DSA March 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief “T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .

he Non Alignment 2.0 paper comes closer to a National Security Strategy (NSS) than any other document churned out by our national security establishment. That is why its contents merit such intensive scrutiny and analysis. A laudable exercise in theory, it falls badly short of being a viable Grand Strategy in practice. A National Security Strategy must outline Alternative End States and identify the desired or normative end state that will maximise our autonomy and ability to influence outcomes. From this analysis will emerge the, ”Ends, Ways, Means” equation as also our Defence Strategy, our individual service perspective plans and strategies. Unfortunately, the very end state defined by the Non Alignment 2.0 Paper itself is seriously flawed. It speaks of a new Bipolar world order with China and the USA as the new super powers and India as a peripheral player which must safeguard itself by being abjectly neutral. An analysis of end states will show this G-2 situation to be our worst case scenario, for it will completely marginalise us and curtail our autonomy. On the other hand, a Multipolar world order, with India as one of the poles of power, will be a far more desirable end state that will maximise our autonomy and ability to influence outcomes by sensible alignments / re-alignments (not Non-alignment). It may be recalled that Multipolar world orders were in place before World War I and II. These were characterised by precisely such rapid alignments and re-alignments to maximise national interests in such fluid and dynamic situations. The very anchor premise of the Non Alignment 2.0 paper therefore is tragically flawed. As the paper concedes, China abuts India, has attacked us in the past, surrounded us strategically in the present and is our biggest security threat. How can India be Non-aligned with its principal security threat? International relations (IR) theory highlights the dire need for India today to balance the power of a rising and assertive China. This can only be done by forming strong, strategic partnerships with other countries that are threatened by the rise of China – like the USA, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, Philippines, Australia and Indonesia. Depending on the fluid and fast changing situations, these alignments may change rapidly. This puts the focus on alignments and re-alignments – not Non-alignment. The very title of the paper is thus flawed and out of step with the situation. The use of force. In regressing to the Non-alignment of the 1950s / 60s, this paper also inadvertently revives a lot of Nehruvian baggage about the role of the Use of Force as a means of establishing order in International relations. The Nehruvian state had crafted for itself a false National Narrative based on Exceptionalism. It stated (incorrectly) that India had obtained its freedom by Ahimsa and non-violence and as such was an exceptional state, based not on hard power but soft power. The historical truth is that the British left due to the spectre of the INA of Subhas Bose and the prospect of mutiny by 2.5 million Indian troops being demobilised after World War II. Nehru, unfortunately soon began to believe his own contrived narrative. He deliberately and pointedly neglected the creation of hard power capacities and barely tolerated the Indian Army as some sort of a colonial nuisance. In 1962 the Chinese taught us a most humiliating lesson on the use of force in international relations. They punctured Nehru’s soft power balloon and he was reduced to pleading for Western military intervention. So much for Non-alignment. Nehru’s successors learnt a very bitter lesson in Realism and Realpolitik. To their credit, they made up for lost time and expanded and modernised the Indian armed forces with generous Soviet subsidies. They then used military force very effectively against Pakistan in 1965 and even more in 1971 – when they broke Pakistan in two. The greatest pity is this paper’s revival of Nehruvian pacifism by the backdoor. Its Military Member pontificates that Nuclear weapons have ruled out the use of Force in South Asia. Conflicts of the future will be reduced to nibbles and shallow bites. Thoughtfully, we are told that even if China and Pakistan attack us in strength, we should not dare use ”Proportionate Force” in retaliation or we will get nuked to the high heavens. Non Alignment 2.0, thereafter becomes a policy prescription for appeasement and kowtowing to the China-Pakistan combine, so that our economy can flourish. In terms of sheer pusillanimity, this approach is hard to beat. A Multipolar world order suits us far better as a normative end state. To actualise this we need strong alignments with middle tier powers like Russia, France, Japan, Israel and Brazil. We need to strengthen our economy and create a defence industrial base in the private sector. Otherwise arms scandals like that of AgustaWestland will keep delaying our arms build-up and open serious windows of vulnerability. We need to align closely with Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia, states that are seriously threatened by China’s assertive behaviour. Above all we need to become a strong state with a demonstrated resolve to use force to safeguard our vital interests. To start with we will have to outgrow the image of a ridiculously soft state and fight Jihadi and Maoist terror with the seriousness that it calls for. The recent visits of the Russian and French Presidents were largely ignored by the media. These countries have shared cutting edge military technology and advanced weapons systems with us and their support would be critical to the emergence of a Multipolar world order. That alone will maximise our autonomy – not new fangled notions of a badly dated non-alignment.

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

founding editor

publisher's view

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Kudos Mr President!

irst two months of 2013 have been eventful for India and Indians, especially in the domain of defence and security. Two persons who grievously assaulted Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security and the well-being of its people were hanged to death for the first time in the history of the Republic of India on charges of their involvement in the conspiracy and terrorist attacks which killed hundreds of our innocent citizens. One was Ajmal Kasab, the only terrorist who was caught alive during the attack on Mumbai on 26 November, 2008 and the other was Afzal Guru, a Kashmiri, for his involvement in the conspiracy hatched in Pakistan to attack the Indian Parliament in December, 2001. It was not an easy task to hang these terrorists. One belonged to Pakistan which tried, very unsuccessfully, to deny his existence in the face of a mountain of evidence that Kasab was a puppet in the hands of state actors within the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence. The decision by His Excellency our President Mr Pranab Mukherjee on the death penalty was one of the most laudable in the past few decades. This one decision has boosted the morale of our defence and security forces as well as the common man who is always the main victim in such terrorist attacks. There has been a complete shift in the mindset of our people by this one decision. The trust level in the government on national security issues has been ramped up and the nation expects that many more such hard and pragmatic decisions by the government and its leaders will be forthcoming in the interest of our safety, security, defence and international affairs. The message must go out loud and clear that India is not a soft state; that it is just and fair and follows the rule of law and respects international conventions; that any individual, group or country playing with the safety and security of India and Indians will be made to pay in equal measure and more. In the other issue that is germane to national security, controversy over kickbacks in the purchase of the helicopters for VVIPs has once again brought another halt to the procurement process to equip our defence forces with the latest equipment, arms and ammunition. In spite of all the best measures being taken by the government to avoid such controversies, it has happened again. It militates against the empowering process of our forces directly or indirectly. For how long will we keep adding and deleting names of foreign and domestic entities on a blacklist for involvement in an activity which we have tried so strenuously, but ineffectually, to stamp out? It has become counter-productive and is hampering the modernisation programme of our defence and security forces. Defence Minister AK Antony has made a pertinent point that the only way to get out of this web of intrigue is to improve our capability of producing whatever military wherewithal the Indian defence and security forces require within the country. By way of encouragement government must provide subsidies and tax benefits to Indian manufacturers who venture into the technologically difficult arena of arms manufacturing. Joint ventures that are based on transfer of technology of the kind that has made the BrahMos missile project such a resounding success should be the norm rather than the exception. As we are wrapping-up this issue another terror strike rocks Hyderabad, killing innocent people. Our security apparatus and people of India must rise as one to smoke out the perpetrators of such heinous crimes against humanity and give them all the most deterrent punishment in the quickest possible time so that our energies and resources are put to better use of nation building. The one thing that is required is a strong political will to take clear, hard and quick decisions. Our next defence budget will be announced soon. It must have provisions to attract more and more Indian companies to form JVs with the best in the world to start the manufacturing of all products we require within India as the route to eventual self-suffiency.

