DSA January 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief “T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .

he Indian Army had truly come of age in 1971, when in a brilliantly synergised, Tri- service operation it broke Pakistan in two and ushered in the birth of a new nation state with the force of arms. 93,000 prisoners of war were taken in a decisive campaign that entailed a march on the enemy capital and enforced regime change. The Indian Army today, is passing through a critical era of phase transition. A significant challenge has built-up on the LC. The Pakistanis have deliberately desecrated the bodies of our men and caused a national outrage. In response the Army Chief told his men precisely what they wanted to hear. This may soon have to be followed up by appropriate action on the LC unless Pakistan chooses to see reason. Introspection. The Indian Army today, is passing through a critical era of phase transition. Today there is a need for the Army to sit back and introspect deeply. On the occasion of the Army Day, the following issues merit great concern and collective deliberation.

Need to accelerate the arms and munitions acquisition process: There are glaring voids and hollowness in the Army. We lack the standard 155 mm medium gun – the mainstay of any battle in the mountains. Our Air Defence (AD) equipment is of the 1960s and 1970s vintage and is crying out for replacement. So is the case for our Army Aviation helicopters and we cannot wait till the old machines start falling out of the skies. A large proportion of our tank fleet is night blind and the infantry needs new small arms and night vision capabilities across the board. We need these urgently and not a quarter of a century later. Crafting a limited war doctrine: By the 1980s, the Chinese under Deng Xiaoping, had come to the clear-cut determination that large scale, general wars like the First and Second World Wars were now history. Our era will primarily witness Limited Wars against a nuclear backdrop. These would be sharp, short and very violent. Nations would have to rely upon a come as you are capability. In 1999, our Army Chief was forced to state, “We will fight with what we have.” The pity is that our Ministry of Defence (MoD) Papers still insist that Indian Armed Forces will prepare to fight a general war. This would, the MoD feels, prepare us for any lesser contingency. Limited Wars have their strong inbuilt constraints and the doctrinal base or way of war fighting that caters for a long duration, general war of 4-6 years can just not do for a sharp Limited War that lasts for a month or less. The entire scope of preparation, organisation and conduct modalities are vastly different for these two genres. These differences need to be recognised – if at all we are serious about fighting limited wars. Armies have to be specifically prepared and primed for the wars they are likely to fight – rather than the wars of a distant past. It is time we stopped hanging on so pathetically to the apron strings of our colonial past and did our own doctrinal thinking to suit the present day context and requirements. The PLA provides useful inspiration in this regard. Primary and secondary task: There is a need for an in-depth doctrinal debate. For long, a canard has been spread that Internal Security tasks detract from the Army’s readiness for conventional conflict. One only needs to see the records of the 3 Infantry Division and 8 Mountain Division in the recent Kargil War to see the bankruptcy of this argument. 8 Mountain Div, that was continuously in CI operations did far better than a division left free to prepare for its primary task. This canard has been spread by peacetime soldiers who have evaded service in CI environments and yet want accelerated promotions. The Chinese PLA has four tasks. This includes external and internal security tasks and there is no gradation or weightage accorded to different tasks. All are of equal importance. In the modern context, some 95-98 per cent of the time, Armies, will be engaged in LICOs. A doctrinal denial of this stark reality leads to mindsets that do not prepare for the most likely task. There is no better tactical training ground than live CI / CT operations. No simulator can replicate the adrenaline rush of live combat. Troops engaged in CI operations do much better in regular combat. Conflict termination versus conflict resolution: Our Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine currently is very pessimistic. It aims merely at minimalist level of conflict resolution that just sets the stage for talks between the government and the insurgents. That, it feels is all that armies can do. The decisive defeat that the Sri Lankan Army inflicted on the LTTE, clearly highlights that armies can do much more. We need to debate and discuss whether the Indian Army now needs to raise its sights and at the very least ensures that the government talks from a position of clear strength. Where foreign armed terrorists enter the fray, they will simply have to be eliminated. Period. Proportional force versus minimal force: Our Aid to Civil Authorities pamphlets were crafted in the British Colonial Era. The colonial regime was facing a non-violent Gandhian Protest Movement that was peaceful. The levels of violence were very low or largely absent. Hence minimal force was the order of the day. Post-independence, unfortunately the levels of violence have risen exponentially. Some 80,000 AK-47 series of weapons were recovered by the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir alongwith several hundred machine guns and rocket launchers and virtually tons of military grade explosives. This has led to the dangerous militarisation of such internal fault line conflicts. It would now be essential to use proportional and not minimal force. Anything less would endanger the unity and sovereignty of this country.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

publisher's view

o one more year has gone by and we are welcoming another new year. Time to take stock. Time for introspection. Time to ask ourselves if we have learned any lessons from the past 365 days? At 64, is the Republic strong enough to face and surmount the challenges both internal and external? Are the Indian people mature enough to create a nation where all live in peace and harmony, where all have security and dignity and where all can work for their own and the nation’s progress and prosperity?

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Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 4 J a n u a r y 2 0 1 3 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london business development shaifali sachdeva marketing and sales dhirendra sharma corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: maj gen (dr) g d bakshi (retd).

The recent brutal rape and eventual death in a Singapore hospital of a Delhi girl has shaken India down to its very roots. And shaken the faith of the people in the way India works. It was not an isolated case of rape or atrocity on women. There have been hundreds of such cases every month of every year all over the country. Unfortunately there have been no measures strong and deterring enough to control this menace which is affecting law and order, the image of our country and ultimately the security of every common man and woman. The unpalatable truth is that in the India of today a woman is not safe. She is not safe in the womb of her mother, in her home, in her school and college, at her workplace or out on the streets. Indian men have made her life unhappy and insecure. If any further proof was needed, how most of Indian men think and behave it was provided by Abhijit Mukherjee, Member of Indian Parliament and son of the President of India. And we have all seen how “Women’s Reservation Bill” is hanging fire in the Parliament for so many years. And how political parties have been opposing it tooth and nail whenever it has been tabled in the house for discussion. We Indians have forgotten the credo that should be central to our existence: Yatra Naryastu Pujyante, Ramante Tatra Devata is an ancient maxim which means wherever womanhood shall be celebrated and women will be worshipped, the lord our God shall reside there, his pious existence shall instill happiness all around.

Yatra Naryastu Pujyante, Ramante Tatra Devata

Republic at 64: Still unsafe for women

Who among us does not know how demeaning and denigrating women has been a national pastime for most Indian men. Time to put a full stop to this condescending and patriarchal demeanour that is emasculating and stifling the spirit of equal and constructive partnership between men and women so necessary for harmony in the family and society which carries a nation forward on the path of progress and prosperity. Now is the time for us all to introspect. Put our heads together. Gather whatever little goodness is left within each of us and as a sovereign people try to find how we can improve our laws, our judicial processes and most importantly the consciousness of our citizenry which creates a better and harmonious environment where women can feel safe and secure and live and work with dignity and contribute in building a vibrant India. And as Mahatma Gandhi was so fond of saying “Let us be the change we want to see”. Let us also remember what John F Kennedy said about the America of his time “We will neglect our cities to our peril, for in neglecting them we neglect the nation.” I suggest the following easily doable changes and improvements which I am sure will go a long way in meliorating the situation we find ourselves in.

After a gruesome and harrowing incident like Delhi rape public outcry and widespread agitation is natural. But while protesting and condemning such incidents young people and other concerned citizens must ensure that their protests and demonstrations are peaceful and do not create untoward law and order problems. I hope the Delhi braveheart’s heroism, indomitable struggle against inhuman odds and the spontaneous outrage and anger all over the country galvanise Indians both ruling and ruled to demand and collectively work for a just and humane society and each one of us resolves to declare that enough is enough and to ensure that human dignity is inalienable and the human spirit unconquerable. Union Home Minister Mr Sushilkumar Shinde has pledged that “Government is committed to seek deterrent punishment for all culprits and to make necessary changes in the law to make it more stringent so that such incidents do not recur in future.” MoS for Home Mr RPN Singh has also assured that the government would work towards ensuring “Harshest possible punishment in the quickest possible time.” I hope the pledges and assurances this time are not like the promises politicians generally make to douse the fires of the burning tragedy. These pledges and assurances are doable and government must do everything in its power to change the laws and ensure their implementation and execution without any further delay. Every Indian must make sure that security is not for the selected few only but for every citizen. In a sovereign country security is a fundamental human entitlement. And the state must ensure to put in place the structure of policies and policing and delivery mechanism that guarantees security for all. The Mission Statement of DSA since its inception has also been sounding the same Alert in the words of Chanakya, “The power of a King lies in his mighty arms … Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.”

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

A special police force of women for women should be raised immediately in all states and UTs to deal with atrocities on women so rampant in all parts of India Special training should be given to this force to deal with rape and other cases of atrocities on women Till this force is raised special women police officers should be appointed in each police station to deal with such cases and only they should be allowed to handle such cases Separate fast track courts to decide all such cases within 90 days Provision of the harshest punishment for culprits Police personnel should be trained to be more sensitive while dealing with women The entire country should be covered under the safe city concept Use of effective technology and surveillance systems along with patrolling by police Special budgetary provisions should be made for the security of women Banning of tinted glasses and curtains in all passenger vehicles Effective patrolling and monitoring of all roads and vehicles after dark Mandatory self-protection training should be given to all girls from schools and colleges and to the working women Strict monitoring of the areas around liquor shops Every case of accepting illegal gratification by Traffic Police from transporters must attract immediate suspension of the license and arrest of the operator and policemen

Another Indianism unique to our politicos. Indian political parties and other outfits have been creating and propagating various Senas (private armies) to promote their vested agendas. I wonder why no political party or activist group has thought of forming a Naari Suraksha Sena (private army/security force for women)? Its time. We have National Women’s Commission and similar commissions in every state of the country. Every political party also has a women’s wing. I don’t understand what is the significance of these commissions and wings if they cannot work for the welfare of the women and fail time and again to ensure safety, security and dignity of the women of India. Team DSA condemns the brutal attacks, atrocities and rape of women and we stand with the women of India in their struggle for a life of equality and dignity. 2013 gives us another opportunity to get it right. Will India rise and get it right this time? India must. The stakes are very high. I take this opportunity to greet all Indians on the Republic Day and all Army Personnel on the Army Day both of which we celebrate in the month of January. Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

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Jointness: Need for a new approach

st battalion, The Assam Regiment, recently lost half a dozen of its brave soldiers in Sub-sector Hanif, in the Siachen Glacier area. They were unlucky to have been caught in an avalanche during a post link-up. The tragedy made news on the day it happened and was forgotten the following morning. The story was passed over for more tempting fare, including Vijay Diwas, national anniversary of the 1971 war. Meanwhile the rest of the Army went about doing its duties as a matter of routine, as they are wont to. There isn't a pause for them from duties, high altitude or hot desert, steaming jungles or sultry plains. And so it was for 1 Assam as well. Despite losing valuable lives it chose to remain committed to its operational duties in the most difficult of terrains known to man. Drawing its troops from the myriad of societies that populace India's northeast, 1 Assam is equal to the job, as much as any other troops can be. Including those that belong to high altitude areas.

Which is really the unique aspect of India's Army. When it comes to operational tasks and responsibilities there is no compartmentalisation in the Army. Each task is everyone's responsibility. So each combat unit can and will, be deployed in tasks and terrains that everyone else will commit to as well. Of course tanks can't be used in most high altitude areas. But that doesn't stop officers and jawans from armoured regiments being deputed to units and formations undertaking operations in such areas. The wealth of experience passes across the Army's body and each will be willing to undertake impossible tasks. The spirit on display in Kargil was evident of this Indian Army feature. And which is the source of great pride for the people of India.

The Army's contribution to the security and well-being of India is an often overlooked aspect of the service. There is not one tehsil in the country, so to say, that doesn't have a son or a daughter serving in the Army. That connectivity with the soils of India is the greatest strength of the Army, as also the primary source of India's security. Even in the most disturbed parts of the country there will inevitably be a serving or retired soldier. The flag bearer of national pride. But unfortunately it is not a pride that is shared by many within the governing circles of India. So the distance that remains between those that live and fight for India and those that cause the fighting, continues to widen. Basic and common sense privileges that are owed to the soldiers remain unfulfilled. There is still politicking over the essential one-rank-one-pension scheme for ex-servicemen. Many other promises to soldiers remain undelivered. Irrigated land awarded to soldiers has not been given in many cases. Land disputes of soldiers remain unaddressed in numerous villages across India. Leave time from hard duties is taken up running pillar to post, but government doesn't care. When it begins to address these basic matters that will be the greatest honour the country can give to the sacrifices of its Army.

manvendra singh

Centre-state synergy in counter-terrorism operations For subscription write to: subscription@dsalert.org online@dsalert.org Or call: +91-11-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

contents L AND POWER IN INDIA Special Issue Januar y 2013 A R T I C L E S army's contribution to nation building: the way ahead M M Pallam Raju

08 An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

c o n t e n t s

Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 4 J A N U A RY 2 0 1 3

challenges of human resource management in the Indian army 12 Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (retd)

employment of mechanised forces in himalayan terrain

combat helicopters

marginalising the military: a return to the 1962 mindset?

astride northern borders

changing perspective of warfare in 21st century: it’s impact on land warfare

India, Afghanistan, central Asia: the post-2014 scenario

preparing for future conflict

a transformational doctrine for India’s land forces

the “fourth kind of war” truth or myth?

Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj PVSM, VSM (retd) Lt Gen B S Pawar PVSM, AVSM (retd) Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Lt Gen Prakash Katoch PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (retd)

F E A T U R E S CYBER SECURITY IN INDIA: THE NCIIPC ROAD MAP Muktesh Chander, IPS

Lt Gen (Dr) D B Shekatkar PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) Amb Ashok Sajjanhar

Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch SM, VSM (retd) Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee PVSM, AVSM, YSM (retd) Ilias Papadopoulos

missiles in land warfare in the Indian subcontinent: an update 56 Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd)

army's role in nation building

deconstructing contemporary Maldives

Indian artillery: lesser god of war

India’s continental military strategy: prepare two front, fight one front

Indian terrorist groups’ funding and its relation with money laundering

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) R S N Singh

Colonel U S Rathore (retd)

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (retd)

Michalis Diakantonis

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land power in India

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

M M Pallam Raju The writer is an Electronics and Communications Engineering graduate (BE) from Andhra University, Visakhapatnam and an MBA from Temple University, Philadelphia,USA. As a successful entrepreneur in the field of Information Technology, he was on the boards of many successful Public Limited Companies until his induction into the Union Council of Ministers. He has represented the Country in the United Nations General Assembly at New York, USA in October 2004 and at the SAFMA Conference in Pakistan in May 2005. He was the leader of the MPs delegation to Tokyo, Japan in November 2005 which was organised by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the SASAKAWA PEACE Foundation (SPF) and he was also a member of the delegation to Beijing, China in November 2005 for the Conference on Globalisation which was jointly organised by the Konrad Adeneur Foundation (KAF) of Germany and the Institute of Peace Studies, India.

In India, democracy however tenuous, has managed to hold and the constitution as initially introduced continues to be sacrosanct. This has been facilitated, by no small measure, by the armed forces who have maintained, most scrupulously, the ideals enshrined in the constitution and have made a great contribution towards nourishment of democracy in the nation

he writer of the lecture carried below is now the Union Minister for Human Resource Development. He gave the annual Field Marshal Cariappa Memorial Lecture for 2011 in his capacity as the Rajya Raksha Mantri. His long tenure in the Ministry of Defence has helped propel him to the Cabinet ranks. That long tenure exposed him to the Indian armed forces like never before. And that is the context of the memorial lecture. Nobody could be better prepared to address the question of the military's contribution to nation building than Shri M M Pallam Raju. "Chief of Army Staff, Gen Bikram Singh, Director General Infantry, Lt Gen Bajwa, distinguished guests and friends, I am deeply honoured to be invited to deliver this year’s Field Marshal Cariappa Memorial Lecture on the occasion of Infantry Day to such a distinguished audience. I consider it a privilege, because it gives me an opportunity to pay homage to the memory of one of the most distinguished Military leaders of our country. Field Marshal Cariappa, the first Commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, laid the foundation of India’s Army on the cherished ideals of our leaders at the time of Independence, as also the collective wisdom of the armed forces. These ideals have since long remained the cornerstone of Nation Building and the armed forces have proved to be amongst the most important national institutions ensuring security of the nation so that we could transform our country into a democratic and plural society. Therefore, none other than the topic for today’s lecture could have been more apt to pay homage to Field Marshal Cariappa, because after taking over the reins as the first Chief of Army of Modern India he not only taught the Indian Army to be apolitical but was a firm believer that Indian Army will continue to play a pivotal role towards Nation building. Today I intend to re-emphasise the same beliefs of his and their continued relevance as India shapes its destiny as it increasingly gains greater stature in the comity of Nations. Firstly, what does Nation Building imply? Originally, nation building referred to the efforts of newly-independent nations, notably the nations of Asia and Africa, to reshape territories that had been carved out by colonial powers or Empires without regard to ethnic, religious, or other boundaries. These reformed states later on became viable and coherent national entities because of their nation building efforts aimed at establishing a national identity for themselves. This was needed to be deliberately constructed by moulding different ethnic groups into a nation, especially since in many newly established states colonial practices of divide and rule had resulted in ethnically heterogeneous populations. Today in a globalised and interdependent world nation building has become even more relevant. Nation states are political units in an international system and they represent the citizens’ aspiration to be grouped in a single political unit that would in turn act as an instrument to achieve, life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. So the process of Nation Building by any nation aims at the unification of the people within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long-run. The 21st century looks towards security, justice, economic development and a democratic polity as the pillars of nation building. Security comes first in the pecking order because the other three pillars function effectively only if the security threshold on the nation, both internal and external, remains intact. This in turn facilitates smooth functioning of democracy and brings in its wake social justice and economic development. Unfortunately, in states where the roots of democracy are not firmly embedded, security becomes a victim of inefficient, parochial and dithering attitudes that form the essence of the difficult business that defines democracy. This in turn opens windows of opportunity to the armed forces to take over the reins of governance. In the Indian sub-continent, the armies of some states littoral to India have, instead of providing the security umbrella to their countries, exploited the system to seize power and have effectively stagnated the flow of the polity towards democracy.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Army's Contribution To Nation Building: The Way Ahead

In India, democracy however tenuous, has managed to hold and the constitution as initially introduced continues to be sacrosanct. This has been facilitated, in no small measure, by the armed forces who have maintained, most scrupulously, the ideals enshrined in the Constitution and have made a great contribution towards nourishment of democracy in the nation. The strength of the armed forces lies in their high standards of discipline and morale supported by a secular outlook and an apolitical demeanour. They have, in the highest spirit of nationalism, stepped forward to face all challenges posed to the nation and have been a pillar of support to the people who look up to them in times of crises. The capability of the nation to maintain its most significant pillar of security, has contributed significantly to the progress that it has recorded post independence.

The military organisation by virtue of its inherent disciplined and centralised nature can act as a vast model of national development. This serves to project the image of the military as a national organisation that embodies the aspiration of its citizens and in whose effectiveness the nation is fully confident. It thus ensures the prime requirement of existence: security, on a planet so easily vulnerable to strife and insecurity Economic interdependence among India’s varied regions has undoubtedly made considerable progress and can surely be cited as contemporary India’s prime achievement. Economic interdependence has also brought in its wake economic integration and is therefore one of the enduring foundations of the Indian nation state. How strong then is the Indian nation state today? Undoubtedly, India’s progress has been considerable. Politically, the nation has demonstrated that it is a stable and indeed a vibrant parliamentary democracy. Economically, we are the second fastest growing nation in the world. Cultural integration has made progress and is definitely oriented in a positive direction. Social integration is however still a distant goal and its conflicts manifested in religious fundamentalism, caste and the ever-growing gap between the `haves’ and the `have-nots’ is certainly a cause for concern. However when viewed in the historical perspective and the global context, the problems, deficiencies and inadequacies are transient and inherent to the stage of development that India is passing through. The Armed Forces with their ingrained spirit of Nationhood can certainly play a significant role in fostering the spirit of ‘inclusive growth’ as enunciated by government. After Independence, the Indian nation inherited a battle experienced and an apolitical force. It played virtually no role in the freedom struggle and though at partition it was deprived of nearly one third of its manpower and assets, it played a commendable role during the horrendous communal violence that was witnessed at partition. It was also immediately involved in defending Kashmir and its performance was no less commendable. Since independence the Army has fought four major wars with Pakistan and one with China. It was also involved in Hyderabad, Junagadh and Goa to facilitate their entry into the Indian Union. The Army has also been involved extensively in internal security duties including fighting insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast states. The military has also always played an intensive role in human assistance and disaster relief in various parts of the nation in the direst of circumstances and at all times.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

In India, though the military forces are a substantially big institution, it has so far played no role as an institutional power group in the country’s politics. The military forces have in fact steadfastly remained loyal to the elected government and been its obedient servant. In comparison to other developing countries, it can now be very safely concluded that it is because of this non-role in politics by the military forces of India that the nation has been able to establish and maintain its democratic foundations. This non-role in governance has helped the Indian military to achieve a high degree of professionalism and concentrate its efforts on readying itself for its main task of defence of the country. The military however plays its traditional role for rendering advice on matters concerning national security.

This highly disciplined and patriotic human resource should be utilised in the capacity building efforts of the nation in various spheres through a focused approach to employable training and other vocational skill sets that can be leveraged for the nation building effort The Indian military has always devoted itself to being able to successfully carry out any of the roles that the elected government has allotted to it. The prime and major role is clear – defend the nation against its potential enemies. This per se is not a nation building function but it is the absolute pre-requisite for nation building. To fulfil this primary role, the requirement is that the armed forces are in readiness to defend the nation at all times. In a rapidly changing security matrix this role of the armed forces needs to be further strengthened. The armed forces have been a symbol of unity and secularism through turbulent times faced by the country and have fostered the spirit of One-India, like no other organ of the state. Be it the sectarian clashes, terrorism or insurgency, the armed forces in general and the Army in particular have maintained their ethos; an ethos that has proved to be a strong fabric for National Integration. The Army continues to play a critical role in bringing peace to regions where misguided youth choose to take up arms against the nation. This onerous responsibility has been undertaken by the Army with utmost responsibility and maturity. Not only have many areas been rid of violence and fear of terrorism, succour has also been provided by undertaking extensive public support programmes like Operation Sadbhavana and Operation Samaritan. From building of roads, schools, public health facilities, vocational facilities, sporting facilities and provisioning essential supplies, the Army has been at the forefront of nation building in these troubled areas.

a very small part of the contribution they can make to national economy if their services are utilised in agriculture and industry in an organised manner. This highly disciplined and patriotic human resource should be utilised in the capacity building efforts of the nation in various spheres through a focused approach to employable training and other vocational skill sets that can be leveraged for the nation building effort. There is also immense scope in deploying this manpower in playing an integral role in the harmonising of efforts of government, NGOs and CSR activities towards improving the quantiative and qualitative deliverables at the ground level. A nation such as ours with its diverse internal and external threats calls for a higher degree of operational preparedness and armaments and capabilities that can be optimally acquired given the restricted amounts that we spend on Defence due to the various economic and social challenges that are inherent to our nation. There are no runners up in war. It is therefore axiomatic that we seek the best capabilities and technology for our armed forces. We started with nearly no capability of indigenised capacities and yet we were confronted with conflict at the outset of our journey as an independent country. As a country we created a capability through our Defence Public Sector Undertakings and Ordnance Factories. The Defence Research Development Organisation brought about the scientific support. We all realise that the permeation of technology is not constrained by ownership and spreads its reach to all areas of human endeavour. Therefore it goes without saying that the spin-off effect of this process towards many aspects of nation building has been immense. Looking ahead the trends are obvious that the Defence Industrial base would be further strengthened with wider participation by the vibrant private sector enterprise of the nation. Here again there is a greater need for the armed forces to work in close coordination in leveraging all the capabilities towards our security and Defence preparedness. Our indigenous efforts have indeed yielded results in increasing the nation’s self-reliance but there is a case to do much more by harmonising the efforts of all the stakeholders. The military organisation by virtue of its inherent disciplined and centralised nature can act as a vast model of national development. This serves to project the image of the military as a national organisation that embodies the aspiration of its citizens and in whose effectiveness the nation is fully confident. It thus ensures the prime requirement of existence: security, on a planet so easily vulnerable to strife and insecurity.

I shall also seek to highlight some of the other significant areas where the Indian armed forces play a stellar role in nation building and where in the coming years there portends a larger role for them in shaping the destiny of India, a Nation with a young demographic profile and an increasingly aware and aspirational young population.

In the ultimate analysis the contribution of the Indian military to the nation building process is dependent on its quality of leadership. As it happens in all democratic countries with a volunteer military force, a situation has developed primarily due to the various other attractive options thrown up by a growing economy, where the military is finding it difficult to attract youth of the requisite quality needed to officer the fourth largest military force in the world. This phenomenon poses a problem vis-a-vis the quality of leadership. Therefore a conscious push is needed to attract the right kind of talent and human resource to the armed forces.

The Army has also been at the forefront of helping build the country through developmental initiatives. Amongst some of the most important contributions to the task of nation building, has been the untiring efforts of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) in connecting the far flung areas of the country with the national mainstream. Areas which were considered distant and desolate are very much a part of the network of roads created by BRO. Working in the most difficult and harshest of conditions, the efforts put in by these dedicated men of the BRO have linked the hearts of the people of the country through thousands of kilometers of roads paved and maintained despite life threatening conditions. Peering into the future, the task ahead is colossal and requires a great deal of focus, resources and disciplined manpower to execute this humongous task that shall shape the infrastructure in the remotest and inaccessible parts of the country.

The military by itself is also in a process of transformation and development along with the rest of the nation. The change however has to be deliberate and carried out after visualising its long term implications. The relationship between officers and other ranks should adjust to change in the socio-economic scenario of the country. The growing levels of education and increasing awareness of the enlisted man call for dynamic qualities of leadership and man management. This is a major ‘in-house’ problem of the military that has to be tackled. Nothing can be accomplished by the military institution, in any role, if the leadership is weak. With growth in regional and communal tendencies in the country, the need for insulating the military forces against them cannot be over emphasised. It will require a motivated leadership, to be able to prevent subversion of its personnel.

The Territorial Army has contributed immensely to the task of nation building through the years. These battalions have assisted in securing vital interests in threatened regions. They have undertaken re-forestation initiatives and have transformed large swathes of land which had been ravaged by natural and man-made disasters. The home and hearth battalions have been at the forefront of soldiering in some of the most sensitive areas of the country. They have not only fought against difficult military odds, but have also provided a helping hand to the local administration, helping bring peace and stability in their areas of responsibility.

It is apparent that the military’s role in nation building is inherent in the fulfilment of its primary function. The spin-offs from the role are many and varied with a fairly extensive coverage. Democracy can only flourish with strong military forces which are under civilian control. This has been accepted and was never questioned by the military leadership. However problems of civil-military relations have and still exist in the nation. But these are problems that are inherent in the democratic structure of the country and call for a mature Military leadership to ensure that such matters do not prove to be detrimental to the larger cause. Parallelly, civilian leadership should realise that there is an increasing need to leverage and integrate the rich wisdom of military experience of our Armed Forces in the Nation’s Management, Governance and Diplomacy.

A more visible manifestation of the Army’s nation building role is the National Cadet Corps. It is engaged in grooming the youth, imbibing in them the qualities of discipline, selfless service and the spirit of nationalism. All the ideals that shape our forces are instilled in the young minds to develop their character, through qualities like comradeship, discipline, leadership, secular outlook, spirit of adventure and ideals of selfless service. This according to me is and shall remain a core activity for the times to come that shall shape the value system of the future generations and hence has a direct bearing on the moral quotient of the nation building effort! The military due to its functional imperatives is a centralised organisation, hierarchical structure, with stress on discipline and leadership. It thus becomes an ideal organisation where national policies can easily be implemented and nourished. The direct consequences of military service are manifold. The soldier is trained, disciplined and has a character that bravely faces the challenges of life. In service, he serves as an obedient soldier that specialises in the application of force. It is in his utility after service that the military can contribute to nation building. So far, the ex-servicemen’s qualitative contribution to civilian life, by way of invigorating its culture and character and their quantitative contribution especially to rural economy is something which has not been assessed so far. But significant though this contribution is, it is only

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To conclude I would once again like to re-emphasise the beliefs of Field Marshal Cariappa, that the Army has always in the past and also in the future will continue to play a pivotal role in the Nation Building and for that it must emerge as a national symbol that represents the nation’s unique characteristic which is “Unity in Diversity”. The military virtues of sacrifice, loyalty and discipline have always remained and must serve as objects of veneration for the rest of the nation. Thank you very much. Jai Hind "

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

HR CHALLENGES

Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (retd) The writer is the former Adjutant General of the Indian Army and erstwhile Corps Commander of the sensitive 15 Corps in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. A professional to the core, he is passionate about writing on defence issues.

Human Resource Development is an essential command function and, in this context, it needs to be understood that the soldier of tomorrow has to be an innovator who can combine imagination and knowledge with action – Indian Army Doctrine 2004

Some of the characteristics that are vital for soldiers of the future are: • Quick decision making capability, greater mental mobility and adaptability • Capacity to handle higher stress levels • Capability to handle independent assignments • Higher technical competence • Greater motivational levels and higher standards of junior leadership • Better administrative skills

uman Resource Management in the Army is an extremely vital issue because its strength has always been its soldier. It has been aptly said that institutions do not transform – its people do; platforms and organisations do not defend the country – people do. Of the Army‘s sanctioned strength of 47,762 officers, the held strength is only 36,790. This shortage is not of recent vintage. The shortfall ranged from 12 to 15 per cent in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Emergency and short service commissions spurred by wars during that period were the preferred approach to bridge the gap. The next three decades however, saw the shortage rise up to 24-25 per cent. Significantly there are no deficiencies in the higher ranks of Colonel and above. The criticality is of the prescribed annual induction in the Army of 2,240, where actual intake in the 2009, 2010 and 2011 was 1,599, 1,892 and 2,275 respectively. This corresponds to 67, 72 and 102 percentage. The upward trend is encouraging and is likely to again surpass the authorised intake in 2012. Two main areas of concern where the intake has been marginal are the Direct Entry (DE), Gentleman Cadets (GCs) in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun and the Short Service Commission (Non-Technical), SSC (NT) GCs in the Officers Training Academy (OTA), Chennai – IES in the lower part of the pyramid at the level of captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. This is being redressed. Against a sanctioned strength of 1,650, 500 and 1,800 at IMA, OTA and NDA respectively, approx 1,850, 700 and 2,025 cadets are undergoing training. The Academies are overflowing by over 200 cadets each. A most informative article by the former Adjutant General.

he Indian Army is a highly motivated, optimally equipped, modernised and operationally ready force, capable of functioning in a joint services environment across the entire spectrum of conflict.1 As a major component of national power 2, the Army along with the Navy and the Air Force is entrusted with the primary role of preserving national interests and safeguarding the country‘s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity against external threats, either by deterrence or by waging war. It also has a secondary role of assisting government agencies to cope with ‘proxy war‘, other internal threats and also providing aid to civil authorities when requisitioned. Given the complexity of tasks it has to perform, it is imperative that it is manned by individuals who are loyal, responsible and professionally competent. Orchestration of human resources in the Army, therefore, needs to be accorded the highest priority so as to unleash the full potential of the men and material that constitute the organisation.

Human Resource Management in the Army is an extremely vital issue because its strength has always been its soldier. It has been aptly said that institutions do not transform – its people do; platforms and organisations do not defend the country – people do; and units and formations do not sacrifice and take risks for the nation – people do! It is therefore, evident that without highly skilled, competent and dedicated soldiers in its rank and file, it matters little how lethal the weapon systems are or how strategically responsive the field formations are trained to be. More vital are the men behind the weapons, who truly execute the mission. The enormity of the task can be gauged from the fact that the Army has about 12 lakh serving soldiers3 in its rank and file and it also has to cater to the needs of over 22 lakh of its veterans who have retired from service. What is special and distinct about the Army is the very high emphasis on delivering the goods even at the cost of laying down ones‘ life. This makes the Army the final bastion and invariably the most reliable asset that the Nation can fall back upon during the hours of crisis. 1. Chief of the Army Staff, The Sunday Indian, August 2008. http://www.thesundayindian.com/ 2. Indian Army Doctrine, October 2004. ids.nic.in/Indian %20Army %20Doctrine/Indian Army Doctrine_1.doc 3. http://www.IndianArmy.gov.in/index.aspx?flag=LfcVLYFIbed=

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CHALLENGES OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

IN THE INDIAN ARMY “Human Resource Development is an essential command function and, in this context, it needs to be understood that the soldier of tomorrow has to be an innovator who can combine imagination and knowledge with action.”4 – Indian Army Doctrine 2004.

Challenges of managing human capital Challenges in relation to nature of conflict. National Security in the present day environment is an aggregate of both external as well as internal threats.5 Economic compulsions and the global environment have reduced the threat of all-out wars between nations. Future wars are likely to be short and intense and will witness the employment of high-tech weapon systems with comparatively larger scales of damage and destruction. The probability of joint operations, including with other armies of the world, have also increased manifold. The world is seeing a spurt of a new kind of warfare called ‘Fourth Generation Warfare‘6 encompassing terrorism, internal destabilisation and economic blackmail aimed to undermine the very sovereignty of a nation.

The project, which was conceptualised and initiated just about a decade back, has grown by leaps and bounds and constitutes 426 polyclinics, providing medical cover to about 12 lakh veterans and more than 27 lakh of their dependents. It also has on its rolls over 1,300 private hospitals spread over 170 stations, which have been empanelled to supplement the polyclinics that are already functional Given the dynamics of future conflicts, it is imperative that the Army prepares itself to meet these challenges head-on. Organisational and equipment voids, which hither-to-fore were considered acceptable, may not be the case in the future. Staffing of formations and units, including that of reserves, also need to be maintained at the optimum level at all times to ensure operational effectiveness. The spectrum of conflict for which the Army needs to be prepared for and the demands of the future battlefield environment on the human resources element necessitate that the soldiers inducted into the Army be qualitatively superior to what was expected earlier. Some of the characteristics that are vital for soldiers of the future are: • Quick decision-making capability, greater mental mobility and adaptability. • Capacity to handle higher stress levels. 4. Indian Army Doctrine, October 2004, pp 67-74. 5. Ibid, Types of War, p 38. 6. John Robb, 4GW-Fourth Generation Warfare. 08 May 2004. Globalguerillas.typepad.com/2004/4gw-fourth-gene.html.

