DSA January 2011

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25 JANUARY 2011

INDIA : ` 120 VOLUME 2 ISSN

ISSUE 4

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

Soldier: The silent sine qua non of the nation’s well-being

> VOLUME 2 > ISSUE 4 > JANUARY 2011

Majestic recognition to

EAR !

Y NEW ANZA BON o. 79 eN

Pag

editor-in-chief

W

ikileaks has set the world of governance alight. Julian Assange has assembled a cast of info-warriors, info-martyrs and what not. If it is trunk loads of United States government cables tomorrow it will be another country. Of that there is a certainty, for the doors of defiance have been opened and they cannot easily be

bolted again without changing the nature of governance. There is nobody spared, no country free from the vast stores of diplomatic limes. There are a lot more cables on India yet to be released. And Wikileaks have provided enough teasers to whet the appetite. Wikileaks have set the trend.

So it wasn’t in the least bit surprising that the first fake Wikileaks have also hit the public domain. And it wasn’t in the least bit surprising that they originated from Pakistan and concerned the Army in India. There is a curious relationship between Pakistan and India’s Army. It of course began at the birth of Pakistan and its failed ‘tribal’ invasion of Kashmir. It has continued over the years in similar fashion. So it makes sense for Pakistan to attempt a Wikileaks on the Indian Army.

For in a very real sense it is the Indian Army that stands between Pakistan and success with its completely awry policies.

The Indian Army has frequently pulled the country’s chestnut out of the fire. Many chestnuts over the years, from many fires. Even as the politics of the country has created a million little mutinies, it has been the ethos and the efficiency of the Army that has saved the country serious blushes. It is the single most respected institution in the country, quite unlike the image of other similar institutions in the neighbourhood. From the first war over Kashmir in October 1947 till date, there have been innumerable instances of the Army coming to the rescue of the country’s leadership. And as is its culture, it will continue to do so. So it isn’t surprising, therefore, that Pakistan would want to target India’s Army with a bunch of fake cables. It hasn’t produced fake cables on India’s diplomatic policies, or its politicians, but has begun the process with the one institution that stands between its warped mission and success, India’s Army.

Despite decades of saving the country blushes there is still a great deal of chasm between the political elite and the Army. There is still a great deal of learning of the other that has yet to happen. Politicians don’t know much about the Army, how it functions and what needs to be done to make it function better. And the Army doesn’t know much about politicians, how they function and their limitations. In a very real sense nobody wants to know about politicians, but knowing the Army is important given the neighbourhood India lives in and its own little political mutinies. It is the least that the country can do for the one institution that has kept its side of the deal. It is important to know what can and cannot, be done by the Army.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

1

announcement

publisher’s view Our heartiest greetings and best wishes to Indian Army on the Army Day! Volume 2 Issue 4 January 2011 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications monika kanchan ad-sales manish upadhyay amit kumar representative J&K salil sharma creative vivek anand pant correspondent (europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution vijay bhatia ranjeet, amit kumar system administrator vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscri ption: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002(India) t: +91-011-23243999,23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence And Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

2

Jai Jawan Jai Kisan!

I still remember one of my seniors in school who hailed from a village in Haryana who told me about a fact of his family arrangement: He was the youngest son in the family and his two elder brothers were in the Armed Forces - one in the Indian Army and the other in the Indian Navy. He had decided to stay at home after his education and support his father in the farming and agriculture business. When asked why he did not want to join the Armed Forces like his other two brothers, he clarified that the arrangement in his family was that at least two sons would join the Armed Forces to serve the motherland and the youngest one would take care of the family responsibilities.

This arrangement had been prevailing in his family for the past three generations and his father being the youngest son had kept up the family tradition and he, a student still, was expected to do the same.

His was a tradition in keeping with the spirit of JAI JAWAN JAI KISAN—a bifurcation of the family into defenders of the nation in one stream and of sustainers of development and growth in the other. It was this reality of Indian life that former Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri wove into a national slogan at the height of the Indo-Pak war of 1965 in recognition of the services of both, the defenders and the sustainers of growth for the national good. Alas, I see little sign of that today. Few in modern day families think of serving in the Indian Armed Forces and a tradition that linked the family to an important pillar of the nation-State is dissolving and disappearing.

A N N O U N C E S February 2011 Issue as

Russia Special Aspiring resurgence of a beleaguered nation

There is an alarming shortage of officers in our Armed Forces which is a matter of great concern for the State as well as for every one of us. How is this shortfall to be filled-up?

We see that there are more and more new avenues available today for the youngsters but neither the educational system nor the State are able to do anything to attract young men and women back to military service.

Only the National Cadet Corps has some potential to give to the impressionable child an empathy with things military. But participating in the NCC is not a compulsory activity in schools and colleges; nor is the curriculum able to retain the interest of a youth on the threshold of a career.

I strongly believe that the government must now think the hitherto unthinkable and seriously examine the possibility of introducing compulsory military service for the recruitable population of the nation. A tenure of two years of military service on attaining the age of 18 years could be the precursor of the Short Service Commission already in existence if the youngster develops an affinity to things military. A direct continuum into regular military service should be an option available to those who want to avail the facility.

Since the attractions of the corporate sector have proved to be a more powerful magnet than military service the government can persuade the civil employer to give preference to those who have done a tenure with the Armed Forces. Only releasing a few advertisements is not going to serve the purpose. A broader master plan has to be crafted to draw in the youngsters to the Armed Forces. I believe if that happens then I am sure that the shortfall in the forces can be reduced to some extent and a new dimension will be introduced in civil society as well.

I remember Guru Gobind Singh who created the Sikh Panth to defend the motherland had mandated that every family must send one son to join his Army. The prevailing circumstances are such that it is time to think in these terms and appraise how every Indian, young man and young woman can contribute not only in the development and prosperity of the country but also safety and security of our motherland.

DSA wishes you a safe, secure, prosperous and happy 2011. May we rise to the times to adequately protect our nation-State and our people from the almost daily assaults by external and internal enemies in the coming 365 days, round the clock!

As the wise counsel goes, “Prepare and prevent, don’t repair and repent”.

Happy New Year!

Jai Hind.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Available at all leading bookstores LANDMARK LTD.

SPENCERS

ODYSSEY

OM BOOK SHOP CROSSWORD

contact for subscription: online@dsalert.org

subscription@dsalert.org

contents INDIAN ARMY SPECIAL ISSUE JANUARY 2011

contents

Volume 2 Issue 4 January 2011

A R T I C L E S

defence and security: Chanakya’s vision

7

armed forces special powers act (AFSPA)

8

Air Marshal (Retd.) Satish Inamdar Lt. Gen. (Retd.) O. P. Kaushik

future wars: operational doctrines

13

military diplomacy

16

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Aditya Singh

military leadership: morale and motivation 20

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Singh

peace at Siachen?

24

Kargil conflict: resounding victory

30

the nation builder

35

Indian army and professionalism

42

military deployment in Afghanistan

46

helping civil authority Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. Mrinal Suman

49

structural changes

53

impeccable record!

Praful Shankar Adagale

58

Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. R. Raghavan Dr. Bidanda Chengappa

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

for online edition of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) log on to: www.dsalert.org

4

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

the siege within?

62

bumpy road ahead?

65

military organisations

71

India: security in doldrums?

Brig. (Retd.) Chitranjan Sawant

74

free trade and counter-terrorism

77

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. Sheru Thapliyal Brig. (Retd.) Dr. Anil Sharma Prof. R. N. Swarup

Dominika Cosic

Follow DSA on :

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Follow DSA on :

DSALERT January 2011 Defence AND security alert

5

Indian army

mission

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms…

Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

TROOPS MANAGEMENT

Chanakya’s greatness lies in that he remains all things to all persons millennia after he consummated his sojourn in India’s golden era. Here is one of the august sage’s perceptions that is doing the rounds in recent times that the Mauryan soldier was the great facilitator of nation-building. It is juxtaposed with Air Marshal (Retd.) Satish Inamdar his dire prediction that the empire would collapse if it ignored the needs of the soldier. This, of course, is in the modern-day context of the Sixth Pay Commission. Powers that be should heed Chanakya’s plea “I beseech you to take instant note and act with uncommon dispatch to address the soldier’s anxiety”!

— Chanakya

Defence and Security:

Chanakya’s vision

First published in DSA April 2010. Abridged for Indian Army Special.

T

he Mauryan soldier does not himself the Royal treasuries enrich nor does he the Royal granaries fill. He does not himself carry out trade and commerce nor produce scholars, thinkers, littérateurs, artistes, artisans, sculptors, architects, craftsmen, doctors and administrators.

He does not himself build roads and ramparts nor dig wells and reservoirs.

He does not himself write poetry and plays, paint or sculpt, nor delve in metaphysics, arts and sciences.

He does not perform any of these chores himself directly: he enables the rest of us to perform these without let, hindrance or worry (nirbhheek and nishchinta).

“He is thus the very basis and silent, barely visible cornerstone of our fame, culture, physical well being and prosperity; in short, of the entire nation-building activity.

Deterrent “Our military sinews, on the other hand, lend credibility to our pronouncements of adherence to good Dharma, our goodwill, amiability and peaceful intentions towards all our

neighbour nations (sarve bhavantu sukhinaha, sarve santu niramayaha…) as also those far away and beyond.

Th ese also serve as a powerful deterrent against military misadventure by any one of them against us.

Guarantor “While the Magadha citizenry endeavours to make the State prosper and flourish, the Mauryan soldier guarantees that the State continues to exist! He is the silent ‘sine qua non’ of our very being!

Chief’s role “If you first learn of your soldiers’ problems and needs from your own trusted informers (gupta doota) and NOT from the Commander-in-Chief (Senapati) himself, relieve him of his charge and retain him not for another day. No matter how good a horseman (Ashwarohi), a swordsman (Khadgaveera), a wrestler (Malla), an archer (Dhanurdhara) or a tactician (Rana neetigya) he is, dismiss him (ardha chandra prayoga) for failing to keep his ear close to the military

ground. Dismiss him also for not having the gumption and courage to be the first to tell you of the soldiers’ anxiety and needs before the others do. “ The Senapati owes a downward loyalty and sensitivity to his troops in much the same way and measure as he owes these upwards to you, for this is a unique and age-old essential feature of sound military leadership and an article of faith between the troops and the General!

“It is my bounden duty to caution you, My Lord, that the day when the Mauryan soldier has to demand his dues or, worse, plead for them, will neither have arrived suddenly, overnight nor in vain. It will also bode ill for Magadha.

“For then, on that day, you, My Lord, will have lost all moral sanction to be King! It will also mark the beginning of the end of the Mauryan Empire!!”

The writer, a Fighter Pilot, retired from IAF as Air Marshal in 2003. He has flown over 4700 hours on 28 different types of aircraft and commanded No. 7 Squadron (The ‘Battleaxes’).

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

7

Indian army

PROTECTING NATION-STATE

It has to be put bluntly: If it was not for the Armed Forces Special Powers Act most of the north-east corner of India would have become freefloating nation-states embroiled in ethnic, religious and tribal wars with the fallout affecting India as happened before Bangladesh was created. India’s adversaries, particularly Pakistan and China have come to realise that unless the Indian Army is rendered hors-de-combat by ensuring that the shield under which it operates is withdrawn they will never be able to achieve the vivisection of monolithic India into tiny pieces. Having said that it is pre-eminently in the national interest that the Indian Army does not allow the recurrence of several instances of misuse that have shaken the nation’s conscience.

A

gitational approach adopted by some organisations in J and K and Manipur against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is, indeed, sad, unfortunate and misconstrued.

Consequently, anti-national elements in these states, who are mostly the collaborators and sympathisers of militancy and some disgruntled politicians have started exploiting the situation. It is also unfortunate that even the government has made no efforts to educate the public about the true nature and necessity of retaining the AFSPA. The act has become a political football.

failure of the state administration and the police in controlling the insurgency in the valley. Subsequently, Jammu was also brought under this act on 11 August 1990 temporarily and then reimposed in 2001 where it still remains operative.

Shield against separatism

The AFSPA was applied in Manipur in September 1980 and since then it has remained applicable. The situation in Manipur, prior to 1980, had deteriorated to such an extent that it had become impossible to run the administration, maintain law and order and provide peace and tranquility to the public.

There were 18 militant outfits who were killing, kidnapping and extorting for causes differing from one group to the other. Some of them had declared independence from India and had established links with Burma and Bangladesh for weapons and training.

Alarmed at the spate of violence, the Imphal Valley was declared a “disturbed area” in September 1980, bringing the entire state under the AFSPA.

The AFSPA was passed by the Parliament in September, 1958. While introducing the Bill in the Parliament in August 1958, the then Home Minister Shri. G. B. Pant, had justified its necessity to tackle the menace of militant Nagas, who having formed the Naga Federal Government (NFG) under A. Z. Phizo had declared themselves as independent. The law was enforced, initially, only for six months. Since then, it has been applied in many other states, where militants have taken up arms against the State and currently, in addition to Manipur and the J and K, it is enforced in Assam, Nagaland, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh. It was also used in Punjab when the state was engulfed by the Sikh Khalistani movement.

The AFSPA was invoked in Kashmir on 5 July 1990 consequent upon total

8

While invoking the AFSPA in 1990 the then governor of J and K Shri G. C. Saxena, had said, ″The need was obvious. The administration was non-existent in many parts of the state.

There was no alternative to this act.”

Manipur

To understand why the AFSPA, one needs to have a brief insight into the background. Maintenance of law and order is the responsibility of a state

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) O. P. Kaushik

government which it performs with state police assisted by Central Police Organisations (CRPF, ITBP, BSF etc.)

When they fail to control the situation, help of the Army is sought under the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). Even when the Army has been called out, responsibility for carrying out effective coordination between the various security agencies, viz state police, CRPF, CPOs and the Army, remains that of the civil administration. In order to assist the Army in performing this difficult and sensitive task, magistrates and police personnel are attached to the Army. Hence, the onus for any action taken for combating the situation remains that of the civil administration.

War by other means In areas afflicted with insurgency and terrorism, as is evident in the J and K, Manipur and Assam, conditions of maintaining law and order are more serious and grave. Insurgents and terrorists are well organised, equipped with sophisticated weapons and well trained. They operate from bases which are located in extremely difficult terrain covered with high hills, thick jungles and snow where no police or magistrates are present. They also operate from urban areas, where by their militant action, they ensure total collapse of civil administration. The police and CPOs are neither equipped nor trained to fight such serious law and order situations. Invariably, police is not present in such difficult areas.

Army is asked to play a more active role in controlling such dirty, dangerous

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

9

Indian army

PROTECTING NATION-STATE

and difficult situations. Army has no legal authority to operate on its own without the presence of a magistrate and the police representative. To assist the Army to operate efficiently in such an environment the AFSPA was passed by the parliament.

Danger to national security The AFSPA is made applicable by specific orders of the central government in extremely grave situations where law and order has completely collapsed, civil police has not been effective, civil administration is paralysed and there is serious danger to national security. There is yet one more rider. The state government must declare the affected region as “disturbed area” under a notification.

Without the area having been declared disturbed, the AFSPA cannot be made applicable. The state government, after declaring an area disturbed, refers the case to the central government, which, based on intelligence inputs available with them, assessment of the situation made by the state government and detailed interaction with the civil and military authorities, takes a conscious decision whether to make the AFSPA applicable.

Four powers Once the central government orders application of the AFSPA in a specific area or a state, it confers four special powers upon the Army. First, Army can use force, including opening of fire, for maintenance of public order where orders have been issued prohibiting assembly of five or more persons. Two, arrest without warrant any person who has committed a cognisable offence or is about to commit and hand him over to the police without delay.

Three, enter and search any premises without warrant of search to make recoveries of persons, involved in acts of terrorism and lawlessness, or arms and ammunition. Four, destroy any arms dumps or fortified position from where armed attacks are made. The law also provides protection to the armed forces personnel who are acting under the spirit of the AFSPA in that no prosecution or legal proceedings can be instituted against them for anything done or purported to be done in exercise of powers conferred by this act without the previous sanction of the central government.

10

No magisterial supervision

Legal protection

Imagine what will happen if the AFSPA is not imposed and the security forces receive a tip-off about the presence of terrorists is some village or insurgents committing crimes against innocent and law abiding citizens. Although the army unit may be located adjacent to the village and in a comfortable possibly favourable position to apprehend the terrorists, they would have to, by law, wait for the magistrate to arrive to issue a warrant. It would involve loss of time and advantages of conducting an immediate raid will get jeopardised.

The Army has a difficult and dirty task to perform and resolve situations which get created by bad governance on the part of politicians and inefficient working of the bureaucrats and the police. The Army must have strong hand of legal protection for the dirty work they are asked to perform lest a stage comes when soldiers will start questioning the legality of officers’ orders to avoid subsequent harassment at the courts. There are approximately 450 cases currently filed against the Army in courts in the north-east.

An equal number, if not more, are also being contested in the courts of the J and K. If a soldier has a duty to safeguard his nation and he is ready to sacrifice his life for it, the nation owes him a responsibility to protect him for performing his duties in extremely difficult circumstances.

To illustrate the impact, let me narrate an incident which I personally faced.

In the year 1975 I was commanding 2 Rajputana Rifles in Nagaland and was intensively involved in encounters in apprehending the Naga insurgents.

In one of such raids, we succeeded in capturing the aide-de-camp (ADC) of the self-styled home minister of Naga Federal Government. Since he was an important source, I ordered the company commander to carry out search of his house which was about a kilometer away from the jungle hideout from where he was captured.

During this search very valuable and incriminating documents, revealing details of locations and personalities belonging to the rebel organisations, were recovered with the help of which in our subsequent search operations we recovered 54 weapons and apprehended 137 militants which included two self-styled Vice Presidents of the Naga Federal Government (The underground government of the militants).

Unfortunately, Nagaland, then, was not a notified “disturbed area” and the AFSPA was not in vogue. A court case was instituted against us for carrying out the search of the house without authority. We had to struggle for many a month in Gauhati High Court in fighting out the case. Should I have waited for police men to arrive and accompany our search party and a magistrate to fetch up from Kohima to issue search warrant, opportunity provided to us by the ADC’s sudden and surprise capture and equally quick and prompt search of his house would have been lost and so would have been the capture of huge quantity of weapons and the militants.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Contraband industry Manipur, today, has become a haven for insurgent groups with as many as 29 militant organisations functioning both in the Imphal Valley and the encircling hills bordering Mizoram, Nagaland and Myanmar. They are paralysing the day to day functioning of the administration. Drug running and arms smuggling are rampant. Every militant organisation has links abroad and managing free flow of weapons.

State police due to their connivance with the militants is unreliable. CRPF and other CPOs are ill-equipped to face well-motivated, well-equipped and trained militants. The state administration is a helpless spectator.

Present situation in the J and K is the creation of self seeking politicians who are actively involved in exploiting the state for advancement of their families and their activities are void of any interest of the nation. Some towns of the state are suffering on account of stone pelting tactics of the militants.

People in villages are terrorised and are compelled to pay taxes to the militants.

Loyal citizens are being harassed and killed. Security forces posts are being subjected to grenade attacks.

Arms smuggling has got activated.

Chief Minister of the state is unable to address a public meeting and so called political leaders are shy of meeting the suffering public. Army has again got involved in countering

the cross-border infiltration and has been successful in killing or apprehending more than a hundred militants during the last three months. The civil administration has been thoroughly compromised by militant sympathisers.

The same is true of the state police and the shots are called by the militants in all the activities of the law and order machinery.

The state finances are in a chaotic condition. Substantial portion of central aid is getting siphoned off to insurgents, politicians and bureaucrats. In the absence of state writ, militants and their collaborators have started advocating for Azadi (freedom) and separation from India.

Separatist game plan Having failed in their efforts to get the AFSPA revoked from the Kashmir Valley, demand has been made to remove the Army from the towns which are located along the highways.

Such a demand has inherent security risk as these very places are dominating the logistic lines of the Army deployed in the Valley, Kargil and Ladakh. If the AFSPA is removed from these towns, along the lines of communication, army convoys will be subjected to militant attacks at liberty. Army will have no legal authority to retaliate and apprehend the attackers and if the Army responded to such militants activities they will face court cases - resulting in demoralising the army. Withdrawal of the AFSPA from any areas of the state of J and K will destroy 20 years outstanding work done by the Army at the cost of sacrificing nearly 4,000 soldiers. It will result in loss of control on areas there by enabling free movement to the militants and will serve Pakistan’s motives which are to demoralise Indian Army and prepare the local population of J and K for an open revolt. More than 27 terrorist organisations are currently active in the J and K who are being trained, equipped with weapons and supplied with adequate money from 70 camps which Pakistan has organised for them in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK).

North-east insurgencies In Assam and other states of the northeast, militancy has been destroying the

liberty and peaceful life of law abiding citizens for the last 53 years. Army has been involved in a conflict situation during all these years. Although the Army succeeded in eliminating nearly 38,000 militants they are still active.

NSCN in the Nagaland and ULFA and BODO militants in the states of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh are potent organisations, capable of bringing the state administration to its knees. It is only the Army that has given some semblance of governance in these areas.

It is an irony of fate that notwithstanding the cover of AFSPA, over 300 court cases have been filed against the Army by the families of militants in the state of Assam alone. Situation will be graver, if the AFSPA was revoked.

In that eventuality, unit commanders of the Army will be thinking more about defending themself and their soldiers in courts. Offensive spirit and vigour with which the Indian Army has pulsated during all these years will get diluted and no commanding officer will be able to motivate his soldiers to be offensive against anti-national elements and conduct operations even at the cost of their lives. The likes of Irom Sharmila Chanu, who has been on hunger strike since 2000 for the repealing of the Act, need to ponder what will happen to them when police, magistracy and the administration are absent and Army refusing to come to their help for fear of court cases. Army being the last bastion of government

authority, an act that ensures motivation for a soldier to sacrifice his life for national cause is necessary.

Promote indiscipline The above are the ground realities in the J and K and the states of north-east India. In the prevailing circumstances, there is a need for the Army to remain in these areas and operate firmly and effectively. In the absence of the AFSPA, they will also be helpless and paralysed because the fear of court cases against their actions will continuously haunt them. Removal of the AFSPA will promote indiscipline in the Army as every order of the superior in those extremely challenging circumstances will be subject to mental scrutiny for legality. Situation in these areas is extremely serious, disturbed and very vulnerable to hostile influences from across our borders.

Notwithstanding the agitation by a few elements who are infected with anti-national militant propaganda; and calls by a few politicians who are openly collaborating with the militant organisations, the central government must not remove the AFSPA. The nation owes an obligation to the silently suffering Army.

The writer is former General Officer Commanding in Kashmir Valley and Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

11

Indian army

NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

future wars: T

Meet the buyer – a chance for world-leading South East industries to build international business relationships

here is no substitute for visiting the market.

If you are an exporter looking to expand your business overseas there is every chance you have heard this before – and for forming a rounded impression of what it takes to trade in a foreign market, from first-hand experience of the local business culture, to on-the-spot research and face-to-face meetings with potential clients, it remains sound advice.

However, the next best thing, and with its own advantages, is if prospective clients can come to you.

UKTI South East, with the UKTI Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO), the Security Innovation & Technology Consortium (SITC), and Farnborough Aerospace Consortium (FAC) and Defence and Security Alert (DSA) India, is staging a "Meet the Buyer" event for two of the region’s most successful industries – security and aerospace – on 17 and 18 January 2011.

“Three Continents – Meet the Buyer – Aerospace, Airport and Homeland Security” at Arsenal’s Emirates Stadium in North London is designed to give SMEs a chance to exploit opportunities in India and the USA – key growth markets for both these sectors – and to establish private-sector partnerships, joint ventures and technology transfer agreements.

Not only do dedicated events of this kind save time and the costs of international travel, they offer a chance to meet buyers who come with a predisposition to do business.

The platform provided by the Three Continents event offers access to 50 private-sector decision makers keen to meet UK suppliers and form commercial relationships. Each company registering for the event will be advised of the attending buyers and will have the opportunity to select a co-respondent company online against capability / requirement and objectives, and to pre-book individual 40-minute meetings.

Additional meetings can be booked on the day

and there will be interactive workshops on related subjects.

UKTI South East International Trade Adviser and Security sector specialist John Gordon said: “The whole purpose of the event is to drive opportunities for South East SMEs in key identified markets and help companies cross the business threshold there. It is very much not a one-off occasion, but part of an ongoing, long-term programme of business development support, which began with separate Meet the Buyer events for India and the USA last year, followed by trade missions to both countries designed to help SMEs take advantage of fully researched and validated opportunities “We believe this continuity is vital to help companies forge profitable long-term business relationships, whether through joint ventures and technology partnerships, or on a buyersupplier basis.”

Around 50 per cent of the suppliers who took part in last year’s events are returning for meetings in January.

To date, the India support programme has generated sales worth £30 million to South East SMEs, with one company having opened an Indian factory; while US sales have reached £12.5 million.

A dedicated event website has been set up at www.uktisoutheast.com/meetthebuyer with details of registered suppliers and buyers, so that companies can learn about each other and start a dialogue before they meet next year.

Suppliers and buyers spoke highly of the benefits of last years’ events. Business and technology service company Logica saw it as a “great starter event for our proposed entry to the Indian Market”; and Stonewood Encryption said: “There is no other way that we would be able to enter the US encryption market place – outstanding event.”

Some participants already active in the US

operational doctrines

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Sudhir Sharma

or India were seeking to broaden their reach.

For example, Trilogy Communications Ltd of Hampshire, said: “We are already a supplier to Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, but such organisations are tough to penetrate across the breadth of their activities. This was an ideal setting to do this in.”

From the buyers’ side, Behavioral Recognition Systems of Houston, Texas, remarked that “as a result of your event, I am convinced to open operations in the UK and will be hiring a UK representative with plans to open an office.

Security and aerospace are majority contributors to regional GDP in the South East, which is home to world-leading capacity in both areas. The region accounts for over 80,000 of the 135,000 people employed in Security nationwide (yes) and there is a growing export market. The global Homeland Security market alone is growing at an astonishing rate, and is expected to double its currently estimated US$150 bn worth by 2018. UK security exports rose by 14 per cent in 2008/09 to £1.36 bn.

The Meet the Buyer opportunity is particularly appropriate for suppliers with capabilities in: Aerospace and Airports: ■■ Airline products and services ■■

Aerospace manufacturing

■■

Airport project management, ` products and services

Homeland security: ■■ Security integration into SMART buildings ■■

Aviation passenger screening

■■

Cyber security

■■

Biometrics /Access Control

If you are interested in taking part, call 08452 717 400, or e-mail events@uktisoutheast.com

Among all the ambiguities induced by the possession of nuclear weapons by two of our neighbours – Pakistan and China – there is still a clear window of opportunity for conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold.

China has published tomes (demi-semi officially) that a “limited war” with India could happen. Pakistan is just rearing to go to delink Kashmir preferably with its conventional forces camouflaged in tribal salwarkameez. India does not have a policy of territorial aggrandisement but its war aim must be to liberate its own territory and break the China-Pak nexus in Jammu and Kashmir. It would be a test of India’s politicalmilitary leadership to devise a strategy to achieve that aim before the nuclear boom is lowered.

B

efore we delve into the future operational scenario it would be appropriate to examine the strategic landscape of the Indian subcontinent as the same has a direct bearing on operational parameters.

Till a few years back the cornerstone of Indian strategic thought was based on the premise that, if a war is to be fought it would be a short, swift

and intense conflict, with limited gains, before the big powers forced it to a grinding halt through politico, economic and / or military coercion.

This scenario presupposes that the war would generally be reactive, given the stated moral repugnance of the Indian State to be seen as starting hostilities.

Furthermore the war was planned to be fought under a nuclear backdrop with

an undefined and rather ambiguous nuclear threshold.

