DSA March 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

ndia and Iran were neighbours until 1947, a fact that is just about forgotten today. Both were in regular cultural and trading relations long before the birth of Islam and the discovery of oil, the reasons commonly stated for the closeness between the two civilisational states. In a very real sense Iran is India’s oldest trading partner, culturally as well as economically. India of course has the world’s second largest Shi’a population, the majority belief in Iran. And when it came to hard nosed realpolitik both cooperated closely during the dark days of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In fact the former Northern Alliance survived its bleakest days only because of the support given by India, Iran and Russia. Even today there is considerable common ground between India and Iran over Afghanistan and how it should be governed. That remains the world’s biggest security concern. Though some would like the world to believe that the bigger threat is Iran.

It does India no credit, from a historical, social and political sense, that even as some countries hurl themselves into conflict with Iran, there is nothing New Delhi is doing to bring level-headedness to an eminently avoidable situation. India enjoys good relations with all those on the other side of the fence with Iran and which is pretty much what is happening in Tehran. There is a sense of siege creeping into the minds of the people, thus throwing a lifeline to the extremely unpopular Ahmadinejad regime. By all logic of social and political aspirations of people for change, Iran should have led the way in sowing the seeds of a spring of its own. But the constant battling, over the airwaves and motorway bombings, has pushed the people of Iran into the clutches of their unpopular president. He in turn perpetuates the throttlehold on patriotism et al. Perfect recipe for a disaster the world must avoid. The setting is, thus, tailor-made for an Indian role of mediation and reconciliation between Iran and the west led by Israel. India, however, has once decided to outsource its foreign policy to those driven by an agenda that is at odds with the regional and national interests.

It is little wonder that India was selected by those who targeted the Israeli embassy vehicle in Delhi. And that too on one of the posh roads of the capital. There is a message in it, for all those willing to listen. But first India must open its eyes and ears to events unfolding around it, rather than wait to wriggle out of a maelstrom in which it is certain to find itself. Perpetrators of the attack must be bought to justice, whether they are Iranians or otherwise. And then both sides of the ever widening divide must be made to listen to the logic of good sense. An insular India is harmful to itself just as it is a disaster to the world. It has proven that over the Maldives coup and now it seems to be burying its head once again over Iran. It does so at its own peril.

manvendra singh

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

executive editor

publisher’s view National Interest - First And Foremost

eople associated with the defence and security domain directly must be laughing after the announcement by our central government a few weeks back of the creation of another establishment to counter terrorism. It is so painful to have to see the non-serious approach of our government on countering terrorism in real terms.

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Vo l u m e 3 I s s u e 6 M a r c h 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari amit e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

Copying the ideas of counter terrorism institutes in US and other European states has actually proved to be a nice fancy idea here in India. Whereas the reality is that the present security apparatus is so weak that only few days back an Israeli diplomat’s car was blown away by some terrorist group just a few meters away from the residence of our Hon’ble Prime Minister. It is a matter of alarm for our government that if this attack can happen in such a secured area then what to say about any other common area which is not as heavily guarded as the area around the Prime Minister’s residence over which, not long ago, there was a heated debate about creating a “no fly zone” to ensure that there is no possibility of an attack from the air. While there is no gainsaying the possibility of an airborne attack with toy-sized model aircraft and helicopters it is clear that much more needs to be done to secure the ground beneath our feet given that an attacker can make a clean getaway as happened after the blast in the Israeli embassy vehicle on Aurangzeb Road. The inability of Indian security forces to intervene immediately at any of the crossroads leading out of the area is compounded by the inane claims and out-of-the-blue analysis of likely culprits leaked by police and intelligence agencies to show that they are still relevant in the Indian security morass. We have seen many attacks in the past years from the attack on Parliament, Mumbai carnage and many more like in the premises of the Delhi High Court and to the latest on the diplomatic car in the most secured zone. And the worst is to learn that the Israel’s secret service Mossad experts will be investigating this attack on their diplomat which is a matter of shame for all Indians. I don’t know whether our government allows them for such investigations or not but this statement itself is more than enough assault on our dignity. Government should not allow such investigations by any foreign organisation for an attack that has occurred on our soil and should only make our own investigation agencies to do it and prove their abilities. But even after so many attacks our government has not taken adequate measures in the following aspects related to the security apparatus: Strong surveillance

Special training

Procurement of latest arms and ammunition

That the present government is floating these new ideas of establishing new counter-terrorism institutes is proving to be just fanciful and contentless and is just another political show and nothing more. Till now nothing has actually started on the recently announced National Counter-Terrorism Centre even after the announcement many months ago. It looks as if government is just trying to cover up by announcements only and is not actually committed to counter terrorism at all. And now many chief ministers are clamouring to compel the government to roll back or even rescind the NCTC decision. We at DSA suggest to the policy makers and decision makers responsible for security to first tighten the present security apparatus, provide special training to police and security personnel and procure the best arms and ammunition to counter terrorism in real manner rather than take recourse to floating new fancy ideas which are proving to be a futile exercise on their part. Our current issue is focused on Iran which I think is very topical considering the present happenings in the region that would be affecting India as well. The major threat I can foresee is what happens if Iran stops supplying oil to India for any reason. What is going to happen to our economy which is very much dependent on stable oil prices and we are importing approximately 12 per cent of our total oil requirement from Iran. I wish things are sorted out soon between Iran, Israel and US - so that Indian interests are not affected adversely.

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

crisis looms in the Gulf of Iran. It reached our shores with the attack on an Israeli diplomat in Delhi last month. However far more serious is the threat of an impending conventional conflict between Israel and Iran. If the Straits of Hormuz blow up in our faces, it could have serious consequences for our economy. The facts are stark. 68 per cent of our energy needs (some figures put it as high as 72 per cent) are sourced from the Gulf. This includes 68 per cent of our oil and virtually 100 per cent of natural gas. Our oil refineries that used to refine and re-export Iranian crude are close to losing some US$ 40 billion worth of business. 12 per cent of our oil is imported from Iran. Our Strategic Partners expect us to jettison our national and energy security interests and make ourselves entirely dependent upon Saudi Arabia for oil. The consequences of such a pathetic dependence on a single source could be catastrophic in the event of say a conflict with Pakistan or China or both. Our media today is rife with speculations about an Iran–Israel shadow war being waged in the streets of New Delhi. Of far greater concern however are the threats to our energy security. What if the economic sanctions on Iran panic it into blocking the Straits of Hormuz? What if Israel attacks Iranian nuclear facilities? How would such a scenario pan out? What are the chances of the success of such a strike - how could it be conducted? Far more important, what would be its consequences? Some 6 million Indians work in the Gulf and remit some US$ 40 billion annually. In case of war therefore, apart from the hit to our energy supplies, we stand to lose some US$ 80 billion a year of refining revenue and remittances. The price of oil could climb up by 4-5 times the normal (to US$ 200 and beyond per barrel) and deliver a serious blow to our economy. Most of our refineries are geared to the specific type of crude imported from Iran and as such India cannot rapidly transit to other types of crude in a hurry. We need to urgently check the status of our Strategic oil reserve. We need to anticipate the future and grow out of pathetic knee jerk responses that seem more concerned with safeguarding the National Security Interests of our Strategic Partners than our own. Our own national and energy security interests cannot come last, always and every time in such interactions. Yet we are faced with a Hobson’s choice. We need our friends. Especially, tried and tested friends like Israel, who have helped us in every conflict and (like the Russians) are willing to give us their latest and the best in military technologies. We need the Americans to counterbalance the power of a rising China that is beginning to loom ominously in our backyard. Of course we need our friends – but the counterpoint is, they need us equally. The situation is materially different from what it was a few years back when we were asked to jettison Iranian oil in return for nuclear energy. Our American Strategic Partners are today in full-fledged retreat from Afghanistan. We will badly need Iran for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. We are rapidly losing ground to China in Iran (even as we had earlier lost ground in Myanmar and had belatedly to take energetic steps to correct a decade or more of drift). Gratuitous advice that we must now underline our subservient status in South Asia, by handing over Jammu and Kashmir on a platter to Pakistan and recognising Islamabad’s right to reduce Afghanistan to a colony, are not tenable or welcome anymore. Sure, we do not need a nuclear arms race triggered in West Asia by an Iranian Bomb in the basement. Any further nuclearisation of our neighbourhood would be highly destabilising. Equally, Iran needs to tone down its tub thumping rhetoric on Israel and adopt more realist policies. However, Iran should not be panicked into a situation where, like North Korea, the nuclear card becomes its sole survival option. The Americans were prepared to live with a Pakistani bomb because it only threatened Indian cities. Can they live with an Iranian bomb rather than a Global Recession? In the end, we may be forced to seek alternative sources of supply in the short term. However it would be a strategic disaster for Asian powers to become reliant on western approval to access Middle Eastern energy resources in the long term. It is time therefore to take stock, do plain talking to friends and foes alike and keep contingency plans ready. Soldiers, statesmen and strategists have done just that in this issue of the DSA devoted to the looming crisis in Iran. It is deeply linked to a dangerous sectarian fault line crisis in the Islamic world. The Shia-Sunni axis could equally erupt, adding new complexities to the Middle Eastern cocktail of oil, gas and angst. There is a bomb ticking away in the Persian Gulf. It would be in our prime national interests to defuse it if we can. If we can’t we have to safeguard our own national security interests as best as we can.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents Crisis in Iran ISSUE March 2012

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 6 March 2012

A R T I C L E S the Iran dilemma

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal

Israeli attack on Iran? dire consequences for India

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Iran - a war has begun

20 26

Dr Sudhanshu Tripathi

Cecil Victor

Dominika Cosic

F E A T U R E S 30

Vice Adm Arun Kumar Singh (retd)

crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme: implications for India

Iran’s nuclear bomb: emerging threat of war

EU-Iran relations

Dr Arvind Gupta

A peep at the Asian crystal ball in 2012

Dr Navniit Gandhi

link to Afghanistan and beyond

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd)

Iran’s foreign policy and its impact on India-Iran relations

walking the tightrope

Defence and Security Industry Monitor 18, 19, 53 Exclusive Interview - MD, ShinMaywa, Japan 37 The Maldivian Question 72 Security Round-up 61, 71, 81

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

the Iran-Israel intelligence war

Dr Prem Mahadevan

crisis in Iran: impact on India's energy security

Dr Ahmad Reza Taheri

likely impact of Iran's nuclear programme

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd)

the looming crisis in Iran: impact on India's energy security

Air Marshal B K Pandey (retd)

India’s challenge in West Asia

Dr Harsh V Pant

international oil scenario and energy security for India

Lt Gen O P Kaushik (retd)

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Follow DSA on :

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Follow DSA on :

DSALERT March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1966. He reached the highest position in the Indian Foreign Service on his appointment as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India from July 2002 to November 2003. He is a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. He is on the Board of Directors of the New York based East-West Institute. He is on the Advisory Board of the Vivekanand International Foundation. He has received the high distinction of Grand Officier of the Ordre du Merite from France.

India has to give priority to its energy security, particularly as it already imports 70 per cent of its oil and gas needs and this figure will increase to 90 per cent in the years ahead. While it has diversified its sources of oil supply, Iran remains its second largest supplier after Saudi Arabia, providing about 12 per cent of its annual requirements worth about US$ 12 billion. Iran has the second largest reserves of gas in the world and can also be a source of either pipeline gas or LNG if pipeline security issues can be resolved and Iran can have access to embargoed LNG technology. With Iran geographically located virtually next door it makes no sense for India to compromise its long term interests there by cutting off or reducing oil purchases from that country for extraneous political reasons

NATIONAL INTEREST PARAMOUNT India’s strategic interest in maintaining a productive relationship with Iran conflicts with United States’ strategic interest in a regime change there. India’s political and economic interests in Iran are apparent, whether they relate to energy security, easier access to Afghanistan, countering Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan, profiting from contradictions between Iran and Pakistan and maintaining a balanced posture on the Iran-Saudi Arabia and the developing Shia-Sunni divide in West Asia. A strategic partnership should have an element of reciprocity. If India is to take cognizance of vital US strategic concerns, the reverse should be the case too in some measure. The US has tolerated nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan as it strategically balanced Indo-Soviet ties in the cold war era. Pakistan’s nuclear capability was seen as India-centric, not a regional problem. Even today the US is unwilling to make an issue of China’s continued support to Pakistan’s nuclear programme in violation of the NSG guidelines. The frenzied western opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme contrasts with the attitude to Pakistan’s programme.

S policy towards Iran constitutes a big diplomatic headache for India. Iran cast a shadow even on the negotiations with the US on the nuclear deal. The US legislation enabling cooperation with India’s civilian nuclear sector gratuitously called for an alignment of India’s policy on Iran with that of the US. Since then US interlocutors have persevered in persuading India to see the Iranian reality through their eyes and downgrade ties with that country. They presume that India needs to reciprocate United States’ strategic initiative on the nuclear deal by being receptive to American demands on the Iranian question. In this background, it should not cause any surprise if in further sanctioning Iran, the US disregards India’s interests there.

The government has shown political grit in resisting US pressure to dilute even our energy relationship with Iran. The Finance Minister has expressed most recently in Chicago India’s inability to drastically reduce its oil supplies from there. We have stated our willingness to abide by UN sanctions on Iran but not those by individual countries. Iran is not an easy partner and its conduct is questionable on many counts. Its decision making processes are convoluted and its postures on Israel and the Holocaust are needlessly provocative

We have to worry additionally about competition from China which needs massive oil imports to fuel its frenetically growing economy. China has already out-competed us in a few countries in the oil sector, though in some cases our companies have entered into collaborative arrangements to avoid under-cutting each other. It is believed that the Gulf region will be the major source for meeting India’s and China’s future needs, with falling US dependence on oil and gas from this region. China already has a big head start over us in securing its oil and gas needs from the Gulf region and Central Asia. In Iran it is now solidly entrenched. As member of the Security Council and possessing enormous

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

cutting off or reducing oil purchases from that country for extraneous political reasons.

financial resources, China has bargaining power that we lack. It can defy US and EU sanctions more easily than us, while its massive exports to the global market give it the capacity to enter into barter arrangements with countries like Iran. We are floundering when it comes to paying Iran in dollars or euros for the oil we buy, whereas China has worked out a barter system based on transactions in yuan. India has now reached an understanding with Iran to pay for 45 per cent of the oil bought in rupees which will be used for Indian goods and project exports to that country. With India reluctant to amass huge rupee funds and Iran concerned about

exchange rate fluctuations of the rupee. There are issues to be worked out still, but this seems to be the most practical way out. In any case, India would still be facing the challenge of paying for 55 per cent of its purchases in hard currency. Even before the enhanced US and EU sanctions, India had problems in investing in Iran’s petroleum sector because of concerns about potential application of the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of the US restricting investment in Iran’s oil sector to US$ 20 million a year. For that reason we have not been able to take hard decisions on investing

in the offshore Farsi block (which would require almost US$ 5 billion of investments over seven-eight years) and the huge SP-12 gas field. While the government is opposed to the extra-territorial application of US laws, it is also reluctant to enter into a political conflict with the US at a time when the relationship is progressively shedding the inhibitions and suspicions of the past and entering into a new phase. Moreover, our banks are unwilling to jeopardise their US operations or risk being denied access to the US financial sector if they disregard US sanctions, with the result that de facto India observes them. All this points

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

NATIONAL INTEREST PARAMOUNT

to the need to have a clearer policy in practice to preserve our equities in Iran and not lose ground there irretrievably to China.

US policy towards Iran constitutes a big diplomatic headache for India. Iran cast a shadow even on the negotiations with the US on the nuclear deal. The US legislation enabling cooperation with India’s civilian nuclear sector gratuitously called for an alignment of India’s policy on Iran with that of the US. Since then US interlocutors have persevered in persuading India to see the Iranian reality through their eyes and downgrade ties with that country US-Iran tensions are hurting India in other areas too. As India is unable to get access to Afghanistan through Pakistan, Iran provides a logical alternative. India, Iran and Afghanistan should have a shared interest in reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan by giving the former an alternative access to the sea. India took the strategic decision to build in Afghanistan the Zaranj-Delaram section of the road directly linking the Chabahar port in Iran to Kabul. India and Iran have discussed this project several times but progress has been tardy, with Iran slowly working on upgrading the port facilities and building the necessary rail links in the hinterland. India would be willing to invest in infrastructure at Chabahar but without the port declared a Free Trade Zone potential investors think the economics may not be favourable. Even earlier, Iran’s tense relations with the West were problematic for large scale investments in the country, but now with the situation further deteriorating and the West engaged in economic warfare against Iran, the appetite for such investments has got reduced. For India the Chabahar route acquires even more importance in the context of its planned investments in the Hajigak iron ore project in Afghanistan. Beyond transit to Afghanistan, the heightening tensions in the region will also delay plans to develop transit facilities through Iran to Central Asia and Russia (the North-South Corridor), from which

India and other countries could have benefited greatly. India’s strategic interest in maintaining a productive relationship with Iran conflicts with United States’ strategic interest in a regime change there. India’s political and economic interests in Iran are apparent, whether they relate to energy security, easier access to Afghanistan, countering Pakistan-backed Taliban in Afghanistan, profiting from contradictions between Iran and Pakistan and maintaining a balanced posture on the Iran-Saudi Arabia and the developing Shia-Sunni divide in West Asia etc. India is not playing any anti-western game in Iran or putting nonaligned solidarity ahead of its improving ties with the US. In fact, barring sourcing oil supplies, which, incidentally, are indispensable for the Mangalore refinery, India’s overall relationship with Iran is modest in scope. India has not proceeded with existing petroleum sector projects, considered very attractive by ONGC / OVL, because of a reluctance to fall afoul of US sanctions. On the sensitive nuclear issue, India has already annoyed Iran by voting against it in the IAEA in the past. This was criticised domestically as our step was imputed to US pressure. India has expressed public opposition to any Iranian nuclear weapon programme and, while recognising its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has asked Iran to comply with its NPT obligations and respond to the queries raised by the IAEA about some of its nuclear activities. India is cognizant of the adverse regional consequences of Iran going nuclear. We would want stability in the Gulf region where we have vast energy and trade interests and where several million expatriates reside, remitting home annually billions of US dollars. But we can neither make common cause with the US against Iran on the nuclear issue nor share its apocalyptic view of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. India itself has long suffered from US-led international sanctions targetting our nuclear programme. Worse, the US has tolerated nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan as it strategically balanced Indo-Soviet ties in the cold war era. Pakistan’s nuclear

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

capability was seen as India-centric, not a regional problem. Even today the US is unwilling to make an issue of China’s continued support to Pakistan’s nuclear programme in violation of the NSG guidelines. The frenzied western opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme contrasts with the attitude to Pakistan’s programme even though under cover of its nuclear capability Pakistan has used terrorism as an instrument of state policy, earlier against india and now even against US interests. Pakistan not only escapes sanctions despite its rogue conduct, it continues to be engaged as a matter of policy, ironically for the reason that pressuring it may result in its collapse as a state and its nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of extremists, making the situation worse. With Iran the approach is openly coercive, with military threats evoked from time to time to prevent it from going nuclear. Simply because the Pakistani leadership does not rant against Israel and the reality of the Holocaust does not make Pakistan less disruptive of regional stability, or less an incubus of extremist religious ideologies with their terrrorist links that endanger peace and development. A strategic partnership should have an element of reciprocity. If India is to take cognizance of vital US strategic concerns, the reverse should be the case too in some measure. If the US does not consider Pakistan a black and white case and therefore its Pakistan poilcy has to be inserted into a regional famework, the same considerations apply to Indian policy towards Iran. In fact Pakistan threatens India’s security directly, without this inhibiting the US from arming it, whereas Iran threatens US’s extended regional interests and not its territory directly. The US should therefore take cognizance of India’s legitimate interests in Iran that transcend the present situation. US electoral pressures should not affect the barometer of tensions in the Gulf, nor should India be expected to accept without demur the narrow, domestically-driven, Israel-incited US concerns about Iran. The US should not put serious constraints on India’s oil purchases from Iran as the latter’s nuclear defiance cannot be countered by undermining India’s energy security and its broader regional interests.

India itself has long suffered from US-led international sanctions targeting our nuclear programme. Worse, the US has tolerated nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan as it strategically balanced Indo-Soviet ties in the cold war era. Pakistan’s nuclear capability was seen as India-centric, not a regional problem. Even today the US is unwilling to make an issue of China’s continued support to Pakistan’s nuclear programme in violation of the NSG guidelines. The frenzied western opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme contrasts with the attitude to Pakistan’s programme even though under cover of its nuclear capability Pakistan has used terrorism as an instrument of state policy, earlier against India and now even against US interests It is politically simplistic to suggest that India can buy more oil from Saudi Arabia in case Iranian supplies get disrupted. Saudi Arabia has announced that it will increase its output to compensate for non-availability of Iranian oil in the international market, to which Iran has responded sharply. Indian oil supplies from Iran have in any case got reduced because of payment difficulties compared to volumes imported a couple of years ago. Our private sector players could well reduce their purchases further. India can react appropriately to commercial exigencies but we should not become an engaged party in political manoeuvres against Iran on oil supplies. Our effort should be to avoid getting entangled in the mounting Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry as much as possible as there is a deepening sectarian basis to it. Saudi Arabia fears rising Iranian power may make the Shias in Arab countries more restive against oppressive Sunni domination, threatening the power of the elites in the Gulf countries. India’s productive relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies in the field of energy supplies, trade, investment, manpower and remittances have, of course, to be preserved. However, India, with its own large Muslim

population composed of Sunnis and Shias, should not be seen getting caught in the sectarian politics of West Asia. We should maintain a dynamic balance between our interests in the Arab world and Iran. US alignment with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries against Iran is not sufficient reason for India to tailor its policies accordingly. This would be common sense, not the lingering influence of nonalignment in india’s thinking. India is accused by foreign as well as domestic critics for being a fence-sitter, of avoiding hard choices, of unwillingness to accept, as a rising global power, responsibilities at the global level that come with an enhanced international status. India would presumably pass the test of acting responsibly if it sided with the US and the West on Iran, Libya, Syria and, earlier, on Myanmar. We have to be careful about such arguments. It is well to remember that countries make decisions in the light of their national or alliance interests, not on the basis of abstract principles. When interests and principles are in harmony, principles can be invoked to give a moral cover to self-interest, but when principles and interests collide, principles are often abandoned. Protecting human rights and promoting democracy are unexceptionable principles but are applied selectively in practice in consonsance with self-interest. The principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries and respect for national sovereignty are being violated by powerful countries in order to shape the international or regional environment to their advantage. India’s enhanced international status does not require it to give up independence of judgment or endorse western policies on the presumption that they are necessarily right. Assuming responsibilty at the global level should actually mean supporting or opposing western policies as necessary for the equitable functioning of the international system. If India gives weight to its own interests in crafting its policy towards Iran, just as the West does, it does not mean India is shirking its global responsibility. It means that India favours a less one-sided international view of the complex Iranian problem.

It is not the money Iran earns from sale of oil to India or others that will determine its nuclear decisions. Much more important is Iran’s political judgment on the advantages and disadvantages of going nuclear. As it is, political developments have moved in its favour after the empowerment of the Shias in Iraq. The so-called Arab Spring has kindled the Shia communities of West Asia, generating pressure on Sunni regimes. Does Iran need to go nuclear to consolidate its political advantage? On the face of it, Iran is being pushed to the limit to go nuclear by western policies of economic warfare and miltary intimidation. The remarkable patience they are showing in the face of threats of regime change could either reflect lack of domestic consensus on the subject or technical inability to develop a nuclear weapon at this point. It is not clear whether the networks that A Q Khan exploited for Pakistan’s clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapon technology have been uprooted to the extent that Iran cannot use them. Can China, which is still supplying nuclear and missile technolgy to Pakistan, be relied upon to behave “responsibly” in this regard? On the whole, the government has shown political grit in resisting US pressure to dilute even our energy relationship with Iran. The Finance Minister has expressed most recently in Chicago India’s inability to drastically reduce its oil supplies from there. We have stated our willingness to abide by UN sanctions on Iran but not those by individual countries. Iran is not an easy partner and its conduct is questionable on many counts. Its decision making processes are convoluted and its postures on Israel and the Holocaust are needlessly provocative. India is playing its difficult hand on the Iranian question as well as it can. The US should show better understanding of India’s stakes in Iran. India cannot ask the US for exempting it from the application of its latest sanctions as it would mean accepting the extra-territoriality of its laws. India should do what it must do and hope that the US will take into account its developing strategic relationship with India to decide what it should do.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

war game: Israel vs Iran

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Iran has threatened that in such a strangulation scenario it would close the straits of Hormuz and trigger a global economic recession. The economies worst hit would be those of China, India, Japan and South Korea. Over the last two years India has already lost some US$ 40 billion of export revenues because the Reliance facility at Jamnagar has been prevented from refining Iranian crude oil. It is noteworthy that India imports of oil were some 21.2 mn tons some two years ago. These are still at 13 mt. Any closure of the Gulf of Hormuz could trigger an energy crisis as over 68 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the Persian Gulf countries. The price of oil could easily cross over US$ 200 per barrel and trigger a serious economic crisis not just in Asia but all over the globe

HOBSON’S CHOICE?

The terror strike on an Israeli diplomat brought the Iran-Israel shadow war to the streets of Delhi. Any crisis in the Persian Gulf would dramatically escalate the price of oil and thereby seriously impact on the Indian and global economy. The price of oil could easily cross US$ 200 per barrel and more. Over 68 per cent of India’s oil supplies and 100 per cent of its gas are currently sourced from the Gulf region. The US and Europe are now putting in place economic sanctions to target Iran’s oil exports. Iran in turn has threatened to block the Straits of Hormuz in retaliation. Any Iranian attempts to close the Gulf of Hormuz could seriously impact the Chinese, Indian, Japanese and South Korean economies. Such an economic crisis would be pushing the envelope too far and there is now a need for a frank dialogue between us and our strategic partners. This article analyses the likely shape and contours of an Israeli military strike on Iran and its huge consequences. A clear and present danger is looming and there is a dire need to anticipate events and defuse the crisis before it overtakes us.

here is a looming crisis gathering over the Persian Gulf. Israel is getting restive over the Iranian quest for a nuclear weapons capability and is seemingly preparing for a military strike to knock out the Iranian nuclear facilities. This shadow war between Iran and Israel reached New Delhi with the terror attack on the Israeli diplomat within earshot of the Prime Ministers residence at 7 Race Course Road. Far more critical than this terror escalation however, is the prospect of a conventional conflict between Iran and Israel and the disastrous impact it could have on our energy security. With the recently concluded war in Iraq and the still ongoing engagement in Afghanistan, the US has apparently little appetite for another war in the Persian Gulf so soon - especially one that could spin out of control. In 2007-08 the US had made naval show of force deployments in the Persian Gulf to coerce Iran into calling off its nuclear programme. US air strikes then would certainly have put back the Iranian nuclear programme by a few years. However, the fear of Iranian retaliation, primarily through means of asymmetric warfare options and its capability to target shipping / oil lanes in the Gulf, threatened to entrain an escalator where the endgame would have become highly risky. It could have derailed the global economy and generated a worldwide recession with the price of oil soaring beyond the US$ 200 a barrel mark. So America had clearly backed off then.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAN? DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR INDIA

The US intelligence estimates stated thereafter that Iran had halted its drive for nuclear weaponisation. The world had heaved a sigh of relief and there was a visible deescalation in the strident rhetoric for then. There are however some indications of a change in the scenario once again. When the military option was taken off the table in 2007, the Israeli intelligence was given a free hand and virtually unlimited funds to target the Iranian nuclear programme and scientists. Meir Dagan, the head of the Mossad was given a three years extension to hit the Iranian programme. So far five very senior Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated alongwith the head of the Iranian missile programme. The Stuxnet virus was used to infect the Iranian Uranium enrichment facility and serious acts of sabotage hit the Iranian missile production programme. Meanwhile in Sepember 2007 itself the Israeli Air Force had struck the Syrian nuclear facility at Al Kabir and destroyed it successfully.

When the military option was taken off the table in 2007, the Israeli intelligence was given a free hand and virtually unlimited funds to target the Iranian nuclear programme and scientists. So far six very senior Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated. The Stuxnet virus was used to infect the Iranian Uranium enrichment facility and serious acts of sabotage hit the Iranian missile production programme

Israeli rehearsals In June 2008 Israel had carried out a major military exercise, which appeared to be a full dress rehearsal for a potential bombing attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. US officials then said that the Israeli exercise appeared to be an effort to develop the country’s long range strike potential and demonstrate the seriousness with which it views Iran’s nuclear programme. Was it another coercive exercise to deter Iran or a full fledged rehearsal for an impending Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities? Media reports speculated that over a 100 Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft had taken part in these manoeuvres over the

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

war game: Israel vs Iran

Eastern Mediterranean over Greece and Crete. The exercise also included Israeli helicopters that could be used to rescue downed pilots. The helicopters and refuelling tankers flew over 900 miles – the approximate distance between Israel and nuclear target sets in Iran.

But such an economic crisis would be pushing the envelope too far and there is now a need for a frank dialogue between us and our strategic partners. While our strategic partners expect us to buy their civil and military aircraft to bail out their economies, they cannot create a situation which could seriously derail the Indian economy. There are vital national stakes involved and we must articulate them to our friends who have to show some understanding. Particularly important at this juncture is the fate of Afghanistan post the US withdrawal and India would need Iran for access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian landmass. In Athens, an official of the Greek Air Force Central Command, had confirmed, that it had taken part in a joint training exercise with Israel off the Mediterranean island of Crete. Named Glorious Spartan 08, these exercises, were actually conducted from May 28 to June 12, 2008. It was a highly visible and coercive exercise intended to demonstrate Israel’s serious concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, on June 6, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, Shaul Mofaz, had warned that Iran would face attacks if it pursues what he said was its nuclear weapons programme. The Mossad Director Meir Dagan got an extension till 2010 which was being linked to Israel’s likely plans for a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Sabotage attempts have clearly slowed down the Iranian nuclear programme. However they have also served to highten Iran’s deep sense of insecurity which would impel it to move faster on its nuclear weapons programme. The US and its European allies are now going ahead with their plans to impose severe economic sanctions on Iran that target its petroleum exports and could derail its economy. Iran has threatened

HOBSON’S CHOICE? that in such a strangulation scenario it would close the straits of Hormuz and trigger a global economic recession. The economies worst hit would be those of China, India, Japan and South Korea. India is close to losing some US$ 40 billion of export revenues because the Reliance facility at Jamnagar has been prevented from refining Iranian crude oil due to its linkages with the American banking system. It is noteworthy that India imports of oil were some 21.2 mn tons some two years ago. These are still at 13 mt. Any closure of the Gulf of Hormuz could trigger an energy crisis as over 68 per cent of India’s oil imports come from the Persian Gulf countries. The price of oil could easily cross over US$ 200 per barrel and trigger a serious economic crisis not just in Asia but all over the globe. However, our strategic partners seem least concerned about the potential damage to the Indian economy. Apparently their national security interests are supreme and they couldn’t care less about ours. We are supposed to tamely subordinate our national interests to their security concerns. So far India has gone along with the security concerns of its strategic partners but such an economic crisis would be pushing the envelope too far and there is now a need for a frank dialogue between us and our strategic partners. While our strategic partners expect us to buy their civil and military aircraft to bail out their economies, they cannot create a situation which could seriously derail the Indian economy. There are vital national stakes involved and we must articulate them to our friends who have to show some understanding. Particularly important at this juncture is the fate of Afghanistan post the US withdrawal and India would need Iran for access to Afghanistan and the Central Asian landmass. We cannot accept a situation where the crumbling state of Pakistan is appointed as the colonising power for Afghanistan. At the same time however, the Israelis have been our trusted strategic partners and our second largest source of military equipment and supplies, especially of critical high-tech equipment which the Americans are not prepared to give us directly. We also need American support to counterbalance the rising power of China. Hence

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

the situation is achieving critical mass and requires some very clear-headed thinking and articulation of vital national interests that cannot be compromised. This is the time for hectic parleys and dialogue before the situation spins out of control.

