DSA January 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

he 26 November attack on Pakistan Armyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s post in Mohmand Agency is a seminal event in a troubled relationship between allies in a constant spat. Whatever the spin put out by the Pakistan Army, or United States military spokespersons, the truth of the matter will remain confined by the differing perceptions generated out of this vexed relationship. Stories of vastly different interpretations abound, as they are expected to when the occasion is of such magnitude. And it is of enormous magnitude, one that cannot be measured by merely the statistical recourse to the number of casualties. 26 dead and at least half as many injured is a significant figure by any stretch of imagination. Even in the realms of South Asian negligence of the value of human life this is an enormous calamity that has hit the Pakistan Army.

Pakistani spin masters have been quick to point to various loopholes in their domestic airspace management, rules of engagement and the unequal nature of the relationship with the United States of America. What matters more to them is that the convoluted justifications find news space, not that they necessarily absolve the Pakistan Army of all its wrongdoings. And the list of wrongdoings are legendary in their audacity, myopia and the sheer subversion of law and good relations with all. The relations with the United States has been the bedrock as far as the Pakistani state is concerned and more so its military. Beneficiaries of arms sales and slush funds by the billions the Pakistani military machine was on hire to the United States for the longest time. Both looked the other way when it came to protecting core interests. If the Pakistani state allowed itself to become the frontline of anti-communist subversion it did so on its own volition. And if the United States slept over Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s nuclear shenanigans it did so with its eyes wide open. The problem, however, with looking the other way is that the earth is round and there comes a point when the two opposing visions are bound to collide.

Which is precisely the basis of the ongoing tensions over happenings on both sides of the Durand Line. Even as they may claim to be allies in the War On Terror, there is nothing to suggest that Pakistan and United States have interests anywhere near being common. The facts on ground clearly point to the fact that there is not convergence of interests between the two. In fact even as Pakistan draws coalition support funds from the United States its actions have clearly been subversive of NATO / ISAF interests. In that Pakistan has always been consistent, especially adept at pulling wool over the eyes. But such tactics have a limited shelf life and the expiry date was clearly crossed on 13 September 2011 when the militant attack on US interests in Kabul left a trail leading directly to the ISI. The Rubicon was crossed that day by Pakistan and 26 November is a direct outcome of that game. Suffice to say, the final whistle is a long way off.

manvendra singh

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

executive editor

publisher’s view

T h e E r a o f L i m i t e d Wa r s

his month’s theme “Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop” is by itself a controversial topic given that Pakistan believes it has shut any window of opportunity that may have existed for a conventionally stronger India to exploit by officially unveiling its “bomb-in-the-basement” programme in May, 1998 and threatening that its nukes will be used in a “First Strike” mode.

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Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 4 J a n u a r y 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales pranesh vadhera anupama singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari ranjeet amit e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

India, on the other hand had clearly followed every major move by Pakistan to “go nuclear” at any cost including, as the progenitor of the concept of “Islamic Bomb” former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto put it, eating grass if necessary. It was acutely aware of the transfer of nuclear weapons technology from China to Pakistan, including blueprints for miniaturised warheads to be fitted on surface-to-surface missiles to be supplied by North Korea. Hence its unequivocal refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that would have foreclosed India’s nuclear option and left the China-Pakistan collusive intent to hold sway in the emerging geopolitics. One cannot but recall with clarity the steely delivery of India’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Arundhati Ghosh who told the world in no uncertain terms that India would not sign the CTBT “Not now, not ever!” Keeping a sharp eye on the ongoing China-Pak nuclear collusion, successive Indian governments from Indira Gandhi, who ordered the first nuclear test in 1974 to ensure that India had got it right, up to the moment the Atal Behari Vajpayee led BJP coalition government decided to keep its election promise to exercise the nuclear option, with three underground tests in Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert on 11 May 1998 followed by two on 13 May, all had made sure that India would not be caught napping. The final straw may well have been the testing by Pakistan of a North Korean supplied missile in April, 1998. It illustrated that Pakistan now had both the bomb and the means of delivery. In the face of American and its western allies’ attempt to put pressure on India to sign the CTBT even in the presence of so much evidence that Pakistan had been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme with extensive help from foreign sources India remained steadfast on its nuclear option. The fact that Pakistan conducted five tests on 28 May showed that American expert Leonard Spector who had said as early as in 1987 that Pakistan’s bomb-in-the-basement project was just “two screwdriver turns away” from completion was bang on target and that the Indian tests forced Pakistan to also go public. With proven nuclear warheads and the means of delivery in its arsenal Pakistan’s military establishment which has exclusive control of the project decided to take advantage of its newfound nuclear parity with India. Gen Musharraf dusted out an old plan to occupy the Kargil heights and threaten to disrupt the Leh supply line to the Siachen Glacier. He did just that and India did not discover the treachery for several months. When it did, it responded with all its conventional weapons and within two months had rolled back the Pakistani Army Northern Light Infantry troops with devastating effect on the Pakistani psyche. The Kargil campaign highlighted the possibility of a “limited war” between nations armed with nuclear weapons. Since then there has been heated debate and cold-blooded analyses about how deep Indian troops could penetrate Pakistani territory before Islamabad responds with nuclear weapons; how long would it be that the war escalated into a nuclear exchange between the two countries leading to what is known as Mutual Assured Destruction or, appropriately, MAD. In this edition DSA has once again brought before the Indian public a consolidated ready backgrounder on the whole gamut of issues involved in the concept of “limited war” in the sub-continental context including one that says that for too long we have allowed Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence to work to the detriment of Indian national interests in Jammu and Kashmir. Wishing our readers happy reading and an even happier and secure 2012.

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

The onset of limited wars

n the eve of its second Anniversary the DSA had held a path breaking Seminar on “Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop”. Three former Service Chiefs, a former Foreign Secretary and Director, Centre for Air Power Studies had participated. The Seminar was attended by young parliamentarians and a host of serving and retired service officers to include the CISC, DGMT and DGPP. In this Issue we are publishing the highlights of the Seminar and a number of incisive articles on this theme by very senior retired officers and well known academics – including one from the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. This is a live and burning issue. We may well have to fight Limited Wars against Pakistan or China or both. These wars will be fought against a Nuclear backdrop. The formulation that we will continue to prepare for a general conflict (like the two World Wars) and that preparation can take care of any lesser contingency will not work anymore. Gen Maxwell Taylor of the US Army was emphatic on this subject. A Limited War fought against a nuclear backdrop has its own characteristics and limitations and requires very specific force structuring and preparation. A generalised, “one size fits all”, solution does not work in all cases related to limited wars. The Chinese are crystal clear on this subject. Since 1978, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had come to the clear-cut determination that general global wars were a thing of the past and henceforth China would structure its armed forces and prepare to fight only Local Wars. The nature of these Local (or Limited Wars) evolved in the Chinese perception to first "local wars fought under high-tech conditions" and now under what is termed "conditions of informatisation". Today there is a vital need for wide-ranging and participative debate in India about the nature and characteristics of the wars that we are likely to fight. There is a need to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine for Limited wars that spells out our determination to uphold our vital national interests even against a nuclear backdrop and synergises the response of not just the three services but ensures a “whole of the government” approach to such situations. We need to war game a series of response options and escalation ladders for such Limited Conflicts. The CCS will have to accord approval in principle for such contingencies in peacetime itself so that the transition to a limited war is smooth and well thought through and Escalation Dominance is ensured. There is an urgent need for India to field dominant conventional war fighting capabalities in South Asia to generate credible response options to Pakistan’s asymmetric adventurism or Chinese attempts at hegemonism. Our response so far has been characterised by an unexplicable meekness and timidity. Our arms acquisition process has been badly hobbled by inordinate delays and huge time and cost overruns and is proceeding at a glacial pace. This process will need to be speeded up urgently. The deliberations of the Seminar and articles by many retired senior officers on this issue provide food for thought that will help us crystallise a Doctrine for Limited wars which is long overdue. We will have to go beyond Cold Start’s Land Power centric approach and examine conflict initiation options that rely more on the far more flexible assets of Air Power and Sea Power to set the stage for such a conflict. We need to examine the nature of such a conflict, it’s modus operandi and desired end states. We need to war game scenarios as escalation ladder generators and help our political class overcome it’s astonishing diffidence and meekness in the face of external challenges. Cold Fusion presents a revolutionary new form of energy which we must exploit to create a demassified / distributed energy grid that takes us beyond the fossil fuel era. As a vibrant civilisation we need to invest in this path breaking future now. This issue has a very interesting article on Table Top Fusion. 16th December was the 40th Anniversary of our landmark victory in the 1971 war that led to the birth of Bangladesh. We need to learn our lessons from that seminal conflict which has crystallised the Indian way of war characterised by information dominance, the offensive use of asymmetric warfare to break the adversaries balance, methodical preparation and a rapid execution based on shock and awe generated by massing effects. Lt Gen Jacob, one of the prime architects of the victory recounts the inside details of the war in this issue.

We would avidly look forward to your feedback on all these vital subjects and hope to kick-start a participative and wide-ranging debate in the country.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents Limited Wars in South Asia ISSUE January 2012

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Volume 3 Issue 4 January 2012

A R T I C L E S limited wars in South Asia: 8 against a nuclear backdrop General V P Malik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd)

break the steel collar

sub-continental dilemma

Cecil Victor

Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd)

limited wars in South Asia: a civilian perspective

limited war: some doctrinal issues

Interview

Roger Rose - Chief Executive Lockheed Martin India Private Ltd

nuclear neighbourhood: challenges for India

exercise sudarshan shakti: validating doctrine

post show report: IFSEC homeland security India

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) Amb Arundhati Ghosh

limited wars in South Asia: 24 against a nuclear backdrop Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s nuclear dilemma

limited war and escalation in South Asia

conventional wars and the shadow face

preventing armageddon: search for a new strategy

silent revolution in nuclear science

talking trade, not war

the lie of the limited war

remembering Bangladesh: a historic victory

limited war in the Indian context

limited wars in South Asia: against the nuclear backdrop

Lt Gen Shantonu Choudhry (retd) Lt Gen V R Raghavan PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (retd) Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd) Dr Rajendra Prasad Dr M Srinivasan

Anna Louise Strachan

Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd) Lt Gen J F R Jacob PVSM (retd) Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

F E A T U R E S

Nitin Gokhale

Dr Rajiv Nayan

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January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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DSALERT January 2012 Defence AND security alert

S R A W D LIMITE A-

I S A H T U IN SO NUCLEAR BACKDROP

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limited wars

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Following is the text of the keynote address given by General V P Malik, Former Chief of Army Staff during the Kargil conflict at Anniversary Seminar of DSA on “Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop”. General V P Malik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) General Ved Prakash Malik assumed charge of the Indian Army, as the 19th Chief of Army Staff, on 30 September 1997. He was decorated with the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) in 1996. He took over as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee with effect from 01 January 1999. He coordinated and oversaw the planning and execution of Operation Vijay to successfully defeat Pakistan’s attempted intrusion in the Kargil sector during May to July 1999.

There may be several situations where both the initiator and the affected nation are tempted to use conventional weapons and forces. The initiator is tempted to give it a greater push with conventional forces to achieve the desired results, as it happened in 1947, 1965. In the 1999 Kargil war, it did so despite our nuclear weapons capability. On the other hand, the affected nation, when pushed to the wall, may use its conventional forces to bring the proxy war into the open rather than fight with all the limitations of a ‘no war no peace situation’. Pakistan did in 1971. We almost did in 2002.

hen we consider the nature of wars in South Asia, which includes China’s border with South Asian nations, at the outset, two important facts need to be noted.

Geopolitically, armed conflicts and wars around the world are gradually moving down the paradigm scale of intensity and inclusivity. People do not talk of nuclear war; only of nuclear deterrence or disarmament. Even the probability of regular high intensity conventional conflicts has got reduced. There are several reasons: • The world has shrunk. Developed as well developing nations have no options but to join ‘internationalisation’ and ‘engagement’, thus reducing the chances of open and intense conflicts. USA, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and India’s engagement with China are an example. • Governments are focused on economic development. This requires regional stability and not conflicts. • There is close monitoring of conflict situations by the media. This ensures greater accountability of governments. • The cost of maintaining standing armed forces and military weapon equipment has escalated. • Finally destruction of enemy’s military potential or occupation of foreign territories are not easily attainable objectives even in an asymmetrical armed conflict. We have seen that in Vietnam, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. With paradigm shift in the nature of security - military and non-military - the military today has to prepare itself for an elongated spectrum of conflict, ranging from Aid to Civil Authority, counter terrorism, low and high intensity conflicts to a war involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. The military has to be more innovative and receptive, to new ideas and changes to be able to deal with this elongated spectrum. More importantly, it requires greater political guidance to decide on priorities and defence planning than hitherto fore.

Nuclear war In South Asian security scenario, due to horrendous destructive power of nuclear weapons, almost certain universal condemnation and nuclear deterrence, the chances of a nuclear war between India, China and Pakistan are extremely unlikely. My own experience is that even a miniscule probability of a nuclear war inhibits political leaders, particularly the democratically elected leaders, from taking a chance with nuclear weapons. It exercises stricter control on such weapons in a conflict situation. Let us be clear; no nation is prepared to use nuclear weapons at the drop of a hat, more so when a credible nuclear deterrence is in place. Some people talk of very low nuclear threshold of Pakistan. However, Pakistan Army too is maintaining very large conventional forces which indicate that they are not going to jump into a nuclear war scenario in an irresponsible manner.

Despite being nuclear weapons states, Soviet Union and China were the first to fight a border war along Usury River way back in 1968

escalate into a warlike situation is not an infrequent occurrence. As far as proxy war situation is concerned, I have always maintained that a proxy war is part of the spectrum of conflict. There may be several situations where both the initiator and the affected nation are tempted to use conventional weapons and forces. The initiator is tempted to give it a greater push with conventional forces to achieve the desired results, as it happened in 1947, 1965. In the 1999 Kargil war, it did so despite our nuclear weapons capability. On the other hand, the affected nation, when pushed to the wall, may use its conventional forces to bring the proxy war into the open rather than fight with all the limitations of a ‘no war no peace situation’. Pakistan did in 1971. We almost did in 2002.

Conventional wars

Here, we must also note that despite being nuclear weapons states, Soviet Union and China were the first to fight a border war along Usury River way back in 1968.

India, since independence, has had to fight four wars; either due to border and territorial disputes or because a smaller neighbour thinks that we are a weak nation and wishes to keep us that way. It keeps us engaged in a proxy war. Along a disputed border - be that of India-Pakistan or India-China - a skirmish which can

LIMITED WARS IN SOUTH ASIA: AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

limited wars

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

So, is there a space for waging conventional war in South Asia between the spectral ends of all out nuclear war and sub-conventional conflict? My answer is yes! It would be wrong to assume that there is no space for a conventional conflict between a proxy war or border skirmishes and a nuclear conflict. We may call that a conventional war or a limited conventional war or just a limited war. Chinese call that border wars. As all post World War II wars have been only conventional, nonnuclear wars with several political, geographical and military restrictions, there is no clear-cut definition of a ‘limited war’. Such a conflict can also spread out in time, in what could possibly be termed as ‘a war in slow motion’.

There is also a linkage between deterrence and conventional war escalation. A limited war does not mean limited capabilities. It refers to the use of those capabilities. Capability to wage a successful conventional and nuclear war is a necessary deterrent. A war is likely to remain limited because of a credible deterrence or Escalation Dominance. Escalation dominance means that one side has much greater military superiority at every level of violence. The other side will then be deterred from escalating it to higher intensity conventional or a nuclear war level as the superior military power will have greater chances of success. It implies that more room is available in diplomacy as well as in conflict.

Limited war concept

In such a conflict scenario, politico-diplomatic factors will play an important role. Careful and calibrated orchestration of military operations, diplomacy and domestic political environment is essential for successful outcome. Control of ‘escalatory ladder’ requires much closer political oversight and politico-military interaction. Therefore, it becomes necessary to keep the military leadership in the security and strategic decision-making loop and maintain a direct politico military interface. During a conflict situation, all participants must remain in constant touch with political leadership. We did that during the Kargil war.

A limited conventional war would imply limited political and military objectives, limited in duration, in geography and in the actual use of forces level. It could also be limited in the quantum and pace of application of firepower. The adversaries will try not to hurt each other excessively at any one time. The limited wars concept is, therefore, far removed from the classical ‘no holds barred’ attitude. It is typically characterised by severe limitations and constraints imposed by the political leadership on the employment of the military. Due to nuclear overhang, such a conflict would have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals (capping of the military objectives) and military moves which permit adequate control over escalation and disengagement. What will be important political and military objectives? Should this simply aim at acquiring a piece of territory for post war bargaining? Or should it aim to destroy a particular facility or capability? Should it be simply to raise costs for asymmetric adventurism? What should be the aim and desired end state in such a war? What are its political and military implications and possible reactions of the adversary? What is likely to be the duration of war, or how much time is available to the armed forces to execute their missions and achieve politico-military goals? All such decisions will be crucial for planning and conduct of operations. This is something on which there would have to be complete understanding between political and military leadership. In such situations, we can also expect fairly rigid political terms of reference as were given to the military in the Kargil war. (In 1962, China and India did not employ air power due to (justified or unjustified) political reasons.

Escalation dominance means that one side has much greater military superiority at every level of violence. The other side will then be deterred from escalating it to higher intensity conventional or a nuclear war level as the superior military power will have greater chances of success Another aspect: in a ‘reactive’ situation - like the Kargil war - the duration of the war can be prolonged. However, the duration available will be much less if we decide to take the initiative.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

The fundamental point in a limited conventional war is that it is a process conducted primarily for obtaining political advantage and bargaining. The aim is not to be ‘victorious’ but to fight in such a way that the enemy is forced to concede the politico-strategic advantage and settle for peace. When a war starts to move down the intensity spectrum, victory and defeat shift more into the political, economic and psychological dimensions. In such a situation, perceptions are as important as the reality. The political goals may be limited but are synergised in a way that optimises them in our favour. This aspect too stands out in the conflicts fought during 1962 and 1999.

Important politico-military challenges The political definition of the goals and its translation into military objectives: It would be

difficult, sometimes uncertain and indirect, yet its success is truly critical to the attainment of the political goals. Key military concepts pertaining to the desired end result such as ‘military victory’ or ‘success’ is fundamentally transformed to reflect a much heavier political emphasis.

Rapid decision making and military reaction: The successful outcome of such a war hinges on the ability to react rapidly to an evolving crisis, which most often erupts by surprise. This would be a major challenge for the military. For the military is expected to be able to react quickly to the changing circumstances, in order to localise, freeze and reverse the situation on the ground and to arrest the deterioration, enhance deterrence and diminish incentives for escalation. Mobilising and sustaining domestic and international political support: Military operations in

the present age of transparency and openness require political legitimacy. In that most important issues are avoidance of casualties on both sides and minimisation of collateral damage.

It is Necessary to keep the military leadership in the security and strategic decision-making loop and maintain a direct politico-military interface Militarily, the greatest challenge could be in the political reluctance to commit a pro-active engagement and insistence to retain the authority for approving not just key military moves but also many operational decisions pertaining to deployment and employment of military assets. Political and military requirements will require heavy reliance on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Surgical strikes would be a common option. Airpower, precision guided weapons, stand-off armaments and information would be the weapons of choice.

Employment of ground forces across the borders could be discouraged, or delayed, due to fear of casualties and difficulty in disengagement. Information operation becomes important. The political requirements of the military operations, in order to achieve and retain the moral high ground and deny that to the adversary, would need a comprehensive and sophisticated media, public affairs and information campaign. This has to be fully integrated and synchronised with the planning and execution of the military operations. Psychological warfare has always been a part of classical war; it becomes more important now. Limited conventional war would also have to take into account counter-intervention and defensive measures. The so-called ‘cold start’ does not mean inadequate defence measures. Lucrative targets would have to be defended and denied through dispersal and other means, taking into account the capabilities of the adversary.

Some doctrinal aspects Airpower We all know that the airpower is faster to mobilise, is more flexible and can achieve strategic and tactical surprise better than other services. Airpower is also decisive because it can cause heavy and precise destruction. It provides mobility, aerial observation and close air support. It is ideally suited to initiate and achieve success in a limited war conflict. Control of air is the single greatest manoeuvre and firepower advantage. Along with other Air Force priorities, we need to make close air support most responsive to Army needs.

Rapid mobilisation The sooner an intervening force can arrive to influence the course of a military event, the lesser is the chance of the conflict devolving into firepower intensive, wasteful slugging match. Rapid mobilisation out-paces enemy and has the same

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

limited wars

asset as surprise. For a limited conventional war environment, we may need to carry out strategic re-locations of some of our combat formations, particularly those that take a long time to be moved and deployed. Also, we need not wait for full mobilisation to start operations.

The military is expected to be able to react quickly to the changing circumstances, in order to localise, freeze and reverse the situation on the ground and to arrest the deterioration, enhance deterrence and diminish incentives for escalation

Surveillance and intelligence Without adequate intelligence and continuous surveillance, even the best of plans cannot succeed. We require a very clear strategic, operational and tactical picture and assessment with the help of all possible technology and human intelligence. We have to obtain real time intelligence and ensure that it reaches those who need it in time. We need much better integration of surveillance and operational resources like satellite imagery, air reconnaissance, radars, armed helicopters and so on to reduce force generation time.

Surprise In a limited conventional war, due to short duration, surprise as a factor becomes more important than ever before. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is least prepared. A pro-active strategy and contingency planning in peacetime have distinct military advantage. But that would be a difficult political option.

Rapid reaction forces In a limited or small-scale war, tempo and speed dictate that light, Rapid Reaction Forces comprising elements from arms, services, with embedded air force capability. We need more Special Forces for such missions. The basic engine of attrition will be the synergised and integrated

limited wars

KEYNOTE ADDRESS applications of firepower - artillery, missiles and all other firepower. Massive and surgically applied firepower will cause disruption, destruction and dislocation and provide a decisive edge in a war. Air delivered firepower and long-range artillery will not only affect enemy’s morale, it will offer freedom of movement to the manoeuvre element. However, in difficult terrain conditions like Siachen, Kargil and north-east, we must have a clear understanding of what fire power and technology can or cannot do.

Electronic warfare A conflict in future could well be decided on the basis of better exploitation of the electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum. Its impact is all pervasive: to assist in anti-terrorist operations, prevent attacks against civilian or military targets. The e-bombs have the advantage of no collateral damage and lesser likelihood of loss of life. Concerted R and D and user innovations into the varied uses of the EM spectrum are an urgent requirement.

Information war These days, media reporting catches events at their source, when the events are still history’s raw material. Robust reporting of the past has now given way to brittle reporting. The result can be unpredictable swings in public sentiment, compounding the government’s challenge of building support for the war. And it is not possible to resist the transparency pressure anymore to be transparent. People - analysts, journalists, investors, employees, or members of the public - have high standards and consider knowing situational information to be their right, an entitlement rather than a luxury. The lesson, therefore; don’t try to seal all lips. The communications effort daily briefings, live broadcasts and so on - must start from the very top and go down the channel in a planned manner.

Conclusion Mere

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

possession

nuclear

weapons does not stop conflicts. A question that often arises, ‘are we, therefore, adequately equipped and trained for the more likely form of conflicts or the less likely form?’ Are we prepared for yesterday or tomorrow’s armed conflicts? India now is confronted with the task of defending itself militarily against nuclear armed adversaries. The action has to be effective but not so effective as to cause inadvertent escalation. These parameters demand new war fighting strategies and doctrines that the Indian political and military leadership is not used to traditionally. It is a conflict situation and a strategy, that puts a premium on achieving speedy decision on the battlefield and then terminating offensive action before the conflict degenerates into attrition.

Currently, our operational planning caters more for reactive all out conventional war settings; much less for limited war scenarios. A reactive strategic culture tends to erode our deterrence capability Currently, our operational planning caters more for reactive all out conventional war settings; much less for limited war scenarios. A reactive strategic culture tends to erode our deterrence capability. For the new strategic environment, there is a need for the armed forces to prepare different level joint plans, which can be implemented at a short notice, or during the course of mobilisation. Such contingency plans and their full implications will need prior politico-military discussions: even ‘in principle’ approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security. Lastly, with the conflict becoming multi-dimensional, the armed forces require geo-strategically aware and specialised political guidance and networking. We also need to re-organise networking of the armed forces within and with other government and non-government agencies which could have an important role to play in any future armed conflict. Only then it would be possible to succeed in such conflicts.

LIMITED OPTIONS

Limited Wars in South Asia:

A civilian Perspective

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1966. He reached the highest position in the Indian Foreign Service on his appointment as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from July 2002 to November 2003. He is a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. He is on the Board of Directors of the New York based East-West Institute. He is on the Advisory Board of the Vivekanand International Foundation. He has received the high distinction of Grand Officier of the Ordre du Merite from France.

This is the text of the talk by Ambassador (Dr) Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary. It is remarkable for its analytical and very clear-headed approach to the subject of limited wars in South Asia – whether against China or Pakistan or both and provides an invaluable civilian perspective to this vital issue.

he title of this seminar is, in a sense, politically correct as it talks about limited wars in South Asia rather than limited wars between India and Pakistan. There is not much sense in talking about limited wars between India and other South Asian countries because, first of all, such an eventuality has no basis in reality and even if India were to be engaged in such a conflict, there is no nuclear dimension that we need to worry about in case of escalation.

India has been bled by terrorism from Pakistan for almost two decades and a half. Even when dramatic attacks took place against our Parliament and later in Mumbai, India could not take even limited retaliatory military action for fear of the conflict escalating into a nuclear stand-off. This gives Pakistan a fairly free hand theoretically to use the terrorist weapon against us at a time of its choosing

In reality, the issue really relates to Pakistan. And it is a practical issue. India has been bled by terrorism from Pakistan for almost two decades and a half. Even when dramatic attacks took place against our Parliament and later in Mumbai, India could not take even limited retaliatory military action for fear of the conflict escalating into a nuclear stand-off. This gives Pakistan a fairly free hand theoretically to use the terrorist weapon against us at a time of its choosing , knowing that Indian capacity to retaliate has been neutralised by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Consequently, our policy makers and military planners have to address the issue in the interest of national security. They have to examine whether realistic options for a limited war between India and Pakistan are available. This is an issue of importance because there is no certainty that another terrorist attack of the dimension of the Mumbai carnage can be ruled out. Should that happen the government cannot afford to be passive as public opinion will not accept that.

The chance of a skirmish on the Indo-Tibetan border cannot be ruled out. Curiously, in such a case no one expresses fears of a potential conflict going nuclear. Indeed both countries have strengthened their conventional capability on the border, with the calculation that the fact of possession of nuclear weapons does not obviate the possibility of a limited conventional war between the two

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limited wars

LIMITED OPTIONS

Pakistan’s Kargil adventure was within the framework of a limited war in a nuclear backdrop. Pakistan calculated that it could take limited military action in a contested area, that is, in Jammu and Kashmir and assumed that India would certainly not be able to repeat 1965 and launch an attack across the international border. It also assumed that India would be hesitant to launch a large scale attack across the LoC because of doubts about being able to contain the spiral of escalation that might result.

No other country uses terrorism by non-state actors or simulated non-state actors on the scale Pakistan does. For it, it is a force multiplier against a stronger India; it provides deniability so that the government of Pakistan is not held accountable for what takes place from its soil against another country In the event, India took defensive military action but with tight restrictions on tactics which imposed extra casualties on our armed forces. The Indian forces were not allowed to cross the LoC; the defensive action had to remain confined on our territory so that Pakistan could not argue that it had been attacked by India. In the event, Pakistan’s incursion was rolled back successfully, with Pakistan suffering both a military and political defeat. If General Musharraf’s intention was to internationalise the Kashmir issue, the end result was the political consolidation of the LoC as a “border”, with President Clinton’s warning that borders could not be changed with blood-letting. Kargil perhaps proved that limited wars can be fought in a nuclear backdrop but the futility of such risk-taking was perhaps also proved as it showed that retaining the fruits of aggression, which by definition have to be limited too, through such adventures cannot be assured. In the case of the India-Pakistan scenario, India faces a peculiar problem as Pakistan uses non-state actors as instruments of state policy. No other country uses terrorism by non-state actors or simulated non-state actors on the scale Pakistan does. For it, it is a force multiplier against a stronger India; it provides

deniability so that the government of Pakistan is not held accountable for what takes place from its soil against another country. Pakistan also has used the convenient argument that non-state actors react against the atrocities by Indian armed forces against innocent fellow-Muslim Kashmiris and the state cannot fully control their activities. India will always have a problem when a major terror attack occurs against it from Pakistani soil by the so-called non-state actors. Unless it is starkly evident, Pakistan will deny official complicity. The Indian state will be seen taking punitive action against another state for an attack by non-state actors and this could expose India to the charge of escalation. We have seen how external powers, despite evidence to the contrary, are willing to accept the fiction that Pakistan is not officially involved in promoting terrorism, as accepting that reality would entail imposing sanctions. Pakistan’s geopolitical leverage in the context of Afghanistan in particular shields it from exposure. Any Indian action against Pakistan would therefore be diplomatically very problematic for India. Over and beyond that, we have eroded the ground from under our feet by clubbing ourselves with Pakistan as victims of terror by non-state actors. How then can we take action against Pakistan for acts of terror from its soil against us when we acknowledge Pakistan to be their victim too?

We have from under ourselves victims of actors

eroded the ground our feet by clubbing with Pakistan as terror by non-state

The question to be asked is whether we can deter Pakistan from using the instrument of terror against us. The Cold Start doctrine, that was aired in India and subsequently denied at governmental level, could be seen as an Indian exercise to explore limited war options with Pakistan. Since India would be politically compelled to take some retaliatory action if another Mumbai like attack occurs, can India react immediately in a credible manner rather than having to wait for a period of time to muster its forces and alerting Pakistan of

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the coming riposte as well as the international community? Waiting means inviting external diplomatic pressure against any retaliation. At one level, such explorations of possibilities of retaliation and doctrines like Cold Start do have some deterrent value. The Pakistanis have already staged military exercises to counter Cold Start and feel they are adequately prepared to meet any such Indian action. They have also let it be known that they are developing a cruise missile equipped with tactical nuclear weapons as an answer to Cold Start.

Its capacity for brinkmanship is considerable.

mean limited objectives and limited gains. Is it wise to risk a limited war, especially when nuclear weapons hover in the background, when the aims are limited and yields are to be limited? The risk taken should be proportionate to the gains to be achieved. Kargil has shown that preserving the limited gains is also an uncertain exercise because of international pressures.

Pakistan can hardly base its policies realistically on a sense of immunity for whatever it does, its risk taking capacity and sense of quasi-immunity is visible in the way it has dealt with US demands on combatting terrorism on its western frontier. Its capacity for brinkmanship is considerable

A major consideration for the government has been the impact of limited conflict with Pakistan on India’s economic situation. India needs a period of peace for maintaining the rate of its economic growth. India has at long last entered a period of high economic growth which alone can enable it to remove poverty and meet its national aspirations. India-Pakistan tensions will adversely affect the investment atmosphere, provoke flight of capital, divert funds from development projects etc. India as a rising state has much greater stake in peace than Pakistan as a failing state. Pakistan, in fact, may wish to prevent India’s rise to the extent it can by causing instability which its support for terrorism was intended to do. India has therefore serious inhibitions in choosing the option of retaliation even when gravely provoked.

India could take limited air action in PoK that includes the Northern Areas in retaliation. It could be argued that would not be construed as aggression against foreign territory as this area is legally ours. We could stop after limited surgical strikes and put the onus on Pakistan to escalate the conflict. They would find it difficult to retaliate in Jammu and Kashmir for fear of causing civilian casualties. Acting against other parts of India would broaden the conflict. Will they risk an aerial conflict with us?

That limited wars by definition mean limited objectives and limited gains. Is it wise to risk a limited war, especially when nuclear weapons hover in the background, when the aims are limited and yields are to be limited? The risk taken should be proportionate to the gains to be achieved. Kargil has shown that preserving the limited gains is also an uncertain exercise because of international pressures

Pakistan too would have to fear the consequences of retaliation. If India has to worry about Pakistani nuclear capability, Pakistan too has to worry about India’s nuclear strength. Will Pakistan act totally irresponsibly? General Musharraf has warned in the past against any Indian military action in PoK and has threatened a befitting Pakistani response. The Pakistani leadership has to do that in any case. Ultimately, it is a question of risk taking and nerves. If on the one hand, Pakistan can hardly base its policies realistically on a sense of immunity for whatever it does, its risk taking capacity and sense of quasi-immunity is visible in the way it has dealt with US demands on combatting terrorism on its western frontier.

While talking of limited wars with Pakistan in today’s context, one should bear in mind that wars between India and Pakistan have always been limited, whether those of 1948, 1965 or 1971. There never has been all-out war between the two countries. Whether this was because of limited capacity on both sides to sustain a long drawn out war, their dependence on foreign defence supplies that imposes restraint, or the intervention of external powers or the UN, can be analysed. Pakistan is provocative but seems to know its limitations. It is both adventurous in its policies towards India and also afraid of us.

