DSA January 2010 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

DSA is as much yours, as it is ours!

From the entire team at DSA I extend our warmest seasonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s greetings and happy new-year to you, dear reader. We ride into the new-year on the back of an exciting period at DSA. We launched DSA in the last quarter of 2009, and in this limited time, we have made a mark. There is an audible appreciation for DSA, and the response has been positive, to say the least. All that we have achieved thus far is entirely owed to you dear reader! While your response has been our best guide in taking DSA forward, what has really changed the nature of our work is how you have taken an interactive and participative role in making each copy. We value our relationship with you, and this will always be the driving force between us, at DSA, and the dear reader. A number of valuable suggestions have already come from you, and we look forward to more such inputs, in the months and years to come. While we are not soothsayers it is certain 2010 promises to be an exciting year. Having made a modest start in late 2009 we are certain that 2010 brings exciting days ahead for us. And that sentiment is dictated by our belief in your contributions, intellectual as well as literary. We will continue to welcome contributions from you dear reader, rather we call upon you for your articles and pieces. DSA is all about the reader and the environment and that is why we believe evolution is a part of our ethos. We at DSA will continue to evolve our, your, product so as to keep pace with the demands and desires of the readers. There will be nothing static in DSA, for that would be an intellectual disaster for us all.

We, therefore, begin 2010 by highlighting the importance of our naval capability. Vice Admiral (Retd.) P.S. Das sets the agenda for what we would like to be a nationwide debate. No country has survived its ambitions if it has not developed its naval capability. India is remarkably reticent in naval matters despite being the only country anywhere in the world that has an ocean named after it. No country dominates an ocean by the happenstance of geography, as does India with the Indian Ocean. The sheer size, location and the shape of the Indian mainland make it appear over its ocean with a look that neednâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t always be so neglectful. By any stretch of imagination, and expectation, India has ambitions in the 21st century. Some of it is of course riding piggyback on the expected Asian century phenomenon. On the other hand are responsible members of the country who sincerely believe that India should, can, and will, play a global role in the current century. Accident of its geography dictates that India cannot play such a role if it continues to neglect its naval forces. There are no shortcuts for great power status is a sine qua non of sea dominance.

manvendra singh January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

publisher’s view

Vol 1 Issue 4

new decade, new vision

January 2010

chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh sales & advertising shishir bhushan consultant yogesh srivastav international business (uk & europe) shrey agrawal communications sweta sehgal correspondent (europe) justyna bajer art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london art & graphics vipin choudhary dilshad & dabeer photographers subhash, deepak circulation & distribution ranjeet, prakash systems vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002, india t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org articles@dsalert.org advt@dsalert.org subscription@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

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we enter 2010 we realize that we are stepping into the second decade of the new millennium. It was in the very fertile breeding ground of the events and developments of the first decade that the idea of Defence And Security Alert germinated and blossomed. Mumbai 26/11 confirmed our resolve to produce a magazine that will stoke up the embers of awareness among the people of this nation of the grim prospects presented by global terrorism emanating from our own neighbourhood. Terrorism had become the first echelon of unconventional means of undermining the deterrence and restraint that nuclear weapons were supposed to impose by their baleful presence. It was in the widespread terrorism that we also understood the machinations behind the greater “assertiveness” by China in its cross-border relationship with India. Its ULFA nexus underscored the security perimeter in the North-east throughout the first decade of the millennium. It was revealed in its full starkness only after a change of regime in Bangladesh and the mysterious “return” of the top guns of that separatist grouping. Indians came to realize the convoluted ramifications of Chinese grand design and threats to “Balkanize” India. It made our mission that much more urgent. Our first issue came in October, 2009 and the fourth is in your hands now. The journey so far has been a great revelation, an enriching experience. The tremendous response and positive feedback from our readers, especially defence and security personnel, has been and will remain, our beacon as we navigate and chart our course to make DSA the most read and respected defence and security magazine. We will always endeavour to add value to the magazine in every forthcoming issue by further improving it’s layout and quality of it’s already highly regarded content. We also propose to introduce many novel and useful features and relentless campaigns highlighting importance of security and creating awareness among the masses. Team DSA is growing. Highly competent and committed professionals are joining the Mission. Circulation is also galloping, thanks to discerning readers from all parts of India and around the world.

Defence And Security Alertt

In the fast changing world, more so, in the emerging geo-strategic scenarios there are things to learn and we reiterate our promise to stoke up your awareness of all that impinges on our defence and security.

writers and do not necessarily reflect those of

defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal on behalf of ocean media private limited and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at ocean media private limited, 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY T ALERT

The power of a king lies in his mighty arms…

—Chanakya

contents 40

cover story

ISSUE JANUARY 2010 A R T I C L E S

Vol 1 Issue 4

January 2010

ARTILLERY

contents

buying hara-kiri Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

NEIGHBOUR WATCH

Indo-Pak détente? ...prospects 50 Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ramesh C. Chopra, AVSM

MAOIST INSURGENCY

the war within Dr. Harsh V. Pant

DOMINION

china’s pugnacity Rear Admiral (Retd.) Ravi Vohra

CENTRE N STATES

Nagaland: new overtures Bachaspatimayum Sunzu

10 MILITARY MIGHT

defence budgeting 68

JIHAD

campaign of terror: genesis and escalation

TERRORISM

Low-cost warfare Rohit Singh

F E A T U R E S GALLANTRY AWARDS

22 68

know our heroes YOUNG INDIA

jaago India! ronen chatter

56 64

SECURITY TIPS

responding to a bomb threat

MARITIME SECURITY

Indian Navy Uncharted Mission 40 Vice Admiral (Retd.) P. S. Das

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Thank you for your letter of December 5, 2009 and for the issue of Defence And Security Alert (DSA). I have read the issue with great interest and must compliment you on the quality of the articles. I wish you all success in taking this laudable venture forward. Shyam Saran (Special Envoy of PM), Prime Ministerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Office, New Delhi

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January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

artillery

Indian army

buy uying hara-kiri

The Bofors 155mm howitzer purchase of the mid 80s was the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;mother of all scamsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. But it is amazing how successive governments have allowed a series of scams to delay by more than two decades the acquisition of guns that will be needed to stop the Chinese in their tracks in the Himalayas. The scamsters are doing to Indian national security what Ajmal Kasab, the Pakistani terrorist, did to Mumbai on 26/11. Scamsters should be tried for treason in fast-track courts. If the weapon is good, buy it. Better still make your own. DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

artillery MODERNISATION will be adequate to equip seven medium artillery regiments and will cost approximately Rs 3,000 crore. The RfP was reportedly issued to UK’s BAE Systems (which now owns Bofors), for the M777 howitzer claimed to be the lightest in the world at under 4,220 kg, and to Singapore Technologies for the Pegasus SLWH. However, in June 2009, Singapore Technology, whose light howitzer was slated to undergo ﬁeld trials, was blacklisted for its suspected involvement in another scam in the Ordnance Factory Board. This is a new setback to artillery modernisation plans.

Field artillery

rom its original status as a “supporting” arm, the Indian Army artillery has now graduated to a full-fledged combat arm that dominates the battlefield with its inherently destructive firepower. In the post-Pokhran 1998 and post-Kargil 1999 scenario on the Indian sub-continent, artillery is clearly seen to be a decisive arm, indeed even a battle-winning one. It was clear to all perceptive observers who followed the Kargil conflict closely that, though hundreds of valiant infantrymen took back the mountaintops of Kargil foot-by-bloody-foot from the intruding soldiers of the Pakistan Army, it was the artillery that had paved the way for victory with the overwhelming superiority of its concentrated firepower.

Acquisitions Modernisation plans of the Regiment of Artillery have stagnated for quite some time for various reasons, some beyond the control of military leaders. Beginning in January 2008, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued three global tenders to revive the long-delayed plans to modernise the Indian artillery. Tenders were issued for 155mm guns and howitzers for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials were expected to be held over the next one year and, expectations ran high that contracts for acquisition and local production would be awarded as early as in the ﬁrst half of 2010. As none of the bidders were invited to participate in summer trials in mid-2009, it appears that there will be further delay in the procurement and modernisation plans of a critically

important arm of the Indian Army. It is a well-established fact that potent artillery firepower had turned the tide and eventually paved the way for victory during the Kargil conflict. Despite the lessons learnt in Kargil, modernisation of the artillery has continued to lag behind. The first and last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. This gun had proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. After two decades of neglect during which the 100mm and 122mm field guns of Russian origin and the indigenously developed and manufactured 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun joined the long list of equipment bordering on obsolescence but still in service with the army, tenders were floated and trials were held for a 52-calibre 155mm gun to replace all field and medium guns.

Scam-struck Just when a contract for 120 tracked and 180 wheeled self-propelled (SP) 155mm guns was about to be concluded after years of protracted trials, South African arms manufacturer Denel, a leading contender for the contract, was alleged to have been involved in a corruption scam in an earlier deal for anti-material riﬂes (AMRs). The other two howitzers in contention, from Soltam of Israel and BAE (Bofors) of Sweden reportedly did not meet the laid down criteria and Army HQ recommended fresh trials, setting the programme back at least three to four years. Another bone of contention was that the howitzers that had been offered were

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

technology demonstration models and not guns that were in actual service with the home country armies. The probability of the next conventional war breaking out in the mountains is far higher than that of a war in the plains. With this in view, the artillery recently conceptualised a requirement for a light-weight towed howitzer of 155mm calibre for employment in the mountains. Neither the present Bofors howitzer nor its 52-calibre replacement will be capable of effective operations in the mountains. A light-weight 39 or 45-calibre 155mm howitzer weighing less than 5,000 kg, with a light but adequately powered prime mover, is ideal for the mountains. The guntrain should be capable of negotiating sharp road bends without the need to unhook the gun from the prime mover. Two British 155mm howitzers had competed for the US contract for a similar howitzer some years ago – the UFH (Ultra-lightweight Field Howitzer) and the LTH (Light-weight Towed Howitzer). Others like the Pegasus of Singapore Technology have now been developed. These could be considered for licensed production with transfer of technology.

Lightweight howitzers In January 2008, the MoD ﬂoated a Request for Proposal (RfP) for 140 pieces of ultra-light 39-calibre 155mm towed howitzers for use by the Indian Army’s mountain formations. Presumably, these will also be employed by the army’s rapid reaction divisions – as and when these are raised – as these howitzers will be easy to transport by air. About 140 howitzers

The MoD has also ﬂoated a global tender for the purchase of 400 155mm towed artillery guns for the Army, to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,100 howitzers, in a project worth a whopping Rs 8,000 crore. The RfP was issued to eight prospective bidders including BAE, General Dynamics, Nexter (France), Rhinemetall (Germany) and Samsung (South Korea). An RfP has also been issued for 180 wheeled selfpropelled 155mm guns for around Rs 4,700 crore for employment by mechanised forces in the plains and semi-desert sectors. Since the Bofors 155mm howitzer was introduced into service, the indigenously designed and manufactured 105mm Indian Field Gun (IFG) and its (not so) light version, the Light Field Gun (LFG), have also joined the list of guns and howitzers heading for obsolescence. Approximately 180 pieces of 130mm M46 Russian medium guns have been successfully “up-gunned” to 155mm calibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam of Israel. The new barrel length of 45-calibres has enhanced the range of the gun to about 40 km with extended range ammunition.

Multibarrel rockets There has been notable progress on the rocket artillery front. A contract for the acquisition of two regiments of the 12-tube, 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with 90 km range was signed with Russia’s Rosoboronexport in early-2006. This weapon system is a major boost for the long-range firepower capabilities of the army. If this weapon system had been available during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan’s brigade HQ and forward airfield at Skardu and other targets deep inside POK could have been hit with impunity. Extended range (ER) rockets are being introduced for the 122mm Grad MBRL that has been in service for over three decades. The ER rockets will enhance the weapon system’s range from 22 to about 40 km. A contract worth Rs 5,000 crore has also been signed for the serial production of the Pinaka MBRL weapon system, another DRDO project plagued by time delays and completed with help from Larsen and Toubro and the Tatas.

The probability of the next conventional war breaking out in the mountains is far higher than that of a war in the plains. With this in view, the artillery recently conceptualised requirement for a light-weight towed howitzer of 155mm calibre for employment in the mountains. A light-weight 39 or 45-calibre 155mm howitzer weighing less than 5,000 kg, with a light but adequately powered prime mover, is ideal for the mountains January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

artillery MODERNISATION The Pinaka rockets will have an approximate range of 37 km.

Radars

Counter-bombardment (US term counter-fire) capability is also being upgraded, but at a slow pace. At least about 40 to 50 weapon locating radars (WLRs) are required for effective counter-bombardment, especially in the plains, but only a dozen have been procured so far. In addition to the 12 AN-TPQ 37 Firefinder WLRs acquired from Raytheon, USA, under a 2002 contract worth US $200 million, Bharat Electronics Limited is reported to be assembling 28 WLRs. These radars will be based on both indigenous and imported components and are likely to be approved for introduction into service after extensive trials that are ongoing. The radar is expected to match the capabilities of the Firefinder system and will have a detection range of about 40 km. The indigenous sound ranging system for locating the positions of enemy guns based on the sound of their firing does not appear

BrahMos missile Efforts are also underway to add ballistic as well as cruise missiles to the artillery arsenal. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (Mach 2.8 to 3.0), with a precision strike capability, very high kill energy and range of 290 km, is being inducted into the army. A ceremonial induction function of the Block-I version was held in July 2007. Since then, the Block-II version has successfully completed trials. It is a versatile missile that can be launched from TATRA mobile launchers and silos on land, aircraft and ships and, perhaps in future, also from submarines. Fifty BrahMos missiles are expected to be produced every year. Efforts are afoot to further increase its strike range. BrahMos Aerospace has orders worth Rs 3,500 crore from the army and the navy, which has opted for the anti-ship as well as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) versions. These terrain hugging missiles are virtually immune to counter measures due to their high speed and very low radar cross section and are far

In 2008, the MoD floated a Request for Proposal (RfP) for 140 pieces of ultra-light 39-calibre 155mm towed howitzers and invited UK’s BAE Systems for the M777 howitzer and Singapore Technologies for the Pegasus SLWH. However, in June 2009, Singapore Technology, was blacklisted for its suspected involvement in an Ordnance Factory Board scam. This is a new setback to artillery modernisation plans to be making worthwhile progress and may be shelved in favour of an imported system. In fact, it needs to be considered whether this relic of the two World Wars, that is rather cumbersome to deploy and maintain, deserves a silent burial as gun and mortar locating radars now provide accurate locations of enemy guns and mortars. The modernisation plans of tube artillery alone are likely to cost Rs 13,000 crore at 2008-09 prices. The major acquisitions will be of initial lots of 400 towed howitzers of 155mm calibre, with a barrel length of 52-calibres, costing about Rs 4,000 crore, 140 ultra-light weight 155mm towed howitzers, with a barrel length of 39-calibres, costing Rs 3,000 crore and 180 SP 155mm howitzers costing Rs 5,000 crore. The “Shakti” project for command and control systems for the artillery, earlier called Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS), has reached the stage of maturity and is now being ﬁelded extensively in the plains. Gradually it will be ﬁelded up to the corps level and the two artillery divisions will be equipped with it.

maoist insurgency END GAME

superior to sub-sonic cruise missiles like Pakistan’s Babur. Chile, Kuwait, Malaysia and South Africa have shown interest in acquiring this missile. The Regiment of Artillery is now a battlewinning arm on the conventional battlefield and is the sword edge of India’s nuclear deterrence. From a supporting arm with the limited role of neutralising large areas of the ground with its inherent dispersion of fire, Artillery has graduated to an arm of decision on the modern battlefield. This is an honour the Indian artillery has earned by virtue of its performance during Operation Vijay in the Kargil conflict in 1999. It now has a new role - that of destruction in defensive as well as offensive operations.

Overdue

However, despite the increasing obsolescence of artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers, the government has been unable to conclude contracts for their replacement even though protracted trials of several 155 mm howitzers have been carried out over the last few years. The failure to modernise the Indian artillery

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

is likely to have adverse repercussions for national security. No matter how much emphasis is laid on the early resumption and successful conclusion of artillery modernisation plans, it will be inadequate as these plans are critical to the army’s performance in the next conventional war that India may have to ﬁght. If there is any ﬁeld of defence procurement in which the MoD must make haste, it is this one.

Stopp Press

Various national dailies carried the following news item on December 26, 2009. On Army’s request MoD - reversing its earlier stand –has given the go-ahead (only) for field trials of the equipment manufactured by two blacklisted companies Israeli Military Industries (IMI) and Singapore Technology Kinetics (STK). Defence ministry officials, however, clarified that no contracts will be awarded to these companies till CBI investigations are over. We hope this will help accelerate the procurement process. The writer commanded an infantry brigade on the Line of Control (Operation Parakram, 2001-03) and an artillery regiment in counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir Valley (Operation Rakshak, 1993-94). At present he is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. Brigadier Kanwal has authored several books including Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal; Indian Army: Vision 2020; Pakistan’s Proxy War; Heroes of Kargil; Kargil ‘99: Blood, Guts and Firepower and Artillery: Honour and Glory.