We cannot accept a situation where the crumbling state of Pakistan is appointed as the colonising power for Afghanistan. At the same time however, the Israelis have been our trusted strategic partners and our second largest source of military equipment and supplies, especially of critical high-tech equipment which the Americans are not prepared to give us directly. We also need American support to counterbalance the rising power of China. Hence the situation is achieving critical mass and requires some very clear-headed thinking and articulation of vital national interests that cannot be compromised The Israelis have said that they have only 9 months to stop Iran from achieving nuclear capability. The Americans they feel have only 15 months (with their superior resources) to do so before the window of opportunity closes finally. The US intelligence sources however feel the Iranians are still some three years away from nuclear capability (courtesy the covert offensive). They are nervous over Iranian plans to retaliate in kind - with covert asymmetric options on US soil. They have asked Israel to give them at least 10 days notice in case they plan to take out the nascent Iranian capabilities through Air strikes. A dangerous situation is developing. America has totally eliminated its dependence on Saudi and Gulf oil. Europe is about to curtail its dependence on Iranian oil courtesy the oil resources of Libiya and Iraq. We import 12 per cent of our oil needs from Iran and 22 per cent from Saudi Arabia. Our energy security reliance on Saudi Arabia is growing by leaps and bounds. The close ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan make it a worrying scenario in case of any conflict triggered by terrorist strikes

or otherwise in South Asia. What if a panicked Iran closes the Gulf of Hormuz in retaliation for the economic sanctions? What would be the impact on our energy security? How long would such a closure last? What would be the impact on oil and gas prices? What is the state of our Strategic petroleum reserve?

Our energy security reliance on Saudi Arabia is growing by leaps and bounds. The close ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan make it a worrying scenario in case of any conflict triggered by terrorist strikes or otherwise in South Asia. What if a panicked Iran closes the Gulf of Hormuz in retaliation for the economic sanctions? What would be the impact on our energy security? How long would such a closure last? What would be the impact on oil and gas prices? What is the state of our Strategic petroleum reserve? This article will steer clear of value judgments on the proliferation issues involved and focus on a purely military net assessment of likely conflict scenarios that could emerge in the Gulf in case of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This article will employ the technique of pattern modelling to discern the shape and basic contours of an Israeli air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Towards this end it will: • Study the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor. • Speculate upon the likely details of an Israeli air strike option on Iranian nuclear facilities. • Briefly examine Iranian response options . • Examine the impact on India of such a hypothetical conflict scenario in the Gulf.

Osirak redux In a very meticulous paper entitled “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities”, Whitney Raas and Austin Lang (International Security Vol No 31. Spring 2007), had carried out an excellent analysis of Israel’s raid on the Iraqi Osirak Reactor of June 7, 1981.They had gone on to outline an equally credible net assessment of an Israeli directed strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The paper is insightful and revealing and merits study in detail. On June 7, 1981, Israel had launched one of the most ambitious preventive attacks in history. Israel’s Mossad had sought to buy time by allegedly sabotaging the reactor cores before the French companies could supply them to Iraq and assassinated some key Iraqi nuclear officials. In October 1980, Mossad reported to the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin that Osirak Reactor would be operational by June 1981. There was intense debate in the Israeli Government before the final clearance was given. The Israeli Air Force employed a strike package of 16 aircraft (8 x F-15s and 8 x F-16s). These took off from Etzion air base in the Sinai desert. Their flight profiles were low altitude across the Gulf of Aquaba, southern Jordan and then across northern Saudi Arabia to the target. The F-16s carried 2 x MK-84, 2,000 Ib bombs each with delayed action fuzes. Though these were dumb gravity bombs, the F-16 aircraft did have onboard targeting computer systems that could make their delivery fairly accurate. However, such accuracy was required that the planes get close to the target. The strike package arrived near the Osirak reactor completely undetected. The F-15s then climbed up to establish a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to intercept any Iraqi fighters that would attempt to challenge the mission. The F-16s formed up at predetermined points to begin their bombing runs. About four miles from the target, the F-16s climbed to 5,000 feet to dive at Osirak and release their bomb loads. Despite some navigation problems and Iraqi air defences, at least 8 of the 16 bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. The strike package then turned and climbed to high altitude and returned to base along much the same route it had adopted for entry. All the 16 aircraft returned safely to base. The results were spectacular. Bomb damage assessment showed that the Iraqi reactor was totally destroyed.

Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities: Target analysis Iranian target sets The Rass and Lang paper stated that Iran has obviously learnt the lessons of the Osirak raid. Its nuclear facilities

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

war game: Israel vs Iran

are widely dispersed. The paper asserts that Iran is pursuing multiple pathways to nuclear weapons capability to include Uranium enrichment and Plutonium production concurrently. The Uranium enrichment pathway, it avers, is significantly more advanced than the Plutonium production route presently. As such, the paper identifies the following Iranian target sets (the three critical Iranian nodes for the production of fissile material): • Isfahan. Uranium facility at Isfahan.

conversion

• Natanz. The large Uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. • Arak. Heavy water (HW) plant and plutonium production reactors under construction at Arak. • Bushehr. The paper analyses the projected plans for construction of the light water reactor with Russian aid at Bushehr. However, it feels that this is not a hardened site and being on the coast, could be better struck by submarine launched cruise missiles. A detailed analysis of the three earlier target sets would now be essential. • Fordo. The facility that the Rass and Lang paper did not factor in was the newly unveiled underground storage facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom where substantial amounts of low grade and middle grade Iranian fissile material is stored in a deep underground facility some 220 ft deep underground (and as such beyond the capabilities of most bunker busting bombs). It is noteworthy that Iran has five tons of low grade enriched Uranium which could be used to make some 5-6 bombs. It has also stockpiled 175 lbs of medium grade fissile material. Israel claims Iranian scientists could make a bomb within 9 months of the decision to do so and may need another 6 months to reduce its size to fit the Shabab missiles. Isfahan: Iran’s nuclear conversion facility at Isfahan is the primary chemical facility for Iran’s nuclear programme. This facility produces Uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed gas for uranium centrifuges, Uranium dioxide (UO2) for reactor fuel and Uranium metal. Destruction of this

HOBSON’S CHOICE? facility could result in significant production of hydrofluoric acid which is a highly corrosive chemical. Major risks of collateral damage would be inherent, as this facility is located fairly close to the major population centre of Isfahan. The destruction of this facility would interrupt the production of UF6 feed gas for enrichment at Natanz as well as production of UO2 fuel for future heavy water reactors at Arak.

The Deep Command was specifically established with potential conflicts in distant theatres like Iran in mind. This previously was solely the responsibility of the IAF. The Raas and Lang Paper feels that Israeli Special Forces employment will only be confined to vectoring in the air strikes with laser designators and carrying out immediate bomb damage assessment. In fact, the paper has identified the Sayeret-Shaldag Unit 5101 of the IAF, which specialises in laser designation and Unit 5707, which specialises in real time bomb damage assessment, for this task Natanz: The Natanz facility is the next critical link. This site is 200 miles south of Tehran and 40 miles from the nearest city. It comprises a pilot fuel enrichment plant and, as the paper asserts, a much larger commercial plant underground which is awaiting arrival of thousands of centrifuges. As such the optimal time for the strike would be once the centrifuges are installed but before a large quantity of UF6 has been introduced. Bombing the empty hall prior to centrifuge installation would be futile in terms of an anti-proliferation strike. The installation of centrifuges and their operation has been delayed by sabotage (Stutnext virus and faulty parts). Arak: The HW plant and plutonium production reactor at Arak constitute a very large facility, located some 150 miles south-west of Tehran. The site itself is some 20 miles from the nearest town. The paper claims that Iran has a small research reactor that uses HW as coolant, but the Arak HW facility, will be able to produce more than 16 tons of HW per year –

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

a capability, that is far in excess of the civilian requirements. The two Arak reactors are scheduled for completion by 2014 and they could produce weapons grade Plutonium.

Israeli strike options Having defined the Iranian target sets, we need to examine in comprehensive detail, the Israeli strike options. The capabilities of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) are far more advanced today (in terms of enhanced accuracy and ability to penetrate hardened targets such as reactor containment) than they were in 1981 at the time of the Osirak raid. Acquisition of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) in 1980s and 1990s, means that the dynamics of IAF bombing have been transformed. The Lo-Lo-High mission profile would now be redundant. Accurate delivery would no longer require approach at low altitudes and then popping up to dive directly on target. The Israeli strike package would now come at mid or high altitude, navigate accurately due to GPS and attack the target with laser guided bombs (LGBs) or GPS guided munitions from standoff ranges of at least 15 kms or more. CEP at the time of the Osirak raid was of the order of 8-12 metres (due to computerised aiming system of the F-16). GPS guided munitions can achieve the same accuracy today from a 15 km standoff range and high altitude delivery. Laser guided bombs could give a CEP of about 3 meters from the same stand off range. Target penetration levels have also been greatly enhanced with the use of “bunker busters” or penetrating warheads with delayed action fuzes. These are delivered from high altitudes at steep angles and can penetrate tens of feet of earth and even several feet of reinforced concrete. Possible options in the Israeli inventory are: • PB 500 AI A 1,000 lb class penetrating bomb • BLU-109 A 2,000 penetrating war head

class

• BLU-113 A 5,000 penetrating war head

class

Accuracy could be further enhanced by laser designation of the targets by

Israeli Special Forces (SF). The article cites Maj Gen Etyan Ben Elyahu (former Commander of IAF who took part in Osirak raid) as saying that even if one BLU-113 did not penetrate the earth and concrete at Natanz, two successive strikes could do so. A combined blast of three BLU -113s he felt, could destroy the Natanz facilities. For complete assurance levels, a combination of BLU-113s and BLU-109s may be required. The other two target sets at Isfahan and Arak are not hardened as of now and would be relatively easier to tackle. These may well be targeted by the smaller BLU-109 warheads.

It would be therefore very much in India’s interests, as also in the regional and global interests to ensure a peaceful, negotiated resolution to this crisis. It would be prudent however, to make contingency plans for the worst case scenarios that may entail a diversification of our oil and gas import sources and possibly a large scale evacuation of the Indian emigrant population from the Gulf region. The base line assumption would proceed from the likely duration of the conflict and disruption of the oil supplies. The long-term spectre of a series of failed states in Asia is chilling

Strike modalities The Israeli strike at PLO headquarters at Tunis in 1985 amply demonstrated Israeli deep strike capabilities upto a range of almost 4,000 kms. Today these capabilities remain centered on the F-15s and F-16s. The IAF now has 25 x F-15 I Raas and 25 or more F-16 I Soufa aircraft which have been specially configured for deep strike. Both these planes have an unrefuelled combat radius of 1,700 kms with external drop tanks. The F-16 I could deliver 2 x 2,000 lb bombs while carrying external fuel tanks. Both types of aircraft have advanced ECM suites and remain capable of air–to–air combat. Whitney Raas and Austin Lang have envisioned a 50 strong strike package of 25 x F-15 Is and 25 x F-16 Is.

This package would be divided into three smaller strike packages (one for each facility) Any larger strike package than this would strain Israeli refuelling capabilities. The paper has considered three routing options as under: • Northern Route: Fly North to the Mediterranean sea, refuel ex airborne tankers, fly East over Turkey to strike Iran. Total route length 2,220 kms approx. • Osirak Route: Fly South-east, skirt Jordan and Saudi Arabia, fly North-east over Iraq (with mid-air refuelling) and into Iran. This would largely be the Osirak route. Total length 2,160 kms. • Southern Route: Fly South-east, then East along Saudi–Iraqi border to the Persian Gulf, refuel either over Saudi territory or the Gulf and on to Iran. At 2,410 kms, this is the longest routing option and would entail refuelling twice, both on the way out and in. Refuelling Capacity: Israel has a fleet of 4 to 5 KC-130s and 5 to 7 KC-707s. For a strike package of 50 aircraft, the KC-707 fleet could deliver 12 to 16,000 lbs at a distance of 1,000 NM. All the three routing options would need refuelling twice, especially, if air–to–air combat takes place short of or over the target.

Analysis The paper is silent about the aspect of reduction in range if the F-16 Is carry the 5,000 lbs BLU-113 warheads. Presumably, air–to–air refuelling on both the route in and route out of the flight path could overcome this constraint. However, the transit of such a huge strike package over the territories of Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Turkey is a major grey area that almost rules out these routing options. All that is left is the classical Osirak route over Iraq. The paper has also not gone into details of the suppression

effort required to neutralise Iranian air defences, the electronic suppression measures and whether a Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW or AWAC) would be needed to control the air-to-air battle that is bound to result as the strike packages penetrate Iranian airspace. Also these calculations are silent about the Fordo facility near Qom.

Employment of special forces After the experience gained in trying to co-ordinate the three wings of the Israeli Special Forces (Sayeret Matkal of the Israeli Intelligence, Shaldag of the IAF and Sahyetet 13 Commandoes of the Israeli Navy) during the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, the Israelis have now set up the Special Forces Command or the “Deep Command”. This is now responsible for commanding and co-ordinating all operations beyond Territorial Command Theatres. It is headed by Brig Gen Tal Russo, a veteran Special Forces officer and is now the Israeli Defence Forces Eighth HQ authorised to operate forces – the other being Air HQ, Naval HQ, Northern, Central, Southern and Home Front Commands as also the AMAN or Israeli Intelligence. The Deep Command was specifically established with potential conflicts in distant theatres like Iran in mind. This previously was solely the responsibility of the IAF. The Raas and Lang Paper feels that Israeli Special Forces employment will only be confined to vectoring in the air strikes with laser designators and carrying out immediate bomb damage assessment. In fact, the paper has

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

war game: Israel vs Iran

identified the Sayeret-Shaldag Unit 5101 of the IAF, which specialises in laser designation and Unit 5707, which specialises in real time bomb damage assessment, for this task. Post the war in Lebanon, the IAF primacy in matters military is being challenged by a new generation of Israeli Army Generals led by the new Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi.

The Chinese may view this assault on Iran as a direct attempt to hit their economy. (China imports 22 per cent of its oil from Iran, Japan 14 per cent, India 12 per cent and South Korea 10 per cent) Are economic sanctions on Iran’s Oil exports meant to hit the Chinese economy? It also has the unintended (or intended?) serious consequences for the Indian economy which India can ill afford to ignore or take lightly The Special Forces and Israeli Intelligence are also likely to play a more prominent role. Though destruction of the nuclear facilities may entirely be left to the IAF, Special Forces are likely to play a role in the neutralisation / elimination of key radars or command and control facilities for air defence, as Israel lacks stealth aircraft capability to take on these. Air penetration corridors may have to be cleared by Special Forces action. However, large scale employment of Special Forces may not be likely, given the widespread nature and distance of the targets and the sheer complexity of operations involved. After all, the US Delta Force’s botched attempt to rescue hostages in Iran is not a reassuring precedent. It would all be a function of the quantum and quality of human intelligence assets available to Israel within Iran itself and the degree to which Iran’s air defences could be physically / electronically suppressed. In sum, Israeli air attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities will be a very mammoth and extremely complex operation with huge in-built risks and serious potential

HOBSON’S CHOICE? for uncontrolled escalation and widening of the conflict. These constraints by themselves lessen the chances of the adoption of this option but cannot be ruled out altogether. Given the operational and political complexities and also the uncertainties in execution and outcome, this option will be difficult, but not beyond the capabilities of the IAF. The problem area would be in dealing with the likely Iranian conventional and asymmetric responses.

Iranian response options Briefly, Iranian response options could be analysed under two heads: Conventional Air defence: Iranian fighters are a mix of vintage US aircraft like the Phantoms and F-5s as also Russian Su-22, Su-24 fighters and 40 x Mig-29s. Since, these would be operating close to their bases they would have an advantage. Hawk SAMs would pose a threat to Israeli strike packages. There are reports of Iran having Russian SA-10 and SA-15 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). However, radar cover and command and control are weak links. Iran’s missile capabilities: Iran could hit targets in Israel, the Gulf countries, Middle East and even Southern Europe. Its missile inventory comprises: • Shabab I: Maximum range 205 miles (330 kms) • Shahab II: Maximum range 435 miles (700 kms) • Shabab III: Maximum range 840 miles (1,350 kms). This puts Israel and the fringes of Europe in range. Israel and the Middle eastern Sunni states are likely to be hit by a barrge of conventional tipped missiles. Oil tanker war II: Iran could blockade the Gulf of Hormuz. It could mine sea lanes and attack oil tankers with surface-to-surface

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

missiles. Some 300 mines would be sufficient to close the narrow strait. Iran has some 2,000 mines. This could seriously disrupt global oil supplies and push oil prices to beyond US$ 200 a barrel. India would be particularly affected. Iranian high speed boats could launch massed swarming attacks on US warships in the closed waters of the Gulf and cause the loss of major capital ships. Iranian Kilo submarines are also a significant threat as are its Midget submarines Asymmetric options • Hezbollah could open a front against Israel via Lebanon with help from Iranian Special Forces. Hezbollah has some 50,000 rockets in its armoury and could strike civilian targets all over Israel. • Palestinian organisations could be assisted by Iran’s Special Forces (Al Quds detachments). • Iranian Special Forces could strike targets in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, as also assist the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hezbollah and Hamas could strike targets in Israel and other Middle Eastern states. All this could create a global economic crisis with the worst fallout on China, India, Japan and South Korea, the key consumers of Iran’s energy exports.

Implications for India India is close to losing some US$ 40 billion of revenue from refining the Iranian crude at the Reliance Jamnagar refinery. Any crisis in the Persian Gulf would lead to the need to evacuate some 6 million Indian expatriates now working in the Gulf. They send home remittances worth US$ 40 billion every year. Besides a Gulf crisis could dramatically escalate the price of oil and thereby seriously impact on the Indian and global economy. The price of oil could easily cross a US$ 200 per barrel and more. Over 68 per cent of India’s oil supplies and 100 per cent of its gas are currently sourced from the Gulf region. This dependence on Persian Gulf oil and gas is

largely a function of geography, spatial distance / linkages and transportation costs. Keeping in view the extreme volatility in this region, it would be prudent for India to try and diversify its sources of energy imports and possibly try to get more oil and gas from Africa, Russia and Central Asia and even Brazil and Venezuela. However this cannot be done in a short time frame as most Indian refineries are geared to deal only with Iranian crude. Israeli or US attacks could cause Iran to make expedient tactical shifts and provide support to Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. Its support to the Taliban could have a very destabilising impact on Afghanistan and by extension in Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of India. In a post US withdrawal scenario from Afghanistan India would need Iran to gain access to Afghanistan. Hence India would need to keep its channels of communication open with Iran.

Conflict however may be instigated in this case by the Israelis. A pattern analysis of Israeli decision making before the Osirak raid reveals many patterns that are repeating themselves. Isreali former Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan has stridently expressed himself against any conventional attack on Iran. However the Israeli PM and Defence Minister are worried that time is fast running out and may well decide to strike It may have to expedite the consolidation of its strategic petroleum reserves. Gas is going to be the primary energy source of the 21st century and our energy dependence on gas is likely to grow by leaps and bounds. India’s attempts to secure supplies of Iranian gas reserves over land routes / pipelines may need to be expedited, because of the likelihood of disruption of supplies routed through the sea. Passage through Pakistan however is another question mark. Iran and India had earlier closed ranks to support the

Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine. It would be therefore very much in India’s interests, as also in the regional and global interests to ensure a peaceful, n e g o t i a t e d resolution to this crisis. It would be prudent however, to make contingency plans for the worst case scenarios that may entail a diversification of our oil and gas import sources and possibly a large scale evacuation of the Indian emigrant population from the Gulf region. The base line assumption would proceed from the likely duration of the conflict and disruption of the oil supplies. The long-term spectre of a series of failed states in Asia is chilling. It would give a major boost to the forces of destabilisation and chaos and encourage non-state actors to flourish in such shatter zones of collapse. Inconclusive conventional conflicts in the Gulf could lead to the chilling prospect of the “Somalisation” of this region. This prospect is daunting both at the regional and global level and could have a paradoxical impact – that the very quest for enhanced security, leads to greater destabilisation, chaos and instability. While air strikes on Iranian nuclear / missile complexes might neutralise assumed conventional or WMD threats, these may end up creating an entire new series of asymmetric threats. In purely military terms, the outcome of this conflict would be critical for the Chinese, as it would enable them to evaluate the impact of massed ballistic / cruise missile strikes on US naval surface combatants, especially high value targets like aircraft carriers and also the efficacy of the Kilo submarines – both, key ingredients of their access denial strategy to prevent US intervention in any hypothetical

crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese may view this assault on Iran as a direct attempt to hit their economy. (China imports 22 per cent of its oil from Iran, Japan 14 per cent, India 12 per cent and South Korea 10 per cent). Are economic sanctions on Iran’s oil exports meant to hit the Chinese economy? It also has the unintended (or intended?) serious consequences for the Indian economy which India can ill afford to ignore or take lightly. The Iraq and Afghan experience has certainly drained American political will to engage militarily overseas. Conflict however may be instigated in this case by the Israelis. A pattern analysis of Israeli decision making before the Osirak raid reveals many patterns that are repeating themselves. Isreali former Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan has stridently expressed himself against any conventional attack on Iran. However the Israeli PM and Defence Minister are worried that time is fast running out and may well decide to strike. Chinese reliance on energy supplies from the Gulf is very high and, as such, the impact on the Chinese economy would also be highly adverse. So would it be for the Indian, Japanese and South Korean economies. The most likely outcome of crisis in the Gulf would be a full fledged global economic recession.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

French Dassault And Indian Reliance Industries Limited Join Hands

Rolls-Royce Water Jets For Indian Coast Guard

Barely a week after bagging the US$ 15 billion 126 fighter aircraft deal, French Dassault and Indian Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) have signed an agreement under which they will start working together in defence and homeland security sector from next week. "Dassault Aviation, a major player in the global aerospace industry, has entered into MOU with Reliance Industries, for pursuing strategic opportunities of collaboration in the area of complex manufacturing and support in India," the two companies said in a joint statement. The MOU has been signed after the Defence Ministry on January 31 offered Dassault the multi-billion dollar deal to supply 126 combat aircraft to the IAF.

British aerospace manufacturer Rolls-Royce will soon deliver 60 water jets for a new fleet of 20 Fast Patrol Vessels for the Indian Coast Guard, the company said announcing its results last week. Rolls-Royce "will deliver 60 Rolls-Royce water jets for a new fleet of 20 Fast Patrol Vessels for the Indian Coast Guard," the company's India President Anil Shrikhande, said in New Delhi.

Sources said Dassault would involve RIL for working together in the Medium-Multirole Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal here under the offsets clause. After finalising the deal, Dassault will have to reinvest 50 per cent of the worth of the deal back into Indian defence sector. The aerospace and security division of the Reliance Industries is headed by Vivek Lall, who has been closely associated with the MMRCA deal while spearheading the campaign for Boeing in the deal. Lall has earlier worked with American NASA and Raytheon. In the recent past, there have been efforts by the MukeshAmbani-headed RIL to position itself in the defence, internal security and aerospace solutions sector.

Guidelines For Defence Public-Private Sector JVs Approved India has come out with detailed guidelines on formation of joint ventures (JVs) between defence public and private firms enabling future tie-ups between the two for exploring business opportunities in the security sector and for boosting indigenous design, development and production capabilities, over four months after it had put on hold such an effort by Mumbai-based government-owned Mazagon Docks and Gujarat-based private sector Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering. The decision also comes even as there is a major debate in progress over demands from the private sector for increasing the foreign direct investment in the defence business from the existing cap of 26 per cent to 49 per cent, which they claim would increase technology transfer and also help develop indigenous capabilities. The new guidelines, prepared by the defence ministry, were approved by the central cabinet headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and in which Defence Minister A K Antony is a key member. The guidelines, it said, will help enhance "fairness and transparency" in the selection of the JV partner and ensure "A well-defined nature and scope" of the JV. It will also explicitly help in retention of the "affirmative right" of the Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU) for prior approval to key JV decisions such as amendments to articles of association of the company, declaration of dividend, sale of substantial assets and formation of further JVs or subsidiaries. The guidelines also mandate that there will be "exit provisions" for the DPSU under the JV and there will be regular reporting and monitoring of the JV functioning."The JV guidelines will provide a streamlined, fair and transparent framework for entering into JVs by DPSUs, with the ultimate objective of better risk-management, greater efficiency and shorter time frames for delivery to meet the increasing demands of our armed forces and for enhancing self-reliance in the defence sector as a whole," defence ministry officials said. The guidelines became necessary after MDL formed a JV with Pipavav for modular shipbuilding, but this decision came in for criticism from other private shipbuilders in the country such as Larsen & Toubro, ABG Shipyard and Bharati Shipyard, who lodged formal protests with the defence ministry, leading to Antony's decision to put the MDL-Pipavav JV on hold in September 2011. Since 2000 India had opened up its defence sector, which was till then the exclusive domain of government-owned undertakings, for private participation and also allowed for 26 per cent foreign participation in private JVs. There is a demand for hiking the defence FDI cap to 49 per cent and this demand also has the support of the ministry of commerce and industry. But the defence ministry wants to keep it at 26 per cent for the moment. India has allowed for 50 per cent foreign participation in defence design, development and production projects only in the case of Russian firms and the best example of this is BrahMos Aerospace, an Indo-Russian partnership firm that developed and now produces the eponymous 290-km range supersonic cruise missiles that are already in service withthe nation's armed forces.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

"India is a key market for Rolls-Royce and one in which we have been active for over 75 years. We continue to develop our manufacturing and engineering-services presence here through mutually beneficial collaborations with companies like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), L&T, TCS and Quest. Recently, the company had announced the start of construction of a facility in Bangalore, to manufacture important aerospace components for the Trent family of engines. Today Rolls-Royce engines are powering India’s critical growth sectors like – civil aerospace, defence aerospace, marine and energy. We are proud to be a partner in progress and look forward to continuing to deliver excellence for our customers in India during 2012,” Shrikhande added.

Selex Sistemi Naval Radars For INS Vikrant Selex Sistemi Integrate, part of the Italian major Finmeccanica company, has inked a contract with state-owned Cochin Shipyard Limited for the delivery of naval radar for India’s indigenous aircraft carrier. As per the contract, the Italian firm Selex will deliver the air surveillance naval radar RAN 40L and IFF radar for the 4, 00,000tonne warship INS Vikrant. The Italian firm Selex Sistemi’s radar called RAN-40L is a 3D long range early warning radar with fully solid state active phased array antenna which is capable of detecting an aircraft up to 400 kilometers. The design of the RAN-40L radar has been proven on the land based 3D RAT-31DL by the firm. The 3D RAT-31DL is the famous long range surveillance radar provided worldwide to the NATO countries. Selex Sistemi Integrati has been a dependable supplier of radar systems for air defence to India and has had a presence in India for almost four decades. In the naval field, the parent company Finmeccanica has supplied three command and control systems for the Godavari and Brahmaputra class frigates and the additional logistic support. The company is also providing the Indian Navy and Air Force with the PAR 2080C system, a Precision Approach Radar. Lately, the Italian firm has also realised radars and systems for air traffic control to be set up at a few airports in southern Indian cities.

The World’s First Precision 81 mm Guided Mortar Round General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems and BAE Systems have teamed to develop, demonstrate and produce the 81 mm Roll Controlled Guided Mortar (RCGM), an affordable 81 mm precision mortar round. The companies have been maturing the guided mortar technology over the last 12 months and will be conducting tactical demonstrations early in 2012. The teaming arrangement between General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics and BAE Systems' Munitions business, will leverage their respective strengths to provide a low-cost, highly affordable, precision mortar. The 81 mm RCGM uses the current UK L41 round and US M734A1 fuse, but incorporates GPS guidance and General Dynamics' patented Roll Controlled Fixed Canard (RCFC) technology to provide a precision strike capability.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

The nature of war that we are currently witness to in Iran does not readily fall into any mould. Covert action, cyber attacks and political alienation sufficiently reinforced by economic sanctions and intrusive nuclear inspections on the one hand, has unleashed globally disruptive nationalism on the other. Potentially a far more dangerous effect is what nations over the last century have turned to, the strategy of despair: terrorism

military pre-emption A war has begun in Iran; a combination of covert action, economic sanctions, political isolation and the threat of military pre-emption have not just crippled the Iranian economy but have checkmated Iran’s war waging potential. The threat of unleashing an asymmetric conflict is more pressure tactics than a credible denial strategy. Critical aspect is assessing Iran’s ability to close the Gulf as threatened periodically. Iran and especially the naval elements of its Revolutionary Guard Corps, has sought to develop a unique denial naval force based largely upon flotillas of fast, attack crafts backed up by a variety of crafts capable of laying mines, conventional and midget submarines. These are supported by shore-based anti-shipping missiles, aircraft, rockets and artillery all with rudimentary command and control. However they are not equipped materially nor technologically for any sustained denial operations when up against US and coalition forces. What they could achieve is disruption through low level sporadic attacks on shipping. Whether Iran has the political sagacity to cope with the current situation without giving opportunity for the US to take recourse to arms is a moot question. And what of the strategy of despair: terror?

n the morning of 29 November 2010 the Iranian nuclear physicist Majid Shahriari was working his way on Artesh Street in central Tehran when a motorcycle pulled up alongside his sedan, stuck a metallic object and sped away. Within moments a shaped charge tore through the door and left the scientist a mangled mass of flesh. The scientist died instantly. Some twenty kilometres northward and a few minutes later in the foothills of the Alborz Mountains close to the Pas-e-Qaleh neighbourhood another motorcyclist drove up to the car of Fereydoun Abbasi Davani and placed his explosive, only this time the victim managed to get out of the car to safety before the bomb went off. Abbasi was a leading ballistic missile scientist. It was also the same day that Iranian President Ahmadinejad admitted that software that controlled high speed centrifuges used to enrich uranium for nuclear reactor fuel and (possibly) to weapon grade levels had been damaged in cyber attacks. Wars through the ages occur when the established order is challenged and this challenge is resisted; and as Clausewitz so one-dimensionally put it “wars take place mainly for the defender”. But the trigger has varied from declaration to direct military action and sometimes more insidiously through covert action or by political riddance. In each case, empires and dispensations had fallen through erosion of the founding canon, that of obligation of the citizenry. Sometimes

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran - A War has Begun

this occurs rapidly due to sheer weight of an intervening power or due to a slower process of exhaustion of internal energies. The nature of war that we are currently witness to in Iran does not readily fall into any mould. Covert action, cyber attacks and political alienation sufficiently reinforced by economic sanctions and intrusive nuclear inspections on the one hand, has unleashed globally disruptive nationalism on the other. Potentially a far more dangerous effect is what nations over the last century have turned to, the strategy of despair: terrorism.