here is a belief that things of the past can remain relevant in the future, even if they need to be retooled a wee bit. Institutions, organisations, alliances, all of these of the yesteryears continue to have a relevance with a bit of retouching. Something a little more than a rouge job. In this there is an underlying assumption that says the forces which made a particular association, organisation, are still relevant decades down the line. In the world of politics, particularly of the international variety, there is a dynamism that can age even the most contemporary institutions. So it raises serious questions when some theorise on a new non-alignment movement, a version 2.0.

An independent India entered the world of diplomacy and international relations under the shadow of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister. His persona, intellect and world view, completely dominated Indian politics, even if it was not of the claimed stature. Indian politicians, at that period, remained enthralled by his extrapolations and hence, his word carried undue weight. A number of institutions that were created in that period continue to exist, long after their expiry date. Even as the Indian economy has opened up, modernised and integrated globally, the country continues to have a Planning Commission. An idea borrowed from the concept of centralised and planned economies, the Planning Commission has long outlived its utility. Similar is the story of India and Non-Aligned Movement.

In the post-independence era of the 1950s and 1960s, large parts of the newly liberated world joined together to create the NAM. The logic being that a country need not be a member of either of the two competing blocs, Warsaw Pact or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Instead they would raise their own bloc and which would not be aligned to either.

Theoretically it meant that the NAM countries pursued an independent foreign and defence policy. But the reality was always different. And that was because the membership of NAM consisted of countries hardly akin in any sense of the word. Some were fledgling democracies, like India; while others were regional nationalist government, like Egypt and Arab nationalism; and then there were dictatorships, which meant most of the NAM members. Even in the peak period of NAM mobilisation member countries pursued policies that suited their interests rather than that of a disparate collective.

Which is really the current reality. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, there is no cold war and NATO is currently engaged in out of area operations in Afghanistan. African Union troops are frequently called upon to engage in peacekeeping operations in the troubled continent, as well as United Nations peacekeepers. The lines between alignment and non-alignment are long blurred. But some think it is still relevant for India, with a little tweaking. The bottom line being that India should pursue its core national interests without aligning with any bloc, or country. The stark reality of today is that the pursuit of national interests is all encompassing. In a globalised and integrated world not every country can pursue its policies in isolation. An understanding is required, over many issues. Then more countries will begin to join and create a coalition of likeminded.

manvendra singh

Jai Hind! March 2013 Defence AND security alert

pawan agrawal

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

contents

Non Alignment 2.0: Need To Debate Our Grand Strategic Choices Global Terrorism, UN And Its Policies

Special Issue March 2013

A R T I C L E S non alignment 2.0

c o n t e n t s

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 6 M A R C H 2 0 1 3

Lt Gen HS Lidder PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM (retd)

non alignment 2.0, a critique

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

non alignment 2.0: India's grand strategy

Air Marshal Anil Chopra PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (retd)

non-alignment or issue-based partnerships: a commentary on "non alignment 2.0"

Non Alignment 2.0

Amb Ashok Sajjanhar

non alignment 2.0: the quest for grand strategic options

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

wither India's non-alignment?

Dr Shrikant Paranjpe

defence outlay: too inadequate to meet security needs

F E A T U R E S

Lt Gen OP Kaushik (retd)

the dangers of non-alignment

Dr Harsh V Pant

strategic options for India

42 46

Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria

continuing threat of politico-terrorism from Pakistan to Indian security

Dr PM Kamath

DRDOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s endeavours for CBRN challenges in homeland security

Dr Rakesh Kumar Sharma

the al-Qaeda presence in Africa

Papadopoulos Ilias

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MBDA Exclusive Interview

Purchase of Helicopters for VVIPs: a Procedural Appraisal

The AgustaWestland Helicopter Scam?

DSA Research Team

Sana Hashmi

global terrorism, UN and its policies

ShinMaywa Debut

Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd)

Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

non alignment 2.0: an attempt to pacify China?

Loic Piedevache, Country Head, India

Maj Gen PK Chakravorty VSM (retd)

NAM, non alignment 2.0 and Indian navy

Aero India 2013, DSA Report

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non alignment 2.0

WORK IN PROGRESS

A Lt Gen HS Lidder PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM (retd) The writer was commissioned in Indian Army in December 1967 in the elite Parachute Regiment. A Special Forces officer, he has extensive experience of Sub-conventional Warfare. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College and National Defence College. He has experience of multifarious instructional, staff and command assignments. He has been Military Liaison Officer in Indian Embassy at Colombo and was Defence Military Adviser in Embassy of India at Washington DC when momentous changes in Indo-US relations began to take shape. He hung his uniform as the CISC, IDS.

Geostrategically India’s geographical size and capacities bequeath to India the swing status which is recognised by the US, China, EU and Russia. India’s association can make a major difference in shaping global geostrategic equations. This is India’s geostrategic and geopolitical strength. India has consciously deferred its swing because its geostrategic interests are better served for the present by the process of “Strategic Partnerships”

India’s economic and military power should reflect our concomitant continental and maritime orientation. This is the need of the hour

former CISC takes a look at the attempts to craft a National Security Strategy via the Non Alignment 2.0 paper. Needless to say that the document in its present shape, is far from being perfect. The choice of terminology is a self-defeating one. Geostrategically India’s geographical size and capacities bequeath to India the swing status which is recognised by the US, China, EU and Russia. India has consciously deferred its swing because its geostrategic interests are better served for the present by the process of “Strategic Partnerships”. Asia has assumed centrality in the world’s geopolitical arena. China’s economic growth and military modernisation has overshadowed all else in Asia. Of all the geostrategic equations China fears the Indo-US relationship the most. China has acted aggressively by putting Pakistan as a millstone around India’s neck. The centre of gravity of conflict globally has shifted to the sub-conventional arena.

his document has taken a long time in coming. It portends well for our country, because it shares with the citizens of India as well as the world just how the Indian mind is working or not working. Kudos to the National Security Advisor who has had the courage to promulgate a document that stands in for India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy. Needless to say that the document in its present shape is far from being perfect. Essentially it’s a work in progress. The authors have been pragmatic and have themselves stated that the intent of this document is to prompt further discussion and elaboration. My observations enumerated in subsequent paragraphs are intended as contribution in order to make the subsequent national security strategy document to be more holistic and balanced.