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land power in India

HR CHALLENGES

• Capability to handle independent assignments. • Higher technical competence. • Greater motivational levels and higher standards of junior leadership. • Better administrative skills.

Challenges in relation to the changing socio-economic environment The Army taps its manpower from the populace at large and perforce it needs to be sensitive to the societal changes that take place with the passage of time. A growing economy, globally interdependent, advanced technology and a flourishing private sector now offer unimaginable opportunities to India‘s youth. Overall development necessitates moving rapidly towards an educated and aware workforce. In the case of the Army it translates moving from a ‘brawn force‘ to a ‘balanced brain-cum-brawn force‘. With all the agencies trying to tap the cream, talent is at a premium. Attracting, retaining and motivating the best talent is a constant challenge for the Army in the present circumstances and the problem is likely to become more acute in the coming years. Some of the challenges that confront the military leadership are as follows: Nuclear family norms. Lack of security and support hitherto provided by the joint family system and hazards of the now largely prevalent nuclear family norm has resulted in soldiers having to take on additional pressures of their domestic front. The joint family system provided inherent security, both physical and economic and invariably motivated the soldier to give his best without any apprehension. This protective shield vanished with the breakdown of the joint family norm7, leaving the soldier to fend for himself and his family. The problem gets more accentuated when the families are located at places which are not within convenient commuting distance of their duty stations. A conscious effort, therefore, is being made to ensure that the interest of the soldiers in operational areas is taken care of by providing separated family accommodation in military stations within easy travelling distances.

Once inducted into Service, the aim is to retain the human resource for the optimal period, while constantly making an endeavour to enhance their professional and individual growth so as to ensure that the 1.2 million strong Army remains highly motivated and committed Pressures due to exigencies of service. Exigencies of service often make it difficult for men in uniform to strike a reasonable balance between their home and the professional front, at times leading to problems like depression, suicide and fratricide.8 Grant of leave at periodic intervals with liberal travel facilities and connectivity to ensure that he constantly remains connected with his loved ones is, hence, very essential. Hazards of service life. A career in the Army is accepted in the civil street as one fraught with immense risks. The perception has been further aggravated by the increasing deployment of the Army for various tasks ranging from counter insurgency to counter terrorism, apart from the conventional role that it is meant for along our troubled borders. What needs to be ensured is that the compensation offered to the next of kin must be adequate in terms of financial independence. Increased aspiration levels. The present day youth look for improved quality of life, better pay and perks, assured career progression, appropriate educational and housing facilities, good medical backup, equitable status with their civilian counterparts and better post retirement benefits. The paradigm shift in the quality of intake required for the Army, both at the officers level and for JCOs / ORs warrants that adequate incentives be made available to attract the right material, motivate them to join the services and thereafter retain them in service.

Induction of adequate and quality resources Officers' shortage and the current status Of the Army‘s sanctioned strength of 47,762 officers, the held strength is only 36,790. This shortage is not of recent vintage.9 The shortfall ranged from 12 to 15 per cent in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Emergency and short service commissions spurred by wars during that period were the preferred approach to bridge the gap. The next three decades however, saw the shortage rise up to 24-25 per cent. Significantly there are no deficiencies in the higher ranks of Colonel and above. The criticality lies in the lower part 7. Dalip Singh Wasan, Joint Family system is breaking, http://www.sreetdirectory.com/travel_guide/202457/ Family joint system is breaking.html 8. “Increase in cases of suicides in Armed Forces”. Rajya Sabha Official Website, questions, Starred and Unstarred, question Number 3150 December 2010. http://164.100.47.4/new rs question/search_sessionwise.aspx. 9. Mukesh Sabharwal, “Indian Army – Human Capital”, Indian Defence Review, Oct-Dec 2011.

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of the pyramid at the level of captains, majors and lieutenant colonels. And what is more, this shortage translates to a reduction in strength at the Regiment and Battalion level, which is the cutting edge of the Army. The stark truth that faces us is that the number of officers posted in each Unit is likely to reduce to fifty per cent of their authorised strength. A unit cannot be efficient in its functioning without full complement of hard scale, which is a minimum 60 per cent of the authorised strength.

Attracting, retaining and motivating the best talent is a constant challenge for the Army in the present circumstances and the problem is likely to become more acute in the coming years Junior leadership in the battalions is extremely vital when deployed along the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. Even in the hinterland, the Rashtriya Rifles continue to exert pressure on the militants to ensure low levels of violence. Without adequate leaders at the company and platoon level, tactical operations are bound to be adversely affected. Reality check It is high time that we did a reality check on the quantum of officer intake in the Army. Of the prescribed annual induction in the Army of 2,240, actual intake in the 2009, 2010 and 2011 was 1,599, 1,892 and 2,275. This corresponds to 67, 72 and 102 percentage. The upward trend is encouraging and is likely to again surpass the authorised intake in 2012. Two main areas of concern where the intake has been marginal are the Direct Entry (DE), Gentleman Cadets (GCs) in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun and the Short Service Commission (Non-Technical), SSC (NT) GCs in the Officers Training Academy (OTA), Chennai. The DE strength has risen from 255 in 2008 to 309 in 2011, but is still well below the 500 vacancies authorised. The SSC (NT) has remained more or less constant and was 211 against 350 vacancies in 2011. Inflow at IMA, OTA and National Defence Academy (NDA) According to the figures obtained from the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, a pleasantly positive picture is revealed. The state of officer cadets under training in 2011, at these pre-commissioning academies makes interesting reading. Against a sanctioned strength of 1,650, 500 and 1,800 at IMA, OTA and NDA respectively, approx 1,850, 700 and 2,025 cadets are undergoing training. The Academies are overflowing by over 200 cadets each. The fact is that there is no more capacity available in these academies to house more cadets. Even these additional numbers have been accommodated by modifying existing quarters. Any further intake would certainly compromise the quality of training.10 The case of NDA is unique. The number of applicants for the NDA examination has been increasing exponentially. Whereas 2.8 lakh boys applied in 2008-09, 4.2 lakh filled the forms in 2009-10 and 5.6 lakh in 2010-11. Of these, 990, 1,160 and 1,221 passed the written exam and cleared the SSB. Yet all of them could not be called for joining due to limited vacancies available. The NDA currently has 15 squadrons and a 16th squadron is likely to be constructed by next year. Not that this contingency was not foreseen, but administrative and bureaucratic delays slowed down the process. Capacity building is paramount What is amply evident is that the real stumbling block is a lack of training capacity. Building infrastructure takes time, even if land is readily available. Housing is only one of the essentials. Training areas for weapon training, firing ranges and sport facilities have also to be catered for. Instructors and staff to support the training activity are equally important. For instance, it has taken years to get the deficient civilian staff sanctioned for these academies. Another Officers Training Academy to cater for commissioning the support cadre was inaugurated in July 2011 at Gaya, with an initial capacity of 150 cadets to be increased to 750 cadets by 2015. This will add to the much needed capacity. Similarly, the case for four additional squadrons in NDA is being progressed. What is also required is increasing capacity of Selection Centres. Having progressed the case for three years, seven more SSBs have finally been sanctioned by the government, including two for the Army. Quality of intake This is another perception that needs to be demystified. Most people think that selection standards have been pegged down and the quality of intake leaves much to be desired. The reality is that the Services Selection Centres have not lowered an iota of the standards continuing since decades. Even with the stringent criteria, the numbers of candidates that qualify are more than the existing vacancies. So why should selection standards be brought down? Take the example of the Technical Education Scheme. The 10+2 Technical Education Scheme has been a success story. The Cadet Training Wings at CME Pune, MCEME Secunderabad and MCTE Mhow have turned out to be superb centres of excellence. Against a sanctioned strength of 170, a total of 232 officers were trained in these institutions in 2011. When it started, candidates to be eligible had to score at least 72 per cent marks in their 10+2 exams. 10. Mukesh Sabharwal, “Operational Implications of Officers Shortages in the Army”, FORCE, September 2012.

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land power in India

HR CHALLENGES

For the January 2012 TES course, about 20,000 candidates applied. Only 6,500 could be called for the interview due to lack of capacity and time. And talking of quality, all those candidates had scored above 82 per cent marks. So where is the question of inducting inferior candidates?

Human Resource Management in the Army is an extremely vital issue because its strength has always been its soldier. It has been aptly said that institutions do not transform – its people do; platforms and organisations do not defend the country – people do; and units and formations do not sacrifice and take risks for the nation – people do! It is therefore, evident that without highly skilled, competent and dedicated soldiers in its rank and file, it matters little how lethal the weapon systems are or how strategically responsive the field formations are trained to be. More vital are the men behind the weapons, who truly execute the mission The Short Service Commission, Technical, SSC (T) has also been very popular of late. Floundering in dismal double figures till 2008, the SSC (T) was hugely oversubscribed in the last two years. In fact 20 per cent of candidates for the Non-Technical course at IMA are engineers. This is a welcome trend and is proving to be beneficial to the organisation, which is looking forward to modernisation in a big way.

In service management of human capital Once inducted into Service, the aim is to retain the human resource for the optimal period, while constantly making an endeavour to enhance their professional and individual growth so as to ensure that the 1.2 million strong Army remains highly motivated and committed. Enhanced career prospects Cadre review: Officers. Cadre review of officers by way of implementation of Ajai Vikram Singh Committee11 recommendations was aimed at improving their promotion prospects and thereby satisfying the aspirations of a sizeable number of officers. While Phase I of the recommendations were implemented, primarily benefiting officers up to the rank of Colonel by assuring them guaranteed promotions up to the rank of Lt Col and additional vacancies for 750 Colonels, implementation of Phase II of the recommendations has resulted in the upgradation of 20 posts of Lt Gen, 75 posts of Maj Gen, 222 posts of Brig and 734 posts of Col. Cadre review: JCOs / ORs. This is a major initiative aimed at meeting the aspirations of JCOs / ORs by enhancing the scope of their promotion prospects. The objective is to increase the total number of JCOs and NCOs within the establishment of the Army, so that larger numbers of JCOs / ORs are assured promotion to higher ranks. The focus of the review is to effect changes based on functional requirements. Assured career progression. The aim is to ensure that despite having a pyramidal structure, where requisite ranks are important to ensure functional efficiency, all JCOs / ORs are assured of financial progression on a time scale basis, thereby assuring them of financial benefits of the next higher ranks even if they cannot get promoted due to lack of vacancies. Empowerment of JCOs / ORs. Empowerment of JCOs / ORs has emerged as one of the major focus areas of the Army and the important projects initiated towards this end are Projects ‘Gyan Deep‘ and ‘Kshamta‘. Project Gyan Deep. Project Gyan Deep is an initiative to accord recognition to the ‘in service’ training carried out by JCOs / ORs through their service career and have a graduate Degree granted to them for the same through a tie-up with Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU). This initiative will provide JCOs / ORs with the necessary wherewithal to facilitate a ‘second career‘ post retirement. A very large number of JCOs / ORs have registered for this scheme so far. Project Kshamta. Yet another important initiative aimed at empowering JCOs / ORs is Project Kshamta, which entails providing soldiers with basic skills in Information Technology and English Speaking / Soft Skills.12 Individuals who have the potential to be trained as instructors are being trained as ‘Master Trainers‘ and after obtaining necessary certification, they train the remainder personnel to increase the possibility of the soldier acquiring an appropriate second career post retirement.

Improvement of quality of life Provision of quality education. The Army Welfare Education Society13 has over a period of time grown into an organisation which is capable of providing quality and affordable education to the wards of both serving and retired soldiers. Apart from providing schooling facilities, it has also made pioneering strides in provision of higher education 11. Ajai Vikram Singh Committee; 1896 new posts in Defence Forces 03 Oct 2008. 12. http://www.kshamtaonline.com. 13. http://www.awes.nic.in/

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to the wards of serving and retired Army personnel in the fields of Engineering, Medical, Dental, Law, Management, Hotel Management and Nursing. Those personnel who were disadvantaged because of lack of domicile status, frequent movements and lack of reservation of seats, now have dedicated institutions which accord priority to their educational requirements. Provision of married accommodation. In order to provide all ranks an opportunity to stay with their families at least for the duration that they spend in a peace station, the Army launched an ambitious Married Accommodation Project thereby substantially increasing the satisfaction level of housing while in service. Provisions also exist for field area family accommodation to cater to the needs of the soldiers who are posted at non-family stations. Maintaining high standards of motivation and morale. Apart from various hygiene factors which keep a solider energised and motivated, certain issues which have a bearing on the morale and motivational levels are those related to speedy redressal of his grievances and his status in society. Armed forces tribunal. With an aim to establish an effective redressal mechanism, absence of which led to a large number of Service personnel moving the civil courts, the government passed a bill in the Parliament to set up the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT).14 A large number of cases relating to Service matters filed by armed forces personnel and which have been pending in the courts for very long have been transferred to the AFT for speedy disposal. The forum provides both serving and retired Service personnel and their dependents an option to seek speedy justice at affordable cost. Since, inception, as many as 16,000 cases were transferred to the Tribunal. Of these, the Tribunal had disposed off almost 3,500 cases by the end of the year 2010. High standards of discipline. Every effort is made to maintain impeccable standards of discipline in the Army and defaulters, if any, are brought to book without any delay.15 It is also ensured that action is initiated only after a thorough inquiry is instituted and the due process of law followed. During the last three years, at an average, approx 300 officers and 12,000 JCOs / ORs have been proceeded against annually on discipline or administrative grounds that correspond to less than 1 per cent officers and about 1 per cent soldiers. Punishment was awarded in almost 80 per cent of the cases which indicates the seriousness the Army accords to discipline. Management of retired personnel. Veterans who have given the best part of their life for the service of the Nation and to the Army need to be adequately cared for and this aspect is given special emphasis at all levels. A conscious effort is made to reach out to the environment and enable them to interact with appropriate agencies to resolve their problems and grievances. Ex-servicemen contributory health scheme (ECHS). Access to proper healthcare is one of the most pressing requirements of senior citizens and it was with this in mind that the ECHS was set up in 2003. The aim of ECHS is to provide comprehensive, quality and timely medical care to armed forces Veterans and their dependents. The project, which was conceptualised and initiated just about a decade back, has grown by leaps and bounds and constitutes 426 polyclinics, providing medical cover to about 12 lakh veterans and more than 27 lakh of their dependents. It also has on its rolls over 1,300 private hospitals spread over 170 stations, which have been empanelled to supplement the polyclinics that are already functional. Welfare schemes. A number of welfare schemes have been instituted for battle and physical casualties including financial assistance to serving and retired soldiers, educational concession to children of battle and physical casualties. Welfare of soldiers, both serving and retired, is thus, a key focus area for the Army. Constant efforts are made to ensure that veterans, veer naris and their dependents get their dues and lead a life of dignity and honour in society.

Conclusion Management of Human Resources in the Army is an extremely complex issue, given its size, spread and diversity. The key ingredient in the organisation despite all the technological upgrades still remains the soldier, who is the man behind the weapon and the enabler of its strategy. It is therefore, vital that adequate care be taken to ensure that the morale of the soldier be maintained at the highest level at all times. Being the last bastion, the Nation invariably looks towards the Army with a lot of expectation, not only for safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also at times of internal strife and during crisis situations. For the soldier to stay motivated and give his best, both the government and the Army are making a conscious effort to ensure that the basic needs and aspirations of the soldier are met at all times – yet there are miles to go!

14. Armed Forces Tribunal Bill gets Parliament nod, The Times of India, PTI, 06 Dec 2007. 15. Rajya Sabha Official Website, questions, Starred and Unstarred, question Number 2372 December 2010. Number 2381 December 2010. http://164.100.47.4/new rs question/search_sessionwise.aspx.

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land power in India

KEY FACTOR

Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj PVSM, VSM ( retd) The writer is a former Director General of the Mechanised Forces, Indian Army.

The most dangerous threat to our security would be a simultaneous conventional attack on both our Northern and Western fronts supported by internal disturbances. Hence the armed forces must be prepared to dissuade, deter and if necessary take punitive action. As all future wars will be joint operations the synergy and capabilities of the services need to be enhanced. The Army in particular would need to upgrade its fire power and manoeuvre capabilities to operate in High Altitude Areas (HAA)

China over the past two decades has made phenomenal advances in their capabilities to operate along our Northern borders. They first enhanced their development of their infrastructure and have now provided all weather metalled roads leading to the Tibetan plateau right up to their border posts. Apart from this their railway lines connecting their hinterland to the plateau have greatly enhanced their mobilisation capability. The POL pipelines provide adequate logistic support to the deployed troops

n August 2010 the PLA conducted a logistic exercise on mobilisation and movement of large formations on the Qinghai-Tibet railway line. In October 2010 the PLA conducted its first Group Army level joint air-land exercise (Shimingxindong) by both Lanzhou and Chengdu Military regions to practice manoeuvres and ground-air coordination. In November 2011 the PLA practised capture of military passes in HAA beyond 5,000 m by employing armoured vehicles and airborne troops. As per media reports the Army is planning to raise two armoured brigades. (six armoured regiments and two mechanised infantry battalions) especially for the Northern borders to be employed along with the Mountain Strike Corps planned to be raised. This no doubt will give a boost to our defensive and offensive capabilities, but what needs to be analysed is its equipment profile of the mechanised forces and their employment in these areas.

ndia has approx 3,380 km long border in the North with China which has not yet been demarcated. The dispute over demarcation has flared up on more than one occasion resulting in a war in 1962 and subsequently remained tense on more than one occasion. Despite signing the Treaty of Peace and Tranquillity and holding 16 rounds of talks to resolve the contentious issue, not much headway has been made. After 50 years of the 1962 war, the Army needs to re-analyse the concept of defending our Northern borders against China in the present scenario. The most dangerous threat to our security would be a simultaneous conventional attack on both our Northern and Western fronts supported by internal disturbances. Hence the armed forces must be prepared to dissuade, deter and if necessary take punitive action. As all future wars will be joint operations the synergy and capabilities of the services need to be enhanced. The Army in particular would need to upgrade its firepower and manoeuvre capabilities to operate in High Altitude Areas (HAA). With the induction of the 155 mm Light Howitzer Gun M777, the fire support would be enhanced to a large extent. As per media reports the Army is planning to raise two armoured brigades (six armoured regiments and two mechanised infantry battalions) especially for the Northern borders to be employed along with the Mountain Strike Corps planned to be raised. This no doubt will give a boost to our defensive and offensive capabilities, but what needs to be analysed is its equipment profile of the mechanised forces and their employment in these areas. Aim: The aim of this article is to analyse the employment of Mechanised Forces along our Northern borders.

Historical perspective

On 27 October 1947 the first Indian Army troops landed in Srinagar to implement the Instrument of Accession whereby the state of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India. The attention of the Army was diverted towards the West. In June 1948 Pakistan attempted to sever Ladakh and occupied the heights dominating the only road axis between Srinagar and Leh at Kargil, Dras and Zoji La and thereby isolating the garrison at Leh. The operations launched to clear the road axis could not make much progress as the enemy was well entrenched on dominating heights at 16,000 ft. The crux of the problem was to clear the Zoji La Pass (11,575 ft) and hence Maj Gen K S Thimayya, then GOC Srinagar Division conceived the idea of employing tanks to clear the pass and road axis. Tanks had never been employed at such heights and the problem was compounded by logistical difficulties of moving tanks from the plains of Jammu to the operational area. On 23 September, orders were issued to Lt Col Rajinder Singh (CO 7 Cav) to move his tank squadron (Stuart tanks) from Akhnoor to Baltal and along with 77 Para Brigade clear the Zoji La Pass by 31 October 1948 (Snow would have made Zoji La Pass impassable thereafter). Due to lack of adequate infrastructure, the tanks had to be dismantled and the turret, chassis and ammunition moved separately. As the bridges could not take the combined weight of the tank and transporters, the chassis had to be frequently dismounted and cross the bridges on tracks.

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EMPLOYMENT OF MECHANISED FORCES IN HIMALAYAN TERRAIN The move commenced on 05 October and was completed on 15 October. The tanks were thereafter reassembled and readied for battle at Baltal (base of Zoji La Pass). To ensure surprise the convoy moved only at night. Simultaneously the Engineer task force was converting the existing track of 7.5 km length to a road wide enough for tanks. In addition caves were made at the head of the pass to hide the tanks. This herculean task was successfully completed and the attack was launched on 01 November. Tanks led the assault and the enemy was totally surprised with the appearance of the tanks with their deafening roar and spitting fire on the well entrenched enemy that within the next 8 hrs Zoji La Pass and the adjoining Gumri Basin fell to 77 Para Brigade. Thereafter tanks were employed upto Dras and on 14 November they were de-inducted before the pass closed for the winter season. Strategic, operational and tactical surprise was achieved with the appearance and employment of tanks at that altitude, a first in the history of tank warfare. It was truly a game changer as subsequently the link up with Leh garrison was facilitated which ensured the liberation of Ladakh.

During the 1962 war against China the Indian Air Force was not employed, nor were the tanks employed. The lessons learnt have oft been repeated, however, time has now come to ensure that when the bugle calls the mechanised forces are appropriately equipped, organised and trained to secure our Northern borders During the 1962 operations with China, two Armoured Regiments were moved, however they saw little or no action. It was only in the late 1980s that tanks and ICVs were deployed in HAA. The move of tanks to Leh was

again a mammoth logistic exercise. The T-72 tanks had to be dismantled and flown to Leh where a major exercise followed to re-assemble the tanks, conduct zeroing of their guns and preparing them operationally. Tanks and IFVs are being employed by ISAF in Afghanistan achieving phenomenal success, dominating their area of responsibility. No operation is being conducted in the hinterland without the support of tanks. It is the intimidating effect of the tank with its accurate fire power, mobility and inherent protection which has an awesome effect on the enemy and belligerent local population. AFVs are being employed for multifarious tasks such as road clearance, convoy protection, direct fire support to the assaulting infantry and occupying pivots of manoeuvre.

Peculiarities of operating in high altitude areas The challenges to man and machine operating in HAA are many. Half the battle is won if both the soldier and his weapon platform are fighting fit. The altitudes of the border areas vary from 11,000 to 18,000 ft where the oxygen content being low, the performance of both deteriorates sharply. If proper acclimatisation is done the soldiers overcome many hazards, however it is the equipment that has to be specifically designed to operate in these adverse conditions. Terrain: The borders to the North can be further divided into three distinct sectors, the Western, Central and Eastern sectors. All three sectors have their own peculiarities. The Western sector (Ladakh) is more akin to the deserts with wide valleys and flat open terrain giving a frontage for upto two troops of tanks to operate. The hill features on either side are dominating and would require high angle

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KEY FACTOR

direct fire weapons to provide intimate fire support. In the Eastern sector the valleys are narrower till the start of the Tibet plateau. The problem is that lateral movement between valleys is non-existent hence the greater challenge of inducting troops and subsequent reinforcements to the desired area.

The future ICV being indigenously developed has been conceived keeping our requirements for both the Northern and Western theatres. Hence a tracked and wheeled version of the ICV is likely to be inducted by 2017 Infrastructure: A concerted effort is being made to develop and upgrade the infrastructure as regards roads, bridges and air-strips. However greater urgency is required to ensure the desired level of operational and tactical mobility is achieved. Simultaneously, construction of insulated garages for the AFVs and appropriate ammunition dumps especially for the anti-tank missiles need priority. As deployment areas are restricted, construction of large tunnels and caves in the hillsides are ideal for AFVs as they provide additional protection and security.

Automotive aspects Power. The rated horse power of an engine and more important its torque is directly dependent on the altitude and density of the air. Higher the density more oxygen molecules are present hence greater the power, lower the density (in HAA) less oxygen hence the rated horse power decreases. For every 1,000 ft you climb above sea level there is a reduction in air density of approx 4.5 per cent. The formula to calculate the percentage loss in horse power is given below % HP loss = {ALT (in ft) x 0.03 x 1} / 1000 Therefore, a 520 HP engine at sea level losses 34 per cent of its power at an altitude of 3,500 m giving the AFV only 343 HP available. Technology has been utilised to minimise this loss by employing turbo charged inter-cooled engines, automatic gear box, electronic control of fuel injection whereby the ideal stoichiometric ratio between fuel and oxygen is maintained. Extreme cold temperature. In the operational areas, the temperature drops to minus 30 deg C / minus 40 deg C. Hence the fuel and lubrication systems need to be pre-heated. In addition for optimum performance of the sophisticated electronic equipment now fitted on AFVs they need central temperature control devices. Tracks versus wheels. The characteristics of tracked and wheeled AFVs are well known. For mountainous terrain where specialist vehicles are required it is essential that a mix of tracked and wheeled AFVs (tanks and ICVs) are deployed. The lighter wheeled vehicles provide phenomenal operational mobility especially when quick mobilisation, induction and lateral shift is required. Firepower ◘◘ High angle firing. More often than not tanks will be

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

employed to provide direct fire support to the assaulting infantry. Hence the tanks and ICVs need high angle firing capability. ◘◘ Fire control systems (FCS). All AFVs need integrated FCS to cater for the variation in pressure, temperature, density of air and wind velocity. ◘◘ Ammunition. HE ammunition would be required in larger quantity as also thermobaric rounds in addition to missiles.

Capabilities of the adversary It would be pertinent to first review the mechanised equipment held with the PLA: ¡¡ Armour. The PLA indigenously manufactures the entire fleet of AFVs. The tanks are based on the Soviet / Russian philosophy with the first generation T-59 / 69 tanks (based on the Soviet T-54 tank) upgraded to a 105 mm gun, fire control system with night fighting capability, is still held in service. The mainstay of their armour is the second generation T-96 tank which entered service in 1996 with a 125 mm gun, integrated fire control system and a 1,000 HP engine. The hull is akin to the Russian T-72 tank with a western design welded turret. In 1999 the third generation T-98 / 99 tank was inducted into service. The hull is similar to the T-72 and the turret akin to the Leopard 2 tank. It mounts a 125 mm gun with an integrated fire control system and a 1,500 HP engine with automatic transmission. The tank weighs 54-58 tonnes with an autoloader with a 3 man crew. For additional protection, apart from the ERA panels it claims to have both a soft and hard kill capability with a laser dazzler. It is claimed that the frontal arc protection is 1,000-1,200 mm RHA. Its conventional APFSDS ammunition penetrates 860 mm RHA at 2000 m and the DU ammunition penetrates 960 mm at the same range. In addition the PLA has an indigenous light tank the T-62 / 63 based on the Soviet PT-76, which has been replaced by the indigenous light tank ZTD-05 which has a 105 mm gun firing a beam rider missile apart from the conventional ammunition. ¡¡ APC / ICV. A similar philosophy was adopted for the armoured personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles. Initially they manufactured the Type-86 ICV (similar to BMP-1) and by 1991 upgraded it to Type-91 (similar to BMP-2). In 2006 they introduced the ZBD97 (similar to BMP-3) which mounts both the 100 mm smooth bore gun and a 30 mm cannon. It fires the 3UBK10 beam rider missile which can penetrate 600 mm armour. The ICV is amphibious with a crew of 3+7. In addition the PLA has a wheeled APC the Type-92 which was introduced into service in 1995 for the light mechanised infantry units. The APC is amphibious, weighs 12.5 tonnes with a crew of 3+7 and mounts a 25 mm cannon with a 320 HP engine. China over the past two decades has made phenomenal advances in their capabilities to operate along our Northern borders. They first enhanced the development of their infrastructure and have now provided all weather metalled roads leading to the Tibetan plateau right up to their border posts. Apart from this their railway lines connecting their hinterland to the plateau has greatly enhanced

their mobilisation capability. The POL pipelines provide adequate logistic support to the deployed troops.

pre-positioned ab initio and the reserves can be built-up in due course.

If proper acclimatisation is done the soldiers overcome many hazards, however it is the equipment that has to be specifically designed to operate in these adverse conditions

Light tanks. A number of light tanks mounting the 120 mm gun are available in the open market. For better operational and tactical mobility, in conjunction with the medium tanks, the light tanks will provide greater flexibility to the field commanders. Preferably the tanks should be wheel based. Wheeled light tanks are required not only in HAA but also to operate in riverine terrain along our Eastern borders and for Out of Area Contingencies. A minimum of six regiments equipped with light tanks are required of which four regiments could be initially deployed with the remaining two regiments forming part of the Rapid Reaction Force.

China’s shift in strategy from continental to peripheral defence resulted in a change in its military doctrine intent in preparing to fight local wars along its borders under conditions of informationalisation. This can be appreciated when the development of infrastructure into Tibet and along our borders and the modernisation of their equipment is analysed. The PLA now is a more mobile and better equipped force which can be deployed faster and sustained over a period of time across the Tibetan plateau and provide all inclusive support for any operation along our Northern border. As regards the mechanised forces the PLA has deployed a number of motorised divisions in Tibet plateau, Lanzhou and Chengdu Military regions which are equipped with medium and light tank battalions (tracked and wheeled). Hence their offensive operations will be spearheaded by their mechanised forces for which a number of exercises have been conducted over the past two years. In August 2010 the PLA conducted a logistic exercise on mobilisation and movement of large formations on the Qinghai-Tibet railway line. In October 2010 the PLA conducted its first Group Army level joint air-land exercise (Shimingxindong) by both Lanzhou and Chengdu Military regions to practice manoeuvres and ground-air coordination. In November 2011 the PLA practised capture of military passes in HAA beyond 5,000 m by employing armoured vehicles and airborne troops. In 2012 the PLAAF from Chengdu Military region conducted an exercise with live ammunition practising surgical strikes at night employing their multi-role J-10 fighter aircraft operating from bases at 3,500 m at temperatures of minus 30 deg C on targets with laser guided weapons. If all these exercises are analysed it is obvious that the PLA / PLAAF are preparing for a potential high intensity regional conflict in HAA.

Equipping our mechanised forces In view of PLAs deployment, equipment profile and known tactics practised in conducting its anti-access and anti-denial operations, it is evident that most of their operations will be spearheaded by their mechanised forces. Therefore it is imperative that the Army counters the same by deploying our mechanised forces not only for a defensive battle but have the capability to launch a limited offensive if required. Hence the appropriate AFVs need to be deployed backed by a balanced logistic infrastructure.

Armour ¡¡ Medium tanks. Both the T-72(M) and T-90S are appropriate for deployment in HAA. Apart from the initial deployment if additional tanks are required they can be air transported by the newly acquired C-17 aircraft. However the minimum requirement for a defensive battle must be

Mechanised infantry The BMP-2 has proved its effectiveness while operating in HAA for more than two decades. With the modernisation programme being implemented especially with regards to uprating its engine and fitting an FCS, the BMP-2(M) will be the mainstay for the next decade. ¡¡ FICV. The future ICV being indigenously developed has been conceived keeping our requirements for both the Northern and Western theatres. Hence a tracked and wheeled version of the ICV is likely to be inducted by 2017.

Recce and surveillance The appropriate unit to initially stem a mechanised advance is the Recce and Support battalion. An ICV suitably equipped primarily with the third generation fire and forget missile must form the backbone of our defensive posture. A battalion each for the sectors would suffice to be built-up further if required. The recce troop / platoon of the mechanised forces are its eyes and ears and in keeping with the changed operational scenario, the base vehicle needs to be upgraded to the capability of a light armoured vehicle (LAM) of approx 8 tonnes to give it the desired protection and remote weapon station. For enhanced surveillance it requires a TI night sight, a BFSR and mini / micro UAV.

Organisation As no large scale manoeuvres are envisaged most of the deployment will be in combat teams with the integral reserves concentrated as combat groups. In an Infantry Division apart from the integral armoured regiment, it must be allotted a mechanised battalion and a Recce and Suppot company from the theatre reserves.

Conclusion During the 1962 war against China the Indian Air Force was not employed, nor were the tanks employed. The lessons learnt have oft been repeated, however, time has now come to ensure that when the bugle calls the mechanised forces are appropriately equipped, organised and trained to secure our Northern borders.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

CII protection The writer is Centre Director of Centre for Cyber Deterrence and Information Assurance in National Technical Research Organisation, Govt of India. He has been DIG of Police, Goa, Additional Commissioner of Police, Crime and Traffic Delhi and Inspector General of Police Daman and Diu. He graduated in Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering from Delhi University in first class with distinction. He holds a law degree from Delhi University. He has completed his Masters Degree in Criminology and is pursuing his PhD in Information Security Management from IIT, Delhi. He has also done Hostage Negotiation course at Louisiana State Police Academy, USA. His current areas of interest are Cyber crime and its detection, cyber terrorism, E-governance, Digital Signatures, Cryptography, E-policing, Information security and Cyber laws, Social media monitoring etc. He has been awarded police medal for meritorious service and President's police medal for distinguished service.

CYBER SECURITY IN INDIA: THE NCIIPC ROAD MAP VISION: To facilitate safe, secure and resilient information infrastructure for Critical Sectors of the nation. MISSION: To take all necessary measures to facilitate protection of Critical Information Infrastructure from unauthorised access, modification, use, disclosure, disruption, incapacitation or destruction through coherent coordination, synergy and raising information security awareness among all stakeholders.

eclaring America’s digital infrastructure to be a “strategic national asset” President Barack Obama called cyberspace the “fifth domain”, the “new frontier” and as vital and valuable as land, sea, air and space – and as threatened by the enemies of peace and amity, progress and prosperity. Britain also has set up a cyber-security policy outfit and an “operations centre” based in GCHQ, the British equivalent of the American NSA. Recognising that the nation’s Critical Infrastructures are vital and indispensable systems and invaluable assets whose incapacitation or decimation would trigger a debilitating impact and repercussions on national security, economy and well being, National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) under NTRO organised a “National Conference of Chief Information Security Officers of Critical Sectors of Government” on 17th December, 2012 at Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. IT Act Sec 70A envisages an agency for the protection of Critical Information Infrastructure in the country. The Critical Infrastructures (CIs) extend across many sectors including information and telecommunication, energy, transportation, defence, e-governance, industrial manufacturing, agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, chemicals and hazardous materials, banking and finance, space, petroleum and natural gas, power, law enforcement and security apparatus etc. The Conference was attended by almost 200 representatives, CISOs of Central and State Governments, Ministries and PSUs who discussed and learned about the Central Government’s vision for protecting Critical Information Infrastructure and Cyberspace. The Conference was graced by Shri Ajit Seth, Cabinet Secretary, Govt of India who gave the Keynote Address and Dr R Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Advisor, Govt of India who delivered the Valedictory Address. The Chief Guest Shri Shivshankar Menon, National Security Advisor, Govt of India inaugurated the Conference. Highlighting the vital

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Jim Lewis of a leading think tank in Washington DC says “cyber espionage is the biggest intelligence disaster since the loss of the nuclear secrets (in the late 1940s).” Spying probably presents the most immediate danger to the national security; the loss of high-tech know-how that could erode economic growth of the country or if it ever came to a shooting war, blunt military edge

Muktesh Chander, IPS

importance of Critical Infrastructures and Cyberspace he cautioned that their incapacitation and destruction would have debilitating effect on national security and economy. Expounding his views he said, “protecting Critical Information Infrastructures (physical or virtual information system that controls, processes, stores or exchanges electronic information vital to the functioning of critical sectors) will also mean working not just in government but with other stakeholders, particularly the private sector whose networks and assets are integral to our cyber security and whose expertise is essential to this purpose. The NCIIPC is setting up a joint working group under Indian Institute of Science, Associate Director, Shri N Balakrishnan with representatives of industry associations to bring out the guidelines for protection of Critical Information Infrastructures”. Concluding his address Shri Menon hoped that the Conference would help formulate legal framework, create necessary expertise and suggest practical measures within a pragmatic time frame to achieve the mandated goal.

