue the campaign. The landings showed imagination and may well have succeeded, but for a combination of critical failings which included fragmented Command, poor leadership, lack of preparation, the geography and terrain in the peninsula with its few beaches and constraints on logistic support. Unfortunately, the “British Army was too rigidly structured … to attempt amphibious operations” and it was “the antiquated command structure that impeded progress.”22 The British advance crucially lost momentum and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) landing on the western coast between Gaba Tepe and Ari Burnu (‘Anzac Cove’) met with stiff resistance from the Turkish 2nd Division commanded by Colonel Mustapha Kemal Ataturk and almost got thrown back into the sea. Between May and July, the French and British slowly advanced up the peninsula while the Anzacs clung to their small perimeter, content to inflict losses on sustained Turkish attacks. The landings established beachheads but the MEF failed to gain the vital heights on Gallipoli. During May, June and July, as the campaign settled into a deadlock of trenches, frontal assaults and raids mirroring those of the Western Front. The Allies could neither break out of their beachheads nor the Turks drive them back into the sea. Hamilton claimed a lack of reinforcements and ammunition denied him the ability to attack the Turkish lines decisively. However, by the midsummer of 1915 the Government’s Dardanelles Committee eventually determined that Hamilton had to be allocated more resources in order to achieve the necessary thrust. Three new army divisions were dispatched to Gallipoli in July. These troops (the 9th Army Corps) were to land in August to the north west of the peninsula in the hope of outflanking and turning the Turkish defenders. For a few fleeting hours, as this force landed at Suvla Bay on 6 August 1915, it appeared the plan might succeed. Their surprise arrival threatened to overwhelm the few Turkish ground forces present. However a combination of difficulties in disembarking at the assigned sites and in securing sufficient supplies of drinking water had led senior officers of 9 Corps to halt and regroup their troops on the beaches. This inertia in moving inland in sufficient strength allowed the defenders to withdraw to the heights above Suvla, reinforce and dig in. Despite Hamilton’s arrival at Suvla on the 8 August 1915 to urge his commanders onwards and the subsequent replacement of a number of officers concerned by generals fresh from the Western Front, the MEF had again reached an impasse. 20. Travers, Tim. ‘The Army and the Challenge of War 1914 - 1918’ in Chandler, David and Beckett, Ian The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 215-240. 21. Ibid p 223. 22. Ibid 223.

The evacuation General Hamilton’s amphibious force was unsuccessful in its attempt to capture the Gallipoli peninsula and its withdrawal was ordered in January 1916, after 10 months of fighting and more than 2,00,000 casualties (overall casualties were immense: approximately 2,52,000 for the British / French while the Turks suffered about 3,00,000). The failed campaign gained nothing and badly tarnished the Allies war waging capability. Evacuation of all combatants from the peninsula was completed by 9 January 1916. The failure of the Gallipoli campaign led to Churchill’s relegation and by the end of 1915 he had resigned. The campaign has been varyingly portrayed, but none more critical than by the war correspondent E Ashmead-Bartlett when he described it as a story of “muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice.”23

Relying on mere army-navy cooperation without unity of command particularly so in an amphibious operation is a clear formula for inefficiencies. For in a cooperative situation what is being provided is support bereft of precise allocation and definition of subordinate responsibilities along without a comprehensive command and control network to bind together the sea, land and air elements of the amphibious force

Analysis The intellectual framework provided by Molyneux when he first propagated ‘Conjunct Warfare’ and the idea of a ‘strike by an invisible hand’ placed amphibious operations in the context of a ‘Manoeuvrist Approach.’ The key lay in the ability to project force from the sea in a manner that lends itself to such manoeuvreist precepts as surprise of time and place and out-flanking movements. As would be apparent from the narrative, the amphibious campaign to seize the Gallipoli peninsula and lay control of the Straits fell far short of the attributes that make for manoeuvre warfare despite the obvious advantages that weighed with the maritime power. ‘Muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice’ as mentioned earlier, were features of this campaign which rose to prominence as planning dithered, casualties mounted and the drive for control of the Straits visibly faltered, some logic may even conclude that one fed on the other. Yet, in order to bring some objectivity to the analysis, the same litmus tests that gave victory at Aegospotami in 405 BCE may be applied to the Gallipoli campaign primarily because the larger strategic objective of Control through the instrument of an amphibious landing were indistinguishable. The seven attributes that may therefore be placed in balance are: The objective: While the larger strategic aims were well conceived, it was the fragmented approach both in methods and time towards attaining it that was unconvincing. After all to force the Straits through pure naval action and then within a month to fundamentally alter it to an army sized amphibious operation would not only suggest a radical strategic dither but also a failure of higher political and military decision-making to fully appreciate what the alteration implied in terms of preparation, training and logistics. Kitchener’s ‘Campaign Instructions’ to his Commander-in-Chief lacked the strategic commitment necessary to see through an operation of this scale. Also, it was neither based on a thorough intelligence estimate nor on a realistic appreciation of the state of preparedness of the landing force. And then to break the momentum of the offensive by reinforcing the April landing only in the second week of August, long after energy of the thrust had petered out, would suggest a total lack of grasp of the ground situation. Nature of operations: The Nature of amphibious operations, demanded comprehensiveness of planning and precision in execution. The most important aspects of management and control of operations was the critical need for cooperation between navy and army commanders, a system as a prerequisite on which the operation is founded (doctrine in present day parlance) and significantly, the attitude of awarding a place of primacy for this form of warfare; these were woefully lacking. By May 1915, within a month of launching operations it became clear that the hope of a short campaign was a pipe dream and success in the Dardanelles would require a far greater effort both in terms of resolve and preparation than the planners had ever contemplated. Gross underestimation of the enemy can only have been credited to incompetence. Balance of forces: The balance of forces weighed up on the side of the Entente. Yet, due fragmented approach, poor planning and the inability to commit to and underwrite unity of Command; the advantages of capability and firepower could never be brought to bear. Mounting port and training: The location of mounting ports in Egypt (Alexandria and Port Said) was ideal, for they were situated in the theatre of operations yet adequately displaced (600 miles) from the amphibious objective area to ensure no enemy interference. Also base support and logistic facilities available in Egypt were comprehensive. Where the fatal flaw lay was in the inadequacy of training of the amphibious force for what was envisaged to be speedy and inexpensive campaign. After all if the “essential course for Britain therefore, was to re-equip Russia and to rally the Balkan States against Austria and Turkey; and this could best be done by forcing the Straits and capturing Constantinople” (and Churchill concluded) that this was the “only prize which lies within reach this year. It can 23. North John Gallipoli the Fading Vision. Faber and Faber Limited London 1936, p 30.

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jointness and synergy

FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

be won without unreasonable expense and within a comparatively short time. But we must act now and on a scale which makes speedy success certain.”24 Evidently there was serious mismatch between the “essential course” and the preparation needed to realise it. Appraisal of elements and selection of landing beaches: Weather-wise April and August were fair weather months and well suited for amphibious operations. The selected beaches were appropriate for landing operations, however their geographic spread of less than 10 miles provided inadequate manoeuvring space for, what eventually amounted to, seven Divisions. The cramping of the invasion front permitted the Turkish defenders to operate on inner lines and concentrate there efforts which eventually stalled the invasion practically on the beaches. Intelligence: Periodic intelligence bulletins were made available to the MEF throughout the campaign, however these were persistently of a field and a tactical level.25 The absence of strategic intelligence is obvious by the absence of information on the preparedness and combat readiness of the Turkish Army on the Peninsula; Paragraph 5 of Kitchener’s Campaign Instructions makes this apparent (see End Note 17). Also, the extent of complacency and the belief that a victory was to be got on the cheap was palpable in Churchill’s statements (see End Note 22). In addition the impact of naval gunfire (ranging from 15 inch to 8 inch guns26) while attempting to force the Straits was never ascertained as a result there was neither intelligence on damage assessment nor an appreciation of the state of Turkish morale at this crucial juncture of operations. In the absence of such intelligence, to abandon the plan, would suggest feeble resolve.

The Indian maritime doctrine recognises amphibious warfare as an operation intrinsic to its capability Planning, leadership and unity of command: ‘Muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice’; the words used by the war correspondent Ashmead-Bartlett succinctly summed up the characteristics of direction and control of the campaign. Starting with Kitchener’s Campaign Instructions, planning at the highest level of decision-making was muddled; the change in strategic impulse was neither justified nor carried with it the determination necessary to push for a decision. Also, the planning of an amphibious operation without adequate time for training and rehearsal provided the immediate recipe for disaster. Misconception of force requirements and Logistic planning was so derisory that within a month of the first landing (by May), the invasion was starved of munitions and reinforcements. Leadership’s belief in the success of operations was based on some abstract and baseless notions that the adversary’s fortitude and grit would crumble with the first salvo; this underestimation of the opponent’s operational tenacity was a cardinal failure. At the operational level, leadership was never in touch with the ground realities of the progress of the campaign and failed to appreciate the criticality of the principles of surprise, concentration of effort and coordination. Command at every level was disjointed and lacked unity of purpose. Relying on mere army-navy cooperation without unity of command particularly so in an amphibious operation is a clear formula for inefficiencies. For in a cooperative situation what is being provided is support bereft of precise allocation and definition of subordinate responsibilities along without a comprehensive command and control network to bind together the sea, land and air elements of the amphibious force.