As the war was likely to be thrust upon us and conflict termination was to be dictated by powers outside, the desired end state was never lucidly articulated. Consequently all operational thought was focused on high speed of operations and quick

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

13

Indian army

NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

discernable territorial gains. Though there is nothing fundamentally flawed in the need for high speed operations, a disproportionate premium on the same can result in operational imbalance and overstretch, inviting a riposte.

Operational plans and design of battle were often based on time lines rather than desired conflict termination aims.

Greater flexibility As things stand today, fortunately we have come a long way from our past compulsions and limitations.

Our strength and importance as a country across the strategic spectrum is such that we cannot perceive being pressurised to initiate or terminate hostilities at the dictates of another country. Thus the first hypothesis that emerges is, that it is now in the realms of strategic planning to prosecute war in supreme national interest at a time and place of our own choosing, as also to do so with a well thought out end state in mind. At operational level plans need not be too time sensitive and hostilities could be terminated on achieving theatre specific conflict termination aims. This paradigm shift bestows a degree of flexibility to operational level commanders.

Another interesting geopolitical dynamic which merits scrutiny relates to our subcontinental rivals and the world order. The situation as it stands today would suggest that should we go to war with one or both of our adversaries, that, besides routine rhetoric no major country would oppose the war vehemently.

We can thus assume enough strategic space short of the nuclear threshold to fight a just war with a somewhat tolerant public opinion and even tacit international support. Except for the fear of the war spiraling out of control and / or spreading, a number of countries would be secretly happy to see our adversaries brought down a few notches.

Nuclear overhang The second strategic dynamic that needs to be kept in mind is that post World War II, there has never been a direct major conflict between two nuclear powered nations especially where one or the other has transgressed territorial boundaries. In the case of the Indian subcontinent the potential

14

adversaries are nuclear powered with one nation having a stated policy of nuclear ambiguity. Be that as it may the war would need to be fought in the strategic space available below the nuclear threshold. This is highly possible and bold and specific plans should be made to exploit this window.

However nuclear brinkmanship of threats and counter-threats would test the resolve and resilience of the top political and military hierarchy. An incorrect reading of conflict scenario may force the early cessation of hostilities by the victor and of course an overreaction or misreading of the same may result in catastrophic results.

It therefore suggests that the operational scenario of tomorrow must be based on well defined aims, which spell out the level of military potential destruction and limits of territorial ingress desirable. Unless the same is understood at the operational level of a corps, the fluidity of operations and the awesome punch that they carry, an imbalance can suddenly manifest itself setting the scene for a dramatic breakthrough. Whilst in the past this would have been the dream of operational planners, in future this would need control and fine-tuning at strategic level to fit into the overall nuclear equation. This would be a nerve wracking dilemma and demand a high quality intuitive generalship. There is thus an imperative need to train senior commanders in the forgotten skill of operational art.

High casualties Another feature of the future operational stage would be the high level of casualties due to the lethality and accuracy of modern weapons.

Transparency of the battlefield would further enhance the reach and spread of the weapons compounding the casualties. The real time and constant media coverage of the visual horrors of modern war would create major psychological and emotional pressure on the war effort. The political will at this stage would be tested to the limit and would put pressure on the forces to achieve the end state in a quicker timeframe. This would influence the operational design calling for prolonged high tempo operations without rest or refit or an operational pause. This in turn would demand creation of additional inbuilt reserves

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

in men, material and equipment to rapidly recycle and reuse the combat power to keep pace with the relentless tempo of operations.

Information glut The next peculiarity of the future operational scenario is going to be information overload and the ways and means of handling this. Today Google earth has more information than can be handled easily. Imagine the resources available to a modern day operational level commander. Besides small scale satellite imagery, he has air photos, mosaics by high precision day night cameras, UAVs, signal intelligence, human intelligence and much more.

The realtime intelligence data thus generated would be immense and demand a very astute and exceptionally well-honed information filtering process in the shortest possible time.

This is easier said than done as high grade intelligence whets the appetite of most commanders who would like maximum possible inputs before taking difficult decisions. There would thus be a need to put in place a mature, sharp and responsive intelligence set up to run through the fast paced intelligence cycle. Deception and misinformation which is easier in a digitised communication-dependant battlefield would be the order of the day and would further compound the problems of commanders and intelligence staff. Counter- intelligence would therefore demand serious attention at all levels. Strategic intelligence and high grade intelligence relating to nuclear warheads, delivery means and the command and control setup would of course be pivotal to the entire intelligence gathering machinery and get the lion’s share of intelligence gathering assets.

Communication management The next aspect of the future operational scenario relates to frequency management and spectrum allocation. Whilst this aspect looks mundane and unimportant at this stage its devastating effect would be felt when electromagnetic interference (EMI) and cyber attacks paralyse or dilute the range of communications or deceive / jam radars and array of sensors vital in today’s technology dependant weapon systems. We need to be especially chary of our

eastern adversary who has devoted a lot of thought into cyber warfare and electronic counter-measures.

Communications which would be the backbone of the future battlefield will be repeatedly attacked by all available means including hard kills. The operational battlefield communications architecture of tomorrow would need to be robust and many layered to withstand the consistent attacks on their infrastructure. Totally secure. foolproof and toughened communications for the nuclear arsenal would in any case be the sine qua non of a nuclear battlefield.

Pitfalls The rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of both sides of our western borders has resulted in major constriction of space for the use of large scale mechanised forces in all their glory. Except for the desert region which too has its share of problems use of mechanised forces especially armour is going to be on a much lesser scale than is normally associated with the future operational scenario. Our eastern borders in any case do not allow their use in the classical sense.

Air power, precision guided weapons and next generation anti-tank missiles would make use of large scale armour prohibitive. It may therefore need very astute handling and the shaping of the battlefield and airspace may be necessary before major armoured manoeuvres are undertaken. There may thus be more reliance on use of mechanised forces at combat group or maximum at combat command level. Mechanised Infantry on the other hand would be effective and may be at a premium. Another factor to be borne in mind by operational commanders is the threat-in-being that a well positioned and properly shaken out armoured formation poses. This is one force which because of its reach, speed and destructive potential can pose a serious threat to the so called nuclear threshold. Unless as stated earlier the operational directive is lucid and the operational commander in sync with higher game plan a dangerous situation can rapidly develop. This would require synchronisation and coordination at theatre level, thus inhibiting the use of the full combat potential of our superior armoured punch.

Another peculiarity of the future war would be the war aims / target selection.

In the past it was felt that capture of

maximum territory especially well known geographical entities would be advantageous for post war bargaining and also to demonstrate unquestioned victory in eyes of the nation and the world. The nuclear dimension has muddied the waters and now force destruction would be much more desirable than mere territorial victory.

In fact force destruction would arguably have a deeper nuclear threshold as compared to loss of vital territory. It therefore appears that forces would seek to draw out and destroy enemy forces resulting in violent intense clashes with neither side giving up battle till the last. Turning movements and attacking enemy centre of gravity would be the norm, with artillery ordnance being liberally used to pulverise opposing forces. The use of Special Forces to fix the enemy and to disrupt his command and control and destroy vital communication arteries would pay rich dividends. War would be fought 24/7 without any let up or discernible operational pause.

The battlefield will continue to be non-linear with attempts by both sides to tackle various echelons simultaneously.

However the classic breakout will be elusive as opposing forces will be locked in a series of break-in battles due to the lay of ground and well prepared tiered defences.

Peculiarities of terrain On the eastern front progress will be slow due to terrain and vulnerability of axis of maintenance. Attempts to bypass strong defensive positions will be the norm but difficult to execute due transparency of the battlefield and night vision devices, use of artillery in the mountains will be a decisive force multiplier. Infantry will continue to be the predominant arm in all theatres and would in fact be used and reused to the point of exhaustion. Night vision devices would push the pace of war and reduce periods of forced break giving no time to rest or recoup. The need for reserves will manifest in all operational plans and the force which husbands its combat potential and recycles the same prudently, will gain the tactical advantage and succeed in maintaining the momentum of battle.

Air-land battle Despite all efforts and desire by senior commanders synergy of operations by air force and army on the tactical battle

area (TBA) will be difficult to achieve.

The density of air defence assets and hand-held ground-to-air weapons combined with the fluidity and proximity of opposing forces would make close air support difficult and hard to control.

Identification of forces (IFF) with high speed aircraft would be difficult. Battle area interdiction would be more useful and the fight to degrade each other’s air assets would take up most of air effort. Thus classic close air support at operational level on the western front will not be possible in the initial stages.

On the eastern front, air where possible to employ would play a very important role especially for short and long term interdiction as also to attack scarce and axis locked logistic elements. Heavy and medium lift helicopter effort would be a major force multiplier and contribute significantly to the war winning effort.

Operational doctrines Given the geo-political scenario and sagacity of our leaders, an all out conventional war in the near future looks improbable. That it will be fought simultaneously on two fronts even more unlikely. However it is the business of military commanders to be sceptical of good intentions and prepare assiduously for worst case contingencies. Combat power and supporting infrastructure must be built today to fight a successful war on two fronts. Intentions are fickle but potential is permanent. The operational scenario of tomorrow will need constant study and updating, as technology will drive weapons and equipment of the future, necessitating a revisit of operational doctrines. Training and mental conditioning of all, especially officers to understand the nuances of the changing battlefield is imperative. The Indian Army has always shown great flexibility and resilience in face of severe odds, it shall again prevail and be ready to take on any adversary successfully in the future too.

The writer is a graduate of the Staff College at Camberley (UK), and commanded his unit as part of IPKF in Sri Lanka and later J&K. He was Military Adviser, Indian High Commission at London (UK). He retired as the Quarter Master General of the Army, wherein he made major contribution in modernising the logistic chain management of the forces. Decorated twice by the President for his exemplary service and devotion, he is an MPhil in defence studies. He writes on strategic issues and gives lectures on decision making and positivity to the corporate sector.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

15

Indian army

GAMECHANGER

Military diplomacy by India has hitherto been something of a curate’s egg—good in parts. A good example of what is bad is the treatment meted out by China to a very senior Indian General because he commands the defences of Jammu and Kashmir. Must we allow ourselves to be thus humiliated? Yet on the other end of the spectrum is the long-forgotten Somali experience where a coalition of armed personnel from many countries, including India, under the UN flag but overall American command, became targets of the local population for their generally uncouth behaviour. A US Blackhawk helicopter was shot down and its crew dragged around the streets of Mogadishu. When the time to withdraw came Indian troops were among the very few who were allowed to do so with all equipment intact and personnel safe - an example of the vast cache of goodwill India has, especially in the Indian Ocean Region.

I

ndia’s growth has been acknowledged by the world as a peaceful development based on democratic institutions, a pluralist and tolerant polity that respects human rights and freedoms and is based on the rule of law. It is based on the principles of Panchsheel i.e., peaceful coexistence. India publicly acknowledges the need for a world free of nuclear weapons and secure for future generations. Complexities of the region and international relations however make progress a byzantine exercise which requires a mix of all elements of national power. Armies today have multiple roles including war prevention, hence diplomacy and defence the two established pillars of foreign policy, warrant reorientation with changing times.

Soft power projection Historically, India has projected its interests through a process of soft power, based on trade and cultural ties.

It does not covet any territory beyond its own and stirs no apprehension or animosity in the region. Its tradition of promoting peace and amity dates back more than a thousand years in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South East (SE) Asia. Developments postindependence in the neighbourhood should therefore be seen as an aberration as long term interests of India can only be served by regional peace and stability. It is in this context that military diplomacy in particular the Army, can play an increasingly important role in the coming years.

Low-key interaction Military diplomacy is not a new

16

phenomenon, it has been practiced since independence, however its contribution has, in a manner been ‘low key’. This was possibly due to vision of our leaders at independence, the nascent democracy and the understandable anxiety of a military takeover in keeping with what happened in Pakistan. Engagement with ‘friendly foreign countries’ was mainly through training exchanges for all the three Services, with only the Navy so called ‘showing the flag’. This interaction post 9/11 has increased, however, its potential is far from realisation. With maturity of the past sixty-three years and stable democratic institutions, it is now incumbent to use all elements of national power to promote India’s interests. Not doing so will be detrimental to growth specially, as military diplomacy is being extensively pursued by our neighbours.

C. Raja Mohan writing in the Indian Express avers “While the civilian bureaucracy and the political leadership in our Ministry of Defence continue to constrain the Indian military’s engagement with the world, China is consciously promoting it”. In Pakistan’s case, the military has exploited its position to secure every perceived advantage for their nation and today greatly influences their foreign policy.

An asset It must therefore be appreciated that if India is to grow to a great nation status, it must increasingly use military diplomacy as an element of confidence-building and power projection both within the region as also internationally. This has vast scope but requires a major reorientation in all the three Services. More so the Army, which so far has mainly seen its role as

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Military-industrial dividend The other major facet of military diplomacy is arms supply. This builds up dependencies and relationships and greatly contributes to closer ties.

Here too, India has lagged far behind.

Development of an indigenous defence industrial base and export of military hardware is vital for national security.

Excluding China and Pakistan, many of these nations have navies and air forces, or both, however their size is small and it is the Army which is the dominant Service. It therefore follows that merely engaging these countries in the diplomatic and political sphere is not enough and that the Indian Army must play an increased role in building closer ties. Military men generate

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Aditya Singh

protection of the land borders.

Simply put, military diplomacy could be defined as using the resources of the armed forces of a nation to promote its national security interests. Similar to conventional diplomacy, this covers a whole range of activities from training, defence consultations, strategic interactions, protocols, military exchanges, planning for common threats, UN Peacekeeping missions, confidence building measures (CBMs) et al, to bring about amity and avoid conflict. With increased emphasis on conflict prevention, military diplomacy has acquired greater relevance in international relations.

It has vast implications and is another subject all together. This article only covers aspects other than arms supply. It also argues for the increased relevance of the Army. This is not to say that the other services do not have a charter in this regard, but emerging realities in the regional context have to be acknowledged and it is here that the Indian Army can be of immense benefit.

Accretion of national power

Significance in the region

China has adopted this as a State policy and Beijing uses its armed forces to enhance its national power. It has been defined by Yasuhiro as “foreign affairs work performed by defence institutions and armed forces”, or “all diplomatic activities relating to national security and military diplomatic activities”. Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan writes “Military diplomacy does not differ very much from the regular diplomacy in its content in the sense that it includes visits, meetings, exchanges, negotiations, participating in international conferences, treaty signings and exchanges of diplomatic documents. The difference is that all these would essentially be conducted by men in uniform or otherwise civilians in the defence ministries and that the content would be military-oriented. It should however be noted that these activities would be undertaken in tune with the general foreign and security policy guidelines set by the political leadership, but one that would have strategic and military significance”.

An overview of the neighbouring countries testifies to the close involvement of the armed forces mainly, the Army in their socio-political structure. This covers a vast range from leadership and power in Myanmar, tacit control in Pakistan, positions of influence in Nepal and Bangladesh, special role in Sri Lanka and security needs of the island territories in the Indian Ocean. This is also so in South East Asia; Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and also China are countries where the Army has a major contribution in national policy making. To the west in Afghanistan, a well-trained Army is seen as essential to stability. The case with the Central Asian Republics is also similar. The Army had formed part and is now influential in major African governments such as Egypt and Sudan.

It is seen as a stabilising force in African countries like Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania as also other smaller States.

faith amongst themselves and as the Olive Green is ubiquitous, it is only logical that this be encashed to build relationships.

In India the Armed Forces sadly are at the periphery of the national planning process. Hence harnessing this potential and steps to promote the role of the Army in diplomacy will face considerable opposition, specially from the Indian Foreign Service (IFS).

Low level of current involvement of the services in the national security structure notwithstanding, it is considered that there is space for all and time has come for all organs of the State to be involved. More so as given its increasing responsibilities, the IFS today has deficiencies of manpower.

This shortfall is going to increase. It would therefore only be prudent and logical that the Services supplement its efforts, more so as men in olive green form an integral part of the policy structure in most countries of the region.

Increased interaction will open hitherto closed doors, build existing bonds and ensure new levels of engagement.

International partnerships As growing power, India also needs to build up partnerships with major countries of the world. The role of its armed forces was lauded post the tsunami. Prowess was further demonstrated during the evacuation

from Lebanon in 2006. There has been universal acclaim for the actions of the Navy off the coast of Somalia.

International protocols to counter global threats such as terrorism, piracy, environmental challenges or natural disasters, demand regular interaction and interoperability. In addition to this are humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. In recent years there has been increased interaction with the USA, Russia, UK. However this needs to be extended to cover all other major powers such as Japan, Australia, South Africa, Brazil. It must also extend to the Middle East where over four million Indians reside.

According to the recent survey of Chinese military power by the Pentagon, Beijing uses its armed forces as an instrument of diplomacy to enhance China’s national power. The report notes that the military diplomacy of the PLA allows “increased operational experience both within and beyond Asia and access to foreign military management practices, operational doctrine and training methods.” According to Qian Lihua, the director general of the foreign affairs office of the ministry of national defence, China’s military diplomacy during 2006-10 has “witnessed constant expansion with more objects, wider fields and greater depth, forming an all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging landscape.” Qian reports that up till now “the People’s Republic

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

17

Indian army

GAMECHANGER

of China has established military relations with 150-plus countries and set up the military attache offices in 112 countries while 102 countries have set up their military attache offices in China.” He adds that “PLA dispatches about 170-plus military delegations to visit foreign countries and receives 200-plus foreign military delegations every year.”

The PLA also sent 1,200-plus military students to study in nearly 100 military academies of 30-plus countries. India sadly is nowhere by comparison.

The way forward While the thrust for military diplomacy has to be tri-Service, the Army for reasons mentioned above, as also the fact that concerns and issues in most countries of the region are similar and predominantly land-force based, must play greater role. In the past six decades, the Indian Army has acquired a vast range of operational experience from internal security to full scale conventional war. This can be of benefit to all. Thus whether it be training, peacekeeping operations, seminars, joint exercises, humanitarian missions, security related projects, or even adventure treks or expeditions, the scope is vast. All this requires a strategic review in close concert with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

The increase has to be exponential.

It is bound to bring out issues of training and exposure, however given the Army’s ability to adapt, it is well within its capability.

Dispassionate reappraisal What is needed is an open mind, fresh thought and a determined resolve to overcome bureaucratic and political inertia. The Navy created its foreign cooperation cell under an admiral years ago. Time is long past for the Army to establish a similar directorate as also a matching interservice organisation in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Cross postings of officers of the IFS and the services in both the MEA and MoD must now become a reality. Planning must include a specific need-based thrust for each country. Each nation to be treated as a special entity and expertise developed.

Representation in foreign missions which, over the years have been cut citing economic constraints, must be enhanced. This is specially so in the

18

case of neighbouring countries and the IOR. These increased numbers will not only demonstrate a greater presence in keeping with India’s changing status, but more importantly, allow detailed interaction with the host nation. A proactive approach and presence of Indian Army officers at all their events will also demonstrate the sense of importance accorded by India to each nation irrespective of its size and consequently, build bonds.

Officers and other ranks could also be deputed for specific project related works such as setting up a baffle range, training facilities, organising seminars and other events. Amongst others, the successful road construction project in Afghanistan and the airbase in Tajikistan testify to the prowess of the Indian Army and have earned immense goodwill.

Capability development It is appreciated all this would require considerable training and resources.

Officers would have to be tutored to reorient to a diplomatic role. Increased funding would be required, however payoffs in terms of closer relationships which in turn contribute to national security will justify the effort. In case of immediate neighbours this will also simplify border management, cut down physical deployments and promote growth and development. As stated earlier, this would need a major reorientation in both the MoD and MEA and far greater understanding between these two ministries. Existing engagements need to be enhanced and new fields explored. Priorities should be defined and followed up. Capabilities have been built-up over the years in the form of training teams such as those in Bhutan, Botswana, Cambodia and Seychelles. These have generated immense goodwill and faith. Thus models exist and this potential can easily be exploited. There is much to be learnt from the Chinese experience where this is being pursued at a breathtaking pace.

and constitute major challenges. Each needs a special approach in which the Indian Army can and must play a role. Other countries are smaller in size and should be closely engaged to curb the influence of inimical powers. In their case too, land borders dictate closer Army-to-Army contacts. Similar confidence-building steps are required for the IOR and South East Asia. Here however, these must be in close concert with the Navy. Specially any security partnerships with the island nations.

Relations with powers outside the region would be dictated by foreign policy objectives, regional security requirements and needs for interoperability. These would primarily be in the nature of military exchanges, discussions and exercises.

Broad spheres in this regard are given in the succeeding paragraphs.

Each category of nations would require different emphasis which in turn, would determine pattern of engagement.

Training Training at all levels has always been the basis of all military interaction with friendly foreign countries. The scope and numbers need to be greatly boosted and where required, supported in financial terms. New fields such as counter-insurgency and asymmetric war, counter-terrorism, information war, common concerns of organised crime, humanitarian missions need to be introduced. This should include training at the NCO level in the junior leader academies at Belgaum and Bareilly. All trainees especially those from the neighbourhood, must also be exposed to India’s growth with diversity and a special effort made to cultivate each and every one as a well-wisher. Another field of India’s expertise is peacekeeping missions. The USI has introduced UN peacekeeping cadres, these need to greatly augmented and countries encouraged to participate.

Priorities

Sporting, adventure contacts

Conduct of military diplomacy specially that of the Indian Army should be under three categories; the neighbourhood, within the region and externally, in that order of priority.

Within the neighbourhood Pakistan and China present their own dynamics

An effort was made in the mid-90s with the HIMEX (Himalyan Expedition) series. This was not followed up.

Another high mark was the conduct of the World Military Games at Hyderabad in 2007. Given India’s varied terrain, availability of infrastructure

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

and emerging prowess, sports and adventure activities create a new realm for interaction. The advantage is that it involves both men and women, officers and enlisted personnel, as also support staff and senior officers in keeping with needs of protocol. Annual features both, bi- and multi- lateral must be organised. Interaction with increased frequency be undertaken in the border regions, specially where it is logistically feasible, e.g., across the borders with Nepal, Myanmar or Bangladesh.

Other exchanges There has to be a thrust in exchange of military delegations. These should comprise not only senior officers, but also the middle and junior rungs. In the past this has been undertaken in respect of Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka but numbers are insignificant. This needs a greater push. The Indian Army has support infrastructure in all states and major towns.

Similarly, cultural or religious exchanges need to be enhanced.

Buddhist shrines hold great significance for soldiers from Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The larger numbers that visit India, the greater will be the levels of mutual confidence and friendship.

Larger number of seminars and expositions on common concerns and regional issues, structured around interoperability must be organised. Such events similar to the ‘cultural festivals’, must regularly be conducted in friendly foreign countries to coincide with days of national importance. Given the stature of the Army in most countries of the region, an exposition of the Indian Army’s role in nation building or the manner it ‘wins hearts and minds’ is bound to generate interest and amity. Conduct of medical camps in remote districts as was the recent case in Sri Lanka, form part of this process.

Joint exercises Joint exercises range from small cross-border coordination mechanisms to large multilateral exercises in the IOR. There are bilateral exercises both within India and abroad. All these are structured to increase understanding and improve interoperability. They form an integral part of the CBMs. There is a perception that our MoD

mandarins frown on frequent military exercise and cancel them arbitrarily at short notice. Such manoeuvres form an essential part of building relationships and must be pursued vigourously.

As clarified above, the degree of involvement of the Indian Army would be greater with the neighbours and in the region. Exercises with others would primarily be tri-Service in nature. The extent and schedules need careful planning years in advance and must be structured within a long-term context. This coordination will have to be undertaken under a pro-active MoD with each Service putting up its plans.

Security partnerships Some nations especially those within the IOR cannot for domestic and other reasons, maintain defence forces of the strength needed. Given the relevance of asymmetric and other threats, India must be partner to their security.

The 1988 and 2006 interventions in Maldives are examples. Building such partnerships involves close interworking of their land and other forces with the Indian Army and playing out all unconventional scenarios.

The expertise of Indian Army Engineers and the Border Roads Task Force in construction and other security related projects as mentioned earlier, is yet another field for exploitation.

Pakistan and China The two countries which pose special challenges are Pakistan and China more so, because of their openly stated all-weather friendship. The Army in Pakistan dictates national policy and is in de facto control. Despite this, very little attempt had been made to establish Army-to-Army contacts.

Indian and Pakistani officers meet cordially abroad and CBMs such as the ceasefire are holding out. It is therefore considered that notwithstanding the current state of relations, that time has now come for the Indian Army to reach out to its counterpart and establish another track to progress ties.

It is bound to be a long and torturous process, but if the Pakistan Army can be convinced that India is not a threat as they imagine it to be, peace and tranquility could possibly ensue. A start could be made with invitations to seminars of common interest such

as counter-terrorism or disastermanagement; annual functions such as passing out parades; Army Day et al. Logical realities dictate that sooner rather than later, armies will have to build contacts if relations have to normalise. The case with China is equally complex. The recent visa issue notwithstanding, there have, in the recent past been engagements between the PLA and Indian Army at different levels. Border meetings continue.

All this must be taken forward and engagements restored to ensure peace and tranquillity on the border.

Conclusion The scope for military diplomacy by the Indian Army, specially in the region is vast. Steps since independence though significant by themselves, fall far short of its potential in building relations and generating mutual confidence.

Military diplomacy, conducted as part of India’s foreign policy objectives, will act as a significant catalyst in strengthening its ties. Beijing and Islamabad have been cashing on India’s lethargic approach in this arena.

India, especially its Army therefore needs to pursue military diplomacy in a proactive manner in order to create strategic space for itself.

Any neglect will be to its peril and India will lose out in its own neighbourhood. Major reorientation by the MEA, MoD as also the Services to a joint approach keeping national security objectives in mind is therefore a compelling need. The expense and effort in pursuing these larger strategic interests will result in peace which in turn will contribute to growth and well-being of the nation.

The writer retired on 30 September 2007 as GOC-in-C, Southern Command, the largest and senior-most Command of the Indian Army. Prior to this he had been C-in-C, Andaman & Nicobar Command from Jan 2005 in the aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004.

In this capacity he was also the Vice Chairman and Operational Head of the Integrated Relief Command responsible for the emergency relief and rehabilitation of the ravaged Islands. He now devotes time to strategic and national security issues, looking after educational establishments and building institutions.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

19

Indian army

VALOUR

When fighters give their very best, professionally, in the heat of battle is an indicator that the leadership has been good.

They have been motivated, or “primed”, if you may, to do what somebody else has planned for execution. The Indian Army has given a new connotation to US General “Ike” Eisenhower’s very apt definition of leadership on the battlefield. It is that the commander “leads from the front” by personal example. In the episodes mentioned below there is the incomparable Sam Manekshaw who reached the pinnacle of leadership as Field Marshal. And there is 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal at the very bottom of the ladder of leadership in the Indian Army. There can be no better examples of military leadership.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Singh

"Leadershi p is the art of getting someone else to do something you want done beca use he wants to do it."” - General Dwight D. Eisenhower

T

here are many definitions of military leadership, but the one quoted above is perhaps the most succinct and easily understood.

It also captures the whole essence of military leadership - getting someone else (usually those who are led) to do what you want done not because they have been told to do it, but because they themselves want to do it. In other words, they have been motivated to do it, by the leader. This is the fundamental feature of military leadership and one that sets it apart from all other forms of leadership. Military leadership is directly related to morale, a peculiarly military attribute that is difficult to describe but very easy to gauge. Not surprisingly, morale is one of the ten principles of war and a battle winning factor that is difficult to define or quantify.

Indian examples The history of military leadership is as old as human civilisation.

Fortunately, we have many examples in Indian mythology and history, some of which will be used to explain the concept in this article. The two most well known epics - Ramayana and Mahabharata - contain several examples of military leadership and their effect on motivation and morale. Ram had no legal authority over the monkeys of Kishkindha, yet all of them, especially Hanuman, became his followers and helped him in defeating Ravana, the demon king of Lanka. Lord Krishna was not a military leader, but his words

20

of encouragement that motivated a demoralised Arjun on the battlefield must surely rank as one of the finest examples of military leadership.

had happened many times in the past.