If the idea of a limited war is to teach a lesson, it is not certain the lesson will be learnt in the way intended. The lesson learnt by the recipient country can be the opposite, namely, an incentive to strengthen its defensive and offensive capability so that the next time a lesson needs to be taught the response will be more robust and the exercise would then become more risky and less assured of success. One can enter in this case into the spiral of an arms race. Between powers that are manifestly unequally matched, the stronger country can take punitive military action repeatedly as the US does. The US also gets approval generally from either the UN or a coalition of the willing for its military action. Israel also acts periodically with punitive strikes against the Palestinians because the latter are not in a position to retaliate militarily. Between roughly equally matched countries, or where the gap is not too large and where the capacity to mobilise the international community behind a punitive military strike is absent, a limited war as a punitive strike may give short term results but not longerterm ones. This is the case between India and Pakistan. Unless there is a radical change of mindset in Pakistan not only towards India but also in the direction of its own future, a limited punitive war with Pakistan will only sow greater hatred for India and vengeful feelings towards it. Despite the loss of Bangladesh, the internal terrorist onslaught within the country, the rise of extremism and loss of international reputation, Pakistan is unwilling to follow rational policies of a responsible state. Its nuclear capability has now greatly enhanced its capacity for mischief and shields it from condign punishment.

We should also reflect on the fact that limited wars by definition

The 1962 India-China military conflict was a limited one. China

wanted to teach us a lesson in 1962. It voluntarily vacated large portions of Indian territory it had captured, limiting to that extent the territorial stakes on both sides in a longer term perspective. But the lesson India has learnt is to strengthen its defences vis a vis China, albeit not as rapidly as it should have. The military strength of both sides across the border is not as unevenly matched as in 1962 and today the ability of China to teach India a lesson is highly questionable. The lesson to be learnt actually is that a limited war can always be fought but its longer term consequences cannot be controlled. If one talks of limited wars in South Asia one should also address the possibility of such a war between India and China, even though both countries are nuclear weapon powers. The border issue between the two countries has not been resolved, aggressive patrolling is taking place in the disputed areas where the Line of Actual Control is contested and China’s sensitivities about the Dalai Lama have got aggravated after the latest revolt in Tibet. The situation is inherently unstable despite the peace and tranquillity agreement and agreed CBMs. In fact, the chance of a skirmish on the Indo-Tibetan border cannot be ruled out. Curiously, in such a case no one expresses fears of a potential conflict going nuclear. Indeed both countries have strengthened their conventional capability on the border, with the calculation that the fact of possession of nuclear weapons does not obviate the possibility of a limited conventional war between the two. With our common border with China after its occupation of Tibet, any discussion on limited wars in South Asia cannot therefore exclude the India-Tibet frontier. India is strengthening its defence capabilities. It is preparing itself for all eventualities. India does not want any conflict, limited or otherwise, but it has to develop a response capability. A limited war is always a possibility, an all-out war can be ruled out. India should not initiate military action against any adversary. But what should it do in the face of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism? It has at some stage to think of retaliation, but the choice is not easy to make.

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limited wars

theoretical aspects

Following is the text of the talk given by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd), Director of Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi at Anniversary Seminar of DSA on “Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop”. Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) The writer is Director of Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is Fellow of World Academy of Science and Art and has been awarded the Padma Bhushan for a life-time’s contribution to national security and defence.

Given the present trends in China’s military modernisation, it can be concluded with a degree of confidence that its future wars are unlikely to remain in keeping with the centrality of local-border war in its military doctrine; and its much more likely to shift toward a limited war where its air and missile power are much more likely to be employed on long-range strikes with precision weapons, though on land it may stick to the local-border war doctrine

efore I get into discussing the doctrinal issues, let me emphasise two central elements of a limited war:

• Limited wars would produce limited effects; and hence to expect a “decisive military victory” leave alone capture of large swathes of the adversary’s territory would not be realistic. This in turn demands that the limited aims of a limited war must be carefully constructed to ensure that national interests are adequately (if not fully) addressed. But the history of the 20th century tells us that even a total war seeking unconditional surrender finally had to be terminated without achieving that goal. • The presence of nuclear weapons imposes an inalienable condition on states to ensure that wars remain limited; in other words, the Clausewitzian concept of war as an extension of politics by other means would have to remain seriously restricted if not avoided as Bernard Brodie had pointed out as early as 1946. The history of the Cold War between two super powers reinforces the wisdom of this concept. Hence war under a nuclear umbrella would have to be fought in a different manner like the two super powers did with their proxy wars in developing world (and Pakistan has been pursuing the strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts, where each cut is too small to provoke a major response and yet debilitate India through sponsored terrorism in the name of religion where the target of Pakistan’s killings are primarily its co-religionists).

Limited wars would produce limited effects; and hence to expect a “decisive military victory” leave alone capture of large swathes of the adversary’s territory would not be realistic While wars in earlier centuries had assumed characteristics that would define them as total wars, all the wars during the 20th century, with the exception of the Second World War, had been limited although some elements of the campaigns / battles of First World War could be termed totally based on the very high casualties in trench warfare in Europe. The use of two atomic weapons gave the Second World War an image of being fought to obtain “unconditional surrender,” a dimension that could only be described as total and unlimited war. The goal of unconditional surrender in fact increased the scope of the outcome toward a more total war than what it might have had otherwise where the Axis powers would have some incentive to surrender earlier than they did. For example, Japan had shown willingness to surrender as early as November 1944 as long as the Emperor was allowed to remain as such. The final atomic catastrophe made the Japanese surrender dramatic though the Allied Powers agreed to the Emperor remaining on his throne thus denying war termination the characteristics of a total war leading to unconditional surrender. China adopted the doctrine of “local border war” in 1987 after a two year review of the nature of wars in future. This has been a clear and unambiguous doctrinal articulation and numerous suffixes and prefixes (high-tech war, informatisation, etc.) since then have not altered the centrality of the local-border war doctrine. It is significant that a rising power in Asia formally adopted the concept that future wars would be limited and even defined them in terms of their restricted to border regions. And it is curious that all the wars that China had fought (and there were nearly 14 such wars after PRC took over the country) had been limited wars, including the Korean War. After adoption of the local border war (or in more general terms, a limited war) China has not fought any war though its military modernisation has been proceeding at a rapid rate since the mid-1980s. Given the present trends in China’s military modernisation, it can be concluded with a degree of confidence that its future wars are unlikely to remain in keeping with the centrality of local-border war in its military doctrine; and its much more likely to shift toward a limited war where its air and missile power are much more likely to be employed on long-range strikes with precision weapons, though on land it may stick to the local-border war doctrine.

LIMITED WAR: Some Doctrinal Issues

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The presence of nuclear weapons imposes an inalienable condition on states to ensure that wars remain limited; in other words, the Clausewitzian concept of war as an extension of politics by other means would have to remain seriously restricted if not avoided On the other hand, the West in general and the United States in particular have reposed significant faith in total war, especially with the aim of regime change to suite its strategic interests. The US-led wars in the first decade of the 21st century certainly indicate this propensity with results that only time will help to assess them accurately. Part of this reason is also due to the absence of any hostile military which can come up to its own military in technological terms. But it supported a large number of wars (like the Soviet Union) in the territories of the developing world where the two super powers actually contested with military power for influence and control. At the same time, there is one country in the world, Pakistan, where its senior military leadership, including president General Zia ul-Haq, (mis)interpreted the holy Quran to argue for a military doctrine of total war pursued through terrorism in the name of religion, modifying the army’s motto also to include the term jihad in it. And this doctrine has been implemented with great cruelty and indiscriminate killing of civilians, children and women mostly belonging to Muslim religion. If the limited war was the dominant trend in the 20th century, it should not cause us any surprise to find that all the wars that India, the second largest country in Asia, had to fight had two distinct characteristics: (i), none of them were initiated by it; and (ii) all these wars had remained limited due to limited goals and objectives set by New Delhi, almost invariably in accordance with pre-conceived objectives supporting this concept, even where political and / or military factors changed some of the goals (like they did in East Pakistan sector during 1971 war, though New Delhi stuck to a defensive local war in the western sector). And while it is obvious that the presence of nuclear weapons (and the catastrophe they would cause if used) would be a naturally strong factor to ensure that wars remain limited, the important point to note is that all the major wars India was forced to fight were in the pre-nuclear period but where New Delhi intentionally exercised strategic restraint thus limiting the war and terminating it at the earliest when the minimal objectives it sought were fully met at its terms by the clash of arms whose result was shaped by the proficiency and valour of the Indian Armed Forces. It was, therefore, not surprising that when Pakistan launched its surprise offensive in Kargil sector in the summer of 1999, when both countries possessed nuclear weapons, India would exercise restraint and limit the warfighting and was satisfied by the final stage for Pakistan’s withdrawal being set by the United States. At the same time, it proved that Indian Armed Forces were capable of defeating a clandestine build-up and war initiated by Pakistan, a nuclear weapon state against another nuclear weapon state. And in spite of serious restraints applied by New Delhi, especially on its Air Force, Pakistan army was defeated in a war at a time and place of its choosing.

General Zia ul-Haq, (mis)interpreted the holy Quran to argue for a military doctrine of total war pursued through terrorism in the name of religion, modifying the army’s motto also to include the term jihad in it Territorial wars in the past were fought for (human and mineral) resources where the industrially superior states

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limited wars

theoretical aspects

(mostly of Europe) controlled military technology and this also helped them to control populations. Nuclear weapons have limited the aim, scope and extent of war among states that possess such capabilities (and their allies) because of the tremendously destructive potential of such weapons1. As Martin Creveld wrote, “From Central Europe to Kashmir and from the Middle East to Korea, nuclear weapons are making it impossible for large sovereign territorial units, or states, to fight each other in earnest without running the risk of mutual suicide.”2 Total and unlimited conventional war has been relegated to the backyard of history because the age of imperial colonies which was a major factor making war a global phenomenon has long passed away. States simply do not have the means to conduct a total war, unless they use nuclear weapons. And this would result in mutual assured destruction, nullifying any possible political goal for which it might have been started. But modern states are also increasingly vulnerable even to conventional war. Conventional weapon attack on nuclear power stations, for example, could result in a hundred Chernobyls in Europe. It may be recalled that the accident in the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal (which resulted in 3,000 dead and over 5,000 injured in December 1984) could be replicated by a 500-kg conventional HE warhead. The potential damage of conventional war may be judged from the fact that nearly two million tons of chemicals are in transit or storage at any one time in Europe. While fire-bombing caused much of the damage to the cities in the Second World War, asphyxiation is likely to be the major cause of casualties of conventional attacks of tomorrow in society that relies so extensively on synthetics. High precision guided weapons of today make it possible to impose damage of the scale carried out during the strategic bombing campaign in Second World War with a fraction of the earlier air effort. It is not merely

that the highly organised industrially developed states would be so vulnerable to conventional warfare. The developing states are even more vulnerable because of the few high value assets they possess which have been acquired through investment of scarce resources. The case of Iraq, where development has been set back perhaps more than three decades first by Iranian air attacks and later by the US-led coalition air campaign is a prime example. If nuclear war and total global war are no longer viable propositions as an extension of politics by other means, the only choice available to states to use destructive force for political purposes is through limited conventional war, sub-conventional war with military type weapons and / or the use of coercive military force (like Op Parakarm in 2001-02 by India) without necessarily resulting in war. The overall result has been a reducing potential of war down to limited wars and from that point an expansion of opportunities for limited wars, sub-conventional wars and use of force without war. It can be argued that any modern war would remain limited unless consciously expanded to a total war. On the other hand, a total war in most circumstances between two nuclear-armed states would involve the substantive use of nuclear weapons, terrorism and / or other attempts to affect the survival of a state. The important point is to try and assess the factors that result in limiting war so that the true dimension of the nature of limitations and their impact can be understood and factored into policy.

In spite of serious restraints applied by New Delhi, especially on its Air Force, Pakistan Army was defeated in a war at a time and place of its choosing Limitations in political goals are obviously the most crucial and over-riding since employment of military power normally serves a political purpose. By definition, political goals in a limited war will

have to be curtailed and, therefore, very carefully defined. As the goals keep narrowing, the scope for error keeps increasing. Some examples from the Kargil War may be helpful to illustrate the points. If Pakistan had undertaken the aggression across the Line of Control in Ladakh in 1998 with a limited political objective, then it was obvious that the scope for error would be high. The purpose of military operations would not result in internationalisation (if that was the goal) of the Kashmir issue beyond what has existed. Or if the establishment of a bridgehead across the Line of Control was to seek negotiated cease-fire along an altered line, this depended entirely on Indian willingness to accept the change. This was obviously unlikely. But if the goal (as this writer believes) was larger than that to spread into the Indus and Shyok valleys with hard-core militants while Pakistan Army held the dominating heights overseeing Srinagar-Leh road, then its future depended entirely on the nature and extent of Indian military-political response. And here Pakistan made its more fundamental errors of assumptions. Such errors may not have an over-riding impact in a full-scale war (even of short duration) since failure in one area could be compensated by success in another. But in limited war the margin of error reduces tremendously and the victor would normally have taken care to make the least mistakes. The political factors may be classified into a number of factors discussed in the following paragraphs. One obvious one concerns territory. Capturing and occupation of territory used to be the most important political objective in earlier times essentially since control of territory used to imply control over human and material resources. This in fact was the strongest motivation for the colonial wars and imperial rule. However territory has lost its value as the aim of wars for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, even small quantity of territory has become far more important in the modern world of sovereign national

More than 25 states now either possess nuclear weapons formally or otherwise, or are protected by nuclear weapons through treaty arrangements. 2 Martin van Creveld, On Future War, Brassey’s (UK), London, 1991, p.194. 1

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states since states are highly sensitive to their sovereignty. Indian war aims for 1965 war laid down a week before Pakistan launched its main offensive to back up its covert war in Kashmir had laid down that Pakistani territory was to be captured during the war “which would be returned after the war” but Pakistani forces were to be evicted from India territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Conventional weapon attack on nuclear power stations, for example, could result in a hundred Chernobyls in Europe. It may be recalled that the accident in the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal (which resulted in 3,000 dead and over 5,000 injured in December 1984) could be replicated by a 500-kg conventional HE warhead De-colonisation and the dramatically enhanced political consciousness of peoples makes it extremely difficult to hold populations under subjugation against their will especially when an activist international community would inevitably be an important influence. Globalisation of economy and means of production have dramatically reduced the necessity to physically occupy territories as used to happen till mid-20th century. The only resource base tied to territory that could trigger a war now is the hydrocarbon resource. But territory has not eliminated itself from the political aims of war. In fact territory would continue to be important objective for military action in relation to at least three purposes: (i) Salami-slicing of the adversary’s territory where each slice does not attract a major response and yet the process over time would result in gains of territory. China’s strategy of salami slicing during the 1950s on our northern frontiers is a typical example which led Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to describe this as a Chinese concept of “mobile frontiers.” It is possible that Pakistan attempted the salami-slicing goal in Kargil last year; (ii), the second possibility is that of occupation of adversary’s territory to use it as a negotiating chip. India’s occupation of Pakistan’s territory in 1965 and 1971 wars falls into this category; (iii) Occupation of territory may also be undertaken

for demonstration and psychological goals which may convey signals of victory in war and also as demonstration to other elements like the militants and insurgents. The occupation of symbolic places or territory would be a prime target in such cases. Such signals by the occupying force may also be meant entirely for domestic audience. Another factor that promoted imposition of limitations on war is the reaction of the international community in pursuit of their own interests. The international community, especially the OECD countries have been projecting South Asia as a nuclear flash-point. It is generally believed that the international community would adopt an activist position in case of a war in this region and try to put pressure for controlling and terminating it. By the same logic the UN becomes an active agency in trying to limit the war as indeed it did in 1965 and 1971. Similarly lack of support or even sanctions and other punitive actions by the great powers (as happened in 1965, equating the aggressor and the victim) could be a significant factor in imposing limitations on a war Economic factors are likely to constitute a major factor in placing limitations on a war because they play a major role in the building of capabilities. Restrictions on funds for defence would lead to lowered preparedness which in turn would result in limiting the ability of the country to apply military power. In fact, adequate military power may simply not be there if un-preparedness has become endemic. The constraints that our Army faced in 1962 is but one example. It can also be argued that Pakistan Air Force was forced to stay out of harm’s way during the Kargil War since it had failed to keep its modernisation because of reducing defence budget since the early 1990s. This situation had been forced on Pakistan because of the economic mess that the country’s leaders had placed it in. Similarly human resources can place severe limitations on a country’s ability to prosecute a war. Perhaps the most important of these is the question of casualties in war, both one’s own as well as that of the adversary, not to talk of

collateral ones. Most democracies are increasingly sensitive about casualties in war and India is no exception. This can place a severe limitation on the way war has to be fought. But looking ahead the demographic trends indicate that the proportion of working age population in developed countries is falling rapidly and this is likely to lead to shortage of young military as a profession forcing the military leadership to adopt a low casualty limited war doctrines.

Political goals in a limited war will have to be curtailed and, therefore, very carefully defined. As the goals keep narrowing, the scope for error keeps increasing There are a number of military imperatives that also could impose limitations on war. As noted earlier, presence of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most important factor forcing governments to limit if not avoid war directly between two nuclear armed contestants. The scale and nature of destruction caused by nuclear weapons and the reality that there is no credible defence against such weapons creates conditions where either the likely use of such weapons is controlled (and, ideally, eliminated) or the countries concerned risk a nuclear holocaust. In a situation of nuclear asymmetry of course the imbalance in this capability would almost completely constrain the non-nuclear state from fighting a nuclear-armed one. Besides the presence of nuclear weapons there are also a number of military-related factors that lead to limiting wars. The most important of these is the limitation that military power itself has to face and hence the political goals have to be tailored to such limits. The main imperatives affecting military power may be summed up as follows: (i) Political limitations impose limitations on the creation and employment of military power. This is inevitable in modern states, especially liberal democracies, where rationale of military power rests in political goals and control; (ii) Reduction in the size of defence forces, their equipment and defence budgets constraining the ability of nations to fight.

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limited wars

Amb Arundhati Ghosh The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963 and served in various capacities in the Ministry of External Affairs and in Indian missions abroad. She was incharge of economic relations when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangladesh Government - in - exile in Calcutta during the birthpangs of that nation-state. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea and as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. As Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva she etched in indelible words the sovereign resolve of the Indian nation never to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Her words reverberate in Indian hearts to this day. She told the world in measured, authoritative tones that India would never sign the CTBT. “Not now! Not ever!”.

The already friable situation could be exacerbated to intolerable levels if the state itself, following the trends within Pakistani society, becomes a theocratic intolerant state, bent on the establishment of a Caliphate in the region. The military and non-state groups are certain to have been emboldened by India having been ‘deterred’ in 1999, following the Kargil attack, in 2001 after the attack on Parliament and Operation Parakram and more so, after 2008, after the attack on Mumbai. Would India react differently in the event of another Mumbai-type attack?

PRAGMATIc engagement An excellent civilian perspective on the aspect of Limited wars against a Nuclear backdrop. India is perhaps the only country that faces the challenges arising from having two nuclear neighbours, who closely cooperate with each others’ nuclear programmes and who maintain adversarial relations with her. A nuclear-weapon enabled terrorist threat is supported by strong and consistent denials of culpability for any such ‘non-state’ attack and a reliance on its ‘protector’ and mentor, China, to handle the inevitable diplomatic furore that is bound to rise if the taboo on nuclear weapons is broken with however limited an application. It would appear that Pakistan has adopted a policy of battlefield use of its nuclear weapons, a likely escalation of a conventional confrontation to a nuclear level, arrangements for rapid deployment which could entail pre-delegation to unit commanders in the event of a loss of communications, (which is what apparently happened at Salala recently when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ISAF air attack on two border posts). She asserts that there is a need to slightly tweak our nuclear doctrine; the objective would be not to change our No First Use policy, but to revert to the language of the Draft doctrine on the question of retaliatory strikes - these should be ‘punitive’ rather than ‘massive’ as now exists. Lastly, she makes the very bold assertion that in order to disillusion the adversary of our intent to retaliate, the control of the weapons should be placed squarely with the Strategic Forces Command.

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ecent developments in India’s neighbourhood have led to an increase in the instability in the region with particular implications for India’s security. Pakistan’s foolhardiness - or as the Pakistanis view it, their boldness - in challenging the international community by deciding to not attend - and to not allow its surrogates, the Taliban - to attend the just concluded Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, in taking actions which could see a military confrontation with the US and the ISAF forces on its western border and when it is such a parlous situation at home, can only arise from their assurance that at least politically and diplomatically, if not militarily, they can depend on the support of China. Despite India’s own efforts to manage her prickly relations with China, such unqualified support of Pakistan, particularly in the military and nuclear areas, must inevitably raise concerns in India. India is perhaps the only country that faces - or has ever faced - the challenges arising from having two nuclear neighbours, who closely cooperate with each others’ nuclear programmes and who maintain adversarial relations with her. To be sure, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union faced several hostile nuclear neighbours, which were bound together in an alliance and from 1971, another nuclear neighbour that formed a formidable challenge to its security. China, too, till 1971 and for about a decade before that, faced both the United States and the Soviet Union in adversarial positions. It was in the context of the Cold War that theories of limited conventional wars under a nuclear overhang usually on different continents - has been developed by scholars, mainly in the West. Whether such theories are applicable to the dual challenge facing India is a question that needs to be carefully considered.

Unique scenario The situation that India faces today is unique; firstly, it shares common and disputed borders with both hostile neighbours; China has, according to several knowledgeable commentators and intelligence sources (of the West) built-up Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal almost

nuclear neighbourhood:

challenges for India

from scratch - providing designs, material, including fissile material, technology, delivery vehicles (either directly or through North Korea) and even conducted a weapons test in 1990 on its Lop Nor Test site, for Pakistan. Today it is supplying reactors, which it claims will be under IAEA safeguards; but given the short shrift it has given the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, not to mention its obligations under the NPT in arriving at the agreement to do so, it is unlikely that the material from these reactors will remain for civilian purposes only. Thirdly and most dangerously, Pakistan has been using its growing nuclear arsenal as an umbrella under which it appears to feel that it can use sub-conventional attacks against India with little or no danger of (conventional) retaliation.

None of the above has been seriously disputed by either party; nor has the vague but ominous ‘red lines’ that Pakistan seems to have evolved regarding its stated doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. It appears to have in mind the escalation of any conventional response from India to even an armed attack on Indian soil by its nationals, to a nuclear counter-response. The theories of deterrence would seem to not be applicable in a situation if there is a ‘failure of rationality’ on one side. Of course, it could very well be that the intention is to indeed give an impression of irrationality, to act as a deterrent to any action on India’s part for fear that Pakistan would react ‘irrationally’. This stand, of what has been termed ‘a nuclear-weapon enabled terrorist threat’ is supported

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limited wars

PRAGMATIc engagement

by strong and consistent denials of culpability for any such ‘non-state’ attack and a reliance on its ‘protector’ and mentor, China, to handle the inevitable diplomatic furore that is bound to rise if the taboo on nuclear weapons is broken with however limited an application. India’s doctrine calls for ‘massive retaliation’ in the event of a nuclear first strike; that would entail attacking counter-value targets, which could include cities and other population centres. There would inevitably be calls for restraint on India’s part, despite the enormity of the action by Pakistan and there is also likely to be some domestic resistance to attacks on cities or towns. In this, perhaps, worst-case but not improbable, scenario, what are India’s options? There are some facts which are needed to be factored in to any consideration of the issue.

Difference between a ‘declaratory’ doctrine and an operational one; the latter can only be deduced from the information available on acquisitions and capabilities, statements of policy by albeit retired senior military men from Pakistan and such Western sources, presumably from intelligence inputs. On the basis of these, it would appear that Pakistan has adopted a policy of battlefield use of its nuclear weapons, a likely escalation of a conventional confrontation to a nuclear level, arrangements for rapid deployment which could entail predelegation to unit commanders in the event of a loss of communications, (which is what apparently happened at Salala recently when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ISAF air attack on two border posts)

Sino-Pak nexus Firstly, we need to take China’s support of Pakistan for granted, even the use by the latter of non-state groups as a part of their foreign and security policy. This has been demonstrated repeatedly and not only in the UN Security Council, where China has blocked any forward movement on the naming of specific

Pakistani nationals and sponsored groups as terrorists. Secondly, while the state of the internal instability in Pakistan is probably exaggerated in the media, Indian, Pakistani and the Western, there is no doubt that there is a considerable rise in religiosity with strong sectarian and intolerant strains in Pakistani society in general; this would have an inevitable impact on all state institutions, including the military. At the same time, the military has not yet abjured its support for specific non-state groups as ‘assets’ in the furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. Some of the groups may well be out of control of the military, though there is little apparent effort to control them in any effective way, though some other groups, targeting the Pakistani state, are being attacked or negotiated with, according to press reports. Thirdly, while like many other developing countries, Pakistan’s economy is currently in a very fragile condition, the worsening of relations with the US may adversely affect the budgetary support that Pakistan has been used to receive - China usually restricts itself only to project and commodity aid and does not give budgetary support to any of its allies, however close. Notwithstanding these developments, the ambitions of Pakistan’s military remain vaulting. Given these facts, it is clear that the situation is such that in the event of any crisis, or with the intention of creating one, India could face nuclear threats at multiple levels from Pakistan - it is not unlikely that these would be supported by China, which, however, will ensure that it is not directly involved. Pakistan has repeatedly stated that its nuclear arsenal is ‘India-centric’ as it’s entire military strategies were till a short while ago; at one level, therefore, the threat arises from its official policy and the doctrine it has apparently adopted. The Pakistani nuclear doctrine, at least our knowledge of it, is today based on an interview given by Lt General Khalid Kidwai (retd), Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division to Paolo Cotta-Rassmussen and Maurizio Martinelli published by Pugwash International in 2002. There is, however, as has been noted elsewhere, a difference between a ‘declaratory’ doctrine and an

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operational one; the latter can only be deduced from the information available on acquisitions and capabilities, statements of policy by albeit retired senior military men from Pakistan and such Western sources, presumably from intelligence inputs. On the basis of these, it would appear that Pakistan has adopted a policy of battlefield use of its nuclear weapons, a likely escalation of a conventional confrontation to a nuclear level, arrangements for rapid deployment which could entail predelegation to unit commanders in the event of a loss of communications, (which is what apparently happened at Salala recently when 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ISAF air attack on two border posts) and increasing risks of inadvertent or accidental launch. Ashley Tellis in his 2000 book on India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture has written of the ‘uncertainties’ which arise from “The severe motivational and cognitive biases that have historically afflicted Pakistan’s higher decision making institutions on matters of war and peace (which) raise fears about the prospect of extreme responses that might be precipitated in a crisis … These failures of rationality … could be compounded by exigencies of domestic politics, civil-military discord and biased and unreliable intelligence … ”This posture is one which appears to be based on the assumption that India will not permit the situation to escalate, by considering a limited and targeted use of, for example, air strikes.

Non-state actors At another level, non-state groups could be used either to provoke a military response from India, or, more dangerously, nuclear material could become available to these groups through theft or through insider linkages. The attack on Pakistan’s Mehran naval base was apparently enabled by insider collusion. At the same time the already friable situation could be exacerbated to intolerable levels if the state itself, following the trends within Pakistani society, becomes a theocratic intolerant state, bent on the establishment of a Caliphate in the region. The military and non-state groups are certain to have been emboldened by India

having been ‘deterred’ in 1999, following the Kargil attack, in 2001 after the attack on Parliament and Operation Parakram and more so, after 2008, after the attack on Mumbai. Would India react differently in the event of another Mumbai-type attack?

There is a need to slightly tweak our nuclear doctrine; the objective would be not to change our No First Use policy, but to revert to the language of the Draft doctrine on the question of retaliatory strikes - these should be ‘punitive’ rather than ‘massive’ as now exists. Massive retaliation would imply counter-value strikes and would lead to incorrect assumptions on the part of the adversary, whereas a punitive strike would retain the flexibility of options. In addition, in order to disillusion the adversary of our intent to retaliate, the control of the weapons should be placed squarely with the Strategic Forces Command There is no doubt that the current dialogue with Pakistan helps us to buy some time, though given the political instability in Pakistan and the split polity in India, the chances of it being sustainable or effective remain slight unless other signals are sent. There is a need to use this time to formulate other tools to reinforce the message behind the talks; a need for example, to start serious discussions with Pakistan on nuclear doctrines. It will be more difficult to get this accepted by the Pakistanis, particularly as the Pakistani military is at the moment more preoccupied with consolidating its somewhat frayed image within the country and dealing with the immediate challenges of dealing with the US and Pakistan’s ambitions in Afghanistan. Nonetheless this objective has to be followed with persistence and patience, with as much importance given to this objective as to our overall military preparedness. So far, there have been some discussions on nuclear CBMs with Pakistan, mainly at the Track II level, but they have been over-modest efforts and at the official level, the steps have been faltering and weak. Pakistan sees its nuclear weapons not only as essential to their security but as their ‘crown jewels’ almost as a symbol

of their nationhood. Without disputing their possession of these weapons, however, an increase in efforts to prevent any nuclear misadventure is urgent. At the same time, discussions on nuclear issues with China too, need to be started and again it will be a difficult task. The discussions need to be at high political levels or even with trusted back channels. Some Track II discussions have indeed taken place with China, but they remain sporadic and with little substance or follow-up.

Retribution Within our own establishment, there is a need to slightly tweak our nuclear doctrine; the objective would be not to change our No First Use policy, but to revert to the language of the Draft doctrine on the question of retaliatory strikes - these should be ‘punitive’ rather than ‘massive’ as now exists. Massive retaliation would imply counter-value strikes and would lead to incorrect assumptions on the part of the adversary, whereas a punitive strike would retain the flexibility of options. In addition, in order to disillusion the adversary of our intent to retaliate, the control of the weapons should be placed squarely with the Strategic Forces Command. The Pakistani and Chinese militaries have the ‘advantage’ of greater coherence and congruence in their weapons policies, as the military is in full control of the nuclear weapons programme, whereas our weapons remain under civil control even while the delivery vehicles may be with the military.

India is perhaps the only country that faces - or has ever faced - the challenges arising from having two nuclear neighbours, who closely cooperate with each others’ nuclear programmes and who maintain adversarial relations with her

To emphasise, these are signals to the adversary in this interim period, without any other change in our nuclear posture. There are bound to be many who will see this as too hawkish and too dangerous; they should then propose less dangerous methods of signalling. Others might see it as too little in terms of preparedness for retaliation, but the hope is to try and avoid the necessity of nuclear retaliation. The ultimate objective must always be to ensure that the chances of adversarial nuclear incidents are minimised and that nuclear weapons are never actually used in a war.

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limited wars

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. The key is the rapid fielding of overmatching conventional capabilities. These will undo Pakistan’s conventional deterrence dialectic and forge the realistic mind space for waging a Limited War. What should be the aim of such a Limited War? It should be simply to raise costs for asymmetric adventurism – to achieve deterrence by punishment. The aim should not be terrain oriented but force oriented. It should aim to bring the adversary’s strategic and operational reserves to battle in his own territory and degrade them seriously. It should aim at destroying / degrading his infrastructure of terror and decimating the ISI

Welcome address This is the text of the welcome Address delivered by the Executive Editor of the DSA at the inauguration of the Seminar on Limited Wars in South Asia. It sets out the issues for debate and discussion in perspective and flags the aspects that merit much deeper study and analysis. It highlights the crying need for India to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine for Limited Wars Against a Nuclear Backdrop. It also decries the, “one size fits all” approach of preparing for a general, total conflict that can cater for any lesser contingencies. The Chinese have emphatically recognised that the era of general wars is over and we need to prepare today for Local / Limited wars under conditions of nuclear symmetry.

LIMITED WARS

IN SOUTH ASIA: AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP

hris Gagne had theorised about the “Stability-Instability Paradox” that resulted from nuclear parity in South Asia. Stability at the nuclear level has led to endemic instability at the sub-conventional level. Nuclear parity has emboldened Pakistan to push the asymmetric warfare envelope to the hilt. India’s severe problem is its abject inability to conventionalise the conflict in response to Pakistan’s sub-conventional provocations and raise costs in a manner that would deter such adventurism. The problem stems primarily from India’s failure to field dominant war fighting capabilities that can generate a convincing edge in conventional military power. This alone would generate escalation options that can ensure escalation dominance. The primary need therefore is to field dominant war fighting capabilities, especially in terms of aero-space power at the earliest. This alone will generate the requisite asymmetry and provide the space for waging a conventional conflict in response to sub-conventional provocations. These over matching capabilities however have to be fielded in a realistic time frame. It is here precisely that we are witnessing dangerous delays and time and cost over-runs that have now become a cause for serious national concern. The problem in India is that consequent to nuclearisation, our political leadership seems to have convinced itself that any conventional response to asymmetric provocations is totally ruled out due to the risk of rapid escalation beyond the nuclear threshold. This has resulted in a marked decline in India’s military force usage profile. This force usage merits an empirical analysis. The graph below gives the number of divisions used by India in actual combat in each of her wars after independence.