Sanctions and the coming oil shock The UN ratified four rounds of sanctions against Iran between 2006 and 2010 in reaction to its refusal to halt uranium enrichment and co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These sanctions include a ban on the supply of heavy weaponry and nuclear-related technology to Iran, a block on Iranian arms exports and an asset freeze on key individuals and companies. Resolution 1929, passed in 2010, mandates cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran’s acquisition of illicit materials. The European Union (EU) has imposed its own restrictions on trade in equipment which could be used for uranium enrichment and has put in place an asset freeze on a list of 39 individuals and 141 companies and organisations which it believes are helping advance the country’s nuclear programme. On 23 January 2012, EU

approved a ban on imports of Iranian crude oil, a freeze of assets belonging to the Central Bank of Iran and a ban on all trade in gold and other precious metals with the bank and other public bodies. The EU currently buys about 20 per cent of Iran’s oil exports.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical maritime chokepoints of the contemporary global energy system. Through its narrows (less than 34 miles) close to 18 mbl of oil, a fifth of global consumption, courses through every day along two, 2 mile wide shipping lanes carried onboard 5,800 hulls (approx) annually (all figures sourced from Energy Information Administration, USA). The north and eastern side of the strait is dominated by the Iranian coastline while the southern side by Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Traffic density is high and well regulated, the waters are shallow and do not favour submarine operations and the constricted nature of the seaway does not support large scale stealth operations or large force manoeuvres. The Gulf nations produce nearly 30 per cent of global oil while sitting on 57 per cent of the world’s crude reserves. It is also the repository of 45 per cent of proven world gas reserves

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

military pre-emption

The other economies that are likely to take the brunt of denial are China, Japan and South Korea. In the end analysis, restoration of oil supplies from Libya and Iraq and controlled ramping up of Saudi oil production serves to stabilise prices and for the western markets and replace EU dependence on oil sourced from Iran. Control of Libyan and Iraqi oil not only provided the strategic logic for the recent wars in these two nations, but also presents a convincing argument to answer one of the critical elements for a possible war in Iran. It is therefore hardly any surprise that Libya today globally exports 1.4 mbl / day and Iraq 2 mbl / day of which 20 per cent goes to the EU which amounts to 6,80,000 bl / day against 4,30,000 bl / day that was coming from Iran (all figures in this section sourced from Global Trade Atlas and Energy Information Administration, USA). So as far as energy security is concerned, a war in Iran will raise not only anxiety levels amongst the eastern economies, but will rack these markets through another oil shock The USA has long-standing comprehensive sanctions in place on Iran. Since 1980 the US has imposed successive rounds of sanctions, citing what it says is Iran’s support for international terrorism, human rights violations and refusals to co-operate with the IAEA. The US sanctions prohibit almost all trade with Iran, making some exceptions only for humanitarian activity. In late November 2011 the US, UK and Canada announced more bilateral sanctions on Iran, in reaction to an IAEA report which suggested Iran’s nuclear programme may have a military purpose. The US expanded sanctions to target companies that aid Iran’s oil and petrochemical industries. Other countries including Switzerland, Japan, Australia and Canada have also imposed bilateral sanctions on Iran in recent years in response to Iran’s lack of co-operation with the IAEA. A US law signed on 31 December 2011, imposed new sanctions on financial institutions dealing with Iran’s central bank. The law is intended to hamper Tehran’s ability to sell oil abroad. A fall in Iran’s oil exports would not only have a big impact on the Iranian economy but its fall out could drive up the global oil price and harm global economies. The EU’s ban of 23 January on imports of Iranian crude oil, is expected to have a more significant impact on the economy of the Islamic Republic, because the EU currently buys about a fifth of Iran’s oil exports. Japan and South Korea, which together account for 26 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, are non-committal as yet. The sanctions are designed to bring the Iranian economy to its knees. The grim realities of its effects are there for all to see as the Rial has dropped close to 70 per cent against the US dollar in recent months. Russia has rejected any further sanctions against Iran. China and India have indicated that they do not intend to curb Iranian oil imports. Turkey, too, has signalled that it will not adopt any oil embargo.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Impact of sanctions on energy security In order that the perspective is not lost sight of, the reader must come to grips with what universal sanctions will mean to the world particularly in the oil sector and how its denial will influence global energy security in general terms with specific reference to the Indian situation. Table 1 below makes a graphic statement of Iran’s oil export destinations. When viewed against the total world consumption of 86 million barrels / day (mbl / day), Iran’s exports amount to about 2.5 per cent of global needs. However this does not give a wholesome picture of the situation. The largest consumer of oil, the USA, which accounts for over 25 per cent of global consumption does not import any oil from Iran; and as far as the EU is concerned, 20 per cent of Iran’s exports is destined to European consumers of which close to 15 per cent goes to the weaker economies of Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey for whom alternative sources are being put in place. The graphic, then, makes it amply clear that it will be the eastern economies that will be sorely hit by a denial regime.

India is the world’s 4th largest oil consumer at 3.5 mbl / day, which represents 4 per cent of global use and the amount that it imports from Iran is 3,44,640 bls / day against a total import of 3 mbls / day which approximates 11.5 per cent (all statistics in this section are sourced from the US Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics). Given these figures any disruption in supply or attempt to find alternative sources will have serious adverse impact on an already strenuous economic growth to the extent of one to two per centage points (writer’s estimate). The other economies that are likely to take the brunt of denial are China, Japan and South Korea. In the end analysis, restoration of oil supplies from Libya and Iraq and controlled ramping up of Saudi oil production serves to stabilise prices and for the western markets and replace EU dependence on oil sourced from Iran. Control of Libyan and Iraqi oil not only provided the strategic logic for the recent wars in these two nations, but also presents a convincing argument to answer one of the critical elements for a possible war in Iran. It is therefore hardly any surprise that Libya today globally exports 1.4 mbl /day and Iraq 2 mbl / day of which 20 per cent goes to the EU which amounts to 6,80,000 bl / day against 4,30,000 bl / day that was coming from Iran (all figures in this section sourced from Global Trade Atlas and Energy

Information Administration, USA). So as far as energy security is concerned, a war in Iran will raise not only anxiety levels amongst the eastern economies, but will rack these markets through another oil shock.

The case for asymmetric warfare Iranian maritime capabilities particularly to wage asymmetric warfare have, apparently, improved considerably since the tanker war of the 1980s. But it is clear that the impending conflict will have little semblance to the 80s when the scope and intensity were limited. “Asymmetric” warfare essentially refers to the way a weaker adversary can attempt to counter a much stronger military player by adopting a variety of tactics and weapons systems to create an alternative to a simple head-to-head contest. In the broadest sense of the word it entails a ‘Denial Strategy’ pitted against a ‘Control Strategy’.

The UN ratified four rounds of sanctions against Iran between 2006 and 2010. These sanctions include a ban on the supply of heavy weaponry and nuclear-related technology to Iran, a block on Iranian arms exports and an asset freeze on key individuals and companies. Resolution 1929, passed in 2010, mandates cargo inspections to detect and stop Iran's acquisition of illicit materials. The European Union (EU) has imposed its own restrictions on trade in equipment which could be used for uranium enrichment and has put in place an asset freeze on a list of 39 individuals and 141 companies and organisations which it believes are helping advance the country's nuclear programme. On 23 January 2012, EU approved a ban on imports of Iranian crude oil, a freeze of assets belonging to the Central Bank of Iran and a ban on all trade in gold and other precious metals with the bank and other public bodies. Iran and especially the naval elements of its Revolutionary Guard Corps, have sought to develop a unique denial naval force based largely upon flotillas of fast, attack crafts backed up by a variety of crafts capable of laying mines, conventional and midget submarines. These are supported by shore-based anti-shipping missiles, aircraft, rockets and artillery all with rudimentary command and control. The theoretical problem with asymmetricity in the Iranian context is that it draws inspiration from guerrilla land warfare doctrines which in the maritime domain translates to an inability to

go beneath the surveillance blanket or threaten versatile command and control structures; counter precision strikes and fatally so, to break through enveloping manoeuvres.

The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz The Persian Gulf is a 600 mile water body that flows into the Arabian Sea through the Strait of Hormuz, it splits the Arabian Peninsula from Iran (see Map 1).

Map 1: Strait of Hormuz Source: www.bbc.co/news 10 January 2012

Whether Iran has the political sagacity to cope with the current situation without giving opportunity for the US to take recourse to arms is a moot question, for if it does not it goes the Libya-Iraq way. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical maritime chokepoints of the contemporary global energy system. Through its narrows (less than 34 miles) close to 18 mbl of oil, a fifth of global consumption, courses through every day along two, 2 mile wide shipping lanes carried onboard 5,800 hulls (approx) annually (all figures sourced from Energy Information Administration, USA). The north and eastern side of the strait is dominated by

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

military pre-emption

the Iranian coastline while the southern side by Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Traffic density is high and well regulated, the waters are shallow and do not favour submarine operations and the constricted nature of the seaway does not support large scale stealth operations or large force manoeuvres. The Gulf nations produce nearly 30 per cent of global oil while sitting on 57 per cent of the world’s crude reserves. It is also the repository of 45 per cent of proven world gas reserves.

Iran and especially the naval elements of its Revolutionary Guard Corps, has sought to develop a unique denial naval force based largely upon flotillas of fast, attack crafts backed up by a variety of crafts capable of laying mines, conventional and midget submarines. These are supported by shorebased anti-shipping missiles, aircraft, rockets and artillery all with rudimentary command and control

Closing the Gulf Three issues have to be addressed when assessing Iran’s ability to close the Gulf as threatened periodically. The first of these is the attitude of global shipping to disruptions; operations. The second issue is Iran’s military potential to fulfil the task; as mentioned earlier neither are they equipped materially nor technologically for any sustained denial operations when up against US and coalition forces. What they could achieve is disruption through low level sporadic attacks on shipping and facilities in an effort to put pressure on the other Gulf states. Even this will have to be weighed against the probability of a massive US led conventional retaliation that would quickly neutralise their war waging capacity and cripple their economy. The third and most significant issue is that not only have the sanctions begun to bite and erode resolve, but also that Iran is itself acutely dependent on oil revenues.

The end analysis will suggest that Iran’s ability to close the Strait of Hormuz is hardly a foregone conclusion (despite Vice President Rahimi's most recent declaration that “not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait” as quoted by IRNA on 27 December 2011), particularly so in the light of the mounting US presence in theatre. In addition any step taken by Iran to disrupt energy flow will have crippling military and economic consequences. Under the circumstances the question really is, is Iran willing to commit economic, military and political harakiri? And what of the strategy of despair: terror? Given the strategic situation, this too would invite disproportionate retaliation as indeed Iran would have noted the devastation caused in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran’s nuclear programme The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has declared that medium-level uranium enrichment had begun at the Fordo plant near Qom in northern Iran. In reply Tehran has said it plans to carry out uranium enrichment there for purely peaceful purposes. The West argues Iran is building a nuclear weapons capacity. In November 2011 the IAEA released its latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme, suggesting that Iran is secretly working to obtain a nuclear weapon. Iran has dismissed the claim. The IAEA has long expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear programme, but its latest report lays out the case in much greater detail than before. Drawing on evidence provided by more than 10 member states as well as its own information, the IAEA said Iran had carried out activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”. The report documents alleged Iranian testing of explosives, experiments on detonating a nuclear weapon and work on weaponisation. While the west is convinced of the veracity of these reports,

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

there remains the absence of a ‘smoking gun’. Notwithstanding, Iran undoubtedly would have noted the West’s approach to Saddam and Gaddafi as opposed to Kim Jong Il and it is reasonable to assume that they would have come to the conclusion that it was the North Korean nuclear arsenal that made the difference. From this perspective it makes strategic logic for Iran to do nothing to change the West’s belief that they are very close to weaponising if not already in possession of a small nuclear arsenal.

Conclusion A war has begun in Iran. Its nature is as never witnessed before; a combination of covert action, economic sanctions, political isolation and the threat of military pre-emption have not just crippled the Iranian economy but have checkmated Iran’s war waging potential. The threat of unleashing an asymmetric conflict is more pressure tactics than a credible denial strategy and yet Solzhenitzin’s words in his book August 1914 ring a sinister warning that “in war it is often small outcomes that determines the course of history”. Clearly the invasion of Iraq and the war in Libya are elements of a grand scheme for eventual control regulation of the energy resources of the Gulf region. The only obstacle to this design is Iran’s (eroding?) resolve and its nuclear programme which seemingly provides the present regimen with the solitary lifeline for survival. Whether Iran has the political sagacity to cope with the current situation without giving opportunity for the US to take recourse to arms is a moot question, for if it does not it goes the Libya-Iraq way. In the meantime nations like India must cultivate alternate energy sources in preparation for the contingency when its energy lines from Iran are severely disrupted.

Iran conundrum

Dr Arvind Gupta The writer is the Director General, IDSA, New Delhi. The views expressed in this article are personal.

Iran will be crucial to any settlement of the Afghan conflict. A large number of Afghan refugees are still living in Iran. The western regions of Afghanistan are linked with Iran. The Afghan government tries to maintain good relations with Iran despite the former's overwhelming dependence on the West for survival

BALANCING ACT India Iran relations took a turn for the worse when India voted against Iran at the IAEA in 2005, 2006 and 2009. Eventually, Iran was referred to the UN security council which resulted in imposition of UN sanctions on it. Iran has also been apprehensive of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Iran feels that India has jettisoned its independent foreign policy by siding with the US against Iran. In Iran’s perception, the lack of progress in the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is due to the US pressure on India. Iran will be crucial to any settlement of the Afghan conflict. In the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, India and Iran must maintain close relationship. This will require India to balance its relations with Iran on the one hand and the US, Israel and the Gulf countries on the other. India’s Finance Minister has stated that India will not stop buying oil from Iran. This should reassure Iran.

he latest round of tensions between Iran and the US began when on January 3, 2012, the US announced new sanctions on Iran aimed at preventing Iran’s oil exports. Iran retaliated by warning that it would close the straits of Hormuz through which the oil from the Persian Gulf passes. Statements emanating from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard commanders suggested that the Iranians will prevent the return of US aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf. The US Secretary of Defence said that Iranian action to prevent the passage of US aircraft will be regarded as a red line requiring a response. A military conflict in the Persian Gulf will have direct and immediate impact on the global oil prices. Iran’s location at the Straits of Hormuz on the Persian Gulf makes it critical to the safety and security of the sea lanes. Turbulent times lie ahead. The European Union has announced that it would not buy oil from Iran from 1st July onwards. The Iranians have retaliated saying that they would close the straits of Hormuz in retaliation. Europeans feel that oil embargo of Iran will not affect the oil prices significantly as there is enough oil in the world. The latest episode only highlights the fact that Iran is central to global and regional security. Iran is situated at the intersection of five volatile regions namely the Persian Gulf, West Asia, the Caucasus, Eurasia and South Asia. It influences the developments in these regions.

Iran’s vast hydrocarbon and natural gas reserves make it indispensable to global energy supplies and oil markets. According to National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Iran’s oil and gas reserves in 2005 amounted to 10 per cent of world’s total recoverable liquid hydrocarbon reserves (137 billion barrels)

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran’s Foreign Policy

and its Impact on India-Iran Relations

and 15 per cent of world’s total recoverable gas reserves (28 trillion cubic meters). According to the Company, Iran’s production capacity is about 4 million barrels per day @ US$ 5 per barrel extraction cost. The latest episode only highlights the fact that Iran is central to global and regional security. Iran is situated at the intersection of five volatile regions namely the Persian Gulf, West Asia, the Caucasus, Eurasia and South Asia. It influences the developments in these regions The Persian civilisation is one of the oldest civilisations. Iran’s approach to the world affairs is conditioned not only by its geo-strategic location but by also its culture. Culture plays an important role in determining its global outlook. Iran is also a prominent Shia country. This religious factor is critical to the antagonism between the Shia Iran and the Sunni Arab world which has significant Shia minorities. One of the most important tasks before Iran is to pursue an independent foreign policy weathering the sanctions. After the Islamic revolution in 1980, Iran’s relations with the US have deteriorated. This is one of the central factors in global and regional security. A key plank of Iran’s foreign policy is its vehement opposition to the US military presence and dominance in the region surrounding Iran. The US has a permanent naval base in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, its troops are present in Afghanistan and until recently were also in Iraq. The US has military presence in Kyrgyzstan and is in search of bases in Uzbekistan. Although Iran denies pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme,

the international community is not convinced. Iran has come under several UN, US and western sanctions on account of its nuclear programme. Iran says it is only pursuing a peaceful nuclear energy programme and is not in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Ironically, Iran has been the unintended beneficiary of US policies despite the antagonism between the two countries. The US military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 removed Saddam Hussein and the Taliban from Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. As a result of these developments,

Iran’s influence in the region has grown. The end of US military presence in Iraq and the impending troop drawdown and eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan will help raise Iran’s regional profile further. The turmoil in the Sunni West Asia – the so called Arab Spring - has also benefited Iran to some extent. The Shia populations in the Gulf countries are looking to Iran for help in their fight against oppressive regimes. The rise of Iran and the Shia influence in the region has caused anxiety and worry in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, the leading country in the Persian Gulf and the leader in the Arab world is extremely worried

at the rising influence of Iran in the region.

India Iran relations took a turn for the worse when India voted against Iran at the IAEA in 2005, 2006 and 2009. Eventually, Iran was referred to the UN security council which resulted in imposition of UN sanctions on it. Iran has also been apprehensive of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Iran feels that India has jettisoned its independent foreign policy by siding with the US against Iran. In Iran’s perception, the lack of progress in the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is due to the US pressure on India

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

BALANCING ACT

Iran has played its cards well. It is confident that it will survive the negative impact of the sanctions although that claim will be tested when oil sanctions come in force. It has maintained good relations with China, the rising super power and Russia. Both Russia and China have commonality of interest in opposing US domination in the region. Russia, despite the pressure on Iran due to its nuclear weapons, has helped Iran build a nuclear reactor. It has promised Iran to build more reactors. Russia has warned against military attack on Iran and opposed economic suffocation of Iran. Similarly, China has also been muted in its criticism of Iran. China has a flourishing relationship with Iran, particularly in the hydrocarbons exploration sector. China has invested big sums in Iran’s oil and gas sectors. Iran has also been a part of several regional initiatives like the ECO. It is an observer member of the SCO. Central Asian counties look to Iran for access to the Persian Gulf.

Culture plays an important role in determining its global outlook. Iran is also a prominent Shia country. This religious factor is critical to the antagonism between the Shia Iran and the Sunni Arab world which has significant Shia minorities Iran is focusing on building rail and road connectivity with Central Asia. It is upgrading the ports of Bandar Abbas, Chabahar and building several north-south rail and road connections. These connections will make Iran a major transit country for trade between Eurasia and the rest of the world. The ambitious International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) passes through Iran. The corridor will provide the much needed access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan and Afghanistan. The INSTC will also link up with East-West transport corridor in Central Asia.

Iran’s support to Hezbollah and Hamas is a major factor in the Middle East developments. Iran has extended its support to the embattled Bashar Al Assad regime in Syria. In the Caucasus, Iran has maintained good relations with the Christian Armenia and helped it survive the Turkish and Azerbaijani pressures on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the Caspian sea region Iran is a major power. The demarcation of the resource rich Caspian Sea cannot take place without Iran’s concurrence. Iran will be crucial to any settlement of the Afghan conflict. A large number of Afghan refugees are still living in Iran. The western regions of Afghanistan are linked with Iran. The Afghan government tries to maintain good relations with Iran despite the former’s overwhelming dependence on the West for survival. Iran is totally opposed to US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. There have been reports that it might be clandestinely helping the Taliban although these reports have been denied by the Iranian authorities. The major challenge to Iran comes from Israel which has undeclared nuclear arsenal. Iran has sought to develop missiles which can reach Israel. Iran-Israel conflict can spur a war in the region.

India-Iran relations India Iran relations took a turn for the worse when India voted against Iran at the IAEA in 2005, 2006 and 2009. Eventually, Iran was referred to the UN security council which resulted in imposition of UN sanctions on it. Iran has also been apprehensive of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Iran feels that India has jettisoned its independent foreign policy by siding with the US against Iran. In Iran’s perception, the lack of progress in the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is due to the US pressure on India. Despite these problems, the two counties have sought to maintain working relations. Iranian president

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Ahmedinejad transited through India in 2008. India-Iran joint economic commission has been meeting regularly. Foreign office level dialogue has been held regularly. Ministerial level visits are common. Foreign ministers have been regularly visiting each others’ countries. India and Iran also exchange views on regional security issues including Afghanistan.

In the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, India and Iran must maintain close relationship. This will require India to balance its relations with Iran on the one hand and the US, Israel and the Gulf countries on the other. India’s Finance Minister has stated that India will not stop buying oil from Iran. This should reassure Iran India-Iran trade in 2010-11 was US$ 13,670 million. Iran is India’s 13th largest trading partner. India buys about 9 per cent of its imported oil, worth about US$ 12 billion annually, from Iran although in recent times there have been problems in payments due to the sanctions. Indian pilgrims go to Iran regularly and several thousand Iranian students study in India. Iran wants defence cooperation with India but not much progress has been made so far. For India Iran will remain important for access to Central Asia. India should invest in the modernisation of INSTC and Iran’s rail network. Indian companies should also take advantage of the investment opportunities in Iran. In the rapidly changing geopolitical environment, India and Iran must maintain close relationship. This will require India to balance its relations with Iran on the one hand and the US, Israel and the Gulf countries on the other. India’s Finance Minister has stated that India will not stop buying oil from Iran. This should reassure Iran. The Indian PM has indicated he will visit Iran. This will help stimulate Iran-India relations. India will need to follow a pragmatic, issue based foreign policy driven by its own national interests.

Iran conundrum

Vice Adm Arun Kumar Singh (retd) The writer is former Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakhapatnam. He was Director General of the Indian Coast Guard during the Tsunami of 2004 and Commander-in-Chief of the Tri-Service, Andaman and Nicobar Command. He is also a prolific writer on maritime, strategic and nuclear issues.

Even if the US Navy uses force to keep the Hormuz straits open, the conflict would soon result in western air and cruise missile strikes on Iranian ports, airfields, coastal missile batteries and other military installations, along with "nuclear weapon building facilites". This conflict will take weeks to open the Hormuz straits and of course would end only when a suitable "regime change" takes place in Tehran. India needs to expedite its oil and gas reserves, "operationalise" the Kudankulam civil nuclear reactors and have contingency plans to evacuate Indian expatriates from the Middle East

CAPRICIOUS MINDSET

The Iran-USA standoff on the Iranian threat to close the Hormuz straits, has serious implications for India, as it imports 70 per cent of its oil and gas from the Middles East, on ships transiting the Hormuz straits. The EU decision to ban oil imports from Iran wef July 2012 and Israel's decision to give the USA only 12 hours notice of any strike on Iran'snuclear facilities, both announced on 23 January 2012, have further aggravated tensions.

ome recent events have perhaps not got the importance they deserve, possibly due to the Indian nation’s fixation with scams, polls and cricket tour of Australia. Some of these are: The study by an American University team, that China possibly possessed 3,000 nuclear weapons. The decision by Seychelles to permit Chinese Navy ships to dock in port for refuelling and rest and recreation. Japan’s decision equipment.

export

military

After the NATO inspired and aided violent “Regime change” in oil rich Libya, it appears that its now the turn of oil and gas rich Iran. The Iran-USA standoff on the Iranian threat to close the Hormuz straits, has serious implications for India, as it imports 70 per cent of its oil and gas from the Middles East, on ships transiting the Hormuz straits. The EU decision to ban oil imports from Iran wef July 2012 and Israel’s decision to give the USA only 12 hours notice of any strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, both announced on 23 January 2012, have further aggravated tensions. No one has asked the question whether the apparent “thaw” in Indo-Pak relations is a tactical move by Pakistan’s Army to enable it to focus on its problems with the Americans and also Afghanistan. The reported move by USA and UK (presently being voiced by some western strategic analysts), to find a way “to seperate Baluchistan” from Pakistan, needs to be studied carefully, as it will be interesting to see how a “repeat Libya” type operation would be conducted by the West against a nuclear armed Pakistan, supported by its neighbouring “all weather friend” nuclear armed China. The American study on Chinese nuclear weapons, even if “33 per cent correct” will mean that China will have atleast 1,000 nuclear

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

A peep at the Asian Crystal Ball in 2012

weapons as against the earlier estimate of 240. This study indicates the complete lack of intelligence and attention available to India with regard to China. It also means that we need to relook at our nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear doctrine. Similarly, the offer by Seychelles to “invite” Chinese Navy warships to dock at its ports, indicates a failure of Indian diplomacy and intelligence in its own backyard. I have been to Seychelles and always considered it as “pro-India” just like Mauritius and wonder why this turn around in attitude has taken place. Similar is the case of China setting up its embassy in “pro-India” Maldives. With Chinese warships soon using Gwadar port (funded and built by China for Pakistan), Hambantota port (funded and built by China for Sri Lanka) and new sea terminals at Chittagong port (funded and built by China for Bangladesh), its only a matter of time before the Indian Ocean becomes a “Chinese lake” and the Indian Navy, loses its slight technological edge over its Chinese counterpart.

The American study on Chinese nuclear weapons, even if "33 per cent correct" will mean that China will have atleast 1,000 nuclear weapons as against the earlier estimate of 240. This study indicates the complete lack of intelligence and attention available to India with regard to China. It also means that we need to relook at our nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear doctrine. Similarly, the offer by Seychelles to "invite" Chinese Navy warships to dock at its ports, indicates a failure of Indian diplomacy and intelligence in its own backyard Only a handful of Indians (even fewer in the military and intelligence agencies) speak and write Mandarin. There is an urgent requirement to have Mandarin taught in schools and also to have a “National China Institute” (NCI) . Selected Indian diplomats, intelligence and military personnel, should be trained at this proposed NCI, to study Mandarin and also to focus completely on China, so as to provide the national leadership with credible inputs on China’s

economy, military, intelligence and diplomatic endeavours, so that India can protect its national interests, without being perpetually surprised. Later, this “NCI” could be made a part of the much delayed NDU (National Defence University).

Only a handful of Indians (even fewer in the military and intelligence agencies) speak and write Mandarin. There is an urgent requirement to have Mandarin taught in schools and also to have a "National China Institute" (NCI). Selected Indian diplomats, intelligence and military personnel, should be trained at this proposed NCI, to study Mandarin and also to focus completely on China

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Japan’s recent decision to permit export of defence equipment, should present a great opportunity to Indian shipbuilding yards, to learn the latest techniques of building warships, submarines and Coast Guard vessels. I have been to Japanese shipyards and onboard Japanese warships, submarines and Coast Guard ships and can vouch for their excellent shipbuilding capabilities. Indian shipyards (public and private) could gain immensely by inducting modern Japanese shipbuilding technology and this could be the forerunner of “strategic Indo-Japanese Maritime Co-operation”.

There are dozens of autocratic regimes in the world, but somehow, the West decides to do "regime change" only in oil rich nations like Libya and now possibly Iran. Since Iran (unlike North Korea and Pakistan) presently does not have nuclear weapons, it can only threaten to block the straits of Hormuz. Any such action will result in a global economic meltdown, with countries like India suffering the most, since our strategic oil reserves are a little over 15 to 20 days, as against the prudent level of 90 to 180 days. There are dozens of autocratic regimes in the world, but somehow, the West decides to do “regime change” only in oil rich nations like Libya and now possibly Iran. Since Iran (unlike North Korea and Pakistan) presently does not have nuclear weapons, it can only threaten to block the straits of Hormuz. Any such action will result in a global economic meltdown, with countries like India suffering the most, since our strategic oil reserves are a little over 15 to 20 days, as against the prudent level of 90 to 180 days. Even if the US Navy uses force to keep the Hormuz straits open, the conflict would soon result in western air and cruise missile strikes on Iranian ports, airfields, coastal missile batteries and other military installations, along with “nuclear weapon building facilites”. This conflict will take weeks to open the Hormuz straits and of course would end only when a suitable “regime change” takes place in Tehran. India needs to expedite its

Iran conundrum

CAPRICIOUS MINDSET oil and gas reserves, “operationalise” the Kudankulam civil nuclear reactors and have contingency plans to evacuate Indian expatriates from the Middle East. If the current “thaw” in Indo-Pak relations is a strategic decision taken by the Pakistan Army, than it bodes well for peace in the sub-continent. However, given the January 2012 discovery in Delhi of Rs six crore fake Indian currency (printed by the ISI in Karachi) India must be prepared for the more likely reality, that GHQ Rawalpindi, has initiated a tactical move, to “buy some time” on its eastern border with India, while it focuses on its problems with USA and Afghanistan. A real indicator of Pakistani peaceful intentions will come if it dismantles the terror camps on its soil, reduces its massive nuclear weapons cum missile programme and gives MFN status to India. Here too India must keep its ‘powder dry’ and believe in the maxim ‘trust but verify’. Here the long delayed Army modernisation and a need to modify India’s ‘no first use’ nuclear policy needs to be reviewed by a transparent team of strategic experts. We now come to Baluchistan, which was annexed by the British in the mid nineteenth century and then, ‘seperated from Oman’ and handed over to “strategic located” Pakistan just some 50 years ago. Now that Pakisan has become an international migraine, reports are coming in the media of a need to create a “Free Baluchistan” as a buffer between Afghanistan and Pakistan (thus allowing logistic support to NATO forces in Afghanistan, via Gwadar port), while also acting as buffer between Iran and Pakistan. In addition, the proposed new state could permit Central Asian oil and gas to be exported via Gwadar port. A free Baluchistan, geostrategically located (Gwadar port is only 360 nautical miles from the straits of Hormuz) would, in theory, be “good” for international seaborne energy commerce. While, in 1971, India created Bangladesh out of East Pakistan in 14 days of “lightening war”, the situation in nuclear armed Pakistan is complex and its doubtful, if China would permit such an adventure by NATO in its backyard.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

REGIONAL INSTABILITY

India, which is likely to remain neutral in such an eventuality, needs to have contingency plans ready and be prepared to deal with nuclear threats from Pakistan along with the possibility of millions of refugees coming here, in case NATO launches a “free Baluchistan” operation on the Libya model.