Malware is exploding. It is typically used to steal passwords and other data or to open a back door to a computer so that it can be taken over by outsiders. Such “zombie” machines can be linked to many thousands, even hundreds of thousands of other machines around the world to create a “botnet”. Estimates for the number of infected machines may go up to millions. Botnets are used to send spam, spread malware or launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks which seek to bring down a targeted computer or network by overloading it with countless bogus requests

NTRO team headed by Chairman, Shri P V Kumar ably supported by Senior Advisor Shri Alhad Apte, Advisor Dr M S Vijayaraghavan and other NCIIPC officers skilfully steered the proceedings. The following pamphlets and bulletins were released during the Conference: Release of pamphlet “Roles and Responsibilities of Chief Information Security Officers of Critical Sectors in India” by Shri Ajit Seth, Cabinet Secretary. Release of the inaugural issue of the bi-monthly bulletin “Cyber Suraksha” by Shri Shivshankar Menon, National Security Advisor. Release of CD “Reading Material on CIIP” by Shri P V Kumar, Chairman, NTRO. Release of special issue of “Technology Update” on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection by Dr R Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Advisor.

AR MENON

SHIVSHANK

Developing an apocalyptic cyber-attack scenario in his new book, Richard Clarke a counter-terrorism and cyber-security expert envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. “Computer bugs bring down military email system; oil refineries and pipelines explode; air traffic-control systems collapse; freight and metro trains derail; financial data are scrambled; the electrical grid goes down; orbiting satellites spin out of control; society breaks down as food becomes scarce and money runs out. Worst of all the identity of the attacker may remain a mystery”

NCIIPC now embarks on a mission of critical national importance. The first goal is to develop a framework of guidelines to ensure protection of Critical Information Infrastructure. NCIIPC also proposes to set up 24x7 helpline to issue alerts, advisories and analyses on cyber-attacks, tracking trends, security measures and organising training and awareness programmes.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

EVOLUTION AND EMPLOYMENT

Lt Gen B S Pawar PVSM, AVSM ( retd) The writer is an alumnus of Rashtriya Indian Military College and National Defence Academy and was commissioned into Artillery in June 1968. He fought the 1971 war as an Observation Post Officer in the Uri sector of Jammu and Kashmir. He was the Brigade Major of an Infantry and Mountain Brigade and a Director in the Perspective Planning Directorate. He commanded a Rocket Regiment and has the distinction of commanding the largest Artillery Brigade in Jammu and Kashmir. He was Maj Gen Artillery, Western Command during Operation Parakram. He also headed the Army Aviation Corps and was the Commandant, School of Artillery. He hung his boots in September 2008. A defence analyst, he writes for a number of defence journals and publications. He is a member of the Governing Council of the Rotary Wing Society of India.

The combat helicopter is a formidable weapon system which can turn the tide in any future conflict and will continue to be relevant in the coming decades. Core technologies will need to be harnessed and exploited to make the future helicopters fast, tough and autonomous capable of operating by day / night, adverse weather, as well as in hot / high conditions. In our context with the probability of the next conflict in the mountains the HAL has a greater challenge in the development of future generation combat helicopters

he combat helicopter has proven very useful in providing valuable ground support for Infantry and Mechanised columns. Combat helicopters can be classified into two categories ie the armed helicopters / gunships and the modern day dedicated attack helicopters (AH). While slower and vulnerable to ground fire compared to the fighter aircraft, their staying power in the tactical battle area makes them more popular with the ground troops. In our context we did use the Mi-25 / Mi-35 AH in Sri Lanka during ‘Operation Pawan’ in 1987 in support of Indian and Sri Lankan forces but did not exploit its full potential. In fact there has been a burning debate why the AH were not used during the Kargil conflict. The late 70’s / early 80’s saw the advent of AH like the American Apache (AH 64A) and upgraded Huey Cobras (AH 1), the Soviet Mi-24 and the Italian Mangusta (A-129). It has puzzled many counter terrorism experts as to why the Indian armed forces have been reluctant to use AH / gunships specially when dealing with terrorist hideouts in jungles and mountainous ranges like the Pir Panjal.

ombat helicopters can be classified into two categories ie the armed helicopters / gunships and the modern day dedicated attack helicopters (AH). Both are military helicopters, wherein the armed helicopters / gunships are normal utility, cargo or reconnaissance helicopters, modified with weapon mounts for attacking targets on the ground. The purpose of modification could be field expediency during combat as well as need to maintain helicopters for missions that do not require weapons.

the need for armed helicopters and equipped the military Mi-8 helicopter with weapon pods. This was subsequently developed into the Mi-24 which saw active action in Afghanistan during the 1980’s. In our own context we had earlier the Mi-8 and Ranjit (modified Cheetah helicopter for carrying a machine gun) and presently the Mi-17 and Lancer (Cheetah helicopter) modified for armed helicopter roles. All these armed helicopters have been used at some point of time by the Army and Air force – ‘Op Pawan’ in Sri Lanka and ‘Op Sarp Vinash’ in Jammu and Kashmir.

The AH on the other hand is specifically designed and built to carry weapons for engaging targets on ground and air. The weapons include machine guns, cannons, rockets and guided missiles for air to ground and air to air engagement. Modern day AH have two main roles of providing direct and accurate close air support for ground troops and anti-tank role to destroy enemy armour. Specialised armed helicopters flying from ships at sea are equipped with weapons for anti-submarine and / or anti-shipping operations.

Evolution of modern combat helicopter

Combat helicopter concept The concept evolved with the French during the Algerian and first Indo-China Wars (1954-1962) in the form of modified armed helicopters. The first use of armed helicopters by the USA in large scale combat operations was in Vietnam. Until Vietnam, military helicopters were mostly used for troop transport, observation and casualty evacuation. The modified helicopters included the UH-IC troop carrying Huey and the larger ones like Sikorsky and Chinook CH-47. During the 1960’s The Soviet Union also felt

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

With the armed helicopter / gunship concept battle proven, began the advance AH development. The late 70’s / early 80’s saw the advent of AH like the American Apache (AH 64A) and upgraded Huey Cobras (AH 1), the Soviet Mi-24 and the Italian Mangusta (A-129). While some questioned the relevance of these dedicated AH due to increased costs over gunships, the 1991 Gulf War however put at rest any doubt about their relevance. Fleets of Apaches and Huey Cobras dominated Iraqi armour in the open desert during the Gulf War. In fact, the Apaches fired the first shots of war destroying early warning radars and SAM sites with hellfire missiles. The Soviet operations in Afghanistan during 1979-1989 saw the emergence of the Mi-25 / Mi-35 AH. The 9/11 bombings and subsequent American foray into Afghanistan put the AH / gunships in the centrestage due to their inherent characteristics. The battle proven Apaches from their anti-tank role in Iraq, now got into Infantry support role against the Taliban forces. The 2003 Iraq invasion saw some major reverses suffered by the Combat Helicopters in the initial stages, due to ground fire and SAMs. This was

COMBAT HELICOPTERS basically due to faulty tactics adopted, which were altered subsequently and success achieved. Modern day AH has been further refined and the American Apache Longbow (AH-64D) demonstrates many of the advanced technologies being considered for deployment on future AH. The latest Block-III version of the Apache incorporates 26 new technologies mainly related to use of composites, gear transmission system for better power capacity, efficient and more powerful engines, main rotor blades and higher altitude capability. The Russians are currently deploying the Ka-50 (a co-axial single pilot AH) and Mi-28 AH which is roughly the equivalent of the American Apache Longbow but without command and control link up.

Designed as weapon systems integrating multiple functions, helicopters will have to become truly modular, making it possible to change part of the system without affecting overall integrity. The concept of modularity is likely to increase, especially with the emergence of multirole machines In the Indian context in the 1980’s we had a Chetak helicopter fitted with the primitive AS11B1 anti-tank missiles as an AH, though basically it only qualified as an armed helicopter. Today we have in our inventory the export version of the Russian Mi-24, ie the Mi-25 / Mi-35 AH. They are however vintage, though certain amount of upgrade has been carried out in making them night capable. Trials for their replacement have already been completed and the Apache has scored over the Mi-28N also known as the Night Hunter. It is understood that the Block III version would be supplied to India. Also the development of the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is a milestone achievement in this direction. Presently in the developmental stage, based on its features it compares with the best, specially given its stated capability to operate at altitudes of 16,000 feet.

Employment of combat helicopters Nature of future wars will be short notice, short duration

and high intensity. They will be non-linear with deeper and wider combat zones, with emphasis on depth battle. The combat helicopter being an offensive weapon system and part of aerial manoeuvre units is an ideal weapon system for such a conflict scenario. It is capable of massing combat power rapidly at the decisive time and place and delivering massed fire power rapidly and accurately.

The combat helicopters never fight alone due to their inherent characteristics / vulnerabilities and must always be employed as part of combined arms team. The integration with other weapon systems enhances its overall effectiveness. These helicopters can attack the enemy forces anywhere on the battlefield due to their mobility and flexibility, thereby enhancing the commanders' reach and facilitate the shaping of the battlefield. Combat helicopter units provide the depth and simultaneity in a non-linear / non-contiguous battlefield of the future and their effective employment in conjunction with ground forces requires detailed planning and coordination. Hence real time intelligence, location of enemy deployment / weapons and plans for suppression of Air Defence in the tactical battle area are a key towards ensuring successful operations by combat helicopters. The case of 38 American Apache helicopters deep attack against the dispersed armour units of the Republican Guards (Medina Division) near Karbala on 23 March 2003 during operation Iraqi Freedom, resulting in total failure due to ground fire of anti-aircraft guns and other small arm fire is a vivid example. However the same Apache helicopters, supported by ground and air elements staged a successful attack five days later. Change of tactics and proper planning and coordination with other weapon systems was the key. Despite the negatives the combat helicopter has proven very useful in providing valuable ground support for Infantry and Mechanised columns. While slower and vulnerable to ground fire compared to the fighter aircraft, their staying power in the tactical battle area makes them more popular with the ground troops. In our context we did use the Mi-25 / Mi-35 AH in Sri Lanka during ‘Operation Pawan’ in 1987 in support of Indian and

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

EVOLUTION AND EMPLOYMENT

Sri Lankan forces but did not exploit its full potential. In fact there has been a burning debate why the AH were not used during the Kargil conflict. The AH was the ideal and effective weapon system for use against targets such as Tiger Hill. Possibly one of the main reasons could be the unsuitability of the Mi-25 / Mi-35 to operate at high altitudes. We must adept ourselves to operating in the mountains with such potent weapon systems (AH), both in the Eastern and Northern regions. The LCH should hopefully fill this void. The Indian Army has been fighting insurgency in the northeast for the last four decades and in Jammu and Kashmir for the last two. While the use of helicopters in both these areas has mainly been restricted to troop carriage, logistics, surveillance and casualty evacuation, we have been reluctant to use the gunships / AH. Gunships have been used in very specific cases like ‘Operation Sarp Vinash’ in the Pir Panjal ranges of Rajauri / Poonch area in May 2003. The operation resulted in the killing of a number of terrorists, as well as recovery of large scale cache of weapons and equipment. It has puzzled many counter terrorism experts as to why the Indian armed forces have been reluctant to use AH / gunships specially when dealing with terrorist hideouts in jungles and mountainous ranges like the Pir Panjal. Both the Army and Air Force have suitable weapons on their helicopters like the Mi-17 and Cheetah for employment in CI operations against terrorists. The basic reason for not employing them is collateral damage. The Pakistani Army is using the Huey Cobra AH against the Pak Taliban on the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Americans and the Russians are both using AH against the Taliban and Chechen rebels respectively, with a number of attacks resulting in collateral damage specially in urban settings. In the terrorist attack of 26/11 in Bombay, helicopters were used effectively for dropping the commandos at otherwise inaccessible points. Use of gunships is however ruled out in such a situation due to heavy collateral damage likely. Notwithstanding the above the use of combat helicopters for CI / CT operations requires us to think in new ways, employ new tools and jointly train for the same along with all agencies involved.

Combat helicopters in neighbourhood The Pakistan armed forces have the entire gamut of helicopters including AH as part of their Army Aviation Corps. It holds in its inventory the Bell AH-IS (Huey Cobra AH) and is in the process of refurbishing / upgrading them specially with night capability. Induction of additional AH (latest version of Huey Cobras), is also on the cards. With regard to China, the Army lacks a dedicated AH. The limited AH force consists of approximately 30 x WZ-9’s, some Gazelles and Mi-17 retrofitted with rockets. However, the Chinese have now developed the Zhi-10 (Z-10) AH. This is reportedly in the same class as the Italian Mangusta and the German Tiger and has all features of a state-of-the-art AH.

Future development While jet fighters are in their fifth generation, the helicopters are still strutting around with the same old airframes for the last several decades, with mostly upgrades to its credit. However, the new generation platforms are now

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

featuring the latest advances in aeronautics giving military helicopters improved flight performance. These platforms are also weapon systems that the incremental technological and technical progress has taken to the highest level. This offers the new generation machines unprecedented capabilities; lighter and stronger materials of construction, increased autonomy, more powerful engines, reduced acoustic signatures, more accurate navigation systems, enhanced data acquisition and protection systems and more effective weapons and munitions. Designed as weapon systems integrating multiple functions, helicopters will have to become truly modular, making it possible to change part of the system without affecting overall integrity. The concept of modularity is likely to increase, especially with the emergence of multirole machines. In terms of data acquisition, day / night observation and detection capabilities will increase and become more diversified specially in respect to information sharing and cooperation with other aircraft and UAVs. Target engagement capabilities with regard to weapon range and precision is likely to remain the focus of future development. With sub-conventional operations gaining ascendency around the world, helicopter survivability will assume greater significance. Advances in stealth, such as reductions in radar and acoustic signatures offer major results in this area, as does the development of early detection / jamming countermeasure capabilities. Some of the above technologies are already being incorporated in the development of Eurocopters X2 and X3 and Sikorsky’s X2 co-axial compound helicopter, which in its demonstrative flight achieved a speed of 287 mph, a major leap from the current standard helicopter speeds. Its military version the Sikorsky S-97 Raider is stated to be the future light tactical helicopter of the US Military. Finally, the development of innovative concepts, along the lines of V-22 Osprey (tilt rotor technology), could generate fresh momentum in the utility / logistics domain. The V-22 is already deployed in Afghanistan and was instrumental in the rescue of a downed US pilot in Libya last year. The US is looking at a joint heavy lift Rotorcraft platform designed to enter service for all three forces by 2030. Another area of future development is helicopter UAVs. Two avenues are already being explored and implemented in different countries – UAV-helicopter cooperation and development of rotary wing UAVs. Lockheed Martin’s K-MAX helicopterUAV is currently deployed in Afghanistan for logistics resupply and is proving to be quite a hit.

Conclusion The combat helicopter is a formidable weapon system which can turn the tide in any future conflict and will continue to be relevant in the coming decades. Core technologies will need to be harnessed and exploited to make the future helicopters fast, tough and autonomous capable of operating by day / night, adverse weather, as well as in hot / high conditions. In our context with the probability of the next conflict in the mountains the HAL has a greater challenge in the development of future generation combat helicopters.

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land power in India

INTROSPECTION

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

The Army today stands totally marginalised in the Indian context. Frankly, at this rate, it could turn into a peacetime Army like the one we had before 1962. Its spirit and elan will be corroded by the complete absence of challenge in the operational context (it will simply not be used). Challenges bring the best out of institutions and individuals. They weld units into cohesive and motivated teams. They give an organisation a sense of purpose and belonging. That is what a peacetime Army lacks and today, it is beginning to tell in the isolated instances of strained Officer-Men relationships – especially in units not exposed to challenging operational environments that bind and build units into effective fighting teams

here was an era in the 1980s and the 1990s when the Army felt it was being overused and overtaxed in the Internal Security and Aid to Civil Authorities settings. Today, the wheel has come a full circle and the Indian Army finds itself largely marginalised from both the external and internal security processes of the country. The nuclearisation of the subcontinent has greatly curtailed the prospects of conventional wars. This has induced the political elite to virtually rule out any chance of employing the military in its primary role. The insurgencies in Kashmir and the northeast have largely petered out and the government is dead set against using the Military against the Maoists. That takes care of its secondary role. The state is militarising the Police instead, a process that could take well over a decade. Would it not have been far more cost effective to raise five or six Light Infantry Divisions instead, which could be invaluable in any two front war scenario? Is there an unconscious return to the Nehruvian mindset of the pre-1962 era when the political elite mistrusted the military and felt that given India’s soft power orientation, the police was all we needed? Marginalising the military from the national security process for a second time would be a tragic mistake.

he Indian Army is the second largest Army in the world. It is an historic Army with some 300 plus years of an unbroken corporate existence. It has fought with the world-class Armies like the Germans, Japanese and Turks and come out with flying colours. Its post-independence record is most impressive. This Army really came of age with its stellar liberation of Bangladesh. In just 14 action packed days, it launched a Blitzkrieg that cut through to the capital city of the country. Over 93,000 Pakistani soldiers surrendered and for the first time after the Second World War, a new nation state was created with the force of arms. It was a decisive military campaign, which entailed a march on the enemy capital and enforced a regime change. Low intensity conflict: What followed was an era of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). With the sanctuaries in the former East Pakistan taken out, India intensified its Counter Insurgency (CI) operations and forced the Hostiles to surrender in Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura. The Punjab terrorist movement was a traumatic phase but this militancy was decisively defeated in a decade. India then intervened in Sri Lanka and Maldives. For the past 20 years, it has fought Pakistan’s proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and has broken the back of the jihadi tanzeems. Normalcy has been restored and today we only need to be vigilant about any Pakistani attempts to revive this insurgency in a post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan setting.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Our era will primarily witness Limited Wars against a nuclear backdrop. These would be sharp, short and very violent. Nations would have to rely upon a come as you are capability. In 1999, our Army Chief was forced to state, “We will fight with what we have.” The pity is that our Ministry of Defence (MoD) Papers still insist that Indian armed forces will prepare to fight a general war. This would, the MoD feels, prepare us for any lesser contingency. Limited Wars have their strong inbuilt constraints and the doctrinal base or way of war fighting that caters for a long duration, general war of 4-6 years can just not do for a sharp Limited War that lasts for a month or less. The entire scope of preparation, organisation and conduct modalities are vastly different for these two genres. These differences need to be recognised – if at all we are serious about fighting limited wars. Armies have to be specifically prepared and primed for the wars they are likely to fight – rather than the wars of a distant past There was an era in the 1980s and the 1990s when the Army felt it was being overused and overtaxed in the Internal Security and Aid to Civil Authorities settings, to an extent that apparently detracted it from its primary role. There was some debate and questioning of why the Army should be so over-used in Internal Security tasks.

MARGINALISING THE MILITARY:

A RETURN TO THE 1962 MINDSET? The era of marginalisation? From the era of overuse, the wheel has turned a full circle and today the Indian Army finds itself largely marginalised from both the external and internal security processes of the country. The nuclearisation of the subcontinent has greatly curtailed the prospects of conventional wars. The paradox that is not understood by our political elite is that within just a year of nuclearisation, Pakistan had launched a serious military provocation with its intrusions in Kargil. This triggered off a Limited War, confined in space to the Kargil sector of the Line of Control (LOC). However, it was a violent conflict that saw the employment of two Army divisions and the Indian Air Force and Artillery were extensively employed to mass effects. The Limited War raged for close to three months as the world sat on the sidelines and let two nuclear armed adversaries slug it out. This standoff was followed by an even bigger confrontation in 2001-02, which led to India mobilising her entire armed forces. This coercive deployment did put pressure on Pakistan, but soon lost its sting as the deployment was not followed up by any actual employment of force. The results of the coercive exercise were quite mixed and it was extended much beyond its logical expiry date.

The Indian Army today, is passing through a critical era of phase transition. A combination of events have led it to be largely marginalised from the National Security Process in our country. After nuclearisation, the current political elite have erroneously concluded that it just cannot be used in a conventional conflict fought against a nuclear backdrop. That makes its primary task largely irrelevant Post 9/11, the Americans had attacked Afghanistan. Bruce Reidel, the architect of the US Af-Pak policy concluded that the only way to motivate Pakistan was to pressurise India to make major concessions on Kashmir and remove all military pressure from Pakistan’s Eastern Front. Tremendous American pressure was now put on India to negotiate peace with Pakistan and more or less hand over Kashmir on a platter through a camouflaged process that began with open borders (and an open sesame perhaps for large scale re-infiltration) as the first step in a track two process. The new political administration in Delhi now sharply reined in its armed forces and determinedly set out to negotiate peace with Pakistan

at any cost. What quid pro quo, if any, was expected from the USA for this sell out on Kashmir, was never spelt out. To put psychological pressure on the Indian Army, a whole new host of foreign funded NGOs now launched an orchestrated campaign to demonise the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir and delegitimise its operations. Motivated sections in the media joined in this orchestrated campaign to usher in a Munich mentality (via the Aman ki Asha chorus). The result was a spurt of pressure on the Indian armed forces to give reprieve to the beleaguered terrorist tanzeems in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Army had effectively broken the backs of these tanzeems by 2005. The ISI shifted gears and got the Jamaat-e-Islami cadres infiltrated in the valley to launch mass agitations to give it the spin of a Palestinian-style Intifada and create a new narrative of utter victimhood. The stinging military defeat of the terror tanzeems was now sought to be converted into a psychological and information war coup. This almost broke the will of the Indian state to consolidate the victory won by its forces in the field and the air became rife with slogans of a return to the pre-1953 situation. In 2007-08, Pakistan unleashed

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

INTROSPECTION

the new asymmetric arm of the Indian Mujahideen (IM) to stage low grade explosive vector attacks in all major cities of India. By using subverted Indians, Pakistan’s ISI gained virtual deniability. Fortunately the Indian Police and Intelligence agencies soon penetrated and dismantled large sections of this new tanzeem. Pakistan’s ISI retaliated with the carnage of 26/11 that shook Mumbai for 3 days and left 166 dead and over 700 wounded. Astonishingly, there was not even a hint of military retaliation by India. The entire effort seemed to be to somehow staunch the public outrage and deflect suspicion towards ‘saffron terror’. This was the ISI’s cover plan for deniability. However the entire cover was blown by the capture of Ajmal Kasab and the lively cross border signal traffic between the handlers and the killers.

The foreign pressure to negotiate peace with Pakistan was compounded by a conscious / unconscious retard put on the Indian Arms Acquisition process. Whether by design or by pure accident, it was slowed down to a painful crawl. Thus when Mumbai happened, the then Indian Army Chief virtually conceded that he was not in a position to retaliate. The worrying fact is that the pace of the arms acquisition process as it is, contemplates a completion of our military build-up only by 2025 (that is after the 12th and 13th Defence Plans are completed). To this astonishingly leisurely pace are added the severe turbulence in the arms acquisition process with accusations of corruption leading to repeated derailments of contracts and blacklisting of virtually half of the major arms industries of the world The retard arms acquisition conspiracy: The foreign pressure to negotiate peace with Pakistan was compounded by a conscious / unconscious retard put on the Indian Arms Acquisition process. Whether by design or by pure accident, it was slowed down to a painful crawl. Thus when Mumbai happened, the then Indian Army Chief virtually conceded that he was not in a position to retaliate. The worrying fact is that

the pace of the arms acquisition process as it is, contemplates a completion of our military build-up only by 2025 (that is after the 12th and 13th Defence Plans are completed). To this astonishingly leisurely pace are added the severe turbulence in the arms acquisition process with accusations of corruption leading to repeated derailments of contracts and blacklisting of virtually half of the major arms industries of the world. This painful slowing down of the recapitalisation of the major weapons stock of the Indian armed forces has led to a dangerous window of vulnerability that could last till 2018 or 2020. It is only then that the Rafale and LCA fighters of the Air Force and the medium artillery guns, AD weapons and new light helicopters of the Army will start coming in. Till then the Indian armed forces have been effectively defanged and neutered from retaliating effectively across the border to any further Pakistani Terrorist Provocation. The motor mouthed Rehman Malik added insult to this injury as he thumbed his nose at our hopes of getting judicial redress for 26/11. Pakistan’s recent peace gestures are simply a clever tactic for keeping the Eastern Front quiet – as Pakistan goes for the kill in Kabul post-2014. India will then be expected to applaud the hanging of Karzai from the sidelines. Marginalisation complete: This has painfully highlighted the near total marginalisation of the armed forces from the National Security Process. The political elite looks determined not to use them for launching any conventional military operations for raising costs for Pakistan or even deterring China from adventurism. They are equally determined that they will not be employed to fight the Naxals. The Nehruvian state despised the armed forces. It found the Army a nuisance and felt that all that India needed was Police forces. That was the pre-1962 mindset. It is extremely worrying to see its full blown return in the 21st century. One earnestly hopes that under-resourced and humiliated armed forces will thus not be set up for a second lesson from the Chinese-Pakistani combine. Meanwhile, the marginalisation of the armed forces from the national security

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

process has been accomplished now for the second time (after 1962). The Low Intensity Conflicts (LICOs) in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast have petered out. The political elite are determined not to use the armed forces to counter external provocations. The political elite will not even use the Army against the Naxals. Instead the Police are being militarised to fight insurgencies in dense jungle terrains. Some 3,00,000 additional policemen have been recruited. Unfortunately, they are not trained, organised or equipped for this task. It would have been far more cost effective to raise some six Light Army Divisions instead. At least they would have been of use against China or Pakistan in any existential crisis. The CRPF unfortunately would be of very little use in any such eventuality. Thus the Army today stands totally marginalised in the Indian context. Frankly, at this rate, it could turn into a peacetime Army like the one we had before 1962. Its spirit and elan will be corroded by the complete absence of challenge in the operational context (it will simply not be used). Challenges bring the best out of institutions and individuals. They weld units into cohesive and motivated teams. They give an organisation a sense of purpose and belonging. That is what a peacetime Army lacks and today, it is beginning to tell in the isolated instances of strained Officer-Men relationships – especially in units not exposed to challenging operational environments that bind and build units into effective fighting teams.

Introspection Today there is a need for the Army to sit back and introspect deeply. The following issues merit great concern and concerted effort: Need to accelerate the arms and munitions acquisition process: There are glaring voids and hollowness in the Army. We lack the standard 155 mm medium gun – the mainstay of any battle in the mountains. Our Air Defence (AD) equipment is of the 1960s and 1970s vintage and is crying out for replacement. So is the case for our Army Aviation helicopters and we cannot wait till the old machines start falling out of the skies. A

large proportion of our tank fleet is night blind and the infantry needs new small arms and night vision capabilities across the board. We need these urgently.

To put psychological pressure on the Indian Army, a whole new host of foreign funded NGOs now launched an orchestrated campaign to demonise the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir and delegitimse its operations. Motivated sections in the media joined in this orchestrated campaign to usher in a Munich mentality (via the Aman ki Asha chorus) Crafting a limited war doctrine: By the 1980s, the Chinese under Deng Xiaoping, had come to the clear-cut determination that large scale, general wars like the First and Second World Wars were now history. Our era will primarily witness Limited Wars against a nuclear backdrop. These would be sharp, short and very violent. Nations would have to rely upon a come as you are capability. In 1999, our Army Chief was forced to state, “We will fight with what we have.” The pity is that our Ministry of Defence (MoD) Papers still insist that Indian armed forces will prepare to fight a general war. This would, the MoD feels, prepare us for any lesser contingency. Limited Wars have their strong inbuilt constraints and the doctrinal base or way of war fighting that caters for a long duration, general war of 4-6 years can just not do for a sharp Limited War that lasts for a month or less. The entire scope of preparation, organisation and conduct modalities are vastly different for these two genres. These differences need to be recognised – if at all we are serious about fighting limited wars. Armies have to be specifically prepared and primed for the wars they are likely to fight – rather than the wars of a distant past. It is time we stopped hanging on so pathetically to the apron strings of our colonial past and did our own doctrinal thinking to suit the present day context and requirements. The PLA provides useful inspiration in this regard. Primary and secondary task: There

is a need for an in-depth doctrinal debate. For long, a canard has been spread that Internal Security tasks detract from the Army’s readiness for conventional conflict. One only needs to see the records of the 3 Infantry Division and 8 Mountain Division in the recent Kargil War to see the bankruptcy of this argument. 8 Mountain Div that was continuously in CI operations did far better than a division left free to prepare for its primary task. This canard has been spread by peacetime soldiers who have evaded service in CI environments and yet want accelerated promotions. The Chinese PLA has four tasks. This includes external and internal security tasks and there is no gradation or weightage accorded to different tasks. All are of equal importance. In the modern context, some 95-98 per cent of the time, Armies, will be engaged in LICOs. A doctrinal denial of this stark reality leads to mindsets that do not prepare for the most likely task. There is no better tactical training ground than live CI / CT operations. No simulator can replicate the adrenaline rush of live combat. Troops engaged in CI operations do much better in regular combat. Conflict termination versus conflict resolution: Our Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine currently is very pessimistic. It aims merely at minimalist level of conflict resolution that just sets the stage for talks between the government and the insurgents. That, it feels is all that armies can do. The decisive defeat that the Sri Lankan Army inflicted on the LTTE, clearly highlights that armies can do much more. We need to debate and discuss whether the Indian Army now needs to raise its sights and at the very least ensure that the government talks from a position of clear strength. Where foreign armed terrorists enter the fray, they will simply have to be eliminated. Proportional force versus minimal force: Our Aid to Civil Authorities pamphlets were crafted in the British Colonial Era. The colonial regime was facing a non-violent Gandhian Protest Movement that was peaceful. The levels of violence were very low or largely absent. Hence minimal force was the order of the day.

Post-independence, unfortunately the levels of violence have risen exponentially. Some 80,000 AK-47 series of weapons were recovered by the Indian Army alongwith several hundred machine guns and rocket launchers and virtually tons of military grade explosives. This has led to the dangerous militarisation of such internal fault line conflict. It would now be essential to use proportional and not minimal force. Anything less would endanger the unity and sovereignty of this country.

Conclusion The Indian Army today, is passing through a critical era of phase transition. A combination of events have led it to be largely marginalised from the National Security Process in our country. After nuclearisation, the current political elite have erroneously concluded that it just cannot be used in a conventional conflict fought against a nuclear backdrop. That makes its primary task largely irrelevant. It has been reduced to a token insurance policy for which huge premiums have to be paid most grudgingly. There is an unfortunate return to the Civil-Military mindset of the pre-1962 era. The Nehruvian dispensation despised the Armed Forces as the last relic of the Raj. The military it felt was just not needed. All India needed according to them was the Police. The Police bureaucracy of our Intelligence Services of that era, whole heartedly supported this thesis – especially after the 1956 Coup by the Pakistani Army. The Army was thereafter completely sidelined from the National Security Strategy Formulation process and was barely tolerated. The disaster of 1962 was a natural corollary of such schizophrenic thinking based on false national narratives about India being a soft power state that abhorred hard power. You may abhor hard power. However unless you have hard power in adequate measure, you could endanger the very survival of your state. Today the marginalisation of the military process has reached a stage where the political elite have no use for it in External Security or even for Internal Security tasks. This marginalisation and studied irrelevance, could spell great danger for our polity, for the panoply of external and internal threats that we face today are indeed daunting.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

SINO-PAK NEXUS

A Lt Gen Prakash Katoch PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC ( retd) The writer is a third generation Army officer who retired as DG Info Systems in 2009 after 40 years service. He participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, commanded a Special Forces Battalion in Sri Lanka, a Brigade on Siachen Glacier during Kargil Conflict, a Division in Ladakh and a Strike Corps in Semi Deserts. He is former Colonel of The Parachute Regiment. A leading defence expert, he is a visiting fellow in foreign Think Tanks and contributes regularly for Indian and foreign publications.

The collusive China-Pakistan threat is acquiring dangerous dimensions with both countries following the policy of ambiguity, denial and deceit

China nuclearises Pakistan enabling it to maintain anti-India proxy war and threaten nuclear terrorism. China trains, arms, advises Pakistani Taliban, ULFA and supplies weapons to PLA in Manipur and Indian Maoists. Vernacular Pakistani media and US think tanks report Pakistani plans of leasing out Gilgit-Baltistan region to China for 50 years. Radicalisation of Maldives is underway by LeT courtesy ISI

n important article by a former Brigade commander of Siachen and Corps commander of the Ladakh region who perhaps knows the terrain better than any other veteran. He highlights the perils of vacating the Soltoro Ridge in the face of the enhanced Chinese-Pak collusion in Gilgit-Baltistan. Operations in mountains are time consuming and more significantly manpower intensive. In addition to the aerospace dimension, land based conflict should be expected more in areas conducive to deployment of mechanised forces, examples being Eastern Ladakh, North Sikkim, Chumbi Valley etc. Offensive operations essentially require uncommitted troops. To this end, there is definite need to deploy an exclusive Mountain Strike Corps in Ladakh considering the collusive China-Pakistan threat including China’s strategic designs in PoK-Ladakh region. A second Mountain Strike Corps needs to be deployed to cater to Chinese claims to so-called “South Tibet” for appropriate response when required. There should be no needless apprehension about Chinese sensibilities in this context.