Surat Singh was then passed over and some others, who were junior, were cleared.

Another feature that distinguishes military leadership from all others is the focus on action rather than on results. A corporate leader must show profits and a political leader must win elections to be well-known. In contrast, military leaders often win renown for valour, rather than victory. India’s most famous military leaders - Porus, Prithviraj Chauhan, Rana Pratap and Rani Laxmi Bai - lost their battles, but are still revered for their courage and fortitude.

When Sam returned to his company in the evening, he found an eerie silence, which was most unusual, since Sikhs are noisy and boisterous by nature.

Soon, his senior Junior Commissioned Officer, Subedar Balwant Singh came to his tent and told him the reason.

Surat Singh had come to know that he had been overlooked for promotion and had declared that he would kill his company commander, for not recommending him. He had been disarmed and bound, awaiting Sam’s return. On hearing the story, Sam immediately ordered that the company should fall in and Surat Singh marched up to him. Within a few minutes, the company was formed up in a hollow square, facing a table and a chair. After Sam had taken his seat, the offender was marched up. During war, mutiny and cowardice are punishable by death and the men knew this. After the charge had been read out, Sam took out a pistol and walked up to Surat Singh. Handing over the pistol to the burly Sikh, he told him to do what he had threatened to do. Surat Singh immediately broke down and started begging for mercy.

Sam gave him a sound slap and told him that if he lacked the guts to kill, he should not make such statements in future. He dismissed the case and ordered that Surat Singh’s weapon should be returned to him.

Manekshaw mantra Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw is one our most well known military leaders.

An incident from his early life illustrates his leadership qualities that proved crucial in his subsequent career. In 1942, Sam was commanding a company in 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment (FFR), also known as the 54th Sikhs, in Burma.

There was a large number of casualties among non-commissioned officers, and a conference was held by the Commanding Officer, to select suitable men for promotion as corporals and sergeants. There was a soldier called Surat Singh in Sam’s company, who was considered a ‘bad hat’. When his name came up and Sam was asked for his recommendation, he said that it was no use promoting him, since he would lose his stripes within a few days as

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

morale and motivation

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

21

Indian army

VALOUR

Sam thought that this was the end of the episode and retired to his tent.

However, after some time Subedar Balwant Singh again came in and told Sam that he had committed a mistake in letting off Surat Singh, who would certainly kill him during the night, since his weapon had been returned to him.

Sam sent for Surat Singh and in front of the JCO, told him that he would now work as his orderly and should sleep outside his tent. He dismissed him, after ordering him to wake him up at 5.30 in the morning with a cup of tea and hot water for his shave. That night, Sam could not sleep a wink out of fear. But he knew that if the men came to know that he was afraid, he would never be able to command them. Next morning, at 5.30, Surat Singh entered his tent with a mug of tea and hot water for his shave.

For the rest of the war, Surat Singh followed Sam like a puppy and became one of the most disciplined soldiers in his company.

Guts in battle Another military leader who motivated his command to an extraordinary degree is Lieutenant General Hanut Singh. The morale and loyalty and motivation of the unit was visibly seen during the Battle of Basantar in 1971, when Hanut was commanding 17 Horse, popularly known as the Poona Horse, an elite cavalry regiment of the Indian Army. During fierce tank battles on 16 and 17 December, the Poona Horse destroyed 50 enemy tanks, losing 13 of its own. In the Battle of Basantar, one of Pakistan’s oldest and proudest cavalry regiments, 13 Lancers, was decimated while another, 31 Cavalry, was crippled. It was during this action that Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, a young officer with barely six months service, sacrificed his life and was awarded a Param Vir Chakra. The incident is now a legend and brings out the fierce sense of loyalty that Hanut inspired in his command.

During the battle, Major Amarjit Bal, Officer Commanding B Squadron, who had only two of his troops with him, requested for reinforcements. The Squadron second-in-command, Captain V. Malhotra, was ordered to reinforce B Squadron with two troops. Malhotra immediately took off, with Number 3 Troop under Avtar Ahlawat and

22

Number 4 Troop under Arun Khetarpal.

With their guns blazing, the six tanks rushed towards the enemy and shot up several enemy tanks. In their exuberance, these tanks of A Squadron raced ahead of the positions occupied by B Squadron and had to be pulled back in line by Hanut, on the radio. They had barely got into fire positions when the main attack by the enemy was delivered and they were smack in the middle of it. Whereas three tanks managed to find some cover, the three being commanded

by Malhotra, Ahlawat and Khetarpal were out in the open.

Very soon, Malhotra’s tank broke down and that of Ahlawat was shot up. Now only Arun Khetarpal was left in the fray. Hanut had just passed a net call on the radio, ordering “all tanks will fight it out from where they are; no tank will move back even an inch”. Arun’s tank had received a hit, but it had ricocheted. Now he received a second hit and the tank caught fire. Malhotra ordered him to abandon his tank, but Arun, realising that he was the only one left, who could stop the enemy, refused, saying “my gun is still functioning. I will get the remaining lot.” When Malhotra insisted that he abandon his tank or pull back, Arun switched off his radio set.

The driver, Prayag Singh, remonstrated with Arun, saying that it would take them only a few minutes to pull back, put out the fire, and rejoin the battle.

Arun replied “Didn’t you hear the CO’s transmission. No tank will pull back even an inch.”

By this time most of the enemy squadron had been destroyed, but four or five tanks were still left.

Arun systematically began knocking them out and the last tank he hit was that of Major Nissar, the squadron commander, at a range of barely 75 metres. At this stage, his own tank suffered a fourth hit, killing the radio operator and severely wounding Arun and the gunner. The driver, showing great presence of mind, reversed his tank behind cover and evacuated the gunner to another tank. Though he was himself wounded, he tried to pull Arun out of the tank, with the help of the crew of another tank. In the process, the gallant officer breathed his last.

The PH spirit Arun Khetarpal’s act of supreme sacrifice was more than an act of

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

personal courage, and valour. It was a manifestation of ‘The PH Spirit’, which Hanut had inculcated amongst his officers. Twenty years later, when Hanut wrote the book Fakhr-e-Hind, he dedicated it to “The PH Spirit”, which, according to him, is ‘an intangible compendium of many qualities that defies description, but infuses every Poona Horseman and guides and sustains him both in peace and in war.’ In simpler terms, it is a rare combination of comradeship, loyalty and total dedication to the profession of arms. Arun’s refusal to abandon his tank, at grave personal risk, on the grounds that the CO had forbidden such a course of action, is a manifestation of the fierce sense of loyalty which Hanut commanded from his subordinates.

It is such a feeling of mutual trust and loyalty, which wins battles and the ability to inspire it is the true hallmark of a leader, which Hanut undeniably was.

A measure of Hanut’s leadership and its effect on his subordinates can be gauged from the respect and loyalty he still commands, two decades after his retirement. He lives in Dehradun, in relative seclusion and spartan simplicity. Many years ago, Lieutenant General Ajai Singh, who was later Governor of Assam, explained the unique bonds that still exist between Hanut and his subordinates. “If Hanut were to telephone and tell me that he wants me to meet him in Dehradun or Jaipur or wherever, I will just go, without a second thought. He need not tell me the reason and neither will I ask. I will just go.”

The above examples clearly bring out the role of military leadership in sustaining morale and motivating men to give their lives, without a second thought.

The epics of Saragarhi and Rezangla are a tribute not only to the valour of the Sikhs and Kumaonis who died fighting, but the leadership of the commanders, Havildar Ishar Singh and Major Shaitan Singh, who sustained their morale in the face of heavy odds and motivated them to lay down their lives, almost to the last man.

The writer served in the Army for 35 years, his last appointment being Chief Signal Officer of the Western Army. In November 2000 he joined the Cabinet Secretariat, (R&AW), where he served up to June 2004, when he retired from government service. He has authored five books including India's External Intelligence - Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2007.

Indian army

DEMILITARISATION

The demands for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the glacier began soon after the death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who had ordered the deployment in April 1984 on military advice that the Soltoro Range would be the best place to stop Pakistani adventurism. It may not have any strategic importance for India because it was a reactive deployment meant to prevent a deeper ingress but for Pakistan it was life and death to grab as much of Jammu and Kashmir as possible and remains so to date because it is linked to a final solution of the Kashmir issue to its advantage. No treaty or confidence building measure has survived that ambition, not even the UN resolutions that it swears by.

T

he Indo-Pak rapprochement process has been floundering for almost two years and is in serious need of some resuscitation.

Though the two prime ministers met at Sharm el-Sheikh in mid-July 2009 and a joint statement was issued, the pressures of domestic politics forced the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to once again reiterate that the only negotiations that were possible with Pakistan were about bringing to justice the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks. Quite obviously, the two countries have come a long way from the time about three years ago when it was being whispered in the corridors of power in Delhi that India and Pakistan were about to conclude an agreement on the “final” settlement of the Kashmir dispute. This agreement was said to have been negotiated on the back channels by the prime minister’s special envoy Mr. Satinder Lambah with Mr. Tariq Aziz, his Pakistani counterpart.

Members of the foreign policy and defence establishments as well as the strategic community in both the countries realise that it is in the best interests of both to resolve all outstanding disputes as early as possible and live in peace and harmony with each other so that the two governments can concentrate their energies on much needed socio-economic development.

Hence, it is inevitable that the stalled rapprochement process will be resumed and measures will be initiated to institute confidence building measures at the diplomatic and military levels.

24

Perhaps the two issues that are the easiest to tackle are the demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier conflict zone and the Sir Creek maritime boundary dispute. The defence secretaries of India and Pakistan had met at Islamabad on April 6 and 7, 2007, to discuss Siachen and Sir Creek but had failed to make further headway. While Pakistan insisted that there must be some tangible progress on Kashmir for the rapprochement to gather momentum, India continued to reiterate that it is necessary to first build confidence by resolving relatively less intractable problems. President Barack Obama said much the same thing during his recent visit to India.

Roadblocks While offering a treaty of “peace, friendship and security” to Pakistan in March 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had hinted that issues like the dispute over the Siachen glacier region and the boundary dispute in Sir Creek could be resolved soon. Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister, Khurshid Ahmed Kasuri, had claimed that discussions to demilitarise the Siachen conflict zone, as a prelude to a final agreement to extend the Line of Control (LoC) beyond map reference NJ 9842, had made substantial progress towards reaching an agreement.

However, the Indian side had been reticent and Defence Minster A. K. Antony, who visited Siachen on May 5, 2007, had gone so far as to say that there is no question of progress on demilitarisation unless Pakistan agreed

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

peace at

Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

to authenticate the forward positions of Indian troops. The Indo-Pak peace process needs a showpiece agreement if it is to be revived and carried forward successfully. Only an agreement to demilitarise the Siachen conflict zone could provide the fillip that is necessary.

Strategic importance?

Since April 1984, Indian troops have been deployed at the Saltoro Ridge to deny the Siachen Glacier to the adversary. The initial deployment was undertaken to thwart an impending Pakistan army move to occupy the Saltoro Ridge that summer. The key question that policy makers on both the sides must ask is whether Siachen has major strategic significance that justifies prolonged occupation, or are the two nations fighting over an icy wasteland merely for jingoistic and chauvinistic reasons? In his book Siachen: Conflict Without End, Lt. Gen. V. R. Raghavan (Retd.), a former Indian DGMO, has written: “The (Siachen) theatre of conflict, as is now widely accepted, did not offer strategic advantages… It is clear that neither India nor Pakistan wished the Siachen conflict to assume its lasting and expensive dimensions.” To justify a prolonged conflict, a piece of land must provide significant military advantage and open up options for seeking major military gains through war. It should either deny the adversary an avenue to launch strategic-level offensive operations to capture sensitive territory or resources, or offer the home side a launch pad for such a purpose.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

25

Indian army

DEMILITARISATION

Alternatively, for a land mass to be considered strategically significant, it must be politically or economically important. The neighbouring cities of Amritsar and Lahore are politically important for India and Pakistan, respectively. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were economically important to France and Germany due to the huge iron ore reserves that

and other telecom equipment, would need to be dumped over two to three summer seasons before a worthwhile military offensive could be launched through this difficult terrain. Since a major road cannot be built over a moving sheet of ice in what is perhaps the most treacherous mountainous terrain in the world, all logistics preparations by the adversaries would

difficult Chalunka-Thoise approach from Skardu while simultaneously attacking into the Kargil sector to cut off Ladakh. If operations along this approach to Thoise, astride the Shyok river, could be successfully conducted by Pakistan, the Siachen area would be automatically cut off. Hence, militarily, it is more important for India to defend this axis in the Turtok sector

Externally, Pakistan faces strident international criticism for not doing enough in the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. Dr. A. Q. Khan’s revelations and the credible information that his proliferation activities were carried out at the behest of the Pakistan army have further damaged Pakistan’s standing in the international community. Under these circumstances, Pakistan can ill-afford to break international agreements like an agreement to demilitarise the Siachen conflict zone these provinces had and several wars were fought to gain control over them.

Siachen does not qualify as an area of strategic importance on any of these grounds though it has now become a politically sensitive issue. Some Indian analysts do believe that the Siachen tract provides contiguity between the Gilgit-Baltistan areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the areas occupied by China across the Karakoram Pass on the Karakoram Range and that, hence it is of strategic significance to Pakistan. While this is true, the value of this argument is tempered by the fact that China and Pakistan have already built the strategic Karakoram Highway through the Khunjerab Pass north of the Siachen tract through the Shaksgam Valley which was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China under an agreement of March 1963 and additional contiguity through some of the most difficult terrain in the world will not confer major strategic advantage.

have to be undertaken by employing large transport helicopters. These slow-moving monsters would be sitting ducks for the fighter jets of the Indian Air Force and for Special Forces equipped with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.

Better options Even if one were to grant the possibility of a joint China-Pak offensive into Ladakh, however remote the probability may be in the prevailing geo-political environment, better options are available to both the countries to plan and execute their offensives such that the Indian army

rather than fight at Siachen itself.

Cost of conflict Although a ceasefire has been in place since November 25, 2003 and there are now no battle casualties, even at the peak of fighting in the 1980s and 1990s, maximum casualties on both the sides were because of medical reasons due to the harsh terrain and climatic conditions. The lack of oxygen at heights between 18,000 and 20,000 feet and prolonged periods of isolation are a lethal combination and result in pulmonary oedema, frostbite and other serious complications. Besides, they take a heavy psychological toll.

Pak-China pincer Many Indian analysts have made militarily unsustainable projections about the possibility of a China-Pak pincer movement over the Karakoram Range and the Saltoro Ridgeline into northern Ladakh with a view to capturing Leh. Such exaggerated apprehensions are truly amazing as these fail to take into account the lack of a road axis to mount and sustain a major offensive logistically. Thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, oil and lubricants and other supplies, including rations, clothing items for the extreme climatic conditions prevailing at Siachen and spares and batteries for radio sets

26

is unbalanced at the operational level.

China could develop its operations using the Demchok road along the Indus river as well as along the Chushul axis and Pakistan could plan to advance along the relatively less

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

While these casualties are now better managed due to early evacuation, improvements in medical science and the establishment of forward medical facilities, they can never be completely eliminated.

The economic cost of maintaining an infantry brigade group at Siachen to guard the desolate super-high altitude mountain passes and approaches leading to them from the western slopes of the Saltoro Ridge has been estimated to range between Rs. 3.0 to 3.5 crore per day - Rs. 1,000 to 1,200 crore annually.

The costs are high because the logistics tail is long, the only road ends at the Base Camp close to the snout of Nubra river where the almost 80-km glacier ends and a large number of infantry posts can be maintained only by light helicopters that air-drop supplies with attendant losses, as recoveries are often less than 50 per cent. There have been occasions when a Cheetah helicopter has been able to carry a single Jerrican of kerosene in each sortie. The frequent turnover of troops adds to the costs as a battalion can be stationed at the Saltoro Ridge for a maximum of six months.

Induction and training costs are also fairly high. Though the Pakistanis are relatively better off due to the lower heights on the western spurs of the Saltoro on which their troops are holding defensive positions and their shorter lines of communication to Dansam and Skardu, the weather Gods are equally unkind on both the sides of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). In mid-March 2007, five Pakistani soldiers had perished in an avalanche.

Senseless war a

Both the governments must make dispassionate politico-military

assessment of the costs of contesting and defending the Siachen Glacier and the costs of the conflict in terms of human lives and material resources.

Dr. Stephen Cohen, a well-known and respected Washington-based South Asia analyst, has described the Siachen conflict as a fight between two bald men over a comb. In his view, “Siachen… is not militarily important… They (Indian and Pakistani armies) are there for purely psychological reasons, testing each other’s ‘will’.” This test of the will has gone on for a long time and both the sides have proved their resilience though at great cost. It was a mistake for both the sides to have occupied the Saltoro Ridge - if the Pakistan army had not responded to the Indian attempts to occupy the passes on the Saltoro, in all likelihood, the Indians would have withdrawn at the end of the summer. It is time now to rectify that error.

its “aggression” without insisting on legitimising its illegal occupation through the demarcation of present positions. A glimmer of hope was provided by news reports two years ago that Pakistan is willing to let India annex maps with the demilitarisation agreement showing India’s forward posts on the Saltoro Ridge without prejudice to Pakistan’s stated position but that Pakistan will not authenticate the marked maps. However, official sources have denied that Pakistan had made any such commitment. It should be possible to persuade Pakistan of the wisdom of acquiescing to the attachment of Indian maps showing the AGPL as annexures to the agreement without prejudice to Pakistan’s stated position on the course of the LoC beyond NJ 9842.

Entrenched mindsets

After Pakistan’s treachery in Kargil in 1999, the Indian army’s advice to the government that the AGPL must be jointly verified and demarcated before demilitarisation is given effect, is balanced, pragmatic and completely justified military advice. However, Pakistan’s military capacity to grab and hold on to vacated Indian positions after the demilitarisation agreement comes into effect needs to be carefully evaluated. In case Pakistan occupies any of the posts vacated by India, it will be a breach of an international agreement that will push Pakistan into a corner as an international pariah. Pakistan is passing through

Both the sides have been finding it difficult to overcome deeply entrenched negotiation mindsets and are unable to look for innovative and creative approaches. India insists that the present forward positions of both the armies on the Saltoro Range along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) should be demarcated so that there is a reference point in case a dispute arises in future. Pakistan’s position is that by suddenly occupying the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier, India violated the 1972 Shimla Agreement and must, therefore, undo

Kargil treachery

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

27

Indian army

DEMILITARISATION

turbulent times. Its polity has been torn asunder by an uprising in NWFP, FATA and Balochistan and a jihadi siege within. Externally, Pakistan faces strident international criticism for not doing enough in the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan.

Dr. A. Q. Khan’s revelations and the credible information that his proliferation activities were carried out at the behest of the Pakistan army have further damaged Pakistan’s standing in the international community. Under these circumstances, Pakistan can ill-afford to break international agreements like an agreement to demilitarise the Siachen conflict zone.

Modus vivendi India should insist on building a clause into the demilitarisation agreement that in case of a clear military violation of the agreement, both sides reserve the right to take whatever action they deem fit, including offensive military measures.

Simultaneously with the withdrawal of its troops from the glacial heights, India should create and maintain suitably structured reserves for counter-action across the LoC at a point of its choosing.

These quick reaction teams should have air assault capability with sufficient assets for air maintenance. They should be stationed in Ladakh, acclimatised for launching operations in high altitude and should be maintained at a high state of readiness. The Indian Air Force must equip itself with suitable surveillance and ground attack means to detect and attack Pakistani intrusions. These reserves would also be handy for intervention on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the border with China should it ever become necessary.

Science park Soon after a political agreement to demilitarise the Siachen conflict zone is reached, the disengagement process can begin with the Indian and Pakistani armies negotiating its basic framework.

The two DGMOs, assisted by civilian representatives from the MEA and the MoD, can together chair a Joint Working Group (JWG) to finalise the modalities of the disengagement and monitoring process. This JWG should decide the extent of the area to be included in the demilitarised zone and the stages of demilitarisation. The JWG

28

should also work out the stages and the time frame for each stage of the process of disengagement to be completed. It should be possible for the two sides to agree to demilitarise the area over a period of two summers.

The demilitarised zone north of NJ 9842 should be free of all military and paramilitary personnel. The demilitarisation process can begin from the northern sub-sectors that have the highest posts and proceed systematically to the south. Infantry personnel and artillery observation post parties should destroy their bunkers and other weapons emplacements after vacating them. The gun and mortar positions can be vacated simultaneously. Where it is not possible to take the guns back, these will need to be destroyed in situ. The base camps and the forward logistics camps on both the sides and the staging camps on the Indian side will have to be the last to be demilitarised due to the difficulty of the terrain in these areas. Some of the camps that have good fiberglass huts can be left intact for subsequent use by mountaineering expeditions and by the teams of international scientists who may be given access when the Glacier and its surrounding areas are declared a ‘science park’.

Monitoring of the disengagement process to ensure compliance with the demilitarisation agreement can be done to mutual satisfaction by using national technical means such as aerial and satellite imagery. Today, aerial reconnaissance through manned fixed wing and helicopter sorties, side-looking airborne radars and UAVs flying well within each country’s airspace, provide viable means to monitor disengagement and detect intrusions.

Certain ground-based sensors that are suitable for the terrain and climatic conditions obtaining in the area can also be used. The monitoring process could be initially unilateral and could slowly graduate to joint and cooperative monitoring with a jointly manned monitoring centre established at the LoC between Chalunka and Siari on the south bank of the Shyok river.

On the final completion of the demilitarisation process, an international “science park” could be established at Siachen Glacier to promote the study of Himalayan glaciers and to take regular measurements for

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

monitoring climate change. Dr. Saleem Ali of the University of Vermont, USA, the originator of the ides of the Karakoram Peace Park Initiative, has done some seminal work in this regard and both the governments could benefit from his writing and activism.

The Siachen Glacier zone could also be opened up for international mountaineering expeditions in a step by step manner as both the militaries gain in confidence in monitoring and verification. International help would be necessary to clean up the environmental damage caused over almost three decades of conflict and the dumping and disposal of warlike stores in the area.

Genuine rapprochement The Siachen Glacier and the mountain ranges surrounding it have very little strategic significance.

Therefore, the continued military occupation of the area by both India and Pakistan is counter-productive and is a retrograde step for pursuing a genuine rapprochement process. It would be more appropriate to demilitarise the area as a prelude to negotiations on the extension of the LoC beyond NJ 9842. After demilitarisation has been successfully completed, the Siachen DMZ can be declared a ‘science park’.

Environmental cleaning will need to be undertaken as a high priority task so that the mess left by 25 years of military occupation can be cleared up.

The demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone will act as a confidence building measure of immense importance. For India, it is a low-risk option to test Pakistan’s long-term intentions for peace. It is, therefore, an idea whose time has come. Indian and Pakistani leaders need to find the political will necessary to accept ground realities. Trust begets trust and it will be well worth taking a political and military risk to give peace a chance.

It is time the Indian government began the process of building a national consensus around this important bilateral measure.

The actual negotiations for the demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone would be best conducted by the two militaries, which have a history of standing by mutually concluded agreements.

The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, India.

Indian army

SYNERGY

It has come to be described as the benchmark for valour. Rightly too because the terrain is unbelieveably difficult and to dislodge an entrenched enemy from heights that gave him all the advantages of observation and inaccessibility required all the professionalism and guts that any military could muster. The Indian Army did that and more as the scenario developed from the discovery of the invasion to the preparation to contain the intrusion, evict the personnel of the Pakistan Army Northern Light Infantry and then ensure that no further intrusions could take place.

General Pervez Musharraf’s perfidy lay exposed to the world. It was nehle pe dehla!

T

hroughout independent India’s history, in all the conflicts that India has been involved, the Indian Army has been called upon to bring to exhibit its awesome firepower to decimate India’s enemies on the battlefield. Drawing on their priceless heritage and proud of their glorious traditions, the Army has always risen to the occasion. It can be claimed with the greatest conviction that the Kargil conflict was no exception.

Kargil, a silent valley in the lap of rocky mountains has been making headlines during all the Indo-Pak skirmishes since Partition. Once known for polo, archery and a variety of district folk dances, this entire area has since turned into a battlefield with hundreds of Pakistani shells wreaking havoc every day.

Running along most of this portion of the LoC is the Srinagar-Leh National Highway, open to vehicular traffic for about five months of the year from June to October. The LoC runs as close as four to 12 kms from the highway.

Before, the incursions began, the Pakistanis only had a few windows, through which they could visually spot short stretches (about 100 to 300 meters) of the highway. These served as observation posts to direct Pakistani artillery fire from positions located behind the ridges. But since Pakistan did not have any gun position directly overlooking the road, the traffic flow remained relatively unaffected.

Thus, any encroachment in the Dras-Mashkoh-Kargil-Kaksar sector would enable the Pakistanis to dominate, interdict or even render this highway in a state of disuse.

Kargil district is situated in the northeast of Kashmir Valley, 205 kms from Srinagar. This district was carved out in July 1979 after the district of Ladakh was bifurcated. The district spread over 14,036 kms is generally devoid of any natural vegetation and has barren rocky mountains all around.

The population density of the district is seven persons per square km as against the average of 59 persons per square km in the state.

Across the LoC opposite Dras in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) is Gultari where Pakistan has an advance landing ground for short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft. From Gultari and Dras, two sets of roads run to the LoC, which means that gains in the Dras sector can link these two roads, thereby bringing the Pakistanis much closer to the highway. Similarly, there is a road each running from Skardu (the location of a Pakistani brigade headquarters

Heritage

30

Strategic importance

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Kargil conflict: resounding victory

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

and an air base) and Olthingthang (in PoK) towards Kargil. Thus, incursions in this sector again bring them closer to interdicting the National Highway.

Pak objective ■■ Choke the strategic road linking Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital winter supplies reaching Ladakh.

■■ Occupy Dras and Kargil and use that to open the LoC. ■■ Use the capture of heights in Chugh valley near Kargil and use it as a major route for fresh infiltration.

■■ The grand design was to alter the LoC by force, bury the Shimla Agreement and bring the Kashmir issue back on the international stage.

Implications The implications of such a situation would have been simply disastrous.

Depending on the extent of the incursion, the army’s efforts to stock its garrisons at Kargil and Leh would be serverly hampered and might even get completely cut off. A minimum fallout could severely restrict free flow of traffic, which means it will take much longer than the current two days for convoys to travel between Srinagar

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

31

Indian army

SYNERGY

and Leh. A complete cut-off would mean employing the long and arduous Pathankot-Manali-Bara Lachla road to Leh. But the militarily strategic implication would be even more serious for India, because: A cut-off in the Srinagar-Leh highway would render Ladakh and the Kashmir valley into two insolated compartments within the same state.

The army would then lose its flexibility to move, redeploy or augment from one theatre to another in order to respond to any further Pakistani incursions in Ladakh.

Pakistan could then even launch operations towards Turtuk, close to the southern Siachen glacier, a further incursion.

This would suit the Pakistani game plan, which has been to link Siachen with the Kargil region and then increase its bargaining power.

Alternatively, a pincer attack by Pakistani and possibly Chinese forces in Ladakh could have been fatal for India.

In the mountains, the advantage always rests with the side, which initiates an offensive. Occupying heights takes less men but to dislodge them is expensive and can take up to 10 times more manpower. Thus, Kargil could well turn out to be a win-win situation for Pakistan. At worst, it would have to retreat to status quo position.

Build-up In April 1999, regular soldiers from the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistani Army intruded into several unoccupied areas on the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kargil district of J and K. In launching its ill-conceived military adventure, Pakistan breached the provision of the Shimla Agreement and violated the sanctity of the LoC that had been assiduously maintained by both the sides since 1972. After the heavy snow falls were over and relatively mild winter was coming to an end, the Northern Light Infantry troops transgressed the LoC in large numbers in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kaksar and Batalik sub-sectors and established themselves on the top of the high mountain ridgelines. The Pakistani soldiers were dressed in salwar-kameez

32

Pathan civilian clothes so that they could pass off as ‘indigenous Kashmiri freedom fighters’. In all, the intruders were estimated to have numbered between 1,000 to 2,000.