Non Alignment 2.0 The choice of terminology in my opinion, is a self-defeating one. Besides resurrecting the ghost of the cold war globally, it also conjures up in the minds of Indians a period of financial dearth and geopolitical disempowerment. Furthermore it does not reflect today’s ground reality. While non-alignment signalled our rejection of global power play, with the adoption of the geostrategic tool called ”strategic partnership” we have signalled our willingness to engage freely with power centres. This is the reverse of what we did during the non-aligned days and has a positive connotation. India would therefore have been better served had we titled the document as Strategic Partnership 2.0

Strategic independence This is a conceptual underpinning with which we sucessfully sold Non-alignment to our public. We never explained to them that we cried out for US help and received it in the wake of our military defeat at the hands of China in 1962. Similarly we reached out to the Soviets in 1971 by signing a treaty of Peace and Friendship just prior to our war with Pakistan over what is today Bangladesh. After we created Bangladesh, our strategic independence was a major casualty and we were firmly in the Soviet camp. Only the demise of the USSR in 1989 resurrected the thought of strategic independence, which I am sure will last as long as we are not forced to swing decisively either towards the continental powers (Russia and China) or maritime powers led by the US. In a world which is in a state of slow movement from unipolarity to multipolarity this conceptual formulation will serve us well.

Conceptual dichotomy Since the document is to stand up for foreign policy as well as national security it has tried hard to balance diplomatic reliance on expediency of the immediate with the natural propensity for national security for extrapolation into the future. It would be better to divest the two documents and treat the NSS as a stand alone document covering likely challenges to India from the political, economic, social, cultural, military, existential and international regimes along with strategies to counter these challenges.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Non Alignment 2.0 The growing role of globalised finance and technology as well as growing influence of MNC’s, non-state actors and our response to these also needs to be articulated. Challenges from drug cartels, criminals, illegal migration and drug trafficking which are mostly trans-national in character. This compels us to articulate our responses across concerned ministries, departments and agencies.

International environment Sino-US engagement With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 the world became unipolar. China being the next largest communist country occupied centrestage in the eyes of the US and her allies for neutralisation. Yugoslavia and Vietnam as well as Soviet ally India were also in the US sights.

The NSS must not contain the military strategic elements. This should be left to the MoD and COSC China showed geopolitical prudence and rode to safety by riding on the US desire for economic growth. China offered her markets to the US in return for its survival. The US GDP at that time was only growing at 1-2 per cent. The US saw in the Chinese offer an opportunity to grow upto 5-6 per cent. This mutuality of interest saw the advent of the world’s largest and longest ongoing economic engagement. The US hopes are to convert China to Democratic form of governance through the tool of market economy. The Chinese hope to garner wealth and technology which is essential for the survival of its communist system. How this relationship pans out, will be seen during this century, when this engagement will culminate. As it appears today the fallout will definitely

bequeath to China a super power and second pole status. Economically, technologically and militarily the Chinese have made great progress and have developed strong leverage vis a vis the US. They have shown great flexibility in the absorption of Hong Kong by adopting a ”One Country Two System” approach. Their eyes are now set upon assimilation of Taiwan which will make their economy of the same size as the US. In my opinion Taiwan would be transferred to them when the Chinese reach a tipping point towards democratisation and not a day earlier. India was adrift after demise of the Soviet Union. Its demise was staved off by its financial bankruptcy and by signing the WTO. Between these two events, India too signalled its willingness to be part of the global economic order and thereby opening up its own virgin economy for Western exploitation in return for peace and prosperity. Russia, is economically inconsequential. Its technological excellence has shrunk due to non-availability of funds. Its erstwhile territories in Europe have been successfully integrated by EU and NATO. It has been trying unsuccessfully to recreate the continental power bloc by wooing China and India. China has not responded because it sees itself as a super power in its own right in not too distant a future and India has not responded because it wishes to make a fresh start geostrategically by engaging countries which can make it quickly grow multidimensionally. Geostrategically India’s geographical size and capacities bequeath to India the swing status which is recognised by the US, China, EU and Russia. India’s association can

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

WORK IN PROGRESS

make a major difference in shaping global geostrategic equations. This is India’s geostrategic and geopolitical strength. India has consciously deferred its swing because its geostrategic interests are better served for the present by the process of “Strategic Partnerships”.

We too need to have the capacity to fight through a nuclear exchange, without any reference to the nuclear threshold Given the backdrop of the Sino-US engagement and the US desire to democratise China, the success of India’s democratic credentials would be the shining example the US could use to tip communist China towards democracy. India should utilise the US intent to ensure the success of its democratic polity, economy, human index of wealth and happiness and political, social and existential prowess. Both India and the US share a common interest in this regard.

Asian environment China Asia has assumed centrality in the world’s geopolitical space because of it being the home of the world’s largest number of growing economies as well as the world’s largest source of energy. China’s economic growth and military modernisation has overshadowed all else in Asia. This has naturally given rise to an exclusive view of Asia, with China as its epicentre amongst Chinese strategists. US global positioning and India’s own growing strength stand out as detracting possibilities. India with its potential and swing status capability can alter the geostrategic landscape substantially not only in Asia but across the globe as well. Of all the geostrategic equations China fears the Indo-US relationship the most because it will create a geostrategic equipoise with the nuclear India and first world economies of the US, ASEAN, JAPAN, Taiwan and South Korea. China would rather have a multipolar world rather than the revival of the cold war type balance of power in Asia. India’s relationship with China has

little to cheer about. China has acted aggressively by putting Pakistan as a millstone around India’s neck in order to constrain it in South Asia. It has aggressively pushed its maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean. India has out of sense of weakness chosen not to respond to Chinese overtures. India has surrendered its Tibet card without extracting any quid pro quo on the territorial and boundary issue. It is time India understood its strength and operated therefrom. India should make it clear that the Tibet card has not been recessed permanently and that it is linked to territorial and boundary issues. China also needs to be told that just like they think that they can constrain India by putting a millstone which is 1/5 our geographical size and 1/8 our economic capacity, we cannot see how they themselves can rise to super stardom with a millstone of our size around their neck. Both China and India are old civilisations and do understand that time here is not of the essence. Resilience of aim is. China is a pragmatic country with strong strategic credentials. It is more prone to making adjustments and accommodations in order to avoid debilitation and prolonged distractions which will keep it from reaching its desired geostrategic destination. It will not make concessions to a weak state.

propensity for an external threat to keep its flock together, it willingly acquiesced to. Time has come to subject Pakistan to a cold unemotional geostrategic review.