THE

AR ITHIN

After decades of dithering, the Centre and the twenty states afflicted by the Maoist menace must implement a coordinated two-pronged strategy of military operations against its armed cadres complemented by a programme of simultaneous development. It is time to expose the intellectual vacuity of an ideology that destroys infrastructure as a pre-requisite for its own brand of “supremacy of the proletariat”. January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

maoist insurgency END GAME

n September last year the Maoists abducted Atindranath Dutta, the Ofﬁcer-in-Charge of the Sankrail police station in West Bengal and killed two of his colleagues. After 55 hours in captivity, Dutta was released in the presence of national media by the Maoist leader Kishenji who underlined that this was the “ﬁrst case of release of Prisoner of War” by the Maoists. Dutta’s release came hours after the state government let 22 alleged Naxals walk free by not opposing their bail plea though both the state government and the Maoists were quick to deny any deal.

Embarrassingg deal

The West Bengal government later admitted that it gave in to the demands of the Maoists to secure the release of the police officer and cited the release of militants in the 1989 Rubaiya Sayeed kidnapping case and the 1999 IC-814 Kandahar hijack as precedents. The Home Secretary went to the extent of calling India a “soft State” while the Chief Minister’s Principal Secretary admitted that the government “had to bend over backwards.” This prisoner swap happened even as the security forces had surrounded the Maoist abductors with their leader Kishenji also part of the squad. They were instructed to call off their operations. This incident once again underscored the growing might of the Maoists and the abject passivity of the Indian State even when its institutions are assaulted with impunity. Not a single day passes when the Maoists do not make it to the national headlines. For some time now we have been hearing the Indian government talking of Naxalism and Maoism in grave terms, labelling them as the greatest internal security threat facing the nation. Yet the policy response has not been up to the mark. It has been full of sound and fury signifying nothing. The UPA government in its first term failed to see the Naxalite threat for what it was – one of the most significant challenges to the very existence of India. As a result its response was a mixture of denial, accommodation, and neglect. With the Left Parties as coalition partners and an ineffective Shivraj Patil as the Home Minister, the government ended up worsening an already serious situation, giving ample opportunities to the Naxalites to demonstrate their might across an ever expanding swathe of territory called the “Red Corridor.” For years Naxals have been killing security personnel and civilians continuously and consistently with a ruthlessness that is unprecedented but the Indian State has tended to look the other way while celebrity activists have tended to justify these acts on all sorts of moral grounds.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SEC

Salwa jjudum

In the absence of leadership from New Delhi, the states decided to chart their own courses and their approaches ranged from offering amnesties to the raising of armed militias like Salwa Judum. Realising that the situation has got out of control, the UPA government in its second term had no option but to take the threat head on and it started with the new Home Minister P. Chidambaram admitting in the Parliament that the national security threat posed by the Maoists has been underestimated for the last few years. Conventional wisdom on tackling Naxalism, fashionable amidst the Indian liberal intelligentsia, suggests that this is a mere socio-economic problem. And only if we can

provide jobs to the disaffected youth and win their hearts and minds, we can preven Maoism from spreading. This assumption the basis for the developmental package t the government has announced for Naxal infested areas where signiﬁcant developm aid is now being channelled in the hope this will help in alleviating the perception alienation from the national mainstream. Growth and good administration has simp passed over certain geographies and peop and Naxalites thrive in this development-a governance vacuum, often supplanting the State’s legitimacy. And as the State’s auth has eroded, Maoists have moved in to ﬁll this vacuum by erecting parallel structure governance. Development, however, is ne

the goal of such movements. It is all about power.

Rout maoism

No doubt, a multi-pronged strategy is needed to tackle Naxalism and one of the planks will have to be to ensure that the developmental aid trickles down to those at the very bottom of the nation’s socio-economic ladder. But this should not mean that the military defeat of Maoists should be put on the back-burner. For far too long there has been a complacent attitude regarding fighting these forces. There has been an absurd sentimentality about the Maoists’ Leftist pretensions. The argument went that these are idealistic, well-intentioned people who have gone astray but soon they will recognise the benefits of participatory democracy and start engaging with the nation’s electoral process. The Congress Party has never been categorical about defeating Maoism because of its love for the Leftist thought and so we have heard clichés suggesting that development is the only way to tackle the menace of Naxalism and the Maoists are merely disaffected youth. It is indeed surprising because India has been rather ruthless in fighting other challenges to its internal security, be it in Jammu and Kashmir or in the North East where all kinds of insurgencies have challenged the might of the Indian State and the Indian State has never been diffident in responding in kind. As the Home Minister has pointed out, Left wing extremism affects 20 states, and over 2000 police station areas in 223 districts in those states. He also catalogued that in 2008, 1591 incidents of Naxalite violence resulting in 721 deaths were reported. By August end last year, that figure already stood at about 580. While 231 security personnel were killed in Naxalite violence in 2008, 250 had already died last year till August. Despite this the Naxalites have continued to be seen as misguided or harmless or even basically right in what they wish to achieve though perhaps a bit too harsh in their choice of means.

Nation-State targeted The Maoists have made it clear time and again that they seek the dismemberment of the Indian State and have cynically exploited the genuine grievances of the local population in their areas of operation toward their larger ideological ends. The Indian intelligentsia and the Indian government should disabuse themselves of any possible reconciliation with the Maoists at this juncture. The Maoists have made it clear that they will only come to the negotiating table if security forces are withdrawn from their areas of operation, all DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

It is indeed surprising because India has been rather ruthless in fighting other challenges to its internal security, be it in Jammu and Kashmir or in the North East where all kinds of insurgencies have challenged the might of the Indian State and the Indian State has never been diffident in responding in kind arrested Maoists are released and there won’t be any precondition of laying down arms. There should be no question of accepting any of these demands. The extremism of their goals and the excesses of their method make them the most dreaded enemies of the Indian State. The main task of great urgency before the Indian government today, therefore, is a military defeat of the anti-democratic Naxal forces. The Indian government needs to re-establish its authority, creating conditions for pursuing an inclusive political process and developmental agenda.

Unshackle locals As recent events make amply clear, India has been failing its paramilitary and police consistently. In the absence of adequate personnel, training and equipment, the Indian police have been reluctant to take on the Maoists head-on making it even more difficult for the local population to challenge the Naxal’s writ. In the absence of adequate security, a “hearts and minds” strategy is unlikely to work and the local populace will continue to get targeted by both the Naxals and the security forces. In this context while the recently launched Operation Green Hunt against the Naxalite movement is a step in the right direction, the government will have to think about building institutions of governance rather rapidly after clearing the areas of the Maoist cadre. The Maoists insurgency is a brutal and illegal war against the Indian State, against the idea and existence of the Indian democracy – and that includes the poor tribals and farmers in whose cause Maoists claim to fight. It is not only ignorant but also extremely dangerous to romanticize the Naxal cause. While recognizing the limits of Indian democracy and developmental model, there is no need to be apologetic about the ability of the Indian democracy in bringing ever greater number of people, mostly marginalized, into the mainstream. Maoists by the violence they have unleashed on security personnel and civilians, by their persistent destruction of infrastructure are actually the greatest impediment to the development of the people for whom they are ostensibly fighting. It is time for the Indian State to assert itself as well as expose the intellectual vacuity of their ideology. Anything less would allow such forces to keep working towards the weakening of the Indian State. The writer teaches in King’s College, London and is presently a Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

dominion BELLIGERENCE

CHINA’S

pugnacity pugnacity

Chinese the timing of the current state of confrontation with India is a bit of a mystery. The clues may lie on the far horizon not in the border issue which is an excuse, not the cause. Pakistan’s predicament with the jihadis, the creation of

Rear Admiral (Retd.) Ravi Vohra

Like many things

responsible for giving Islamabad the nuclear weapons from behind which the terrorists could operate in Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, India is not about to hand over the umbilical relationship

which the Chinese are equally

Buddhism to the godless and its stand on the Dalai Lama is in welcome contrast to the rest of the kowtowing world. India must be prepared for “another 1962” to give as good as it gets.

with

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

he viewpoint of those who are closer to the government ofﬁcials indicates that they do not foresee any war / military threat from China in the short to medium term until about 2020. However, none of them are able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for Chinese latest incursions (over 140 of them) across the Line of Actual Control after a lull in such activities for the last several years. Both the Chief of the Army Staff as also the recently retired Chief of the Naval Staff have clearly voiced their opinions highlighting the threat. It surprised many of us when the Chief of the Army Staff later stated that the Chinese threat across the land borders in the North was not alarming and the incursions were a routine affair. Was the Chief asked to withdraw his earlier statement? Your guess is as good as mine.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

dominion BELLIGERENCE than those in the inventory of the Indian Navy and several nuclear submarines (seven SSNs and three SSBNs). Add to it the time that our government machinery takes to take decisions whether on defense procurements or in other areas and we can understand why the Chinese are forging ahead in every ﬁeld. The Indian Defense Ministry is still carrying on with vintage organizations and structures of World War II says eminent Indian defence expert and strategist Mr. K. Subrahmanyam.

Sea front China is extending its reach southwards to

Flexing muscles The Indian media has been highlighting the Chinese rail and road infrastructure build-up across Tibet and giving a wake up call to the Indian authorities in order to speed up such facilities on the Indian side of the border. World media too has published a number of reports regarding the Chinese mobilization and deployment of two to three Divisions of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) by rail and road for a massive military exercise in the Tibet plateau region just a couple of months ago. As per reports it took Chinese just under 3 weeks to move the entire number of troops and equipment to the exercise area. The question we must ask ourselves is, what was the aim of this exercise and against which enemy force? For some time after the exercise there was tension in bilateral relations. It is only after the recent bilateral meeting between the two prime ministers that some thaw was brought about. Notwithstanding, the Chinese leadership did not make any neutral statements suggesting that no aggressive intent need be assumed in such exercises. The only saving grace which

was supposed to provide some comfort was the oft repeated Indian government claim that India-China bilateral trade is a good indicator of growing relations between the two Asian giants. Some skeptics considered the Chinese statements as duplicitous and warned through the print media of a repeat of 1962 history based on the latest developments. That was just one month ago. The Indian Air Force has been reported by the media to be shoring up its airﬁelds in the Eastern region of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh in the North East, positioning ﬁghter squadrons closer to the China borders, reviewing its supply depot routes etc. The army too is reported to be raising two more divisions to enhance its defences along the northern border. What is one to understand from these reports? Are these reports in the media misplaced? Is the world media conning India into a confrontation with China? Are the new arrangements simply a part of routine reorganizing / rotation of deployment patterns? Have these forces been pulled out to reduce pressure on our western front with Pakistan as desired by USA?

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

safeguard its transportation and supply routes of oil and other energy products essential for its economic development. Although the Chinese government is working to eventually bypass the important choke point in the Indian Ocean through transportation by roads and pipelines from the ports in the Indian Ocean to the heart of China it would be quite some time before it is capable of achieving this goal. This is what the Chinese President Hu Jintao called the Malacca dilemma. To overcome this challenge the Chinese government has adopted what is called the “string of pearls” strategy in friendly countries

along the northern coast of the Indian sub-continent. As reported by the media it is constructing commercial and naval bases in Myanmar and helping the military junta in control of the country by building roads, waterways and pipelines to link the Bay of Bengal to the province of Yunan in China. This would enable China to transport its energy requirement through commercial ships from the Persian Gulf to Myanmar by sea and then through land routes and pipelines across Myanmar to the heart of China. Thus China would be in a position to have an alternate route for its energy requirements,

Crossed paths I do not think so. Because no matter which side India looks to whether north towards Tibet and off late Nepal, east towards Bangladesh or Myanmar or west to Pakistan it seems to bump into China. This is because both countries want to establish their own spheres of inﬂuence in the region which are beginning to cross each other. The recent events in Nepal are for example rather worrisome. India has over the years invested a lot of effort and time in Nepal and it was quite a surprise for most of us that the country’s political balance simply took a swing to the other extreme as soon as the ruling monarch relinquished his throne. The latest news that China is planning to build roads, modern infrastructure and has opened a number of schools to teach Chinese to the local Nepalese is not very encouraging either. Without a doubt China is a much stronger power. Its economy is three times that of India and its army is twice our army’s size. The ratio of Chinese air force to Indian air force is stated to be three to one and it has three times the number of conventional submarines

America does not want to upset the number two economic power of the world especially when its own economy is wobbling. Whether US efforts to contain China east of Malacca would succeed is a moot question. But this is no long term assurance that India’s interests would not get compromised. India would simply have to look after itself January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

dominion BELLIGERENCE bypassing the Malacca strait, in the eventuality of a confrontation with any other global power. But what about the sea span from the Gulf through and up to Myanmar? That too must be a worry for the Chinese planners and therefore a great factor in planning their future maritime strategy. In Sri Lanka China has extended its help and expertise and built a modern port, Hamban Tota, on the southern tip of the country, a fuelling station and the road network to link the port for easy access to the heart of the country. In Pakistan, its all weather ally in the Indian sub-continent, China has helped Pakistan in building a large naval port and a modern listening post in Gwadar. It is also helping Pakistan in linking Gwadar to Pasni, another port along the coast about 80 miles

away from Gwadar. Some media reports have suggested that China is now monitoring or is able to monitor all the ship trafﬁc to and from the Persian Gulf. Possibility of China’s naval deployment and operations from Gwadar in future is now being called India’s ‘Hormuz dilemma’.

Ocean gauntlet It is certainly beginning to worry the Indian planners in view of its oil and energy transportation requirement from Gulf to various Indian ports along its west coast. This is not to suggest that India does not have the capability to face this challenge. In fact in our own theater any hostile naval forces other than those of the USA would

be quite vulnerable, at least in the medium term. Notwithstanding, the problem for both India and China is to ﬁnd a workable solution to their dilemmas in the waters of the Indian Ocean. India has to watch the footprints being established by the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean and assess its intentions in order to work out its own strategy to safeguard the national interests.

Indo-US entente Let us consider why the Chinese have started cranking out insults through their controlled media not seen in decades. The Chinese have blamed India of hegemonic dreams and accused us of trying to befriend countries

No matter which side India looks to whether north towards Tibet and off late Nepal, east towards Bangladesh or Myanmar or west to Pakistan it seems to bump into China. This is because both countries want to establish their own spheres of influence in the region which are beginning to cross each other

far away from the region (read USA) and criticizing the countries in its vicinity (read China). There have been references to trade barriers, anti-dumping actions and so on. At the heart of the problem, according to me, lies the recent India-USA nuclear deal which they could not stop despite strong opposition. The main cause of friction lies in the unresolved land border dispute i.e. Aksai Chin, a high plateau controlled by China, and the McMohan line agreed to by the British India and Tibet, a historical event documented but being disputed by China. China also claims the whole of Arunachal Pradesh which it calls as Southern Tibet. Add to it the visit by the Indian Prime Minister and the recent visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh and we have a strange cocktail which has resulted in some rather odd and bizarre actions by the Chinese like issue of visas to Indians from Arunachal Pradesh and so on. There does not seem to be any other explanation for the present tense situation except that China perhaps considers that now is the best time and opportunity to settle the border issue on its own terms. But let us not get taken in. It is too simplistic to call it a border line dispute. A whole lot of territory is involved and we have to safeguard it against the hegemonic and expansionist dragon. It would be unwise for India to rely on USA or other European countries in this regard. The US media is in fact suggesting that the Obama administration is considering a policy of neutrality on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh. America thus does not want to upset the number two economic power of the world especially when its own economy is wobbling. But despite its own problems, the USA is

Satellite picture of western Tibet Xinjiang highway

The Chinese have thus mastered the art of duplicity. One level blows hot and another level blows cold. We should never take their insults and accusations as a matter of routine but must give it back to them as good as they dish out

reported to be helping Indonesia in building its navy and defense infrastructure along the Malacca Strait and has positioned its own ﬂeet in strategic places to contain Chinese expansionism. The inference is obvious. Control of Malacca is more important to contain China’s domination of the Indian Ocean. Whether US efforts to contain China east of Malacca would succeed is a moot question. But this is no long term assurance that India’s interests would not get compromised. India would simply have to look after itself.

Indian strategy India therefore must work out its strategy along the following broad lines: Build up its military capability to ensure there is no repeat of 1962. Bureaucratic lethargy in acquisition of military hardware recommended by the armed forces must

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

dominion BELLIGERENCE

Modern infrastructure along the Indo-China borders for movement of troops and material for rapid deployment is required.

be overcome. The country must provide its armed forces with the best and latest ďŹ ghting tools to ensure not only territorial integrity but also safeguard its interests in the area of our interest, that is, countries in the Indian Ocean and in the sub-continent. 1. Speed up modern infrastructure build-up along the borders to ensure speedy response, movement of troops and material for rapid deployment when required. We must be able to spot incursions as they occur and react quickly with every means at our disposal both diplomatically and at the local theatre level. These must be highlighted rather than kept under the carpet. The citizens of this democracy have a right to know about the threats being faced by its armed forces and what is being done to face them. 2. Continue diplomatic dialogue with the Chinese at various levels, both through ofďŹ cial and track II channels. Again we must not shy away from disclosing whether the

talks were successful or not and what were the reasons. No one wants to know the full details but to just suggest that the issues were taken up in a cordial atmosphere does not convey much. Why should it take the Prime Minister only to give details and suggest what the two sides agreed upon? It is no secret that the Chinese operate at two different levels. There are diplomats who blow hot and cold but at the higher level there are voices that are saner. The same goes for the PLA too. The Chinese have thus mastered the art of duplicity. Regrettably we have not. We should never take their insults and accusations as a matter of routine but must give it back to them as good as they dish out. A bully can only be tackled by facing him squarely and not running away from the competition. 3. We have to resolve the territorial / border issue in a sensible manner. Chinese are known never to give up their claims. All historical records, treaties and such other

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

documents must be used and then the issue settled. If the Chinese claim is genuine then I am sure, if made public, the Indian citizens will learn to accept it provided there is a balanced give and take and not just a one sided take and no give. But this would need courage at the highest level and broad shoulders to carry the burden both by the ruling and opposition leaders. Will our Prime minister be able to carry this weight and convince others to do so?