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

GHQ Rawalpindi, has initiated a tactical move, to "buy some time" on its eastern border with India, while it focuses on its problems with USA and Afghanistan. A real indicator of Pakistani peaceful intentions will come if it dismantles the terror camps on its soil, reduces its massive nuclear weapons cum missile programme and gives MFN status to India To add to the woes of India’s dormant diplomacy, continued appeasement of China and ostrich like attitude to taking any strategic decisions, is the ongoing lack of governance, economic slowdown (the GDP may now grow at 7.8 per cent) and the inability of the Indian Army to convince the government about the urgent need to modernise its infantry, artillery and raise additional troops to face China. All this, while the Indian Navy, Coast Guard and Indian Air Force are modernising at some pace. The Indian Navy, will need to quadruple its budget and double its blue water capability, if we are to protect our legitimate national interests in the “Indo-Pacific Region”. The recent induction of the Akula class SSN from Russia, is not enough, as we need a dozen such platforms, along with six improved Arihant type SSBNs. Another recent report listing the world’s think tanks, shows that no Indian think tank is in the list. This is a re-confirmation of the global perception that India lacks strategic culture and vision. If India’s decision makers fail to look at the crystal ball and take timely strategic decisions, then, we may become victims of the ensuing instabilty in a nuclear armed and terrorist infested region of the globe.

The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed in this article are personal.

Crisis over Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Implications for India

While the on-going stand-off will not result in a major breakdown in Indo-US ties, it will dampen India’s enthusiasm for greater depth and sustained cooperation in the nascent strategic partnership. It will also have a debilitating impact on India’s civil nuclear energy programme, which cannot flourish without advanced Western nuclear reactor technology and safeguarded nuclear fuel. It will further increase India’s dependence on fossil fuels for sustained economic growth and force India into forging an energy security partnership with Iran on Iranian terms. The latter course of action is neither in Indian interests nor in US interests

Iran conundrum

REGIONAL INSTABILITY

ndia and China have stayed away from the new economic sanctions imposed unilaterally by the United States on Iran and have come in for some sharp criticism, particularly from US Congressmen. This has been continuing for some time now. Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, had said a few years ago: “We are unhappy with the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India US$ 7 billion gas pipeline project … There could be consequences for countries investing in Iran.” Earlier, the then Ambassador Mulford had voiced his reservations about the Indo-US Nuclear Deal being approved by the US Congress if India did not vote to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. And, Congressman Tom Lantos has always been very vocal in expressing his misgivings about India’s limited support for Iran.

India cannot wish away the crippling impact that economic sanctions and, even worse, military strikes on Iran will have on its energy security and its trade in the region. In the ultimate analysis, India’s interests lie in the diplomatic resolution of the crisis Diplomatic arm-twisting on the Iranian nuclear crisis is continuing to undermine the strategic partnership between India and the United States (US). No single issue has posed as much of a foreign policy challenge for the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in India like the on-going Iranian nuclear imbroglio. In a September 2005 IAEA vote, India had voted to hold Iran in “non-compliance” of its safeguards obligations to the IAEA even though China, Russia and Pakistan abstained. Again, in a February 2006 IAEA vote, India had voted in favour of referring Iran to the UN Security Council, as India is apprehensive that Iran’s growing uranium enrichment capability may eventually lead to the development of nuclear weapons. The stand against Iran helped to bolster India’s case for the passage of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement through the US Congress. However, it was seen domestically as a meek surrender of India’s strategic autonomy for uncertain future gains and as a move that undermined, even jettisoned, India’s half-century old policy of non-alignment. It was also viewed as being detrimental to India’s long-standing friendship with Iran and, as a corollary, harmful for India’s energy security, as India is heavily dependent on Iran for its oil and natural gas imports.

Nuclear instability in the region While the Iranian government has categorically ruled out any intentions of acquiring nuclear weapons, India is concerned that the acquisition of uranium enrichment capability may create the propensity to develop nuclear warheads. Indian policy makers and analysts have been largely apprehensive of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists who may use these as weapons of terrorism. As a hard-line nationalist regime has been ruling Iran for over two decades, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will add to regional instability in an already unstable neighbourhood, particularly when viewed in the light of

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

the on-going conflict in Iraq that faces the prospects of a civil war and Afghanistan that has seen the resurgence of the Taliban. Saudi Arabia may also opt to acquire its own nuclear weapons and other neighbours may seek nuclear guarantees from the US and even Israel. The long history of conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan and the uneasy thaw between India and China are also causes for strategic instability in the region. An unstable regional security environment hampers growth and economic development as overseas investors shy away from investing in the region. Iran has obtained uranium enrichment technology by clandestine means from Pakistan through Dr A Q Khan and may, in turn, pass on this technology to terrorist groups either as a state policy or through lax procedures that may be exploited by scientists with fundamentalist leanings. Also, an Iran-Pakistan nexus cannot be ruled out in future even though their present relations are lukewarm. Iran’s nuclear programme is following the same pattern as that of Pakistan and the possibility that Iran may acquire nuclear weapons in future cannot be ruled out. Iran also has an advanced ballistic missile development programme with the Shahab-3 IRBM capable of striking targets in western India. Together these two programmes are capable of giving Iran a robust nuclear weapons delivery capability. On account of national security considerations alone India’s opposition to Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, which violates Iran’s treaty and safeguards obligations, is absolutely justified.

The best way to ensure that Iran is never tempted to make nuclear weapons will be to address its security concerns and accommodate it as a major regional actor that is now showing increasing willingness to play a more responsible role in international affairs. There is no reason for India to abandon its traditional friendship with Iran and endanger its energy security

Impact on India’s relations with Iran During the regime of the Shah of Iran, India’s perception of Iran was that of an alliance partner of the US and Pakistan. Post-1979, the two countries crafted a warmer relationship that laid the foundation for renewed bilateral cooperation on the basis of mutuality of interests. In the past Iran has taken helpful positions on Kashmir in the Organisation of Islamic Conference meetings despite Pakistan’s extensive sabre rattling. More recently, Iran helped India in providing assistance to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban before the US-led coalition finally overthrew the oppressive regime. In 2004, Iran offered India a road link to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port, a North-South corridor for access to Central Asia and Russia and long-term cooperation in the field of hydrocarbon energy. India has a rapidly growing appetite for hydrocarbons to sustain its eight per cent per annum growth rate

and Iran is one of India’s leading suppliers. Currently India imports over 70 per cent of its requirement of oil and natural gas. This is expected to double by 2020. India’s energy relations with Iran extend far beyond the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. In June 2005, the two countries signed a 25-year deal, potentially worth up to US$ 22 billion, under which India would obtain five million tons a year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran. In connection with this deal, Iran granted development rights to India in two Iranian oil fields that are potentially capable of generating 60,000 barrels per day in production. In another deal, Iran awarded India development rights to a block in the North Pars gas field, but this has not yet fructified. Both countries have also pledged to explore joint investment projects in petrochemicals. All of these deals are now beset by uncertainty. Iran has already reneged on the previously contracted price for natural gas and is now demanding commercial rates. Though the US is no longer actively opposing the IPI pipeline, India’s negotiations with Iran and Pakistan are stalled.

The majority in India perceives Iran as a non-hostile Muslim country with which India can do business. However, most Indians are unfavourably disposed towards the present hardline regime and are in favour of greater restraint on the part of Iran However, it is sometimes forgotten that Iran has been an unreliable energy partner for India. In the 1960s, India had joined a consortium led by Amoco to produce oil from the Rostam and Raksh oil fields in Iran. When Islamist hardliners came to power, they nationalised these and gave India a pittance as compensation. Also, the wisdom of depending on gas pipelines running through Pakistan has been questioned by many Indian analysts on account of the likelihood of their frequent disruption by Jihadi elements in the north and the Baloch tribesmen in the south. Despite their obvious drawbacks, pipelines

from Iran and Turkmenistan are attractive lifelines for India’s energy security and India can ill afford to ignore these for long-term nuclear energy gains unless alternative sources can be tapped. It is hard to see what the alternative sources might be except more LNG terminals for liquefied gas from West Asia. The saving grace is that even though Iran is apparently dragging its feet at present, it is unlikely to use oil as a weapon and withhold supplies to India in case India continues to vote against it as that would be detrimental to Iran’s own commercial interests.

Impact on India’s relations with the US India and the United States signed a landmark Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s summit meeting with President George W Bush on July 18, 2005. The agreement accepts India as a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” and amounts to a tacit US recognition of India’s status as a de facto nuclear weapons state outside the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). As part of its obligations under the agreement, the US is expected to lift technology denial regimes imposed on India, thus opening up cooperation in the fields of nuclear energy, the transfer of defence and space technologies and the joint development of future weapons systems. After having been a nuclear pariah for over three decades, this agreement is seen in India as a major foreign policy success that will remove the remaining impediments to India’s economic development. On this count the Indian government has shown remarkable flexibility in accommodating US interests so that the deal’s passage through the US Congress can be hastened. While the on-going stand-off will not result in a major breakdown in Indo-US ties, it will dampen India’s enthusiasm for greater depth and sustained cooperation in the nascent strategic partnership. It will also have a debilitating impact on India’s civil nuclear

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

REGIONAL INSTABILITY

energy programme, which cannot flourish without advanced Western nuclear reactor technology and safeguarded nuclear fuel. It will further increase India’s dependence on fossil fuels for sustained economic growth and force India into forging an energy security partnership with Iran on Iranian terms. The latter course of action is neither in Indian interests nor in US interests.

In the past Iran has taken helpful positions on Kashmir in the Organisation of Islamic Conference meetings despite Pakistan’s extensive sabre rattling. More recently, Iran helped India in providing assistance to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban before the US-led coalition finally overthrew the oppressive regime. In 2004, Iran offered India a road link to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port, a North-South corridor for access to Central Asia and Russia and long-term cooperation in the field of hydrocarbon energy

Impact on domestic politics The Left parties (CPI and CPM) combine has been sharply critical of India’s opposition to Iran’s plans for uranium enrichment as the IAEA had found no evidence of any plans to assemble nuclear weapons. In their view the Indian government’s actions were taken under US pressure and signified “a departure from the government’s commitment to follow an independent foreign policy”. Since China and Russia came on board and voted with the US, criticism of the Left parties has been more muted. Similarly, the BJP has also been critical but only to score debating points at the time of elections to five state assemblies. Indian Muslims comprise almost 15 per cent of the country’s population and while they have never voted en bloc on issues concerning the community, the political parties seldom lose an opportunity to exploit their sentiments for narrow electoral gains. Former Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, pointing out the sensitivities of India’s 150 million Muslims, had said that a significant number of them are Shias. This raises the question whether India’s foreign policy is no more than an extension of domestic politics. The majority in India perceives Iran as a non-hostile Muslim country with which India can do business. However, most Indians are unfavourably disposed towards the present hard-line regime, are in favour of greater restraint on the part of Iran and are against the development of technological capabilities that will give Iran the ability to produce nuclear weapons in future. At the same time, most Indians are disinclined to allow the US and its allies to dictate terms to Iran. One Indian analyst has written: "By blackmailing India into voting against Iran, the US hopes to undermine Indo-Iranian economic relations to such an extent that New Delhi becomes a stakeholder in the drive for ‘regime change’ there." This is an extreme view that is not shared either by other Indian analysts or the Indian

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

government. In a suo motu statement in Parliament on February 17, 2006, the Indian Prime Minister emphasised the civilisational nature of India’s relations with Iran, the importance of cooperation on hydrocarbons for India’s energy security and the security implications of Iran’s clandestine uranium enrichment activities. The Prime Minister highlighted India’s security concerns arising from proliferation activities in India’s extended neighbourhood and favoured a solution based on compromises acceptable to Iran and the international community through diplomatic efforts aimed at seeking a consensus in the IAEA.

Conclusion No agreement will work in the long term if it does not recognise Iran’s right to produce or process its own nuclear fuel under mutually agreed IAEA safeguards. This is not only a key clause of the NPT but was conceded in the Paris agreement signed in November 2004 by the EU-3 and Iran. The best way to ensure that Iran is never tempted to make nuclear weapons will be to address its security concerns and accommodate it as a major regional actor that is now showing increasing willingness to play a more responsible role in international affairs. There is no reason for India to abandon its traditional friendship with Iran and endanger its energy security. However, India has made it abundantly clear that it stands for Iran respecting its treaty obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards and giving up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. India must balance the concerns of the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions with the advantages of close ties that are in India’s interests.

Diplomatic arm-twisting on the Iranian nuclear crisis is continuing to undermine the strategic partnership between India and the United States (US). No single issue has posed as much of a foreign policy challenge for the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in India like the on-going Iranian nuclear imbroglio It is not clear whether the current Iranian regime would ultimately opt to be isolated from the international community but refuse to forego its option to develop nuclear weapons, or prefer to integrate Iran with the new world order on Western terms, that is, gain in economic and technological terms but lose the capacity to develop its own nuclear weapons. A civil nuclear energy programme that bestows enrichment capability on a state that is ruled by a hard-line nationalist regime and has been among the most active state sponsors of international terrorism, is a threat to peace and stability and must be curtailed or at least subjected to an intrusive safeguards regime. India has gone along with the international community in seeking such an arrangement. However, India cannot wish away the crippling impact that economic sanctions and, even worse, military strikes on Iran will have on its energy security and its trade in the region. In the ultimate analysis, India’s interests lie in the diplomatic resolution of the crisis.

DSA: Kindly tell our readers about ShinMaywa Industries? When was the company founded? What products do you have to offer the Indian Armed Forces? ShinMaywa: ShinMaywa Industries began its business operations as the Kawanishi Machinery Company about 90 years ago. The company later renamed as ShinMaywa Industries Ltd. (ShinMaywa means New Bright Harmony) expanded its business to include Passenger Boarding Bridges, Environmental Systems, Pumps, Direct Drive Motors and automated car parking systems. We now have customers in more than a 100 countries. We have overseas plants in five countries and last year we had sales of about US$ 1.3B. Our company philosophy is to contribute to the improvement of societies and our company prioritises the values of Safety, Quality, Schedule and Cost in all its operations. The Company has supplied 47 seaplanes to the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF). Its latest product is the US-2 which is operated by the JMSDF. We have offered the same US-2 to the Indian Navy. DSA: Would you like to share ShinMaywa vision for its India operations with us? ShinMaywa: ShinMaywa is a major supplier of Passenger Boarding Bridges and Wire Terminating machines to Indian customers. We have now responded to the Indian Navy’s RFI for amphibian aircraft. We also have regular inquiries for our other engineering products and environment systems. We are here in India for the long term. DSA: ShinMaywa Industries are contributing to the advancement of the aircraft industry by fusing traditional craftsmanship and leading-edge technology. How do you differentiate your technology from the others when it comes to making the finest amphibian aircraft? ShinMaywa: The STOL Technology based on BLC (Boundary Layer Control) which allows ultra-low speed operations and introduction of Spray Suppressor technology which enables operation in rough seas with waves of three meter high is unmatched. This permits least takeoff and landing distance whether on land or sea, the longest range, the highest payload and is the only aircraft in its class which is proven, in-service and certified / ruggedised for military specifications. Its radar system combines both weather and surface surveillance. For India, the US-2 uses the same class of engines that the C130J uses. I think we have a very good product for our global and strategic partner - India. I also see the US-2 as a very good vehicle to implement the vision of our two countries to build a solid partnership between India and Japan. This benefits a larger world community and would rightly fit into India’s growing responsibilities. DSA: Could you elaborate about the “amphibian aircraft” in greater detail? What is their usefulness in the Indian context? ShinMaywa: The US-2 is a vastly superior aircraft with fly-by-wire flight controls, glass cockpit with integrated instrument panels, pressurised cabin and new marinised AE 2100 J Rolls Royce engines with increased power. Its high performance capabilities and versatility enables the aircraft to be deployed for a wide spectrum of missions including – surveillance, MEDEVAC, remote islands and offshore platforms support and enhanced SAR capabilities, fleet logistic support and many others. Every day we hear that the aircraft can be given more missions because of its unique capabilities. These ultimately benefit society. This is an aircraft that meets not only Indian requirements but also provides a capability for regional deployments commensurate with global expectations from a rising power such as India. The US-2 is really the best option for safe seas and secure coasts for a better tomorrow. We are very happy and ready for joining DEFEXPO in New Delhi to introduce our amphibious aircraft US-2 to many people in India. DSA: What are your business expansion plans for the Indian market? Where do you see ShinMaywa Industries in India 10 years down the line? ShinMaywa: Ten years is not such a long time. Our focus is to first introduce the US-2 in the Indian Navy since we believe that this aircraft is really the best and second to none in its category. Our other products are also of unmatched quality and use very powerful modern technologies. We expect that the Indian market will accept our products for their high quality and high technology. Our intention is to be in India for the long term and we will expand our operations in a calibrated manner.

Iran conundrum

announcement

The First and the Only ISO 9001:2008 Certified Defence and Security Magazine in India

A N N O U N C E S

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

The Iran-Israel Intelligence War Dr Prem Mahadevan

March 2012 Issue on

The writer is Senior Researcher for Intelligence, Sub-state Conflict and Organised Crime at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, Switzerland. Between 2002 and 2009, he completed an undergraduate degree in War Studies and postgraduate and doctoral degrees in Intelligence Studies from King's College, London. He has written extensively on Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies and his articles on Indian counter-terrorism have been made recommended reading for military officers in North America and Western Europe.

TIBET:

CHINESE BRIDGEHEAD OR VULNERABILITY?

A useful analysis of Israel’s covert offensive against Iran‘s nuclear facilities and its likely consequences in terms of a regional conflict that could close the straits of Hormuz and cause major damage to our energy security and the economy per se. What is worse is that the Israeli covert methodologies used could inspire the ISI and its Jihadi cohorts to attack Indian nuclear facilities and scientists. That constitutes a very dangerous new scenario for which India must prepare its response options.

s tensions ratchet up over the Iranian nuclear programme, India has reasons to be worried. Any violent confrontation in the Persian Gulf has the potential to disrupt its energy supplies, upon which further economic growth is conditional. There is another dimension as well, not so extensively studied: a silent war between Iran and Israel, fought by intelligence agencies. The viciousness of this conflict can lend itself to emulation by India’s enemies. There have already been warnings that terrorist groups are scouting ‘strategic targets’ in India, including nuclear facilities. The residences of senior defence scientists have been surveyed for possible fidayeen attacks. Should the covert contest between Iran and Israel continue to escalate, the methods featured in it might be opportunistically replicated on the Indian subcontinent.

The Guards have roughly 2,000 mines with which to block commercial shipping in the Straits, although it is estimated that not more than 300 are actually needed for the purpose. Iran also has a large fleet of speedboats with which to mount guerrilla-style attacks on merchant vessels and is positioning missiles to hit the wealthy and crowded cities of the United Arab Emirates, just across the Strait. Unless tensions can be defused in the next few months, some kind of military action is likely

How it all began

SPENCERS BOOK SHOP CROSSWORD Available at allODYSSEY leading OMbookstores

LANDMARK LTD.

contact for subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online@dsalert.org

Concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme derive from an American-Israeli ‘intelligence panic’ – a sudden realisation that recent data on a critical issue is unavailable. Until the late 1990s, the US was confident in its ability to monitor Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

programmes in the developing world. Such complacency was shattered in May 1998, when a defecting Pakistani scientist revealed that his country was secretly selling nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. The revelation stunned US officials, who believed until then that the risk of nuclear proliferation was limited to theft from poorly-guarded installations in former Soviet Union republics. They had envisaged the worst-case scenario to be pilferage of a nuclear device by organised crime groups, who might sell the device on to terrorists. Little thought was given the possibility of governmental involvement in such enterprises.

There have already been warnings that terrorist groups are scouting ‘strategic targets’ in India, including nuclear facilities. The residences of senior defence scientists have been surveyed for possible fidayeen attacks. Should the covert contest between Iran and Israel continue to escalate, the methods featured in it might be opportunistically replicated on the Indian subcontinent The Pakistani scientist’s claims suggested that illicit trade in nuclear material could also occur among states. For five years thereafter, US intelligence agencies sat on the new information. They had already received inputs from India in the 1980s of a nuclear trafficking network run out of Islamabad by A Q Khan, but had disregarded these. Now an independent source appeared to confirm the existence of this network. Yet, the political mood in Washington was to wish away evidence of state involvement in illicit nuclear trade, particularly when it concerned countries with whom the US already had uneasy relations that needed to be handled with care. Not until 2003, when a chance interception triggered off an international investigation into the network, were US intelligence agencies confronted with reality: they were poorly informed about undeclared nuclear activities. Many of the states alleged to have done business with the network were signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The sincerity of their commitment to it now appeared doubtful.

At around the same time, Israel’s Mossad discovered that a uranium enrichment facility was operating near the Iranian town of Natanz. Although this site had been under surveillance since the mid-1990s, Mossad analysts had long been unable to ascertain the nature of research conducted there. The A Q Khan investigation abruptly revealed that the installation had secretly acquired centrifuges whose main purpose was to enrich uranium for possible military use. Once this information was verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concerns began to be voiced over Iran’s nuclear intentions. Over the next three years (2003-06), talks on the issue dragged on, with some analysts believing that Iran was stalling for time until it could develop a nuclear weapon. Mounting worries about Tehran’s nuclear policy stemmed from a growing appreciation of how difficult it was to track WMD programmes in hostile or ‘denied’ territory. American and Israeli intelligence agencies had already been wrong twice on the subject. In 1990 they underestimated the degree to which Iraqi WMD capabilities had developed and in 2003 they went to the opposite extreme and invented a non-existent threat. By 2006 Iran had begun taking advantage of the Iraq insurgency to position itself as a major power in the Persian Gulf region. Having developed a jaundiced view of Tehran since the 1980s, as a result of its consistent support for Shia militancy, neither Washington nor Tel Aviv was prepared to assume that Iran’s nuclear intentions would be benign. In February 2007, such doubts appeared to be partially justified. That month, US intelligence arranged the defection of a senior Iranian official, who had been closely connected with the nuclear programme. This official revealed that Iran, Syria and North Korea had set up a joint research project aimed at pooling nuclear technology and knowledge. Information that three countries hostile to Western interests were collaborating in nuclear proliferation raised fears about another A Q Khan-style trafficking operation. Having failed to react to past warnings about such activities, the US

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

could not afford to disregard the new information. For its part, Israel was extremely alarmed at the prospect of Syria acquiring a nuclear shield. Its intelligence agencies had had no information on this development. In mid-August, a reconnaissance mission by Israeli commandos verified that a secret nuclear reactor was operating in northern Syria. Three weeks later, on 6 September 2007, Israeli aircraft bombed the installation. According to photographs released by the US government in April 2008, the Syrians had been producing plutonium at the site - an activity that analysts interpreted as having a military purpose. Having grown convinced that a wave of nuclear proliferation was about to occur, the US and Israel now focused on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons status. With North Korea having already tested a nuclear device in 2006, time was not in favour of the non-proliferation regime unless intervention took place.

A prelude to conflict ` That intervention, it seems, has largely taken the form of an intelligence war. Mossad has long been suspected of assassinating WMD scientists in Arab states, in order to deny a nuclear shield to terrorist groups operating against Israeli borders. It is therefore, the prime suspect in a series of targeted killings that have caused severe disruption to the Iranian nuclear programme. So far, six scientists have been killed, with an attempt made against the life of a seventh. The assassinations have provoked a double-sided outcry in Iran. On the one hand, there is indignation that a foreign power can unilaterally assume the right to carry out extra-judicial killings of Iranian nationals. On the other, the Iranian government is blamed for being unable to protect its citizens. In the long term, these two trends are likely to fold into an even stronger and broad-based commitment to the nuclear programme. Whether the government intends to keep the programme peaceful or not might be irrelevant: public pressure will edge it towards either weaponisation or

at the least, threshold status. Such a state of affairs would be partly the Iranian regime’s own fault and partly the fault of Israeli intelligence.

With the European Union having announced an embargo on Iranian oil, effective 1st July 2012, Tehran has retaliated by declaring that it will immediately stop supplies to the EU. The Revolutionary Guards are meanwhile, bracing for a military confrontation in the Straits of Hormuz The Iranian regime, for its part, has constructed a perceptual wall between its citizens and the outside world, such that dialogue free of recriminations becomes difficult. With its name-calling rhetoric, it has vitiated the atmospherics of diplomatic engagement. On a more pragmatic level, its support for the Lebanese Shia militant group Hezbollah has kept alive old concerns about nuclear terrorism, however exaggerated these might be. Rather than a terrorist incident involving WMDs, what the Israelis fear is precisely the kind of problem that India already faces: increased belligerence from radical Islamist groups, protected by a nuclear-armed state patron. The combative posturing of the Iranian regime, while good for domestic politics, is only underscoring international concerns about its long-term gameplan. Israel on the other hand, has used methods that can only harden Iranian resolve. While some of its covert operations have been quite sophisticated (for instance: the 2010 release of a computer virus called Stuxnet into cyber-systems associated with the nuclear programme) others have been politically inflammatory. Besides the afore-mentioned killings, they include sabotage incidents at sensitive military sites. Since 2006, such incidents have claimed the lives of several dozen Iranian security personnel and placed the regime in a difficult position: now that the nuclear programme has its martyrs, it becomes politically difficult for the government to change course. For a population that strongly believes in self-sacrifice amidst overwhelming odds, it seems logical to push on in

the face of setbacks and intimidation. Paramilitary operations are likely to delay the Iranian nuclear programme, but they will also solidify the process by which Iran might push on to develop nuclear weapons. The 2011 Libyan Civil War can be seen by some regime hardliners as a sign of the perpetual vulnerability that comes with being a non-nuclear weapons state. Having dismantled his WMD programme, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi ended up being toppled by the West and killed by his own countrymen. In contrast, Kim Jong Il, who as a dictator was hardly more benevolent than his Libyan counterpart, died of old age and was mourned by his people as their ‘Dear Leader’. The difference: Kim hung on to his WMD programme. Even as it continues with its nuclear activities, Iran is seeking to neutralise Western leverage over its economy. With the European Union having announced an embargo on Iranian oil, effective 1 July 2012, Tehran has retaliated by declaring that it will immediately stop supplies to the EU. The Revolutionary Guards are meanwhile, bracing for a military confrontation in the Straits of Hormuz, whose defence is their responsibility. The Guards have roughly 2,000 mines with which to block commercial shipping in the Straits, although it is estimated that not more than 300 are actually needed for the purpose. Iran also has a large fleet of speedboats with which to mount guerrilla-style attacks on merchant vessels and is positioning missiles to hit the wealthy and crowded cities of the United Arab Emirates, just across the Strait. Unless tensions can be defused in the next few months, some kind of military action is likely.

Implications for India The secret war between Iran and Israel could impact India in two ways. First, it might drive up tensions in the Persian Gulf to such levels that oil supplies would be disrupted by naval clashes. Tehran already knows the region’s worst-kept secret: that opposition to its nuclear programme, while being spearheaded by the US and Israel, is quietly endorsed by its Arab neighbours. It has little reason to be concerned about the negative

impact that its actions could have on their economies and might even wish for a calibrated confrontation to punish them. Second, the methods used could make paramilitary covert action against nuclear assets fashionable for some rogue intelligence agencies in India’s neighbourhood. Many analysts would argue that this would not be a new development - terrorist threats to nuclear facilities, particularly the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) have been detected in the past, but nothing has happened. Still, there is no room for complacency. Indian intelligence agencies have already warned of the underlying logic behind terrorist plans to attack nuclear sites. The terrorists and their patrons wish to discredit the physical security arrangements surrounding India’s nuclear programme and generate international pressure for suspending nuclear trade with India. In the bestcase scenario, as far as India’s enemies are concerned, the country would be unable to consolidate its fledgling nuclear energy programme and would remain dependent on oil imports. This would greatly increase the strategic leverage of states that lie between Indian energy consumers and Central Asian suppliers. There are two such states: Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of these, the former is a friend of India, while the latter is known to be quite fond of covert paramilitary operations (besides being the original source of the Iranian nuclear programme in the first place). An attack on Indian scientists or nuclear installations, even if ostensibly carried out by non-state actors, would be a provocation of a greater magnitude to that so far faced by New Delhi. It would have strategic implications and require a policy response. With the Iran-Israel intelligence war showing that ‘wet’ operations and casualty-causing sabotage, like state-sponsored terrorism, remain a component of statecraft, India needs to prepare retaliatory plans if its strategic assets are attacked by a neighbour’s proxies. No amount of international pressure or political sentimentalism should be allowed to hold back the Indian response.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

INDIAN CONCERNS

CRISIS IN IRAN: IMPACT ON INDIA'S ENERGY SECURITY Dr Ahmad Reza Taheri The writer is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Iranshahr, Iran. He is an expert on Iran and Western Political Philosophy. He has published many books and contributed articles in academic periodicals.

An important article that presents the Iranian perspective on the crisis likely to emerge from Western economic sanctions. Iran exports 60 per cent of its crude oil to Asia; China alone imports 20 per cent of its crude oil from Iran .According to Iranian official reports, Iran's oil accounts for 16.6 per cent of India's crude oil imports. According to Indian official reports, India has imported about 22 million tons of crude oil valued at about US$ 10 billion in 2009-2010, which makes it the third largest market for Iranian crude. India exports diesel, refined oil, petroleum products and processed minerals to Iran. It is said that close to 40 per cent of the refined oil consumed by Iran is imported from India. The article is pessimistic that India is likely to buckle under Western pressure and shift its energy dependency almost entirely to the GCC countries.

In lessening or cutting relations with Iran, India has to deal with care, since this approach might create few divisions or confusions within the Republic of India, especially on the part of Muslim community. Thirdly, a safe Afghanistan matters a lot to the Indian national interest. India knows that together with a sincere Iran, they may be capable of working to make a relative secure Afghanistan. Neither India nor Iran will welcome a regime in Afghanistan close to Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ISI. Fourthly, a friendly Iran can play its own positive role in Indo-Pak relations. The Iran-Pak-India pipeline, for example, could meet the energy demands of both India and Pakistan, had it been approved

he present article deals with the following interrelated issues: Iranian crisis resulting from Western sanctions, impact on Indo-Iranian oil business resulted from Iranian crisis, the Indian concerns and the extent of Indian capability in dealing with these concerns. In order to understand the problem, the article is divided into four sections. The first explains the Western projection of Iranian crisis; it discusses the way former crisis led to current crisis. The second section highlights general consequences of sanctions in Iran; it also considers the probable prospect of Iranian oil business with the Asian giants. The third one refers to recent Indo-Iranian energy ties; considering the Indian support of US approach towards Iran, what concerns India will be faced with. The fourth section deals with the following questions: Can India deal with the concerns? What shall be the impact on Indian energy security?