Pak deployment The extent of intrusions varied from four to five kilometers to a maximum of 7 to 8 kms. On average, each major ridgeline was held by 30 to 40 NLI soldiers under the command of an officer. The intruders quickly set about building sangars, bringing forward their heavy weapons and dumping ammunition, ration and other military stores. Besides personal weapons with the troops, the intruders were provided some battalion support weapon such as heavy, medium and light machine guns, rocket launchers and automatic grenade launchers. Some of the posts were also given mortars, anti-aircraft guns (which could also be used in the ground role against assaulting infantry) and shoulder fired Stinger and Unza surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Large numbers of plastic anti-personnel mines were indiscriminately laid along the expected approaches to the ridgelines. Mule tracks were gradually extended into Indian territory across the LoC and forward administrative bases were established near the LoC for the maintenance of NLI troops on posts on the ridgelines. Subsequently, artillery and mortars were moved forward and deployed close to the LoC to provide close fire support to the NLI sub-units. Telephone communications were also extended up to the posts on the ridgelines by laying additional field cable. While the intrusions undoubtedly had larger and rather ambitious strategic aims, at the tactical level the aim was clearly to hold on to the occupied ridgelines and resist all attempts at eviction. Ultimately the intrusions proved to be a strategic blunder and led to the ignominious defeat of the Pakistan army.

India’s fight back Between 8th May 99 when “Operation Vijay” began and 11th May 99, more than 20 Infantry soldiers were killed in hand to hand combat. This made it obvious that it was first necessary to hit the enemy from the air and by Indian Army’s artillery fire. But after the loss of two aircraft, the Air Force flew high above

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

the targets to avoid being hit by Stinger missiles. Thus, a heavy burden fell on the Army’s artillery and it played a crucial role in aiding the advance of the Indian Army’s infantry. As a result, at places Army’s infantry faced very little resistance. Point 4875 a post southwest of Tiger Hill, was captured with minimal casualties to the infantry.

The post was renamed “Gun Hill”.

It is relevant to mention that enemy artillery fire caused 80 per cent of our casualties. Likewise Pakistani troops also suffered a very high percentage of their casualties as a result of Indian artillery fire. On Indian side Brig.

Lakhwinder Singh, VSM, Commanded 8 Mountain Artillery Brigade with distinction.

The first reports of the presence of unidentified personnel came to an army unit in Kargil sector from the local people on May 6, 1999. Reconnaissance patrols were expeditiously dispatched to investigate. Extensive patrolling and aerial reconnaissance followed over the next few days. The depth of Pakistani inclusion and the extent of preparation soon became evident and plans were made to evict Pakistani troops from the Indian side of LoC as early as possible and with the least possible casualties.

The Indian government stipulated that the LoC was not to be crossed, so as to avoid escalation to a larger conflict. It was soon realised that the re-capture of each of the ridgelines occupied by Pakistani regular force would be an extremely difficult military operation.

Infantry assaults would have to be undertaken along super high altitude approaches under withering fire from several directions. It is a well-known military maxim that the mountains favour the defender, an attacker assaulting uphill is at an immense disadvantage. It was appreciated at the Army HQs, New Delhi, that maximum available firepower would need to be requisitioned before Infantry battalions could launch physical assaults to regain each position. Formation commanders emphasised the necessity of destroying the enemy prepared positions through preparatory bombardment to reduce the combat potential of the posts and to break the enemy’s will to fight.

IAF requisitioned It was also appreciated that ground strikes from the fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) would also be

necessary to strike at enemy positions particularly those that were not directly visible to ground observers. Cabinet approval for air strikes against the enemy positions within own territory was sought and obtained. The first air-to-ground strikes by fighter ground attack aircraft of the IAF were launched on May 26, 1999. The military strategy in ‘Operation Vijay’ was to contain-evict-deny, that is, to immediately contain and limit the intrusions up to the areas already affected, then prepare for an eviction of the Pakistani soldiers from the Indian side of the LoC and, finally, enhance surveillance, patrolling and deployment, where necessary, to ensure that the Pakistani Army is denied the opportunity to launch such an attack again. In view of the fact that the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras sub-sector dominated the Srinagar-Leh highway, the highest priority was accorded to the eviction of intruders from these features.

Next in order of priority was the Batalik-Turtuk sub-sector as it provided access to the Ladakh-Siachen region.

Relatively lower priority was accorded to the Mushkoh valley and Kaksar sub-sectors as the intrusions in these areas had lesser tactical significance.

More troops Besides 3 Infantry Division, additional troops of 8 Mountain Division, engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the Kashmir Valley, were inducted into Kargil sector. While 3 Infantry Division remained responsible for the Batalik and Kaksar sub-sectors, responsibility for the conduct of operations in the Dras and Mushkoh Valley sub-sectors was assigned to 8 Mountain Division.

Additional infantry battalions, artillery regiments and engineer units were inducted from other sectors in J and K on an as required basis. Artillery regiments were also inducted from other parts of India. The aim was clearly to achieve a preponderance of firepower. Logistics plans were fine-tuned to sustain the additional forces in the difficult terrain of Kargil sector. Fortuitously, Zoji La pass opened in early May 1999 (it normally opens

only by mid-June every year) and the additional induction of combat forces and logistics units became possible when it was most required. Specialised equipment and extreme cold climate clothing necessary for fighting at super high-altitudes were rushed in from various sectors.

Flanking movement While additional troops were building up and acclimatisation was underway, attempts were made to get around the intruder’s positions and cut off their supply lines. These efforts were only partially successful due to the lay of the land and the dominating observation that the intruders enjoyed. Along with regular troops, Special Forces troops were also employed for such tasks. The artillery utilised this time interlude to prepare main, secondary and alternative gun positions, to carry forward survey and to register targets. Plans for high-intensity fire assaults were drawn up and coordinated in conjunction with infantry. Battalion and Brigade

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

33

Indian army

thethe

the nation nation

Indian army

SYNERGY

Commander counter-bombardment and counter-mortar plans were made and fine-tuned. Maximum use was made of air photographs to accurately locate enemy gun positions and other key targets deep inside enemy territory. These when fired upon the attempts were made to carry out damage assessment through aerial reconnaissance. Meanwhile, the NLI troops holding defences on the Indian side of the LoC were allowed no rest and were kept constantly on edge by firing detailed, skillfully evolved harassing bombardment

builder nation builder

builder

Role of artillery Army played a decisive role in the success of ‘Operation Vijay’ through telling damage and destruction inflicted on the enemy. The devastation caused by extremely accurate and timely fire assaults in most difficult and inhospitable terrain assisted greatly in the recapture of key objectives. The innovative use of guns and multi-barrel rocket launchers in direct firing role at long ranges added a new dimension to the application of artillery fire. The contribution of the Army’s artillery to the overall success of the operations by their singular resolve and exemplary affiliation with the infantry signalled an exponential growth in their confidence as a combat arm.

Army’s artillery was one of the main battle winning factors. It created such fire supremacy on the battlefield that the enemy was physically and psychologically degraded to such an extent that ground operations were pre-destined to succeed. Inherent flexibility and concentration of force at the desired point in the right timeframe were exploited in an effective manner. Daring, bold and dynamic handling and unconventional way of employment of artillery resulted in positive execution and made artillery a good force multiplier.

The Gunners were ever willing to undertake any task assigned to them and they executed their duties with valour, sense of responsibility and exemplary courage. The Gunners had once again proved the need for strategic dominance of firepower on the battlefield and have done the nation proud through their gallant act and professional excellence.

34

BULWARK

Synergy ‘Operation Vijay’ had once again demonstrated that when the different arms viz Artillery and Infantry are in synergy, nothing can withstand their onslaught. Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil has not merely been defeated but crushed militarily, diplomatically and politically and notably on account of accurate delivery of lead on the enemy’s head by Artillery, suitably exploited by the brave infantrymen. The professionalism, ingenuity and daring displayed were indeed praiseworthy.

Indeed, there is no parallel of such bravery in the annals of military history. The army has placed on record the gratitude of the entire infantry fraternity for the professionalism of the troops and their contribution in crushing and decimating the enemy. We hope that sanity will dawn on Pakistan and particularly its army, to realise that Indian Artillery and Infantry can achieve synergy of the highest order, which no military might will be able to withstand.

If it was the unflinching courage and steely resolve of thousands of infantrymen that made it possible to evict regular Pakistani soldiers from the areas into which they has intruded in Kargil sector, it was the speed, accuracy,

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle

massive volume and the destructive capacity of artillery firepower that made the victory possible.

An early military victory in the conflict thrust upon us by Pakistan in the Kargil Sector would not have been possible but for the overwhelming destruction and heavy casualties that our Army’s firepower inflicted on the enemy.

Conflict termination occurred on our terms. Pakistan Army was forced to beat a hasty retreat only because our forces, particularly artillery and infantry, broke the enemy’s will to fight. The exemplary affiliation and synergy between different arms was a major battle-winning factor.

The entire military campaign, from planning at the inception stage, rapid induction and deployment, evolution of the superior concept in the application of fire, meticulously coordinated fire plans, skilful ammunition management and sustained effort over a period of two months, was efficiently conducted by the Indian Army - a feat it can cherish with pride.

The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Allahabad Central University, Allahabad, India.

T

he Indian Army has been serving the country in many ways, a security provider to deter wars, comprehensively decimating the adversary when forced to battle and rushing to save lives in natural disasters and human tragedies. Yet a key role of the Army has been as a nation builder, in meeting the challenge of many rebellions that have festered in a young country unshackling from the colonial past. As a nation of 1.3 billion people with large number of linguistic, ethnic and religious diversities, weaving together unity in diversity has remained one of the key tests of our national will and fortitude. As India emerges as a vibrant and modern

democracy, the years of hope bear a legacy of the past of multitudes of dissent many of which have manifested themselves in violent insurgencies and terrorism across the country. In times of dire internal crisis, it is the Indian Army which has stood steadfastly against the many fissiparous anti-national elements unwavering in its resolve to keep the nation not just territorially, but also as a people, united.

Faith keeper Classically these missions of nation building are typified as counterinsurgency or terrorism. Quite rightly in the diachronic framework of security

the Army’s role in the cause of national integrity and unity would fall in this paradigm. However the mission of the man in the ‘Olive Green’ goes beyond that of targeting the guerrilla or eliminating the terrorist be it in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab or the north-east, above all it is as a sentinel of national values and faith keeper of the nation.

Thus the Army’s approach to counter-militancy has been unique, most appropriately called as, “iron fist in velvet gloves,” keeping the common man out of harms way but targeting the rebel with judicious precision.

For the Army this has been a saga of sacrifice, written in human sacrifice,

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

35

Indian army

BULWARK

The amazing truth is that India has survived its many contradictions and diversities and no part of the Union of India has broken away since it won independence from Britain. After all, this was the India that Winston Churchill had once dismissed as "a ‘geographical expression’ - a land that was ‘no more a single country than the Equator’." Churchill was rarely right about India, nor his latter-day companion V. S. Naipaul one of the many doomsayers who predicted India's disintegration well before the twentieth anniversary of its independence from British rule. By 1990 Naipaul was writing in celebration of the "million mutinies" through which Indian diversity was working to transform the democratic society he had so recently been prepared to write off, records Shashi Tharoor in an article in Foreign Affairs. In very large measure thanks are due to the Indian Army. blood and toil. What has endured in this narrative is the rate of success of the Indian Army acknowledged by many as near perfect. Thus the Army’s role in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism over the decades from the perspective of a nation builder should provide lessons for the many forces that are faced with similar challenges across the globe. An overview of the counter-insurgency operations over the years and foundations of success are addressed herein.

Ironically even as the debate over employment of armed forces in countering Left Wing Extremism popularly known as Naxalism has

36

gathered steam over the past year or so, a lesser known fact is that for the first time the Indian Army faced rebels was in Telangana in 1948. This communist guerrilla movement had its roots in the repressive rule of the then Nizam of Hyderabad who was also resisting accession to the Indian Union. The Nizam desperate to stay out of the Union roped in the guerrillas making temporary peace with them. This led to “police action,” by New Delhi. In turn the Army put down what can today be called as the first wave of left wing extremism in 1950. While the local mission was accomplished, the larger aim of these guerrillas had been to spread the contagion of violent rebellion across the country. The timely

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

The Indian Army’s commitment to nation building is amply demonstrated over long years of counteringinsurgency and terrorism. While many a soldier lost his life and many more have been wounded in the six decades of being, ‘forever in operations,’ the nation has benefited by integrating the country from Kashmir to Kohima and Kanyakumari. This unique contribution of the Army has no doubt come at a cost, not just in lives but in terms of progress in modernisation and capacity building backdrop of failed political initiative to weave Naga aspirations into the national fold at the personal initiative of the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

The mission undertaken in April 1956 was perhaps the most challenging for the Indian Army as the rebels were in strength and well versed with the terrain and guerrilla tactics. The winter of 1956 was the defining period as sustained operations were launched leading to the arrest of over 4,000 guerrillas thereby firmly establishing the writ of the Indian State in the region. While the ordinary Nagas recognised that their destiny was with India, rebels like Phizo slipped out to erstwhile East Pakistan and continued to fan the militancy with external support.

External instigation

Nagaland

The external element, one of the constants of militancy in the country, soon came to light. Phizo who had also served in the Indian National Army met then Major General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan in 1948 when he was the GOC in East Pakistan.

Ayub who had served as a Major in 1 Assam Regiment in 1944 which had Naga troops agreed to support their rebellion. Thus outside support to the many mutinies in the north-east has continued with China also providing intermittent political as well as training and arms support to the guerrillas in the region posing the Army a constant challenge which continues to this day.

A few years later, the Army was called to meet a challenge that festered for over 50 years and is simmering today in spurts, the insurgency in Nagaland. The initial mission in 1955 was that of aid to civil authority when an infantry battalion was deployed in Tuensang Division. However by 1956, it was clear that a general rebellion was in the making and a brigade was inducted once the Naga leader Zapio Phizo organised his cadres and increasingly indulged in terrorist activity. The induction of the Army came against the

An operation which was to define the Indian Army’s actions as a counter insurgency force was on the headquarters of the so called Naga Federal Army in the Sema area.

While the guerrillas were cornered, they were given an opportunity to surrender. The rebels used this opportunity to escape, only to fall to the forces subsequently. But this soft touch was to be the essence of counter insurgency practiced by the Indian Army. Ingrained was the determination to wean away the rebels from a path of

action by the Indian Army prevented a conflagration against democracy.

violent confrontation to political action, the true call for nation builders.

There were many ups and downs in the Naga insurgency, but the perseverance of the Army has paid for today there is much peace and tranquillity in Nagaland as is evident from the Horn Bill festival held this winter attended by tourists from across the globe.

Other insurgencies The Naga rebellion was the precursor of many such internal conflicts in the north-east, the Mizos followed with famine in 1958-50 being the root cause.

The Army played the lead role to coerce and cajole the militants to join the national mainstream and a peace accord initiated by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was signed in 1986. The Mizo counter insurgency campaign is regarded by many as one of the most successful and bore the hallmark of an army whose calling was of nation building rather than brutal action against its own citizens.

Other militancy followed in the north-east; in Assam, Manipur or Tripura but these were brought to a successful military conclusion amenable to policing action and political solutions. That all these states are on the fringes of the national boundary with hostile neighbours supporting the guerrillas makes the accomplishment all the more creditable. The Army formula for success was people centric operations thus there are no sordid tales of mass human rights violations or brutal bloodshed of the type witnessed in other insurgencies from time to time.

Moving from the east to the west, in the 1980’s the Indian Army was engaged in intense counter-terrorist operations in Punjab and by the end of the decade was also called to action in Jammu and Kashmir. Perhaps the Punjab experience was a true test of the soldier’s commitment to the nation. Traditionally the Sikhs who form the majority in Punjab have

been the bulwark of the Indian Army and remain so to this day. Misguided elements amongst the community led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, receiving extensive support from across the border from Pakistan, took over the Golden Temple in Amritsar and established a stronghold in the holiest shrines of the Sikhs in 1984.

This was a call which touched the very heart of the Army’s core. As then General- Officer-Commanding-in-Chief of Western Command and later the Chief of the Army Staff, General K. Sundarji who was in charge of the operation said, “From the outset, it was a very sad thing. All of us hoped it would never come to this. But when I was finally charged with the mission, I was convinced at that time that there was no other option. None. It was a duty to be performed”.

The counter terrorist operations in Punjab continued for almost a decade.

The role played by the Army remains seminal. While the soldiers remained in the background securing space for the police under the dynamic leadership of Mr. K. P. S. Gill to be the public face of operations. This self effacing dyadic succeeded in countering the militant designs and with erection of a robust fencing on the border, the challenge was eroded by the early 1990’s. Another successful mission accomplished after Mizoram.

Jammu and Kashmir Northwards from Punjab to Jammu and Kashmir in 1989 perhaps a bigger challenge awaited the Army. In the initial years the troop’s role was all encompassing from countering infiltration to tracking down and eliminating terrorists and frequently even policing and governance. As the capacity of the local administration expanded the role was restricted to counter-infiltration and militancy. The challenges on this front grew each year as controlled from across the border, the terrorists increased their tempo of operations from sporadic firing on convoys and posts, to IED based

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

37

Indian army

BULWARK

ambushes and suicide attacks spread in a span of two decades or so.

Suffice to say Pakistan tried every trick in the bag by inducting foreign terrorists in large numbers trained in Afghanistan and specially established camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and expanding the geographic spread from the Kashmir Valley to the Jammu

exposure to the jawans to counter terrorist operations away from home facing a group, the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Ealam [LTTE] with a new brand of tactics of asymmetry, suicide terrorism and assassinations, a deft use of fanaticism and modern explosives.

There are many who are critical of the Army’s handling of Sri Lankan militancy, yet the sacrifice made by the

campaigns averaging over 20 years as providing fuel to the cause and ideology.

Yet time is necessary to neutralise a militancy which has external support.

As even the most advanced armed forces in the world have realised in Afghanistan, these conflicts cannot be won merely by, ‘shock and awe’ but need perseverance and patience - the forte of an Indian soldier. What then are

wider impact of even small unit actions was recognised by the issue of, “COAS (Chief of Army Staff) Ten Commandments,”

of counter-militancy operations, to relieve excessive strain on this prime arm without losing the teeth edge, Rashtriya Rifles came into being in

Legal framework The current debate over withdrawal of the Armed Forces Special Powers

COAS TEN COMMANDMENTS (1993) 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

No rape.

No molestation.

No torture resulting in death or maiming.

No military disgrace.

No meddling in civil administration.

Competence in platoon / company level tactics in counter insurgency operations.

Willingly carry out civic action with innovations.

Develop media interaction.

Respect Human Rights.

Only fear God, uphold Dharma and enjoy serving the Country.

SUPPLEMENTARY COMMANDMENTS (2005)

region in Doda, Kishtwar and Poonch, Rajauri. The Indian Army measured up to the challenge and did not wilt through those trying years shifting strategy from well defended border fencing to targeted counter-terrorist operations.

The Army’s resolve supported by the people of the state saw the situation gradually improving from a peak in violence in 2001 to a drop in fatalities below 1,000 in 2006.

Today the dynamic in Jammu and Kashmir has shifted to the political space and Army presence is scaling down. An atmosphere has been created for successful politicisation, now it is up to the state and national leadership to build upon the same to find a lasting solution.

Sri Lanka The Indian Army’s external counter-militancy mission was in Sri Lanka in 1987, as the flow of Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu increased to over 2,00,000. It was to be the first

38

officers and jawans paved the way for political reconciliation in early 1990’s, one that could not be consolidated upon. For the Indian Army it was a just contribution to a nation building in a neighbour in distress.

Foundations of success The basic foundation of success of the Indian Army’s unblemished counter-insurgency operations and counter-terrorism record can be attributed to the perspective of nation building applied to a task which was seen as a, “duty to be performed,” and not of relentless bloodletting against an internal deviant. This was certainly a challenge fighting the enemy with one’s, “hands tied behind the back,” but the Indian jawan who implemented this strategy how so much provoked, refused to retaliate against his own countrymen even when many a time he saw his comrade beside him in a pool of blood. Some people have castigated the long and extended period of the country’s counter-insurgency

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

the other foundations of success of the Indian Army?

Doctrine and strategy For an Army as successful as the Indian, it surprised the purists that there was no central framework for consummation of operations in the form of a doctrine or strategy till one was published in 2004. Commanders and units relied on core values and anecdotal experience to meet the challenges of militancy in the early years. The honour code of the Indian Army provided the guiding principles for counter-insurgency, these being use of minimum force (never an eye for an eye), unconventional tactics (fighting a guerrilla like a guerrilla), intelligence-based operations, merging with the sea (of people), establishing legal basis for use of force and facilitating delivery of governance, aid and assistance at the grassroots. This did not preclude the use of measured force where required but was strictly need based in a scenario of high violence. The phenomenon of, “strategic corporal,” or

1. Remember that people you are dealing with are your own countrymen. All your conduct must be dictated

by this one significant consideration.

2. Operations must be people friendly, using minimum force and avoiding collateral damage - restraint must

be the key.

3. Good intelligence is the key to success - the thrust of your operations must be intelligence based and must

include the militant leadership.

4. Be compassionate, help the people and win their hearts and minds. Employ all resources under your com

mand to improve their living conditions.

5. No operations without police representative. No operations against women cadres under any circumstances

without Mahila Police. Operations against women insurgents be preferably carried out by police.

6. Be truthful, honest and maintain highest standards of integrity, honour, discipline, courage and sacrifice.

7. Sustain physical and moral strength, mental robustness and motivation.

8. Train hard, be vigilant and maintain highest standards of military professionalism.

9. Synergise your actions with the civil administration and other security forces.

10. Uphold Dharma and take pride in your Country and the Army.

[Source: Indian Army Sub-conventional Operations Doctrine 2006]. to every soldier which became his personal credo. Today these simple principles have been expanded into a comprehensive Indian Army and a joint doctrine for sub-conventional operations. It is therefore not surprising that these have been replicated by armies across the globe.

Organisational innovation An important facet of the Indian Army’s success has been organisational innovation to meet the varying circumstances required to counter-insurgency in different pockets of the country. While the infantry remained at the forefront

the 1980’s in Punjab and has proved extremely valuable in controlling the contagion of terrorism wherever it has been deployed. Employing units of supporting arms such as artillery provided valuable support to the infantry as the gunners have performed creditably even as foot soldiers. Today all arms and services are chipping in most valiantly in Rashtriya Rifles units. The role of Assam Rifles in the east officered by the Army has also been noteworthy. At another level, Headquarters as Town Commander Jaffna and training establishments as Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte have also been a part of the innovation cycle.

Act from Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur highlights the Indian Army’s concerns for a legal framework within which to conduct counter-insurgency operations.

Even when operating in Aid to Civil Authorities for maintenance of law and order, the Army has been a stickler for following norms of law with the presence of an Executive Magistrate incumbent on the ground.

The insistence on a legal framework within which to operate has been seen by some as a demand for safeguard against subsequent prosecution; however insistence of propriety under the law is the main theme. There is no denying that there have been violations

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

39

Indian army

BULWARK

of human rights by some deviants who have been relentlessly brought to book as the Indian Army’s records show, but the insistence on a legal framework has ensured that these are aberrations rather than a norm.

Humane approach A corresponding principle of operations in the counter-insurgency environment has been that of humane approach. The chain of command is highly sensitive to the needs of the population and restrictions are strictly limited, scaled on level of violence in a particular area. The COAS Ten Commandments exhorts each soldier to operate keeping in view sensitivity of locals particularly women, children and the aged in mind. And the Indian jawan brought up in a value based society has been operating with a sensitive and humane approach.

Beyond civic affairs The Army’s civic affairs campaign popularly known as “Sadbhavna,” in Jammu and Kashmir or “Good Samaritan” in the east goes beyond the charter of providing relief to the distressed and governance, given that normal functioning is disrupted during periods of insecurity in a region.

The focus is again on the marginalised and the demand for civic action is seen to come from the grass -roots rather than

40

imposed from the top as is normally the case. Thus it is the locals who identify the need for say a school, a link road or a tube well which are then taken up under such schemes. This model has been successful and has also become the theme of the government of the day, thus ‘development,’ has been accepted as an essential panacea for tackling Naxalism at the national level and today the Planning Commission is also deeply involved in implementation of schemes for integrated advancements in marginalised areas. The Indian Army deserves credit for pioneering the concept which has served it well in its counter-insurgency campaigns.

Leadership Leadership remains a key component of any military campaign more so a counter-insurgency one with exceptional pressures on the chain of command. The Indian Army has been fortunate to have extraordinary leaders at the helm.

Field Marshal Cariappa and General Thimayya were first blooded in the North West Frontier Province.

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw also had an initial exposure there but as GOC-in-C of Eastern Command handled both the Naga and Mizo insurgencies very competently. Their legacy has been people first, which continues to this day.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

The Indian Army’s commitment to nation building is amply demonstrated over long years of countering-insurgency and terrorism.

While many a soldier lost his life and many more have been wounded in the six decades of being, ‘forever in operations,’ the nation has benefited by integrating the country from Kashmir to Kohima and Kanyakumari. This unique contribution of the Army has no doubt come at a cost, not just in lives but in terms of progress in modernisation and capacity building. It took nine months for the Army to launch operations in 1971 and there were many problems encountered in 2002 when Operation Parakram was launched after an attack on the Parliament in December the previous year. Today as the nation can see some peace and stability, the Army would get a chance to fulfill these primary commitments, yet be prepared to match any future asymmetrical challenge for which viable organisations like the Rashtriya Rifles have been created. Undoubtedly when the history of modern India is written, this dedication of the Army to nation building by countering militancy and terrorism will be one of the golden chapters.

The wrter is an army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt. Ltd., a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, “Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities”.

I

FSEC India, Homeland Security India and FIREX India are organised by UBM India, a subsidiary of UBM (organisers of the world’s largest international security trade fair IFSEC, held in the UK).

Having grown 44%* over, IFSEC India cemented its position as India’s largest international exhibition for commercial homeland security and fire technology. More than 280 world-renowned exhibitors from over 23 countries, a 26% growth from 2009 in terms of exhibitors, showcased their latest products and services to the 11,341 security professionals’ visitors in attendance.

Household names such as ADI, Aditya, Agilent, Automatic Systems, Arise, Axis, Bharat Electronics, Came, CBC, Cisco, Cooper, D-Link, Dorset Kaba, Dupont, DVTel, Everfocus, FAAC, Godrej, Gunnebo, HID, Hikvision, Honeywell Life Safety, Honeywell Security, Indigo Vision, JVC Mhatre, Kores, LG, Matrix, Miscrosoft, Morpho, NEC, Neural, Panasonic, Salto, Schnneider, Smart I, Sony, Turbo, Tyco, UTCFS, Vectra, Verint, Videotech, Western Digital, Z Plus, to name a few, including country Pavilions from UK, USA, Israel, Korea, Taiwan and China.The event, which was opened by Chhagan Bhujbal, State Governement Minister Public Works & Tourism, Government of Maharashtra and Major General (Dr) JK Bansal, Minister of State National Disaster Management Authority took place from 23 – 25 November at Bombay Exhibition Centre, Goregaon (E) Mumbai.

Co-located with Homeland Security India and Firex India the event was supported by Asian Professional Security Association, India Chapter, UK Trade & Investments & Israel Export & International Cooperation Institute the show was also certified by US Commercial Services. IFSEC India 2010 brought together the leading Indian and international homeland security solution providers with the key decision makers and influencers from the Indian government / state government

and private industry looking to source the latest security innovations and technology. " Visitors from across India stopover and a significant proportion of the attendance came from Armed Forces, Navy and Border Security Forces with representatives from State Police Forces and the industry on DSA stall. Had received positive reception and feedback on the November issue of CHINA Special. The event was well attended by all sectors of the homeland security industry and showed an extremely high level of satisfaction from all visitors and participants."

