DSA June 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

Welcome General Bikram !

en Bikram Singh is no stranger to Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence and the generally prevailing culture of the South Block-Sena Bhawan area. And he would be the first to admit that he takes over as COAS in possibly the most trying time in the history of India’s Army. It could possibly not have been as divided and factionalised even after the defeat of 1962. Sure there were murmurs against Lt Gen Kaul, some formation and battalion commanders. But that resentment was an expected outcome of an unexpectedly terrible command. These times are, however, different. There is no war, or an operation, that divides the Army, vertically and horizontally. What does cause this split is a more dangerous human weakness than failure and it is called ego. Conflicting egos have torn the Army asunder over the past few years. Gen Bikram’s first and primary task will be to overcome this illness, by a deft touch of leadership and firmness. He will have to ensure that the red and blue corners of a boxing ring are only for inter-battalion competitions, not for those who wear stars on cars.

Sukhna was and should have remained an internal matter. Something that should have been resolved through military procedures alone. Instead it became a national shame, with motivated leaks to the media and pens drawn as sharp as scimitars. Thus allowing the Ministry of Defence to fish in waters that otherwise would not have been turbulent. The Minister of Defence then began to see Army HQs akin to another Police HQs of a state, groups and lobbies vying for influence through peddlers that are a Delhi trademark. And why wouldn’t he when General officers were behaving in a manner not too dissimilar. So Gen Bikram’s task has been cut out for him even before he has put on the fourth star. In terms of operational matters as the new COAS he will have to take a call on the Army’s role in anti-naxal actions. Vacillation on this issue is not good for the country, even as it pays a steadily rising price in terms of lives lost. The efficacy of the CRPF and the various state police forces is seriously wanting when it comes to actual operations. Without a more positive role of the Army there is unlikely to be a turnaround. It is a serious call to take.

Gen Sundarji was the last COAS to have left a legacy in the Army. Like him or not, agree or disagree, but Gen Sundarji was the last chief to have made fundamental changes to the Army. Since then the Chief’s have either been fire-fighting for their service extensively deployed in counter-insurgency operations, or beating back the Pakistan Army from Kargil. None has been able to positively impact the structure and functioning of the Army even if they wanted to, or were incapable of doing so. So if Gen Bikram is interested in leaving a legacy and giving back to the Army more than he has taken from it, he must ensure that the squabbles of the past years are never repeated again. He can begin by bringing the various branches and directorates of Army HQs onto one channel. Root causes are better nipped in the roots. Force modernisation and such fancy things are of secondary importance right now. In any case the Army is more than capable of thwarting any adversary. All that is required is for its generals to be told that those they take to be adversaries are in fact brother officers. And brotherhood always comes from a father figure, a role Gen Bikram has to accept or reject.

manvendra singh

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

executive editor

publisher’s view

Naxal Menace: Who Is Responsible?

he transformation of the Naxal menace from a blip on the landscape to a large red blob on the map of India has not happened in the span of months or a year. It has grown like a malignant cancer from a pimple in Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967 to a suppurating wound extending to Kerala on the other side of Mother India in the second decade of the twenty-first century - enough time for state and central governments to have found a chemotherapy to eradicate it. But it is growing.

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Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 9 J u n e 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

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There is no one in the government or in the opposition who will ever take the responsibility for letting it worsen. The ruling party has its own agenda and the opposition parties do not appear to be too concerned except to make futile noises when civilians as well as the police and military personnel are eliminated in their dozens. Here are the reasons for a mess that has grown over the past forty-five years: Lack of a strong political will. Non-existence of a clear policy. Nexus between the organised criminals and Naxals. Differences between the central and state governments for political reasons. Old generation arms and ammunitions in the hands of our security forces. Poor training of our security forces. Poor intelligence. Lack of coordination among the various security and intelligence agencies. Socio-economic reasons. There may be many more reasons for the worsening of this menace in the country but if we conduct a thorough analysis we would arrive at the conclusion that the above mentioned malaise is the leaven on which the phenomenon described variously as Naxalism, Maoism, CPI- (Marxist), People’s War Group et al has thrived and flourished. If the secretive intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing has come to the conclusion that there are as many as 50,000 cadres within these groups the government of India and the state governments must raise at least a force of 2.5 lakh as per the teachings of the man who started it all - Mao Zedong of China. It needs to be emphasised that counter-insurgency is a manpower intensive operation. The new forces should be provided the best arms and ammunition and rigorous jungle warfare training because it is through the contiguous jungle terrain between one state and another that the naxalites have infiltrated into hundreds of districts across fifteen states. Why is it that our policy and decision makers do not want to understand the basics of this problem? You cannot just frame policies like the National Counter-Terrorism Centre concept in airconditioned chambers and expect state governments to fall in line with an obviously flawed arrangement. The leaders at the centre need to be empathetic to the reactions of the local governments while framing policies to counter this menace. They need to establish that trust so that the tribals and the disaffected populace in the villages can be convinced that they have a stake in the new emerging India. Our internal security is badly affected and we are talking of peaceful measures. Everyone wants peace but how can we afford peace at the price we have already paid but still we have not reached a meeting ground. A bureaucrat and a legislator have recently been kidnapped and it took our state and central governments weeks to get them released. It’s so disgustingly shameful. We talk about the American and European ways of countering such problems but we forget that there are vast differences between their and our problems. One thing is clear that we Indians are always influenced by the fancy ideas of other countries but we forget that these countries have a united agenda for their people and they have strong political will to take tough decisions in the interest of their people. Whereas we every day see the differences between the central and state governments only for the one reason that the parties ruling are different and so they never reach any united conclusion on such national problems. All political parties must surrender their egos and commit themselves to join hands to fight this menace under a strong and straight forward national policy. Otherwise things will go absolutely out of control and that will exacerbate the socio-economic balance in the Indian society. Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

espite decades of experience in Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorist operations, the Indian state is dithering today in the face of the escalating Maoist insurgency. It is behaving as if it has encountered this problem for the first time. This lack of Strategic clarity stems primarily from the sharp dichotomy between the government and the party. Though the government seems fully aware of the gravity of the situation - the Party is inducing paralysis under the influence of a host of foreign funded NGOs who seemingly couldn’t care less if this country breaks up into pieces as long as they get their share of Magasaysay awards. We borrowed the CI Grid Model from Templar’s operations in Malaya and used it successfully for decades in the north-east. Today, with 15,000 armed Maoists (many highly skilled in IEDs), terrorising our Jungle tracts - why haven’t we established a CI grid so far? We have no option but to find the resources to secure our lines of communication and population centres in the Red corridor. Decades of previous operational experience cannot be stood on its head as a new generation of police officers seek to reinvent the wheel. The CRPF and BSF unfortunately are not structured, equipped or trained to undertake offensive CI Operations. It will take over a decade to militarise them adequately and this calls for a complete revamp of the operational ethos. Do we have the time for it? Others insist that the problem must be tackled by the Criminal-Justice Model of the 19th century designed to deal with petty thieves and criminals. Doesn’t the law evolve to change with the transformed context of the threat? CI operations in dense Jungle terrain are militarised operations. They can’t be reduced to a judicial probe that ignores the operational context and danger entailed. Yes, a whole lot of well meaning academics, liberals and professionals have pointed out that India has treated its tribals very badly. We have failed to implement the fifth and ninth schedules of the Constitution we gave ourselves. Yes, we failed to setup Tribes Advisory Councils and we failed to push land reforms through. Industrialisation, mega dams and mining have simply displaced the tribals and worsened their deprivation. Our contractors and moneylender mafias have rapaciously exploited the tribals. The simple fact is that these critics are absolutely right. We have forced the tribals to join the Maoist Insurgency. We don’t seem to listen till people take up the gun. The critical question is where do we go from here? A dangerous insurgency with 15,000 armed cadres, many highly skilled in causing mass casualties with IEDs, has fully commenced in our Jungle tracts. The Maoist movement has become criminalised. There is now an extortion economy worth Rs 1,500 crore per year. Drugs are being cultivated. The worst part is that the Maoists are already in contact with the ISI and Chinese Intelligence and the first trickle of foreign weapons has started. Do we have to wait till it becomes a flood? Can we now honestly give them the development we should have given from 1950s onwards? The harsh truth is, we will now first have to disarm 15,000 armed goons and create a climate where the developmental agencies can function and deliver. Otherwise we will soon be short of District Collectors and there will unfortunately be many more Alex Menons and Krishnas. The pure socio-economic theory approach sounds wonderful in principle. I am afraid I have seen too much of Low Intensity Conflict and can state emphatically that it won’t work in practice. We need to put a proper CI grid in place first, to secure our communications and population centres. We simply have no option but to find the resources to do it. We cannot stand decades of operational experience on its head. We need to implement the clear, hold, build strategy and not just talk about it. Above all we need to focus development in districts where Maoism has made inroads but not yet assumed the status of full-fledged Insurgency. This comprises some 187 districts of the country where we must head off the insurgency before it begins. That is the area where our developemental efforts must be focused. In the core districts of the Red corridor (so called liberated Zones) we have to fight and disarm / sideline the rebels first. Development can actually come there as the peace dividend. It can realistically take place only once the area has been adequately pacified to permit the development agencies to deliver. We need to draw up a 25 year Perspective Plan that integrates the security aspects with the developemental. Security operations must clear the way for road construction and infrastructural penetration. Only then will administrative penetration be possible. We need an Urgent Operation Sadbhavna to build schools in these areas to win over at least the next generation and skill them to get jobs in the industrial and mining complexes coming up in such areas. Let the Army and CAPFs recruit extensively from the tribal areas and provide gainful employment in the here and now. Above all, like Arjun before the Kurukshetra War, let us stop wallowing in waves of guilt and get on with the job now, before the Chinese or Pakistanis decide to make things a bit more difficult for us.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) June 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents Maoism Special Issue June 2012

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Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 9 J u n e 2 0 1 2

A R T I C L E S the deception of ‘policy’ Dr Ajai Sahni

maoism: need for a national strategy

learning lessons from success stories

the maoist naxalite insurgency in India

get the tactic right

India's maoist insurgency: need for strategic clarity

naxalism and police: object lesson from Ballia

maoist insurgency and UAVs

naxal / maoist challenge to the Indian state

left wing extremism in India: causes and remedies

status of anti-lwe campaign

kidnapped

if this is not war… then what is war?

threat of naxalism and India’s response

floundering in the morass

naxals’ strategy and tactics

maoist movement in Nepal: impact on India

Prakash Singh, IPS

Hormis Tharakan, IPS E N Rammohan, IPS Manvendra Singh

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Amitabh Thakur, IPS

Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) Nitin Gokhale

Col U S Rathore (retd) Pathikrit Payne

Dr Pranav Kumar Cecil Victor

Prof Shekhar Adhikari Shreejana Shreshtha

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

F E A T U R E S Defence and Security Industry Monitor Security Round-up In The Final Analysis Pawan Agrawal

21, 41, 47, 65 74 83

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DSALERT June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

REIGN OF INSINCERITY

D Dr Ajai Sahni The writer is Director, Institute Management and Terrorism Portal South Asia Review.

Executive for Conflict South Asia and Editor, Intelligence

That development is desirable cannot be contested but it is desirable of itself, not because someone is holding a gun to the government’s head. Unfortunately, moreover, it is not something that can be ordered off a menu card and served quickly on a platter. The time frames of development and CI are, quite entirely, irreconcilable. Crucially, moreover, you cannot develop what you do not control. Indeed, the Indian experience even now demonstrates that the government is failing spectacularly in its developmental duties in areas fully under its control, where no Maoist activities and violence are in evidence. Delivering development to the areas under Maoist disruptive dominance is an obvious pipe dream and would be laughed out in any rational discourse

ecades into the Maoist insurgency, it is, indeed, astonishing, that it is nigh impossible to arrive at an objective, consistent and coherent assessment of this crisis on the basis of official statements. And if assessments are incoherent, the confusion and fragmentation in policy, strategy and tactics can only be greater. Indeed, it is confounding that a country that has encountered and engaged with insurgencies for over six decades now and with the Naxalite or Maoist movement for all of four and a half, should have failed to arrive at any ordered understanding of the nature of the problem and the contours and priorities of a solution. Indeed, a review of the official discourse and projections in recent years would suggest that there is far greater enthusiasm in the struggle for power and control on internal security issues between the centre and the states, than there is for any sustained confrontation with the Maoists by the centre or the states. As the Union Ministry for Home Affairs (UMHA), in particular, makes a determined bid to augment its powers, blatantly pushing at constitutional boundaries, we see assessments and prognostications constantly tampered with and transformed. In September 2010, well after the farce of the centre’s “massive and coordinated operations” against the Maoists had produced the tragedy of Chintalnar where 76 Security Forces (SF) personnel were massacred on April 6, 2010 - and a succession of lesser disasters before this, the then Union Home Secretary G K Pillai, claiming dramatic successes, declared that the SFs had “regained control” over more than 10,000 sq km from the Maoists! (It is not clear when the Maoists had ‘established control’ in these areas). No concrete evidence was provided to back this claim and, by all indices, the centre’s “clear, hold and develop strategy” had been an unmitigated failure, with Maoist depredations, SF reverses and the loss of civilian lives, all, escalating substantially. In the midst of rising chaos and manifest loss of control, Union Home Minister P Chidambaram, had, in July 2010, declared, “The government was confident that the problem of left wing extremism would be overcome in the next three years.” However, instead of any visible effort to intensify its counter-insurgency (CI) campaigns - which had been spearheaded by central forces between late 2009 and April 2010 - operations came to a virtual standstill, with the bulk of deployed forces essentially hunkering down into a posture of passive defence. By February 2011, Chidambaram had scaled down the official assessment, again without any apparent basis in visible transformations

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

on the ground, declaring that “a kind of stalemate” had been reached. Abruptly shifting responsibility from the centre, he added, “The state governments concerned cannot claim any major advance, nor should we conclude that the CPI-Maoist has gained the upper hand.” The SFs remained in the grip of operational stasis into 2012 and the Maoists chose to de-escalate as well. Fatalities in all categories declined, with the total dropping from 1,180 in 2010 to 602 in 2011 (all data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, unless otherwise mentioned), even as the Maoists were forced by a continuous loss of leadership cadres - the result of sustained intelligence work, overwhelmingly by the Andhra Pradesh Police Special Intelligence Branch (SIB), though often backed by the Intelligence Bureau and Police organisations in other states - to reassess their plans to “extend the people’s war across the country” and to deepen their “work in urban areas”.

The Deception of ‘Policy’ T

he gibberish about ‘policies’, ‘SOPs’, the centralisation of responses, the transformation of ‘tactics’, ‘terrorists’ and other such twaddle, is nothing more than a diversion, an attempt by bankrupt politicians and force commanders to direct attention away from the awful crisis of capacities that undermines India’s security and all dimensions of governance. It is not the Maoists that hold India hostage today, but the enduring venality, the incompetence and the collapse of imagination of the country’s leadership.

Thus we have the interminable harping on ‘root causes’ and ‘developmental solutions’ and a meaningless and contra-factual polarisation between the ‘hearts and minds’ and the ‘law and order’ approaches By February 2012, Chidambaram was again declaring qualified victory, arguing that India was ‘winning command’ over mineral rich areas where Maoist attacks had blocked off billions of dollars in potential investment. “Albeit slowly,” he said, “we are gaining control of the situation.” There was no evidence of any significant operational successes over the preceding months. By this time, however, the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, with a significant usurpation of powers of intervention in the states, was being cooked up by the UMHA and prognostications quickly began to take on an air of stridency, to justify expanding powers for central agencies. “There was indeed a decline in the number of incidents and the number of casualties,” Chidambaram stated in April 2012, “However, I must caution you that behind these figures lies a more worrying narrative - which is the spread and the reach of some adversaries and their success in augmenting their weaponry and their military capabilities.” Declining fatalities in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected Districts, he warned, “may give a false sense of assurance, but that is not the true picture.” Claims of operational ‘successes’ that were earlier boasted about, began to be watered down. In recent months, the security forces have made bold forays into hitherto forbidden territories such as Saranda Forest and Koel-Sankh in Jharkhand and Abujmarh

in Chhattisgarh. However, the results remain sub-optimal, especially in areas under the control of Area or Zonal Committees operating in Bihar-Jharkhand-North Chhattisgarh, Andhra-Odisha and Dandakaranya. Jan Adalats and military training camps continue to be held with impunity. Economic infrastructure and so-called police informers continue to be targeted. Extortion is rampant.

What we need, today, is not a ‘national policy’, nor, indeed, a ‘national debate on policy; we do not need to rewrite centre-state relations and the distribution of powers in the Constitution of India; we do not need sham institutional impositions such as the National Counter Terrorism Centre. What we need, rather, is a relentless focus on the nuts and bolts of capacities and capabilities in existing institutions of intelligence, policing and governance; in the absence of these, all our ‘polices’ and ‘strategies’ remain nothing more than slogans

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

REIGN OF INSINCERITY

The reality is, central security and intelligence agencies are, at present, no better endowed to deal with the Maoist menace than are the states - and structural impediments ensure that capabilities are not being developed at a pace that would radically alter this balance in the foreseeable future. The UMHA is constantly harping on institutional form, not operational capabilities and competence. The whole idea of a ‘national policy’ has, in fact, become code for greater centralisation By May 2012, with his bid for the NCTC in a virtual shambles, Chidambaram had reportedly concluded that “India is fighting a losing battle against Naxalism” and that “states like Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were not cooperating in the fight against Naxalism and their chief ministers were not helpful ...” Astonishingly, it was discovered, at this stage, that the government’s “two-pronged approach” was securing “outstanding success” in its developmental “prong”. “The Integrated Action Plan launched in November 2010, with an outlay of Rs 3,300 crore over two years, has been an outstanding success”, we were told. Curiously, Chidambaram simultaneously conceded that “our capacity to execute the plans is not commensurate with the nature of the challenge.” Worse, anecdotal evidence from the field indicated that the ‘developmental strategy’ to counter Naxalism was riddled with corruption, incompetence and an absence of accountability, with little of the monies actually reaching projects and intended beneficiaries. No comprehensive review of the implementation and impact of IAP has yet been attempted, though the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) had been asked in May 2011, to carry out a ‘special audit’ on the performance of the project. The status of the CAG assessment is presently not known. However, reports regarding a CAG audit of the IAP and Backward Region Grant Fund projects in the Sonbhadra District of Uttar Pradesh, fairly far off from the Maoist core areas where a physical audit would present greater challenges, indicate that most projects were not completed

in time, the quality of work was poor, there was duplication of projects, the tender process had been skipped in some cases, financial reporting was faulty and a number of procedural irregularities were noticed. In the meanwhile, there has also been a tendency to manipulate or fudge data, to support the varying assessments of the centre. The UMHA’s January 2010 ‘monthly report card’, for instance recorded 1,125 Maoist-related fatalities in 2009. Just months later, however, UMHA’s Annual Report 2009-10 inexplicably brought this figure down to 908. 217 people had, miraculously, been brought back to life, presumably by the UMHA’s ministrations. Similar manipulations have regularly characterised claims on police-population ratios. Speaking at the All India Conference of Directors and Inspectors General of Police at Delhi on September 16, 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that the Police-population ratio for the country was 145 per 1,00,000. The reliable Crime in India report, published annually by the National Crime Records Bureau, subsequently noted that, as on December 31, 2009, the ratio was, in fact, 133 per 1,00,000. NCRB data indicated, further, that this ratio remained the same, at 133, as on December 31, 2010. Nevertheless, the UMHA informed Parliament in March 2011, that, as in January 2011, this ratio was 174 per 1,00,000. The enormity of this distortion becomes clear from the fact that, given India’s population of over 1.2 billion, for each digit of augmentation in the ratio, at least 12,000 personnel need to be added to the existing Force, without adjusting for natural attrition. An increase of 41 in the ratio between December 31, 2010, and January 2011, would consequently require the recruitment of at least 4,92,000 personnel, without adjusting for attrition. Naturally, as the centre wrote hectoring letters to the concerned state governments on their failure to deal effectively with the Maoists, the states responded defensively by attacking the centre’s failures and blocked off key initiatives that appeared to erode the state’s constitutional

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

mandate and expand that of the UMHA. When the UMHA upbraided Jharkhand for its ‘ineffectiveness’ in dealing with the Maoists, for instance, a stung Chief Minister Arjun Munda argued, defensively, that the UMHA was “maligning the image of the state government” and “playing politics over such a major issue”. Why is all this important? And does it not even more deeply underline a need for a ‘national policy’ against the Maoists? Clearly, as long as perceptions remain fragmented and polarised, no coherent or coordinated effort to confront the Maoists is possible. The intuitive appeal of such an argument is great, but entirely misdirected. For one thing, no national policy, even if one is articulated, has any possibility of successful implementation, as long as the mistrust between the centre and the states persists and this can only deepen in current circumstances, where the UMHA is making a concerted bid to transgress constitutional boundaries to arrogate greater powers to itself and where it has used every deception and stratagem to build a case, not for greater effectiveness in CI, but merely for greater control and centralisation of responses. Far more significantly, however, such a bid for power is being made in the absence of effective capacities for its efficient utilisation. The reality is, central security and intelligence agencies are, at present, no better endowed to deal with the Maoist menace than are the states - and structural impediments ensure that capabilities are not being developed at a pace that would radically alter this balance in the foreseeable future. The UMHA is constantly harping on institutional form, not operational capabilities and competence. The whole idea of a ‘national policy’ has, in fact, become code for greater centralisation, not an effective consensus on what needs to be done, given the real contours of the problem and the objective imperatives of a cooperative and coordinated ‘solution’. It is, moreover, fairly easy to demonstrate that the centre does not, in fact, have the solution to all of India’s internal security problems in general, and to Maoism in particular and that it has acted, at least on occasion, with as

little wisdom as the worst responding states. Indeed, the CI record of at least some states is much better than that of the centre - an obvious and recent case in point is Andhra Pradesh, which was the heartland of the Maoist movement till the mid-2000s, but where the rebels were quickly decimated by a well conceived and dramatically well managed campaign of intelligence led operations in 2005-07. Andhra Pradesh suffered as many as 508 Maoist-related fatalities at peak in 1998, 320 in 2005, but just 33 in 2010 and 10 in 2011. Crucially, the turnaround in Andhra Pradesh occurred within the same context of centre-state relations, the same distribution of power, the same institutional framework and the same absence of a ‘national policy’ and ‘national consensus’ (as well as of a National Counter Terrorism Centre and National Investigation Agency) that are the focus of the chattering classes today. Indeed, much of the policy debate on the ‘Maoist challenge’ and on CI, remains mired in counter-productive debates on the most irrelevant variables and concepts, much of which only confers oblique legitimacy to the extremists, evolves an apologetics for their relentless violence and paralyses state responses. Most of these arguments derive from faith, not fact. Thus we have the interminable harping on ‘root causes’ and ‘developmental solutions’, and a meaningless and contra-factual polarisation between the ‘hearts and minds’ and the ‘law and order’ approaches. The reality is, development is, quite simply, not a CI strategy at all. That development is desirable cannot be contested - but it is desirable of itself, not because someone is holding a gun to the government’s head. Unfortunately, moreover, it is not something that can be ordered off a menu card and served quickly on a platter. The time frames of development and CI are, quite entirely, irreconcilable. Crucially, moreover, you cannot develop what you do not control. Indeed, the Indian experience even now demonstrates that the government is failing spectacularly in its developmental duties in areas fully under its control, where no Maoist activities and violence are in evidence. Delivering development to the areas under Maoist disruptive dominance

is an obvious pipe dream and would be laughed out in any rational discourse. As Cherikuri Rajkumar aka Azad, the CPI-Maoist spokesman who was killed in June 2010, once noted, "The exploiting classes have absolute control over more than 90 per cent of the country’s geographical area. If at all they wish to reach out to the masses with their so-called reforms, who is preventing them from doing so? Instead of addressing the problems of the poor in these vast regions under their absolute control, they are talking of recapturing territory from Maoists." Even if the developmental enterprise is to be intensified in areas of present Maoist disruption, moreover, it must be abundantly clear that this can only be possible after a degree of stable and enduring SF dominance has been restored. As one commentator rightly noted, “you can argue about whether security is 10 per cent of the problem or 90 per cent of the problem, but it’s the first 10 per cent or the first 90 per cent.” The truth is, neither the centre nor most of the states have the capacities to effectively implement either the ‘developmental’ or the ‘law and order’ ‘solution’ at present. These may be emotively powerful idioms in a polarised discourse, but they have no relevance unless issues relating to the necessary resource configurations and objective circumstances of their application are settled. India’s multiple crises of capacities have been repeatedly written of elsewhere, by this writer, but a quick overview of the most significant numbers is useful here. The Police-population ratio, at 133 per 1,00,000 in end 2010 (and perhaps just marginally higher now) compares adversely with Western ratios of well over 200 and up to 500 and a UN recommended ratio of about 222 for peacetime policing. India has a judge to population ratio of 1.4 to 1,00,000. The Law Commission

had recommended, in 1987, that this be raised to at least five. The US ratio is 11 judges to 1,00,000 people; China has 17; Germany has 25; and Slovenia has 39. Clearly, capacities for security and justice administration are abysmal. Civil administration (the ‘bulwark’ on which the ‘developmental solution’ is to be constructed) is as bad. The US Federal Government, based on a philosophy that the ‘least government is the best government’, employs 840 personnel per 1,00,000 population; the Indian Union government - with a finger in every pie - employs just 257, with 44 per cent of these in the Indian Railways alone, as far from a ‘core governance’ function as you can get. In the US, state and local governments employ 6,841 employees per 1,00,000 population. In Bihar, this number stands at 457; in Uttar Pradesh, 801; in Chhattisgarh, 1,174; in Odisha, 1,191. 93 per cent of all central and state government employees are in the Class III and Class IV categories, and contribute little to the delivery of core administrative services. These are just numbers and the less said about the quality, competence, capabilities and integrity of this rudimentary administrative setup, the better. What we need, today, is not a ‘national policy’, nor, indeed, a ‘national debate on policy; we do not need to rewrite centre-state relations and the distribution of powers in the Constitution of India; we do not need sham institutional impositions such as the National Counter Terrorism Centre. What we need, rather, is a relentless focus on the nuts and bolts of capacities and capabilities in existing institutions of intelligence, policing and governance; in the absence of these, all our ‘polices’ and ‘strategies’ remain nothing more than slogans.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

ne of India’s most

experienced

Police Officers takes a close look at the ongoing campaign against the Naxals. After initial setbacks the Paramilitary forces had become

Prakash Singh, IPS The writer, a recipient of Padma Shri, was Director General of the Border Security Force and also DGP UP and DGP Assam.

The Prime Minister has said more than once that the Maoist threat is the biggest challenge to the internal security of the country. Strangely, his statement has not been backed by any comprehensive long-term plan to deal with the problem. Much time has been lost and, meanwhile, the Maoists have expanded their territorial sweep. It is high time that the centre defines its strategy and, in consultation with the states, fine-tunes the tactics to be followed in the affected theatres. At the national level, the government should give serious thought to defining its strategy. It is indeed disappointing that while we have been dealing with this problem for the last more than 40 years, we have not cared to codify our response or define our policy

defensive for a couple of months. They concentrated more on holding the ground rather than undertaking any offensive operations. The Prime Minister has said more than once that the Maoist threat is the biggest challenge to the internal security of the country. Strangely, his statement has not been backed by any comprehensive long-term plan to deal with the problem. Much time has been lost and, meanwhile, the Maoists have expanded their territorial sweep. It is high time that the centre defines its strategy and, in consultation with the states, fine-tunes the tactics to be followed in the affected theatres. The writer makes concrete suggestions for a comprehensive counter strategy.

he anti-Maoist campaign appears stuck in a quagmire. About two years back, the Government of India embarked on a comprehensive campaign by deploying paramilitary forces in the Maoist affected states. There were expectations. It was projected that within a couple of years, the paramilitary forces would be able to establish their dominance and break the backbone of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army. However, that did not happen due to a a number of reasons. On the contrary, there were some major setbacks. On April 6, 2010 seventy-five CRPF personnel and one policeman were annihilated in an attack by about 1,000 CPI (Maoist) armed cadres in Dantewada district. Maoists also lost eight men in the engagement. The attack was launched to mark the centenary of the Bhumkal adivasi rebellion. The security forces thereafter became defensive for a couple of months. They concentrated more on holding the ground rather than undertaking any offensive operations.

Tide turns The tide nevertheless started turning gradually. The operations of the security forces, albeit restrained, had their impact. By the end of 2011, the number of districts affected by Maoist violence had shrunk from 223 to 182. There was also a substantial drop in the level of violence. As against 2,213 incidents recorded in 2010, there were only 1,745 incidents in 2011. The number of casualties as a result of incidents of Maoist violence declined from 1,005 in 2010 to 606 in 2011. Casualties of security forces personnel came down from 285 in 2010 to 142 in 2011. There was, at the same time, general decline in the number of attacks on economic targets like railways, telephone exchanges / towers, power plants, school buildings etc. Thus, as against 54 incidents of attacks on railway property in 2010, there were only 31 attacks on railway establishments in 2011.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

Maoism: Need for a National Strategy The Maoist leadership also suffered considerable attrition. Out of 16 members of the politburo, 2 were killed while another 7 were apprehended. The central committee was greatly weakened with 5 of its members being killed and 13 arrested out of a total of 39. All this meant a severe setback to the Maoist leadership. In early 2012, the security forces, exuding confidence, undertook some bold operations. The CRPF combed a major part of Abujmarh in Chhattisgarh in March 2012. It is a 4,000 sq km area which the Maoists considered a ‘liberated zone’. Significantly, the area has no revenue or police presence. The Maoists were taken by surprise and avoided any engagement with the security forces, though they fired from long distances.

Slide-back A series of abductions in Odisha and Chhattisgarh, however, put the government on the back foot. It started with the abduction of two Italians, Claudio Colangelo and Paolo Bosusco from the Kandhamal district of Odisha on March 14, 2012. Ten days later, another group of Maoist guerrillas abducted Jhina Hikaka, an MLA of the Biju Janata Dal, from Koraput district. The state government of Odisha showed weakness in handling the situation and buckled in the face of Maoist blackmail. The hostages were set free one by one, but not before several demands of the Maoists for the release of their cadres were conceded. The Maoists saw that this was the easiest way to get their demands conceded, their comrades released from prison or cases against them withdrawn. Intoxicated with their success in Odisha, the Maoists extended the tactics to Chhattisgarh and kidnapped the

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH

Collector of Sukma, Alex Paul Menon on April 21, 2012 when he was meeting a group of villagers for a government outreach programme. The Collector was eventually released after 12 days on May 3. The Chhattisgarh government handled the situation firmly; they did not concede the demand for release of Maoist cadres, much less call off the so-called ‘Operation Green Hunt’. The only concession they made was that they would “review all cases of persons in respect of whom investigation / prosecution is pending”.

Tackling the Maoist problem would call for a comprehensive strategy. It will have to be a whole-of-government approach with every department contributing within its area of responsibility. The problem will have to be dealt with at political, social, economic, administrative, police and intelligence levels The tardy progress or even a slide-back in the anti-Maoist operations is to be attributed to a number of factors. At the state level, there are no standing operating procedures (SOPs) to be followed in hostage situations. The state governments are acting as per their own perception. The Odisha government promptly conceded some demands of the Maoists and gave an unmistakable impression that it did not have the will to fight. The Chhattisgarh government, on the other hand, merely agreed to review all cases of Maoists against whom probe or prosecution is pending. It is necessary that the SOP for such situations is finalised by the Home Ministry in consultation with the states and circulated to them for observance in the event of any crisis of this nature in future. It is also unfortunate that the centre-state coordination leaves much to be desired. Naveen Patnaik, chief minister of Odisha, blamed the central government for not extending the necessary help. This was rebutted by Chidambaram, who contended that Odisha government had not asked for any help. The Chhattisgarh government however did not have any such problem. Soon after the abduction of the Collector, they sent a high level team to Delhi with their

list of demands which were placed before the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry extended all the help and both the centre and the state appeared to be on the same page.

Government policy At the national level, the government should give serious thought to defining its strategy. It is indeed disappointing that while we have been dealing with this problem for the last more than 40 years, we have not cared to codify our response or define our policy. In 2006, Government of India issued a 14-point policy to deal with the Maoist problem. Its salient features were: Deal sternly with the Naxals indulging in violence. Address the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts in a holistic manner. Ensure inter-state coordination in dealing with the problem. Improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action. No peace dialogue unless the Naxals agree to give up arms and violence. Political parties must strengthen their cadre base in affected areas. Focus on faster socio-economic development of the backward areas. Promote voluntary local resistance groups. Highlight the futility of Naxal ideology and violence through mass media. Post willing, committed and competent officers in affected districts. Have an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy for Naxalites. Accord high priority to distribution of land to landless, development of infrastructure and employment opportunities to the youth.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

Ensure uninterrupted economic development in affected areas. Supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts.