The common thread that binds millennia The history of warfare infrequently tolerates replication of campaigns. And yet to regard battles and armed struggles in isolation rather than a part of a larger panorama of conflicts often leads to erroneous inferences which do not in any way further the cause of refining strategies. Examination of the larger continuum or the strategic approach seeks to understand and employ the inter-relationship between economics, geography and military genius to pursue political goals; these goals, however, have an uncanny iterative character. Both the Battle of Aegospotami and the Gallipoli Campaign, though displaced in time by almost two and a half millennia, was trans-historical in commonality of aim and that was ‘Control of the Straits’. In the one case to bring about economic and logistic strangulation of the opponent while in the Gallipoli Campaign it was to bring about economic and logistic relief of a vital ally; both saw in the manoeuvre an efficient tool to bring about a speedy termination of the conflict. The Battle of Aegospotami was planned and implemented with consummate skill and its aim was fully achieved. The Gallipoli Campaign, on the other hand was a grand litany of ‘muddled planning, mismanaged leadership and appalling waste of life’. If one were to attempt to put a finger on the single critical feature that differentiated the two, it had to have been the leadership of Lysander who saw to it that unity of command was upheld at every stage of the battle; whether it was integrity of the plan, intelligence gathering or coordination of the amphibious assault with the seaborne offensive.

The Indian context, a strategic overview as a conclusion To the minds of many Indian military leaders, amphibious warfare remains a lesser known mystery; to merit 24. Aspinall-Oglander CF History of the Great War Military Operations Gallipoli Volume II. William Heinemann Ltd London 1932, p 61. Churchill in a memorandum to the Government justifying the Gallipoli campaign pointed out that the allies, by April 1915, had regained 8 square miles of territory for a loss of 3,00,000 men on the Western front; almost as if to suggest that a victory at Gallipoli was available on the cheap! 25. http://www.kingscollections.org/catalogues/lhcma/collection/f-j/ha30-001/7/h0-0706. 26. McMurtrie Francis E Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1939, p 23-64, 175-206.

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theoretical examination at the Staff College and thereafter to be set aside as a costly conjecture that has little chance of success in the real world of operations. This is based on the premise that a frontal military assault out of the water with all the complications of forming up in and disembarking from boats, moving through surf and landing on a hostile beach with neither overwhelming force nor stealth nor saturation firepower by air and sea that could suppress shore defences; was futile. The Gallipoli disaster appeared to many military critics to seal this judgement to the extent that Liddell Hart believed that amphibious assaults had become impossible.27 However the experience of the Normandy landings and the Pacific Campaign during the Second World War, the 1950 Inchon landing in South Korea and the 1982 Falklands war all suggested not only the viability of amphibious operations but also underscored its operational effectiveness. The Indian maritime doctrine recognises amphibious warfare as an operation intrinsic to its capability.28 Amphibious operations could potentially find a central role in each of the ten conflict scenarios identified in the doctrine.29 Postulating the relationship between doctrine and strategy, the document titled “India’s Maritime Military Strategy” elaborates that “Doctrine is a body of thought and a knowledge base which underpins the development of strategy”.30 While there can be no argument thus far, what is problematic is the ability to bridge and characterise the linkage between doctrine and the military resources that are built up in circumstances when the development of strategies remain a dark area. Viewed from another perspective, this amounts to the maintenance of an amphibious capability without defining and distinguishing a contract for use. India today maintains a combat sea lift capability of one Brigade, this facility is being built-up to a Division size ability (by 2020) in terms of specialised ships, command platforms, escorts, surveillance and strike elements along with logistic support ships. The questions then are: Given a scenario, what best can be achieved by this amphibious force? Have we spelt out (in elaboration of the ten conflict scenarios) the specific contingencies in terms of circumstance and geography for use? Have we trained man and material and rehearsed for these contingencies? Have strategies been developed, Instructions and plans formulated (strategic, operational and logistic) to confront these contingencies? And lastly, are our command structures nimble enough to cope with the complexities of amphibious warfare, are they unified and is leadership at every level attuned to the unyielding demands of this form of warfare? If the answer to any of these questions is in the negative or even conditional, then we have neither understood the quintessence of ‘Conjunct Warfare’ nor the perils of having to run the gauntlet of another Gallipoli.

27. Weigley, Russell F The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 256. 28. Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Indian McMurtrie Francis E Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1939, p 23-64, 175-206. 28. Weigley, Russell F The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 256. 28. Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) 2004, p 81 and 114. 29. Ibid, p 59. The ten conflict scenarios identified are: conflict in immediate neighborhood, operations in extended neighborhood, peacekeeping operations, conflict with an extra regional power, protecting persons of Indian origin, anti terrorist operations, fulfilling bilateral strategic obligations, preserving SLOCs, safeguarding Indian energy assets and humanitarian role. 30. India’s Maritime Military Strategy Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Indian Navy) 2007, p 6.

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jointness and synergy

SEAMLESS INTEGRATION

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is Adjunct Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, USA.

The rich experience of the Indian armed forces in successfully managing joint tri-Service establishments augurs well for the future. However, the pace of integration needs to be stepped up considerably. It will probably take many more decades before a stage is reached where all the officers can wear the same uniform. Though the attire may not be purple, a purple ethos can be inculcated in the hearts and minds of the officers with some effort. Instead of following a top-down approach, it may be better to start from the lowest rung so that a new generation of officers grows up without the parochial baggage of its predecessors

The ends of jointmanship would be much better served if officers of the rank of Major Generals and equivalents from the Navy and the IAF were posted to suitable slots in each other’s Service HQ. For example, the ADG Movement Control could be from either the navy or the air force and not necessarily only from the army. A large number of such appointments can be identified

he post-Independence history of the Indian armed forces suggests that wherever integration has taken place, the experience has been praiseworthy. The tri-Service training institutions present perhaps the greatest success story. Among tri-Service HQ, the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) have proved their efficacy in the short time period that these have been functional. These two HQs have demonstrated their capability for integrated operational planning and, in the case of HQ ANC during Tsunami relief operations, skilfully coordinated execution. In fact, their success augurs well for “theatre commands” in future. HQ Integrated Defence Staff(IDS)has also achieved immense success in its experiment with vertical as well as horizontal integration in all its branches. The revolution in military technology has not only changed the character of our military programmes, it has also to a significant degree blurred the lines of demarcation among various Services. – Charles Hitch

n the present era of strategic uncertainty, which dawned at the end of the cold war, India is confronted with many complex threats and challenges to its security. The sources and types of conflicts for which joint planning must be carried out have become more diverse and less predictable even as the number of potential adversaries continues to grow. The range of missions that armed forces will need to undertake in future is expanding to include sub-conventional conflict, low-intensity border wars and insurgency fuelled by foreign powers. The global security agenda has expanded in functional terms. Yesterday’s peripheral challenges, such as the security of energy sources and the threat from mass migrations, now compete with conventional threats for the attention of the armed forces. These changes in the security paradigm are changing the strategic terms in which military leaders must address long-term integrated joint planning so as to create defence capabilities that will be relevant to the emerging threats. While almost all operational planning still tends to have an individual Service orientation from the strategic to the tactical levels, the post-Independence history of

Building Jointmanship in the Armed Forces

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the Indian armed forces suggests that wherever integration has taken place, the experience has been praiseworthy. The tri-Service training institutions present perhaps the greatest success story. The National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, has earned well-deserved laurels for the deep and strong spirit of camaraderie and the long-lasting bonds that it inculcates among its alumni. The Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington, provides institutionalised guidance to budding staff officers from the three Services and puts them on a common grid as far as staff procedures and processes are concerned so that they learn to converse in a tri-Service language that all graduates understand. The College of Defence Management (CDM), Secunderabad, provides common professional training in modern management practices to mid-career officers who will be placed in both command and senior staff appointments. The CDM has earned an enviable reputation as a leading management training college in India. Though the three Services still conduct individual Higher Command courses, a Joint Capsule (JOCAP) lasting one month is conducted jointly at the Army

War College, Mhow. The joint training imparted during JOCAP helps officers from the three Services to better understand complex operational issues so that they are better trained for integrated joint planning. Finally, the National Defence College (NDC), New Delhi, brings together potential future leaders and bureaucrats to learn and absorb the intricacies of national-level defence planning and the interplay of economic, diplomatic and political factors with national security. All of these institutions have been extremely successful in achieving the aims that were set out for them.

During the first five years of service, each above average officer should spend a period of one to two months on attachment with a unit, preferably in an operational area, in one of the two sister Services Among tri-Service HQ, the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the Andaman and Nicobar

Command (ANC) have proved their efficacy in the short time period that these have been functional. These two HQs have demonstrated their capability for integrated operational planning and, in the case of HQ ANC during Tsunami relief operations, skilfully coordinated execution. In fact, their success augurs well for “theatre commands” in future. HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has also achieved immense success in its experiment with vertical as well as horizontal integration in all its branches, including at the level of PBOR. However, the three Services HQs have so far not extended the cooperation necessary to make its functioning a complete success. Other success stories include the fully integrated tri-Service Signals Intelligence (SI) Directorate under the DGMI, including some units in the field, the Defence Imagery Interpretation Centre (DIPAC), the Movement Control Directorate at Army HQ, the Armed Forces Medical Services, the National Cadet Corps (NCC), the Services Sports Control Board (SSCB). To a lesser extent, the Military

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jointness and synergy

SEAMLESS INTEGRATION

Engineer Service (MES) has also fulfilled a common requirement. Hence, a good base already exists and on this the edifice of more deeply integrated jointmanship can be built in future.

Hand-picked instructors should be posted to each other’s training establishments so as to enhance awareness and learn from each other’s strengths

Measures at the functional level The fact that success on the modern battlefield requires the formulation of joint and fully integrated plans and their methodically coordinated execution does not need to be emphasised. Tri-Service planning requires a deep understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations at all levels. Such a professional ethos can be inculcated only through first hand experience gained through service in each other’s HQs and units. Bearing in mind the commitments of each of the Services, the need to participate in and attend specialised professional courses, the impact on the career prospects of officers and the shortage of officers in all the Services, particularly the army, the following measures are considered necessary to inculcate a triService ethos among officers of the armed forces: Attachment with units: During the first five years of service, each above average officer should spend a period of one to two months on attachment with a unit, preferably in an operational area, in one of the two sister Services. This will give the officers an insight into the functioning and professional ethos of the other Service.