“C

hinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims … for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate on two fronts simultaneously ... ”, wrote Sardar Patel to Nehru on 7th November 1950. The unholy China-Pakistan nexus, including nuclear and asymmetric, has multiplied exponentially over the years. Patel’s strategic prophecy has been repeatedly proved right, latest instance being China’s recent claim to entire Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet”.

China will not hesitate to take physical action against India if and when it suits her national interests including opening multiple land routes to the Indian Ocean keeping in mind her long term energy requirements. This is likely even while China’s power projection in IOR remains constrained in absence of credible air cover till aircraft carrier group(s) with accompanied air cover can be deployed, which is years away With China getting more and more aggressive, the collusive China-Pakistan threat is acquiring dangerous dimensions with both countries following the policy of ambiguity, denial and deceit.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Changed picture Lets view the following developments since Sardar Patel’s prophetic warning: Forsaking the opportunity to flush out Pakistanis from Jammu and Kashmir in 1948, India facilitates PoK (one-third Jammu and Kashmir) abandoning proximity to Wakhan Corridor, resulting in China wooing Pakistan. China occupies Aksai Chin; 38,000 sq km of Indian Territory. Pakistan illegally cedes Shaksgam Valley (6,000 sq km Indian Territory) to China; “Higher than the Mountains, Deeper than the Sea” relationship takes off. Pakistan claims NJ 9842 to KK Pass.

directly

from

China nuclearises Pakistan enabling it to maintain anti-India proxy war and threaten nuclear terrorism. China tacitly anti-India jihad.

supports

Pakistan’s

Uniformed PLA soldiers observed in Northern Nepal by foreign journalists. China claims Doklam Plateau in Bhutan and entire Arunachal Pradesh.

Astride Northern Borders PLA owned companies take up development projects in all countries in proximity of India where deployment of serving PLA personnel cannot be ruled out.

Arunachal Pradesh and South China Sea as part of China.

China trains, arms, advises Pakistani Taliban, ULFA and supplies weapons to PLA in Manipur and Indian Maoists.

Siachen has been in the news in recent times. Of strategic relevance is the Saltoro Range that India dominates. It is a wedge not only between India and Pakistan, it’s strategic significance should be viewed with relation to Pakistani claims for extending the LC beyond NJ 9842 to KK Pass, Shaksgam Valley and more significantly, Chinese strategic designs along the entire Himalayan Range; PoK, Gilgit-Baltistan, Shaksgam, Saltoro-Siachen, Aksai Chin-KK Pass, Northern Nepal, Doklam Plateau in Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh et al.

Chinese nationals apprehended with fake Indian Pan Cards on mission to contact Indian insurgents. Chinese State TV shows maps of India with entire Jammu and Kashmir as part of Pakistan. Vernacular Pakistani media and US think tanks report Pakistani plans of leasing out Gilgit-Baltistan region to China for 50 years. Chinese make strategic footprints in PoK and Pakistan. Pakistani defence analyst foresees China administered Baluchistan by 2030. Radicalisation of Maldives is underway by LeT courtesy ISI. Maps appended with Chinese visa show Aksai Chin,

Siachen

China is openly exhorting neighbours to break alliance with the US – signalling US to get out of the region; declaring China will go to any length to protect their claimed territories; Xi Jingping’s prompt visit to the Second Artillery Corps (that oversees the land-based ballistic and cruise missiles and of Chinese nuclear forces and complimenting them as the strategic pillar of China’s great power status It is generally believed that the LC was drawn along areas held by opposing sides but this is not true in case of NJ 9842. NJ 9842 was neither occupied at the time of

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

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SINO-PAK NEXUS

drawing the LC and is not held even today. It is actually a point not on the Saltoro Range but much south of the western edge of the Saltoro Range.

that lack of settlement affects the Tibet issue, the implications are very clear; China wants to keep the issue open to keep the option of enlarging

with the US – signalling US to get out of the region; declaring China will go to any length to protect their claimed territories; Xi Jingping’s prompt visit

flexing her muscles 2010 onwards and that India should settle her borders with China before this, little was done to even plug the gaps for defence along our northern borders. The much hyped improvement of border infrastructure has not really taken off in any worthwhile measure despite colossal Chinese military upgrades in TAR (including nuclear missile deployments) and massive exercise by PLAAF and Chinese Airborne Corps in proximity to the LAC.

We must strive to remove the asymmetry vis-à-vis our adversaries in fields of aerospace, cyber, electromagnetic domains and rapid aerial deployments. The vital deterrent to irregular warfare must be established by optimising our Special Forces. There is absolutely no reason that we cannot take on future challenges

The two points denoting northern extremities of undivided Kashmir (acceded by Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to India) are Dafdar in Taghdumbash Pamir near Beyik Pass (bordering Wakhan Corridor) and Karakoram Pass (bordering Xinjiang in China). Precise coordinates are available in Wikipedia. The logical conclusion is that the LC beyond NJ 9842 should run north to the northwestern extremity (Dafdar in Taghdumbash Pamir near Beyik Pass bordering Wakhan Corridor) instead of Pakistani mischievous claim to KK Pass, which by no means coincides with “runs thence north to the glaciers”.

Enhanced threat Continued emphasis on ‘peaceful’ rise by China is belied by her actions; provocations both in South China Sea and against India while also hurting India economically through a grossly unbalanced bilateral trade (US $ 50.5 billion in favour of China out of a US $ 75 billion trade) that has shut down scores of small scale industries in India including severely affecting the bamboo industry in our northeast. If China says that the border issue will not be resolved for a very long time knowing full well

her territorial claims, recent addition of entire Arunachal Pradesh being one example. Pakistan’s renewed rhetoric for demilitarisation of Siachen is clearly egged on by China and being facilitated by the US who want to prop up Kayani even at the disadvantage of India. We should also have no illusions that PoK is already a strategic objective of China and can no longer be treated as an Indo-Pak issue. While China is already constructing a road through the Wakhan Corridor, PoK ensures Chinese access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, to Afghanistan and CARs. This in turn restricts any power projection by India to the west. Meanwhile, China-Pakistan collusion to create the third front within India (already accounted as half front by Indian Army) will continue, plus border transgressions and doling money to villagers in the border belt to manipulate perceptions physically, through hawala or electronic transfers. The new Chinese leadership that has dawned the era of ‘Princelings’ is already showing its true colours: enhanced territorial aggressiveness with tensions in South China Sea having multiplied manifold; China is openly exhorting neighbours to break alliance

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

to the Second Artillery Corps that oversees the land based ballistic and cruise missiles and of Chinese nuclear forces and complimenting them as the strategic pillar of China’s great power status. During a recent international seminar, a petite PLA Colonel told the Indian delegates she believed Chinese nationals hobnobbing with and arming Indian insurgents was without knowledge of her government and PLA. She was told this is unlikely considering the tight citizen control in China but if true, amounts to admitting anti-India non-state actors in China. She then changed tack saying Arunachal Pradesh was part of China in ancient times, to which our delegates responded that India then should be claiming territory right up to Hindu Kush Mountains and in 6th century BC, Tibet was a bigger kingdom than China and had even annexed the then capital of China. She then insisted China will not even yield one inch of territory and feigned ignorance of China’s illegal occupation of Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley. Though both the US DoD and strategic community had warned a decade back that China will start

Indian policy makers are lulled, amongst other reasons, with the dubious belief that China is so involved with South China Sea that it will not attack India. Chinese designs on Ladakh have never been appreciated. The 2006 Google imagery showed an extraordinary large scale (1:500) terrain model extensively duplicating eastern Aksai Chin built close to Yinchuan (capital of Ningxia autonomous region), the 3,000 × 2,300 feet is being used for tank war-games. When India was battling Pakistanis in Kargil during 1999, China was developing a road in eastern Aksai Chin towards south of KK Pass. In April this year (2012) China called upon Japan and South Korea to establish astronomical observatories in Aksai Chin. To think that China has no plans on Ladakh will be the height of naiveté considering persistent ground and air Chinese violations in the area. India should have had a complete Division deployed in Eastern Ladakh a decade back considering LC or LAC, grabbers are takers and we should not expect anything different just because we were foolish enough to hand back a captured strategic height like Hajipir. China is fast emulating Nazi Germany; her actions indicating her belief that she has achieved the level of CNP to extract whatever

territorial gains she wants from her neighbours without challenging the US or daring the US to intervene with its declining economic strength. Should the US get physically more involved in the Middle East (Syria and / or Iran, elsewhere), more Chinese adventurism can be expected. Ignoring Chinese preparations for future large-scale conventional wars on multiple fronts including informationised and mechanised for potential Asia pacific and Indian war scenarios would only be at our peril. The US may have announced the Asia Pivot in recent months but China already has in place a globally deployable military force with nuclear / non-nuclear allies / proxies in North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria as counter even if one discounts Chinese not resorting to large scale nuclear breakout. The simple fact is that China will not hesitate to take physical action against India if and when it suits her national interests including opening multiple land routes to the Indian Ocean keeping in mind her long-term energy requirements. This is likely even while China’s power projection in IOR remains constrained in absence of credible air cover till aircraft carrier group(s) with accompanied air cover can be deployed, which is years away. For the time being, her power projection in IOR will likely be under guise of what may be termed as ‘military operations other than war’. Some western strategists even feel that to shock India into territorial concessions, PLA may consider a savage campaign including limited nuclear exchange. Though unlikely (crossing the nuclear rubicon), we certainly cannot rule out the possibility altogether. What we should be ready for is opening of multiple / mass front as it happened earlier. Land based enveloping actions of yesteryears will be replaced by vertical envelopment through helicopter based RRF. Physical activation of LAC will be preceded by full spectrum satellite surveillance, cyber attacks on military, non-military networks and critical infrastructure, laser and plasma attacks. Conflict may be simultaneous at the operational, strategic and tactical levels that may be intense but short with use of PGMs to maximum effect.

Securing northern borders There is no reason to get overawed by China’s economic and military might but portraying weaknesses is inviting attack. We first need to ensure that we do not present a weak front anywhere along our northern borders. Operations in mountains are time consuming and more significantly manpower intensive. In addition to the aerospace dimension, land based conflict should be expected more in areas conducive to deployment of mechanised forces, examples being Eastern Ladakh, North Sikkim, Chumbi Valley etc. Offensive operations essentially require uncommitted troops. To this end, there is definite need to deploy an exclusive Mountain Strike Corps in Ladakh considering the collusive China-Pakistan threat including China’s strategic designs in PoK-Ladakh region. A second Mountain Strike Corps needs to be deployed to cater to Chinese claims to so-called “South Tibet” for appropriate response when required. There should be no apprehension towards Chinese sensibilities in this context. Chinese spokesmen say that the massive PLA build-up is necessary since China does not have any military alliance with any country. India, is not in any such alliance either. Our forward infrastructure development needs to be taken up on critical operational priority to ensure rapid mobilisation and switching of forces. In addition, we must strive to remove the asymmetry vis-à-vis our adversaries in fields of aerospace, cyber, electromagnetic domains and rapid aerial deployments. The vital deterrent to irregular warfare must be established by optimising our Special Forces. There is absolutely no reason that we cannot take on future challenges. It is not that China does not realise that ‘internal dissent’ is the biggest threat to China today. Possibly, the ruling party wants to deflect this dissent by igniting external trouble spots in order to deflect internal dissent into heightened nationalism. This may succeed for sometime but then the world may catch on and resort to slowing down China through the Chinese population.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

UNFOLDING SCENARIOS

Lt Gen (Dr) D B Shekatkar PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer has served extensively in northeast from 1964 to 2000. He mastered the art of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. He also combated terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir. He was head of the operational group of Unified Command in Assam. He also served as Additional Director General Military Operations and also as Additional Director General Perspective (Strategic Planning at Army HQ New Delhi. He was Chair Professor, Policy Studies in the Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies at University of Pune. He is President of the Forum for Integrated National Security of India.

The future conventional war more likely will be limited to time and space. Due to tremendous advancement in information technology, communication, space assets, inter-connectivity the future war or armed conflict will be based on full knowledge and detailed information about each other. It would be difficult to maintain surprise. It would also be difficult to hide large concentration of forces, specially mechanised forces, artillery guns, missiles, aircraft and ships

Sea denial, airspace denial for commercial airlines of targeted nation or to the targeted nation, no fly zone, technology denial, energy denial, trade denial and may be even food denial will be new forms of external intervention before the actual war starts in military terms

t is evident that the nature of war is changing at a very fast pace. While ground forces will continue to dominate combat, decisive victory will depend on the judicious employment of air assets. An in-depth analysis of events in Middle East would clearly reveal that in Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya we have seen the collapse of ruling regime and destruction of national assets and infrastructure due to internal uprising instigated by outside powers, supported and sustained through indirect military aid and advice and finally military intervention in different forms. The writer outlines the new model of covert intervention and overthrow of inimical regimes in weak states. “In no other organisation the penalty for failure to accurately forecast future, is as high as in the armed forces. The rate of change of technology has a tremendous impact on war fighting specially the land warfare”.

t is getting exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment as the events in the last two decades have clearly shown. The character of emerging military threats will depend on how nations focus their resources. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared for a combination of conventional and unconventional war. Mr Winston Churchill when asked about the possibility of war with Germany had categorically viewed it most unlikely. Again in 1920, he had stated that there was not the “slightest chance” of war with Japan! Could anyone predict war between China and India when India was caught totally unprepared in 1962? Entire nation was made to believe that “Hindi Chini were Bhai-Bhai”. While serving as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of a Corps in northeast India, on 24 April 1999 at the highest forum of Indian Army’s Operational Planning in Military Operational Room at Army Headquarters, when this writer pointed out possible infiltration of terrorists / irregular forces of Pakistan East of Zoji La Pass, there were comments about “poor professional judgment” and “lack of strategic analytical depth”!! Events just after one week between Zoji La Pass and Kargil proved the writer right. In 1997 at the Conference Room of Ministry of Defence, during the meeting of Indo-US defence cooperation initiative; when American delegation members were given indication about the possibility of use of commercial / cargo aircraft as “bomb” the idea was not only laughed at but also ridiculed by both delegation members. Events of 9/11 opened a new chapter of warfare!! If analysed honestly, keeping in view the trends of events, alternate use of technology for destructive purpose, combined with anticipatory and predictability threat analysis it is not very difficult to make

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a reasonably accurate forecast of emerging trends in warfare.

Paradigm shift In the past six decades, warfare has moved down the scale of intensity and inclusiveness. Desire of more nations to possess nuclear weapons and capabilities to deter possible adversaries will pose new challenges to warfare and specially the ground forces which will be fighting in a most hostile environment. Illegal proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how, illegal smuggling of nuclear material and the likelihood of these getting into the hands of the “non-state actors” who will be duly encouraged and supported by hostile / rogue states will pose new challenges to the ground forces operating even in their own homeland. There is a very strong possibility and certainty of shift from use of “weapons of mass destruction” to “mechanism of disruption and destruction of masses”. With the concept of “suicide bomber” nothing should be ruled out in future. What was 9/11? The use of suicide bombers and civil technology to destroy American assets, civil population and disrupt the masses not only in America but in many parts of the world!! Arab-Israel conflicts, Vietnam War, events in Eastern Europe, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, followed by unceremonious withdrawal after 10 years of occupation, the first US-Gulf War, (US-Iraq War), invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq are glaring examples of paradigm shift in incentive, causes, motivation and mechanism of warfare. The threats of conventional conflict / war of prolonged duration between states or group of states are now being over-shadowed by unconventional, sub-conventional conflict / war ranging from intra-state conflict to regime change under the pretext of War on Terrorism are gradually gaining prominence. Economic,

Changing Perspective of

Warfare in 21st Century: It’s Impact on Land Warfare

demographic, social, religious, political tensions, desire to control energy and other mineral resources which are so essential to industrial and economic growth of advanced Western Nations are now promoting incentive and urge to first ignite, encourage internal conflict within a nation state, followed by international intervention using conventional armed power, without even declaring a war. Yemen, Syria, Libya are recent examples. It is a matter of time when Western world will be able to execute regime change in Syria by using unconventional war mechanism. The same will hold good for “regime change” in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in near future of course depending on the usefulness of ruling regimes to the Western world. Whether internal, unconventional, sub-conventional or limited armed struggle under any pretext (like in Yemen, Libya, Syria) it is a “War” for the armed forces and ruling regime of a nation which are targeted and subjected to such internal conflict or undeclared war. The ultimate end result is the death and destruction of civil society, national infrastructure, armed forces, combat power and the ruling regime. When it comes to deaths and destruction unconventional, internal, sub-conventional, low intensity conflicts are more dangerous than the short duration conventional war. Terrorism in Kashmir, Insurgency in northeast India, Naxalite Violence, Kargil War have proved to be equally destructive as conventional war. It would be difficult to identify “political objectives” that would justify a protracted conventional war between

nations. Also war may not be taken to logical conclusion of military victory as was the case in the past. War in future would be conducted with the objective of achieving political, geo-strategic success rather than a total military victory in the Gulf War, Afghan War, Iraq War. War between Israel and Lebanon is yet another example. War will now be an extension of politics and diplomacy through military means. Therefore it may be reasonable to term “War as Diplomacy through Armed Forces”.

It is evident that the nature of war is changing at a very fast speed. While ground forces will continue to dominate combat, decisive victory will depend on the judicious employment of air assets. It would be desirable to explore the philosophy and concept of “co-operative security” while resorting to war as a final option to conflict resolution. Armed forces across the world and specially in India will have to shift focus from “reactive” to proactive philosophy and mechanism There may not be such a thing as inevitable war. If war comes suddenly it will be a failure of human wisdom and vision which will lead to a war or conflict. Therefore, all military commanders all over the world should be prepared to go to war with what the nation and armed forces will possess at the time of going to war and not what they want or what they should have. Most recent example in South Asia has been the Kargil War. The future conventional war more likely will be limited

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

UNFOLDING SCENARIOS

to time and space. Due to tremendous advancement in information technology, communication, space assets, inter-connectivity the future war or armed conflict will be based on full knowledge and detailed information about each other. It would be difficult to maintain surprise. It would also be difficult to hide large concentration of forces, specially mechanised forces, artillery guns, missiles, aircraft and ships. Depending upon the concentration of combat forces the adversary will be able to assess the likely area of interest of aggressor and will be ready to trap the ground forces in the sector, of its choosing.

In Indian context the land operations will be mostly in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh sectors which are in high attitude areas. There will be serious limitation for classical employment of mechanised forces and even artillery fire power. Same will hold good for Kargil sector and along line of control from Kupwara in Kashmir to Poonch in Jammu region along line of control. The built-up area, irrigation canals and other natural and man-made obstacle systems will restrict the effectiveness of mechanised forces in Punjab sector The concept of “survival of the fittest” will be replaced by “survival of the fastest”. After a quick and effective surgical strike the attacting forces will have to disperse or get away for fear of limited chemical, biological, nuclear reaction may be even part of “armed blackmail”. The concept of destruction of armed forces on ground or at sea will be gradually shifting to destruction and neutralisation of “total combat power” (men, material, weapons and equipment); destruction of total war endurance by subjecting the targeted nation or ruling regime to technological, economic, trade sanctions. Deprive the masses or population of targeted nation of basic needs (food, medicine, healthcare, energy resources etc) and generate internal unrest, uprising against ruling regime will be the new philosophy; ideology, strategy of prolonged internal war instigated, supported and sustained by aggressor or outside powers. (Yemen, Libya, Syria are examples). The trend will be to first degrade, neutralise, exhaust the combat potential of the armed forces by subversion, forcing combat assets to be applied against own people (who are directly or indirectly) supported by so-called super power and and later launch conventional attack by involving the armed forces and armed power of interested nations. Instead of capturing territory the objective will be to dislodge the ruling regime and install such people in power to rule targeted nation who can be operated and controlled by remote control mechanism. (Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and some North African nations are recent examples). Therefore the thrust of future armed conflict, war may not be to capture territory and rule, but capture thinking, imagination of masses, psychology of population of the targeted nation and rule through installed regime which cannot question the so-called super power and Western countries. This is a harsh truth and hence will not be acceptable to the so-called think tanks and self-proclaimed experts of international relations and warfare.

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Emerging concepts In 21st century, it would be useful to consider certain concepts of war in the emerging world environment: In modern society war / combat will not depend only on military hardware though it would include it. War / combat will not be traditionally only military activity though it would encompass it. Warfare / combat will no longer be only “employment of military force” though it would involve it. War / combat will be deterrent and punishment to internally weak, militarily unprepared, adversary and so-called “rogue nation” (people of any nation or entire nation is never rogue; the governing mechanism becomes rogue) which may be perceived along the “axis of evil”. War may not be fought with the aim of only capturing territory but to capture, exploit strategic advantage, geographic location and mineral resources of the targeted nation state.

An excellent example of quick transformation and adaptability of military role is the famous 8 Mountain Division of Indian Army. Having been deployed to execute counter insurgency operation (COIN) in northeast India for a decade the division quickly changed and adopted the role to conventional war against East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 Conventional war, aggression, land and air combat may not commence suddenly with use of military power, military hardware. War like activity will commence suddenly with use of military power, military hardware. War like activity will commence from within targeted nation in the form of internal uprising, which will graduate into internal armed conflict, which will be duly supported, sustained and guided by outside powers who are interested in change of governing regime or governing mechanism. This is likely to be supported through the mechanism of international sanctions. The final stage would involve direct use of military power not necessarily by one single nation but by “association and combination of the forces and military resources of several nations with a view to give “legitimacy” to the armed aggression. (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria are examples). Space, air, sea domination, attainment of local air superiority through the concept of “no fly zone” and control of coastal zone of targeted nation will be finally followed by “boots on the ground”. This boots on the ground may be in the form of reconstruction force, peace enforcing, peacemaking force for the targeted nation which will be totally destroyed militarily, industrially, economically, socially and psychologically. Sea denial, airspace denial for commercial airlines of targeted nation or to the targeted nation, no fly zone, technology denial, energy denial, trade denial and may be even food denial will be new forms of external intervention before the actual war starts in military terms.

Considering the emerging concepts, trends and future possibilities, it would be necessary for developing countries, for nations located in mineral rich Central Africa, North Africa, Middle East, some parts of Central Asia and even in South Asia to ensure internal stability, internal capacity, national war endurance of prolonged duration. It would also be necessary to ensure freedom from economic, political, social, religious and military threats from within, through proxy war, instigated by neighbours.

Therefore the thrust of future armed conflict, war may not be to capture territory and rule, but capture thinking, imagination of masses, psychology of population of the targeted nation and rule through installed regime which cannot question the so-called super power and Western countries The nations (specially located in South East Asia, along Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea, who wish to prevent war, conflict, combat enforced on them by outside powers with whatever political, diplomatic, economic and so-called geo-strategic motives must be prepared to face a war thrust upon them. To prevent a war, conflict the nations must identify, detect and counter: Domination of any form Interference through mechanism of internal unrest Control through coercion or consensus Regulation through international sanctions Monitoring through skillfully manipulated international mechanism by monitors carefully selected and appointed to ensure safeguarding of interest of few powerful nations Supervision, stability, control and sustenance of newly installed governing / ruling regime which is operable and controlled through remote controlled mechanism

There may not be such a thing as inevitable war. If war comes suddenly it will be a failure of human wisdom and vision which will lead to a war or conflict. Therefore, all military commanders all over the world should be prepared to go to war with what the nation and armed forces will possess at the time of going to war and not what they want or what they should have. Most recent example in South Asia has been the Kargil War With the emergence of the concepts of war of necessity, wars of choice, wars of interest and wars of conscience, how and where will we draw the line to differentiate between each other? Will the application of military hardware differ between the war of choice and war of interests?

New challenges It will be a big challenge to strategists, experts, military

planners and commanders executing the war to ensure air space domination, air space superiority, air space denial, sea domination, sea denial, military intervention, ground assault to capture or destroy centres of gravity of national governance, war endurance and military operations of the targeted country. Battles will not be fought by soldiers alone, but also irregular armed groups and the so-called “mujahids”. War / combat will no longer be restricted to border area (like Kargil War), but deep within the nation state, thus there will be greater involvement of paramilitary forces and even the state armed police. This will be more applicable to Indian context and in the context of fourth generation and fifth generation warfare and asymmetric warfare. Afghan War, Iraq War, Libya and now Syria are glaring examples of increasing employment of so-called private security companies. Gradually these elements are employed, involved in the role performed traditionally by military forces. Both the nations employing these and also the targeted nations will have to be careful about the role, accountability of such elements not only during active war / combat but also at a later stage. Militarily indoctrinated minds can prove to be dangerous in the long run to the security, stability and peace of the country which employed them. They may prove to be counter-productive and risky to internal security of the nations to which they belong. The trends, developments and concepts of execution of war / combat have resulted in transformation of military force (specially the ground forces) which are primarily designed, organised, equipped, staffed, trained and motivated for conventional warfare to be re-oriented towards new concepts and challenges of emerging warfare. An excellent example of quick transformation and adaptability of military role is the famous 8 Mountain Division of Indian Army. Having been deployed to execute counter insurgency operation (COIN) in northeast India for a decade the division quickly changed and adopted the role to conventional war against East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. Immediately after the war the division returned to northeast and got deployed in COIN in Nagaland. The division was moved from northeast India to Kashmir to undertake counter-terrorism operations in entirely a different terrain, environment and operational setting. This was the biggest “military operational blunder” committed by military planners. The division adopted to the new role in a very short span of time and performed exceedingly well in counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir. Similarly again during Kargil War the division was moved to Kargil sector to undertake conventional operations against Pakistan Army which had intruded into Kargil sector in the garb of terrorists. Within 48 hours of the issue of orders the division got inducted into most hostile terrain and operational setting, initially with its own organisational Resources and commenced conventional operations. With additional resources, fire support and air support this division retrieved Kargil from Pakistan Army. It is this division which ensured victory for Indian Army and India, when the entire border management, intelligence management mechanism at all levels upto Army Headquarters was taken by surprise.

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land power in India

UNFOLDING SCENARIOS

The military planners, professionals not only in India but abroad may wish to learn from the operational philosophy “forever in operations” of this Division. Indian Military planners are always concerned about collateral damage. Same holds good when Indian Army operates in COIN and counter terrorist operations. This self-imposed restriction invites casualties to own troops many times. Many foreign military planners will never be able to appreciate the compulsion of Indian armed forces. There must have been some very good reason as to why Indian Army and Air Force was not permitted to cross the line of control during Kargil War.

Nations are now promoting incentive and urge to first ignite, encourage internal conflict within a nation state, followed by international intervention using conventional armed power, without even declaring a war. Yemen, Syria, Libya are recent examples. It is a matter of time when Western world will be able to execute regime change in Syria by using unconventional war mechanism. The same will hold good for “regime change” in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in near future of course depending on the usefulness of ruling regimes to the Western world Future war / combat will have to be planned and executed to ensure avoidance of collateral damage, destruction and loss of innocent lives, specially if the attacking nations wish to position their armed forces in targeted nation to ensure transition of power from targeted ruling regime to newly installed ruling regime to the liking of attacking nation Land warfare and ground operation will be totally dependent on air and sea support. Before commencement of land combat / operations it will be necessary to totally degrade / destroy the war fighting capacity of targeted state. Ground forces inducted into combat zone ultimately will have to be sustained through sea and land routes. Total dependence on air sustenance may not be feasible and cost effective. An analysis of Afghan War proves that both American and NATO forces have paid a very heavy price and penalty by depending on Pakistan’s sea ports and land routes. It reflects on poor logistic consideration and planning. I can say with reasonable degree of confidence that both Pakistan and terrorist organisations will extract heavy price during de-induction of America and NATO forces, from Afghanistan in 2014. In next war on foreign soil, the war will be prolonged one and time consuming. It will not be a short and surgical war. Initial conventional air and sea attack will soon invite induction of ground forces if meaningful victory has to be ensured. It is very likely that during initial stage of induction of ground forces they may be subjected to limited chemical, biological and even tactical nuclear attack, before the ground forces disperse in the countryside to prevent becoming “sitting ducks”. During induction stage the ground forces will be most vulnerable to irregular attack. It is not surprising when immediately after attack on Iraq in 2003 Prime Minister of a nation state made a call to all Islamic Nations to possess nuclear capability to prevent aggression. With the

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

proliferation of nuclear technology it is difficult to accurately predict as to where all the technology has reached. Considering the hostile environment, unfamiliar terrain, hostile response to foreign Army (ground forces) by the local population, attitude and alignment of neighbouring countries of the targeted nation as well as capacity and capabilities of the armed forces of the targeted nation to wage irregular war against invading ground forces will be of paramount importance. When examined in Indian context, it would be desirable to consider that fighting capacity, capability, endurance for war / combat and national endurance to hostile enemy in neighbourhood as well as non-conventional war within India are totally different than American or NATO forces. The basic difference being that Indian armed forces go to war / conflict resolution to ensure India’s territorial and national integrity on Indian soil. On its own India has never taken an initiative to launch armed aggression anywhere. There is a vast difference in motivation level of soldiers and leaders of the armed forces when they fight for defence of the motherland and for protection of national interests in foreign lands. Any serious student of Military Science, should be able to analyse the difference. An in-depth analysis of events in Middle East would clearly reveal that in Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya we have seen the collapse of ruling regime and destruction of national assets and infrastructure due to internal uprising instigated by outside powers, supported and sustained through indirect military aid and advice and finally military intervention in different forms. The combat implications of the linkages between internal unrest, terrorism, armed uprising, irregular and sub-conventional warfare and also the conventional war will be that it would be “strategic military blunder” to plan for future threats that focuses only on one of the threats and excludes the other. A rigid separation between irregular war and conventional war would be problematic. In an uncertain and rapidly changing security environment even a small scale event can trigger a large scale war / conflict. Just one terrorist attack on 9/11 has started new philosophy of warfare and also a new concept of global war on terrorism; involving armed forces of almost 37 nations in Europe, Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and maybe even South East Asia. Central African nations, Latin American nations and even China may soon be facing the new emerging situation and challenges!!

Futuristic ground combat operations Gradually the centre of gravity of land operations will be in hilly / mountainous terrain in China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Turkey and maybe some parts of Western Africa. In Middle East, North Africa the land operations will be mostly in desert terrain and built-up area. Considering the peculiarities of fighting in built-up areas the thrust for grand operations will be to avoid entering built-up areas. This limitation of ground forces will be exploited by irregular forces and terrorists. In Indian context the land operations will be mostly in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh sectors which are in high attitude areas. There will be serious limitation for classical

employment of mechanised forces and even artillery fire power. Same will hold good for Kargil sector and along line of control from Kupwara in Kashmir to Poonch in Jammu region along line of control. The built-up area, irrigation canals and other natural and man-made obstacle systems will restrict the effectiveness of mechanised forces in Punjab sector. Area of Rajasthan sector and across will see large scale employment of mechanised forces and air and land battle. It is reasonable to assume that avionics will dominate mechanised forces in future combat in Indian context. There is a need to cater for a contingency wherein both Pakistan and China could launch land operations against India. China can create an operational challenge in Ladakh sector in areas of Demchok, Dungti, Chushul, DBO sector and at the same time Pakistan could launch Kargil like operation along line of control in selected areas. Kupwara, Baramula sectors can also be activated. The objective of land operations will also be to restrict India’s options to switch or shift ground forces and military hardware from Eastern theatre to Western and Northern theatre and vice versa. In any case even if combat assets are shifted from other theatres of India to eastern theatre it will be a very time consuming process. Orientation and preparation for combat in mountains and high attitude areas is always a “painfully slow process”. Unfortunately our infrastructure development in Eastern theatre will require time span of at least 15 years to face the threat from China! There is also a thought process, which was also there during 1962 War that “we will deal with China diplomatically”. If we are not careful history will repeat itself. Chinese planners must be having some very good reason to call Arunachal Pradesh now as South Tibet. Chinese leadership always make statements and stances after due deliberations and caution. They do not indulge in making “off the cuff” statements under momentary provocations. Even if ground forces and combat assets are inducted in Eastern theatre by air they will still need enough time and preparation to be effective at the point of decision during combat. It is questionable if our adversaries will give us enough warning and time to prepare ourselves to face another Kargil or 1962. We need to be careful about Pakistan. Both the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and General Musharraf have categorically stated that “there will be ten more Kargils”. We must appreciate that “another Kargil” will not take place in Kargil sector but elsewhere. What was 26/11 attack at Mumbai? Entire security and intelligence system was caught unprepared. There is enough scope for a setting for local, limited war / conflict despite nuclear deterrence under conditions of information canvas. Why is there such an increased Chinese interest in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and in Indian Ocean region? In any air, sea and land combat in future following will need serious consideration: Full information of each other's order of battle and locations. Deception and camouflage measures will be difficult. Every nation will have to formulate national deception policy and plans which will need to be updated regularly. Deception measures will have to include political, diplomatic moves and combat preparations.

Due to the concept of “war of necessity” as a last resort, there will be a need for sudden mobilisation and employment of ground and air war assets. No reaction time will be available for detailed planning and coordination hence there will be a need for preparations and readiness to go to war and conduct surgical operations at a very short notice. It would be always desirable for all nations to remember the philosophy of governance and war by famous strategist Chanakya: “If you wish to prevent a war / conflict, always be prepared for it. (Do not be eager for war, but remain prepared). Because if you are not prepared for war it will be forced on you which will not be at the place and time of your choosing”. (Both Kargil and Afghanistan are examples). Predominance of avionics, drones will overshadow employment of mechanised forces. Fighting in mountains and hilly terrain like in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh of India, China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Central Africa will restrict employment of mechanised power. Battle / combat in built-up areas, towns, cities will restrict employment of mechanised combat power and also of air power. Deep penetration operations in enemy territory will largely depend on logistic support, sea and land facilities, land routes to support and sustain land forces committed in combat zone. There will be a shift in concept of war to shift the focus from "how many killed to how quickly killed" and destroyed. There will be a shift in the concept of “survival of the fittest” to ”survival of the fastest”. It would be difficult to ensure total military victory in true sense of war. Geopolitical, geostrategic objective of war may not be totally achieved, only through military operations. It is evident that the nature of war is changing at a very fast speed. While ground forces will continue to dominate combat, decisive victory will depend on the judicious employment of air assets. It would be desirable to explore the philosophy and concept of “co-operative security” while resorting to war as a final option to conflict resolution. Armed forces across the world and specially in India will have to shift focus from “reactive” to proactive philosophy and mechanism. Finally again it would be useful to remember the philosophy of Chanakya “If you know your adversary and if you can deter them, you will live in peace for hundred Years! Because the weak have one weapon, the errors of those who think they are strong!”