James Blue, Portfolio Director – Fire & Security at UBM Live, organisers of IFSEC India, said: “Growing 44%* in our fourth year demonstrates the importance of IFSEC India to the region. This year we expanded our visitor base, with 7,946 first time visitors attending to see the extensive exhibition which included 60 new exhibiting companies. With so many leading security personnel from all over the globe in attendance, and our return to Pragati Maidan in New Delhi next year, we are in no doubt that the Indian security market is and will continue to benefit from this event for many years to come.”

Maj. Gen. (Dr) J K Bansal, (Minister of State), Member, National Disaster Management Authority, said of the event: “IFSEC India has been a revelation. It is amazing to see so many critical technologies and products.

From a disaster management perspective, I am impressed with the skills and technologies that are on display. In addition, I am very happy to see key specialist speakers at the ‘Homeland Security Conference – Mumbai Attacks – Two Years on’ share a common dais and discuss terrorism threadbare.”

Mr. Brian Knutsen, VP-Business Development at Boeing, said: “I am excited at the opportunities that the event has thrown up. My interactions with high-profile visitors here have been top quality. I take with me

some great memories of the event. Great knowledge sharing and latest technologies.”

Prakash Prabhu, Country Manager, Axis Communications, said: “IFSEC India has surpassed our expectations. We were pretty tied up with the high level of decisionmaking visitors. There was detailing in the entire planning of the event.”

The co-located Homeland Security India Conference: “Mumbai Attacks – Two Years On”, was a resounding success.

The complimentary sessions focused on the evolving measures being taken by the Union and State governments to counter the international terrorist threats facing India.

Speakers included: ■■ Major General (Dr) JK Bansal, Minister of State National Disaster Management Authority ■■ Chhahan Bhujbal, Former Deputy Chief Minister, Maharashtra ■■ Sanjay Vir Singh, Inspector General of Police Anti Terrorist Cell (internal Security Division) Karnataka ■■ Brian Knutsen, Vice President, Business Development, Boeing ■■ Madhavi Reddy, country lead for India, Detica BAE Systems With hours of complimentary, highly topical content on offer, visitors heard about the lessons learnt from the 2008 attacks and how these will be prevented in future.

IFSEC India will return in 2011 from 8 – 10 December 2011 to Pragati Maidan, New Delhi with another packed exhibition and conference programme. * - IFSEC India 2010 has achieved 44% increase in m2 from IFSEC India 2009. www.ifsecindia.com www.homelandsecurityindia.in www.firexindia.com DSA was the media partner for this event.

Indian army

NOT A VOCATION

There are no better illustrations of professionalism or otherwise in the military than in the manner in which the wars of 1971 and of 1962 were conducted. If “defending the State” is the touchstone by which to judge military professionalism here is cheese and chalk. In the council of war presided over by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when things became unbearable in the former East Pakistan and in the fallout on the neighbouring Indian states General Sam Manekshaw gave his reasons for delaying direct Indian military involvement and this is how the conclave ended:

Indian Army

and professionalism

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. R. Raghavan

She said, 'Everything you told me is true?'

'Yes! It is my job to tell you the truth,' I responded. 'And it is my job to fight, it is my job to fight to win and I have to tell you the truth.'

She smiled at me and said, 'All right Sam, you know what I want?'

I said, 'Yes, I know what you want!'"

In 1962 the Chief of Army Staff wanted the order to “throw the Chinese out” in writing. And the Chinese came in…

M

ilitary professionalism has been a recurrent element in discussions on the Indian military. What does it mean to the military, the political classes and to the citizen? Recent reports of senior military officers being involved in land scams, or of military units violating the human rights of citizens have once again led to comments about the military losing its professionalism.

What constitutes professionalism is a subject of considerable debate amongst not just within the military, but also amongst social scientists. Is the Indian military more professional than in other countries? Is there a threshold of professionalism by which the military can be judged?

Definition There are diverse definitions of military professionalism.

The well known definition by Samuel Huntington, stated as far back as 1957, lists three characteristics of professionalism that distinguish it from a vocation. These are expertise,

42

responsibility and corporateness.

Expertise refers to specialised knowledge in a significant field. This knowledge is acquired through formal learning in schools and imparted through institutions of the profession.

Responsibility involves performing service or duties essential to the functioning of society. The professional serves the society and material rewards are not the main consideration for this duty. This separates the professional from those who work in a vocation merely to earn. The duty of the military man is to protect the State and society.

It also means protection of their values.

The third characteristics of corporate character, which Huntington described as unity and consciousness among the profession’s members, that they belong to a distinct group which has formal standards and which are enforced. He went on to emphasise that the group is not just organisations but the complex set of custom and tradition that determine the conduct of its members.

A critique of the Huntington outlook was based on the argument that

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

military leaders have not confined their expertise to fighting but also developed capabilities related to political, economic and other spheres.

This was called ‘new’ professionalism, as against the ‘old’ which limited itself to defending the State. Another critique of Huntington was based on the role the military profession performs by its involvement in internal security and national development. This was due to internal security and development having political, economic and social dimensions in which the military cannot but get involved.

Politicisation Studies of militaries in developing countries have shown no clear pattern. In some states militaries heavily involved in internal conflicts have been shown to be politicised while in others this has not been the case. Cases of the military profession using external threats as a means of gaining and retaining political power is juxtaposed with States where a similar threat scenario has not impacted on the apolitical nature of the military.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

43

Indian army

NOT A VOCATION

The issue of government control of the military, otherwise referred to as civilian control, is also an important dimension in military professionalism.

This had been interpreted as the extent to which armed forces respond to the directions of the civilian government.

Red lines A significant debate in the Huntingtonian argument relates to Subjective and Objective control of the government over the military. In Subjective control military and the civilian leadership have identity of views. Military in such conditions performs duties because it agrees with the policies. Objective control is the condition wherein the military obeys civilian leaders’ orders as a duty and not because it agrees with such policies. This clear difference in the control over the military is rarely seen in democracies and liberal societies. In Iraq and Afghanistan there have been serious differences between the political and military leadership of the US on both the purpose and strategy for the wars. In India, there has never been a doubt between the civilian and military leadership when wars were forced on it from across the borders. On the other hand, in internal conflicts there has always been reticence in the military on conducting operations against its citizens. Yet both in the US and in India, differences have been resolved through professional dialogue and collegiate decision making. The reality is that both subjective and objective controls can operate simultaneously over the same military.

Malign nexus In the Indian context, the important issue today is not so much of civilian control of the military. It is on the contrary of a curious and disturbing mix of civilian and military leadership coming together to obtain illegal monetary gains from public resources.

The land scam in Sukhna or the Adarsh apartment scam of Mumbai show a clear pattern not of civilian leadership controlling the military but of the latter co-opting itself with the civilian in malfeasance. The military profession, or at least its leadership, seems to have jettisoned their responsibility on two grounds. First, it has failed to protect the interests of society by involving itself with wrongdoing with public

44

property. Second, it has failed to live by the custom and tradition of the military profession, what Huntington had termed as corporate or professional responsibility.

In the debate on military professionalism, a different dimension had been developed on the military’s professionalism with its political orientation. This has been seen to create the conditions wherein civilian leadership can make deals with military professional leadership to serve its political ends. This is indeed a dangerous condition where the constitutional fabric of the State can be subverted through a civilian-military nexus or ‘understanding’ on handling both the internal conflict and its consequences. Instances have not been wanting in India where political convenience has been a debilitating factor for the military in effectively managing internal conflicts.

The Indian economic growth has brought forth a new set of values in the polity. Economic opportunities and the opportunities for quick profits have brought forth an increased tendency for political leaders, bureaucracy and business houses to work together in circumventing rules for personal gains.

This cannot but also have its impact on the military profession. The increasing number of cases in which senior members of the military have bent rules or transgressed the norms is indicative of the decline in the corporate character, nature of military professionalism.

Evolving situations The nature of war has also undergone a significant change in the 21st century.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the difficulty of political leadership, even in developed and democratic States, being able to provide strategic guidance to the military. In the Afghan war it is yet unclear if the lead player is the US military or the political leadership.

The US finds itself with decreasing commitment from its allies on continuing the war in Afghanistan due to low levels of public support. Public support in US and EU for continuing the war is at the lowest and its political costs are not lost on the leaders. In such circumstances political leadership faced with popular disillusionment with its policies, often places the blame on the military. This was amply demonstrated both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Touchstone What lessons are to be drawn by Indian military profession from the new types of wars. In J and K, in the north-east and in the large swathe of Naxal affected Indian hinterland, there are ongoing internal conflicts.

These are long lasting, unlikely to end soon and cannot be ‘won’ by the use of military. Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, these conflicts are in our country and amongst the Indian people. The role of military profession in internal conflicts is already under increasing public scrutiny and opprobrium. The flawed but vociferous discourse on Armed Forces Special Powers Act, or the instances of Human Rights violations in internal conflicts are examples of the standards of military professionalism coming into question.

The safeguard against misuse and misapplication of military force in such conflicts will rest on the advice the military profession will provide to the civilian leadership. If that role is to be performed by the military profession correctly, the need is for it to continually re-visit the basic criteria of military professionalism.

The writer is Director, Delhi Policy Group and President, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai, India.

New Delhi, December 4, 2010 The nation’s capital was the centre stage for the Global Security Leadership Summit 2010 Conference held on 3 and 4 December 2010 at Sheraton Hotel, New Delhi.

Surging with the success of its previous edition, the Global Security Leadership Summit 2010 Conference attracted over 150 delegates.

Several officials from APDI, CAPSI, Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indian Air Force, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Integrated Defence Staff, Prasar Bharti, Bureau of Police, Research and Development, National Informative Center (NIC), National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), etc. were present at the event sharing and learning ways to individually, as well as, collectively equip the nation in its endeavour to safeguard the lives and infrastructure of its citizens.

The event was organised by The Central Association of Private Security Industry (CAPSI) and The Association of Private Detectives and Investigators (APDI) and was managed by Comnet Conferences, a division of Exhibitions India Group.

The theme of the conference was “Employability / Standards / Compliance”. The sessions approached the concerns, by focusing attention on the importance of ‘Mission Safe India’ and ‘Threat Assessment and Response - National Preparedness’ mechanisms to avert man-made disasters.

Pointing towards the growing need of internal security, Shivraj V. Patil, Governor Punjab & Rajasthan said, “In India, especially in the South Asian Countries we are discussing issue of national security not individual security. But now it’s the time for us to deflect our attraction to provide security to an individual and urbanisation. More attention is required for internal and private security.”

Engaging discussions also highlighted issues like Protecting Intelligence: Technology, Friend or Foe, Creating Security ConsciousnessCorporate culture, Global standards for Private Security, Role of Media in crisis situation, Safe City concept, Transport and critical Infrastructure Security, Nuclear security, as well as Skill Development- National Mission 2020.

Speaking on the occasion, Kunwar Vikram Singh, Chairman, CAPSI & APDI said, “This summit is a platform to discuss and deliberate on best business norms, practices, standards and compliance in line with global standards of private security and intelligence industry. I am happy to see CAPSI play a lead role in addressing these to regulators and policy makers, corporate India, service providers, the private security fraternity in India as well as the rest of the world.”

Industry leaders and specialists from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Association of Detectives, Inc. (WAD), Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS), World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) and other high ranking officials shared their views on key emerging trends and opportunities including global security industry standards and trends.

Eminent speakers including Hon’ble Shri Shivraj V. Patil, Governor, Punjab & Rajasthan, Iqbal Singh, Lt. Governor, Pondicherry, Errol Southers, Associate Director, National Homeland Security & Economic Analysis for Terrorism Events (CREATE), USA, Dr. Roger Howsley, ED, World Institute of Nuclear Security(WINS), Austria, Slawomir Redo, UNODC, M.L. Kumawat, IPS, Former Director General, BSF, Vladimir Solamanidin, President, World Association of Detectives, Hilde De Clerck, General Secretary, Confederation of European Security Services, Dilip Chenoy, MD, National Skill Development Corporation, S.S. Deswal, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Haryana, Inder Malhotra, Former Editor, Times of India and many more took the dais and actively contributed in the thought-provoking sessions. Security leaders from Russia, Turkey, Italy, Ukraine, Malaysia, Singapore, Belgium, South Africa, UAE and other leading nations attended this prestigious conference and gave it a different dimension and status.

About CAPSI CAPSI has been playing a vital role with licensing authorities across the country for an effective and successful implementation of Private Security Agency Regulation (PSARA) Act 2005. The association is playing a leadership role in the formulation of “Global Standards and Best Practices” for Private Security Industry world over. CAPSI is also working closely with the National Skills Development Corporation towards developing security skills development centric ecosystem with a long term industry vision.

About APDI The Association of Private Detectives (APDI) is the association of all Private Intelligence Professionals and firms in India. The association has representations from all states and Union territories of India.

About Comnet Conference, Exhibitions India Group Comnet Conferences is a strategic business venture of Exhibitions India Group focusing on conference organisation, marketing, and promotion of knowledge-based products and services.

Defence and Security Alert (DSA) was the supporting journal in defence and security genre for this event.

Indian army

POWER PROJECTION

There is no gainsaying the fact that Afghanistan plays a crucial role in India’s security calculus. Unlike as in Sri Lanka where force-levels were inadequate and there was no inkling that the LTTE would turn against India, in Afghanistan all India’s expertise in counter-insurgency can be brought to bear on the Taliban. Emperical experiences of such guerrilla fighters as Mao Zedong, Che Guevara and the Vietnamese military genius Giap should also be consulted and, given the lay of the land a force ratio of 50 Indians / ISAF to one Taliban should be the first deployment (unlike the American mistake of sending in limited troops and then effecting a “surge”).

With the Iranian port of Chahbahar as the logistical support base India should endeavour to clear southern Afghanistan of the Taliban and reach the Afghan-Pak border opposite Quetta where Pakistan is sheltering the ‘Afghan Shura’ led by Mulla Omar. Also, there should be no timeframe set for withdrawal.

U

S President Barack Obama’s pointsman for AfPak late Richard Holbrooke recently stated that Pakistan has a critical role to stabilise Afghanistan and is a legitimate concerned party, a position which has serious implications for Indian national security and foreign policy interests in the region. Considering he was also dismissive of New Delhi’s concerns over reconciliation with the Taliban clearly calls for a radical review of

46

India’s policy towards Afghanistan.

Support US effort Now New Delhi cannot afford to kowtow to US policy interests which are aligned with Pakistan’s insecurity vis-a-vis India. Instead it should be clear about its security concerns.

Today, India faces a far greater threat to its national security interests from Afghanistan with the ground being laid

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

for the creeping return of the Taliban to Kabul. India will be vulnerable if the Taliban assumes power in Afghanistan.

New Delhi, therefore, seriously needs to consider the possibility of military deployment in Afghanistan to support and strengthen the US-led coalition military efforts against the Taliban terrorists.

Dr. Bidanda Chengappa

In reality New Delhi, rather than Washington, needs to tackle the Taliban in Afghanistan considering they pose a direct security threat to Indian interests given their physical proximity to Pakistan. India has never flexed its military muscles against Pakistanisponsored cross-border jihadi terrorism - except occasionally for some shallow trans-border commando raids - besides the December 2001 coercive diplomacy through military mobilisation.

However, a sizeable and powerful Indian military presence, either a brigade group or one comprising 4,000-5,000 troops or a divisionstrength of 15,000 to 18,000 soldiers in Afghanistan would rattle Pakistan, support / strengthen US / ISAF force levels and help to hit the Taliban harder.

US helplessness Today, the ground reality is that the Americans are surrendering to the Pakistan Army owing to a sense of helplessness. It ignores their support to groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, exaggerates the importance of actions against some minor terrorist outfits and gives them aid in the form of money and weapons. As a result, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is being coerced by Islamabad and Washington to actually talk to the Taliban only because Washington depends predominantly on Islamabad for logistics, intelligence and operational support.

Evidently, Islamabad’s rationale in pursuing such a policy is only to ensure that Afghanistan continues to remain its backyard and be a sanctuary for cross-border terrorism against India.

Pakistan playground?

Close cooperation with Afghanistan a country with which India historically has had friendly relations up to 1992 - is a cost-effective policy to keep Pakistan in check. But India committed a grave strategic error when it took a back seat and allowed Pakistan to assert itself

military deployment in

Afghanistan in Afghanistan’s post-communist era.

India, which has serious aspirations of becoming a regional power, should not allow Afghanistan to once again become a playground for Pakistan.

For

India

to

curtail

Pakistan’s

capability to foster cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the first step would logically be to fight the Taliban. New Delhi has attempted all possible instruments of foreign policy ranging from diplomacy and trade with Islamabad to protect and promote

its national interests, but nothing has proved successful till now. India has also fought a limited war against Pakistan in Kargil in 1999 with no results.

Given the strategic stalemate in

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

47

Indian army

Afghanistan, with the US led NATO / ISAF forces making little headway against the Taliban owing to a paucity of force levels in relation to the size of the territory, Indian military participation would certainly contribute to the counter-insurgency effort and help boost the morale of the western troops deployed there.

Proactive India The Indian Army has rich experience in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir which is much more than contingents of the western armies fighting in Afghanistan.

Moreover, Indian soldiers would relate better to the Afghan people given the cultural commonalities. This would go a long way in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people which is integral to counter-insurgency operations.

It is time New Delhi sheds it passive policy towards cross-border terrorism and attempts to beard the lion in its own den without any violation of Pakistani territory. In the post-Taliban phase since 2002, India has only provided development aid to Afghanistan without a military role to tackle the tricky Taliban.

The absence of Indian military participation in Afghanistan is linked to various external and internal considerations: Pakistani objections to an Indian presence, fear of body bags, the Sri Lanka / Indian Peace Keeping Force stigma and political culture without strategic security orientation.

Negativity It could be argued that Indian involvement should be avoided because the Taliban would massacre our troops deployed there. But the Indian Army is not a para-military force that the Taliban can easily slaughter. After all, it succeeded in Somalia where US Army Rangers failed to deliver in 1992. Yet, the Sri Lankan experience against the LTTE cannot be easily erased from military memory. Also, considering the US / ISAF troops plan to exit Afghanistan in July 2011 would suggest that an Indian military entry at this stage amounts to thinking that fools tread in territory where angels fear to.

But US / western forces are not

48

Indian army

POWER PROJECTION keen on remaining in Afghanistan only because they lack a committed, reliable and local ally in the Pakistan Army. However, with Indian troops supporting the coalition forces, the strategic stalemate in Afghanistan has the potential to work against the resurgent Taliban. Western forces have an option to exit Afghanistan considering their countries are not vulnerable directly to cross-border terrorism that afflicts India exclusively.

If Indian troops are initially deployed along with coalition forces it would mutually boost the confidence of both parties. Only the rules of engagement have to be strictly enforced for Indian troops who cannot afford to indirectly or directly clash with their Pakistan counterparts that have the potential to trigger a ‘hot’ war or shooting match between the two traditional foes.

Also, objections about a shortage of military manpower to secure our territorial interests are equally invalid.

One should realise that India has massive para-military forces precisely for such border guarding tasks - while the Army is meant exclusively for war-fighting roles. Besides, the almost 9,000 Indian troops on UN peace keeping roles could also be re-deployed in Afghanistan.

Lay of the land The US chose Pakistan in 2001 as a partner to embark on its Afghan adventure with a major consideration being that Pakistani territory would facilitate logistics to landlocked Afghanistan. The fact that the two countries had earlier partnered with each other during the early 1990s to oust the erstwhile Soviet forces from Afghanistan was another reason. This implied a track record in terms of intelligence sharing and a comfortable covert operations relationship that could be taken forward. Evidently, India never figured even if it wanted to at that time owing to the absence of a common border with Afghanistan.

However, after the US-led global war on terror gained momentum in 2001, India diluted Pakistan’s monopoly as a gateway to Afghanistan and as part of its development aid built a strategic road that connects the Afghan hinterland with the Iranian port city of Chahbahar. The 280 km road from Delaram on the Kandahar-

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

NON-MILITARY ROLE

Herat highway to Zaranj on the Afghanistan-Iran border brings the landlocked country 1,000 km closer to the sea. Iran too has constructed a vital bridge on a river that marks the frontier between its territory and Afghanistan and is busy upgrading the road from Zaranj to Chahbahar.

The Delaram-Zaranj road forms part of Afghanistan’s new thrust to upgrade its road network, beginning with the primary “Garland Highway” and connects Kabul to Mazar-eSharif in northern Afghanistan from two sides - via the Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush mountains and the other via Kandahar and Herat. Given such a new geographic reality, this strategic road implies that New Delhi, with the concurrence of Iran, can transport military logistics overland to support a war-fighting role in Afghanistan after reaching it to Chahbahar by sea.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. Mrinal Suman

helping

civil authority

New strategy Afghanistan forms part of India’s neighbourhood and New Delhi needs to work against a Taliban-centric policy through involvement of other neighbours like Iran and the Central Asian States to counter Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan - to keep India out as far as possible.

Prior to the Kabul Conference, late Holbrooke said “India has a very real role in the region for historic and strategic reasons,” while addressing the press corps in Washington. In this context, New Delhi needs to realise that fighting a war against the Taliban is a vital security interest that cannot be left to the US or western world alone. India must make use of this opportunity to assert itself as a regional power.

The writer is presently associated with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, India. He has been a consultant with the Directorate of Net Assessment of the Ministry of Defence and a Senior Fellow with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He has lectured widely at army fighting formations, paramilitary and police training institutions. He has authored two books: One on Indian national security and foreign policy towards China and another one on Pakistan's Islamisation, besides a research monograph on the Pakistani ISI Directorate.

He holds a masters in strategic studies from the Madras University and a PhD in Political Science from the Bangalore University.

T

he military is one of the most ancient, vital and hierarchy-based of all human organisations. Most social scientists consider it to be the nerve centre of the State. In the ancient scripture Sukraniti, the relation of the military to the State has been compared with that of the mind of man. It is the most potent instrument available to the State to safeguard national security and create an effective deterrence in the minds of potential adversaries. Being

the last bastion of national defence, it cannot fail the nation.

Although the primary role of the military continues to be ensuring national security, a number of other roles are also emerging for the militaries of late. Quite understandably, this role-assignment is country specific as every country has to countenance a different geo-political-strategic environment. In the case of developing

countries, militaries’ role appears to be extending to non-military fields and non-traditional areas. Therein military is employed as an agent of order, efficiency and social change through its active participation in socially beneficial programmes. In many countries military is viewed as a major modernising force.

Moshe Lissak goes to the extent of calling military to be irreplaceable as a nation-builder in his well known book Military’s Role in Modernisation.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

49

Indian army

NON-MILITARY ROLE

The Indian Army has bewildered those who had expected, nay hoped, that after the first flush of nationalistic fervour at having overthrown colonial rule, the armed forces would come to the fore and take up the reins of governance as happened in the several outgrowths of the erstwhile Empire in the Asian continent, most particularly Pakistan. As the archpriest of political destabilisation the American Edward Luttwak wrote in the preface of his A Practical Handbook: Coup d’etat his intention was to ‘democratise’ the coup and so he laid out the ways and means of executing it. The Indian Army has been a pillar of democracy and territorial integrity by tackling the many insurgencies that have plagued the nation almost from the moment of its birth. Yet, there is always the lurking danger that in the overuse in the maintence of internal security there could germinate tendencies of praetorianism.

50

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

This role-expansion of the militaries in developing nations has been evoking interest amongst the policy makers, political scientists, sociologists and military leaders. Further, the impact of undertaking non-military functions on regular basis has been a cause for concern for many. They fear adverse effects on military’s functional character and degradation of its ‘professionalism’.

Roles As with other armies, the role assigned to Indian army can also be categorised under the following two broad heads: (a) Military tasks In addition to defending the nation against external threats, it is also called upon to counter insurgent movements that pose grave internal threat.

Insurgency is an armed insurrection against a legally constituted government and covers the complete spectrum from initial subversion to final guerrilla struggle. Although military action is an essential element, an effective counter-insurgency operation has to be based on an integrated politico-military response. Indian army is tasked to bring the level of violence down to levels wherein conditions become conducive for the initiation of political process. (b) Non-military tasks These are generally of two types – designated tasks and non-designated tasks. Aid to civil authority, as mandated under India’s statutory laws, falls under the category of designated tasks. When called upon to respond, the army has to provide assistance. It can neither decline nor has any discretion in the matter. On the other hand, non-designated tasks are those which the army undertakes of its own volition in larger national interests. Thus they are voluntary in nature and are collectively referred to as military civic action programmes.

This article deals with the employment of Indian army on non-military tasks i.e. in aid to civil authority and military civic action activities.

Aid to civil authority It needs to be reiterated at the outset that aid to civil authority

As every counter-insurgency operation becomes a protracted affair, the army should be replaced by paramilitary forces once the situation stabilises. For that purpose, necessary competence must be developed in paramilitary forces. The army should be used as a shock-action therapy and withdrawn at the earliest. In any case, the role of the army in controlling internal strife should never be allowed to get institutionalised means assisting the civil authority in the performance of its functions and not replacing it. Defence Services Regulations (DSR) lays down the tasks that can be entrusted to the army in aid to civil authority and they are as follows: (a) Law and order Indian society is beset with dissentions.

After centuries of deprivation and exploitation, disadvantaged segments of the Indian society demand an equitable distribution of resources.

Popularisation of socialistic ideals has also raised their hopes. When the dissenting groups lose faith in the fairness of the system, they resort to agitational means. Every agitation inevitably results in violence. Law and order becomes the first casualty.

Furthermore, India is witnessing the new phenomenon of political terrorism, wherein a dissident group uses violence to coerce the authority into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators. As political terrorism draws sustenance from foreign sources, it is inevitably controlled by anti-national elements.

are invariably declared illegal by the government. The army is often asked to run the affected services in order to prevent striking workers from holding the society to ransom, whatever be their grievances.

During the railway strike of 1974, the army manned electrical and telecommunications services and even operated locomotive sheds. The Assam agitation of 1980 saw workers of the oil company striking work and even damaging pumping machinery.

To prevent damage to the oil pipeline due to the freezing of residual oil, army soldiers undertook the task of repairing the machinery and pumping oil. In 20 days, troops reactivated the entire system and achieved the pre-strike pumping rate of 3,700 kilolitres per day.

critical importance.

Due to frequent floods and cyclonic storms in the Indian peninsula, disaster relief has become a major commitment of the Indian army. Tsunami of 2004 was one of the deadliest natural calamities in recorded history. The armed forces were employed to provide relief to the disaster-hit areas and restore damaged services. (d) Other assistance

Although seeking assistance of the army to maintain essential services helps the society at large, many experts question the advisability of employing soldiers to break strikes.

It is an open ended assignment – the civil authorities can seek assistance of the army in varied other fields as well.

During the Commonwealth Games at Delhi, the army was tasked to construct a foot bridge against tight timeframe as the one constructed by civil agencies had collapsed. Similarly, the army provided uniformed manpower for awards ceremonies. Construction of pontoon bridges to facilitate movement of pilgrims during Kumbh Melas is a regular task assigned to the army.

(c) Natural calamities

Military civic action

(b) Essential services

A disaster is a major calamity and invariably results in widespread death, destruction and devastation.

Common natural disasters are floods, cyclones, hurricanes and earthquakes.

Disaster relief includes all measures and activities which help minimise the effects of a disaster and thereby prevent loss of life and property to the maximum possible extent. The army with its pool of trained manpower and equipment constitutes an important component of the governmental effort to ameliorate the sufferings of the disaster-affected people.

The concept of military civic action encompasses all activities performed by the military for the socio-economic betterment of the people. In the United States, civic action has been defined as – “Use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others, contributing to economic and social development which would also improve the standing of the military forces with the population”.