While almost all operational planning still tends to have an individual Service orientation from the strategic to the tactical levels, the post-Independence history of the Indian armed forces suggests that wherever integration has taken place, the experience has been praiseworthy. The tri-Service training institutions present perhaps the greatest success story. The National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, has earned well-deserved laurels for the deep and strong spirit of camaraderie and the long-lasting bonds that it inculcates among its alumni. The Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington, provides institutionalised guidance to budding staff officers from the three Services and puts them on a common grid as far as staff procedures and processes are concerned so that they learn to converse in a tri-Service language that all graduates understand Cross-posting in HQ: Suitable appointments that are tenable by officers from sister Services should be identified in various HQs by all three Services, eg, at brigade, divisional and corps HQs. After the Staff College course at Wellington, up to 25 to 30 per cent officers should serve in junior staff appointments at HQ in sister Services to consolidate theoretical learning. For example, the DQ of an armoured brigade could be from the air force. Those who do not get an

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

opportunity at this stage should be posted to such appointments later during their service. Appointments will need to be carefully selected to ensure that efficiency is not compromised. Placing the much larger number of army officers in suitable appointments will pose much greater challenges for the navy and the air force than for the army. However, it should be possible to find a suitable via media.

The sources and types of conflicts for which joint planning must be carried out have become more diverse and less predictable even as the number of potential adversaries continues to grow. The range of missions that armed forces will need to undertake in future is expanding to include sub-conventional conflict, low-intensity border wars and insurgency fuelled by foreign powers Observers in exercises: A much larger number of observers should be sent for both joint as well as single-Service exercises, especially exercises with troops. The logistical difficulties should not prove to be insurmountable. Inter-posting of instructors: Hand-picked instructors should be posted to each other’s training establishments so as to enhance awareness and learn from each other’s strengths. To some extent this is being done already but the scale needs to be enlarged. For example, there is no reason why a navy or air force expert cannot teach electronic warfare at the Military College of Telecommunications Engineering, Mhow and vice versa. Tri-Service courses: Similarly, training establishments should offer specially designed courses to officers from the sister Services. For example, a two-week course at the Infantry School, Mhow, could be designed to teach the basics of small arms and light weapons and explosives to navy and air force officers. Integrated higher command course: In due course, it should be possible to conduct an integrated tri-Service Higher Command course with specialised training being combined with joint lectures, seminars, model discussions, syndicate work, area studies and war games. The initial model could be the one adopted by the DSSC where each of the Services has its own Division and about one-third of the training is common.

Measures at the directional level Higher level decision-making in the Services still tends to be personality driven and the collegiate concept of decision-making has not really taken root. This exacerbates the lacunae inherent in single-Service operational planning. Ideally, there should be a five star Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and command should flow from him to the Theatre Commanders who command integrated commands established on theatre basis. However, such a solution is still considered far too radical and is likely to take over a decade to implement. As an interim measure, the following are recommended:

Integration of operations directorates: The quality of discussion at the tri-Service Joint Planning Committee (JPC) would be considerably enhanced if advisors from other Services were posted in each of the operations directorates at the level of ADG and DDG so that individual Service plans benefit from professional advice of the other Services before these are taken up for integration at the HQ IDS. These advisors could be given only a consultative role or they could be given functional responsibilities as well. For example, one of the ADGs at the Military Operations Directorate could be from the air force and one of the DDGs could be from the navy.

All high-level war games, such as those conducted at Command HQ and premier training establishments should be open to senior officers from the other Services Inter-posting at Services HQ: The ends of jointmanship would be much better served if officers of the rank of Major Generals and equivalents from the Navy and the IAF were posted to suitable slots in each other’s Service HQ. For example, the ADG Movement Control could be from either the navy or the air force and not necessarily only from the army. A large number of such appointments can be identified. Command level: This logic could easily be extended to staff appointments at the Command HQ as well. There is no reason why the MG i/c Administration at HQ Central Command should not be from the navy or the air force. Naval and air force Command HQ can also identify appointments tenable by senior officers from the sister Services. War games: All high-level war games, such as those conducted at Command HQ and premier training establishments should be open to senior officers from the other Services. This will enhance the quality of understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations.

Higher level decision-making in the Services still tends to be personality driven and the collegiate concept of decision-making has not really taken root. This exacerbates the lacunae inherent in single-Service operational planning. Ideally, there should be a five star Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and command should flow from him to the Theatre Commanders who command integrated commands established on theatre basis Integrated bureaucracy: Efforts must also be made to gradually assimilate bureaucrats also in Services HQ and Command HQ as today’s wars, particularly sub-conventional conflict, can be fought successfully only with the full support of civilian counterparts. Sports and adventure activities: Sports and adventure activities should be increasingly planned on a tri-Service basis.

future, the rich experience of the Indian armed forces in successfully managing joint tri-Service establishments augurs well for the future. However, the pace of integration needs to be stepped up considerably. It will probably take many more decades before a stage is reached where all the officers can wear the same uniform. Though the attire may not be purple, a purple ethos can be inculcated in the hearts and minds of the officers with some effort. Instead of following a top-down approach, it may be better to start from the lowest rung so that a new generation of officers grows up without the parochial baggage of its predecessors. However, it must be ensured that while promoting jointmanship, individual Service expertise and professionalism is not compromised or even diluted. Finally, the aim should be to create an integrated framework from the bottom up, which, while capitalising on single-Service professionalism, is increasingly and necessarily joint.

Conclusion If the past is a pointer to the

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internal security

ARCHAIC LAWS, INEPT POLICING

I Joginder Singh, IPS (retd) The writer is former Director of Central Bureau of Investigation and is best known for bringing the Bofors papers from the Swiss Courts to New Delhi. As a student he was selected for the Indian Police Service at the age of 20. He is both a regular columnist of leading dailies in India and an author of repute, with 50 books (including versions in Indian and foreign languages) to his credit.

The Union Law Minister conceded on 12th January 2013, that “Law is perceived as impotent in the face of grave injustice, leading to an unacceptable erosion of faith in the justice delivery system and rule of law”. He added, like his predecessors, in the last 60 years that the Government is contemplating the structural changes aimed at ensuring the credibility and citizen-friendly judicial process

The laws in India are built on the distrust of the Police and it is no wonder, that the witnesses produced by the prosecution turn hostile, possibly more out of fear than any other reason. Law clearly lays down that no confession before a Police Officer of any rank, is inadmissible in law, irrespective of the nature of the crime or the time or place of crime

n olden times, whenever a prince was sent for education, a whipping boy was sent to accompany, so that he could take all the blames for mistakes or slow learning of the prince. He was the one, to face disasters, criticism and suffer all harm on behalf of his master. He was a convenient target. In a Democracy, the Government of the day, has found alternative whipping boys, in the form of Police or other Government Departments. It cannot blame the Courts, because it would be in their contempt. In the troubled times, the Police, Paramilitary or Army deployed in the disturbed areas, have taken the place of the whipping boy. Seventy-five CRPF personnel and one state policeman were killed in an ambush by Maoists at dawn on April 6, 2010 at Taadmetla village of what was in the then Dantewada district (now called Sukma). Police had charged 93 accused, but could arrest only 10. The accused were acquitted on 8th January, 2013, as all the 43 Prosecution Witnesses turned hostile. Even at the National level, most of the accused get away with one of the lowest conviction rates of crimes like rapes and murders, which ranges from 25 per cent to 40 per cent. Infact, Modern India’s criminal justice system is based on the ancient laws given to us in 1861 to 1863. At that time, mass rapes or murders or problems like Naxalism and Maoism did not exist. Even the Supreme Court of India observed on 17th August, 2012, “We can only observe, that, our legal system has made life too easy for criminals and too difficult for law abiding citizens.” The laws in India are built on the distrust of the Police and it is no wonder, that the witnesses produced by the prosecution turn hostile, possibly more out of fear than any other reason. Law clearly lays down that no confession before a Police Officer of any rank, is inadmissible in law, irrespective of the nature of the crime or the time or place of crime. It is an anachronism, that you start with the presumption of disbelief in the law enforcement machinery. This is apart from absence of Witness Protection Act, or Whistle Blower Act, the need of which has been emphasised more than once by the Supreme Court, Law Commission and National Police Commission.

In a number of cases starting with Swaran Singh versus State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2017 and many other cases, the Supreme Court observed; A criminal case is built on the edifice of evidence, evidence that is admissible in law. For that witnesses are required whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Here are the witnesses who are a

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

harassed lot. A witness in a criminal trial may come from a far-off place to find the case adjourned. He has to come to the Court many times and at what cost to his own self and his family is not difficult to fathom. It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and he gives up.

The Naxalites have been identified as the biggest internal security threat to India by the Prime Minister of India. Yet there is no specific law to deal with them or with terrorism problem. Action is taken against the accused under the laws of 1863, which are not only inadequate, but irrelevant to the current state of affairs in India It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only that a witness is threatened; he is abducted, maimed; or done away with; or even bribed. There is no protection for him … A witness is then not treated with respect in the Court. He is pushed out from the crowded Courtroom by the peon. For all these reasons and others a person abhors becoming a witness. It is the administration of justice that suffers.