The writer took premature retirement from Indian Navy after 33 years of active service. He was the Chairman and Managing Director of Garden Reach Shipyard, Kolkata. He helped in settting up the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi and took over as its ďŹ rst Director. He has edited number of books and is deeply interested in matters of strategic importance, particularly those that are concerned with events in the Indian Ocean.

jihad MODI OPERANDI

Maloy Krishna Dhar

To be able to defeat terrorism of any kind it is necessary to identify the crucible in which it has germinated; decrypt its genes and look for locations where its spores may have been disseminated. As these words suggest it is as difficult as looking for microbes under a scanner.

But it has to be done, methodically and clinically. 30

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

campaign of

terror: genesis and

ESCALATION January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

jihad MODI OPERANDI pectacular subversive bomb blasts and other acts of Islamist violence primed by Pakistan have prompted the police and security agencies divulging names like terrorist modules and cells of the SIMI, Indian Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-eMohammad and HuJI etc. to conﬁrm the well known facts that Pakistani and Bangladeshi jihadists have heavily inﬁltrated certain pockets in India. The National Security Advisor has claimed existence of 800 such modules all over India.

Genes

Before we consider and examine the existence of jihadist modules and cells it should be clariﬁed that terrorist / jihadi actions are executed either by a single cell or multiple cells controlled by hubs and modules. Some scholars have averred that single cell operations were in vogue during the earlier stages of urban guerrilla warfare waged by Communism inspired groups like Red Brigade, Japanese Red Army and the Italian Red Brigades. These urban groups of sixties and seventies tried to clone the traditional cell system devised by the communist party apparatchiks.

The basics of understanding the guerrilla warfare and early stages of jihad related terror are taught with great care by the experts trained in Pakistan under supervision of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). These are like the grassroots functional bases of all terror groups - the Red Brigade, Sandero Luminiso, FARC, IRA and present day Maoist groups infesting parts of India

Genetic dispersal The concept of guerrilla warfare and use of cells and modules are parts of unconventional warfare directed at key-assassinations, targeted sabotage and subversion, gradual Mass Control (capturing public mind) and to spring surprise on the presumed enemy. In recent times Lawrence of Arabia, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro etc. are venerated as successful guerrilla warfare leaders. In our own country Chhatrapati Shivaji used similar tactics against the Mughals, Balwant Rao Phadke against the British and of course the Bengal, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh revolutionaries against the British regime during independence struggle. Most of our historians have elaborately recorded the exploits of Mahatma Gandhi type mass

revolution but very little reading materials are available on the revolutionary struggle by the Indian youth during the 19th and 20th century. The Russian Communist strategy of guerrilla warfare adopted by the rebels in Malaysia, Greece, Cuban rebels, the Telengana rebels and the Sandinista etc. were modiﬁed by later revolutionaries with inputs from the guerrilla warfare tactics preached and practiced by Mao Zedong.

Leftist revolutions

The communist strategy of cell-module operations to prepare grounds for a bigger warfare is illustrated from the three basic steps taught by Mao Zedong: Establishment of cells and modules in target areas, Guerrilla cells start converting people to their ideology, earn public sympathy (generate Mass Control), escalate frequent targeted attacks with support from local cell members and after prolonged cell-module based attacks initiated frontal mass action - both civil and military. In fact, in post Mao era this reﬁned strategy was given shiny polish by Che Guevara, which was published in his book of 1960-Guerrilla Warfare. These storehouses of strategic and tactical methodologies were adopted by the

modern urban and rural guerrilla groups in France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Japan, Latin American countries and obviously the Muslim resistance groups that initiated terror and jihad campaign against Israel and other western targets. The Abu Nidal group, PLO and Hamas etc. followed the same principle. The obverse side of the same tactics were adopted by the early Jewish guerrilla ﬁghters who initially fought the British and later the Muslim Palestinians. Nearer home in Vietnam General Vo Nguyen Giap tried the classical cell and module based guerrilla warfare against the American occupation forces. His ant-columns (to deliver supplies) were more successful in module and cell based warfare that led to the ﬁnal frontal attacks.

Trainings by the CIA (some in US based camps), ISI and Royal Saudi Intelligence had created a new breed of faith-warriors - jihadis. Mao’s and Guevara’s ideological tactics were replaced by religious fervour and faith which instilled the theory of inevitability of success of jihad against the jahil, kafir and Dar-ul-Harb enemies

Mutations

In India, we have witnessed cell and module based insurgency in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Assam, Punjab and are still experiencing the same in Jammu and Kashmir. Having served in most of these conflict areas for nearly two decades, the writer realised that the concepts of cells enunciated by Mao, Guevara and other practitioners and scholars are not always strictly followed by the grassroots practitioners. To briefly narrate: A Naga insurgent cell could coalesce around a lowly Rajapeyu (district level chief operative) or a Midanpeyu (regional governor). He mostly planted one to five people in each village to recruit soldiers, collect taxes, and indoctrinate villagers and to organise ambush parties. Success of the Indian intelligence corps and the operational forces depended on identification of village level cells and destroying them either through civil or military actions or combination of the both. This is a vast area of operational technology and cannot be covered in this essay.

Crucible of jihad

However, the physical, tactical and philosophical contents of guerrilla warfare underwent drastic changes when the CIA in collaboration with the ISI and Royal Saudi Intelligence mounted orchestrated guerrilla actions against the Soviet Russia in Afghanistan. Besides training the recruited personnel and volunteer jihadis in cell and module based action squads, training was imparted for organised group attacks, what Mao had described as “Escalation of attack” leading to “Conventional attack.” These trainings by the CIA (some in US based camps), ISI and Royal Saudi Intelligence had created a new breed of faith-warriors - jihadis. Mao’s and Guevara’s ideological tactics were replaced by religious fervour and faith which instilled the theory of inevitability of

success of jihad against the jahil, kaﬁr and Dar-ul-Harb enemies. Religion had infused more intense commitment to the presumed cause than a communist guerrilla was inspired by motivation instilled in him by the Mass Control methodologies of the revolutionaries.

Philosophy Pakistani jihadi tanzeems organised by the Jamait-e-Islami, Makarz-ud-Dawa-ul-Islam, Deoband, Ahl-e-Hadith and Tablighi Jammat etc. congregations had recruited youths educated in madrasas and maqtabs, especially from the poorer sections of the society. Gradually educated youths and professionals were drawn to the “jihad philosophy” by manifold propaganda like Islam in danger, Hindustan is yet to be liberated for Islam through jihad and regaining the Taj-e-Hind lost to the British and misappropriated by the Hindus. Those who have some experience of “taqrirs” (speeches) in the fanatic dini (religious) madrasas and some of the mosques controlled by extremist groups in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh would know that these are few of the basic lessons that are imparted to the recruits by the Maulanas to control their minds and to turn them to ﬁdayeens and shahids.

i-Jihadis

Sympathetic counterparts of the Pakistani, Bangladeshi tanzeems and those who get converted through electronic media and other sources of propaganda by friends, acquaintances, Arab associates and are driven by a romantic sense of commitment to the Ummah. There is a class of Digital i-Muslim community in the Diaspora and at home who are gradually dragged into the network of the Maulanas, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and Directorate General of Forces

Intelligence (DGFI) operatives and used as nucleus of Cells and Modules. However DGFI involvement has been drastically reduced under the new liberal government.

Indian milieu

There are multiple Muslim religious schools and jamaits who control different segments of the Muslims through their respective mosques, madrasas and other frontal organisations. In fact, the intelligence community in India is not aware of these layers of sects, madrasas, maqtabs and mosques afﬁliated to each congregation and innumerable front organisations operated by them. The mainframe organisations in public domain, like the Milli Council, Muslim India, Personal Law Board etc. do not seed jihad grounds. They carry out ideological propaganda highlighting the aspects of separatism, voicing real and imaginary problems of the Muslim community and trying to work as substitutes for political interface with the governments and other political parties. Their activities imitate the role once played by the Aligarh institution that acted as the renaissance platform for separate Muslim nationalism and the Muslim League. They aid the historical separatist hangover still haunting certain sections of the Indian Muslim. In their language: There is Muslim India and not Indian Muslim.

Propagation The jihad seeds are broadcast by two sources: The internal relics of the separatist past which had acted for creation of a separate Muslim country. The external forces comprise of geopolitically nearer forces rooted in Pakistan and Bangladesh and Pan-Islamic forces rooted in the Middle East and of course the Muslim Diaspora, especially in UK, Germany, USA

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

jihad MODI OPERANDI and other countries. The broadcast materials have ideological content and physical content in the form of deputation of jihadi tanzeems, weapons, explosives and ﬁnancial resources. The Diaspora mainly helps through ﬁnancial assistance and through electronic propaganda which have easy access to homes and shelters of educated and even professional elements of the society. The jihad movement jointly started by the ISI, RSI and the CIA to defeat Cold War adversary has now infected Pakistan and Bangladesh in our neighbourhood and regional countries like Afghanistan, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. The jihad infection has spread in other Asian, African and European countries as well.

minded religious fanatic separatists and Ansars (helpers) recruited by them. They are assisted by the unidentiﬁed fronts, madrasas, mosques and groups which are parts of the Pan-Islamic garland that span over the three neighbouring countries and the Ummah in general. The network is complicated, mostly interconnected and often separated by invisible walls of tanzeem incompatibility.

Tools of terror

However, what we experience in India is not “terrorism.” There is nothing like “terrorism” as other ism-based political and revolutionary organisations are categorised by the specialists. Terror is a weapon, used by most ideological and religious groups who want to expand, occupy and appropriate territories and peoples in the name of an ideology or religion. India had experienced ideologically inspired rebellion during Telengana uprising, Tebhaga Andolan and the recent growth of armed Maoist revolution. The periodical bomb blasts in several parts of the country are attributed to the groups of people, tanzeems and paramilitary bodies created by religious congregations in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the ofﬁcial intelligence agencies of these countries. They have cloned several such jihadi entities amongst the vulnerable sections of the Indian Muslims, who swear by the slogans of separatism.

Linkages

The itinerary jihadis deputed from neighbouring countries cannot function in isolation. They require nestling facilities, ideologically supportive groups, local assistance from the members of the like

It may be noted that different tanzeems normally do not collaborate with each other and very often the selection of the tanzeems and personnel in India is done by the ISI and the DGFI. They in turn, task the Pakistani and Bangladeshi tanzeems to establish cell/s, module/s amongst the identiﬁed locations with help from already subverted people. The word “module” is used as a self contained functional unit of which one or more “cell” may form part. Module is the larger component and the cell is a smaller entity. A module may have more than four / ﬁve cells. The cells are created in collaboration with the India-based tanzeems after detailed studies. This job is done by the holed-in operatives of the ISI / DGFI in collaboration with local associates. Let us examine two separate diagrams of a ypical Cell and a Module: Mostly located in Muslim dominated clusters; communication through personal contact. Functions: Receive and spread jihadi ideology; arrange safe house for foreign visitors; recruit volunteers for helping

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

visitors; help locating target for attack; help surveillance; help spotting location; help procurement of raw material and fabrication; at least four layer scouting before planters go for action preparation. The modules are more complicated. The module boss is normally the designated operations chief of the India-based tanzeems. Besides controlling the core of the module (may be 2/3 members) he personally and through other Module members remains in touch with the cells and cell members through hub members. A module may have 3/5 hubs and each hub may have 3/5 cells. However, the temporary Ansars are not allowed to get closer to the module bosses. They are created and activated by the cell chief. In a Typical Cell there can be a single member or maximum 3/5 members depending on circumstances and requirements. In a multi-event strike, say Mumbai train blasts and Jaipur blasts the modules must have had 10 members and the cells minimum ﬁve members and another 10/15 Ansars. One such operation requires minimum 20 people. Let us examine a Typical Module. Notice the core of the module. It is the nerve centre that controls the hubs. The hubs in turn control the cells. One hub is not allowed to know about cells under a neighbouring hub. How does it operate? The population and institutional locations near a mosque (South Delhi) may have harboured some cells in the slum clusters behind the mosque which had taken place in 2005 Diwali eve multiple bomb blasts at highly congested locations. The possibility of one such cell located in nearby Gobindpuri population clusters taking part in planting a bomb in a passenger bus could not be ruled out. The illustrative South Delhi Cell was not a Module, which might have operated from another location in Delhi.

Illustrations

As an illustrative study let us presume existence of a Master Module somewhere near the Jahangirpuri population cluster in Delhi. The areas covered by Silampur, Jahangirpuri, Babarpur, Sunlight Colony etc. are predominantly inhabited by the Muslim community. The presumed module boss / bosses might be located in one of the labyrinthine inaccessible lanes, commanding two to four hubs, which, in turn, command

controlling minds of the people, destroying their faith and trust in the established State and promulgating the suzerainty of the jihadis through armed struggle and ideologicalreligious warfare. According to informed sources the Deendar Anjum (Karnataka-Andhra Pradesh, now banned) tanzeem was inﬁltrated by Lashkare-Toiba way back in 1998. Two Maulvis were deputed from Markaz-ud-Dawa by the ISI to militarize the organisation by setting up cells and modules in southern parts of the country. Altogether 25 cells were established by them. Once the job was completed the Anjum deputed ﬁve youths to Pakistan for training in Lashkar camps in POK. On return, these youths set up more cells in the areas assigned to them. The Anjum later linked up with the SIMI and allowed its cadres to work for that tanzeem.

Current scenario

TYPICAL MODULE, HUBS AND RELATED CELLS one or more cells under their assigned area. The task allotted to individual cells has been outlined above. The module boss / bosses remain in charge of communication with foreign bases, receiving instructions, arranging safe houses in religiously compatible or mixed population areas, activate the cells and arrange acclimatisation process for the visiting tanzeem’s collaborator. The module is also responsible for “cooling period” for the guest jihadis after an incident and for arranging their exit from the country with help from compatible modules in other parts of the country. It is important to note that module owing allegiance to one particular tanzeem is not normally exposed to another tanzeem unless parent bodies like the SIMI assign such collaboration. A module trained and positioned by the Lashkar-e-Toiba may collaborate with HuJI activist if the task is collaborative in nature. For example, as per informed sources, the HuJI activists from Bangladesh responsible for carrying out Varanasi multiple blasts were initially nestled in an Ahl-e-Hadith mosque near the Cantonment station.

Let us move to Mumbai and select Nagapada Khutb and Fatima mosques as presumed examples. The locations mentioned are illustrative and have no connection with any known jihadi attack incident. The probability of existence of one or more modules in heavily populated areas near the selected locations could have worked as hubs for carrying out multiple train bomb blasts could not be ruled out by investigating agencies.

Historical intelligence

For combinations of reasons it is not possible for the intelligence and police agencies to identify in advance location of such modules, hubs and cells. To study this minuscule and micro subject of cell and module functioning, the agencies would be required to understand the historical functioning of such modules and cells amongst the early indigenous and foreign revolutionary / fanatic religious groups and obviously the methodologies adopted by the communist revolutionaries. This part of intricately mixed sciences of social studies, guerrilla warfare methodologies and mass control mechanism forms the basic science of counter-terrorism and counter-jihad operations. In short, mass control means

These aspects of underground formation of cells, modules and hubs are not scientifically studied by the Central agencies and the state police forces. Lack of Human Intelligence and penetration of the target areas and localities render the task more difficult. Circumstances after the 26/11 attack on Mumbai, internal situation in Pakistan and international pressure has compelled Pakistan to go slow on the front of jihadist thrust in mainland India, though its proxy-war programme continues to be at higher pitch. Recent information that Jamait-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) activists have infiltrated into India to carry out violent attacks is a matter of serious concern. Pursued and haunted in Bangladesh these jihadist elements, linked up with Al Qaeda and Taliban are as fanatic as the Lashkar jihadis. India has an unaccounted mass of Bangladeshi population, mostly in northern and western parts of the country. In case JMB, HuJI set up new cells and modules it will be as difficult to track these as the existing cells and modules are inaccessible to the Indian agencies. Better intelligence penetration is the archway to enter the labyrinthine world of jihadist cells, modules and hubs. It is high time that the central and the state agencies wake up to the ground realities. The political decision makers have to own up greater responsibility.