Pakistan is a country which has never been a political entity even in Indian medieval history. It is a country which is 1/5 our geographical size and 1/8 our economy. It has the queerest of ethnic composition with fierce tribal loyalties for which reason it requires enmity with India to keep the country together. This country has occupied inordinate mental space in our minds. This document too assigns to it the importance that it does not deserve.

Pakistan is a country without a historical past. It is basically an agricultural country which was the wheat bowl of undivided India. At independence it became a food exporting nation. Today it imports food. It has a poor industrial base and its knowledge industry is nascent. It is socially and culturally a weak entity and has had to use enmity with India, fundamental Islam and linkages with powerful countries in order to assure its existence. Though a nuclear state, its economy by itself is incapable of sustaining the state. Her geostrategic overreach over Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan has placed it in a situation of imperial overstretch. The mindset that has brought it this far and the entrenchment of the army in governance in the garb of being nation protectors and nation builders, will ensure the continuation of its antagonism towards India. Democratic institutions which the US and India desire to see succeed in Pakistan, cannot succeed, since it will call for the army to be placed totally under civil control. This is unlikely to happen unless the Pakistani Army is militarily defeated or it implodes from within. Both contingencies seem unlikely at present. Given its propensity to match India, conducting a sub-conventional war against India over Jammu and Kashmir and a desire to subsume Afghanistan for its own survival, we can rest assured that balancing India for Pakistan will come at a huge economic cost for Pakistan. Though Pakistan’s external masters will keep giving it financial and material doles from time to time, because it gives strength to their leverage in South Asia. Pakistan is itself in a two front war. In the east she has a self-created problem. In the west Pakistan is in a geopolitical situation which is a British legacy in the form of now defunct border in the form of the Durand line. The fight primarily is for the allegiance of the Pushtoon tribes who straddle the Pak-AF border

It is true that Pakistan has been used by foreign powers to balance India, something which given its

Given the impending withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan in 2014, Pakistan would like to quickly reassert

Pakistan has been used by foreign powers to balance India, something which given its propensity for an external threat to keep its flock together, it willingly acquiesced to Pakistan

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

its control over Kabul with its Taliban supported by Pak Army in civilian clothing. For this fight, Pakistan will seek to checkmate US, Russian, Iranian and Indian countervailing forces. For Pakistan, making a temporary truce on its eastern border is essential. In order to achieve this Pakistan is likely to ride Indo-US desire for peace between nuclear India and Pakistan and offer peace thereby giving a feeling to India that to political and economic initiatives vis a vis Pakistan are finally bearing fruit and would logically extend to the resolution of other disputes in Jammu and Kashmir and Gujarat. However given Pakistan’s aspirations, peace on its eastern borders with India is likely to be a temporary opportunistic truce, till the resolution of its western border issue. Should we get baited and stay out of the Afghan post US solution we would have permitted the neutralisation of our leverage vis a vis Pakistan in Afghanistan without any substantial gains to ourselves. For India prolonged involvement in Afganistan would not only ensure Afghanistan's independence but ensure Pakistan's continued deployment along its western border.

The demise of the USSR in 1989 resurrected the thought of strategic independence, which I am sure will last as long as we are not forced to swing decisively either towards the continental powers (Russia and China) or maritime powers led by the US Additionally one fails to understand why Pakistan is more than willing to engage India in peace talks when it has invested heavily in an ongoing sub-conventional war since 1988 – a war it perceives to be winning. The document strangely lists out the levers India intends to develop vis a vis Pakistan as if it were a banana republic. Such a thing is never done in a document for public consumption. If such a thing is done, it permits the target country to take evasive action.

Hard power aspects The document correctly argues that India needs to look seawards, but it is not because we are militarily boxed in on the continental shelf and

seek to maintain riposte capability from the sea. The whole orientation toward maritime domain is related to economics. Our efforts to keep the oceans, particularly the Indian Ocean open, relates to our economic activity with SAARC and IOR countries over the maritime domain. Our energy security too demands a maritime orientation. Projection of our military power into the Pacific and the South China sea opposite the Chinese coast should not be the purpose of our maritime expansion unless we wish to be defeated in this domain too.

Essentially it’s a work in progress. The authors have been pragmatic and have themselves stated that the intent of this document is to prompt further discussion and elaboration. My observations are intended as contribution in order to make the subsequent national security strategy document to be more holistic and balanced Defeating Chinese maritime intrusions into our SEZ and neutralising challenges to our maritime interests in the Indian Ocean should be stated missions of and the limits of our naval power. Linked to this is the act of building naval and other military capabilities by the supply of subsidised Indian made equipment to friendly countries like Vietnam rather than to actively fight their battles. On the continent itself we need to keep focus on our objective of regaining lost territories and preventing any further loss of territory. This will enable us to structure our forces appropriately. Resources will have to be made available for this. At least till the continental objectives are achieved India would not be able to shift resources from the continent to building the maritime domain. With India spending just 1.79 per cent of its GDP on defence, even as most countries in the world spend about 3 per cent, we have enough scope to increase our budget outlay for building our maritime domain without upsetting the continental equation. Some additional defence outlay will have to be made to strengthen both the army and air force in order to build capacity for achieving our twin

continental objectives. Such a move will underscore our resolve to people both within and outside our country. The next element which has impacted the thinking of our political masters is the nuclear aspect. We went nuclear for prestige in the comity of nations – we do not treat nuclear weapons as war fighting weapons. Consequently the armed forces have been unnecessarily burdened with endless discussions on the nuclear threshold. This debate on the nuclear threshold has convoluted thinking within the armed forces. In my opinion the armed forces have only one business and that is to fight and win wars across the entire conflict spectrum including the nuclear spectrum. The armed forces well understand, that the enemy’s nuclear threshold will only be reached by their success of their operations. Its a moot point, whether having brought about circumstances of success, the armed forces need to shut-off out of fear of the conflict reaching a nuclear exchange stage or show further resolve and press home the advantage. In any case if the decision to stop lies in the military domain there will be little movement in the battlefield. Even during the cold war both blocs never discussed nuclear thresholds but only signalled their resolve to fight through a nuclear exchange and prepared for it – needless to say that their political leadership never let the situation reach that point. We too need to have the capacity to fight through a nuclear exchange, without any reference to the nuclear threshold. By signalling to the world our reluctance to use nuclear weapon and endless discussion on the nuclear threshold we have effectively defanged ourselves on the nuclear as well as the conventional spectrum. That is why there is so much talk about limited wars under the nuclear backdrop. With non-activation of the offensive sub-conventional spectrum we have ourselves created a situation of powerlessness. The only way to restore our full spectrum capacity and free our restrained conventional capacity, is to acquire the resolve and capability to fight through a nuclear exchange and to activate the offensive