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Thus from Independence to the 1962 India-China War watershed, India’s force usage was confined to the tactical level of 2-3 Divisions along with limited air power. This was primarily due to capacity constraints. India simply lacked the wherewithal to do anything more. India graduated to the level of Operational Art in the 1965 War when it fielded some 12 Divisions in Combat and its entire Western Air Command participated. It was however with the 1971 War that India demonstrated the

capacity and managerial skills for a quasi-total war with the synergistic employment of all three services. Some 19 Divisions of the Army and the entire Indian Air Force and Navy saw intensive combat. India’s force usage profile has shown a dramatic and precipitate decline post the era of recessed nuclear deterrence in 1987. With overt nuclearisation the dip in India’s Force usage profile was drastic. Kargil saw a regression back to the tactical level. In response to major Pakistani intrusions across the

LC India used only two Divisions. However it massed effects with Airpower and artillery and launched frontal attacks to push the enemy back through sheer attrition. India’s energetic response did disabuse the Pakistanis of their notions that with the advent of nuclear capability they had totally stymied any Indian conventional retaliation. However our failure to cross the LC or IB in 1999 convinced the Pak Army that their conventional deterrence had worked better than their nuclear

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limited wars

welcome address

deterrence. Peter Lavoy writes that by the time of Op Parakram 95 per cent of the weight of deterrence in Pakistani thinking had shifted to conventional deterrence instead of the nuclear level. Though India postured with its entire armed forces for over a year, its actual use of force in Op Parakram was zero. When Mumbai 26/11 happened India did not even posture forces. Its military response was again a resounding zero. This total inability to use military force to safeguard India’s national interests has dangerously eroded India’s deterrent image. If this is not restored post haste, India will encourage further asymmetric adventurism by Pakistan. This then is the crucial dilemma that India faces. How do we overcome the Stability-Instability Paradox in the post nuclear scenario? How do we respond to sub-conventional provocations by Pakistan? Post Kargil there was wide-ranging debate and discussion on the concept of Limited Wars in South Asia. Gen Malik, Air Cmde Jasjit Singh and the then Defence Minister had triggered this debate. Unfortunately it died out in three years.

The problem stems primarily from India’s failure to field dominant war fighting capabilities that can generate a convincing edge in conventional military power. This alone would generate escalation options that can ensure escalation dominance The Post Parakram angst led the Indian Army to formulate the Cold Start Doctrine. Unfortunately it was a land power centric doctrine that relied on the Army to initiate a Limited War by rapid and dispersed attacks by Battle groups from within the Defensive (or Pivot Corps) themselves. Land forces once launched generate a great deal of the fog of war. They cannot be easily disengaged or recalled. A limited conventional attack, hamstrung by fears of nuclear release, can invite a devastating full scale conventional response by the enemy. Quite obviously Air Power and even Naval Power are far more precise and flexible instruments to initiate a Limited War in response to asymmetric provocations. They can actualise deterrence by punishment instead of deterrence by denial. Air power led responses constitute precise and focused retaliation that is just and proportionate and puts the onus of further escalation on the enemy. The enemy’s responses can be exploited to set the stage for a Limited conflict. This brings us to the key issues that we will deliberate upon at this path breaking Seminar. • Is there space for a Limited War in South Asia between the spectral ends of all out Nuclear exchange and sub-conventional provocations? • If so what form should such a Limited War take? What would be the desired end state and objectives? What would be the primary limitations? What should be the modus operandi? What would be the means to ensure escalation dominance in such a conflict. How do we ensure conflict termination on our terms? • India’s Defence Ministry’s Annual Reports have stated that India would prepare for a general war

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(a la World War I or II) and such preparation could take care of any lesser contingency. This is a deeply flawed approach. Limited Wars have a different dialectic and need specific doctrine, preparation, force structures and training. The Chinese PLA is specifically preparing and structured for Local Wars or Limited Wars. • Keeping the above in view is there a need for India to enunciate a declaratory Doctrine for Limited War against a nuclear backdrop? What should be the essential contours of such a doctrine?

Quite obviously Air Power and even Naval Power are far more precise and flexible instruments to initiate a Limited War in response to asymmetric provocations. They can actualise deterrence by punishment instead of deterrence by denial

Spasmodic release psychosis The Seminal issue is psychological. Is there space for such Limited Wars between the spectral ends of Nuclear war and sub-conventional wars? There is a deeply entrenched psychosis amongst our political elite that even if a single soldier crosses the LC / IB it will lead to a spasmodic nuclear release. Is such a one step nuclear escalation ladder in South Asia logical or realistic? Did the Kargil war not rage for over two months with no sign of graduating to the nuclear level? The writings of senior Pakistani Generals like Lt Gen Sardar F S Lodhi and Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai clearly speak of a cautious and graduated approach that stretches all the way from demonstration nuclear explosions in one’s own territory to tactical nuclear strikes on our armoured spearheads, to an all out Counter value / Counter city exchange. The implied nuclear threshold is quite high, even as enunciated by Gen Kidwai (once a large part of Pakistan’s territory is captured or a large portion of its armed forces are destroyed). The simple fact is that if Pakistan genuinely believed in a one step nuclear escalation ladder, would it spend so much of its depleting treasure on such large conventional armed forces? Its primary deterrence mode is conventional and not nuclear.

Chris Gagne had theorised about the “StabilityInstability Paradox” that resulted from nuclear parity in South Asia. Stability at the nuclear level has lead to endemic instability at the sub-conventional level. Nuclear parity has emboldened Pakistan to push the asymmetric warfare envelope to the hilt. India’s severe problem is its abject inability to conventionalise the conflict in response to Pakistan’s sub-conventional provocations and raise costs in a manner that would deter such adventurism It is painful therefore that our political class seems to have mesmerised itself into complete impotence due to an irrational fear of a one step nuclear escalation ladder in South Asia. This spasmodic nuclear release thesis is a preposterous and ridiculous formulation. It is vital

that we rapidly overcome this policy paralysis and generate viable response options.

Generating conventional force asymmetry In 1990 India’s entire Capital-Military stock of Soviet Origin was due for an across the board replacement. The tragedy is that in 1990-91 the Indian economy came perilously close to collapse. India’s military buildup had to be postponed for over two decades. All the sub-conventional challenges have come in these two decades of conventional weakness. The tragedy is that our economy has now picked up considerable traction. Yet amazingly, our arms buildup is proceeding languidly, at a glacial pace that is supremely unconcerned with the ominous threats that we face in our region. It is now vital that we rapidly translate our growing economic power into usable, hard military power; that we rapidly field dominant, conventional war fighting capabilities. Such capabilities will generate response options that ensure escalation dominance. The key is the rapid fielding of overmatching conventional capabilities. These will undo Pakistan’s conventional deterrence dialectic and forge the realistic mind space for waging a Limited War. What should be the aim of such a Limited War? It should be simply to raise costs for asymmetric adventurism - to achieve deterrence by punishment. The aim should not be terrain oriented but force oriented. It should aim to bring the adversary’s strategic and operational reserves to battle in his own territory and degrade them seriously. It should aim at destroying / degrading his infrastructure of terror and decimating the ISI.

China China follows a no first use policy for nuclear weapons. Its conventional military strength gives it the confidence to largely limit combat to below the nuclear threshold. The PLAs view of local wars or limited Wars is limited largely in terms of non-use of nuclear weapons. The scope and scale of its limited conventional wars however, has been inordinately high. China threw in a million troops into the

Limited War in Korea and fought the US and its allies to a standstill over three years. In Vietnam it launched 25 Divisions. Against India, it could launch 34 Divisions via Tibet in just one season. It has generated the requisite infrastructural differential in Tibet. Unlike Pakistan, China is not likely to cross the nuclear threshold first unless there is a sudden and precipitate military reverse (this is unlikely given our current offensive capability in the Himalayas).

The scope and scale of its limited conventional wars however, has been inordinately high. China threw in a million troops into the Limited War in Korea and fought the US and its allies to a standstill over three years. In Vietnam it launched 25 Divisions. Against India, it could launch 34 Divisions via Tibet in just one season It is therefore time to kick-start a wide ranging debate on the vital subject of Limited Wars in South Asia that will be fought against a nuclear backdrop. We are indeed fortunate that to initiate these discussions – we have with us three former Service Chiefs from the Army, Navy and Air Force, each of whom have had hands on experience in the genre of Limited Wars. Gen Malik led the Indian Army in the Kargil War. Admiral Sushil Kumar led the Navy in that conflict and was Chairman Chiefs of Staff during the Op Parakram stand-off. Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major was the Air Chief during the 26/11 Mumbai carnage - when reportedly air strikes on terrorist targets were contemplated. We also have with us today Air Cmde Jasjit Singh who is perhaps our foremost theorist on Limited Wars. Above all to provide a civilian perspective to this debate we have our former Foreign Secretary Dr Kanwal Sibal, so well regarded for his vision and clear headed thinking. I am most grateful to our distinguished speakers for taking time off from their busy schedules to participate in this seminal Seminar. It is hoped that this will provoke a wide ranging debate and discussion within our country on this very vital theme.

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limited wars

Lt Gen Shantonu Choudhry (retd) The writer retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff in January 2005. He has served in Military Operations and Military Intelligence Directorates and has been an instructor in Defence Services Staff College. He is a widely read officer who writes regularly on national security.

By some guesstimate Pakistan has approximately 90 to 120 warheads with adequate number of delivery systems in the shape of aircraft and different varieties of nuclear capable missiles including the latest Shaheen I and Shaheen II. Besides they have developed / been gifted cruise missiles Babur and Raad which are nuclear capable. With enhanced capacity of production of weapon grade plutonium they are in a position to add four to six warheads every year to their stockpile. To these the latest vector which has been added is a Tactical Missile System Nasr which Pakistan claims is nuclear capable. This missile has been tested during a recent exercise by Pak forces. Obviously this also implies that they have in all likelihood, carried out miniaturisation of the nuclear systems to be fitted into The Nasr Missile which are claimed to be highly mobile and vehicle mounted

tactical nukes A highly cerebral former Vice Chief of the Army reflects upon the recent introduction of Nasr Tactical Nuclear Missiles by the Pak Army. He feels this constitutes a paradigm shift which calls for a rethinking of our nuclear and conventional warfighting Doctrines. Pakistan has enough land based missiles to carry out such a first strike by launching Tactical Nuclear Weapons, either as a demonstrative one or on a tactical target to inflict sufficient damage to own troops and concentrations which are purely military in nature and thus be termed as Counter Troop. In all likelihood such a strike would be on Indian soil but be termed as defensive. He feels that the current Indian doctrinal position of a full fledged Indian counter value response to such tactical nuclear use may not be viable. He recommends instead a matching response with own tactical warheads which will enable own conventional offensives to proceed apace.

n May 1998 India and Pakistan carried out nuclear explosions in their respective countries and in the face of great opprobrium of many countries declared themselves as new ‘nuclear weapon’ powers. Soon the think tanks of both countries started their deliberations to evolve nuclear doctrines suited to their strategic needs. India declared a policy of NO FIRST USE while Pakistan made no such commitment and remained ambiguous, with a stated position that India has a much larger conventional force and could overwhelm Pakistan Forces in a conventional war; hence Pakistan may / will resort to FIRST USE if needed. This in essence implied that India will not use nuclear weapons first but if the other side chose to do so India will retaliate fully to the extent necessary. Both sides since then steadily built up their nuclear stockpile and today by some educated estimates Pakistan has much larger a nuclear arsenal than India and in fact has emerged as the fifth largest country behind USA, Russia, China and France. This concept or doctrine remained valid till such time both sides had strategic nuclear weapons of large yields, ranging upwards of 20 Kiloton and above. This also meant that such weapons will essentially be COUNTER VALUE because of the inevitable collateral damage and not likely to remain confined to COUNTER FORCE. With induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons however by Pakistan, there is a paradigm shift which needs to be articulated. Tactical nuclear weapon refers to a

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weapon designed to be used in battlefield in a military situation as opposed to Strategic Weapons which are designed to menace large population. In other words, the former is meant to be used primarily against enemy forces while the latter counter value, meant for targets which may include civilian objectives like population centres. Tactical nuclear weapons were a large part of World’s nuclear stockpile during the Cold War and still constitute a sizeable number with USA and Russia and perhaps others.

A sizeable group of strategic thinkers maintain that THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON because once a nuclear weapon has been launched by any side regardless of its size and yield it is “open season” thereafter and the adversary is free to use its strategic weapons in a counter value mode It was Robert Mc Namara, the great strategic American thinker and once The Defence Secretary of USA who first articulated the concept of counter force strategy publicly in 1962 when he said that “Complete destruction of cities etc. would ultimately lead to a Mutually Assured Destruction situation. Instead cities can be held hostages; to destroy them at the outset was to sacrifice their principal value as object of leverage against the enemy. If War comes, USA will destroy enemy’s military forces and not his civilian population.” This concept led to the development of tactical nuclear weapons which enabled the power using

them to confine the proposed strike to enemy troops and material without a risk of major collateral damage to civilian population. Use of tactical nuclear weapons can be Counterforce or Demonstrative to show the will and determination of the user to use larger yield nuclear weapons against strategic targets if necessary. The deploying of tactical nuclear weapons is however fraught with risk of escalation quickly, particularly with the side having no self-imposed restrain of NO FIRST USE. Suspicion of the adversary’s intention can lead to an early launch of a weapon because of the syndrome of -“He thinks, we think, he thinks we think; he thinks we will attack, so he thinks we shall: SO WE MUST”. It is further accentuated if the releasing authority is delegated to subordinate commanders instead of being retained in the hands of a central authority.

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limited wars

tactical nukes

Pakistan nuclear doctrine Now let us look briefly at Pakistan nuclear arsenal. By some guesstimate Pakistan has approximately 90 to 120 warheads with adequate number of delivery systems in the shape of aircraft and different varieties of nuclear capable missiles including the latest Shaheen I and Shaheen II. Besides they have developed / been gifted cruise missiles Babur and Raad which are nuclear capable. With enhanced capacity of production of weapon grade plutonium they are in a position to add four to six warheads every year to their stockpile. To these the latest vector which has been added is a Tactical Missile System Nasr which Pakistan claims is nuclear capable. This missile has been tested during a recent exercise by Pak forces. Obviously this also implies that they have in all likelihood, carried out miniaturisation of the nuclear systems to be fitted into The Nasr Missile which are claimed to be highly mobile and vehicle mounted. Further, because of its comparatively smaller size and mobility would be easy to conceal which becomes vital in today’s battlefield which is becoming more and more transparent. This system, purely by definition would fall in the category of tactical nuclear weapon. Pakistan has stated without any ambiguity that their nuclear arsenal is solely India specific. Further they have repeatedly emphasised that they will resort to nuclear weapons

should their core interests be threatened which include a number of parameters of space, survival of military forces and economic blockade.

This concept or doctrine remained valid till such time both sides had strategic nuclear weapons of large yields, ranging upwards of 20 Kiloton and above. This also meant that such weapons will essentially be COUNTER VALUE because of the inevitable collateral damage and not likely to remain confined to COUNTER FORCE. With induction of tactical nuclear weapons however by Pakistan, there is a paradigm shift which needs to be articulated Now where that threshold lies is ambiguous to say the least. They also indicate through well considered leaks that this may be resorted to even if a limited war is started by India in response to whatever provocation that occurs. This has been written about by some noted military writers of Pakistan. There is also a double whammy that was first articulated by their Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg when he wrote in his book that there is also a degree of irrationality that creeps in Pakistan military mind when a threat emanates from India! All this is designed to deter India from undertaking even a limited war option. Even though Pakistan lacks a sea launched nuclear strike capability, they have enough land based missiles to carry out such a first strike by launching tactical nuclear weapons, either as a demonstrative one or on a tactical target to inflict sufficient damage to own troops and concentrations which are purely military in nature and thus be termed as Counter Troop. In all likelihood such a strike would be on Indian soil but be termed as defensive. To cater to the possibility of a massive counter strike by India which could, in the present context be ‘counter value’, either to inflict unacceptable losses or destruction of Pak nuclear capabilities,

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Pakistan must possess a credible second strike capacity. Hence the ever growing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan. Pakistan thinking on the subject which has been articulated in writing by them defines the nuclear threshold as under: • Pre-emptive response on major troop concentration to deter India to start its offensive. • Early response against Indian Forces when they cross into Pakistan. • A delayed response when Indian Forces have made major gains and threaten its hinterland. • Last is the situation where Pak war waging potential is about to be seriously degraded and their National Security is at stake.

India had the ability to respond to the launch of tactical nuclear weapons with a similar kind and show its resolve to go through, with the further option of larger yield nuclear weapons, Pakistan may have to pause and think about taking the next step. This may also enable India to continue with its conventional operation concurrently These when aired openly are meant to emphasise that starting from India’s forward move and concentration to actually launching an attack and thereafter to further expand and consolidate, Pakistan may resort to a nuclear strike across the whole spectrum of eventualities. Logically the first two or even three threshold responses are likely to be launched on Indian troops and armaments and may be confined to Tactical Nuclear Weapons delivered with precision to avoid any major collateral damage to civilian targets; this they argue would give them a morally defensible position.

Indian response Given our present doctrine our response if executed will be a major counter value strike which

may or may not be able to destroy Pakistan’s second strike capability. With our present arsenal such a strike, even if aimed at being confined to counterforce targets, will invariably have collateral damage to civilian population which would invite an attempted second strike by Pakistan. Can India be sure that her first strike would definitely destroy or deter Pakistan from launching their second strike? Perhaps not.

While the possibility of an armed conflict with China is not ruled out in a limited context, it is unlikely to spin off into a nuclear exchange. On the contrary, a limited war with Pakistan continues to be a distinct possibility. The professed nuclear doctrine of Pakistan indicates a strong likelihood of their resorting to tactical nuclear weapons in an early stage of the conflict. India needs to rethink its own nuclear doctrine and consider what steps need to be initiated to counter them It also must clearly be understood that to respond to Pakistan’s first strike, when confined to military targets by tactical nuclear weapons of comparatively low yield with precision, by a major counter value strike of high yield weapon(s),

will of necessity demand a very resolute political leadership who will not be deterred by the thought of massive losses (in the event of a second strike by Pakistan) to Indian civilian population and value targets of strategic import. Nor will the leadership allow itself to be persuaded and coerced by International pressures to withhold such a strike. Not carrying out a retaliatory nuclear strike(s) will not only be a political suicide by the ruling government, it will also be extremely demoralising to the nation and its armed forces. As opposed to the above scenario if India had the ability to respond to the launch of tactical nuclear weapons with a similar kind and show its resolve to go through, with the further option of larger yield nuclear weapons, Pakistan may have to pause and think about taking the next step. This may also enable India to continue with its conventional operation concurrently. The counter argument to this would be that there is no certainty that this will stop the escalation by both sides graduating to counter value strikes in an increasingly escalatory response. While there is no cut and dry or hard and fast answer to any of these questions one needs to ponder and discuss it threadbare

and not rubbish the option out of hand.

Conclusion The debate on the viability of retaining tactical nuclear weapons has been going on in USA, NATO and Russia for a long time. A sizeable school of thought has emphasised that tactical nuclear weapons cannot be an option in the post-cold war in the West. The probability of an all-out war in Europe has receded and there is a clamour by NATO members to dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Russia has not subscribed to this thought. The geopolitical situation has altered drastically is West but that is not the case in the Indian subcontinent where India faces two adversaries who are nuclear powers. While the possibility of an armed conflict with China is not ruled out in a limited context, it is unlikely to spin off into a nuclear exchange. On the contrary, a limited war with Pakistan continues to be a distinct possibility. The professed nuclear doctrine of Pakistan indicates a strong likelihood of their resorting to tactical nuclear weapons in an early stage of the conflict. India needs to rethink its own nuclear doctrine and consider what steps need to be initiated to counter them.

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limited wars

Lt Gen V R Raghavan PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (retd) The writer was India’s Director General of Military Operations from 1992 to 1994. He is currently a Director at the Delhi Policy Group. He has been a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, USA.

Osgood pointed out that while rapid escalation to win the war would probably risk wider conflict, gradual escalation would involve the United States in a protracted and costly war. He offered no solutions, but effectively pointed out the fallacy of getting into the Vietnam War without a clear purpose. Perhaps the most important analysis of Vietnam came from Harry G Summers. His main argument concerning limited war was that in Korea, while the United States limited its objectives, it did not limit its means to attain those objectives. It used every resource available other than nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in Vietnam, the United States reversed the equation and consequently paid the price of a long war and eventual defeat

DOCTRINAL CONTRADICTIONS A highly perceptive article by a former DGMO and well known Military analyst on the theme of Limited wars in South Asia. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decision making processes of the two countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

he status of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers with growing nuclear arsenals has raised the risks of a nuclear exchange between them, if the two countries engage in a large military conflict. The political leadership in both countries does not seem to have fully grasped the implications of nuclear weapons in relation to the ongoing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. This conflict could lead to a limited war, as it has triggered three wars in the past. The risks involved in fighting a limited war over the Kashmir issue and the potential for such a war to escalate into a nuclear exchange are at best inadequately understood and at worst brushed aside as an unlikely possibility. Despite this official stance, however, a close examination of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine reveals elements that could contribute to the rapid escalation of a limited war to include nuclear weapons. Strikingly, India and Pakistan have not revealed war-fighting doctrines for the post-1998 condition of nuclear weapons readiness. It is not clear, for example, what threats to its security would compel India to declare a state of war with Pakistan. There is also no indication of the circumstances that would induce Pakistan to seek a larger war with India. The political objectives that a limited war might seek to achieve have also not been articulated in official and public discourse in the two countries. This article examines the possibility of limited war between India and Pakistan and the potential of such a conflict triggering a nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could push each of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusses how such a war might be waged and the circumstances that would likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange. The doctrinal beliefs and decision making processes of the two

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Limited War and Escalation in

South Asia

countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiral towards a nuclear war. The article concludes that the probability of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in the event the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.

Nuclear dimensions to old conflicts India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and surprised everyone by the arguments they respectively advanced to justify the action. There was never any doubt that both countries had the capability to make nuclear weapons at short notice. It was already widely known that both countries possessed untested nuclear weapons. To justify its tests, India points to China as a nuclear neighbour with whom India fought a war in 1962. It is widely acknowledged that China has also assisted Pakistan with missile and nuclear weapons technology. The Indian government’s response to Pakistan’s nuclear tests, however, was indicative of a deeper belief. There was hope in New Delhi that with a declared nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan would no longer be concerned with the strategic asymmetry that had long prevailed in India’s favour. This line of analysis indicated that a nuclear Pakistan would find it possible to build a stable relationship with India. Nuclear weapons were expected to enhance stability by removing Pakistani anxieties about superior Indian conventional military capability. The Lahore initiative, launched during a February 1999 visit to Pakistan by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, was largely driven by the belief that the two nuclear states could develop a new relationship based on new confidence levels. The Lahore Declaration issued at the conclusion of that meeting by Vajpayee and

his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif affirmed that belief. It recognised, “that the nuclear dimension of the security of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries.” It pledged bilateral consultation on security concepts and nuclear doctrines with a view to develop confidence building measures in nuclear and conventional fields aimed at avoidance of conflict. The short but intense conflict in Kargil effectively destroyed the prospects of stability that the declaration had offered. More than that, Indian confidence in Pakistan’s ability to abide by mutually agreed accords was badly dented. New Delhi also realised that there was no consensus within Pakistan on normalising relations with India, since the military and the prime minister had taken contradictory actions after the Lahore meeting. The military conflict in Kargil commenced following Pakistani intrusions into Indian territory. Pakistan Army and armed irregular forces occupied areas across the Line of Control (LC) in Jammu and Kashmir stretching over 100 km. This infiltration was carried out covertly during the winter of 1998-1999. Preparations in Pakistan for these military intrusions would therefore have commenced immediately after the nuclear tests of May 1998.

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The conclusions drawn in New Delhi from the Kargil experience are significant. Instead of seeking a stable relationship on the basis of nuclear weapons capabilities, Pakistan used nuclear deterrence to support aggression. Kargil indicated that armed with nuclear weapons, Pakistan had increased confidence that it could raise the conflict thresholds with India. It demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks in conflict escalation. Instead of seeking nuclear stability, Indian analysts concluded, Pakistan demonstrated a greater propensity to sustain instability, by seeking a military conflict. In short, the neutralisation of military asymmetry by nuclear weapons had made Pakistan seek higher levels of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. The stability-instability paradox generated by nuclear weapons had come into play. The end of the military conflict in Kargil caused political turmoil in Pakistan. Dissension surfaced in Pakistan regarding who should be held responsible for the military embarrassment of Kargil. The military leadership in Pakistan felt that they were denied a victory, as Prime Minister Sharif agreed to a withdrawal of Pakistani forces in his July 4, 1999, meeting with US President Bill Clinton in Washington. This led to the military coup in Pakistan.

In response to Pakistan raising the level of violence and abandonment by the Pakistani military leadership of the Lahore Declaration, the Indian government declared in January 2000 that it did not rule out a war with Pakistan. In statements made almost simultaneously, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes and Indian Chief of Army Staff General V P Malik declared that India would not hesitate to fight a limited war with Pakistan, regardless of its nuclear weapons capability General Pervez Musharraf during the spring of 1999, just months after the Lahore Declaration - who would lead the coup, said the Lahore Declaration did not serve Pakistan’s interests, as the Indian

Prime Minister never wanted to discuss Kashmir. The installation of the military government in Pakistan has been followed by a substantial rise in violence and killings in Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan-based armed militants. There was also December 1999 hijacking of an Indian airliner, in return for whose safe return India was forced to release individuals imprisoned for terrorist actions in Jammu and Kashmir. After being released these individuals returned to Pakistan and rejoined the armed conflict. These developments further reinforced the conclusion in New Delhi that Pakistan was deliberately raising the level of conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, assuming that nuclear weapons would effectively deny India the option of a military response.

view believe that hopes for a stable, united Pakistan that seeks a peaceful relationship with India are unlikely to be met in the near future. As one commentator declared in late 2000: It is now conceivable that India could take the conflict into Pakistani territory, first covertly and then overtly, with the explicit goal of hastening the process of Pakistan’s disintegration.

Nuclear reality

Overall, nuclear weapons have had an adverse impact on the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan. The threshold of conflict has gone up in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan-based militant groups have expanded their operations into other parts of India. Bomb blasts and killings have occurred as far as in Tamil Nadu, in southern India. Even New Delhi has experienced such blasts on occasion. Threats have also been made of armed action against the Indian political leadership. Kargil, increased violence, attempts to derail the peace process and continued Pakistani support for militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir had created an explosive situation. These developments prompted calls in India for action against Pakistan. Some circles in India now argue that Pakistan’s problems of governance, its economic decline and internecine conflicts in its society have made it vulnerable. Those who take this

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The combination of escalating conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, the belief in Pakistan that nuclear weapons have constrained Indian response options and the belief in India that a limited war against Pakistan can be fought and won despite the presence of nuclear weapons, is, to say the least, a potentially dangerous condition.

The Indian belief in limited war is counterbalanced by Pakistani belief that the low intensity war being conducted in Jammu and Kashmir is cushioned against the risk of a larger military response by Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. The linkage between nuclear risk reduction and the Kashmir issue is a recurring theme in Pakistani policy statements. The suggestion that nuclear risks would be left unattended until the Kashmir issue is resolved is clearly an attempt at leveraging nuclear weapons to compel a settlement. In response to international pressures, India and Pakistan have both committed themselves to a series of actions aimed at maintaining nuclear discipline. They have declared a moratorium on further nuclear tests; committed themselves to not deploying nuclear weapons; pledged not to transfer nuclear technology to third countries; expressed support for negotiating a regime to restrict the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; and stated they plan on continuing a dialogue to resolve bilateral issues. Pakistan has urged the establishment of a strategic restraint regime with India. For its part, India has pointed to its no first use commitment and its desire to limit its nuclear capability to a minimum and credible deterrent. These commitments, however, do not in any way hinder either side

from carrying the ongoing Kashmir conflict into the other’s territory. The danger is also not reduced by Pakistan blurring the distinction between conventional military conflict and sub-conventional conflicts through the use of irregular forces. It was reported last year that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is vastly superior to India’s in quantitative and qualitative terms. This report produced a response in India that Indian deterrent capabilities need to be projected more effectively. Another report, from the Jane’s defence analysis firm, confirmed this point in more specific terms. It highlighted the main difference in the perspectives placed on nuclear weapons in the two countries. According to this report, while India does not view nuclear weapons as possessing military utility, Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities have been more fully incorporated into its military strategy. Pakistan believes its nuclear weapons give it the option of strongly supporting insurgency in Kashmir. Doubts and mistrust combined with disinformation will force both countries to seek a deterrence advantage. The stability of deterrence between the two countries runs the risk of being affected by the uncertainty produced by clashing views about who is “ahead.” Nuclear reality between India and Pakistan is therefore of an uncertain quality. It is neither based on deterrence stability, nor on a desire to seek it. Pakistan appears to seek continued deterrence instability as a means of pressure aimed at achieving its desired political outcome in Kashmir. This uncertainty sheds light on the debate between nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists. The optimists believe that the spread of nuclear weapons will reduce and may even eliminate the risk of future war between India and Pakistan. Nuclear pessimists are convinced that nuclear weapons will lead to crises, accidents and even nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Despite repeated assertions by political leaders in the two countries about the improbability of war, the reality of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan is one of considerable instability.

Limited war After the 1999 Kargil conflict, India introduced the notion of a limited war which can be fought and won despite nuclear deterrence. Indian Defence Minister Fernandes spoke on January 5, 2000, at a seminar, “Challenges of Limited War: Parameters and Options,” organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi. In his address Fernandes stated: They [Pakistan] held out a nuclear threat to us on May 31, 1999 and did it again yesterday without absorbing the real meaning of nuclearisation, that it can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not conventional war. … The issue is not that war has been made obsolete by nuclear weapons … but that conventional war remained feasible. Fernandes repeated this view at another seminar conducted by the IDSA later in January 2000. At the same seminar, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Malik, added to this perspective by saying limited war can erupt any time. He went on to say that India would have to remain operationally prepared for the entire spectrum of war - from proxy war to an all out war … Strategy adopted for Kargil, including the Line of Control constraints, may not be applicable in the next war. In all limited wars the only commonality would be the national aim and objectives. These statements raised serious doubts about the understanding of the limited war concept amongst the Indian leadership. As Raja Mohan pointed out at the time, such statements revived concerns

about South Asia as a nuclear flash point. Mohan concluded: “It is in India‘s interest to elaborate in greater detail, its compulsions in adopting a strategy to fight a limited war and commitments to maintain nuclear restraint.” The ill-informed references to limited war by Fernandes and General Malik also drew a sharp response from other Indian strategic analysts”. As if in response to criticism about Indian limited war policy, in October 2000 the IDSA elaborated on the meaning of limited war as understood by the Indian leadership. The IDSA journal, Strategic Analysis, carried an article by IDSA Director Jasjit Singh on the subject. Singh argued that “it is necessary to define … what we mean by limited war. The context is of regular military operations by a state against regular military of another state.” The article then recommended that air power should be the primary means of forcing results in a limited war, owing to its capability to strike targets of critical importance at will. Superiority in the air, then, would be the key factor in deterring limited war. This explanation, however, creates more questions than it answers about the belief that a war between two nuclear adversaries can be kept limited, without a mutual understanding to do so. Studies during the Cold War and analysis of results from the many war games conducted by other nuclear powers have indicated that such restraint would be a near impossibility. Even in the much smaller 1999 Kargil conflict, India started moving its major military formations towards their battle locations and its navy had

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put out to sea westwards towards Pakistan. In response to these steps, Pakistan had warned of a nuclear response, if the conflict widened. The less than limited conflict in Kargil displayed the potential to turn a small war into a wider military conflict with the potential to reach the nuclear threshold.

Nuclear reality between India and Pakistan is therefore of an uncertain quality. It is neither based on deterrence stability, nor on a desire to seek it. Pakistan appears to seek continued deterrence instability as a means of pressure aimed at achieving its desired political outcome in Kashmir India and Pakistan fought three wars before they declared themselves nuclear weapon states. These wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971 were fought with the full military power available to the two nations. They were fought without the appellation of either total or limited or general wars. The overt introduction of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent in 1998, quickly followed by the conflict in Kargil in 1999, forced Indian political and military leaders to assess the new dynamic of conflict with Pakistan. Indian leaders believe that in the Kargil conflict, Pakistan demonstrated its willingness to test the limits of military restraint placed on India by nuclear weapons. From this perspective, Pakistan worked on the assumption that India would not be able to resort to a general war in the face of a possible nuclear retaliation. The Indian response to Pakistani action in Kargil, which included not crossing the Line of Control and consequently accepting very high casualties in clearing the Kargil heights of militants, may have reinforced this Pakistani belief. The Indian political and military leadership, on the other hand, have obviously convinced themselves that a war can be fought and won without crossing the nuclear threshold. The assumptions behind these beliefs are not only unclear but they also underestimate the risks of nuclear escalation inherent in an Indian-Pakistani military conflict. While there is a divide between military contingency planning and political authorisation for the

implementation of such plans, there is no assurance that restraint will prevail in a future conflict under conditions in which one side feels forced to act in the face of grave provocation or military losses as in Kargil.