The policy should have been more elaborate and covered the various aspects of the Maoist problem - addressing the grievances of tribals, winning their hearts and minds, inter-state coordination, intelligence sharing between the states and between the centre and the states, surrender and rehabilitation policy, developing infrastructure in the affected states The plan, however, never took off. The then Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, had an idealistic approach to tackling the Maoists - he considered them as “our brothers and sisters”. The Maoists naturally took advantage of this attitude to expand their territorial spread across the sub-continent and strengthen their organisation. The terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 led to Patil’s resignation and installation of P C Chidambaram as the new Home Minister. Chidambaram said at the very outset that the gravity of the problem had been underestimated in the past and formulated a new strategy to deal with the Maoist threat to the Indian state. Government’s new response was summarised by the Home Minister in 2009 in three graphic words: Clear, Hold and Develop. It implied a three-stage strategy. In the first phase, the Maoists would be drained out of their swamps by undertaking well coordinated counter-insurgency operations against them. In the second phase, the civil administration would be established in the areas cleared. And, in the third phase, economic development would be undertaken on a priority in these regions. “The idea is to dominate and then quickly bring in development - hospitals, schools, roads, fair price shops - keeping the basic necessities of people in mind”, as explained by an official. The policy was sound, though it was a little too cryptic. The policy should have been more elaborate and covered

the various aspects of the Maoist problem - addressing the grievances of tribals, winning their hearts and minds, inter-state coordination, intelligence sharing between the states and between the centre and the states, surrender and rehabilitation policy, developing infrastructure in the affected states etc. In any case, the policy even in its limited import could not be implemented fully. This was because certain elements in the Congress high command either did not want to see Chidambaram successful in the anti-Maoist campaign, or they had genuine doubts about the soundness of the policy. Digvijay Singh, General Secretary of the AICC, struck a discordant note when he emphasised development to win the loyalty of the tribals. The different signals emanating from the centre naturally confused the state chief ministers. They also, while enunciating their policy, spoke in different frequencies. Nitish Kumar, chief minister of Bihar, said that enforcement action alone would lead to further alienation of the people and stressed that the “underlying disease” needed to be addressed. Mamata Banerjee’s attitude was ambivalent. Jharkhand’s response has generally been tepid.

The Chhattisgarh government handled the situation firmly; they did not concede the demand for release of Maoist cadres, much less call off the so-called ‘Operation Green Hunt’. The only concession they made was that they would “review all cases of persons in respect of whom investigation / prosecution is pending”

Need for comprehensive strategy Tackling the Maoist problem would call for a comprehensive strategy. It will have to be a whole-of-government approach with every department contributing within its area of responsibility. The problem will have to be dealt with at political, social, economic, administrative, police and intelligence levels. Political: A concerted effort will have to be made to isolate the Maoists and challenge their ideology. The politicians must visit their constituencies and establish rapport with the people. Unfortunately, the elected representatives hardly visit the interior areas, leaving its inhabitants vulnerable to Maoist propaganda. They will also have to resist the temptation of seeking the support of Maoists on the eve of elections. We have seen politicians in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal hobnobbing with the Maoists to boost their electoral prospects. Social and cultural: Social customs and cultural traditions of the indigenous people will have to be protected. The government has not shown enough sensitivity in the matter notwithstanding the constitutional guarantees

on the subject. Surprisingly, in Bastar, even the Maoists were guilty of interfering with the social customs and cultural practices of the local tribals. They closed several ghotuls, discouraged weekly markets and put restrictions on traditional celebrations at the time of marriage. These excesses antagonised the tribals, who gave vent to their anger in the form of Salwa Judum.

The state government of Odisha showed weakness in handling the situation and buckled in the face of Maoist blackmail. The hostages were set free one by one, but not before several demands of the Maoists for the release of their cadres were conceded Economic measures: There can be no substitute for development with at least a functioning primary health centre and a primary school in every village. Roads should be the next priority as they have the potential to transform an entire region. It will also have to be ensured that NREGA is properly implemented and the Forest Rights of the tribals are protected. Land reforms

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must be carried out and alienated land restored to their rightful owners. If any group of people were unavoidably displaced for any reason, they must be properly rehabilitated.

Maoist leadership also suffered considerable attrition. Out of 16 members of the politburo, 2 were killed while another 7 were apprehended. The central committee was greatly weakened with 5 of its members being killed and 13 arrested out of a total of 39. All this meant a severe setback to the Maoist leadership Administration: The local administration should have a people-friendly face; it must address the legitimate grievances of the people in a humane manner. The Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land constituted by Ministry of Rural Development (2004) found that “derelict revenue officers including Deputy Commissioners, unscrupulous lawyers, ignorant civil courts … have all joined hands, as it were, to deprive the tribal communities of their land”. This must change. It has also been seen, lately, that administration is very sluggish in moving to areas cleared by the security forces. The government has recently shown signs of filling up this gap. The Union Rural Development Ministry is going to launch a plan across Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh to build on the police pressure at the tri-junction which is in Maoist grip. It would straddle across Latehar and Garhwa in Jharkhand and Balrampur in Chhattisgarh. The plan has been approved by the states and the centre. There are, besides, areas where the administration has not even established its presence. The Abujmarh area of Chhattisgarh is a classic case where there is to date no revenue or police presence; the 4,000 sq km area inhabited by Maria tribes has been left to the care of gods. Police and paramilitary: The capability of the police will have to be enhanced by adding to its manpower, giving it better weapons and communication equipment and imparting to its select personnel training in counter-insurgency. There are huge deficiencies in police

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WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH manpower in different states, apart from the fact that the sanctioned strength itself is well below the minimum prescribed by the UN. Thus, Bihar has the lowest number of policemen (64) per lac of population among all the states. In Odisha, there has been no direct recruitment of Deputy Superintendents of Police since 1976 with the result that an entire layer of police leadership is missing. Police and paramilitary personnel deployed in the area must be sensitised on human rights. There should be, at the same time, full coordination between the forces deployed in different states. Intelligence: The intelligence setup at the state level will need to be reorganised. The local intelligence unit at the district level also must be revived and activated. Any intelligence input, given by the Intelligence Bureau or the state special branch, must be shared and disseminated to all the stake-holders. The Multi-Agency Centre must play its mandated role until it is replaced or supplemented by the proposed NCTC. Peace talks: The option of peaceful negotiations should always be kept open, but these may be conducted only from a position of strength. The government’s earlier stance that there could be no dialogue with the Maoists unless they agree to give up violence and surrender their weapons was unrealistic. No insurgent group would ever agree to that unless it is on the verge of being vanquished. The government has no qualms in holding talks with the Hurriyat leaders in Jammu and Kashmir; it has been having a dialogue with the NSCN (IM) in Nagaland without the Naga rebels surrendering any weapons. Why, then, a different yardstick for dialogue with the Maoists? Fortunately, the government has now shown flexibility in the matter. The Home Minister has repeatedly said that they would be willing to hold talks with the Maoists if they would abjure violence. Corruption: Corruption levels in the affected states will have to be substantially brought down or else the development efforts will come to a naught. In Jharkhand, former chief minister Madhu Koda was found

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

involved in money laundering to the tune of Rs 4,000 crore. It also came to light that he had assets in Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Dubai and had bought a coal-mine even in Liberia. Even the governor of the state was involved in questionable transactions. In Chhattisgarh, a section of the bureaucracy and police officers appear to have developed a vested interest in the Maoist insurgency.

The tide nevertheless started turning gradually. The operations of the security forces, albeit restrained, had their impact. By the end of 2011, the number of districts affected by Maoist violence had shrunk from 223 to 182. There was also a substantial drop in the level of violence. As against 2,213 incidents recorded in 2010, there were only 1,745 incidents in 2011. The number of casualties as a result of incidents of Maoist violence declined from 1,005 in 2010 to 606 in 2011. Casualties of security forces personnel came down from 285 in 2010 to 142 in 2011

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WHAM: There will have to be, above all, a conscious effort to win the hearts and minds of the people and mobilise their support against the insurgents. Sadbhavana projects will need to be undertaken by the forces in the interior areas. These may be in the form of extending medical benefits to people in the interior areas, opening primary schools in villages where there are none or organising sports and games among the rural youth. These measures, sincerely implemented, would take the wind out of the sails of the Maoist movement. The Prime Minister has said more than once that the Maoist threat is the biggest challenge to the internal security of the country. Strangely, his statement has not been backed by any comprehensive long-term plan to deal with the problem. Much time has been lost and, meanwhile, the Maoists have expanded their territorial sweep. It is high time that the centre defines its strategy and, in consultation with the states, fine-tunes the tactics to be followed in the affected theatres.

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APPRAISEMENT

A Hormis Tharakan, IPS The writer was Secretary (R) in the Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India and Director-General of Police, Kerala. Currently, he is a Member of the National Security Advisory Board and is also a Visiting Professor at the Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University. He writes on strategic issues and police reforms. He is a former Member of the National Security Advisory Board.

Maoists have nowhere in India succeeded in carrying the revolution forward from the Perspective Guerilla Stage to the Base Stage. The corresponding progress from guerilla warfare to mobile warfare has also not been achieved by Indian Maoists except in isolated cases. He assesses that it is beyond the Indian Maoists to take the revolution forward to the final phase of positional warfare, as after being at it for forty years, they are nowhere near seizing power which their Chinese comrades managed to do in twenty-eight years under the leadership of Mao

s the demand for a reappraisal of the anti-Maoist insurgency strategy grows in the wake of the recent kidnappings of District Collectors and MLA’s, it would be worthwhile learning from the experience of the few states which have had a degree of success in containing the menace. The man who led the Greyhounds commented that it is beyond the Indian Maoists to take the revolution forward to the final phase of positional warfare, as after being at it for forty years, they are nowhere near seizing power which their Chinese comrades managed to do in twenty-eight years under the leadership of Mao. The then DGP of Chhattisgarh was on record as having assessed that the best strategy would be to concentrate on the development of districts like Kanker and Rajnandgaon bordering Dantewada, rather than try to carry the development offensive to the Maoist heartland. There is consensus among senior police officers on a strategy which focuses on consolidation in the fringe areas to prevent the spread of Left Wing Extremism. It is not realistic to (sic) turnaround such a rebellion in two to three years. Only a genuine quick initiative to command (not demand) respect for the state in the area of operation can bring about a gradual return to normalcy and sustainable democratic governance. Realistically speaking, it may take about twenty-five years for the state to regain its democratically legitimate power in the areas currently under the control of the LWE forces.

FROM SUCCESS STORIES

was taking a morning walk in the gardens of the ISI (Indian Social Institute and not Inter-Services Intelligence) in Bangalore, when I noticed a vaguely familiar lady walking ahead of me. A Jesuit priest introduced her as Ajitha, the once-feared Naxalite leader of Kerala. She was in Bangalore to attend a conference on Women’s Empowerment. The chance meeting set me thinking. When I reached Kerala at the beginning of the Seventies to start my career as a young Assistant Superintendent of Police, Ajitha was an adversary, someone whom we in the Police considered an enemy of the state. Today, while continuing to champion the cause of the underprivileged, she has repositioned herself as someone who helps society through legitimate means. In fact the reason why she looked familiar was that she had met me, when I was Chief of Police in Kerala, for help in rehabilitating a young woman abandoned by her family. In some ways, Ajitha represents the success of the Kerala model of tackling Left Wing Extremism. Not many remember now that Kerala faced a serious Naxalite problem in the Sixties and Seventies. It was tackled not merely by resolute police action, but also by parallel developmental activity, centred around the historic land reforms introduced by the Achuta Menon-led ministry and schemes to promote education and rural health. There is no denying the fact that the opening up of the Gulf helped too, by weaning away thousands of potential revolutionaries who found sustenance on alien shores.

LEARNING LESSONS

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Treating Left Wing Extremism (or more precisely, the violence perpetrated by its votaries) as a crime to be tackled through systematic and painstaking investigation rather than combatting it merely through military means may pay greater dividends in the campaign to reestablish the rule of law in the regions affected by the malaise As the demand for a reappraisal of the anti-Maoist insurgency strategy grows in the wake of the recent kidnappings of District Collectors and MLA’s, it would be worthwhile learning from the experience of the few states which have had a degree of success in containing the menace. Tripura (where the threat was not primarily from Left Wing Extremists) and Andhra Pradesh are two other states which have dealt competently with insurgencies in recent times. The then Governor of Tripura, former IPS officer D N Sahaya wrote (The Hindu, September 19, 2011) on “How Tripura overcame insurgency”. He recounts how under the leadership of

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APPRAISEMENT

Chief Minister Manik Sarkar, the state took on the problem of insurgency in a strategic and resolute manner. He goes on to say, “It (the state) formulated a multi-dimensional and fine-tuned construct to respond creatively to the situation. The control mechanism was subsumed in counter-insurgency operations intent on swift area domination and ascendancy, as well as psychological operations and confidence-building measures. An accelerated development thrust, management of the media, civic action programmes of the security forces and the political process were additional factors.” The then Director General of Tripura Police, B L Vohra has also chronicled the remarkable turnaround in Tripura in his book, Tripura’s Bravehearts.

The role that the Greyhounds of AP played in bringing the Naxalite menace under control is well documented. It is no coincidence that the training Guru of the Greyhounds is a veteran of the Special Services Bureau, an outfit set up after 1962 to mobilise the civilian population as an auxiliary fighting force in case of enemy action, as well as a developmental agency in times of peace. It needs to be examined whether such an agency could be created in the fringe areas around territories controlled by Left Wing Extremists Swaminathan S Anklesaria Aiyar, writing in his column “Swaminomics” in the Sunday Times of India on March 10, 2010 paid compliments to the Andhra Police and government in a piece titled, “Tackling Maoism - Lessons from Andhra”. According to the Police Officers that he spoke to the following were the reasons for the success, however temporary, of the Police operations against Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh: 37,000 additional posts were created in the Police, although not fully filled up. The training facilities at the State Police Training Academy were upgraded substantially. A dense network of roads, police stations, schools and sundry

government offices were created in the northern forest belt adjoining Chhattisgarh. Public works created jobs and ration shops offered cheap rice. The state reoccupied the areas vacated by the Maoists. There was proliferation not merely of Police Stations, but all government offices, so that services needed by the local populace could be provided efficiently. The role that the Greyhounds of AP played in bringing the Naxalite menace under control is well documented. It is no coincidence that the training Guru of the Greyhounds is a veteran of the Special Services Bureau, an outfit set up after 1962 to mobilise the civilian population as an auxiliary fighting force in case of enemy action, as well as a developmental agency in times of peace. It needs to be examined whether such an agency could be created in the fringe areas around territories controlled by Left Wing Extremists. Anjani Kumar, who headed the Greyhounds as its Inspector General, argued in a presentation made at a seminar (“Paradox of Tactical Advances of the Maoists: It’s not a Revolutionary Advance”, Jabalpur, August 2010) that the Maoists have nowhere in India succeeded in carrying the revolution forward from the Perspective Guerilla Stage to the Base Stage. The corresponding progress from guerilla warfare to mobile warfare has also not been achieved by Indian Maoists except in isolated cases. He assesses that it is beyond the Indian Maoists to take the revolution forward to the final phase of positional warfare, as after being at it for forty years, they are nowhere near seizing power which their Chinese comrades managed to do in twenty-eight years under the leadership of Mao. It is an interesting analysis coming from a man who led the Greyhounds with considerable success. However, it may be unwise to underrate the capability of the Maoists to learn from their mistakes and shortcomings. Gulshan Bamra, who as Collector of Balaghat in Madhya Pradesh who, along with Superintendents of Police Harinarayan Sharma and

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Santosh Singh as well as officers from the Forest and Public Works Departments played a major role in checking the Maoist advance into that district (21 attacks in 2005, none in 2009) says that the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) helped him a great deal in creating local employment and thus ensuring that jobless youngsters did not get recruited by the Maoists. In fact, there is no adequate acknowledgement of the fact that some of the most potent anti-extremist weapons available to the government are schemes like NREGS, National Rural Health Mission and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, if properly implemented. We must also take note of the fact that several states in which there was a growth rate of over 7 per cent over the last five years were Maoist-affected, like Bihar, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. This means that the development strategy is not failing but is beginning to work, though there is still a long way to go. Perhaps, the fact that District Collectors, who along with Superintendents of Police and District Forest Officers have been tasked to lead the government’s development initiative, are increasingly being targeted for kidnapping would also seem to indicate that the official outreach is a cause for concern for the Maoists.

The following were the reasons for the success, however temporary, of the Police operations against Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh: 37,000 additional posts were created in the Police, although not fully filled up. The training facilities at the State Police Training Academy were upgraded substantially Results of surveys conducted by economist Jean Dreze in Chhattisgarh sometime back showed that while MNREGS did not gain much headway in the areas under Maoist control, it worked extremely well in remaining districts of the state. The then DGP of Chhattisgarh was on record as having assessed that the best strategy would be to concentrate on the development of districts like Kanker and Rajnandgaon bordering Dantewada, rather than try to carry the development offensive to the Maoist heartland. It would be useful

can bring about a gradual return to normalcy and sustainable democratic governance. Realistically speaking, it may take about twenty-five years for the State to regain its democratically legitimate power in the areas currently under the control of the LWE forces.”

to assess how well this strategy has worked. The abduction of the District Collector of Sukma need not be the only criterion by which the success of the development offensive is assessed. It is perhaps not known outside police circles that intense, informal discussions are going on incessantly amongst police officers about the proper strategy to deal with Maoists. Some of them publish their views, but most officers prefer to limit their debates to the restricted internet frequented by senior police officers. It is seen from these that there is consensus on a strategy which focuses on consolidation in the fringe areas to prevent the spread of Left Wing Extremism. General Secretary M Laxman Rao alias Ganapathi had told Swedish scholar-journalist Jan Myrdal, son of economics Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal in Chhattisgarh in February 2010 that the Maoist strategy was to make the war as lengthy as possible as they still regarded their party as a “small one”.’But we are confident that there is a long-run advantage that cannot be achieved in a short period. But, unlike the enemy, which wants to finish this in a short period, we want to stretch this war and turn the situation into our advantage.” Against this background, Amar Pandey, Director of the Karnataka State Police Academy

at Mysore, writing in an internet forum of police officers, has made a significant assessment. I take the liberty of quoting his words at some length: “The State, therefore, has to be prepared for the long haul in its quest to regain its legitimate democratic power in the areas currently under the control of the LWE forces. With laws that mandate the Police to use minimum force, a decisive armed battle against the Left Wing Extremists is not an option that is available. The State has to have a plan of action for the short term, which would focus on containment of the further spread of the menace by resolute democratic governance. This would involve strengthening of intelligence, choking of funding, encouraging traditional institutions of administration, restoring power to the people to manage natural resources as per traditional rights, creating gainful employment opportunities in the vicinity, introduction of welfare programmes managed by the locals and implementation of land reforms, wherever warranted. It does not suit the majesty of a democratic State to seek a quick fix solution to a social rebellion, nor is it realistic to (sic) turnaround such a rebellion in two to three years. Only a genuine quick initiative to command (not demand) respect for the State in the area of operation

Among police officers who have published their views is Pupul Datta Prasad, a Senior Superintendent of Police with the National Human Rights Commission, who in a recent article entitled “In Principle” in the Times of India advised strongly against resorting to an out-and-out bellicose and militaristic response to crises arising out of Maoist abduction and killing of State functionaries. "Even if moral, legal and ethical considerations were to be brushed aside as irrelevant where innocent lives are being lost, there are compelling pragmatic and strategic reasons for the state not to convert the confrontation into a full-scale war. The remedy after all should not be worse than the disease", asserts Prasad.

As the demand for a reappraisal of the anti-Maoist insurgency strategy grows in the wake of the recent kidnappings of District Collectors and MLA’s, it would be worthwhile learning from the experience of the few states which have had a degree of success in containing the menace. The man who led the Greyhounds commented that it is beyond the Indian Maoists to take the revolution forward to the final phase of positional warfare, as after being at it for forty years, they are nowhere near seizing power which their Chinese comrades managed to do in twenty-eight years under the leadership of Mao. DGP of Chhattisgarh was on record as having assessed that the best strategy would be to concentrate on the development of districts like Kanker and Rajnandgaon bordering Dantewada, rather than try to carry the development offensive to the Maoist heartland. Consensus among senior police officers on a strategy which focuses on consolidation in the fringe areas to prevent the spread of Left Wing Extremism

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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APPRAISEMENT

Kerala model was tackled not merely by resolute police action, but also by parallel developmental activity, centred around the historic land reforms introduced by the Achuta Menon-led ministry and schemes to promote education and rural health. There is no denying the fact that the opening up of the Gulf helped too, by weaning away thousands of potential revolutionaries who found sustenance on alien shores Many officers agree with this view. An officer has pointed out that Punjab Police officers paid the price for winning the war for the whole country by facing more than 2,000 court cases. In Kerala, there is a former IG of Police, hailed in 1970 as a hero for eliminating the most dreaded Naxalite leader of that era, now languishing in the Central Prison in Poojappura. At least some of his contemporaries believe that he was responsible for setting the LWE advance in Kerala back by half a century. But that did not protect him from being sentenced to life imprisonment at the age of seventy-five. Some young officers are of the view that the tactics of the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh (search and destroy, ambush, jungle-combing, shoot down people seen with arms in the jungle, fire first etc.) are not sanctioned under India’s criminal justice system. A young officer, however, pointed out several difficulties in securing the conviction of the Maoists indulging in violence. Mostly; there is no witness or material evidence available to establish the crimes perpetrated by Maoists in remote locales. Villagers are reluctant to depose fearing for their own lives. Mobile phones of villagers are being used by the Maoists. Hence it is difficult to locate the culprits by tracking their calls. Most of the modern forensic tools concerning hair, liquids, ballistics etc. are of little use in Maoist crimes since they commit crimes in groups. This young officer, therefore, argued that there should be a change in the laws and the rules of engagement.

Defence Offsets Set To Zoom To US$ 4 Billion Mark

He says, “Devising a different set of rules of engagement with Naxalites is a necessity to protect our men at the frontlines. The concept of human rights must be inclusive and strike a dynamic balance between the needs of society to progress and individual freedom.” In response, an experienced officer who has built-up a formidable reputation in the CBI for his forensic capabilities proffered the advice that it is still possible to do a great deal under the existing laws. He pointed out how cartridges and bullets may be found with deep search metal detector and how ballistic signature from the cartridge, the firearm and the bullets can be extracted and preserved for future matching. He stressed the need to build-up a databank of the ballistic signatures of all the weapons as and when used. He advised the young officers on how to secure the co-operation of the villagers in the investigation and how to establish the evidentiary chain against Maoist perpetrators of crime even when they resort to the use of villagers’ mobiles for their communication. He also cited an interesting case of how DNA was extracted from the toothbrushes found at a camp of the Maoists. This refreshing exchange of views brought home to me the realisation that the unsung heroes of the war against Naxalites are often the investigating officers who have to

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

put together evidence against great odds to secure convictions. Veteran officers from Andhra Pradesh have shared the names of some of these stalwart investigators who probably contributed more to the defeat of the Naxalites than the Greyhounds did. I do not mention their names since they may continue to face a security threat. The same is true of Kerala. I mentioned the case of Ajitha, who after going through the legal process for taking part in attacks on two Police Stations is now a respected activist. Another prominent Naxalite leader of those times, I am told, has taken to religious life on coming out of jail. Mundur Ravunny, who was the first accused in the Kongad murder of 1970, a heinous beheading of a landlord and was brought to justice through rigorous investigation led by my first boss, late Balagangadhara Menon, is still prominent in India’s LWE firmament, but has not been able to regenerate the reverberations of the spring thunder of the late sixties. Treating Left Wing Extremism (or more precisely, the violence perpetrated by its votaries) as a crime to be tackled through systematic and painstaking investigation rather than combatting it merely through military means may pay greater dividends in the campaign to reestablish the rule of law in the regions affected by the malaise.

ndia has already attracted over US$ 4.27 billion through defence “offsets’’ through arms contracts since October, 2007. The defence procurement policy specifies that a foreign armament company, which bags an arms deal over Rs 300 crore, must plough back at least 30 per cent of the contract value back into India as offsets. The offsets figure will zoom further north with India poised to ink several more mega defence deals in the coming years. The around US$ 20 billion MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) project to acquire 126 fighters for IAF, for instance, specifies a 50 per cent offset obligation on the foreign vendor. Whilst the offset contracts worth around US$ 3.435 billion were signed while procuring aircraft, radars, drones and other systems for IAF, the naval contracts notched up US$ 843 million, thanks to the acquisition of fleet tankers, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, radars and UAVs. The Army does not figure in this list perhaps because of its slow modernisation projects, which the defence ministry is only now trying to fast track after Gen V K Singh complained of “critical hollowness’’ in his force’s operational capabilities. India still imports almost 70 per cent of its defence requirements because neither have the DRDO and defence PSUs got their act together, nor has the private sector stepped into the defence arena in a major way. The offsets, it is hoped, will help boost the country’s defence industrial base (DIB), with the defence ministry also encouraging joint ventures or `co-production arrangements’ between Indian firms and foreign armament majors.

Goa Shipyard To Build Six OPVs For Indian Coast Guard

ndia’s Defence Ministry-owned Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) signed a contract with the government to build six Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) for the Indian Coast Guard (ICG). The order is expected to be worth US$ 400 million or Rs 1, 800 crore. The overall length of the vessels will be 105 metre with a displacement of about 2,400 tonne. GSL has in the past built over 12 OPVs for the ICG. The new vessels will be fitted with contemporary navigational integrated bridge systems, bridge watch navigational call up systems, CCTV systems and additional features such as quick response boats for rescue and anti-piracy operations. It will also have four-lane simulator for small arms training and many more advanced features, including helicopter decks. At present, ICG is managing with about 100 surface vessels and 45 aviation assets, which include 24 Dornier planes, 17 Chetak helicopters and four Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopters to protect India’s 7,500-km coastline, including 1,197 islands, apart from 2.01 million sq km of Exclusive Economic Zone.

PAN-India Optical Fibre Cable Network For Defence Forces

ndia is poised to have an exclusive pan-India Optical Fibre Cable (OFC) for its Defence Forces which will help them to vacate the radio waves spectrum they currently occupy. The proposal for the pan-India OFC is currently being processed and it will be to the tune of US$ 1.3 billion. A dedicated and highly secure state-of-the-art OFC network for the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force will enable improved communication services and boost homeland security as well. The US$ 1.3 billion OFC proposal envisages a network to be laid out over 60,000 km to provide connectivity for 129 Army, 162 Air Force and 33 Navy stations.

The Union Cabinet had approved the roughly US$ 2 billion plan to build an alternate optic fibre cable (OFC) network for the Defence services in December 2009. However, the state-owned BSNL, to whom the project was awarded, overshot its budget for building the alternate communication networks in 2010 by a huge 50 per cent. BSNL had sought an additional funding of over US$ 1.19 billion from the centre for the same. As per the MoU between the Defence and Telecom ministries, the Armed Forces agreed to vacate portions of radio waves depending on the progress of the alternative network. June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

GENESIS

he genesis of the Maoist Naxalite insurgency lies rooted in the development and stratification of the Hindu caste system. As Hinduism evolved after the Aryan migration to India and the pastoral economy gradually changed into an agricultural economy, ownership of cultivable land generally remained restricted to the three upper castes of the Brahmin, Kshatriya and the Bania or Vaisya. The Shudra and the Scheduled tribes had to be content to work in the fields of the upper castes as labourers. Many of the Scheduled tribes were forced to retreat into the forests of the country and became hunters / gatherers and hence came to be called Vanvasis or Adivasis.

E N Rammohan, IPS The writer is 1965 batch IPS officer of Assam cadre. He has been Suptdt of Police Khasi Hills Shillong, Deputy Inspector General of Police - Northern Range Tezpur during infamous election of 1983, Inspector General of Police Operations Guwahati during op Bajrang and op Rhino, SP and DIG CBI, IGP CRPF north-east IG BSF Kashmir 1993-95, DG BSF 1997-2000. Advisor to Governor of Manipur 2001-2002. Member National Security Council Advisory Board 2005-2006.

The root cause of the Naxalite Maoist Insurgency is that the state is not willing to enforce the laws of the land, because it will take away land from the upper caste landlords. This unlawful action of the government has created the space in which the Marxist and now the Maoist party has moved in and taken up the fight against an unlawful and illegal government

Regrettably though all the states had passed land ceiling legislations by 1955, only three states enforced the land ceiling laws till date. These were Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal and Kerala, the latter two when Communist Parties were ruling the two states in the mid 1960s. No other states in India have enforced the Land Ceiling Laws that they had legislated by 1955

It is after the Communist party was formed in Russia and the Indian Communist Party of India (CPI) was born that they began working among the Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes from 1946. They first operated in the Rangpur and Dinajpur districts of North Bengal and in the Telangana area of the princely state of Hyderabad in 1946. In both these districts the CPI workers finding that the landlords had owned vast areas of land and the lower castes and tribes had to work as labourers on the lands of their upper caste landowners for minimal wages which was more often than not just one fifth of the produce that they produced by their hard toil. There were no Revenue laws then that determined how much land could be held by an individual. The CPI workers would request the landowners to part with some land to be given to the lower caste workers. When the owners refused, the CPI workers would organise the workers in areas far off from the few Police Stations in the district, surround the houses of the owners of agricultural lands and force the owner to part with some land and then distribute these lands to individual lower caste farm labourers. Rough pattas for the land would be written and given to the labourers and sometimes the landowners would be forced to sign such landownership documents. Sometimes their granaries would be looted and grain distributed among the poor labourers. The landowners would naturally report to the police later, who would then visit the area and reverse all the takeover of land by the labourers and arrest the labourers who had been given land, taken forcibly from the landowners.

The Maoist Naxalite Insurgency in India A

n emotive and impassioned analysis of the causes and context of the Maoist insurgency. The writer traces the history of this movement and describes how the Indian state has failed abjectly to enforce the Fifth and Ninth Schedules of the Constitution we gave to ourselves in 1950. The Fifth Schedule had stipulated that the state Governors would administer the Tribal areas by appointing Tribes Advisory Councils. The Ninth Schedule dealt with the equitable distribution of cultivable land by enacting land ceiling laws and restricting ownership of cultivable land to specific limits and taking out the surplus land and distributing it among the landless labourers. The honest fact is that the Indian state has lacked the political will to implement these schedules. In the bargain we have invited the armed Maoist insurgency on ourselves. The critical question now is where do we go from here? Can we now deliver the development which we should have given from 1950 onwards, without first pacifying the area and ensuring that the writ of the state runs in these tracts? No tribals occupy any senior or even middle or lower level leadership positions in the Maoist political structure or military organisations and there is evidence of criminalisation in terms of a Rs 1,500 crore extortion economy. A hard-hitting and impassioned article that calls for serious reflection.

The Constituent Assembly and its deliberations in 1950. Passing of the Ninth and Fifth Schedules The British who were ruling the country did not interfere in the land distribution system. In the run up to independence, the politicians elected to the Constituent Assembly after India got Independence discussed this issue in the Constituent Assembly and came up with two Schedules, the Ninth Schedule which dealt with the equitable distribution of cultivable land by enacting land ceiling laws and restricting ownership of cultivable land to specific limits and taking out the surplus land and distributing it among the landless labourers. As for the Adivasis, forest tribes who had been pushed into the forests of the country, the members of the Constituent Assembly discussed and passed the Fifth Schedule, which stated that the Scheduled areas that is the Forest Reserves of the mainland (excluding the north-eastern states that were covered by the Sixth Schedule) was to be administered by the Governors of the states by appointing a Tribes Advisory Council which was to consist of tribals from the concerned forest. The Governor was to report to the President of India on this. This meant that the state Chief Minister did not have any power to deal with the forests inhabited by forest tribes like the Adivasis!