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

announcement

WORK IN PROGRESS

sub-convention capability which we have ourselves recessed unilaterally unlike other players in our region ie USA, China and Pakistan. The other aspect that bears emphasis is that the NSS must provide the inputs to MoD for the formulation of its Defence Strategy and Policy. The NSS must not contain the military strategic elements. This should be left to the MoD and COSC. Inputs for the MoD could follow the following pattern:

Continental shelf • Create capability progressively in order to recover territories of Jammu and Kashmir occupied by Pakistan and China no matter how long it takes. • Create capability to face a collusive war situation created by our hostile neighbours. • Protect island territories.

Maritime domain • Ensure sea lanes and ports remain open during hostilities. • Protect maritime assets to ensure free flow of trade in a conflict situation. • Prevent and restore adversarial situations vis a vis our island territories.

Common to both domains • Plan and launch joint operations in future conflict in order to ensure Indian armed forces prevail over our adversaries. • Maintain a triad nuclear capability to prevent nuclear coercion. Ensure that seventy per cent of our equipment is indigenous. Ensure that the equipment profile of each service follows the 30:40:30 rule.

Internal security India is a diverse land with heterogeneous society which is multilingual, multireligious and in

various stages of development from the tribal to knowledge age urbanite with the agricultural and industrial waves in between, all co-existing at the same time. As per Toffler, each segment represents a wave. Toffler has opined that society migrates from one wave to another due to the next wave representing a superior economic wave. Thus the tribal society was supplanted by the agricultural wave which in turn was supplanted by the industrial wave. As one wave attempts to supplant the other conflict results due to the ensuing process of change and resistance to change. This theory explains the causes of conflict in society and also points out what needs to be done to facilitate movement from one wave to another till theoretically all reach the same current knowledge age. The scale of the effort at transition calls for a national effort. Our conflict resolution strategies should be aimed at the seams of the waves. There is no one standard fit all solution in economic assistance, education, HR development or even policing. Policing for a tribal society would be different to policing in a feudal backdrop or in the industrial belt ruled by unions. Cyber policing requires a totally different education for the policeman. In addition, to why conflict occurs, we need to take note that the centre of gravity of conflict globally has shifted to the sub-conventional arena. This has happened because of the supremacy of the US in the conventional spectrum as demonstrated by the gulf wars and the war in Afghanistan. In this spectrum, lines between combatants and non-combatants stands blurred. Additional areas have been activated for inclusion in threats / challenges will be posed in the economic, political, social, cultural, diplomatic, military domains of international law / regimes, existential areas like water electricity food and fuel. Cyber space today is a virtual conflict domain. Areas like smuggling which the terrorists ride, illegal money transactions, illegal migration, drug trafficing and human trafficking all have foreign dimensions. India needs to prepare in order to ward-off these challenges posed independently as well as in tandem with conventional conflict. Our solutions lie in an all

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

of government approach since the challenges lie beyond individual domains of MHA / MoD / MEA. Even the intelligence agencies divided between external and internal cannot effectively track external threats posed within India’s hinterland. Our strategy for real time orchestration of an all of government response and how the inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, inter-agency process would actually be made to work needs to be spelt out. We also need to indicate who will provide the clearing house for such a process.

Conclusion

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East Asia Pacific Strategic Partnership …

India-Japan-Vietnam

The present document is trying to marry the MEA’s strength of handling global situations in a methodology of expediency and a National Security Strategic strength of futurology. In fact reconciling the two is difficult unless we lay down a national strategy in a manner from where all concerned components draw inspiration in order to formulate their own strategies. India is an emerging global player. Geography has bequeathed to India unequivocal superiority in South Asia as well as a unquestioned appeal to IOR countries through sound and resilient economic linkages. Our economic model which is reflection of agriculture wave exports with little components of industrial as well as knowledge age exports needs to be quickly upgraded to reflect exports of machinery and software driven products. Failing which, we will not be able to project India’s economic model as a model worth emulating. Our internal conflicts are political in nature. These should be resolved politically by drawing up wave related responses. India’s economic and military power should reflect our concomitant continental and maritime orientation. This is the need of the hour. A matter of inclusive power rather an exclusive one which pitches one domain versus the other or one service versus the other.

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non alignment 2.0

A TRYST WITH UTOPIA ?

T Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

The document would carry far more weight if it had addressed itself to the issue of devising concrete transformatory policies to convert the burden into an opportunity; it remains inadequate to state subjectively that “by engaging with Asia more broadly, it can put South Asia in a larger context, serving as the region’s platform to globalisation”

he purposes of the present strategy document Non Alignment 2.0 are three-fold: to lay out the opportunities that India enjoys in the international sphere; to identify the challenges and threats it is likely to confront; and to define the broad perspective and approach that India should adopt as it works to enhance its strategic autonomy in global circumstances that, for some time to come, are likely to remain volatile and uncertain. The order in which the Chapters appear in the document do not contribute to either a logical flow of ideas or coherence in the process of developing a national strategy. The absence of a Theory makes strategy reactive to global impulses rather than attempting to shape these very impulses; unfortunately the Introduction segment of the document serves poorly in the role of a Theory. In dealing with the Asian Theatre, for reasons best known to the authors, Japan, Russia and Central Asia have been left out of the calculus. In addition the linkage of the Asian Theatre with the rest of a globalised world and the dynamics generated by the actions of the USA are conspicuous by omission. The intellectual muddle that pervades the paper is often caused by its title, for some of the precepts formulated are brazen alignments; perhaps the document may have been better branded as ‘Enlightened Alignment 1.0’

awaharlal Nehru, addressing Parliament on his policy of non-alignment articulated, what he considered, the inner compulsions that obliged India to embrace this course of action; he said “What I have done is to give voice to that policy (non-alignment), I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind”.1 Undoubtedly, such a lofty Utopian understanding of national conditions and national psyche could only have come from a man of Nehru’s stature, yet for all his erudition, to build policy rooted ideationally in the past would suggest that the present was no more than a re-creation of that past which did not see the future as a distinct idea where the strength of a new nation could be brought to bear to harmonise with a rapidly changing modern world. The need was not to live the present as the past but to orient it towards a future which in essence would capture the spirit of modernity. Non-alignment in its first avatar suffered from this malaise.