The nature of limited war At this point, it is worthwhile to examine the concept of limited war as it has been traditionally understood. The Indian understanding of the issue is better grasped in the light of the substantial body of thought on limited war that appeared at the height of the US-Soviet nuclear stand-off during Cold War. This literature on limited war grew in the aftermath of the Korean War. The United States had entered that war with the predominant experience of total war. Its military doctrine was based on total victory. However, in Korea, the United States found that neither the use of total force nor total victory were feasible. The arrival of nuclear weapons had changed the nature of war. Four major themes concerning limited war emerged from the debate that followed and continued into the 1960s. First, there was the question of limited objectives. Bernard Brodie, in widely quoted writings, made the essential argument that weapons of unlimited capacity had made it necessary to find some way to fight without using the full military power which was then at hand. He went on to add that regardless of the need to limit warfare, it would be impossible to do so, unless both Americans and Russians agreed on the concept of war limitation. Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger both defined limited war as having limited political objectives. They argued that local wars could stay limited if both adversaries had well-defined political objectives. The second theme in the limited war debate concerned possible limits on resources to be applied in war. Should war be fought for unlimited objectives or for limited objectives with unlimited resources? The first was unlikely to gain victory as in Korea and the other was counter-productive in the response it might evoke from a nuclear adversary.

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The third theme concerned the role of bargaining with the adversary, in arriving at limits for limited war. This point implied that either before, or certainly during the limited war, the two sides would have to settle on the limits to which they would pursue their objectives. One of the earliest writers on the subject was Thomas Schelling. He made the persuasive argument that the limiting points or “saliencies” should be distinct and known to the adversaries. Examples would be geographical limits or on the kind of weapons to be used. The fourth theme concerned the relationship between limited war as the instrument and the desire to achieve the goals of arms control. Kissinger’s famous comment that limited war provides a middle road between stalemate and total victory was a dominant theme for some time. A critique of this thinking came from Albert Wohlstetter. He argued that fighting a limited war significantly increases the likelihood of total war through escalation and he cautioned against the use of nuclear weapons. Limited war, he thought, was neither likely to be short nor small. It could prove protracted and require the mobilisation of significant national resources. This pattern would tend to escalate the conflict into unpredictable dimensions and generate an escalatory spiral leading to a nuclear exchange. In the 1970s, after the Vietnam War ended, ideas about limited war again surfaced. Robert Osgood believed winning the Vietnam War was beyond US capabilities. Osgood felt that the perceived national security needs of the United States became more sweeping and generalised than US vital interests warranted … The doctrine of limited war not only exaggerated the efficacy and underestimated the costs [of conflict] … but also exaggerated the US security interests and the nature of threat to them. Osgood pointed out that while rapid escalation to win the war would probably risk wider conflict, gradual escalation would involve the United States in a protracted and costly war. He offered no solutions, but effectively pointed out the fallacy

of getting into the Vietnam War without a clear purpose. Perhaps the most important analysis of Vietnam came from Harry G Summers. Summers’ main argument concerning limited war was that in Korea, while the United States limited its objectives, it did not limit its means to attain those objectives. It used every resource available other than nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in Vietnam, the United States reversed the equation and consequently paid the price of a long war and eventual defeat.

Indo-Pak limited war

objectives will certainly limit the war substantially. Second, geographic limits on the war zone can limit the war to specific areas. Third, war can also be limited by placing restrictions on the type of weapons to be used. Such a limit would reassure the adversary about controlling possible escalation. Fourth, a time limit can be placed on the war by stating that military operations can be called off when the adversary complies with certain demands. It is worth noting that the wars that India and Pakistan fought in the past exhibited, with one exception, none of these limits. The exception was India’s terminating the 1971 war immediately after Pakistan’s forces laid down arms in Bangladesh. In previous wars, India has reserved and exercised the right to take the battle into Pakistani territory in response to an attack on Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Air Force has attacked targets deep into Pakistan as part of that policy just as Indian strike corps attacked and seized territory in Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh provinces. All available resources, including the navy, were employed in the previous Indian-Pakistani wars. All weapon systems were utilised. Neither country imposed a time ceiling on the war. Neither side threatened civilian populations while the wars were fought. A significant factor in these conflicts, however, was that neither country posed an existential threat to the survival of the other. The overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan has altered the context of military conflict between them. It has substantially raised the threat of a nuclear conflict, if another war is fought by the two countries.

Limited wars can be limited in more than one way. First, setting limits on political and military

How would the political and military leadership in India and Pakistan plan and conduct limited

Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger both defined limited war as having limited political objectives. They argued that local wars could stay limited if both adversaries had well-defined political objectives That raises the question of how to define victory in limited war. If victory is negotiable, constraints would have to be placed on the operational needs of the military. These constraints can have serious consequences, if limited military operations are perceived as weakness by the opponent. Such constraints can also lead to ineffective application of military force. On the other hand, the idea of limited war reflects the principle that war continues to be an instrument of policy, in which the primacy of political purpose remains paramount. Victory in such circumstances cannot therefore be defined in military terms, even as the military remains the more visible and dramatic instrument of policy. The fact remains, however, that limited war is not yet a fully developed idea, even at the turn of the 21st century. In many countries, the military does not like the restrictions imposed on military operations, while political leadership has few ideas on how a given conflict can be kept limited. The reality of limited war is that the limits set on it make it difficult to gain a military victory and war termination without a victory closely resembles a defeat.

war against each other? Can they unilaterally limit political and operational objectives? The answers to these questions remain uncertain, as one side’s limited political and military objectives could be viewed as unlimited and unacceptable by the other. If a nuclear first strike from Pakistan is to be avoided after a limited war is begun, how are Indian political and military saliencies to be conveyed? If Pakistan wishes to avoid escalating a limited conflict with a nuclear strike, how would it cope with an outcome which is militarily or politically unfavourable? Indicating the geographical limits of war would detract greatly from operational needs, while identifying political limits will allow the adversary to better plan his response. Under these circumstances, how would victory be quantified in political and military terms? In Kargil, a conflict on much smaller scale than a limited war, India was able to define its geographic salience by announcing that its forces would not cross the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. That immediately placed serious limits on operational plans. It forced a high casualty rate on the Indian Army. A number of former senior military officers were publicly critical of the government’s self-imposed limitation at the cost of military casualties. This criticism placed the government under pressure and it started moving its major combat forces to operational locations, as preparation for widening the conflict, if it became necessary. That in turn placed the Pakistani military leadership under pressure. The escalation ladder had thus been placed against the wall. It was fortuitous that the Kargil conflict ended when it did. It is true that the conflict ended by a

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combination of graduated military measures taken by India, which placed the Pakistani leadership in an increasingly untenable position. But it was also equally likely that a beleaguered Pakistani leadership could have perceived the situation as one warranting extreme decisions.

How to define victory in limited war? If victory is negotiable, constraints would have to be placed on the operational needs of the military. These constraints can have serious consequences, if limited military operations are perceived as weakness by the opponent. Such constraints can also lead to ineffective application of military force At the moment, both official pronouncements and published doctrine fail to clarify how the two sides will limit a future conventional war. There is also no perceptible change from past patterns in Indian and Pakistani approaches to fighting a conventional war. The way the two countries fought previous wars throws some light on how any future conflicts might unfold and suggests how they could escalate to the nuclear threshold.

The pattern The phrase “offensive defence” sums up the approach India adopted in past wars with Pakistan. This approach involved a strong defensive line in areas of importance, with adequate forces to break up enemy forces that might manage to penetrate the defenses. These formed the dissuasive elements of the force structure. They comprised infantry divisions for control of territory, mechanised infantry for shifting positional operations like counter-penetration and some tank elements for counter-attack operations. In addition, substantial forces have been created that are equipped to conduct offensive operations in enemy territory. These consist of armoured forces and supporting infantry, with strong artillery support. The Indian Air Force favours the Second World War approach of winning the air war before coming in to fully support the ground war. As the official Indian Air Force doctrine

states, “in the doctrine of the Air Force, the fight for control of air or air superiority gets first priority in every case.” According to some Indian defence analysts, this doctrine reflects “conceptual confusion between ‘favourable air situation’ and ‘air superiority.’” The sequential development in Indian Air Force doctrine of air operations through the ladder of counterair operations, interdiction operations and finally in support of ground operations has led to inadequate synergy in the conduct of war. It has also meant the Indian Air Force conducting operations deep inside Pakistan, while land forces objectives were more limited. The basis of Indian Army’s planning is to “await in a defensive posture the start of a war by Pakistan. After Pakistan … had launched its offensive, a multipronged Indian offensive would be launched.” Pakistan has fought previous wars with India by taking to the offensive first. These offensives were led by its air force striking at Indian airfields. Its overall plan always included a substantial military offensive in Jammu and Kashmir. This offensive included both conventional military offensives and large-scale infiltration by irregular forces into and behind Indian positions. Pakistan also launched airborne forces behind Indian lines in an attempt to disrupt communications and command facilities. Seizing territory was and remains the criteria for success. In the scenario of a future Indian-Pakistani war, a victory for Pakistan would mean the seizure of land and it would be logical for the Pakistan Air Force to wrap its operations around the land plan. In all its wars with India, there was a major operational emphasis by Pakistan on severing communications links between Jammu and Kashmir to rest of India. The Indian response, not unexpectedly, was both violent and extensive. The emphasis on a ground offensive defines the operational doctrine of both India and Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan used its air power to support the ground offensive while the Indian Air Force used its superiority to cripple Pakistani military facilities, including air bases deep inside Pakistan. The defining emphasis on

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war over Kashmir. It would not be entirely incorrect therefore to infer, that the “ugly stability” of 1997 has been replaced by an “ugly instability” that rests much more openly on nuclear weapons.

Decision-making dynamics

offense by both sides is the central pattern of their previous wars. This pattern is unlikely to change in a future war. Indian plans are firmly based on taking a future war into all Pakistani territory, even if the conflict commences in Jammu and Kashmir. This almost existential response reflects both the military and political principles of Indian planning. Since 1965, when Indian forces crossed the international border to take the war into Pakistan’s Punjab province, an attack on Jammu and Kashmir has invoked the doctrine of an Indian military response against Pakistani territory outside Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine of first use in the event of Indian conventional attack explicitly anticipates this eventuality. If vital Pakistani territory were taken by an Indian offensive, Pakistan could retaliate by initiating first use of nuclear weapons. Indian restraint in not crossing the Line of Control during the Kargil conflict reflects Indian awareness of this nuclear reality. As a result, considering the need to avert a nuclear first strike from Pakistan, future Indian operational doctrine can be expected to aim at seizing vital Pakistani territory in the earliest phase of a future war, before a Pakistani decision to escalate could be made. This strategy could, however, inadvertently encourage a more rapid - and possibly less considered - nuclear response from Pakistan. Indian attempts to avoid a nuclear attack from Pakistan, by attaining military objectives with a powerful and rapid offensive, could in fact hasten a Pakistani nuclear response. Wars are not generally started casually or by a cavalier attitude about the possible consequences.

This observation applies equally to India and Pakistan. The possibility of a war has been dismissed by Indian and Pakistani political leaders, as discussed above. It has also been discounted by some outside observers. In a 1997 study of stability in South Asia, RAND analyst Ashley Tellis characterised the situation as one of “ugly stability.” The RAND study based its conclusion on the inability of the two countries to obtain a decisive outcome through a conventional military conflict. Nevertheless, the study cautioned that “ugly stability” could collapse if Pakistan were affected by an internal power struggle and if the Indian quest for great power status were to make good progress. This situation could “unnerve Pakistan and cause it to initiate military action - as it did in 1965 - to secure out-standing territorial claims before it is too late.” The study also noted what it termed the “implausible” possibility of India embarking on a war to “solve the Pakistan problem.” The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests were conducted in 1998 and the Kargil conflict commenced just months afterwards. Pakistan apparently intended to bring about a situation which would force the Indians to negotiate from an unfavourable military position. Pakistan’s argument that its operations in Kargil were a response to Indian actions in the Siachen glacier area was no more than an after-thought, voiced only after Pakistan was forced to give up on Kargil. The Kargil conflict led to the assumption of power by the military in Pakistan, led by officers who had planned and conducted the Kargil operation. Violence levels went up in Jammu and Kashmir in 1999 and Indian political and military leaders declared a readiness to fight a limited

In an unstable conflict situation, decision-making processes assume a special importance. The processes and assumptions that influence decision-making can be critical elements in conflict management and escalation control. Decision processes in India and Pakistan operate on different premises. In India, decision-making has undergone a shift from a collegial and consensus-based process to decisions arrived at by a small group of individuals based in the prime minister’s office. The decisions to conduct the nuclear test of 1974, authorise nuclear weapons related research during the 1980s and embark on an integrated missile programme were all made without forging a national consensus. Former Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh had described the national security decision-making apparatus as a transitional system and had said he would prefer an institutionalised decision making arrangement. While political control over military matters in India remains a reassuring fact, the growing tendency towards major decisions being taken by the more risky individual, rather than the more considered collective process, is cause for concern. Decision-making in Pakistan has traditionally been influenced by the burden of dealing with a stronger and larger adversary. The “pathology of decision-making” in Pakistan has been largely influenced by the military. When the Pakistani military is in power it has tended to ignore or brush aside advice based on political and international realities. Past experience has shown that when the military leadership in Pakistan is in full political control of the country it has preferred to choose the military offensive even in a situation of a military asymmetry. Military governments are more likely to favour war irrespective of the prevailing strategic situation. In

the military-dominated government of Pakistan, the absence of strong representation from other key government departments, particularly the foreign and domestic ministries, gives the central decision makers the illusion that they are operating without political limits. In addition, decision-making in Pakistan has not been free from “cultural discounting.” The phenomenon of cultural discounting describes the belief that the adversary is culturally inferior and therefore can be defeated despite his real quantitative advantage. That Pakistan’s military has taken decisions based on such assumptions has been convincingly demonstrated. One example of a similar analysis from Pakistan demonstrates this point. In his article “Four Wars and One Assumption,” former Pakistani cabinet minister, biographer and columnist Altaf Gauhar, wrote that Pakistan’s four wars with India, including the one in Kargil, were “conceived and launched on one assumption: that the Indians are too cowardly and ill-organised to offer any effective military response.” How India would wage a limited war against Pakistan is not explained in either official statements or in the analysis put out by the quasi-governmental think tanks like IDSA. As one commentator put it, Indian restraint in the Kargil conflict was at least in part dictated by the reading that Pakistan would not now take a humiliating defeat of the kind it experienced in 1971, without resorting to desperate measures including the possible use of … nuclear weapons capability. The reality of a post-nuclear India … has come to roost. On the other hand, Indian restraint has been tested to the extreme. The talk of a limited war by Indian leaders is therefore not to be lightly dismissed. India would like to limit a future war with Pakistan to the level of conventional military forces. It must therefore secure its political and military objectives in a rapidly conducted operation, without giving Pakistan the opportunity for nuclear retaliation. This approach would require a proactive military operation to seize carefully considered territorial objectives. The traditional approach of bringing the adversary’s forces to battle and destroying them in a long series of battles would be counterproductive

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DOCTRINAL CONTRADICTIONS

for India under current circumstances. The territory seized must be of critical importance to Pakistan. The military offensive to obtain that outcome would have to be extremely powerful. These two Indian requirements are likely to combine to provoke a violent response from the Pakistani high command. If the Indian offensive gains ground in critical areas, Pakistan would be forced to exercise the nuclear option or the threat of its use.

Decision processes in India and Pakistan operate on different premises. In India, decision-making has undergone a shift from a collegial and consensus-based process to decisions arrived at by a small group of individuals based in the prime minister’s office The Indian-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971 offer examples that confirm the possibility of the nuclear option coming into play sooner rather than later in a limited war. In 1965, the Indians launched an offensive into Pakistan’s Punjab province. The Indian forces reached within miles of the major metropolis of Lahore only hours after the commencement of the offensive. If that were to occur now, Pakistan’s military high command would be faced with a very serious dilemma. In military terms, the more time the Indian forces had to consolidate, the greater would be the difficulty of dislodging them. An offensive by Pakistan elsewhere into Indian territory would weaken the defence around Lahore. The Punjabi heartland of Pakistan having been breached and the Indian offensive threatening to make deeper inroads, recourse to a nuclear strike would become a necessity. In political terms, the leadership would be under immense pressure to retaliate quickly. International pressures to broker a ceasefire would mount by the hour. A nuclear strike would seem to offer many advantages to a beleaguered Pakistani leadership. As this scenario shows, an escalation from a conventional to a nuclear war, within one or two days of the outbreak of war, is not implausible. In the 1971 Indian-Pakistani War, an Indian heliborne and ground forces offensive succeeded in making a small but meaningful thrust into

Pakistan’s desert sector towards Rahimyar Khan. If a larger armoured and mechanised forces thrust had been made in this weakly defended “waist” of Pakistan, there was a risk of the country being strategically split. Pakistan could certainly have used nuclear weapons in this situation, had they then been available. It can be argued, of course, that the overt presence of nuclear weapons now precludes such offensives being launched. On the other hand, from the Indian perspective, the post-Kargil need to engage in limited war could motivate even stronger and more decisive thrusts to forestall Pakistani attempts to manipulate the nuclear threshold. It is difficult to determine which dynamic - the attraction of a conventional offensive, or the fear of a potential nuclear riposte - might actually prevail in such circumstances. The high probability of a rapid escalation from conventional to nuclear engagement cannot, however, be ignored. A transition from the ongoing low intensity war between India and Pakistan, to a limited war and then quickly to a nuclear exchange is a possibility. This scenario has been anticipated by a recent Pakistani analysis. The presence of extremist militant organisations in Pakistan could create added pressures on the Pakistani military high command. The presence of armed militant groups in Pakistan and their influence in the military is a factor that can contribute to escalation. As one Pakistani analyst said: the principal danger lies in escalation of low intensity war into a nuclear conflict. This is a serious possibility. On the Pakistan side this threat has a deeper connection with militants, who are a smaller group but enjoy greater support in the country’s armed forces.

Nuclear doctrines As noted earlier, India and Pakistan have both listed a number of measures they intend taking to ensure nuclear stability. They have each declared a moratorium on further testing; asserted that they intend to have no more than a minimum nuclear deterrent; committed themselves to not deploying nuclear weapons; pledged not to export nuclear technology; and said they will join negotiations at the Conference on

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

Disarmament on stopping further production of fissile material. Pakistan has made it abundantly clear that it will use nuclear weapons, if its survival is threatened by Indian military action. While Pakistan has not brought out an official document defining a nuclear doctrine, the essential elements of a doctrine can be surmised from various Pakistani writings on the subject. India has stated that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but will respond with massive nuclear retaliation if nuclear weapons are used against it. Its draft doctrine states, “any nuclear attack on India or its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons, to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.” In doctrinal terms, the critical difference between the two countries rests on the question of first and second nuclear strikes. India will do everything to maintain a second strike capability. If Pakistan must use nuclear weapons first to halt an Indian offensive on its territory and hope to avoid an Indian nuclear strike, it will be faced with extremely difficult choices. It will either have to be ready to bear the impossibly high costs of a massive Indian nuclear response, or limit its own nuclear strike to Indian forces on Pakistani territory. The collateral costs of the second option would also be heavy and would still not entirely guarantee Indian restraint. India’s challenge in engaging Pakistan in a limited war would be to ensure that Pakistan does not face circumstances in which a nuclear strike becomes necessary. The circumstances under which Pakistan would use nuclear weapons would therefore be dependent on the military and territorial losses it can sustain. The losses Pakistan can sustain would be of two kinds: actual losses as a consequence of combat and potential losses as a consequence of Indian nuclear retaliation which would follow a Pakistani nuclear strike on India. It is difficult to believe that if India were to receive a nuclear strike from Pakistan that it would refrain from retaliation in deference to international pressure or promises of reparations. Pakistan’s decision on a nuclear strike would be heavily influenced by its military hierarchy and the decision-making dynamics discussed above. The dangers of escalation and the initiation

of a spiral of negative action and reaction thus become apparent. Pakistan has not yet announced a nuclear doctrine. However, on the subject of fighting a war when the adversaries have nuclear capability, there is a body of published Pakistani opinion written by senior military and civilian officials. Perhaps the most credible assessment has come in an article by three experienced Pakistani policymakers. In an article published in The News on October 5, 1999 - a few days before the military government assumed power - they defined the red line that would trigger a Pakistani nuclear strike against India. One of the authors, Abdul Sattar, became the Foreign Minister in the military-led government. The article listed three occasions before 1998 when nuclear deterrence, as applied by Pakistan, produced a restraining effect on India. The implication of this statement is that a nuclear threat was issued by Pakistan, through explicit or implicit means. The authors argued that a minimum deterrent would be adequate for Pakistan and said it need not enter an arms race with India. The authors dismissed India’s no-first-use declaration as, a cost-free exercise in sanctimonious propaganda. Renunciation only of first use of nuclear weapons seems like a subterfuge to camouflage the intention to resort to the first use of conventional weapons. They went on to define the condition in which Pakistan would use nuclear weapons as a situation when, “the enemy launches a general war and undertakes a piercing attack threatening to occupy large territory or communication junctions.” Under these conditions, they concluded, “weapons of last resort would have to be involved.” These views indicate the Pakistani tendency to extend the nuclear deterrent to different levels of military conflict. As was demonstrated in Kargil, the threat of a nuclear strike would be held out at the very beginning of small scale conflict. The threat would be projected as part of a plan, which would attempt to gain political advantage through military action in Jammu and Kashmir. The threat of use of nuclear weapons would be exploited to contain a larger military response from India. This strategy

would be in keeping with plans for the Pakistani nuclear deterrent to be used in influencing the outcome of armed political conflict. Once war is joined and major operations are begun, conditions for a nuclear first strike by Pakistan are clearly spelled out by a senior military analyst. In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defences or has already breached the main defence line causing a major set-back to the defences which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilise the situation. India’s superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s preferred option to escalate quickly to the nuclear level is indicated by another Pakistani analyst. “It [Pakistan] should go for a one-rung escalation ladder knitted-in tightly with a highly cohesive state-of-the-art tactical conventional military. This means that it must acquire sophisticated conventional technology at the tactical, theatre level while maintaining a posture of one-rung escalation in case of all-out strategic war. This becomes necessary because Pakistan lacks spatial depth and should not needlessly waste its resources in a static conventional war.”

Deterrence stability The Indian official position, indicating a readiness to fight a limited war, is an attempt to impose a higher military and political price on Pakistan without giving it cause for commencing a nuclear exchange. There is, however, no certainty that Pakistan’s response to this strategy can be kept limited. The notion of nuclear deterrence is being stretched by both sides to include non-nuclear conflicts. An escalatory process is inherent in the linkage being established between nuclear deterrence and the perceived need to change territorial status quo through military action. This situation effectively creates deterrence instability between the

two countries. If Pakistan acted with disregard for major strategic consequences in Kargil, India showed restraint by limiting the conflict to Kargil. When India demonstrated resolve to widen the conflict by moving forward its offensive forces, Pakistan was able to pull back from Kargil, albeit under powerful pressure from the United States. Both India and Pakistan are developing weapons systems and command and control structures to create a survivable second strike capability. Pakistan is in no doubt that a nuclear first strike would bring about a massive retaliation from India. Indian planners cannot be in doubt that a second strike, notwithstanding its size, is still likely to leave Pakistan with some residual nuclear capabilities. Indian planning must also take into account the possible response from other powers, which would be determined to bring the apocalyptic exchange to an end, by force if necessary. Not enough thought seems to have been given to these possibilities in India and Pakistan. As for avoiding an accidental nuclear war, the two countries have made tentative efforts at unofficial levels, but have yet to find common ground. The balance, therefore, remains adversely weighed against deterrence stability. The doctrinal contradictions analysed above in the declared and undeclared nuclear policies of India and Pakistan have introduced serious difficulties in establishing nuclear stability on the subcontinent. In the absence of an official dialogue between the two countries, the emergence of a deterrence stability model remains problematic. Deterrence perceptions between two new nuclear states also need time to evolve. Past experience and models of the Cold War also do not always apply in their entirety to South Asia. India and Pakistan have thus become a, “test bed for nuclear deterrence theory.” Attempts by these two countries to extend the interpretation of nuclear deterrence and apply it to a wider spectrum of conflicts, does not augur well for deterrence stability between them. The risk of nuclear escalation is therefore further enhanced by the doctrinal differences between the two countries.

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interview potential as a manufacturing hub in the aerospace and defence sector is just being realised. India is a very important and attractive destination for a company such as Lockheed Martin which is interested in a long-term partnership with Indian industry and services. We share the thirst for technological innovation … The Indian software industry has developed skills and expertise which are applied to such varied sectors as banking, insurance, financial applications and artificial intelligence. We recognise that Indian industry and research facilities are promising partners for us in this strategically critical field. Lockheed Martin is committed to a long-term partnership in technology development, manufacturing and strategic collaboration in third markets with Indian companies from both the public and private sectors. Its broad-based portfolio can address important Indian requirements in defence, security and delivery of vital public services. Lockheed Martin has an unmatched performance record in establishing partnerships with industry.

Roger Rose took over as Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin India Private Ltd in August 2009. In this position, he is responsible for all Lockheed Martin corporate business in the South Asia region that includes India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives. DSA: You have been the Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin India Private Limited, since 2009. How do you visualise the business opportunities in the Indian Market? Roger Rose: Lockheed Martin is pursuing a range of programmes in India and sees business opportunities across sectors. Our priority is to execute the contracts that we have signed. We have delivered the C-130J to the Indian Air Force ahead of schedule and significantly under-budget. This was an FMS sale. We have received a request for additional six C-130J’s. Lockheed is part of the Apache team in which Boeing is the lead. We have the mission and missile systems on the platform. We are looking forward to a closure on that contract. We are also part of the team with Raytheon on Javelin missiles. This will be another FMS programme and we are currently at the Letter of Request (LoR) stage. The Indian Army has not only seen the missile firing during Exercise Yudh Abhyaas in which the US Army had brought the Javelin, but also fired it. There is a lot of interest in Javelin in the Indian Army. Lockheed is also looking at offerings for Coastal and Homeland Security. We have also offered the MH60R to the Indian Navy. We have been talking about naval combat system. The Indian Navy has been looking at creating aircraft carrier battle groups. The best system to protect a carrier battle group is the Aegis Combat System. It is a mature, developed system which has been there for 30 years and the only one that can stop an incoming modern missile system. DSA: Lockheed Martin’s presence in the Indian market is more than 20 years now. What measures and strategies are being formulated to strengthen and better support India’s Military Sector? RR: Lockheed Martin has maintained a presence in New Delhi for more than 20 years. With the Indian economy growing at more than 8 per cent and the simultaneous strengthening of the Indo-US relationship in the past decade, Lockheed Martin has increased its presence in India. In 2005, the Corporation expanded its office to better support the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its global security needs. Recently, Lockheed Martin has aggressively pursued opportunities for all three military services (Navy, Army and Air Force) apart from civil applications in the fields of renewable energy and civil aviation. Lockheed Martin’s sale of six C-130J special mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represented the first major military deal between the two countries. DSA: India is strenuously trying to build a Military Industrial Complex in the Private sector. What role can LM play in actualising this vision. What partnerships, if any, do you have in mind? RR: Tata LM Aerostructures Pvt Ltd, our joint venture with Tata Group, is our first initiative in this direction. This will add significantly to defence manufacturing capabilities in the country. We are always looking at more opportunities where we can partner with domestic industry to build lasting partnerships. DSA: India’s Offset Policy is designed to help build capacities for military production in our private sector. How effective is this policy? What can LM do to promote the growth of a Military Industrial Complex in our Private sector via this route? RR: India’s offset policy is evolving. We at Lockheed Martin have a lot of experience in executing offsets and I am sure that we can work with Indian industry to create a win-win situation for all stakeholders. India is fast becoming part of the global supply chain of some of the biggest defence suppliers in the world. India’s

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

DSA: Lockheed Martin’s sale of six C-130J special mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represented the first major military deal between the two countries. What are the other deals in the pipeline? RR: In addition to the sale of six C-130J special mission aircraft, LM also provided turnkey infrastructure to the IAF under a separate commercial contract. We have since then sold equipment for a Naval programme to MDL and are close to contract award with the IAF on two other programmes - as prime in one case and jointly with another US company in second case but with substantial LM work share. Beside these, we are also looking at contract award for additional six C 130J special mission aircraft under FMS programme for which a letter of request was received on 16 September. DSA: What are the prospects of LM in the Civil Aviation Sector in India, considering the increasing fleet size and emerging private airlines? RR: Every day across the globe, 60 per cent of the world’s commercial air traffic is monitored and controlled by Lockheed Martin air traffic control systems - systems that are powerful, advanced and completely reliable. Lockheed Martin knows how to work with governments worldwide in a way that’s fiscally sound and we are accountable for generating strong results. We provide the experience, technology and financing to bring the most modern and efficient operations to our air traffic customers in the United States and worldwide. To meet tomorrow’s growth in global travel, we are developing next-generation systems today to modernise airspace management. Our systems offer air traffic controllers flexible routing, collaborative decision-making, conflict resolution tools and more accurate and timely surveillance information, all of which leads to safer skies. Lockheed Martin provides tools for ground surveillance monitoring, coordination between airport service personnel and the air navigation and management of aircraft in the taxiways and runways. Our hub and ramp management system integrates surveillance data, collaborative decision making tools and airline legacy systems into a single automated system. The system helps airline operations managers and air traffic controllers improve the efficiency of their operations. Our security systems protect the entire aviation infrastructure. DSA: The US, which lost a bid for US$ 11 billion contract for 126 war planes, has now offered India partnership in the development of the world’s most advanced flying machine, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Can you elaborate on this offer? RR: Sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is an issue to be addressed by the Indian and US governments. As an OEM of the aircraft, we will be happy to support the decision made by the two governments. DSA: In a recent development the Pentagon has notified the US Congress about the possibility of a US$ 1.2 billion deal with India for six more C-130J Super Hercules heavy-lift aircraft in addition to six ordered for the same price in 2008. Your comments RR: The original programme to provide India with a highly advanced airlift capability set a new benchmark in international defence cooperation. The acquisition, under the US Foreign Military Sales programme, of six C-130J Super Hercules called for the highest levels of cooperation between our countries’ governments, the United States Air Force and Lockheed Martin. I am happy to say that the levels of cooperation achieved resulted in India receiving its original six aircraft well ahead of schedule and under cost. As we see the capabilities and flexibility of this proven aircraft put to the test by the Indian Air Force, I know there are many more roles and missions out there that can be met by the C-130J and we look forward to many decades of IAF C-130 operations around the world. DSA: Where do you place LM in the next 5 years in India? RR: We expect much larger footprint for LM in India in the next five years with our top end solutions for the Indian Air Force, Navy, Army and the Coast Guard. In addition, we also hope to work with Paramilitary organisations, National Disaster Management Organisation, DPSUs and the private sector defence industry to meet the emerging requirements in the fields of aerospace, defence and internal security. January 2012 Defence AND security alert

limited wars

ASPEROUS REALITIES A former C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command reflects upon the linkages between conventional warfare and nuclear warfare. He avers that the dynamics that condition military conflicts are largely predicated on the two faces of warfare. The primary face as defined by conventional forces and the shadow face as circumscribed by strategic nuclear forces. Application of the former is an active art while the latter scripts the perimeter and imposes cut-offs. To bring about a modicum of stability given a tinderbox situation, diplomacy backed by military force would provide the necessary means of arbitration. The coming of non state actors into the picture muddies the waters. Since their stakes in orthodox relations between states do not exist, their potential to cause destruction is extremely high. In dealing with such conditions the state must be prepared to take pre-emptive action and should the need arise, enable counterforce capabilities to prevent nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands.

Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former C-in-C of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute. The emergence of the fourth generation of warfare in our calculus and how its coming has twisted the very nature of warfare. In the absence of stakes normal to societies, non state actors bring with them disproportionate destructive powers. They pose a primordial threat that can only be countered by pre-emptive action

n 1950 a curious document emerged from the American Strategic firmament which put in place a blueprint for a new world order and redefined a logic for the use of power. The report titled NSC-68 came in response to a Presidential directive that Truman had articulated when wrestling with the impending nuclear and thermonuclear confrontation with the USSR that he perceived on the cards. The dilemma was; what would be the determinants that would influence and control the use of power in general and nuclear weapons in particular? The use of force and weapons of mass destruction was intrinsic to the terms of reference that was identified in the presidential directive.1 The report attempted to reconcile order and security with freedom. It saw the design of authoritarian states with its implacable mores and ‘malevolent’ dogmas in direct confrontation with liberal traditions and the aspirations of a ‘free’ state. In this scheme of things the logic of an impending armageddon in response to survival threats was reemphasised which in turn led to a perverse division of the world into allies and foes. Opacity and the absence of trust in such an uncompromising understanding of the world were natural corollaries. In time these deviations degenerated into a premium

being placed on shock and surprise as a natural feature in relationship; this included the implied savagery of a surprise nuclear attack2 The prescription was dominance of military strength and the holding together of allies in a manner that did not permit drifting out of the fold into neutrality giving rise to the self-fulfilling logic of containment and the use of violence to preserve such an order. Brodie’s axiom of war avoidance3 had by this directive been turned on its head for the proposition was to use war making capacity in order to maintain order and the principles of conventional warfare of initiative and surprise were equally applied to nuclear weapons. In such an environment of global suspicion the sense of calibration and escalation controls were non-existent on the grounds that “we cannot let the smoking gun be a mushroom cloud”4 and this provided an all pervasive thrust towards pre-emption.5

The thesis The relationship of conventional warfare with that of nuclear forces must be seen as one that is a correlation between two of a nation’s power tools; the one that accomplishes a purpose and the second that destroys purpose. In this context a thesis proposes itself:

NSC-68. A report submitted by the Secy of Defense and the Secy of State in response to a US Presidential directive of 31 Jan 1950. 2. Chomsky, Noam. Failed States, Metropolitan Books 2006, p 125. 3. Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon, AtomicPower and World Order. Harcourt Brace, New York 1946, p 76. 4. Woodward, Bob. State of Denial, Simon and Schuster, 2006. 5. The plot of the Hollywood satire Dr. Strangelove is centred on the insane levels to which warfare had been taken and the terminal hazards of maintaining a decentralized and opaque nuclear arsenal. 1.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

Conventional Wars and the Shadow Face

“Within change and the realism that pervades international relations, the dynamics that condition military conflicts are largely predicated on the two faces of warfare. The primary face as defined by conventional forces and the shadow face as circumscribed by strategic nuclear forces. Application of the former is an active art while the latter scripts the perimeter and imposes cut-offs.”6

restrain warfare. His trinity of forces that drive warfare maybe summarised as, violent emotions-chance and probability-political motives, significantly he underscored political motives7. While the basis of his works was personal experience and an analysis of the Napoleonic Wars, they bear a moment of pause for their applicability holds sway to this day. In retrospect the significance of his writings are summarised below:

The ‘perimeter’ suggested in the thesis is of importance to our study since it provides pointers to a sense of limitation to the use of force. Clausewitz in this context offers an understanding of the nature and motivations that

• Wars are governed considerations.