There are certain services whose efficient and uninterrupted functioning is essential to the nation or the society at large. The army with its large pool of highly disciplined and trained manpower is often summoned to run these essential services in times of labour trouble. As essential services are vital to the basic infrastructure which contributes to the general well being of the society, labour strikes in them

The most common feature of all disasters is the loss of human life.

Disaster relief entails rescue of trapped personnel and their transportation to safe areas. Restoration of damaged means of communications and broken down essential services requires considerable effort. At times, temporary bridges are required to be constructed to reach the affected areas. Provision of food supplies and medical aid assume

Many experts feel that through civic action, the army acts as an agent of social integration. Edward Shils is of the view that the military serves to integrate ethnic groups into a national community, widen horizons beyond villages and locality, keep young men from being infected by nationalistic demagogy and give them a greater concern for the nation as a whole.

According to Morris Janowitz, military

Although law and order is a state subject, politicisation of police forces has rendered them incapable of maintaining law and order. Additionally, they are inadequately trained, ill-equipped and poorly led. Inability of police forces to counter the tactics employed by disruptive elements results in frequent summoning of the army to maintain order.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

51

Indian army

becomes a device for developing a sense of national cohesion – a social psychological element of national unity – which is especially crucial for a nation which has suffered because of colonialism.

Thus, civic action has twin objectives of helping the population and improving the image of the military. As these tasks do not fall within the ambit of conventional charter of duties of the army, a certain degree of discretion is available to the army. Its participation is comparatively on voluntary basis, driven by a sense of concern for fellow countrymen.

Indian army considers civic action to be an important part of its duty to the nation. Since Independence, it has been making enormous contribution towards economic development of remote and under-developed areas.

Through constructive participation in nation building tasks, it has been performing the role of a catalysing agent for national integration, education and modernisation.

In insurgency prone areas, civic action forms an integral part of the overall politico-military initiative to win the hearts and minds of the affected people. In inaccessible areas where civil institutions are non-functional, it runs schools, provides basic medical cover, runs water supply schemes, constructs play grounds and provides vocational training to local youth.

The way forward Military is the embodiment of a nation’s conscience and will.

Therefore, its role assignment deserves due deliberation. Being a part of the apparatus of the legitimate government, military owes allegiance to the people of the country. J. P. Moreigne describes it aptly when he says that a nation’s army constitutes, from a sociological point of view, a human collectivity which is structured into a society by the ends of which it has to serve.

Undoubtedly, internal security is as important as external security.

However, it must never be forgotten that external security can be ensured only by the armed forces

52

Indian army

NON-MILITARY ROLE whereas other organisations can be trained and equipped to undertake internal security assignments.

Although employment of the army in counter-insurgency duties cannot be avoided, it should be restricted to the barest minimum when nation’s survival gets threatened. As every counter-insurgency operation becomes a protracted affair, the army should be replaced by paramilitary forces once the situation stabilises.

For that purpose, necessary competence must be developed in paramilitary forces. The army should be used as a shock-action therapy and withdrawn at the earliest. In any case, the role of the army in controlling internal strife should never be allowed to get institutionalised.

Praetorian tendencies The army’s assistance in the maintenance of law and order to prevent anarchy can never be questioned. However, it should be summoned as a last resort.

Recurrent employment in law and order duties can prove taxing to a soldier psychologically. Frequent switching of roles can dilute a soldier’s focus on his primary task. Some soldiers may also acquire political leanings and even ambitions, as has been witnessed in many developing countries. Worse, state police forces fail to develop their own competence. Everyone looks up to the army to restore order and the civil law enforcement agencies lose credibility and respect of the population.

Army’s assistance in disaster relief brings the army and the society closer to each other. It improves army’s image. It is the best possible example of soldiers’ concern for fellow countrymen. But frequent employment on disaster relief duties may result in a loss of training time.

It may also breed a certain degree of complacency in civil agencies and over-dependence on the army. It will be better for the civil agencies to develop adequate in-house capacity to be able to handle most of the emergencies themselves.

As regards military civic action, the army should continue to participate in well-selected

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

activities. However, two points need to be kept in mind. First, only the effort that the army can spare without affecting its operational efficiency should be diverted towards civic action tasks.

As warned by Hugh Hanning, civic action must not be construed as substitution of warfare by welfare. Secondly, since most civic action functions normally fall under the charter of the civil administration, army’s entry should not be seen as a failure of the civil agencies to do their job.

Therefore, selection of civic action programmes should be such that they do not undermine the civil administration – civic action should supplement the efforts of civil agencies and not attempt to replace them.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

structural changes

Finally, it must never be forgotten that the raison d’être for the existence of the army is to ensure national defence against external threats. Nothing should be done to dilute that focus. The army must be kept free of all avoidable non-military commitments to allow it to remain prepared for its primary task.

More importantly, excessive participation in aid to civil authority commitments can have an adverse affect on the apolitical nature of the army. It may start entertaining ideas of a permanent role for itself in civilian functions. “India is notable among all the new States for the stable subordination of the military to the civil power,” remarked Edward Shils.

Nothing should be done to upset this well established military-civil equation.

The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration.

He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world i.e. the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being ‘the most outstanding engineer of the year’. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

MODERNISATION

F

orce structuring can be done in two ways - Threat based or capability based. Traditionally, Indian Force structures have generally been premised upon a threat-based analysis in the post-independence period. By 2026 India will have the youngest population profile in the world. In theory therefore it could field the world's largest Army, Marine Corps, Paramilitary and Internal

Security Forces. What are the structural changes that the Indian Armed Forces would need to usher in to face the challenges of the 21st century?

Quick reaction Within manpower intensive land forces, it will have to create islands of technological excellence. The force structure must increasingly be

capability based and not just threat based. For transformation, we need the capability to undertake at very short notice, concerted air-land operations against a nuclear backdrop to raise costs or punish Pakistan for its subconventional assault against India and also deal with the Chinese threat of local wars under conditions of informatisation. To make significant changes it will have to generate the

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

53

Indian army

MODERNISATION

A doctrinal shift is taking place in the Indian Armed Forces and it must, perforce, demolish many shibboleths like “downsizing” and “defensive defence”. The Kargil war could well have been invited by the reduction of troops that took place at the time and the difficulty in evicting the intruders (it took us two months) by moving acclimatised troops from other Mountain Divisions always keeping one wary eye open to see that China does not take a hand in the proceedings.

A greater synergy is required for air-land and air-land-naval operations so that all hardware held by all three Armed Forces and their respective capabilities are brought to bear in concentrations for swift manoeuvres and envelopment-of-enemy operations. capability to carry out operational manoeuvre from the sea, to turn Pakistan’s flank in a land-centric conflict or to carry out out-of-area contingencies. We will need to generate worthwhile air-assault capabilities, both for over the hump assault capabilities in the mountains as also for our littoral spaces.

Sino-Pak challenge The Indian Army will need the capacities to deal with a two-front war with China and Pakistan as also concurrently deal with an adverse rear area security situation caused by jihadi tanzeems and Left Wing extremism.

All notions of cutting manpower

54

while doing so could turn out to be recipes for disaster. There is a serious need to reassess entrenched mindsets.

Modernisation in the Indian Army was long associated with down-sizing and saving on manpower to usher in new technologies. Given the range and scope of our threats, we will need capabilities that leverage on both - manpower and technology. Fortunately, in the decades ahead, India should have these twin assets in ample measure. The first is a gift of its demographic youth bulge. For the second, India will have to generate its own military-industrial complex in the private sector. These capabilities merit elaboration.

■■

Air Power: If India is to generate

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

the next RMA in South Asia it will have to embrace air power and naval aviation in a very major way. India needs a 60 Squadron Air Force with a healthy mix of Fourth and Fifth Generation fighters, AWACS, aerostats, air-to-air refuelling capabilities and a massive increase in its inventory of precision guided munitions. Precision strikes can only be launched with precise intelligence and this will need a transparency revolution based upon satellites, synthetic aperture radars, aerostats and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Air dominance is the key to success in an air-land battle scenario.

This will be the key technology to usher in an edge over likely adversaries in the South Asian context.

The Chinese mobilisation (in Tibet) will now be by air, rail and road and the velocity and scale of induction into Tibet has undergone a dramatic paradigm shift. The very scale of the initial Chinese offensive would foreclose most of India’s response options. Unless India wants to confine itself to a suicidal defensive-defence format, it will be forced to counter attack uphill, over the Himalayan hump.

To speed up this process it needs credible air assault capabilities ■■ Naval Aviation: India needs a three carrier Navy with the ability to project power ashore not only in terms of naval aviation but also land attack cruise missiles and SLBMs. The third leg of the Indian nuclear triad must be based on nuclear powered submarines.

It would need a viable Marine Corps.

Why does India need this marine capability? It will give it the capability to execute operational manoeuvre from the sea. Its capability to turn the flank in a war with Pakistan is immense and overwhelming. Besides India would need this to counter China’s growing amphibious assault capability which was created for Taiwan but is now largely rendered surplus. This could be used to seize the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Such marine intervention capability could help India to come to the aid of island microstates like Maldives, Mauritius or Seychelles and react strongly to pirate attacks upon its shipping fleet in South Asia or off the coast of Africa. It could enable India to assist friendly countries (like Vietnam) in case of need or even assist the Indian diaspora in case it faces threats or persecution. Marine Amphibious capabilities that are able to exploit the over-the-horizon envelope would truly constitute an RMA in South Asia.

Power projection assets India has so far created a Brigade plus sized amphibious capability of straight legged Infantry. These Infantry battalions are rotated once every three years and as such loose their specialisation. Once landed, their mobility and reach is painfully restricted. What India needs is a full fledged Marine Corps of two Divisions.

This should be patterned on the erstwhile Soviet Naval Infantry which was fully mechanised (It used BTR-60 and BMP amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicles and PT-76 tanks) The Soviet Naval Infantry was 16,000 strong and had one Naval Infantry Division with the Pacific Fleet and one Naval Brigade each with the Baltic, Northern and Black Sea Fleets. The Baltic fleet had staged marine landings in Georgia

recently (2008). The Soviet concept relied upon landing of armour and mechanised Infantry directly on to the beach in amphibious ships and air cushioned vehicles (ACVs). The Soviet Naval Infantry Brigades had four Naval Infantry Battalions, one Amphibious Tank Battalion along with Artillery and Anti-tank Battalion each. It had 83 Assault ships and 82 Air Cushioned Vehicles. Mechanisation would make it a dual tasked capability. It could be used over land and it could be projected ashore by the Navy.

India needs to go in for helicopters to land troops ashore and large hovercraft (air cushioned vehicles) that will help actualise the “Over the Horizon Beach Assault Concept”. This merits explaining. The current crop of existing amphibious equipment and methods make surprise very difficult to achieve.

Only some 30 per cent of the world’s beaches lend themselves to assault by the existing equipment. This severely restricts options and choices. The enemy can easily identify and defend the beaches that are assaultable. Besides Amphibious ships have to close with the beaches (come within 10-20 Nautical miles) to launch the Amphibious assault vehicles. This makes the assault force critically vulnerable to mines, coastal artillery and anti-ship missiles. The Americans are now talking in terms of a new RMA that can be initiated by the employment of tilt rotor helicopters and air-cushioned vehicles. With ACVs up to 70 per cent of the worlds beaches can be negotiated. It is this which will enable the over-the-horizon assault concept and make opposed landings a thing of the past. Tilt rotors would land troops to secure a beach. The ACVs would then rapidly deliver tanks and mechanised Infantry directly on to the beach to counter the enemy’s response and break out for depth areas / vital objectives in the enemies’ rear. Given the high mobility of amphibious ships, (e.g. waterjet powered ships can carry 12,000 tons of military cargo - including Abram tanks and Bradley ICVs and travel 1,000 miles in 24 hours or 7,000 miles in a week!) Tilt rotors could strike

suddenly at any point over a wide area of littoral and secure landing areas for ACVs. In the tilt rotor-ACV-waterjet powered ship combination we have the makings of another RMA.

Air assault capabilities A direct spinoff of airpower would be the creation of air assault capabilities.

India needs these urgently to counter the rising threat profile from China.

China has brought about a paradigm shift in its logistical capabilities in Tibet by extending a railway line to Lhasa.

It is planning to extend the same to Nepal. It is also planning to create two more rail lines into Tibet. As part of generating trans-regional mobility, this will enable China to position massive forces for any conflict with India. The Chinese mobilisation will now be by air, rail and road and the velocity and scale of induction into Tibet has undergone a dramatic paradigm shift. The very scale of the initial Chinese offensive would foreclose most of India’s response options. Unless India wants to confine itself to a suicidal defensive-defence format, it will be forced to counter attack uphill, over the Himalayan hump. To speed up this process it needs credible air assault capabilities.

China’s 15 Airborne Corps could well serve as the model for a Rapid Reaction Force capability for India. It would surprise most to learn that during the Second World War, the British Indian Army had an Airborne Corps of two divisions. These included: 2nd Indian Air Borne (AB) Division.

50 Para Brigade (still existing); 77 Para Brigade (disbanded after 1947-48 J and K war); 14 Air Landing Brigade (went to Pakistan).

6 Airborne Division (ex Europe).

This AB Corps was disbanded on 23 October 1945. However its elements

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

55

Indian army

MODERNISATION

had earlier played a significant role in the Second Chindit operations that tried to affect a deep turning manoeuvre in Burma by getting injected in the depth of the Japanese Army in Burma. Unfortunately, the wrong depth area had been selected and did not draw the level of Japanese reaction that it was designed to.

The Second Chindit Operation was largely an Air landed operation using glider-borne troops that landed in improvised airfields cleared by the first wave of paratroopers. India is heir to this military historical tradition, yet its “think small” attrition mindset led it to disband all of its airborne assets (less 50 Para Brigade). India needs at least an Airborne Corps consisting of one Air Assault Division and one Air Landed Division along with upto Division strength of Special Forces capability. To create the space for their employment and for exploiting the air flank, India first and foremost needs to invest most heavily in the current RMA based on air power. With such an Airborne Corps, India can force Chinese offensives to recoil by seizing airheads on the Tibetan plateau for large scale air assaults that execute significant turning manoeuvres and directly threaten the Chinese lines of communication. An air assault capability can achieve and create serious problems for Pakistan in any future war in the sub-continent.

These air assault capabilities must primarily be raised and tasked for conventional conflicts with China and Pakistan, but would have a secondary role for out-of-area contingency tasks, say in Afghanistan, Nepal or the microstates of the Indian Ocean, as also to assist the legitimate governments in South Asia in case they ask for our assistance. Air assault capabilities could play a significant role in any international coalition that seeks to prevent / retrieve Pakistan’s nuclear assets from falling into the hands of jihadi non-State actors in the event of that country experiencing a collapse of the State.

Ground holding vs Pakistan In the late 1950s, Pakistan as a member of the SEATO and CENTO alliance architectures received massive amounts of American military aid.

This enabled Pakistan to switch from holding ground with manpower to holding it with firepower instead. This was done by the newly raised Recce

56

and Support Battalions (R and Sp).

These battalions had large number of machine guns and anti-tank recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps. These enabled Pakistan to hold the same length of ground with just half the number of troops that India was using for defence.

Thus even though the Pakistani Army is half the size of the Indian Army, by holding ground thinly, it was able to release matching levels for offensive operations against the much larger Indian Army. This concept served Pakistan quite well in both the 1965 and 1971 wars. In these conflicts the Indian Army spent the bulk periods of the war in the Western theatres fighting the Reserve and Special Battalions (R and Sp) and Recce Regiments of the Pakistan Army. The most amazing aspect is the fact that India has not been able to redress this ridiculous ground holding differential for the past 50 years. Post Operation Parakram the mobilisation differential of the Pakistan Army was once more highlighted rather painfully.

The Cold Start Doctrine tried to redress the aspect of Pakistan’s geographical advantage in mobilisation timings by using the defensive / Pivot Corps to launch rapid offensives into Pakistan virtually from the line of march. To generate this offensive potential, it is imperative that the defensive / holding corps hold the existing lengths of ground with far fewer troops and thereby generate greater force levels for offensive operations across the border.

The way to achieve this would be to raise Pakistan style R and Sp battalions.

These could be based on tracked BMP Infantry Combat Vehicles. However technology today offers a radical new solution which could generate a mini RMA. India could base these new R and Sp units on Fast Attack Vehicles (FAVs) or Light Strike Vehicles (LSVs).These are very high mobility cross country vehicles which represent a quantum jump from the jeep technology of the Second World War. The jeep class vehicles weigh some 4-5,000 kg whereas the FAVs weigh just a 1,000 kg or less.

With 400 or more HP engines these have a terrific power to weight ratio and pack a lethal punch in the form of an anti-tank guided missile, a machine gun and an automatic grenade launcher. These are low silhouette vehicles with very low levels of engine noise and hence low acoustic and infrared signatures. As such these depend on stealth and not armour protection for survival. The best part is their

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

heli–portability. One Mi-17 class helicopter could carry two to three such FAVs to place in the path of any surprise enemy breakthrough. FAV based R and Sp battalions or even Infantry battalions equipped with such vehicles could generate a revolution in the South Asian context and enable India to generate far greater force levels for offensive tasks.

Overcoming night blindness Another significant RMA can be wrought in South Asia by making India’s tank and BMP fleet fully capable of night fighting. Currently 70 per cent of India’s tank fleet is night blind (compared to Pakistan’s tank fleet 80 per cent of which is capable of fighting at night and China’s tank fleet which is 100 per cent night-capable). The First Gulf War in Iraq had clearly indicated that the Soviet made T-72 tanks could hold their own by day against the American Abram tanks but they courted disaster at night because with their Image-Intensifier night sights the Abrams could pick off the T-72s at 1,500 m whereas the T-72 gunner could at best see hazily till 6-700 m at most with his IR sights. Unless we rapidly overcome the night-blindness of our tank fleet we could court serious problems in the next round with Pakistan. In fact every soldier of the infantry should be equipped with third-generation night vision devices and all Army Aviation helicopters must rapidly acquire the ability to fly by night in all weather conditions. Though this is currently being done, what is needed is an all out effort to speed up the scope and scale of this project and make it conform to realistic timelines

Improving artillery The artillery calibre (base measurement) must be standardised on the 155 mm calibre at the earliest so that effects can be massed. The Indian Artillery as an arm has been the victim of criminal neglect. After the Bofors crisis, it has not been able to induct any new medium calibre artillery systems.

It had purchased 400 Bofor howitzers.

Sweden was thereafter supposed to transfer the technology to build another 1,000 such guns in India. This never happened as the Bofors scandal broke out. It had to improvise by converting Russian 130 Medium guns to 155 cal. It also went in for further purchases of the

World War II vintage Russian 130 mm guns and 122 mm guns. Only lately has it been able to add the Russian Smerch Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher System and the indigenous Pinaka system. It is yet to get its 1,000 medium guns and its tracked / self-propelled artillery for supporting its armoured formations.

■■ The Indian Air Defence Artillery is still stuck with guns and SAMs of the 1960s era. India must complete these badly delayed modernisations at a most urgent pace that must take into account the rising profile of threats from China and Pakistan. As India’s economic profile rises exponentially, India must create the capacities to dominate the arc from the Straits of Hormuz to Malacca and create out-of-area contingency capabilities that are credible and usable. It must create the capacities to be able to intervene militarily in Afghanistan and Central Asia to safeguard its vital interests and not secede this strategic space so

supinely to Pakistan or China. It cannot afford to ignore its land or maritime environments. Both are equally vital to its well being and national security.

Let us now examine the concepts to actualise such capabilities in greater detail.

Internal security The growing profile of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in central and peninsular India is an ominous development. India will have to raise upto 5 to 6 additional Rashtriya Rifles / regular divisions to cater for the same.

Keeping in mind the ever-escalating envelope of India’s internal security threats, India needs at least an overall 9 to 10 Division strong capability of the RR. This would be analogous to the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (which was simply converted from demobilised Chinese infantry divisions). For the five to six new RR / Infantry divisions, the bulk

of manpower should be recruited from the tribal areas themselves (so as to suck out the Recruitable Male Population) and to provide immediate gainful employment to the forest tribes.

40 to 50 per cent of the recruitment should be from the tribal areas of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. This would prove to be the greatest vehicle for upward social mobility of these groups. Dr Ambedkar, incidentally was the son of a Subedar Major of the Mahar Regiment.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in J&K and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

57

Indian army

PEACEKEEPING

That many nations have veered around to supporting India’s candidature in the UN Security Council as a Permanent Member is largely the product of India’s impeccable record in UN Peacekeeping operations. With the third largest contingent under “Blue Helmets” in seven missions in hotspots in various parts of the world stretching from Haiti to East Timor including the perennially suppurating Congo, Indian peacekeepers – both men and women – have shown grit, fortitude and empathy in dealing with very complex racial, ethnic and tribal conflicts.

The institutions that it has set up to deal with internal security issues are now being thrown open to friendly nations to learn the skills of warfare in various kinds of terrain and geographical conditions.

impeccable record!

Praful Shankar Adagale

‘War and peace are becoming indivisible, therefore it is not enough for one country to secure peace within its own borders but it is also necessary that it should endeavour to its utmost capacity to help in the maintenance of peace all over the world’ Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru Former Prime Minister of India

P

eacekeeping has been defined by the United Nations as ‘a way to help countries frayed by conflict and create conditions for sustainable peace.’ Over more than 60 years, UN peacekeeping interventions have helped to maintain international peace and reduce conflicts.

The role of Indian Army in peacekeeping later became a foreign policy tool immediately after the independence of India in 1947, as the above statement made by the former Prime Minister explains its mission to promote peace and safeguard India’s national interest.

58

Uniquely difficult The role of army in war and conflict within its own country is known to all, however, the situation is different for Indian peacekeepers deployed for peacekeeping missions abroad.

The peacekeeping operations are carried in the highest conflict zones in various parts of the countries, the climatic conditions, geographical location, culture, traditions and the intensity of conflict makes it a most dangerous place to operate for the peacekeepers. However, the Indian peacekeeping efforts of UN have time and again proved their effectiveness and credibility due to various factors

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

supporting its contribution. The army is known for its professionalism, selfcontrol, tolerance, discipline, morale, respect towards others and after all their commitment towards maintaining world peace makes it a globally recognised peacekeeping force.

Indian peacekeepers are considered the toughest forces to operate in any region due to tough training and soldiers operating from different regions from India, its cultural diversity and its terrain conditions makes it more adaptable to manoeuvre and use its strategy and tactics to win any warfare.

Indian troops are trained for not only the tactics of battlefield but also require

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

59

Indian army

PEACEKEEPING

India is not just randomly following the UN mandate but its ability to understand and analyse the problem in the region and ask questions pertaining to minor reforms in the UN office proves its ability and intellectual power. It has also expressed concern on the manner in which UN peacekeeping operations are conducted, where such missions are given "unrealistic and confusing mandates”. It has always raised its voice to bring reforms and transparency in the way the operations are conducted and with clear command and control units the peacekeepers to understand the problem in those regions, as their important task is to win the hearts and minds of the people in the region and use effective communication tools to pacify the situation.

Third largest At present the UN peacekeeping forces of 1,23,000 are deployed worldwide with 16 missions in different regions. India is the third largest troops contributor to the UN Peacekeeping missions with around 8,760 military personnel deployed in seven missions as UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNDOF (Golan Heights Israel/Syria), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo), UNMIS – (Sudan), UNOCI (Ivory Coast Cote’d Ivoire), MINUSTAH (Haiti) and UNMIT East Timor. It has its largest presence in Congo approximately 4,000 peacekeepers under force commander Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash in (MONUSCO) where they have already completed 23 community projects worth more than US$ 2,00,000 which includes, providing adequate health care, sports facilities, bridge constructions etc. India’s 4,500 strong standby brigade group in emergency response is also stationed at New Delhi.

Women in peacekeeping The Security Council adopted UN resolution 1325 on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000. The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

Resolution 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. The contribution of women

60

peacekeepers at present is 3,332 which is 3.33 per cent of the total force. The first all-women contingent to serve in a peacekeeping mission, a Formed Police Unit from India, was deployed in 2007, to the UN operation in Liberia which had 125 women of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Liberia is the first African country to complete a National Action Plan to implement the resolution.

First contingent The contribution of the Indian Armed Forces in UN peacekeeping operations began in early 1950’s. The first call came early enough, when India sent troops to Korea to form the Custodian Force (India), which functioned under the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission headed by Major General (later General) K. S. Thimayya, DSO in 1953-54. This was a delicate task, involving the repatriation of Prisoners of War. The largest (and longest serving) contingent was sent to the UN mission to the Congo (1960–1964). Since the end of the Cold War, India has been engaged in most of the UN’s missions, whether in Africa or elsewhere. It provided military observers in the Iran–Iraq (1988–1991) and Iraq–Kuwait border disputes (1991 onwards), Namibia (1989–1991), Angola (1989– 1991), Central America (1988–1992), El Salvador (1991–1995), Liberia (1993– 1997), the Congo (1999 onwards), and Ethiopia–Eritrea (2000 onwards).

Additionally, sizeable military contingents from India participated in PKOs in Cambodia (1992–1993), Mozambique (1992–1994), Somalia (1993–94), Rwanda (1993–1996), Haiti (1994–2000), Angola (1995–1999), Lebanon (1998 onwards) and Sierra Leone (1999–end of 2000) mostly in Africa. India is giving assistance to the UN’s peacekeeping efforts throughout the world.

Post-conflict resuscitation Peacekeepers monitor and observe

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist ex-combatants to implement the steps these processes involve. The various tasks undertaken

by Indian peacekeepers include introducing confidence-building measures, encouraging power-sharing arrangements, providing electoral support, strengthening the rule of law and fostering economic and social development.

Accordingly, UN peacekeepers (often referred to as ‘blue berets’ or helmets) can include soldiers and other civilian personnel, among them police officers. Some of the principles of UN Charter are as follows: All means for the peaceful settlement of disputes should be exhausted before establishing a peacekeeping operation.

Secondly, peacekeeping operations should strictly adhere to principles of the UN Charter, in particular the principles of full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs. Thirdly, peacekeeping operations should be considered only at the request of the member States involved and should be under the command and control of the UN. Fourth, the anticipated duration of a peacekeeping mission should be tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria to end the mission and an exit strategy.

With the increase in the number of inter-State conflicts peacekeeping operations have become more complex. Peacekeeping now has to be distinguished from both peacebuilding and peacemaking. To define all three where peacekeeping relates to the presence of groups of neutral soldiers, military observers, civilian police, electoral observers and human rights monitors to ensure that hostile groups not to return to the use of arms. Peace keepers’ tasks can include establishing and policing buffer zones, demobilisation and disarmament of military forces, establishing communication between parties and protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Second, peace-building is

reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example through training and restructuring of local police and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media) and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. Third, peace-making the first step to peace if fighting breaks out revolves around diplomatic measures to negotiate a ceasefire and an agreement to which all parties agree, accepting that no gains are to be won by continuing the conflict. Implementing the peace agreement and rebuilding communication needs to happen on official and informal levels to build a foundation for future reconciliation.

Peacekeepers are involved in various stages of conflict resolution as peacebuilding and peacemaking form a part of post-conflict creation of zones which are maintained by the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation of men and material, construction of bridges, roads, schools medical facilities, all these give an image of India’s building civil-military relationship to maintain harmony.

Gender influence The role of women in peacekeeping has helped to build a strong relation and faith between the females from the regions as they been the victims of terror from rape, abuse, sexual exploitation, unemployment and poverty. The Indian female peacekeepers are trained in sophisticated combat tactics and weaponry, crowd and mob control, counter-insurgency and act as a helping hand to improve the situation as the case in Liberia where females in the region are trained to work in social sectors, motivated to join armed forces, train in self defense, which has made them understand the role of women in the society and to protect their identity.