Deliberate inaction by Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Legislators and Governments of the Ninth Schedule and Fifth Schedule, except for Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal and Kerala Regrettably though all the states had passed land ceiling legislations by 1955, only three states enforced the land ceiling laws till date. These were Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal and Kerala, the latter two when Communist parties were ruling the two states in the mid 1960s. No other states in India have enforced the Land Ceiling Laws that they had legislated by 1955. As far as the Forests of India inhabited by the Adivasis, no Governor has ever established a Tribes Advisory Council under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution by selecting tribals living in the forests of their states in all these years since the Fifth Schedule was passed in the Constitution of India. This means that all the actions taken by the states through the Forest Department in granting mining leases in Forests where Adivasis were living in their state since 1950 are illegal and unlawful and ultravires the Constitution of India!

and a Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI M) had been formed In West Bengal. The Jotedars, as the landlords were called tried to short circuit the Land Ceiling Laws legislated by getting the revenue staff to fake landownership records! Attempts to prevent landless peasants from getting land redistributed from jotedars by ruffians of the jotedars attacking peasants led to a rebellion by the Communist cadres, who now split from the CPI M and formed an extremist faction - the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist (CPI ML). This was led by Kanu Sanyal and Charu Mazumdar.

In Jammu and Kashmir, the Chief Minister legislated Land Ceiling Laws and executed them on the ground as most of the landowners were Hindus and tenant farmers were Muslims. The only two other states that executed the Land Ceiling Laws legislated were West Bengal and Kerala, both when Communist parties were ruling the state. By then the Communist Party of India CPI had split

At the time when this revolution hit West Bengal, an independent revolution hit the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh organised by a CPI M leader Vempatapu Satyanarayana. In Andhra Pradesh however, the state government, though Land Ceiling Laws were legislated by 1955, did not implement these laws. Vempatapu Satyanarayanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s revolution was against the odds of the government not implementing the laws that their State Assembly had passed in 1955.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

GENESIS

Tribals or as they were locally called Girijans constituted about 70 per cent of the population of Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh situated on its north-eastern edge, a district of rolling hills of the Eastern Ghats, extensively wooded and with few roads. The British had generally not interfered with the state of cultivable land distribution and the rights of the tribals living in the forests of India. The only exception to this was in Srikakulam district, where the British Collectors found that the upper caste landowners and the Vaisya traders were cheating the simple Girijans of Srikakulam district. They passed executive orders that in the Agency areas of this district, where Girijans were in a majority, caste Hindus could not own land. Unfortunately, though this order was well meaning, it was observed more in the breach than as per the directions of the order. The situation after independence and the passing of the Indian Constitution in 1950 was however very different. After debates in the Constituent Assembly the Constitution of India was passed. What concern us with respect to the Maoist insurgency are two Schedules of the Constitution - the Fifth and the Ninth Schedule.

The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution Part A. General: The Governor of each state having scheduled areas therein shall annually or whenever so required by the President make a report to the President regarding the administration of the Scheduled areas and Executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to the state as to the administration of the said area. Part B: Administration and control of Scheduled areas and Scheduled Tribes: There shall be established in each state having Scheduled Areas therein and if the President so directs, also in any state having Scheduled Tribes but not Scheduled Areas a Tribes Advisory Council consisting of not more than twenty members, three-fourths shall be the representatives of the Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of the state. Provided that if the number of representatives of the Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of the state is less than the number of seats in the Tribes Advisory Council to be filled by such representatives, the remaining seats shall be filled by other members of those Tribes.

The Ninth Schedule of the Constitution This Schedule lists the list of Land Ceiling Acts passed by the different states of India in pursuance of Article 31 of the Constitution of India which deals with the compulsory acquisition of property by the state. The Srikakulam uprising of Girijans-1968: Girijans or local tribals comprised 70 per cent of the population of this forested hilly district in the north-eastern corner of Andhra Pradesh. This state was formed in 1956 by carving out Telugu speaking areas of the erstwhile Princely State of Hyderabad and part of the old Madras Presidency. Since long, the exploitation of the simple Girijans was done by the Vaisya traders who purchased the forest produce collected by the Girijans from the reserved forests of Srikakulam. The Vaisya traders generally loaned money to the Girijans and slyly inflated the amounts in their handwritten kathas. The Girijans did not know to read and write and taking advantage of this the Vaisya traders slyly inflated the figures of money loaned

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

and when the Girijans expressed their inability to clear the loans, the Vaisyas generally seized the pieces of land that was being used by the Girijans to grow some crops. In this way most of the lands that were owned by the Girijans passed into the hands of the upper caste plainsmen. Where Girijans worked as labour in the lands of the plainsmen, they were paid subsistence wages. In 1967, one Vempatapu Satyanarayana an upper caste who had become a communist began to organise the Girijans. He began moving round with a band of Girijan followers and began forcing the upper caste landowners to pay better wages to the Girijans. As a result the landlords were forced to pay higher wages to the Girijan labourers. The movement was able to make substantial gains for the poor Girijans. Wages of farm servants rose, the landlord’s share of the harvest was reduced from 2/3 to 1/3. 2000 acres of land was wrested from the landlords and more than 5,000 acres of waste land came under the possession of the Girijans. Then on 31 0ctober 1967 a clash took place between a group of Girijans going for a meeting of the Communist Party Marxist and a group of landlords. The landlords had guns and they shot at the crowd of Girijans and killed two tribals. The Girijans were incensed and their movement became violent. Vempatapu Satyanarayana organised the Girijans into Guerilla squads or dalams. At this stage, the CPI M broke away from the parent body and became the CPI ML. Subsequently there was a series of raids on houses of landlords and moneylenders; their houses were burnt down and cash looted. There were a number of encounters with the Police. From December 1968 to January 1968 twenty nine policemen were killed in encounters with the dalams of the CPI ML. Charu Majumdar, the CPI ML leader from West Bengal visited Srikakulam and gave a fillip to the movement. During 1969, the Naxalites committed 23 murders and 40 dacoities all of upper caste landlords and their minions. On 11 May 1969, a landlord P Jammu Naidu of Ethamanuguda was killed and slogans painted with his blood by the members of the dalam that killed him. He was a notorious landlord, who had grabbed the land of the tribals and forcibly taken the daughters of the tribals as his wives. When he was killed he had seven wives, two of whom were little girls he had forcibly taken from the tribals. What is surprising is that the state government sought police action as a reply to the rebellion of the tribal and scheduled caste peasants of this district. Instead of introspecting and seeing that the land ceiling laws were enforced in the district, the state government deployed police force and crushed the rebellion. Vempatapu Satyanarayana and several members of his dalams were killed in an encounter with the Police. Neither the politicians, nor their servile bureaucrats and Police officers spoke out on the caste atrocities on the scheduled castes and scheduled tribals of Srikakulam. No land ceiling laws were enforced, nor was any Tribes Advisory Council formed in a district where the tribal population was 79 per cent of the total population. Till today there is a thunderous silence on this blatant violation of the Constitution of India and the law of the land.

No Governor has ever established a Tribes Advisory Council under the provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution by selecting tribals living in the forests of their states in all these years since the Fifth Schedule was passed in the Constitution of India. This means that all the actions taken by the states through the Forest Department in granting mining leases in Forests where Adivasis were living in their state since 1950 are illegal and unlawful and ultravires the Constitution of India

Peoples War Group - Andhra Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra

Pradesh,

The Girijan awakening in Srikakulam had preceded the Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal. The Naxalbari insurgency had broken out in West Bengal, despite the fact that it was one of only three states that enforced the Land Ceiling legislation as per the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. In West Bengal, the Jotedars or landlords in order to get around the Land Ceiling Laws enforced tried to conceal their land holdings by bribing the Revenue employees. This upset the landless masses who were waiting for the enforcement of the Land Ceiling orders. When they found the Jotedars trying to subvert the Land Ceiling legislation, they took the law into their hands and a rebellion of sorts was sparked off. This was controlled but the Land Ceiling Laws were enforced in parts of West Bengal. In Andhra however the upper castes were entrenched and after the uprising of Vempatapu Satyanarayana was controlled and the leaders killed in Police encounters, all the lands taken by the Girijans were returned to the landlords by the government and the Girijans put in their place. The creation of the CPI ML threw up another Andhra leader - Kondapalli Seetharamiah. He reorganised the scheduled castes and tribals in Telangana area - north Andhra Pradesh, particularly the wild area bordering Madhya Pradesh and Odisha. In ten years his Peoples War Group virtually controlled north Andhra Pradesh and the Police lost control of the area. The basic reason for the rise of this group was the continued exploitation of the tribals by the landlords and government officials specially those of the Forest Department. The tribals owning small pieces of land were expropriated and share-croppers impoverished. They were all kept under perpetual bondage towards repayment of a small debt supposedly taken generations ago. Forest wealth was freely smuggled out by contractors in connivance with the forest staff. The tribals got neither a remunerative price for their produce nor a fair wage for their labour. The social dimensions of exploitation were far more revolting. The landlords of the region were commonly known as doras. C Lokeswara Rao has described the high handedness of the doras. The tyranny of doras in Telangana was unmatched. Tribal girls working on the dora’s land were forcibly taken in his household and were at the disposal of the master and his guests. She was forced to have abortions when she got pregnant. Naxalite songs were replete with references to rape by landlords and to girls growing up with the knowledge of the inevitability of rape that awaited them.

Kondapalli Seetharamiah organised the scheduled castes farm workers and the Scheduled tribes in north Telangana and on 20 April 1980 formed the Peoples War Group (PWG). After a meeting of 30,000 tribals who had gathered for a meeting called by the Peoples War Group was disrupted by police and 13 Gond Tribals were killed in police firing. Kondapalli Seetharamiah reorganised and soon had 50 armed dalams operating in the area. The police were soon outmatched and the PWG redistributed nearly half a million acres across Andhra Pradesh. The modus operandi was to forcibly occupy excess land of big landowners and give them away to the landless or to the labourers working for the landlord. As per the state government’s own admission counter affidavit 58/82 filed by the state against unknown Naxalites the radicals had forcibly redistributed 80,000 acres of agricultural land and 20,000 acres of forest land. The Court ordered the land to be returned to the landlords. The interesting question in this transaction was why the honourable judge did not go into the question of the first illegality of why the state did not enforce the Land Ceiling Law passed under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution and how and why were the landlords holding such vast areas of land totally in violation of the Land Ceiling Law passed by the state government in pursuance of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. I happened to be posted in Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad from 1986 to 1990 in the Central Bureau of Investigation. My batchmate was the then DIG Intelligence and I studied the Naxalite Insurgency in Andhra Pradesh then. I was asked to meet the then Revenue Minister of Andhra Pradesh by my batchmate when the Minister heard that I had been trained in Counter-Insurgency and had some experience of handling insurgencies in the north-east. When asked by the Revenue Minister how to solve this problem I answered that the problem could be solved easily and the solution was in the hands of the state government. The Minister appeared surprised and leant forward asking me about the solution. I answered that the state should immediately enforce the Land Ceiling Law legislated by the state. The Minister was taken aback and then angrily replied -”It is impossible to enforce the Land Ceiling Law.” Herein is the root cause of the Naxalite Maoist Insurgency. The state is not willing to enforce the laws of the land, because it will take away land from the upper caste landlords. This unlawful action of the government has created the space in which the Marxist and now the Maoist party has moved in and taken up the fight against an unlawful and illegal government.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

UNEQUAL FIGHT?

T Manvendra Singh The writer is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. He is a well known defence journalist and columnist. He was member of Indian parliament till 2009 from one of the largest constituencies in Rajasthan. Lithe, lean and highly mobile forces are the order of the day. And all backed by the highest levels of technology for intelligence and interdiction. Currently this is an unequal fight, heavily loaded in favour of Naxal insurgents since they’re operating in a terrain of their choice. The tables have to be turned on them and that can only be done by using the same tactics as they employ. Stealth and guile is the way insurgents operate anywhere and everywhere. The same must be employed against the Naxals if success is to be guaranteed. For that to happen an innovative leadership has to be in place. In the current method of policing and its structures this is not happening. So lives continue to be lost and the Naxals remain dominant in the news

What is required, therefore, is a specialised police force which does not operate in the manner of conventional forces - large, loud and lethargic. The Andhra Police put together one called the Greyhounds which appears to have a fair degree of success against the Naxals in that state. Lessons learnt from there need to be replicated and enhanced, in the neighbouring areas affected by the same violence. But for some inexplicable reasons these are not being done

he Union of India and its constituent states have yet not been able to get the upper hand against the Naxals terrorising large swathes of the country. The impunity with which the various Naxal groups can strike across the country reflects very poorly on the efficacy of counter-Naxal strategy and basic tactics. Devoid of both these essentials the campaign against the Naxals flounders and sputters. Large number of lives are lost, key public figures in affected areas kidnapped, thus giving a helpless look to the campaign. In fact there is no effective campaign worth the name. Different states are pursuing their own isolated strategies, forgetting for the moment that ideologies and terrorists don’t recognise administrative and political boundaries. The Naxal ideology is all about the disintegration of India, which, therefore, makes it incumbent on the states and the Government of India to get their act sorted out, together.

Currently this is an unequal fight, heavily loaded in favour of Naxal insurgents since they’re operating in a terrain of their choice. The tables have to be turned on them and that can only be done by using the same tactics as they employ. Stealth and guile is the way insurgents operate anywhere and everywhere. The same must be employed against the Naxals if success is to be guaranteed. For that to happen an innovative leadership has to be in place. In the current method of policing and its structures this is not happening The first requirement in fighting Naxal terrorism and all other insurgencies, is an enhanced intelligence network. In this game there has to be better coordination between the central and state agencies. The continuing row over a National Counter-Terrorism Centre notwithstanding, both entities have to be in sync with each other to stamp out this threat. The NCTC idea may well be a national requirement, but there are basic flaws in its current design. Unless the primacy of operational responsibility resides with the states there is scope of improving the functioning of institutions. The onus, therefore, should be on capacity building in the states. And in that the first steps should be on enhanced intelligence capabilities. The requirement is both, human and technical skills. Both cannot function without the other. The human element of intelligence augments the technical capabilities and vice versa. Without the human input and output any technical intelligence is of no use. Which only goes on to prove that both the state and the central agencies have to complement each other, rather than living in isolation. There is already a fair amount of coordination, but what is required is greater real time sharing.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

It doesn’t take much, for example, to have a fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles loitering over the heartland of Naxalism. They could be providing real time visuals, as well as picking up radio transmissions of Naxal cadres. At a later stage the UAV could well pick out important targets if they were to be armed. But for this to happen, the country needs to raise the bar on operational efficacy. It must realise, first and foremost, that the resources put in place do not have the requisite skills, acumen, training and tactics to handle an operational obligation as vast and important as countering the Naxals. The state and central police forces deployed in counter-Naxal operations do not have the skills and training to match the cunning of the Maoists in the jungles. It is not that the Naxals are any superior force or beings when it comes to operations. They are simply using common sense tactics when taking on the might of the Indian state. Which, on the other hand, is not using any of the basic perquisites of common sense in its counter-insurgency tactics. The Naxals operate within the parameters of an unequal fight, knowing that the resources available to them are limited when compared to that of the state. Within this matrix they make do with the resources available to them in the most cost-effective manner possible. This is not rocket science, but simply the first lesson in mounting an insurgency, or a war of subversion. Hence the use of ambushes in a place, time and method, that enhances their survivability vis-à-vis the police forces deployed against them. This is what all insurgent groups do and this is also how all police forces suffer. India has not learnt the lessons in this respect, at all. What is required, therefore, is a specialised police force which does not operate in the manner of conventional forces - large, loud and lethargic. The Andhra Police put together one called the Greyhounds which appears to have a fair degree of success against the Naxals in that state. Lessons learnt from there need to be replicated and enhanced, in the neighbouring areas affected by the same violence. But for some inexplicable reasons these are not being done. Ego, for one, cannot be the reason that creates this disconnect between what is an operational necessity and the absence of its application. The biggest shortcoming seen in the various police forces deployed, of the states or the central ones, is the sheer non-existence of an operational leadership. By this is meant a leadership that is seamlessly connected from the field to the headquarter level and which understands the ethos of operations from the first step taken. This does not exist within the police forces, on account of duality of induction and command. An over-age company

Get the tactic right T

he state and central police forces deployed in counter-Naxal operations do not have the skills and training to match the cunning of the Maoists in the jungles. What is required, therefore, is a specialised police force which does not operate in the manner of conventional forces - large, loud and lethargic. The Andhra Police put together one called the Greyhounds. Currently this is an unequal fight, heavily loaded in favour of Naxal insurgents since they’re operating in a terrain of their choice. The tables have to be turned on them and that can only be done by using the same tactics as they employ. Stealth and guile is the way insurgents operate anywhere and everywhere. The same must be employed against the Naxals if success is to be guaranteed. For that to happen an innovative leadership has to be in place.

commander cannot be understood by a Director General who hasn’t the basic knowledge of counter-insurgency operations. Conventional wisdom makes them follow the principle of massed manpower, in effect a reverse of Mao’s dictum. But that is a contradiction when it comes to counter-insurgency operations. Lithe, lean and highly mobile forces are the order of the day. And all backed by the highest levels of technology for intelligence and interdiction. Currently this is an unequal fight, heavily loaded in favour of Naxal insurgents since they’re operating in a terrain of their choice. The tables have to be turned on them and that can only be done by using the same tactics as they employ. Stealth and guile is the way insurgents operate anywhere and everywhere. The same must be employed against the Naxals if success is to be guaranteed. For that to happen an innovative leadership has to be in place. In the current method of policing and its structures this is not happening. So lives continue to be lost and the Naxals remain dominant in the news.

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RESPONSE OPTIONS

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. The basic problem today is the glaring disconnect between the central government and its own ruling party. The government seems convinced of the need to tackle this violence firmly. No less a personage than the PM himself has repeatedly called LWE the most serious threat to our Internal Security. Till 2006-07, however, the Home Ministry itself (under the instigation of the Party) was in a state of complete and total denial. It simply refused to acknowledge that such an LWE problem existed. The Party and its ultra-liberal ideologues have invented a whole new discourse to frame this problem in purely socio-economic terms. The harsh reality is that the Party, under the influence of a whole range of foreign funded NGOs and high profile liberal intellectuals has insisted that LWE is primarily a problem of depriviation and displacement and all that it needs is a dose of development for it to vanish like a mirage

he basic problem in tackling the Maoist insurgency today is the glaring disconnect between the central government and its own ruling party. The government seems convinced of the need to tackle this violence firmly. Yet till 2006-07, the Home Ministry (under the instigation of the Party) was in a state of complete and total denial. The Party, under the influence of a whole range of foreign funded NGOs and high profile liberal intellectuals, has insisted that LWE is primarily a problem of deprivation and displacement and all that it needs is a dose of development for it to vanish like a mirage. What is ignored in the bargain, unfortunately, is the fact that today Maoism has metamorphosed into a serious Internal Security threat. There are some 15,000 armed terrorists, a large number of whom have lethal expertise in using IEDs to cause mass casualties. A quantitative comparison would help define the scale and magnitude of the problem. The total number of terrorists that Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ISI maintained in Jammu and Kashmir never exceeded 3,500-4,000. The level of armed violence has reached such disturbing proportions that to treat it purely as a socio-economic problem would now be a tragic error. With 15,000 armed cadres and a Peoples Guerilla Liberation Army in place, to ignore its major security implications would indeed be tragically shortsighted. We need an urgent clarity of response and a National Level Perspective Plan for the next 20 years that synthesises the Military, Police, Developmental and Perception Management components of this vital campaign. Decades of CI experience cannot be stood on its head. The Police and CPOs will have to get over a penchant for re-inventing the wheel and rely on tried and tested operational methodologies. The manpower resources to establish a proper CI grid will simply have to be found. We need to urgently establish a proper CI grid. A proper CI campaign must then be launched based on our historic experience of these operations to give effect to the Clear, Hold and Build strategy that has only been talked about so far.

n the post War period, India has one of the richest funds of experience in terms of tackling Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC). It has successfully tamed tribal insurgencies in Mizoram, Tripura and Assam and a vicious Terrorist Movement in Punjab. The back of the terrorist movement in Jammu and Kashmir has been largely broken and Nagaland and Manipur have been largely reduced to extortion rackets. With this vast fund of experience in tackling LIC, one would have thought that the Indian state would have reacted in a most professional and concerted manner to the rising tide of LWE.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

INDIA'S MAOIST INSURGENCY: NEED FOR STRATEGIC CLARITY

It is amazing therefore, to see a complete lack of strategic clarity on the issue of tackling LWE. The basic problem stems from Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s indecisiveness in defining the very nature and scope of the Maoist movement. The state in India seems to betray a complete lack of institutional memory of how such previous conflicts were tackled and tamed in the past. There is a strange tendency to ignore the accumulated bank of experience and lurch into an inchoate process of re-inventing the wheel. It was as if India had not fought a single CI campaign before. This is confounded with a strange new discourse of ultra-liberalism. The basic problem today is the glaring disconnect between the central government and its own ruling party. The government seems convinced of the need to tackle this violence firmly. No less a personage than the PM himself has repeatedly called LWE the most serious threat to our Internal Security. Till 2006-07, however, the Home Ministry itself (under the instigation of the Party) was in a state of complete and total denial. It simply refused to acknowledge that such an LWE problem existed. The Party and its ultra-liberal ideologues have invented a whole new discourse to frame this problem in purely socio-economic terms. The harsh reality is that the Party, under the influence of a whole range of foreign funded NGOs and high profile liberal intellectuals has insisted that LWE is primarily a problem of depriviation and displacement and all that it needs is a dose of development for it to vanish like a mirage. What is ignored in the bargain, unfortunately, is the fact that today Maoism has metamorphosed into a serious Internal Security threat. There are some 15,000 armed terrorists, a large number of whom have lethal expertise in using IEDs to cause mass casualties. A quantitative comparison would help define the scale and magnitude of the problem.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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RESPONSE OPTIONS

The total number of terrorists that Pakistan’s ISI maintained in Jammu and Kashmir never exceeded 3,500-4,000. Whatever number the Security Forces (SF) killed each year, the ISI simply replaced. It took us 20 years and a massive Fence on the LC to stop the infiltration and reduce the number of terrorists down to a manageable 300 today. The Maoists today have nearly ten times the number of armed cadres operating in the jungle tracts of some 8 states of the Union. For quite some time the fiction was maintained that the Maoists are patriots per se. Some called them Gandhians with guns whatever that oxymoron means. At the very least they are not supposed to be secessionists. A closer look at the Maoist Strategy document however dispels this fanciful notion. The Maoists are engaged in alliances with the so called ongoing “nationality struggles” (euphemisms for religious extremists in Jammu and Kashmir and Tribal insurgents in the north-east). They are in touch with the Communists in Nepal. What is cause for positive alarm now is their recent contacts with the ISI and Chinese Intelligence.

The state must launch concerted psychological-initiatives to mould popular perceptions and win tribal hearts and minds. It must highlight the failed nature of the ideology that the Maoists are trying to impose on our country by overthrowing the democratic state. This psy-campaign must be launched on multiple media channels that have adequate reach and penetration in these areas. Transistors must be exploited to the optimum and solar Panel based TV sets made available in large numbers so as to reach every hamlet. At the very least, the state must stop providing its official channels to Maoist sympathisers and overground elements to carry on their propaganda on state channels Fortunately the 26/11 disaster forced the exit of Mr Shivraj Patil and his unduly soft approach to all forms of armed violence in the Indian polity. Mr Chidambaram took energetic steps to take on the Maoists thereafter. He mobilised some

72 Battalions of the CRPF besides other CAPFs to assist the Naxal affected states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra and West Bengal. 34 districts in these 8 states were earmarked for Integrated Security and Development Action Plan. 55 most affected districts were brought under the Backward Districts Initiative. In essence it seemed a sensible combination of concerted Police action and developmental initiatives. Mr Chidambaram however was immediately set upon by his own Party. Mr Digvijay Singh openly criticised his approach as a purely law and order response that did not cater for the problems of the tribals. This criticism was echoed by Mr Mani Shankar Aiyyar and other liberals. There was a virtual barrage of strident criticism in the media. This friction seriously hampered and fettered the state response. In the interim, the Maoist problem had become greatly aggravated. Even as the nation was engaged in interminable debates on the causes of this problem, the consequences were becoming serious. Even Mr Chidambaram’s grandiosely named Operation Green Hunt, sadly, came in as too little - too late. It had not been thought through and Mr Chidambaram himself complained of the limited mandate that had been given to him. Given the scale of the problem it was definitely underestimated and under-resourced.

Absence of a CI grid The Indian Army had borrowed the CI grid approach of the north-east from the British Templar Model of Malaya. It first and foremost seeks to secure the lines of communication and the major population centres. Given the Force to Space ratio, the Police and CAPFs were too few in number to establish a classical CI grid. The police therefore debunked the CI grid Model all together and resorted instead to “armed sweeps” as show of force operations. These can at best achieve temporary nutralisation. The CRPF and BSF unfortunately are not structured, trained or equipped for such offensive CI Operations in such dense jungle terrain. It was unfair to ask them to do so. The CRPF suffered heavy casualties in the

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

bargain. In one ambush alone it lost 76 personnel along with their arms and ammunition. The initial bluster and optimism faded rapidly. The CAPFs thereafter went into a defensive sulk. Headquarters in Delhi tried to assume minute by minute control and major emphasis was now placed on casualty avoidance. This seriously curtailed offensive operations and the emphasis shifted to saving face and casualties. Fortunately a new DG CRPF, who had led operations against the Brigand Veerappan, took personal charge and mercifully got his harried troopers moving again by personally leading operations. However, the real problems are systemic and structural. The Kargil Report designated the CRPF as the lead CI Force of the country without going into its operational ethos and structure. CRPF, so far, is primarily an add-on law and order force that is adequate for election duties, communal riots and such lower grade contingencies. It is excellent for static guard duties and defensive operations. It is simply not structured or trained for offensive CI Operations. For one, it operates at the Company level. The Battalion Commander just concerns himself with logistics and administration, for his troops are placed at the disposal of the local SSP. Unlike in the Army, CRPF units do not function as battalions and Commandants do not lead from the front. Only a Battalion based force can undertake coherent CI Operations. This cannot be done by isolated Companies. The CRPF relies upon civilian contractors for its logistics support. These contractors have to pay extortion money to the Maoists to deliver rations and provisions! With lines of communication not secured, relief of troops for leave, mail etc. becomes a severe problem. All these are seriously detrimental to morale in sustained operations. The policy of no turnovers of units will add to the strain. The liberal media and the Maoist propagandists in the meantime have been shrill in their human rights accusations and have largely succeeded in demonising the Security Forces and putting further brakes on their operations. The Party now stepped in to ask the hands on Home Minister to step

back and not take ownership of these operations. To score political brownie points, they exhorted him to blame this on the states on the plea that Law and Order is a state subject. Coalition governments have, as it is, weakened the centre and this has led states to assert themselves. This has been highly detrimental to the synergy and coordination that is so badly needed to coordinate operations between some eight states and the centre. Playing politics with such a serious problem could be an invitation to a national disaster. Despite a plethora of Coordination Committees (including the Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxal Affected states) no decision has so far been reached on the simple issue of hot pursuit operations across state borders. India has not been able to undertake hot pursuit operations against terrorists operating from across the LC or IB. However not being able to do so beyond the boundaries of our own provinces is simply amazing!

The Kargil Report designated the CRPF as the lead CI Force of the country without going into its operational ethos and structure. CRPF, so far, is primarily an add-on law and order force that is adequate for election duties, communal riots and such lower grade contingencies. It is excellent for static guard duties and defensive operations. It is simply not structured or trained for offensive CI Operations. For one, it operates at the Company level. The Battalion Commander just concerns himself with logistics and administration, for his troops are placed at the disposal of the local SSP. Unlike in the Army, CRPF units do not function as battalions and Commandants do not lead from the front. Only a Battalion based force can undertake coherent CI Operations. This cannot be done by isolated Companies. The CRPF relies upon civilian contractors for its logistics support. These contractors have to pay extortion money to the Maoists to deliver rations and provisions! With lines of communication not secured, relief of troops for leave, mail etc. becomes a severe problem. All these are seriously detrimental to morale in sustained operation

Despite exhortations from his own Party, the Home Minister has shown the vision and maturity not to give up ownership of these operations. Given the scale of the problem, the centre has to provide the lead and the resources. However, the NCTC setback has highlighted the need for greater interaction and consultations with the states. This is a National problem and calls for a highly concerted and coordinated National Response. The Maoists are now engaged in expanding the Red Corridor to the Western Ghats and down to the forest tracts of Karnataka. They are also trying to make inroads into the industrial belt of the Golden Corridor formed by Mumbai-Pune-Ahmedabad belt. They have set up an extortion economy worth over Rs 1,500 crore annually and are now into kidnapping and drugs. They have established contact with the Jammu and Kashmir terrorists, the NE insurgents, Pakistan’s ISI as well as the Chinese intelligence.

The problem of origins The country in the meantime remains bogged down in metaphysical debates about the problems of the origins of the Maoist insurgency where the JNU professors and bleeding heart liberals have a field day. A brief historical analysis would be in order here. India was unified in the past by three empires of sub-continental reach - The Mauryan, the Mughal and the British Empire. The present Republic is a successor entity of the British Empire. All three empires of the past found that the tribal areas were subsistence

economies that could not generate any surplus revenue. Hence they did not find it worth the cost to make administrative and infrastructural inroads into the tribal areas. As such they allowed the forest tribes to live in splendid isolation. The British encouraged the isolation of the tribes and even tried to convert many of them - so as to sharpen the identity cleavages. They tried to give them separate electorates to further deepen their marginalisation and separation from the mainstream. Post independence we continued with the policy of splendid isolation that preserved the tribes as museum pieces.

From a purely socio-economic problem today it has become aggravated into a serious law and order problem and a security threat to the state. Now genuine development can only be possible if the state reclaims these areas first and re-imposes the rule of law. Only then can it create an environment for its developmental agencies to function. Otherwise like Alex Menon and Krishna, sincere Collectors and legislators will keep getting abducted and the state will have to simply keep opening the portals of its Jails Today, the harsh reality is that over 80 per cent of India’s mineral resources of Iron, Aluminum, Copper and Coal are located in these Tribal tracts. As such an industrialising Indian state has simply no option but to carry out administrative and infrastructural penetration of these historically neglected areas.

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RESPONSE OPTIONS

Lack of infrastructural penetration had largely led to a total absence of governance. Industrialisation and mining of these areas however did not lead to any development for the tribals. They were mostly uprooted and displaced from their traditional habitats and their depriviation was made worse by ruthless exploitation by contracters, moneylenders and the other exploitative elements. The failure to enforce land reforms has compounded the problem. All this is true. The historical neglect and lack of infrastructural penetration has now led to the Maoist insurgency. The unfortunate problem now is that this insurgency has now acquired a critical mass and has become very lethal and widespread. The writ of the Indian state has ceased to run in these areas. The Maoists are trying to impose a failed Communist ideology on the country. The pity is this ideology failed in Russia and has been disowned in China. The Maoists, in trying to uproot the democratic state, are peddling a solution worse than the disease. Maoist ideology had led to the extermination of some 20 million Chinese and horrific slaughters amounting to large scale genocide in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge. From a purely socio-economic problem today it has become aggravated into a serious law and order problem and a security threat to the state. Now genuine development can only be possible if the state reclaims these areas first and re-imposes the rule of law. Only then can it create an environment for its develpemental agencies to function. Otherwise like Alex Menon and Krishna, sincere Collectors and legislators will keep getting abducted and the state will have to simply keep opening the portals of its Jails.

Despite a plethora of Coordination Committees (including the Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxal Affected states) no decision has so far been reached on the simple issue of hot pursuit operations across state borders. India has not been able to undertake hot pursuit operations against terrorists operating from across the LC or IB. However not being able to do so beyond the boundaries of our own provinces is simply amazing!

Matrix of response options Command and control attrition: The most successful component of the Maoist Counter-Insurgency Strategy so far has been the targeting of its very narrow, Urban (and largely Andhrite) leadership base. Out of some 13 members of the Politburo, only 6 are alive today. This has considerably slowed down their operations and imposed caution. It is vital that this Command and Control attrition should be intensified. If necessary, the NSG and Army Special Forces could also be co-opted for this task as a national priority.