6. 7.

political

purpose

and

• In theory wars aspire to extremes but in reality

Author’s lectures to the DSSC and the Higher Command Course titled Strategic Concepts to Prosecute Short Wars. Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War. Howard and Paret, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1989, p 140.

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ASPEROUS REALITIES

uncertainty, friction and lack of intelligence put limits on its prosecution. • War is not a science and yet its instruments and their efficacy is driven by science; the need for experience, intuition and military genius remains an all pervasive imperative. • An analysis of the nature of war that is to be fought is all important in its understanding of the protagonists involved, the limits on purpose and means and the importance of these to the players.

To bring about a modicum of stability given a tinderbox situation diplomacy backed by military force would provide the necessary means of arbitration The abiding struggle between the efficacy of the instruments of warfare on the one hand and the importance of purpose on the other is really the dilemma of military power, its application and limits that our study must take us through. The efficacy of instruments of warfare is a function of technology and technology has taken us to a stage when weapons have the capability of obliterating the reason for which they were intended. This brings us to the awkward irony of strategic weapons, for clearly, the purpose is to be achieved and not destroyed. If then political purpose is at the heart of a nation’s aspirations, then it would be in order that we widen our discernment of the principles that political realism suggests.

Principles of political realism “War”, Clausewitz emphasised “has its own language but not its own logic.” While the language can take violence to the extreme, it is always the logic that it serves that can either provide redemption or be the cause for devastation and misery. It is in his conception of the logic being the nation’s driving purpose or interest and the language relating to the means of application of power that he placed wars within a political setting; this is the single most powerful idea in his opus On War and remains to this day central to the formulation of grand strategy.

The significant issue is an understanding of the threshold, crossing which, could escalate into a nuclear exchange. The credibility of strategic forces serves to leverage the time and spatial threshold of any conventional conflict and therefore the necessity to ensure the development of strategic capabilities in concert with the conventional The influence of purpose on means would, theoretically, in any strategic formulation provide the basis for action. Unfortunately it is at times the opposite that drives international relations. Where there is a misconception of what comprises the means or the strategic resources of a nation and the purpose to which it could be applied, we would be faced with an expansionist dynamic much on the 8. 9.

lines of the Czarist extension into East and Central Asia, Hitler into Europe and Russia, Mussolini in North Africa and, indeed, China’s stated claims in the South China Sea and South and South East Asia. Once again, the lessons of experience and history would state that human impulses that pressurise leadership at war give rise to urges and interests that seem to mock theory. This propensity is far more manifest when all power is vested in one authority as in authoritarian states and dictatorships; not that democracies provide any greater comfort on this score as the First World War, Suez crisis 1956, Vietnam War and the invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2011 would testify. The modern western conception of world order emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries, when the medieval structure of Europe dissolved into a group of states of approximately equal strength. Balance-of-power diplomacy was less a choice than an inevitability8. The political theorist Hans Morgenthau saw international relations through two prisms; through the first he perceived relations between nations determined by the depths of human behaviour while the second was established more by notions of sovereignty9. Both perspectives provide an insight into the anarchic nature of relations between states which neither saw moral principles find a place nor suggest an alternative to friction when balance-of-power was skewed or when national interests clash. The Eastern view; whether it was Confucius or Kautilya, took an approach that was vastly different. They neither saw engagement with another state on the basis of equality nor accepted the inevitability of persistent friction. While China donned the mantle of superiority and centrality, sometimes without substance; Kautilya suggested ways and means of achieving dominance through alliances, campaigns, soft power and intrigues (reminiscent of contemporary times!).

The nature of conventional wars Conventional wars are marked by the fact that they are waged between the military might of two or more protagonists whose aims, resources and intensity of combat and resolve are limited. Even as the danger of escalation to use of weapons of mass destruction does exist, the norm would suggest that it stops short of that threshold. The paradox is that while practically all nations maintain armed forces, the probability of occurrence has vastly reduced in the developed world but has increased in the developing world more so in areas of growth where absence of international order, clash of interests and the non-viability of supreme sovereignty of states vitiate the situation. Conventional wars are acts of policy and leadership, as a rule, cover their conduct by a cost benefit calculus which not only brings in rationality but also are loathe gambling beyond a tangible verge. This is true not only of the Indo-Pak situation, but also of the wars fought in the Middle East, Latin America, Falklands, Africa and the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is, however, a change that has occurred in

Kissinger, H. ‘On China’, p 16. Penguin Group New York 2011. Morgenthau Hans J, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition Pgs 4-15, New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1978.

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recent times and that is a hybridisation of the 3rd and 4th generation of warfare10. The Fourth Generation of warfare is characterised by the blurring of lines between politics, war, soldiers, violent civilians and non state actors. The decentralisation of the instruments of violence and its seeming separation from the state is what gives it disproportionate destructive power and the license to brook no limits. The South Asian situation is branded with a liberal dosage of 4th generation warfare. Unless this aspect can be addressed and neutralised, the ability to calibrate the escalatory ladder is severely compromised. In addition, asymmetricity casts aside the burden of rationality and in its place can introduce the ‘shadow face’ of warfare without concern of repercussions.

The shadow face The Shadow Face of warfare is distinct by the menace of introduction of strategic nuclear forces into the conflict. It at once draws alarm to the fact that the limits of the conventional war have been reached and that stability of nuclear deterrence stands breached. This is the paradox of it all; for “in orthodox analysis of deterrence, political leadership is assumed to be rational and willing to engage in interest-benefit analysis when making strategic choices. The assumption of balance is considered universal in terms of context, challenges and likely consequences. Rationality, in this scheme of things, is largely an exercise in mirror imaging”11.

Since rationality lies at the heart of strategic deterrence, for a deterrent relationship to remain stable the nuclear arsenal must not only be credible and survivable but also must be backed by structures that assure readiness, adequacy, security and surveillance. Strategic underpinnings that drive development and operationalising of the arsenal must also underscore leadership resolve and provide the necessary windows for both communication and selective transparency.

The coming of non state actors into the picture muddies the waters. Since their stakes in orthodox relations between states do not exist, their potential to cause destruction is extremely high. In dealing with such conditions the state must be prepared to take pre-emptive action and should the need arise enable counterforce capabilities to prevent nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands For deterrence to work, the assumption of rationality, as is apparent, is the basic premise. But is this in itself rational? For if rationality is at the core, by stretching the logic deterrence itself may not be necessary. Therefore at the root of the problem dwells irrationality of a degree that amalgamates all the elements of power with human behaviour. Under these primal circumstances it must come as no surprise that what works is the convincing reality of assured destruction. The Fourth Generation warrior exposes the shadow

10. The essence of the 3rd generation of warfare employed by conventional forces was mobility, manoeuvre, fire power and bypass; while the 4th generation was a return to decentralised warfare and the amalgamation of the civilian with the soldier and the use of violent non state actors. The term is attributed to William S Lind to describe warfare’s return to a decentralised form and was first used in 1989 in a US Marine Corps gazette article titled “Changing Face of Warfare: into the Fourth Generation”. 11. From writer’s lecture to the Defence Services Staff College (India) titled “Strategic Concepts to Prosecute Short Wars” on 10 July 2009.

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face in its most nightmarish form, when even the conviction of assured destruction does not inhibit the non state actor from the use of nuclear weapons (if in his possession). This is the state of affairs that we find ourselves in the sub-continent.

The success or failure of conventional wars of the future will be determined as much by an understanding of the global context and the linkages within the environment and our ability to shape it as it will be to fight the conventional battle within time, spatial and cognitive thresholds

Realities that constrain conventional warfare We have noted that the anarchic state of international relations precipitate contradictory interests that have a high probability of generating friction. To bring about a modicum of stability given a tinderbox situation diplomacy backed by military force would provide the necessary means of arbitration. The dynamics that bind conventional warfare with its shadow face has been dealt with earlier. The significant issue is an understanding of the threshold, crossing which, could escalate into a nuclear exchange. The credibility of strategic forces serves to leverage the time and spatial threshold of any conventional conflict and therefore the necessity to ensure the development of strategic capabilities in concert with the conventional. The coming of non state actors into the picture muddies the waters. Since their stakes in orthodox relations between states do not exist, their potential to cause destruction is extremely high. In dealing with such conditions the state must be prepared to take pre-emptive action and should the need arise enable counterforce capabilities to prevent nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands.

Strategic matrix to prosecute conventional wars The hazards of formulating a prescriptive matrix to prosecute conventional war are well known. The primary pitfall is the inability to forecast the uncertainties that may emerge. Yet without an empirical mould in which operations can be launched we may blind ourselves to the linkages and ramifications of such operations and lose sight of purpose particularly when the aims are limited. The planner would do well to heed the words of Sun Tzu that in a strategic contest everything is relevant and connected: weather, terrain, diplomacy, the report of spies, supplies and logistics, the balance of forces, historic perceptions and the intangibles of surprise and morale. Each factor influences the other, giving rise to subtle shifts in momentum and relative advantage.12 The task of a strategist is therefore, not just to analyse a situation but to determine its relationship to the context within which it occurs. The first step then is a clear definition of context within which control is sought to be exercised. This enquiry will tax the planner to the extreme for if there are linkages that, when disturbed, may disturb operations in a 12. 13.

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ASPEROUS REALITIES manner that jeopardises achievement of objectives then a review may be called for; the 2003 war in Iraq exemplifies the lack of just such a rigour.13 Clearly if a fourth generation situation is prevalent planning must cater for its removal from the equation or providing prophylactics. The next step is to establish the period over which control is sought to be exercised and the objective considerations that will impact on control. This may include not just adversarial action but also the pressures that maybe brought to bear by the environment along with human factors that invariably come to play. The third consideration that must be analysed is what nature of capabilities and resources will be necessary in order to proceed with operations. It is again at this stage that the whole plan can be subjected to a review if capabilities and resources do not match objectives.

A N N O U N C E S February 2012 Issue on

Jointness, Synergy and Crafting Vibrant Defence Industrial Base

Understanding and quantitatively making an assessment of what degree of criticality the objective is to protagonists involved calls for great impartial judgement because it is the outcome of this assessment which will determine the intensity of operations the degree of difficulty and the extent to which resources will be committed and casualties accepted. At every stage it is necessary to analyse the progress of operations with a view that should a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;plan Bâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; be necessary then it must be enabled at the appropriate time. The last strategic consideration is what are the conditions under which operations will be terminated. This is another vital segment of the matrix since terminal conditions must answer the question whether the maximum has been achieved or whether, indeed, it was worth it.

Conclusion We have noted with some disquiet the emergence of the fourth generation of warfare in our calculus and how its coming has twisted the very nature of warfare. In the absence of stakes normal to societies, non state actors bring with them disproportionate destructive powers. They pose a primordial threat that can only be countered by pre-emptive action. Our thesis posited that within change and the realism that pervades international relations, the dynamics that condition military conflicts are largely predicated on the two faces of warfare. The primary face as defined by conventional forces and the shadow face as circumscribed by strategic nuclear forces. Application of the former is an art while the latter scripts the perimeter and imposes cut-offs. The success or failure of conventional wars of the future will be determined as much by an understanding of the global context and the linkages within the environment and our ability to shape it as it will be to fight the conventional battle within time, spatial and cognitive thresholds.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans by Samuel B Griffith. Oxford University Press 1963. Woodward, Bob. State of Denial. Ibid.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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limited wars

Dr Rajendra Prasad The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

The limited war theorists have many times emphasised that the risks of escalation would keep a war limited. Arguably, however, contradictory it may appear, the danger of escalation is one of the underlying reasons why a strategy of Limited War adds to Deterrence and also why, if Deterrence fails, there is a possibility of holding a conflict limited. A strategy of limited war contributes to Deterrence for the very reason generally raised against it

CARDINAL OBJECTIVES Indian formulations of limited war are to a great extent based on the same consensus that the limited war theorists of the United States had in the 1950s and ‘60s. According to Kissinger, a Limited War “is fought for specific political objectives, which by their existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponent’s will not to crush it, to make the conditions imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation”. The concept of India engaging in a Limited War with Pakistan gained primacy following the Kargil conflict in the nuclearised politico-strategic milieu of South Asia. The primary aim of Limited War is to inflict damages or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under contention. Henry Kissinger aptly argues that “the restraint which keeps a war limited is a psychological one; the consequences of a limited victory or a limited defeat or a stalemate - the three possible outcomes of a limited war - must seem preferable to the consequences of an all-out war. If Pakistan could initiate and finalise a limited war on Indian soil, could the latter repeat the same on the former’s soil? India’s success [in Kargil] was due to the ability of our defence forces to fight and win such a limited war at a time, ground and means of fighting chosen by the aggressor. Success would be more likely if the initiative lay with India.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

Preventing Armageddon:

Search for a New Strategy

onceptualising ‘Limited War’ in the context of India and Pakistan requires a critical survey of the historical occurrences of such wars and lessons learnt from them in the field of strategic theory and theorisation, contemplated largely in the Western world in general and India and Pakistan in particular. Taken in historical context, it was the British military thinker Sir Basil Liddell Hart who was first to conceptualise ‘limiting war’ during the climax of World War II. According to Liddell Hart, the more total the war became, the greater the risk

that freedom would be permanently jeopardised. Liddell Hart was of the view that the wars should be limited. Two specific determinants prompted Liddell Hart to argue for limiting war. First, nations can no longer claim that war is any test of people’s strength, or even its national strength. Science has eroded the foundations of nationalism, at the very time when the spirit of nationalism is most uncontrolled. Second, there was the advent of atomic weapons. Liddell Hart believed that “where both sides possess atomic power, total warfare makes nonsense” and

any unlimited war “waged with atomic power would make worse than nonsense: it would be mutually suicidal.” (B H Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947). He intended to stimulate a set of limiting rules for warfare based on a rational view that wars are likely to occur again and that the limitation of their devastation is everybody’s concern. Though the concept of Limited War gained currency essentially as a limited conventional war in the

1950s and ‘60s, it was expanded to encompass ‘Limited Nuclear War’ in the 1970s. As an offensive strategy, Limited War was an integral part of the US strategy to cope with the erstwhile Soviet Union; as a defensive strategy, it aimed to defend the interests of the United States and its allies, mainly in the Western Europe. Defined as a strategy, Limited War has been one in which the opposing sides limit the purposes for which they fight to actualise definite objectives that do not require the utmost military endeavours of which the opponents are capable and that can be tackled

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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CARDINAL OBJECTIVES

in a negotiated agreement. The actual fighting in such a war remains restricted to a local geographical area and directed against selected targets, mainly of direct military significance. It requires the opponents to employ only limited human and material resources. It provides substantial space for their economic, social and political patterns of survival to go on without any severe impact or paucity. Limited wars were meant that either the ends or means, or both, are limited in the conflict. It could also be defined as a military engagement in which the attempt of each antagonist falls short of the endeavour to employ all of its strength to annihilate the other. It may be a war confined to a defined geographic area, or war that does not employ the entire available resources, arms and delivery systems (such as eschewing the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction). It may be a war which brings into play the entire weapon systems but it restricts its employment to hit specific targets.

According to Kissinger, a Limited War “is fought for specific political objectives, which by their existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponent’s will not to crush it, to make the conditions imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation” Credit goes to the US strategist Henry Kissinger who was first to analyse the increasing quandary intertwined with nuclear weapons and their political and military repercussions in conditions of an all-out war. According to Kissinger, a Limited War “is fought for specific political objectives, which by their existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponent’s will not to crush it, to make the conditions imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation.” (Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Council

on Foreign Relations, 1957). These objectives should be minimal and restrict the conflict within the intended limits. Any explicit linkage of Deterrence with Limited War in case of India and Pakistan as nuclear opponents lends credence to the fact that a strategy of Limited War would seek to attain Deterrence not so much through the threat of destruction but through depriving the aggressor of the possibility and probability of achieving his objective.

What limits a limited war? The concept of India engaging in a Limited War with Pakistan gained primacy following the Kargil conflict in the nuclearised politico-strategic milieu of South Asia. How did such a concept germinate? What are the main arguments for the utility of limited war advanced by its supporters? The political leadership should clearly identify the objectives of a Limited War, since the entire conduct of military operations - its strategy, tactics and termination must be carried out in full conformity with the nature of a nation’s political objectives and not by independent parameters of military victory or prestige. The primary aim of Limited War is to inflict damages or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under contention. The more moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be. This does not ensure that the military operations cannot flare up beyond the geographical confines or the objective in contention; in fact, one alternative of increasing the adversary’s motivation to reconcile is to deny him of something he can recover only by making peace. Henry Kissinger aptly argues that “the restraint which keeps a war limited is a psychological one; the consequences of a limited victory or a limited defeat or a stalemate - the three possible outcomes of a limited war - must seem preferable to the consequences of an all-out war. Limited war, therefore, involves as many psychological complexities as a policy of deterrence.” It is also a matter of credence that the cooperation between the two belligerents during a

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

Limited War would keep the war limited. Opponents who would otherwise not intend to cooperate and who prefer a limited war, would however cooperate during actual fighting, so that it does not escalate.

The political leadership should clearly identify the objectives of a Limited War, since the entire conduct of military operations - its strategy, tactics and termination - must be carried out in full conformity with the nature of a nation’s political objectives and not by independent parameters of military victory or prestige. The primary aim of Limited War is to inflict damages or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under contention The limited war theorists have many times emphasised that the risks of escalation would keep a war limited. Arguably, however, contradictory it may appear, the danger of escalation is one of the underlying reasons why a strategy of Limited War adds to Deterrence and also why, if Deterrence fails, there is a possibility of holding a conflict limited. A strategy of limited war contributes to Deterrence for the very reason generally raised against it. One side or both may be inclined to concede limited defeat rather than take the initiative in violating the rules and to work in a manner that reassures the other of such intention. The rules may be cherished because if they are once broken, there is no guarantee that any new ones can be brought into being and jointly recognised in time to restrict the expansion of the conflict. In addition, geography has also an important role to play in limiting the war.

Quest for new strategy Though India has been emphasising the concept of Limited War since the late 1990s and Pakistan denying it; paradoxically it is Pakistan that first reverberated the concept in actual scenario. As in the case of the United States versus the erstwhile Soviet Union during the 1950s, the idea of Limited War gained primacy while articulating a new strategy to deal with Pakistan in the post-Kargil security scenario. The then Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes,

while explaining the doctrine of limited war, underlined the necessity for a new policy orientation by stating that “India has traditionally pursued a non-aggressive, non-provocative defence policy based on the philosophy of defensive defence. This represents the political doctrine of employing military power. But military efficiency will continue to demand the pursuit of the principle that “offence is the best means of defence.”

“Surgical strikes” of militant camps and “hot pursuits” of militants across the Line of Control (LoC) were realised as most potent strategies that India could opt for Since the 1990s, India’s political initiatives to make peace with Pakistan met with serious reverses in making any major breakthroughs, despite some hopeful developments. In case of Jammu and Kashmir, though the passion of militancy and cross-border terrorism faded, peace still remained a distant goal, irrespective of elections for state and national legislative assemblies. Three major determinants in the late 1990s proved supportive for the materialisation of Limited War as a potent strategy to deal with Pakistan. First were the limits of any sustained political negotiation with Pakistan, leading to an agreeable accommodation on all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. Second was the persistence of militancy and cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s clumsy stance, irrespective of India’s efforts to combat it. Third was the Kargil War itself, which was appreciated by a section of politico-military elites and decision-makers in India as a limited war under the nuclear umbrella. Having realised visible complexities to prevent militancy in Kashmir politically and militarily and limitations to impose international pressure on Pakistan to give up its support for cross-border terrorism, India started thinking and opting for a new strategy to deal with the problem on its own strength. “Surgical strikes” of militant camps and “hot pursuits”

of militants across the Line of Control (LoC) were realised as most potent strategies that India could opt for while curbing cross-border terrorism and their outfits. Coupled with the strategies of “hot pursuits” and “surgical strikes” have been the underlying dangers of escalation. What if Pakistan gets prompted to escalate the conflict during or after a hot pursuit or surgical strike? To be in readiness to face the military implications of the escalation, India evolved an overall resolute strategy, with which it could launch operations against the militants and foreign terrorists on the other side of the Line of Control, without pulling the strings of a full-scale war. The strategy of Limited War seems fit for India’s current needs of pursuing its immediate politico-military objectives to combat militancy and trans-national terror, yet without escalating into a full-scale war with Pakistan. Besides, the proponents of Limited War as a strategy also believe that such a limited military response would keep the war limited to Jammu and Kashmir and would not flare up along the international border. As pointed out, while the first two factors contributed to the articulation of the concept of limited war in India,

it was the third factor - the Kargil War, which made India realise that a limited war along the Line of Control is plausible. The Kargil War in fact was a limited engagement in every sense - in objectives, in territory, in use of military manpower and weapons and other resources. Regardless of the occasional threats to enlarge the war either in terms of using bigger weapons, including nuclear weapons and enlarging the theatere of operations, the Kargil War remained limited. If Pakistan could initiate and finalise a limited war on Indian soil, could the latter repeat the same on the former’s soil? The advocates in India of limited war believe that India could wage a limited war vis-à-vis Pakistan, arguing that there exists sufficient space under the nuclear umbrella.

Gen V R Raghavan argued: “The defence of national interest, nevertheless, cannot justify recourse to nuclear weapons. On the other hand, nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan from launching the offensive. One can even conclude that nuclear weapons encouraged it to think otherwise”

Real threat or a stunt? Were nuclear weapons just one of

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limited wars

CARDINAL OBJECTIVES

many factors in Pakistan launching the infiltration into Kargil area? Did the presence of nuclear weapons deter India and Pakistan from escalating the Kargil conflict, thereby holding the military confrontation limited? Strategist analysts and informed minds differ in their appreciation regarding the role of nuclear weapons in Kargil conflict. For example, Gen V R Raghavan argued: “The defence of national interest, nevertheless, cannot justify recourse to nuclear weapons. On the other hand, nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan from launching the offensive. One can even conclude that nuclear weapons encouraged it to think otherwise. The limits of the ‘currency of power’, which nuclear weapons signify in some circles, are made apparent in Kargil. India neither contemplated the use of nuclear weapons nor gave any threat of their use during the conflict.”

India’s success [in Kargil] was due to the ability of our defence forces to fight and win such a limited war at a time, ground and means of fighting chosen by the aggressor Pakistan, on the contrary, trumpeted threats even at the highest political levels. The then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was the first to make a veiled threat. On May 27, 1999, he stated: “1998 nuclear tests have given Pakistan the confidence to counter ‘any enemy attack’ … They [the people of Pakistan] are confident for the first time in their history that in the eventuality of an armed attack, they will be able to meet it on equal terms.” But the threat was merely defensive and not offensive. The national confidence attained from the 1998 nuclear tests could be used by Pakistan only against any offensive on it by India and not vice versa. Was it just rhetoric or a real threat? The armed forces in India and Pakistan, who were either a part of the conflict or witnessed it from close quarters, do not believe that there was ever a nuclear threat during the Kargil conflict. India’s reaction to the nuclear threat from Pakistan was calculated and adequately measured. It

downplayed the impending nuclear threat, while upholding adequate counter-measures. Except for some background reports in the United States under Clinton Administration, there was no credible threat of the use of nuclear weapons during the conflict. Over and above, there is no reason to believe that the military planners ever thought of using nuclear weapons. The occasional threat of use of nuclear weapons, as has been discussed earlier, was a political stunt and was never real.

Strategy of limited war Kargil is emphatically cited as an example of Limited War by its proponents in Indian strategic community. Viewing the consequences of Kargil conflict, they pin-point that India could fight such a war and finally win it. According to George Fernandes: “India’s success [in Kargil] was due to the ability of our defence forces to fight and win such a limited war at a time, ground and means of fighting chosen by the aggressor. If India can beat a professional military force equipped with modern fire power, at the ground (with Pakistani forces on dominating heights) and time of Pakistani choice with the initiatives also in their hands, then India can beat Pakistan anytime, anywhere”. Some of the arguments favouring India’s strategy of limited war against Pakistan run along the following lines: • Under the shadow of nuclear umbrella, there is sufficient space for India to fight a limited war with Pakistan. • The political, economic and human price of the use of nuclear weapons would prevent both India and Pakistan from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in any limited conflicts with each other. • India is having sufficient grasp of the limits short of full-scale conflict to which Pakistan can be pushed in a limited war scenario. • US caveat / caution directed towards Pakistan, during any limited conflict scenario and would restrict

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

the latter from either escalating the conflict or from transforming it into a large-scale conventional war. • The psychological fear of massive Indian retaliation, in case of a Pakistani first nuclear strike, would deter the latter from exploiting the nuclear strike.

The road ahead Indian formulations of limited war are to a great extent based on the same consensus that the limited war theorists of the United States had in the 1950s and ‘60s. First, the proponents believe that there lies considerable leverage under the nuclear deterrence to wage a limited war with Pakistan. Nuclear weapons can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not all and any war and under the nuclear umbrella, a conventional war remained plausible though with clear-cut limitations if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be averted. As a test case, the Kargil War was thus handled within this perspective followed by obvious outcomes.

The question that defence planners must deal with themselves is: what repercussion does the nuclear weaponry have on conventional wars - and therefore, on the force structure that is required for the foreseeable future? The answer is genuinely sound: the necessity is to prepare for a Limited War Nuclear weapons have limited the objectives, scope and extent of war among states that have developed or acquired such capabilities on account of their tremendously devastative potential. The question that defence planners must deal with themselves is: what repercussion does the nuclear weaponry have on conventional wars - and therefore, on the force structure that is required for the foreseeable future? The answer is genuinely sound: the necessity is to prepare for a Limited War. There is a general perception among the supporters that since the inception of nuclearisation has rendered ‘total war’ unthinkable, ‘Limited War’ option must necessarily be central to the military contribution for national defence.

limited wars

TABLE-TOP NUCLEAR ENERGY!

Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science Dr M Srinivasan Formerly Associate Director, Physics Group, BARC, Mumbai the writer is from the first batch of the BARC training school. He served as a Reactor Physicist and an experimental Nuclear Physicist at BARC, Mumbai for 40 years (1957 to 1997). His specialisation was in the general area of Nuclear Science and Technology, focusing on the “Physics of Fission Chain Reactions and Fusioning Plasmas”. At the time of his retirement he was Head, Neutron Physics Division of BARC and also Associate Director of its Physics Group. His main contributions were in the design, construction and experimentation with the three Purnima series of experimental nuclear reactors at Trombay and played a key role in the 1974 Pokhran nuclear explosion experiment. He was responsible for initiating Fusion Plasma experiments culminating in the building of the huge 500 KJ Capacitor Bank Facility at Purnima laboratories. During the last seven years of his research career at BARC he was deeply involved in the study of the controversial new field of “Cold Fusion”.

The term Low Energy Nuclear Reactions (LENR) is increasingly being used as a more appropriate name to refer to nuclear reactions which take place under special conditions when certain metals (or their mixtures) such as Palladium, Nickel, Titanium, Zirconium etc. are made to absorb large quantities of Deuterium or Hydrogen on the surface

The writer of this article has just learnt that Dr P K Iyengar, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, passed away on 21st December 2011. He would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Dr Iyengar as he had the courage and conviction to stand by the early BARC results (1989 to 1995) which confirmed the occurrence of Nuclear reactions in deuterated metallic samples. In recent months he was very happy to learn of the development of the Ni-H Rossi reactor and the imminent commercialisation of Cold Fusion / LENR and has thus passed on with the feeling that his stand has been fully vindicated!

A path breaking article on Table-Top Nuclear power via Cold Fusion or Low Energy Nuclear Reactions which could generate a revolution in Energy generation. A maverick Italian engineer-inventor Andrea Rossi had demonstrated a 10 KWth cold fusion reactor at the University of Bologna, in Italy on 14th January 2011. This novel Ni-H LENR reactor which has been named by Rossi as Energy Catalyser or “E-Cat” for short, was fuelled with just one gram of Nickel nano powder exposed to pressurised hydrogen gas. A practical embodiment of the inventive apparatus, installed on October 16, 2007, is at present perfectly operating 24 hours per day and provides an amount of heat sufficient to heat the factory of the Company EON at Bondeno in Italy. Imagine having a new source of clean energy which is decentralised (needs no electrical grid), does not require Uranium or Plutonium, does not produce any radioactive waste products nor nuclear radiation, does not leave any carbon footprint and is mass manufactured and sold in the market place as a common consumer product! A “Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science” appears to have indeed taken place behind the backs of our nuclear scientists. In the USA the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) have all been quietly funding Cold Fusion / LENR research for the past several years. This could turn out to be a significant game changer that can revolutionise the field of Energy and take us beyond the fossil fuel era to a new and de-massified energy future. DRDO must take a look at this breakthrough technology.

he September 2010 issue of DSA which was a “Nuclear Special” carried an article of mine titled “Table-Top Nuclear Energy!”. To be honest I did not give that title; it was given by the Editors of DSA. The title I had given was a more modest “Emerging Third Route to Tap Nuclear Energy: Birth of Condensed Matter Nuclear Science”. I submit that the title I had given was perhaps long for a magazine; but I must also acknowledge that I was somewhat embarrassed by the title given by DSA, for fear my friends would accuse me of being a bit too imaginative! Table-Top Nuclear Energy? Isn’t that going a bit too far? In my previous article I had posed a question: “Prospects of developing captive decentralised and mass produced table-top nuclear power packs, generating power in the range of

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

10 to 100 KW looms on the horizon with the potentiality of private industry taking a leading role in mass manufacturing and marketing these power packs. Is all this merely a pipe dream or could it become a reality?” Well that pipe dream seems to have indeed come true! The September 2010 article had reviewed the checquered history of the controversial field known as “Cold Fusion”. The term Low Energy Nuclear Reactions (LENR) is increasingly being used as a more appropriate name to refer to nuclear reactions which take place under special conditions when certain metals (or their mixtures) such as Palladium, Nickel, Titanium, Zirconium etc. are made to absorb large quantities of Deuterium or Hydrogen on the surface. In February 2011 this writer had conducted the 16th International Conference on Condensed Matter Nuclear Science

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

limited wars

TABLE-TOP NUCLEAR ENERGY!

(ICCF 16) in Chennai. Majority of the papers presented at the Chennai conference dealt mainly with the Palladium-Deuterium system originally propounded by Fleischmann and Pons. Although CMNS researchers were quite aware that Nickel-hydrogen configurations too, under certain conditions, do sponsor anomalous nuclear reactions, it was generally believed that Pd-D was the more promising route rather than Ni-H.

Another aspect which is attracting attention is the potential Defence related applications of Ni-H reactors. Not many are aware that in the USA the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) have all been quietly funding Cold Fusion / LENR research for the past several years. A US Defense Intelligence Agency Technology Forecast Report, dated 13th November 2009, had providentially concluded (full report at http://newenergytimes. com/v2/news/2009/2009DIA-08-0911-003.pdf): “If nuclear reactions in LENR experiments are real and controllable, DIA assesses that whoever produces the first commercial LENR power source could revolutionise energy production and storage for the future.” One immediate application that may be drawing the attention of Defence authorities could be the prospects of developing small and inexpensive “nuclear” propelled sea going vessels, inclusive of submarines. Published studies indicate that for nuclear propulsion, power levels of interest are from 11 MWth to 190 MWth depending on vessel size. The Otto Hahn German Cargo boat for example, which was one of the early nuclear propelled ships, had a nuclear reactor of just 36 MWth capacity! E-Cat technology may even enable remotely controlled underwater unmanned drones tipped with deadly missiles which can remain submerged for a long durations and be guided to specific targets.