Police and Paramilitary used as whipping boys by the Maoists

eventy-five CRPF personnel and one state policeman were killed in an ambush by Maoists at dawn on April 6, 2010 at Taadmetla village. Police had charged 93 accused, but could arrest only 10. The accused were acquitted on 8th January, 2013, as all the 43 Prosecution Witnesses turned hostile. Even at the National level, most of the accused get away with one of the lowest conviction rates of crimes like rapes and murders, which ranges from 25 per cent to 40 per cent. Infact, Modern India’s criminal justice system is based on the ancient laws given to us in 1861 to 1863. At that time, mass rapes or murders or problems like Naxalism and Maoism did not exist. Even the Supreme Court of India observed on 17th August, 2012, “We can only observe, that, our legal system has made life too easy for criminals and too difficult for law abiding citizens."

For the Government, it is business as usual and so the criminals get emboldened. Lynching of rapists and criminals is often reported in the media, A Bench of the Supreme Court observed in February, 2009, that the “Criminal justice system has collapsed. The courts of magistrates and munsifs have ceased to be an option for the common man,” the Bench said and compared the lower courts to ill-equipped and ill-staffed public health centres (PHCs) in rural areas … “Only those people go there who have no other option.” In Babu Singh versus State of UP the Supreme Court of India has stated that: “Our justice system, even in grave cases, suffers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal to “fair trial”, whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a component of social justice since the community, as a whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly and finally punished within a reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings.” The Union Law Minister conceded on 12th January 2013, that “Law is perceived as impotent in the face of grave injustice, leading to an unacceptable erosion of faith in the justice delivery system and rule of law”. He added, like his predecessors, in the last 60 years that the Government is contemplating the structural changes aimed at ensuring the credibility and citizen-friendly judicial process.

Supreme Court observed in February, 2009, that the Criminal justice system has collapsed. The courts of magistrates and munsifs have ceased to be an option for the common man, the Bench said and compared the lower courts to ill-equipped and ill-staffed public health centres (PHCs) in rural areas ... Only those people go there who have no other option The Naxalites have been identified as the biggest internal security threat to India by the Prime Minister of India. Yet there is no specific law to deal with them or with terrorism problem. Action is taken against the accused under the laws of 1863, which are not only inadequate, but irrelevant to the current state of affairs in India. The then Union Home Minister, Mr Chidambaram said publicly on 25th October, 2009, that “India which is facing serious terror and Naxal threats has an ill-equipped police machinery, especially at its lower ranks … “Police system is outdated. Police are ill-trained, ill-equipped and ill-paid … The Police

Constable, “who works for 12 to 14 hours a day throughout the year is the most abused” part of the machinery. “Everyone believes that he (Constable) can be bullied, or cajoled or bribed … he is the most reviled public servant … “Self-esteem of average policeman is very low … And this average Police Constable is a frontline force for the internal security.” He added that the Constable lives in a “very different cultural milieu and brings his culture to the workplace”, Chidambaram remarked that there was a very “feeble attempt to improve his behaviour or attitude. The pronouncements of the Law, Home and Prime Minister have remained at best pious wishes, without any action. All in the Government of India know the ways, but only the smallest possible number walk it. Those in Government must bear in mind that mother nature takes away any faculty, that is not used. The shortest answer in dealing with the Naxalites and Maoists and other problems lies in doing the right thing. Right for the Government and Right for the People.

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jointness and synergy

GEOPOLITICAL STRATAGEM

J R S N Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects.

The beheading of the Indian soldiers on the LoC has clearly unmasked the vast structure that has been assiduously created in India by the American establishment to promote the new geopolitical script of the region. In this script the perpetrator and sufferer of terrorism have been put on the same pedestal. For America it is of no concern that Hafiz Saeed and the ISI planned and executed 26/11. The US has already granted legal immunity to two former ISI chiefs for their role in 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. Allegedly, this deal was reached at a clandestine meeting between Admiral Mike Mullen and General Ashfaq Kayani held in Oman on 22 February 2011

India needs to be prepared for a more vicious terrorism in times to come. The indications are already there. As per reports, LeT is relocating some of its camps in Eastern Afghanistan, ie Kunar and Nuristan, not very far from Kashmir. Hafiz Saeed has meanwhile reiterated his terror message, ie ‘arms struggle is the only solution to Kashmir struggle’

ohn Kerry never fails to underscore the strategic importance of Pakistan. This support from Kerry that resulted in the provision of US$ 688 million to Pakistan for its infrastructural support to the US led coalition in Afghanistan. It may be noted that Americans in reaching out to Pakistan displayed no concerns about jihadi groups targeting India. Far from moving away, the hyphenated Indo-Pak paradigm, has hit a new low. Indians are being inured to believe that they are condemned to suffer terrorist bombings; LeT is relocating some of its camps in Eastern Afghanistan, ie Kunar and Nuristan, not very far from Kashmir. Hafiz Saeed has meanwhile reiterated his terror message, ie ‘arms struggle is the only solution to Kashmir struggle’. The beheading of the Indian soldiers on the LoC has clearly unmasked the vast structure that has been assiduously created in India by the American establishment to promote the new geopolitical script of the region.

ndia’s seriousness on war against terrorism has fluctuated with the imperatives and diktats of the USA. When Operation Enduring Freedom was initiated by the US and its allies, there was a palpable anticipation amongst Indians that India’s moment of redemption from decade long unremitting jihadi terrorism had arrived. Utterances from US officials like: ‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (George W Bush in US Congress) and ‘we will bomb you to the Stone Age’ (Richard Armitage), only fuelled the hope of Indians.

India-Pak hyphenation There was unmistakable alacrity in the Indian establishment to forge a strategic partnership with the US in the so-called war against terrorism. Indians, who by nature, place heavy premium on natural justice were convinced that Pakistan was going to dissolve because of the accumulated sins of the successive establishments and the jihadis. They were convinced that Islamic fundamentalism and jihadi terrorism was going to be rolled-back from its epicentre. They were also convinced that this time around, unlike after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Americans would not leave the theatre without drastic and enduring geopolitical restructuring of the region. This implicit faith prompted many Indian security experts and some policy makers to advocate deployment of two divisions in Afghanistan. These security experts ensured that they sold this idea at every conceivable seminar or gathering which mattered. Editorials were churned out in favour of the idea. The news channels held regular debates to contrive support for the proposal. At one level the proposal did not appear to

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THE NEW PHASE IN PROXY WAR

be foolhardy because of the stakes involved for India in the long term perspective. Indian investment in Afghanistan of more than US$ 1 billion was not resented by any quarters in India because of sheer robustness of the strategic logic of purging Taliban from Afghanistan and depriving Pakistan of any strategic depth. India was said to have moved far away from the hyphenated Indo-Pak paradigm in international reckoning.

There has been incontrovertible proof of growing ISI-Maoist-ULFA links and the formation of Strategic United Front. The Indian Army cannot fail to appreciate the new phase of proxy war from Pakistan A decade down the line, on this day, hope has given way to despair. Far from moving away, the hyphenated Indo-Pak paradigm, has hit a new low. Indians are being inured to believe that they are condemned to suffer terrorist bombings; 13/12, 26/11 are just dots on the vast political landscape of India and the country has enough manpower to sacrifice; beheading of two soldiers on the LoC is routine; abduction and killing of Sarpanches in Kashmir is normal feature of ongoing insurgency; ISI forging links with Maoists is logical; Hafiz Saeed did plan 26/11 in concert with the ISI, but he is only an antithesis to the RSS; and targeting terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden or Hafiz Saeed is the exclusive preserve of the sensitive and nationalist Americans!

The new geopolitical structure Just as an entire structure was put in place in India to promote US intervention in Afghanistan, a similar or may be more elaborate structure comprising politicians, so called intellectuals, diplomats, strategic experts and journalists has been created to ensure

new geopolitical reconfiguration of the region to ensure its smooth and honourable exit. The overwhelming refrain at the time of intervention was that 9/11 happened because the Americans did not dismantle the jihadi structure in Af-Pak region to contest the grand finale of the cold war before abandoning the region to its own destiny and devices and as a consequence, the jihadi structure suffering from a misplaced sense of invincibility after humbling the Soviet Union, a super power, took on its mentors, ie the USA. There was genuine and acute apprehension in India about the consequences if the Americans were to abandon the region again without dismantling the jihadi structure in Af-Pak region. This apprehension is seemingly vindicated. The US war machine looking for an honourable

exit and the jihadis raising the pitch of having chased out another super power is quite discernible. The last time when Soviets withdrew, the jihadi machine was redirected to India, and thanks to the attrition caused by the Indian Army over a decade, only one 9/11 took place. India needs to be prepared for a more vicious terrorism in times to come.

If Ajmal Kasab had not been caught by sheer act of providence, 26/11 would have been certainly portrayed as an act of ‘Hindu Terrorism’. If one were to treat 26/11 as the centre and plot rest of the stories Hindu terror revealed through inspired leaks to one and only newspaper, the entire fraud can be unravelled The indications are already there. As per reports, LeT is relocating some

of its camps in Eastern Afghanistan, ie Kunar and Nuristan, not very far from Kashmir. Hafiz Saeed has meanwhile reiterated his terror message, ie ‘arms struggle is the only solution to Kashmir struggle’. The beheading of the Indian soldiers on the LoC has clearly unmasked the vast structure that has been assiduously created in India by the American establishment to promote the new geopolitical script of the region. In this script the perpetrator and sufferer of terrorism have been put on the same pedestal. For America it is of no concern that Hafiz Saeed and the ISI planned and executed 26/11. The US has already granted legal immunity to two former ISI chiefs for their role in 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. Allegedly, this deal was reached at a clandestine meeting between

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

GEOPOLITICAL STRATAGEM

Admiral Mike Mullen and General Ashfaq Kayani held in Oman on 22 February 2011. Hafiz Saeed, on whom the American establishment had announced a reward of US$ 10 million, roams free in Pakistan. The then Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram had then hailed the US decision. Few months down the line, Kashmiri separatist leaders in India were allowed to travel to Pakistan on Indian passports and meet Hafiz Saeed. Another Home Minister referred to this terrorist leader as “Shri Hafiz Saeed” in the parliament and more recently, another senior politician famous for his ‘Osama ji’ remark, alluded to him as “Hafiz Sahab”. The word ‘Sahab’ was not used in jest, but reflected the authority that Hafiz Saeed has begun to exercise over the Indian establishment for intriguing reasons.