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land power in India

HIGH STAKES

Amb Ashok Sajjanhar The writer a postgraduate in Physics from Delhi University and a career diplomat, has served as Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia. He has also held several significant positions in Indian Embassies in Moscow, Teheran, Geneva, Dhaka, Bangkok, Washington and Brussels. He negotiated for India in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. He has been an active participant in many International Seminars organised by UNCTAD and WTO.

India must not allow its Afghan policy to become hostage to its tense and difficult relations with Pakistan. India’s policy in Afghanistan must stay Afghan-centric and not be excessively influenced by Pakistani efforts to gain strategic depth

he sense of disquiet has increased further in Afghanistan with the announcement by US Defence Secretary Panetta in February, 2012 that the transition plan would be accelerated to hand over all security operations to Afghan forces by the end of 2013, a full one year ahead of the earlier announced date. India must not allow its Afghan policy to become hostage to its tense and difficult relations with Pakistan. India’s policy in Afghanistan must stay Afghan-centric and not be excessively influenced by Pakistani efforts to gain strategic depth. At the international level, there is a sense of fatigue with the unending fighting and elusive peace in the country. The ongoing efforts to muster financial support for sustaining the process of stabilisation of the Afghan state appear to be lackadaisical and half-hearted. Afghanistan enjoys the potential to emerge as a transit hub between the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia. Apart from the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan -Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, it can earn substantial revenue from overland trade. The Partnership Agreement between the two countries allows India to strengthen linkages in the security sector too. The common Afghan, irrespective of ethnicity, is keen that India continue to play a bigger role in stabilising Afghanistan. In contrast, Pakistan has lost credibility among the Afghans.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

he day of reckoning in Afghanistan is drawing nearer. The writing on the wall has been clear since the announcement by President Obama in November, 2010 at the Lisbon NATO Summit that US and NATO forces will withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014 and hand over the task of maintaining security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). However nervousness and anxiety in Afghanistan as well as among its neighbours and other significant stakeholders is growing rapidly as uncertainty looms large over developments in the coming months. The sense of disquiet increased further with the announcement by US Defence Secretary Panetta in February, 2012 that the transition plan would be accelerated to hand over all security operations to Afghan forces by the end of 2013, a full one year ahead of the earlier announced date. The twin formidable challenges confronting the government and people of Afghanistan are security and development. All countries of the region have enormous stakes in the stability and security of Afghanistan. They have all benefited from the US-NATO led operations in Afghanistan. However, these countries also have their own interests and agendas. Pakistan is looking for strategic depth; Iran wants to see the back of American forces from Afghan soil; China eyes Afghan resources without any definite commitment to invest in Afghan security and stability; Russia is ready to engage as a service provider if funds can be arranged elsewhere. At the international level, there is a sense of fatigue with the unending fighting and elusive peace in the country. The ongoing efforts to muster financial support for sustaining the process of stabilisation of the Afghan state appear to be lackadaisical and half-hearted. The adverse effects of decreasing international aid on critical areas including building democratic institutions, ensuring gender equality and strengthening of the media can have far-reaching negative effects on the ongoing process of stabilisation in Afghanistan. In the post-2014 scenario, the role of regional countries is likely to increase significantly. The Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, will be directly affected by instability in Afghanistan. Due to a persistent inadequacy of state capacity and military capability, these states can at best ensure that their territory is not used as safe haven by the Taliban. They could also contribute with limited logistics support.

Chinese designs The SCO, which has been on the sidelines

India, Afghanistan, Central Asia

The Post-2014 Scenario until now is gearing up to assume a bigger role in Afghanistan, thanks to a new-found interest by China. Afghanistan has been on the agenda of the annual SCO summits for the past several years. Before Afghanistan was admitted as an Observer to SCO in June, 2012, President Karzai participated as a Special Invitee in these deliberations. The SCO Peace Mission Joint Military Exercises which started in 2003 on a modest and limited scale have expanded in scope and intensity in recent years. This could partly be in response to the emerging situation in Afghanistan. The SCO countries currently seem to lack the will or inclination to engage substantively in security operations in Afghanistan although China could mobilise the necessary financial resources if it considered that its vital interests were at stake. There are encouraging indications that Afghanistan will increasingly integrate with Central Asia in the post-2014 phase. Afghanistan enjoys the potential to emerge as a transit hub between the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia. Apart from the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan -India (TAPI) gas pipeline, it can earn substantial revenue from overland

trade. Given China’s growing interest in building a communication network in the region in general and in Afghanistan in particular, as well as Pakistan’s resistance to allow India transit through its territory, Afghanistan could become more integrated with Central Asia than South Asia. The ‘’New Silk Road’’ strategy propounded last year by USA also seeks to transform Afghanistan into a hub of all exchange in trade, energy, business and people-to-people contacts between the East and the West.

India should also strive to be part of multilateral efforts, particularly the SCO, CSTO, NATO etc. India should consider having a dialogue with China (and even with Iran and Russia) on the nature and scope of our future engagement with Afghanistan Greater and more active cooperation between the CSTO and NATO can also be envisaged in the post-2014 phase. The Russians and Chinese both realise that although the NATO presence so close to their borders is undesirable, it does provide security to Afghanistan and should be continued to the maximum

extent in future. China has benefited enormously from the security provided by international forces for its investments in Afghanistan. Russia understands the adverse effects of a radical dispensation in Kabul and would support future efforts to provide security to a liberal and democratic government in Afghanistan. Thus, cooperation among rivals is a possibility.

Indian support Afghanistan has recorded some impressive achievements which are highly praiseworthy. Girls are going to school, the security situation in northern and western parts has improved and some developmental activity has taken place, thanks to the aid and assistance from the international community. The Afghan security forces have also been able to put up a tough fight against the Taliban in several areas. If given consistent and sustained support by the international community, they may be able to get the better of the Taliban. However the Afghan government suffers from several institutional weaknesses that need to be addressed. That is where India can come in.

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land power in India

India, by adopting a low-key role in the last few years, has set itself apart as a country which is genuinely interested in reconstruction and development. India’s small-budget interventions in Pashtun areas have been well-received by the population in areas infested by the militants. This has compelled even the Taliban to grudgingly acknowledge India’s constructive role. The Partnership Agreement between the two countries allows India to strengthen linkages in the security sector too. The common Afghan, irrespective of ethnicity, is keen that India continue to play a bigger role in stabilising Afghanistan. In contrast, Pakistan has lost credibility among the Afghans who consider it as a country which does not have anything positive to offer.

Afghanistan could become more integrated with Central Asia than South Asia. The ''New Silk Road'' strategy propounded last year by USA also seeks to transform Afghanistan into a hub of all exchange in trade, energy, business and people-to-people contacts between the East and the West There is a pessimistic view in certain circles that India will find it difficult to stay engaged given Pakistan’s continuing nexus with the Taliban and its resolve to deny space to India in Afghanistan. However, the situation does have several silver linings for India. It will be much more difficult today for the Taliban to take over Kabul given that support from Pakistan will be hard to come by because of both the gaze of the international community on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s increasing preoccupation with its own domestic security situation. There is growing recognition in Afghanistan cutting across all ethnicities and groups that the war ravaged country would need continued assistance from all possible sources. Among the regional countries, it could bank on India as a reliable partner. Even the Taliban may not be too averse to receive continued Indian assistance. The perception that India is open to the idea of working with Pakistan in Afghanistan (even if it appears impractical at the moment) has enhanced India’s image among ordinary Afghans.

land power in India

HIGH STAKES India will need sustained and resolute political will to remain engaged in Afghanistan even as the latter might become increasingly turbulent and unsettled. India will need to stand ready to invest the necessary resources, both financial and human, to sustain its engagement. India will need to show greater receptivity and sensitivity to the needs of common Afghans and build contacts at multiple levels. India no longer has as much leverage with the erstwhile northern alliance members (Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras) as it had a decade earlier. These links will have to be reactivated. India will need to ensure that its role is not misconstrued as interference. India has historically had warm and friendly ties with Afghanistan and wishes to see a stable government installed in Kabul. It has funded several Afghan reconstruction and development projects totaling US $ 2 billion so far. These include construction of the 218 km-long Zaranj-Delaram road linking the Iranian border with the Garland Highway, electric power lines including one from the CARs to Kabul, hydroelectric power projects, school buildings, primary health centres and the new building for the Afghan Parliament. India is also training Afghan administrators, teachers and officer cadets. While at present there is no support in India for sending troops to Afghanistan, there is realisation that the fight against the Taliban and the al Qaeda has long term security implications for India. With some effort, New Delhi could be persuaded to join a UN peacekeeping force provided Pakistan’s sensibilities about Indian military presence in Afghanistan can be assuaged. India can increase the number of developmental projects in Afghanistan, offer larger number of scholarships to Afghan students, relax visa procedures for Afghan businessmen, students and patients seeking medical attention in India and encourage the private sector to invest in areas related to education, IT, healthcare systems, aviation, mining, media and communication. Afghanistan is in urgent need of measures to boost its revenue generating capacity. India can

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DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

contribute in the field of revitalising agriculture, building infrastructure (railroads, highways, processing plants etc), which could spur long-term economic growth and create jobs. It can also help in building of institutions that will stabilise the process of democratisation. Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch

At the international level, there is a sense of fatigue with the unending fighting and elusive peace in the country. The ongoing efforts to muster financial support for sustaining the process of stabilisation of the Afghan state appear to be lackadaisical and half-hearted

SM, VSM (retd) The writer is the Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

The importance of doctrine cannot be overstated. Doctrines set out the way we intend to fight. This leads to strategy formulation and consequent equipping and restructuring of the force to fit in with war fighting aims and goals

The India-Afghanistan relationship must go beyond aid and build a comprehensive security and economic relationship. It would also be worthwhile to contemplate a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The recent Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan is a good beginning that must be sustained. While Indian engagement with Afghanistan needs to be significantly upgraded, this may not be easy. A regular political dialogue with the Afghan government would be desirable to ensure that it adapts to the changing political scenario and adopts correct policies. India should also strive to be part of multilateral efforts, particularly the SCO, CSTO, NATO etc. India should consider having a dialogue with China (and even with Iran and Russia) on the nature and scope of our future engagement with Afghanistan. All these discussions will experience pitfalls on account of the differing perceptions and interests of the concerned countries but the effort would be worth our while if some progress on adopting common, joint strategies to deal with the security and development situation in Afghanistan can be made. India must not allow its Afghan policy to become hostage to its tense and difficult relations with Pakistan. India’s policy in Afghanistan must stay Afghan-centric and not be excessively influenced by Pakistani efforts to gain strategic depth.

The Army’s modernisation and restructuring thrust appears to be based on building a capability based force for future conflict scenarios. In the aviation sector, this envisages integral lift capability of a company at the Corps level, a battalion at Command level and a brigade at Army level

Preparing for Future Conflict O

ur war fighting doctrines must be structured to fighting the wars of the future. Operations against Pakistan will have a certain set of dynamics, dictated by the need to prevent cross-border terrorism and deter Pakistani support to terrorist activity within India. Against China, the thrust will be on deterring war and preventing transgression into own territory. Based on the doctrine, the Army must be equipped and trained to fight accordingly. This will also throw up the need for restructuring the Force. On the Western border, a rethink on the composition of the Strike Corps may be called for. As integral aviation capability gets enhanced (with the proposed creation of aviation brigades at the corps level), the armour component of the strike corps may well need to be downsized.

Perception Management is now a tool of war and will see increasing use in conflicts of the future. Winning wars in today’s globalised world is not by itself enough. It is essential to also win the moral high ground in the public domain on a global scale – and not just in the short term. To that purpose, the military leadership at all levels will need to be trained on using perception management techniques as a force multiplier

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

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DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

odernisation of India’s armed forces is an ongoing process which has been proceeding apace for some time now. The process is long-term and involves not just acquisition of weapons and equipment but encompasses a whole range of issues such as logistic support measure, night fighting, firepower and mobility capability and training and doctrinal issues. An important milestone achieved in 2011 was the raising of two additional divisions for employment on the Eastern border. The manpower for the new raisings is an additional increment and is not from savings accrued by carrying out manpower cuts from units and establishments within the Army. Another important event occurred recently when in November 2012, the decision to equip the Army with attack helicopters was taken by the Raksha Mantri, thus fulfilling a long felt requirement of the Army. The present Army Chief, General Bikram Singh as indeed earlier Army Chiefs too, have consistently maintained that the Army needs control over attack and medium-lift helicopters as they are mainly used for close support operations in the battlefield and such support can best be exercised by having all operational assets under one command. The recent development to equip the Army with attack helicopters thus signifies a noteworthy albeit delayed step in the enhancement of India’s military capability. The Army’s modernisation and restructuring thrust appears to be based on building a capability based force for future conflict scenarios. In the aviation sector, this envisages integral lift capability of a company at the Corps level, a battalion at Command level and a brigade at Army level. Accordingly, the resources for this capability in terms of tactical and heavy lift helicopters have been planned for induction as per Army’s perspective plan. Exploiting the third dimension through the rotary wing is vital to achieving quick success in the tactical battle area as it is both an element of manoeuvre and a deliverer of firepower. This explains the rationale for the Army moving towards creating aviation brigades

at the corps level, equipped with both attack and utility helicopters to exponentially increase combat power both in defensive and offensive operations. As of now, there is no decision given to provide the Army with integral tactical heavy lift capability but the future aviation brigades are likely to be so equipped. This decision needs to be expedited.

Chinese military doctrine lays stress on force modernisation, emphasising preparations to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China’s periphery. Its doctrine of “Active Defence” posits a defensive military strategy and asserts that China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity and attacks only after being attacked. Beijing’s definition of an attack against its territory, or what constitutes an initial attack, is left vague Perspective plans to modernise the Army include the ambitious modernisation project for the Infantry called Futuristic Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS). The project begun in 2007 envisages enhancing the soldier’s capability through improved weapons, better protection and enhanced battlefield awareness capability. Implementation of the project is presaged in a time bound manner but current trends indicate slippages in implementation. The modernisation plan also focuses on enhanced firepower and mobility capability of the artillery and mechanised forces. Another thrust area of the Army is in enhancing battlefield transparency through a variety of surveillance means not least of which will be the unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs). What we will see in the future is the MALE Class (Medium Altitude, Long Endurance) of UAVs at the Command and Corps level and the tactical class of UAVs at the division, brigade and battalion level. The lowest level of the platoon would have micro UAVs. As military capabilities get enmeshed into a robust C3 architecture, the goal of becoming a capability based force

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gets that much closer to achievement. The above will in course of time propel the Army in moving from its present status of a threat based force to becoming a capability based one. What is required now is to prepare new doctrines for fighting the wars of the future. Mere reliance on mass is passé and will be counter-productive. The need for speed and agility will be overriding. This facet has been a constant over the centuries despite dramatic changes being brought out in the way war is waged. Great victories more often than not have been won not so much by the larger armies with bigger guns but by those armies which were prepared to adapt faster to new ideas and concepts of warfare. The story of a small David slaying a much larger Goliath with a sling shot finds constant resonance in Christian mythology. The victory of Alexander over a much slower albeit stronger Porus, the Battle of Panipat in 1526 which established Moghul power in India and Clive’s victory in the Battle of Plassey in 1757 which was the starting point to the events that established the era of British dominion and conquest in India validate the above. This will remain the defining concept in future conflict and brings to the fore the importance of doctrinal issues.

The Chinese emphasis on the “Three Warfares” as part of their military doctrine is similar to the US and Western concept of “Shaping the Information Environment” prior to the conduct of operations. The above is aimed to reinforce domestic will, attenuate alliances and sap the opponent’s will to fight The importance of doctrine cannot be overstated. Doctrines set out the way we intend to fight. This leads to strategy formulation and consequent equipping and restructuring of the force to fit in with war fighting aims and goals. A recent example of the importance of doctrine was the formulation of the proactive stance doctrine by the Indian Army, referred loosely in some quarters as the ‘cold start doctrine’. Designed to give space for conventional operations in a nuclear environment, it has opened up various possibilities for an Indian response against Pakistani

intransigence. Pakistan is still groping for an appropriate counter and its efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons could perhaps be seen as a response to India’s military doctrine.

Preparation for conflict is based on the premises that future wars will be short, will almost certainly not entail the occupation of China, although Chinese political, economic and military centres are likely to be attacked and will involve joint military operations across land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space and the application of advanced technology, especially information technology China aims to use its military muscle to resolve issues from a position of strength Chinese military doctrine lays stress on force modernisation, emphasising preparations to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China’s periphery. Its doctrine of “Active Defence” posits a defensive military strategy and asserts that China does not initiate wars or fight wars of aggression, but engages in war only to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity and attacks only after being attacked. Beijing’s definition of an attack against its territory, or what constitutes an initial attack, is left vague. Once hostilities have begun, evidence suggests the characteristics of “active defence” are distinctly offensive. Chinese doctrine has shifted from its earlier strategy of what it termed as fighting ‘Local Wars under Modern, High-tech Conditions’ to its present doctrine of “Fighting Local Wars under Informatised Conditions”. PLA theorists and planners believe future campaigns will be conducted simultaneously on land, at sea, in the air, in space and within the electronic sphere. Preparation for conflict is based on the premises that future wars will be short, will almost certainly not entail the occupation of China, although Chinese political, economic and military centres are likely to be attacked and will involve joint military operations across land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space

and the application of advanced technology, especially information technology. China aims to use its military muscle to resolve issues from a position of strength. While doing so, space domination and what the Chinese refer to as the “Three Warfares”, will play an important part in the conflict. This implies: Use of space assets to dictate the operational and tactical terms of the conflict, by conducting closely coordinated precision strike operations with joint forces. Use the “Three Warfares” to dictate the strategic terms of the conflict, by influencing domestic opinion, opposition will and third-party support. That future wars will be short and intense is well accepted by the Indian military. Geostrategic factors and the reality that conflict will take place in a nuclear environment points to wars of limited duration in which all elements of combat power must be optimally used to achieve decisive results. The fluidity of operations in the tactical battle area demands quick decision-making and swift deployment and utility of response resources. Failure to do so will lead to sub-optimal utilisation of combat resources and missing out on fleeting opportunities which such conflicts bring about. This could well lead to stalemate rather than outright victory and in some cases even to suffering disproportionate losses in battle. Our war fighting doctrines must hence be structured to fighting the wars of the future. Operations against Pakistan will have a certain set of dynamics, dictated by the need to prevent cross-border terrorism and deter Pakistani support to terrorist activity within India. Against China, the thrust will be on deterring war and preventing transgression into own territory. Based on the doctrine, the Army must be equipped and trained to fight accordingly. This will also throw up the need for restructuring the Force. On the Western border, a rethink on the composition of the Strike Corps may be called for. As integral aviation capability gets enhanced (with the proposed creation of aviation brigades at the

corps level), the armour component of the strike corps may well need to be downsized. Improvements in battlefield transparency should result in fewer forces holding the front line, leaving a larger component as a reserve and for offensive operations. Against China, emphasis will have to be laid on dominating space, building adequate capabilities in the cyber domain, having an effective missile arsenal and ensuring adequate dominance over the air in the Tibetan Plateau. The above capabilities in conjunction with strong mobile forces are essential to prevent any military misadventure across the High Himalayas. The Chinese emphasis on the “Three Warfares” as part of their military doctrine is similar to the US and Western concept of “Shaping the Information Environment” prior to the conduct of operations. The above is aimed to reinforce domestic will, attenuate alliances and sap the opponent’s will to fight. Perception Management is now a tool of war and will see increasing use in conflicts of the future. Winning wars in today’s globalised world is not by itself enough. It is essential to also win the moral high ground in the public domain on a global scale – and not just in the short term. To that purpose, the military leadership at all levels will need to be trained on using perception management techniques as a force multiplier. Training must include developing leaders in such a way that they learn to thrive on chaos, complexity and uncertainty. There will be at once too little knowledge and too much information and the Army would have to adjust to this reality. Shaping the information environment needs to be undertaken as a war winning strategy which would require strong and enabled structures for successfully implementing laid down objectives. This too would require a supporting doctrine both at the national level and in the armed forces. How we develop our structures will determine our future capability in this regard.

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MILITARY METAMORPHOSIS

Lt Gen Gautam Banerjee PVSM, AVSM, YSM (retd) The writer was commissioned into the Corps of Engineers in June 1971. During his 40 years of service, the writer has taken part in all operations and has served in all field and high altitude areas. He was the Chief of Staff, Central Command and then the Commandant, Officers' Training Academy, Chennai before superannuating in June 2011.

A transformational doctrine has to be shaped taking into account the national strengths and limitations. Since policies of the past have prevented the development of the kind of basic military industry that was needed by India, we remain dependent on the favour of import for most of our major weaponry and equipment

While the soldiers engage in physical combat, complimentary effort has to come from expert soldier-citizens operating in the banking, excise, cyber, financial, technical, transportation, media, even policing sectors. A transformational doctrine may afford an answer to this development

t is imperative that our military institution receives a clear-cut direction as to its mandate from the political institution of the state. Only then would the military leadership be able to translate the political mandate into specific roles and its range, depth and scope of ‘force-application’. The resultant land forces’ doctrine would then dictate a compatible ‘force-structuring’, which in turn would foster impermeable military security at optimal costs to the nation. A discursive essay on the need and contours of a Transformational Doctrine in the Indian context. He recommends that instead of a doctrine of swift, sharp and shallow retaliation, a doctrine of deliberate build-up and longer war, in simultaneity with diplomatic hedging, would be more appropriate in deterring China and Pakistan. “Only those who have great strength and who are perceived to be willing to unleash it, can protect their interests without use of force”. – Luttwak

ictates of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) in the contemporary era has led to profound changes in the mode and manner of articulation of military force. Consequently, all modern nations – USA, UK, Russia, China, Australia, France, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, have undertaken to revise their military strategy and correspondingly, restructure their military institutions. This effort has invariably been a political exercise, guided by sound military advice and implemented under 5 to 15 year long projects that have been described variously as ‘Military Transformation’, ‘Strategic Review’, ‘Draft Military Doctrine’, ‘Modernisation Programme’, ‘Defence Programme Laws’, ‘Blue Ribbon Commission’, etc. In so doing, these nations have been able to contrive optimal symmetry between their political objectives, military strategy and defence expenditure.

It would be sufficient for China to use her conventional superiority to secure her political gaols when she wishes to, unless India wields a demonstrated military strength that prevents China from benefiting by military aggression A similar motivation has caused the Indian Army to delve into the spectrum and scope of warfare that it might be called upon to prosecute and the most cost-efficient manner of delivering that mandate. Initiatives have thus been taken towards pioneering of an appropriate military doctrine and implementation of time-bound modernisation schemes – bringing about a profound military ‘transformation’. However, there are reasons to believe that the results of such efforts have neither been conclusive, nor comprehensive – as yet.

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This article seeks to examine as to what could be the parameters of a pertinent transformational doctrine for India’s land forces. The issue is no doubt controversial and a debate, therefore, should be welcome.

Invocation of a contemporary doctrine Armed forces are raised, maintained and equipped at great costs to the exchequer for the simple reason that in a ‘dog-eat-dog’ world of international relationships, application of military force remains the only effective recourse to protect a nation’s sovereign will. Thus in a world order that is unbound by any universally enforceable law, armed forces are needed by a state to protect its interests when peaceful entreaties fail to make the adversaries see reason. Obviously, under the concept of a state, it is for the political leadership to dictate the occasion, purpose and scope of application of military power and then structure the military institution accordingly. Further, to enable the armed forces to undertake the extraordinary mandate of prosecuting war, it is covenanted for the state-institutions to respect military advice and to backup the military forces with all the resources that can be mustered. These are the twin conditions which must form the plank on which a best-suited military doctrine is built. Therefore the right military doctrine for a state must flow out of political considerations and duly translated with military acumen. If that is not the case, the doctrine – and consequently the entire military structure – would be but impertinent; it will burden the national exchequer but not bring victory. Independent India inherited an Army that was highly acclaimed for its professionalism, discipline and valour. But that was an Army designated to expand and preserve the

A TRANSFORMATIONAL DOCTRINE

FOR INDIA’S LAND FORCES British Empire. With no such empire to protect and an avowed principle of “not coveting other’s territories” – as the leaders of new India put it – it was natural that the Indian Army had to be re-planted on a fresh foundation. Thus was enunciated the current role, of protecting the nation from ‘external aggression’ with a secondary commitment to plunge in ‘calamity relief’ when needed. Remarkably, the change of the role was not allowed to dilute the intrinsically pristine characteristics of the Indian military institution. Thus over the following six decades, the nation has received dividends that far outstrip the investments made; it has protected the nation’s integrity against the continuous machinations of external predators and internal saboteurs.

Advertisement of such perceptive insinuations leads to degradation of India’s conventional credibility while negating her nuclear deterrence. Indeed, these are serious indictments of our current strategies to deter war Contemporary geo-politics has not been kind to India, surrounded as she is in a neighbourhood made up of powers some downright hostile and some latently inimical. Besides, there are fissures steaming menacingly within. India therefore is obliged to maintain the second largest standing land force in the world. The amount spent by the nation on its land forces runs into nearly rupees two lakh crore – even when one third of her citizens crave for just two square meals a day. Obviously, maintaining an optimally strong Army is a very, very crucial ordination for India. Thus the land forces’ doctrine

must reflect India’s national pursuit and conform to the socio-economic compulsions of her polity.

Doctrinal parameters As India shifts gear to emerge as a fast developing nation, the challenges she faces have assumed different complexions. Added to this complexity are the profound changes worldwide that have occurred in strategic articulation of military power and as a corollary, in its organisational structure, equipment profile, manning and training. To be able to manage these changes in the most cost-efficient manner, it is imperative that our military institution receives a clear-cut direction as to its mandate from the political institution of the state. Only then would the military leadership be able to translate the political mandate into specific roles and its range, depth and scope of ‘force-application’. The resultant land forces’ doctrine would then dictate a compatible ‘force-structuring’, which in turn would foster impermeable military security at optimal costs to the nation.

Political directive Reportedly, the Indian Army’s goals are set under a ‘directive’ enunciated by the union’s Raksha Mantri. In keeping with our socio-political culture, this ‘directive’ is non-offensive in its intent. However, it is also known that the Indian Army is not fully equipped to fulfil the mandate enunciated; there are reckonable shortfalls in weaponry, ammunition, military hardware, even junior

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leadership and quality of soldiery. Obviously, there is a mismatch between the capabilities needed to meet the objectives specified in the ‘directive’ and the resources allocated for the Army. Bereft as it is, of deeper military understanding, the existing political directive does not lend itself to formulation of a realistic doctrine for the land forces. It would be optimistic to expect the political establishment to conclusively spell-out the Army’s operational objectives and make provisions for resources to match. The observable policy intent of the governing establishment is clear from the statements made by the top policy makers – notably the Prime Minister and the National Security Advisor (NSA). Infrastructural development and poverty alleviation are the declared top priorities of the government. Further, this commitment is sought to be funded by the economics of production and world trade, which, if necessary, would be secured through accommodation and acquiescence with the dictates of global order. Accordingly, defence funding is kept just about adequate to keep the defence forces alive in the state it is in, no more.

The transformational doctrine could thus free India’s land forces from having to bend backwards to accommodate the dictates of altruistic strategies No doubt this policy is a sanctified prerogative of the political leadership. The military brass may reconcile to that unequivocal fact and set about its transformation within the ambit of that policy. As a corollary, it must be the burden of the Army leadership to devise an implementable doctrine within the resources that may be available. Further, such a transformational doctrine must have the formal approval of the policy makers and duly coupled with formal commitment of logistic support from the other organs of the state – transportation, supplies and industry for example. Contrarily, should it not be feasible to match the politico-military aspirations with the resources at hand, the state has the choice of scaling down its objectives, as it has been done in many advanced countries?

Bindings of cultural demeanour When the political directive is indefinite, wisdom dictates that the drafters of India’s transformed land forces doctrine undertake to test the bindings under which it may have to operate. Some of such cultural bindings may be noted as follows: The nation’s polity believes that security comes from the lowest possible military denomination. Our national leadership wishes to avoid war at any cost and yet when imposed, there is the urge to terminate it at the first opportunity. Further, there is satisfaction in being considered a restrained and responsible nation state in the international fora, even to the extent of sometimes losing out in its own national interests. Except for tactical conduct of operations, the Indian political establishment does not depend on military advise in tackling its security concerns. Even the burden of the nation’s military security concerns and pegging to the desired level of military preparedness are assigned to the civilian institutions. The

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military hierarchy is thus excluded from decision-making confabulations. The nation’s future is pregnant with possibilities of outbreak of armed revolts, some of which may be beyond the capacity of civil institutions to contain. In such cases, the state would demand the Army’s intervention.

The foremost incongruity is the mismatch between the political directive and the resources committed by the state to enable the Army to meet that mandate. Simply put, it translates to ‘hollowness’ of very serious nature in the Army’s organisational structure when tested against the political directive or national expectations Military traditions of a society is a function of its culture. Therefore it is futile to devise a military doctrine that is disjointed from the nation’s cultural demeanour. Our demeanour finds solace in the belief that nuclear missiles could cover the hollowness in our conventional prowess, or remains oblivious to the urgency of developing post-independence indigenous military industry and finds wisdom in depending on scientists and bureaucrats to fight a nuclear war while keeping the military institution isolated from all such endeavours. Rational or not, in the current dispensation this cultural demeanour is fact that may not be overlooked.

Incongruities in articulation of military power For a doctrine to be strategically salient, it must be rooted in political goals and tailored to the resources allocated. The transformational land forces’ doctrine therefore must assimilate the strategic incongruities which currently afflict the Indian Army. The foremost incongruity is the mismatch between the political directive and the resources committed by the state to enable the Army to meet that mandate. Simply put, it translates to ‘hollowness’ of very serious nature in the Army’s organisational structure when tested against the political directive or national expectations. This is an ambiguity that the doctrine must resolve. The options are either to seek formally committed allocation of resources to match the mandate, or in scaling the military capabilities down to fit what may be the state’s affordable allocation on its defence. The second incongruity is that India’s conventional military power fails to deter Pakistan’s proxy war. India’s integrity thus remains hostage to Pakistan’s drumbeaten belief that her implied nuclear war-mongering has rendered India’s military power irrelevant. The latest talk is directed at India’s nuclear policy of inflicting “massive retaliation to wipe out the first user of nuclear weapons”, wherein it is insinuated that the Indian political leadership may not have the stomach to implement that policy and that Pakistan may get away with her adventurism. In effect, this implies that India’s defence spending is un-remunerative and that her edifice of military power vis-à-vis Pakistan is actually a mirage. This is a suggestion that puts the defensive minded Indian policy makers in a quandary, rendering

them helpless in restraining Pakistan’s unending obsession of sabotaging our nationhood. In an era when deterrence is contingent on perception, there is a need to articulate a doctrine that would rescue India from this kind of serious logjam.

It must be the burden of the Army leadership to devise an implementable doctrine within the resources that may be available. Further, such a transformational doctrine must have the formal approval of the policy makers and duly coupled with formal commitment of logistic support from the other organs of the state – transportation, supplies and industry for example. Contrarily, should it not be feasible to match the politico-military aspirations with the resources at hand, the state has the choice of scaling down its objectives, as it has been done in many advanced countries? The current doctrine of ‘swift, short and intense’ operations, notwithstanding its excellence, could be workable only if a good part of the Army is maintained at a state of ever-readiness, there is uninterrupted flow of actionable intelligence, mobilisation plans are ever-ready, industry is poised for surge-production of consumables of war and above all, the political ‘end-state’ is spelt-out – all in a matter of just few days. Such a dispensation is difficult to visualise in the near-future. This is therefore another incongruity. May be a doctrine of deliberate build-up and longer war, in simultaneity with diplomatic hedging, would be more appropriate in deterring China and Pakistan. Given India’s geographical depth, a terrain that saps offensive intrusion, a vast industrial base and cultural resilience, it may be worthwhile to examine if long-drawn war with cunningly articulated tempo, may be more advantageous in the contemporary dispensation. A quagmire of conflict from which it is difficult to extricate swiftly and with honour, is a nightmare to any of the aggressive powers of today; India may create a favourable asymmetry out of this situation. The transformational doctrine could thus free India’s land forces from having to bend backwards to accommodate the dictates of altruistic strategies. The current doctrine presumes that Pakistan, taking note of India’s assertion of ‘massive retaliation’, will have a certain level of tolerance to conventional offensives against shallow objectives, before opting to cross her threshold of nuclear strike. Thus is substantiated the Indian Army’s doctrine of ‘limited war under nuclear overhang’. Some experts, however, repudiate this logic. They argue that for a nation that is so paranoid in its anti-India afflictions, the idea of ‘noble death in jihad’ may possibly prevail in opting for brinkmanship. It is also argued that global powers may restrain India from going ahead with massive retaliation in order to nip the nuclear war at that point. The argument is construed further to suggest that even India’s leadership might

hesitate in adopting her stated recourse. Finally, there may be a doubt among the strategists as to whether nibbling of some patches of land across the borders at a heavy cost, only to have to return these at the end, would make any sense either to India or Pakistan. Advertisement of such perceptive insinuations leads to degradation of India’s conventional credibility while negating her nuclear deterrence. Indeed, these are serious indictments of our current strategies to deter war. Similarly, experts opine that India’s ‘minimum nuclear deterrence’ against China may not really matter to a regime that could, under the garb of cultural revolution exterminate 36 million people and sink 15 cities to construct one ‘great dam’. It is therefore simplistic to consider that few numbers of nuclear warhead tipped missiles, raising two Army divisions and bits of modernisation of the forces would deter China in any manner. It would be sufficient for China to use her conventional superiority to secure her political gaols when she wishes to, unless India wields a demonstrated military strength that prevents China from benefiting by military aggression. A transformational doctrine to overcome the aforementioned incongruities is therefore imperative to India’s future security.

Shaping a doctrine A transformational doctrine has to be shaped taking into account the national strengths and limitations. Since policies of the past have prevented the development of the kind of basic military industry that was needed by India, we remain dependent on the favour of import for most of our major weaponry and equipment. Conversely, India is highly competent in construction, transportation and information technology (IT). Therefore, the transformational doctrine could be shaped to enhance the ‘relative combat effectiveness’ of our forces by means of IT-induced surveillance, command, control and deception mechanisms. Similarly, the doctrine could invest on indigenous engineering expertise to harness the attributes of strategic and tactical mobility to deploy and re-deploy in quick time and so optimise the operational dividends from

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what military hardware we have. The transformational doctrine could also articulate our culture of slow but eventually sustained military reaction, to advantage. Further, for the doctrinal changes to be implementable, the state has to invest on those who would actually bring about the change – that is, the executive functionaries both within the Army as well as in the defence bureaucracy.