Rossi’s E-Cat That is why when we heard that a maverick Italian engineer-inventor by the name of Andrea Rossi had demonstrated in the presence of a select group of 50 invitees, a 10 KWth cold fusion reactor at the University of Bologna, in Italy on 14th January 2011, just three weeks prior to the Chennai conference, all of us were taken by great surprise. No other CMNS researcher had so far observed “excess power” releases in KW levels; the fact that this was observed in an Ni-H system was even more impressive! The short video available on YouTube titled “The Magic of Mr Rossi” (http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=NzL3RIlcwbY) recapitulates that historic test and explains the background to Rossi’s invention. The radio interview given by Rossi available at http:// tomanddoug.com/podcasts/rossiShow_128.mp3 is also very informative. This novel Ni-H LENR reactor which has been named by Rossi as Energy Catalyser or “E-Cat” for short, was fuelled with just one gram of Nickel nano powder exposed to pressurised hydrogen gas. Details

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posted

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

February 2010 in his blog-site www.journal-of-nuclearphysics.com both in the form of a scientific paper jointly authored with Prof Focardi titled “A new energy source from nuclear fusion” and a patent application dated August 2008 titled “Method and apparatus for carrying out Nickel and Hydrogen exothermal reactions”. The patent claimed that: “A practical embodiment of the inventive apparatus, installed on October 16, 2007, is at present perfectly operating 24 hours per day and provides an amount of heat sufficient to heat the factory of the Company EON at Bondeno in Italy.” Rossi waited for his patent application to be filed before going public. While his Italian patent was granted on 6th April 2011, his international patent application was returned on grounds that it lacks detail in describing the technology. It would seem that Rossi’s strategy of withholding vital information in the patent application seems to have backfired.

MWth reactor demo Soon after his 10 KWth reactor demo of 14th January, Rossi had announced that he will be unveiling in public a 1 MWth reactor in the month of October and hence the CMNS community was eagerly anticipating this event. This potentially game changing breakthrough event in fact occurred on 28th October 2011, again at the University of Bologna when Rossi demonstrated a 1 MWth water boiler / steam generator in the presence of a specially invited group of observers which included a representative of his first “customer”. (see http:// pesn.com/2011/10/28/9501940_1_MW_E-Cat_Test_ Successful). This 1 MWth system comprised of over a hundred 10 KWth E-Cat modules, connected in a series-parallel fashion, such that coolant water flowed from one module to the next, progressively picking up more and more heat, there being several such parallel coolant circuit lines, carrying the heat away to generate steam. The whole system was housed in a standard 20 feet shipping container “ready for dispatch”. The 1 MWth reactor is reportedly fuelled with about a Kg of Ni powder. But, Rossi has revealed, that the Ni fuel powder also contains a small percentage of a proprietary additive, whose nature he has kept as an industrial secret for now. A built-in electrical resistance heater was used to heat the fuel powder to about 450o C in order to trigger the nuclear process. Once the Nuclear reactions commence, the input electrical power can in principle be switched off and the whole reactor allowed to operate in a “self-sustaining mode”. During the 28th October test the “1MW reactor” in fact operated for over 5 hours at a power level of about 470 KW in a self-sustaining mode. In general however Rossi has observed that controlling the reactor is easier if the input power is still kept on. If the input power is still retained throughout the reactor operation, it is said to operate as an “Energy Amplifier”. According to Rossi, the optimum power gain factor for safe and stable operation of his present E-Cat model is about 6 to 10. It is learnt that Rossi’s first “customer” was satisfied with the outcome of the test and paid up the agreed price of two million Euros; the reactor has since been shipped to

the customer’s premises. The real identity of the customer has not been revealed so far, except that they are a Military research organisation. We have since learnt that this customer has now placed a repeat order for an additional one dozen 1 MW reactors (“for use in a cold, remote location”) and a civilian customer from the east coast of the US, has also placed an order for a similar plant. The full technical specifications of the commercial version of the 1 MWth E-Cat reactor are available at http://www. leonardo-ecat.com/fp/Products/1MW_Plant/index. html. The plant includes a 250 KW auxiliary power source for start up of the reactor (initial heating of Ni core to 450o C) in a remote location. Further reports on this exciting development are available at the following dedicated websites which have all sprung up during the weeks following the epoch making 28th October event: www.ecat.com, www. leonardo-ecat.com/fp, www.e-catworld.com, www. ecatnews.net, www.ecatnews.com, www.e-catsite.com, www.ecatplanet.net, www.energycatalyzer3.com www. hnifusion.com, www.rossifocardifusion.com, www. andrearossiecat.com etc. The first listed site, namely ecat.com is managed by a UK firm called “Hydro Fusion” founded by four Swedish entrepreneurs (two of whom are Particle Physicists) and who have obtained the rights to market E-Cat reactors in Northern Europe. Likewise a start up company called Ampenergo, Inc founded in April 2009 in the USA, by among others some former employees of the US Department of Energy, have been granted the exclusive rights for marketing E-Cats in the Americas. All the above E-Cat related websites are solely devoted to disseminating information on this breakthrough and are vying with each other to be the first to publish the latest news and “juicy gossip” regarding this new born kitten! Rossi claims to have preliminary experimental evidence which suggests that in his Ni-H system, energy is released following nuclear transmutation reactions between Nickel nuclei and protons (from the hydrogen gas), resulting in copper isotopes. He has said that after 6 months of reactor operation, the spent Ni fuel was found to contain as much as 30 per cent of Cu and the Cu63 to Cu65 isotopic ratio was substantially different from its natural abundance value. Rossi and Focardi have deduced that this translates to an energy equivalent of 4,000 barrels of oil per Kg of Ni. Rossi has not published details of his invention in any peer reviewed scientific journal so far for fear it will not be accepted, since cold fusion is even today discredited by mainstream science. In the absence of any credible scientific paper, the physics community is understandably suspicious of his claims. But Rossi’s stand is that the test of the pudding is in the eating: “I am an inventor; I am more interested in marketing my invention and making money, than wasting my time convincing skeptical physicists.” Rossi who is resident in the US, has set up a company there called Leonardo Corporation to exploit his technology. The main stumbling block for rapid commercialisation seems to be the refusal of the US patent office to grant him a patent on grounds that this is based on invalid science. If however his claims are found to be true and his invention indeed results in a safe, clean, cheap and reliable source of energy for mankind, then one

has to concede that Rossi is probably sitting on a “trillion dollar jackpot!”. It is learnt that Rossi has just signed a half a million Euro contract with the Physics department of the University of Bologna to systematically study the Physics of the E-Cat, both during operation as well as post run elemental / isotopic analysis of the Ni fuel powder, to nail the mechanisms responsible for the nuclear energy release. The University authorities have accepted the contract on condition they will be allowed to publish the results in peer reviewed scientific journals when the study is completed.

Pathway to commercialisation There is an interesting twist to this fascinating scientific-technological drama that is currently unfolding. Rossi had initially tied up with a Greek company called “Defkalion Green Technologies” through his physicist friend Prof Stremennos who was instrumental in an agreement being signed between Rossi and Defkalion for transfer of technology, at a price tag of 100 million Euros (http://www.defkalion-energy.com/White_ Paper_DGT.pdf). Unfortunately that tie up fell apart in August 2011 after a heated argument following “under performance of a prototype test unit” resulting in Defkalion withholding the agreed upon first instalment of the payment. An angry Rossi apparently “walked off in a huff” and unilaterally cancelled the agreement. The two parties, namely Rossi and Defkalion, are now independently developing their own versions of the Ni-H reactor. Defkalion which has set up their manufacturing plant at Xanthi in Greece, calls their Nickel-Hydrogen LENR reactor by the name “Hyperion”. A press release issued on 30th November 2011, by Defkalion (http:// www.defkalion-energy.com) was accompanied by a preliminary technical specifications sheet, describing their 5 KW Hyperion product which they say will enter the market sometime in 2012. In addition details of a 45 KW version of Hyperion composed of nine of the basic 5 KW modules, have also been unveiled. A surprising but disturbing feature noted in the specs sheet, is the built-in “self-destruct mechanism” expected to be incorporated in the units to protect their trade secrets from being stolen through reverse engineering following disassembly of

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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TABLE-TOP NUCLEAR ENERGY!

the reactor core. It is however doubtful if any national licensing authority will permit such a feature to be installed in a commercial product sold in their territory.

Rossi had announced that he will be unveiling in public a 1 MWth reactor in the month of October and hence the CMNS community was eagerly anticipating this event. This potentially game changing breakthrough event in fact occurred on 28th October 2011, again at the University of Bologna when Rossi demonstrated a 1 MWth water boiler / steam generator in the presence of a specially invited group of observers which included a representative of his first “customer” Meanwhile the original father figure of the Ni-H field, namely Prof Piantelli of Siena, Italy who was the first to discover and publish papers jointly co-authored with Prof Focardi, on anomalous heat production in Ni-H systems as early as 1994, is upset that his findings and ideas have been usurped and patented by Rossi. So in November 2009 and again in April 2011, Piantelli filed his own patents and has set up his own company (“Nichenergy Srl”) to develop his version of Ni-H LENR reactors. (All these patents are available in the public domain.) It is interesting that Piantelli is actually a Biophysicist and the story of how he accidentally discovered anomalous heat production in a Nickel rod (which was being used as a sample holder for biological specimens) when it was exposed to Hydrogen, forms fascinating reading. Since Rossi has not succeeded in obtaining international patent protection so far, the field is now wide open for exploitation by others and there is now a worldwide scramble to get on board the Ni-H nuclear bandwagon. All this competition is clearly good for the field and we have every reason to be optimistic that LENR technology may well succeed in becoming available to power an energy hungry world in the years to come and in the bargain possibly even turn topsy turvy, the established global economic order. A new book titled Rossi’s eCat - Free Energy, Free Money, Free People by John Michell (published in September 2011) elaborates on the likely impact of Rossi’s invention on the global energy scenario! Imagine having a new source of clean energy which is decentralised (needs no electrical grid), does not require Uranium or Plutonium, does not produce any radioactive waste products nor nuclear radiation, does not leave any carbon footprint and is mass manufactured and sold in the market place as a common consumer product! In fact, as already noted, Defkalion have indicated that their 5KW Hyperion home heaters will be in the market in 2012, while Learnado Corporation hopes to make their E-Cat home units available in 2013 at an indicated cost of US$ 500 per KW. (As per Rossi, by 9th December 2011 10,000 potential customers have signed up online for his 5 KW home unit!) But there is however one possible stumbling block: Will the big brother, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission wield their long stick and play spoilsport, requiring that all these products pass inspection by regulatory authorities?

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

This will certainly delay commercialisation prospects. But the shocking part of this rapidly developing story is, here we seem to have a game changing clean nuclear energy source but there is no consensus on the exact physics that explains how it works, beyond the fact that it presumably involves a nuclear reaction between Ni and protons from the Hydrogen! Perhaps I should caution just in case any of the readers start digging deeper into the internet regarding the status of the Theory behind LENRs, they may find some people emphatically stating that there is one Theory based on “weak interactions” that can explain all experimental results and consequently it is now proven that the whole CMNS phenomenon should be referred to ONLY as LENR and NOT “Cold Fusion”. I personally feel that the jury is still out on the theory question and in any case as far as a working LENR reactor is concerned, it does not matter to the customer whether the nuclear reaction occurs by overcoming the coulomb barrier or is mediated by a virtual neutron formed following electron capture. I am in favour of leaving it to the Theoreticians to battle it out!

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TABLE-TOP NUCLEAR ENERGY! John Michell’s new book (Published in September 2011) “Rossi’s eCat - Free Energy, Free Money, Free People”

All along mainstream Physicists have continued to reject the whole field of cold fusion / LENR saying: “Text book nuclear physics can’t explain it, my student can’t repeat it and so it must be nonsense!” Now that working LENR power packs have entered the market place, hopefully the scientific community will sit up and acknowledge that a “Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science” appears to have indeed taken place behind their backs. It is now left to “generation next” to jump in and unravel the science behind these Low Energy Nuclear Reactions. In this context the recent announcement that starting January 2012, the Massachusettes Institute of Technology (MIT) will be offering a short course labelled “Cold Fusion 101” in a bid to attract fresh young blood to this emergent new branch of nuclear science, is a welcome development.

Defence and aerospace applications Another aspect which is attracting attention is the potential Defence related applications of Ni-H reactors. Not many are aware that in the USA the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) have all been quietly funding Cold Fusion / LENR research for the past several years. A US Defense Intelligence Agency Technology Forecast Report, dated 13th November 2009, had providentially concluded (full report at http://newenergytimes.com/ v2/news/2009/2009DIA-08-0911-003.pdf): “If nuclear reactions in LENR experiments are real and controllable, DIA assesses that whoever produces the first commercial LENR power source could revolutionise energy production and storage for the future.” One immediate application that may be drawing the attention of Defence authorities could be the prospects of developing small and inexpensive “nuclear” propelled sea going vessels, inclusive of submarines. Published studies indicate that for nuclear propulsion, power levels of interest are from 11 MWth to 190 MWth depending on vessel size. The Otto Hahn German Cargo boat for example, which was

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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one of the early nuclear propelled ships, had a nuclear reactor of just 36 MWth capacity! E-Cat technology may even enable remotely controlled underwater unmanned drones tipped with deadly missiles which can remain submerged for a long durations and be guided to specific targets. On 22nd September 2011 NASA had organised a one day “LENR Innovation Forum workshop” at their Glenn Research Centre in Cleveland, to take stock of the field. Dennis Bushnell, the Chief Scientist of the NASA Langley Research Centre who reviewed the potentially wide ranging applications of LENR technology concluded his talk with the words: “In short LENR … appears to be capable of Revolutionising Aerospace across the board. No other single technology even comes close to the potential impacts of LENR upon Agency Missions.” Another NASA scientist Joseph Zawodny was equally upbeat titling his paper as “Low Energy Nuclear Reactions: Is there a better way to do Nuclear Power?” NASA is particularly excited by the prospects of increasing the “payload to fuel weight ratio” (since there is no burning chemical fuel) which according to Zawodny is expected to revolutionise aviation and access to space! Zawodny has also highlighted the potential advantages to the armed forces of “unlimited loiter” and “enhanced mobility with a reduction of supply logistics”. (Thanks to New Energy Times Editor, Steven Krivit, who invoked the provisions of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the USA, the power

points of the presentations made at the restricted NASA meeting are now all in the public domain!) If the Rossi invention is indeed such a big breakthrough, how come the media is not raving about it? That mystery (bias?) can be traced back to the events and euphoria triggered in March 1989 by the original Fleischmann-Pons announcement. But it must be pointed out that unlike in 1989 when all that Fleischmann and Pons had to show was a test tube and lots of promise, this time around Andrea Rossi has built a real working industrial product which has been publicly demonstrated and is now even available for sale! Persons / organisations involved in setting up and operating large central station power plants with generation capacities in the range of 100s to 1000 MWe may be tempted to dismiss 10 KW and 1 MW reactors as mere toys which can hardly make a dent in the overall power scenario of the country. In this context it is worth recalling that an automobile is essentially a power plant converting chemical energy of petrol or diesel into heat / mechanical energy and even a bit of electricity for charging the car battery. Taking a modest figure of 100 KW for the engine capacity (actually most big sedans and trucks have ratings of several 100 HP) and an annual production of one million cars / trucks in India, the automobile industry adds an average of 1,00,000 MWth of power capacity every year. This is equivalent to 30,000 MWe of electricity and by far

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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exceeds the annual capacity addition to overall grid power generation in the whole country! The contribution of two wheelers is additional. Thus one should not belittle the role of mass produced small captive generators which can substantially help in reducing the pressure on government authorities in charge of planning central station power projects. At a time when so much is being hotly debated in India about the safety of the Kudumkulam and Jaitapur nuclear power projects, the wisdom of importing of Light Water Reactors, the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, the controversy stemming from the Nuclear Liability Law and all this superimposed on the backdrop of the catastrophic melt down of the Fukushima reactors in Japan which occurred in March this year, the Ni-H E-Cat reactor breakthrough provides fresh hope for mankind. As I give finishing touches to my article, representatives of all the countries of the world are wrapping up their efforts at Durban to bring down atmospheric carbon levels. Is it not obvious that the LENR breakthrough is going to have a crucial role to play in this? The year 2011 also happens to be the centenary of the discovery of the Atomic Nucleus by Rutherford and may well end up being remembered as a historic turning point in man’s quest for an environment friendly “third route” (fission and thermonuclear fusion being the other two) to tapping the enormous energy locked in the atomic nucleus.

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limited wars

Anna Louise Strachan The writer is a PhD scholar at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. She also holds an MSc in Asian Politics from SOAS and a BA in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Exeter in the UK. Her research interests include conflict resolution, electoral politics and UN peacekeeping. Following India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 the stakes in the conflict between the two countries were significantly raised. However, few believe that there is a real prospect of nuclear conflict unless terrorist elements are able to acquire a nuclear weapon. Following the nuclear weapons tests, India and Pakistan became embroiled in the 1999 Kargil War. According to Chandran, this conflict constituted a limited conventional war and served to highlight the fact that a limited war between India and Pakistan was possible

CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM A cogently argued article that suggests that there are chances of peace breaking out between India and Pakistan and as such the option of a Limited Conventional War can be ruled out. Some argue that this is the only way to compel Pakistan to contain jihadi elements undertaking terrorist activities within India’s borders. However, the writer cites Ganguly and Kapur to point out, Pakistan may simply be lacking the capacity to eliminate jihadi groups. She feels it is much wiser to create a situation whereby the economic costs of supporting jihadi groups far outweigh the benefits of supporting them. Economic and Commercial Cooperation talks between the countries, she feels have been progressing at an unprecedented rate. She concludes cautiously that there are likely to be many setbacks and given the intractable nature of the India-Pakistan conflict the road to peace will be a long one. However, she feels that at a time when there is room for cautious optimism it makes sense to embrace the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The editors are constrained to point out that far too many previous Indian attempts to seek peace have ended up on the battlefield due to the intransigence of the Military-ISI complex of Pakistan and hence keeping one’s options open may be far more prudent. Pak military’s current endorsement of the peace process may be purely Tactical to seek a free hand in shaping Post-US withdrawal Afghanistan to India’s extreme discomfiture.

ommerce rather than conflict appears to be the order of the day for the India-Pakistan relationship. The conflict between the two countries remains one of the most intractable in the world, with three wars having been fought between the two countries since partition in 1947. However, despite numerous setbacks, recent months have seen the relationship between India and Pakistan take a positive turn. Despite fears to the contrary, even the July 13 Mumbai bombings and September’s terrorist attacks in Delhi did not succeed in scuppering attempts to improve the relationship between the two countries. Moreover, when an Indian helicopter strayed into Pakistani territory due to adverse weather conditions in October the crew were freed immediately.1 This incident, which could have renewed tensions, was dealt with swiftly and sensibly. Rather than seeking to become embroiled in a costly war, India and Pakistan’s current focus appears to be on finding common ground. This article highlights why war, even in the limited conventional sense, seems less likely than ever and looks at the conflict resolution potential of the steps being undertaken by India and Pakistan to improve their relationship.

Unpredictability Following India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 the stakes in the conflict between the two countries were significantly raised. However, few believe that there is a real prospect of nuclear conflict unless terrorist elements are able to acquire a nuclear weapon. Following the nuclear weapons tests, India and Pakistan became embroiled in the 1999 Kargil War. According to Chandran, this conflict constituted a limited conventional war and served to highlight the fact that a limited war between India and Pakistan was possible.2 The prospect of another Wright, Tom. 24 October 2011. “Pakistan Releases Indian Air Crew.” Wall Street Journal. Available at http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204777904576648773079094998.html 2 Chandran, S. 2005. Limited War: Revisiting Kargil in the Indo-Pak conflict. India Research Press: New Delhi.p. 88.

limited conventional war between India and Pakistan is often discussed and sometimes even advocated by those who argue that this is the only way to compel Pakistan to contain jihadi elements undertaking terrorist activities within India’s borders.3 However, as Ganguly and Kapur very rightly point out, Pakistan may simply be lacking the capacity to eliminate jihadi groups.4 Even if this is not the case, waging war against Pakistan, even in the limited conventional sense, is unlikely to result in the state taking tougher action against jihadi groups. It is much more likely to fuel antiIndian sentiment and to provoke further attacks, given the fact that Pakistan knows that a limited war is precisely that – limited. It is much wiser to create a situation whereby the economic costs of supporting jihadi groups far outweigh the benefits of supporting them.

This is the only way to compel Pakistan to contain jihadi elements undertaking terrorist activities within India’s borders. However, as Ganguly and Kapur very rightly point out, Pakistan may simply be lacking the capacity to eliminate jihadi groups Proponents of limited conventional war also argue that such a conflict cannot and will not escalate into a nuclear conflict. Those opposing the strategy on the other hand are quick to point out that this simply cannot be guaranteed, especially when nationalist sentiment comes into play. Discussing the use of limited conventional war as a potential Indian strategy, Garg cites Manpreet, stating that “objectives will have to be limited, stated to the opponent and well-defined by the political leadership, so that military operations can be properly calibrated in line with political

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

Garg, R. 2011. “Positive Prospects for Limited War in South Asia.” Journal of Defence Studies. Vol.5(2). Ganguly, S.and Kapur, S.P. 2010. “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Islamist Militancy in South Asia”, The WashingtonQuarterly.Vol. 33(1). pp. 55-56.

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January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM

constraints.”5 Garg adds that “the territory involved in conflict, military resources used (weapon type as well as extent of military capacity deployed) and duration of conflict should be such that least encourage expansion of the battle.”6 Such arguments fail to take into account the unpredictability of war. While there is a chance that such an approach to conflict could work there is also a very significant risk that it would not. Were such a conflict to escalate the consequences would be dire for all parties concerned. Moreover, in advocating limited war, Garg fails to consider the humanitarian aspect of such a conflict. Limited conventional wars are not immune to significant casualties. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the Kargil War resulted in over 1,000 deaths and over 70,000 people were displaced.7 This raises the very serious question of whether this number of deaths could be justified at a time when the relationship between India and Pakistan is improving. The answer seems clear - armed conflict should and must be a last resort. In keeping with the argument outlined above, Singh argues that India’s “primary national concern will always be the prevention of an armed conflict, be it conventional or subconventional, regular or irregular, full scale or limited.”8 His argument is economic and is based on his claim that “the fundamental prerequisite for unhindered socioe-conomic growth is an

environment of peace and stability.”9 India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also stated that India will not fulfil its economic potential until there is peace with Pakistan.10 These are strong arguments against the use of limited war as an Indian strategy to resolve its differences with Pakistan.

Commercial cooperation Focusing specifically on South Asia, Mamoon and Murshed convincingly argue that trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict. They also argue that efforts to promote bilateral trade serve as significant confidence-building measures.11 Thus, the fact that Pakistan agreed to normalise trade relations with India in November 2011, granting India ‘most favoured nation’ status12 must be seen as a positive development. Taneja states that the Economic and Commercial Cooperation talks between the countries have been progressing at an unprecedented rate.13 Echoing Mamoon and Murshed, Taneja argues “easing or eliminating these non-tariff barriers would not only lead to much higher levels of trade, but would also serve as a powerful means for conflict resolution, further forging connections and interactions between Pakistan and India.”14 It is hoped that bilateral trade between India and Pakistan will jump from US$ 3 billion at present to US$ 6 billion by 2014.15 It is worth noting that countries which have a strong

trade relationship are much less likely to go to war than those that do not.16 Moreover, the other possible benefits of a better India-Pakistan relationship such as increased trade with Central Asia would also far outweigh the temporary gains that might be made by a limited conventional war. Basrur and Kassim are also optimistic about the possibility of better ties between India and Pakistan arguing that the two countries “are in a position to focus on common gains, mainly from an improved economic relationship and a renewed effort to create a “soft border” in Kashmir.”17 The search for common ground seems set to yield greater rewards than belligerency has ever done. In conclusion it seems clear that a positive approach to improving relations between India and Pakistan is necessary. There needs to be more talk of peace and less talk of conflict. Both countries should continue to seek common ground and to focus on those areas in which they can cooperate rather than setting preconditions for improved relations and greater engagement. There are likely to be many setbacks and given the intractable nature of the India-Pakistan conflict the road to peace will be a long one. However, at a time when there is room for cautious optimism it makes sense to embrace the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the conflict rather than dismissing the process before it has had a chance to get fully underway.

Manpreet, S. 2009. “Conventional War in the Presence of Nuclear Weapons”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33(3). pp. 415– 425. Garg, R. 2011. “Positive Prospects for Limited War in South Asia.” Journal of Defence Studies. Vol.5(2). p. 100. 7 Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Available at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=122&regionSelect=6-Central_and_ Southern_Asia# 8 Singh, H. 2011. “India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns.” Asian Security. Vol. 7(2). p.151. 9 Ibid. 10 3 November 2011. Pakistan to boost trade with India. The Wall Street Journal. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529 70203804204577013641982204650.html 11 Mamoon, D. and Murshed, S. M. 2010. “The conflict mitigating effects of trade in the India-Pakistan case.” Economics of Governance. Vol.11(2). 12 3 November 2011. “Pakistan to boost trade with India.” The Wall Street Journal. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 52970203804204577013641982204650.html 13 Taneja, N. 17 November 2011. Come together, right now – over trade. Foreign Policy. 14 Ibid. 15 Khambatta, P. and Thakkar, K. 2011. “India-Pakistan Trade – Better late than never.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at http://csis.org/publication/india-pakistan-trade-better-late-never 16 See for example Hegre, H., Oneal, J. and Russett, B. 2010. “Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict.” Journal of Peace Research. Vol.47(6). 17 Basrur, R. and Kassim, Y. R. 2011. “Pakistan, India and Kashmir: Will Nature force an Aceh Effect?” RSIS Commentaries. No. 151. 5 6

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

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Vice Adm Barry Bharathan (retd) The writer is former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. He also served as Indian Naval Attache in Washington DC, USA.

Hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason for its initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement would perforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along with the ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. More critically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries is bound to have an inhibiting influence on a military to miitary engagement. It is bad to have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one

GROUND REALITIES South Asia is like a wounded, lumbering, mad elephant unsure of where it is going. It often tramples itself. There are many mahouts with different kinds of “ankus, anlius or in the vernacular ankusa” for controlling the pachyderm. The two most inimical neighbours, India and Pakistan are declared nuclear weapons states. However they are still nascent nuclear militaries. China is a robust military nuclear / conventional power in comparison. It has the unique ability of being the most strident of the mahouts, with pervasive influence in the region. The current security environment is simmering, just at the boil thanks to the unstable, volatile, “Nobody really in charge situation” in Pakistan. The degraded Afghan angst, the ham handed American / NATO approach, USPakistan misperceptions, Taliban resurgence, the high probability of nuclear installations falling into terrorist hands and lastly the Indo-Afghanistan stand alone relationship seem to vindicate “THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR” in the Sub-continent. The enigmatic Chinese keep every one guessing including their ally Pakistan. The Americans would eventually bid good bye and leave behind a sordid, squalid mess that is already oozing through the pores of the Sub-continent. South Asian Leadership has simply changed to pleader-ship and dealer-ship. The writer’s appeal: This article needs to be read purely on the narrow context of limited war and security in a nuclear weapons environment.

THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR

The writer, a former Vice Admiral with a penchant for out of the box solutions, contends that there is no scope for a Limited war in South Asia. He asserts that hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason for its initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement would perforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along with the ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. More critically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries is bound to have an inhibiting influence on a military to military engagement. It is bad to have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one. He avers that economic development alone is the panacea for our ills.

“Lie” means falsity. It is also a golfing term signifying the position of the golf ball with reference to the grass beneath it. Both these are relevant to the concept of Limited war.

he concept of limited war came about in the 50s. Its origins were Western but also accepted by the Eastern bloc. To the American mind it meant a conflict that would not result in the destruction of the United States. The Soviets understood it as not having to employ their full military might while achieving restricted objectives.

Earthy examples International arena The American experience in Vietnam, the Russian adventure in Afghanistan, Chinese border skirmish with Vietnam, India’s IPKF efforts in Sri Lanka, all in a non-nuclear environment are traumatic historic examples of the failure of Limited war in principle and practice. In human context it is tantamount to a woman being a little pregnant. Today, the American angst in Iraq, the American / NATO agony in Afghanistan are all pointers to the powerlessness of the powerful. Asymmetry in warfare, no holds barred ruthless tactics of weaker powers stump security and military forces all over. South Asia The sub-continent, has inherent, internal, intrinsic, conundrums and contradictions. It is quicksand all the way that is dragging the region down into a morass. India and Pakistan are at each other, since partitioned independence. China has joined the fray from the early sixties. In effect there exists a continuing state of confrontation, contention, stand-off and conflicts. The 48, 62, 65, 71 wars were all short term limited wars without the nuclear weapon scenario. China is the only gainer in terms of territory. Possession of the Tibet autonomous region and the Aksai Chin area in the north-west give it a strategic edge in terms of water table control in the East and access to the Arabian sea in the West through a class one Karakoram highway. Op Parakram, Kargil and all the previous conflicts clearly show that in the South Asian security scenario, there is no difference between war or limited war. Both are clearly not affordable. Irony of conflict futilities Intractable is the position of all countries of the region regarding geographical markings, land ownership, sharing of waters at the basic level. The levels of stand-off fluctuate from simmering discontent to high tension. Hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason for its initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement would perforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along with the ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. More critically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries

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is bound to have an inhibiting influence on a military to miitary engagement. It is bad to have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one. At the end of the day nothing in the sub-continent has ever changed! Nuclear weapon dimension The big question that still begs an answer is the Nuclear weapon dimension and the threshold of its military application. The American-Soviet Union Cold War stand-off, the Cuban crisis, the SALT talks, the NPT, the MTCR are global attempts by the nuclear haves to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons. There is also the fear of these falling into the hands of rogue states or terror groups. Closer home, the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues, highlight the ever present irrational possibility of nuclear weapons use by such radical groups. The September 2001 attack on the twin towers at New York and the 26 November Mumbai attack are grim reminders too. The West and East led by USA and Soviet Union were opposing ideologies and established industrial powers. There was effective governance and clear understanding of the use of military power given the experience of two World Wars. Dialogue was very much part of the stand-offs. All parties were also conscious of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

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limited wars

GROUND REALITIES

Analysis of the Cold War era shows the practice of brinkmanship through carefully orchestrated overtures of diplomacy, military, intelligence agencies, spy rings and interlocutors. The super powers also held a tight leash on their respective alliances. The hotline was an effective conduit for direct communication between leaders who controlled the nuclear button. In stark contrast is the South Asian scenario.

Ground realities India You have a stable democracy with a defensive military mindset; forced to deal with two contentious neighbours who are in collusion. This is further compounded with the reality of the Indian entity having no collective determinants on the Nation’s Management, Interests, Threats, Foreign, Security aspects. It is made more complex by Political diffidence and laissez faire ignorance. Compartmentalised working of the key ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Home, Finance is at the root of this. This is further complicated by the lack of operational synergy between the Services, Paramilitary, Police forces and Intelligence agencies. Lack of a networked set up in the overall functional apparatus, outdated working on files with interminable delays in the decision chain are our endemic weaknesses. The whole world is aware that an economically sustainable India is “Militarily immature” and fragile in Combat and Security dimensions. Op Parakram, the 26th November Mumbai attack bring this out loud and clear. Forget the fact that we are yet to take a decision on Kasab, the terrorist caught red-handed. Remember, that barring a few notional changes; India is as it was. The country and our culture appear to be OK with this. Military power Application of Military power has to be preceded by higher decision flow. Doctrine would have to drive strategy. Strategy would evolve Policies. Tactics would then emerge. Effective Command, Control,

Coordination, Communication are integral to this. Operational and Administrative logistics with robust transportation are inherent with the above. Overlooking absolute terms and assessing our relative military strengths would show that we may just have an overall edge over Pakistan in the conventional sense. It is enough to hypothetically exercise the option of a limited war, even if we could! In every case political objectives would have to be defined and the obvious Indian Objectives would require a full scale war. Even then it would be hard put to achieve these in the present and future. This is the nature of the geo-political game! And our National Aggregate strength. Our two front occupation and comparative fragility in the NE in terms of infrastructure, operational logistics reach, internal security issues and troop holdings is well known. That this is being addressed too is obvious. That this would take time and effort is also very apparent. Net assessment of India in a security construct both external and internal needs to be done through a collective calculus. It would become apparent that the Indian combat and security market place needs a robust military industrial complex and well integrated higher, middle and field echelons of decision making. It must include the intelligence community. At the International level, considering where India is today and where she is predicted to be in the future, “Our Country” should elevate itself from being “Pak centric to Pak agnostic”. Kashmir should be on the back burner but with proactive possessiveness and hyperactive vigil. Pakistan was a threat till a couple of years ago. Today it is a terrorism scourge which has to be soundly dealt with. Even the Chinese and Americans have reviewed their Pakistan approach. We should focus on robust military mechanisms, heightened alert systems, coordinated security structures. It is well within our reach. The status of our International defence cooperation with Russia, USA, Israel, France, UK needs to be pragmatically leveraged to achieve self-reliance through effective transfer of technologies. This would perhaps take two or three decades. In the interim, consolidation

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of our overall Defence through revamp must be our immediate goal. We have the foundation for this. It can be drawn from within existing resources with pragmatic, innovative, imaginative, participative involvement by the PoliticoBureaucratic-Diplomatic-MilitarySecurity-Intelligence combine. It must be made accountable to the Parliament as behoves a democracy of our stature. Pakistan The creation of Pakistan was a tragic artifice of partition that troubles the region. It is still struggling to seek an identity for itself. Its Paranoia of comparing itself with India, its Military dictatorship and apology of a Government has made their country a failing state. Pakistan is out of control without any direction on any front. The present period of its dark history is fraught with various probabilities, ranging from implosion, to subjugation by radical elements. Their military is divided against itself. The Nuclear command and control structure is suspect. Their democracy is culturally pseudo because it is mixed up with Islamic theocracy. That society has to find answers within. Indian political-diplomatic-militaryintelligence collective must be aware that Pakistan would leverage nuclear deterrence to continue its tactics of militancy and terrorism. Pakistan is aware that a democratic India is unlikely to be provoked to engage in a limited war as has been proved on a few occasions. India needs to insulate and guard itself while creating counter deterrence measures. Our constant harangue on Pakistan, about its misdeeds and trespasses need to be stopped. We have to get our Political, Diplomatic and Military act together to find workable answers to the situation on hand. Indian answers India is a reluctant Nuclear weapons power. The primacy of its purpose being preservation of its sovereign integrity. It has an openly declared “No First Use Policy”. India needs to understand, accept the ground realities of Pakistan with all its complexities. We have to ensure our security by robust, resolute and openly affirmed doctrine of “Growth

and Development” on terms that are not conditioned by events in the neighbourhood. This requires us to be sound in “Security and Defence”, with synergy and innovation. We have the economic wherewithal, the industrial base, the science, technology foundations, to convert all our challenges into opportunities. Our demographic advantage needs to be maximised to ensure sustaining and improving upon our growth rate. Developing rural India and combining the agrarian and commercial economies would be part of this.