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

INDIAN CONCERNS

Although Islamic Republic of Iran strongly denies Western allegations, to a large extent, West has succeeded in projecting Iran as a rogue state. The West led by US characterises Iran as a regime that violates human rights, backs terrorism and pursues its illegal nuclear programme. The impression has not been only westernised but also globalised

Iranian crisis Although Islamic Republic of Iran strongly denies Western allegations, to a large extent, West has succeeded in projecting Iran as a rogue state. The West led by US characterises Iran as a regime that violates human rights, backs terrorism and pursues its illegal nuclear programme. The impression has not been only westernised but also globalised. In turn, the scenario demands Iran to comply with the so-called international standards by presenting itself as more transparent; a demand which Iran does not accept. Rather, Islamic Republic maintains that it has already been transparent and that it is not for the West especially the US to play the so-called role of “global police.” The dispute has made the situation more critical, exacerbated the already bad US-Iran relations. The circumstance has led to the emergence of new sequential crisis, such as: 1) Emergence of tougher Western sanctions on Iran. 2) Pulling in other regional powers such as India into the game. 3) Paralysing the Iranian economy. 4) Damaging the Indo-Iranian ties. These crises have left not only an impact on Iran’s regime but also an impact on other Asian countries such as India, the subject of the discussion. Before focusing on Indian impact, however, it will be advisable to focus first on Iranian impact.

Sanctions Since the inception Islamic Republic has been faced with waves of sanctions, but the regime persistently has declared all sanctions to be unsuccessful or ineffective. Quite often, in his various presentations, President Ahmadinejad has proclaimed that

“sanctions are nothing but pieces of torn papers.” The impact, however, was not instantaneous. Indeed, sanctions have had a gradual impact on the Iranian economy. The recent incidents which happened in late 2011, such as accusing Iran of having a role in the attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington, as well as, the deliberate attack on the British Embassy in Tehran, encouraged West to impose more effective sanctions on Iran. Thus, many other institutions associated with Revolutionary Guards Corps and a number of important banks including the Central Bank of Iran have been boycotted by both the EU and US. Besides, in late January 2012, the EU has banned the oil imports from Iran. It was estimated that 20 per cent of the Iranian oil used to go to the EU markets. Well, to come to the point, the impact on Iran has been severe, making unemployment higher, inflation uncontrolled, brain drain greater, more financial corruptions, dragging more sections of the society below poverty line, exchange rates incredibly high and domestic investment inconsistent. The situation within will become worse if diplomatic tensions with the West continue to escalate. The crisis will also overshadow the relations with Asian giants dealing in oil business with Iran. The likelihood of banning the Iranian oil, for example, regarded to be a major concern for the Asian buyers. Iran exports 60 per cent of its crude oil to Asia; China alone imports 20 per cent of its crude oil from Iran. As far as initial negotiations between Japan and US (January 2012) are concerned, Japan has made it clear that it takes Japan around 6 months to finalise its decision on the question of boycotting Iranian oil. Perhaps, sooner than the above deadline, Japan may conclude its decision. So can be the case with South Korea. Experience indicates that both Japan and South Korea ultimately will follow the Western path against Iran. The Chinese and Russian positions are yet doubtful; in order to convince both China and Russia to support the Iranian sanctions, the West has to devote a great deal of time and energy. Well, despite its energy need, the Republic of India has become more favourable to US. For such approach, however, India has to deal with a number of

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

concerns as far as the issue of energy is concerned.

Indian concerns The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been regarded as a good partner by the Republic of India. The two countries have relatively enjoyed good ties with each other. The trade between the two in 2009-2010, for instance, has reached US$ 13.4 billion. In the case of energy business both have had satisfactory collaborations. As far as Iranian contribution is concerned, Islamic Republic exports oil to India. According to Iranian official reports, Iran’s oil accounts for 16.6 per cent of India’s crude oil imports. According to Indian official reports, India has imported about 22 million tons of crude oil valued at about US$ 10 billion in 2009-2010, which makes it the third largest market for Iranian crude. Based on a six-month independent data published in June 2011, India has further increased the imports of crude oil from Iran. On the whole, however, it has been estimated that Iran accounts for around 8 per cent of Indian oil imports. On the Indian part, India exports diesel, refined oil, petroleum products and processed minerals to Iran. It is said that close to 40 per cent of the refined oil consumed by Iran is imported from India. Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, the Indian oil companies have invested billions of dollars in developing gas fields in Iran. Aban Offshore, India’s largest offshore drilling company, for example, is doing work for the Iranian ministry of petroleum. According to an Iranian local source, “Iran daily pays at least US$ 2,50,000 to this company on drilling business.” Despite Western sanctions that have prevented a number of Indian firms from dealing with Iran, Indian manufactured products have been brought into the technological fields of Iran. The Indian companies such as ESSAR, OVL and ONGC have acquired shares in the Iranian energy sector; they are engaged in petroleum technologies. In brief, oil business has overshadowed commercial ties between these two countries. Now, the question is that considering Indian stance, how far Indo-Iranian ties can go? Or, to be to the point, what will be the Indian concerns? No doubt, the issue of Iranian sanctions has raised problems;

sanctions have concerned India about its energy security. This concern, in fact, has already had an impact on Indo-Iranian relations. A clear sign of such impact was notable in a 2011 incident when Iran faced major problems from India regarding the payments for exports; India postponed the payments mainly due to sanctions. The gesture has left a bad impact on diplomatic relations between the two regimes. The crisis, if it continues, further will lessen the Indo-Iranian ties. In this respect, however, as far as Indian side is concerned, it will have to deal with the following concerns. Firstly, in regard with oil trade, Iran has been one of the major contributors. But, India will have to lessen the ties with Iran; under foreign political pressure, India may lose its share of energy supplies from Iran. The same will undermine the Indian contribution to Iran as far as technological and human resource capitals are concerned. Secondly, in lessening or cutting relations with Iran, India has to deal with care, since this approach might create few divisions or confusions within the Republic of India, especially on the part of Muslim community. Thirdly, a safe Afghanistan matters a lot to the Indian national interest. India knows that together with a sincere Iran, they may be capable of working to make a relative secure Afghanistan. Neither India nor Iran will welcome a regime in Afghanistan close to Pakistan’s ISI. Fourthly, a friendly Iran can play its own positive role in Indo-Pak relations. The Iran-Pak-India pipeline, for example, could meet the energy demands of both India and Pakistan, had it been approved. It should be reminded that without Pakistan’s goodwill gesture, India’s security cannot be guaranteed. Quite often, for example, certain Pakistani rogue elements have been involved in terrorist activities against India. Fifthly, China’s growing influence in the region is a worrying factor for India. China is already the largest economic partner of Iran; how to counteract this has been a concern to India. The more India associates itself with US, more will it make Iran away from India and closer to China. Thus, in case of unfriendly relations with Iran, India will have to deal with these problems. Now, taking into account the

aforesaid concerns, we need to deal with two more questions. 1) Can India challenge these concerns? 2) What will be the impact on Indian energy security?

Energy security The issue of energy security is one of the most important concerns for India. For that, therefore, Iran is vital. But, the question is that at what cost Iran remains essential to India? Had India not been influenced by Western powers perhaps it would have maintained its independence by keeping normal ties with Iran. So, the crucial point is that India has to make its stance fully clear; it has to swim with the western tide. After all, the main player in the region is neither Iran nor China, rather it is the West. Therefore, the aforesaid Indian concerns, whatever, can be reduced only if India continues to satisfy the United States of America. The fact is that comparing to Western powers India is not that much powerful; India has been more dependent on the West. As a result, it has to fully cooperate with the West as far as US approach to Iran is concerned. This is evident from the Indo-US relations. For example, few years ago, India was asked by US to prove its loyalty by supporting US at the IAEA on the question of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Bush administration had clearly stated that “If India voted against the February 2006 US motion on Iran at the IAEA, Congress would likely not approve the Indo-US nuclear agreement.” India voted against Islamic Republic of Iran, a move which made US happy. Or, with respect to Iran-Pak-India gas pipeline the stand taken by India had demonstrated that regardless of its energy necessity, India gives priority to the West rather than Iran. Although Iran is rich in natural resources, it is the West that dominates the world energy market. Moreover, under Western pressures, even if India decides to completely ban the Iranian oil imports, the policy probably will not jeopardise Indian energy security. For India has already taken care of the issue by looking beyond Iran. In recent years, for example, Indian ties with Arab countries have increased remarkably. India has already

consolidated its economic relations with the naturally-rich countries such as Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabiaand UAE. Saudi Arabia is a major supplier of oil to India; India, considered to be the fourth largest recipient of Saudi oil after China, US and Japan. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is also the second largest trading partner of India. According to a report, "the GCC countries supply 45 per cent of India’s petroleum; the Saudis are responsible for a quarter of those supplies and Kuwait, Oman and UAE are other major suppliers. Qatar remains India’s exclusive supplier of natural gas, annually supplying 5 million tons of LNG to India." The same report presents that "the Middle East provides almost 65 per cent of India’s energy requirements." In addition, India has already been active in further exploration and exploitation of its own natural resources with the help of both domestic and international companies. Even if in case of war with Iran, which seems less likely, Indian energy security, in all probability, will not be endangered. The theory of war stems from the recent quarrel (January 2012) exchanged between Iran and US in which Iran warned the West that “if any disruption happens regarding the sale of Iranian oil the Strait of Hormuz will definitely be closed.” Well, since the navies of Western powers such as those of US, UK and France are involved in the region most likely they themselves will take care of a probable clash against Iran. In reaction to the Iranian threat, however, US warned back by declaring that “any threat to the security of the Straits of Hormuz will bring a military confrontation against Iran.” In a nutshell, therefore, as far as Iranian crisis is concerned, the impact on Indian energy security will not be substantial. India has shifted its attention on other naturally-rich countries of the Middle East; they may fill the Indian energy supply vacuum. India can also challenge the aforementioned concerns if it continues to support the powerful West against Iran, for the powerful West has a more decisive role in preserving the energy security of the region than other countries.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Maj Gen P K Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attaché to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects.

A senior retired intelligence official from Israel has stated it was not possible for Iran to develop a bomb before 2015, an assessment agreed by most American officials. The main hitch is the centrifuges have been partially disabled by a computer virus the Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet appeared in industrial programmes around 2009. Experts dissecting the virus, soon deduced that it had been possibly calibrated in a way that it would send nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control, adding to suspicions that it was meant to sabotage Iran’s nuclear programme. Apparently Stuxnet appears to have wiped out roughly 20 per cent of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, thereby delaying production of nuclear weapons

THE GENESIS Post 1979 revolution Iran has fought a war with Iraq, stated publicly her wish to ‘Wipe out Israel’ and has been on hostile terms with all Arab countries except Syria. Iran also provides financial assistance and arms to the Hamas group in Palestine and the Hezbollah group in Lebanon. The implications of Iran having nuclear weapons are certainly a threat to the Middle Eastern region. A well researched article that traces the genesis of the current crisis.

he 1979 Iranian revolution which ousted the pro-American Shah of Iran and replaced him with the anti-American spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini surprised the intelligence authorities of the United States of America. The Central Intelligence Agency had all along reported that the country was not in a pre-revolutionary or revolutionary state. It may be pertinent to note that the Shah of Iran was brought in through a coup d’etat which was conducted with US assistance in 1953 by which the elected government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadek was overthrown. Many Iranians state that the coup and the extensive support to the Shah were responsible for his arbitrary rule, which tarnished the image of USA in Iran. Iran as is well known is a country rich in oil and gas. Currently Iran has the third largest reserves of oil in the world. This works out to about 150 billion barrels, which is roughly 10 per cent of world’s known reserves. According to Iran Petroleum Ministry, Iran’s proved natural gas reserves are about 1045.7 trillion cubic feet (29.61 trillion cubic metres) or about 15.8 per cent of world’s total reserves, thereby making it the world’s second largest reserves of gas in the world. It is obvious that consumers like China, Japan, European Union, India and other countries are large importers of Iranian oil. While Iran has vast resources in terms of oil and gas, nuclear energy has been on the horizon post the coup in 1953. The US signed a civil nuclear cooperation programme in 1967 and the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) was established and run by the Atomic Energy Organisation for Iran (AEOI). The US supplied a five megawatt nuclear research reactor, which was fuelled by enriched uranium.

Nuclear programme The Shah of Iran felt the necessity of nuclear energy and cuddled up to the US to assist in this critical field. To start with he signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1968. Further he ratified it in 1970 making Iran’s programme subject to International Atomic Energy Agency verification. In March 1974

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

LIKELY IMPACT OF

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

plans were made to build 23 nuclear power stations in about 25 years to generate about 23,000 megawatts of electricity. The first plant was established at Bushehr and supplied electricity to the city of Shiraz. Thereafter German and French companies set up nuclear plants. In 1976 US President Gerald Ford signed a directive offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a US built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The Ford document stated that the introduction of nuclear power will cater for growing needs of Iran’s economy and free oil reserves for export. At the same time, the Shah of Iran signed an agreement with South Africa where Iranian money will be used to process enriched uranium which would be supplied to Iran.

Finance Minister on 29 January 2012, stated that it is not possible for India to take any decision to reduce imports from Iran drastically The Shah was overthrown by the 1979 revolution. This was followed by Iranian students taking over the US Embassy and holding diplomatic staff hostage for 444 days from 04 November 1979 to 20 January 1981. This led to the US stopping its nuclear assistance. Similarly France and other European suppliers stopped supplying enriched uranium to Iran. In the 1984-1988 war with Iraq the Bushehr reactors were damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes and work on the nuclear programme was affected. As per reports disclosed in 2006, The Argentinean government signed three agreements with Iran from 1987 to 1988. The first agreement was to assist Iran in converting TNRC from highly enriched uranium reactor to 19.75 per cent low enriched uranium and to supply the same to Iran. The uranium was delivered in 1993. In addition there were two agreements on supply of components for constructing uranium enrichment plants which were terminated under pressure from the US. The Russian federation formed a joint research organisation Persepolis which provided Iran with Russian nuclear experts and technical information.

India imports 11 per cent of her oil requirements from Iran. She is also planning a pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan which is presently on hold. Further she is jointly developing the port of Chabahar in Iranian Baluchistan and linking up the same through a web of roads to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Further as the US moves out troops from Afghanistan, India and Iran share fears of a Taliban come back

This occurred in the period 1990 to 1995. Five Russian institutions provided assistance in the nuclear field and missiles. President Boris Yelstin had a two track policy of offering commercial nuclear technology to Iran and discussing with the US. Due to media reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, permission was accorded by Iranian government to IAEA inspectors to visit sites and facilities which they wished to visit in 1992. The IAEA visits were conducted under the supervision of Director General Blix. He reported that all activities

were indicating that Iran was using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Russia signed a contract with Iran in 1995 to reconstruct Bushehr plant and installing into the Bushehr building a 915 megawatts pressurised water reactor which would be possibly completed by 2009. Meanwhile the Iranians sought Chinese assistance for their projects. The US however, prevailed on the Chinese to pull out of a contract to build a uranium conversion plant. This occurred in 1996 but the blueprints of the project were handed over by the Chinese to the Iranians. This site was

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

THE GENESIS

visited by the IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei.

President Barack Obama on 01 July 2010 signed the Comprehensive Iran sanctions, accountability and disinvestment act. This is the toughest law passed by the US Congress against Iran and targets the government’s primary source of income, its energy sector and seeks to exploit one of Iran’s primary vulnerabilities, its shortage of petroleum refineries. The new law penalises firms that help Iran develop petroleum and natural gas, firms that sell Iran gasoline and firms that help Iran buy gasoline by providing shipping, insurance or financing. Similar actions have been taken by the European Union as also Japan The National Council of Resistance of Iran, ‘Alireza Jafarzadeh’ on 14 August 2002, revealed the existence of two nuclear sites under construction. The first a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak. The IAEA immediately sought access to these facilities and further details from Iran regarding its nuclear programme. Iran kept dilly dallying about the issue and with possible guidance from Russia, China and North Korea kept continuing with its enrichment efforts. Since January 2006 Iran stepped up enrichment work at its underground nuclear plant at Natanz. The centrifuges are presently the P-2 design which has been provided possibly by the nuclear smuggling network run by Pakistani scientist A Q Khan. As per IAEA reports enrichment programmes in Iran and Libya relied on the same source. Recently Iran has declared that a second enrichment plant is under construction at Fordo near the city of Qom. The site is completely underground and is expected to become operational shortly. Despite Iran’s stated position of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, she is presently possessing nuclear fuel for production of about four nuclear bombs. However, intelligence officials have pointed to significant problems with the nuclear programme. A senior retired

intelligence official from Israel has stated it was not possible for Iran to develop a bomb before 2015, an assessment agreed by most American officials. The main hitch is the centrifuges have been partially disabled by a computer virus the Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet appeared in industrial programmes around 2009. Experts dissecting the virus, soon deduced that it had been possibly calibrated in a way that it would send nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control, adding to suspicions that it was meant to sabotage Iran’s nuclear programme. Apparently Stuxnet appears to have wiped out roughly 20 per cent of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, thereby delaying production of nuclear weapons.

In March 1974 plans were made to build 23 nuclear power stations in about 25 years to generate about 23,000 megawatts of electricity. The first plant was established at Bushehr and supplied electricity to the city of Shiraz. Thereafter German and French companies set up nuclear plants. In 1976 US President Gerald Ford signed a directive offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a US built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The Ford document stated that the introduction of nuclear power will cater for growing needs of Iran’s economy and free oil reserves for export Iran has been closely working with North Korea and China to use a suitable delivery system for her nuclear weapons. Weapons inventory indicate the possible use of missiles. The missiles list begins with Shahab-1 with a range of 320 km, Shahab-3 (essentially North Korean Nodong missile) with a range of 1,300 km and goes on to Shahab-6 which ranges to about 7,600 km. The presence of North Korean experts to guide them in this field is well known. With these ranges Iran is capable of threatening Israel, all Arab countries and many West European countries.

Likely impact Post 1979 revolution Iran has

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

fought a war with Iraq, stated publicly her wish to ‘Wipe out Israel’ and has been on hostile terms with all Arab countries except Syria. Iran also provides financial assistance and arms to the Hamas group in Palestine and the Hezbollah group in Lebanon. The implications of Iran having nuclear weapons are certainly a threat to the Middle Eastern region. Accordingly the first step was to impose sanctions. The UN Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran. The first was Resolution 1696 which was passed on 31 July 2006 and demanded that Iran suspend its Uranium enrichment activities, invoking Chapter VII of UN charter. The second was Resolution 1737 passed on 23 December 2006. This led to imposition of sanctions after Iran refused to suspend its enrichment activities. It implied cutting off nuclear cooperation and freezing assets of a number of organisations linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. The third was Resolution 1747 passed on 24 March 2007. In this resolution the list of entities was expanded in the sanctions. The fourth was Resolution 1803 passed on 03 March 2008. This further extended those sanctions to additional persons and entities. Further travel restrictions were imposed on sanctioned persons and bar exports of nuclear missile related dual use goods to Iran. The fifth Resolution 1835 dated 27 September 2008 reaffirmed the preceding four resolutions. The sixth Resolution 1929 dated 09 June 2010 imposed a complete arms embargo on Iran. This banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles and extended the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Islamic Republic of Iran shipping lines. The seventh resolution 1984 dated 08 June 2011 extended the mandate of the sixth resolution for an additional 12 months. The United States has left no stone unturned to ensure that the sanctions have their desired effect on Iran. President Barack Obama on 01 July 2010 signed the Comprehensive Iran sanctions, accountability and disinvestment act. This is the toughest law passed by the US Congress against Iran and targets the government’s primary source of income, its energy sector

and seeks to exploit one of Iran’s primary vulnerabilities, its shortage of petroleum refineries. The new law penalises firms that help Iran develop petroleum and natural gas, firms that sell Iran gasoline and firms that help Iran buy gasoline by providing shipping, insurance or financing. Similar actions have been taken by the European Union as also Japan. There is no doubt that the sanctions have hurt Iran, as on 26 January 2012 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has stated that Iran is prepared to resume negotiations.

Currently Iran has the third largest reserves of oil in the world. This works out to about 150 billion barrels, which is roughly 10 per cent of world’s known reserves. According to Iran Petroleum Ministry, Iran’s proved natural gas reserves are about 1045.7 trillion cubic feet (29.61 trillion cubic metres) or about 15.8 per cent of world’s total reserves, thereby making it the world’s second largest reserves of gas in the world. It is obvious that consumers like China, Japan, European Union, India and other countries are large importers of Iranian oil Apart from sanctions, there is a military alternative of using Airpower to destroy these reactors. Presently Iran has nuclear facilities at Anarak, Arak, Ardakan, Bonab, Bushehr, Chalus, Darkovin, Isfahan, Karaj, Lashkar Abad, Lavizan, Natanz, Parchin and Qom. The issue has been considered and though workable, will not yield long term result as Iran will be able to reconstruct these reactors with covert assistance. Though Israel and the US have the capability this would not be advisable at the current juncture. Of late the sanctions are hitting Iran considerably. At this juncture Iran is constrained by deep political divisions, civil strife and a woeful economy. The life of the ordinary Iranian becomes more precarious every day, with rising unemployment, inflation, state repression and the country’s growing international isolation. In late December 2011, Iran issued a blunt warning that it would block the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil transit point. The US

seriously warned Iran, that it was demanding a military response. The strong stand of US calmed down the tension and ship movement in the Persian Gulf is normal.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, ‘Alireza Jafarzadeh’ on 14 August 2002, revealed the existence of two nuclear sites under construction. The first a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy water facility in Arak

Indian perspective India imports 11 per cent of her oil requirements from Iran. She is also planning a pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan which is presently on hold. Further she is jointly developing the port of Chabahar in Iranian Baluchistan and linking up the same through a web of roads to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Further as the US moves out troops from Afghanistan, India and Iran share fears of a Taliban come back. It may be pertinent to note that India and Iran both supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Since 2005 India has voted three times against Iran at the IAEA. India is still to determine her stand with regard to the present sanctions. Much as India would not like to see Iran with nuclear weapons, she is biding her time to apply the sanctions

due to her strategic needs. At the present juncture the Finance Minister on 29 January 2012, stated that it is not possible for India to take any decision to reduce imports from Iran drastically.

Way ahead The stiff sanctions being implemented are having great economic impact on Iran. Her nuclear programme has been affected by numerous setbacks which would take time to rectify. Possibly by 2015, Iran would have a nuclear weapon. In such a scenario there could either be a military response or compel possibly, Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons.

Conclusion Iran developing nuclear weapons is not in the interest of peace and stability. However, Iran feels it has a legal right to develop enriched uranium. Though not stated the authoritarian regime of Iran possibly feels that possession of nuclear weapons would ensure that the US will not attack the country. This is of particular significance due to the regime changes in Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and the present revolts in Syria. Therefore all out efforts must be made to make the sanctions decimate Iran economically to change its present nuclear programme.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Air Marshal B K Pandey (retd) The writer is former AOC-in-C HQ Training Command, IAF, Bengaluru and served for three years in a Diplomatic Assignment at the Indian Embassy during the years of turmoil (1989-1992) in war-torn Afghanistan. He was responsible for setting up the only English Medium School in Kabul at that point in time. He has also been Operations Manager at ARC, an intelligence organisation.

Both India and China have refused to join the crusade for sanctions against Iran sponsored by the US. India’s officially held position is that she will comply with only those sanctions that are imposed by the UN. However, given the exclusion of Iran from the international banking system, India will and must find alternatives to pay for the oil that she proposes to continue to buy from Iran. One of the options available to India could be a model similar to the rupee-rouble model or barter system adopted for trade with the Soviet Union years ago

SANCTIONS AND AFTERMATH There is an uncanny similarity between the actions of the US in the run up to the assault on the sovereignty of Iraq nearly a decade ago and those in the recent months aimed at what appears to be emerging as serious intent of military action against Iran. The Gulf holds 60 per cent of the global oil reserves and the three major oil producing nations Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran together can boast of owning 25 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. Around 40 per cent of the global trade in crude passes through the Strait of Hormuz and hence its blockage by Iran would create a serious imbalance in global demand and supply driving oil prices through the roof.

here is an uncanny similarity between the actions of the US in the run up to the assault on the sovereignty of Iraq nearly a decade ago and those in the recent months aimed at what appears to be emerging as serious intent of military action against Iran. In the case of Iraq, ostensibly, the primary motivation behind the military action was the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The real driving force however, was securing the oil resources of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as also control over Iraqi oil. The first step in the US endeavour was a sustained campaign in the global media by the US about the serious threat posed to humanity from the arsenal Saddam regime was purported to possess. Simultaneously, vigorous efforts were made at building a consensus for a military coalition that was not very successful. This was followed by sanctions and finally, military action in 2003 against Iraq which left the nation in political, social and economic disarray. As the alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction were not to be found, the US lost some credibility. However, in the bargain, Iraq lay completely shattered and clearly worse off than it was before the invasion.

a serious threat to their national security interests. Not surprisingly, Iran has responded angrily to the report by the IAEA describing it as being “full of fabricated evidence”. Iran has always insisted that her nuclear programme is meant for entirely peaceful purposes and that she would not tolerate any interference by the West in her nuclear ambitions or endeavours.

IAEA report

India’s energy security in the long term will be best served by reducing dependence on fossil fuels and moving decisively towards nuclear and renewable sources of energy. The former is unfortunately mired in serious controversy and the latter would require a long term calibrated programme as also massive investments to be of any consequence. India’s energy security will, therefore, hinge on the capability of the government to bring about a paradigm shift

For some years, the US and its ally in the region, Israel have been concerned about intelligence reports indicating that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. Earlier on, George Bush Senior had branded Iran as a “rogue nation” and part of the “Axis of Evil”. Also, Iran has been threatening to wipe out the tiny Jewish state of Israel from the face of the earth. Amidst the ongoing confrontation with Iran, a report on the investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the nuclear watchdog for the UN, has catalogued incriminating evidence to indicate that the nation could well be engaged in an effort to develop nuclear weapons. As a state armed with nuclear weapons, Iran is perceived by both the US and Israel, to be

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

THE LOOMING CRISIS IN IRAN: IMPACT ON INDIA’S ENERGY SECURITY

Sanctions and aftermath While doubts have been expressed about the accuracy and veracity of the report, the US apparently needs no further proof of Iran’s intentions for it to take further action. Apart from extending the application of the financial and economic sanctions regime that has been in force for the last three decades, the US, supported by Britain and Canada, has been aggressively campaigning with the international community to join the bandwagon and impose fresh sanctions against Tehran which would include embargo on export of crude oil. As a first step, the US would like Iran to come to the negotiating table, something that has not been possible so far despite efforts.

Through a Bill signed by the US President on December 31, 2011, the US has asked for sanctions to prevent foreign financial institutions doing business with the Central Bank of Iran directly affecting oil

transactions. The US has, therefore, already successfully pressurised the international banking system to bend to its will and has managed to isolate Iran making it difficult if not impossible for nations including India to continue trading with the country. The action by the US has played havoc with the economy of Iran by way of steep fall in the value of the Iranian Riyal, hyper-inflation and high interest rates. However, in pressurising Iran to come to the negotiating table, the US has been conscious of the loss of credibility in Iraq and hence is proceeding with relatively greater caution. The move, aimed at

choking off Iran’s critical oil income, prompted furious reactions from the Islamic Republic which has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical choke points on oil routes in the oceans. If these measures prove ineffective and Iran does not discontinue its nuclear weapons development programme to the satisfaction of the US and Israel, there will be no option before the US but to undertake military action. However, given the experience of the wars against Iraq and more recently of the politico-military debacle in Afghanistan, for the US, a decision to undertake large scale military campaign in Iran may be a difficult proposition. Also, barring Israel, there

is unlikely to be much enthusiasm among the international community to join any US-led military coalition. Military action by the US, therefore, could be limited to air strikes that alone may not be able to help the lone super power and Israel to achieve its objectives as the Iranian facilities are largely underground. The compulsions of an election year in the US may also influence the process of decision making with regard to the possibility of military action. It is therefore somewhat difficult at this point in time to define precisely the action the US and Israel could take jointly or individually against Iran. There is however reasonable certainty that Israel would not go it

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

SANCTIONS AND AFTERMATH

alone and launch any attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, but in all likelihood, will continue to beat the drums of war to pressurise the major powers to act on the political, diplomatic, economic and military fronts.

Apart from extending the application of the financial and economic sanctions regime that has been in force for the last three decades, the US, supported by Britain and Canada, has been aggressively campaigning with the international community to join the bandwagon and impose fresh sanctions against Tehran which would include embargo on export of crude oil Iran has quite expectedly reacted to the call for fresh sanctions by the US and has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the western nations actually place an embargo on its export of crude. Situated between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical choke points on oil routes, links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is the only access from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean for shipping. The Gulf holds 60 per cent of the global oil reserves and the three major oil producing nations Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran together can boast of owning 25 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. Around 40 per cent of the global trade in crude passes through the Strait of Hormuz and hence its blockage by Iran would create a serious imbalance in global demand and supply driving oil prices through the roof. Estimates are that if the Strait of Hormuz was to be closed to tanker traffic for a month, the price of crude could rise by three to five times. The impact on the US economy would be loss to the tune of a staggering US$ 75 billion. It goes without saying, therefore, that the US cannot afford to tolerate a blockage of the Strait of Hormuz and would come up with an appropriate response to ensure its energy supply and hence, economic security.

India’s energy security India is the second largest customer of Iranian crude after China. Nearly 12 per cent of India’s requirements of crude is procured from Iran. It is not surprising therefore, that both India and China have refused to join the crusade for sanctions against Iran sponsored by the US. India’s officially held position is that she will comply with only those sanctions that are imposed by the UN. However, given the exclusion of Iran from the international banking system, India will and must find alternatives to pay for the oil that she proposes to continue to buy from Iran. One of the options available to India could be a model similar to the rupee-rouble model or barter system adopted for trade with the Soviet Union years ago. Currently, India’s requirement is of two million barrels per day and given the demands of a resurgent economy that is expected to sustain a respectable growth rate, in a decade from now the requirement is expected to rise to seven million barrels a day. As for dependence on foreign sources for oil, today India imports 110 million tonnes of crude annually and by 2020, this is expected to rise at least to 150 million tonnes. Similarly, India’s requirement to import gas will rise to an estimated

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

figure of 75 billion cubic metres by 2024 with a balance of 52 billion cubic metres being produced locally. Today, India’s share of the proven global reserves of oil is only around one per cent. While vigorous efforts at oil exploration in India are underway both on and offshore, today, 70 per cent of India’s requirement of crude is procured from foreign sources and all of it is transported by the sea-route. Of the total oil exports by Iran, India’s share constitutes 12 per cent. By 2050, India is likely to be the largest importer of oil in the world. It is only natural, therefore, that the Indian economy is and will continue to be highly sensitive to disruption in the sea lanes of communication that could disrupt the flow of oil to the Indian economy. Given the high level of dependence of the Indian economy on imported oil, the escalating tension in the Gulf and the uncompromising and menacing postures by parties to the conflict are bound to create uncertainties and in turn, adversely impact the economy.