To enable the armed forces to undertake the extraordinary mandate of prosecuting war, it is covenanted for the state-institutions to respect military advice and to back up the military forces with all the resources that can be mustered

Outlines of force application and force-structuring The first step towards military transformation may be to propose a doctrine, duly elaborated and presented to the national leadership for it to be sanctified with the political stamp of approval. Thus it may be fair to assume that the broad outlines of the proposed ‘political directive’ to the military institution would specify the following mandate: To dissuade China from attempting to secure her territorial claims by military means. To deter Pakistan from her habit of indulging in militarily overt, covert or proxy mischief. To be geared up to participate in UN and allied operations for India to be counted in the global politics. To suppress insurgencies gone out-of-hand and to control these to a level when political settlement becomes feasible. To meet these ends, the land forces doctrine may indicate the strategies by which its mandate may be performed. These strategies could be, for example, outlined as under: China may be dissuaded by rendering unprofitable the politico-diplomatic cost of a military aggression. A military strength that would deny China the satisfaction of proclaiming a quick and ‘lesson-teaching’ kind of victory might serve that end.

Of international relationships, application of military force remains the only effective recourse to protect a nation’s sovereign will. Thus in a world order that is unbound by any universally enforceable law, armed forces are needed by a state to protect its interests when peaceful entreaties fail to make the adversaries see reason To restrain Pakistan, India’s conventional strategy has to break free of the fear of nuclear ‘stumping’ to be able to conduct deliberate, sharp, short and yet debilitating offensive. Towards this end, it may be worthwhile to consider blocking her access and use of nuclear weapons – rather than just depending on the regional version of the nuclear ‘game theory’ – to pave the way to prosecute conventional operations unhindered.

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A very potent force dedicated to deal with insurgencies, the light infantry, is already in place in the form of Rashtriya Rifles – it could do with enhanced supporting elements though. In all the above listed eventualities, highly capable Special Forces, backed up with modern conventional battle formations would be necessary. This necessity would translate to review of the role of the battle formations and consequently, in their composition and application. A combination of force-modernisation, modular force-composition and complementarities in terms of interoperability may be thought of to ‘balance’ the battle formations according to the contemporary scales of firepower, mobility C3ISR and logistics. Lastly, the weapons of war are no more confined to the parameters of physical combat; it has transcended to money-trafficking, cyber-subversion, media-manipulation, economic arm-twisting and technology denial. Therefore, while the soldiers engage in physical combat, complimentary effort has to come from expert soldier-citizens operating in the banking, excise, cyber, financial, technical, transportation, media, even policing sectors. A transformational doctrine may afford an answer to this development.

land power in India

FUTURE WARFARE

The “Fourth Kind of War” Truth or Myth?

Ilias Papadopoulos The writer holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and Strategy, with a specialisation in intelligence. His main research interests are intelligence and counterterrorism / counterinsurgency. He has served in the Greek Special Forces and in Greek NATO base and also participated in a series of seminars and lectures concerning political violence and international affairs.

A time to transform With far reaching changes in regional politics – and therefore in the causes and courses of war – time is ripe for another look at the Indian Army’s doctrine and organisational structure. There are fundamental disputes in the neighbourhood and even if it takes two to fight, just one is enough to start it. Indian Army, therefore, has no choice but to be ready to undertake its mandate within the resources affordable by the state. No doubt, concerted attention is being paid to modernise the military forces in a big way. Yet, the effort remains short of a perfectly integrated approach and weighed down with procedural, fiscal and technological hurdles. It is therefore time to devote attention towards a conceptual inquisition of the strategic complexities that confront the Indian Army. A new-look Doctrine may just do that.

Acknowledgements ‘Military Transformation and Modern Warfare’, Elinor Sloan, Fraeger Security International, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2008. Jasjit Singh, ‘Security environment in 2025: India’s Interests and Strategies’, USI Journal, Jan-Mar 2007. Ali Ahmed, ‘The Interface of Strategic and War Fighting Doctrines in the India-Pakistan Context’, Strategic Analysis, Sep 2009. ‘Understanding War’, Col T N Dupuy, Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1990. B D Jayal, ‘India’s Military Modernisation’, India’s National Security, 2003.

philosophical but interesting dissertation on the changing nature of warfare and the impact of the RMA. The writer contends that while great changes have appeared in the way we wage war, the essence of warfare has remained a constant. Technology has enhanced lethality and enabled great dispersion. This enables the insurgents and guerillas to fight dispersed and by sustaining the hatred in the population prolong wars till the will to fight of the opponent is sapped. No wonder, the populations have become the Centre of Gravity in modern operations.

Already new doctrines have begun implementation (counterinsurgency – COIN), that are not based, as traditional doctrines did, solely in application of conventional force, but on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population in question, in the collection of actionable intelligence and in the formation of small, extremely manoeuvrable units capable of responding immediately in threats

In order to make any conclusions in the essence of war, we must start from the basics, which are spelt out by Prussian military scholar Carl von Clausewitz. According to him the essence of war comprises three ingredients, each of which is present in every confrontation, but in different doses. Those ingredients are i) hatred / violence, ii) chance and iii) subjugation of the military to political goals

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n order to make any conclusions in the essence of war, we must start from the basics, which are spelt out by Prussian military scholar Carl von Clausewitz. According to him the essence of war comprises three ingredients, each of which is present in every confrontation, but in different doses.1 Those ingredients are i) hatred / violence, ii) chance and iii) subjugation of the military to political goals. Each of these facets of war corresponds to a particular element of the society that fights. Hatred mainly regards the wider civilian population of the country at war and its will to continue the fight. Chance regards the country’s military forces, where a small shift of luck can mean the difference between victory and defeat, eg a rainfall that impedes a breakthrough to the enemy lines. Political domination exclusively regards the country’s political elite. This was true in the Napoleonic era that the Prussian theorist lived and wrote in, but is this also true in the era of ICBMs and smart weapons? In 1989 right after the fall of the Soviet Union, came an article that opened a debate that is still active today and it claimed that we are entering a new generation of war, the fourth since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The article was “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation” and it suggested that the very way we are conducting war is under constant evolution.2 The main arguments for that were that four changes have taken place since the end of the Second World War which are so monumental that the nature of war has changed. The first of these changes is that the force dispersion in a battlefield has vastly increased, it is near impossible for a commander to control all his units. Thus low level initiative must be exercised, something that was unthinkable before. The second is that this dispersion of action severely hampers logistic support of the units. This means that isolated units will have to sustain themselves from the land they operate in. The third change is due to the technological progress, an Army comprised of small scale units is an asset, while in the past it was a deficiency. Finally due to the technological progress the military goal is no longer the physical neutralisation of the enemy, but to collapse him by striking with surgical precision his command and control nodes and similar ‘soft targets’.

The RMA factor and the incentive for new strategies All of the above points are directly linked to one factor, technology. The vast increase of technology in today’s battlefield has been called the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) and is defined as “discontinuous increase in military capability and effectiveness”.3 RMA can increase the tactical effectiveness of a military formation in an unprecedented manner. For example compare the American infantryman of World War II to his nowadays counterpart. The former was armed with a 5-round rifle, while the latter is armed with a 30-round automatic rifle. That is six times the firepower available. Nowadays soldier also cannot lose his bearing due to GPS systems, can move in the dark due to night vision goggles and has higher survivability expectancy due to body armour.

Small and highly motivated terrorist groups operated in the country and made use of the RMA to cause casualties both in civilian and occupational forces via the use of improvised explosive devises (IEDs). Their strategy worked and brought Iraq on the verge of open civil war and coalition forces on the verge of strategic defeat The above facts mean that contemporary armies need significantly less personnel to pack the same amount of firepower. This leads us to the major shift in military affairs today. That is the fact that in the past for one international actor to wage war he needed a substantial conscription pool, since that was the only way he could pack sufficient force and conduct the war. Today on the other hand the RMA allows a smaller force to pack the same amount of firepower as an earlier Army.4 The first question that comes to mind is “What difference does that make? All nations benefit from RMA, so the international balance of power would roughly remain the same”. This question is true but only if we consider state actors. What the above question does not acknowledge is the appearance of non-state actors trying to achieve state status, or to promote their agenda. This leads us to the core of our article, which is the appearance of terrorism and insurgencies in international affairs with great momentum. While in the past a group of people had no means to promote their political agenda whatever that might be (political, religious, sectarian etc), other than the democratic process, nowadays this group can wage a small war. That fact on the one hand destabilises the sovereign states and on the other gives the incentive to displeased civilians to take arms. Since these insurgents can do little harm in conventional military forces, which as we saw benefit equally from the RMA, they move their battlefield to the civilian population. 1 More on Clausewitz‘s trinity, see Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, book 2, p 127-177. 2 See Willian Lind, Col Ceith Nightengale, USA, Cpt John F Schmitt, USMC, Col Joseph W Sutton, USA and Lt Col Gary I Wilson, USMC, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”, published in Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989. 3 See, Steven Metz, James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: from Theory to Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, p 3. 4 See Tom Lansford and Jack Covarrubias, The Limits of Military Power: The United States in Iraq published in Tom Lansford, Robert P Watson, Jack Covarrubias, America’s War on Terror, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2009, p 169 - 181.

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Irregular warfare can benefit from all of the four new characteristics of war that we mentioned above. Insurgents operate in a decentralised manner and employ low level leadership (cell organisation). Since they operate mainly in a civilian environment, they can sustain themselves from their area of operations. They are also organised in small units and cannot cause heavy casualties, but can successfully target society’s morale.

Contemporary armies need significantly less personnel to pack the same amount of firepower. This leads us to the major shift in military affairs today. That is the fact that in the past for one international actor to wage war he needed a substantial conscription pool, since that was the only way he could pack sufficient force and conduct the war. Today on the other hand the RMA allows a smaller force to pack the same amount of firepower as an earlier Army As the recent experience showed us in Iraq, small and highly motivated terrorist groups operated in the country and made use of the RMA to cause casualties both in civilian and occupational forces via the use of improvised explosive devises (IEDs).5 Their strategy worked and brought Iraq on the verge of open civil war and coalition forces on the verge of strategic defeat. Other cases of sub-state actors waging effective insurgencies against state actors include the Afghan campaign from 2001 until today, Islamic insurgencies in the Caucasus waged against the Russian Federation, Palestinian insurgencies waged against Israel etc. But still are these examples capable to claim that Clauzewitzian thinking is obsolete and that we need new theories to study war?

Is there a “new kind of war”? Our answer to the above question is emphatically no. To explain the shift in contemporary strategic theory, we will employ the Lakatos model.6 According to that, a theory’s core theoretical assumptions are not subject to change if the theory is to remain legitimate, while its auxiliary hypotheses can change. To bring things in strategy, the Clausewitzian trinity is still valid. What has changed is the impact of each of the components in nowadays warfare.7 While during the cold war the main element of the trinity was ‘political guidance’, after the end of it the main element became ‘hatred’. Thus we have a shift from the political elites to the peoples and their will to conduct war / suffer casualties for their cause. This changes the strategies that need to be employed to combat the new phenomenon, but does not change the strategy itself. The same thing applied in the end of World War II, when the main element of strategy shifted from the military to the political due to the appearance of nuclear weapons. Today’s catalyst for the shift is the RMA.

The future of war Surely war in the future will have different facets, but it will not be different in its essence. Nations will have to find new norms to combat the new challenges but the Clausewitzian statement that “war is an act of force, to compel the enemy to do our will”, is still true. Already new doctrines have begun implementation (counterinsurgency – COIN), that are not based, as traditional doctrines did, solely in application of conventional force, but on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population in question, in the collection of actionable intelligence and in the formation of small, extremely manoeuvrable units capable of responding immediately in threats.8 Proof of that statement is the Iraqi campaign from 2003 until 2011. When coalition forces chose to base their strategy in engaging the unconventional forces of the insurgents, they failed. That is because they identified the enemy military as their centre of gravity9, something that in practise proved to be wrong. When General D Petraeus took command in 2007 and re-identified the enemy’s centre of gravity as its civilian morale and not its military forces, he changed the doctrine and it was successful. In the future we will face more of this kind of challenges. Arab Spring revolutions bear witness that sub-national actors will pursue their agenda by forcible means and if left unchecked, they could severely impact international politics. For example, one can imagine what the response would be of a nuclear Israel, should it find itself strategically encircled by radical Islamic neighbouring states. What states need to do is to adapt to the new environment. Deeply rooted perceptions will have to be altered and this is easier to say than to implement, but it is the only way for states to promote their national as well as regional security and stability. 5 More on that see, Bruce R Pirnie, Edward O’Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), RAND, Santa Monica, 2008, p 44-46. 6 See Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980. 7 This theory is also supported by Colin Gray. See Colin S Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. 8 See David J Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p 29-51. 9 Another Clausewitzian term that refers to the element that is the main source of strength of a strategy / Army / formation. According to the Prussian general, the enemy’s centre of gravity must be correctly identified and attacked until it collapses. When it collapses, the enemy will capitulate.

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VISION FOR THE FUTURE

M Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was comissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attache to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects.

Due to our stated â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;No First Useâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; nuclear doctrine, usage of missiles during the conventional phase of war would essentially be confined to cruise missiles. Cruise missiles do not adopt ballistic path and therefore are difficult to detect and subsequently track. This possibly will require sensors to be located in outer space to locate, track, guide, intercept and finally destroy an incoming missile

China has a lead of 17 years with regard to development of missiles. Yet it was insecure after the successful firing of Agni-V as the strategic gap has been narrowed with all Chinese targets in range from India

issiles have been used with tremendous success in the Libyan conflict as well as in the present standoff between the Hamas and Israel where long range Fajr rockets landed at Tel Aviv in Israel. Though Israel used the Iron Dome to counter these rockets; they were compelled to accept a ceasefire as they did not wish to escalate the conflict. We should not be surprised that a short missile war takes place suddenly. The article surveys missile developments in India, China and Pakistan and speculates that many future conflicts could well be confined to missile and cyber attacks. In the current security milieu our nation has to be prepared for the eventuality of a two front war. Accordingly, there is a need to undertake a reality check on our need of missiles to respond effectively to such an eventuality. This would necessitate a Committee comprising members from the Services, DRDO and other specialists, who must work out the force levels needed for the next 15 years. Our vision for the future should encompass technical improvements, which are necessary to optimise the missile systems.

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he Indian Army is currently equipped with two regiments of state-of-the-art BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. The Integrated Guided Missile Programme (IGMDP) which commenced in July 1983 has seen the development of array of systems which has enhanced our Firepower capabilities. Today both our adversaries are capable of delivering nuclear and conventional weapons using missiles. There is a need to see our preparedness in this critical area as the next war may only be an exchange of missiles with a combination of possibly cyber warfare.

Updates on missile system The missile programme comprised essentially of five systems. The first, Trishul a short range surface-to-air missile with a range of 9 km was designed to be used against low level (sea skimming) targets at short range. The system has been developed to defend naval vessels against missiles and also as a short range surface to air missile on land. As the development costs of the missile became prohibitive the programme was foreclosed on 27 February 2008. Thereafter the missile has remained a technology demonstrator and delinked from the services.

Our response to Pakistan is to have adequate number of cruise missiles, for a limited conventional war and improve our Ballistic Missile Defence to ensure effective retaliation to Pak nuclear weapons in a scenario where we have declared No First Use of nuclear weapons Akash is a medium range, surface to air missile with an intercept range of 30 km. The missile flies at a speed of around Mach 2.5 and can reach an altitude of 18 km. The system allows multiple targets to be attacked at the scale of four per battery. The missile is supported by a multi-target, multi-function, phased array, fire control radar, Rajendra, with a range of about 80 km in search and 60 km in terms of engagement. The missile is completely guided by the radar without any guidance of its own, thereby allowing it greater capability against jamming. The system is meant for the Army and the Air Force. The first flight test of Akash was carried out in 1990 and the Air Force completed user trials in December 2007. Based on the success of the trials the Air Force has commenced induction of the system. The Army has also accepted the system and is in the process of inducting the same. Nag is a fire and forget Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM) with a range from 500 m to 7,000 m. The guidance is provided by an imaging, infra red sensor based seeker and the missile hits the turret of a tank in a top attack mode by

MISSILES IN LAND WARFARE

IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: AN UPDATE flying up and falling vertically down on the most vulnerable part of the vehicle. The Nag can be carried and fired from a modified BMP-2 vehicle, Namica which has a carriage of four ready to fire missiles. The helicopter version is being developed on the Advanced Light Helicopter with a range of 7 km named Helina. Though user trials of the missile have been completed there are few issues yet to be resolved after particularly performance of the missile in high temperature. DRDL is straining every sinew to rectify the defect after which the Army will place firm orders for the variant. Ballistic missiles have proved to be the most successful part of IGMDP. Prithvi and Agni missiles have been developed and inducted into our services. The Prithvi-I was a single stage, liquid fuelled missile developed in 1990. The warhead

payload was 1,000 kg, a range of 150 km and was launched from transport launchers. This class of missiles was inducted into the Army in 1994. The Prithvi-II had a warhead of 300 kg and the range was thereby extended to 250 km. It was test fired in January 1996 and inducted into the Army and Air Force in 2004. The range has been further enhanced to 350 km and the warhead from 500 kg to 1,000 kg. The K-15 Sagarika is a submarine launched version of the Prithvi missile. This is a two stage missile; the first is an underwater booster that powers the missile to 5 km above the surface of the ocean, the second is a solid fuelled stage with a thrust motor that propels the missile over 700 km. Sagarika is in the final stages of evaluation after which it would be inducted in the submarines of the Indian Navy. Dhanush is a ship launched variant of the Prithvi missile. An enhanced

version with a range of 350 km was successfully test fired from INS Subhadra in December 2009. The Agni missile system forms a part of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) development. The system was first tested in 1989 with a strategic payload of 1,000 kg. Agni-I is a single stage solid propellant which ranges from 700 to 800 km. Agni-II is a two stage solid propellant missile and ranges between 2,000 to 3,000 km. Agni-III is an IRBM with two stages of solid propellant and ranges between 3,500 to 5,000 km. Agni-I and Agni-II are already inducted into the Services. In June 2011 it reported that Agni-III has been manufactured and inducted into the armed forces. Recently Agni-III has been modified and successfully tested as Agni-IV, with a range of 3,500 km. DRDO undertook an appraisal

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VISION FOR THE FUTURE

of IGDMP on 8 January 2008 and formally announced its successful completion. However, the development of missile technology will continue without any interruption.

Other developments The development process included the areas of cruise missile. BrahMos is a supersonic cruise missile capable of being launched from multiple platforms, on land, sea, subsurface and air against land and sea targets. It has a maximum range of 290 km, a maximum velocity of 2.5 to 2.8 Mach and cruises at an altitude of 15 km. BrahMos supersedes the most popular cruise missiles in the world by three times in terms of velocity, flight range, seeker range and nine times the kill energy range. The missile has been inducted in our Army and Navy and the air version is under development. The air version will be fitted on the modified Su-30 MK1 and necessary preparations are underway in this direction. DRDO is also developing a subsonic cruise missile Nirbhay, an extension of the Pilotless Target Aircraft Lakshya. It has a subsonic speed of 0.7 Mach and has a range of 1,000 km. The system is capable of firing numerous warheads and is likely to be fired from Chandipur in a matter of weeks. Nirbhay would be a force multiplier to the Indian armed forces.

BrahMos is a supersonic cruise missile capable of being launched from multiple platforms, on land, sea, subsurface and air against land and sea targets. It has a maximum range of 290 km, a maximum velocity of 2.5 to 2.8 Mach and cruises at an altitude of 155 km. BrahMos supersedes the most popular cruise missiles in the world by three times in terms of velocity, flight range, seeker range and nine times the kill energy range. The missile has been inducted in our Army and Navy and the air version is under development. The air version will be fitted on the modified Su-30 MK1 Apart from these, DRDO is developing Air Defence missiles.

The Prithvi air defence missile named as Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor has a maximum interception altitude of 80 km and is capable of engaging ballistic missiles that range between 300 km to 2,000 km at a speed of Mach 5.0. On 23 November 2012 a Prithvi missile fired from Chandipur was intercepted accurately by an Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile fired from Wheeler Island. The Long Range Tracking Radar was deployed at the temple town of Konark and the Multi Function Control Radar was deployed at Paradip. The success of the test is creditable. DRDO would now develop a comprehensive ABM shield to intercept missiles at altitude outside the atmosphere at a height of 110 to 120 km in an exothermic mode. Recently DRDO tested a 150 km ballistic missile Prahar which has an accuracy of less than 10 m. The requirement of this variant is to be weighed against the availability of cruise missiles which offer numerous advantages at these ranges. In addition missiles are being developed for fighter aircraft. Astra a Beyond Visual Range missile uses a terminal active radar seeker to find targets and electronic countermeasures to jam radar signal from surface weapon units. The missile uses a solid propellant and attains a speed of Mach 4.0 at an altitude of 20 km. The range is 80 km head-on and 15 km in a tail chase. The trial held in May 2011 was successful and fulfilled most of the parameters. Efforts are on to reach the production stage.

Agni-V India’s dream of joining the ICBM club was fulfilled by the immaculate launch of Agni-V from the Wheelers Island at 0807 hours on 19 April 2012. The automatic launch commenced at 0804 hours and took off from the launch pad at 0807 hours. The missile followed the designated trajectory and the three propulsion stages behaved correctly. The ships located in the path of the missile and at close proximity to the target tracked the vehicle and witnessed the final impact. The test saw the induction of indigenous newly developed technologies which comprised of redundant

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

navigation systems, accurate Ring Laser Gyro based Inertial Navigation System (RINS), Micro Navigation System (MINS) and these enabled the missile to reach the designated target within a few metres. Precise guidance was provided by the high speed onboard computer with fault tolerant software. The missile had a launch weight of 50 tons and carried a dummy warhead of 1.5 tons. There would be six trial flights and the first flight will be a canister launch which will be undertaken in 2013. The missile is likely to be inducted into the Strategic Forces by 2015.

Current status While we are doing our utmost to develop our capabilities, it is pertinent to assess the capabilities of our Western and Northern adversaries. China has a lead of 17 years with regard to development of missiles. Yet it was insecure after the successful firing of Agni-V as the strategic gap has been narrowed with all Chinese targets in range from India. Chinese have termed India as a strategic co-operator whereas we certainly are a competitor. The Chinese Second Artillery is presently responsible for handling all types of missiles. Having been raised in 1966, their initial task was to undertake limited nuclear strikes in case of a nuclear conflict. After the First Gulf War in 1991, its role diversified to include conventional engagement against high value strategic targets. The Second Artillery has currently a series of cruise and ballistic missiles. The cruise missiles are the SY-I, HY series, FL series, YJ series, C 701 and C 801. These range between 300 to 600 km. China has upgraded her missiles, which currently use solid propellants instead of liquid propellants, thereby enhancing their speed of mobilisation as also the range. The DF-21 currently is stated to have an enhanced range of 2,150 km. The Chinese Second Artillery is reported to have missiles deployed in three launch bases which can effectively engage targets in India. These are Kunming (Yunnan province) – two brigades DF-21 (Range – 2,150 km); Luoyang (Henan province) – three brigades DF-31A (Range – 11,200 km, MIRV) and at Delinga near Xning (Qinghai province) – three brigades

of DF-21. Each brigade has 3 to 4 battalions; each battalion has 3 to 4 launch companies and each company has one launcher. In addition there are isolated missile locations close to Lhasa in Tibet. Our entire country would be covered adequately by these land based systems, China has 62 submarines; some of these would be fitted with the JL-2, submarine launched ballistic missile with a range of 7,200 km. China has satellites that could provide targeting data of our entire country. China has modified missile DF 21-D for engagement of large ships at sea. During the preceding year she has carried out numerous space launches, to perfect her satellite launching capability which would assist her in surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, engagement of targets and post-strike damage assessment. China has destroyed a satellite in outer space. In comparison our capabilities are limited. There is an urgent need to deploy our Agni-II, III and V (on successful completion of trials) and BrahMos with steep dive capability in suitable locations to cover the Chinese threat. Further our SLBM capabilities need to be developed. We need to have our surveillance satellites as also High Altitude Long Endurance UAVs to provide us real time targeting inputs. Our synergy in application of our resources would narrow the strategic gap, thereby dissuading him from a conflict.

There is a need to see our preparedness in this critical area as the next war may only be an exchange of missiles with a combination of possibly cyber warfare Pakistan’s missile build-up has been all along India centric. The programme is run by Chinese and North Korean assistance. Some of the systems have been imported and the remaining are assembled in a Semi Knocked Down or in a Completely Knocked Down state. Pakistan possesses SRBMs (60 to 750 km), MRBMs (maximum ranges from 1,500 to 2,300 km), IRBMs (2,500 km), cruise missiles, Babur-700 km and RAAD-350 km. The missile force would be primarily responsible for delivery of Pakistani nuclear

weapons. Being an India centric programme, there would be matching responses to India’s development. Currently Pakistan can respond with nuclear weapons, in the event of a conventional offensive by India. Our response to Pakistan is to have adequate number of cruise missiles, for a limited conventional war and improve our ballistic missile Defence to ensure effective retaliation to Pak nuclear weapons in a scenario where we have declared No First Use of nuclear weapons.

In perspective In the current security milieu our nation has to be prepared for the eventuality of a two front war. Accordingly, there is a need to undertake a reality check on our need of missiles to respond effectively to such an eventuality. This would necessitate a Committee comprising members from the Services, DRDO and other specialists, who must work out the force levels needed for the next 15 years. Based on the report of the Committee our future development strategy needs to be formulated. Our vision for the future should encompass technical improvements, which are necessary to optimise the missile systems. At the outset precision is important, to undertake surgical strikes. Our present systems are based on GPS / GLONASS. To improve the Circular Error of Probability (CEP), we would need precision code from these agencies. This would entail processes which are time consuming and giving technical inputs of our fire control system. Accordingly we would need to develop possibly our own mini navigation system through ISRO to obtain precise coordinates to undertake surgical strikes. As on date Prithvi missiles are equipped with liquid propellant boosters, which need to be filled prior to their launch, which increases our response time, in a No First Use of Nuclear Weapons situation. To overcome this hurdle, we must switch to solid propellant boosters for Prithvi missile. Further to overcome the intercept capability of our adversaries we need to develop Hypersonic missiles which have speed of Mach 7.0 and above. China and Pakistan have satellites, providing Battlefield Transparency. There is a need to destroy these

satellites using Anti Satellite Missiles. Accordingly we need to develop this category of weapon system to degrade real time intelligence.

Our vision for the future should encompass technical improvements, which are necessary to optimise the missile systems. At the outset precision is important, to undertake surgical strikes. Our present systems are based on GPS / GLONASS A missile must be able to engage multiple targets simultaneously. Development of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) is needed to be done at the earliest to engage multiple targets as also to counter the anti-ballistic missile threat. Due to our stated ‘No First Use’ nuclear doctrine, usage of missiles during the conventional phase of war would essentially be confined to cruise missiles. Cruise missiles do not adopt ballistic path and therefore are difficult to detect and subsequently track. This possibly will require sensors to be located in outer space to locate, track, guide, intercept and finally destroy an incoming missile. The technical developments stated above need state-of-the-art technology which is available with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) located abroad. Corroborative effort with foreign OEMs in the form of Joint Ventures (JVs) and consortiums need to be established to ensure developments take place as per defined timelines to meet our critical war requirements.

Conclusion Missiles have been used with tremendous success in the Libyan conflict as well as in the present standoff between the Hamas and Israel where long range Fajr rockets landed at Tel Aviv in Israel. Though Israel used the Iron Dome to counter these rockets; they were compelled to accept a ceasefire as they did not wish to escalate the conflict. We should not be surprised that a short missile war takes place suddenly. We must strain every sinew to develop state-of-the-art systems for a two front war.

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ENCOMIUM

A Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst.

Dubbed “scrupulously apolitical”, the Indian Army’s greatest achievement since independence is undoubtedly its monumental contribution to keeping the Indian nation united, despite strong fissiparous tendencies, strident religious fundamentalism, ethnic dissonance and externally aided insurgencies. Called out to quell numerous ethnic and communal riots, to disarm mutinying armed constabularies and state police forces and for many other allied tasks when the civil administration had failed to stem the rot, the Army has always acted firmly but fairly and always employed the minimum possible force. The Army’s unimpeachable impartiality has led to success in these endeavours and has earned for it the trust and admiration of a grateful nation as a steadfast defender of the supremacy of the Constitution of India. Unlike in some neighbouring countries, the Indian Army has been a real champion of democracy

It is up to the present and future leaders of India to ensure that this great national institution remains in fine fettle. Army men take pride in their calling and engage themselves wholeheartedly in the pursuit of professional excellence so that they can serve their country with honour. Passionately patriotic, with an apolitical and secular ethos, the Indian Army is without doubt a strong and unyielding bastion for national unity and integrity

warm and personal tribute to the Indian Army. Ever since independence, the Army has been involved in shooting wars and multiple insurgencies and “militancies” with fissiparous tendencies and has participated vigorously in stemming the rot and stabilising the situation. It has also extended the reach of the state to inaccessible areas and, through egalitarian recruitment policies and secular conduct, it has contributed immensely to national integration. It could be said that the Indian Army’s march through the first half century since independence has been a long “Knit India” campaign. For over sixty years since independence, the Indian Army has been at the forefront as the guarantor of the nation’s freedom against external aggression, along with the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force and as the primary force engaged in keeping the nation together in the face of internal discord, communal disharmony and fissiparous tendencies.

ver since Pakistani Razakars and regular troops poured across the borders of Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947, with rape, torture and loot as their weapons of choice, India’s territorial integrity has never been free of threat and India’s security environment has continually remained in a state of flux. Besides the inconclusive operations in Kashmir in 1947-48, in the early years after independence, the Army assisted Sardar Patel, India’s Iron Man and first Home Minister, in consolidating some of the recalcitrant Princely states with the Indian Union. In Junagadh, a simple brigade-level demonstration of strength achieved the desired results. The Nizam of Hyderabad dallied for one year and an armoured division had to finally undertake a 100-hour operation to settle matters in September 1948. When the government of Portugal had failed to see reason for 14 years,

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in a swift offensive in 1961, the Army liberated Goa, Daman and Diu and finally rid the nation of foreign colonisers. Basking in the afterglow of a successful non-violent struggle for independence and carried away by its own rhetoric of Ahimsa and Panchsheel, independent India’s leadership neglected the development and modernisation of the Army, secure in the belief that a politico-diplomatic response was adequate to meet the threats and challenges to national security. Unprepared to execute Pandit Nehru’s hastily conceived “forward policy”, the Indian Army suffered a crushing blow at the hands of China’s invading hordes in 1962. However, it is not so well known that individual units mostly fought with spirit and determination in the face of daunting odds. While the Army took the rap for the nation’s worst ever humiliation, with hindsight, the blame must be laid squarely on the national leadership’s inept higher direction of war, unpardonable inability to accept professional military advice and its myopic vision of the inter-play between national security and foreign policy. Due to some phantom fears, the Indian Air Force was not even allowed to take part in the war! Perhaps the whole truth will emerge only when the Henderson Brooks-Prem Bhagat Report on the Himalayan Blunder is finally de-classified.

Two wars The post-1962 period was marked by rapid expansion of the Army, primarily for the defence of the Himalayan frontiers. However, the next major threat came from Pakistan in the west. Armed to the teeth with shining new Patton tanks and Sabre jets from the United States, Pakistan launched a series of misadventures in the Rann of Kutch in April-May, Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August and Operation Grand Slam in the Akhnoor-Jammu area in September 1965. The Mujahids of Gibraltar Force were quickly rounded up in Kashmir, Grand Slam was checkmated near Chhamb and Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh’s three-pronged offensive into West Pakistan achieved major breakthroughs. In the largest tank-versus-tank battle since World War II, Pakistan’s famous Patton tanks met fiery ends in a border village of Punjab. Coincidentally but very appropriately named Assal Uttar (real answer), the wheat and paddy fields of this village are even today an eerie graveyard of the flaming metal coffins the fleeing Pakistani crews left behind. At the strategic level, the 1965 war was a stalemate, as the Kashmir issue remained unsettled.

Six years later, Pakistan President General Yahya Khan’s refusal to install Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legitimately elected Awami League government and his Army’s brutal crackdown in East Pakistan, led to the exodus of almost ten million refugees to India and sowed the seeds of another war. The 14-day war, which Pakistan started on 3 December 1971, resulted in a grand Indian victory and the emergence of Bangladesh. Having decided to fight a holding action in West Pakistan, the Indian Army pulled out all the stops in its race for Dhaka.

In a brilliantly planned and meticulously executed lightning campaign, in some of the most easily defensible riverine terrain in the world, Eastern Command’s multi-pronged offensive spearheads contained and bypassed well-fortified defences. They caused a mental paralysis by operating deep inside the enemy’s rear areas and quickly broke the Pakistani commanders' will to fight In a brilliantly planned and meticulously executed lightning campaign, in some of the most easily defensible riverine terrain in the world, Eastern Command’s multi-pronged offensive spearheads contained and bypassed well-fortified defences. They caused a mental paralysis by operating deep inside the enemy’s rear areas and quickly broke the Pakistani commanders’ will to fight.

On 14 December 1971, Lt Gen J S Aurora, General Officer C o m m a n d i n g - i n - C h i e f , Eastern Command and Bangladesh Forces, accepted one of history’s greatest surrenders. Lt Gen A A K Niazi and over 93,000 Pakistani soldiers laid down their arms. It is a defeat that Pakistan has still not been able to stomach. With this glorious victory, the Indian Army finally overcame the trauma of its defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. However, the Pakistan Army never learns. In the summer of 1999, it engineered intrusions across the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir in the Kargil sector with a view to interdicting the Srinagar-Leh road and opening a new front for infiltration across the Zoji La Pass that divides Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. In the first week of July 1999, the Indian Tricolour was hoisted on Tiger Hill and soon fluttered atop many other peaks in the high Himalayas of Kargil district. By mid-July 1999, Pakistan’s perfidious intrusions into territory on the Indian side of the LoC had been undone after a truly heroic effort and the Pakistan Army had been handed out one more military defeat by the Indian Army. This victory was only the latest success of the Indian Army in guarding India’s national security interests.