Contention to co-existence The planetary, strategic, economic and navigation charts of Democratic India and Communist China cause mostly contention, misperception, brinkmanship and also cooperation at times. Given the present circumstances, an agreement for Co-existence by these two Asian majors would have all round salutary effect. The Indian evolution The infinite wisdom of the Indians has beaten the odds. It has evolved as a progressive, stable, secular democracy with global recognition. Perhaps the realisation of the overarching need to achieve economic well being and development drives the Indian polity to constantly seek balance between military spending and progress. Mature restraint, resilience to act within the realm of real politik is remarkable considering the contradictions and conundrums of a large democracy. Introspection China and India are the biggest commercial partners. Today it stands at nearly US$ 60 billion and expected to rise every year. India and China displayed solidarity in the Copenhagen convention on climate change to ensure that no ultra concessions were given to the developed nations by the developing ones. The Chinese and Indian Navies exchange visits at various levels. Joint exercises and port visits by ships also take place. India and China are two ancient

civilisations. The former is a rising power and the latter is risen as highlighted above. Both are set for preeminence in the International arena. India has to project itself as a confident democracy with robust and integrated higher management structures of Command, Control, Coordination through collective determinants of Interests, Threats on Sovereignty, Security, Economy, Trade and Development. It has to deal with the reality of the overarching Chinese presence. Both have divergence and convergence opportunities in the region. Raising the “threshhold of Contention” while accommodating dialogue and debate have to be ongoing. India’s nuclear weaponisation, border Military reinforcements, Maritime build-up, regional naval cooperation with Indian Ocean rim countries and International navies are all on dead reckoning track. The Indian democracy is evolutionary in nature and culture. Comparisons with China, its economic power, Military / Maritime strategic capacity would only create uncalled for Sino-phobia. Six decades of independence has shown that in the ultimate, India’s wake is wise, despite all its apparent functional weaknesses. These all can be set right as mentioned earlier in the charts. It can no longer appear diffident and muddled but mature and futuristic. After all, we are India and have to map our charts to ensure co-existence and cooperation. This is the intuitive Indian wisdom and faith that will see us reach our destiny. This should be our core belief and vision.

Pakistan, We are progressing with the former. The latter being tactically more fractious, volatile and unstable needs us to evolve responses with synergy and calculated risks. We never need to be the proverbial good neighbour willing to turn the other cheek or just rant and rave helplessly. Our Kargill response was effective and gained International recognition.

Net assessment of India in a security construct both external and internal needs to be done through a collective calculus. It would become apparent that the Indian combat and security market place needs a robust military industrial complex and well integrated higher, middle and field echelons of decision making Our International relationships, need to be leveraged well as stated earlier. US-INDIA relationships must be turned into dynamic cooperation. We need to expose the West to what Pakistan has become - a haven of radical terrorism, religious fundamentalism with potential of nuclear weapons falling into wrong hands. Solution of the Kashmir issue would not by itself be the panacea for Pakistan to become peaceful. It requires that country to realise the folly of its Anti-Indian mindset. This should be our constant diplomatic and political endeavour.

Curtain call

Our Internal security and counter terrorist measures must become sophisticated, holistic and responsive. The Ministries of Defence, Home must work with the states in cohesion. Concept, Policy, Action must flow from Political direction.

The cold start doctrine and the concept of limited war in our context are fallacies that need to be given up. That it was taken without any political direction does not matter. That our Leadership vision is myopic can also be discounted. Even if we miraculously obtained oneness of thought on our security paradigm, “Preemption” is not in our culture and we are also no good at prevention as yet. Most importantly we are not in a position to control the chain of events.

The good news is the growing awareness. The bad news has been described above. The solutions suggested are not only known but highly and easily doable. India and Indians must learn ownership and find answers from within. We are much beyond the Rubicon of reason and restraint and have to focus on what needs to be done in the pursuit of our Interests. Kautilya’s Arthashastra and the Bhagwad Gita are timeless in mentoring the Indian Polity.

Our economically evolving Nation has to nurture openness and freshness of thought in dealing with China and

Let us not fall prey to the “LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR”.

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limited wars

Lt Gen J F R Jacob PVSM (retd) The writer was the Chief of Staff of Eastern Command during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh. He is widely regarded as one of the key architects of that spectacular victory. Post retirement, he has served as the Governor of the states of Punjab and Goa. We divided the area of operations for the freedom fighters into sectors. Maj Zia was to be responsible for the Chittagong sector. Major Khalid Musharaf for Comilla, Maj Saifullah for Mymensingh, Wing Commander Bashar for Rangpur, Lt Col Zaman for Rajshahi, Major Usman for Kushtia, Maj Jalil for Khulna. ‘’Tiger’’ Siddiqui was to operate from Tangail as did Noorul Kadar and Toha

HEROIC CAMPAIGN The 40th anniversary of the historic victory in Bangladesh fell on 16 December this year. Lt Gen Jacob, former Army Cdr Eastern Command and one of the prime architects of this victory, reminiscences about that text book campaign. It was a classic campaign that saw India’s political and military leadership at its inspired best. In a blitzkrieg of just 14 days, a new nation state was created with the force of arms and over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war were taken. Gen Jacob highlights the vital role played by the Mukti Bahini Guerillas, as also the in-house debates of what should be the centres of gravity of this campaign. Army HQ felt it should be the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong, whereas Gen Jacob insisted it should be the capital city of Dacca. He gives a graphic first hand account of the climactic events leading to the Pakistani surrender at Dacca.

Remembering Bangladesh:

A Historic Victory

n this 16 December, the 40th anniversary of the unconditional public surrender of Lt Gen A A K Niazi and 93,000 military of the Pakistan Eastern Command, let us pay tribute to all those in Bangladesh and in India who gave their lives in the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh. Special tribute must be paid to the people of Bangladesh who rose up against the Pakistani oppressors and resisted them most gallantly. Let us also not forget the tremendous contributions of the freedom fighters and the East Bengal battalions fighting along side with the Indian armed forces. On the night of 25/26 March 1971 Gen Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistan Army to crack down on Dacca university and other areas. Mujib the hero of the freedom struggle and leader of the struggle for the liberation of Bangladesh, was arrested. Mujib is deservedly recognised as the father of the nation. The brave people of Bangladesh led by Mujib, rose up and resisted the Pakistan Army. The East Bengal battalions moved into India, the refugees streamed into India.

In view of the intolerable economic burden, Mrs Indira Gandhi decided to help the freedom struggle and ordered the army to help the freedom fighters verbally and later officially on 29 April 1971. Meanwhile in early April a number of resistance leaders began arriving at Calcutta, prominent amongst them Tajuddin, Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, Qamaruzzam, Col Osmani and Group Capt Khadkar. A government in exile was established in a bungalow at 8 Theatre Road, Calcutta. I interacted with them frequently. They wanted to have a meeting of parliamentarians at Baidyanath Tala to declare their independence. I suggested that they should issue a declaration as was done by Charles de Gaulle in World War II. Tajuddin asked for a draft declaration. I gave him a short draft. This was expanded by legal experts. The declaration was issued on 17 April at Baidyanath Tala just within East Pakistan. We facilitated the defection of personnel of the Pakistan Deputy High Commission, Calcutta. They joined up with the the government at 8 Theatre road. Government of India asked us to assist the freedom fighters. I reconnoitered and had initially 8 camps set up in the border areas. Each camp had the capacity to train 1,000 recruits. Army HQ spelt out 3 tasks: 1. To advise and guide the provisional government. 2. To organise and equip a guerilla force of 20,000, to be subsequently expanded to 1,00,000. 3. To plan and conduct guerilla operations in East Pakistan. We divided the area of operations for the freedom fighters into sectors. Maj Zia was to be responsible for the Chittagong sector. Major Khalid Musharaf for Comilla, Maj Saifullah for

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Mymensingh, Wing commander Bashar for Rangpur, Lt Col Zaman for Rajshahi, Major Usman for Kushtia and Maj Jalil for Khulna. ‘’Tiger’’ Siddiqui was to operate from Tangail as did Noorul Kadar and Toha. Group Capt Khadkar played a pivotal role in overseeing operations of the freedom fighters, as Osmani was most of the time out at Sylhet with his East Bengal battalions. He formulated what the tasks were and guided the operations of the freedom fighters. His dedicated contribution to the successful operations of the freedom fighters was a crucial factor in the freedom struggle. The operations of the freedom fighters were decisive in the freedom struggle. They attacked the Pakistan Army and their infrastructure. They created an environment of fear throughout the Pakistan Army, lowering their morale. Due credit must be given to them for their decisive contribution to the liberation of their country. In early April Manekshaw phoned me that government was wanting Eastern Command to move in immediately into East Pakistan. I explained that we had mountain divisions with no bridges or motor transport. We needed time for training. The monsoon was about to break.

The operations of the freedom fighters were decisive in the freedom struggle. They attacked the Pakistan Army and their infrastructure. They created an environment of fear throughout the Pakistan Army, lowering their morale. Due credit must be given to them for their decisive contribution to the liberation of their country

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limited wars

HEROIC CAMPAIGN

He asked by when we should move in. I said not before 15 November by when the terrain should be reasonably firm.

Some 30,000 tons of stores and supplies were moved to Tripura for a corps. Large tonnages were moved to Tura, North Bengal and West Bengal. This we did during the monsoon before the receipt of any orders He asked for a brief which I sent him by hand of Brig Sethna. A meeting was held in the operations room in Delhi attended by Mrs Gandhi, the ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Finance, Home, Defence Secretary and Director Military Operations. Manekshaw read out my brief ... Mrs Gandhi accepted that we could move in after 15 November. Lt Col Sukhjit Singh [Maharaja Kapurthala] GSO-1 ops was present.

Our strategy We assessed that Gen Niazi would defend the towns and territory. We therefore adopted the following strategy: 1. Dacca, the centre of gravity of East Pakistan, was to be the final objective 2. Fortified towns were to be bypassed. Thrust lines were to be along subsidiary tracks. 3. Subsidiary objectives were to be communication and command and control centres. 4. The Pak Army was to be drawn to the border areas by operations of the Mukti Bahini. We made our outline plans accordingly and sent them to Army HQ. Logistics were of paramount importance. We developed the infrastructure, built up logistical cover. Some 30,000 tons of stores and supplies were moved to Tripura for a corps. Large tonnages were moved to Tura, North Bengal and West Bengal. This we did during the monsoon before the receipt of any orders. When the

war started, troops did not have to look back - everything was in place. The creation of the logistical backing was critical to our success, regrettably the bridges were only released in mid August and were old World War II repairable pontoon bridges. These we were able to have repaired in time. The maps we had were some 50 years old. Courtesy of the Mukti Bahini however, we were able to get the latest Pakistani maps which the survey of India reproduced. These maps were issued to our troops in November. In mid August Manekshaw and Maj Gen K K Singh came to Fort William with their draft operations instruction. They spelt out the objectives to be the “entry ports” of Khulna and Chittagong. Dacca was not an objective. I pointed out that Dacca was the centre of gravity and it was imperative that we take Dacca. Manekshaw supported by Gen Aurora disagreed. He was adamant that it was not necessary to capture Dacca. Air Chief Marshal P C Lall in his book “My Years With the I. A. F.” confirms that Dacca was never an objective. He states that there was no coordination at service headquarters and that once limited objectives were agreed to, each service did what it thought best. We did not take either Khulna or Chittagong but nevertheless decisively won the war. We had to find troops to take Dacca. In November we moved down three brigades from the Chinese border. When Manekshaw found out he ordered them back. In October we planned the air drop of a battalion group at Tangail to take part in the capture of Dacca. The drop was planned to take place on D plus 7 and the link-up 24 hours later. The drop and link-up took place as planned. The operations order for the drop signed by SASO Devasher, Brig Matthew Thomas of the Para Brigade and J F R Jacob, was issued in October itself. In November we sent Capt Ghosh

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of 50 Para Bde to Tangail to mark out the dropping zone and to inform Siddiqui that he was to advance with our troops to Dacca. Unfortunately, this Siddiqui did not do. In a masterstroke Mrs Gandhi had the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed. This ensured that the Chinese dared not intervene. The Soviets moved 40 divisions to the Xinjiang border and 7 to the Manchurian border. Throughout the operations for the liberation of Bangladesh Mrs Gandhi stood firm and determined. She took pragmatic decisions. She never wavered. Due credit for her decisive contribution must be given to her. On 22 November a decision was taken to move up to some 10 miles into East Pakistan to counter Pakistan Artillery fire. We used this opportunity to create jumping off areas for the coming operations. This drove Yayha Khan in desperation to order on 3 December the bombing of our airfields in the west. The war had started. We put our offensive plans in operation. The thrusts into East Pakistan went as per our plans. The para drop went off well and by 13 December our troops reached the outskirts of Dacca. On 13 December the Soviets vetoed a US resolution asking for cessation of hostilities. They said there would be no more vetoes. The Enterprise carrier group was in the straits of Malacca. There was consternation in Delhi. We were on the outskirts of Dacca. Manekshaw sent us an order to go back and capture all the towns we had bypassed but not Dacca. He copied this order to our corps commanders. We told our corps commanders to ignore this order and to proceed with the offensive as planned. [remember Nelson at the battle of Copenhagen in 1801, on seeing a flag signal to withdraw, he put his telescope to his blind eye and said ‘’I see no signal to withdraw, attack’’. The rest is history. We had not captured any town. I was being blamed for the strategy for not capturing towns. If a ceasefire

was ordered we had no captured towns to show [Jessore and Comilla were abandoned by the Pakistan army]

The ceasefire proposal was given to Bhutto in New York on 15 December. It was rejected out right by Bhutto. He stormed out of UN Security Council meeting later that night swearing to fight on.

out. There were snarls from the generals there. Niazi said ‘’who said I was surrendering, you have only come for a ceasefire ‘’. Farman Ali said that they did not recognise the joint Indo-Bangladesh command. I took Niazi aside and told him that I could not give him better terms as we had discussed this on the wireless ... We had included protection of all who surrendered as also that they would be treated with respect as per the Geneva Conventions. I told him if he surrendered we would ensure protection of all military personnel, their families and ethnic minorities. If he did not surrender we obviously could not take any responsibility for their safety. I added that if he did not surrender I would order the resumption of hostilities and the bombing of Dacca cantonment. I gave him 30 minutes to answer and walked out.

On the morning of 16 December, Manekshaw phoned me saying ‘’Jake go and get a surrender’’. I asked if I should negotiate on the draft instrument of surrender that I had earlier sent him. He said “you know what to do, just go”.

I was extremely worried. He had 26,400 troops in Dacca and we some 3,000 some 30 miles out. I had nothing in my hand. Aurora and his entourage were to land in a short time. The ceasefire was about to expire.

The UN was in session. I took with me the draft that I had earlier sent which remained unconfirmed. I took a chopper to Dacca. I was met by representatives of the UN who wanted to come with me to take over the government. I thanked them and declined. Niazi had sent me a Pak Army car with a Brigadier.

I went back after 30 minutes. The draft was on the table. I asked Niazi three times whether he accepted the draft instrument of surrender. He did not respond. I picked up the draft and said that I took it as accepted. There were tears in Niazi’s eyes. I told him he would have to surrender on the Race Course in front of the people of Dacca. He resisted surrendering in public but reluctantly agreed. I told him he would provide a guard of honour. He said there was no one to command it. I said his ADC would command it. We worked out the modalities for local surrenders. After lunch we proceeded in Niazi’s car to the airport to meet Aurora and his entourage. They arrived at around 1630 hours. We then went to the Race Course. The ceremony was basic and simple. We hardly had any troops in Dacca. There were not the

On 14 December we got an intercept regarding a meeting in government house. The Air Force bombed the house. The governor resigned. That evening Niazi and Farman Ali went to see the American Consul General, Spivack with the following ceasefire proposal: 1. Ceasefire under the UN. 2. Hand over the government to the UN. 3. Withdrawal of all personnel by the UN 4. No reprisals. There was no mention of India.

There was fighting going on between the freedom fighters and the Pakistan Army. We had hardly gone a few hundred yards when the Mukti fighters fired at the car. I jumped out. They recognised my olive green uniform and stopped firing. They wanted to kill the Brigadier. I persuaded them to let us continue to Niazi’s HQ. On reaching Niazi’s HQ I had the draft instrument of surrender read

resources nor the time for any frills. It was imperative to get the document signed at the earliest. A ceasefire was converted in the space of a few hours into an unconditional public surrender - the only one in recent history. After the documents were signed, there were tears in Niazi’s eyes. The people of Dacca rushed to lynch Niazi. We had difficulty in getting him to safety. It is pertinent to quote from the Hamoodur ur Rehman commission of enquiry. ‘’General Niazi, when you had 26,400 troops in Dacca and the Indians a few thousand outside and you could have fought on for at least two more weeks, the UN was in session and had you fought on for even one more day the Indians would have had to go back, why then did you accept a shameful unconditional public surrender and provide a guard of honour commanded by your ADC‘’. Niazi replied, I was compelled to do so by Gen Jacob who blackmailed me into surrendering. This he had repeated in his book ‘Betrayal of East Pakistan. I did not blackmail him. Had I failed to get Niazi to surrender the UN would have made us go back the next day. I did not fail. New nation Bangladesh was born. India emerged as a regional super power.

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limited wars

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. Views are personal.

The major aim of launching conventionally armed military forces into action will change from defeating the enemy to creating a militarily stable favourable situation so that negotiations, or even mediation, can be resumed. Traditional military principles and aims, that centred around planning for launching large-scale offensive operations to defeat the enemy, are likely to change to limiting military action to inflicting devastating damage on the enemy’s field forces and thus containing them, rather than defeating them comprehensively. The long-term emerging trend in inter-state warfare clearly points towards “limited wars”

PRECLUDING ESCALATION Today when nations carry out a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the achievement of national aims is commensurate with the likely costs of waging a major war, prudence invariably dictates that if war is unavoidable, it must remain limited in scope and conduct. It is now well accepted in India that future wars in the Indian context are likely to be limited wars. These will be predominantly land battles that will spin out of ongoing conflicts on land like the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India in Jammu and Kashmir and the half-century old military stand-off along the Line of Control. The Indian doctrine for limited war must emphasise massive asymmetries of firepower to achieve destruction and degradation of the adversary’s war waging potential in a strategic context.

n the early decades of a new century and, indeed, a new millennium, it appears certain that major, full-fledged, no-holds-barred wars, like the two World Wars of the 20th century, are no longer likely to dominate the strategic landscape. Regular, conventionally armed militaries will gradually become less usable and will eventually take over the role of an “unusable” deterrent from nuclear weapons. Mass destruction and large numbers of civilian and military casualties will no longer be acceptable in the prevailing socio-political milieu. A policy of ‘protectivism’, in which resort to armed force is rejected as an active instrument of state policy but accepted as a means of protecting a country’s existing territory against military action by an adversary, is likely to gain international acceptance in future. In short, the aim of maintaining military forces will be to deter war and, as Maj Gen J F C ‘Bonny’ Fuller wrote a century ago, the object of war will be peace and not victory.

Emerging trend Consequently, the major aim of launching conventionally armed military forces into action will change from defeating the enemy to creating a militarily stable favourable situation so that negotiations, or even mediation, can be resumed. Traditional military principles and aims, that centred around planning for launching large-scale offensive operations to defeat the enemy, are likely to change to limiting military action to inflicting devastating damage on the enemy’s field forces and thus containing them, rather than defeating them comprehensively. The long-term emerging trend in interstate warfare clearly points towards “limited wars”. The term limited war implies

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

Limited War

in the Indian Context

regular military operations by one nation state against the regular military forces of another nation state and excludes irregular operations by terrorist organisations against a state or by other non-state actors like warlords against a state or against other warlords. With its passage marked by two World Wars and numerous lesser conflicts, the 20th century was without doubt the bloodiest in history. After the advent of the atom bomb, capable of causing horrendous destruction and its first use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it is indeed amazing that the record of blood and gore was not much worse. Perhaps some basic human instinct for survival stayed the hand that controlled the nuclear trigger. Though war continued to hold its Clausewitzian place as the “continuation of politics with other means”, it gradually dawned on the security establishments of the world’s leading powers that “total”, “absolute”, “general” or “all out” war was no longer possible. However, tacit acceptance of this truism came much later in the early 1990s when it was realised that the half-century since the end of World War II had witnessed mainly “limited wars”. The Korean conflict that resulted in a stalemate, the defeat of the United States (US) in the Vietnam war, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967, 1973 and 1982, the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, the India-Pakistan conflicts of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, the Falklands War (1982), the long drawn out Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-88), the Soviet intervention in and ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan (1979-89), the Gulf War of 1990-91, the Indo-Pakistan Kargil conflict (May-July 1999) were all limited wars. The continuing conflict between the international coalition against terrorism and the

Taliban-Al Qaeda combine in Afghanistan since October 2001 is also a limited war. Each of these conflicts had limited political objectives and military aims and even though these objectives were not fully achieved in some cases, escalation was avoided.

Major, full-fledged and no-holds-barred wars, like the two World Wars of the 20th century, are no longer likely to dominate the strategic landscape. Regular, conventionally armed militaries will gradually become less usable and will eventually take over the role of an “unusable” deterrent from nuclear weapons Today when nations carry out a cost-benefit analysis to determine

whether the achievement of national aims is commensurate with the likely costs of waging a major war, prudence invariably dictates that if war is unavoidable, it must remain limited in scope and conduct. India and Pakistan have fought four short wars since independence, including the 1999 Kargil conflict. Though relations at the strategic level continue to be reasonably stable, instability persists at the tactical level. The Pakistan Army and the ISI (InterServices Intelligence Directorate) have waged an unrelenting proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere since 198889 through mercenary Mujahideen belonging to international terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad

(JeM), among others. However, India has steadfastly conducted its counter-proxy war operations within its own territory – mainly to avoid the risk that military strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) may escalate to full-fledged conventional conflict, with the attendant risk of nuclear exchanges. The Indian military leadership nevertheless believes that there is space for limited conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold.

Military objectives While confronting the Pakistan Army’s nefarious intrusions into the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir in mid-1999, the Indian government had come to the conclusion that while the early eviction of the intruders was

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a prime necessity, it was not in the overall national interest to escalate the conflict to other fronts along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border with Pakistan as the conflict may have spun out of control and risked crossing nuclear red lines. Hence, India fought only a limited, localised war to evict Pakistani intruders. At the same time, the Indian military planners did not hesitate to use overwhelming artillery firepower and punitive ground strikes by the Indian Air Force on the home side of the LoC to support the ground offensive in the Kargil sector. Simultaneously, Pakistan was deterred from escalating the conflict by skilfully stage-managing the movement of the Army’s strategic reserves and combat squadrons of the Indian Air Force towards the western border and by deploying the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet in the Arabian Sea to present Pakistan with a fait accompli. Thus, a clear and concise, though limited, national aim was achieved through limited military objectives in a localised conflict that employed maximum available ground and air firepower and succeeded beyond expectations.

It is now well accepted in India that future wars in the Indian context are likely to be limited wars. These will be predominantly land battles that will spin out of ongoing conflicts on land like the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India in Jammu and Kashmir and the half-century old military stand-off along the Line of Control (LoC) Speaking at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, seminar on Limited War on January 6, 2000, former Defence Minister Mr George Fernandes had expressed the view that conventional war can still be fought and that covert proxy wars are not the only option. “Conventional war remains feasible, though with definite limitations, if escalation across the nuclear threshold is to be avoided.” Most Indian analysts are convinced that the advent of nuclear weapons has not ruled out the feasibility of limited war. Late Mr K Subrahmanyam, Air Cmde Jasjit Singh and General V P Malik,

limited wars

PRECLUDING ESCALATION

Limited Wars

former Chief of the Army Staff, among others, have articulated the belief that there is clear strategic space for a conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold because nuclear weapons are not weapons of warfighting. They are political weapons whose sole purpose is to deter the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons by India’s nuclear armed adversaries. Hence, it is now well accepted in India that future wars in the Indian context are likely to be limited wars. These will be predominantly land battles that will spin out of ongoing conflicts on land like the proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India in Jammu and Kashmir and the half-century old military stand-off along the Line of Control (LoC). A limited border conflict between India and China due to the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute cannot be ruled out despite the ongoing rapprochement between the two countries. Conventional war in future is likely to be a point somewhere midway on a continuum that encompasses the present conflict along the LoC and the AGPL with Pakistan, as also Pakistan’s ongoing proxy war and a possible border conflict along the LAC with China. Since it is likely to spin out of ongoing conflicts on land, it will be predominantly a land battle. Gaining, occupying and holding territory and evicting the enemy from any Indian territory occupied by him will remain important military objectives. It is well recognised that it will not be possible to conduct a successful land campaign without overwhelming and sustained support from the Indian Air Force by way of air-to-ground strikes by fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft in the contact, immediate depth and the deep strike battles. Only a joint Air-Land campaign can possibly achieve the military objectives of limited war in the Indian context. In his excellent book on Limited War written for the

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NEW PERSPECTIVE

in South Asia: Against the Nuclear Backdrop Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, Maj Gen G D Bakshi (Retd) has recommended that “primacy must be given to air power and naval power in a limited war over projection of land power responses.” He emphasises deterrence by punishment primarily through air and naval power and recommends a graduated response strategy. After the 2001-02 military standoff and India’s frustration at not being able to launch a swift military response, the Indian Army began to look for a new doctrine that would enable the country to achieve its political and military aims in a short war without running the risk of crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. The Indian doctrine for limited war must emphasise massive asymmetries of firepower to achieve destruction and degradation of the adversary’s war waging potential in a strategic context that precludes destruction and paralysis through large-scale manoeuvre. However, it needs to be clearly recognised that while future wars on the Indian sub-continent may be fought as limited wars, larger conflicts cannot be ruled out. Planning and preparation for war and future force structures must take this reality into account. The nation must remain prepared to eliminate threats across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Another civilian perspective on the issue of Limited wars in South Asia. Though the writer rules out a limited Nuclear war as an obvious absurdity, his view on a conventional conflict against a backdrop of nuclear symmetry is more nuanced.

Dr Rajiv Nayan The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he published his monograph Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia.

In 1953, Ralf Lapp’s technical work was the first published literature which analysed the possibility of nuclear weapons in limited war. However, the most popular and authoritative work was produced by Bernard Brodie in 1954. He argued for limited and tactical role of nuclear weapons in war in Europe to scuttle the communist advantage in the region

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NEW PERSPECTIVE

outh Asia is the region that has been witnessing statesponsored terrorism for decades. The prevalence of enduring and recurring terrorist violence orchestrated by Pakistan has been forcing the international community to chalk out a strategy to counter terrorism. However, the western campaign for counter-terrorism made the biggest terrorist state - Pakistan a partner. As a result, counter-terror activities could not act on the source of terrorism not only in Pakistan but also all over the world. Admittedly, in the past months, the leader of the counter-terror campaign appeared sending some signals, if not action, to Pakistan. This signal has yet not generated enough confidence and hope among people suffering from terror for decades. Quite frequently, victims of terror are asked to make peace with terrorists in South Asia. In the region, the victim of terror, India, is advised to enter into dialogue with Pakistan. The understanding is that it will broker peace and end terrorism. The experience explains otherwise. After the Mumbai attacks, the prevailing tense atmosphere in South Asia drew attention of the international community. This focused attention and monitoring of the situation forced Pakistan to suspend its terror activities temporarily. The moment the dialogue was resumed, a series of celebratory terrorist attacks were carried out by Pakistan-based terror groups. Many western pundits had predicted nuclear flashpoint in the tense situation. Instead the tense situation in South Asia and tough position of India produced a period of relative peace in South Asia. The traditional western position stands defeated. Similarly, Traditional Western Pundits on South Asia instantly rule out a limited war in a nuclear condition now. They predict catastrophe. An all out war. Quite interestingly, some of them had planned war in a nuclearised atmosphere during the cold war. The plan had to fight not only limited war in the nuclear shadow but also nuclear war. The

alarmist

situation

created

by Western nuclear theologians and their Indian counterparts has been shielding Pakistani terrorists. For years, this kind of thinking allowed Pakistan to keep its antiIndia terror operation intact. The Pakistani blackmail took hundreds of innocent lives. However, time and again, the strategic community is put under pressure to explore war as an option to end terror strikes of Pakistan. 26/11 provided yet another occasion to ponder over the issue. Is a limited war under the nuclear shadow impossible? The answer is no. The entire formulation of the impossibility of limited war in the nuclear atmosphere is based on limited and lopsided facts. The nuclear world has a very short history and often complex history. The first problem of all these theoretical formulations is the conceptualisation of limited war. Some writings of the early cold war period generally referred the World Wars as the real wars and all the wars fought at the relatively lower scale as limited wars. Some of the writings considered the conquest of a country as the total war, but the withdrawal from the enemy’s territory as limited war.

The alarmist situation created by Western nuclear theologians and their Indian counterparts has been shielding Pakistani terrorists. For years, this kind of thinking allowed Pakistan to keep its antiIndia terror operation intact However, the dominant understanding on the limited war, during the early decades of the cold war, was in terms of use of tactical and other battlefield weapons for limited effect. In fact, the attempt to marry nuclear weapons with limited war was made by the US government as early as 1948. It started Project Vista at the California Institute of Technology to explore the role of tactical nuclear weapons for limited warfare. The effort continued in the later years. In 1953, Ralf Lapp’s technical work was the first published literature which analysed the possibility of nuclear weapons in limited war.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

However, the most popular and authoritative work was produced by Bernard Brodie in 1954. He argued for limited and tactical role of nuclear weapons in war in Europe to scuttle the communist advantage in the region, though the NATO council ruled out its possibility in Europe.

war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilised world.”

The attempt to marry nuclear weapons with limited war was made by the US government as early as 1948. It started Project Vista at the California Institute of Technology to explore the role of tactical nuclear weapons for limited warfare

Contemporary writers on limited war are also struggling to define and understand limited war. The plethora of literature is confusing the policy and strategic communities both. On South Asia, too, we witness writings arguing the possibility and impossibility of a limited war in the nuclear age. In India, the Cold Start doctrine is discussed to promote the idea of a limited war; Pakistan, it seems, is putting an emphasis on tactical weapons to send a different signal on limited war.

Throughout the cold war and even after the end of it, writings and reports from both the governmental and non-governmental organisations continued to come arguing for and against the use of nuclear weapons for a limited war. In 1957, James King debunked the thesis that a nuclear war can be kept limited. Later, he was joined by Bernard Brodie and much later in the 1960s onwards by a number of writers. The idea was called ‘unmitigated nonsense’. However, the relevance of nuclear weapons for limited war got a very prominent name and that was Henry Kissinger. For decades, he along with others kept arguing the significance of nuclear weapons to keep a war limited and deterrence credible and cost effective. The Korean War gave another dimension to the discourse on limited war. The war refuted the idea that a limited war cannot be fight in the nuclear age. The Korean War was generally accepted as a limited war by all standards. Even the involvement of the two hostile groups did not make it a total war. In fact, later declassified documents and other writings reveal that MacArthur wanted to make the war total because in his thinking there is nothing called limited war; according to him, there should be either total peace or total war. However, President Truman later wrote about the Korean War that “Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind; to prevent a third world

What is the guarantee that nuclear exchange will not take place in a future war because it did not take place the last time?