The Indian Army had borrowed the CI grid approach of the north-east from the British Templar Model of Malaya. It first and foremost seeks to secure the lines of communication and the major population centres. Given the Force to Space ratio, the Police and CAPFs were too few in number to establish a classical CI grid. The police therefore debunked the CI grid Model all together and resorted instead to “armed sweeps” as show of force operations. These can at best achieve temporary nutralisation. The CRPF and BSF unfortunately are not structured, trained or equipped for such offensive CI Operations in such dense jungle terrain. It was unfair to ask them to do so Building comm. infrastructure: The Maoist problem’s primary origin lies in a lack of infrastructural penetration of our forest tracts which in turn leads to the absence of administrative penetration. The primary cause of the success in Andhra was a rapid addition to the road network. Better infrastructure there allowed the Police to prevail. We thereafter have to ensure that operational planning is focused on facilitating a very rapid creation of communication infrastructure into the Red Corridor. Intensive sweep operations must clear the path for road building and a CI grid must be established to secure these road arteries at the earliest. Establishment of CI grid: Decades of CI experience cannot be stood on its head. The Police and CPOs will have to get over a penchant for re-inventing

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

the wheel and rely on tried and tested operational methodologies. The manpower resources to establish a proper CI grid will simply have to be found. It would be essential to critically examine the performance of our CAPFs (Central Armed Police Forces). So far the exchange rate or the casualty ratio has hovered around a worrisome 1:1 or below it. An optimal casualty ratio between insurgents and counter-insurgents is 1:5. In Jammu and Kashmir in the peak period of 2001-02, the Army had achieved casualty ratio of 1:7 which broke the back of the terrorists. We need to honestly monitor the performance of our CAPFs and Police. Employment of the army: The Army is understandably not keen to get involved as this is a heartland and not a Rim land insurgency and will take it far from the borders it is supposed to guard. It will have a very adverse impact on mobilisation timings for war. Besides the current Political dispensation’s penchant for cheap popularity with the Bleeding heart NGOs would lead it to first use the Army and then blame it for all the NGO orchestrated outcry on HR violations. These foreign funded NGOs would do their best to ensure that the Army is demonised and its operations de-legitimised. Nevertheless, unless the CAPF performance improves drastically in the near term, we may soon have no option left but to employ the last resort option of the Army. Options for that could be as under: Partial employment: Use upto two divisions of the Army in the core 8 districts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Maharashtra. These would be in addition to the 80-90 odd CAPF Units deployed there presently. Complete involvement: Rapidly raise 6 additional Mountain Divisions. These could be ultimately employed in the Himalayas as strike corps in the Mountains. However (on the analogy of Op Bajrang and Op Rhino in Assam) these could be used for an initial two to three years against the Maoists in the Core areas. These would establish a proper CI grid and take under command the Police and CAPFs

currently involved. At least 40 per cent of the new raisings must be recruited from the tribal areas to suck out the Recruitable Male population (RMP) from these areas and provide gainful employment. A proper CI campaign must be launched based on our historic experience of these operations to give effect to the Clear, Hold and Build strategy that has only been talked about so far. The simple fact is that without a proper CI grid, there is no area domination worth the name. It is noteworthy that Alex was abducted just 4 kms from the CRPF post. The operating force should be able to secure its own lines of supply and run its convoys on the roads. It must be able to distribute free rations to the tribals rather than doing local purchase for its men in a subsistence economy. The Chinese had made that mistake in Tibet and paid a heavy price for it. Subsistence economies will break down completely if they have to support large scale deployment of forces from local resources alone.

Mr Chidambaram took energetic steps to take on the Maoists thereafter. He mobilised some 72 Battalions of the CRPF besides other CAPFs to assist the Naxal affected states of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra and West Bengal. 34 districts in these 8 states were earmarked for Integrated Security and Development Action Plan. 55 most affected districts were brought under the Backward Districts Initiative. In essence it seemed a sensible combination of concerted Police action and developmental initiatives. Mr Chidambaram however was immediately set upon by his own Party Educational infrastructure: Education and skills development is a key aspect for the emancipation of the tribal population. It will empower them and make them employable by the industries and mining corporations that are coming into those areas. An immediate Op Sadbhavna clone model should be launched where every CAPF Company builds and supports the functioning of at least a Primary School in its operational area-and each Battalion a Secondary level School. Sector HQs could

build at least one High School and a skills centre. This will help win hearts and minds and counter Naxal propaganda that subverts the tribal masses. Literacy rates amongst the tribals are the lowest in the country and female literacy is the worst. The Maoists are recruiting females and this sexual exploitation can only be curtailed by the spread of education which will lead to employment in the local mines and industries.

For quite some time the fiction was maintained that the Maoists are patriots per se. Some called them Gandhians with gunswhatever that oxymoron means. At the very least they are not supposed to be secessionists. A closer look at the Maoist Strategy document however dispels this fanciful notion. The Maoists are engaged in alliances with the so called ongoing “nationality struggles” (euphemisms for religious extremists in Jammu and Kashmir and Tribal insurgents in the north-east). They are in touch with the Communists in Nepal. What is cause for positive alarm now is their recent contacts with the ISI and Chinese Intelligence Perception management: The state must launch concerted psychological-initiatives to mould popular perceptions and win tribal hearts and minds. It must highlight the failed nature of the ideology that the Maoists are trying to impose on our country by overthrowing the democratic state. This psy-campaign must be launched on multiple media channels that have adequate reach and penetration in these areas. Transistors must be exploited to the optimum and solar panel based TV sets made available in large numbers so as to reach every hamlet. At the very least, the state must stop providing its official channels to Maoist sympathisers and overground elements to carry on their propaganda on state channels. Perspective plans: There is a need for the MHA to draw up a long term perspective plan to tackle the Maoist Insurgency both at the tactical level and the developmental plane. The Maoist insurgency now affects 233 districts or 37 per cent of the Indian population. 45 districts are

badly affected and need an urgent Law and Order Response to restore the writ of the state. It would be important to head off the incipient insurgency in the 187 districts that have been touched by Maoist inroads but not in a major fashion so far. This calls for focusing development activities here in a concerted manner that heads off the incipient Insurgency - even as we fight it in the badly affected districts. Road infrastructure must be created in these areas before they come in the grip of armed insurgency. The concept of the “Peace dividend” for the pacified districts must be kept in mind. As the areas of insurgency are cleared and held by a CI grid, the Civil Administration must follow closely and deliver development and progress in a visible way that is self-evident to the local population. All districts that get pacified should reap the peace dividend.

Conclusion As they come under pressure in the core areas of the Red Corridor, the Maoist response will be to widen the area of the conflict so that the Force to Space ratio remains quite adverse for the Security Forces. Already there is a perceptible ongoing shift from Chhattisgarh to Jharkhand (even as they had earlier been displaced from Andhra Pradesh) as also a widening of the Red Corridor to include the Western Ghats and the forests of Karnataka plus the industrial belt of Mumbai - Pune - Ahmedabad. This Insurgency is now spread over some 45 districts with some 232 districts (or 37 per cent of the population) affected in varying degrees. The level of armed violence has reached such disturbing proportions that to treat it purely as a socio-economic problem would now be a tragic error. With 15,000 armed cadres and a Peoples Guerilla Liberation Army in place, to ignore its major security implications would indeed be tragically shortsighted. We need an urgent clarity of response and a National level Perspective Plan for the next 20 years that synthesises the Military, Police, Developmental and Perception Management components of this vital campaign. We have little time to waste as external threats and developments could soon take away our capacity to deal with this problem effectively.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

EXEMPLAR

Amitabh Thakur, IPS The writer is an IPS officer from UP cadre. He is also associated with a civil society National RTI Forum working in the field of accountable governance. It is quite important to tackle Naxalism in the beginning. Ballia was fortunate that the Police there acted in time and before the Naxalites could make their permanent stronghold in the district, the Police had acted in such a swift manner that the naxalites lost much of their ground. The key to any naxal movement has to be people’s participation, people’s contact and people’s faith. In Ballia, the police was successful in overcoming this menace only because they made people’s participation the key focus of their planning and activities

ore often than not, it is thought that the only government department linked directly with Naxalism is Police. Though this is not true and we all know that Naxalism as a problem has many facets, many roots, many reasons and many vistas. In fact, Naxalism is more an offshoot of the inherent socio-politico-economic situations which finally manifest themselves in the shape of Naxalism. Hence, Naxalism can be considered as a symptom of some deep-rooted maladies in the society which come to the fore in the shape of violent Naxal movements. At the same time there can be no denying that it is the Police department that has to primarily deal with Naxalism. There could be hundreds of government agencies whose performance and non-performance, omissions and commissions resulted in Naxalism coming into being, but all these departments remain in the sidelines and the department that finally comes to the fore is the Police department. In sum, the problem of Naxalism finally takes the shape of a Police problem and is recognised and accepted in the same manner. There are many instances where violent movements like Naxalism have been dealt with successfully by the counter Police actions. We have seen in our own country how the legendary K P S Gill, the ex DGP of Punjab almost single-handedly became the driving force to counter the extreme Sikh terrorism in Punjab. Similarly, there are many lesser known examples of police officers successfully countering these violent mass movements through their hard and honest pursuits. It is also true that if a police officer is honest about his intentions and is taking up his work with the required sincerity and seriousness, he can make a lot of impact in curbing and checking many such violent mass upsurges, including Naxalism. The only requirement is to have honest, sincere and dedicated outlook. No mass movement or any violent activity that involves people at a larger scale can be successfully curbed unless the people power is not used in the counter-offensive. It needs to be an equally systematic, cleverly planned and deeply entrenched in the masses. A massive participation of the masses is the only way through which any adequate and visible dent can be made as regards the problem of Naxalism. Having made this generalised introduction, I will bring myself to the specific reference of District Ballia. Ballia is a far off district in Uttar Pradesh. It is located in the eastern side of this vast state and it juts into a great extent

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Naxalism and Police:

Object Lesson from Ballia ----------------------------------------------------------------------

n instructive case study of how the early Maoist upsurge in Ballia district of UP was tackled by an intelligent and effective combination

of energetic police action and winning over the local population. The writer highlights how the Maoists are constantly trying to spread their movement into areas where the terrain is difficult, the population poor and exploited. The Maoists carry out a meticulous analysis of the physical and human terrain and are constantly trying to expand their area of operations so that they can over extend and tire out the security forces. Their recent spread into the Western Ghats of Karnataka is a pertinent example.

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EXEMPLAR

in the neighbouring state of Bihar. This district has Baxar, Bhojpur and Chhapra as its neighbouring districts in Bihar and Mau, Gazipur and Deoria as the surrounding districts in Uttar Pradesh. The district has two big rivers the Sarayu and the Ganga surrounding it from two sides, one in the north and another in the south, both of which meet at a place near Sitab Diyara, the birth place of Jayaprakash Narayan, the man responsible for the Total Revolution of 1975.

It is not necessary that Naxal movement will be started only by the local people. As was later found in Ballia, most of the Naxal leaders were outsiders, mostly from their cadres, who had come to Ballia finding it a fertile land for their activities and had later recruited and incorporated a few of the local people The district is generally densely populated but some of its pockets, particularly those on the riverside are quite scantily populated. The primary reason is that the Ganga river has had a tendency of shifting its flow quite often. The result is that there are huge stretches of sand in this region where there would hardly be any hamlet or population. Other than the geographical locations, it is equally important to understand the demographic structure of Ballia so as to understand why Naxalism came to this district in the first place. Ballia has a population mix where the dominating caste has always been considered to be the Thakurs. The Thakurs, the traditional Landlords are supposed to have kept an upper hand in Ballia where the vast majority of landholdings have remained in the hands of the Thakurs. The next in political and economic superiority and dominance are the Brahmins but surprisingly the poltico-social dominance of the Thakurs seems to be much more apparent in this district than many others. On the other side of the spectrum

are a very large number of poor people, who consist primarily of the so-called weaker castes. These people constitute the majority of the population but unfortunately they never had a say in the politico-social structure and fabric. Thus, these people had, for long, been the passive receivers of whatever decisions were taken by the dominant groups.

Thus the twin factors of supportive geographical terrain along with the fertile population mix and socio-economic conditions made it possible for the Naxal movement to come knocking to Ballia. Ballia must be one of the first districts in Uttar Pradesh which got affected by Naxalism. It caught the attention of the stalwarts of Naxal movement as a potential ground for percolating and spreading their ideas because here they had both the things in ample measures - the caste related atrocities and the accompanying caste hatred simmering in the less privileged castes and the geographical suitability of rushing around to such terrain either in the Diyara (river beds and the river side) or in the neighbouring state of Bihar where it was very difficult for the Ballia police to catch the propagators of Naxal violence. The first incidents of Naxal violence in Ballia took place in the mid 1970s. It started with a series of murders. All these murders were that of big landlords, most of who belonged to the Thakur castes. The Naxal activists made it sure that their murder did not go unnoticed. Hence, while a normal murderer tries all possible measures to hide his crime, these people assured that the murders got wide publicity as Naxal murders. They would not only murder the landlords, they would do it with extremely neat and meticulous planning. They would try to make the murder as violent and as grotesque as possible. Other than this, they would also leave a large number of visible marks like Red flags, hand-written notes; Red marks etc. which would make everyone realise that the man had been murdered by Naxalites. Along with each dead body, the Naxalites left their mark and their messages. They tried to explain why the murdered man had been particularly chosen to be murdered. They wanted this to be taken as a

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

lesson for others. They would also announce who else were on the hit list. Finally they would state what the ways to get away from this menace were. In short, the result of this meticulous planning was that very soon Naxalism became the leading horror of the district. Since those getting murdered were rich and powerful people and belonged to the group of the haves, the message soon spread far and wide. It also became a big political issue and politicians started participating in this game as per their own convenience and political gains and losses. Sadly the police was proving to be quite ineffective because they had no idea about who these people were. They were also not getting any proper support and cooperation from the local people, particularly the so-called lower castes where the Naxalites had a very strong base. The Naxalites were being liked and admired because they were being seen as taking revenge against the traditional exploiters of these harassed people. The same situation would have gone on for years had not the Naxalites made it too hot for the police and the district administration. They murdered two highly influential Thakur landlords from Chhata and Bansdih. These murders proved too much for the police to bear. The state headquarters decided that enough was enough and a very clear diktat was sent to get Naxalism eliminated through rough and suitable measures. The Police of Ballia started functioning with much more dedication and concern. One of the first things it did was to bring the people into confidence. Major reliance was made on making friends with the people and bringing them on the side of the administration. For this, a large number of measures like attending the people’s problems much more swiftly and promptly, holding regular meetings in the Naxal affected areas, forming Village and Area committees, providing Arms licences to the people of the affected areas etc. were adopted. This became a very regular process and was truly appreciated by the people. The focus of all these attempts was on the poorer sections of the society because

it were they who had sympathy for the Naxalites as they saw them less as perpetrators of crime and more as avengers of Justice.

Ballia is a far off district in Uttar Pradesh. It is located in the eastern side of this vast state and it juts into a great extent in the neighbouring state of Bihar. This district has Baxar, Bhojpur and Chhapra as its neighbouring districts in Bihar and Mau, Gazipur and Deoria as the surrounding districts in Uttar Pradesh. The district has two big rivers the Sarayu and the Ganga surrounding it from two sides, one in the north and another in the south, both of which meet at a place near Sitab Diyara Other than these measures, the other thing that police did was to open a large number of police stations and police outposts in the Naxal affected regions. These police outposts were suitably reinforced. A very major emphasis was given on the river side policing where large contingents of Provincial Arms Constabulary were placed. It was ensured that these PAC contingencies not only remained there, they also made a lot of movements, including regular combing in the area. Very soon these measures started yielding results and within a period of two years, the problem of Naxalism had ebbed to quite some extent. After this period, there were a few incidents here and there that could be related with Naxalism but the major threat was over. When I was the Superintendent of Police at Ballia, much later in 2003, I found that there was still a remembrance among the old-time people of the massive threat that Naxalism had posed to the life and property of the rich people of this district. Particularly while talking to the elder people, I could perceive their fear and concern. But the younger lot had hardly any concern for this problem. To them it was as if this problem had never really made its presence felt in Ballia. The Police remained vigilant and watchful but certainly much of the sting had already been taken away. Thus, Naxalism came and finally

ebbed in Ballia. Ballia certainly is very important in this way as one of the few places where the police and administration was successful in winning over Naxalism so effectively.

They would also leave a large number of visible marks like Red flags, hand-written notes; Red marks etc. which would make everyone realise that the man had been murdered by Naxalites Some of the important conclusions that possibly can be derived from the Ballia experience of Naxalism are as follows: 1. Naxalism wants to extend its presence and make it felt in all possible places. 2. These people are always on the search and look out for newer places to make their footholds in newer geographical regions. 3. The first target of Naxal movement are places where there are geographical barriers and which have difficult geographical terrain. 4. More often than not, the Naxalites have the possibility of being accepted, welcomed and appreciated by the extremely poor and down-trodden people, because they believe that these people are fighting for justice. 5. It is not necessary that Naxal movement will be started only by the local people. As was later found in Ballia, most of the Naxal leaders were

outsiders, mostly from their cadres, who had come to Ballia finding it a fertile land for their activities and had later recruited and incorporated a few of the local people. 6. It is quite important to tackle Naxalism in the beginning. Ballia was fortunate that the Police there acted in time and before the Naxalites could make their permanent stronghold in the district, the Police had acted in such a swift manner that the Naxalites lost much of their ground. 7. The key to any naxal movement has to be people’s participation, people’s contact and people’s faith. In Ballia, the police was successful in overcoming this menace only because they made people’s participation the key focus of their planning and activities. 8. Ballia also shows that it is not impossible to tackle and uproot Naxalism despite its having made its presence, if the administration gets completely decided about this. 9. Finally, it also needs to be kept in mind that even if Naxalism gets eliminated once, it needs to be kept under regular observation. It is almost like the disease of Cancer which might recur anytime and hence utmost precautions need to be taken. If we could do this in Ballia, we can do it anywhere, with equal success. This is the hope with which the Administration needs to go about tackling this deep-rooted problem of Naxalism.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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EYE IN THE SKY

M Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Officer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major flying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Services Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies. After premature retirement he now flies as Commander on Boeing 737-800 NG.

There are a number of UAVs from size range in few cms to few meters and of lower endurance as well as lower operating altitude. These are mainly for the security forces out on patrol, own convoy protection, IED spotting, route clearance, urban area ISR etc. However, these could be integrated with operations room in order to pass significant intelligence. More so in time critical targeting of this link becomes essential not only with the operations room but also with armed strike aircraft / armed UAV or an armed helicopter on alert

aoist insurgency in 232 plus districts is a socio-political problem needing efforts in multiple fronts for a solution. Socially the entire population has to be engaged in inclusive growth schemes dealing with the occupational enterprises like agriculture, handicraft, mining, foresting etc. Politically they need to be weaned away from bankrupt Marxism. They need to be educated in suitable form about the demise of communism in former Soviet Union, the changing face of Chinese market oriented communism and closer home the experience of communist regimes in Kerala and West Bengal.

Maoist Insurgency and UAVs

For the above to take place, it is essential for security forces (police force, paramilitary force) to create and sustain a safe environment which will permit implementation of socio-political plan without the violence unleashed by Maoists affecting its implementation. Quite obviously the bedrock of success for security forces plan would be the correct and timely intelligence on Maoist leadership, organisation, political indoctrination camps, camps for arms training and their sources of intelligence, finances, arms procurement, external support etc. UAVs can contribute a lion’s share in this intelligence collecting. Indeed UAVs are already being used as reported in the press. The press report stated that UAV operations are being planned since April 2010 after deadly Maoist ambush in which 75 CRPF personnel were killed. The report mentioned the use of mini UAV Netra - something similar as shown in the movie “3 Idiots”. Also larger UAVs collected SIGINT capturing rebel’s telephonic conversation and spotted Maoist cadres during their move from one place to another. The press report further states Home Ministry’s plans to induct more UAVs for the Security Forces.

Maoist terrain Most of the Naxal affected area consists of tropical dry deciduous forest containing many national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. The area is pastoral with arable terrain. Electrification is sparse. The affected combined forested area in states of MP, Maharashtra, Odisha and AP is approximately 3,42,000 sq km. The area has Bauxite, Iron ore and plentiful coalfields. Agriculture is predominantly rice and oil seeds cultivation. Industrially it is a poorly developed area. Population density varies from 101-300 per sq km. There is less penetration of television and radio.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

very useful article on the employment of UAVs in anti-Naxal operations. In the forested environment of Naxal affected area, the mini and small UAVs will be restricted in operation due to forests and foliage. Pure EO sensors will have severe limitations. IR sensors will be essential. Also foliage penetration radars and underground detection radars, which are in evolution in the West, need to be introduced here. The medium altitude UAVs are likely to provide the best result. Using Searcher type of UAV would be optimal. The multiple sensors give phenomenal amount of data. To extract intelligence out of this maze of data, software automation is essential. It would be facial recognition, change of scene detection and so on. While it is easy to procure UAVs and sensors, the most challenging part is to acquire and adapt automated software for our conditions.

Needless to say there must be a well orchestrated plan for integrated Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) effort. However, the following suggestions / explanations are offered more for general awareness and understanding. ISR is undertaken by various government organisations. These initially evolved as vertically organised, separated from each other similar to smoke-stack industries in the past. The lateral interaction and co-ordination was a periodic activity, the frequency of interaction deciding on the timeliness of integrated intelligence. But the world has witnessed massive communication change in the last two decades. In the forested environment of Naxal affected area, the mini and small UAVs will be restricted in operation due to forests and

foliage. Pure EO sensors will have severe limitations. IR sensors will be essential. Also foliage penetration radars and underground detection radars, which are in evolution in the West, need to be introduced here. The medium altitude UAVs are likely to provide the best result. Using Searcher type of UAV, psychological employment can definitely put the naxals at disadvantage. This must be capitalised on.

UAVs are more demanding in operation than normal manned aeroplanes. It is a full time job and soon to be a lifelong profession. Airmanship, a core competence of Air Force is also a requisite competency for UAV operations. Therefore, proper UAV operations are best undertaken by Air Force. No matter how sincere the effort, the other paramilitary forces will be sub-optimal in this art and science of flying. The UAV operations room needs to be manned by experts in Intelligence analysis and the operational experts to select the suitable armed response The modern world is FLAT and so seamlessly interconnected, that if connecting network fails, there is economic chaos. An apt example is anybody’s ability to use an ATM card anywhere in the world for either economic transactions or withdrawal of instant money. However, this kind of integration in ISR is the dream of all countries. USA, Israel and some others are in the vanguard of this integrated ISR pursuit. Others are following at various stages depending upon the effort made. How is modern ISR integrated in a seamless manner? Obviously by connecting all agencies in real time and processing the enormous information gathered by intelligence experts making copious use of software algorithms. Let us see one such model in detail.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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EYE IN THE SKY

Small UAVs will continue to be operated more in decentralised fashion. It is their ISR data which needs centralisation. This is inevitable and is the only way for success

Satellites Satellites with their EO / IR / SAR sensors constantly map / sense the area over which they pass in each orbit. Their orbital time varies between 90 minutes to 120 minutes and each orbit covers a new swathe. A combination of many satellites could increase the frequency with which they can cover the same area. Their digital information is stored and transmitted to suitable ground station. If programmed the satellites can detect desired object / area / information and pass it in real time to ISR operations room. Also it could cue lower flying UAVs to the designated area for a closer look on detected activity.

inescapable need of all agencies being networked and in as real time as possible.

Automated processing The multiple sensors give phenomenal amount of data. To extract intelligence out of this maze of data, software automation is essential. It would be facial recognition, change of scene detection and so on. While it is easy to procure UAVs and sensors, the most challenging part is to acquire and adapt automated software for our conditions. It is only with constant usage and experience that this software can be developed and refined.

India To Disinvest 10 Per Cent Equity From HAL

he government of India is considering a proposal to disinvest 10 per cent equity from the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that is its only military aircraft and helicopter manufacturer. This information was provided to the Indian Parliament by Defence Minister A K Antony, who also noted that the government was yet to take a final decision on the proposal. The plan was approved by the Defence Ministry in September last year. The government is already considering disinvestment in two other Defence public sector undertakings - Bharat Electronics Limited (25 per cent) and BEML (34 per cent).

UAVs UAVs of varying size from micro (wing span less than 15 cms) to very large (wing span 100 feet plus) size are already in use. A brief look at different types follows:

High / medium altitude UAVs (HALE / MALE) These UAVs namely Global Hawk, Reaper, Predator, Heron, Hermes etc. fly at 20,000 to 65,000 feet. The higher the UAV, larger is the area it can see but the size of the object that can be seen increases. To see maximum details and small sized objects, like a human being from the top, UAVs need to fly lower. So the UAV could be used either in isolation or in a networked manner. Satellites cueing can take the UAV to the immediate area of interest to examine the data in greater detail. These UAVs having endurance varying between 24 to 50 hours enable good persistence. But then these also need a proper operations room manned and equipped suitably to handle the vast amount of data. When multiple sensors are networked / integrated then operations room also needs suitable upgradation.

Smaller UAVs There are a number of UAVs from size range in few cms to few meters and of lower endurance as well as lower operating altitude. These are mainly for the security forces out on patrol, own convoy protection, IED spotting, route clearance, urban area ISR etc. However, these could be integrated with operations room in order to pass significant intelligence. More so in time of critical targeting this link becomes essential not only with the operations room but also with armed strike aircraft / armed UAV or an armed helicopter on alert.

Area of search While the ISR network can watch over a wide area 24 hours a day, the reality is not so simple. Pure search without any other intelligence is a highly time consuming, painstaking, monotonous work resulting in quick fatigue to the sensor operator. As per one source it requires about 8 hours of UAV work to fully search an area of 5 sq km. But with suitable intelligence inputs this search can be expedited. Hence the

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

Centralised operations If each agency is going to work in near isolation then the magic of UAVs would be missing. UAVs are more demanding in operation than normal manned aeroplanes. It is a full time job and soon to be a lifelong profession. Airmanship, a core competence of Air Force is also a requisite competency for UAV operations. Therefore, proper UAV operations are best undertaken by Air Force. No matter how sincere the effort, the other Paramilitary forces will be sub-optimal in this art and science of flying. The UAV operations room needs to be manned by experts in Intelligence analysis and the operational experts to select the suitable armed response. Then we need the support of armed UAVs / aircraft / heli-borne teams to deal with actionable intelligence. The brilliant success of Israelis against terrorists, the Americans’ drone strikes in Afghanistan-Pakistan area are all a result of painstaking yet revolutionary networked approach as described above. Except their efforts are far more complex to utilise larger ISR resources available. Centralised refers to the process of centralised processing of data and arriving at required decisions promptly. The execution, therefore, has to be decentralised as per the resources and demands of the site. Similarly small UAVs will continue to be operated more in decentralised fashion. It is their ISR data which needs centralisation. This is inevitable and is the only way for success. Shown above is schematic of an ISR operations room, which is a part of an Air Operation Centre.

HAL is at present handling key projects for the Indian Armed Forces such as the development of the Tejas light combat aircraft, Dhruv advanced light helicopters, indigenous production of Russian-origin Sukhoi combat planes. With a sales turnover of over Rs 13,000 crore annually, HAL is handling crucial development projects like the ones for the Tejas light combat aircraft, Dhruv advanced light helicopters and indigenous production of the Russian-origin Sukhoi-30MKI fighters, all of which are running well behind schedule. It is also preparing to handle future projects such as the indigenous production of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) and fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA), light utility helicopters and multi-role transport aircraft (MTA). India’s MMRCA project to acquire 126 fighter aircrafts is all set to be sealed by early next year. The project will see only the first 18 jets come in “fly-away condition’, while the rest will be manufactured by HAL after transfer of technology. An even bigger project will be the joint development of the stealth FGFA with Russia, with a US$ 295 million preliminary design contract inked last December for the futuristic fighter.

India Ready To Deploy Ballistic Missile Shield

ndia has become the fourth nation in the globe to have a ballistic missile Defence shield which can be deployed at a short notice and offer protection to a minimum of two cities. According to DRDO Chief Dr V K Saraswat, the ballistic missile defense shield is now mature and will be put in place. The missile shield has been tested successfully and an incoming ballistic missile with the range of up to 2,000 kilometers can be destroyed. The missile shield can be put in two places where the infrastructure is available. While this will constitute the first phase of the plan, the places where the missile shield will be deployed are yet to be finalised by the government. The DRDO chief said that in the second phase, the shield would be capable of intercepting and destroying an incoming missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. This upgradation of the system to the range of 5,000 kilometers will occur by 2016. The system required for phase-II of the project is being developed and ships are being built from where the target missiles would be launched. For the test of the missile shield, Prithvi missile variants were used as simulated targets and successful interception of the missiles took place. All of the elements including long-range radars and tracking devices, real-time data-link and mission control system required for the missile system have given a successful performance. With this missile shield test, India will be the fourth nation after the US, Russia and Israel to have such a capability.

State-Run Mazagon Dock Confirms JV With Pipavav

ndia’s largest private defence shipyard Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering has been chosen by state-run Mazagon Dock as a joint venture partner to build warships and submarines for Indian Navy. Whilst the joint venture was stalled earlier due to a row over the Mazagon Dock’s selection policy, the joint venture now stands confirmed by the government. This crucial joint venture was put on hold since other private sector giants and Pipavav Shipyard’s rivals including Larsen & Toubro and ABG Shipyard had complained to the government over the inconsistencies in the selection process by Mazagon Docks. Pipavav Shipyard covers roughly 200 hectares with approximately 720 m of sea front and 685 m of outfit quay. Besides being the largest shipyard in India, Pipavav is also one of the largest drydocks in the world. The latest joint venture would afford better utilisation of Pipavav’s shipyard which is considered as one of the most modern in India. Mazagon Dock will now use Pipavav’s facility in Gujarat to build orders that it has on hand. June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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COUNTER STRATEGY

Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria The writer is Associate Professor at the Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Central University of Allahabad, Allahabad. He is a Fellow of the International Visitor Program of the United States Information Agency (USIA). He is the Secretary of the National Congress for Defence Studies (NCDS) and the Associate Editor of the Indian Journal of Strategic Studies (IJSS) published by the University of Allahabad. He is a keen researcher in the field of National Security and International Relations.

Present Home Minister P Chidambaram has recognised the gravity of the problem and has initiated several pragmatic measures to combat naxalism from both angles - law and order and meaningful socio-economic development. Unfortunately, in coalition politics, he is constrained by his own party and allies alike, in spite the Prime Minister having given a blank cheque to his Home Minister. There is lack of consensus among the political elites on the issue of giving priority to either development or police action

aoist insurgency in India is often linked with deprivation and displacement, the two often cited causes for Maoist insurgency. Maoist insurgents are in touch with their Nepal counterparts, who have emerged as powerful force in neighbouring Nepal. Maoist groups of South Asia have formed Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations. Since Maoists are fighting against Indian state to establish Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), they collaborate with all those forces in the different parts of the country, who are waging struggle against the Indian state such as ethnic insurgent groups of north-east and religious extremist groups of Kashmir. The Maoist groups of South Asia have formed Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) for coordination in the sub-continent. Indian Maoist groups are also part of Revolutionary International Movement. Maoist top leadership is highly educated and usually come from well-off families, who aim at capturing political power through revolutionary violence. But their cadres are poor illiterate, who do not have any political ambition. It has been established that state police and even CRPF are neither equipped nor trained to combat well trained Naxal cadres armed with highly sophisticated weapons. In this uneven battlefield the former have become cannon fodder.

olitical turmoil and violence are not new to India. But with internal political firestorms breaking out almost continuously-reflective of a state on the verge of turbulence; the creeping trend of anarchy in the regions where Naxal / Maoist infested insurgency has been gathering considerable pace which poses challenges to the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stability and hence the role of the stakeholders in this insurgency especially that of the establishment becomes extremely important. Thus, besides reducing resource scarcity, poverty / inequality, political instability, lack of development and lack of human security the task of the present government is to deal with the Militant Conflict and ensure the physical security of individuals in Naxal / Maoist infested regions and reduce their vulnerable conditions.