The writer served as a senior operative in the Intelligence Bureau. After retirement, he took to authoring books and freelance journalism, and has contributed to English and Hindi newspapers and magazines.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

terrorism SUICIDE BOMBERS

low-cost

warfare

Rohit Singh

opposed to this, suicidal terrorism is initiated he 1991 Gulf war and the 2003 Iraq Suicide terrorism by armed terrorists using hand-held guns, war were known for their ‘shock sub-machine guns, and hand grenades with no and awe’ firepower and manoeuvre is distinct from pre-meditated intentions of blowing himself / warfare. The world sat up to take note of themselves up or with a foreclosed option of the sheer invincibility of the smart bombs, guerrilla warfare. death. Suicidal terrorism acts are undertaken precision guided munitions, aerial platforms Jihad has no against insurmountable odds, stiff opposition, delivering lethal and devastating ordnance where chances of a terrorist coming out of the on far away and seemingly safe underground religious or political targets. Mobile forces swept across islands attack, alive, are slim but not ruled out at the planning / inception stage. of resistance with impunity, leaving them sanction and that defenceless. This high voltage fire assault and manoeuvre caused many countries to overhaul is why when its The Mumbai 26/11 attack qualifies as an act of their defence thinking. For instance, China ‘suicidal terrorism’. Acts of suicidal terrorism was quick to forsake its concept of ‘People’s mentors resort to in India have been numerous and undertaken war’. Elsewhere, in the terrorism domain, mostly by Pakistani and Afghani terrorists suicide terrorism it terrorist organisations evolved the concept of affiliated with the LeT and JeM, mostly inside ‘suicide terrorism’, to counter fire power and J&K. Attacks on the Public Relations Office comes into direct manoeuvre warfare. complex inside the Badami Bagh Cantonment in Srinagar in November 1999, on the Srinagar conflict with its Legislative Assembly Building on 1 October Senseless killing own milieu. That is 2001 and Kaluchak, Jammu on 14 May 2002 Suicide terrorism as a weapon has been used were some of the major such attacks. by the Hamas in Israel, by the Chechen rebels what is happening in Chechenya, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, the LTTE rebels in Sri Lanka, and now with in Pakistan. For Categories unnerving frequency by the Tehreek-e-Taliban The selection and training of a suicide bomber suicide terrorism Pakistan (TTP). In India, the first victim of is dictated by considerations of type of targets suicide terrorism was Prime Minister Rajiv and the motivation of the terrorist group. to have long-term Gandhi blown up by an LTTE human bomb Those trained to attack military installations in May 1991. The second incident of a suicide and army personnel are the best trained, political effect it attack was on 19 April 2000 at the Badami most skillful and tremendously motivated. Cantonment in Srinagar when a JeM will have to convert Bagh The second category of human bombs attack suicide bomber, a teenager from downtown personnel of the law enforcement agencies drove up to the Batwara Gate and itself to conventional Srinagar, while the third category (the weakest of the blew the car along with himself when stopped lot), use car bombs or remotely activated by the guards. warfare mode. In improvised explosive devices. Fortunately, India has been spared the trauma More ominously, suicide bombing is aided the meantime the of suicide terrorism ever since but in the wake by the ease with which these devices are of regular, impetuous and brazen suicide produced, say in Waziristan, Pakistan. nation-State can bombings in its immediate neighbourhood Production of suicide belts, there, has become Pakistan, India has no option but to take a cottage industry as one household makes develop its counter- incognizance of this potent threat in all its the detonators, another sews the belt, a third manifestations. measures and one moulds ball bearings. The material is then collected by the organisations like the TTP spectacular suicide and the like, who pay profusely. Motivated death Contrary to perception, a suicide bomber is by Suicide terrorism has been defined as a strikes will bring and large not a volunteer. There is a deliberate “motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self process conducted under the diminishing returns aware individual or individuals who actively selection parameters of commitment to religion, desire and purposely cause their own death through for revenge, belief in cause and fearlessness. as is happening in blowing themselves along with chosen target. The selection is done by a religious teacher perpetrators ensure death is a preJammu and Kashmir. The where the ‘bomber’ is imbibing education. condition for the success of the mission”. As January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

terrorism SUICIDE BOMBERS further. The benefit for the perpetrator is that he is seen as a shaheed, a ‘martyr who fell in the process of fulfilling a religious command, the jihad or holy war.’ Suicide attacks provide the shaheed and his family with substantial rewards such as improvement in social status and financial windfall. The shaheed goes to paradise with permission to see the face of Allah, loving kindness of 72 young virgins who will serve him in heaven. Additionally, the shaheed earns a privilege to promise a life in heaven to 70 of his relatives. Terrorist cells carry out prolonged surveillance of the target area, monitor the habits of the target and make elaborate notes on the security details. A solid support network to lodge the bomber, and his handlers in the area close to the target area is then formed.

However, this face of a suicide bomber was turned on its head by the likes of the now deceased Baitullah Mehsud and his successor Hakeemullah Mehsud, the present TTP leader. Under the leadership of Qari Hussain, the most notorious and lethal suicide bomber trainer, the TTP churns out suicide bombers like a factory would produce cars.

Penury helps According to a 2 July 2009 investigative report published by Washington Times, the TTP is buying children as young as seven years old to act as human bombs. The report filed by Sara Carter stated that a ‘child bomber’ went for $7000 to $14000. The price depended on how quickly the human bomb was needed and how close the child was expected to get to the target. “Mehsud produces these suicide bombers, which are sold or bartered, which can be used by Mullah Omar’s Taliban or other groups. In some cases, the children are kidnapped and then sold to Mehsud”. Qari Hussain, also known as Ustad-e-fidayeen or teacher of suicide bombers, has been recruiting boys as young as twelve; this was ascertained when one of the training camps in Spinkai Ragzai was busted on 18 May 2008 by the Pakistan Army. On 17 January 2009, Qari Hussain released video of statements from bombers and some of the attacks carried out by them. The two attacks shown on camera were the 11 March 2008 and 24 November 2007 attacks in Rawalpindi in front of the ISI Headquarters when a bomber drove his explosive ridden car into a bus carrying 35 ISI officers killing 15. It is not known for how long the TTP will be able to sustain the rapid and sustained rate of suicide attacks. Notwithstanding the above, the fact remains that the selection and training process of a bomber is an elaborately protracted one, where the prospective bomber suddenly disappears from the family, without intimation. He is made to sleep inside a grave for several hours, to overcome the fear of death, writes out a will before the attack, offers special prayers as motivated and emotional value for others and etches out a propaganda video cassette. The tempo and temper of this suicide bomber is maintained till he reaches the climax and to the extreme just before he approaches his target. Despite the TTP ability to churn out ‘bombers’ as young as 7 to 10, study of suicide bombing in other countries prior to the current spate of bombings shows that the bombers are generally in the age group of 18 to 27, not married, unemployed and hail from poor families.With the exception of the 9/11 aircraft bombers like Mohammad Atta (a degree holder from a German university), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, an engineering student

Counter measures

from North California, so far not a single suicide bomber in Pakistan has studied higher than matriculation. In fact, a study of the lives of 25 human bombs who had blown themselves in the period 2002-2005 showed that none of them came from the elite class; they were all from the lower middle class and middle class families. A poor family background was a common thread in all of them.

Motives and benefits Revenge, religious fanaticism, self-sacrifice, glory, martyrdom, model for future emulation and inspiration, worldwide publicity, servility to charismatic leadership, to instil a traumatic effect on the population are the key motives. A study carried out by an elite intelligence agency showed that perceived US atrocities including innocents killed in drone strikes were the major motivation for a majority of the bombers. Benefits accruing to terrorist organisations from suicide missions are that they can choose the time and place of attack such that there is no result other than heavy casualties on the intended target. Suicide attack requires no escape plan with the added benefit of not compromising on the planners, handlers and their locations. The biggest advantage is assured and extensive media publicity, which invariably focus more on the perpetrator than the victims, thus propounding their cause

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Contrary to perception, a suicide bomber is by and large not a volunteer. There is a deliberate selection process conducted under the parameters of commitment to religion, desire for revenge, belief in cause and fearlessness. The selection is done by a religious teacher where the ‘bomber’ is imbibing education

At the operational level much can be done to prevent a bomber from carrying out his attack. Research has revealed that ‘suicide bombing’ is a very intricate plan involving planners, trainers, teachers, recruiters, handlers, lodgers and those assigned the surveillance task. In this long link even if one or two of these can be compromised, a suicide attack may be prevented. More importantly, it is the family which ﬁrst notices a change in behaviour of the prospective bomber or it may so happen that the bomber disappears suddenly. Also, to come to know will be the family’s neighbour. In case the bomber is not detected through the family or uncovering the activists who recruit, train, gather operational intelligence or collaborators who give logistical assistance, the bomber can still be intercepted at the execution stage. Study of suicide attacks has revealed that a bomber is usually very courteous when he is on the prowl in the crowd, making extra efforts to merge with the crowd, because he knows he is different, wears unseasonally warm clothing, there are bulges in his clothing, is sweating, mumbling, ﬁdgeting, avoiding eye contact, steering clear of security forces, dressed as an army man or as an orthodox Islamist. In case the bomber is vehicle borne, look out for vehicles parked diagonally across the roads, or facing the wrong direction on a one way road, parked in unusual locations, or if the car is weighed down in the boot. On the psychological plane, engage in a propaganda war against the terrorist organisations which exploit the vulnerabilities, fragilities of young minds. The media should not give them legitimacy by keeping the focus only on the victims of terrorists. On the military level, ensure that excessive force is never used to neutralise terrorists. Drone attacks, helicopter gunships, aerial

A study of the lives of 25 human bombs who had blown themselves in the period 2002-2005 showed that none of them came from the elite class; they were all from the lower middle class and middle class families. A poor family background was a common thread in all of them strafing may take out some selected targets but they kill many innocent people which sets into motion a cycle of revenge. Fortunately in India, the security forces are known to operate with a fair degree of restraint in order to avoid collateral damage and loss of innocent human lives; it is more important to let 10 terrorists slip away than to kill an innocent one - if this principle is kept in mind, then India will be well on its way to present a playing field for suicide bombers. We can be sure that the LeT, the JeM and Al Qaeda will be planning to tap this front any time soon. The ongoing investigations of David Coleman Headley and Tawahhur Hussain Rana, LeT operatives arrested by the FBI in the US has unearthed ongoing plots to carry out spectacular suicide attacks on prominent defence, educational and commercial centres in India. The LeT having drawn its lessons from the 26/11 attacks would be drawing more elaborate, sophisticated and deadlier plans both at the conceptual and execution stages. Attempts to recruit Indians in carrying out a suicide bombing mission cannot be ruled out. We need to cast our eyes out on our population centres, ramping up citizen committees, household checks, National ID cards / biometric cards, etc. to make it difficult for the ‘suicide bombing operations’ to find their feet in our society. Create the fear of constant surveillance, somebody who will compromise their well crafted plans with one fatal weakness by the recruiter, teacher, the collaborator, the lodger, the handler, the eyes and ears of the bomber and finally the bomber himself.

The year 2009 has been the bloodiest in the eight years in the US global war on terror in Afghanistan. Against a total of 1700 ISAF fatal casualties, the months of August to October 2009 have been devastating for the US, losing upwards of 100 dead in these three months - mostly to suicide bombers and roadside bombs. If Stinger missiles stopped the Soviet juggernaut forcing it to exit Afghanistan in the year 1989, the ‘human bomb’ or the ‘suicide bomber’ is all set to cause a severe draw down in the way the US, hereafter, pursues its Af-Pak strategy. Suicide attacks are proving to be a bane for Pakistan as a whole and FATA and NWFP, in particular. Over one thousand army and police personnel have been killed by human bombs all over Pakistan between 04 July 2007 and 04 July 2009. Additionally, in more than 170 suicide attacks in the last two years including the last two months, approximately 2700 people have been killed. The US dependence on drones and heavy fire power to win them the war has been severely dented by this unexpected tool of battle - the human power represented by the suicide bomber. The jury is out on who is winning this war - fire power and manoeuvre warfare or the suicide bomber. The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. His areas of interest include the strategic, geo-political and sub-conventional warfare fields. He has previously worked with Times Now and reported on various defence related news.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

maritime security PARADIGM SHIFT

INDIAN

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Vice Admiral (Retd.) P. S. Das

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

maritime security PARADIGM SHIFT

avies have traditionally been seen as military forces structured to ﬁght in war. This essential role can never change but new emerging threats at sea in peacetime dictate a fresh look at what more is now expected from these deterrent symbols of State power. Piracy is now taking forms which were not visible in earlier years; from plain robbery it has graduated to ﬁrst taking the crew hostage and now ships themselves, both for ransom. From here, maritime terrorism is only a step away. It is not something new as seen in Al Qaeda attack on the US destroyer Cole in Aden some years ago followed by another on

the French tanker Limberg in the Gulf of Aden soon thereafter and, a little later, on offshore oil platforms off Basra. At another level have been activities of the marine wing of the LTTE in Sri Lanka in earlier years using suicide craft to ram themselves against selected targets.

1993 serial blasts In the Indian context, all explosives used in the several bomb blasts in Mumbai carried out in 1993 were brought in by sea in quite ramshackle boats, commonly known as “dhows”, landed on the unguarded coast in and around ﬁshing villages and then

transported into the hinterland with the connivance of some Police and Customs people. More of such incidents might have taken place since then which have remained undetected. There has been awareness of what more might happen in the way of blocked ports, oil spills, tankers being set on ﬁre and so on. Then, there is the serious threat to coastal security as highlighted so traumatically by what took place in Mumbai on 26th November 2008, India’s 26/11, which was, quite literally, an amphibious assault from the sea. This scenario is much more complex than that of just military threats from nation-State adversaries.

On 19th November, a week before the attack, Indian Intelligence Agencies intercepted telephone conversations indicating that a vessel carrying terrorists had sailed from Karachi and was in a position about 50 miles south west of that port. Two earlier reports from different agencies, in May and September, had indicated that ‘something big’ was being planned by Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists and speciﬁcally the Taj and other hotels located on the sea front could be targeted

Coastal security On 19th November, a week before the attack, Indian Intelligence Agencies intercepted telephone conversations indicating that a vessel carrying terrorists had sailed from Karachi and was in a position about 50 miles south west of that port. Two earlier reports from different agencies, in May and September, had indicated that ‘something big’ was being planned by Pakistan based Lashkare-Toiba (LeT) terrorists, a group banned and assessed as threatening to its homeland security by the USA, and that high proﬁle targets in Mumbai, speciﬁcally the Taj and other hotels located on the sea front could be targeted. Unfortunately, these three bits of information, though communicated to different agencies at the time they became known, were not put together or analyzed, thereby giving no indication of what could be expected and, more importantly, when and how. At the maritime boundary, separating India and

Pakistan, the terrorists apprehended the Indian fishing trawler Kuberr, killed four of the five crewmen, and, using the fifth as hostage, moved towards Mumbai, posing as a fishing vessel by day. The passage covered the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) across two coastal states; Gujarat being the northern one bordering Pakistan, and Maharashtra. Together, these two states account for almost 60,000 fishing boats of various sizes, mechanized and otherwise, not all of them registered or with required authorization. These waters also host dozens of oil platforms of different sizes and functions drilling for, processing, and pumping out oil and gas. There are some Coast Guard (CG) stations but only marginal marine police forces; a couple of radar stations stand guard but the possibility of detecting small craft is low and that of differentiating between friend and foe even less. Patrol boats provide staggered and random surveillance assisted by aircraft. This is the barrier that the attackers crossed with

such great ease. All this, of course, became known only later when the fishing trawler was located and the captured terrorist, a prized catch, interrogated. Subsequent days also brought home the sophistication of the attack including how the computer based voice link for conversation between the handlers in Karachi and their ‘workforce’ in Mumbai was camouflaged to avoid identification. Within hours of the raid having started, this link was intercepted and tracked and, thereafter, continuously monitored and taped. Clearly, everything was indicative of an operation by a very well trained terrorist group, masterminded, planned and executed by people well versed in special operations. Several measures have, of course, now been taken to plug the loopholes, of which there were quite a few, in the system.

Lessons learnt? Intelligence is clearly key to preemptive and or preventive action against terrorism. There are

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

maritime security PARADIGM SHIFT There is need to bring all aspects of maritime security in the country under one common superior authority; presently, they are diffused and without accountability. Unity of command, an essential prerequisite to effective counterterrorism, has not been instituted. Proposals to set up a Maritime Security Agency at an appropriately high level have got lost once again in the turf wars which are endemic to our corridors of power.

several agencies involved in this activity, both at the federal and state levels and exchange of information between all of them is essential. As stated earlier, there had been inputs from different sources in earlier months; unfortunately, these were neither analyzed nor shared with the two state governments most affected. A National Intelligence Agency has now been constituted to rectify these shortcomings. Coastal surveillance also proved to be weak. Until now, security at sea has been a naval responsibility only in the blue-waters while security in the EEZ came under the purview of the CG, and the coastal belt within the jurisdiction of state marine police forces, largely ineffective. In the new security environment, an entirely war ﬁghting role for the Navy can no longer be sustained;

it must assume counter-terrorism duties in peacetime as well. Accordingly, the entire spectrum of maritime security, both at and from the sea, against State as well as non-State actors, has now been assigned to the Navy. For this purpose, CG forces involved in coastal security are now to function under naval control and operations of the two maritime forces conjoined and networked for real time exchange of information. More CG stations are being set up on the Saurashtra coast and a Coastal Command constituted. Marine police of coastal states is also being strengthened and will take orders from these control rooms as required. Measures to augment resources needed for coastal security, ships as well as aircraft, and installation of more radar stations, have been

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

initiated.

NSG hubs Similarly, quick reaction forces, until now positioned only in Delhi to be moved as required, are being augmented and will now be positioned at four or five important locations. All vessels entering Indian ports will need to provide advance information of arrival and cargoes carried. Indian craft below 300 tons must have Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) transponders and all fishing boats compulsorily registered, until now done quite lackadaisically. Port security, including harbour patrols, is to be strengthened along with screening of containers, already required under the

Container Security Initiative but not yet implemented by India and many other countries. The entire offshore area of oil and gas exploitation is being declared a prohibited area with zero tolerance of violations. In short, required measures are now being taken to ensure security of the exposed coast; if taken earlier, they might have prevented the Mumbai attacks. If implemented seriously, they will certainly make things a lot more difﬁcult for elements planning such dastardly acts in future but one year after the event, it is not certain if things have not begun to lose steam. Unity of command, an essential prerequisite to effective counter-terrorism, has not been instituted, it being assumed that coordination would be enough when that is clearly not a particularly

Indian trait.