Being a Universalist, Nehru’s view of national interests saw no incompatibility with the interests of other nations, a concept at the core of non-alignment.2 Casting aside for the moment the exaltedness of the idea, three main historical impulses were central to belief in the policy: firstly, anti-colonialism; second, consciousness of an Asian identity and lastly, a denial of the economic rationale that energised imperialism. Between the ideas of mutuality of interests of nations, geopolitical circumstances on the collapse of imperial powers, the emergence of a world order held hostage to the cold war and an appraisal of national imperatives; lay, not just the reality of India’s economic impoverishment, but also the impracticality of lifting the economy without leveraging global capital and the market system. And this was the problem with non-alignment, to attempt to democratise international relations in a milieu that first and foremost respected power and then sovereignty; left adherents to choose between opportunism and pliability. The failure of the policy to bring stability in the neighbourhood or to remove India from the list of ‘basket cases’,3 stands in mute testimony to the upshot of the policy. Non-alignment, was seen more as policy of self-seeking expediency and a recourse taken by the weak. By the end of the 1980’s the policy lay in tatters, its members had stomped time and again over non-alignment’s founding canons aligning blatantly with any and every cause that promoted 1. Jawaharlal Nehru speech in Parliament 09 December 1958. 2. Rao, Narasimha PV. Nehru and Non Alignment from Nehru: The Nation Remembers, 1989. 3. The phrase “a basket case” in origin had a physical meaning. In the grim slang of the British Army during World War I, it referred to a quadruple amputee who could only be moved in a basket due to the hopelessness of his condition. This term was then applied to an emotionally or mentally unstable person and later to anything that failed to function particularly to economies. From the American heritage dictionary of idioms, Anmer Christine. Houghton Mifflin Company 4th edition April 1997.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Non Alignment 2.0, a Critique

self-interests. The end of the cold war brought in its wake prognostication of the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy, an end to conflict and of man’s ideological evolution with the grand formulation that western liberal democracy had prevailed.4 Some saw a multi-polar order and the arrival of China; others forecast a clash of civilisations.5 However, these conjectures found little use in understanding the realities of the post cold war world as each represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day is ‘Uncertainty’ as marked by the tensions of multi-polarity; tyranny of economics; anarchy of expectations; and a polarisation along religio-cultural lines all compacted in the cauldron of globalisation. It is against this backdrop that the document “Non Alignment 2.0, a Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the twentyfirst century” must be viewed.

The Chapter summarises three imperatives that make for internal stability: security of the citizen, empowerment of the population and a political culture that serves to unite. What appears to have been left out is the rotten, corrupt and ponderous state of the delivery mechanism. There is no dearth of noble political intentions; where things disintegrate is when it comes to the administration for implementation

Non Alignment 2.0, new wine into old wineskins or is it enlightened alignment? The authors of the document Non Alignment 2.0 have in the preface emphasised their conviction that “the success of India’s own internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities in order to maximise our choices – thereby enlarging our domestic options to the benefit of all Indians”. This opening statement is clearly an affirmation of the need to link and leverage the global environment in order to achieve self-centred growth. This at once is a refreshing departure from the past for it suggests deflating the idea of finding compatibility between national interests and the interests of other nations. It continues, “The purposes of the present strategy document are three-fold: to lay out the opportunities that India enjoys in the international sphere; to identify the challenges and threats it is likely to confront; and to define the broad perspective and approach that India should adopt as it works to enhance its strategic autonomy in global circumstances that, for some time to come, are likely 4. Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18. 5. Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

A TRYST WITH UTOPIA ?

to remain volatile and uncertain”.6 In purpose also, the aim of conditional strategic autonomy at once discredits the central theme of non-alignment. At which time the question that begs to be asked is, why does this policy document carry the sobriquet “Non Alignment 2.0” at all?

What does not emerge is a strategic inference other than a need to diversify our sources of energy. The fact that the region is a hotbed of terror activities, that 16 per cent of our oil imports come from Iran, that Israel provides us with a technological window to the West, that China has stepped up its strategic engagement with the region and that several wars are ongoing in the area have all been given short shrift The document comprises seven Chapters opening with an introduction and rounding off with a conclusion. The Chapters include: The Asian Theatre, India and the International Order, Hard Power, Internal Security, Non-conventional Security Issues, Knowledge and Information Foundations and State and Democracy. The order in which the Chapters appear do not contribute to either a logical flow of ideas or coherence in the process of developing a national strategy. The fragmented manner in which opinions and perceptions appear are more symptomatic of distinctive individual notions that defy synthesis and remain inconsistent with the concept of a Strategic Approach7. The Strategic Approach, a phrase popularised by Julian Corbett,8 intended to put in place the means of achieving one’s national objectives given the contrary pulls and pressures of the international system. It derives from two critical characteristics of the international system. The first of these is the prevailing instability of protagonists involved in the system; whether it is their politics, national interests, alliances or even their historical antagonisms which when it interacts with the larger global settings causes friction, a sense of deprivation and generates a chemistry of volatility. The second is the function of a state as a sovereign entity that is charged with guardianship of certain specific and at times unique set of values sometimes contrary and at others in opposition to the macro system. Therefore a pre-requisite to adopt a strategic approach is to have a cogent theory of how power in all its dimensions (both hard and soft) may provide a context to formulate a policy oriented towards achieving national goals, which would in turn enable the development of a national strategy. It is the absence of theory that makes the generation of strategy rapidly devolve to reacting to global impulses rather than attempting to shape those very impulses. Unfortunately the document fails to convincingly articulate such a theory. There is an outline of global trends, impulses and a run through of some deficient and at times imperfect proclamations and assertions. These deal with the times being auspicious for change and reconstitution; the passive nature of India’s power and the need to enhance it; that economic matters will dominate the calculus of power; China being prematurely given the mantle of a super power without debate; and the need to enhance state capacity in order to enjoy both legitimacy and credibility.9 The Introduction to the document serves poorly in the role of a theory.