The problem In the past decade, India has had to cope with internal armed movements like the Naxalite and the Maoist armed insurrections

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

extending from Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Odisha and Chhattisgarh to Andhra and parts of Maharashtra. Here, the challenge is more internalised and springing from issues of economic deprivation, underdevelopment and lack of good governance in the first place. But with the passage of time it has become a complex issue. Maoist insurgency in India is often linked with deprivation and displacement, the two often cited causes for Maoist insurgency. Socio-economic deprivation resulting from poverty, inequality, unemployment, etc. is said to be the primary cause of violence in the vast swathe of eastern and central India. Displacement of poor villagers and tribals from their ancestral land in the name of development is another cause for fuelling Maoist violence in the forested part of east and central India. Maoist insurgency is basically an internal security issue but it has external dimension also. Maoist insurgents are in touch with their Nepal counterparts, who have emerged as

NAXAL / MAOIST CHALLENGE

TO THE INDIAN STATE

powerful force in neighbouring Nepal. Maoist groups of South Asia have formed Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations. Since Maoists are fighting against Indian state to establish Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) or liberated zone, for tactical reasons, they collaborate with all those forces in the different parts of the country, who are waging struggle against the Indian state such as ethnic insurgent groups of north-east and religious extremist groups of Kashmir. The Maoist groups of South Asia have formed Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) for coordination in the sub-continent. Indian Maoist groups are also part of Revolutionary International Movement (RIM). They get ideological inspiration from different Maoist groups active in the different parts of the world. Thus, the problem has reached an alarming proportion calling for immediate attention.Â

The genesis There is a distinct correlation between deprivation and violence. Poverty, inequality, etc. create conditions of extreme socio-economic deprivation and injustice. Deprived people feel frustrated and loose faith in the state or political system. This frustration leads to aggressive behaviour, which eventually erupts into violence. However, not all the time poverty and underdevelopment is correlated to violence and insurgency. For instance, Kalahandi and Bolangir districts are more backward and poor than the Malkangiri and Koraput districts of Odisha. But Kalahandi and Bolangir districts are relatively free from the Maoist violence, whereas Malkangiri and Koraput are worst affected. Similarly poverty and indebtedness does not always lead to violence. Farmers of Vidarbha region of Maharashtra are committing suicide but not indulging in violence like the tribals of Garhchiroli districts of the same state. Eastern Uttar Pradesh bordering Nepal is still free from Maoist violence despite the extreme poverty and backwardness of the region. Even Maoists of Nepal have failed to influence much the people of border area of eastern Uttar Pradesh. There are several examples in India, where extreme poverty, backwardness, exploitation, indebtedness and injustice have not led to the eruption of insurgency. Thus, all the time, correlating poverty and violence is oversimplification of the complex issue of Maoist insurgency. There seem to be linkages between the poverty and insurgency, but this is not true all the time and in all the places.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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COUNTER STRATEGY

It has been established that state police and even CRPF are neither equipped nor trained to combat well trained Naxal cadres armed with highly sophisticated weapons. In this uneven battlefield the former have become cannon fodder. Political establishment must continue to refrain from using Armed Forces to combat naxalism. It would be a tragic day for India, if political masters to cover up their sins use our Armed Forces to fight our own civilian population Related to the problem of deprivation is the model of development pursued by the state. Poor people are not benefiting from the developmental process. But they are paying huge cost in the name of development. Poor tribals, peasants, villagers are displaced from their ancestral land in the name of development. To set up industries and to erect dams for irrigation and power generation, a large chunk of land is needed. Poor villagers and tribals are displaced from their homelands to acquire their lands. No proper resettlement and rehabilitation arrangements are made, which lead to the loss of their land and further impoverishment. All the benefits of development through industrialisation, dam and power projects is reaped by the outsiders. Displacement of the poor people from their land is one of the major issues of Maoist violence. Forested area of east and central India is predominantly inhabited by the tribals. This forested area is also rich in minerals. Corporate world wants to extract these minerals for their industries. Mining companies have commercial interest in these forested tribal inhabited regions of the country. Mining industry is not only displacing the people from their homeland but also polluting their water sources, making their land permanently infertile and destroying the forest, their main source of livelihood. State is aiding big business houses and mining companies in the extraction of minerals. Mining companies like Vedanta and Sterlite are reaping windfall profits and poor tribals are further impoverished.

Tribals have been living in the forest since time immemorial and forest was their main source of livelihood. But they were never granted legal rights to own the land. Independent India continued the British policy and never conferred legal rights to own land to people living in the forest. For conserving forest and wild life, government declared forest as reserved. Tribals in their own ancestral land were made the illegal occupants of the land. Forest officials in independent India began oppressing and exploiting poor tribals. This exploitation of forest officials created the fertile ground for the eruption of Maoist violence in the tribal areas. For poor tribals, Maoists are their liberators, who have freed them from the clutches of forest officials, moneylenders and landlords. The cumulative impact of all these factors has been the advent and spread of Naxal / Maoist insurgency, which has now spread to the one third part of the country and which in view of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh constitutes the single largest threat to internal security.

Naxal / Maoist’s strategy Maoists justify and glorify violence to achieve their political objective. They believe in Mao’s clarion call that power flows from the barrel of the gun and Charu Majumdar’s that only that person can be called revolutionary who has dipped his hands into the blood of class enemies. Charu Majumdar advocated the annihilation of class enemies. Maoists call their violence as counter violence in reaction to state violence. They don’t believe in parliamentary democracy and except the CPI (ML) led by Deepankar Bhattacharya, all other Maoist groups do not have any intention to participate in the electoral process and call for its boycott. Maoists are annihilating class enemies, landlords and moneylenders, who are responsible for the misery of poor Dalits and Adivasis and liberate them from their clutches. Therefore, they are popular among the oppressed poor people. They organise Jan Adalat (peoples court), a type of kangaroo court and dispense instant justice

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

in their liberated zone. Maoists also kill police informers, security forces and all those who collaborate with the state thereby creating a deterrent. Maoist top leadership is highly educated and usually come from well-off families, who aim at capturing political power through revolutionary violence. They have been outraged by the ruthless exploitation and oppression of the poor people in the country. But their cadres are poor illiterate, who do not have any political ambition. They are interested in their socio-economic emancipation and development of their region with equity and justice. Poor Adivasis are opposed to alienation from their land and forest and their displacement for the sake of development, which is benefiting outsiders and not the poor indigenous Adivasis.

Contrary to the Indian government’s recent approach in drawing strategies from classical counter insurgency theory, the American campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan gradually dropped the strategy of targeting insurgents in favour of a more sensitive and calculated human approach where the objective is not to defeat an enemy as in conventional warfare, but rather to win “the hearts and minds” of the local population The three most prominent intra-state struggles in India are right wing religious extremism in Kashmir and some other parts of the country, ethnic violence in north-east India and Maoist / Naxal violence in the east and central India. Maoists unlike the first two are not secessionists. Maoists are not questioning Indian sovereignty. They treat India as their country but are opposed to semi-feudal and bourgeois Indian state. However they have sought to align themselves to the Jammu and Kashmir secessionists as also the north-east tribals. They aim at establishing peoples democracy through the protracted armed struggle; the revolutionary path suggested by Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che Guevara, Charu Majumdar and other revolutionaries. Mao’s Red Book is their bible and Mao’s guerrilla warfare is the strategy to achieve their objective.

It is only after Military, Political and Population pressure, will the Naxal leadership come to the negotiating table to ultimately get them into the democratic process

Government’s response Present Home Minister P Chidambaram has recognised the gravity of the problem and has initiated several pragmatic measures to combat Naxalism from both angles-law and order and meaningful socio-economic development. Unfortunately, in coalition politics, he is constrained by his own party and allies alike, in spite the Prime Minister having given a blank cheque to his Home Minister. There is lack of consensus among the political elites on the issue of giving priority to either development or police action. Chidambaram has recently said that the “debate on what should take place first-development or police action is misplaced, both are essential and there can be no fixed prescription.” 1 An analysis of the government’s response is summed up as under: Government's focus on basic amenities, including health, education, roads, electricity and childcare is correct and needs to be sustained. Government must ensure that the development schemes are implemented with utmost sincerity. Government must take people into confidence while carrying out development schemes. The government has revised the recruitment guidelines to divert the youth from the Naxal-affected areas to get into government jobs. Now, it has been permitted that 40 per cent of the total recruited in the CRPF can be taken up from the Naxal or militancy affected areas. To pursue effective and sustained intelligence driven police action against

naxalites’ and their infrastructure individually and jointly by the states.

Pradhan Mantri Gramin Rojgar Yojna reach the targeted beneficiaries.

How can development be initiated in these areas without the Naxals interfering? Would economic improvement eventually bring about a change in perception? Once development reaches and expands its reach, circumstances will force the powers to create and maintain the progress.

Special schemes and programmes aimed at the overall economic deprivation of Naxal affected regions should be chalked and implemented.

The central government should continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts and bring greater coordination between the states to successfully tackle the problem. The central government needs to accord a very high priority to review and monitor the Naxal strategy and the measures being taken by the states on both security and development fronts to control it. However, the response required should focus on the following: The local people of the naxal-infested regions should be taken into confidence. The government machinery must neutralise the negative government image as created and sustained by the Naxalites through their overground supporters. It should be ensured that the benefits of all government anti-poverty and development schemes including National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme, Member of Parliament Local Area Development Programme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, National Rural Health Mission, Special Component Plan, Tribal Sub-plan, Integrated Tribal Development Plan, Indira Awas Yojna, Integrated Child Development Scheme, Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojna, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna and

Improved and pronounced government interventions and presence would also help bridge the confidence gap between the government and the public, thereby strengthening the internal set-up, so required for countering the naxal menace.

Counter strategy Contrary to the Indian government’s recent approach in drawing strategies from classical counter insurgency theory, the American campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan gradually dropped the strategy of targeting insurgents in favour of a more sensitive and calculated human approach where the objective is not to defeat an enemy as in conventional warfare, but rather to win “the hearts and minds” of the local population 2. In fact, the strategy of targeting insurgents by the American Army in Afghanistan and Iraq was so unpopular that it became to be known as “mowing the grass’ because the killing of insurgents and the resultant collateral damage would only increase the alienation and resentment of local population leading more of them to join in the insurgent’s operation / insurgent ranks3. Hence, India must guard against adopting primarily such an approach. The Counter insurgency operations have three distinct phases “clear, hold and build.”4 The first involves military operations to clear territory of insurgents, the second call for holding territory and protecting the population from insurgent attacks and the third consolidates military success by building functional institutions of the state that in turn

1. Express News Service, “PC’s Naxal Strategy: Development Action,” http://www.Indian express.com /news/pcs-naxal strategy -development-action /610535/November 30, 2010. 2. Colin H Kahl, ‘COIN of the Realm: Is there a Future for Counter insurgency, Foreign Affairs, November - December, 2007. www.foriegnaffairs. com. 3. Namrata Goswami, India’s Counter Insurgency Experience: The Trust and Nurture Strategy, Small Wars and Insurgency, Vol. 20, No. 1 March 2009, pp 66-86. 4. Tactics in Counter Insurgency, Field Mannuals, 3-24.2.

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COUNTER STRATEGY

can deliver good governance. It is in the third phase, the civil administration holds the centre stage. Therefore, the success of a counter insurgency strategy depends not only on military action but also on the ability of the civil administration to consolidate the gains made by the Army and to win the improved security situation to win the hearts and minds of the population. It can be said that until the structural conditions, which have led to inequality, poverty, exploitation, caste discrimination and great social injustice against the poor Dalits (low caste untouchables) and Adivasis (tribals) are not removed, there seems to be no end of violence. Maoist insurgency is primarily a socio-economic rather than a law and order problem. It has erupted because of agrarian crisis, coupled with massive corruption, poor governance, exploitation of poor lower caste people and tribals by the feudal landlords and moneylenders. Violence is the symptom and not the cause of the problem. With the removal of structural conditions of inequality, poverty, exploitation, injustice and discrimination, the problem of insurgency can be resolved. However, in the sensitive areas and liberated zones where Naxals run a parallel government, combat operations have to be undertaken to make the environment conducive for the civil administration and the development agencies to function. Immediate establishment of GOI authority in the guerrilla zones for which the police has to be re-oriented for Combat, specifically in, Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare. The effort should be to carry out a creeping re-occupation of the guerrilla zones. As the areas get secure, socio-economic activity to follow, political leadership to expand their base and a Mass Psychological Warfare Campaign to be launched to wean away the population from Naxal influence. The Modernisation of the police to not only be limited to weapons, equipment, communications and

technology but in terms of modernising the ‘policeman’ in his mental, physical and psychological re-conditioning to meet the Naxal Challenge. It is only after Military, Political and Population pressure, will the Naxal leadership come to the negotiating table to ultimately get them into the democratic process. Naxalism / Maoism in India is basically a human security issue. Scholars of Development Economics and Human Security such as Pakistan Economist late Mahbub-ul-Haq, Amartya Sen, Jean Dreze etc. have linked conflict and violence with deprivation generated by the extreme poverty, inequality, exploitation, injustice and underdevelopment. Social exclusion and exclusive growth has led to marginalisation of the vast majority of people and only a tiny minority has created enormous wealth under the global regime of liberalisation, globalisation and privatisation. This has led to exclusion of the vast number of people from developmental process. Impoverishment of the vast majority of people has created fertile ground for emergence of conflict and violence throughout the world including India. `Lincoln C Chen has identified 3 key strategies to achieve human security-protection, promotion and prevention. In situations of acute insecurity progressive utilisation of protection measures for relief, establishing safety nets and supporting peace keeping. For chronic insecurity poverty should be the focus of concern and development likely cure. To protect established human security regimes and to provide a warning against future challenges a preventive course of action based on information, diplomacy and sanctions. What we witness in the country today is a clear signal of lack of peace, security and development. The rise of extremism in most parts of the country is an ultimate threat to human security. 5

Conclusion The nature of threat to a nation’s security, stability and progress is multi-polar, i.e. non-military, internal and external. The security management would require being dynamic and taking into account this multi-polar nature of threat of Naxalism. This phase of extreme volatility can have serious repercussions unless the nation has a well formulated ‘National Security Strategy’ which is dynamic and resilient so as to be capable of absorbing midcourse corrections. Therefore, there is a necessity to carry out a reassessment of our priorities in tackling the Maoist Insurgency.

Ultra-Light Howitzers For The Army

he Committee appointed by Defence Minister A K Antony under DRDO Chief V K Saraswat to recommend whether the Army should proceed with procurement of 145 Ultra-Light Howitzers from the US has submitted its report with the government. The Committee has given a go ahead to the government to allow the Army to proceed with the procurement and carry out the remaining trials of the BAE Systems manufactured in the US. The Committee was formed by the Ministry after the leakage of a trial report involving the howitzers. The leaked report suggested that the guns had underperformed during the trials and the Army was not happy with it. The Ministry had then formed a Committee under DRDO chief Saraswat to submit a report whether the procurement should be realised or not. The ultra-light 155 mm 39 calibre howitzer is supposed to be the first howitzer to have been procured in the last 27 years after the Bofors gun deal after which the procurement in artillery had come to a standstill.

Linking deprivation all the time and places with violence is the oversimplification of a complex issue of Maoist violence. However, socio-economic deprivation and gross injustice provide fertile ground for the emergence of Maoist insurgency. There are various stakeholders in the Maoist insurgency such as Maoist insurgents, security forces, villagers, peoples’ representatives, rights activists, civil society groups, media people, corporate houses etc. Unless we pay attention to all these vital links, a meaningful engagement will not be possible. It has been established that state police and even CRPF are neither equipped nor trained to combat well trained Naxal cadres armed with highly sophisticated weapons. In this uneven battlefield the former have become cannon fodder. Political establishment must continue to refrain from using Armed Forces to combat Naxalism. It would be a tragic day for India, if political masters to cover up their sins use our Armed Forces to fight our own civilian population. It is noteworthy that those analysts who have commented on the issue of Naxalism which has reached the top of the agenda and the problems associated with it in fact, both the counters of Naxalites and apologists of underdevelopment are equally far away from the real operational environment in which the contours of Counter Insurgency act.

IAF Procuring 75 Pilatus Aircraft

ulfilling Air Force’s long-pending requirement, government cleared a proposal worth over Rs 1,800 crore for procuring 75 Pilatus aircraft from Switzerland to train its rookie pilots. The decision was taken at a meeting of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The aircraft are being procured by the IAF to provide training to its new pilots and replace the HPT-32 trainer aircraft which have been grounded for over two years after a fatal accident in 2009, Defence Ministry officials said. The delivery of the planes is expected to begin by the middle of 2013. Since 2009, the IAF has relied on Kiran Mk II aircraft for providing basic training to its young pilots. Advanced training to them is provided on the Hawk aircraft procured from the UK. The Air Force also plans to send some of its young pilots to Switzerland for training till the delivery of initial batch of 12 aircraft commences in 2013.

NAL Converting Hansa Trainer into UAV

he state-run National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) has entered into an agreement with private sector firm Kadet Defence Systems to convert the Hansa trainer aircraft into an optional unmanned vehicle. Hansa is a lightweight trainer-cum-general purpose aircraft developed indigenously by NAL. The agreement also entails joint development of a new tactical drone. NAL had developed the Hansa trainer aircraft fabricated entirely out of composite materials and it is used for abinitio training and surveillance besides other tasks. The Hansa aircraft programme was launched in the late 90s and involved the indigenous design, development, fabrication and tests of an all-composite 2-seat aircraft which could replace the ageing trainers.

5. Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln C Chen (eds.), “Human Security: Concepts and Approaches.” in Common Security in Asia New Concepts of Human Security. Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995, p. 139.

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PROSPECTS

I Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was comissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attache to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects.

The Maoists have been in contact with the Maoist movement in Nepal, ISI and possibly certain elements of China who are supporting militant groups in the north-east. Some of their leaders have undergone training abroad and weapons as also RDX slabs are being supplied. The Maoists have realised that the best weapons to be used against the security forces are the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and the suicide bomber. Foreign connections and extortion as also sale of drugs have led to Maoists gathering an annual turnover of Rs 1,500 crore (US$ 300 million)

ndia attained her independence 65 years ago and despite all efforts has a sizable portion of her rural population living in poverty. This is particularly predominant in rural areas which house the major portion of our population. Left Wing politics has been present in India prior to independence, but resort to violence commenced with the Naxalbari movement in West Bengal on 24 May 1967. The rebellion was started by a breakaway group of Communist Party of India (Marxist) who formed a new party, Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) under the leadership of Kanu Sanyal and Charu Mazumdar. The movement was aimed at redistribution of land to the peasants. The party used violence and this triggered violent clashes in rural Bengal between the landlords and tillers of the soil. The Naxalites adored the Chinese leader Mao Zedong and believed in his diktat, “Power flows from the barrel of a Gun.” It is pertinent to note that in 1966 Mao had started the Cultural Revolution in China which led to purges in the Chinese Communist Party and the Naxalites drew their inspiration from Mao and his political thoughts. The movement was contained by 1971 and people expected there would be social and economic development of the affected regions. Unfortunately, there has been negligible development in these areas resulting in resurfacing of violent activities along with India’s economic resurgence in 1990. The opening of the economy helped India to be possibly the fourth largest economy in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) but failed to remove the disparity between the rich and the poor. This led to the creation of the Maoist movement involving 232 districts which work out to about 37 per cent of the Indian population.

Formation of the present movement The present Maoists are a part of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), an underground political party of India which aims to overthrow the government of India through people’s war. It was founded on 21 September 2004 by the merger of two political groups, the People’s War and the Maoist Communist Centre. The party was formed on 18 October 2004 and a Central Committee was constituted. The CPI (Maoist) is often referred as Naxalites as they draw their impression from the Naxalbari revolt in 1967. The Party has finally drafted a Constitution which is an amalgamation of all the positive points in the document of the two erstwhile parties as well as their experiences in this field of waging a people’s war and building a revolutionary movement in the tribal areas of the country. The Maoists are fighting for the rights of the tribes in the forest belt in the

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states of Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Kerala and Karnataka, They have been charged by the government with running an extortion economy in the guise of popular revolution, extorting vast amounts of money from local branches of mining companies and other businesses. They have been involved in disrupting communications, blowing up of schools and accused of keeping their pockets away from organised development so that they can retain their control over these forested areas.

Most of these areas lack infrastructure. The Maoist leaders leave no stone unturned to prevent the development of communications network in the region to ensure that their propagation against the government is easily digested by the people. The next aspect is demography. India is faced with a youth bulge as per which 70 per cent of our 1.2 billion population are below 35 years and need to be gainfully employed The ideology of the Maoists is contained in their party programme. The document denounces globalisation as a war on the people by market fundamentalists and the caste system as a form of socialist oppression. Their aim is to undertake a people’s war with a view to establish people’s government as a part of new democratic revolution. Out of 232 districts which have been affected by the problem, about a total of 45 districts are seriously affected. In 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referred to the Maoists as the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country. The government of India banned the CPI (Maoist) under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act as a terrorist organisation on 22 June 2009. The total number of operatives is between 14,000 to 20,000 and there are 45 districts where the Maoists have a stronghold and police operations are active. The states in which these districts lie are the Southern portion of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra. While the ideologues are based all over the money comes mainly from Jharkhand and the state deeply affected is Chhattisgarh followed by the forest belt of Odisha. The recent kidnappings of a Member of the Legislative Assembly and two Italian nationals in Odisha as also a district collector in Chhattisgarh bears testimony to this issue. Presently there are about 78 CRPF battalions, reasonable number of BSF, ITBP battalions and the local police of the state. There is no dearth of discretionary financial assistance to tackle the problem from the authorities.

LEFT WING EXTREMISM IN INDIA:

CAUSES AND REMEDIES T

he Maoist movement currently involves 232 districts which work out to about 37 per cent of the Indian population. Out of 232 districts which have been affected by the problem, about a total of 45 districts are seriously affected. The government of India banned the CPI (Maoist) under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act as a terrorist organisation on 22 June 2009. They have been charged by the government with running an extortion economy in the guise of popular revolution, extorting vast amounts of money from local branches of mining companies and other businesses. They have been involved in disrupting communications, blowing up of schools and accused of keeping their pockets away from organised development so that they can retain their control over these forested areas. The Maoists have been in contact with the Maoist movement in Nepal, ISI and possibly certain elements of China who are supporting militant groups in the north-east. Some of their leaders have undergone training abroad and weapons as also RDX slabs are being supplied. The Maoists have realised that the best weapons to be used against the security forces are the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and the suicide bomber. Foreign connections and extortion as also sale of drugs have led to Maoists gathering an annual turnover of Rs 1,500 crore (US$ 300 million).

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PROSPECTS

The Maoist movement currently involves 232 districts which work out to about 37 per cent of the Indian population. Out of 232 districts which have been affected by the problem, about a total of 45 districts are seriously affected. The government of India banned the CPI (Maoist) under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act as a terrorist organisation on 22 June 2009. They have been charged by the government with running an extortion economy in the guise of popular revolution, extorting vast amounts of money from local branches of mining companies and other businesses. They have been involved in disrupting communications, blowing up of schools and accused of keeping their pockets away from organised development so that they can retain their control over these forested areas

Cause Maoist insurgency is caused due to numerous reasons. However, a few snippets are interesting. First of all out of the 100 districts in India with highest poverty rates only 26 districts are affected by the Maoists. With regard to education, out of the 100 districts in India with lowest literacy rates there are only 20 districts which are under Maoist influence. With regard to healthcare, out of the 100 districts in India with highest infant mortality rates only 9 districts are gripped by Maoist terrorism. Statistically in a diverse country like India insurgency is triggered by multifarious issues. In the present case the insurgency is mainly spread over areas which are forested and are rich in mines.

States must raise forces like Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh police who have practically paralysed the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh. The main aspect is the issue of leadership. Police officers must be participative leaders and they should be able to motivate by personal example. The Maoists would gradually transform once they meet determined and honest Security Forces

There are primarily two causes for the Maoist extremism in India. These are lack of governance and socio-economic issues. In as much as governance is concerned the most important issue is we lack a Long Term Strategic Perspective. Development of these regions has been haphazard and does not lend to long term benefits. There is no plan of action ipso facto any accountability. Further the government has been mistaking industrialisation for development. The tribals have been denied their constitutional rights and justice has been denied to them. The Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) operating in these regions have their own vested interests consequently providing the space for Maoists to spread their agenda. The next issue is equitable distribution of land. The Maoists promise that they would equitably distribute land and this lures the people to participate in their movement. With regard to socio-economic issues, education must be the prime intervention and this needs to be addressed with innovation. The Operation Sadbhavna model could be innovatively replicated. Once education enters the blood stream of the people in this region, they would be discrete with their actions. Most of these areas lack infrastructure. The Maoist leaders leave no stone unturned to prevent the development of communications network in the region to ensure that their propagation against the government is easily digested by the people. The next aspect is demography. India is faced with a youth bulge as per which 70 per cent of our 1.2 billion population are below 35 years and need to be gainfully employed. It is also pertinent to note that bulk of this population live in the rural areas and often fall a prey to the call of Maoists in the absence of suitable employment. It may be noted that being a diverse country there has to be a separate plan for each region based on the peculiarities.

Remedies There are no easy answers to the Maoist problem. At the outset the Union government in conjunction with state governments must formulate a Long Term Perspective

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Plan for dealing with tribal areas. This will institutionalise the overall development of these areas and create a framework for organised development in tribal areas.

It is pertinent to note that in 1966 Mao had started the Cultural Revolution in China which led to purges in the Chinese Communist Party and the Naxalites drew their inspiration from Mao and his political thoughts. The movement was contained by 1971 and people expected there would be social and economic development of the affected regions. Unfortunately, there has been negligible development in these areas resulting in resurfacing of violent activities along with India’s economic resurgence in 1990 With regard to dealing with ongoing issues, broadly there are two distinct areas in which the Maoists can be divided; 45 districts which need constant vigil by the security forces and the remaining 187 in which situation has partially stabilised and needs further improvement. To start with the difficult districts of the red corridor security forces must create a good intelligence network and use state-of-the-art technology to track rebels. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) with Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) must be used for surveillance and reconnaissance. Further helicopters must be available for the same purpose. The force must operate from independent operating bases and should be trained exclusively for this task. The security force must have adequate Improvised Explosive Device (IED) jammers and well trained Guard and Tracker dogs to sniff out suicide bombers. The leadership in these forces must be of the highest order. Further the existing Village Defence Committees and forces like Salwa Judum must be well equipped and protected. There should be all out efforts despite presence of these hard core Maoists to run educational institutions, medical aid posts and building of infrastructure. As the Maoists would apply obstruction to these activities, the district administration has to innovatively create and look for windows of opportunity to undertake these activities. All operations have to be people centric.

is the issue of leadership. Police officers must be participative leaders and they should be able to motivate by personal example. The Maoists would gradually transform once they meet determined and honest Security Forces.

The government has been mistaking industrialisation for development. The Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) operating in these regions have their own vested interests consequently providing the space for Maoists to spread their agenda People have to be the centre of gravity of the entire organisation. In these districts the Deputy Commissioner, the Superintendent of Police and the District Forest Officer must work as one team who must work out the tactical framework to improve conditions in these remote areas. The officers must be visible and this would have a tremendous impact on the local population. In the remaining districts the focus should be on development particularly in the fields of education and health. Further road network and electricity must be established in all habitations. There must be atleast one model town created in the affected areas by the government which becomes an attractive alternative for the Maoist rank and file who are actually craving for minimum inescapable needs of education, affordable medical treatment and opportunities for employment. Further land must be redistributed to give the poor their rightful share to enable them to earn their livelihood.

The Party has finally drafted a Constitution which is an amalgamation of all the positive points in the document of the two erstwhile parties as well as their experiences in this field of waging a people’s war and building a revolutionary movement in the tribal areas of the country. The Maoists are fighting for the rights of the tribes in the forest belt in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Bihar, Assam, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Nagaland, Kerala and Karnataka

Apart from these socio-economic measures the security forces must be made capable of dealing with the Maoists. Viewing the enormous size of the problem there is a need for the Home Minister and a Committee of Chief Ministers to form a central body which can form an organisation at the apex level to formulate and coordinate all activities at the national level. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is a step in the right direction. As law and order is a state subject and in a federal structure a committee comprising of representatives from the state and central governments should resolve their differences and form the NCTC at the earliest. This would require patience, persistence and persuasion on the part of the centre and state governments but must be done at all cost. Success of security forces depends on the availability of timely actionable intelligence. This would be possible by having an Intelligence Grid at the national level and subordinate organisations at the state level. The intelligence gathered must be disseminated in real time which would permit timely cordon and search operations. The security forces be it CRPF, BSF, ITBP or the local police must be structured, trained and equipped for these tasks. They must have IED detectors, jammers and state-of-the-art surveillance equipment like UAVs with SAR and Long Range Observation and Optical Equipment. There should be well trained tracker and guard dogs who can take on suicide bombers. States must raise forces like Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh police who have practically paralysed the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh. The main aspect

Army’s involvement The Maoist movement is presently being tackled by socio-economic development and security measures. Security forces comprise of the local police and Central Police Organisations. The situation is being managed and issues have not gone out of control. The security forces need to be having greater tenacity and improve intelligence collection and dissemination. Positive steps are being taken to improve on these aspects. With all these improvements is there a need for the Army to be inducted in anti-Maoist operations? The answer is that in the present circumstances there is no need to induct the Army in anti-Naxal operations. Assistance of the Army can be sought in training security forces in counter-terror operations. Active involvement of the Army would rather be detrimental as it will lead to greater difficulties in transforming the Maoists as their movement gets highlighted and their leaders are able to convince the people to harden their attitude resulting in lengthening the struggle between the Maoists and security forces.

Conclusion Maoism is a social problem caused primarily by poor governance. Socio-economic development with precise operations by security forces will transform the attitude of the people, who in turn will gradually resist the insurgents thereby paving the way for normalisation of the problem.

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DIVERGENT VIEWS

STATUS OF ANTI-LWE CAMPAIGN!

Nitin Gokhale The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTV's Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

The aim is to uphold the law of the land, provide security of life and property and provide a secure environment for development and economic growth. Considering the inter-state ramifications of Naxalite activities, the central government seeks to emphasise on the need for inter-state coordination and cooperation, both in terms of uniformity in approach and in terms of ground-level joint police action

ast one m o n t h ' s developments show that despite extensive planning and resource mobilisation, the government’s anti-Maoist policy remains mired in confusion and contradictions. One day, the government talks tough, the next it succumbs to threats. One day it talks of no-negotiations, the next it appeals for talks. A deeper look suggests that despite high-profile pronouncements in the past few years, the government is still groping in the dark. Till 2006, policy-makers in New Delhi underestimated the problem. It was for the first time in 2006-07 that the MHA first acknowledged the seriousness of this issue. At that point MHA enunciated a “multi-pronged strategy, essentially of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development and management of public perception.” Accordingly, 34 affected districts in 8 states have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of development schemes. Within these 34 districts, 8 most affected districts in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha, have been earmarked for implementation of integrated security and development action plans. However, there is another problem to contend with: divergent views at the highest levels in the government and the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA). If the Maoist movement-and the issues it raises-isn’t addressed soon enough, it won’t be long before India will be fighting a war not just on the borders with its neighbours, but within its own heartland-against its own people.

hree high profile abductions - two in Odisha and one in Chhattisgarh - within a month have brought the focus right back to Maoist insurgency, a problem that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described as India’s greatest security threat just three years ago.

When Alex Paul Menon, the first collector of the newly-created Sukma district in south Chhattisgarh was taken into custody by the Maoists, the focus was almost exclusively on the young IAS officer’s plight. Most of us forgot that two of his bodyguards were killed ruthlessly by the well-armed Maoists before they took away the Collector. That attitude of the administration, media, politicians and opinion-makers of focusing on the Red Menace only when high-profile

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abductions or killings take place, suits the Maoists very well. Rest of the time, they can continue to rule the roost in the distant and as-yet-underdeveloped areas. When the attention shifts after these abductions are over, Maoists actively broker deals with political parties for safe-havens where they can rest and train undeterred and demand rights to collect levies in exchange of electoral support during elections. Last one month’s developments show that despite extensive planning and resource mobilisation, the government’s anti-Maoist policy remains mired in confusion and contradictions. One day, the government talks tough, the next it succumbs to threats. One day it talks of no-negotiations, the next it appeals for talks. A deeper look suggests that despite high-profile pronouncements in the past few years, the government is still groping in the dark. Till 2006, policy-makers in New Delhi underestimated the problem and clearly did not see the difference between the Naxalbari Movement of the 1960s and the current Maoist movement in terms of its spread, scope or nature. In fact, it was for the first time in 2006-07 that the first acknowledged, when outlining, a pan-India plan to deal with the Maoists, it said: “Naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection and perceived injustice among the underprivileged and remote segments of population.”