Other elements Serious as events of 26/11 were, they cannot expunge other major issues of maritime security. The Indian Ocean littoral is a vital region. Not only do its sea routes carry about half of all global seaborne commerce but a ﬁfth of this comprises oil and gas. Energy lifelines of many countries start and stop here. The USA, France, Japan, India and China are all major importers of energy from the Gulf and the dependence will increase with time. Since 65 per cent and 35 per cent of the world’s known oil and gas holdings respectively are located in this littoral, it is most unlikely that this involvement will diminish in the

foreseeable future. Then, there are resources under the sea yet to be discovered. All of these together lend great strategic importance to the region. All exits and entries to and from the IO pass through restricted waters. In these channels, there is little scope for violent manoeuvring or high speed which makes it easy for vessels to be boarded by miscreants and robbed or hijacked. The waters off Somalia have overtaken the Malacca Straits as the most dangerous area. Dozens of ships have been hijacked in this region.

Anti-piracy role The ﬁrst and positive blow against the criminals was struck by the Indian Navy when one of its frigates, ﬁrst warded off some

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

maritime security PARADIGM SHIFT China is not yet on the scene but given the pace of its naval modernization, energy interests and quite clearly articulated goals, it is inevitable that it will seek to be an IO player before long; its involvement in development of ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, which might later be available for use by its ships as base facilities, is a harbinger of what could lie ahead

threatening moves and later actually sank a mother vessel of the pirates; a few days later, a dozen pirates were apprehended by another Indian warship. Since then, there have been more arrests by ships of other nations but the pirates continue to operate and vessels are being hijacked at the rate of about one every week or ten days. So, the problem is serious. The political scenario in the region is also not very reassuring. Most littorals are faced with racial, religious, sectarian and ethnic problems. There is also the inherent dissonance between Shiite Iran and the predominantly Sunni Gulf States. The strategic importance of the IO littoral has, therefore, to be viewed in the context of its vulnerability. India’s interests are both strategic and more proximate. The Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea guard its eastern and western ﬂanks. To the south, approaches towards sub-continental India

pass through the island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles and, nearer home, of Sri Lanka and the Maldives. There is a continuing interest of external powers in this region which manifests itself in military presence.

China’s posture China is not yet on the scene but given the pace of its naval modernization, energy interests and quite clearly articulated goals, it is inevitable that it will seek to be an IO player before long; its involvement in development of ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, which might later be available for use by its ships as base facilities, is a harbinger of what could lie ahead. These developments need to be watched closely. Proximate concerns are closely linked to safety of merchant shipping moving through the East-West sea lanes which transit across the Arabian Sea and the Bay of

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Bengal. Enough has been written about piracy and potential acts of maritime terrorism in recent times to bear repetition. Obviously, adequate capabilities are needed to cope with these threats but these alone will not help. Close cooperation with maritime forces of other countries is a vital necessity.

Maritime terrorism In the IO, as the preeminent regional force at sea, India has to play a proactive role to promote such engagement, both with littoral countries, many of whom do not have capabilities of their own, and with those who have similar interests and concerns. In recent years, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have come together to ensure safe movement in the Malacca Straits which has reduced incidents of piracy very considerably. India also patrols the approaches in

coordination with these littorals. Something similar is needed in the Gulf of Aden. India is more seriously involved than most in the safety of merchant ships as a great number of them have Indian crews serving on them. There is need to expand upon cooperative interfaces as ‘stand alone’ capabilities can never be enough to cope with such challenges. Joint exercises and regular interaction are key ingredients of engagement at sea; they promote mutual conﬁdence and trust without which meaningful cooperation and sharing of intelligence is not possible.

Disaster management The IO region is also susceptible to frequent natural disasters and cooperative regional capabilities are needed. As the largest regional maritime force, India has a special responsibility to respond effectively in times

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

maritime security PARADIGM SHIFT

of such disasters and acquisition of INS Jalashvaa which can embark a thousand troops and a dozen large helicopters has been one step in that direction. Concurrently, there is need to bring all aspects of maritime security in the country under one common superior authority; presently, they are diffused and without accountability. Proposals to set up a Maritime Security Agency at an appropriately high level, kept in the dust bin for many years, were revived after 26/11 but seem to have got lost once again in the turf wars which are endemic to our corridors of power. The Indian Navy, like all others, has been groomed to counter threats from nationStates; peacetime constabulary duties, considered infra dig, are not in its ethos. The

emerging environment, however, requires a change in this mindset. In times of crisis, such as faced by the country on 26/11, public opinion correctly sees the Navy as the ﬁnal guarantor of security at and from the sea and is unwilling to divide responsibility, or accountability, between various maritime forces viz. the CG, marine police et al. Combat readiness is a full time activity in peace and diversion of assets to other duties comes at a cost.

Mindset change Changes in mindset and long established methods are not easy. From training just for war, the Navy has now to be prepared for peacetime security functions which include

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

coastal security, safety of sea lanes against piracy and terrorism and cooperation with a large number of other navies. To do all this, within the time and resource constraints is no easy task and there is a challenge to be faced. Yet, with economic growth having become a key determinant in a nation’s development and power, energy security and overseas trade which depend upon tranquillity at sea are becoming increasingly important; as economies grow so will their importance. So, their safety and security, in peacetime, is not less important. In short, not only is the focus of India’s security concerns shifting seawards but it is also acquiring several new dimensions which cannot be ignored. There is need for

augmentation of forces as well as ruthless organizational modiﬁcations because one without the other cannot achieve the desired results. It is necessary to reframe our maritime security doctrines appropriately.

The writer retired from the Navy as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has been Co-Chair of the Maritime Security Group in the Council of Security Cooperation in Asia Paciﬁc, writes frequently on strategic and security issues and is a regular speaker at War Colleges in India. He has served as member of the National Security Advisory Board.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

neighbour watch TRUST DEFICIT

INDO-PAK N S

C S

ven the most cynical will have to admit that in spite of the terrorist attack on Mumbai on 2 India has not escalated tensions along the international border with Pakistan or along the Line of Control unlike Operation Parakaram deployment after the attack on the Indian Parliament. This was deliberate policy. In fact there have been troop reductions in ammu and ashmir. If Pakistan also takes manifest pro-peace steps, the possibilities of good neighbourly relations and collaboration are endless. 50

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ramesh C. Chopra, AVSM

ssisting Pakistan in its ﬁght against terrorism is indeed a tall order! There is no ‘mantra’ to change the acrimony and anti-India mindset. But somehow the endeavour should be to bring about mutual conviction to cooperate. Every country has the primary responsibility to ﬁght its own battle against terrorism, including the terrorism network operating from its soil of non-State (home-grown or externally sponsored) including Taliban LeT, JeM… etc.Fortunately, there are signs that Pakistan is now trying to get out of the denial mode. Hopefully, it is no longer ‘running with the hare and hunting with the hounds!’ Witness the unholy mess in Afghanistan and northern frontiers of Pakistan where the US, NATO, ISAF and a host of countries are hopelessly involved who are not sure whether to stay the course or cut and run.

Failed State? Unlike the view of many observers, Pakistan is definitely not a failed State, not as yet. Like many, it has it’s problems - who doesn’t? Lack of governance in far flung areas, terrorist strikes, insurgency in Baluchistan, military offensive in tribal areas (‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat’), sectarian in-fights, over stretched Army, economic crisis... and so on. Nevertheless, it has a large and vibrant civil society - which showed its power in the lawyer’s movement - being extremely vocal about its rights and wants to progress with a higher quality of life which needs to be encouraged and supported. Additionally, it has a functional Higher Judiciary. The Pakistan Army is still considered a National Institution which provides security, stability and continuity; its only problem being that over a long period, ‘rule’ tends

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

neighbour watch TRUST DEFICIT

Another suggestion in the military field is that India and Pakistan could, to start with, undertake coordinated patrolling on the LOC, gradually upgrade to joint patrolling and eventually, operations ‘a la Bhutan’ along the Assam-Bhutan border against the UL A, where the Bhutanese Army launched strikes and the Indian Army sealed the border; this, of course, assumes a high level of trust against the mutual enemy, terrorists to degenerate to ‘misrule’. India, being a full-ﬂedged democracy, needs to support people-to-people contact - with a human centric empathetic approach - Institutions and capacity building and in no way undermine democracy. In the context of the non-State actors involved in terrorism, even though the nuclear arsenals are safe from their efforts and those of Taliban, we need to actively pursue our nuclear risk reduction measures and other CBMs as these have been successful when implemented sincerely.

India willing India’s PM displayed political will and recently once again extended the hand of friendship to Pakistan and made an offer of engagement proclaiming that his Government is ready to talk to anyone for peace and stability in J&K and no conditions are being laid. In this connection, to enable a forward movement,

Pakistan could at least make a symbolic gesture of punishing some of the perpetrators - even fringe - of 26/11 (based on CIA, FBI, Mi-6 reports, not necessarily Indian) and wind up a few of the many terrorist camps and infrastructure along the LOC. This will also provide relief to some of their forward positions and posts along the LOC, POK... and so on to demonstrate some positive action and encourage India to restart the stalled peace process.

Trust deﬁcit This is the crux of the problem. Regrettably, the historical baggage of mutual mistrust continues and there is a perception that there are vested interests, survival of the Pakistan Army rests on the Indian threat and so on… Actually, post Kargil and the ‘Operation Parakaram’ wasteful deployment by both sides on the border in 2002 wherein neither

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

whether a solution to the problem in J&K will lead to a cessation of terrorism as the LeT- which has evolved from a Regional Threat to a Global Terror group with cells in the UK, Europe, West Asia and even South East Asia - JeM and many others have forged strong alliances with the Al Qaeda as well as vowed to expand their activities to the rest of India which means that the very notion that, solving Kashmir will stop terrorism stands negated. In fact, the Taliban (TTP) have declared that once an Islamic State is achieved in Pakistan they will assist in the ﬁght against India. The 26/11 Mumbai attack and the recent expose of Headley and Rana (both reportedly have connections with Pakistan and the Al-Qaeda) have not helped either. Regardless of the aforesaid, it is felt that India should continue with its policy of not exploiting Pakistan’s vulnerabilities in the East due to their commitment and overstretching in the West, Pakistan Army’s involvement earlier in Swat, now South Waziristan, recent relentless terrorist strikes in Punjab - Pakistan needs to be watchful of the divide that may come about between Punjab and the Pashtun frontier - sectarian violence, Taliban backlash and so on. Looking into the future, it seems that the next stronghold of terrorism in Pakistan may well be South Punjab.

One can understand the State’s reluctance to address the issue as many of the former and current proxy groups draw their support from this region and, increasingly, South Punjab has become the base of Army recruitment thus compounding the problem. If Pakistan feels it necessary to tackle these terrorist groups, India can offer to help seal the border on its side as both sides of Punjab are prosperous and want to avoid terrorism in any form.

India positive Further encouraging steps have been taken by India in the military field as it does not want to unnecessarily keep its troops out of barracks. As part of disengagement in J&K, besides the formations, like Pakistan which have been part of the defensive mode on the LOC since 1947, it is understood that India has withdrawn two division size formations and left five Rashtriya Rifles Task forces to deal with terrorism in urban areas only. Recently, the Indian Government has announced further reductions in Central Paramilitary Forces. This should enable the Pakistan Army to move necessary formations from the international border as well as PoK to tackle terrorism on the Afghan border and within Pakistan itself. Above all, Pakistan should now be further convinced regarding

India’s bonaﬁdes and that it has no aggressive nor territorial designs; despite our economic prowess and galloping GDP, we are still a developing country and do not want to squander our resources. Another suggestion in the military ﬁeld is that, India and Pakistan could, to start with, undertake coordinated patrolling on the LOC, gradually upgrade to joint patrolling and eventually, operations ‘a la Bhutan‘ along the Assam-Bhutan border against the ULFA, where the Bhutanese Army launched strikes and the Indian Army sealed the border; this, of course, assumes a high level of trust against the mutual enemy, terrorists.

The hereafter Looking beyond this, the foregoing is only a start. The South Asia Region - which has a multiplicity of common threats - both conventional and the recent phenomenon of non-conventional such as piracy, arms, smuggling, drug traffic etc., definitely needs a security architecture; the major players would inevitably be India and Pakistan. Some form of Task Force graduating to a full-fledged South Asia Security Organisation / Forum to tackle, inter alia, the menace of terrorism and other threats is required. Herein, we can try and create an environment where

India’s PM displayed political will and recently once again e tended the hand of friendship to Pakistan and made an offer of engagement proclaiming that his Government is ready to talk to anyone for peace and stability in and no conditions are being laid but wants Pakistan to demonstrate some positive action to encourage India to restart the stalled peace process

coercion nor deterrence was achieved, just a temporary marginal drop in infiltration and violence in J&K - the trust deficit has increased. The only glimmer of hope in our common fight against terrorism is that the ceasefire of 23 Nov 2003 is holding, and, following back channel negotiations in 2007, India and Pakistan nearly reached a broad agreement on the framework for a settlement on J&K: this recognised that borders could not be changed through religion or geography but free movement of people, goods, services, investments etc. across the LOC would make them irrelevant.

Global terror Greater autonomy on both sides would help. However in spite of strong opinion in some quarters in the US, currently it is debatable January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

neighbour watch TRUST DEFICIT i.e., Herat and avoid South and South Eastern Pashtun areas as well as the earlier Northern Alliance swathe.

Media restraint There are many media Moghuls in the analytical ﬁeld so the suggestions are made with a little trepidation! Since we are democracies, one established, the other latent, our media - all facets - is independent, robust and extremely vocal which is all to the good! The only suggestion is that, especially on TV, media persons - who otherwise are rendering stellar service - need to play a more constructive role and create a healthy environment, promote harmony so as to facilitate public opinion; avoid broadcasting everything in a “Breakthrough / Breaking News” mode, sensationalising and adding colour, blaming each other instantly for every terrorism act in the other’s country, with an eye on TRPs! Additionally, analysts from both sides, who seem to be living on the premises and are immediately available for ‘Nescafe’ type TV bytes, tend to highlight the negative aspects in the thirty seconds slot that they get!! It will be appreciated that mindless scoring, one-upmanship and baseless allegations only muddy the pitch!

Dialogue both militaries can work together especially in disaster relief. We are already successfully coordinating our Peace Keeping operations in distant and difﬁcult lands which is a good example of cooperation. But even before this, rightly, we need to revive and revitalise the defunct Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism or any such suitable organisation because without cooperation and sharing of meaningful intelligence or at least actionable information, the only gainers will be the terrorists. To achieve success in counter terrorism, what we need urgently is a Counter Terrorism Deal, MOU or whatever. In any case, there has to be a common data base to start with, joint interrogation etc. We already have telephonic contact between the DGMOs and Sector Commander meetings. To further strengthen cooperation, the need of the hour, is intelligence level (not necessarily the top - meetings to frankly discuss differences, share intelligence - to the extent possible) devise means to counter terrorism as also our mutual perceptions on Afghanistan as India-Pakistan-Afghanistan are inextricably linked! We need to discount recent references by Gen. Musharraf - which are most untimely and only serve to up the ante - regarding the ISI’s association and ingress into all terrorist organisations and their inﬂuence. Of course, he has placed all Afghan Intelligence under the Indian Intelligence... our R&AW and IB

heads would be beaming with pride for these undeserved accolades!!!