The need for alternative sources In the ongoing confrontation between the western alliance and Iran, as per Pranab Mukherjee, the Finance Minister, in an international forum India has categorically stated that she has decided to chart its own course and that it will not scale down its petroleum imports from Iran despite US and European sanctions against the Islamic republic. However, with the level of hostility in the region, the rising tensions, the possibility of conflict and inability of India to mediate to diffuse the situation, a drop in the level of imports from Iran may not be unexpected. It may, therefore, be imprudent to continue to depend heavily on oil from Iran and the nation must urgently explore other avenues. In fact, India has already begun to increase import of crude from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to compensate for the reduction in supplies from Iran. While India would like to maintain a balance in her relationships with oil producing states of the Middle East, the fact that Iranian crude is qualitatively superior to that from Saudi Arabia, cannot be lost sight of and hence, the preference for Iranian crude will continue to be high. India must also look beyond the Middle East to the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan that have vast reserves of oil and natural gas. However, transportation from the Central Asian Region has serious attendant transportation difficulties. A possible option could be transportation by pipelines running through Afghanistan and Pakistan, an option fraught with imponderables given the endemic instability in the region. Other viable and more convenient options for India are to source crude from Australia and Africa. However, security during transportation will remain an area of concern. In the final analysis, India’s energy security in the long term will be best served by reducing dependence on fossil fuels and moving decisively towards nuclear and renewable sources of energy. The former is unfortunately mired in serious controversy and the latter would require a long term calibrated programme as also massive investments to be of any consequence. India’s energy security will, therefore, hinge on the capability of the government to bring about a paradigm shift.

Raytheon, US Navy Complete JSOW C-1 Developmental Testing The U S Navy completed developmental testing (DT) of the Raytheon Company Joint Standoff Weapon C-1. The conclusion of DT brings US and allied warfighters one step closer to being able to engage moving ships as far as 60 nautical miles (70 statute miles) away with an air-launched weapon. Developmental testing finished when the JSOW C-1 struck a small, fast-moving ship target during the weapon's second flight test.

Boeing Begins Production Of F/A-18E/F Boeing has announced that it has started production of the new Distributed Targeting System (DTS) for the F/A-18E/F Super `Hornet strike fighter. It is part of the U S Navy's F/A-18E/F Network Centric Warfare Upgrades programme and the F/A-18E/F Flight Plan, which will ensure that the Super Hornet remains ahead of emerging threats in coming decades. The Boeing Super Hornet is a multirole aircraft, able to perform virtually every mission in the tactical spectrum, including air superiority, day/night strike with precision-guided weapons, fighter escort, close air support, suppression of enemy air defences, maritime strike, reconnaissance, forward air control and tanker missions. Boeing has delivered more than 480 F/A-18E/F to the US Navy. Every Super Hornet produced has been delivered ahead of schedule and on budget.

Cmde Samaddar Appointed Director And CEO Of ShinMaywa, India Commodore Sujeet Samaddar, NM (retd) has been appointed as Director and Chief Executive Officer of ShinMaywa Industries India Private Limited (SMIIPL). SMIIPL is a wholly owned subsidiary of ShinMaywa Industries Ltd Japan, which manufactures amphibian aircraft, industrial machinery systems, special purpose trucks, aircraft passenger boarding bridges, water treatment equipment and environmental systems. Sujeet will be based in New Delhi. Sujeet is an alumnus of IIT Roorkee and has two masters in Defence and Security Studies and a postgraduate diploma in Business Management. He is also an alumii of the United Nations University, Tokyo and the National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo. Sujeet retired from the Indian Navy after 29 years of service which included command of four warships and held several key staff and training assignments. He has several years of experience in defence acquisitions and defence budgets having retired as the Principal Director Naval Plans. Post retirement he served as Vice President Operations at NOVA Integrated Systems a TATA Enterprise.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Dr Harsh V Pant The writer teaches at King’s College, London and is presently a Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.

India would like to increase its presence in the Iranian energy sector because of its rapidly rising energy needs and is rightfully feeling restless about its own marginalisation in Iran. Not only has Pakistan signed a pipeline deal with Tehran, but China also is starting to make its presence felt. China is now Iran’s largest trading partner and is undertaking massive investments in the country, rapidly occupying the space vacated by Western firms. Iran's total crude exports to China increased 47 per cent from January to July 2011

PRECARIOUS IMPASSE As tensions mount in West Asia, India will need to think creatively to safeguard its regional interests. There are some in India who have suggested that New Delhi can play the role of bringing the US and Iran closer. This is not only a gross overestimation of India’s own diplomatic heft but a serious misreading of the factors that have led to the drifting apart of the US and Iran over the last more than three decades. New Delhi would be better served by focusing on its own interests and how best to protect them in a regional milieu that is being shaken by Iran’s global isolation and military bellicosity. A new containment policy is being structured by Washington with the installation of anti-missile batteries in the Arab states and with an emerging plan to put more ships and anti-missile batteries into the Persian Gulf as the concerns of Arab Gulf states have risen.

he Iranian nuclear programme is once again hitting the headlines and the spectre of military conflict in West Asia looms large over the horizon. Citing “credible” intelligence in its latest report to the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expressed “serious concerns” that Iran is working towards building a nuclear weapon. In its most explicit and authoritative account of Iran’s nuclear activities to date, the IAEA underscores a structured, focused and secretive effort by Iran to acquire the essential skills for weapons-building, from warhead design to the testing of triggering devices. There seems to be a certain inevitability about the Iranian capability to assemble a crude nuclear device in the near future. And this poses a particular dilemma for the Obama administration. Much like its predecessor, the Obama administration has also vowed that it would not allow Iran to go nuclear. Israel is already fretting and debating its pre-emptive options. Tel Aviv has made it clear, time and again, that it would not hesitate to act unilaterally, overruling American objections, if they judge that Iran is getting too close to nuclear capability. Meanwhile tensions are rising in the capitals of Arab Gulf states. It was the Saudi King, after all, who had famously advised the American diplomats that the only Iran strategy that would work was one that “cut off the head of the snake.” Since last year, the Islamic republic has seen its largest regional rival - the government of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak - toppled by protesters, while the Iranian-backed Hezbollah has strengthened its grip on Lebanon.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

India’s Challenge in West Asia

Saudi Arabia, another regional bulwark against Iranian expansion, is distracted by uprisings on its borders, particularly in Yemen, Oman and Bahrain. Sensing an opening, Iran has ratcheted up its competition with Saudi Arabia for influence in the region. The Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States is just one of the latest manifestations of this long-standing conflict. Iran’s hand is being suspected in the death of a Saudi diplomat in Pakistan earlier this year and the role of the Quds Force, the most elite Iranian unit, is coming under scanner. The Obama administration is having to rethink an Iran strategy that relied on Middle Eastern allies to counterbalance Tehran’s conventional forces and prevent cheating on economic sanctions. A new containment policy is being structured by Washington with the installation of anti-missile batteries in the Arab states and with an emerging plan to put more ships and anti-missile batteries into the Persian Gulf as the concerns of Arab Gulf states have risen. There is little likelihood of more serious sanctions as the Chinese and Russians remain opposed to any new sanctions and have already made it clear that the revealing new evidence by the IAEA will only harden Iran’s position. In its latest round of sanctions, the US has targeted exports of gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran and banned US banks from doing business with foreign banks that provide services to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. And in response to the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran in November last year, the European Union not only imposed new sanctions that included freezing assets and travel ban on 180 Iranian

individuals and companies linked to the Iranian nuclear programme but many European nations such as France, Germany and the Netherlands recalled their Ambassadors from Tehran. Meanwhile, the US is also trying to assuage the concerns of its Arab allies. The Obama administration announced an arms deal worth nearly US$ 30 billion with Saudi Arabia last week, sending a strong message to the regional states that the US remains committed to the stability in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, which has a predominantly Sunni

Muslim population and Iran, mostly Shiite, have competed for regional influence for decades and the Obama administration has sought to bolster its security relationship with Riyadh, despite their differences over the response to the Arab Spring. A new containment policy is being structured by Washington with the installation of anti-missile batteries in the Arab states and with an emerging plan to put more ships and anti-missile batteries into the Persian Gulf as the concerns of Arab Gulf states have risen. The gulf between

the West and Iran is widening which many fear will only empower the radical elements of the governing elite in Iran, making the resolution of the nuclear crisis even more difficult.

The gulf between the West and Iran is widening which many fear will only empower the radical elements of the governing elite in Iran, making the resolution of the nuclear crisis even more difficult

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

There seems to be certain inevitability about the Iranian capability to assemble a crude nuclear device in the near future. And this poses a particular dilemma for the Obama administration. Much like its predecessor, the Obama administration has also vowed that it would not allow Iran to go nuclear. Israel is already fretting and debating its pre-emptive options. Tel Aviv has made it clear, time and again, that it would not hesitate to act unilaterally, overruling American objections, if they judge that Iran is getting too close to nuclear capability India shares with the West the belief that Iranian nuclear ambitions would be destabilising for the Middle East. The Indian Prime Minister is on record suggesting that a nuclear Iran is not in Indian national interest. But New Delhi does not have the luxury of viewing Iranian nuclear ambitions only through the prism of Iran-Israel rivalry which is the norm in the West. India has to consider this issue from a much wider perspective where Iranian nuclear drive becomes a product of Arab-Iran and especially Sunni-Shia, rivalry. For Tehran, its nuclear ambitions are as much a counter to a two-front encirclement of Shias by Sunni Pakistan and Sunni Saudi Arabia as it is about ending Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the region. The Riyadh declaration signed in January 2010 during the Indian Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Saudi Arabia asked Iran to “remove regional and international doubts about its nuclear weapons programme.” In fact, India has even endorsed the Arab call for a nuclear-weapons free Middle East - a proposal traditionally targeting Israel but increasingly focused on Iran. India’s broader position on the Iranian nuclear question is relatively straightforward. Although India believes that Iran has the right to pursue civilian nuclear energy, it has insisted that Iran should clarify the doubts raised by the IAEA regarding Iran’s compliance with the NPT. India has long maintained that it does not see further nuclear proliferation as being in its interests. This position has as much to do with India’s desire

Iran conundrum

PRECARIOUS IMPASSE to project itself as a responsible nuclear state as with the very real danger that further proliferation in its extended neighbourhood could endanger its security. India has continued to affirm its commitment to enforce all sanctions against Iran as mandated since 2006 by the UN Security Council, when the first set of sanctions was imposed. However, much like Beijing and Moscow, New Delhi has argued that such sanctions should not hurt the Iranian populace and has expressed its disapproval of sanctions by individual countries that restrict investments by third countries in Iran’s energy sector. India would like to increase its presence in the Iranian energy sector because of its rapidly rising energy needs and is rightfully feeling restless about its own marginalisation in Iran. Not only has Pakistan signed a pipeline deal with Tehran, but China also is starting to make its presence felt. China is now Iran’s largest trading partner and is undertaking massive investments in the country, rapidly occupying the space vacated by Western firms. Iran’s total crude exports to China increased 47 per cent from January to July 2011, compared to an identical period the previous year. Where Beijing’s economic engagement with Iran is growing, India’s presence is shrinking, as firms such as Reliance Industries have, partially under Western pressure, withdrawn from Iran and others have shelved their plans to make investments. S Jaipal Reddy, Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas has suggested that India should be prepared for all eventualities and is planning to replace a part of its Iranian oil supplies with other sources like Saudi Arabia. But India remains firm in opposing American and EU unilateral sanctions on Iran as concerns rise that the US might persuade Turkey to block the use of its bank as an intermediary by India to make payments to Iran for the US$ 12 billion worth of annual crude exports. India is working with Iran to find the best way to ensure uninterrupted purchase of oil from Iran at a time when the US is ready to sanction firms that do business with Iran’s Central Bank and has been

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

reaching out to its Asian partners such as Japan and South Korea in order to isolate Iran. India imports 12 per cent of its oil from Iran which is its second largest supplier after Saudi Arabia. Pranab Mukherjee was categorical in suggesting that it was not “possible for India to take any decision to reduce the imports from Iran drastically.”

The Obama administration is having to rethink an Iran strategy that relied on Middle Eastern allies to counterbalance Tehran’s conventional forces and prevent cheating on economic sanctions. A new containment policy is being structured by Washington with the installation of anti-missile batteries in the Arab states and with an emerging plan to put more ships and anti-missile batteries into the Persian Gulf as the concerns of Arab Gulf states have risen. There is little likelihood of more serious sanctions as the Chinese and Russians remain opposed to any new sanctions

PRAGMATIC SOLUTION

INTERNATIONAL OIL SCENARIO AND ENERGY SECURITY FOR INDIA India imports 73 per cent of its present oil requirements. By the year 2025 this is likely to get enlarged to 83 per cent. Dependency on foreign oil is a major security concern for India. Furthermore, major oil suppliers to India - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Libya, Iraq to name a few are members of Organisation of Islamic Conference, a 57 member group of Islamic countries, who, in the past sided with Pakistan. India must build-up reserve oil stocks. All developed countries have built-up stocks. China is also buying oil by offering higher prices and creating emergency reserves. We must create a strategic Petroleum reserve equivalent of 90 days of total Indian crude oil imports.

As tensions mount in West Asia, India will need to think creatively to safeguard its regional interests. There are some in India who have suggested that New Delhi can play the role of bringing the US and Iran closer. This is not only a gross overestimation of India’s own diplomatic heft but a serious misreading of the factors that have led to the drifting apart of the US and Iran over the last more than three decades. New Delhi would be better served by focusing on its own interests and how best to protect them in a regional milieu that is being shaken by Iran’s global isolation and military bellicosity. The strategic reality that confronts New Delhi in West Asia today is that India has far more significant interests to preserve in the Arab Gulf and as tensions rise between the Sunni Arab regimes and Iran, India’s larger stakes in the Arab world will continue to inhibit Indian–Iranian ties. At the same time, New Delhi’s outreach to Tehran will remain circumscribed by the internal power struggle within Iran, growing tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbours and Iran’s continued defiance of the global nuclear order.

Lt Gen O P Kaushik (retd) The writer has been General Officer Commanding in the Kashmir valley. He was chief of staff of Eastern Command and is the former Vice Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, India.

Coal is being used for 64 per cent of our energy consumption. We have enough coal available indigenously and, therefore, its use for power generation can be enhanced to save on diesel consumption for the same purpose. Use of oil for electricity generation can be further reduced by exploiting our hydro generation. We have nearly 300 perennial rivers and rivulets to provide us unlimited hydroelectricity. New findings of natural gas in Godavari basin and in Gujarat should be utilised to meet our energy requirement and to save oil

ndia imports 73 per cent of its present oil requirements. By the years 2025 this is likely to get enlarged to 83 per cent. Dependency on foreign oil is a major security concern for India. Furthermore, major oil suppliers to India - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Libya, Iraq to name a few are members of Organisation of Islamic Conference a 57 member group of Islamic countries, who, in the past sided with Pakistan. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971 and oil crises of 1973, some of these countries had caused serious problems for India. Hence, security considerations demand that India must diversify its oil supplies and considerably reduce dependency on oil producers of South West Asia and North Africa.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

PRAGMATIC SOLUTION

Blending ethanol into petrol must be introduced not only in a symbolic form but commercially to achieve substantial reduction in consumption of oil. It will require setting up of new sugar mills and ethanol plants and growing more cane involving huge investments. One estimate suggests that a courageous step in this regard can achieve, at least, 10 per cent reduction in oil consumption International security environment is also warming up on account of major world powers – USA, Russia, China, involved in gaining control of world’s energy supply. The USA had entered the Arab world when President Roosevelt guaranteed protection to Saudi Arabia and in return bargained for uninterrupted supply of oil from that country. Today, the US has full control on Saudi oil production and supply. During the last six decades, the US has enlarged its stronghold on all oil producing countries of the Arab world and those who tried to defy her, were subjugated militarily as it happened in Iraq and Libya. They went on to establish the US Army’s Central Command at Tampa, Florida and chartered it for protection of the US interests in the Arab world and specially, the oil rich countries of the Persian Gulf. More recently, Central Asian Republics, who are said to possess second highest energy reserves in the world, have been included in its areas of responsibility. Some strategists have opined that the so called American War against international terrorism is not really to defeat terrorism but an effort to gain control of oil. Russia has abundant oil and Gas and, in fact, is a supplier of energy to quite a few countries of Europe and Japan who are the US allies. Russia has started using energy as a weapon of influence. During the year 2010 it shut off gas supplies to Ukraine, erstwhile Soviet Republic and presently showing closeness to the US. To deny inroads to the US in Central Asian Republics, it has formed Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Some world watchers have named it as Central Asian version of Opec.

China is going all out to acquire drilling rights wherever she can get and especially in Arab, African and Central Asian Republics. She has outbid India in this respect in Sudan, Myanmar and Iran. Her growing closeness to Iran is likely to interfere with India’s supply of oil from Iran. Iran has 12 per cent of the World’s oil and 15 per cent of World’s gas and for oil supply it is so important for us that we have refused to be dictated by the US in our relationship with Iran. China’s partnership with Iran and Russia in order to lock in and block oil and gas from the Central Asian areas and the Caspian Sea Region is a great geo-strategic worry for the US from the point of view of oil potential Iran is most strategically located as it covers most important oil sources of the world namely the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asia Republics. Iran’s own oil reserves and her dominance over other major oil producing countries are perhaps the main reasons for the US concerns about Iran and not the nuclear issue. Among other efforts of China, some more sensitive are a deal for oil with Saudi Arabia in exchange for sophisticated weapons and new technologies, a US$ 100 billion deal with Iran, pipelines and explorations in Central Asian Republics, oil deal with Venezuela, establishment and operational rights to use Gwadar port in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Haingyi in Myanmar for energy security and overland energy routes in preference to sea lanes which could be interfered by the US and her allies. Above is a view of international oil war. In this scenario what should India do to ensure its energy security? Indian economy is developing at a fast speed. We recorded a growth of 7 to 9 per cent during the last decade - second only to China in the world. Due to this, the demand for oil in India has been rising at the rate of 4 to 5 per cent per year against global rise of 3 per cent. Since we import approximately 73 per cent of our oil requirements, it is a huge burden. Close to one third of India’s export earnings goes in payment for oil imports. It is on account of swelling oil bills that our trade has been facing

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

a huge deficit. India’s crude imports (1,000 Tons) in the year 1998-99 were 39,808. In 2009-2010 these went up to 1,59,259, an increase of 400 per cent. We have adequate reserves of foreign currency to meet the deficit but, in future, circumstances can be created by our adversaries and competitors whereby foreign exchange reserves shrink and we face payment difficulties. Recently, we had this problem in making payment to Iran for the oil supplies although this was on account of economic embargo by the US and European Union against Iran. Recently announced new sanctions by the US and the EU against Iran, whereby any country indulging in oil trade with Iran will be denied banking transactions with their banks, causes further problems for India as we have to make all payments for oil purchases from Iran in dollars. In spite of Iran accepting 45 per cent of payments in rupees the problem is very grave. There is, therefore, an immediate need for strict demand management to reduce the growing deficit. We had a sad situation in the year 1991 when we were forced to mortgage our gold reserves and compelled to move these reserves from Indian banks to those of Europe and America. Currently oil imports are causing a deficit of US$ 150 billion every year. This shows how important it is for India to speedily tap its own oil reserves. It is estimated, based on present trend, that our dependency on oil import is likely to grow up to 80 to 85 per cent by 2025. This will almost be an emergency situation. This emerging scenario calls for concentration on increasing oil exploration within the country to have adequate reserves to cater for emergencies forced upon us by international security environment. We are extremely vulnerable on oil security front. Our performance in oil exploration has been dismally poor. During 1984-85 the production of crude oil was 29 million tons which rose to 33.69 million tons during 2009-2010. Increase in production has, therefore, been only marginal. Various surveys conducted by us, as well as hired companies from abroad, have proved that there is enough oil in Rajasthan, Gujarat and river basin areas on our east coast. These need to be explored on emergency basis.

There are huge pay-offs in buying oil from abroad. Sometime back, India’s external affairs minister had to resign when his involvement was proved. This vested interest of corrupt political leaders and equally corrupt bureaucrats is coming in the way of rapidly exploring our indigenous oil potential. This corrupt attitude has kept India dependent on foreign oil for so many years.

The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission is meant to install 20,000 MW of grid connected solar power by 2022. In the first phase of the bidding process, 620 MW plants have been bid out. Biomass has a scope in rural areas and 80 per cent of our population lives in villages. Energy production from biomass, if harnessed properly, can meet the total domestic requirement of rural sector Since oil prices are likely to remain high, it is important that we reduce consumption of oil by using other sources of energy. Coal is being used for 64 per cent of our energy consumption. We have enough coal available indigenously and, therefore, its use for power generation can be enhanced to save on diesel consumption for the same purpose. Use of diesel oil for electricity generation can be further reduced by exploiting our hydro generation. We have nearly 300 perennial rivers and rivulets to provide us unlimited hydroelectricity. New findings of natural gas in Godavari basin and in Gujarat should be utilised to meet our energy requirement and to save oil. By use of other sources of energy, we must achieve, at least, 10 per cent cut in oil consumption. The government is already exploring possibilities of power generation by nuclear technology. This will also enable us to conserve oil from power generations. Other sources of energy which have great potential in India are the wind power, solar energy and biomass. India is generating over 3,000 MW of energy from wind power. Enough scope exists in the country to take it to 20,000 MW. Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan in particular offer enough opportunities in this regard. We should send teams to Denmark to study new technologies in wind

power exploration where 80 per cent need of energy is being met by wind power generation. New and efficient technologies have made solar energy as a viable alternative. India has more than adequate solar system servicing the entire country and throughout the year. Earnest efforts are needed to use this energy. The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission is meant to install 20,000 MW of grid connected solar power by 2022. In the first phase of the bidding process, 620 MW plants have been bid out. Biomass has a scope in rural areas and 80 per cent of our population lives in villages. Energy production from biomass, if harnessed properly, can meet the total domestic requirement of rural sector. Crisis of oil security can be managed by properly harnessing our other sources of energy which are available in plenty within the country. Recent surveys on oil reserves in India have been very promising. Our 4,00,000 sq km offshore basin and 1.53 million sq km onshore basin have abundance of oil reserves. One estimate is that within them are hidden 50 billion tons of hydrocarbons. Our indigenous production of oil is mainly from Bombay High, upper Assam, Cambay and the Krishna-Godavari and Cauvery basins. These are too insufficient to meet growing requirement. We must concentrate all our efforts to achieve early result in oil exploration. Recently, oil has been found in vast areas of Rajasthan and huge reserves of gas in the Godavari basin. Under the new exploration licensing policy, contracts have been signed covering 100 blocks. About a dozen discoveries have already been made. Among them Krishna-Godavari basin indicates availability of 7 trillion cubic feet

of gas. Mangla is expected to give up to 800 million barrels. Similarly, large reserves of oil have been reported from Rajasthan. These are welcome signs for an increase in our internal production of oil and gas. Our neighbour Bangladesh has large reserve of gas. India is negotiating for supply of Bangladesh gas. Interestingly, China has offered to develop and operate a port in the vicinity of Chittagong for Bangladesh, free of cost. It has, however, demanded berthing rights for the Chinese navy and drilling rights for exploring oil and gas. China’s presence and especially huge economic package that Chinese have offered to Bangladesh, may come in the way of our getting gas from Bangladesh. India must build up reserve oil stocks. All developed countries have built up stocks. China is also buying oil by offering higher prices and creating emergency reserves. India must create reserves in built-in stocks, to reduce the impact of rise in prices and also interruption in oil supplies on account of sudden deterioration in security environment. In army, ‘War Wastage Reserves’ are created to cater for replenishment of equipment spent during war. Similarly, the country must have adequate reserve of oil stock to cater for emergent situation. We must create a strategic Petroleum reserve equivalent of 90 days of total Indian crude oil imports. It is appreciated that 90 days may be enough to resolve a situation hampering oil supply. We have surplus food grain stocks. In fact, our food stock is rotting for want of storing space. Most of the oil exporting countries import food

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

PRAGMATIC SOLUTION

grain. We should work out a trade agreement of swapping food for oil. Rise in price of one can be offset by corresponding rise in the price of the other. A long term agreement in this field will help in reducing the impact of rise in oil prices. We also have huge scientific trained manpower and elaborate training facilities which can be bartered for oil.

The demand for oil in India has been rising at the rate of 4 to 5 per cent per year against global rise of 3 per cent. Since we import approximately 73 per cent of our oil requirements, it is a huge burden. Close to one third of India’s export earnings goes in payment for oil imports Blending ethanol into petrol must be introduced not only in a symbolic form but commercially to achieve substantial reduction in consumption of oil. It will require setting up of new sugar mills and ethanol plants and growing more cane involving huge investments. One estimate suggests that a courageous step in this regard can achieve, at least, 10 per cent reduction in oil consumption. At the same time public must be continuously educated to reduce consumption of oil by efficient use and by resorting to substitution where possible. Diesel alone accounts for 40 per cent of fuel consumption and 64 per cent of diesel consumption is used by automobiles. To reduce this, we need to develop coastal shipping, inland waterways and the rail. These measures offer a great scope to save energy Diversion of traffic from road to rail would save energy. On the strategic front we must strengthen our relationship with the Arab countries as we are overwhelmingly dependent on ‘Gulf oil’. We import 73 per cent of our total oil requirements. Of this, 23 per cent comes from Saudi Arabia, 17 per cent from Iran, 9 per cent from United Arab Emirates (UAR). Nigeria gives us 11 per cent and Malaysia approximately 4 per cent. The Gulf and West Asia provide over 80 per cent of India’s oil imports and the major portion of our gas requirements. Approximately 10 million Indians are working in this

region who send nearly US$ 40 billion every year back home in India. Indian corporates are engaged in executing major project works in various countries of the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia alone there are 600 Indian small to big business concerns. Economic ties, based on joint ventures in Arab lands and India are growing. Central Asia has great oil and gas reserves. Influential powers of the world the US, Russia and China have had an eye on these resources. India has friendly relationship and historical ties with these countries. Russia and China have joined hands to undercut the US strategic reach in this region. They have formed Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to control global energy resources with particular emphasis on resources of Central Asian Republics. India also showed interest in this Organisation but was granted entry only as an observer along with Mongolia, Pakistan and Iran. The member states of SCO have no concern for India’s security and energy needs. Nevertheless, Central Asian Republics had suffered at the hands of Russians when they were part of Soviet Union and were forced to part company and be independent. With China, they have many an emotive issue like dispute over territory and water resources. Indian efforts towards cooperation with Central Asia are without motive and are gradually gaining respectability. We should, therefore, not insist too much on becoming a member of the SCO. We should establish relationship with these republics on our own, enlarge trade with the region and eventually our energy security interest in the region will get looked after. India must develop multifaceted relationship with these republics and this relationship could eventually reduce India’s over dependence on the Gulf oil. In the next 15 years, oil crisis is likely to get aggravated on account of rising demands for oil all over the world and fast declining supply. This economic phenomenon will lead to rise in prices. Emerging international security scenario may also have an impact on an uninterrupted supply of oil from abroad. Under these circumstances, we need to

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

design a strategy for oil security. Key components of the strategy will be exploration of oil reserves and increased production within India to reduced dependence on import, explore possibilities and encourage use of alternative source of energy like wind power, solar energy, biomass and introduce latest technologies in these fields; exercise restraint, strict discipline and efficiency in consumption of oil to reduce consumption by at least, 10 per cent in next 15 years; encourage public sector and private companies to venture into exploration of oil and gas in foreign lands; create and store strategic petroleum reserves equivalent of 90 days of total Indian crude oil imports; diversify sources of supply as much as possible and practical and develop strategic relationship with regions like the Central Asia which have an abundance of oil and gas reserves. Since we do not have geographical contiguity with Central Asia or for that matter any other major oil producing country, we will remain dependent on oil imports by sea from the Persian Gulf Region. We must, therefore, cultivate and develop more intimate and bilaterally beneficial relations with the countries of this region, notwithstanding what the US policy and designs are in the area. We have over 10 million Indians working in these countries, providing skilled and technological workforce for the prosperity of these countries. Back up support provided by highly skilled and technological expert Indian manpower is an inescapable need for sustaining their economic growth. This manpower should be utilised to develop an intimate relationship. Strategically, we must make efforts for stability all over Afghanistan and Pakistan so that for future security of oil, environment can be created to build pipelines from Central Asia Republics and Iran to bring oil. These could even be joint projects for Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The strategy should also include short and long term programmes and a high powered committee to ensure strict and time bound implementation of the programmes. We need to move speedily in the matter as it is seriously affecting the national security.

Israeli Embassy Vehicle Attacked In New Delhi

n Israeli diplomat’s car exploded near the Indian prime minister’s residence in New Delhi injuring the wife of an embassy staff member and at least three other people, in what appeared to be a coordinated, two-pronged terror attack against Israeli missions in India and Georgia.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately blamed the strikes on Iran and Lebanonbased Hezbollah, raising concerns in the Mideast about a more overt confrontation by regional powers. “Iran is behind these attacks,” Netanyahu said. “It is the biggest exporter of terror in the world. ... We will continue to take strong and systematic, yet patient action against the international terrorism that originates in Iran.” After the attacks, the Israeli Foreign Ministry instructed all diplomats and embassy personnel to refrain from driving their cars until they have been inspected by security personnel. “India condemns such incidents,” said Foreign Minister S M Krishna. “The investigation has started. We will keep Israel posted.” Israel and India have maintained diplomatic ties for the last 20 years. They have close relations and often share intelligence, given that both face Islamic fundamentalism on their borders. The two are discussing a free-trade agreement. Israeli officials said they had thwarted similar would-be attacks in recent weeks in Azerbaijan and Thailand.

Delhi Police Going Hi-tech

ver the years, along with rapid changes in the way of life, has come a whole new way of crime. In order to deal with the same with a firm hand, the Delhi Police has been on a modernisation drive to improve its capability and be better equipped to handle the changing face of crime in the capital. In addition to this initiative, better and faster vehicles have been procured for the PCR, to give an incisive edge to the whole concept of speedy response, Emergency Response Vehicles have also been attached to all police stations. Integrated Command Control Co-Ordination And Communication Centre (C4i) Established in Delhi, the C4i project seeks to provide uniformed situation awareness and an integrated decision support system. The purpose of C4i is to provide real time situation awareness for Delhi Police in all situations and includes various markets border check-posts etc.

CCTV Surveillance System Delhi Police has CCTV surveillance system in 26 market places and 5 border check-posts. In the next step, 28 new markets and 10 border check-posts have also been identified for installation of CCTV system. Know Your Police Station This is a useful programme initiated recently by Delhi Police in association with Microsoft that has been launched to enable citizens to get information about the respective jurisdictions of 161 territorial police stations of Delhi and other useful information like the police station phone numbers, name and photograph of SHOs, etc. on their website It also enables the user to visualise the route of the desired police station in respect of any particular location in Delhi and has a mechanism too for sharing information with the police without disclosing one’s identity.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

INDIA’S DILEMMA There are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies in international politics; only permanent interests ...

Dr Navniit Gandhi The writer is a freelancer and an author of repute based in Kuwait.