The jingoists and warmongers! The new structure assembled in India during the last decade by the US could, in the wake of the recent LoC incident be seen to be unabashedly pro-US and pro-Pak. Any one advocating caution with regard to Pakistan’s ulterior strategic motives was labelled as ‘jingoistic’, a term that has crept into the Indian security establishment and will cost India dearly.

A decade down the line, on this day, hope has given way to despair. Far from moving away, the hyphenated Indo-Pak paradigm, has hit a new low. Indians are being inured to believe that they are condemned to suffer terrorist bombings One diplomat turned politician, known for his acerbic speech and specialisation and fealty to one particular political dynasty has been abusive towards members of the diplomatic and strategic community who favour holding the Pakistani establishment accountable for the dastardly act on the LoC and other acts of terror and suspending sporting and cultural links as they cannot be allowed to facilitate murder and terror. Even as the shock and anger following the LoC incident had attenuated, one media house persisted

with an Indo-Pak friendship show wherein some Indian journalists chose the occasion to indulge in India bashing. One of them went to the extent of equating Hafiz Saeed with the RSS. This was even as Hafiz Saeed was being accused for his role in the beheadings. So the pro-Hafiz constituency is not only confined to the separatists and certain segments of the political class in India. Then there was a journalist who began to drum the notion that Indian troops also resort to beheadings citing verbal testimony of two journalists from their experiences in Kargil War. Well one of them is known to have enjoyed the hospitality of ISI linked Fai Foundation in the US and the other has been in news for indulging in political-fixing. Also in this very period Musharraf was in India and unabashedly, for the first time, from the Indian soil he declared that indeed he was the architect of Kargil War as a revenge for 1971. This was something always known but never before officially acknowledged. The number of Pakistani participants in the debates following the LoC incident, is baffling, given the logistics and coordination involved. On one channel a former Pakistani Admiral derided India by calling it an inherently weak state and on another channel a retired Brigadier ridiculed the Indian panelist’s suggestion that India refrained from exploiting Pakistan’s preoccupation with its western front. He retorted that India did not dare to do so because of the strategic diktats of the US. Both these statements can be construed as sarcastically provocative, nevertheless, coming from the adversary, there may be more than passing truth and therefore cry for introspection.

Anti-India spin doctors There have always been Indian journalists under the patronage of the ISI, but in the past they were fewer. A journalist friend of this writer who was part of Vajpayee’s entourage to Lahore had one evening accompanied another Pakistani journalist to the club. As they got up to leave a well known Indian journalist walked in. Alluding to

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him the Pakistani journalist said that he was bewildered that the Indian authorities do not bother to ascertain as to on whose cost the said journalist makes monthly visits to Pakistan and enjoys five star hospitality. With the proliferation of news channels the segment of disloyal media has only increased in size, notwithstanding the rise in their nationalistic pitch when things become impossible.

Indian investment in Afghanistan of more than US$ 1 billion was not resented by any quarters in India because of sheer robustness of the strategic logic of purging Taliban from Afghanistan and depriving Pakistan of any strategic depth The new structure that has evolved over the years to serve strategic interests of extra regional powers and political interests of some outfits in India has subverted the Indian state as such. Collaboration of elements in the Indian establishment with terrorist groups and ISI in Pakistan is therefore not a wild possibility. If Ajmal Kasab had not been caught by sheer act of providence, 26/11 would have been certainly portrayed as an act of ‘Hindu Terrorism’. If one were to treat 26/11 as the centre and plot rest of the stories Hindu terror revealed through inspired leaks to one and only newspaper, the entire fraud can be unravelled. Probably Hafiz Saeed and the ISI know too much and that is why the fear and respectability amongst the collaborators in the Indian establishment. Such was the sensitivity and anger noticed in the pro-Pak and pro-US lobby in India that anybody talking of punitive action following the beheading of soldiers on the LoC and the killing of Sarpanches in the valley was greeted with umbrage and epithet of ‘warmonger’. They deliberately ignored that there were many diplomatic measures short of war. These include extradition of Hafiz Saeed for his involvement in 26/11, extradition of David Headley from the US and action against Hurriat leaders for meeting Hafiz Saeed during their recent tour to Pakistan on Indian passport. Even these suggestions were considered to be blasphemous.

In this entire episode, the viciousness and the naked courage of anti-India spin doctors in the Indian establishment is the most disturbing feature.

Revising threat perception The Indian Army Chief and the GOC-in-C of Northern Command were rightly incensed over the beheading. Nevertheless it would have served the security of the country better, if the Army Chief had taken a more holistic view of the country’s security rather than just the incident at the LoC. This incident was not isolated but was concomitant with killing of Sarpanches and ambush in Chhattisgarh by the Maoists, wherein weapons of Pakistani origin were found. There has been incontrovertible proof of growing ISI-Maoist-ULFA links and the formation of Strategic United Front. The Indian Army cannot fail to appreciate the new phase of proxy war from Pakistan.

The distinction or line between internal security and external security has obliterated. The degree of harmony between internal security and external security determines the overall security of a country Taking into account the threat from China and Pakistan, more importantly the proxy wars in form of jihadi terrorism and Maoist terrorism emanating from them; the developments in Afghanistan; the extent of the Red Corridor; the jihadi terrorism emanating from Bangladesh; the impact of instability in Nepal; the insurgency in Assam and Northeast; the growing ISI footprints in the very heart of India – the Indian Army needs to readdress its threat perception. It is reiterated that the ISI is a part of the military establishment of Pakistan and jihadi terrorism is its inalienable strategic tool, therefore the Indian Army can continue to compartmentalise internal and external security at the peril of India. The form of warfare has changed and so has the concept of defeat and victory. Defeat has so far been our destiny in this new form of warfare because we do not even know what constitutes victory!

The distinction or line between internal security and external security has obliterated. The degree of harmony between internal security and external security determines the overall security of a country. It is this disharmony that has cost us 230 districts in the Maoist corridor and the displacement of more than four lakh Kashmiri pandits from their own motherland. The latter poses a glaring question on the very secular model of Indian state that we have inherited. It is a sad reflection on the ability of the state and its instruments to provide to its people the very basis of Indian nation state. The Indian security forces cannot afford to get carried away by the new political and diplomatic discourse in Indo-Pak relations. If at all, the recent LoC incident has exposed the irreconcilable disconnect between political reach out, diplomatic reach out and security imperatives vis-à-vis Pakistan. In fact, a very sizeable segment of the political and diplomatic community, as also the media, has been seen to be desperate in localising the LoC incident. Their entire thrust was to dissociate Kashmir from the overall Indo-Pakistan interface, so that the country could be told that it is our manifest destiny to suffer terrorism in Kashmir. The script made itself quite evident when the scare of a nuclear war was propagated by a Kashmir based newspaper. The entire exercise is to portray Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint to the international community and therefore the beheadings should be seen in that larger backdrop. The ostensible ‘peace lobby’ is in deliberate criminal neglect to ignore that terror had moved full circle from Kashmir to Mumbai. This circle remains intact. It would have done wonders to the morale of Indian troops if the Prime Minister had visited the families of the beheaded soldiers, just as he did in the case of a diplomat, who lost his life in Afghanistan, since both were victims of the same jihadi terrorism. It is incumbent on the Indian Army to argue cogently with the decision-makers regarding the circle of terror operating in India. It

must prevail on the decision-makers that since the terrorist camps in PoK and elsewhere continue to thrive and there is not an iota of change in the terrorist discourse in the Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment, no amount of investment in peace would deliver dividends. It may help the Americans to script the new geopolitical discourse in the region and a new Pakistani dispensation that will ensure smooth exit from Afghanistan, but it will certainly be at the cost of India. In fact, we may just be in worse situation than before 9/11 as far as victims of jihadi terrorism.

Conclusion The new strategic reality obtaining in the region was best summed by John Kerry, a passionate Pakistan supporter, in the US Senate when he challenged senator Rand Paul’s proposed bill to make US aid to Pakistan incumbent on release of Dr Shakil Afridi, who had helped in locating Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil. John Kerry, who is to shortly take over as the new Secretary of State, argued that the victory in the war against Al Qaeda would not have been possible without Pakistan and Pakistanis are sacrificing lives in the Northwestern tribal regions. It was this support from Kerry that resulted in the provision of US$ 688 million to Pakistan for its infrastructural support to the US led coalition in Afghanistan. It may be noted that Americans in reaching out to Pakistan displayed no concerns about jihadi groups targeting India. John Kerry never fails to underscore the strategic importance of Pakistan. It may be mentioned that whenever Pakistan has been on the verge of collapse, it has been salvaged by concourse of a strategic circumstances. In the 50s and 60s its key strategic location was critical for CENTO and SEATO, in the 70s when it was on the verge of collapse its territory became indispensable to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in the beginning of 21st century its demise was prevented by the US led war against terrorism. This is the reality. India has to learn to fend with its own initiative, if necessary with foreign weapons, but without foreign threat perception.