Afghanistan While it is acknowledged that for any lasting solution towards a stable and neutral Afghanistan, they themselves will have to run their own country - as in the past in whichever way - with the Afghan National Army and Police, once fully trained and equipped, responsible for security and law and order. Within the Regional context and role and in their mutual interest, as outlined earlier, India and Pakistan must get over their trust deﬁcit by evolving and forging a common strategy albeit at the Track-2 or Back Channel level. Presently, Pakistan seems to be sensitive to any Regional Security role except Security Forces of Islamic countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh… but will anyone listen to them without Arab inclusion?) and India is reluctant and under the circumstances, most unlikely to send its security forces to Afghanistan. However, if ever a situation comes to pass under UN auspices or at the request of Afghanistan to combat terrorism which affects Pakistan directly and India indirectly, India should not shy away from its responsibility, reconsider and after due evaluation send whatever size formation requested. In keeping with Pakistan’s concerns it could be deployed in the Western region

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

While India’s anger and outrage over Pakistan’s involvement in Mumbai’s 26/11 is understandable, communication still is the only aspect that will help bridge the gap, remove suspicion, uncertainties and so on… Towards the ﬁght against terrorism, we need to break the current impasse and urgently revive and strengthen dialogue: Back Channel, Track-2 (these talks are in the right direction as these try and keep up the momentum), informal India Pakistan Soldier’s Peace Initiatives, proposed Intelligence Chief’s periodic meetings and the all-important, currently stalled, Composite Dialogue. These must not be impeded nor interrupted regardless of provocations; as otherwise, we will play into the hands of the terrorists and inimical forces. India is currently involved in quiet dialogue and diplomacy with the separatists, talks between the Centre and the J&K state government as well as an intra-State discussion; all moves in the right direction. The writer was the Chief of Intelligence, Indian Army and thereafter, a CEO with the TATA Group. He is presently actively engaged in several Peace Forums, ‘International Think Tanks’ and NGOs in India and abroad (China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Africa, Europe & USA). He is actively involved in Track-2 peace eﬀorts with Pakistan besides being the Vice President of the India-Pakistan Soldier’s Peace Initiative.

gallantry awards MAHA VIR CHAKRA - ARMY

HEROES

S a l u t e s

The Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) established on 26th January, 1950 is the second highest Indian military decoration and is awarded for acts of extra ordinary gallantry and bravery in war on land, at sea or in the air. The medal is circular and is made of standard silver. Embossed on the obverse is a five pointed heraldic star with circular center-piece bearing the gilded State emblem in the center. The words â&#x20AC;&#x153;Maha Vira Chakraâ&#x20AC;? are embossed in Devanagari and English on the reverse with two lotus flowers in the middle.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

gallantry awards MAHA VIR CHAKRA - ARMY

141

MAJ

DHARAM VIR SINGH

8 GDRS

REP. DAY

1972

! "

142

COL

UDAISINGH

8 GR

REP. DAY

1972

# #

143

LT COL

SUKHJIT SINGH

SCINDE HORSE

REP. DAY

1972

# #

144

A/COMDT

RAM KRISHNA WADHWA (P*)

31 BN BSF

REP. DAY

1972

# #

145

BRIG

SANT SINGH

SIKH LI

REP. DAY

1972

146

BRIG

HARDEV SINGH KLER, AVSM

SIGS

REP. DAY

1972

147

BRIG

ANTHONY HEROLD EDWARD MICHIGAN

GDRS

REP. DAY

1972

# #

148

LT COL

VED PRAKASH GHAI (P*)

16 MADRAS

REP. DAY

1972

149

CAPT

SHANKAR SHANKHAPAN WALKAR (P) 18 MADRAS

REP. DAY

1972

150

HAV

BIR BAHADUR PUN

5/1 GR

REP. DAY

1972

151

HAV

THOMAS PHILIPOSE

16 MADRAS

REP. DAY

1972

152

L/NK

SHANGARA SINGH (P*)

2 SIKH

REP. DAY

1972

153

LT COL

VED PARAKASH AIRY

3 GDRS

REP. DAY

1972

' (

# #

& &

# #

154

LT COL

RAJ MOHAN VOHRA

4 HORSE

REP. DAY

1972

155

LT COL

HANUT SINGH

17 HORSE

REP. DAY

1972 1972

156

MAJ

AMARJIT SINGH BAL

17 HORSE

REP. DAY

157

BRIG

JOGINDER SINGH BAKSHI

JAT

REP. DAY

1972

158

SEP

ANSUYA PRASAD (P*)

10 MAHAR

REP. DAY

1972

159

BRIG

ARUN SHRIDHAR VAIDYA, AVSM

9 HORSE

REP. DAY

1972

160

CAPT

DEVINDER SINGH AHLAWAT (P*)

10 DOGRA

REP. DAY

1972

161

LT COL

SHAMSHER SINGH

8 GUARDS

IND. DAY

1972

162

MAJ

VIJAY KUMAR BERRY

4 PARA

IND. DAY

1972

163

BRIG

ANAND SARUP

8 GR

IND. DAY

1972

164

SUGAN SINGH (P*)

7 RAJ RIF

IND. DAY

1972

165

BRIG

KAILAS PRASAD PANDE

ARTY

IND. DAY

1972

166

LT COL

NARINDER SINGH SANDHU

10 DOGRA

IND. DAY

1972

167

LT COL

ARUN BHIMRAO HAROLIBAR

4/5 GR

IND. DAY

1972

168

BRIG

MANJIT SINGH

INF

REP. DAY

1988

169

LT COL

INDER BAL SINGH SINGH BAWA

4/5 GR

REP. DAY

1988

170

MAJ

PS GANAPATHY

8 MAHAR

REP. DAY

1988

# #

171

MAJ

KRISHNAGOPAL CHATTERJEE

3/4 GR

REP. DAY

1988

172

SUB

SANSAR CHAND

JAK LI

REP. DAY

1988

# #

173

L/HAV

NAR BAHADUR ALE

4 GR

REP. DAY

1988

!)#

174

PREM BAHADUR GURUNG

4 GR

REP. DAY

1988

% &

175

CAPT

PRATAP SINGH (P*)

75 MED REGT

REP. DAY

1989

176

COL

VIJAY KUMAR BAKSHI (P*)

6/8 GR

REP. DAY

1989

& &

)

177

2/LT

RAJEEV SANDHU (P*)

7 ASSAM

REP. DAY

1989

# #

178

MAJ

SONAM WANGCHUK

ASSAM

IND. DAY

1999

179

MAJ

VIVEK GUPTA (P*)

2 RAJ RIF

IND. DAY

1999

MAJ

RAJESH SINGH ADHIKARI (P*)

MECH INF, 18 GDRS

IND. DAY

1999

# &

180

181

MAJ

PADMAPANI ACHARYA (P*)

2 RAJ RIF

IND. DAY

1999

182

CAPT

ANUJ NAYYAR (P*)

17 JAT

IND. DAY

1999

183

CAPT

NEIKEZHAKUO KENGURUSE (P*)

ASC, 2 RAJ RIF

IND. DAY

1999

184

KEISHING CLIFFORD NONGRUM (P*)

12 JAK LI

IND. DAY

1999

185

BALWAN SINGH

18 GDRS

IND. DAY

1999

186

DIGENDRA KUMAR

2 RAJ RIF

IND. DAY

1999

187

SEP

IMLIAKUM AO

2 NAGA

RD-

2000

188

CAPT

GURJINDER SINGH SURI (P*)

AOC

IND. DAY

2000

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January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

INDIAN ARMY

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

centre n states ENTENTE?

N A G A L A N Dn 60

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

An NSCN(IM) cadre standing guard at a designated camp.

There appears to be a realization on all sides of the Naga conundrum that things cannot be allowed to continue as they have been over the past 0 years. The Centre sees in the situation a greater possibility of foreign instigation and involvement and the various factions of the Naga insurgency realize that the current state of brigandage, e tortion and internecine warfare is doing their cause no good.

Bachaspatimayum Sunzu

o sooner had the Congress led UPA government begun it’s second innings last May, union home minister P. Chidambaram announced a slew of measures to break the stalemate in the peace process with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah). The role of interlocutor and Group of Ministers has been done away with and home secretary G. K. Pillai was even quoted by the media in Imphal as saying that the Constitution would soon be amended to pave way for greater autonomy to Nagaland.

Permanent solution There is a sudden sense of urgency in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to settle the Naga imbroglio that has dragged on for more than six decades now. Officials who were satisfied with the ongoing ceasefire with the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the NSCN and cessation of hostilities in Nagaland have begun talking in terms of a “permanent solution” and restoration of complete normalcy in the disturbed state. The idea is to arrive at a solution with a united Naga front instead of only a single militant outfit so that the possibility of a repudiation of any agreement by other armed groups is minimized as it had

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

centre n states ENTENTE? happened with the Shillong Accord (1975). The ministry’s change of attitude can be understood in terms of certain developments in the North-east and neighbouring regions. Militant outfits have been proliferating in the North-east and the law and order situation in some states like Assam and Manipur has deteriorated in the past two years. The NSCN(IM), which is known as the mother of all insurgent outfits in the region has been indulging in extortion and training of cadres of other outfits. Nagaland chief minister Neiphiu Rio even said that the NSCN(IM) was forging links with jihadi outfits.

China connection The Communist Party of India (Maoist) has ﬁrmed up an alliance with the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA of Manipur) and efforts are also on by ULFA to revive the defunct Kamatapur Liberation Organisation and Bhutan Communist Party. ULFA continues to shun the path of dialogue and even more disturbing

are reports that ULFA and PLA cadres have received the patronage of Beijing. Militant camps continue to exist at Sagaing Division in Myanmar and repeated assurances by Yangon to eliminate these bases have not yielded any result. “The deadlock with the NSCN(IM) has not conveyed an encouraging message to other groups who might want to come overground and enter the peace process. There are already eight groups across the four states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Meghalaya that have already signed ceasefire agreements with the government and awaiting a final resolution. Outfits like the DHD and UPDS have occasionally voiced strong criticism against the government’s delaying tactics.”

First jolt But the Centre’s recent overtures and indication about amending the Constitution for greater autonomy to Nagaland has evoked

sharp criticism from the NSCN(IM). It’s leadership has come down heavily on the government and has termed as an “insult” the offer of an “inclusive package” by the Centre. “If it reflected the opinion of the UPA government to settle the Naga issue then it was an antithesis to the bilateral agreement signed between NSCN(IM) and New Delhi in 1997, and therefore not acceptable to the Naga people,” said a statement issued by the outfit which also outlined the chronology of events in the ongoing talks. It added that the application of the “colonial divide and rule policy” on the Nagas would create more problems for India rather than solving them. This statement notwithstanding, officials in the Ministry of Home Affairs are optimistic about an early breakthrough in the dialogue. They are of the opinion that the Naga leadership would soon be invited to New Delhi for comprehensive talks on the new proposals that have been prepared by the ministry. To recapitulate, the NSCN(IM) came overground in 1997 following a ceasefire

The idea is to arrive at a solution with a united Naga front instead of only a single militant outfit so that the possibility of a repudiation of any agreement by other armed groups is minimized as it had happened with the Shillong Accord ( 5) Council HQs of NSCN(IM) named Hebron Camp near Dimapur in Nagaland which is a designated camp.

agreement with the government. Talks on the 30-point Charter of Demands at the political level began in 2004 with the formation of a GoM headed by senior Congress leader Oscar Fernandes. Several controversial demands have been included in the Charter like a separate constitution on the lines of Jammu and Kashmir, separate representation in the UN, joint control over defence and external affairs, ﬂag and currency.

Greater Nagalim? What has become the most contentious however is the demand for Greater Nagalim which aims at integrating all Naga inhabited territories in the North-east under a single administrative mechanism. This would entail dividing the states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh and attaching areas to Nagaland. But all these states have vehemently opposed the demand and have even passed resolutions in their assemblies to the effect. The insistence on Greater Nagalim by NSCN(IM) is understandable. More than 70 per cent of cadres in the outﬁt are from Manipur and Muivah himself is a Tankhul from Ukhrul (a hill district in Manipur where 82 per cent population are Tankhuls). In fact the domination of Tankhuls in the organization was January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

a primary reason behind the split in NSCN(IM) in late 2008 when a senior Sema leader Azeto Chophy walked away with his followers to ﬂoat the NSCN(U) in Dimapur. NSCN(IM) has accused the majority Meiteis in Manipur and the Assamese of neglecting the Naga areas and hence the rationale of the demand for clubbing all these areas with Nagaland. However the Centre has categorically told the Naga leaders that dividing the three states would be next to impossible which in effect has put an end to Greater Nagalim.

Blueprint MHA officials have hinted about the possibility of amending Article 371A of the Constitution which gives Nagaland a special status like some other North-eastern states. Such a move could grant greater financial autonomy to the hill state like additional royalty from minerals and power generated from rivers flowing through the state and liberal norms for loans and funds for more development. A senior functionary of the NSCN(IM) who did not wish to be named however said that the situation was “fluid” and that a final decision was yet to be taken by the leadership over home ministry’s new proposals. He explained that the final settlement must take into account

the backwardness of the Naga areas in the three states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh and a “solution” found for their cultural and economic development.

Entente? In Nagaland, hostilities between the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions have reduced drastically since the last one year, thanks to the efforts by the Church and civil society organizations. But it is not yet clear if the government would initiate dialogue with the K faction or the Naga National Council (NNC). While the former is headed by Myanmar-based S. S. Khaplang, NNC is remote-controlled from London by Adino Phizo, the daughter of the venerable Angami Zapu Phizo who ﬁrst challenged the merger of Nagaland with the Indian Union in the early 1950s and subsequently raised a guerrilla army to ﬁght for independence.

The writer is based in Imphal and is the Chief of Bureau of Manipur with NETV. He is a senior TV journalist and has reported extensively on conﬂict and related issues in the North-east.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

young india RISE N SHINE

aag In ia

Ronen Chatterjee

A CLARION CALL

The

real war is not against

crime

and terrorism, but to bring about change in our our

thinking, our values,

‘systems’ so that more

Frisking, metal detectors, police checks - the list goes on and on. The public has become so used to being checked and frisked that they forget that their personal space is being invaded. They cannot access any Mall or hotel without being hounded by security. “What is our nation coming to?” A youth today says in despair, “Is Desh ka kuchh nahin ho sakta!” - this phrase represents the common man’s thinking. The story, the questions, the assumptions and the answers all began at the dawn of the 21st century, with the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers in New York, the bomb blasts in the London metro and the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai. Today, the whole country, indeed the whole world is on Red Alert. Though perspectives are endless and questions don’t have proper answers, the way to awaken this generation is to make them aware of their surroundings and the possibilities for dealing with the situation. How do we bring about serious changes for the better? Change will come only when the ‘gifts of god’ are put to use, that is the eyes for observation, the mind to think and the hands to work. The platitudes we speak, ‘the nation will change when we change’, ‘put corrupt politicians in a queue and shoot them’, ‘corruption must go’. Mere talk costs nothing. (My saying so costs nothing) Nor does it solve any

problems. Actions speak louder than words and it seems that the terrorists have a head start, because they have, indeed, thought planned and executed. And their motto of ‘we die fighting’ is something we need to learn from. So, what we youths are waiting for? Another 26/11 to happen? Think now! But even if thinking changes, how are we going to start acting? It depends on what you don’t like and what you want to change. If you feel that the police and armed forces don’t perform up to the mark, join the forces rather than squander your energy in school and college fights. If the administration is wanting, join the civil service. If education is not heightening knowledge and awareness, instead of opening up any business, open an NGO or become an educationist. In short, don’t waste time and energy in futile fretting. You must get involved to make a difference with a positive attitude and optimistic approach that together, we can change and we will, to lead the world. Why is our current system insufficient? How does it affect our security? I believe that the country has three types of people: those who act and do the needful, those who do not do, and those who do not know what to do and how to do. The poor and unemployed are often easily lured by

unscrupulous elements into crime and from there terrorism is but a step away. The vast majority of our people live for themselves and have no interest in what is happening in the country. For them India exists only on the maps. Recently our leaders have been indulging in ﬁst ﬁghts inside the state assemblies and even in Parliament. Now if our leaders have priorities other than the country’s needs, then are we not revealing the ‘Achilles heel’ and simply inviting trouble? In caring more for ourselves than in what is happening in the country, are we not endangering the security of the country? Who are we doing this for? The reason for this question is that today’s youth may not be making any effort for the country, but since our existence in this world is limited why do we not work for the nation, nay humanity so that our children have a better future? We must work to create more jobs, better education and such facilities that people are spared the need to indulge in crimes and terrorism for their existence. The real war is not against crime and terrorism, but to bring about change in our thinking, our values, our ‘systems’ so that more criminals and terrorists are not bred in our society. If the youths are guided by sensible acts and given direction, then India will indeed be a safer place to live in.

criminals and terrorists are not bred in our

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

society.

The writer is the youngest novelist in the country. His ﬁrst novel Fire Within was published in 2007 when he was just 15. His second novel Ready to Rock came in 2009 and was highly acclaimed. He is a creative and proactive individual, eager to explore new avenues and keen to rise to opportunities to pursue a career in the world of writing, journalism and the print and electronic media. Extremely keen to make a contribution to the world around him, improving it in any way he can. He also has interest in the social and security related issues, has appeared for several live and recorded television interviews including NDTV, Lok Sabha TV and Star Plus, has several published interviews in local and national print media including Hindustan Times, Pioneer, India Today, was chosen for the Young Achievers Award 2008 by Career Launcher.

security tips BOMB THREAT

RESPONDING TO A

Treat all threat calls as important. Just because statistics suggest that most of the bomb-threats are hoax, it does not give us any room for complacency.

All your phones must have caller ID system.

BOMB THREAT

Having a facility for automatic recording of calls is not a bad idea. robability of being caught is the biggest deterrent for any prankster. Let your employees / workers / students know that you have state of the art machines ﬁtted at your central phone console. It helps.

sweta sehgal

Instruct all personnel, especially those at the telephone switchboard, in what to do if a bomb-threat is received. A calm response to the bomb threat caller could result in obtaining additional information. This is especially true if the caller is a genuine one and wishes to avoid injuries or deaths. If told that the building is occupied or cannot be evacuated in time, the caller may be willing to give more speciﬁc information on the bomb's location, components, or method of detonation.

The bomb threat caller is the best source of information about the bomb. Keep the caller on the line as long as possible.

Immediately afterr the caller hangs up, report the threat to the person erson designated by management to receive such information. Report the information immediately to the police. police Never think that you will be called an alarmist.

Remember – every call is true, unless proven otherwise.

Ask him / her to repeat the message. Record every word spoken by the person.

Remain available. Cooperate with the Police

If the caller does es not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of possible

as they seek details from you.

detonation, askk him / her for this information.

After all this process is in your interest and also in the interest of your family and society

Inform the callerr that the building is occupied and the detonation of a bomb

and of course larger interest of country's security.

could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people.

When a written threat is received, save all materials, including any

Pay particular attention to background noises, such as

envelope or container.

motors running, music playing, and any other noise

Once the message is recognized as a bomb threat, further unnecessary handling should be

which may give a clue as to the location of the caller.

avoided.

Listen closely to the voice (male, female), voice quality

Every possible effort must be made to retain evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting

(calm, excited), accents and speech impediments.

or typewriting, paper and postal marks. These will prove helpful and essential in tracing the threat and identifying the writer.

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

military might FUNCTIONAL COSTING

NC IN

India has long yearned for jointedness in the military, for commonality in equipment that would result in costeffective solutions to threats confronting the nation.