Interventions The ethnic conflict between the

Tamilians and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka finally sucked in India when, in response to a request from President Jayawardene, the Indian Army was deployed in Sri Lanka to implement the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987. Initially, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was successful in maintaining peace without the use of force. However, when the LTTE violated the terms of the Accord, there was no option but to resort to military action. The LTTE guerrillas proved to be a determined and well-motivated force. Though they suffered many tactical defeats and numerous casualties, the jungles of Vavuniya and Trincomalee provided them safe sanctuaries in which to rest, recoup and refit before launching still more raids and ambushes. At the insistence of President Premadasa, the IPKF returned home in March 1990. Whether the IPKF made a substantial contribution to the achievement of India’s foreign policy objectives, shall remain a debatable point. That individual soldiers and units performed heroically on foreign soil under extremely unfavourable conditions, including restrictions on the use of force, shall never be in doubt. India’s other overseas intervention in the 1980s was more successful. The legitimately elected Government of President Gayoom of Maldives was overthrown in a mercenary-led coup in November 1988. Flying in from

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over 2,500 kilometres away at Agra, Indian paratroopers secured the international airport at Hulale and the capital Male in a surgical strike which caught the coup leaders completely unawares and unprepared. With this one swift tri-service operation, India signalled the nation’s emergence as a pre-eminent power in the southern Asian and northern Indian Ocean region.

While the Army took the rap for the nation’s worst ever humiliation, with hindsight, the blame must be laid squarely on the national leadership’s inept higher direction of war, unpardonable inability to accept professional military advice and its myopic vision of the interplay between national security and foreign policy. Due to some phantom fears, the Indian Air Force was not even allowed to take part in the war Normally a nation’s international borders are managed by paramilitary and police forces during peacetime. However, India’s disputed borders with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir and with China along the Himalayas, are managed primarily by the Army. Along the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir, there has been an eyeball-to-eyeball standoff between the Indian and Pakistani Armies since the 1947-48 conflict. Exchanges of small arms and medium machine gun (MMG) fire are an almost daily occurrence. On occasion, even artillery duels have lasted from a week to ten days. Many of the posts are in high altitude areas above 3,000 metres (10,000 feet) height, in some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world. The jawans live in bunkers under primitive conditions and usually only the most basic amenities are available. During heavy snowfalls and after avalanches, some of the pickets remain cut-off for many months. Casualties have to be carried on stretchers to the nearest helipads and then flown out when the weather conditions permit helicopter flights. To maintain a high state of morale under such trying conditions, superhuman skills of leadership and man-management are required to be developed in the officers. The Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) on the Saltoro Ridge

west of the Siachen Glacier is an un-demarcated continuation of the LoC beyond the famous map reference NJ 9842. Since 1984, the Indian and Pakistani Armies have been fighting at Siachen (average height 5,000 metres or 16,500 feet), the highest battlefield in the world. Unlike the LoC where there is still some restraint, Siachen is an active battle zone. Artillery duels are commonplace and short-range missiles and rocket launchers are employed frequently by both the sides. Incidents of hand-to-hand fighting, though infrequent, cannot be ruled out as attacks are still launched to gain tactical advantage. However, survival against the elements is a greater concern than the fear of an enemy attack. Besides advanced mountaineering skills, a stint at Siachen Glacier requires outstanding physical endurance, steely mental resolve, an indomitable spirit and raw courage. If there is one bilateral problem between India and Pakistan that needs early resolution, it is that of the dispute over Siachen and the other glaciers of the Karakoram Range.

Maintaining internal security The Indian Army has been engaged in internal security and counter-insurgency operations in the country almost throughout the post-independence period. The armed insurrections supported by various foreign powers in almost all the northeastern states since the early 1950s were successfully fought by the Army and the Assam Rifles that is officered by the Army. Though various accords and ceasefire agreements were signed over the years, these interludes were used by the insurgent groups to regroup and re-arm themselves before getting back to the business of demanding either autonomy or independence. While in almost each case the Army succeeded in providing the right security environment that is essential for a negotiated peace settlement, peace continued to elude the people for various reasons. In Punjab, after the Pakistan-supported militancy had continued to fester for many years, the Army was employed as a force of the last resort to flush out Bhindranwale’s armed followers from the holy

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precincts of the Golden Temple in June 1984. Though the operation was successful, the militants soon re-grouped in Pakistan and unleashed a reign of terror on communal lines. However, the people of Punjab did not support the demand for Khalistan and the movement never went beyond the pale of terrorism. The Army was once again called out in the early 1990s to assist the civil administration to effectively control the internal security situation in conjunction with the Punjab Police. The Army’s operations were limited mainly to counter-infiltration, domination of the countryside and patrolling at night and were eminently successful. Even as the situation in Punjab was coming under control, the demand for azadi reared its ugly head in the Kashmir Valley in 1989-90 and a new wave of Pakistan-sponsored militancy gathered momentum. The Army was deployed in large numbers to combat this new “proxy war” from across the western borders and largely succeeded in restoring a semblance of normalcy. Over two decades later, though the people are tired and an elected government is in power, the hard-core militant groups are yet to throw in the towel as they are still being provided financial, military and material support by their foreign masters in Pakistan who are getting increasingly desperate to gain some ground quickly. In fact, especially after the 1999 Kargil conflict, the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir has passed completely into the hands of foreign mercenary terrorists, most of them from Pakistan. However, contrary to the canard spread by Pakistan, not more than approximately 1,20,000 combat personnel have been engaged in counter-insurgency operations at any one time. It was appreciated by the Army leadership that it would not be possible to sustain this level of involvement over a long duration, as it would hamper the Army’s training and preparation for war. Yet, it was realised that though internal security is basically a state government and Ministry of Home Affairs responsibility, the state police and central police and paramilitary forces (CPMFs) could not be expected to counter foreign-sponsored, well trained militants, armed with sophisticated

weapons and state-of-the-art communications equipment, without Army help. There was a need for a national-level counter-insurgency force with the Army’s ethos and leadership and, hence, the Rashtriya Rifles force was raised in the early-to-mid 1990s.

cyclones on the Andhra and Orissa coast and the Latur earthquake, building of bridges and roads during emergencies such as landslides and for occasions like the Kumbh Mela. The Army is often asked to provide essential services when these are disrupted by strikes and bandhs.

Peacekeeping operations

The large-scale construction of border roads by the Army has led to the development of far-flung and remote under-developed parts of the country. Army outposts have often provided canteen services to the inhabitants of remote villages. Very often the unit bania acts as the resident grocer for a cluster of villages, which have no access to a market. Army medical teams have been providing medical assistance and treatment to the inhabitants of remote localities on an ongoing basis. Indeed, for numerous citizens of India residing in the country’s remote frontiers, the Indian Army is the only contact with the administration. In these outposts of the nation, the Army is the flag bearer – the only visible face of India.

By being at the forefront of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide for almost 50 years, the Indian Army has contributed immensely to advancing India’s foreign policy goals. Major missions in which Indian troops participated were in Korea, 1953-54; Vietnam, 1954-70; Gaza, 1956-67; Congo (Zaire), 1960-64; Cambodia, 1992-93; Mozambique, 1992-94; Somalia, 1993-94; Angola, 1994-97; Rwanda, 1995-96; and, Sierra Leone, 1998-2000. At present, a battalion group from India is deployed in UNIFIL, Lebanon and preparations are underway to despatch a battalion to the Congo. Besides infantry battalions, artillery, engineers, signals and medical units and logistics personnel have participated in UN missions and the Army has contributed a large number of military observers to missions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Several Indian Generals have served with distinction as Force Commanders of UN missions in Korea, Gaza, Congo (Zaire), Cyprus, Yemen, Namibia and Yugoslavia. Maj General Inderjit Rikhye is a well-known UN veteran. The old peace-horse, Lt Gen Dewan Prem Chand, served with distinction as the Force Commander in Cyprus, as a member of the Rhodesia Commission and again as the Force Commander in Namibia in 1989-90, when he was in his 70s. All of them brought laurels to the country with their professional acumen and dedication to the cause of peace. In addition to its employment in counter-insurgency and internal security duties, the Army is frequently called upon to render aid to civil authority. Such assistance includes the maintenance of law and order during communal riots, flood and famine relief and humanitarian aid during natural calamities such as the frequent

Contribution to nation building Dubbed “scrupulously apolitical”, the Indian Army’s greatest achievement since independence is undoubtedly its monumental contribution to keeping the Indian nation united, despite strong fissiparous tendencies, strident religious fundamentalism, ethnic dissonance and externally aided insurgencies. Called out to quell numerous ethnic and communal riots, to disarm mutinying armed constabularies and state police forces and for many other allied tasks when the civil administration had failed to stem the rot, the Army has always acted firmly but fairly and always employed the minimum possible force. The Army’s unimpeachable impartiality has led to success in these endeavours and has earned for it the trust and admiration of a grateful nation as a steadfast defender of the supremacy of the Constitution of India. Unlike in some neighbouring countries, the Indian Army has been a real champion of democracy. With its diverse multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural composition, the Indian Army is a

shining example of the national goal of achieving “unity in diversity”. The Army is also an exemplary proponent of the power of positive secularism, as all ranks not only tolerate each other’s religion but also actively participate in all the rituals and celebrations in a spirit of genuine reverence. Hundreds of thousands of ex-servicemen have spread the Army ethos of secularism, tolerance, moral uprightness and selfless discipline in all the corners of the country. The serving jawans proceeding to their villages on leave also carry the same message with them. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the Indian Army has been a major force for national integration and has knit India together better than any other organ of the state. Today, when the nation is at peace, the Army continues to fight a war – even though it is only a proxy war and not a full blown conventional war. In the vitiated security environment within the country and in the southern Asian region, it is clear that the Army will continue to play a dominant part in the affairs of the nation. It is up to the present and future leaders of India to ensure that this great national institution remains in fine fettle. Army men take pride in their calling and engage themselves wholeheartedly in the pursuit of professional excellence so that they can serve their country with honour. Passionately patriotic, with an apolitical and secular ethos, the Indian Army is without doubt a strong and unyielding bastion for national unity and integrity. From the blizzard-swept snows of Siachen, through the sharp escarpments of the Himalayan massif, the steaming hot and humid jungles of the northeast to the shimmering sands of the Thar desert, the gallant men and women of the Indian Army have maintained a steady vigil over the nation’s frontiers for over sixty long years. The gallant jawans have suffered many hardships, borne numerous privations, they have been often lonesome, but they have never complained. A few millions have given the best years of their youth for our tomorrows. Many thousands have made the supreme sacrifice and a few hundred continue to do so every year. Each generation of Indian citizens must ensure that those sacrifices are not in vain.

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GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVES

R S N Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects. There is considerable intelligence available to suggest that there are external powers waiting in the wings to underwrite the financial damage that may accrue to Maldives as a fallout of termination of the contract. The Chinese hand is conspicuous. As part of their thrust into the Indian Ocean and as a sequel to its presence on Sri Lankan coast by way of Hambantota Port and Myanmarese coast in Sittwe, China is making determined bid to establish its strategic presence in Maldives. In this it is also being aided by Pakistan which has significant influence over the new regime

There is increasing inroad of Wahhabi Islam in the social and religious discourse of Maldives. The moderate Sunni society is increasingly getting radicalised. The Arabisation of the Maldivian culture is palpable. Beards and Burkas are becoming increasingly visible.

The political and social discourse in Maldives till very recently never tried to question or counterpoise India’s pre-eminent position in the South Asian region by courting regional or extra-regional powers. It is a nascent phenomenon in some segments

aldives, a chain of 1,192 islands, 199 of which are inhabited and home to 3,15,000 people, has recently been brutalised by violence and coup. Located 300 miles off the southern coast of India and 450 miles southwest of Sri Lanka, this idyllic country, a tourist paradise in the Indian Ocean is yet another victim of Islamic fundamentalism. Maldives straddles major maritime arteries and has the potential to be drawn in big power rivalry. During World War II, the British had established an operational base on Gan Island in southern Addu Atoll. There was great jubilation when Mohamed Nasheed was elected as the President in 2008. He was hailed as “Obama”. When Nasheed was being purged in February this year by a thinly veiled coup we did precious little to save his legitimate government. Our stock reaction was that it was an internal matter of Maldives. If only we had deftly used our leverages we could have saved the regime. That there are external powers waiting in the wings to underwrite the financial damage that may accrue to Maldives as a fallout of termination of the GMR contract. The Chinese hand is conspicuous. As part of their thrust into the Indian Ocean and as a sequel to its presence on Sri Lankan coast by way of Hambantota Port and Myanmarese coast in Sittwe, China is making a determined bid to establish its strategic presence in Maldives. In this it is also being aided by Pakistan which has significant influence over the new regime.

n the Maldives, the ouster bid by the Mohammed Waheed Hassan dispensation of the Indian company GMR engaged in the construction and operation of Ibrahim Nasir International Airport at Male is due to religious and external subversive forces bearing on the new regime. This is in brazen disregard to the contract signed with the previous Nasheed government. The agreement was hailed for its transparent process following global bidding and oversight of the World Bank. The airport was being operated by the Indian company for two years. The three impetuses to this decision are the factor of Islamic Fundamentalism, the China factor and the Pakistan factor. It was none other than Abdul Gayoom who in his three decades rule planted and fanned Islamic Fundamentalism in Maldives and desiccated the soul of the country. This is indeed a strategic set-back to India. We have but invited this situation due to our inherent flawed policies. When Nasheed was being purged in February this year by a thinly veiled coup we did precious little to save his legitimate government. Our stock reaction was that it was an internal matter of Maldives. If only we had deftly used our leverages we could have saved the regime. Once when Waheed took over we began good-humouring him. It is another matter that he nurses a deep-rooted distrust of India for not backing him in his take-over bid. The role of Gayoom in orchestrating the regime change became

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obvious when several of his close aides and more prominently his daughter Dhunya Mamoon, were included in Waheed’s cabinet. India thus gave fillip to Islamic fundamentalist forces in Maldives. The very Indian approach of being everything at the same time by invoking democracy and pluralism has allowed Nepal and Sri Lanka to drift. Our inability to arrive at and convey our threshold foreign policy parameters and irreconcilable strategic imperatives to the world community and specially our neighbours has cost us dearly. Nepal and Maldives owe their geopolitical status as sovereign entities to the historical indulgence of India. Had India not responded militarily to the SOS call by Gayoom in 1988 the image and discourse of Maldives would have been different. Ironically, there are constituencies in these countries, funded and indoctrinated by external powers, who though in minority carry substantial reach and weight. The anti-India forces in Maldives are so rabid that it really does not matter which way the arbitration or decision in respect of GMR by the Singapore Court goes. It has nothing to do with controversy of the US $ 25 charge being levied on departing international passengers, as Maldivians constitute only a trickle.

The government’s plea that it can ill-afford to pay US $ 1.5 million annually is preposterous because as envisaged in the contract the country will have to pay much more if the contract is annulled. It may be mentioned that GMR has already invested US $ 250 million of US $ 500 million in the project. Then there is the provision of re-negotiation as well, but of no avail as the decision to terminate the contract is not commercial but strategic.

Maldives acquired greater strategic significance post 9/11 particularly after Mumbai 26/11 as seaborne terrorism was the new reality. There was also move by extra-regional powers like China to seek naval presence in the country, as part of its strategic stretch in the Indian Ocean There is considerable intelligence available to suggest that there are external powers waiting in the wings to underwrite the financial damage that may accrue to Maldives as a fallout of termination of the contract. The Chinese hand is conspicuous. As part of their thrust into the Indian Ocean and as a sequel to its presence on Sri Lankan coast

by way of Hambantota Port and Myanmarese coast in Sittwe, China is making determined bid to establish its strategic presence in Maldives. In this it is also being aided by Pakistan which has significant influence over the new regime. Significantly the Maldivian government has allotted a crucial plot of land for construction of Chinese Embassy within sniffing distance of the Indian High Commission. Maldives, therefore, needs to be viewed predominantly through ’maritime strategy’ prism rather than purely foreign policy prism. Consequently it is imperative to understand the evolving geo-strategy and geo-politics with respect to Maldives.

Geopolitical flux Strategically significant and geopolitically sensitive, Maldives, a chain of 1,192 islands 199 of which are inhabited and home to 3,15,000 people, has recently been brutalised by violence and coup, shattering the very nascent and fragile edifice of parliamentary democracy, which had just begun to take roots since 2008 after 30 years (1978-2008) rule of Abdul Gayoom.

Located 300 miles off the southern coast of India and 450 miles southwest of Sri Lanka, this idyllic country, a tourist paradise in the Indian Ocean is yet another victim of Islamic fundamentalism. Internal sleaze by some opposition members including Gayoom, Islamic fundamentalist groups with support of external players, particularly Pakistan and China, has engendered the present unrest and instability in Maldives. The turmoil as expected has allured inimical powers to India to make a fresh bid to gain foothold in this part of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) located strategically astride key maritime routes. As has been the wont of most micro-states, political instability and coup is not new to Maldives, even as it made transition from monarchy to a republic under Ibrahim Nasir in 1968. Nasir had to eventually flee to Singapore. Even before that in the year 1953 (January 1952–August 1953) during a brief interruption of the Sultanate and flirtation with Presidential system, President Mohammad Amin Diddi was lynched by a mob due to unpopular policies. Gayoom was also not

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unchallenged, there were at least three (1980, 1983, 1988) attempted coups to oust him, two of them orchestrated by Nasir. What is unusual and of concern is that the latest coup has strong underpinning of Islamic fundamentalism and the China factor. Nasheed is on record to say that a week before his ouster he was under pressure from Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) to sign a defence agreement with China. It is to the credit of the rulers in the country including Gayoom that he did not allow Maldives to be drawn into big power games not even during the cold war period. The geopolitical scenario however has drastically altered in the recent times. The huge impetus to religious radicalisation of Maldives by Gayoom has spawned rising Islamic fundamentalism. An ascendant China is making forays in the Indian Ocean and would like to wean away Maldives from India’s strategic embrace. An out of power Gayoom is not averse to external leveraging. With the ouster of President Nasheed, on 7 February this year, the country has lapsed into uncertainty. It is the same Nasheed who suffered 27 arrests and six years in jail in his unrelenting campaign for ushering parliamentary democracy and against the autocratic rule of Abdul Gayoom, who in 2008 was Asia’s longest serving leader. There was great jubilation when Mohamed Nasheed was elected as the President in 2008. He was hailed as “Obama”. Ironically, it was India who responded to the SOS by Gayoom when he was beleaguered by People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) terrorists. The Indian armed forces reacted instantly by launching Operation Cactus and foiled the attempted coup. India acted in its strategic interests both in the geopolitical context of the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Maldives acquired greater strategic significance post 9/11 particularly after Mumbai 26/11 as seaborne terrorism was the new reality. There was also move by extra regional powers like China to seek naval presence in the country, as part of its

strategic stretch in the Indian Ocean. The new strategic imperative was the impetus for India and Maldives to sign a new bilateral pact on security in August 2009. Probably for some detractors of Nasheed, this was one of his major undoing. The coup was allegedly masterminded by the Islamic fundamentalists, Gayoom, rogue elements in the Maldivian security establishment and anti-India elements and forces. Indications of Chinese and Pakistani involvement are getting increasingly pronounced. The immediate provocation for anti-government protests was the arrest of Justice Abdulla on charges of misconduct and favouring opposition figures. It may be highlighted that Gayoom’s influence in the commercial enterprise, security and administrative establishment as well as judiciary remained overwhelming due to the sheer fact that he strode like a colossus at the helm of Maldivian discourse for three decades. It did not help that in the true spirit of democracy Nasheed as President was not vindictive towards Gayoom. It did not help that he was a liberal and advocated tolerant form of Islam. It did not help that the press was free and transparent under Nasheed.

Imperatives of a micro-state The islands in Maldives are grouped under 26 atolls, each atoll being an administrative unit. This 820 km long (north to south) and 120 km wide (east to west) country with a population little over quarter million and can be described as a micro-state. The generally acceptable definition of a micro-state is applied to countries having population of less than one million. There are about 38 such states of which 27 belong to the Commonwealth. Like all micro-states, Maldives has small size, narrow resource base, difficult geographical configuration and relative proximity to big neighbours. Also like other micro-states, it has to interact with the outside world in three concentric circles ie super powers, big powers and immediate neighbours in the region. Micro-states are vulnerable both from within and without. Their security dependence has been

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implicitly accepted by powerful regional neighbours eg US in Caribbean, France in Pacific and India in the case of Maldives. It would be difficult for the new President Waheed Hassan or even Gayoom if he were to come to power, to jettison Maldives from India’s strategic partnership, given the complexities and intricacies of regional and global politics.

Islamic fundamentalism Nevertheless in the evolution of Indo-Maldives relations, the drastic changes in religious orientation of Maldives, Islamic terrorism and the new power play in the Indian Ocean have begun to impinge rather heavily. During the recent violence and coup in Maldives, about three dozen exhibits, mostly images of Buddha and Hindu Gods were destroyed by Islamic fundamentalists in the national museum. The new president Waheed said: “We are very sad. This is the physical and archeological evidence of this country. We have nothing to show of the pre-Islamic history.” This repudiation and hatred of non-Islamic past is reminiscent of destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by Taliban. Till the 4th century AD, Thervada Buddhism, originating from Sri Lanka, was the dominant religion. Islam was introduced in Maldives in 1153 and remains the cornerstone of its history. It was in this year that the last Buddhist King Bavanditta under the influence of the Arabs, who had become dominant on the Indian Ocean routes, converted to Islam and adopted the title of ‘Sultan Muhammad al Adil’. He was followed by six dynasties and 84 sultans. In fact, the Sultanate lasted for more than 800 years (1153-1968). President Gayoom retained a highly centralised political system, which had its roots in the oligarchic structure of the Sultanate. Traditionally Islam till recently had endured a much different shade in Maldives. Nevertheless it is now seen to be shedding its traditional and cultural moorings. Islamic tenets were superimposed upon Buddhism which can still be discerned, even

though very little physical remnants of the Buddhist past have been allowed to exist over the years. Unlike many other Islamic countries, death penalty is never imposed in Maldives. The maximum punishment is banishment to an island. For adultery, there is no stoning to death. As probably driven by the exigencies of the tourism industry, Maldivians do handle pork and in that they invoke the Shariat, which allows them to do so provided the hands are later washed. Importantly, traditional mosques in Maldives do not face Mecca, but the east, which as per historians is redolent of the past, wherein the first sun worshiping seafarers called Redin first settled on the country’s land. In the past, even though, the aid from the Arab world was substantial, Maldives was not very close to many Arab countries because of its recognition of Israel. In the recent years, the opposite trend is however clearly discernible. There is increasing inroad of Wahhabi Islam in the social and religious discourse of Maldives. The moderate Sunni society is increasingly getting radicalised. The Arabisation of the Maldivian culture is palpable. Beards and Burkas are becoming increasingly visible. The opposition had been constantly accusing ousted President Nasheed for his lack of adherence to Islam and his favourable posturing towards Israel.

The huge impetus to religious radicalisation of Maldives by Gayoom has spawned rising Islamic fundamentalism. An ascendant China is making forays in the Indian Ocean and would like to wean away Maldives from India’s strategic embrace. An out of power Gayoom is not averse to external leveraging There is little hint of moderate Islam in the present religious and the political discourse of Maldives. All religions other than Sunni Islam are forbidden. Alcohol is banned in Male, the capital of Maldives, home to 30 per cent of the population. However, in deference to economic compulsions and imperatives, it is not banned in the tourist resorts despite clamour by Islamic fundamentalists. The Islamic fundamentalists have also been demanding ban on direct flights to Israel.

The man responsible for radicalisation of Maldives is none other than Gayoom. His education and upbringing is steeped in religious fundamentalism. He is graduate of Al Azhar University, Egypt. As a student he got deeply influenced by Syed Qutb, the famous Islamist theorist and leading member of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Gayoom later taught Islamic studies in Nigeria. Back to Maldives in 1971, he was President Nasir’s undersecretary and later rose to be the Transport Minister. He protested against Nasir’s recognition of Israel. He assiduously cultivated the image of a pious man. Once he became President, he declared himself by a constitutional provision “Guardian of Islam’ and ‘Supreme Propagator of Islam”. He established Islamic schools and in 1997 declared Islam as the state religion. He encouraged youth to avail Islamic education in institutions in Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Maldives during his tenure received huge funding from Saudi Arabia for propagation of Wahhabism. Gayoom however could not shut tourism because it was the backbone of the economy. The products of Islamic schools were intensely radicalised and till today are collaborators of Gayoom. Religion also became a tool for Gayoom to marginalise the opposition. Under the assault of Mullahs, Islamic preachers and radicalised elements, Maldivian culture began to disappear. The fact that Islamic fundamentalism has become a substantial feature of Maldivian discourse is reflected by the remark of the new President Waheed: “They are part of the society, you cannot ignore them”. Religious intolerance in Maldives is getting increasingly pronounced. In 2005, a shop in Male was attacked for displaying Santa Clause. In 2006, Islamists had virtually taken over Himandhoo Island (Alif Alif Atoll) and constructed a new Salafi mosque to propagate neo-conservative Islam. Shariah was imposed on all residents and children were banned from attending local schools on the plea of impure influences from foreign teachers. The situation fortunately

was subsequently reversed after the intervention of the state. In September 2007, 12 tourists ie eight Chinese, two Japanese and two British were injured in a blast in Male’s Sultan Park. Two months later, the police alleged that the ten men linked to the explosion were absconding in Pakistan and had links with LeT. The police maintained that it was in madrasas of Pakistan that the absconders had learnt the techniques of bomb making.

Strategic importance There have been persistent reports about China’s bid to establish a submarine base in Marao, a coral island (40 km south of Male). The reports gained currency following the visit of the then China Premier Zhu Rongji in 2001. The reports mentioned the Chinese design to base nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. Coral islands make fine natural submarine base. There have also been reports that Pakistan has been using the Islamic card with Maldives to provide such facilities to China. Yet another dimension to strategic significance of Maldives with respect to India emerged about LeT plans to setup Indian Ocean base in the country. Reportedly, there were plans to use deserted islands to build bases and weapon storage facilities from where they could be moved to Kerala and then to the rest of India. The geo-strategic location of Maldives with regard to Indian Ocean is an imperative that has driven super powers in the past like the Great Britain, the US and the erstwhile USSR to gain foothold in the country. The same imperatives are now driving India, China, Pakistan and Islamic terror groups. Maldives straddles major maritime arteries and has the potential to be drawn in big power rivalry. During World War II, the British had established an operational base on Gan Island in southern Addu Atoll. In 1948, a mutual defence pact was signed between Britain and Maldives, which was followed by a 30-years agreement with the Sultan in 1956, as per which the

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land power in India

GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVES

Royal Air Force was to continue using the base at Gan as a staging post. The airbase at Gan provided much needed staging facilities between Europe and Far East. It provided clear and alternate communications to NATO, West Asia and East Asia. In 1974, consequent to a review of British Defence Policy, all British establishments east of Suez were to be liquidated. Accordingly, in 1976 the RAF base at Gan was handed over lock stock and barrel to Maldives. The facilities included a runway, building and equipment and a modern medical centre. The base provided employment to 850 Maldivian personnel and contributed £ 50,000 to a total income of £ 3 million. For Maldives the winding up of the RAF base at Gan did not mean the end of an environment of super power rivalry in the region. Soon, 600 miles south of Gan, the US established a base at Diego Garcia.

India thus gave fillip to Islamic fundamentalist forces in Maldives. The very Indian approach of ‘being everything at the same time’ by invoking democracy and pluralism has allowed Nepal and Sri Lanka to drift. Our inability to arrive at and convey our threshold foreign policy parameters and irreconcilable strategic imperatives to the world community and specially our neighbours has cost us dearly In fact, Maldives forms a geo-physical part of the same ridge that extends to Diego Garcia. After relinquishment of the Gan base by Britain, the USSR made cogent efforts to acquire it in 1977 and offered a monthly rental of US $ 1 million. Though the stated purpose for the Soviet move was to set-up a supply station for its fishing fleet, the actual purpose was to countervail the US base at Diego Garcia. President Gayoom who was then a transport minister, had vehemently opposed the Soviet proposal. Later in 1982, Gayoom as President had remarked, “the Soviet base would have militated against our non-aligned status, annoyed our brothers in the Muslim world and created suspicion in minds of our neighbours like India and Sri Lanka”. It is believed that Shah of Iran too had made overtures for leasing Gan Island to keep the Soviets out and the Libyan President Gaddafi was determined to stymie Shah.

Threat perception Maldives, so far has faced no external threat in the conventional sense. Its vulnerability is owing to its size and geographical location in the Indian Ocean, which predisposes it to regional and extra-regional strategic machinations. Maldives successfully warded off all attempts by extra-regional powers to fill in the vacuum created by the British departure from the Gan Island. Most of the threat so far has been internal in nature given political schisms and difficult geographical framework. With a modest military capability, it is rather difficult to ensure the security of the country and also the EEZ due to spread of its atolls and islands. The Maldivian government therefore has been vulnerable to coups. Besides, there are other economic and geographical vulnerabilities – the most serious being the problem of global warming, which as per many experts threatens to submerge the country as such. Given the axis of sea route emanating from the infamous Golden Triangle and burgeoning tourism – Maldives is vulnerable to illegal drugs and its trafficking. The society in Maldives is homogeneous mixture of people from Sinhalese, Dravidians, Australian-Asian, Arabs and African origin. There is one common language Dhivehi, which has loan words from Hindi, Arabic and Tamil. Despite the cohesiveness and homogeneity, the country has not been free from internal disorders and secessionist movements. In 1959, three southern atolls declared independence and a United Suvadian Republic with the combined population of 20,000. There are insinuations to suggest that the British had a hand in this, as the Maldivian rulers were putting increasing pressure for closure of the RAF base at Gan. All the three secessionist atolls immensely benefited from the base in terms of economy and employment opportunities. In 1962, the then Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir sent gunboats with government police and re-established control over these atolls. The leader Abdullah Afeef Didi fled to the British colony of Seychelles, where he was granted political asylum.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Further, internal imbalance and instability could arise owing to the following factors: The Male cluster of islands has attracted all capital investment and there has been resultant impoverishment in other atolls. The feeling of discrimination and developmental imbalance is most intense in Addu Atoll. With the winding up of the RAF base at Gan, all able bodied men have moved to other beach resorts for work. They are fluent in Urdu owing to influence of the Pakistani non-commissioned personnel who were employed at the base. The historical memory in not too distinct past when people of the various atolls were virtually free from control of Male and had independent access to India and Sri Lanka, persists. The excessive dependence on tourism is yet another critical economic vulnerability of Maldives. 33 per cent of the country’s GDP comes from tourism. One million tourists visit Maldives every year, which is almost three times the population of the country. Notwithstanding the contribution of tourism in the Maldivian economy, it continues to be vulnerable to nature as well as Islamic fundamentalists. At the behest of the latter, ie Islamist parties particularly the Adaalath Party, the government recently shut down spas and health centres at all island resorts, as it was alleged by them that they were operating as brothels. The government orders in this regard were subsequently rescinded due to acute economic and international compulsions. The vulnerability of tourism to nature was evidenced by Tsunami in December 2004. In relative terms Maldives suffered the sharpest blow. 21 of the 93 islands resorts were closed. Tourism was down by 40 per cent and economic growth was negative by 3-4 per cent. Maldives, as a country is most worried about impact of erosion and global warming, as 80 per cent of the country is one metre or less above sea level. Overall Maldives can be described as a success story of South Asia, which has moved from very poor country with people living in scattered islands to almost a middle income country.

Strategic interface India’s relations with Maldives are different in character and content when compared to other South Asian neighbours. Both India and Maldives have defied the difficulties of glaring power disparity in developing a mutually trustworthy relationship between a regional power and a micro-state. Some of the key catalysts that determine India-Maldives relationships are: Absence of any territorial disputes or irritants. In 1976, both countries most amicably demarcated their maritime boundary based on the median line principle. Relations are free of any colonial baggage, unlike India-Sri Lanka relations. Indo-centrism hither-to-fore was not a factor in the relations between the two countries. It is lately being created by China, Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalists. No problems of common ethnicity or Indian community. Some shades of common ethnicity are only found in India’s Minicoy Island, which is inhabited by Maliki sect to which Maldivians belong. The political and social discourse in Maldives till very recently never tried to question or counterpoise India’s pre-eminent position in the South Asian region by courting regional or extra-regional powers. It is a nascent phenomenon in some segments. Mrs Indira Gandhi was the second foreign dignitary to visit Maldives in 1975, the first being the British Queen. In the same year, India provided a grant of Rs 40 lakh for setting up a fish canning plant. In 1977, India assisted Maldives in setting up an international airline, which was managed and operated by the Indian Airlines. The commercial airport on Hulule Island was also modernised with Indian assistance. As per a five-year economic and technical agreement signed in 1986, India set-up a 200 bed general hospital (Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital) and deputed nearly

100 medical and para-medical staff to run the hospital. India has also been providing use of satellite by Maldives for meteorological data and television re-broadcasting. It has also been generous in providing scholarships and educational opportunities to Maldivian students. During the Tsunami in December 2004, the Indian Navy was quick to respond to the aid of Maldives despite the fact that some of India’s coastal areas itself had been ravaged. As part of ‘Operation Castor’, India deployed its aircraft, helicopters and naval vessels on search, rescue and rehabilitation missions. It also deployed two mobile surgical teams and provided assistance in communication and reconstruction.