Our relationships with both - Iran and Israel could be kept out of limelight and public view. We need access to hydrocarbons from a mixed basket of sources, including Iran. Our ties with Israel will anger the Islamic world and our ties with Iran will upset Israel and the US Since our strategic and economic gains are at stake, we have to be cautious and diplomatic and if possible, maintain a low profile while going about doing our business as usual

Saudi Arabia is the chief supplier of oil to India and our crude oil imports from Riyadh are likely to double in the next 20 years. There are approximately 1.5 million Indian workers in Saudi Arabiaand their remittances (US$ 6 billion annually) are a crucial component of our forex reserves. Also, we need an ally with a clout in the Islamic world

ational Interest is and must be the guiding force and the defining criterion of morality of decisions and tenacity of actions in games of power politics among nations. India today finds itself caught in a fix. The UN Security Council at first, imposed a stringent set of sanctions on Iran and then the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) also imposed sanctions on the country’s oil and gas sector. There is now pressure on companies to cut business or end their affiliation with Iranian firms. The initial focus was on financial institutions and now it has expanded to include manufacturers and service providers. India is caught in this political crossfire. The US and the West European powers seem to be closing in, trying to corner and isolate Iran. India’s purchase of oil from Iran may drop in the near future given the difficulties in making payments through banks due to the tough sanctions against top Iranian banks. Under the new American sanctions made on December 31, financial institutions dealing with Iran’s central bank will be penalised. Our official positions on global issues are usually straightforward and this has been so even with respect to the nuclear programme of Iran. Till date, India has upheld Iran’s right to pursue civilian nuclear energy, while opposing any further proliferation in its extended neighbourhood. What posture should India now adopt in the face of this heightened diplomatic frenzy against Iran? Should we stand by Iran? Or toe the line of the US and other Western European powers?

The stakes Our energy needs are rapidly rising. Iran has the third largest reserve of oil and the

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Walking the Tightrope

second largest proven reserve of gas and we cannot ignore these facts. Iran accounts for about 12 per cent of our oil imports. The relationship between the two nations has become robust and comprehensive since the 1990s. Iran has significantly catered to a percentage of our energy needs, while we have developed infrastructure in Iran. The military and intelligence ties between India and Iran have gained momentum too. It is, however, Iran’s geo-strategic position that makes a big difference to us. Its geographical proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan matters. It matters to us that who wields influence in Afghanistan in the wake of an exit by the American troops. It is in the mutual interests of both - India and Iran that Pakistan is prevented from reigning supreme in the region. We also cannot afford to be marginalised at a time when the axis of Iran-China-Pakistan seems to be gaining strength. China is as hungry as we are for both - oil and gas. China is now Iran’s largest trading partner and is undertaking massive investments in the country. On the other hand, our presence is shrinking and that doesn’t augur too well for our foreseeable future. The proposal to build a North-South corridor - shared by India, Iran and Russia, if and when actually implemented could facilitate the movement of goods across Central Asia as well as Russia. It will save time and costs for all nations involved. There are joint naval exercises, space cooperation, working groups focusing on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, telecommunication development projects and a wide array of ongoing programmes between India and Iran.

The threats We face threats from the sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union. In September 2005 and then in February 2006, India was asked to prove its loyalty to the United States by lining up behind Washington at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. India was warned that it will have to pay a heavy price for a disregard of US concerns vis a vis Iran. And India obliged. Under an advisory provision included in the US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, India was supposed to dissuade, isolate and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability. Ironically though, the China-Pakistan-A Q Khan sponsored proliferation which dates back from 1976 onwards and which led to the alleged nuclearisation of Iran, has hardly ever been openly acknowledged by the US and other Western powers. In fact, in 1957, Washington and Tehran signed their first civil nuclear cooperation agreement and over the

next two decades, the US provided Iran not only with technical assistance but with its first experimental nuclear reactor, complete with enriched uranium and plutonium with fissile isotopes. Today, some members of the US Congress have warned India that it must choose between the Iran of the Ayotollahs, with its oil and gas and the democratic West, with its advanced nuclear power technology. And we face threats from the growing proximity among China and Iran. Iran looks at China as its greatest pillar of support and the latter’s increasing demands for energy makes Iran its indispensable partner. China’s permanent presence on the UN’s Security Council will prove useful to Iran when it finds itself increasingly isolated by the global community.

The dilemma The dilemmas are just too many for us. Our relationship with Iran has historical, strategic and commercial dimensions. Several agreements have

been signed; deals forged; declarations proclaimed and visits exchanged at all levels. With the visits by our then PM Narasimha Rao in 1993 and by Iran’s then President Rafsanjani in 1995, relations between the two nations took a giant leap. The Tehran Declaration signed in 2001; preceded by a visit of the then Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Iran further committed the two states to deeper levels of engagement, including military cooperation. Despite the close historical links, it has, however, not been a relationship altogether devoid of suspicions and mistrust. For instance, during the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan, Iran provided military assistance to Pakistan. Iran was not supportive of the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. Tehran has often criticised the Indian government for the way it has handled protests in Kashmir. And during the Iran-Iraq war, India remained ambivalent as it tried to simultaneously protect its oil interests in both states. Other than our need for energy, an important reason for our continued

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

proximity to Iran is that both, Tehran and New Delhi would not want a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan. However, there are no permanent alliances in the world. Today, Iran maintains that it would not like to see Pakistan’s military interests propel in Afghanistan. But will it sincerely work with India in the long run towards securing this objective?

We cannot afford to be guided by anything but our national interests, in the ongoing issue involving Iran. Much is at stake in the web of global relationships. We cannot antagonise the US and we cannot join the rhetoric and isolate Iran. Both are risk-laden propositions In 2005, we signed a 25-year, US$ 22 billion agreement with Iran for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG), but nothing has materialised since then because there cannot be an LNG plant (which India was to construct) in Iran without American components and that is unlikely in the near future. The US$ 7 billion Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline which is supposed to carry natural gas from Iran to India, via Pakistan has also not made much headway, as India is obviously concerned about the immense risks involved in such a project. The deal has been on freeze as far as India is concerned and the Iranian ambassador in India said in February 2010 that ‘while the doors are open to India to join the IPI, Iran will not wait indefinitely”. On several occasions, the unreliability of Iran as a trade partner to India has come to the fore. We must tread cautiously. Also, the Iranian gas is not the lowest-priced option for India today. It is important that the sources of our supplies be diverse

Our options We cannot afford to be guided by anything but our national interests, in the ongoing issue involving Iran. Much is at stake in the web of global relationships. We cannot antagonise the US and we cannot join the rhetoric and isolate Iran. Both are risk-laden propositions. To begin with, adopting a policy of ‘lying low’, could give us some time

Iran conundrum

INDIA’S DILEMMA for pragmatic calculations. Why join the ongoing propaganda - in favour of or against Iran? Why not simply wait and watch, while trying to conduct business as normally as is possible? This does not make us incapable of eventually taking straightforward positions and committing ourselves to them. We cannot forget that there is the larger Arab world, with which our relations are crucial than ever before. Our defence relationship with the Arab world is substantial too and is gaining in strength and scope. Obviously, that cannot be put at stake. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are rising and at this juncture, moving too close to Iran or vociferously trying to uphold the right of Iran to a civil nuclear programme could prove to be a mistake. Saudi Arabia is the chief supplier of oil to India and our crude oil imports from Riyadh are likely to double in the next 20 years. There are approximately 1.5 million Indian workers in Saudi Arabia and their remittances (US$ 6 billion annually) are a crucial component of our forex reserves. Also, we need an ally with a clout in the Islamic world. On the whole, our bilateral trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is expected to be about US$ 130 billion by 2013-2014, while our trade with Iran (though significant) is to the tune of about US$ 14 billion. We must weigh our options carefully. The GCC countries supply 45 per cent of India’s petroleum and Qatar alone supplies five million tons of LNG to India. Our relations with the GCC countries cannot be compromised with. With the large Muslim population we have and the growing fears that they harbour, it is important for us to maintain good relations with other Muslim states. At the same time, our moving closer towards Saudi Arabia will invite Iran’s hostility. Relations are already strained between Saudi Arabia and Iran. India could find itself dragged in the cold war. If public passions in Iran flare up against India, not only will our core interests in Afghanistan be jeopardised, but we may see China forging ahead more strongly than ever before.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Our ties with Israel are growing too and blunders cannot be made at this juncture by putting this relationship at risk. We need to forge close ties with Israel and the US, in order to tackle the rising terrorism in and around our nation. Our relationships with both Iran and Israel could be kept out of limelight and public view. We need access to hydrocarbons from a mixed basket of sources, including Iran. Our ties with Israel will anger the Islamic world and our ties with Iran will upset Israel and the US. Since our strategic and economic gains are at stake, we have to be cautious and diplomatic and if possible, maintain a low profile while going about doing our business as usual. We cannot always take technology from Israel and pass it on to its foe - Iran and even make a big noise about it. Getting what we need is more crucial and how shall Iran satisfy its needs can be left to its policymakers. The challenges we face are complex and carving a policy on the Middle East is crucial. But we do not need a policy which is hurriedly carved or one which is driven by sentiments of history and of defending the poor South against the mighty North. There is no non-aligned world anymore whose banner has to be held high, while arriving at our foreign policy. There is no pragmatism and merit in joining a powerful bandwagon either. It is important to remember that just as for us, there have been no permanent friends or permanent enemies, so it is for the US and for Iran too. Just as perceptions about and roles assigned to Iraq and Pakistan have changed in the policies of great powers (to suit their convenience), so also when will Iran become an ally and then turn into an evil empire and then will be an ally once again, cannot be ascertained. Which regime becomes a threat and when and why can hardly ever be foreseen accurately in the sphere of International Relations. Caution and Restrain are the key words for us even if our stand is misinterpreted as ambiguous or one involving sitting on the fence. We do not need to prove our mettle to the world. The fulfilment of our short term needs and long term gains is and ought to be our only concern and not winning laurels from one or the other bloc of nations.

PERILOUS IMBROGLIO

Iran’s Nuclear Bomb: Emerging Threat of War

Dr Sudhanshu Tripathi The writer is Associate Professor, Political Science in Dr R M L Awadh University, Faizabad, UP.

The IAEA Press and Public Information Officer Giovanni Verlini informed The Moscow News over the next few days, the report will be distributed only among the delegations of the membercountries and that it will be up to the diplomats to decide whether to pass on its details to the press or not

Several questions arise as regards to Iran’s many nuclear centres. The enrichment centres at Natanz and Qom invariably draw the attention of IAEA experts because they are equipped with dual devices which, after minor alterations, can produce highly enriched uranium of weapons grade level. Similarly the research reactor IR-40 in Arak which is a heavy-water reactor, besides its normal function, can also produce weapons grade plutonium in an easy way. Its construction makes it possible to change fuel cassettes on the fly, without ceasing operation. This makes it easier for manufacturing weapons grade fissionable materials in a secret manner.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

PERILOUS IMBROGLIO

he recent IAEA report has once again brought Iran into limelight as Iran is working on a project to make bomb fuel. This may cause serious impact on regional as well as global situation of peace and security. The US may, besides tough economic sanctions, opt for even the last option of war in order to prevail upon Iran.

The US, but for whose help when the Shah was in power, Iran would not have had such a developed nuclear programme, cannot afford to be seen as washing its hands off the looming crisis. It has too much at stake in West Asia to remain indifferent with these new developments Iran is, now, back in news because of its ongoing nuclear programme allegedly for making nuclear weapons despite application of a variety of tough sanctions over the past several years which in the eyes of western countries, particulary the US, is a sin as Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and also of its additional protocol. On its part Iran has always claimed about it pursuing only for peaceful purposes. For over a decade the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US have been unsuccessfully searching for material evidence to pin down Iran as a nuclear weapons state. This accusation against Iran has been prepared by United Nations’s IAEA, a global watchdog, which is based upon a crystal clear rendering of a document still not recognised as an officially issued IAEA report. The report, though announced long ago and that too with different reservations about its status, began leaking into the press only on Wednesday i.e. November 08, 2011. It was in early October that year, the press began to write about the fact that this report was being prepared and that it was expected to be tough and uncompromising. The IAEA Press and Public Information Officer Giovanni Verlini informed The Moscow News over the next few days, the report will be distributed only among the delegations of the member-countries and that it will be up to the diplomats to decide whether

to pass on its details to the press or not. The IAEA experts are not authorised themselves to do so, as he explained. This is, in fact, a peculiar decision on the future of the document that may potentially influence the issues of war and peace in West Asia. On the one hand, the report enumerates all sins and suspicions concerning Iran going back almost to the 1990’s. This fact has already prompted Iran to call the report a compilation of state accusations that are politically loaded under US pressure and not supported by new facts. On the other hand, the report cites new results of inspections of nuclear facilities (conducted in last two years), which point to a considerable increase in the production of 20 per cent enriched uranium about which Iran has declared to be fuel for its nuclear reactors engaged in civilian programme. It appears that the report, which is an unfinished expert document, was deliberately prepared at the behest of the US. And it has already been disseminated in the Press and on the Internet and has evoked serious comments, will not be officially published at all. What is here of particular concern is the time of its leak because now the US is relatively less engaged in Iraq and also in Afghanistan and that makes it, along with Israel, in a comfortable position to launch a full-fledged military offensive against Iran because both, the US and Israel, are the countries most worried by the progress of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This will also get UNSC approval under the overall guidance of the US. As a result, several news leaks indicating for possible military strike against Iran emerged on the scene and, at the same time, large scale exercises of the US military transport aviation in the Middle East (supposedly to cover up the movement of forces) and ending with almost panicked reports that Iran was about to hide all of its nuclear centrifuges in the mountains in order to protect them from the US attack. Although there is no apparently serious cause of apprehension detailed in the report because most of the details have been common knowledge for quite some time, yet

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

it has led to escalation of tensions as the Iranian President has reacted in strong words counter accusing the IAEA of siding with the absurd US accusations, thereby discrediting itself. Although this report is a factual indication of the existence of uranium enrichment plants and stockpiled nuclear weapons in that country and Iran also appears to have secretly conducted experiments creating sophisticated systems ensuring synchronous detonation of a nuclear charge that are seen as a potential threat to world peace, yet no direct evidence in the act of producing nuclear weapons grade uranium has been found so far.

News leaks indicating for possible military strike against Iran emerged on the scene and, at the same time, large scale exercises of the US military transport aviation in the Middle East (supposedly to cover up the movement of forces) and ending with almost panicked reports that Iran was about to hide all of its nuclear centrifuges in the mountains in order to protect them from the US attack Further, this follows from the report’s clearly worded conclusions, which point out that the operation of these nuclear plants does not contradict the information given officially by Iran to the IAEA. In fact Iran has openly declared about its ambitious plans to construct 20 GW nuclear energy units, though it is not an easy task, to justify the expansion of its uranium enrichment capabilities because of its indigenous fuel production for its reactors by erecting high-tech industries and also to meet its ever increasing energy requirements. However several questions arise as regards to its many nuclear centres. The enrichment centres at Natanz and Qom invariably draw the attention of IAEA experts because they are equipped with dual devices which, after minor alterations, can produce highly enriched uranium of weapons grade level. Similarly the research reactor IR-40 in Arak which is a heavy-water reactor, besides its normal function, can also produce weapons grade plutonium in an easy

way. Its construction makes it possible to change fuel cassettes on the fly, without ceasing operation. This makes it easier for manufacturing weapons grade fissionable materials in a secret manner.

However several questions arise as regards to its many nuclear centres. The enrichment centres at Natanz and Qom invariably draw the attention of IAEA experts because they are equipped with dual devices which, after minor alterations, can produce highly enriched uranium of weapons grade level. Similarly the research reactor IR-40 in Arak which is a heavywater reactor, besides its normal function, can also produce weapons grade plutonium in an easy way. Its construction makes it possible to change fuel cassettes on the fly, without ceasing operation. This makes easier it for manufacturing weapons grade fissionable materials in a secret manner Despite Iran’s repeated claims of conducting strictly peaceful research in these nuclear centres, the fear of misuse by Iran cannot allay the concerns over their military purpose. Although Iran is reiterating constantly about the fatwa of Late Ayatollah Khomeini imposing a religious ban on nuclear weapons, but it is seriously involved in nuclear programme which may produce nuclear weapons. The immediate impact of the report will be felt in West Asia - in Iran’s nearest and extended neighbourhood. Israel has valid grounds to feel alarmed because Iran has repeatedly threatened to wipe out the Jewish state from the map of the world. Similarly Sunni Arab states also find themselves unsafe because a nuclear–armed Shia Iran can further unsettle the Arab states which are already under tremendous pressure on account of internal political turmoil due to ongoing Arab Spring. Evidently, this bodes ominous portents for the peace and security of this region. First, there is the possibility of Israel attacking with a fury, although that appears unlikely at this moment. But if it were to occur in reality, it may trigger a chain reaction causing

massive upheaval here. Secondly, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which have traditionally crafted Arab opinion, would not like to be counted as good for nothing before a nuclear-armed Iran tries to assume leadership of the region. Thirdly, the US, but for whose help when the Shah was in power, Iran would not have had such a developed nuclear programme, cannot afford to be seen as washing its hands off the looming crisis. It has too much at stake in West Asia to remain indifferent with these new developments. Against this backdrop, the only viable option that is worth pursuing is to somehow persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear programme and if it fails, then, the testing of nuclear bomb be delayed and also the announcing of its status as a nuclear weapon state. For these ends, the existing sanctions be further tightened against Iran as is being done and concerted international diplomatic efforts be launched to pressurise Iran. But China and Russia are not in favour of more economic sanctions. France is also unwilling to support further sanctions. Many countries, although tried their best to persuade Iran but could not succeed. Russia even offered to enrich uranium for Iran if it were to stick to a civilian nuclear programme.

In fact Iran should learn a lesson or two from the ghastly deaths that occurred at Chernobyl and Fukushima in Russia and Japan respectively and caused immense damage. Today Japan is under tremendous pressure from its citizens against nuclear option for its energy requirements. Hence, Iran must consider about the catastrophe that is bound to hit its oil industry in the event of a nuclear accident. At the very least, Iran must amend its nuclear programme that is meant to destroy and put the nuclear option to work for its energy requirements. After all, the safety of a country’s residents is more important than the nuclear bomb or such energy. While hawks talk of nuclear capacity as a means of ensuring peace and security in the world, the real prospects for them are illusory. Responsible countries across the world should try to impress upon Iran through persuasive methods rather than aggressive postures to change that hard-headed attitude. Ironically, even as Iran stands virtually isolated, it has nothing to worry about being made to pay a heavy price for violating the NPT. But this may change given the hard posture adopted by the US and its continuing such policy in the Middle East.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

India’s effort to create an effectual linkage with Afghanistan in which the Zaranj-Delaram highway will become the umbilical cord between the besieged Hamid Karzai regime and the rest of the world through Iran’s Chabahar port is in danger of being scuttled. India will have to apply great diplomatic acumen to try and delink the western embargo of Iran from the creation and maintenance of a link with Afghanistan through the Iranian corridor of Chabahar through Milak and Sistan. A rail-cum-road bridge over the early stretch of the Helmand river is part of the plan for the strategic link with Afghanistan

STRATEGIC FULCRUM The road connecting Zaranj on the Iran-Afghan border to Dilaram in west-central Afghanistan on the Kandahar-Herat highway built by India is by itself a good strategic investment but much will depend on how India is able to manage the security of this 218-km stretch in the face of the barren nature of the landscape and the inherent danger of a Pak-Taliban intervention. More urgent, at the moment, appears to be the need to retain workable links with Iran in the face of the strident standoff between Tehran and the US-led western phalanx bent on putting the brakes on what is seen as an Iranian attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.

ndia does not want Iran to become the newest proliferant and has voted within the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran adheres to commitments made to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities much to Tehran’s surprise and chagrin. On the other hand India has also taken steps to circumvent the embargo on Iranian oil revenues to ensure that it is able to pay for the supplies it is receiving or has received in the past. It is a delicate balancing act between two hot stools. Definitely not a comfortable situation to be in. But the stakes are very high both in actual economic terms as well as in the strategic outreach to Afghanistan in the first instance and beyond into the former Central Asia Republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union - all landlocked nations on which Pakistan exercises a stranglehold and an exclusion of India from a region with which it has had historical relations from pre-history.

Pipeline exempt from sanctions During the early stage of the Iran-US contratemps India managed to extract concessions from Washington with regard to the ongoing Indo-Iran talks on the creation of a gas pipeline linkage connecting the two countries. Two options were being discussed at the time – one an undersea pipeline skirting Pakistani territorial waters and the other the overland route through the trouble-torn Balochistan territory and all its attendant dangers as seen in the almost daily bombings of the pipelines leading out of the Sui gasfields to other parts of Pakistan. The Bush administration, already deep into remoulding Indo-US relations on the nuclear issue had agreed to keep the Indo-Iranian pipeline issue outside the ambit of the proposed economic sanctions on Iran. Something similar will have to be worked out with the Obama administration to ensure that India does not

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Link to Afghanistan and beyond

become a victim of collateral damage in the emerging confrontation and Pakistan and the Taliban /Al Qaeda take full advantage of the vacuum that will occur when US troops withdraw completely from Afghanistan in two years’ time.

Vital areas and vital points like the Zaranj-Delaram corridor should be selected for sanitisation and freed from Taliban control. India should then work on the America-led coalition to ease sanctions on the Chabahar-Dilaram corridor so that Afghanistan can then become free from the stranglehold of Pakistan The US has made it clear that it will impose sanctions on any entity that does business with Iran very much in the manner that it did when it blacklisted several Indian public sector undertakings suspected to be involved in India’s nuclear tests in Pokhran in 1998. Several Indian personalities too were prevented from visiting or having contacts with American institutions.

Iran’s nuclear policy Iran, in the exercise of its sovereign right to utilise the full range of its nuclear options has taken the brash and aggressive path to the fulfilment of its ambitions. It has started its enrichment plant and is going full blast towards, nobody knows for sure but presumes, the enrichment of uranium to weapons grade status. Given the kind of threats that are being held out by the western alliance it could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy in the perfervid atmosphere where Iran finds itself hemmed in and feels the need to respond equally aggressively. The omnipresent Israeli threat to deliver the kind of coup de grace to Iranian nuclear ambitions as it did with the Osirak reactor in Iraq (blasted it with a well-placed missile) adds to the generally increasing temperature.

India does not want Iran to become the newest proliferant and has voted within the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran adheres to commitments made to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities much to Tehran’s surprise and chagrin

Unfettering Afghanistan In the midst of all this, India’s effort to create an effectual linkage with Afghanistan in which the Zaranj-Delaram highway will become the umbilical cord between the besieged Hamid Karzai regime and the rest of the world through Iran’s Chabahar port is in danger of being scuttled. India will have to apply great diplomatic acumen to try and delink the western embargo of Iran from the creation and maintenance of a link with Afghanistan through the Iranian corridor of Chabahar

through Milak and Sistan. A rail-cum-road bridge over the early stretch of the Helmand river is part of the plan for the strategic link with Afghanistan.

Indo-Iranian collaboration There has been a confluence of Indian and Iranian interests in Afghanistan and for several years they had collaborated to assist what was at the time known as the Joint Front or the Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Mehsoud with India providing non-lethal supplies like food and medicines using Iranian facilities to deliver the material through Herat and using the Central Asian route through Mazar-e-Sharief in Afghanstan south of the Amu Darya (Oxus). The latter is an extremely long route via the Russian port of Vladivostok in the Pacific whereas the Mumbai-Chabahar-Zaranj sealand route is less than half the distance. Even today Pakistan has not allowed India to use the

land route through its territory for Indian trade with Afghanistan via the Attari-Wagah border and the most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment promised by Islamabad has become trapped in the shoals of objections from the extremist Islamists led by Hafiz Saeed of the new outfit Jamaat-ud-Dawa (former Lashkar-e-Toiba). The attempt is to isolate Afghanistan from Indian influence.

By allowing the corridor to function to its full capacity the US-led coalition would be undercutting the influence of the Taliban-Al Qaeda-Pakistan combine on Afghanistan as well as the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Central Asia most of which are also landlocked and afflicted by Islamic fundamentalist influence.America would be doing itself a favour. For India it would be collateral bounty

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

STRATEGIC FULCRUM

India’s role in Afghanistan is not to appear to be a combatant. While it must improve and strengthen the security within and around the Indian Embassy and the institutions it is trying to resurrect, a high-profile military presence will attract rather than repel attacks

Strategic partnership accord However, the signing of the Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai when the latter visited New Delhi in October last creates a bedrock on which can be constructed an infrastructure of security cooperation based on the training and equipping of the fledgling Afghan National Army into an organisation capable of imposing the writ of the government in Kabul throughout the length and breadth of the country. It is a daunting task given that there has been a steady loss of control over the outlying provinces where the hinterland has been taken over by the Taliban-Pakistan combine and the government is confined to the administrative centres. It has been able to penetrate the defences of both the main cities of Kabul and Kandahar as was evident in the assassination of the main interlocutor in the attempt to forge links with the Taliban – Maulana Burhanuddin Rabbani – the slaying of Hamid Karzai’s brother, the brazen attack on the US embassy in Kabul and the mass escape of hardcore Taliban commanders from Kandahar prison via a tunnel built from outside. There have also been persistent reports that large parts of the Nimroz province through which the Zaranj-Delaram road passes have fallen under Taliban control and the lament in strategic sources is that India did not deploy the Army in Afghanistan to protect Indian assets and investments and the several development projects.

India has to persist India cannot abdicate its responsibility to protect the historical age-old links with Afghanistan (remember the folklore of the Kabuliwala?) Most Afghans are appreciative of Indian efforts to

resurrect the destroyed infrastructure in their country and admire it for doing this under such trying conditions. Indian expertise in raising the proficiency of the Afghan National Army will go a long way in re-establishing control and extending the writ of the government in Kabul. That is the only way that this can be done without an obtrusive presence that would immediately attract reprisals.

India has also taken steps to circumvent the embargo on Iranian oil revenues to ensure that it is able to pay for the supplies it is receiving or has received in the past. It is a delicate balancing act between two hot stools It is not an easy task but it is something that Afghans will remember with admiration in times to come. For one, the multiplicity of ethnic affiliations and sympathies will have to be welded together within the Afghan National Army institutional structure. There has been traditional tribal rivalry even within the Northern Alliance but the respective warlords had decided that they should swim or sink together and so the Northern Alliance survived for as long as it did. President Hamid Karzai is an inheritor of that legacy and he must take the necessary political steps to consolidate his support base and draw recruits from the population that are representative of the diversity of Afghanistan, itself no mean task.

India’s non-combatant role India’s role in Afghanistan is not to appear to be a combatant. While it must improve and strengthen the security within and around the Indian Embassy and the institutions it is trying to resurrect, a high-profile military presence will attract rather than repel attacks. The training of the trainers who will rebuild the Afghan National Army can be done within enclosed compounds with both static and mobile protective units in and around to ensure that no interference with the job at hand can take place. There has to be a clear picture of the number of personnel the ANA must

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

have to be able to both “show the flag” in the hinterland and execute cordon-and-search operations against the militants. In spite of the vast experience in counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations India has miscalculated the number of personnel required to ensure a quick drawdown of militancy in any given segment of the country. There has to be a dual and coordinated approach between the local police (which too must be augmented and trained to deal with counter-terror operations along with the normal policing duties) in what is essentially a manpower intensive operation. It is better to start with a larger number of manpower than with an institutional framework that requires to recruit and train more people to tackle the problem as it goes along. The blanket coverage that the larger manpower gives tends to show quicker results and undercuts the harsh methods that militants need to apply to ensure support and cooperation from the local population. Initial successes based on the larger manpower will have a favourable psychological impact on the populace as a whole and will demonstrate governance and control.

Sanitise the Zaranj corridor Vital areas and vital points like the Zaranj-Delaram corridor should be selected for sanitisation and freed from Taliban control. India should then work on the America-led coalition to ease sanctions on the Chabahar-Delaram corridor so that Afghanistan can then become free from the stranglehold of Pakistan. By allowing the corridor to function to its full capacity the US-led coalition would be undercutting the influence of the Taliban-Al Qaeda-Pakistan combine on Afghanistan as well as the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Central Asia most of which are also landlocked and afflicted by Islamic fundamentalist influence. America would be doing itself a favour. For India it would be collateral bounty. A tightening of sanctions in any case will only push Iran to take recourse to the weapon of last resort, the nuclear warhead.

Mr Rajiv Takes Over As New CISF DG

enior IPS officer Mr Rajiv took over as the new chief of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which guards country¹s sensitive installations like airports and nuclear plants. Mr Rajiv, who goes by his first name, took charge from outgoing Director General N R Das at the force headquarters. Mr Rajiv, a 1975-batch officer of Uttar Pradesh cadre, was till recently serving as the Director General of the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and Civil Defence in the national capital. Taking command of the 1.47-lakh strong force, which guards country¹s airports and sensitive nuclear and aerospace installations, will serve till his retirement in October next year. A winner of President's Police Medals for both distinguished service and meritorious service, he takes over at a time when the CISF is raising fresh units and developing new methods to enhance security preparedness at its sensitive deployments including at 58 airports which it guards at present. A Masters in Physics from the Allahabad University, Mr Rajiv has earlier served as Additional DG in the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), a border guarding force, in New Delhi.

SAARC Meeting On Anti-Terror Mechanism

Meeting of High Level Group of Eminent Experts from SAARC countries to strengthen Anti-Terror Mechanism was attended by delegates from Bhutan, India, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the SAARC Secretariat Indian delegation was led by Director, Intelligence Bureau, Shri Nehchal Sandhu. Issues relating to further improving the functioning of SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and the SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) based in Colombo, Sri Lanka, review of the enabling legislation enacted by the Member States on SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and its Additional Protocol as well as the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and to further enhance the implementation process of these Conventions by the Member States were discussed at this Meeting. The Meeting considered the SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters as well. Exchange of information among the Member States on a real time basis for better coordination to counter terrorism and drug related activities, developing cooperation, capacity and relationship building among the SAARC Police authorities were identified, among others, as possible methods of strengthening the SAARC anti-terrorism mechanism.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

RSN Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military affairs.

There have been persistent reports about China’s bid to establish a submarine base in Marao, a coral island (40 km south of Male). The reports gained currency following the visit of the then China Premier Zhu Rongji in 2001. The reports mentioned the Chinese design to base nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. Coral islands make fine natural submarine base. There have also been reports that Pakistan has been using the Islamic card with Maldives to provide such facilities to China

FUTURE TENSE

The strategic importance of the Maldives can hardly be overstated. 80 per cent of the country is one metre or less above sea level. Besides, there are other economic and geographical vulnerabilities – the most serious being the problem of global warming, which threatens to submerge the country as such. In fact, Maldives forms a geo-physical part of the same ridge that extends to Diego Garcia (A major US Naval base). There have been persistent reports about China’s bid to establish a submarine base in Marao, a coral island (40 km south of Male). There is increasing inroad of Wahhabi Islam in the social and religious discourse of Maldives. The moderate Sunni society is increasingly getting radicalised. The latest coup has strong underpinning of Islamic fundamentalism and the China factor. Nasheed is on record to say that a week before his ouster he was under pressure from Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) to sign a defence agreement with China.

trategically significant and geopolitically sensitive, Maldives, a chain of 1,192 islands 199 of which are inhabited and home to 3,15,000 people, has recently been brutalised by violence and coup, shattering the very nascent and fragile edifice of parliamentary democracy, which had just begun to take roots since 2008 after 30 years (1978-2008) rule of Abdul Gayoom. Located 300 miles off the southern coast of India and 450 miles southwest of Sri Lanka, this idyllic country, a tourist paradise in the Indian Ocean is yet another victim of Islamic fundamentalism. Internal sleaze by some opposition members including Gayoom, Islamic fundamentalist groups with support of external players, particularly Pakistan and China, has engendered the present unrest and instability in Maldives. The turmoil as expected has allured inimical powers to India to make a fresh bid to gain foothold in this part of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) located strategically astride key maritime routes.