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jointness and synergy

TAPESTRY OF CHALLENGES

P Colonel US Rathore (retd) The writer was commissioned in Indian Army into Maratha Light Infantry in 1980. He has a pan-India, cross-culture and multi-terrain operational service experience of 29 years. He had commanded an infantry battalion during Operations Rakshak and Parakram. He is a prolific writer and presenter on defence and security issues and a threat and risk analyst. He is currently serving with Security Knowledge and Skill Development Council of India.

An unmanageable flare-up along the LoC creates a ‘no war no peace’ situation, which after the initial euphoria subsides, impinges on both sides as civilian life is badly affected. Aggressiveness on LoC proves counter-productive in the long run. There are no winners in this contest

Due to sustained counter -insurgency operations by Indian security forces Kashmir insurgency has lost its steam. Infiltration and terror incidents have receded. Public support to movement has waned

We have to develop punitive action capability to give a befitting reply to such misadventures. Mere rhetoric does not suffice

akistan wants to kick-start the Kashmir insurgency again and whip up anti-India hysteria in Pakistan to unify secessionist forces. A turbulent LoC suits Pakistan’s design. That is why it is, despite protests and warnings from India, escalating the situation on the LoC. Conflict along LoC helps Pakistan, because it can create conditions conducive for infiltration. A calm LoC is in India’s interest so that troops can carry out counter-infiltration task better. Here lies the conflict of interests. An unmanageable flare up along the LoC creates a ‘no war no peace’ situation. To exploit post-2014 situation, Pakistan Army and ISI will try to broker peace with militant groups of FATA and KP with the help of Taliban and divert them onto Afghanistan and Kashmir. Sudden assertion from the otherwise taciturn General Kayani should be viewed from this strategic angle. We have to develop punitive action capability to give a befitting reply to such misadventures. Mere rhetoric does not suffice.

ndo-Pak border in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a line of violent uncertainties. In 1947, it was to be an International Border (IB) but soon turned into Cease Fire Line in 1949, which later became Line of Control (LoC) in 1971. Once India and Pakistan occupied Siachen in 1984, another line, the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) demarcating entrenched positions of two warring neighbours sprang up. Starting from Indira Col in Siachen, India and Pakistan share 110-km-long AGPL, which terminates at much referred to map coordinate, NJ 9842. Thereafter, a 740-km-long LoC passes through a tapestry of challenging mountainous terrain to demarcate the most fortified boundary between two nations in the world. As per India the LoC culminates at Akhnoor sector in Jammu and Kashmir and from this point the IB runs south-westward to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan differs with Indian view and maintains that entire border in Jammu and Kashmir is disputed. Pakistan therefore, calls this 199-km-long stretch from Akhnoor to border between states of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab as “Working Boundary”. Trans-LoC firing is a recent phenomenon. In early 1980’s, there were very few such incidents. There was peace and bonhomie. At places Indian and Pakistani troops fetched water from a common spring located in the ‘no-man’s land’ – at different timings. Firing resulted due to extreme provocation or as a mark of jubilation after Pakistan won a cricket match against India. There were very few reasons to resort to firing. Only smugglers, spies, cattle lifters and yearning lovers flitted across the LoC. Even in those days Pakistani troops were more trigger happy than the Indian troops.

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Whenever Indian post commander warned the Pakistani post of dire consequences, common retort from the Pakistani soldiers was, “We can fire at will; but you cannot. To open fire you have to receive orders from New Delhi.” This perception was correct. Indian commanders maintained a strict control over the activities of troops deployed on the LoC and never permitted firing. Even the discretion to retaliate with small arms fire was vested with the divisional commander. In 1984, Operation Meghdoot was launched by India to occupy Siachen. India had pre-empted Pakistan and moved troops to occupy dominating heights on the glaciated terrain. Firing in Siachen glacier became a regular feature between the two warring sides. Soon sniper rifles, medium and heavy machine guns; grenade launchers, flame throwers, anti-tank guided missiles, shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and artillery guns were belching fire at each other. Still the hostilities remained confined to Siachen sector. The LoC sector was relatively calm. There were occasional repercussions on LoC whenever either side suffered setbacks in Siachen sector.

A sizable portion of Pakistan Army has been withdrawn from Indian borders for carrying out counter-insurgency operations and sealing its western borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan is clearly worried by this strategic imbalance. Since 2001, Pakistan Army had undertaken many large scale counter-insurgency operations in South Waziristan and Bajaur in FATA and Malakand and Swat in KP, with little success. Pakistan-Afghanistan border is also active; regular firing between troops has been reported

In early-1980s, Pakistan stoked militancy in Punjab. By mid 1980s, Punjab militancy had achieved dangerous proportions, which lasted till early 1990s, before it was effectively curbed. To support Sikh militants Pakistan had used porous IB in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan sectors to infiltrate militants and smuggle weapons and drugs. Calm along the LoC proved to be a façade. As India was gaining upper hand in Punjab militancy, Pakistan orchestrated proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989. Droves of young men fired by the secessionist ideology crossed over to Pakistan occupied Kashmir to receive training in guerrilla warfare and use of fire arms and improvised explosive devices.

Pakistan also sent in hundreds of its army personnel and foreign mercenaries to fight a jihad in Kashmir. Kashmir was on the boil. Porous LoC and violent actions by Pakistan Army to facilitate infiltration could not be handled by paramilitary forces guarding the LoC at that time. Army was moved in to occupy counter-infiltration posture to check unbridled move of militants and misguided youth. Entire segment of AGPL, LoC and IB in Jammu and Kashmir became active. Heavy exchange of fire between troops became a regular feature. The attrition caused loss of life, damage to property and loss of livelihood to both sides. Each side marshalled more lethal and accurate weaponry to destroy fortifications and interdict line of communications across the LoC.

In mid-1990s, trans-LoC raids by selected troops, commandos and militants started taking place, which became a common place in the activities of LoC domination. Pakistan had a distinct advantage. Trans-LoC raids could be executed by well-trained and motivated cadres of militants and mercenaries on its behalf. Despite extreme vigil by troops and heavy volume of fire all night long, many daring raids took place along the LoC and IB. In order to prevent cross border infiltration India, initiated fencing of LoC and IB, which was completed in 2004. Now a 2050-km-long stretch of IB and LoC has been fenced. It is so well-lit that it is visible from the space. The fencing proved very effective as it reduced the infiltration considerably.

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jointness and synergy

TAPESTRY OF CHALLENGES

internal security

CENTRE-STATE SYNERGY

Guarding nation’s borders is a solemn duty. A field commander attempts to control all that he surveys. It is a tedious task, which involves manning of guard posts, patrolling along the fencing and in-depth areas and laying of ambushes on suspected routes of infiltration. It is a manpower intensive job and is to be done round the year in most trying terrain and weather conditions. Conflict along LoC helps Pakistan, because it can create conditions conducive for infiltration. A calm LoC is in India’s interest so that troops can carry out counter-infiltration task better. Here lies the conflict of interests.

Whenever Indian post commander warned the Pakistani post of dire consequences, common retort from the Pakistani soldiers was, “We can fire at will; but you cannot. To open fire you have to receive orders from New Delhi.” This perception was correct. Indian commanders maintained a strict control over the activities of troops deployed on the LoC and never permitted firing. Even the discretion to retaliate with small arms fire was vested with the divisional commander Nature of terrain along the LoC is such that no side enjoys domination everywhere. At tactical level, it is very tempting for junior leaders to dominate the other side. In most of the cases, loss of life or domination from other side, leads to LoC flare up in other sectors. In the recent case similar thing appeared to have happened. It is said to have started in Uri sector, against a Pakistan Army post resulting into a trans-LoC raid in Poonch sector. An unmanageable flare up along the LoC creates a ‘no war no peace’ situation, which after the initial euphoria subsides, impinges on both sides as civilian life is badly affected. Aggressiveness on LoC proves counterproductive in the long run. There are no winners in this contest. However, own troops cannot be made passive and supine victims of the bullying tactics of the Pak Army and as such, to enforce restraint one has to hit back and sometimes hit back hard. Over a period of time a local balance of power emerges on the LoC.

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.

Pakistan is grappling with serious internal turmoil. Its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan are in the grip of insurgency. Situation is so grave that Pakistan Army recently conceded that country’s internal threats were far more dangerous than its arch enemy, India. A sizable portion of Pakistan Army has been withdrawn from Indian borders for carrying out counter-insurgency operations and sealing its western borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan is clearly worried by this strategic imbalance. Since 2001, Pakistan Army had undertaken many largescale counter-insurgency operations in South Waziristan and Bajaur in FATA and Malakand and Swat in KP, with little success. PakistanAfghanistan border is also active; regular firing between troops has been reported. Due to sustained counter-insurgency operations by Indian security forces Kashmir insurgency has lost its steam. Infiltration and terror incidents have receded. Public support to movement has waned. Among the militant groups in Pakistan, only Lashkar-e-Taiba and Kashmir-centric militant organisations remain loyal to Pakistan Army and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Pakistan wants to kick-start Kashmir insurgency again and whip up anti-India hysteria in Pakistan to unify secessionist forces. A turbulent LoC suits Pakistan’s design. That is why it is, despite

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

protests and warnings from India, escalating situation on the LoC.

In order to prevent cross border infiltration India, initiated fencing of LoC and IB, which was completed in 2004. Now a 2050-km-long stretch of IB and LoC has been fenced. It is so well-lit that it is visible from the space. The fencing proved very effective as it reduced the infiltration considerably NATO International Security Assistance Forces’ (NATO-ISAF) withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014 will place Pakistan and its army on the centrestage. If Taliban succeed in staging a comeback to power, it is Pakistan Army and ISI, which will call the shots in Afghanistan, FATA and KP. To exploit post-2014 situation, Pakistan Army and ISI will try to broker peace with militant groups of FATA and KP with the help of Taliban and divert them onto Afghanistan and Kashmir. Sudden assertion from otherwise taciturn General Kayani should be viewed from this strategic angle. What should be our response to such dastardly act by Pakistan? Kargil showed us that by deft manoeuvring localised operations can be carried out on the LoC. We have to develop punitive action capability to give a befitting reply to such misadventures. Mere rhetoric does not suffice.