Conflict management India’s ongoing experience and efforts to manage and resolve conflicts in most dangerous regions gives both diplomatic and strategic advantage to India in many ways as to become a global player in conflict management. Various institutions and

government organisations across the globe are willing to collaborate and have dialogue with the Indian side, to identify good practices for the use of peacemaking community and expand the research on conflict management.

One such initiative is also taken by Center of Dialogue located in Geneva in collaboration with the Delhi Policy Group.

Multilateral engagements The peacekeeping operations help the Indian armed forces to build strong relations and coordinate with other foreign forces deployed in the region. Indian peacekeepers have used the intelligence to understand the problem in the region and by developing new techniques and skills to resolve conflicts. Its vast experience in the conflict zones has helped to built the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK), New Delhi, which provides training capsules for Military Contingent Officers, Military Observers and Staff and Logistics Officers. CUNPK is also a storehouse of information on India’s involvement in UN Peacekeeping and is continuing to build and update its research on peacekeeping related issues. The foreign troops are also trained in the institution and international events are also held often. We have not stopped here; the peacekeeping forces’ role is recognised by other foreign troops as well due to which it has made the commander of Polish land forces General Zbigniew Glowienka with a delegation to visit New Delhi for talks on possibilities of conducting joint operations between the Polish and Indian troops who served together in the Golan Heights, Southern Lebanon and Congo. New Delhi has also agreed to host the Vietnamese Army for joint training in mountain and jungle warfare at a suitable Indian location next year. India has offered to help Vietnam in mastering the art of United Nations’ peacekeeping operations at the bilateral dialogue for defence cooperation held this year in Hanoi, Vietnam. Similarly, the defence cooperation with Japan in the field of peace-keeping, peace-building and disaster relief was addressed in 2009 by New Delhi following counter visit by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori which also highlighted the need for the same. All these clearly make the Indian peacekeepers the pioneers to built and

develop strong bilateral relationships with the other nations.

India is not just randomly following the UN mandate but its ability to understand and analyse the problem in the region and ask questions pertaining to minor reforms in the UN office proves its ability and intellectual power. It has also expressed concern on the manner in which UN peacekeeping operations are conducted, where such missions are given “unrealistic and confusing mandates”. It has always raised its voice to bring reforms and transparency in the way the operations are conducted and with clear command and control units.

Collateral benefits India’s continued efforts to maintain peace in the African region has also helped it to become an economic partner. Its efforts have also made the US and other countries to support India for the UNSC. Its contribution and global acceptance proves its potential to be a global player in the 21st century.

Further it should be helpful to create a balance between the developing and the developed countries to enhance their skills and techniques to contribute in the peacekeeping forces and understanding of peace-building process. It should adhere to its policy of non-alignment and venture its leadership for innovative thinking about conflict management in near future which will help to achieve excellence in resolving future conflicts. The policy makers should take advantage of this to raise the issue at the UN’s office in New York and support its role in near future for augmenting India’s growing global influence. India also should not ignore the problems at regional level as conflicts in Asia would increase which will lead to inter-State wars. Its engagement in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar shows its strong commitment for peace-building in the region as well. It should also engage itself and other regional partners to fight the future threats.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow working in Yashwantrao Chavan National Center of International Security and Defence Analysis (YC-NISDA). He has written a Paper on Implication of 26/11 on Internal Security: India’s new Counter Strategy. His areas of specialisation are European studies, National Security, International Relation, and Terrorism.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

61

Indian army

BELEAGUERED

Many decades ago an Indian war correspondent was asked to address a group of Army officers who were being groomed to handle the media.

During the Q and A session a question was put to him: “Why does the media highlight cases of rape by military personnel?” He replied: “Because it is like ‘man bites dog’ – not the kind of behaviour expected of a military man. In India most people believe that they are men of superhuman qualities – way above such decadence.” The current spate of exposes of military misdemeanour is the product of over-management of the media by the military, a pathogenic reaction to being “embedded” for much too long.

O

f late, the Army has been buffeted by virtually a storm of so-called scams and senior officers have been accused of financial impropriety, misconduct and misusing their position of authority. Be it Sukhna land case; a Lt. Gen. being accused of misbehaving with a lady and the media calls it the mother of all scams; the Adarsh Housing Society and involvement of two former Army chiefs, one naval chief and many other senior officers. The result is that the Army’s image has taken a beating. Besides the moral dimension, armed forces are critically short of modern hardware and systems and no one seems to care.

Within the Army itself, discontent appears to be growing with official policies, especially the promotions and postings which are being challenged by concerned officers in courts of law or Armed Forces Tribunals. There appears to be a crisis of leadership.

How has this situation come about?

Undeniably the moral degeneration of the civil society has a lot to do with it since Army comes from the same stock.

However, the all-round turmoil in the Army cannot be solely attributed to this reason alone. The reasons for Army’s inner siege are to be found in

62

the manner in which Army evolved after independence, how supremacy of civilians has come to mean that of civil servant and how Army’s crucial modernisation requirements are treated in a cavalier manner by the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership which, instead of working as a team, act as adversaries.

Disharmony Except for a brief period during Maurya Dynasty when the team of scholar Chanakya and warrior Chandragupta achieved spectacular results, India has never had a strategic culture. The rulers never understood the importance of military as an instrument of State policy. At the time of independence, Army was viewed with suspicion as it had been under the British and had not taken part in the struggle for independence. Indeed but for J and K war of 1947-48, Army was in the danger of being disbanded. Gen. Sir Rob Lockhart, C-in-C India at that time recalls that when he went to the Prime Minister to get the Defence Policy approved, Nehru glanced through the paper but was not in the least bit amused. “Rubbish, total rubbish, we don’t need a defence policy. Our policy

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. Sheru Thapliyal

is Ahinsa, we foresee no military threats.

As far as I am concerned, you can disband the Army. The police is good enough to meet our security needs.”

Later Nehru developed a phobia about the Armed Forces when he looked around and saw most of the countries in Asia and Africa and indeed Europe being ruled by military dictators. A policy was thereafter evolved whereby Armed Forces were not made part of the government but were departments under the Ministry of Defence and emasculation of the Armed Forces became the sole agenda of the politician and the babu. There have been two consequences of this. One – instead of acting as co-share holders in the system, Armed Forces and bureaucracy act as adversaries with babu acting as a disinterested spectator with no stake in the operational efficiency and well being of the Armed Forces but having a veto power on everything. Two – It forced the Armed Forces to look within since they had no say in the system. The Services, therefore. became highly personalised fiefdom of Service chiefs. Policies were often changed at the whims of Service chiefs and the same malaise spread to the chain of command. Annual Confidential Reports, promotions and postings

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

63

Indian army

thus did not remain impartial and fair.

The senior officer became the lord and master of all he surveyed and thus corruption crept into the system. Most of the ills of the Armed Forces can be attributed to this factor where, due to loss of status of Service chiefs in the system of governance, they are forced to look inward and treat the Services as their personal property."Both the politician and civil servant have found it convenient to keep the soldier in his place and devise a system whereby the Army is always asking, begging, pleading and justifying. Over the year this method wears down the Army and many army chiefs are content to let cases drop through sheer exortion.

The role of perpertual appelant can be very frustrating." Brid. John Dalvi in Himalyan Blunder.

Insurgency and proxy war Although Indian Army has been fighting insurgency in the north-east since the fifties, it was low key and only a small part of the Army was involved.

All this changed once Pakistan unleashed its proxy war in Punjab and, having failed there, in J and K. Army’s training and ethos underwent a drastic change. System of peace/field tenures got a jolt. Insurgency played havoc with the Army’s value system. On the one hand Army was to root out terrorism while on the other it was expected to do so with one hand tied behind its back with unending criticism by human rights groups even while Army was scrupulously fair. Army’s training for war also suffered. This was manifested in the Kargil war where the Army suffered over five hundred casualties.

Operation Parakram in 2002 saw serious shortcomings in Army’s conventional capability to quickly mobilise and be ready for a conventional war. The result perhaps is a loss of confidence within Army in its ability to defeat an adversary – its primary task. This lack of confidence appears to have percolated down to the lower ranks as well and they have begun to wonder if it is worth fighting for a political establishment which is completely indifferent to their legitimate aspirations.

Eroded fighting capability The complete defence budgeting and procurement procedures are flawed with the result modernisation of the Armed Forces is way behind its

64

Indian army

BELEAGUERED needs. Recently disclosures in Wikileaks about American views on the capability of Indian Army should serve as a wake up call to the powers that be but it is unlikely to happen.

The government will get back to its stupor.

The acquisition of necessary hardware and systems is in a complete mess. The acquisition process ensures that nothing can be acquired in a reasonable timeframe whereas the budgetary allocation is on a yearly basis.

The result is capital fund allocation reverts to the consolidated funds of India year after year. The Finance Minister is only too happy because it helps him in reducing the fiscal deficit.

Budgetary allocation, therefore, needs to be on a roll-on basis. When the legitimate procurement requirements of the Armed Forces are thus not met, Service chiefs also give up after a while and retreat into their own Service.

Army and the media Of late, Army has become the favourite whipping boy of the media.

Young, callous anchors with no knowledge of the Army, its culture and ethos, its organisation and hierarchy comment as specialists and denounce the Army without a shred of proof.

In theory, Ministry of Defence has a public relations wing which should project the Army’s point of view. In practice, it is this organisation, which is under the MoD from where inspired leaks originate. Due to rules, the Army is unable to speak for itself and its reputation is thus under attack. The general public which holds the Army in high esteem starts to think otherwise.

The Ministry of Defence which should defend the Army maintains a silence and the Raksha Mantri’s statements do not inspire confidence. The Army-media interface thus leaves a lot to be desired. Armed Forces need to carry out their own media management.

What needs to be done In order to save the Army from

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

BUMPY ROAD descending further into the morass, macro level steps need to be undertaken. First and foremost is the integration of Service HQs and the Ministry of Defence. Unless Armed Forces are made a part of the government, its woes will continue.

Integration of Ministry of Defence and Service HQ will also ensure probity in the Army. Budgetary allocation to the Armed Forces needs to be on a roll-on basis. Procurement procedures need to be simplified and made transparent so that corrupt practices which have crept into the system can be eliminated. Since the so called land scams seem to be increasing, Directorate General of Defence Estates needs to be put under Service HQ so that Army is not blamed for the acts of commission on part of this department. Within the Armed Forces, Service chiefs need to ensure that exemplary punishment is meted out to those indulging in corrupt practices. The moral degeneration within the Services needs to be arrested by senior officers setting personal example.

Brig. (Retd.) Dr. Anil Sharma

AHEAD?

The need of the hour therefore is macro level reforms to ensure that Armed Forces are taken into confidence and accorded their proper place in the decision making loop. Indian Armed Forces are completely apolitical and to continue to distrust them and keeping them on the periphery can only be done at the peril of the nation.

The writer is working for a multinational information technology company after his retirement. He is PhD in Sino-Indian Relations and contributes regularly to magazines, periodicals and newspapers on Strategy, Security and Defence related issues.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

65

Indian army

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, paid the price in 1962 of perceived anomalies in the Order of Precedence (which has a bearing on civilmilitary relations by the inter se seniority it puts in place) when India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. The Henderson Brookes report on that military debacle has been kept a secret but it does not need a Sherlock Holmes to smell a rat when the Chief of Army Staff at the time asked that the Prime Minister’s order to “throw the Chinese out” be given to him in writing. Low morale for any of the many reasons enumerated in this article could have the same effect given the renewed Chinese assertiveness.

T

he approach that a society adopts towards its armed forces determines the degree of overall security it is going to enjoy in the short and long term period. Shortly after independence, when issue of architecture of post colonial military was being debated, Sardar Patel wrote on a file that a nation is safe where soldiers and teachers are psychologically made to believe that they are a superior and nobler human beings vis-à-vis rest of the citizens, in terms of physical and mental abilities.

Battling for whom and what?

However, in reality, post independence ruling elite, politicians and bureaucrats saw Indian Army through the colonial prism in which erstwhile British Indian Army was perceived as an instrument of suppression. This warped mindset at collective level led to a restructuring of the Army guided more by fears, apprehension and distrust (negative defining drivers) rather than the strategic and professional military logic.

More interestingly and paradoxically, every time the Army successfully defended the nation, the negative defining drivers, instead of getting replaced by trust, pride and respect got further strengthened. Be it 1947-48 Indo-Pak skirmish, ‘62 China War, ‘65 Indo–Pak war, ‘71 Bangladesh

66

Campaign, Kargil or ongoing proxy war and numerous counter-insurgency operations. As a consequence, status and handling of the armed forces by the instruments of State and some elements of society has only become more abrasive, leading to current state where soldiers (including para military and Central Police Forces) are asking the question “Whose battle am I fighting!”.

The first thing that needs to be emphasised is that civil-military relations are dynamic, not static and defined for all time. In the life of the nation, they will evolve, as much as any other set of relationships will change. Changes outside India and within India in the political system, society, and economy will challenge the civil-military boundary constantly.

The threat of war, the advent of nuclear weapons, the emergence of new military technologies, the growth of terrorism and insurgency, the proliferation of other forms of internal emergency (communal and ethnic violence, disasters), the new patterns of military recruitment, the status of the military profession and the civil services compared to business life, the economic opportunities in the private sector, amongst other things, are all affecting the relationship between the civil and the military.

We need to ask some of the basic

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

questions about the state of civilmilitary relations in India as Lt. Col. Ying Ling has formulated for the US military but are equally pertinent for in the Indian context. These are as follows: ■■ Do we have a strategically effective (not just militarily effective) military; ■■ Whose leaders provide strategically sound (not just militarily sound) advice to, ■■ Strategically competent civilian authorities, both executive and legislative, who are representative of and answerable to, ■■ A civically engaged, strategically aware public, ■■ All of this undergirded by a critical free press, a vibrant civil society and a properly subordinated militaryindustrial complex.

■■ Do the civilian authorities oversee that military is strategically competent?

■■ Do civilian authorities — executive and legislative — demonstrate critical, creative understanding of the larger strategic purposes, constraints, effects and implications of military’s operational employment and institutional conduct?

Mass perceptions of systemic corruption, ineffective governance, worsening internal security climate, looming serious external threats from the western border, a disturbed periphery and severely strained civ-mil relations profile which could be causing unrealised dent in Army’s morale and cohesiveness is a serious development. It requires us to sit up, take stock, question our fundamental assumptions and usher in transformation before it is too late ■■ Are they militarily literate — fully conversant with military purposes, capabilities, constraints and effects?

■■ Are the civilian authorities who are charged with overseeing the military representative of and answerable to a civically engaged, strategically aware public?

■■ Are executive and parliamentary political authorities truly representative of the people, or are they part of a privileged, semi-permanent political class that has little in common with the general public?

■■ Does the ideal of true civilian supremacy over the military — public oversight of legislative oversight of executive oversight of a willingly accountable, self-policing military — exist?

■■ Is the public actively engaged in scrutinising, seeking information on and expressing itself on military preparation, conduct and performance?

A rational evaluation of civil-military (civ-mil) relations need to encompass a wider canvas rather than focus only on emotional issues of relative perks, privilege and pay etc. Ying Ling’s penetrating questions have formed the backdrop of the ongoing article. The civ-mil relations in India have been briefly examined as follows: ■■

Impact on national security.

■■

Bureaucratic-military chasm.

■■

State governments and soldier.

■■

Impact of corruption ridden society on the soldier.

■■

Media-military relations.

Impact on national security It is pertinent to ask that has the civ-mil architecture led to making India more secure? Does continuously increasing defence budget deliver the

security outcome expected? The answer is that, there are large deficiencies which prevent an effective and efficient national security structure from emerging. This is due to inability to change an archaic security enterprise, despite numerous excellent studies, starting from Lord Ismay’s in fifties to Subramanyam’s in nineties. For armed forces to keep successfully defending the country, they have to undergo continuous transformation so as to take on current as also the future challenges. Prerequisite for this process to get going are the strategic guidance documents like national security strategy (NSS) giving politico– diplomatic take on nation’s security, followed by defense/military strategy; wherein force development, defence acquisition and production, defence technological, military-doctrinal, organisational and operational issues are put in perspective, keeping both ongoing and futuristic challenges in mind.

Parliamentary oversight In all the major democracies or even in single party state like China, NSS is mandatorily ratified by the Parliament, every time a new government takes office. Such an arrangement commits and binds all pillars of national defence; political bureaucrats, Defence R and D, production agencies, budget allocation departments and the military to a common mission of getting the maximum ‘bang for the buck’. Willful absence of such a system results in the famous cliché that every time there is a crises, be it Mumbai 26/11 or earlier ones, we are found lacking in certain capabilities/capacities. Consequently we go through another round of churning, which fizzles out midway, waiting for the next crisis or fiasco to occur to reinitiate the reform processes, again dump them midway and so on.

HQ Integrated Defence Staff has in its charter to render advice relating to military/strategic perspective on national security challenges. It has been experienced that when that advice is

not to the liking of the key decisionmaker, file is repeatedly returned prompting due modifications/ dilution of the assessment. In one instance relating to the turbulent developments taking place in a country astride northern border, HQ IDS was asked to refrain from rendering advice on security related issues. Decision maker could have simply overruled the MoD (HQ IDS) viewpoint rather than asking it to fall in line. Interestingly, two years down the line, the strategy recommended by the armed forces was quietly adopted without even acknowledging it. As a trend Non-(policy) Papers from Service HQ analysts are preferred rather than assessments on file, since the former need not be formally considered as a policy input.

Mishandled insurgency Recently, a belated realisation has come that Army needs to be involved in training the paramilitary and CRPF in counterinsurgency operations against left wing extremists. For this number of retired Army personnel have been employed by the state governments and Ministry of Home Affairs. Will it deliver the goods?

No. Sprinkling of Service personnel cannot bring about the organisational and attitudinal transformation which is a prerequisite for the success. Lot of learning and unlearning is required.

If civil-military relations were mature and driven by national interests, these forces would have been trained in the Army’s regimental training centre, which have idle capacity. Even officer cadre needs to have been trained in the military institutions rather than relying on Police training imparted to IPS/PPS officers, which is for policing and not the counterinsurgency missions, which are most complicated and challenging military assignments all over the world.

Voids in the national security architecture are the main causal aspect of continuously strained civ-mil relationship in India.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

67

Indian army

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Bureaucratic-military chasm The chasm continues to widen. An uncertain political system, which is weakened coalition governments, is ignorant of matters military/security.

It continues to rely on bureaucrats for advice on major military issues.

Bureaucrats are even more clueless.

They rely on individual Service HQ inputs; colour these with their nonprofessional perceptions to draft decisions and policies which fail at the implementation level. In this era of specialisation, it is only in our country that strategic advice on security/ military has virtual non-participation of uniformed fraternity. There is no three star rank military officer in the national security council. In Defence Ministry, bureaucrats are not prepared to have a composite civ-mil team; hence HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) remains a separate entity not unlike other Service HQs. Furthermore, the continuous relative down-gradation of service officers in the warrant of precedence has left them with no alternative but to work in separate compartments as against contemporary operational imperative of functioning in a seamlessly integrated inter-agency environment. It is inconceivable for an army brigadier of 28 years of service to work under a Joint Secretary with 18-20 years service, where UPSC entry level qualification for both the services is graduation. More so, an IPS officer becomes a DIG with 13 or 14 years service and deems himself equivalent to a brigadier by wearing similar badges of rank. While in the Army, an officer can become only a Lieutenant Colonel in 13 years. Naturally, such a wide and glaringly unjust disparity is bound to create friction, whenever inter-agency functioning of Service personnel and bureaucrats is necessitated in the intra- and inter-ministerial staff or when Army is deployed in aid of civil authority, which is so very often these days. This protocol devaluation creates a deep sense of humiliation and hurt, affecting the pride and self-esteem of officers and soldiers alike.

Obvious anomaly and discrimination meted out in the Sixth Pay Commission and the earlier ones are too well documented to be elaborated here.

Suffice to say that failure of the government to rectify the imbalance of ‘one rank one pension’ in spite of Supreme Court’s clear directions, brings

68

out deep-rooted bureaucratic prejudice against the Services. Such perceptions are making already tenuous thread of civil-military relations even more fragile.

State government apathy Frustration and disbelief spreading amongst the minds of soldiers, both serving and veterans stem from experience of the soldier’s interaction with various organs of state government machinery. All state governments vie with each other in declaring very many high profile welfare schemes for the soldiers. However, their implementation follows the often trodden path of corruption, nepotism and caste / communal policies.

■■ Very recently in one of the hill state capital, that prides itself in contributing largest number of soldiers, an army Captain was slapped by a traffic constable while the former was talking to a traffic inspector. In any other country which is experiencing active insurgency or threats for so long, the top executive or the head of Police force would have publicly apologised and the action taken against the errant cop would have been exemplary and well publicised. Only media reported the issue in a manner which did not highlight the serious nature of the offence committed.

■■ Another Army officer was beaten up by the Police at the behest of an MP’s son few years back in one of the eastern states and FIR filed against the Army officer.

■■ Recently, an Army Havaldar was shot in fake encounter by the Police, while he was on leave in a state adjacent to Delhi.

■■ In the same state last year, media had reported about forcible acquisition of the land of a JCO, allegedly to benefit a top politician.

■■ There are many such incidents in the interior rural/ semi urban towns which do not even come to media’s notice. Only Army authorities on behalf of the soldiers, keep fighting a losing battle.

There are orders galore that a soldier will be given priority and preferential treatment in attending to

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

his various problems, also due to very little leave available to him. However, be it land cases in Tehsil, Registrar office, district courts, police problems, domicile needs or any other office of the government, he finds that without greasing palms his vital domestic needs will not be met. He does not also have kind of ill-gotten wealth that can be used as Suvidha Shulk or service charges. Because of the breakup of the joint family system, even families of military men get victimised by their own relatives and other antisocial elements. In most such cases government agencies not only remain mute spectator but even take the side of oppressor. Stresses growing out of such socio-governmental apathy are one of the main cause of increasing incidents of suicide / fratricide among soldiers.

Corruption and the soldier Civil society at large remains deeply thankful and appreciative of the role of uniformed fraternity in ensuring national unity and territorial integrity. This is the only saving grace.

However, increased consumerism and market forces have created a system where wealth and wealthy call the shots, whether it is ill gotten or otherwise. A soldier stepping into civil environment, on retirement finds that he cannot expect any dignity in society as he is not wealthy enough.

Even his relatives and family members who were all gung ho over him when he was in service, become indifferent, unless of course he can buy their respect by illegally purchasing goods and liquor from the canteen facilities authorised to him.

The environmental reality described in the preceding paragraphs forms the undercurrents, which drive the moral behaviour of our brave men and women in uniform. Many pseudo-champions of morality have been professing that even if all organs of the State and society have gone corrupt the soldier must remain dead honest. Yes it is a very laudable and critically essential requirement for a professional and capable Army that has to keep winning. But for that to happen, all organs of the State machinery and society have to jealously ensure that our soldier does not have to be a victim of the corrupt environment prevailing in our system.

Media and military With the advent of electronic media, scandals or negative news about the Army makes for higher TRP story. Thus Army related news is excessively coloured and captions like ‘Ketchup Colonel’ etc. used for serving officers. While treatment meted out to bureaucrats, whether they are IAS and IPS officers is invariably guarded or finds a very cursory mention.

There is a perception prevailing in the Army, particularly in the lower ranks that Army get such a discriminating treatment, since it is a soft target and cannot fight back in its defence. When Service personnel are charged in high ticket corruption scams like Tehelka, Sukhna scam and now Adarsh Society like cases, they rightly get prosecuted expeditiously, while bureaucrats and politicians continue to get scotfree and media after a while does not pursue their misdeeds with the same vigour, sometimes due to ostensible extraneous reasons. Blaming the media for growing strains in civ-mil relations

in our country will be shooting the messenger, which is very often done by civil and military brass alike. If in future civ-mil relations get stabilised, credit in large part will go to media and the media alone.

Overall impact Whether these perceptions among the men in uniform are right or wrong is not the issue. The fact remains that most of the military men are convinced that these are based on reality. Most of our countrymen who have no relatives serving in the security forces are ignorant of the fact that defending and dying for the country is an emotional calling, which comes when heart is pure and full of gratitude towards ones family, government and the countrymen. If heart is flooded with feelings of hurt, misery and sense of discrimination by the society, will that Army be able to successfully defend the country against proxy wars and numerous other threats is a moot question, which all of us must ask ourselves.

Reality check Against the backdrop constructed in preceding paragraphs we need to view the following reality: ■■ Recently a relatively junior officer released a press brief in Army’s Northern Command, openly criticising the Chief Minister and the state government for removing the bunkers from Srinagar.

This response not only brings to fore serious differences between civil and military, but also points towards possible differences between lower level formation/units and the higher leadership, that may have given in to politicians/bureaucrats against more realistic military judgments.

■■ Wikileaks website has brought out as to how foreign countries (even friendly ones) seek to find out the weaknesses of key decision makers and think tanks of the other countries.

Our civ-mil hierarchy which now is perceived to be full of corrupt leadership will certainly become vulnerable (if it is

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

69

Indian army

Indian army

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

ESPRIT DE CORPS

military organisations Prof. R. N. Swarup

already not so) to blackmail and arm twisting when vital decisions regarding national security and strategic interests are being taken.

■■ American description of Indian Army to be slow and lumbering, as brought out in Wikileaks is not due to its equipment profile, but it is due to its outdated higher defence organisation, non-coherent civil - military relations and organisational malpractices as against the contemporary need for having best practices.

Remedial measures Situation can certainly be redeemed by implementing long awaited reforms and conscious efforts on part of political and bureaucratic system, both at state and central governmental level working together. Some of the broad measures are as follows: ■■ Reorganise the higher defence organisation: ■■ Appoint a Chief of Defence Staff to head a single window as military advisory system to the government.

■■ Inter se protocol difference between bureaucrats and service officers be justly and resolutely resolved through direct political intervention.

■■ MoD to be reorganised composite offices manned bureaucrats and military officers.

70

into by

■■ Separate pay tribunal for the armed forces to be put in place.

counts and there is urgent need for putting the cart back on the wheels.

■■ National Security Council and MEA should post senior officers as against current practice of getting middle level officers, most of whom have no experience of rendering strategic advice to bureaucratic and political leadership.

Very recently a very eminent former member of FICCI during his visit to Germany was conveyed by number of think tanks that India runs a great risk of becoming a ‘Banana Republic’.

Out of a sense of indignation and national pride, we may discard such a description. However, mass perceptions of systemic corruption, ineffective governance, worsening internal security climate, looming serious external threats from the western border, a disturbed periphery and severely strained civ-mil relations profile which could be causing unrealised dent in Army’s morale and cohesiveness is a serious development. It requires us to sit up, take stock, question our fundamental assumptions and usher in transformation before it is too late.

■■ Selection of military officers to senior ranks should be judicious and transparent. It should not be based on their cordial relation with powers that be or seniority but on sheer and visibly demonstrated professional merit, impeccable integrity and moral courage.

■■ Services have to be allowed to create a multi-tiered media relations organisations of a very high quality, which has to remain visible 365 days and round-the-clock.

■■ State governments in conjunct with local formations to redress the grievances of soldiers. Strict punishments be given to defaulters in cases of demanding or seeking bribes or harassment of defence personnel by government/police personnel.

Conclusion Deeper contemplation on the aspects touched above and their corelation with Ying Ling’s questions will bring out that we fail on most

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

The writer is currently Director-SA in the University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun and Joint Director at Institute of National Security Studies, New Delhi, as also Senior Research Fellow with Forum for Strategic and Security Studies, New Delhi. He is former head of the office of Net Assessment, HQ Integrated Defence Staff and retired from armed forces in April, 2008 and, since then, has been actively involved in Research Project of 13th Finance Commission, National Security Secretariat, NCAER, DRDO and the USI of India.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

71

Indian army

ESPRIT DE CORPS

There is, after all, great justification for the retention of “class composition” of military regiments like Jats, Rajputs, Sikhs, Mahars and the like and that is why after much debate on whether to abolish the system, India opted for retention but with the proviso that all new raisings would be of mixed class regiments.