To develop strategy from policy and establish power equations Chapter One concerns the Asian Theatre and the document rightly contends that “Engaging with the Asian Theatre will be a key concern for India’s Foreign and Strategic Policy”. Yet, for reasons best known to the authors, Japan, Russia and Central Asia have been left out of the calculus. In addition the linkage of the Asian Theatre with the rest of a globalised world and the dynamics generated by the actions of the USA both in and out of theatre are conspicuous by omission, which disappointingly leaves the analysis fractional. A passing mention is made of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ without even an attempt at expanding on how the policy ought to develop and propel strategy. The inability to come to grips with the hierarchal relationship between Policy and Strategy is a fault line that runs through the document. There is a suggestion that the Asian Theatre is also one that hosts “competition in ideological hegemony as well,” what it implies or even entails remains a mystery.

The document may have done better to place before decision-makers’ strategies and a set of options that considered alignments and pressures that would compel reconciliation Moving specifically to China, the prescription made is to “hold the line in the North, but maintain and, if possible enlarge India’s edge in the maritime south”. While this makes strategic sense, it clashes with the logic and idea of having awarded China the status of a ‘super power’10. Which in turn throws up the query, how will the edge be maintained without a security contract of alignment (to the credit of the authors they have suggested a security network); and then what becomes of a foundational canon of non-alignment? This forlorn intellectual muddle unfortunately pervades the paper; perhaps the document may have been better branded as ‘Enlightened Alignment 1.0’. Once again the same dilemma comes up when addressing China’s perception of India as a “swing state” for the significance of a swing state (not a very complimentary appellation) is one that aligns! 6.“Non Alignment 2.0, a foreign and strategic policy for India in the twentyfirst century”, p iii. A document published by the Centre of Policy Research, New Delhi 2012. 7. Ibid p 8. 8. Corbett Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longmans, Green and Co. New York 1911, p 8. 9. Non Alignment 2.0, p 1 to 11. 10. Ibid, p 9 para 17.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Analysis of the Sino-Indian economic relations is credible and the identification of a strategy that balances competition with cooperation would appear to be the course to chart. However no rational scrutiny of China as a potential competitor is complete without an insight into their understanding of power if at all a strategic approach is to be adopted. The Chinese believe that the purpose of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) is to render the adversary (or the international system) powerless to stop its will. In this definition there are shades of an expanded Clausewitz when the latter defines ‘war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.11 Clausewitz, in his understanding of the application of national power, perceived two inseparable factors that had to be overcome, the first of which was the total means at the disposal of the adversarial state to pursue their interests and the second the strength of their will to resist. The rub in this knowledge is that as a combination while the former is measurable, the latter is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged by the strength of motivation12. In a conflict this form of calculations will invariably lead to an upward spiral of power application against increased resistance till one or the other breaks, at which point an extreme would have been reached. In dealing with the Chinese one must, therefore, factor such an eventuality. China perceives CNP as the single most critical indicator and measure of the aggregate economic, political, military and technological prowess of a nation. In its mathematics the nature of power is made up of two ingredients; the first and the primary is that set of dominance that manipulates and forces desired outcomes, termed as Command Power; while the second are ideational virtues (soft power) that serve to influence and mould finales with no great certainty. Professors Hu Augang and Men Honghua, in their paper on CNP and grand strategy13 identify three core factors that establish the CNP of states: Strategic Resources, Strategic Capability and Strategic Outcomes. They go on to add that while the latter two are a function of the former; CNP, is in fact a summation of the total Strategic Resources of a nation. Such a form of reckoning brings in objectivity to establishing power equations and may have complemented persuasiveness of the arguments in the document.

The inability to come to grips with the hierarchal relationship between Policy and Strategy is a fault line that runs through the document The authors appear, in the main, to view South Asian region as the proverbial albatross around India’s neck despite acknowledging it as a vital region that would determine India’s progression. At which time the document would carry far more weight if it had addressed itself to the issue of devising concrete transformatory policies to convert the burden into an opportunity; it remains inadequate to state subjectively that “by engaging with Asia more broadly, it can put South Asia in a larger context, serving as the region’s platform to globalisation.”14 In dealing with Pakistan, the absence of a strategic theory is never more apparent than when the arguments in the paper descend to the operational level. The narrative favours an incremental process to improvement in Indo-Pak relations (whatever that means!). However, a long-term assessment of past relations would suggest that the trend has actually been going downhill since the 1950s, which would insinuate incremental animosity rather than goodwill. Its manifestations may be noted in the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons which has taken relations a step closer to a nuclear conflagration; Pakistan military strategy in bed with active Jihadist terrorism targeting India (26/11 the more recent episode) has increased the provocation for finding an armed solution; the inability of an emasculated civilian leadership to rein in the military leaves the question who is in charge in that country and who does one negotiate with (remember Lahore and Kargil)? Under these circumstances the suggested negative and positive levers are purely operational in both form and content15. The document may have done better to place before decision-makers’ strategies and a set of options that considered alignments and pressures that would compel reconciliation. After all if by 2050, India along with the USA is slated to be the second largest economy16, this would represent a wholly changed perspective that can be creatively leveraged.

China being prematurely given the mantle of a super power without debate; and the need to enhance state capacity in order to enjoy both legitimacy and credibility. The Introduction to the document serves poorly in the role of a theory A broad brush treatment of West Asia in spite of recognising it as one of the areas in which India has primary interests, leaves the serious reader with an awkward poser; if a vital region is not to merit a well defined strategy, then either the basic premise of the stakes being critical is misplaced or the fragmented approach to the document has resulted in our concerns falling between the cracks. The main factors that ought to influence the development of a strategy have been identified, but what does not emerge is a strategic inference other than a need to diversify our sources of energy. The fact that the region is a hotbed of terror activities, that 16 per cent of our oil imports come from Iran, that Israel provides us with a technological window to the West, that China has stepped up its strategic engagement with the region and that several wars are ongoing in the area have all been given short shrift for reasons that beg clarification. 11. Clausewitz, Carl Von. ‘On War’ Princeton University Press, 1976, p 75. 12. Ibid, p 77. 13. Prof Hu Augang and Associate Prof Men Honghua. ‘The Rising of Modern China CNP and Grand Strategy’. A paper presented on Strategy and Management, No. 3, 2002. http://www.kiep.go.kr/inc 14. Non Alignment 2.0, p 17 paragraph 53. 15. Ibid p 19-21, paragraphs 62 to 75. 16. Wilson and Stupnytska Goldman Sachs global economics paper, 153, of 28 March 2007, pp 8-9. Projections of size of national economies in 2050, China will be the largest at US $ 70 trillion while India and the USA would be in second place at US $ 37 trillion.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

A TRYST WITH UTOPIA ?