Evasive national consensus W

e are talking terrorism. The normal presumption is that centre-state relations automatically become subordinate to the national interest. Terrorism, as India has suffered it, has a foreign strategic interest involved. Hence the formulation “proxy war”, where the practitioners of terrorism are doing so at the dictation of a foreign power that does not want to take responsibility for the acts of its proxies. It began from the moment of India’s birth. They were pushed back by Indian troops after the Maharaja acceded to India in 1947. After failing to get the Muslims of Kashmir to revolt in 1965, Pakistan began stoking Sikh militancy and the idea of Khalistan though that was not part of the “unfinished business of partition”. It failed again largely because of a national consensus that India even in its religious diversity must remain a united whole. Pakistan turned its attention once more to Kashmir in the 90s but the Kashmiris distanced themselves from Pakistan by a succession of democratic exercises.

The creation and sustenance of a national consensus on security issues has been further perverted by campaigns by retired military personnel to force the government of the day to vacate the Siachen Glacier on the one hand and come to terms with Pakistani demands along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir on the other

Ministry of Home Affairs tried to facilitate, through the NCTC, inter-state hot pursuit so that more realtime information / intelligence becomes available to security forces for effective counter-terror operations

How can one expect synergy under such circumstances? Especially when every Indian knows that terrorism is a tool in the hands of our enemies to force us to come to terms with Pakistan on the one hand and China on the other

s a fountainhead of terrorism, Pakistan has dispersed the seeds of terror to every corner of the globe and it is itself suffering the consequences of its profligacy. Its unique creation, the Taliban, is split into factions, some of which are deadly opposed to any rapprochement with the US because of the daily forays of its armed drone aircraft into that nest of vipers known as the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of which North Waziristan is a particularly noxious domain. The drones take a steady toll of Taliban commanders on the ground. The most recent strike in the first week of the new February 2013 Defence AND security alert

internal security

CENTRE-STATE SYNERGY

year got the leader of the Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan and his band of bodyguards necessitating the naming of a new leader by the group. The TTP considered by the Pakistani Army to be a useful tool in its geopolitics has made it a habit to target security forces and in the latest exploit it has captured 22 border guards and shot them dead. Even while this is happening, the demand made by this terror organisation lies at the heart of the Indian dilemma: The Pakistan Army should “refocus” its operations for a revenge war against India as quid pro quo for ending its attacks on the security forces. The dichotomy is worse confounded when it is revealed that the Pakistan Army which has refused to launch operations against groups designated as terrorist organisations in North Waziristan by the US and UN has been conducting major operations against the tribals in Balochistan in the south.

“Refocus” on Kashmir Ironically, everybody in India and abroad are agreed that once the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force leaves Afghanistan in 2014 the entire focus of conflict will shift eastwards towards India. We have heard Syed Salauddin of the Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahideen say the same thing very recently. It should be taken as a given that the current relatively peaceful period in Jammu and Kashmir is the result of the pressure that has been mounted on jihadi terrorists operating out of Pakistan by US drone attacks, making it difficult for the Pakistan Army to concentrate on Kashmir at the moment. Yet it does find time to rock the boat at crucial moments as with the disastrous visit of Interior Minister Rehman Malik who clubbed the Babri Masjid demolition to the Mumbai attack of 26/11 or the crossborder shooting near the Haji Pir Pass at a moment when cricket was supposed to be a salve between the embittered nations.

NCTC imbroglio It

had

become

necessary

to reiterate these geopolitical developments to understand the need for the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) or something that will help induce a cohesive response to the proxy war that India is being subjected to. Not everything is right with what the central government has proposed especially the absence of an understanding of the new dynamics created by regional political forces. These dynamics affect national security and that is why the centre should have been extra careful in formulating standard operating procedures in the deployment of central forces into the states milieu. As it is there are frequent contratemps in raids conducted in hot pursuit by police from one state into the jurisdiction of the other. Instead of resolving this major problem (which has led to unnecessary accusations of fake encounters) the Ministry of Home Affairs tried to facilitate, through the NCTC, inter-state hot pursuit so that more realtime information / intelligence becomes available to security forces for effective counter-terror operations.

Ironically, everybody in India and abroad are agreed that once the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force leaves Afghanistan in 2014 the entire focus of conflict will shift eastwards towards India. We have heard Syed Salauddin of the Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahideen say the same thing very recently The concept of the National Counter Terrorism Centre was mooted after the intelligence debacle that was revealed by the Mumbai attack. The centre said it had given relevant intelligence inputs about an impending attack to the Maharashtra government. From Mumbai came the rejoinder that it was too vague for counter-measures to be put in place. Nevertheless, a threat from the sea was clearly indicated. That this should happen in a state ruled by Congress led coalition speaks volumes about what could happen when the state is ruled by a political party different and in some cases, inimical to the Congress-led government at the centre.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

The states’ views Among the Chief Ministers who have vehemently opposed the creation of the NCTC are Ms Jayalalithaa of Tamil Nadu, Narendra Modi of Gujarat and Ms Mamata Banerjee of West Bengal, many others have raised objections over specific clauses in the charter that are perceived to impinge upon the states' jurisdiction. An analysis of their respective cases against NCTC will bring to the fore what are essentially regional concerns, some – as in the case of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal – have international ramifications. Tamil Nadu has long been involved in the Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka and people in the state empathise with the condition of Tamils in Sri Lanka which appears to be caught in a timewarp at the moment when the dreaded Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Vellupalli Prabhakaran was killed in military operations. The post-war plight of the Tamils of Sri Lanka is pitiable and there are no signs of any devolution of effective political power to the Tamils who are the dominant population in the north-east of the island-nation. There have been persistent reports that the Sri Lanka government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa committed genocide during the military operations and that the rehabilitation of the internally displaced persons of Tamil origin has been deliberately tardy. The government of India, especially after the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from the island, has not been in favour of splitting the island into Tamil and Sinhala fractions. This has brought the centre into confrontation with the Jayalalithaa-led state government which has been particularly prickly over events in Sri Lanka. When the IPKF returned to India via Tamil Nadu it was deliberately cold shouldered by the state government and, more recently, the state has objected to the inclusion of Sri Lanka armed forces cadets in training programmes in military institutions like Officer Training School that exist in Tamil Nadu. There is, thus, a foreign

dimension to Ms Jayalalithaa’s objections to the creation of the NCTC. That it tends to favour the LTTE which was involved in the murder of former Congress Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi makes the Tamil Nadu stand even more unpalatable.

More recently, after Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, an American of Kashmiri descent was jailed in the US for siphoning off funds supplied by the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence to create pressure groups to mould opinion among American lawmakers a glaring phenomenon of “indigenisation” of such pressure groups has been exposed. A former Chief of Air Staff has been discovered carrying on a brand of “Track-2 diplomacy” over Jammu and Kashmir that replicates what Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai was doing … How can one expect synergy under such circumstances?

Gujarat episode In Gujarat, Chief Minister Narendra Modi has had to wade through an avalanche of allegations that he gave orders to the police to stay their hand and let Hindus take revenge for the Godhra incident in which kar sevaks returning from Ayodhya were killed in two train bogeys that had been set on fire by a Muslim mob. The role of the Gujarat police has been suspicious and the fact that riot cases had to be shifted outside Gujarat under Supreme Court orders and convictions obtained proves the point. Mr Modi has reason to be suspicious of any central effort to create a regime that can intervene in the state during investigation of terrorist activities. More so when Hindu terrorist groups have been identified in the killing of passengers in the Samjhauta Express. The current investigation is confined to Hindu groups acting out of Madhya Pradesh another one of the Bharatiya Janata Party ruled states which has serious reservations about the NCTC and the ramifications of these revelations are obvious.

West Bengal posture Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s stand on the NCTC has become coloured by her stand on the sharing of the Teesta River waters with Bangladesh. She boycotted the visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed to India thereby vitiating the very cordial arrangement initiated by the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the founder of Bangladesh, to help India eliminate the several insurgencies that have plagued it since Independence. Most of them have used the former East Pakistan territory to launch operations inside India. The Bangladesh government under Sheikh Hasina has clamped down on the United Liberation Front of Asom and delivered some of its leaders to India. It is a major breakthrough in counter-insurgency / counterterror operations in the whole of the north-east. West Bengal is aware that the Pakistan Army InterServices Intelligence has opened a second front for jihadi terrorists to use Bangladesh for infiltration into India. The porous border, as yet not fully fenced with dozens of enclaves of each country jutting into that of the other, makes for a very complex relationship between the two countries. Yes, the sharing of the Teesta waters is crucial to agriculture and riverine navigation in West Bengal but then terrorism too is a major national problem.

Freelance track-2 diplomacy The creation and sustenance of a national consensus on security issues has been further perverted by campaigns by retired military personnel to force the government of the day to vacate the Siachen Glacier on the one hand and come to terms with Pakistani demands along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir on the other. It was only when it was brought to the notice of the military establishment some years ago that claims of being “laidback” in tackling Pakistani attempts to grab the Glacier appeared two-faced in the background of counter-claims of extreme hardships and high expenditures on the Indian troops on the glacier by retired

top brass (apparently made at the behest of serving officers using the “Old Boys’ Network” to bring pressure on the government) that the briefing officer said that “they will be asked to shut up”.