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DIVERGENT VIEWS

Considering the inter-state ramifications of Naxalite activities, the central government seeks to emphasise on the need for inter-state coordination and cooperation, both in terms of uniformity in approach and in terms of ground-level joint police action At that point MHA enunciated a “multi-pronged strategy, essentially of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development and management of public perception.” One of the key elements in the policy was to bring 55 Maoist-affected districts under the Backward District Initiative (BDI) for carrying out immediate and focused developmental activity funded by New Delhi. Also, the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) for 250 partially Maoist-dominated and affected districts was launched. The idea behind both schemes, according to the Planning Commission, was to “remove barriers to growth, accelerate the development process and improve the quality of life of the people.” Simultaneously, the MHA also decided to extend financial help to the states to modernise the police forces and deploy paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force, The Border Security Force wherever required. Now five years after enunciating a security plan to deal with the Maoists, the MHA has an elaborate, multi-pronged strategy for Maoists-affected areas. The overall objective, the plan says is to deal with Naxalite activities in a holistic manner in the arenas of security, development, administration and public perception management. “The aim is to uphold the law of the land, provide security of life and property and provide a secure environment for development and economic growth. Considering the inter-state ramifications of Naxalite activities, the central government seeks to emphasise on the need for inter-state coordination and

cooperation, both in terms of uniformity in approach and in terms of ground-level joint police action,” the MHA said. States are being assisted in all-round development of affected areas, with qualitative implementation of central and state development schemes and with fair deal to deprived segments. Various schemes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, the Prime Minister’s Gram Sadak Yojna [Village Road Plan], the National Rural Health Mission Scheme and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan [Educate All Campaign] are being implemented in the affected states. But the biggest scheme launched in March 2011 is the Integrated Area Development programme also called focused area approach. This decision came in the wake of a detailed analysis of the spread and trends in respect of Naxalite violence. Accordingly, 34 affected districts in 8 states have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of development schemes. Within these 34 districts, 8 most affected districts in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha, have been earmarked for implementation of integrated security and development action plans. As if the number of schemes were not enough focus to the Maoist-dominated areas, there is a plethora of committees - Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxal Affected States, a Coordination Committee, a Task Force, an Inter-Ministerial Group and an Empowered Group of Ministers on Internal Security - were set up to resolve, coordinate and control various activities related to the government anti-Maoist operations. Interestingly, despite over one hundred meetings none of these committees have been able to decide on even a basic principle of “hot chase” that is whether a police force from a particular state can cross over to another state in pursuit of a wanted Maoist during an operation! In 2010, the MHA asked states to set up Unified Command structures comprising all agencies involved in the anti-Maoist operations to

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

ensure better cooperation but to no avail. Despite all these measures, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had to appeal to the states to “be and also appear to be united and one in our resolve to counter the growing Maoist problem.”

(Home Minister P Chidambaram’s) strategy that does not take into consideration the people living in the affected area who ultimately matter. He is treating it purely as a law and order problem without taking into consideration the issues that affect the tribals.”

This divide in placing the Maoist movement in proper perspective has reduced India’s ability to address the issue to a jumble of policies that contradict each other Writing in a newspaper Digvijay said: “His (Chidambaram’s) strategy does not take into consideration the people living in the affected area who ultimately matter. He is treating it purely as a law and order problem. When I raised these issues with him, he said that it was not his responsibility. I strongly believe in the collective responsibility of the cabinet and as Home Minister, it is his responsibility to take a holistic view of the issue ...”While Chidambaram is extremely intelligent, articulate, committed and a sincere politician - he is also extremely rigid once he makes up his mind. I have been a victim of his intellectual arrogance many times, but we still are good friends.”

Another v o c a l and high pitched voice against Chidambaram’s policy was the maverick Congress leader from Andhra Pradesh, Keshav Rao. He attacked the policy of launching operation against the Maoists and put the question of inclusive growth, sustainable development and neglect of Maoists in the forefront. Keshav Rao who had been the Member of Parliament till recently, not only attacked the government’s approach in the parliament but he also actively participated in the TV chat shows across the national media, where his voice was not in sync with the policy being adopted by Home Minister.

The view from the right, however, looks at the Maoist movement as necessarily a challenge to the manner in which politics and governance is organised in India. This section advocates the need to tackle the Maoists as enemies of the state.

This is a perfect Congress party style when the top leadership targets a particular member or minister sitting at a key position. This time was the high command targeting Chidambaram (via Digvijay) for his over ambitious plans or for being too talkative before the troops ready to take on the Maoists on ground. Interestingly soon after the article written by Digvijay Singh cabinet secretary issued a note to ministers and advised that no one from government should speak to press about the Naxal policy. Congress high command also issued similar gag order to the party leaders.

There is a plethora of committees - Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxal Affected States, a Coordination Committee, a Task Force, an Inter-Ministerial Group and an Empowered Group of Ministers on Internal Security - were set up to resolve, coordinate, and control various activities related to the government anti-Maoist operations. Interestingly, despite over one hundred meetings none of these committees have been able to decide on even a basic principle of “hot chase” that is whether a police force from a particular state can cross over to another state in pursuit of a wanted Maoist during an operation!

Days after an entire company - 76 men of the Central Reserve Police Force were killed in a single ambush in April 2010, general secretary of the ruling Congress party, Digvijay Singh, said: “In this case (regarding Maoists), I have differed with his

Yet the rift was wide open and Digvijay did not have to wait to find friends to flay Chidambaram. Senior Congress leader Mani Shankar Aiyer was the first one to support Digvijay. When reporters asked him what he thinks about the assessment of Home Minister by Digvijay Singh he said “100 per cent correct”.

Interestingly the same Keshav Rao was also the election incharge of Bengal during the general election of 2009 and very closely worked with Mamata Banerjee. That was the time Maoist surge was on rise in the state of Bengal and the aspiring Chief Minister of Bengal was openly playing ball with Naxalites.

The Maoist problem, according to this view, is a result of the state abdicating its role as a guarantor of welfare. The solution to this, therefore, must lie in addressing the socio-economic development deficit.

These leaders highlighted the problem as a social and developmental issue. This approach was rejected by Home Minister Chidambaram who wanted to tackle the rebels primarily by force only. On a closer look the leaders who were opposing and criticising Home Minister were speaking the language of conciliation but the pitch was so sharp that it contradicted the action of Chidambaram. Just consider the statement of senior Congress leader Keshav Rao. In an interview, he said: “If you preach you become Mahatma. If you act you become a Naxalite.” Not many people remember that Keshav Rao had mediated the talks with Maoists and Andhra Pradesh government in 2005. The talks failed and Rao was one of the most disappointed leaders. Maoism is nothing but a delayed response to the need of development in these areas … says Keshav Rao. This divide in placing the Maoist movement in proper perspective has reduced India’s ability to address the issue to a jumble of policies that contradict each other. Unlike the central government in New Delhi or the various state governments, the Maoist leadership is working with a single point agenda - that of overthrowing parliamentary democracy in India and replacing it with a people’s dictatorship. If the Maoist movement - and the issues it raises - isn’t addressed soon enough, it won’t be long before India will be fighting a war not just on the borders with its neighbours, but within its own heartland - against its own people.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

CAPITULATION

cogently argued article which discusses the lack of a viable response to the Maoist / terrorist tactic of high

profile kidnap operations that repeatedly coerce / blackmail the Indian state into a shameless surrender. Starting with the

Col U S Rathore (retd) The writer is a threat and risk analyst and defence and security expert.

A comprehensive and multi-pronged strategy is needed to address this menace. Intensify counter-Naxal operations and aim at eliminating top leadership by surgical operations. Unless the leaders are not liquidated, the kidnappings are unlikely to stop. For instilling sense of security amongst the population density of police and Central Armed Police Forces in the so-called ‘liberated zones’ of the Maoists will have to be increased. The government officials must not stop visiting areas in their jurisdiction. Development works with short gestation period in the field of healthcare, nutrition, education, sanitation and employment must be started in inaccessible areas. Sound policies regarding forest rights to the tribals, land acquisition, compensation and rehabilitation should be made in consultation with the affected party and implemented

Rubaiya Sayeed kidnap in Jammu and Kashmir, the litany of abject capitulations has been all too familiar and has been recounted in detail by the writer. He emphasises the need for a uniform national policy and Standard Operating Procedures to tackle such incidents. The state cannot fade away in the face of such armed blackmail and permit lawlessness in large parts of its territory. What explains the near total absence of any attempts to launch hostage rescue operations?

idnapping and hostage-taking is an old and proven strategy of the insurgents and terrorists. India’s tryst with such crises situations is very old. Some high-profile cases that have left indelible impression on our counter-terror strategy and decision-making process are discussed below.

In Jammu and Kashmir, during height of militancy, Rubaiya Sayeed daughter of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, then Union Home Minister in V P Singh’s government was kidnapped by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) terrorists on December 8, 1989. The JKLF demanded release of five of their cadres interned in Srinagar jail. The central government, despite resistance from state chief minister Farooq Abdullah conceded to and freed all five terrorists, including a Pakistani national. Rubaiya Sayeed was released from captivity on December 13.

K Doraiswamy, Executive Director of Indian Oil in Kashmir was kidnapped on June 28, 1991, from Srinagar by the cadres of Ikhwanul Musalmeen. Nine terrorists were freed to secure the release of the official.

India was s u b j e c t e d t o embarrassment and humiliation of worst kind when on December 24, 1999, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen terrorists hijacked Indian Airlines flight IC 814 with 176 passengers on board from Nepal’s Tribhuwan International Airport. Terrorists demanded release of three dreaded terrorists - Maulana Masood Azhar, Omar Saeed Shaikh (later convicted in Wall Street Journal’s correspondent Daniel Pearl’s abduction and murder) and Mushtaq Ahmad Zargar lodged in Indian jails. Relatives of passengers on board the hijacked aircraft staged a melodramatic protest in New Delhi forcing the Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government to handover all terrorists to secure release of passengers and the aircraft. A union cabinet minister escorted the three terrorists in a chartered aircraft to Kabul and handed them over to Taliban.

In July 1995, a lesser known terror outfit Al-Faran (later metamorphosed into Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) abducted six foreign tourists from Pahalgam in South Kashmir demanding release of Maulana Masood Azhar (founder of dreaded terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad). Except for an American citizen who could escape from the captivity and a Norwegian whose beheaded body was recovered in August same year, the other four remained untraced despite detailed search operations by security forces in South Kashmir mountains.

It is widely believed that Mufti Mohammad Sayeed behaved more like a panic-stricken father than a Union Home Minister and forced the government’s hand in accepting the demands of the JKLF. A dangerous precedent was set in. On February 27, 1991, Nahida Soz, daughter of Saifuddin Soz, Member of Parliament from National Conference, later a union minister was kidnapped from Srinagar and released on March 8 in exchange of five terrorists.

Kidnapped

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red terror

CAPITULATION

In the absence of any credible government response the population starts accepting ultras as keepers of law and conscience. In far-flung areas of Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand it is a reality, where Maoists kidnap people, try them in kangaroo courts and dish out verdicts ranging from corporal punishment, fines, banishment and more horrific, the capital punishment. Maoists in Garhchiroli area of Maharashtra have issued warning to panchayat and corporation level political workers to resign from their posts or else face consequences In the early nineties, United Liberation Front of Asom and Bodo Liberation Front carried out large scale kidnappings of businessmen, tea estate managers and government officials to establish a reign of terror. Prominent amongst the victims was first chief minister of Assam, Gopinath Bordoloi’s son Bolin Bordoloi, regional manager of Tata Tea, who remained in the captivity of Bodo militants for 330 days. The official was released after a substantial ransom was paid to the militants. Extortion has been main source of funds for militant outfits of Assam and the north-east. In all such situations, state and central governments acted in an ad hoc and supine manner; mostly yielding to the demands of the militants. Such capitulations have exposed the weakness of our system. The central and state governments do not have a uniform policy and Standard Operating Procedures to deal with such situations. Establishment’s responses are mostly dictated by the precedence and possibility of a political backlash. Politicians dither in taking a principled stand against the coercion and blackmail and succumb to emotions and immediate pressure of public opinion. In keeping with this supine tradition, Maoists’ kidnap strategy seems to be paying off. In Naxal-affected areas of Odisha and Chhattisgarh a few kidnappings have taken place in quick succession. The precursor to present crises

dates back to February 16, 2011, when Odisha’s Malkangiri district collector R Vineel Krishna and a junior engineer were kidnapped by Andhra Odisha Border Special Zone Committee (AOBSZC) of Maoists demanding release of Ganti Prasad Rao alias Prasadam - a Maoist ideologue and other cadres lodged in jails. R Vineel Krishna was a well-meaning civil servant and quite popular among the tribals for his sincerity and dedication. That worked in his favour and locals pressed for his release from captivity. After some negotiations the official was set free on February 22 by his captors. On February 23, Odisha High Court granted bail to Ganti Prasad Rao who was arrested on several charges including sedition and waging war against the state. A year later, on March 12, 2012, Maoists aligned to Sabyasachi Panda led Odisha State Organising Committee (OSOC) kidnapped two Italian nationals - Paolo Bosusco and Claudio Colangelo from Daringbadi area of Kandhamal District of Odisha. After hectic parleys and pleadings with Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha (CMAS) - a front organisation of the OSOC, the Italians were released on March 25 and April 12. Panda’s wife Subhashree alias Mili who was in jail since January 2010 under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was released along with 23 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and CMAS. Cases against Subhashree were withdrawn. Interestingly, Odisha Police Association opposed government’s decision to free Maoists and CMAS cadres under the swap deal. Close on the heels of abduction of foreigners, on March 24, Maoists aligned to AOBSZC kidnapped Jhina Hikaka, a tribal himself and a sitting member of State Legislative Assembly from ruling Biju Janata Dal party from Koraput district of Odisha. After being tried by a Praja Court (a kangaroo court of the Maoists) the legislator was let off on April 26 with instructions to resign from state assembly and membership of his political party. On his release after 32 days in captivity, a visibly shaken legislator reiterated his promise made to Maoists to resign from the assembly and the party.

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Reacting to Jhina Hikaka’s statement Biju Janata Dal spokesman said the legislator might be suffering from ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, where victim after prolonged captivity develops sympathy for his / her captors and starts identifying with their cause. Unspecified numbers of jailed Maoist cadres were freed by the government to secure release of the legislator. In Bastar region of Naxal-affected state of Chhattisgarh cadres of South Bastar Divisional Committee of Maoists abducted Alex Paul Menon, collector of newly-formed Sukma district (Sukma shares its border with Malkangiri district of Odisha where in February 2011 Malkangiri collector R Vineel Krishna was kidnapped). The kidnapping was carried out by dozens of Maoists cadres in broad daylight from village Manjipara where Menon was presiding over a farmers’ meet. Maoists also killed two of his security guards before taking him hostage. After hectic negotiations through government and Maoists’ mediators collector was released by ultras on May 3. In all these kidnappings the Maoists have put forward similar set of demands. Cessation of Operation Green Hunt and combing operations; withdrawal of security forces from the forests; release of arrested Maoists and their sympathisers; and fasttracking of court cases against the cadres are few common demands in every case. These are well coordinated operations by CPI (Maoist) and its zonal committees. Why do insurgents and terrorists opt for kidnapping and hostage-taking? It is a cost-effective option which gives them an opportunity to undermine the authority of the government and bask in the media limelight. The government comes under tremendous pressure as it has to secure the release of the hostages within the time limit dictated by the ultras. While abduction of high profile politicians, officials, citizens and businessmen makes it to the headlines, abduction of political workers, low officials, common citizens and petty traders goes unreported. In the Naxal-affected areas of Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra

there have been sporadic incidents of kidnapping of common citizens. In most of the cases, either the victims paid ransom for their release or were tried by Praja Court and met a gruesome end.

Sporadic violent incidents like improvised explosive device attack, ambush, jailbreak, looting coupled with kidnappings create an impression of invincibility about the ultras in the minds of general public and government officials Kidnapping is a source of good income too. In mineral rich and poorly developed Naxal-affected areas there are many mining and infrastructure companies operating with huge investments. Ultras are extorting mind-boggling amounts from these agencies as protection money. There is a psychological angle to this strategy. In any insurgency about 5 per cent population is actively involved in anti-government activities; 15 per cent forms the cadres of overt and covert sympathisers and 80 per cent population is non-committal - the ‘fence sitters’. As ultras intensify kidnappings and other offensive actions against the government officials, they stop venturing out from their headquarters. Tehsils, courts, block offices, police stations, primary health centres, banks, primary schools, colleges etc., register less and less attendance. Public problems remain unaddressed and the ‘fence sitters’ start leaning towards the insurgent’s ideology for grievance redressal. Sporadic violent incidents like improvised explosive device attack,

a m b u s h , jailbreak, looting coupled with kidnappings create an impression of invincibility about the ultras in the minds of general public and government officials. In the absence of any credible government response the population starts accepting ultras as keepers of law and conscience. In far-flung areas of Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand it is a reality, where Maoists kidnap people, try them in kangaroo courts and dish out verdicts ranging from corporal punishment, fines, banishment and more horrific, the capital punishment. Maoists in Garhchiroli area of Maharashtra have issued warning to panchayat and corporation level political workers to resign from their posts or else face consequences. Though the state governments, under the given circumstances, have managed to secure release of the hostages by opening communication channels and carrying out negotiations but for how long can this ad hoc policy of abject capitulation continue? During negotiations the Maoists have been able to extract undue concessions from the government and this seems to be the beginning of a never-ending crisis. While the centre and states squabble over the powers and jurisdiction of proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre, the Maoists seem to have adopted a simple strategy - spread fear psychosis by direct and indirect actions against the individuals and the establishment.

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DERELICTION OF DUTY?

M Pathikrit Payne The writer is an alumnus of S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He was previously associated with The Sunday Indian magazine and is presently a Senior Researcher with a New Delhi based think tank. The lack of a coherent policy and the baggage of federalism under whose pretext states claim that law and order is a state subject and that the centre should not directly intervene, have been the major hindrances in the fight against Maoists. Sadly the way India’s states behave at times, they do not seem to be constituent states of a federal republic but seem more like independent states of a confederation. It is for certain now that the fight against Maoists would peak at a time when the tensions across the border in Pakistan would erupt in a new way in the post US exit era in 2014. There is a very high probability of resurgence of cross border terrorism at that time and also a high chance of mischief by China in that very period. Unless India changes its way of treating Maoism as a national security problem and not as a socio-economic problem it is perhaps staring at the possibility of the three frontal conflict starting from 2014. Is India ready for that?

y last trip to Lalgarh was in August 2009. The battle against the Maoists in the f India is on the back foot in the restive district of West Midnapore war against Maoists, it is not had by then reached its peak. because the Maoists are more Officially Lalgarh was no more a Maoist bastion, which even a few efficient or superior but it is primarily months back, was a no-go zone because of the schizophrenic attitude for the police forces. The tide had started to turn but the silent fear of India’s governments at the central clearly made its resonance felt as well as at the state level. In spite across the contours of the Sal forests. I had been to Lalgarh several times of the clear and present danger, each before that but I vividly remember state is fighting its own war and the last trip for very specific reasons. That West Midnapore was some are even going to the extent of not just any other rustic district of appeasing the Maoists in their own India could be gauged from the glimpse of the police in the district states to make sure that no untoward town itself. The West Bengal Police, incident happens over there. It does notorious for long for its laid-back not matter if heinous activities are attitude and sloth mentality was gradually changing. Most of the carried out by the same Maoists in policemen, one would come across the neighbouring state. The lack of in the district police headquarter were armed with INSAS assault a coherent policy and the baggage rifles and military camouflage of federalism under whose pretext green clothing. They moved around mostly in SUVs and were relatively states claim that law and order is young as well as seemingly fighting a state subject and that the centre fit. The then Superintendent of Police of West Midnapore, should not directly intervene, have Manoj Verma had given me the been the major hindrances in the permission to drive down from the district town to Lalgarh and fight against Maoists. Sadly the he stated it would be safe to do so way India’s states behave at times, even though I had my reservations. they do not seem to be constituent All through my journey of around twenty to thirty minutes, the fear states of a federal republic but seem of some undiscovered landmine more like independent states of a blowing off our TATA Sumo literally haunted me. But the confederation. entire stretch was amazingly calm and serene. The Maoists and their frontal organisations seemed to have almost vanished into thin air. For a change, I felt happy at the way the Bengal Police had gone ahead with the job. But the job was far from over even though signs of change could be witnessed. New rural roads were coming up under the central government schemes like Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana and signboards narrating the jobs being done under the NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) were all over the stretch. Yet beneath the realm of signs of progress, it seemed as if people have lost their voice. You halt at any teashop and no one would speak to you for fear of retribution. For once I had realised then what terror feels like. Terror need not be physically present but stories of terror fly fast and create a ripple effect. In those days, even though Maoists had gone in the hiding, incidents of target killings on suspicion of being police informer or for being a CPM worker were an everyday affair. Every other day one could find bodies with slit throats and tied hands lying on the roadside in the morning. Men with covered faces emerging from the sal forests into the hamlets and knocking at the doors were a regular affair. They would then drag out the unsuspecting victim, mostly an impoverished tribal and either slit the throat or shoot at point blank. So much for fight for the rights of the downtrodden. The local police would dare not touch the dead bodies lest they were a booby trap and it would lie there unless district forces would arrive with bomb squad. People had got so much used to it that they had even stopped noticing the dead bodies lying on the road. Life has its amazing way of restoring normalcy even in desperate times by simply being indifferent to the reality.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

If this is not war… then what is war?

On reaching the Lalgarh Police station, I understood why people, I came across on my way, were fraught with fear of the unknown and the invisible tyranny. The main gate of the police station was locked and the sentry there would not let me and my cameraman enter at any cost. For all the semblance of normalcy, the armed police had preferred to keep themselves completely locked inside. One then cannot blame the hapless common man. Across the road new barracks were coming up where CRPF and West Bengal Armed Police personnel would be permanently stationed. As you cross the barricaded police station, a huge barren land stares at you, across which is a distant land, which seemed like in another nation. I was told by the sentry at the station not to venture into that terrain as it could be mined. A few young men playing cards in a shed near the police station became tentative as I approached them. No one here talks to a stranger and especially if the stranger is a journalist, for there are no neutral journalists who venture into the Maoist battle zones. You are either pro-Maoist or rabidly against them. The young men pleaded not to be asked any question as they narrated what the outcome of saying anything against the Maoist would be, … a slit throat and a dumped body on the road side. Here no one does loose talks and no one minces a word against the Maoists, for, no one knows who would act as a mole and inform them just for the sake of being in their good book and sparing his own life. From inside the boundary wall I saw a police officer speaking on the phone to his daughter. He was trying his best to convince her as to why it would be impossible for him to come home this time for the ensuing Durga Puja. His daughter was adamant and even the offer of the bribe of an extra piece of dress was not enough to convince her. Her father was not somehow in a position to explain as to what Maoists are and why because of them he would not be able to return home for the puja or just in case perhaps ever again. The officer was trying hard to put a brave front on the phone while talking to his daughter but could not stop the rolling tears from exiting his moist eyes. Another police officer from the nearby CRPF camp at Bhimpur had told me the same while staring at the Sal forests right across the school where they had camped. ‘Anything can happen any time.’ The essence of that narrative was vindicated less than six months from that day when the Silda massacre took place. Twenty four jawans of the Eastern Frontier Rifles of West Bengal

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DERELICTION OF DUTY?

Police, a state level paramilitary force, were butchered by Maoists in February, 2010. That was followed by similar attacks in Dantewada where 76 jawans of CRPF were similarly massacred by the Maoists.

It is difficult to fight back with a constant fear of persecution for alleged human rights violations. There lies a very thin red line between a Maoist in olive green and a civilian in the restive Maoist zones. It doesn’t take much time for the Maoists to strip their dead comrade of the uniform and the weapon and dump the body in a nearby village and then allege fake encounters of villagers by the police. An indifferent state government in its quest to prove its neutrality and pseudo-concern for human rights issues invariably end up victimising the jawan Much water has flown down the Ganges since then. India’s GDP rose from US$ 1.2 trillion to almost US$ 1.8 trillion a year. It now has a nuclear powered submarine and proven capability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile. Its per capita income has risen and it aspires to be among the big league of nations in the future in terms of geopolitical and economic clout. But deep inside, India remains as fragile as ever with the shadow of terrorism of all shades and colours out to destroy the very idea of India, which has otherwise withstood the sands of time with much élan. While Islamic terrorism remains a potent force to reckon with, India’s real challenge in terms of internal security is undoubtedly the Maoist threat. The most important reason for the same is that the Maoists have been extremely successful in camouflaging their brutal terror tactics and heinous end objectives with a perfect veil of romantic revolution and pretense of fight for the downtrodden. India’s pseudo elite living in some of the most posh locales of the country and who love to indulge themselves in some or the other form of social cause for the namesake and for getting the much needed page three coverage, fall for this trap and presume that Maoists are doing a great job. Their false notion is reinforced by apologists that the Maoists have successfully placed in the elite arena who keep

justifying the violence of the Maoists and criticise any act of government to counter the same. Sadly, India’s Union government, which should ideally be a visionary in terms of steering the nation towards a better future, is essentially an antithesis of the same. It is rather a clueless dispensation, which runs from one crisis to another and thus is more concerned about its own existence while having little time to spare for the nation at large. Cleary, in today’s perspective the Maoists have an edge if not winning, not because they are better equipped or have mass support but simply because they have a better resolve than India’s central government and the state level governments. Probably there is no other nation where hundreds of police and paramilitary personnel are massacred and yet the rhetoric of Maoism being a socio-economic problem keeps doing rounds. The real success of the Maoist terrorists thus lie in this very attribute of keeping the society intoxicated by the opium of sympathy for the downtrodden. And yet probably there’s no one who has more disregard for the downtrodden tribals of India than the Maoists have. India’s hapless tribal population keep paying the price for the ignorance of India’s policy makers, indifference of India’s bureaucratic babu class and because of the fact that India’s elite presume that any movement that is anti-establishment has to be necessarily good. In fact Lalgarh is perhaps one of the best examples of how Maoists encash on local problems and eventually become the biggest stumbling block to any kind of development of backward regions. True, Jangalmahal region was for long one of the most neglected regions of the state of West Bengal, partly because the terrain and climate in that region has never been suitable for agriculture and partly because incumbent governments have always preferred not to interfere with the indigenous lifestyle of the tribals. The net result was not so glorious as the Maoists deeply embedded themselves in that region which was strategic for them for the fact that it was a key region in their game plan of creating seamless corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh. With the advent of the present incumbent government of Mamata Banerjee, four important steps proved crucial in

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massively reducing the stranglehold of the Maoists in the Lalgarh region and the eventual liquidation of key Maoist leader Kishenji. While giving a free hand to the police to clamp down on the armed Maoist cadres, the administration made it clear that the hapless villagers should be spared. This was seconded by large scale restructuring of the moribund public distribution system and making sure that rice was available for Rs 2 / kg in addition to large scale developmental schemes for the region. The third and the most crucial decision was to recruit around 7,000 tribal youth as junior constables in West Bengal Police. The region responded positively but the Maoists became tentative and resisted the development. It was at that time that the common folk of the region became suspicious of the real motive of the Maoists. If the local issues are getting solved, why are they resisting? … was the question that everyone was asking. Had it not been for alienation of the villagers and the threats of the Maoist leadership (which was mostly from outside) of dire consequences if the youth join the police, Kishenji could not have been killed. That was a body blow to the Maoist movement of the region which led to mass surrender by several others in the rank.

They can shoot at helicopters evacuating injured policemen but the helicopter cannot shoot back. It is perhaps for these idiosyncrasies that the Army is extremely reluctant to join in unless it is given certain basic immunities and rights that are so very essential in such conflict zones The fourth and a very crucial decision of the Mamata government has been to keep the pseudo-human rights activists and intellectuals at bay and give a word for word rebuff to their clamour for withdrawal of forces. That clampdown played a key role in reducing the stranglehold of the Maoists in the Jangalmahal region. It has to be kept in mind that the Maoist bastions in the backward forested regions of the country cannot continue without active logistical and monetary support from India’s prime cities. In the last one year or so, several key Maoist leaders of Bengal have been arrested not

from the forested Lalgarh but right from Kolkata and its suburbs where they have often been harboured by the city’s intelligentsia. It includes Sadanala Ramkrishna who has been responsible for creating a logistical corridor for the Maoists in terms of procuring spares and parts from Kolkata and eventually shipping it to Chhattisgarh for manufacturing sophisticated weapons and bombs. The arrest of Ramkrishna by STF of Kolkata Police was key in exposing the kind of sophistication the Maoists have been able to reach in terms of weapons production.

The unfortunate truth is that the hapless jawans have been left in the lurch, caught between a ruthless adversary and an indifferent state saddled with subservient and self-serving officials in the police and bureaucratic hierarchy. The story is same for every state. Unlike the Armed Forces which act as a cohesive force and wherein their heads literally fight for the cause of their men, in case of state police and even in some cases of central paramilitary forces, doubts remain as to how often their chiefs fight it out for the cause of their jawans While Mamata Banerjee government has been criticised for several other reasons and rightly so, one has to give her credit for decisively reducing the stranglehold of the Maoists in the restive Jangalmahal region. Barring Saranda forests in Jharkhand, there has not been any other region where the police forces and the state administration have been able to put the Maoists on the run in the recent past. As it stands today, the battle against Maoists is gradually entering a decisive phase and sooner than later it is going to hurt India’s economy badly. In October last year directives were sent by India’s Union Home Ministry to the DGPs of 11 states warning them of the impending strikes by the Maoists who, as per the analysis of intelligence inputs, have clear plans to hit hard India’s economic infrastructure. Already the Maoists have started giving shape to their next crucial step in the war against the state by kidnapping and terrorising the elected representatives of the state. Add to it the latest reports by the Home Ministry that states that the

cadre strength of armed Maoists now stand at an estimated 46,000 out of which 8,000-10,000 are heavily armed with sophisticated weapons while the rest are armed with some or the other kind of countrymade weapons. By any standard, the present strength of the armed cadres of Indian Maoists is perhaps bigger than that of the army of several smaller European states like Ireland or Switzerland. Moreover it is now amply clear that the Maoist have close links with north-east based insurgent groups which are working as key intermediary to supply them with sophisticated weapons. It would not be thus surprising if in the next few years instead of 8,000, almost the entire armed cadre of 46,000 personnel of Maoists get equipped with sophisticated weapon systems. This, ironically is happening at a time when reports state that in the last five years an estimated 46,000 personnel have quit India’s Central Armed Police Force. Thanks to a clueless Home Ministry whose babus while sitting in air-conditioned offices in New Delhi and while doing a nine to five job take decisions on deployment of CAPF and remain essentially indifferent towards the plight of the hapless jawans who are made to fight a three-sixty degree war in some of the worst terrains of the country, devoid of any kind of support systems and promotional avenues, one cannot essentially

blame the jawans for quitting. The case is the same for the state level forces also. To take an example what happened in Bengal last year, In September 2011, around 50 jawans of India Reserve Battalion posted in Silda, West Midnapore had staged a hunger strike protesting against their prolonged stint in Maoist hotbeds as also the deplorable condition of their accommodation. Silda, incidentally is the same place where in 2010, 24 jawans were massacred by the Maoists. Anyone who has been to those camps would know that even the servant quarter of the junior most bureaucrats in India, would seem to be a luxury when compared to the wretched condition of the camps. Even by their own admission, the central police personnel posted there had termed those lodging not worthy of human living. A visibly embarrassed Bengal government, in a hush-hush manner transferred the protesting jawans and replaced them with another paramilitary unit namely STRACO. Under the pretext of disciplinary action, seven jawans who were found responsible for instigating the rebellion have been suspended. While the issue of discipline can never be compromised with, the moot issue that needs deliberation is whether all the strictures of discipline and sanctity of police forces apply only to foot soldiers. How often their super-superiors, who mostly

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DERELICTION OF DUTY?