So far things have worked well and both types have risen to great heights of glory on the battlefield.

However, if cohesiveness in combat is to be ensured the splintering of civil society into castes and OBCs could resonate in the military.

M

ilitary, generally known as armed forces, is a symbol of nation’s sovereignty, honour and unity. It helps in the smooth conduct of its mechanics in terms of internal and external vulnerabilities.

Further, it is a source of national strength and visible instrument of power and stability. Its organisational competence and professionalism has earned a significant space in civil society. Hence, revisiting the concept is essential in the light of ongoing military modernisation programmes all over the world, including that of India.

Evolution of organisations In contrast to earlier societies, modern civilisation places much reliance on organisations as the most rational and efficient form of social grouping for the attainment of desired objectives.

In fact, the entire infrastructure of human society is based and functions on some fundamental organisational principles. The organisations of antiquity, of all kinds, differ from their modern incarnation in two

72

respects. Firstly, they were based on an authoritarian structure which in its extreme was characterised by master-slave relationship and secondly they had simple pattern of tasks in which there were only few layers of roles between the top and the bottom of the organisational framework.

Individual specialisation In today’s complex and sophisticated society, organisations are both huge and intricate with stacked layers, proliferated roles and weblike inter-relationships.

Thus military organisations also, in contrast to earlier periods, have become more democratic, flexible and sensitive, particularly due to the changing nature of warfare.

The most significant change has been the tremendous increase in the specialisation of individual soldier’s job and of his operational groups. A soldier responsible for a smaller portion of the total effort is required to produce an end-­item when it could facilitate the process of goal achievement.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Autonomous combat groups

military culture is his compulsion.

Recorded military history reveals that whatever have been the structures, size and characteristics of military organisations their functions have remained same. But seen from a psychologist’s point of view, organisational changes have affected the syntality of the military groups in their socio-emotional and psycho-operational environment.

Old Egyptians, Romans and ancient Indians organised their armies on mini-modern pattern, dividing and organising them on task basis. But these systems suffered from some inherent tactical deficiencies. It was Gustavas Adolfous, a military professional, who in conformity with contemporary strategic thinking, initiated certain organisational reforms to restore flexibility and manoeuvrability to the requirements of the time. Later, these reforms were perfected during the Napoleanic era. The inventions of tank, aircraft, long-range rockets, guided missiles, ABC weapons, Remote Sensing, GPS and GIS etc. gave further stimulus to change in thinking on the ways in which armies should be composed and organised. It was felt, therefore, that self-contained and autonomous smaller combat groups is the only answer to the changed nature of warfare i.e. from conventional to 4-dimensional total.

It is a common experience that in comparison to other members of the civilian organisations, soldier distinguishes himself by his peculiar physical appearance, typical moving style, behaviourial pattern and his ways of doing things. He owes this remarkable transformation in his personality to the military setting in which he works and, in fact, it is this new personality structure which reacts differently to various stresses and strains of the combat and non-combat situations.

This experience confirms that military organisations are characteristically different in its socialisation process, in modifying behaviour of its member to conform with the expectations of the organisation and leaves so profound an imprint on their personalities that it becomes their second nature.

Dichotomy Sociologically, the term ‘military’ implies an acceptance of organised violence as a legitimate means of realising social objectives of national security. Hence, this organisation is fundamentally different from its civilian counterparts in its philosopy, characteristics and functions. These organisations are unique association of men and women of different civilian backgrounds, thrown together by chance and are united rapidly in strongest social bonds, to a military life which is marked by three major characteristics: 1. to kill another human being is one of the major functions of the soldier.

2. to operate in an unusual jeopardous condition with several deprivations is his duty and 3. to conform to norms and values of

Controlled life Technically, these organisations, are characterised by their hierarchical structure and formal nature. They are semi-authoritarian with relatively stable social environment and with emphasis on traditional ways of doing things (ways which brought success in the past). These organisations demand rigid obedience and are highly stratified social systems in which the roles of the members are clearly defined and are minutely established by regulations.

During combat, peacetime military organisations lose many of their bureaucratic peculiarities. Rules and regulations are waived or disregarded and personal leadership becomes more important than formal power positions, oral communications replace many written orders and demarcation between private and organisational life almost vanishes. As such living in military setting distinguishes itself from living in other organisations and involves a controlled life of cooperation under discipline, a life of taking orders, a life without privacy, a life almost deprived of the ordinary comforts and pleasures of civilised existence and a life with projected fears.

Another aspect of military organisations like any other structural group is the stabilisation of lines of communication among its members.

In an organised social system, each individual member is free to communicate with other member of

the group and the process of interaction involves systematic utilisation of these communication channels. But in military setting, individual soldier does not interact equally with the other individual soldier because of the formalised structure of the group which permits communication only through specified channels connecting specific positions. In other words communication nets in military organisations are ‘chain’ type at all levels.

Cohesiveness Organisational environment is another structural property which differentiates military organisations which are comparatively more cohesive with congenial working climate. In combat groups all emotional attitudes become secondary to the need to be strong, protected and united against the enemy. The equal threat of injury produces a high degree of cohesion so that personal attachments become intensified. Friendly terms are made even by those who might never have been compatible in civilian life.

Comparative common hardships and dangers give birth to altruism and generosity that transcend ordinary individual self-interest.

Normal prejudices and diversity of background -- religious, racial, class and outlook which causes social differences and dissension in civil life have little relevance in fighting groups. The feeling of ‘we’ in such organisations is so effective that strict hierarchical distinction tends to loose its meaning while on ‘missions’ and the members are so motivated that they sacrifice even their lives for the success of the task entrusted to their group. The mutual dependence for protection is another uniqueness which contributes to the military organisational environment and motivates the members to carry out complex manoeuvres in the face of uncertain dangers.

Habitats The authoritarian-cum-democratic or middle of the road or 5-5 type leadership (equal emphasis on task and men), at all levels contributes to its congenial environment. In military units the leader performs the fatherrole and the members enjoy the position of the children by virtue of its administrative set-up. As in the case of

children, they must do what he says whether they like it or not. He may or may not fulfill their demands, depend­ ing upon his perception of things.

He may reward them when they are ‘good’ and punish them when they are ‘bad’. Their fate and even, chances of their survival mostly depend on him.

Its members, known as ‘jawans’ are people who spend most of their youth in holding nation’s flag at (a) heights of biting cold (b) deserts with blistering heat (c) jungles infested with leeches (d) rough and stormy sea (on and inside waters) (e) hostile and unpredictable air space. He is a person who is on vigil 24 × 365 days and manages anything and everything which is mis-managed by others.

Integration The effective functioning of military organisations is due to its characteristic capacity of maintaining control over its members. This control is the result of continuous efforts in the organisation to maintain certain levels of motivation and morale making each member to believe that “what his organisation is working for is worthy of all the labour and sacrifices he may be called upon to give”. In other words, condition is maintained in the organisation where there are clear and fixed group purposes that are felt to be important and integrated with individual goals: where there is a confidence in the means of attainment, in the leaders, associates and finally in oneself; where group actions are integrated and cooperative; and where aggression and hostility are expressed against the forces frustrating the group rather than towards other individuals within the group.

To summarise, in today’s international strategic environment of “peace through arms” the problems of military organisations are becoming more complex and multi-dimensional.

It is therefore necessary to carry out a careful study of organisational patterns before adopting a new framework of a particular model, particularly for developing countries like India.

The writer is a war veteran of 1965 Conflict (Major, Retd.). He joined Academics in 1971 and retired from the University of Madras, Chennai in 2003 as Professor and Head, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies. Presently, he is Guest Faculty at the Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

73

Indian army

PREPARE OR PERISH

T

he Indian Army is the bulwark of the Indian defence. The Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force have indeed a major role to play in defending the seas and skies but the major responsibility of defending India against foreign invasions and internal insurgency is that of the Indian Army. Thus if the defence of India is in doldrums, it means the Indian Army is not what it should be professionally. Let us take a close look at the rank and file of the third largest army of the world.

Army through crises The brave officers and jawans of the Indian Army deserve much more than what they have been getting in terms of honour, respect and money. The majority of the rank and file have been giving their best to the country and defending it at all costs but some black sheep are there and these infest the whole flock. Never mind as tomorrow would be another day. What is lost yesterday or today in terms of honour and national esteem may be retrieved tomorrow through wisdom, valour and sacrifice. A real soldier is prepared for that always and everytime. Action speaks for itself and the famous words of General Sir Philip Chetwode written in letters of gold in the Chetwode Hall of the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun need not be paid just a lip service here.

Raw deal The Indian Army has been getting a raw deal from the politicians and bureaucrats from day one of independence. Krishna Menon, the blue eyed boy of Prime Minister Nehru and the then High Commissioner of India in the United Kingdom bought inferior jeeps in large numbers at high price and passed them on to the Indian Army. It was the Army that cut a sorry figure while using them willy-nilly. The story of scams in making purchases of munitions of war by the civil servants and politicians for the army went on and on. The less said about them the better it would be.

Cancerous legacy The Kashmir operations of 1947-48 were not conducted by the Indian officers but by the British officers who called the shots on both sides of the border. The British policy makers

74

were not interested in the Indian Army scoring a clean goal and achieving ultimate victory in driving the Pakistani invaders out of J and K, a part and parcel of India, but in a military stalemate. The Indian Army column that was heading for Muzaffarabad after winning battles was diverted towards Uri under orders of the British C-in-C of the Indian Army.

How amazing that both the Indian Army and the Pakistan Army were commanded by the British Generals who were loyal to the home government in London. The supreme commander of armies of both the countries, General Sir Auchinleck discussed military matters pertaining to the Kashmir war with Lord Mountbatten but not with Nehru or Jinnah. Although both India and Pakistan were independent dominions but the British generals on the pay rolls of India and Pakistan, looked towards the White Hall in London for orders.

With a view to retaining goodwill of Pakistan without annoying India, Lord Louis Mountbatten persuaded Nehru to go to the United Nations with a complaint of aggression knowing it full well that the Security Council would order a ceasefire and India would be deprived of its legitimate final hour of glory, the total victory. The UN resolution, as predicted, halted the army in its tracks on 1st January 1949 and gave Pakistan a much required breather.

Ill-prepared The 1962 debacle of the Indian Army in a short conflict with China was scripted by the duo – Nehru and Krishna Menon. Nehru, as Prime Minister, had issued an off the cuff statement at Madras while on way to Sri Lanka “I have ordered the Indian Army to throw out the Chinese”.

General Thapar, the then Army Chief, went on record to say that the Army had received no such orders. In any case, the India Army was never given the necessary wherewithal to fight a battle against a determined enemy like China.

The Indian Army was ill trained, ill equipped and ill armed to go into a major battle. The writing was on the wall but the policy makers failed to read it. The image of the Indian Army received a major dent and the morale of jawans was in the boots. The

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

commanding general of the fighting formation, 4 Corps, Lt. General B. M. Kaul was mostly away from his officers and men nursing a sore throat in New Delhi.

Perhaps I am the only Indian Army officer to have walked on the battle field from both the Indian side and the Chinese side and it opened my eyes to the disparity in war preparations of India and China. The Indian Army was hustled into a conflict that was not of its choosing and the image of the nation received a severe beating.

In the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, our army did not do badly. In 1971 the Indian Army beat the Pakistan Army hands down and dismembered that rogue nation. The Army did retrieve its lost prestige but in terms of money the rank and file drew a near blank. The Army Chief, Sam Manekshaw, was raised to the rank of a Field Marshal.

Was that enough for the foot soldiers?

No one has taken the call on this so far.

Sleaze The regiment of artillery of the Indian Army had been starved of a modern weapon system to keep the potential enemy at bay. After many discussions across the table and field trials, the government of India, on a recommendation of the army, decided to buy Bofors 155 mm howitzers. The gun is good but some money changed hands under the table. It led to the fall of the Rajiv Gandhi government.

Nevertheless, the gun saved the day for our army in Kargil and was effective in beating back the Pakistan army. The tainted purchase remained talk of the town for a long time and gave sleepless nights to some army top brass too. It is a pity that the Indian Army has not been given any new long range effective gun for the last quarter of a century. And the guilty government of India expects the Indian Army to take on the People’s Liberation Army of China when the issue of international boundary between the two countries becomes hot and the diplomatic talks fail.

By the way, the PLA of China is the biggest land force of the world after the US Army and is equipped with the latest weapon systems designed and manufactured in China.

Brig. (Retd.) Chitranjan Sawant

History, they say, tends to repeat itself. Those who do not learn from history tend to repeat it. No one can deny that geopolitical events are so shaping themselves that the danger of attacks, be they conventional and frontal or the Mumbai variety, appear inevitable. We know what the lessons are but are criminally slow in redressing them: We bought the Bofors 155 mm calibre howitzer - the best weapon for mountain warfare - in the 80s but we have neither made our own nor bought adequate replenishments. China, on the other hand has reverse engineered nearly everything it bought from abroad and produced indigenous versions indigenously. That is what it showcased in the recent anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army.

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

75

Indian army

PREPARE OR PERISH

Corruption virus In the post-Kargil purchases, it is said that high altitude tents were bought at the northern army level paying much higher price than the one prevailing in the market. Moreover, the Ordnance had those tents in plenty and no requirement was projected by the prospective users. Obviously, some high ranking generals were bent upon misusing their financial powers and make money illegally. This incident and some similar ones have put the Indian Army in a predicament.

It won’t be worth our time to recount the corruption in canteens, especially in regard to illegal sale of liquor and replacing of genuine articles with duplicate ones.

punishment for political and financial corruption is swift and severe, other potential law breakers are discouraged from treading on that track. On the contrary, when the government makes tainted bureaucrats central vigilance commissioner, a signal goes out that the

In the eye of a non-army citizen, the level of honesty and integrity in the army is not the same now as it used to be once upon a time. If an army officer or a jawan can sell his personal arms to those who are on the wrong side of the law, how can they be entrusted with the onerous responsibility of the defence of the country?

Can they be bought by the enemy or the terrorist outfit, ask the average citizens. Mum is the answer.

The general standard of honesty and integrity of the country as a whole has gone down many notches. If a union minister like A. Raja sells spectrum and makes money for own pockets and for those of the political parties and is allowed to continue as a member of the cabinet for years, what signal is the central government sending to the rank and file of the army? The cabinet presents a tainted picture and the rest of the citizenry follow suit.

They’re shot in China Is there no corruption in China? Of course, it is there. When their economy is growing by leaps and bounds, corruption cannot but make an entry.

However, many senior communist party officials have been tried, found guilty and faced the firing squad. If the

76

Dominika Cosic

Moral of the story is: Keep the officers and soldiers of the Indian Army happy so that their morale is high. An army with a high morale wins wars. And we must win wars when wars are inevitable. Yogeshwar Shri Krishna has advised his countrymen, through Arjun, “YUDHAI KRIT NISHCHAYAH”, that is wage war with determination and fight to win.

Army not immune It must be said to the credit of the Indian Army that quite a few erring officers have been brought to book and court martialled for the offences and punished as per law.

be loyal to the countries of their origin.

In the first Kashmir war, the British officers of the Indian Army were loyal to England and not to India. Nehru was not kept in the loop, although he was the Prime Minister. Lord Mountbatten presided over the meetings of the defence committee and not Prime Minister Nehru. We must not allow the history to repeat itself.

government is rewarding corruption.

How can the Indian Army remain untouched with the general thinking?

India ready?

Is the Indian Army of today prepared to go to war against a powerful enemy and win the war? The answer is NO. The Chief of the Army Staff has gone on record to say that that capability of the Indian Army to defend the nation is reduced by fifty per cent. The Naval Chief and the Air Chief have spoken in the same voice in respect of their respective Service. Why is that so, one may ask. Well, the Government of India has been sleeping over files for acquisition of the latest armament, equipment and building infrastructure for training. If the armed forces, particularly the army of a country is not equipped with the latest weapon system, is not trained accordingly and is not kept happy, that nation is running the risk of losing a war, should there be a war.

The task of the Indian Army is to defend the nation against an external aggression and protect the life and property of its citizens from internal strifes and acts of terrorism. In the same breath it may be added that the nation in turn must keep its army happy by providing latest weapon system, training facilities and ancillaries to beat the enemy at his own game.

Learn lessons Let the Indian Army remain steadfast and let the government provide the wherewithal to the Army so that it achieves the aim. The high ideals of our leaders should be emulated. The national warriors like Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, Maharana Pratap and Guru Gobind Singh should be the role models of the young officers and jawans. By following their examples, soldiers of today will learn how to face adversity and surmount the heavy odds and survive the day to fight against the enemy on another day. It should be understood by one and all that wars are inevitable and a nation that rears brave sons and daughters lives on and on.

Raise military morale The Supreme Court of India has advised the powers that be that the armed forces must be kept happy. The security of the country depends on the soldiers. We cannot import soldiers to fight our war. The foreign soldiers will

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

The writer is a well-known commentator on television and radio and has been giving running commentaries on Akashvani, Doordarshan and other channels on the Republic Day Parade and other national events for 38 years in Hindi. He has travelled widely and written on events in the conflict zones around the world.

free trade and counter-terrorism

T

he last European Union-India Summit was just a first step in reinforcement of relations between these two partners. Really hard and important negotiations will start in late January and before the end of a year is expected that a free trade agreement between India and EU will be signed. But co-operation is also desired in another field – the fight against terrorism - and the common declaration was a good step in the right direction.

Strategic partner History of bilateral relations between India and European Union does not have a long tradition. However it was at the eleventh summit in 2004 India became one of EU’s “Strategic Partners”. Since 2005, the Joint Action Plan (which was revised in 2008) is helping to realise the full potential of this partnership in key areas of interest for India and the EU. Current efforts are centered on: deepening the political aspects of the cooperation; ongoing negotiations for a trade and investment agreement; and

implementation of the joint working programme on climate change adopted at the summit between the partners in 2008. The previous Summit took place in Delhi in December 2009, and sought to further deepen relations between the two strategic partners in key areas of cooperation. It also aimed at enhancing dialogue and cooperation on issues of major global concern such as climate change, energy security and fight against terrorism, as well as prominent regional issues and bilateral trade.

During this Summit, in December in Brussels, the EU was represented by European Council President, Herman Van Rompuy and by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, accompanied by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and by Karel De Gucht, the EU Trade commissioner. The Republic of India was represent by Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister, assisted by A. Sharma, Minister for Commerce and Industry, and S. Menon, National Security Advisor. The names of participants underlined the importance of this event.

Free trade agreement What was the main focus of the last Summit? It was the strengthening of the political dimension of the EU-India strategic partnership, in particular through increased cooperation in security and counter-terrorism but also preparation for an early conclusion of a broad-based investment and trade agreement. As Mr. Barroso said: “Free Trade Agreement will be bringing together markets of one and a half billion people. We should now give the final push to these talks so we can hail a historic agreement when we meet next year in Delhi“.

The same opinion was expressed by President Van Rompuy who reminded that “The ongoing negotiations on the Trade and Investment Agreement will bring significant economic benefits to both sides and further strengthen our strategic partnership”. Presently the European Union is the first India export destination; India is the 9th EU export destination. The overall trade in goods in 2009 amounted to around 52 billion euro. As a prominent European diplomat said European

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

77

India-EU

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

India and the European Union have shown remarkable accommodation of each other’s concerns on trade and counter-terrorism. Their efforts are expected to ameliorate to a large extent the baleful effects of the global recession in the sphere of economics and commerce. Of particular satisfaction for India were the wide-ranging agreements on the methodology of tackling global terrorism.

Union believes it is not enough, particularly as in a still-difficult economic situation and where fiscal and budgetary policies are limited, free trade is a powerful engine in those circumstances to promote sustainable economic growth in two of the largest world economies, where more than one and half billion people live. Hard work on the Agreement will start with the beginning of the year. All European institutions: Commission, Council and European Parliament will be involved in the negotiations.

Everybody expects really wearisome and difficult negotiations. Just for a reminder previous agreement of EU was with South Korea and it was a few months of very precise dialogue because of the many controversies around this agreement, specially with car industry. With India there is expected to be less difficulty and President Barroso is optimistic. He emphasised that he hoped that after last Brussels Summit both partners have created momentum in the Free Trade Agreement negotiations for an ambitious and balanced conclusion in the Spring of 2011. It would be the biggest agreement concluded by the EU and one of the biggest bilateral agreements ever – he repeated.

Fighting terrorism But economic issues are not the only area of common interest. Other issue, not less important, is the fight against terrorism. Leaders emphasised that EU and India, which share common values relating to democracy, rule of law, civil liberties and respect for human rights, agreed to reinforce their strategic partnership for their mutual benefit in all areas and to better contribute to the resolution of the challenges of the 21st century. Leaders welcomed increasing cooperation in the field of security and defence. They agreed to pursue EU-India dialogue and

78

cooperation in this area, including in the context of counter-piracy naval operations and more broadly in support of the UNSC resolution six, EU and India condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reaffirmed their united stance in combating threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts wherever they take place. Very significant point was common EU-India Joint Declaration on International Terrorism. EU and India reiterated their common interest in a stable, peaceful and inclusive Afghanistan free from terrorism, as well as their support to the Kabul Process building upon broad international partnership towards further Afghan responsibility and ownership in security, governance and development.

They also underlined the need for more effective regional cooperation for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and expressed their continued commitment to an ongoing dialogue to this end. Terrorism must be combated firmly and Mr. Barroso expressed concern at the continuing existence of safe havens, including in the crossborder dimension. European Union representatives underlined important role of India in regional security process and very delicate question of Pakistan. It is Pakistan who can give positive or negative (depending on situation inside the country and actual government) impact on Afghanistan.

EU and India leaders called upon Pakistan to expeditiously bring all the perpetrators, authors and accomplices of the Mumbai attacks to justice. They vowed to continue to discuss counterterrorism cooperation at high level meetings within our security dialogue.

widest possible measure of mutual legal assistance and to expedite processing of extradition requests and to explore the possibility of an EU-India Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement and an EU-India Agreement on Extradition; agree to closer India-EU cooperation and mutual assistance in area of Research, Technology and Cybersecurity; encourage more efficient controls on issuance of identity and travel documents to prevent movement of terrorist and terrorist groups across national borders. Next idea is reaffirming commitment to implement the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as a unique instrument to enhance national, regional and global efforts to counter terrorism and encourage global ratification and effective implementation of all relevant conventions on counter-terrorism

Counter-terror measures

The writer is European correspondent of Polish weekly magazine Wprost. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs and also the Balkans issues. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine from India.

What was very interesting there were more concrete proposals of cooperation: Intensify efforts to render the

January 2011 Defence AND security alert

Mr. Van Rompuy emphasised: “The London, Madrid and Mumbai attacks showed that terrorism knows no boundaries and that a common response is essential: the Joint Declaration on Counter-Terrorism signals a clear commitment in this regard. This Declaration sets out a series of areas of concrete and deeper cooperation. The aim of course is the ‘Afghanisation’ of Afghanistan”.

From a political point of view Brussels Summit was really successful.

Real conclusion of Summit we will observe in Spring, when negotiations of Free Trade Agreement will be finalised and when declarations about terrorism will start to give some more concrete fruits.

New

Year 2 Exc 011 Bo lusi nan ve za!

0 ber 201 Decem

Subscribe Now !

Cover Price Tenure 1 year 2 years 3 years Discounted Price Tenure 1 year 2 years 3 years

“For the

Security

Issues 12 24 36

For India ` 1440 ` 2880 ` 4320

For SAARC Countries US$ 240 US$ 480 US$ 720

For Rest of the World US$ 300 US$ 600 US$ 900

Issues 12 24 36

For India For SAARC Countries + One Lost Mobile Tracking System ` 1296 US$ 216 ` 2448 + Two Lost Mobile Tracking Systems US$ 408 ` 3456 + One Mobile Cum Personal Data Controller System US$ 576

For Rest of the World US$ 270 US$ 510 US$ 720

of your

mobile”

Yes, I would like to avail the Subscription of DSA 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years I would like to subscribe for Gift a Subscription Name (Personal).........................................................................Organisation.................................................................Sex.................

Education / Qualification Graduate Post-Graduate Professional Any Other Profession...................................................................................Organisation.......................................................................................

Billing Address.......................................................................................................................City...........................................................

Shipping Address...................................................................................................................City...........................................................

State.........................................Pin..............................................Tel......................................Mob.........................................................

Your Birth Date........................................................................... Marriage Anniversary........................................................(Optional) DD / Cheque No..........................................................................Dated.................................Drawn on................................................. for `.............................................................................................in favour of OCEAN MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED, Payable at New Delhi Or Please Charge `................................(in words).................................................................................through my credit card to my: Choose any one: Credit Card No............................................................................Expires................................Signature of CC Holder............................ * Please attach your ID proof with your signature in case of credit card payment. * Please add ` 50 for all outstation cheques.

All payments in favour of Ocean Media Private Limited, payable at New Delhi. * Condition applies.

Terms and Conditions:* This Offer is on print edition, valid upto 28th Feb 2011 and available till the stock lasts.

Minimum subscription is for one year (12 Issues). Your subscription will start with the next available issue after the receipt of your payments. DSA will be despatched through Postal / Courier Services.

Packing and forwarding charges will be borne by DSA. Online edition of DSA shall be complimentary to all subscribers of Print Edition for single user. Please mention your subscription ID in all your future communications. Please forward us the completed subscription form with all the required details. DSA will not be responsible for any miscarriage or delay, if postal address is incorrect.

This subscription form supersedes all the previous. Please address all your subscription related queries through Email:subscription@dsalert.org or call us at: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, or fax at: +91-11-23259666 or write to us at: Subscription department, Ocean Media Private Limited, 4/19 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi - 110002 (INDIA) F o r a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d s u b s c r i p t i o n q u e r i e s p l e a s e c o n t a c t : + 9 1 9 2 1 0 2 1 8 3 5 5 .

The terms and conditions may change without any prior notice. This offer is for new subscribers only. Subscription form can also be downloaded from our portal www.dsalert.org

Write for Defence and Security Alert (DSA) a new wave, world class monthly magazine is being hailed as the harbinger of a revolution in India’s defence and security journalism.

To strengthen our mission of making every citizen Aware and Alert we invite distinguished experts with original, novel and constructive ideas - for a Safe and Secure India and the World - to join the mission and write for DSA. Please mail your articles to: articles@dsalert.org

We at DSA welcome your critique and suggestions. Please tell us what other topics you will like to read in your DSA. Write to us on: info@dsalert.org

■ Europe ■ Pakistan ■ East Asia ■ Surveillance ■ Security lapses ■ Environment ■ Disaster management ■ Telecom security ■ Women in defence and security ■ Fire security ■ Health ■ Education ■ Air power and aerospace ■ NATO ■ Migration ■ Airlines and airports security ■ Energy ■ AI and robotics ■ Homes and establishments ■ Military affairs ■ SCO ■ International relations ■ Geo-politics ■ Defence policies ■ Defence budget ■ Defence industry ■ Strategies and tactics ■ Defence technology ■ Defence R & D ■ Maritime security ■ Border security ■ Social and political discord ■ Nuclear technology ■ CBRNe ■ Space technology ■ Homeland security ■ Defence forces ■ Security forces ■ Security budget ■ Intelligence operations ■ Police reforms ■ Cyber security ■ Hardware and technology ■ Corruption ■ Terrorism ■ Fundamentalism and Jihad ■ Insurgency ■ Naxalism ■ Security and development ■ Drugs and human trafficking ■ Money laundering ■ Neighbour watch

Subject experts may contact : article@dsalert.org

www.dsalert.org info@dsalert.org

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25 JANUARY 2011

INDIA : ` 120 VOLUME 2 ISSN

ISSUE 4

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

Soldier: The silent sine qua non of the nation’s well-being

> VOLUME 2 > ISSUE 4 > JANUARY 2011

Majestic recognition to

EAR !

Y NEW ANZA BON o. 79 eN

Pag