As has been the won’t of most micro-states, political instability and coup is not new to Maldives, even as it made transition from monarchy to a republic under Ibrahim Nasir in 1968. Nasir had to eventually flee to Singapore. Even before that in the year 1953 (January 1952 – August 1953) during a brief interruption of the Sultanate and flirtation with Presidential system, President Mohammad Amin Diddi was lynched by a mob due to unpopular policies. Gayoom was also not unchallenged, there were at least three (1980, 1983, 1988) attempted coups to oust him, two of them orchestrated by Nasir. What is unusual and of concern is

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

The Maldivian Question

that the latest coup has strong underpinning of Islamic fundamentalism and the China factor. Nasheed is on record to say that a week before his ouster he was under pressure from Maldivian National Defence Force (MNDF) to sign a defence agreement with China.

The Indian Navy is to assist the Maldivian security forces in monitoring and safeguarding of the country’s vast EEZ. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard vessels will patrol pirate infested waters around Maldives. India’s BEL is setting up radars on all the 26 atolls of Maldives, which will be linked to the Indian coastal command. In October 2011, the Indian Navy based a Dornier aircraft to carry out surveillance of EEZ and anti-piracy vigil. Since 2009, India has been sending warships or naval aircraft to perform security roles for Maldives It is to the credit of the rulers in the country including Gayoom that he did not allow Maldives to be drawn into big power games, not even during the cold war period. The geopolitical scenario however has drastically altered in the recent times. The huge impetus to religious radicalisation of Maldives by Gayoom has spawned rising Islamic fundamentalism. An ascendant China is making forays in the Indian Ocean and would like to wean away Maldives from India’s strategic embrace. An out of power Gayoom is not averse to external leveraging. With the ouster of President Nasheed, on 7 February this year, the country has lapsed into uncertainty. It is the same Nasheed who suffered 27 arrests and six years in jail

in his unrelenting campaign for ushering parliamentary democracy and against the autocratic rule of Abdul Gayoom, who in 2008 was Asia’s longest serving leader. There was great jubilation when Mohammad Nasheed was elected as the President in 2008. He was hailed as “Obama”. Ironically, it was India who responded to the SOS by Gayoom when he was beleaguered by People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) terrorists. The Indian

Armed Forces reacted instantly by launching Operation Sandhya and foiled the attempted coup. India acted in its strategic interests both in the geopolitical context of the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Maldives acquired greater strategic significance post 9/11 particularly after Mumbai 26/11 as seaborne terrorism was the new reality. There was also move by extra regional powers like China to seek naval presence in the country, as part of its strategic stretch in the Indian Ocean.

The new strategic imperative was the impetus for India and Maldives to sign a new bilateral pact on security in August 2009. Probably for some detractors of Nasheed, this was one of his major undoing. The coup was allegedly masterminded by the Islamic fundamentalists, Gayoom, rogue elements in the Maldivian security establishment and anti-India elements and forces. Indications of Chinese and Pakistani involvement are getting increasingly pronounced. The immediate provocation for

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

FUTURE TENSE

anti-government protests was the arrest of Justice Abdulla on charges of misconduct and favouring opposition figures. It may be highlighted that Gayoom’s influence in the commercial enterprise, security and administrative establishment as well as judiciary remained overwhelming due to the sheer fact that he strode like a colossus at the helm of Maldivian discourse for three decades. It did not help that in the true spirit of democracy Nasheed as President was not vindictive towards Gayoom. It did not help that he was a liberal and advocated tolerant form of Islam. It did not help that the press was free and transparent under Nasheed.

In fact, Maldives forms a geo-physical part of the same ridge that extends to Diego Garcia. After relinquishment of the Gan base by Britain, the USSR made cogent efforts to acquire it in 1977 and offered a monthly rental of US$ 1 million. Though the stated purpose for the Soviet move was to set-up a supply station for its fishing fleet, the actual purpose was to countervail the US base at Diego Garcia

Imperatives of a micro-state The islands in Maldives are grouped under 26 atolls, each atoll being an administrative unit. This 820 Km long (north to south) and 120 Km wide (east to west) country with a population of a little over a quarter million can be described as a micro-state. The generally acceptable definition of a micro-state is applied to countries having population of less than one million. There are about 38 such states of which 27 belong to the Commonwealth. The international system can be divided into Super Powers, Great Powers, Regional Powers, Small Powers and Micro/Mini Powers. The clusters of micro-states are in Caribbean, around Africa (Indian Ocean), Persian Gulf and Pacific Ocean. Micro-states are a post-World War-II phenomenon. In the pre-World War-II period, five European micro-entities had sought to be recognised as independent states. They were – Liechtenstein, Monaco,

San Marino, Iceland and Luxemburg. Only the latter was admitted. Post World War-II, Iceland became the first micro-state to be admitted in the UN in 1948. Like all micro-states, Maldives has small size, narrow resource base, difficult geographical configuration and relative proximity to big neighbours. Also like other micro-states, it has to interact with the outside world in three concentric circles i.e. Super Powers, Big Powers and immediate neighbours in the region. Micro-states are vulnerable both from within and without. Their security dependence has been implicitly accepted by powerful regional neighbours e.g. US in Caribbean, France in Pacific and India in the case of Maldives. It would be difficult for the new President Mohammad Waheed Hassan or even Gayoom if he were to come to power, to jettison Maldives from India’s strategic partnership, given the complexities and intricacies of regional and global politics. Nevertheless in the evolution of Indo-Maldives relations, the drastic changes in religious orientation of Maldives, Islamic terrorism and the new power play in the Indian Ocean have begun to impinge rather heavily.

Islamic fundamentalism During the recent violence and coup in Maldives, about three dozen exhibits, mostly images of Buddha and Hindu Gods were destroyed by Islamic fundamentalists in the national museum. The new president Waheed said: “We are very sad. This is the physical and archeological evidence of this country. We have nothing to show of the pre-Islamic history.” This repudiation and hatred of non-Islamic past is reminiscent of destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by Taliban. Till the 4th century AD, Thervada Buddhism, originating from Sri Lanka, was the dominant religion. Islam was introduced in Maldives in 1153 and remains the cornerstone of its history. It was in this year that the last Buddhist King Bavanditta under the influence of the Arabs, who had become dominant on the

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Indian Ocean routes, converted to Islam and adopted the title of ‘Sultan Muhammad al Adil’. He was followed by six dynasties and 84 sultans. In fact, the Sultanate lasted for more than 800 years (1153-1968). President Gayoom retained a highly centralised political system, which had its roots in the oligarchic structure of the Sultanate.

In September 2007, 12 tourists i.e. eight Chinese, two Japanese and two British were injured in a blast in Male’s Sultan Park. Two months later, the police alleged that the ten men linked to the explosion were absconding in Pakistan and had links with LeT. The police maintained that it was in madrasas of Pakistan that the absconders had learnt the techniques of bomb making Traditionally Islam till recently had endured a much different shade in Maldives. Nevertheless it is now seen to be shedding its traditional and cultural moorings. Islamic tenets were superimposed upon Buddhism which can still be discerned, even though very little physical remnants of the Buddhist past have been allowed to exist over the years. Unlike many other Islamic countries, death penalty is never imposed in Maldives. The maximum punishment is banishment to an island. For adultery, there is no stoning to death. As probably driven by the exigencies of the tourism industry, Maldivian do handle pork and in that they invoke the Shariat, which allows them to do so provided the hands are later washed. Importantly, traditional mosques in Maldives do not face Mecca, but the east, which as per historians is redolent of the past, wherein the first sun worshipping seafarers called Redin first settled on the country’s land. In the past, even though, the aid from the Arab world was substantial, Maldives was not very close to many Arab countries because of its recognition of Israel. In the recent years, the opposite trend is however clearly discernible. There is increasing inroad of Wahhabi Islam in the social and religious discourse of Maldives. The moderate Sunni society is increasingly getting radicalised. The Arabisation of the Maldivian culture is palpable. Beards

and Burkas are becoming increasingly visible. The opposition had been constantly accusing ousted President Nasheed for his lack of adherence to Islam and his favourable posturing towards Israel.

There is little hint of moderate Islam in the present religious and the political discourse of Maldives. All religions other than Sunni Islam are forbidden. Alcohol is banned in Male, the capital of Maldives, home to 30 per cent of the population. However, in deference to economic compulsions and imperatives, it is not banned in the tourist resorts despite clamour by Islamic fundamentalists. The Islamic fundamentalists have also been demanding ban on direct flights to Israel There is little hint of moderate Islam in the present religious and the political discourse of Maldives. All religions other than Sunni Islam are forbidden. Alcohol is banned in Male, the capital of Maldives, home to 30 per cent of the population. However, in deference to economic compulsions and imperatives, it is not banned in the tourist resorts despite clamour by Islamic fundamentalists. The Islamic fundamentalists have also been demanding ban on direct flights to Israel. The man responsible for radicalisation of Maldives is none other than Gayoom. His education and upbringing is steeped in religious fundamentalism. He is a graduate of Al Azhar University, Egypt. As a student he got deeply influenced by Syed Qutb, the famous Islamist theorist and leading member of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Gayoom later taught Islamic studies in Nigeria. Back to Maldives in 1971, he was President Nasir’s under secretary and later rose to be the Transport Minister. He protested against Nasir’s recognition of Israel. He assiduously cultivated the image of a pious man. Once he became President, he declared himself by a constitutional provision “Guardian of Islam’ and ‘Supreme Propagator of Islam”. He established Islamic schools and in 1997 declared Islam as the state religion. He encouraged youth to avail Islamic education in

institutions in Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Maldives during his tenure received huge funding from Saudi Arabia for propagation of Wahabism. Gayoom however could not shut tourism because it was the backbone of the economy. The products of Islamic schools were intensely radicalised and till today are collaborators of Gayoom. Religion also became a tool for Gayoom to marginalise the opposition. Under the assault of Mullahs, Islamic preachers and radicalised elements, Maldivian culture began to disappear. The fact that Islamic fundamentalism has become a substantial feature of Maldivian discourse is reflected by the remark of the new President Waheed: “They are part of the society, you cannot ignore them”. Religious intolerance in Maldives is getting increasingly pronounced. In 2005, a shop in Male was attacked for displaying Santa Clause. In 2006, Islamists had virtually taken over Himandhoo Island (Alif Alif Atoll) and constructed a new Salafi mosque to propagate neo-conservative Islam. Shariah was imposed on all residents and children were banned from attending local schools on the plea of impure influences from foreign teachers. The situation fortunately was subsequently reversed after the intervention of the state.

Strategic importance There have been persistent reports about China’s bid to establish a submarine base in Marao, a coral island (40 km south of Male). The reports gained currency following the visit of the then China Premier Zhu Rongji in 2001. The reports mentioned the Chinese design to base nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. Coral islands make fine natural submarine base. There have also been reports that Pakistan has been using the Islamic card with Maldives to provide such facilities to China. Yet another dimension to strategic significance of Maldives with respect to India emerged about LeT plans to setup Indian Ocean base in the country. Reportedly, there were plans to use deserted islands to build bases and weapon storage facilities from where they could be moved to Kerala and then to the rest of India. The geo-strategic location of Maldives with regard to Indian

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

FUTURE TENSE

Ocean is an imperative that has driven super powers in the past like the Great Britain, the US and the erstwhile USSR to gain foothold in the country. The same imperatives are now driving India, China, Pakistan and Islamic terror groups.

During the recent violence and coup in Maldives, about three dozen exhibits, mostly images of Buddha and Hindu Gods were destroyed by Islamic fundamentalists in the national museum. The new president Waheed said: “We are very sad. This is the physical and archeological evidence of this country. We have nothing to show of the pre-Islamic history.” This repudiation and hatred of non-Islamic past is reminiscent of destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by Taliban Maldives straddles major maritime arteries and has the potential to be drawn in big power rivalry. During World War-II, the British had established an operational base on Gan Island in southern Adudu Atoll. In 1948, a mutual defence pact was signed between Britain and Maldives, which was followed by a 30 years agreement with the Sultan in 1956, as per which the Royal Air Force was to continue using the base at Gan as a staging post. The airbase at Gan provided much needed staging facilities between Europe and Far East. It provided clear and alternate communications to NATO, West Asia and East Asia. In 1974, consequent to a review of British Defence Policy, all British establishments east of Suez were to be liquidated. Accordingly, in 1976 the RAF base at Gan was handed over lock stock and barrel to Maldives. The facilities included a runway, building and equipment and a modern medical centre. The base provided employment to 850 Maldivian personnel and contributed £ 50,000 to a total income of £ 3 million. For Maldives the winding up of the RAF base at Gan did not mean the end of an environment of super power rivalry in the region. Soon, 600 miles south of Gan, the US established a base at Diego Garcia. In fact, Maldives forms a geo-physical part of the same ridge that extends to Diego Garcia. After

relinquishment of the Gan base by Britain, the USSR made cogent efforts to acquire it in 1977 and offered a monthly rental of US$ 1 million. Though the stated purpose for the Soviet move was to set-up a supply station for its fishing fleet, the actual purpose was to countervail the US base at Diego Garcia. President Gayoom who was then a transport minister, had vehemently opposed the Soviet proposal. Later in 1982, Gayoom as President had remarked, “the Soviet base would have militated against our non-aligned status, annoyed our brothers in the Muslim world and created suspicion in minds of our neighbours like India and Sri Lanka”. It is believed that Shah of Iran too had made overtures for leasing Gan Island to keep the Soviets out and the Libyan President Gaddafi was determined to stymie the Shah.

Threat perception Maldives, so far has faced no external threat in the conventional sense. Its vulnerability is owing to its size and geographical location in the Indian Ocean, which predisposes it to regional and extra regional strategic machinations. Maldives successfully warded off all attempts by extra regional powers to fill in the vacuum created by the British departure from the Gan Island. Most of the threat so far has been internal in nature given political schisms and difficult geographical framework. With a modest military capability, it is rather difficult to ensure the security of the country and also the EEZ due to spread of its atolls and islands. The Maldivian government therefore has been vulnerable to coups. Besides, there are other economic and geographical vulnerabilities – the most serious being the problem of global warming, which as per many experts threatens to submerge the country as such. Given the axis of sea route emanating from the infamous Golden Triangle and burgeoning tourism – Maldives is vulnerable to illegal drugs and its trafficking. The society in Maldives is homogeneous mixture of people from Sinhalese, Dravidians, Australasians, Arabs and African origin. There is one common language Dhivehi, which has loan words from

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Hindi, Arabic and Tamil. Despite the cohesiveness and homogeneity, the country has not been free from internal disorders and secessionist movements. In 1959, three southern atolls declared independence and a United Suvadian Republic with the combined population of 20,000. There are insinuations to suggest that the British had a hand in this, as the Maldivian rulers were putting increasing pressure for closure of the RAF base at Gan. All the three secessionist atolls immensely benefited from the base in terms of economy and employment opportunities. In 1962, the then Prime Minister Ibrahim Nasir sent gunboats with government police and re-established control over these atolls. The leader Abdulla Afid Didi fled to the British colony of Seychelles, where he was granted political asylum. Further, internal imbalance and instability could arise owing to the following factors: The Male cluster of islands has attracted all capital investment and there has been resultant impoverishment in other atolls. The feeling of discrimination and developmental imbalance is most intense in Addu Atoll. With the winding up of the RAF base at Gan, all able bodied men have moved to other beach resorts for work. They are fluent in Urdu owing to influence of the Pakistani non-commissioned personnel who were employed at the base. The historical memory of not too distinct past when people of the various atolls were virtually free from control of Male and had independent access to India and Sri Lanka persists. The excessive dependence on tourism is yet another critical economic vulnerability of Maldives. 33 per cent of the country’s GDP comes from tourism. One million tourists visit Maldives every year, which is almost three times the population of the country. Notwithstanding the contribution of tourism in the Maldivian economy, it continues to be vulnerable to nature as well as Islamic fundamentalists. At the behest of the latter, i.e. Islamist parties

particularly the Adaalath Party, the government recently shut down spas and health centres at all island resorts, as it was alleged by them that they were operating as brothels. The government orders in this regard were subsequently rescinded due to acute economic and international compulsions. The vulnerability of tourism to nature was evidenced by Tsunami in December 2004. In relative terms Maldives suffered the sharpest blow. 21 of the 93 island resorts were closed. Tourism was down by 40 per cent and economic growth was negative by 3-4 per cent. Maldives, as a country is most worried about impact of erosion and global warming, as 80 per cent of the country is one metre or less above sea level. Overall Maldives can be described as a success story of South Asia, which has moved from very poor country with people living in scattered islands to almost a middle income country.

Strategic interface India’s relations with Maldives are different in character and content when compared to other South Asian neighbours. Both India and Maldives have defied the difficulties of glaring power disparity in developing a mutually trustworthy relationship between a regional power and a micro-state. Some of the key catalysts that determine India-Maldives relationships are: Absence of any territorial disputes or irritants. In 1976, both countries most amicably demarcated their maritime boundary based on the median line principle. Relations are free of any colonial baggage, unlike India-Sri Lanka relations. Indo-centrism hither-to-fore was not a factor in the relations between the two countries. It is lately being created by China, Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalists. No problems of common ethnicity or Indian community. Some shades of common ethnicity are only found in India’s Minicoy Island, which is inhabited by Maliki sect to which Maldivians belong

The political and social discourse in Maldives till very recently never tried to question or counterpoise India’s pre-eminent position in the South Asian region by courting regional or extra regional powers. It is a nascent phenomenon in some segments. Mrs Indira Gandhi was the second foreign dignitary to visit Maldives in 1975, the first being the British Queen. In the same year, India provided a grant of Rs 4 million for setting up a fish canning plant. In 1977, India assisted Maldives in setting up an international airline, which was managed and operated by the Indian Airlines. The commercial airport on Hulule Island was also modernised with Indian assistance. As per a five-year economic and technical agreement signed in 1986, India set-up a 200 bed general hospital (Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital) and depute nearly 100 medical and para-medical staff to run the hospital. India has also been providing use of satellite by Maldives for meteorological data and television re-broadcasting. It has also been generous in providing scholarships and educational opportunities to Maldivian students. During the Tsunami in December 2004, the Indian Navy was quick to respond to the aid of Maldives despite the fact that some of India’s coastal areas itself had been ravaged. As part of ‘Operation Castor’, India deployed its aircraft, helicopters and naval vessels on search, rescue and rehabilitation missions. It also deployed two mobile surgical teams and provided assistance in communication and reconstruction. The event that actually underwrote the special strategic context of India-Maldives relations was the Indian assistance in crushing the coup in 1988. The coup was attempted with the help of about 150 Sri Lankan Tamil separatists (PLOTE), who were led by two Maldivian dissident and Colombo based businessmen Abdullah Luthufi and Sagar Nasir. President Gayoom wanted to avoid enlisting military help of any extra regional power. Possibly, he was convinced by the fact that India did not have grand strategic ambitions, which in any way could impinge on the sovereignty of Maldives.

For India too, any hesitancy in responding to the situation would have meant involvement of regional or extra regional powers with all the imponderables therein. A new reality has confronted India with regard to Maldives, i.e. Islamic radicalisation and the prospect of the country being used to target Indian interests on land and sea including Mumbai 26/11 type attacks. The other reality is the aggressive bid by China to secure footholds in the Indian Ocean region. Driven by these realities, India and Maldives signed a bilateral pact in August 2009 during the visit of India’s defence minister Mr A K Antony. As per the agreement, the two countries agreed to bolster defence cooperation and fortify the security of Maldives. The Indian Navy is to assist the Maldivian security forces in monitoring and safeguarding of the country’s vast EEZ. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard vessels will patrol pirate infested waters around Maldives. India’s BEL is setting up radars on all the 26 atolls of Maldives, which will be linked to the Indian coastal command. In October 2011, the Indian Navy based a Dornier aircraft to carry out surveillance of EEZ and anti-piracy vigil. Since 2009, India has been sending warships or naval aircraft to perform security roles for Maldives. It may be recalled that India transferred a fast-attack craft INS Tillanchang to the Maldivian Coast Guard in the year 2006. Speaking in the naval commander’s conference, Mr A K Anthony said: “The Indian Navy has been mandated to be a net provider of security to the island nations in the Indian Ocean ...”

Conclusion While the foreign policy and defence establishment have displayed great sensitivity about the strategic imperatives of India in respect to Maldives and have acted timely and appropriately, the same cannot be said about the Indian intelligence establishment. The charter of India’s external agency not only involves providing information and intelligence but more importantly to safeguard friendly regimes from powers inimical to India. The coup is a success of the agencies of inimical powers.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Iran conundrum

Dominika Cosic The writer is a journalist and political correspondent based in Brussels. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. Who will be the bigger loser in this game – the EU or Iran? Maybe only some of EU countries? Both sides pretend to hide doubts. One thing is quite certain – in a worst case, if war with Iran will start – the EU will be again not united. France and UK are not representing whole of Europe, even Germany – the biggest economic and political power in EU – is not so enthusiastic

eu perspective This article provides the European perspective on the coming crisis on Iran. European Union, the writer says, is going into confrontation with Iran, specially France and United Kingdom. However, all European countries do not favour conflict with Iran. Relations with Iran have been always very sensitive. There are two main reasons for this sensitivity – EU still does not have one common foreign policy and – last but not least – the trade links are quite close. The European Union is the leading trade partner for Iran, accounting for a third of its imports and Iran is one of the most important exporters of energy to EU. However, after decision of EU foreign ministers, the moment of confrontation is almost upon us.

ccording to official information from European Commission, the EU is the first trade partner of Iran, accounting for almost a third of its exports. Close to 90 per cent of EU imports from Iran are energy related. Iran ranks as 6th supplier of energy products for the EU. Just look for the numbers: EU goods exports Euro 11.3 billion.

EU goods import Euro 14.5 billion.

Iran

2010:

from

Iran

2010:

EU imports from Iran are 90 per cent energy and energy related products. EU exports to Iran in 2010 were mainly machinery and transport equipment (56.4 per cent) and chemicals (15.8 per cent). It shows how close are the mutual trade relations. But the EU and Iran still did not sign Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) (for instance last year the EU has signed this agreement with South Korea). Negotiations between the EU and Iran were initiated in 2002 but have been on hold since August 2005, when Iran resumed its nuclear activities. Both sides are not very much interested in progress.

Difficulties Trade and exchanging of money is one side, political issues is another aspect. Of course for EU like for many other partners, the most serious concern is Iran’s nuclear programme. And there is another issue, quite important from European point of view – human rights, mostly democracy, freedom of expression and women’s rights. The European Commission has no Delegation in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) but is nevertheless working in close collaboration with the EU member states’

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

EU-Iran relations

embassies in Tehran.

The EU is the first trade partner of Iran, accounting for almost a third of its exports. Close to 90 per cent of EU imports from Iran are energy related. Iran ranks as 6th supplier of energy products for the EU

New chapter For a very long time the EU was not agreed on the question of sanctions on Iran. Some countries have been skeptical. A step ahead has been done as a first during EU summit in December. In line with the mandate given by this summit the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 January adopted a package of new measures. These consist of an oil embargo, sanctions on the petrochemicals industry and financial measures including a partial freezing of the assets of the Central Bank of Iran. Furthermore, the ‘package’ also includes restrictions on the export of banknotes and coins, gold, precious metals and diamonds, restrictions on export of additional ‘dual-use items’ and the freezing of assets of some additional Iranian companies (Tidewater, Bank Tejarat). It means that European Union foreign ministers have formally adopted an “unprecedented” oil embargo against Iran over its nuclear programme, banning all new oil contracts with the country. They also agreed on a freeze on the assets of Iran’s Central Bank in the EU. British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in a joint statement. “We will not accept Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran has so far had no regard for its international obligations and is already exporting and threatening violence around its region,” the leaders added.

Substantial impact The EU said the sanctions prohibit the import, purchase and transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products as well as related finance and insurance. All existing contracts will have to be phased out by 1st July. Investment as well as the export of key equipment and technology for Iran’s petrochemical sector is also banned.

European Union foreign ministers have formally adopted an "unprecedented" oil embargo against Iran over its nuclear programme, banning all new oil contracts with the country. They also agreed on a freeze on the assets of Iran's Central Bank in the EU Reaction of Iran was mixed. In the beginning Iranian officials – like Ali Adyani, a member of the Iranian

parliament’s energy commission – has commented that the EU decision “would only serve some American and European politicians” and “It will not have any effect on Iran’s economy,” adding that Tehran could sell oil to “any country” despite the ban.

talking shop capable of little more than vacuous posturing now need to carry out a fundamental reassessment“ – a special comment for New York Times by Mark A Heller, principal research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University.

“It is difficult to imagine that the EU members who adopted the decision on sanctions are unaware of this possible dynamic. Indeed, the very fact that British and French warships accompanied the US imply the opposite: that EU governments, especially the two with the greatest force projection capabilities, are perfectly cognizant of the possible consequences and are prepared to deal with them. And that suggests that the European Union, notwithstanding its economic travails, is experiencing its own “spring” in foreign and defence policy and that those who tended in the past to dismiss it as a flaccid

Recent reactions of Iran show however that the EU decision was not welcome – Iran reacted swiftly and decided to stop selling of oil to French and British companies. Who will be the bigger loser in this game – the EU or Iran? Maybe only some of EU countries? Both sides pretend to hide doubts. One thing is quite certain – in a worst case, if war with Iran will start – the EU will be again not united. France and UK are not representing whole of Europe, even Germany – the biggest economic and political power in EU – is not so enthusiastic.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

Organised by

30 May-1 June 2012, Palace Grounds, Bengaluru

National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC)

s the Union home ministry looks to allay states' concerns over the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), its officials are working to answer questions raised by over a dozen chief ministers about the 'powers' given to this anti-terror agency which is meant for coordinating counter-terrorism efforts throughout the country. Since these chief ministers are strongly opposed to the Centre's notification empowering NCTC with power to arrest and conduct search and seizures anywhere in the country, considering it an encroachment to their jurisdiction, officials are focusing on this particular provision to clarify the ministry's position. A draft, being finalised by them, explains that it is absolutely necessary to empower any such agency under section 43 (A) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act to operate under 'live' operation situation like what had happened during the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack.

Need Intel-Based Approach To Combat Maoists

www.ifsecsouthindia.com

South India’s International Exhibition for Security and Fire Technology

For More Information Please Contact: Mr. Pankaj Jain, Project Director Unit 1604 & 1605, 16th Floor, Narian Manzil, 23 Barakhamba Road Connaught Place, New Delhi 110 001 India T : +91 11 23765553 F : +91 11 23765552 E: pankaj.jain@ubm.com

Supported by

Union Home Minister P Chidambaram fired a couple of rounds from a Light Machine Gun (LMG) to give a sound start to the opening of a shooting drill on Wednesday while emphasising that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) will have to acquire an “Intel-based strategy to combat Maoists”. Mr Chidambaram was speaking at inauguration of the CRPF Intelligence School. The Home Minister pulled the LMG’s trigger like a professional shooter, prompting journalists to ask whether he hit the bull’s eye. But there were no answers from the officials present at the Kadarpur School. The CRPF, a key force in anti-Naxal operations, will have to acquire an intelligence-based strategy to combat Maoists who have organised themselves as a “regular fighting army,” Mr Chidambaram said. “Counter-insurgency and countering Left-Wing Extremists [LWE] require a very different strategy and approach. It’s not intervening, setting things right in a few days and returning to your group centre or your headquarters. It is remaining deployed for a long time to take on an adversary such as the Communist Party of India (Maoists), which is organised as a regular fighting army,” the Home Minister said, terming the training school as a “milestone” in the force’s history. “All this has made new demands upon the CRPF. One has to develop intelligence about his adversary, one has to develop intelligence for operations and one has to work with the community and build confidence among the people in that area, undertake civic action programmes to win the support of the people. “So, a lot of new activities have to be undertaken by the CRPF, which is why it was felt that a small intelligence wing or a group in each battalion will be necessary [for the CRPF]. ”The CRPF has deployed more than 70,000 troops for anti-Naxal operations in various states.

March 2012 Defence AND security alert

The First and the Only ISO 9001:2008 Certified Defence and Security Magazine in India

Subscribe Now!

Februa

ry 201 2

Cover Price

Tenure

Issues

For India

For SAARC Countries

For Rest of the World

1 year

` 1440

US$ 240

US$ 300

2 years

` 2880

US$ 480

US$ 600

3 years

` 4320

US$ 720

US$ 900

Discounted Price Tenure

Issues

For India

For SAARC Countries

For Rest of the World

1 year

` 1296

US$ 216

US$ 270

2 years

` 2448

US$ 408

US$ 510

3 years

` 3456

US$ 576

US$ 720

For Subscribing to DSA online Edition click http://www.dsalert.org/dsa-subscription Yes, I would like to avail the Subscription of DSA 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years I would like to subscribe for Gift a Subscription Name (Personal).........................................................................Organisation.................................................................Sex................. Education / Qualification Graduate Post-Graduate Professional Any Other Profession...................................................................................Organisation....................................................................................... Billing Address.......................................................................................................................City........................................................... Shipping Address...................................................................................................................City........................................................... State.........................................Pin..............................................Tel......................................Mob......................................................... Your Birth Date........................................................................... Marriage Anniversary........................................................(Optional) DD / Cheque No..........................................................................Dated.................................Drawn on................................................. for `.............................................................................................in favour of OCEAN MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED, Payable at New Delhi Or Please Charge `................................(in words).................................................................................through my credit card to my: Choose any one: Credit Card No............................................................................Expires................................Signature of CC Holder............................ * Please attach your ID proof with your signature in case of credit card payment. * Please add ` 50 for all outstation cheques. All payments in favour of Ocean Media Private Limited, payable at New Delhi. * Condition applies. Terms and Conditions: Minimum subscription is for one year (12 Issues). Your subscription will start with the next available issue after the receipt of your payments. DSA will be despatched through Postal / Courier Services. Packing and forwarding charges will be borne by DSA. Please mention your subscription ID in all your future communications. Please forward us the completed subscription form with all the required details. DSA will not be responsible for any miscarriage or delay, if postal address is incorrect.

Please inform our subscription department about non-receipt of your copy latest by 20th day of the month, failing which the request for re-despatch will not be entertained.

This subscription form supersedes all the previous. Please address all your subscription related queries through Email:subscription@dsalert.org or call us at: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, or fax at: +91-11-23259666 or write to us at: Subscription department, Ocean Media Private Limited, 4/19 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi - 110002 (INDIA) F o r a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d s u b s c r i p t i o n q u e r i e s p l e a s e c o n t a c t : + 9 1 9 9 5 8 3 8 2 9 9 9 . The terms and conditions may change without any prior notice. This offer is for new subscribers only. Subscription form can also be downloaded from our portal www.dsalert.org