It was a key region in their game plan of creating seamless corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh. With the advent of the present incumbent government of Mamata Banerjee, four important steps proved crucial in massively reducing the stranglehold of the Maoists in the Lalgarh region and the eventual liquidation of key Maoist leader Kishenji. While giving a free hand to the police to clamp down on the armed Maoist cadres, the administration made it clear that the hapless villagers should be spared. This was seconded by large scale restructuring of the moribund public distribution system and making sure that rice was available for Rs 2 / kg in addition to large scale developmental schemes for the region. The third and the most crucial decision was to recruit around 7,000 tribal youth as junior constables in West Bengal Police. The region responded positively but the Maoists became tentative and resisted the development. It was at that time that the common folk of the region became suspicious of the real motive of the Maoists. If the local issues are getting solved, why are they resisting? live in the luxury of state capitals, spend time with the foot soldiers in Maoist and mosquito-infested regions of Jangalmahal or elsewhere? How often the morale of the seemingly dispensable jawan is taken into account while fighting a faceless ruthless adversary like the Maoists? How many times a foot soldier considers his superiors in the organisation as brothers in arms? How many times the organisational heads essentially take the issues of daily plight of their jawans to the government? And how many times a state’s Home Secretary or Principal Secretary considers it as an issue worth deliberating on a priority basis? Should not the Commandant of the concerned battalion be also held responsible for dereliction of duty for being unable to provide the basic amenities that a sane human being, leave alone a fighting force, requires? If the foot soldier is under an oath to comply with rules and strictures, should not there be similar strictures and accountability for the top officers of the forces and should not they too be suspended for failure to provide the basic amenities? The unfortunate truth is that the hapless jawans have been left in the lurch, caught between a ruthless adversary and an indifferent state saddled with subservient and self-serving officials in the police and bureaucratic hierarchy. The story is same for every state. Unlike the Armed Forces which act as a cohesive force and wherein their heads literally fight for the cause of their men, in case of state police and even in some cases of central paramilitary forces, doubts remain as to how often their chiefs fight it out for the cause of their jawans. The frustration of the jawans is also because of the constant allegation of human rights violation they have to face. In a war zone not everything goes by the rule book and especially if the adversary is as cunning and ruthless as the Maoists, who do not spare a chance to even mutilate the body of a dead jawan, it is difficult to fight back with a constant fear of persecution for alleged human right violations. There lies a very thin red line between a Maoist in olive green and a civilian in the restive Maoist zones. It doesn’t take much time for the Maoists to strip their dead comrade of the uniform and the weapon and dump the body in a nearby village and then allege fake encounters of villagers by the police. An indifferent state government in its quest to prove its neutrality and pseudo-concern for human rights issues invariably end up victimising the jawan. Sadly, in the absence of any legal immunity, jawans fighting Maoists in India are caught between the devil and the deep sea. One also simply doesn’t understand as to why the state is so inclined to impose so many restrictions on those who are fighting for the state. The Maoists can behead policemen, they can rip apart police vans with powerful landmines but the policeman would have to play by the rule book. They can shoot at helicopters

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

evacuating injured policemen but the helicopter cannot shoot back. It is perhaps for these idiosyncrasies that the Army is extremely reluctant to join in unless it is given certain basic immunities and rights that are so very essential in such conflict zones. Perhaps the situation would not have been the same if any top bureaucrat’s son or the son-in-law of any top minister had been serving the CRPF or state police as a front line soldier.

Indian DPSUs Increase Exports To US, Europe, Asia

he Minister of State for Defence M M Pallam Raju has stated in the Parliament that since 2009-2010, the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) have exported products worth nearly US$ 4.03 billion (Rs 1,815 crore) to over 50 countries including the US, UK, China and Israel amongst others. The Minister has stated that the state-run Defence units are continually progressing in terms of exports. Minister of State (Defence) M M Pallam Raju has tabled a report in the Parliament which describes the value of material exported by nine DPSUs to a total of 53 countries. The total export value generated by the DPSUs stood at Rs 1, 81,487 lakh. While Defence products from the Indian DPSUs were exported to major countries like UK, Canada, China, Israel, Germany and France, the countries from the sub-continent like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka also got a share of Indian Defence products. The largest chunk of the export was done by the state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) which sold material worth Rs 78,306 lakh. India has been aiming at self-reliance in the Defence sector for a long time and the ushering of the new Defence production policy in January 2011 has been a step in that direction. In order to produce advanced Defence products, the procurement policy allows means such as formation of consortia, joint ventures and public-private partnerships within the government-approved framework.

While Islamic terrorism remains a potent force to reckon with, India’s real challenge in terms of internal security is undoubtedly the Maoist threat. The most important reason for the same is that the Maoists have been extremely successful in camouflaging their brutal terror tactics and heinous end objectives with a perfect veil of romantic revolution and pretense of fight for the downtrodden. India’s pseudo elite living in some of the most posh locales of the country and who love to indulge themselves in some or the other form of social cause for the namesake and for getting the much needed page three coverage, fall for this trap and presume that Maoists are doing a great job Therefore in essence, if India is on the back foot in the war against Maoists, it is not because the Maoists are more efficient or superior but it is primarily because of the schizophrenic attitude of India’s governments at the central as well as at the state level. In spite of the clear and present danger, each state is fighting its own war and some are even going to the extent of appeasing the Maoists in their own states to make sure that no untoward incident happens over there. It does not matter if heinous activites are carried out by the same Maoists in the neighbouring state. The lack of a coherent policy and the baggage of federalism under whose pretext states claim that law and order is a state subject and that the centre should not directly intervene, have been the major hindrances in the fight against Maoists. Sadly the way India’s states behave at times, they do not seem to be constituent states of a federal republic but seem more like independent states of a confederation. It is for certain now that the fight against Maoists would peak at a time when the tensions across the border in Pakistan would erupt in a new way in the post US exit era in 2014. There is a very high probability of resurgence of cross border terrorism at that time and also a high chance of mischief by China in that very period. Unless India changes its way of treating Maoism as a national security problem and not as a socio-economic problem it is perhaps staring at the possibility of the three frontal conflict starting from 2014. Is India ready for that?

Indian Navy Inducts More MiG-29Ks

efence Minister A K Antony has announced in the Parliament that 15 Russian MiG-29K fighters have been inducted in the Indian Navy. These MiG-29K fighters have been inducted for carrier-borne operations and will operate from INS Vikramaditya once it is inducted in December 2012. The MiG-29K series of fighters will also operate from the other aircraft carrier INS Viraat. In 2004, India had placed an order to the tune of US$ 650 million for 16 MiG-29Ks to be used from INS Vikramaditya which is being refurbished by Russia. Another order for US$ 1.5 billion was placed in early 2010 to purchase the 29 additional MiG-29Ks. The MiG-29K has only been exported to India for use on the refitted Russian-built carrier INS Vikramaditya. The MiG-29K is a naval variant of the MiG-29 land-based fighter and has folding wings, an arrester tail-hook, strengthened airframe and multirole capability. The fighter can be equipped with various air-to-air and air-to-surface weaponry. The MiG-29K will be in concurrent service with the Russian Navy. India operates sixteen out of a total of forty MiG-29K planned for acquisition. The newly designed and upgraded MiG-29K prototype was first revealed by Russia in 2007. The new MiG-29K come in two versions: the single-seat MiG-29K and the two-seat MiG-29KUB. The MiG-29K is equipped with the new Zhuk-E radar, which can detect up to ten targets at a time and engage four of them. The MiG-29K is also equipped with an electronic counter measures suite and the pilot is equipped with a helmet-mounted targeting system. The MiG-29K is powered by two RD-33MK engines and has a maximum endurance of 850 kilometers.

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STATE OF PREPAREDNESS

Dr Pranav Kumar The writer is Assistant Professor - Senior Scale - at Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Manipal. Prior to this he was working as a Research Associate at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He had a stint as an Assistant Professor at Hawassa University, Ethiopia. He holds a PhD from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His areas of teaching and research interests include Indian Foreign Policy, International Politics, Security Issues, Environmental politics, Energy and Technological Cooperation and Governance.

he achievement of the government - states and centre - in dealing with the Maoist challenge has been a mixed-bag. Andhra Pradesh and Bihar are among those states that have displayed the best results in controlling the extent of the menace in both quantitative and spatial terms. However, the Maoist activities have seen upward trend in states like Odisha and Chhattisgarh. Moreover, as stated by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in reply to Question No. 3117 in the Lok Sabha on December 13, 2011, Naxalism has reportedly established a firm base in what is known as the Golden Corridor Area. The so-called ‘Golden Corridor Area’ extends along western India and reportedly stretches along the belt, extending from Pune to Ahmedabad, including Nashik, Surat and Vadodara. Recently, a first-of-its-kind anti-Naxalite operation has allowed paramilitary forces to break into the Abujmarh forests in Chhattisgarh. The writer throws light on the employment of UAVs and RISAT Satellites to counter Naxal activities.

THREAT OF NAXALISM AND

INDIA’S RESPONSE

he Prime Minister of India in 2004 had first time publicly recognised Naxalism as the biggest threat to India’s Internal Security. Subsequently, a number of other leaders, including one of the worst Naxal hit state Chhattisgarh’s Chief Minister, also expressed similar views. The recent abduction spree wherein the Naxalites have targeted high profile persons including a Member of Legislative Assembly, a high profile administrator and foreign tourists in Chhattisgarh and Odisha has demonstrated that Naxalites are gaining confidence day by day and are adopting new tactics to pressurise and delegitimise the government. Notwithstanding the former Home Minister’s refusal to accept Naxalism as the biggest threat, it is a well-accepted fact that the influence of Naxalism has grown thick and fast during the last two decades or so. Indeed, the seriousness of this challenge has been snowballing every year. The geographical extent of Naxalism in India is said to be from “Tirupati to Pashupati”. Apparently, the so called “Red corridor” cutting across the heart of India - extending from Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, all the way to Nepal - is the most vivid representation of the threat that Naxals pose to our country. However, the recent developments show that the extent of Naxalism is limited not only to the red corridor, but it has also been vying to expand its sphere of influence to other regions as well.

The central government has now asked for identification and establishment of UAV bases to cover the entire Left Wing Extremism area. The UAVs would help track Maoists in forest areas; its images would reach base stations and anti-Maoist forces could be mobilised to capture them. The Chhattisgarh government is also planning to use UAVs of the Indian Air Force for reconnaissance of Naxal-hit areas. However, operating UAVs in Naxal-affected areas is also creating problems as surveillance radars and other sighting systems have to penetrate foliage obtained in the dense forests

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STATE OF PREPAREDNESS

As a part of its holistic approach towards combating Left Wing Extremism (LWE), wherein it supplements the efforts of the state governments over a wide range of issues including assistance in implementation of development schemes, improving governance and capacity building by the states in various areas, the central government had announced its decision to introduce a special scheme to ameliorate socio-economic and infrastructural condition in the Naxal hit districts The achievement of the government - states and centre - in dealing with the Maoist challenge has been a mixed-bag. Andhra Pradesh and Bihar are among those states that have displayed the best results in controlling the extent of the menace in both quantitative and spatial terms. Reports say that Andhra Pradesh has almost totally wiped out the presence of the rebel Naxals from the state, except in North Coastal Andhra. Similarly, one of the Naxal abduction victims, Navin Kumar Singh, in a telephonic conversation with the writer pointed out that the effect of Naxalism in the central and southern Bihar has been declining. However, the Maoist activities have seen upward trend in states like Odisha and Chhattisgarh. Moreover, as stated by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in reply to Question No. 3117 in the Lok Sabha on December 13, 2011, Naxalism has reportedly established a firm base in what is known as the Golden Corridor Area. He narrated that the Maoist had formed a ‘Golden Corridor Committee’ to build its base in the industrial areas of Gujarat and Maharashtra. He further explained that Maoists are active in Garhchiroli, Gondia and Chandrapur districts of Maharashtra and have plans to expand their movement to many more districts of the state. The so-called ‘Golden Corridor Area’ extends along western India and reportedly stretches along the belt, extending from Pune to Ahmedabad, including Nashik, Surat and Vadodara.

Security force preparedness ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’ are state subjects, so action with respect to maintenance of law and order lies primarily in the domain of the state governments concerned. However, the central government has a holistic approach towards combating Left Wing Extremism (LWE) wherein it supplements the efforts of the state governments over a wide range of issues including deployment of Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPFs). The Union Home Ministry, both as the central government’s nodal agency on law and order and main policy instrument on social conflicts, has an underestimated but key role to play. Theoretically, as ‘public order’ is a state subject under the Constitution, the state government is supposed to be left free to handle such problems with no role other than a coordinative one for the Union Home Ministry. However, keeping the growing Naxalite threat all across the country in view, the Union Home Ministry’s role becomes nodal as it happens to control the largest number of centralised paramilitary forces to be deployed for counter-Naxalite operations. As far as the preparedness of state police is concerned, owing to its inadequate numerical strength and limited striking capabilities, it has been in bad shape. For instance, the Maoists have killed more than 3,700 people since 2005 and only one Naxal gets killed for four deaths among security personnel and civilians. Moreover, if we rely on the data pertaining to last three years, the Maoists also seized more than 1,000 weapons per year that include AK 47’s, bombs and RDX. The state police forces do not have the strength, training, transportation and arms to gain control over such huge swathe of territory. One of the indicators that help us to understand the police unpreparedness is low police-population average. For instance, Bihar, one of the Naxal-hit states, has abysmal police-population ratio of approximately 1 policeman to 10,000 citizens, which is below the national average of 1.3 policemen per 10,000 citizens. Unless steady capacity-building efforts are put in place, deployment of state police will be ineffective and irrational.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

Hence, the role of the central paramilitary forces becomes very important in handling the menace of Naxalism. Recently, a first-of-its-kind anti-Naxalite operation has allowed paramilitary forces to break into the Abujmarh forests in Chhattisgarh, a left-wing Maoist stronghold. Armed with modern equipment, over 3,000 men from CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) and its strike unit, COBRA, other paramilitary forces and state police have started combing the forests. Moreover, horizontal and vertical integration among different agencies associated with the counter-Naxalite activities is also being employed. In this direction, in the year 2010, a unified command had been set up in each of the States of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, Jharkhand and Odisha. A new scheme has been initiated to assist the state governments in constructing / strengthening fortified police stations. An empowered group of officers in the central government has been set up to ensure effective implementation of flagship development schemes. Moreover, during 2011, under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) in the Naxal-affected states, a total of Rs 255 crore was released to these states as advance and as reimbursements. Similarly, under the new Scheme of ‘Construction / Strengthening of Fortified Police Station’, a total amount of Rs 120 crore was released to the nine LWE affected states during 2011 for construction of 400 Police Stations.

One of the indicators that help us to understand the police unpreparedness is low police-population average. For instance, Bihar, one of the naxal-hit states, has abysmal police-population ratio of approximately 1 policeman to 10,000 citizens, which is below the national average of 1.3 policemen per 10,000 citizens. Unless steady capacity-building efforts are put in place, deployment of state police will be ineffective and irrational The security forces are increasingly adopting new tactics for carrying out operations for longer duration in the Naxal-affected areas. This was particularly evident in Jharkhand where a number of Naxal camps

were raided and destroyed by the CRPF. In Jharkhand, two COBRA battalions have destroyed a series of Naxal camps. Moreover, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is also reiterating the utilisation of the Indian Army’s expertise in operational planning and tactical deployment to the state governments.

The revenue districts carved out of Bastar, namely, Kanker and Dantewada, have a tribal population of about 56 per cent and about 79 per cent respectively. These are the districts predominantly affected by the Naxalite threat. Hence, the initial agrarian-ideological movement has been replaced by an organised criminal activity, with the intent of controlling mineral and forest resources and is, in turn, run by the cadres recruited from deprived and underdeveloped sections of society

Technological preparedness State security forces as well as Naxalites are making maximum use of technology to their advantage. Technological superiority of state would determine effectiveness of counter-Naxalism exercises. The technological preparedness enhances combatant and intelligence capabilities by leaps and bounds.

According to the Department of Homeland Security’s website, the government has already been using drones domestically for several years, but has remained mostly tightlipped on its missions, other than saying that they are regularly used for “support of disaster relief efforts”. India, owing to external acquisition and indigenous development, has also evolved credible technologies essential for operationalisation of UAVs and drones. In the wake of 1999 Kargil Conflict and 2001 attack on the Parliament, the Indian military has inducted more than 100 UAVs into the forces, mainly Israeli-built UAVs known as the Searcher and Heron, used for Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (IRS). Indigenously-built Nishant and Rustom can also help India to tilt the technological pointer in its favour vis-à-vis Naxalites. India’s most prized indigenous drone programme is the Autonomous Unmanned Research Aircraft (AURA), which is tipped as the country’s first high-speed, stealthy UCAV that will autonomously seek, identify and destroy targets with laser-guided weapons. Last month (April, 2012), in the Chief Ministers’ meet on internal security, it was decided to deploy UAVs for counter-Maoist activities, for which

the centre has given a go-ahead. As of now, the Begumpet airfield in Hyderabad is being used to fly the unmanned drones to cover the epicentres of Naxal activities. In order to enhance operational capabilities, the central government has now asked for identification and establishment of UAV bases to cover the entire Left Wing Extremism area. The UAV would help track Maoists in forest areas; its images would reach base stations and anti-Maoist forces could be mobilised to capture them. The Chhattisgarh government is also planning to use UAVs of the Indian Air Force for reconnaissance of Naxal-hit areas. However, operating UAVs in Naxal-affected areas is also creating problems as surveillance radars and other sighting systems have to penetrate foliage obtained in the dense forests. Other related and interlinked technological application, which can substantially enhance the interceptive and operational capacity of police and paramilitary exercises, is related to collection, integration and utilisation of information gathered from INSAT and Remote Sensing Satellites. The microwaves, the optical and the infrared sensors and transponders are being used for civil and military purposes. Although

Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been effectively and successfully used by technologically advanced military across the globe. The UAVs can be used to track communications, enemy movements and real-time data transmission and to detect improving explosive devices (IEDs). UAVs can also use missiles for precise strikes on enemy targets. It can drastically decrease human capital loss and can curb psychological limitations linked to human pilots. With the help of sensors and combat weapons including missiles assembled with it, drone becomes a lethal technological innovation that can be used for preventive and combat counter-Naxal activities. In the wake of their successful, efficient and effective use at overseas theatres, last year, the USA has formally endorsed use of drones for Homeland Security.

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different police and paramilitary forces use information and communication signals gathered from the satellites during counter-Naxalite exercises, similar electro-magnetic waves can also be used by Naxalites for their own purposes. Reports suggest that Naxals have started using High Frequency (HF) radio for communications to avoid being tapped by the police. HF communications, being difficult to intercept, may require far more sophisticated equipment than that available with the police so far. Naxalites and their cadres have also been using Very High Frequency (VHF) sets to communicate. Technosavvy Naxal leaders have been continuously staying ahead of the technology curve from time to time.

Reports suggest that Naxals have started using High Frequency (HF) radio for communications to avoid being tapped by the police. HF communications, being difficult to intercept, may require far more sophisticated equipment than that available with the police so far. Naxalites and their cadres have also been using Very High Frequency (VHF) sets to communicate In this context, the recently launched RISAT-I may give an upper hand to the state supported counter-Naxalism exercises. The most salient feature of RISAT-I is Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) that is fixed with it and will operate in the C-band. The RISAT-1 can beam back imaging of the earth surface features at day and night and under all imagined weather conditions. SAR, which gives the RISAT-1 its magical roving eyes, also makes it superior to the generation of optical remote sensing satellites in clearer imaging at all times and under any condition. The SAR is operating in a multi-polarisation and multi-resolution mode and can provide images with coarse, fine and high spatial resolutions. The ability of SAR to penetrate all sorts of weather-related obstructions, including that of cloud cover, makes RISAT a more effective technological evolution. Apart from RISAT-1, India already has another spy satellite RISAT-2, which was launched in 2009. It was acquired from Israel for a very high cost of about US$ 110 million. Optimal use of the satellites may give an edge to the state security agencies in the near future. Integration and utilisation of space-based technology gives complete space dominance and space superiority over the Naxalites.

Institutional and socio-economic preparedness The Naxalite movement is not only a ‘law and order’ problem. Rather, it has had its own ideological basis during the inception phase. The ideological internal security challenges can only be dissolved by delegitimising the institutional networks of the Naxals. On the contrary, Naxals are gaining new grounds in rural and forest areas and are successful in delegitimising the state institutions. Initially the ideological movement was agrarian in nature and was limited to only northern plain but now its influence has become widespread, covering tribal and poor people from relatively inaccessible central part of the country. For instance, the revenue districts carved out of Bastar, namely, Kanker and Dantewada, have a tribal population of about 56 per cent and about 79 per cent respectively. These are the districts pre-dominantly affected by the Naxalite threat. Hence, the initial agrarian-ideological movement has been replaced by an organised criminal activity, with the intent of controlling

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June 2012 Defence AND security alert

mineral and forest resources and is, in turn, run by the cadres recruited from deprived and underdeveloped sections of society. As these areas are relatively underdeveloped and are deprived of some of their basic necessities, therefore, for the people living in these parts, there is no difference between Naxals and the government. Government’s legitimacy and trust deficit is a basic cause behind acceptance of Naxals among local community. Any sort of effective Naxal control will be a herculean task, unless government institutions regain their lost charm. Undoubtedly, India would require evolving a holistic approach and integrating the socio-economic dimensions, so that the persistent challenges that backward areas of India have been facing are addressed properly. The central and state governments are increasingly recognising the fact that only force and technological superiority is not enough to provide long term solution for Naxalism. As a part of its holistic approach towards combating Left Wing Extremism (LWE), wherein it supplements the efforts of the state governments over a wide range of issues including assistance in implementation of development schemes, improving governance and capacity building by the states in various areas, the central government had announced its decision to introduce a special scheme to ameliorate socio-economic and infrastructural condition in the Naxal hit districts. During the 2010-11 financial year, the government had embarked on a special scheme to address the development of 33 Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected districts. It was, inter alia, stated that the Planning Commission would prepare an Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for the affected areas and that adequate funds would be made available to support the action plan. Subsequently, the IAP was extended to 78 tribal and backward districts across the country. Recently, in a statement made in the Rajya Sabha, the Minister of Home Affairs has said that the IAP has been very successful.

NO COHERENT STRATEGY

Floundering in the Morass <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

he writer highlights the curious fact that despite the decades of experience that the Indian state has in CI / CT operations in the north-east, in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, we have been unable so far to devise a coherent strategy and response to the Naxal problem. A whole host of NGOs and self-confessed experts have so thoroughly confused the issue that the state's response has been seriously hampered. By public pronouncements of staying out of this problem, he feels that the Army has neglected its constitutional duty. He calls for a concerted response. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

Forgetting for the moment that it is the Constitutional responsibility of the armed forces to come to the aid of the civil authorities in times of crisis such a public statement has only encouraged the “red brigades” to sweep across the country happy in the knowledge that armed forces are out of the ring and it will take the state smore than several years to raise sufficient forces to deal with the red menace

Now, some of the state governments have started giving more emphasis to socio-economic empowerment of the deprived sections of the society. For instance, during last few years, Bihar, despite having one of the least prepared police forces, has experienced decline in Naxalite activities. One of the major factors, as highlighted by Navin Singh, is the present Nitish government’s ‘good governance’ agenda and proper execution of developmental plans on ground. These steps have reinstalled the faith of common people in the state institutions and have, in turn, weakened the charm of Naxalism among the underprivileged. So, the government’s success in controlling the bogey of Naxalism very much depends on levels of preparedness in all the three dimensions discussed above. A holistic and integrated approach can only bring a long lasting solution to one of the gravest challenges that India has been confronting.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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NO COHERENT STRATEGY

onfronted time and again by new manifestations of insurgency from the very moment of our creation as an independent, sovereign nation state we do not appear to have learned anything from the valuable insights gained in either pacifying or neutralising the several uprisings that have occurred over the decades be it in Jammu and Kashmir, in the northeast, Punjab and currently in large swathes of what has come to be known as the “red heartland” in central India. We are forever being taken by surprise like babes in the woods, the most recent jolt being the abduction of the District Collector of Sukma who walked into a trap with just two bodyguards. Such overconfidence is mindboggling. Don’t persons in government know about the existence of “liberated zones”? Perhaps they can be forgiven their ignorance because there are places in India that are either not listed on maps or placed in a wrong location as has just been discovered in the Sukma incident. This would not be the first time that the vaunted Survey of India was found to be in default. We need to know what we have to defend. And we need to know how to do it. One sure way of coming to grips with the Maoist / Naxal military doctrine is to study the tome on guerrilla warfare written by the progenitor of “Maoism”: Mao Zedong himself. The gravamen of his thesis suggests that counter-insurgency is a manpower intensive operation. That is the one fundamental that is common to all counter-guerrilla operations be it in India, in Kenya, in Malaysia or Latin America where the legendary Che Guevara wrote his own footnotes to his struggle for egalitarianism. Mao succeeded not only in helping the Kuomintang nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek to beat the Japanese out of the mainland. Then, within a few years, based on the politicomilitary network he had put in place by coalescing the strengths of the workers and the peasants who had supported his revolution he chased the Kuomintang out of the mainland to the tiny island of Formosa (now Taiwan). You have to “inverse engineer” the thoughts of Mao to be able to deal with his legacy.

Mao-Che Guevara calculus When Mao Zedong and the charismatic Che Guevara of Latin America suggest that at the height of a guerrilla movement one guerrilla could tie down fifty government forces it can be inversely construed that it would take fifty government forces to neutralise one guerrilla. It does not necessarily mean that all of the fifty government elements would be armed or military personnel but it does mean that this is the kind of ratio that has some chance of undercutting the guerrilla and his ideology. While manpower is foremost in counter-insurgency it has to be bolstered by governmental actions that seek to remedy the grievances of the local population that lend themselves to exploitation by a well-doctrinated (as in inspired) activist. Because the activist has taken to the use of arms to attain his objective of “liberating” the disgruntled population from the thrall of the government, the government too has, at the first signs of unrest in given localities, to be able to raise forces that can counter the military operations of the guerrillas. It is because “dispersion” (an inversion of the basic principle of conventional warfare of “concentration” that the need for a favourable ratio of forces arises at the very outset of a counterinsurgency / counter-revolution operation).

Essential ingredient in the Punjab situation was the synergy that was enforced by the political leadership between the Indian Army and the police forces of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan Dispersion is an essential tactic of guerrilla forces because standing to fight could cut deeply into their manpower and a military defeat could undermine the very ideology that is supposed to be superior or more beneficial than the one that the guerrillas are seeking to replace. Because dispersion is the cardinal principle of guerrilla warfare government forces too need to be dispersed in a viable network that can stymie guerrilla socio-political tactics of instigating the population to join the revolt and to nip the propaganda in the

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bud. What is known as the “ratio of space to forces” is an important factor in counter-insurgency operations.

A study of how Julio Ribeiro and the charismatic K P S Gill and the state and central governments at the time handled the situation ought to be inscribed in counter-insurgency textbooks for other Maoist / Naxal infested states to study and emulate even if not all insurgencies are amenable to the same counter-measures

Mathematical precision That there is a mathematical construct involved becomes apparent from the writings of the famous Lawrence of Arabia, the Briton who helped the Arabs to revolt against the Turkish empire. Lawrence had calculated the ratio of forces on either side of the divide thus: “That to hold the Arab Revolt in check the Turks would have need of a fortified post every four square miles and a post could not be less than twenty men. So the requirement would be of about 6,00,000 men for the area they were trying to control, whereas they had only 1,00,000 available. Our success is certain, to be proved by pencil and paper as soon as the proportion of space and numbers had been learned“, he wrote. However, much also depends on the lay of the land and the terrain features of the location of the confrontation. Rugged and forested areas are suited for guerrilla warfare and this factor needs to be woven into the calculations for the forces required to confront the guerrillas. And that is why too ratio of contending forces tends to vary dramatically from continent to continent though the British did spring a surprise for tacticians when they managed to curb the insurgency in Malaysia with a ratio as low as 20:1 against the Malayan National Liberation Army, the military wing of the Malayan Communist Party. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the government forces needed to be in larger numbers to be able to impose their will and ensure that the insurgency crumbles.

Punjab model As it happened in Punjab where perhaps for the first and last time a foreign-inspired guerrilla (Sikh Khalistani) movement was crushed in its totality and has not been able to raise its head again in spite of the best efforts of Pakistan. It put an ex-Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence director-general to head the Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee to plant poison in the minds of visiting Sikh pilgrims from India but to date better sense has prevailed in Punjab. A study of how Julio Ribeiro and the charismatic K P S Gill and the state and central governments at the time handled the situation ought to be inscribed in counter-insurgency textbooks for other Maoist / Naxal infested states to study and emulate even if not all insurgencies are amenable to the same counter-measures.

We do not appear to have learned anything from the valuable insights gained in either pacifying or neutralising the several uprisings that have occurred over the decades be it in Jammu and Kashmir, in the north-east or Punjab One essential ingredient in the Punjab situation was the synergy that was enforced by the political leadership between the Indian Army and the police forces of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. It was based on the recognition and acceptance of the local police forces in the collection, collation and dissemination of intelligence on the several Sikh terrorist groups that were operational at that time. When the coup de grace was delivered the Indian Army took on the role of anvil along the border with Pakistan acting as both a deterrent to Pakistani misadventure as well as a barrier against exfiltration that would allow the terrorists to regroup and become operational again. There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Khalistan movement was crushed in its home base in Punjab and police fanned out to arrest those who were operating from neigbouring states. There were grave allegations of human rights violations by the security forces but Punjab returned to normalcy faster and more permanently than in the northeast where half measures have left former militants turned kidnappers and common criminals dictating ransoms and protection payments on the hapless populace.

Whole of government approach Among appropriate measures that all states of the Indian Union need to take (‘on a war footing’ would be appropriate usage) steps to improve both the intelligence wings and the law and order departments of their respective police forces in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. In many states the focus of these improvements will turn automatically to how the Maoist / Naxal movement is able to operate with impunity across huge segments of the nation beginning from West Bengal down to Kerala. Going by the information that became available through the Sukma imbroglio there is no governance in huge parts of the country thereby allowing the Maoists and the Naxals to establish their hegemony where the basics of human existence have been denied to

the populations of states that are, in many respects, rich in natural resources that are being looted by influential politicians to the detriment of equitable growth and development of tribals and villagers in inaccessible interiors.

There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Khalistan movement was crushed in its home base in Punjab. There were grave allegations of human rights violations by the security forces but Punjab returned to normalcy faster and more permanently than in the north-east where half-measures have left former militants turned kidnappers and common criminals dictating ransoms and protection payments on the hapless populace All assets of the Indian nation must be coalesced to create a phalanx be it in the state list or the concurrent list of the Indian Union. It seems this needs to be restated time and again because there have been events that have undermined the national will to tackle the burgeoning Maoist / Naxal phenomenon and insurgencies of other hues in various parts of the country. While it is appreciated that the primary role of the Indian armed forces is to tackle the external enemy on the borders the suo motu statement by the top brass of the Indian military establishment that the armed forces would not be part of the anti-Naxal net sent an unambiguous message that at least one arm of the Indian nation had been rendered hors de combat and that the Maoist / Naxal could “bash on regardless” undeterred by the possibility that the best organised and best armed tool of the Indian nation would not let itself be used in internal security duties. Forgetting for the moment that it is the Constitutional responsibility of the armed forces to come to the aid of the civil authorities in times of crisis such a public statement has only encouraged the “red brigades” to sweep across the country happy in the knowledge that armed forces are out of the ring and it will take the states more than several years to raise sufficient forces to deal with the red menace. Any advice that the armed forces want to give to the government should have been disseminated within the confines of South Block and not tomtomed through the media. Good sense has finally prevailed in the government over the issue of giving arrest and seizure powers to the Intelligence Bureau in the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). With regionalism on the rise a mainstream party like the Congress should have realised the reactions it would evoke in a country sprouting with regional parties and coalition politics.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

CRPF Seeks AFSPA Cover For Troops

RPF has sought the cover of AFSPA for its men conducting anti-Naxal operations, at a time when continuance of the controversial Act in areas of Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east is being debated. The demand for the cover has been made by the commander of CRPF in Jharkhand - Inspector General (Operations) D K Pandey - during a top-level conference on operational matters of the force. “In the present system, Jharkhand police is requisitioning CRPF for providing troops for anti-Naxal operations. CRPF is not in a position to launch any operation of its own.” “Therefore, our achievement is subject to proactive approach of state police. Hence, CRPF should be given (cover under) the Armed Forces Special Power Act for at least six months,” the IG said in his conference submission last month.

Mr Subhash Joshi New DG Of National Security Guard (NSG)

The IG also suggested that if the entire state cannot be brought under the umbrella of the Act, some selected areas can be chosen. The request by the IG, who commands 16 battalions (16,000 personnel) of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and two of the special counter-Naxal force COBRA in Jharkhand, has been made to the force headquarters and no decision has been taken on the issue as of now.

enior IPS officer Mr Subhash Joshi has taken up the charge as new Director General of the ‘black cats’ commando force National Security Guard (NSG). A 1976-batch Uttarakhand cadre IPS officer, Joshi was serving as the Special DG of CRPF at its headquarters before his appointment as NSG DG.

The CRPF had lost 10 personnel while 77 were injured during 2011 in Jharkhand and the state has been the most challenging zone for the force after Chhattisgarh in the anti-Naxal operations. The continuance of AFSPA has been under debate in both political and military circles especially in reference to its operation in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states.

Joshi, who had earlier served as the DGP of Uttarakhand, succeeds R K Medhekar, who retired on April 30, as NSG chief. Joshi will serve as the NSG chief till February 2014. The NSG, which undertakes special counter-terror and counter-hijack operations, has expanded its base to major cities like Mumbai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Chennai for quick response during emergencies.

Indian Equipment For Afghan Security Forces

BSF To Train Border Population

iming at closer involvement of the population residing along the border with the country’s mainstream, the Border Security Force (BSF) has initiated a vocational training programme which will generate employment for them in private sector. The border guarding force, which is deployed along the frontiers of Pakistan and Bangladesh, has partnered with the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) to train and subsequently create job opportunities both for the border population and families of the force personnel, in partnership with corporates.