The demand made by this terror organisation lies at the heart of the Indian dilemma: The Pakistan Army should “refocus” its operations for a revenge war against India as quid pro quo for ending its attacks on the security forces. The dichotomy is worse confounded when it is revealed that the Pakistan Army which has refused to launch operations against groups designated as terrorist organisations in North Waziristan by the US and UN has been conducting major operations against the tribals in Balochistan in the south More recently, after Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, an American of Kashmiri descent was jailed in the US for siphoning off funds supplied by the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence to create pressure groups to mould opinion among American lawmakers a glaring phenomenon of “indigenisation” of such pressure groups has been exposed. A former Chief of Air Staff has been discovered carrying on a brand of “Track-2 diplomacy” over Jammu and Kashmir that replicates what Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai was doing. Does it have government sanction is a closely guarded secret. If things are happening in hushhush and behind curtains what is to become of the resolution adopted in Parliament that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir (including the portion occupied by Kashmir) is an integral part of India – a true reflection of national consensus. How can one expect synergy under such circumstances? Especially when every Indian knows that terrorism is a tool in the hands of our enemies to force us to come to terms with Pakistan on the one hand and China on the other.

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

IMPERATIVES

A relationship of mutual dependence is the normal one between the Centre and the States. It cannot be otherwise. Whenever I have talked of a strong Centre, I have always qualified that statement saying that a strong Centre can exist only when the States themselves are strong, because we are dependent on the States. The Centre by itself is nothing. The Centre is a union of all the States. – Late Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi Praful Shankar Adagale The writer is a PhD Research Fellow working in YCNISDA, University of Pune, India. His areas of expertise include International Terrorism, National Security, European Studies and Nuclear Terrorism.

The Constitution must be amended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List so that the Central Government can act on its own initiative when necessary, particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism. And, it is time the government bifurcated the internal security function of the Ministry of Home Affairs into a separate ministry headed by a cabinet minister

Eliminating terrorism requires the will to go to the root cause of the problem and to counter it is possible with the combination of utilising the application of technology and human intelligence as the only resources available to tackle this menace in the urban environment of the 21st century

he above statement articulated by Mrs Indira Gandhi much qualifies to explain the synergy between the centre and the states as well as its importance to understand the approaches towards tackling the menace of terrorism in India. The major challenge before India’s security agencies in the 21st century is to deal with the problem of internal security. Of the various challenges facing India’s internal security apparatus, terrorism tops the list to the nature of its consequence and threats being global in nature. The state plays a significant role in maintaining law and order in the society. The security of the individual rests in the hands of the state as it is the duty of the state to protect and safeguard the interest of the individual rights and duties. In dealing with the problem of internal security it is imperative for the centre and the states to have jointness and synergy between each other for protecting the national interest of the nation. Terrorism as an internal security threat has added another challenge to the internal security forces to tackle this menace in the 21st century. In dealing with the other challenges facing India’s internal security as threat of naxalism, insurgency and organised crime, the role and functioning of the state apparatus becomes most significant to manage and confront such threats. However, the article focuses on what are the approaches that need to be taken towards countering terrorism and what role the centre and states must play in order to deal with the threat from terrorism.

Role of Centre and State Relations A

n informative article on the need and modalities for coordination between the centre and the states in combating terrorism. The writer cites strategic expert Gurmeet Kanwal to the effect that the Constitution must be amended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List so that the Central Government can act on its own initiative when necessary, particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism.

Firstly, before going into the details of the role of the centre and the states, it must be clear by now to the academic community and the policy makers that we must address this issue more pragmatically. By now it has rationally been clear to all that we are still not able to define terrorism. The threat of terrorism being transnational, trans-jurisdictional and global, in nature, makes it difficult for the internal security apparatus of any nation to tackle such threats with effective coordination and logistics. Defining terrorism and accepting one universal definition of terrorism for all is something most of the experts around the world have given an attempt to further counter it, also is the nexus between the two as crime and terrorism is mystifying which compounds to a major hurdle in countering such threat. With the advent of modern use of information technology by and large terrorism has altogether taken a different form. There has been a transformation in the concept of security that has also taken place, from information technology to information warfare.The influence of globalisation channelises and empowers the non-state actors to fight asymmetric warfare in other states or regions. The misuse of Internet by terrorists in the so called cyberspace has started globally and there is evidence of terrorists using cyberspace for planning, hacking, fund raising, spreading religious propaganda, as well as for recruitment of youths. Altogether this compounds to an additional burden to the states and the centre as well as the nation as one has to deal with future threats in the 21st century.

The influence of globalisation channelises and empowers the non-state actors to fight asymmetric warfare in other states or regions. The misuse of Internet by terrorists in the so called cyberspace has started globally and there is evidence of terrorists using cyberspace for planning, hacking, fund raising, spreading religious propaganda, as well as for recruitment of youths In understanding the relationship between the centre and states as well as its role, a special reference to the Mumbai attacks of 26/11 will always remain a crucial point for debate in the years to come due to the various factors as one dealing with the powers and responsibilities of the state to protect the society, secondly, with focus on the state security apparatus prepared to deal with the threat, which includes the state police being the first line of defence followed by emergency response services as secondary forces, thirdly, resources as both men, material as well as finance to purchase the equipment for effective combat operation in case of terror strikes. The debate on whether state can in near future act on its own or as strategic expert Gurmeet Kanwal states that the Constitution must be amended to move “law and order” from the State List to the Concurrent List so that the Central Government can act on its own initiative when necessary, particularly in the case of externally-sponsored terrorism. And, it is time the government bifurcated the internal security function of the

Approaches towards Countering Terrorism in India:

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

Ministry of Home Affairs into a separate ministry headed by a cabinet minister. Similarly, the former Chief Justice of India, Justice M M Punchhi Commission Report on ‘Centre-State Relations’. Of the seven volumes that make up the report, the first deals with evolution of centre-state relations. The other initiatives although thought and addressed before by the policy makers and strategic experts from academic community was the formation of the State Security Council that was similar on the lines of the National Security Council of the centre remains obscure, due to the unwillingness of the state ministers to at least discuss the issues pertaining to the state security architecture and its present preparedness to deal with the threat. The terror attack in Pune last year has once again proved to the way the state security forces handle the situation. It does mean that the state failed to discharge its

February 2013 Defence AND security alert

jointness and synergy

IMPERATIVES

duties or could prevent the attack but the bottom line remains how the states and centre coordinate both pre and post attacks. The question arises as to the extent and what role does the state need to deliver in case of terror attack that takes place from discharging their preliminary duties as first and foremost being to coordinate with the centre and ask for any further alerts and inputs if at all for strikes at other places and if so to prevent them from occurrence till the central forces arrive, management and control of crowd, major task is to preserve the evidence for forensic experts, conducting seal and check posts and patrolling, most important being management of media being the crucial task as the threat is not restricted only to the state but is globally addressed and any news would misguide or bifurcate, the causes and consequences of the terror strikes. Post 26/11 a series of responsibilities and duties were shared between the states and the centre from exchange of intelligence inputs to investigation of terror strikes. Formation of National Investigation Agency (NIA), national database for crime and criminal activities, Multi Agency Centre has been given the legal backing for exchanging intelligence inputs among all intelligence agencies including those of the states. However, the major problem arose when the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gave its approval for its establishment, there was a conflict in some states that vetoed against the functioning and powers of the NCTC, to which our Prime Minister stated that, “It is not our government’s intention to alter distribution of power between states and centre, NCTC is to coordinate counter terror measures and not to infringe on state powers.” So the central argument remains as to what must be done to have effective coordination and communication between the centre and the state. The NCTC will draw up and coordinate counter-terrorism plans, integrate intelligence gathering and coordinate with all existing investigating and intelligence agencies. The NATGRID (National Intelligence Grid), which was approved by the CCS in June 2011, will provide a data bank of 20 databases such as travel records, immigration details and income tax records as inputs to the NCTC. This is a major turning point for the nation to have such unique kind of the agency although on the lines of the United States, it will definitely be effective in tackling threats related to terrorism which might again occur in the new form as the concept of urban terrorism is bound to disrupt the centre and state apparatus. The empowerment to NCTC will assist the state agencies to prevent any future attacks as well as coordinate effectively in both pre and post attack scenario.

The misuse of Internet by terrorists in the so called cyberspace has started globally and there is evidence of terrorists using cyberspace for planning, hacking, fund raising, spreading religious propaganda, as well as for recruitment of youths In conclusion, eliminating terrorism is not just the task of the centre alone as the attack is bound to occur in any state and region and empowering the state with required resources both financial and equipment related, training of state specialised forces by centre not only in India but also abroad for understanding the threat of terrorism and what strategy and tactics the terrorists’ utilise in planning future attacks will be a workable solution in countering terrorism. The research on terrorism and conducting seminars and conferences with the academic community with the central investigation agencies does assist and boost the morale of the state security forces to fight and remain active to tackle terrorism, as the state ATS and the forensic departments must exchange both physical and academic experiences with each other. The other major departments rest on nominating a concerned strategic experts either from police or from the academic community to act as spokesperson in case of any future terrorist attacks in the state which makes the issue and the problem to remain centralised and not takes a different course for investigation and communication with other nations. Also what Mr Bhanu Krishna Kiran views that the counter terrorism strategy reveals the inheritance of the nation’s cultural traditions and political institutions that are deeply embedded in the state’s culture and psychology, which have a profound influence on the development of counter terrorism strategy. Eliminating terrorism requires the will to go to the root cause of the problem and to counter it is possible with the combination of utilising the application of technology and human intelligence as the only resources available to tackle this menace in the urban environment of the 21st century. Application of technology must be in the hands of both the centre and the state to analyse and predict future threats related to terrorism in the 21st century.

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February 2013 Defence AND security alert

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