Based on the cold war experience, the international community and even analysts in strategic studies assume that a conventional war between two nuclear armed countries or groups is impossible. It is propounded that any conflict between two nuclear entities will either immediately or subsequently escalate into a nuclear war. Is this true? Reality falsifies this hypothesis, which is essentially based on limited historical experience and erroneous logic. India was forced to fight a war with Pakistan in 1999 when both the countries had gone nuclear. Pakistan infringed upon India’s territorial sovereignty, its regular Army fought a war against the regular Indian Army and the Indian assault combined with international pressure forced Pakistan to withdraw its Army from the territory under Indian control. India did not use nuclear weapons when its territorial integrity was infringed, nor did Pakistan do so when faced with defeat. Another question that comes up here is what is the guarantee that nuclear exchange will not take place in a future war because it did not take place the last time? Notwithstanding Pervez Musharraf’s book In the Line of Fire and some of his officials’ statements indicating military parity

between India and Pakistan, because of the latter’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and South Asia becoming a nuclear flashpoint of the world, it has been reiterated time and again by Pervez Musharraf and his officials that a nuclear exchange in case of an India-Pakistan conflict can go out of control and as a result no sensible person from either side will allow this to happen. For them, it is an unthinkable situation. India can feel confident about the thinking capability of the current ruling class of Pakistan, which is well aware of the disastrous consequences that may result if it introduces nuclear weapons in a conflict.

through a very small amount of nuclear weapons. Interestingly, this logic has been adopted by countries like India and China by calling it a ‘minimum retaliating strike’ or credible minimum deterrence. Even some US nuclear whiz-kids and policy-makers have acknowledged this possibility. And a nuclear weapons strike on NATO forces may lead to a different kind of psychological impact on Western public opinion and policy-making. Thus, such understanding of Pakistani inaction can be used to predict the future nuclear behaviour of Pakistan in a conflict with India as well.

There can be some apprehensions about the lunatic fringe or non-rational or jihadi elements, which have infiltrated the Pakistani nuclear establishment. Some may argue that these elements may manoeuvre the Pakistani government to get nuclear weapons introduced in the conflict. This argument can be nullified if one looks at the current conflict between the NATO forces led by the United States and Taliban / Al Qaeda elements. While the United States has bombed Taliban hideouts in Pakistan, there has been no nuclear retaliation from the ‘insane’ elements. It is common knowledge that for the Al Qaeda or Taliban forces the United States is currently enemy number one.

Another argument is that if Pakistan feels or fears that its existence is under threat, it may use nuclear weapons. But this does not hold much ground as an Indian operation is unlikely to have the objective of permanent occupation or a merger of Pakistan with India. Yes, Pakistani existence may come under threat when it introduces nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict because it will then be certain that India will annihilate it with its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistan’s signalling through tactical nuclear weapons development is not going to work. It knows all the ideas were championed by the American strategic community when the US had nuclear superiority. After the advent of nuclear weapons in other countries, the moderate voice regarding the battlefield use of nuclear weapons started emerging.

Associated with this is the issue of the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal in relation to the US predominance or even attacks on Pakistani territory. The international community is already aware of the arm-twisting of Pakistan after the 9/11 incident that has led to the tumbling of the entire terror strategy and policy that Pakistan pursued through the Taliban. Neither the Pakistani military regime nor the civilian government has had the courage to stand up to US belligerence. Here, some may argue that this is because the United States is a formidable power with powerful war machinery. In fact, the logic of deterrence also underlines the threshold of ‘unacceptable damage’

Thus, we find that even a brief history of the nuclear world demonstrates that limited war in a nuclear age is a possibility. The Pakistani nuclear blackmail is to end and for this, war as an option should be kept in mind. In the South Asian context, all the western theology has been proved wrong. Already, a limited war was fought in the region. The Korean experience also demonstrated that the complacency arising out of the possession of nuclear weapons leaves armed forces unprepared or under prepared. India should also not fall in this kind of situation which leaves it unprepared.

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UNLIMITED THREATS

An out of the box civilian view of breaking the Stabilty-Instability Paradox in South Asia. The writer suggests attacking the China-Pakistan linkage via the Karakoram Highway in PoK. Would this trigger a two-front war? Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in Southeast Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

The Karakoram Highway built across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is soon to be turned into a steel collar around India’s neck with the addition of a rail link and pipelines to fuel Chinese expansionism

ndia is no tyro in the planning and execution of limited wars but some of the political objectives achieved by the employment of this kind of warfare have been disappointing in that they have not removed the thorn from India’s flesh in Jammu and Kashmir nor have we been assured of peace and stability in the long term along large segments of our periphery. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 had by the brillance of its execution within 13 days brought 93,000 Pakistanis as prisoners of war to camps in India. Those who compare the figures of POWs taken in World War II forget that the canvas in Bangladesh was miniscule compared to the battleground in Europe and that several nations and their hordes of troops were deployed there. In East Pakistan, a whole army was captured and a new nation created in a midwifery that amazed the world. So we know how to do it. And we have the gutsy manpower to do it. Most importantly we occupy the moral high ground of time and gain giving peace a chance even after being betrayed by perfidious neighbours. Talks on Kashmir have distorted our sovereignty and given bogeyman credence to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence.

demand such foresightedness? Would geopolitics not have been different if Sheikh Mujib had lived longer? This small capsule from history should bring home to Indians the need to understand the centrality of a focused military / politico objective of any limited war and the imperative to preserve the gains on the battlefield.

No peace dividend

Military-politico objectives

But it brought no peace to India. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who stoked the rebellion against Punjabi domination in Pakistan’s body politic became its first President (later Prime Minister) but he was assassinated in a bloody military coup ironically on the very day that India was celebrating its trendsetting emergence from colonial bondage to freedom and independence on 15 August 1975. We were back to square one with Bangladesh once again becoming a haven for anti-India insurgent groups trained, armed and financed by China and Pakistan with only intermittent respite whenever the forever grateful daughter of Bangladesh’s founder, Sheikh Hasina Wazed returned to power. She has repaid India in large measure by helping to break the back of the United Liberation Front of Asom whose cadres were operating from her country’s soil during her current tenure. May God preserve her. For our sake. Or should we not do something to ensure her longevity? Don’t national interests

The Simla Agreement of 1972 has been criticised for its failure to resolve the Kashmir issue by demanding the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the illegally-occupied portion of the former princely state. Indira Gandhi can be faulted for not extricating Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistani clutches. But she has to be credited for making a massive investment in peace and good neighbourliness which unfortunately was not reciprocated by an ungrateful Pakistan. That is a lesson we need to keep in mind - that we are dealing with a nation-state that is a rogue in every sense of the term - and tailor our military-politico objectives and protocol for handling such a nation that prefers to operate (and revels in it) outside the bounds of international law. From Indira Gandhi to Manmohan Singh (with Atal Behari Vajpayee in between) India has made enough investment in peace with Pakistan. No more. Hopes of peace with Pakistan retain all the qualities of quicksand

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

BREAK THE STEEL COLLAR -------------------------------

India will have to put in place a ballistic missile defence network consisting of more than the estimated numbers of missiles in the Pakistan armoury. When Pakistan fires the first salvo of nuclear-tipped missiles at India and most of them are intercepted in midair by the BMD, India will be justified in launching its massive retaliatory strike which is the basis of its nuclear policy. Yes, we would be grievously wounded but then Pakistan would have been obliterated. Would the Pakistanis want that? For far too long we have allowed ourselves to be threatened into submission by Pakistan’s threat of first use of nuclear weapons at the first sign of danger to its national interests

evident from the behavioural pattern of its leaders from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto through Musharraf to Zardari read with General Ashfaq Kayani in brackets because he is nothing but a prisoner of the jihadi military establishment (remember Sherry Rehman’s swift retraction of the bill to amend the infamous Blasphemy Laws?) What then should be the military-politico objective of any future limited war even in its most baleful possibility of an uncontrolled nuclear exchange? Unequivocally, the liberation of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. It is the only legitimate military target available to India. It is

our land. It is in illegal occupation and we have made the mistake of allowing that central fact to be obfuscated by a smokescreen of “disputed territory”.

Why? Because we are being strangulated by the collusive operations of Pakistan and China. The Karakoram Highway built across Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is soon to be turned into a steel collar around India’s neck with the addition of a rail link and pipelines to fuel Chinese expansionism. The effect of this linkage will be that we will never have peace in

Jammu and Kashmir given the insatiable desire for strategic depth in Pakistan and China’s for the means to fuel its industries. The status quo suits them and no self-respecting nation with one of the largest standing military establishments in the world can exist in self-delusion of grandeur when its neighbours begin to turn to the rising sun which is a natural tendency. Nepal is shifting out of our orbit. Bhutan and Bangladesh will follow suit given the blandishments a larger economy can proffer. (The recent case of Seychelles, which India has wooed assiduously in its anti-piracy campaign in the Indian

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UNLIMITED THREATS

Ocean littoral, agreeing to give China facilities for its naval fleet is a case in point.) Thus if the Chinese strategy of creating such facilities from one end of the Indian Ocean Region to the other has come to be described as a “string of pearls”, the facilities through PoK can more justifiably be described as a steel collar. China’s spectacular development is happening at our cost and we have to lie back and grin and bear it.

The first action should be the destruction of all roads and bridges leading to the junction at Gilgit where the Chinese have posted several thousand of their soldiers disguised as labourers working on the modernisation of the Karakoram Highway. The initial strikes will have to be airborne or with appropriate missiles where the Pakistani radar coverage is particularly dense. The Karakoram Highway itself will have to be destroyed both at the Chinese side north of Gilgit to prevent any reinforcements being brought in from Xiangjiang and from the Pakistan side in the south. Indian Special Forces should gain control of Pakistani cantonments in PoK and ensure that the land link between Pakistan and China is cut for a long time to come. Much has been made of the massive infrastructure that the Chinese are laying all around India. It must be remembered that infrastructure makes natural targets. There are some points along the Karakoram Highway where the destruction of a bend could cause major problems for Pakistan and China

Break the encirclement The prime objective of any limited war should now be the liberation of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Scanning the many tomes that have been written on the art and science of limited war there are some brilliant nuggets interspersed with such stupid suggestions like “hot pursuit” of jihadi terrorists. Those who suggest such a line of action have learned nothing from the dismal failure of Operation Parakram that was launched immediately after the attack on Parliament a decade ago.

We had the high moral ground and international opinion behind us but we messed it up. We have since replaced that “long march” concept with one of reaction on a very short fuse. It has also come to be known as “cold start” But hot pursuit will be a mindless misadventure because the Pakistan Army will unleash its jihadi terrorists from its many havens and the Indian Army will find itself in an urban guerrilla warfare situation that would be worse than what was experienced in Jaffna in Sri Lanka during the IPKF operations against the LTTE. Penetration of Pakistani territory of up to 50 km has been suggested by some Indian analysts as the likely trigger for Pakistan using nuclear weapons. The destruction of all infrastructure - roads, bridges, water supply, electricity - within and around major metropolitan centres like Lahore (which is a hotbed of jihadi activity), Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad and a blockade by the Indian Navy of the Pakistani coastline should be the precursor of thrusts at appropriate points to render the Pakistan military machine hors de combat. Air superiority will be a pre-requisite.

Target number one This would draw attention away from the main objective in Jammu and Kashmir. Here too the first action should be the destruction of all roads and bridges leading to the junction at Gilgit where the Chinese have posted several thousand of their soldiers disguised as labourers working on the modernisation of the Karakoram Highway. The initial strikes will have to be airborne or with appropriate missiles where the Pakistani radar coverage is particularly dense. The Karakoram Highway itself will have to be destroyed both at the Chinese side north of Gilgit to prevent any reinforcements being brought in from Xiangjiang and from the Pakistan side in the south. Indian Special Forces should gain control of Pakistani cantonments in PoK and ensure that the land link between Pakistan and China is cut for a long time to come. Much has been made of the massive infrastructure that the Chinese are laying all around India. It must be remembered that infrastructure makes natural targets. There are some

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

points along the Karakoram Highway where the destruction of a bend could cause major problems for Pakistan and China Joint operations by the Army and the Indian Air Force should target symbols of Pakistani control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir like the concentrations of the Gilgit Scouts and the Northern Light Infantry that was used to infiltrate into the Kargil heights in 1999. India’s operation in PoK should be that of a liberation force that will brook no opposition either from the regular Pakistan Army, its paramilitary adjuncts or its jihadi phalanx of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbul Mujahideen and the JKLF.

No cakewalk It will not be a cakewalk but it is definitely a better option of a limited war of attrition spread over months or years that has been bandied about. Kashmir is the core issue between India, Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are being used to scare India into reducing its options in Kashmir even as Islamabad and its military Headquarters in Rawalpindi have been using terrorists to do their dirty work under the nuclear overhang. India has allowed the Pakistan nuclear deterrent to work and yet makes pitiful noises to try and get Pakistan to rein in the terrorists. It is a futile exercise and India’s Operation Parakram after the terrorist attack on Parliament emphasised that futility. If limited war is accepted as state policy, which it appears to be given the current emphasis on Exercise Sudarshan Shakti in the Rajasthan desert, then New Delhi and the Indian military high command will have to break out of that deterrence complex and present Pakistan a fait accompli. The first act must be delinking Pakistan from China geographically across the Karakoram Highway. The effect would be to raise the cost of China’s support for Pakistan-sponsored terrorism behind the façade of a war of independence by “Kashmiri fighters”. It will have to send its forces all the way around the Malacca Strait to come to Pakistan’s assistance.

The China factor Of course it has the other option of

opening up a second front at several different points along the amorphous Line of Actual Control. It is here that the Indian military acumen will be tested to the full. The Indian military establishment must prepare to stop the Chinese in their tracks between the Brahmaputra river and the northern foothills of the Himalayas. If China is unable to make a breakthrough as it did towards Tezpur in 1962 it would severely dent China’s claims to be a global super power. For this to happen India must improve its fire-power capabilities drastically. The ability to mass the kind of artillery support as was done in Kargil will be severely affected by the lay of the land. The accent will have to be on air-to-ground missiles or air-mobile artillery - guns on board aircraft. Anything else that can destroy Chinese troop concentrations well before they make contact with the Indian defence line must be acquired and deployed. A stalemate with China induced by superior firepower would be a victory for India, more particularly if the link between it and Pakistan is severed in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Penetration of Pakistani territory of up to 50 km has been suggested by some Indian analysts as the likely trigger for Pakistan using nuclear weapons. The destruction of all infrastructure - roads, bridges, water supply, electricity - within and around major metropolitan centres like Lahore (which is a hotbed of jihadi activity), Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad and a blockade by the Indian Navy of the Pakistani coastline should be the precursor of thrusts at appropriate points to render the Pakistan military machine hors de combat. Air superiority will be a pre-requisite To make this scenario a reality Indian troops will have to batter their way through Pakistani lines along the Muzzafarabad and Astore axes and link up with the Special Forces and the bridgehead they are expected to create along the Karakoram Highway. From then on air bridges will have to do what they have been doing in any case all along the Himalayas for the past six decades.

And yes, the nuclear factor It would appear that I have ignored the looming and very palpable threat of an escalation of conflict to a full-blown nuclear war. The whole thesis is postulated on the acknowledged Indian expertise in what is currently the rudiments of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) of which the Prithvi Air Defence missile is the key. It has demonstrated its capability to intercept incoming missiles both in the endo-atmosphere (inside the atmosphere altitude) as well as in the exo-atmosphere (outside the atmosphere attitude).

The prime objective of any limited war should now be the liberation of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir India will have to put in place a ballistic missile defence network consisting of more than the estimated

numbers of missiles in the Pakistan armoury. When Pakistan fires the first salvo of nuclear-tipped missiles at India and most of them are intercepted in midair by the BMD, India will be justified in launching its massive retaliatory strike which is the basis of its nuclear policy. Yes, we would be grievously wounded but then Pakistan would have been obliterated. Would the Pakistanis want that? For far too long we have allowed ourselves to be threatened into submission by Pakistan’s threat of first use of nuclear weapons at the first sign of danger to its national interests. We have been paralysed by the “nuclear flashpoint” bugbear. Pakistan appears to think that it can get away unscathed for the use of jihadi terrorists posing as Kashmiri freedom fighters who have operated from behind Pakistan’s nuclear shield. Time we put it to the test.

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Nitin Gokhale The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTV’s Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

The new shift is aimed at strengthening the Army’s capabilities to fight what a serving general calls a war on ‘two and a half fronts’ - a reference to possible simultaneous confrontation with Pakistan and China in addition to being deployed in counterinsurgency situation internally

TRANSFORMATION Exercise Sudarshan Shakti was a major Air-Land battle exercise that would help synergise the resources of the Army and Air Force and enable the actualisation of capabilities envisioned during the recent Transformation study conducted by the present Army Chief prior to assuming charge. Over 60,000 troops and 300 tanks are participating in the exercise. For the first time the Army successfully used its satellites and UAVs during ‘Sudarshan Shakti’ to provide a real-time picture and information of the war zone to battlefield commanders. The shift in outlook and the matching changes in the Army structure are based on a “Transformation Study,” carried out by a group of senior generals over the past two years. The new shift is aimed at strengthening the Army’s capabilities to fight a war on ‘two and a half fronts’. The Indian Army will move from a “Command-based” deployment to a “theatre command” format where the ‘front’ or the spearhead will be seamlessly integrated with resources in the depth or the rear.

inter is usually the favoured season for Indian Army units exercising their armoured and mechanised troops and equipment in the Thar Desert bordering Pakistan.

Cold start Every year for the past half a decade one of India’s three Strike Corps and a Desert Corps have conducted manoeuvres to validate and fine-tune what is popularly come to be known as “Cold Start” war doctrine. Under this concept the defensive corps close to the border with Pakistan were re-designated as ‘pivot’ corps. The pivot corps were given enhanced offensive elements under integrated battle groups (IBGs) which consisted of division-sized force comprising armour, artillery and aviation assets designed to swiftly strike against Pakistan before the strike corps located deeper inside India could mobilise. This was supposed to be the ‘cold start’ in which the IBGs got into action in less than 48 hours.

For the first time the Army successfully used its satellites and UAVs during ‘Sudarshan Shakti’ to provide a real-time picture and information of the war zone to battlefield commanders Last year for instance exercise Vijayee Bhava (Be Victorious), practiced blitzkrieg-style operations to hit the enemy hard at short-notice. It basically revolved around the armour-intensive 2 Corps.

EXERCISE SUDARSHAN SHAKTI:

VALIDATING DOCTRINE

The new concept of real time linking of the command centres with the battle zone was successfully tested during the war game in the deserts of Rajasthan. “The endeavour has been to validate and integrate the use of all available assets, including satellites and UAVs to assist commanders in taking dynamic and proactive operational action in a fluid battlefield situation,” a senior officer, participating in the exercise, said. An important facet being validated is the real-time links between sensor and shooter which enables commanders to take instant decisions even as information is being shared among platforms and personnel to order the weapons to be deployed, he said. The nerve centre of the Exercise was the Joint Operations and Information Room (JOIR). The JOIR, of the 21 Corps, is regarded as the most recent and in-depth practical application of network-centric warfare. In the past three years, this concept was used on and off in different exercises but this was the best application of technology in warfare so far. Since armies around the world are becoming leaner and meaner network-centric warfare is seen as the way forward. At the JOIR multiple screens line the walls and officers shuttle between maps and workstations. Each station is responsible for a separate set of information. Some access real-time intelligence reports from UAVs and direct satellite feeds for the first time from special forces, radars and enemy intercepts. A data wall allows the commanders to view information as and when required, as well as stay in touch with different headquarters and centres simultaneously. Through radio, real-time visuals and information coming up the channel allows the commander to plot enemy movements on a map, analyse enemy capabilities and structure the army’s response. They are able to provide troops on the ground with supplies, reinforcements, air support and visuals of enemy camps, enabling them to plan their point of attack and even strategically launch rockets 90 km into enemy territory. Aerial assets provided by Indian Air Force (IAF) like Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft and AWACS have also been used to provide a real-time data of the war zones.

The two-month long Exercise Sudarshan Shakti in 2011 which reached its zenith in mid-December not only took the concept further but added several new dimensions to India’s war-fighting theories.

Over 60,000 troops and 300 tanks are participating in the exercise which has brought together all elements, including air power on one single platform . This makes it one of the biggest Indian Military Exercises in the last 20 years or so. Apart from 120 artillery guns and an array of missiles and rockets, the exercise involves operation by aircraft such as Su-30 MKI, Jaguars, MiG-27 and MiG-21, AWACS and helicopters.

For the first time the Army successfully used its satellites and UAVs during ‘Sudarshan Shakti’ to provide a real-time picture and information of the war zone to battlefield commanders.

The exercise helped Southern Command to validate its war-fighting concepts while working towards ‘capability-based approach’ relying on a series of transformational initiatives, concepts, organisational structures and

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

limited wars

absorption of new age technologies, an army release claimed. The shift in outlook and the matching changes in its structure are based on a “Transformation Study,” carried out by a group of senior generals over the past two years.

New concept Led by the current Chief of Army Staff, General V K Singh (when he was Eastern Army Commander), the study group had come up with radical suggestions which, when fully implemented, are designed to bring in a paradigm shift in the way the Indian Army is deployed and operationalised for both defensive and offensive situations. Essentially, the new shift is aimed at strengthening the Army’s capabilities to fight what a serving general calls a war on ‘two and a half fronts’ - a reference to possible simultaneous confrontation with Pakistan and China in addition to being deployed in counter-insurgency situation internally. So far, four wars between India and Pakistan and one between India and China have been stand-alone conflicts but Indian strategic thinkers say a future scenario wherein close allies China and Pakistan launch a joint offensive against India is a distinct possibility. The Indian Army wants to be ready for such an eventuality. And the way forward, the Army has concluded, is to become a fleet-footed force capable of quick mobilisation and deployment. Army Chief General V K Singh too confirmed the current thinking at the highest levels in the Indian Army during an interview with the writer earlier this year. Gen V K Singh revealed publicly for the first time that the Army would “reorganise, restructure and relocate” various formations for transforming it into a more agile and lethal force. “We are looking at reorganising and restructuring our force headquarters including the Army headquarters for faster decision making so that it becomes slightly flattened and more responsive,” he said.

limited wars

TRANSFORMATION In an interview last year to this writer, Gen V K Singh had stated: “Our focus is now shifting from being an adversary-specific force to a capability-based force, able to fight across the spectrum - in the mountains, in the desert, night and day, in the hot summer or harsh winter.” The Army Chief confirmed that the transformation plans were originally evolved in a study carried out last year after which sub-committees were formed to implement them. “This year, we will make test beds to try out the concepts that would be implemented at larger level later,” he added. We are looking at theaterisation of combat support resources to ensure synergy of resources in a theatre as part of theatre battle plan,” the Army Chief said. Top generals said this would mean that the Army would be organised in such a manner that the two theatres would be independent of each other and for war-fighting in a particular theatre, the resources of the other theatre would not be required. The Army is also planning to increase its aviation assets by getting more helicopters for the Army Aviation Corps. The exact contours of this long-awaited transformation will be finalised at the end of Exercise Sudarshan Shakti. The transformation envisages seamless integration of available forces without the constraints of limiting the resources in water-tight compartments of “commands.” So far, each Command and Formation operated well within its prescribed boundaries and deployed the combat as well as support services only within its own jurisdiction. The transformation however seeks to break down these artificial boundaries to minimise losses and increase optimal utilisation of resources. So in the years to come, the Indian Army will move from a “Command-based” deployment to a “theatre command” format where the ‘front’ or the spearhead will be seamlessly integrated with

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

resources in the depth or the rear.

War games

UNIQUE SCENARIO

SUB-CONTINENTAL

Exercise Sudarshan Shakti was complemented by a major participation of the Indian Air Force assets including its major frontline combat aircraft, including the Su-30, for a massive joint exercise with the Army in the Jaisalmer sector. The exercise codenamed ‘Maha Gujraj’ was designed to test the efficiency of a conventionally integrated land-air warfighting machinery over the desert.

DILEMMA

The exercise, witnessed the deployment of assets under the Gandhinagar-based South Western Air Command. Hundreds of fighter stories, decimation of advancing armour, round-the-clock readiness for fighter and attack helicopters, mobilisations of several ground and airborne air defence assets are being undertaken by the IAF, said an official.

A succinct article that highlights the dilemmas India would be faced with in a Limited war scenario in South Asia which could emerge from a collusive threat by China and Pakistan. The writer avers that Pak would be keen to use Tactical Nuclear weapons and the onus would be on India to prevent such an escalation.

Another additional feature in both the massive exercises conducted in the deserts this year has been the employment of assets developed by DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) and ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation). Both these organisations tested satellite and surveillance capabilities to connect to a real-time war-like situation. “ISRO is keenly watching the efficacy and robustness of its satellite down-links for the field forces,” an Army spokesperson said. The concept of dedicated Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) units was also validated during the exercise to enhance operational situational awareness.

India’s Unique Security Situation Two Nuclear Armed Adversaries as Immediate Neighbours.

Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd) The writer is working for a multinational information technology company after his retirement. He is PhD in Sino-Indian Relations and contributes regularly to magazines, periodicals and newspapers on Strategy, Security and Defence related issues. A future Indo-Pak conflict will be a scary scenario. On one hand use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pak is a distinct possibility while on the other our failure will reduce us to the status of a minor in Asia and we will remain confined to south Asia - exactly what China wants. Our aim should be to gain a clear tactical victory by thwarting Pak designs on the valley while at the same time not inviting a nuclear strike. A nightmarish scenario indeed

Such massive exercises, which put to test both men and machines are sure to hone the skills of the Strike Corps. Inter-services synergy based on advanced technology has been on the rise in the past five years and is therefore a major gain for the Indian military since future wars, whenever they take place, will be swift, short and fought under informatisation umbrella. To that extent, the Indian Army is keeping itself ahead of the curve.

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

limited wars

UNIQUE SCENARIO

o other country has such a complex security situation as india has. Two nuclear armed adversaries who are all weather friends, could well result in a collusive scenario. Thus evolution of a strategy to tackle both adversaries simultaneously is going to be a tough one for India’s defence and diplomatic establishments. As far as India’s defence forces are concerned, they would have a twin strategy of deterrence against one and dissuation against the other. It will be a test of our foreign policy establishment if one adversary can be diplomatically managed without conflict. Of the two, it is Pakistan which, going by historical evidence, is likely to go in for a conflict to achieve its pet aim annexation of Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that all its attempts, be it war, proxy war, infiltration and terrorism have failed, do not seem to deter its leadership from adventurism. With generous help from its all weather friend China, it has acquired nuclear capability with a sizeable stockpile of nuclear weapons. This has to be factored in by India in any conflict situation. Since we are always in a reactive mode, our riposte will have to be such that it does not cross the nuclear threshold. It implies that the conflict which will start in Jammu and Kashmir has to be kept confined there. An important issue will be the timing of Pak offensive. Most likely it could be after NATO and US forces withdraw from Afghanistan. This would get Pakistan its strategic depth and release forces from the west to be employed in the East.

Pak war aims Since the raison d’etre of any future conflict by Pak will be to annex Kashmir valley, offensive will be launched in Jammu and Kashmir to fulfill this aim. Main thrust will be launched in the valley sector while subsidiary thrusts will be launched, again across the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir to divert Indian forces. Since infiltration has failed in the past, prior to the offensive, Pak will use its agents in the valley to create unrest in the valley with the twin aim of

diverting Indian forces and get an excuse to liberate the valley. Pakistani objectives could be: 1. Capture valley sector. 2. Force India to keep the war localised by nuclear threat. This may result in India not being able to employ its combat superiority across the international border to make Pak recoil in Jammu and Kashmir. 3. Pak will also threaten a collusive scenario with China to make India fight a two front war. Although in the past, China has not colluded with Pak militarily, India will have to earmark forces against China thus reducing force levels against Pak.

Indian dilemma Since Pakistan will be on the offensive to start with, it will gain some success initially. India will thus be faced with a situation wherein any offensive launched by it has to be aimed in making Pak recoil. India will need to achieve an end state where it has managed to make Pak recoil from the valley sector. In this India will have to be careful in not crossing the nuclear threshold. It will be crossed when we capture or threaten a sensitive objective in depth. Since use of tactical nuclear weapons is part of Pak nuclear doctrine, it can be presumed that Pak may well use tactical nuclear weapons against Indian forces which are threatening sensitive objectives in depth. Thereafter to upgrade retaliation to strategic nuclear weapons will be a great dilemma for India. We will have no moral justification in vapourising Karachi and Lahore. In any case, international community will not allow this. The other part of Indian dilemma is to tackle a collusive scenario if it comes about. Forces will have to be earmarked against China. This implies that force levels against Pak will reduce and thus a decisive end state may not be possible and a stalemate may result. Our diplomacy will have to play a big role in preventing a two front war. It must also be borne in mind that a stalemate will be a near victory for Pak and our claim of being an Asian power will

January 2012 Defence AND security alert

be seriously jeopardised.

Indian riposte options In any future conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, capture of Uri-Poonch bulge must be our foremost option. Not capturing Uri-Poonch bulge in 1971 war will forever haunt us. Its capture in a conflict scenario will give us two advantages. Firstly infiltration in Gulmarg and Poonch sectors will stop. Secondly we will have a much shorter route to the valley to counter Pak threat to the valley. It will also deny a launch pad to Pak for an offensive into valley sector. Threatening Muzaffarabad from Tithwal sector will deny Pak a launch pad in northern Kashmir. India could also launch an offensive into the stategic Chenab-Jhelum corridor from Naushera. This will be like getting into Pakistan’s gut. In the international border sector, India will have to be on strategic defensive in a conflict situation. Role of the Navy and Air Force will perforce be limited. The aim of both sides will be to keep the conflict localised to Jammu and Kashmir. Our biggest dilemma will be to ensure we do not cross the nuclear threshold and yet do not allow Pak to capture Jammu and Kashmir. Given half the chance, Pak will be itching to use tactical nuclear weapons. A future Indo-Pak conflict will be a scary scenario. On one hand use of tactical nuclear weapons by Pak is a distinct possibility while on the other our failure will reduce us to the status of a minor in Asia and we will remain confined to south Asia - exactly what China wants. Our aim should be to gain a clear tactical victory by thwarting Pak designs on the valley while at the same time not inviting a nuclear strike. A nightmarish scenario indeed.

IFSEC India / Homeland Security India 2011 – a resounding success !!! IFSEC India 2011 was held at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India from 08 - 10 December 2011. Delhi, December 2011: The fifth security exhibition, IFSEC India 2011, turned out to be a thunderous success with thousands of security professionals from all over the globe descending on Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India, during December 8-10. The Union Minister for Home Affairs, Mr P Chidambaram, inaugurated the event. The exhibition, which was spread over three days from 8th to 10th December, saw over 11,684 trade visitors, which comprised leading names from over 250 exhibitors taking the opportunity to present their latest developments to the market, present and also gather market intelligence from the various international pavilions from countries such as UK, USA, France, Sweden, Taiwan and China. This year IFSEC India, in partnership with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham), featured a Homeland Security India conference titled, “War against terror- A challenge to our Homeland Security.” The conference was a vital event for all homeland and commercial security professionals in both the public and private sector in India. Mr D R Karthikeyan, Padma Shri, Chairman, ASSOCHAM’s National Council on Installations, Premises & Personnel Security (IPPS) delivered the welcome address. The conference focused on the advice, solutions and systems required for vigilance and security. In his welcome address, Shri Karthikeyan said, “Homeland Security is the most important aspect that sets the agenda to a secure future of the country. The event as always has received very positive responses from the industry and I am very excited with the way the industry is reacting towards the event.” Various associations, supporters, members and sponsors and domestic and international participants along with the strong visitor support contributed to the one of a kind B2B exhibition, which has gained a stronger foothold as the most prominent and important exhibition on the commercial and homeland security sector in the country. Amongst the prominent and most reputed industry names in the business of safety and security that were present at the exhibition viz. ADI, Aditya, ANG India, Arise, Axis, BGI, BOSCH, DVTel, Everfocus, FAAC, Godrej, Gunnebo, HID, HIKVISION, Honeywell Security, Indigo Vision, Kores, Kufra, LG, Matrix, Miscrosoft, Morpho, NEC, Neural, Panasonic, Samriddhi Automation (SPARSH), Turbo, Tyco, Vectra Glosec, Verint etc. HIGHLIGHTS of IFSEC India and Homeland Security India 2011 • India’s Largest Exhibition for Commercial, Homeland Security and Fire Technology. • Supported by UK Trade & Investments & APSA- Asian professional Security Association. • Certified by US Commercial Services. • Country pavilions this year from USA, UK, Sweden, France, Taiwan and China. • Over 250 leading Security & Fire Technology Companies exhibiting. • Spread over 15,000 sq mts area. IFSEC India 2011 aimed at bringing together the security experts from various industries including financial services, infrastructure, public safety, law enforcement retail, realty and hospitality – all searching for the latest products and services in the security market. Next edition of IFSEC India is scheduled from 03-05 October 2012 at Greater Noida, Delhi NCR. For more information please contact Mr Pankaj Jain, T- 011-23765553, E: pankaj.jain@ubm.com or login to: www.ifsecindia.com / www.homelandsecurityindia.in

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