Major Revamp Of National Security Apparatus

Over 29,000 AK-47s For India’s Paramilitary Forces

K-47s continue to be the preferred assault weapon for the country’s paramilitary forces to neutralise terrorists and Maoists at the frontiers and in the remote areas. Over 29,000 pieces of this Russian-origin rifle were imported by forces like CRPF, BSF and NSG, leaving behind, by a large margin, other sophisticated assault weapons procured from the US and Israel. The inventory of the assault weapons procured for security forces, including ITBP, CISF and Assam Rifles, during 2010-2013 show that while 29,260 pieces of the ‘AK’ series were procured, only 17,609 units of other weapons in this category like X-95 and SIG were imported. Whilst the Central Reserve Police Force, deployed extensively in the country for anti-Naxal operations procured 18,000 AK-47s, the Central Industrial Security Force guarding Indian airports got 7,921 pieces and the Sashastra Seema Bal securing borders along Nepal and Bhutan got 2,719 units. The Sino-India border guarding force Indo-Tibetan Border Police procured 620 pieces of these ‘Avtomat Kalashnikova’(AK) rifles. Among the other weapons that these forces procured during the same fiscals are MP-5 guns from Heckler and Koch (Germany), Carbine machine guns (Storm) from Beretta (Italy) and Glock Pistols from Hong Kong and Austria.

fter multiple terror strikes, Afghanistan sought India’s assistance in equipping its security forces to counter the Taliban in the run-up to the 2014 withdrawal of international forces from the violence-torn country. Underlining its “unwavering commitment” to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India, on its part, conveyed that it was open to such ideas and would ensure that the country does not become “a target for extremist forces”. Against the backdrop of continuing volatility in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s efforts to control the reconciliation process, External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and his Afghan counterpart Zalmai Rassoul held the maiden meeting of the IndiaAfghanistan Partnership Council. The council was set up under the landmark strategic partnership agreement sealed in October last year during the visit of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Rassoul also called on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and met Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon. The prime minister reiterated India’s unwavering commitment to assisting the government and people of Afghanistan in their endeavour to build a peaceful, stable, democratic and prosperous country. Rassoul expressed Afghanistan’s “deep appreciation for India’s friendship, generous assistance and the crucial role it is playing in the process of stabilisation, reconstruction and economic development of Afghanistan”. India, which has pledged US$ 2 billion for an array of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, has stakes in the security of the neighbouring country which Pakistan tends to regard as its strategic backyard.

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national security task force, headed by former cabinet secretary Naresh Chandra, has submitted its final report to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Among the recommendations it has made, the task force, which had 13 others from Defence, intelligence, diplomacy and strategic affairs sectors, wants a major revamp of the structures and operating procedures of security and intelligence agencies. The task force, set up in July 2011, was mandated to review existing processes, procedures and practices in the national security system and suggest measures for strengthening the national security apparatus wherever needed, including in non-traditional security sectors. The task force’s work is likely to be the basis for India to prepare its first ever national security doctrine. Among other recommendations from the task force include greater say for the armed forces in national security decision-making and greater access to the prime minister and the country’s top political leadership. It also wants a designated political leader from the government to oversee the country’s external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW). The task force’s effort follows a similar first-ever focused exercise carried out under strategic affairs expert and former Defence secretary, the late K Subrahmanyam, about 10 years ago soon after the 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan. The task force had former Intelligence Bureau chief P C Haldar, former Research and Analysis Wing chief K C Verma, former National Investigation Agency chief R V Raju, former Indian Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash, former Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy and former Director General of Military Operations Lt Gen V R Raghavan, apart from bureaucrats Brajeshwar Singh and Vinod K Duggal as members. Other members of the task force were National Council of Applied Economic Research director Suman K Berry, former diplomat and high commissioner to Pakistan G Parthasarathy, former Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar, former Mumbai Police commissioner D Sivanandan and journalist Manoj Joshi. June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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PROTRACTED WARfare

T Prof Shekhar Adhikari The writer is Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Central University of Allahabad, Allahabad, UP, India.

The Central Committee (CC) of the party finalised those plans in the 9th Unity Congress held in January-February 2011. The important decision taken by CC was dissolution of the Central Eastern Regional Bureau (responsible for the states of Chhattisgarh and Odisha) and merging with the Eastern Regional Bureau (in charge of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh). Thus, only four Regional Bureaus (Northern, Central, Eastern and South Western) are functional now. In the military realm, on the analogy of Regional Bureaus, the CC has established two Regional Commands (RCs) to undertake and coordinate large scale operations over and above the already existing State Level Military Commissions (SMCs), namely, the Eastern RC and the Central RC. The RCs have been authorised to issue instructions directly to the lower formations bypassing the SMCs

he exponential spread of Naxalism influence has now engulfed 231 districts / 20 states as compared to 182 districts / 16 states earlier, which indeed gives a pan India hue of the Naxal movement. The CPI (Maoist) plans to establish its presence in the Western Ghats, between Raigarh district of Maharashtra in the North and Wayanad district of Kerala in the South, with Karnataka as its base. The Naxal outfits’ plan to use the Western Ghats, straddling the states of Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka and Kerala, is primarily aimed at creating another Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) analogous to the main one along the eastern corridor of the country. It has set a 3-4 years time frame to achieve this objective.

axalism, especially CPI-Maoists conflict is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma of “Democratic revolution through tactical offensive with tactical speed in the protracted people’s war of strategic defensive.”1 Any such riddle cannot be understood or solved without understanding the meaning and mechanism of strategy. According to Mao, every form of war had a different method of operation. The methods employed in regular warfare could not be successfully applied when an Army is confronted with a guerilla type of situation. It is in this context, the aim of Naxal strategy and tactics become important in understanding the nature of Indian Maoist’s concept of revolution. The consolidation of various factions of the Naxals has been attributed to the organised and planned manner in which the Naxalites function. The ideological dedication, the cadre based organisational set-up and understanding of the micro socio-economic situation in the various regions of India make the extremists plan and implement their strategies efficiently. This provides the commitment and dedication of the members to their cause and also explains the emerging solidarity among the groups despite local differences. There is a Central Committee and a Politburo at the apex. The hierarchical structure, which forms the Regional Bureau-State Committee / Special Zone Committee and Sub-Zone-District / Division Committee-Squad Area Committee, is well established and institutionalised. The armed wing is devided into various Zonal Committees, each of which has a few divisions and dalams. At the village level, they have units called Sangham comprising ideologically, committed active supporters.

Protracted war The Naxalites have adopted the strategy of “protracted warfare”, with the aim of capturing political power by armed struggle as a prelude to subsequent unification of liberated areas. If we see the history of Naxalite movement, at no point guerilla warfare alone was decisive in the struggle against the oppressive forces. Such type of warfare was possible only in peasant oriented revolutionary war. Here, they were inspired by the theory of Mao’s Protracted Warfare. Accordingly, Mao suggested that in the course of any prolonged conflict, guerilla warfare would have to pass through a series of merging phases. These phases, he referred to as “passive or preparatory phase”, “Strategic defensive,” “Strategic Stalemate or active resistance” and “Strategic counter-offensive”. There is no set period for any phase. Each phase will merge into the next depending upon the conditions. Generally, it will be a process that moves forward but these may also be where it will retrogress into earlier phases.This philosophical treatment of the time factor was one of the main features of Naxalite’s revolutionary war. They have resorted to well conceived, thoroughly planned and ably executed sensational actions such as attacks on the convoy of Chandra Babu Naidu, the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, the forced release of prisoners from the jail at Jehanabad (Bihar), Narayangarh (Odisha), police stations in Chhattisgarh and Silda (West Bengal) and recent spurts in hijacking of trains in Bihar and Jharkhand.

Building up bases / guerilla zones Fulfilling the aim of protracted war, Naxalites concentrate on building-up both physical and mass bases. The initial bases built-up in remote and rural areas and, later on, developed into

1. Giridhari Nayak, Strategy and Tactics on Trial in the Conflict of Left Wing Extremists, The Indian Police Journal, Vol. VII-No. 3, July - September 2010, p.19

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“guerilla zones” and finally into “liberated areas”. A guerilla zone is an area where both the government and the revolutionary forces fight for control. However, neither can establish their control and there is perpetual conflict. Armed guerilla squads function under the direction of a centralised military command and represent the party in a guerilla zone. The area thus liberated is known as ‘liberated Area’ where the governance / administration is taken over by the party. The guerilla squads develop into guerilla divisions and then gradually into regular army.

The quality of Naxalite armaments has improved substantially throughout the period. From sources in Bangladesh and Nepal, as well as raids on police stations, the CPI-Maoist now has access to modern assault rifles, pistols, mortars and explosives. In many naxal affected states, the cadres are better armed than the security forces

Compact revolutionary zone The Naxalites with the support of their Nepali counterpart, had planned to create a “Red Corridor,” starting from the border with Nepal and extending up to Kerala. It was in August 2001 that the idea of establishing a Compact Revolution Zone (CRZ) or the Red Corridor came into existence. It extended from the forest tracts of Adilabad (Andhra Pradesh) to Nepal, traversing the forest areas of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar and Nepal. It was conceptualised at Siliguri in a high level meeting of the Maoist leaders. The notion of CRZ seems to be working in the correct direction. There has been remarkable growth in Maoist cadres between 2001 and 2012 in both India and Nepal. The CRZ was essentially seen as a prologue to the further expansion of Left Wing Extremism in the sub-continent. The strategic aim is to have a continuous stretch of territory under their influence and control and the ultimate goal will be to liberate the entire zone.

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PROTRACTED WARfare

Close to 1,00,000 rural youths failing in high school examination every year have neither a job nor a school to go where they could be kept busy. These unemployed youths, 15 to 18 years in age, are joining the ranks of armed guerillas

Regional Bureaus, the CC has established two Regional Commands (RCs) to undertake and coordinate large scale operations over and above the already existing State Level Military Commissions (SMCs), namely, the Eastern RC and the Central RC. The RCs have been authorised to issue instructions directly to the lower formations by passing the SMCs.

Political strategy

CPI (Maoist) formulates financial policy

Along with military strategy, the Naxalites have formulated effective political strategy. Their political strategy has three major aims (i) unity between CPI Maoist party and cadres, (ii) sound relationship among party, PLGA and people and (iii) disunity between people and security forces. They try to create mass struggle through propaganda, agitation and action. Then, they try to convert mass struggle to armed struggle as done in Lalgarh. Through their effective political strategy, they use Revolutionary United Front to save the guerillas from security forces.2 The Maoists have created Tactical United Front (TUF) under the Sub-Committee on Mass Organisation (SUCOMO). TUF includes the Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF), the Committee against Violence on Women (CAVOW), the Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners (CRPP)3. TUF plays important role in the implementation of the political strategies. Political activities are more important than military activities and propaganda, as compared to fighting, is more important. Political Strategy complements military strategy with the main aim of the development of New Democratic Revolution.

The question that perplexes many policy and security experts concerned with the Maoist phenomenon today is just how large is the size of the Naxal economy and financial strength of the CPI (Maoist). The Central Committee (CC) of the party has now begun to formulate a new financial policy to ensure proper collection, allotment and dissemination of funds. The objective of the policy is to streamline the system of collection of funds and check division and unnecessary expenditure. The new policy incorporates a top-down model of allocation of funds from the Central Committee to lower Committees, unlike the erstwhile system of retention of a major share of funds at the lower level, whilst leaving approximately 20 per cent funds for the Central Committee. As per the policy, a higher level committee would now earmark the budgetary allocation of each lower committee in the party hierarchy and the expenditure incurred would be strictly on the basis of budgetary allocations. It is estimated that the CPI (Maoist) in 2007 collected at least Rs 40 crore from the states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab and UP. The Central Military Commission (CMC) had a budget in 2007-09 of approximately Rs 60 crore, including Rs 10 crore earmarked for the Central Technical Committee, Rs 5 crore for communication, Rs 2 crore for the maintenance of hideouts and Rs 70 lakh for the purchase of weapons.

It is interesting to note that with the merger of the Maoist Communist Centre and the PWG to form the CPI (Maoist), the strategy has worked in the consolidation of their military and political wings. It has emerged as the gravest political and military threat to India’s internal security. The CPI (Maoist) policy is based on the policy of coercion and elimination. In this way, its influence has extended over a large part of the country. It is estimated that the merger has also increased the cadre strength. Even if 25 per cent of these are capable of armed action, then also the strength will be much larger than the terrorists at any time in Jammu and Kashmir.4

Major reorganisation of CPI (Maoist) In order to streamline their functioning, the CPI (Maoist) has undertaken a major reorganisation and restructuring process. The Central Committee (CC) of the party finalised those plans in the 9th Unity Congress held in January-February 2011. The important decision taken by CC was dissolution of the Central Eastern Regional Bureau (responsible for the states of Chhattisgarh and Odisha) and merging with the Eastern Regional Bureau (in charge of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh). Thus, only four Regional Bureaus (Northern, Central, Eastern and South Western) are functional now. In the military realm, on the analogy of

Though the movement has strengthened itself in the forest areas and in areas marked with lack of governance, the Maoist leadership feels that urban centres have remained unaffected. Therefore, in the meeting held in January 2009, the Central Committee formed a five member Urban Sub-committee and entrusted it with task of preparing an Urban Perspective Document. The new strategy focuses on a six stage approach called “Saarc” - survey, awareness, agitation, recruitment, resistance and control

Alternate red corridor The CPI (Maoist) plans to establish its presence in the Western Ghats, between Raigarh district of Maharashtra in the North and Wayanad district of Kerala in the South, with Karnataka as its base. The Naxal outfits’ plan to use the Western Ghats, straddling the states of Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka and Kerala, is primarily aimed at creating another Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) analogous to the main one along the eastern corridor of the country.

2. Secret Document of CPI (Maoist) 2004 - “The Strategy and Tactics of Indian Revolution,” published by Central Committee (P) CPI (Maoist). 3. P V Ramana, Maoist Tactical Unit Front and Urban Movement 2007, p. 4. 4. P M S Das, Terrorism, the Untold Story, Chandigarh, Abhishek Publication, 2002.

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It has set a 3-4 years time frame to achieve this objective. The main objective of the CPI (Maoist) is to establish the strategic and tactical base which could provide safe sanctuary from the security forces action and an alternative to the existing CRZ.

Focus on urban centres Though the movement has strengthened itself in the forest areas and in areas marked with lack of governance, the Maoist leadership feels that urban centres have remained unaffected. Therefore, in the meeting held in January 2009, the Central Committee formed a five member Urban Sub-committee and entrusted it with task of preparing an Urban Perspective Document. The new strategy focuses on a six stage approach called “Saarc”- survey, awareness, agitation, recruitment, resistance and control. So far urban areas are concerned, the Maoists have completed the stage of survey, i.e., identifying the target groups and political areas of discontent. Now they are in the process of implementing the second and third stages of their strategy. The process will take time as evident from their strategy of protracted warfare. This is well documented in Maoist’s plan entitled “CPI (Maoist) Urban Perspective.”

Tactics To fulfill their strategic aim, the Naxalites have been very ruthless in their approach. The following methods highlight their tactics to achieve their goals.

Mobilisation and support The few ethnographic studies5 articulate about the extent to which the Naxalites can win support amongst the poor and landless peasants and adivasis and perhaps, especially of young men and women amongst these groups, This is so even if they actually enter a region through the rural middle class of upper caste elites and educated well to do adivasis as has been the case in parts of Jharkhand. These studies,

however, highlight the tensions and contradictions in the tactics and actions of the movements. The relationship between the mainly urban, educated middle class leadership and the peasantry is fraught with tensions. The failure of the Naxalbari movement in the initial stage was largely due to this reason. This led the Naxalite leaders to rely more on those people who support their cause and then to enlarge their mass support base by undertaking developmental work and also to garner the support of the civil liberty groups. Here, the support to their cause comes mainly from the uneducated class. The studies reveal that at the national level, the educated unemployment is increasing at geometrical level. Close to 1,00,000 rural youths failing in high school examination every year have neither a job nor a school to go where they could be kept busy. These unemployed youths, 15 to 18 years in age, are joining the ranks of armed guerillas.

The CPI (Maoist) plans to establish its presence in the Western Ghats, between Raigarh district of Maharashtra in the North and Wayanad district of Kerala in the South, with Karnataka as its base. The Naxal outfits’ plan to use the Western Ghats, straddling the states of Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka and Kerala, is primarily aimed at creating another Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) analogous to the main one along the eastern corridor of the country. It has set a 3-4 years time frame to achieve this objective

Role of women The women have played a significant role in the Naxalite movement and form an integral cornerstone of the Maoist organisation structure. On the occasion of 2011 International Women’s Day one cannot ignore the huge participation of women in the Maoist movement. Hemlata S Mohan, chairperson of State Women Commission opined that whether it were the

Andhra Pradesh Chenchu Adivasi or Jharkhand Santhal Adivasi or Odisha Kond Adivasi or the Dalit women in the various plains and sub-urban areas, it is always the poor, backward lower caste women who are the victims and participants of the movements. One reason we find in them is the aspiration to be liberated from domestic violence and be protected. Thus, Naxalites armed them with weapons which give them sense of power. Women revolutionaries have been put down as sexual victims of their male colleagues. Their personal lives have sometimes been derided with all kinds of slander which is an important component of low Intensity Conflict Strategy.

Armed struggle This is essentially to create a shock effect on the government and its agencies. More concrete and substantial political and organisational work of the Maoists has taken place at the grass-roots in a number of states including Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha. Landmine attack on the convoy of former Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Janardhan Reddy and the killing of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) leader are part of the new “mobile warfare” strategy that the Maoists have evolved and implemented. At the military level, member of the Jharkhand Maoist Group pointed out that this change has been from guerilla warfare to mobile warfare. This apparently involves states such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to become the new fronts in the extended war. These war tactics have been evolved essentially because greater destruction of enemy forces are central to consolidate the gains made so far and advance further. At the political level, the interface for mass movement, too, has become more and more broad-based. Analysts of the struggles against the SEZ in Odisha believe that the Maoist organisations have a big say in setting the agenda. Even in West Bengal the Maoist agitations against land acquisition for industrial projects and related issues had evolved greater mass appeal than ever before.

5. George Kunnath, Becoming a Naxalite in Rural Bihar, Class Struggle and Its Contradictions, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 33 No.1 January 2006, pp. 89-123.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

red terror

PROTRACTED WARfare

The tactics of the mobile guerilla cadres use advanced technology and gadgets to make sensational strikes at high profile targets. Since 1991, Maoist tactics in general have grown more sophisticated and violent. Still armed predominantly with crude home made weapons in the early 1990s, the quality of Naxalite armaments has improved substantially throughout the period. From sources in Bangladesh and Nepal, as well as raids on police stations, the CPI-Maoist now has access to modern assault rifles, pistols, mortars and explosives6. In many naxal affected states, the cadres are better armed than the security forces. The use of IED, a staple in the Naxalite arsenal since the late 1980s, also skyrocketed in recent years, with over 220 successfully detonated from January 2004 to September 2005 alone7. The targets of most of these attacks were police vehicles and the occasional politicians targeted for assassination.

Urban terrorism It appears that the Maoist movement is expanding day by day. The strategic experts in a US think tank have warned the Indian government that the rebel group’s leaders could develop “the tradecraft for urban terrorism.” Taking a closer look at Naxalite threat, Stratfor said “while the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has labelled the Naxalite issue as the biggest threat to the country’s internal security, incidents like the 2008 Mumbai attacks provide evidence to most Indians that Pakistan and the militants who hide there pose a greater external threat.” Despite threats and indications from Naxalites that they will attack urban targets throughout India, the group has yet to demonstrate the intent or ability to strike outside of the Red Corridor - in eastern India that experience considerable Naxalite militant activity. But the leaders could develop such capability and it will be important to watch for any indication that cadres are developing the tradecraft for urban terrorism8.

Target selection The Naxalites choose their target on specific criteria. The criteria are: Anyone responsible for at least one encounter becomes a target; three or more encounters just spirals the target towards elimination. Security Forces (SF) personnel actively participating in anti-extremist operations, the Naxalites band them as harbouring a craving for promotion to higher ranks. It refuses to accept them as those performing their assigned duty. SF personnel harassing militants in Naxalite parlance, militants are those providing logistic support but, strictly speaking, are not cadres. In other words, the Naxalite target SF personnel who attempt to stymie their logistics / support base. Targets based on information. Information provided by surrendered cadres yet loyal to former colleagues. Targets based on information gathered from so-called ‘natural persons’. Targets identified in periodic reviews by the jail committee: a jail committee provides leadership to imprisoned cadres. The Naxlites hold Jan Adalats to dispense criminal civil justice, settlement of disputes and punishment to offenders. The PWG has introduced a new Judicial System by forming the People’s Court, i.e. The Gram Rajya Committee and subsequently ‘Revolutionary People’s Committee’ as an alternate judicial system. The ‘Judicial Department’, i.e, Sangham comprising three to five members with a ‘People’s Protection Squad’ at its disposal, deliver judgments and sentences including fines and imprisonment in a

temporary designated lock-up in the village, apart from carrying out capital punishment. The Dandakaranya Adivasi Mazdoor Kisan Sangh (DAKMS) and the Krantikari Adivasi Mazdoor Sanghthan (KAMS) are two specific naxal front organisations who are entrusted with the task of looking into all disputes. So, Jan Adalats continue to be held to dispense crude and instant justice, supplant the state apparatus and assert their hegemony over the rural tracts.

The road ahead The exponential spread of Naxalism influence has now engulfed 231 districts / 20 states as compared to 182 districts / 16 states earlier, which indeed gives a pan India hue of the Naxal movement. The Naxal’s consolidation along the axis of the projected ‘Red Corridor’ or the CRZ highlights the long term objective of the outfit. These above developments in the field of strategy and tactics show how skillfully the Naxalites have carved out the idea of influencing local masses and thereby extending the areas into remote regions of the country. Thus, one can summarise the impact of strategy and tactics in the words of Sun Tzu9: “When the tactics are wrong and the strategy is wrong, the war will be quickly lost. When the tactics are right but the strategy is wrong, battles may be won, but the war will be lost. When the tactics are wrong, but the strategy is right, battles may be lost, but the war will be won.” What would be the future of the Naxal movement in India will depend largely on their implementation of skillful strategy and tactics.

6. Jane’s Information Group, Maoist Insurgency Spreads in India, A Case Study of Bihar, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1, 2006. http:// www8.Janes.com/ (accessed October 3, 2007). 7. Sandeep Unnithan and Manoj Verma, “Renewed Battle”, India Today, September 19, 2005 p. 24. 8. The Pioneer, July 10, 2010. 9. Sun Tzu, “The Art of War“, translated by James Clavel.

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

NEPALI PERSPECTIVE

Maoist Movement in Nepal:

Impact on India N

o review of the Maoist insurgency in India can ever be complete without an analysis of the impact of the Maoist movement in Nepal. Did India score a self-goal by supporting the Maoists in Nepal? Time alone will fully answer that question. The writer provides a very critical Nepali perspective to the Maoist problem that now spans vast regions of South Asia. The writer states candidly - India faces a serious threat from an acute growth of Naxalite insurgency within its territories. It is true that the porous Indo-Nepal border helped sustain the Maoist insurgency in Nepal for a decade. And it is an open secret that Nepalese insurgents received shelter and some kind of cover in India during the days of insurgency. She rightly concludes that the bulk of the Indian establishment realises that prolonged political instability in Nepal can only help the cause of the Naxalites in Indian states as well as give China the pretext to increase its engagement with Nepal.

Shreejana Shreshtha The writer is Defence News Correspondent of Republica English daily, Kathmandu, Nepal.

Many of the radical Maoists, both in Nepal and India, condemned the 2006 peace accord between Nepal government and Maoist rebels. But when UCPN (Maoist) became the largest party in Nepal and went on to lead the government twice, India started worrying that the developments in Nepal would somehow abet the Naxalite movement back home. India’s major concern is that any kind of anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal could be exploited by Naxalites in India

olitical instability in Nepal has always posed policy challenges for India. Traditionally, geographically, culturally and historically, linkages between the two countries have determined Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Nepal. But the continued political flux in Nepal has made a rethink of Indo-Nepal relationship a necessity.

Nepalese Maoists and India have always had a strained relationship. It is widely believed that Dr Baburam Bhattarai, in return for India’s backing for his prime ministership, is now promoting India’s interests in Nepal. India, likewise, seems keen on prolonging the stint of the Bhattarai-led Maoist government. India’s changed policy in dealing with UCPN (Maoist), however, does not explain India’s historically dubious role in dealing with the former rebel party. When they emerged from the hiding in 2006 to join mainstream politics, UCPN (Maoist) were viewed with skepticism because of their bloody history, not only inside the country but also on the international arena and most importantly in India. Although India provided the major impetus for the peace process, the dilly-dallying in constitution writing is still understood in many quarters as manifestation of camouflaged Indian interest. This is the reason question over India’s dubious position is raised time and again.

Security concern India’s concern over Nepal regarding security issue seems to have changed little even though Nepali politics has come a long way in the last six years. Once an armed revolutionary party, UCPN (Maoist) has now been disarmed and has not just joined mainstream politics, but is now also leading the Nepalese government.

red terror

Security has always been India’s main concern while dealing with UCPN (Maoist) or Nepal as a whole. Now India faces a serious threat from an acute growth of Naxalite insurgency within its territories. It is true that the porous Indo-Nepal border helped sustain the Maoist insurgency in Nepal for a decade. And it is an open secret that Nepalese insurgents received shelter and some kind of cover in India during the days of insurgency. There was extensive reporting on how Nepali Maoist combatants were receiving training from their counterparts in India. It is not clear whether New Delhi chose to ignore the close ties between the insurgent groups on either side of the border. At this point, only a small section of the Indian political establishment wants to see unrest continue in Nepal because they believe that a state of ‘controlled chaos’ in the Himalayan country suits India’s interests the best. But the bulk of the Indian establishment realises that prolonged political instability in Nepal can only help the cause of the Naxalites in Indian states as well as give China the pretext to increase it engagement with Nepal. As the struggle for global supremacy between India and China grows, both the countries are keen on increasing their presence in Nepal. China wants Nepal to crack down on the Free-Tibet movement in the country. On the other hand, India seems keen on playing up the movement to counter the Chinese influence. Likewise, India wants to keep Indian air marshals at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) in Kathmandu. Although the stated reason for this is to prevent incidents like the 1999 hijack of Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu, it could also be that India wants to keep an eye over the Chinese in Nepal in addition to keeping a close tab on Maoist activities. Thus we again see that security is at the top of the Indian foreign policy concerns vis-à-vis Nepal. Therefore, the Indian political and intellectual circle wants the political crisis in Nepal to be resolved as soon as possible. But they also want the main credit for the resolution to go to India.

India faces a serious threat from an acute growth of Naxalite insurgency within its territories. It is true that the porous Indo-Nepal border helped sustain the Maoist insurgency in Nepal for a decade. And it is an open secret that Nepalese insurgents received shelter and some kind of cover in India during the days of insurgency. There was extensive reporting on how Nepali Maoist combatants were receiving trainings from their counterparts in India. It is not clear whether New Delhi chose to ignore the close ties between the insurgent groups on either side of the bordert to counter the Chinese influence

Concern over anti-Indian activities Many of the radical Maoists, both in Nepal and India, condemned the 2006 peace accord between Nepal government and Maoist rebels. But when UCPN (Maoist) became the largest party in Nepal and went on to lead

red terror

NEPALI PERSPECTIVE

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

the government twice, India started worrying that the developments in Nepal would somehow abet the Naxalite movement back home. India’s major concern is that any kind of anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal could be exploited by Naxalites in India.

Mao menace and 2014

IN THE FINAL

ANALYSIS

It doesn’t help that the Maoists in Nepal have consistently spoken out against Indian intervention in Nepalese politics. The then Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), the chair of UCPN (Maoist), had to resign as prime minister in May 2009 because in his own words he was not ready to “kneel down in front of foreign masters,” which was a thin-veiled attempt to expose India’s role in his demise. Another important factor is that the Maoists in Nepal often fan anti-Indian sentiments as a proof of their nationalistic credentials.

But as Nepal is completely dependent on India, only by accepting India’s geopolitical concerns can Nepal expect to gain a semblance of political stability.

As DSA is again sounding an ALERT to the policy and decision makers in India we feel a sense of vindication that the "Red Terror" phenomenon that we foresaw in mid-2009 has, as predicted, spread its tentacles far and wide and has become a national menace threatening the security of the country in a most vicious way.

Background

We have already seen the massacre by the Maoists of 75 of our police personnel in Chhattisgarh in the year 2011. This happened because of the total negligence of our central and the state governments. They cannot absolve themselves of their responsibility in any way.

Since they launched an armed rebellion in 1996, the Maoist organisation steadily gained in strength over time as the state failed to check its growing influence in the countryside. However, using military power to fight a rebel group proved to be a wrong move. The more the state tried to suppress the spread of Maoists around the country through the use of force, the more the Maoists were able to rally the youth to their cause. Meantime, political parties also started viewing the national army as a tool of monarchy that could pose a threat to their own power. UCPN (Maoist), during their campaign for international recognition, had utilised the offices of Revolutionary International Movement (RIM), an organisation that espouses left wing extremism worldwide, as well as Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisation of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), created in West Bengal, a bastion of the extreme left in India. India, for the most part, has provided crucial support to UCPN (Maoist) and other political parties to maintain its hold over Nepali polity. With about 800 kilometers of porous border to exploit, the Maoists were able to smuggle in arms and explosives to train their soldiers. According to a security expert in Nepal, “India regarded Maoists as a tool to overthrow monarchy and believed that it could always play the Maoists against the state.” Other security experts believe there were two phases to UCPN (Maoist)’s strategy - establishment of a democratic front and launch of a ‘social revolution’. They believe that the Maoists have already completed the first phase by creating a united front to remove constitutional monarchy and transform the country into a federal republic. They hold that the Maoists are now in the phase of social revolution aimed at consolidating their hold over the Nepali polity and larger society.

Pawan Agrawal

he cover story of our inaugural issue in October 2009 was on "Red Terror". Team DSA had visualised and presaged the nefarious designs of the Maoists / Naxals which compelled the Prime Minister to say in 2010 that “Maoists / Naxals (Red Terror) are the greatest threat to National Security."

The writer is publisher and CEO of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine and has long and varied experience in publishing and media.

We are, in 2012, still in a state of somnambulance. We have refused to wake up even after such alerts. We are not able to comprehend a basic fact that this is a War and it has to be fought with a clear mindset, excellent training and the best ammunition. What is our home ministry waiting for? For some more such massacres, more landmine blasts killing more innocent people to be followed as usual with more enquiry commissions to dig out the lapses? The lapses lie buried in their policies. Till we are able to improve our policies, we will never be able to overcome these Maoists. My straightforward suggestions to our government are: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Revamp the training procedures immediately. Arrange the best training by the best experts in the world. Equip the forces with the best arms and munitions. Fix the accountability in the federal and state governments.

Our government should not waste a single day in taking these steps. When we can procure technology, have joint ventures, collaborate with international agencies in other sectors, then why are we not procuring the best expertise to train our forces? Why are we not procuring the best arms and ammunitions for our forces to fight this menace? Why are we not fixing the accountability of the concerned officers sitting in their air conditioned fancy offices and floating fancy ideas like the NCTC which can do nothing but prove to be another white elephant. Time is very short. We all know that the Maoists have created linkages with the underworld and other terrorist groups operating in India. Moreover they are backed by China. This problem has to be countered with a strict programme and under a very clear policy at the earliest otherwise it is going to spread to other states in India and then by that time their (Maoists’) network will be stronger and more devastating given intelligence reports that they are now making their own rocket launchers. Now it is time to create an inter-state rapid action force consisting of our retired IPS officers who have in-depth knowledge of the terrain and this menace. This problem has aggravated in the past few years because the statal apparatus is just groping in the dark. I am very sure that our retired officers would come forward for this and they can suggest the best Road Map to counter the Maoists problem very soon. Is government willing to take their advice and act wisely in this regard? Last but not the least – has government ever thought about what is going to happen in 2014 when the US and other forces leave Afghanistan and the Taliban return to Kabul? The Taliban are already in touch with the Maoists who are also looking for external support. The Pakistanis, Taliban and China are in the process of creating connectivity with the Maoists in preparation for 2014. We have already seen what happened in Nepal over the last few years. In 2014 we will be facing the general elections for Parliament. In such a geopolity, our federal and state governments need to act fast and decisively or they are going to face debacles. Jai Hind!

June 2012 Defence AND security alert

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