Dr. Pankaj Jha

he globalisation and end of cold war has given rise to changed strategic perceptions, which has led to economic evaluation of the increasing defence expenditure. The reframing of priorities and the strengthening of alliances like NATO has in a way prompted countries to reframe their defence budgeting to be more transparent and cost-effective. This has led to the experiments with different forms of budgeting. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) started in the US in 1962 has also evolved with time. Some countries have made

defence resources efďŹ ciently involving budgeting, the military production function, incentive systems and performance indicators: Military manpower, namely recruitment, training, retention and the choice of forces, the opportunities for substitution; together with study of internal markets in the armed forces, different forms of organization and their performance. As part of justifying defence budgets and more effective utilization of resources, programme budgeting or functional costing has emerged as a viable solution.

Ends and means

Programme budgeting, by which the threat is identiďŹ ed and the means to eliminate it are strategised before funds are released, is being posited as a solution. But there are pros and then there are cons. 68

January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

military might FUNCTIONAL COSTING

Programme budgeting or functional costing, is a means of identifying the functions of defence forces and the costs of these functions so that those who have to decide on new projects will have much more information than in the past about the relative costs and defence effectiveness of alternative force arrangements and various weapon systems and defence effectiveness of alternative force arrangements and various weapon systems in relation to some speciďŹ ed objective such as the destruction of an industrial complex, an airďŹ eld or a ship. No attempt is made to place a monetary value on the measure of defence effectiveness, the aim being to select the â&#x20AC;&#x153;least costâ&#x20AC;? method of destroying a target or protecting a city or a military installation . The programme budgeting or Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) provides information for answering questions about the efďŹ ciency with which the Ministry of Defence uses resources. It seeks answers to four questions. First, what are the objectives of the Ministry of Defence and is it possible to formulate a set of programmes which can be related to these objectives? Second, what are the current and expected life cycle resource costs of each programme? Third, what are the results or outputs of each programme? Finally, are there alternative methods of achieving each programme and what are the costs and outputs of each alternative (i.e., costeffectiveness studies)? The scheme simply encourages decision-

makers to seek answers to a set of logical questions about the purposes or objectives of defence and the costs of achieving these aims. By encouraging the decision makers to seek answers to such questions, it is hoped that programme budgeting would improve the quality of decisions and the efďŹ cient use of resources . The article will analyse the concept of programme budgeting along with a few case studies of countries which have adopted PPBS and their experiences and the basic requirements for shifting to programme budgeting. The last section of the paper discusses the probability of the principles of programme budgeting being applied in the Indian defence budgeting process.

Historical background PPBS was introduced to sort out the defects of the line item budgeting system; though it was a system of budgeting and expenditure control by detailed expenditure categories. The line item budgeting system was not able to highlight the accountability of that which is produced both in terms of goods and services

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for the expenditure incurred. PPBS was initially introduced in US in 1962 under Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara. PPBS is a system designed to assist the defence establishment in making choices about the allocation of resources among a number of competing and possible programmes and alternatives to accomplish speciďŹ c objectives in the national defence apparatus. The PPBS system works on identifying the threat according to which a strategy is developed and then requirements for such a strategy are enlisted and subsequently the programmes which meet those Robert McNamara

requirements are developed. In the ďŹ nal stage the costs of the approved programmes are budgeted and then funds are sanctioned. The timeline for PPBS is usually one year and the three aspects of PPBS are on a near continuous basis, although not simultaneously in the same ďŹ scal year. So, the process works on deďŹ nitive programme objectives based on speciďŹ c budget estimates to fund the programmes. The question may be asked that how is PPBS different from the traditional budgeting process. Firstly, PPBS focuses on objectives and purposes, and the long term alternatives to achieve them. Secondly, PPBS combines planning and budgeting by programming which thus gives a cost-effective output . PPBS was aimed at improving efďŹ ciency and better allocation of resources through s %STABLISHING LONG TERM PLANNING OBJECTIVES s #OST BENElT ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE programmes which could meet those objectives. s 4RANSLATING PROGRAMMES INTO BUDGET AND legislative proposals and long term strategic projections . In fact PPBS was different from the traditional budgeting process that preceded it in two ways: 1. PPBS focused less on the existing base and annual incremental improvements to it, and more on the objectives and long term alternative means for achieving them. Because of the shift in focus, PPBS was recognised as

an element of budgetary control. 2. PPBS instilled a process that essentially deďŹ nes a procedure for distributing available resources equitably among the many competing and possible programmes . As PPBS was initially launched in the US, the article would discuss functioning of the PPBS in the US. PPBS have generally served DoD in US well, because of internal practices and external demands over the past several years. When McNamara initiated PPBS he had other objectives in developing this management tool. Though he sought to establish output matrices to assess whether or not defence requirements were met but it was difďŹ cult to do so. In the early stages only the initial costs of a programme were reported, and a bow wave of future costs was masked. To address this problem, he asked for the full life cycle costs of a major programme be calculated and displayed. Finally, McNamara intended to link force programming decisions to strategic assessments. The Five Year Defense Programme (FYDP), also known as Future Years Defense Programme, was established with 10 Major Force Programmes (MFP) spending categories that cut across service competencies. The aim was to allow the Secretary of Defence and his staff to give strategic guidance to the military services and then have a tool to measure the service responses in programmatic terms. The programme review process would table

alternative ways of fulďŹ lling requirements. These would be developed, analysed and costed to allow the Secretary of Defence to make high impact choices that cut across individual service programmes .The PPBS has undergone few changes over the past four decades but the basic framework has more or less remained the same. PPBS was in fact designed to cater to a different security context than the one which is prevalent now. The Cold War environment had created an imperative to avoid mistakes. Maximum priority was placed on a steady, evolutionary improvement in military forces to keep pace with a relatively well understood, steadily evolving adversary. PPBS was crafted to meet those challenges and it in a way forced defence planners in the military services and in the OfďŹ ce of the Secretary of Defence (OSD) to make choices and prioritise programmes. Decision makers could get a fair degree of insight into the military capabilities that could be ďŹ elded in the near future. The risk of making a grave mistake and suffering its dangerous consequences was minimized. Also, this predictability allowed DoD to provide guidance in arms control negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s that was coupled with relative strengths and weaknesses of US forces vis-a-vis Soviet forces .

Phases

The complete cycle of PPBS consists of four phases:

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military might FUNCTIONAL COSTING 1. Planning Phase: The first phase of PPBS begins with a review of the country’s national security objectives which includes consideration of broad strategies for dealing with threats to national security and development of force structures to support the strategies. Planning elements are compiled under the general direction of Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. The compiled matter represents the views of the senior defence staff offices including the various elements of the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the unified and specified commanders (CINCs) and the respective elements of the military services and defence agencies. The planning perspective that evolves is reviewed by the Defence Resources Board (DRB). When the review gets completed, the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) is endorsed by the Secretary of Defence to the military departments and agencies, with instructions to prepare and submit their Programme Objectives Memoranda (POM) according to the guidelines and ultimately their budgets. The signed DPG becomes the final product of the planning phase and the basis for the programming phase .

2. Programming Phase: DPG is

for each component through the development of a Programme Objectives Memoranda (POM) and a DoD database called the Five years’ Defence Programme (FYDP). Each service develops a six year plan for allocating their ﬁnancial resources called POM. The ofﬁce of the Secretary of Defence reviews the POMs and makes necessary amendments.

3. Budgeting Phase:: The budget allocates the financial resources necessary to support the approved programmes scrutinized and passed during the planning and programming phase. The budgeting phase of PPBS occurs concurrently with the programming phase; each DoD component submits its proposed budget estimate simultaneously with its POM. The budget converts the programmatic view into the format of the Congressional appropriation structure, along with associated budget justification documents. Upon submission each budget estimate is reviewed by analysts from the office of the Under Secretary of Defence (Comptroller) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Programme Budget Decision (PBD) proposes financial adjustments to address any issues and problems identified during the associated budget hearing. The PBD are ff d f df d d D

President sends his budget (with DoD input) to Congress no later than the ﬁrst Monday in February. Apart from these basic phases of PPBS, one more phase has been added which is known as Execution.

4. Execution Phase: The execution process and review occurs in tandem with the programme and budget reviews. The purpose of the execution review is to provide feedback to the senior leadership concerning the effectiveness of current and prior resource allocation. Subsequently, matrices are developed to support the execution review that will measure actual output versus planned performance for defence programmes. The execution review may scrutinise the existing programme and may lead to recommendations to adjust resources and / or restructure programmes to achieve performance goals .

Operating cost The development of the PPBS along with implementation incurs certain inherent costs which include programme accounting, multi-year costing, detailed description and alternative costing, zero-based budgeting and quantitative evaluation of alternatives. Few of the costs are discussed below:

A strategy is developed and then requirements for such a strategy are enlisted and programmes which meet those requirements are developed. In the final stage the costs of the approved programmes are budgeted and then funds are sanctioned between programmes and costs associated with educating personnel on cost accounting and estimation. PPBS operating costs are associated with the transition costs from conventional ﬁnancial accounting systems to Programme accounting. Also there are costs incurred on revision of a programme and the programme accounting system must also undergo revision as per the changes in organisational objectives, structure and programmes . s 4HERE ARE ALSO COSTS INVOLVED WITH multi-year costing which require time and effort to make estimates for future environment and requirements. Programmes with extended lead times or life cycles require highly skilled cost analysis personnel knowledgeable on the economic environment of the future.

s 4HE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS ARE INCURRED ON detailed description and measurement of activities. The lengthy and detailed descriptions associated with PPBS submissions add considerably to administrative time and overheads. s :ERO BASED BUDGETING ALSO INCURS administrative costs at various organization levels. The process of budgeting and justifying all existing programmes on an annual basis versus incremental changes to existing programmes is very costly indeed. s !N ASSOCIATED COST WITH PERFORMING specialised studies is substantial. These are the costs identiﬁed with the quantitative evaluation of alternatives and can occur internally or as a result of an outside contract. The rational movement associated with PPBS increased the commitment of both internal and external resources of government agencies to the very expensive pursuit of the optimum choice among the alternative course of action .

QDR baseplate In the case of the US, the President approves the new National Security Strategy and then the Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff leads the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR). The QDR is a comprehensive review of all elements of defence policy and strategy needed to support the national security strategy. The QDR forms the basis of the PPBS exercise in the Department of Defence. In fact, the US was facing problems with regard to its programmes as it was initially only 10 major force programmes in FYDP but 11th programme Special Operations Force was added in 1986 to meet future exigencies. Also, with regard to capital formation the

visibility was not there so the programmes were bifurcated into two parts namely war ﬁghting programmes (Programme 1-5) and support programmes (Programme 6-11). Also this gives better justiﬁcation to planning and dispersal of resources, so that no programme gets neglected and also it adds to the capital budgeting system.

New FYDP structure Programme 1- Strategic Forces Equipment Programme 2- Major Theater War (MTW) Forces Equipment Programme 3- Intervention and Presence Forces Equipment Programme 4- Special Operations Forces Equipment Programme 5- Strategic Mobility Forces Programme 6- Intelligence and C4I Programmes Programme 7- Science and Technology Programmes Programme 8- Medical Programmes Programme 9- Central Supply, Maintenance and Sustainable Programmes Programme 10- Personnel, Training and Development Programmes Programme 11- International Activities . Within the US, in 2003, the defense department adjusted its planning, programming and budgeting procedures to support a two-year cycle that result in two year budgets. The revised process is called Management Initiative Decision (MID) 913 implemented in May 2003 which is consistent with submission of a biennial DoD budget that is part of the President’s Budget request to Congress for even numbered ﬁscal years. In this cycle, the evennumbered years are called on-years and also programme review years while the odd years known as off-years, also known as execution

Source: Col.William G. Braun, Addressing the Resource Requirements Mismatch, USAWC Strategy Research Project, Pennsylvania, 2004, p.7. January 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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military might FUNCTIONAL COSTING review years. After it was implemented in the US, the PPBS was introduced in UK in 1965 which originally consisted of 14 major programmes, further subdivided into some 700 programmes or functional elements, each of which was costed. In principle, expenditures were allocated to programmes, so it left miscellaneous categories to the minimum. A 10-year planning period was used in the UK. However, the programme budget information presented to the Parliament in the annual defence statement was restricted to a one-year period with the major programmes sub-divided into over 50 elements.

UK shift

The UK though has moved to New Management Strategy which is designed to improve internal efficiency through creating clearly defined budget holders with specific defence tasks (e.g. submarines, air defence) and delegated budget responsibility within each task. However problems arise where the budget holders have little choice over most of their inputs and expenditure, and where their employment contracts provide no incentive to improve efficiency . The shift in the UK from PPBS to other forms of budgeting is discussed later in the article. So, in a way in the PPBS there is an analysis of the output procured through the three stages of planning, programming and budgeting. The new concept which is now emerging is the PPBE and this includes the other stage of execution, so as to see the programmes are implemented according to the strategic thinking of the country.

Other forms

The defence budgeting has taken a new meaning in the light of the revolution in military affairs and the technological advancement and modernization of armed forces. Different governments have adhered to different forms of budgeting systems according to their needs. The most prevalent forms of budgeting are the following:

Line Item budgeting: g g: In the

traditional form of line item budgeting, the expenditures to be accrued by the government are enlisted according to the money spent on the line items. Items demarcate the amount of money a particular

The lack of information for choosing between competing policies on the basis of the effectiveness of e penditures in this early form of performance-oriented budgeting is identified by the World Bank as a significant factor in the shift to programme budgeting

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agency or sub-unit is allowed to spend on salaries, equipment, infrastructure, consumables and other items. Line item budgeting is about limiting aggregate expenditure of agencies by marking the limits of spending on each item in the budget allocation process. Line item budgeting makes no attempt to identify the objectives of government activity or what activities would be undertaken to promote these objectives. Due to this, line item budgeting does not give details about the reasons for incurring the expenditure and the efﬁciency or effectiveness of the programmes . Owing to the watertight dispersal of resources, line item budgeting cannot accommodate for the changing priorities and circumstances requiring more substantive budgets changes. The allocation or reallocation of funds to the new programmes cannot be envisaged because the existing programmes get a priority in the budgeting process.

Performance budgeting: Performance budgeting is the generalised concept used to refer to the infusion of performance information into the resource allocation processes. First, although the process of budgeting is inherently an exercise of political choice in which performance information can be one of the important factors dictating ultimate decisions, many governments have recognised that systematic presentation of performance information alongside budget amounts will improve budget decision-making. Secondly, no single deﬁnition of, or common approach to, performance budgeting can

encompass the range of needs or interests of decision makers, or the variety of political institutions and organisational arrangements of modern governments. Thus, performance budgeting is best seen as a process of adaptation rather than as an adoption of a specific process .In more general terms, Performance- oriented Budgeting (PoB) involves two key elements: s 4HE INCORPORATION OF INFORMATION THAT measures what governments do and their expected policy impacts into various stages of budget cycle. s 4HE USES OF THIS INFORMATION IN BUDGET decision-making to better align spending decisions with government priorities and expected performance . While management concerns with efficiency continue to be an important influence on budgeting, issues such as the effectiveness of policy in achieving its goals are also fundamental ‘performance’ criteria for assessing government resource allocations. The lack of information for choosing between competing policies on the basis of the effectiveness of expenditures in this early form of performance-oriented budgeting is identified by the World Bank as a significant factor in the shift to programme budgeting . Zero-based Budgeting:: The term Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) came from the requirement that all programmes were considered to have no funding at the beginning of each budget cycle. Zero Based Budgeting represented a major shift away from the idea of incremental resource allocation changes to evaluating the performance of the entire range of government activities. The process required all departments to identify their programmes, and to rank and justify the existence of each programme in order of importance to departmental goals and objectives . Higher ranked programmes stand more chances of getting funds. ZBB was a bottom up process, which required each manger to be responsible for the process of ranking and justifying the value and continued existence of programmes. The process is tedious and difficult because of which ZBB has not emerged as a widely adopted form of budgeting. Output and Outcome Budgeting: Output and outcome budgeting is an approach that focuses budget decision making and government accountability on three core issues. Outcome:: What influence the government wishes to have on the national security by its actions. Output:: How the government wishes to achieve that influence. Performance indicators:: How the government and the armed forces know whether the

p j g to achieve by implementing their chosen policies. The other is to relate the budget’s resource allocation, or how the funds are planned to be used to expected results or impacts (outputs and outcomes). The terms ‘result-based budgeting’ and ‘performance-based budgeting’ are increasingly being used interchangeably with output and outcomes budgeting. Some commentators stress that a results-based budget must include outcomes . The view is that for genuine ‘results-based budgeting’ it is not enough simply to engage in activities that produce outputs and measure their performance. These activities and outputs have to be constantly reconsidered and adjusted in the light of the outcomes that were used to justify the programme in the ﬁrst place. In the above table, different forms of budgeting are listed and the differences are shown.