During the recent violence and coup in Maldives, about three dozen exhibits, mostly images of Buddha and Hindu Gods were destroyed by Islamic fundamentalists in the national museum. The new president Waheed said: “We are very sad. This is the physical and archeological evidence of this country. We have nothing to show of the pre-Islamic history” The event that actually underwrote the special strategic context of India-Maldives relations was the Indian assistance in crushing the coup in 1988. The coup was attempted with the help of about 150 Sri Lankan Tamil separatists (PLOTE), who were led by two Maldivian dissidents and Colombo based businessmen Abdullah Luthufi and Sagar Nasir. President Gayoom wanted to avoid enlisting military help of any extra-regional power. Possibly, he was convinced by the fact that India did not have grand strategic ambitions, which in any way could impinge on the sovereignty of Maldives. For India too, any hesitancy in responding to the situation would have meant involvement of regional or extra-regional powers with all the imponderables therein. A new reality has confronted India with regard to Maldives, ie Islamic radicalisation and the prospect of the country being used to target Indian interests on land and sea including Mumbai 26/11 type attacks. The other reality is the aggressive bid

by China to secure footholds in the Indian Ocean region. Driven by these realities, India and Maldives signed a bilateral pact in August 2009 during the visit of India’s defence minister Mr A K Antony. As per the agreement, the two countries agreed to bolster defence cooperation and fortify the security of Maldives. The Indian Navy is to assist the Maldivian security forces in monitoring and safeguarding of the country’s vast EEZ. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard vessels will patrol pirate infested waters around Maldives. India’s BEL is setting-up radars on all the 26 atolls of Maldives, which will be linked to the Indian coastal command. In October 2011, the Indian Navy based a Dornier aircraft to carry out surveillance of EEZ and anti-piracy vigil. Since 2009, India has been sending warships or naval aircraft to perform security roles for Maldives. It may be recalled that India transferred a fast-attack craft INS Tillanchang to the Maldivian Coast Guard in the year 2006. Speaking in the naval commanders conference, Mr A K Anthony said: “The Indian Navy has been mandated to be a net provider to the island nations in the Indian Ocean …“

Conclusion The GMR insult meted to India is a strategic repudiation and underscores the foreign policy and defence establishment need to display much greater acumen and sensitivity about the strategic imperatives of India in respect to Maldives. This insult could have been pre-empted if the GMR project was treated as strategic investment by India. For any country growing overseas economic footprints have to be backed by increased military posturing. This embarrassment could have been avoided if India had acted timely and appropriately. The same cannot be said about the Indian intelligence. And finally, the charter of India’s external agency not only involves providing information and intelligence but more importantly to safeguard friendly regimes from powers inimical to India.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

CRITICAL ARM

n the First Battle of Panipat (1526), Babur with his small Army of 15,000 soldiers was pitched against Ibrahim Lodi’s 45,000-strong Army with 1,000 war elephants. The outcome seemed obvious; but for the guns. Babur’s artillery ripped through the vulnerable flanks of Lodi’s battle formations causing disarray. By noon, fate of the battle was sealed. Ibrahim Lodi was killed in the field and his grand Army was routed. Panipat was not the sole and singular example of the exploits of artillery; in fact the history of warfare is replete with such instances where guns have changed the course of battles.

Colonel U S Rathore (retd) The writer was commissioned into Maratha Light Infantry in 1980. He has served in high altitude areas and c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n c y operations. He commanded an infantry battalion during Operations Rakshak and Parakram. He is a defence and security expert and threat and risk analyst. Over the years the battlefield milieu has changed. There are better prepared defences and more armoured vehicles on the battlefield. India’s land borders are a multi-terrain tapestry. About 60 per cent of it is mountainous. Entire border with Bhutan, China, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) is mountainous. The conventional field artillery is no longer effective against well prepared and hardened defences. In mountainous terrain, low angle firing guns have restricted employment. It is an irony that artillery is yet to have a suitable howitzer for providing fire support to operations in the mountains

Post-independence, both India and Pakistan Armies inherited World War II vintage, mostly British origin artillery guns. Armies held disparate mortars and guns of various calibres in their arsenal. India fought wars during 1947-48, 1962, 1965 and 1971 employing as many as 12 different types of mortars and guns. Not an ideal situation from the point of view of standardisation, procurement, inventory management, interoperability, training and operational readiness. But there was a resource crunch and like other arms and services, artillery too was expected to be content with what was on the table. See Table 1. Type of Artillery

Weapon System

Status

Mortars

160 mm Mortar

Decommissioned

120 mm Mortar

Obsolescent. 1960 vintage. Still in service

25 Pounder

Decommissioned

75 mm/24 Cal Indian Mountain Gun

Decommissioned

100 mm Field Gun

Decommissioned

105 mm Indian Field Gun

Obsolescent. Still in service

105 mm Light Field Gun

Obsolescent. Still in service

122 mm D-30 Howitzer

Decommissioned

7.2 inch Heavy

Decommissioned

5.5 inch Howitzer

Decommissioned

130 mm 39 Cal M 46

Obsolescent. 1968 vintage. Still in service

155 mm 39 Cal FH 77/B Howitzer

Obsolescent. 1986 vintage. Still in service

155 mm E1 45 Cal Howitzer (Metamorphosis Gun)

130 mm 39 Cal M 46 gun upgraded to 155 mm gun by Soltam, Israel

105 mm FV433 Abbot

Decommissioned

130 mm M-46 Catapult

Decommissioned

122 mm BM-21 Grad Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL)

Obsolescent. 1976 vintage. Still in service

214 mm Pinaka MBRL

Inducted in 1995. In service.

300 mm BM-30 Smerch MBRL

Inducted in 2007.

Prithvi

Phased induction between 1995-2000

BrahMos

Phased induction since 2007

Agni

Inducted in 2010

Field

Medium

Self-propelled

Rocket

Missiles

Table 1: Equipment Profile of Indian Artillery since Independence

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Indian Artillery: Lesser God of War

t needs to be perceived that the distant battle is becoming more important than the contact battle. Only if the enemy is considerably degraded before contact is made can the lethality of his modern firepower means be subdued as to allow success of own forces. Air and artillery are the primary means of breaking enemy’s cohesion and reducing his combat potential. Artillery hence is critical to operational supremacy. Importance of artillery cannot be overstated. Joseph Stalin called it the “God of War”. With depleting and aging arsenal the Indian Artillery can find solace in being dubbed as “Lesser God of War”. An excellent analysis of what ails the Indian Artillery today. This is a critical arm and we cannot now put off some critical decisions. Over the years the battlefield milieu has changed. There are better prepared defences and more armoured vehicles on the battlefield. India’s land borders are a multi-terrain tapestry. About 60 per cent of it is mountainous. Entire border with Bhutan, China, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) is mountainous. The conventional field artillery is no longer effective against well prepared and hardened defences. In mountainous terrain, low angle firing guns have restricted employment. It is an irony that artillery is yet to have a suitable howitzer for providing fire support to operations in the mountains. World over the armies have accepted 155 mm as most suitable gun to meet modern day battlefield requirements. A 155 mm gun at intense rate of fire can deliver overwhelming quantity of explosives on the target to neutralise defences. Even armoured vehicles are wary of a direct hit from its shell. It can fire a variety of ammunition, including a tactical nuclear warhead. Top attack munitions and minelets can be dispersed on a wide front within short notice by this gun. 155 mm gun also fires precision guided munitions. Due to the versatility of 155 mm gun Indian Army had opted for 155 mm FH 77/B 39 Calibre Howitzer from AB Bofors of Sweden in 1986 to transform its artillery into a modern arm. In the mid-eighties it was a revolutionary step. 155 mm FH 77/B 39 Calibre was a state-of-the-art gun. It was computer controlled. It could auto-load and fire a three-round burst in just 14 seconds. To escape enemy’s counter-bombardment, the gun could ‘shoot and scoot’ using its auxiliary power unit. Bofors gun, as it was popularly known, could have placed India decades ahead of her traditional adversaries – China and Pakistan, in the realm of battlefield firepower. The agreement between Government of India (GOI) and AB Bofors catered for transfer of technology (ToT) and indigenous production of guns at the ordnance factories. But the outbreak of Bofors Scandal killed this advantageous deal. We severed all relations with AB Bofors after procuring initial tranche of 410 guns. Over the years, the standoff resulted into a scarcity of spares and ammunition for the guns. As the supply of spares dried up, cannibalisation was resorted to maintain the guns. Presently, about 200 guns are out of action for want of spares, accessories and major assemblies. During Kargil War, Bofors guns were successfully used for providing fire support to assaulting infantry. People realised its real worth, albeit too late. To meet the demand of its scarce ammunition, an exorbitant price US $ 1,000 a piece was paid to middlemen, whom we so fervently abhorred. It was the fire from Bofors, which forced Pakistan Army to vacate occupied heights. With dwindling population of Bofors guns, artillery is saddled with obsolete / obsolescent guns in its arsenal. Its field gun, the 105 mm Indian Field Gun and its mountain version Light Field Gun are well over the hill. Its medium gun, the 130 mm / 39 Calibre M 46 is over four decades old. The fleet of self-propelled guns, the Abbot and Catapult, which are

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

CRITICAL ARM

expected to follow armoured and mechanised columns during their projection into enemy territory, have never rendered credible service and were discarded in the late nineties. Since then Army’s armoured and mechanised formations have been without self-propelled artillery. The rocket artillery 122 mm BM 21 Grad MBRL is also of 1976 vintage. Meanwhile the artillery arsenal of Pakistan and China, which was a motley collection of vintage mortars and guns, has steadily improved. Pakistan during 2006-2010 procured 297 M109 A5 155 mm Self-propelled Howitzers from USA through Foreign Military Sales. Pakistan is also interested in the huge arsenal of military equipment of the USA, which is going to be surplus after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. It has also commenced indigenous production of a Turkish 155 mm howitzer and has procured AR1A / A100E 300 mm MRLS from China.

During Kargil War, Bofors guns were successfully used for providing fire support to assaulting infantry. People realised its real worth, albeit too late. To meet the demand of its scarce ammunition, an exorbitant price US $ 1,000 a piece was paid to middlemen, whom we so fervently abhorred. It was the fire from Bofors, which forced Pakistan Army to vacate occupied heights Though China holds about 17,000 artillery guns and mortars in its inventory, a large percentage of it is obsolete. Of late China has started improving its artillery hardware considerably and has selected 155 mm guns as the mainstay for its artillery. It is producing self-propelled howitzers, MRLS and guided rockets. In the last three decades there is a noticeable obsession amongst China, India and Pakistan to develop short range ballistic missiles and rocket artillery. Similar focus has been missing with regards to field artillery. Whereas, India and her adversaries have developed a wide array of missiles and rockets, but paid little attention to modernisation of their ageing field guns. Decommissioning of guns from service is a tedious exercise. Guns do not fade away as long as their accessories and ammunitions are available. These are dished out to defensive formations, paramiltary forces and training establishments and guns in good shape are moth-balled for future use. Expecting overnight phasing out of mainstay guns would be fallacious. Indian Army has envisioned modernisation of its artillery through Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan (FARP) 2000. Army has adopted 155 mm / 52 as its standard calibre for towed, tracked, wheeled and mounted guns and aims to equip all artillery regiments by 2027. To support operations in the mountains, Special Forces operations and for out of area contingencies need for 155 mm / 39 Ultra Light Howitzers was also identified. See Table 2. Equipment

Employment

Quantity for Direct Procurement

Domestic Production

Number of Regiments to be Equipped

Estimated Cost of Direct Procurement (in US $)

90 Regiments

1.788 billion

155 mm/ 52 Calibre Towed Howitzer

Plains, semi-desert, desert, mountains

400 Pieces

1,180 Pieces

155 mm/ 52 Calibre Tracked Self-propelled Howitzer

Plains, semi-desert, desert in support of armoured formations

100 Pieces

5 Regiments

800 million

155 mm/ 52 Calibre Wheeled Self-propelled Howitzer

Plains, semi-desert, desert in support of armoured formations

180 Pieces

9 Regiments

960 million

155 mm/ 52 Calibre Mounted Howitzer

Mountains

200 Pieces

614 Pieces

40 Regiments

M777 155 mm / 39 Calibre Ultra Light Howitzer

Mountains, special forces operations, out of area contingencies

145 Pieces

290 Pieces

7 Regiments

667 million

151 Regiments

6.115 billion

Total Table 2: Field Artillery Procurement Plan

1,025 Pieces

2,084 Pieces

1.900 billion

It is a big-ticket-purchase. Apart from initial procurement worth US $ 6.1 billion, if we take into account the cost of domestic production and after sales maintenance, the entire programme would cost about US $ 14 billion – biggest order in the world for artillery guns. It will not only attract foreign investments in the form of ‘offset’ but also provide an impetus to nascent domestic defence industry. In India private sector’s participation in the defence production has been subdued due to the monopoly of ordnance factories and public sector undertakings. However, in the last ten years situation has changed. There are some success stories and ’green shoots’ of synergy. Pinaka MBRL was developed with the active participation from TATA and Larsen & Toubro. Recently, TATA Power SED unveiled its 155 mm / 52 Calibre Howitzer prototype built

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

in collaboration with Denel of South Africa. Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is reported to be evaluating possible collaboration with Denel, Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge for its 155 mm towed and self-propelled howitzer projects. In the private sector there are some 40 companies who can and have been undertaking development and production of systems and assemblies for weapon systems. Alarmed by near obsolescence of its field artillery Indian Army and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) took some steps to stem the tide, noticeable among these are the following: Upgrade existing Bofors guns to 155 mm / 45 Calibre by Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). Permitting OFB to produce indigenous version of existing Bofors gun by availing the transfer of technology clause in the original agreement between GoI and AB Bofors. OFB’s prototype 155 mm / 45 Calibre Howitzer is ready. If the gun passes trials by Army it is planned to produce 414 pieces of the indigenous Bofors. Development of an indigenous self-propelled gun Bhim by DRDO by using chassis of MBT Arjun and ordnance of Denel’s (South Africa) self-propelled gun. The DRDO has also embarked upon a project to develop a 155 mm / 52 Calibre Howitzer indigenously. While the immediate outcome of above mentioned initiatives is doubtful, most successful among the other efforts have been the following: ¡¡ To convince US Government to sell 145 pieces of 155 mm / 39 Calibre Ultra Light Howitzer from BAE Systems through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. Decks have been cleared for this US $ 667 million deal. The light howitzer will equip seven artillery regiments of the mountain formations. ¡¡ Upgradation of 180 pieces of existing 130 mm / 39 Calibre M-46 guns to 155 mm / 45 calibre guns with the ordnance and kit provided by Soltam of Israel. These ‘Metamorphosis Guns’ have drawn mixed response. Though it was intended to upgrade 500 pieces, but no repeat orders followed. Defence procurement exercise in India is synonymous with procrastination, lack of subject matter expertise and even corrupt practices. The qualitative requirements from users are more academic than pragmatic. To meet our ‘wish list’ contenders sometimes field equipment which is a technology demonstrator and not a proven design. Trials take years to conclude and if in the meantime some malpractice surfaces, the entire process is junked. Delays have caused cost-overruns of unacceptable magnitude. The procurement of artillery guns has been no exception. In January 2008, MoD issued three global tenders for 155 mm / 52 Calibre Howitzers for towed, mounted and self-propelled artillery. When field trials of guns from different contenders were going on leading contenders Singapore Technologies Kinetics, Rheinmetall Air Defence (Germany) and Denel (South Africa) were blacklisted by the MoD for their misdemeanours in the current or previous dealings. We have not learnt from Bofors scandal, which dented our reputation as a serious buyer. Reputed companies prefer to stay away from bidding for our tenders. We need to be more pragmatic and climb down from the high moralistic molehill to find ways and means to speed up procurement. In such uncertain environment, interim measures sound very appealing, but these take the focus away from the real problem. We must not opt for quick fix solutions and rather pursue the goals of FARP to equip all artillery regiments with 155 mm guns by 2027. It is an irony that despite the vision and financial support being available we are failing to finalise our artillery procurements in time. Due to poor project management skills, all our defence procurement projects be it the aircraft, aircraft carrier, main battle tanks, guns or spares and accessories for the equipment have got inordinately delayed. Services are sitting on obsolete weaponry. In such a situation, it would be prudent for us to explore the government-to-government or FMS route to circumvent the maze of tenders and quotations. It is noteworthy that a lot of 155 mm Howitzers of US Army, which are battle proven in Afghanistan are going to be put up for sale to friendly countries once the US troops pull out from Afghanistan in 2014. We should consider approaching the US government for purchasing these guns through FMS. Geopolitical and strategic environment in South Asia is more compelling than ever. China is becoming more assertive. A two-front war or a conflict with China is a strategic reality for India. We must not lull ourselves with our performance in Kargil War, which was essentially a localised conflict. It needs to be perceived that the distant battle is becoming more important than the contact battle. Only if the enemy is considerably degraded before contact is made can the lethality of his modern firepower means be subdued as to allow success of own forces. Air and artillery are the primary means of breaking enemy’s cohesion and reducing his combat potential. Artillery hence is critical to operational supremacy. Importance of artillery cannot be overstated. Joseph Stalin called it the “God of War”. With depleting and aging arsenal the Indian Artillery can find solace in being dubbed as “Lesser God of War”.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

PREPAREDNESS CHINKS

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (retd)

The writer is an Army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt Ltd, a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, "Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities".

China-Pakistan collusion has made alarming inroads in Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). Ladakh could face the Chinese military on three fronts, East, North and the West from PoJK. China has now claimed Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in personal citizenship documents as e-passports. Surprisingly Indian high level officials are downplaying these predatory “attacks,” on India’s sovereignty

India’s military strategic dilemma has exponentially increased in the past few years. China’s military modernisation has caught the attention not just in New Delhi but across the capitals in Asia and particularly in East and South East Asia. US declaration of rebalancing to the Asia Pacific is now a year old, manifestation of the same is however unclear. On the Western front as NATO pulls out of Afghanistan in 2014 and Pakistan is putting up a show of cooperation now, observers believe that it is setting the stage for regaining strategic space lost in Kabul post 2001

ndian analysts have called for a review of military strategy to prepare for a two front war. As per media reports the Ministry of Defence has accepted this premise and future planning is based on fighting a two front war with China and Pakistan. Given fiscal constraints, systemic inadequacies in capacity building, inefficiency and corruption in arms acquisitions, time taken for preparedness is likely to extend to the end of 14th Five Year Plan or 2027 to 2030. Chinese military readiness trajectory indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be ready for a winnable war by 2020 if not earlier. This indicates a gap in readiness for a two front war. Avoiding a two front war is also necessary for the economic burden that it may place on the country will be a setback to our development and growth paradigm.

ndia’s military strategic dilemma has exponentially increased in the past few years. China’s military modernisation has caught the attention not just in New Delhi but across the capitals in Asia and particularly in East and South East Asia. US declaration of rebalancing to the Asia Pacific is now a year old, manifestation of the same is however unclear. On the Western front as NATO pulls out of Afghanistan in 2014 and Pakistan is putting up a show of cooperation now, observers believe that it is setting the stage for regaining strategic space lost in Kabul post 2001. China-Pakistan collusion has made alarming inroads in Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). Ladakh could face the Chinese military on three fronts, East, North and the West from PoJK. China has now claimed Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in personal citizenship documents as e-passports. Surprisingly Indian high level officials are downplaying these predatory “attacks,” on India’s sovereignty. Given these portends, Indian analysts have called for a review of military strategy to prepare for a two front war. As per media reports the Ministry of Defence has accepted this premise and future planning is based on fighting a two front war with China and Pakistan. Given fiscal constraints, systemic inadequacies in capacity building, inefficiency and corruption in arms acquisitions, time taken for preparedness is likely to extend to the end of 14th Five Year Plan or 2027 to 2030. Chinese military readiness trajectory indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be ready for a winnable war by 2020 if not earlier. This indicates a gap in readiness for a two front war. Avoiding a two front war is also necessary for the economic burden that it may place on the country will be a setback to our development and growth paradigm which

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

seeks to pull millions below the poverty line above the margins in the next decade. As Clausewitz has denoted rational actors wage wars with a clear political purpose which should be attainable. Success will also necessitate correct evaluation of resources, national as well as military of the potential adversaries. Such an assessment will reveal that India can create a favourable balance in a selective theatre of war. This does not prevent us from waging war in case objectives are limited. India’s military strategic choice in the short term may thus be restricted to fighting a one front war while preparing for a two front one in the medium to long-term. Geography provides that the Indian Navy has obvious advantages given dominance over the Indian Ocean. However international maritime and trade regime restricts options for military to military engagements at sea. This would imply that the proposed one front strategy would have to be perforce a continental one, to be fought on the land borders in the North, Northeast and West in which the Army and the Air Force will play the principal role. The nuclear overhang on such a conflict remains a constant which will restrain conventional engagements. Under the circumstances contours of a one front strategy for contesting China that could prove a war winning one for India needs debate. The first component of such a strategy would be to ensure balance. The Himalayas continue to provide India substantial advantage by restricting windows for operations to a maximum of two favourable periods. Despite the vestiges of global warming these are unlikely to change in the near future and include at best April-May and September-December. Operational preparedness for war on the Northern borders and deterrence on other fronts during these periods and particularly the latter is necessary.

India’s Continental Military Strategy: Prepare Two Front, Fight One Front This would imply that plains and desert theatres in the West will have a substantial role to play to deter any adventure by Pakistan during this period. Formations including strike corps will have to rehearse for such a contingency which is non-provocative. Creation of sufficient reserves for the mountain and hill sector in the West also needs consideration. The relevance of dual tasked formations for the North and Northeast may also be relevant herein. Having created an overall favourable balance, strategy for the northern front can now be examined.

This indicates a gap in readiness for a two front war. Avoiding a two front war is also necessary for the economic burden that it may place on the country will be a setback to our development and growth paradigm which seeks to pull millions below the poverty line above the margins in the next decade The key issue will again be war aims. In the present context in view of the boundary dispute with China preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty would be a viable aim. Given India’s primarily defensive strategy vis à vis China operations to ensure the aim will manifest in case China seeks to change the status quo on the border either by attempting to grab claimed areas particularly Tawang bowl or undertake a, “self defence counter attack,” a la 1962

to teach a, “rising,” India a lesson. Balanced dispositions on the Northern and Northeastern borders are thus called for. This would imply organisation of defence of the claimed and disputed areas in depth, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. Accordingly two divisions in the defensive role have been reported by the media, bringing these formations to their operational peak at the earliest needs consideration. Raising of a socalled offensive corps is under active consideration, the decision will have to be expedited. These may possibly be employed in a counter-attack or a counteroffensive role. To achieve balance, ability for cross-border covert and clandestine operations by Special Forces including unarmed drones will have to be created. Such forces should be able to operate in concert with sympathetic locals to carry out long-range sabotage including targeting of counter force targets as missile bases. They could also be used effectively to direct own air and missile strikes on such targets in depth. Augmenting conventional missile capability is another dimension that needs to be addressed on priority. The current range of dual purpose missiles includes the ballistic Prithvi and Agni series and the cruise BrahMos. Numbers available and production capability will have to be augmented.

Strategic reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition based on multiple platforms – satellites, aircraft, UAVs with all weather sensors will provide the overall umbrella for the entire theatre. Here again there are vast deficiencies. The Chinese field 40 military satellites against a single one by India. For navigation the option of tie-up with Glonass for assured coverage of the entire theatre operations should be considered. The key to a one front strategy is jointness between the Army and the Air Force in particular. The ides of 1962 are behind us and the Indian Air Force appears to be fully charged for an active operational role on the Northern frontiers. There are concerns over a joint approach with the recent spat on the attack helicopters regrettably coming in the public domain. Effective implementation of a joint plan irrespective of ownership of assets and service, “name and fame,” will be the core of a one front war strategy for the country. The case for preparing for a two front war and fighting a one front has been briefly outlined here. There are many nuances which need elaboration, however, an attempt to present a basic framework covering major incumbencies has been made which needs consideration and debate to refine and fine-tune the overall approach to meet the impending challenge from China in the near term.

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

ILLICIT MONEY TRAIL

T Michalis Diakantonis The writer is BA in Economics, MA in International Relations / International Political Economy and a Research Assistant at Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies / Centre for International Political Economy of Panteion University of Athens, Greece.

In the case of the Naxalites their funding comes from extortion or by setting local administrative schemes to collect taxes in rural areas where the Indian state is absent. On the contrary, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), was receiving logistic help and funding from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but after 9/11 the US named LeT a terrorist group and Islamabad banned it. While many believe that the Pakistan state continues the funding of LeT, the group has also other money sources. It collects money through charities, public and personal donations (exploiting its connections with the allegedly humanitarian organisation Jamaat-ud-Dawa) or through its website

Illegal money can be laundered through various "offshore accounts" in countries that have bank secrecy laws. Major offshore centres include the Bahamas, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, Jersey Island, Hong Kong, Antilles, Panama and Singapore

errorism is a crucial and long-term problem of India. The wave of violence comes mainly from extremist attacks based on separatist and secessionist movements, as well as ideological disagreements. As long as terrorist groups are securing funds, they will be able to continue their activities. This article’s aim is to focus on the terrorist groups’ funding and its relation with the illegal activity of money laundering (ML). What measures have been taken so far and what can be done in the near future to stop this stream of terrorism?

of placing entails breaking-up large amounts of money into smaller amounts, in order to avoid suspicion of money laundering and anti-money laundering reporting requirements. The money can be deposited into one or more accounts either by one person or by multiple persons (“smurfs”).

For start, we should give a simple definition of the term “money-laundering”. ML is the practice that criminals use to disguise the origins of money obtained through illegal activities so it looks like it was obtained from legal sources. Estimating how much money is actually laundered in India or in any other country is extremely difficult, but the International Monetary Fund’s reports show that the aggregate size of global money laundering is between 2 and 5 per cent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product. Arun Kumar, professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, estimated India’s black economy size to be 50 per cent and he added that about 10 per cent of this money has gone out of the country through different channels such as hawala and trade under and over invoicing.

Hawala: In hawala system, money is transferred via a network of hawala brokers. It is the transfer of money – mainly remittances – without actually moving it. That means that an Indian who works in a foreign country can send a remittance to another person back to India (through hawala brokers) without even visiting a bank or opening an account. Hawala is attractive to customers because it provides a fast and convenient transfer of funds, usually with a far lower commission than that charged by banks.

Money laundering process has three basic steps: 1. Placement: At this stage, the “launderer” inserts the illegal money into a legitimate financial institution (usually in the form of cash bank deposits). 2. Layering: Layering is the practice of changing the form of illicit money through various financial transactions in order to make it difficult to detect. It consists of several bank-to-bank transfers, wire transfers between different accounts, names and countries, changes in the money’s currency or changes in the money’s form through purchasing high-value items (houses, cars, boats, jewelleries, diamonds). 3. Integration: At the final stage, the money re-enters in the mainstream economy in legitimate-looking form. This usually can be done by setting up businesses or institutions or by making investments in the capital market, in the real estate market, in the gold and diamonds market etc. But what are the techniques of ML? There are many and different methods of ML that can be applied in each of the three aforementioned steps and we illustrate some of them below: Structuring (or “smurfing”): This method

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

Cash smuggling: Physically smuggling cash to another jurisdiction, where it will be deposited in a financial institution with greater bank secrecy or less rigorous money laundering enforcement.

Indian Terrorist Groups’ Funding

And Its Relation With Money Laundering T

he International Monetary Fund’s reports show that the aggregate size of global money laundering is between 2 and 5 per cent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product. Arun Kumar, Professor of Economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, estimated India’s black economy size to be 50 per cent and he added that about 10 per cent of this money has gone out of the country through different channels such as hawala and trade under and over invoicing. The Naxalites funding comes from extortion or by setting local administrative schemes to collect taxes in rural areas where the Indian state is absent. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), was receiving logistic help and funding from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but after 9/11 the US named LeT a terrorist group and Islamabad banned it. While many believe that the Pakistan state continues the funding of LeT, the group has also other money sources. It collects money through charities, public and personal donations (exploiting its connections with the allegedly humanitarian organisation Jamaat-ud-Dawa). A very informative and useful article on terrorsit funding through money laundering.

Overseas banks: Illegal money can be laundered through various “offshore accounts” in countries that have bank secrecy laws. Major offshore centres include the Bahamas, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, Jersey Island, Hong Kong, Antilles, Panama and Singapore. Shell companies: In this method, the “launderer” creates companies that exist for no other reason than to launder money. Dirty money appears as a “payment” for supposed goods or services and the transactions covered through fake invoices and balance sheets. Investing in legitimate businesses: Launderers can place illegal money in otherwise legitimate businesses to “clean” it. They may use large businesses like brokerage and insurance firms, real estate firms, casinos or they can use small cash-intensive businesses like restaurants, bars, car washes, parking buildings. In this way the dirty money is combined with the company’s clean revenues or it can simply hide in the company’s legitimate bank accounts. Credit cards and cheques: The “launderer” can use credit and charge cards, banker’s drafts, traveller’s and third-party cheques “cleaning” them in different institutions or different countries. Investing in security markets, real estate sector and artworks: Money can be laundered by investing in stocks, bonds, derivatives, mutual and hedge funds, shares, expensive houses, antiques, paintings, gold, diamonds etc. Charities or non-governmental institutions: The dirty money is “cleaned” through

donations, charities and humanitarian help programmes. This method is used quite often in India, especially in the case of Islamic terrorist groups.

The Students Islamic Movement of India is believed to have enjoyed support from the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in Riyadh and from International Islamic Federation of Student’s Organisation in Kuwait. In addition it has chapters and issues magazines in many countries Internet: Large amounts can be stored in a digital form or they can be transferred in multiple accounts via various websites, including

commercial, betting or donation sites. The first step that is needed in order to locate and stop the terrorist funding is to know well your enemy. Which are the main terrorist groups and which are their funding sources? In the case of the Naxalites their funding comes from extortion or by setting local administrative schemes to collect taxes in rural areas where the Indian state is absent. On the contrary, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), was receiving logistic help and funding from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but after 9/11 the US named LeT a terrorist group and Islamabad banned it. While many believe that

the Pakistan state continues the funding of LeT, the group has also other money sources. It collects money through charities, public and personal donations (exploiting its connections with the allegedly humanitarian organisation Jamaat-ud-Dawa) or through its website. It has also collected donations from the Pakistani immigrant community in The United Kingdom and the Persian Gulf and from Islamic non-governmental organisations. US embassy cables indicated that LeT terrorists raise funds in Saudi Arabia. Besides, LeT uses illegal fundraising activities including false trade invoicing, counterfeiting, extortion and involvement in the

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

land power in India

ILLICIT MONEY TRAIL

drug trade. This money is possibly laundered through its legitimate businesses, including fish farms, a hospital, a market, agricultural tracts, mobile clinics and ambulance services. The funding sources of other Islamist groups which seek to drive India out of Jammu and Kashmir, such as the Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harakat ul-Mujahadeen, Jamiat ul-Mujahadeen and Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami, are officially unknown but they seem to have help mainly from private or secret state sources in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. The Tigers of Tamil Eelam funding includes extortion, legitimate businesses (real estate, restaurants, telecommunications, factories) and illicit activities such as credit cards fraud, human trafficking, arms and narcotics. The group sends money to India through remittances, which are laundered by using traveller’s and personal cheques, wire transfers, hawala system or institutionally through charitable fronts and Hindu temples. Remittances have also been used for the funding of Sikh separatist movement Babbar Khalsa International and possibly by some of the above mentioned Islamist groups. The Students Islamic Movement of India is believed to have enjoyed support from the World Assembly of Muslim Youth in Riyadh and from International Islamic Federation of Student’s Organisation in Kuwait. In addition it has chapters and issues magazines in many countries. The United Liberation Front of Assam funding comes from criminal activities such as extortion, drug trafficking and arms trafficking. In conclusion, it is obvious that some of the “terrorist” money coming from the aforementioned activities is legalised through one or multiple ML methods. The second step to fight ML is to have an adequate legal framework. The Indian state has taken significant measures so far to confront the problem. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA-2002) came into force in 2005 and amended in 2009 and 2011. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA-1967) was amended twice in 2004 and in 2008 in order to criminalise terrorist financing and to come in terms with the UN legislation. India also has its own Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and in June 2010 it was admitted as the 34th country member to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

FATF is an inter-governmental body which develops policies to fight ML and terrorist financing threats. These actions have already started to produce positive results. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) probed 35 stock brokers for possible lapses in controls related to money laundering and terrorist financing (TF). Moreover, official investigations in US showed that Standard Chartered Bank’s branch in Chennai had oversight and communications failures concerning anti-ML procedures with offices in New York. Furthermore, a US senate’s permanent subcommittee investigation blamed HSBC’s staff in India for weak monitoring procedures in the bank’s internal control systems that led to money laundering and terrorist financing. The report also referred that charitable organisations such as the IIRO (International Islamic Relief Organisation) use banks like Al Rajhi Bank to gather donations that fund terrorist activities. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) is also probing eight cases related to terrorist financing in the country, examining hawala transfers to terrorist organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). ΝIΑ believes that funding is being routed through the frontal organisation of the HM, Jammu & Kashmir Affectees Relief Trusts (JKART) while it also investigates a terror funding racket of banned Sikh group Babbar Khalsa International. Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde stated that: “The BKI operatives have been receiving funds from the United Kingdom-based Babbar Khalsa International to commit terrorist acts in India with active material and logistic support from Pakistan-based BKI leaders”. The situation becomes more complicated as terrorists finance their activities through fake currency injections. The money – which allegedly is counterfeited in Dubai and in the Pakistani cities of Quetta, Karachi and Peshawar – is usually transferred physically by Indian and Pakistani people through small Indian border towns such as Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Barmer. The third step for fighting TF and ML is to develop new systems of anti-money laundering and to

January 2013 Defence AND security alert

improve the existing ones. A KPMG survey of 2012 for anti-ML measures in India has made some useful suggestions. Banks should intensify periodic risk assessments for ML, procedures should be based on global practices and not on local regulations, an efficient client data update process is necessary and proper customer identification procedures must take place. “Know Your Client” (KYC) policies could be improved through better documentation or by creating a unique citizen identifier (such as a social security number) while the transaction monitoring system should provide a holistic view of the customer through statistical modelling and risk categorisation. Multiple international lists may be used for sanction screening, politically exposed persons and payment filtering and the financial institutions should meliorate their internal audit procedures. These practices require investments to be made in more sophisticated IT systems and in personnel’s training, something that will inevitably increase the direct and indirect costs of financial sector. Last but not least, a way to confront ML and terrorist activity is through politics. On domestic policy, the implementation of social programmes could reduce the underpinnings of terrorism (eg the IAP programme in the case of Naxalites). On the foreign policy area, India has asked the global community to summon the necessary political will to adopt the Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism (67th Session of the UN General Assembly, October 2012). In addition, new efforts should be made for improving the diplomatic relations with states such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Saudi Arabia. A first step was made after the meeting of Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, with Bangladeshi opposition leader, Khaleda Zia. Zia promised that Bangladesh will not allow separatist groups to use its territory to carry out acts of terror against India, adding that the two countries could jointly work in many areas including poverty reduction. In the end of the day, money laundering and terrorism are not only domestic problems of India, but international matters that require a common political philosophy and cooperation among states.

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