Other experiences In the contemporary world few countries have stuck to PPBS but some have shifted to new forms of budgeting suiting their accounting needs and the future defence requirements. Few of the examples p are ggiven below:

United Kingdom (UK)

The British Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), introduced in 2000, is one of the latest efforts which has been advocated by defence economists like Keith Hartley in a series of management initiatives in rational defence budgeting. It is necessary to note that the

Source: Aidan Jose, Results Orientated Budget Practice in OECD Countries, Working Paper 209, Overseas Development Institute, London, February 2003, p. 17. attempt of applying the PPBS in UK failed as it was not able to change the traditional budgetary practice and could not overcome decentralisation in decision-making processes characteristic for the British armed forces . RAB appears to be the most economic-oriented concept but owing to the strategic management based on outcome, the British use complementary techniques like Balanced Scorecard which along with RAB provides new quality of budgetary management. Keith Hartley enumerates the benefits of RAB. Firstly it identifies the full, total cost of resources used by MoD and the Armed forces. It shows that equipment, buildings, land and spares are not free gifts. There will be interest charges on the total value of stocks and fixed assets. Hence RAB should enable MoD to achieve better management of its resources. Secondly, it is believed that it improves the quality of financial information available to Parliament. Thirdly, it brings MoD in line with the best accounting practices of the business world . The main difference arising from the adoption of RAB is that costs are accounted for as they are incurred, rather than when the payment is made (the principle of Accruals). This gives rise to timing differences in accounting

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military might FUNCTIONAL COSTING between cash and RAB systems and also to the recognition of depreciation. Under RAB, department is required to account for a cost of capital charge, equivalent to an interest charge on the capital (in the form of net assets) held on the balance sheet . So, UK had made its shift from PPBS to more market and economic oriented form of budgeting owing to the structural problems and also adhering to changed dynamics of budgeting in the new global scenario.

Prior to that PPBS form of defence budgeting was used in these countries’. The question arises that whether the PPBS should be kept as a benchmark for the comparative study of the different countries, budgets, then the priorities of the countries and their ﬁnancial standing should be taken into account as PPBS has shown few drawbacks but taking an instance from the new NATO countries which have tried to stick to PPBS system with few changes has in way made them utilise their resources in a cost-effective manner after taking cognizance of the economies of scale in the NATO alliance and so have planned their future acquisitions accordingly.

New Zealand New Zealand uses a unique accounting system to record and control public spending. The accrual financial management system, while widely used in the private sector, has not been adopted by other countries for use in the government sector. It is a system of accounting and management where items are brought to account and included in the financial statements as they are earned or incurred rather than as they are received and paid. The New Zealand method does provide perhaps the compact record of true public sector spending on defence of any country. New Zealand shifted from PPBS form of budgeting to output-intensive budgeting in early 1990s. It is one of the means of shifting the emphasis of the budgetary process away from cash inputs. One feature of the accrual accounting regime is capital charge. Capital charge is a levy set at the rate by the Treasury on the value of all assets held by a department, currently pegged at 11 per cent . Capital charge is recorded as expenditure and is not available to the department to spend, for instance on new equipment, such as armoured vehicles, or to fund operating expenses, such as peacekeeping. Another unique feature of New Zealand’s accrual accounting regime is the funding of capital acquisition from depreciation . The unique approach to recording and reporting government spending makes the comparison of defence spending between countries difficult. It is not that the form of budgeting that was adopted by New Zealand is without flaws. There has been lack of rigour in the definition and measurement of outputs, a lack of clarity and measurability in the choice of outcomes and an almost total lack of reflexive feedback performance measurement system to provide vital feedback as to the impact of purchased outputs on policy driven outcomes. So at the global level there should be single form of defence budgeting to bring transparency and to ensure item classification as used in international trade. In this context it is important to note that even a new country like Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted PPBS and so Bosnia-Herzegovina is discussed.

Bosnia-Herzegovina The Bosnia-Herzegovina defence system is funded from a budget comprised of three parts:

Figure 2-BiH Defence Planning, Programming and Budgeting System

Source:: Defence White Paper of Bosnia-Herzegovina, June2005 at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/ NHQSA/WhitePaper/web-eng.pdf (Accessed 12.6.2006)

the state budget and two entity budgets. The development and proposal of defence budgets is coordinated by the minister of defence. The method and procedures for governing this process make up the Bosnia and Herzegovina common Defence Resource Management System, the major operating component of which is the PPBE. The ultimate goal of the common defence resource management system is to achieve the greatest of security at the least cost, while applying scarce defence resources in an efﬁcient and cost-effective manner to address those military tasks most critical to the security of the state .

Bulgaria In the case of Bulgaria, PPBS was implemented but with few changes. In Bulgaria many steps were taken in the last decade, in particular in the last ﬁve-six years for reform in security sector but the reforms are far from being complete. Effective ﬁnalisation of the reform of the different elements of the security sector is only possible by remembering that an integrated security sector must be the ultimate goal for ‘integral’ security. The longterm vision is to have a new type of armed forces; modernized, professional and an integrated security sector including the former concept of the armed forces, but with a new type of security organisation. In this sense, introduction of PPBS across the whole security sector is a very important task concerning priorities, resources and good governance. The strategic defence review in Bulgaria started on March 1, 2003 and concluded on April 2004. In fact when defence reforms were started in 1999 , it was very effective and fast, based on military doctrine, reform plans, PPBS and was placed under serious civilian control

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with signiﬁcant international participation. Bulgarian PPBS does not copy or imitate the US model . It incorporates the principles of the effective defence resource management in a way suitable for the organisation and the requirements of the Bulgarian defence establishment. In fact Bulgaria has sought the participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and academic and business sectors, as well as foreign partners for the process. Special education and training for the civilians is provided for PPBS and incentives for the bureaucrats are given. The evolution of coordination between departments in a network centric environment has been another achievement. In the whole process of adhering to PPBS the major actors are the Parliament, Security Council, Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, Consultative Council on National Security, Civil Society, NATO representative teams, Strategic partners (US-Reform Implementation Working group, Political military groups within UK and Spain). Within MoD Bulgaria has appointed Consultants from UK (defence planning), Germany (Training), France (logistics), Italy (Navy), Greece as well as military liaison teams from the US for evaluation and assistance in the implementation of programmes. The format of PPBS in Bulgaria is given below. Another interesting example of modern rational defence budgeting can be found in the Australian Department of Defence, where accruals accounting was adjusted for the valuation and reporting of strategic capabilities. Australia, Canada and Netherlands implemented the outcome based budgeting in their defence sectors in the course of the New Public Management Reform circa 2000.

Drawbacks of PPBS Though PPBS is stated to be having a number of strengths and the most important of them is that it keeps track of a very large programme and budget, the decision making with regard to such large sums of money is also relatively transparent but even in the US the need for reform in PPBS is being sought. The major reason that is cited for the reform in PPBS is that it was designed in a very different security context than that which faces the contemporary world. It is stated that DoD and the US Congress have made reporting mandatory on participants. For a few cases it is important but for others the process cannot run without them. In certain cases, the reports become redundant and non-synchronous with other activities in the PPBS cycle. This leads to time gap and so it gets more bureaucratic in nature. Preparation and tracking of reports and meeting deadlines become confused with analysis and diminish the contribution

the staff can make to the important work of developing new options and strategic changes in direction . The cumulative effect of such a problem is that with the passage of time more attention is paid to the budgeting phase of the PPBS and the planning and programming phase gets relegated to a secondary role. One of the most vehement critic of PPBS is Professor Mintzberg who stated forcefully that PPBS was one of the “greatest planning efforts (and failures) of all times …” Mintzberg in his book confuses PPBS with systems analysis and Vietnam War and the legacy of Robert McNamara but systems analysis looking at costs, beneﬁts and related expenses of particular systems or programmes is merely a tool for the implementation of the PPBS rather than the actual process itself . One can assert that in the long run PPBS to a large extent is an “over-constrained problem”. In spite of all these shortcomings PPBS has been adapted by different countries to suit their needs. Even those which have shifted from PPBS initially adopted PPBS to sychronise their planning and budgeting.

PPBS in India? In the Indian context, the existing system though is a time tested mechanism still needs reforms as the current line item budgeting is indicative of the input expenditure under various heads and sub-heads. There is no check mechanism to ascertain whether the expenditure incurred has met the required objectives. The indicative costs of various systems can help in comparing the alternative choices with regard to reaching the goals. There is a need for a more pragmatic

Figure-3: PPBS in Bulgarian Ministry of Defence

Source: Todor Tagarev, Transparent Defence Planning for Effective Democratic Control, PFP Planning Symposium, Oberammergau, January 18-19, 2001.

Though PPBS is stated to be having a number of strengths and the most important of them is that decision making with regard to such large sums of money is also relatively transparent but even in the US the need for reform in PPBS is being sought. The major reason that is cited is that it was designed in a very different security conte t than that which faces the contemporary world assessment of preparedness levels, optimal allocation of resources and best combination of force and weapons to meet the defence requirements of the country. In order to initiate such an exercise there is need for an organisational setup and a defence planning group to look into the matters of budgeting and planning. The staff has to be specialised and committed for the budgeting purpose. Few other required changes in this field could be: s "UDGETARY HEADS OF REVENUE AND CAPITAL need to be widened in scope and expenditure can be earmarked under the broad categories of operations, acquisitions, maintenance and training to facilitate long-term analysis, identification of weaknesses and funding options. s #APITAL BUDGET SHOULD BE ALLOCATED service-wise and capital budgeting should be adopted in a comprehensive manner. s )NDICATIVE BUDGETARY OUTLAYS SHOULD BE stipulated under two / three year time-frames to facilitate short term planning. s %XPENDITURE CEILING FOR THE END OF THE financial year and the surrendered funds should be accumulated in the form of a corpus fund. s 0LANNED ACQUISITIONS SHOULD BE ARRIVED AT after due inter services planning and analysis of operational requirements . s #ENTRAL REGISTRY TO MONITOR THE MOVEMENT OF files in a proper manner and also the reports are provided within deadlines. s 4HERE SHOULD BE A PROVISION FOR accountability and responsibility for revenue expenditure. s 3TRATEGIC PLANNING GROUP TO FORMULATE THE

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military might FUNCTIONAL COSTING

strategic threats in the future and also make suggestions with regard to the procurement of weapons. s 0ROGRAMMING PROCESS SHOULD HAVE THE MICRO evaluation along with timely feedback and revision with sustained reporting from field commanders. The PPBS has been criticised in India by few because it is thought to be a cumbersome process and the subjectivity of the analysis would be marred by errors and thus the results would not be accepted with confidence but PPBS as a concept could be tailored to meet our needs because as a concept it is of help in making value judgments on how best to upgrade desired capability. The changes have to be made in the budgeting process so as to have efficient and optimal allocation of resources through envisioning the future rather than doing the stop gap arrangements which would leave us with only the refurbished and upgraded weapon systems and force mix.

Conclusion The PPBS was initially designed to involve many players in the formation of major strategic thinking and highlighting the objectives for the long term planning. The virtue of the system is that it aims at evolutionary improvement in the force composition and the multitude of participants optimises continuity and reduces risk. The problem of the system is it cannot respond to the dynamic changes in the strategic environment in a short span. The length of the cycle from concept to capability is too long. Many countries have adapted PPBS according to their requirements and budgetary planning, like Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina etc. So in the Indian context there is need for reforms at this juncture to arrive at more pragmatic approach to the defence requirements in the next decade or so. In that context few changes have already taken place like the National Security Council and the creation of National Security Council Secretariat. The fast computing capability and the use of communication infrastructure could also be used in arriving at analytical decisions in a short span of time. The change could be administered in phases as part of functional costing. Firstly, accounting methods should be reformed and should be based more on programmes. Secondly, the presentation of

the budget should be on a ﬁve-year time-frame along with demarcation of various programmes and subprogrammes. Thirdly, the budget based on programmes would bring in transparency as well as provide a logical reason to the adaptation to various programmes and the approval should be sought in principle. Finally, the interlinking of the forces in decision making would reduce the friction between forces with regard to budget allocation and thus would evolve a greater integrated strategy based on optimal resource allocation and modernised force structure. But prior to embarking on such a huge exercise there is a need to initiate greater compilation of knowledge and strategic thinking to make a meaningful contribution to resource management and cost-effective solutions to meet the needs of the defence of the country without compromising on the quality and quantity. Though PPBS is not the panacea for all the problems in the budgeting process, it leads to an improvement in the data compilation and the reasons which are submitted in the support of the budget are more pronounced and logical. PPBS in fact, deciphers the hard choices to be made. The proponents of PPBS have endorsed that with better information along with alternative programmes or goals enlisted and with alternative means of meeting these goals, some of the decisions in the future would be more pragmatic due to integrated planning and thinking. The writer is Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He has done his PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His areas of interest include Southeast Asia, terrorism, defence industry and related economic issues. He has written extensively on the issue of terrorism in Southeast asia, including issues pertaining to radical islam and counter terrorrism policies.

References 1. Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defence Policy, Brassey’s ,UK,1991,p.34 2. Ibid, p.35 3. ‘ PPBS-How does it work?’, at http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/ rdonlyres/14F379F8-3330-4FBB-B651-59A6C9F76A74/0/PPBS. doc (Accessed 26.6.2006) 4.‘OSD Comptroller iCenter:The Historical Context’, at http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/histcontext. htm(Accessed 5.8.2006) 5. Ibid 6. Johnson, Stuart E.,A New PPBS Process to Advance Transformation, Defence Horizons, No. 32 ,September 2003,Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defence University,Washington, p.1 7. Ibid,p.2 8. ‘OSD Comptroller iCenter:The Historical Context’, at http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/budget/histcontext.htm (Accessed 28.5.2006) 9. ‘Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process’, at http://akss.dau.mil/dag/Guidebook/IG_c1.2.asp (Accessed on 18.5.2006) 10. Ibid 1 1. ‘Planning, Programming and Budgeting’, at http://www.

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jokes LAUGH N RELAX! airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/jan-feb/ feltes.html (Accessed 8.5.2006) 12. Ibid 13. ‘Framing the Problem of PPBS’, at http://www.bens.org/ images/PPBS2000.pdf (Accessed 4.7.2006) 14. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defence, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.179-180 15. World Bank Report 1998 , Washington D.C, p.12 16. ‘Performance Budgeting’, at http://archive.gao.gov/ f09026/162387.pdf (Accessed 16.6.2006) 17. ‘Performance Oriented Budgeting Systems’, at http://www. unisanet.unisa.edu.au/Staff/RhondaSharp/budget%20for%20 equity%20FINAL2003.pdf (Accessed 16.6.2006) 18. World Bank Report 1998,Washington D.C, p.12 19. ‘Zero-Base Budgeting: An Overview’, at http://www.swbinc.com/Zero-Base_Budgeting.htm (Accessed 29.5.2006) 20. ‘Performance oriented budgeting systems’, at http://www. unisanet.unisa.edu.au/Staff/RhondaSharp/budget%20for%20 equity%20FINAL2003.pdf (Accessed 16.6.2006) 21. Miller, Davina, “Planning, Programming Budgeting System and the case of rational decision-making in Britain’s Ministry of Defence”, Defence Analysis,No.2,pp.131-145 22. Hartley, Keith, “Long-term policy implications of Resource Accounting and Budgeting: An Economist View”, RUSI Journal, No.8, 2001, pp.33-37 23. ‘Resource Accounting & Budgeting’, at http://www. dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds/2005/pdf/CI/Chap1RABIntro.pdf (Accessed 25.6.2006) 24. New Zealand Defence Spending, Centre for Strategic Studies Briefing Papers,Vol.1(1) December 1999, at http:// www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/Strategic_Briefing_Papers/Vol.1%20 Dec%201999/NZDS.pdf (Accessed 18.5.2006) 25. ‘A Review of Australian and New Zealand Experiences with Accrual Based Budgeting’, at http://www.inpuma.net/research/ papers/sydney/carlinguthrie.html (Accessed 14.7.2006) 26. ‘Defence White Paper of Bosnia-Herzegovina ,June 2005’, at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/NHQSA/WhitePaper/web-eng. pdf (Accessed 28.6.2006) 27. ‘Bulgaria: Analysis of the Stability Pact Self Assessment Studies’, at http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/SSG_regional/ch2_ Bulgaria.pdf (Accessed 12.6.2006) 28. ‘Defence Budgeting in Bulgaria’, http://pfroum.isn.ethz. ch/docs/19BA39C2-3C52-42C6-BBD2AF81B06AC2DC.ppt (Accessed 16.6.2006) 29. Johnson, Stuart E., A New PPBS Process to Advance Transformation, Defence Horizons, No. 32, September 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defence University, Washington, p.3 30. Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning ,The Free Press, New York,1994, p.19 31. Framing the Problem of PPBS at http://www.bens.org/ images/PPBS2000-Framing.pdf (Accessed 26.6.2006) 32. Capital budgeting is an approach intended to take through account of spending levels of capital goods, generally identified as those goods with 10 year long service lives, so as to capture the effects of depreciation as capital stocks wear out and require replacement. Depreciation rates and nominal replacement rates are to be clearly cited .For definition see at http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/03-04/dar/07_18_glossary. htm (Accessed 14.7.2006) 33. ‘Three Parts to a whole’, at http://www.indianexpress.com/ res/web/ple/full_story.php?content_id=32668 (Accessed 16.6.2006)

Jokes of the month Officer: Soldier, do you have change for a dollar? Soldier: Sure, buddy. Officer: That’s no way to address an officer! Now let’s try it again. Do you have change for a dollar? Soldier: No, SIR! An Army brat was boasting about his father to a Navy brat. “My dad is an engineer. He can do everything. Do you know the Alps?” “Yes,” said the Navy brat. “My dad has built them.” Then the naval kid spoke: “And do you know the Dead Sea?” “Yes.” “It’s my dad who’s killed it!”

Two men were boasting to each other about their old army days. “Why, my outﬁt was so well drilled,” declared one, “that when they presented arms all you could hear was slap, slap, click.” “Very good,” conceded the other, “but when my company presented arms you’d just hear slap, slap, jingle.” “What was the jingle?” asked the ﬁrst. “Oh,” replied the other offhand, “just our medals.”

The physical training instructor was drilling a platoon of soldiers. “I want every man to lie on his back, put his legs in the air and move them as though he were riding a bicycle,” he explained. “Now begin!” After a few minutes one of the men stopped

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