Security and economic growth two sides of the same coin Chapter Two deals with India and the International order and is devoted to the integration of India into the global economy; it is the largest section of the document suggesting that it is economic power that will dominate in the international order. But what is missing is an analysis of what the current world order is about and what it takes to thrive in it. The paradigm of the day, as mentioned earlier, is ‘Uncertainty’. Against this canvas and with the belief that economic growth and security are two sides of the same coin, it would have been in order had the document analysed the security ramifications of the main economic precepts of globalisation and of India’s global economic engagement.

Development of force structures and outlining a contract for use In dealing with hard power, Chapter Three astutely points out the need to harmonise with political objectives. However, in the absence of defining policy and designating political objectives in the face of the myriad challenges that confront the nation, there appears a gap between the development of forces and outlining a ‘contract’ for its use. Even where policy has outlined political objectives such as in the “Look East Policy” no endeavour has been made to delineate a military strategy to support policy.

Being a Universalist, Nehru’s view of national interests saw no incompatibility with the interests of other nations, a concept at the core of non-alignment. Casting aside for the moment the exaltedness of the idea, three main historical impulses were central to belief in the policy: firstly, anti-colonialism; second, consciousness of an Asian identity and lastly, a denial of the economic rationale that energised imperialism Also, the transformation to a maritime power, as Mahan reminded us, is not just about geography it also includes character of people and of the government, intrinsic to the latter is the nature of national institutions. The generation of a maritime strategy that dominates the Indian Ocean, as the authors propose, neither takes into account the correlation of forces, nor the existence of both intense mutuality and divergence of interests there; all of which is symptomatic of a further lack of understanding of the nature of maritime power and the principal demand of a maritime strategy which is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces. As far as structural changes are concerned (p 42, paragraph 179), these are very much in order and have been on the table since the Kargil conflict and would demand urgent implementation.

The ideal of what a district officer should be Internal Security, as the Achilles heel to India’s development is, precisely, seen as a political matter. The Chapter summarises three imperatives that make for internal stability: security of the citizen, empowerment of the population and a political culture that serves to unite. What appears to have been left out is the rotten, corrupt and ponderous state of the delivery mechanism. There is no dearth of noble political intentions; where things disintegrate is when it comes to the administration for implementation. What is profoundly needed is, as Wavell so eloquently put it after he left India, “the English would be remembered not by this institution or that, but by the ideal they left behind of what a district officer should be”.17 The document’s value would have increased manifold had they strategised to reform the administrative system.

Energy security and nuclear weapons policy Both energy security and nuclear weapons policy have a central place in the larger comprehensive national power of the state, what is incredulous is that they are clubbed under one head. The unconvincing nature of the grouping lies in the distinction that energy security complements economic growth while the nuclear weapons policy circumscribes and puts limits on the extent to which conventional military power can be applied. After all, the aim is not to use nuclear weapons as they tend to destroy the very purpose for which military power was intended. That being as it may, the issue of a policy and then a strategy to provide for energy security remains unattended, in the absence of which access to global energy resources will remain hostage to dynamics that we would not be in a position to influence unless we adopt policy.

Knowledge, information and democracy The last two Chapters are devoted to the creation of a knowledge society and an introspection of the nature of 17. Mason, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India. Pan Books London 1985, p 399.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

the democratic Indian state. Clearly the elements that go to make a knowledge society are well-known, what is not is the strategy that awakens the innovativeness, generates seamless cooperation and kindles creativity of the mass of the citizenry to efficiently deliver. The document does not undertake to outline a road map to achieve an information and technology enabled society, that is both innovative and creative, such that they are on a platform that could fully grasp and exploit the various elements of comprehensive national power could be accomplished. In as much as the nature of the Democratic Indian state, its institution and their ability to harmonise with the times and deliver to meet economic goals is concerned, Chapter Seven is more a prescription of how they ought to function and not a design of reforms that would compel them to perform towards the desired objectives. Also, the fact that the Preamble to the Indian Constitution lays down in the broadest terms the objectives of the state, it would have been in order had this Chapter devoted itself to elaboration of a strategy of attainment. This segment would have been more appropriately located as a preamble to the document.

Summary of appraisal Addressing the structure of the document, the order in which the Chapters appear do not contribute to either a logical flow of ideas or coherence in the process of developing a national strategy. The fragmented manner in which opinions and perceptions appear are more symptomatic of distinctive individual notions than of a Strategic Approach.

Any appraisal of China and its potential power is incomplete without a reference to its CNP since it perceives it as the single most critical indicator and measure of the aggregate economic, political, military and technological prowess. A broad brush treatment of both South and West Asia leaves the reader wondering why these two vital areas did not merit the importance that they deserved. The absence of a Theory makes strategy reactive to global impulses rather than attempting to shape these very impulses; unfortunately the Introduction segment of the document serves poorly in the role of a Theory. In Form there is also an inability to come to grips with the hierarchal relationship between Policy and Strategy, they are not synonymous; it is Policy that provides a Theory which in turn generates Strategies. This fault line runs through the paper and manifests itself as a gap between the development of forces and the outlining of a contract for their use. In dealing with the Asian Theatre, for reasons best known to the authors, Japan, Russia and Central Asia have been left out of the calculus. In addition the linkage of the Asian Theatre with the rest of a globalised world and the dynamics generated by the actions of the USA are conspicuous by omission, which disappointingly leaves the analysis fractional. The intellectual muddle that pervades the paper is often caused by its title, for some of the precepts formulated are brazen alignments; perhaps the document may have been better branded as ‘Enlightened Alignment 1.0’. Any appraisal of China and its potential power is incomplete without a reference to its CNP since it perceives it as the single most critical indicator and measure of the aggregate economic, political, military and technological prowess. A broad brush treatment of both South and West Asia leaves the reader wondering why these two vital areas did not merit the importance that they deserved. While suggesting a transformation to a maritime power, there is an apparent lack of understanding that it is not only geographic and material factors that would bring about transformation, but also a change in the character of people and the governmental institutions involved, this as will be appreciated requires a very long-term and detailed road map. Also the principal demand on a maritime strategy is not to dominate oceanic spaces but to control or to challenge control of those spaces. In dealing with internal security, the document’s value would have increased manifold had it identified the rot in the administrative system and strategised to reform it. Chapter Seven on the subject of State Democracy would have been more appropriately located as a preamble to the document. It would have done well to have leaned on the directive principles of the Indian Constitution which lays down in the broadest terms the objectives of the state and been in order had this Chapter devoted itself to elaboration of a strategy of attainment.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

METTLE

A Air Marshal Anil Chopra PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (retd) The writer is highly decorated and qualified aviator with more than 3,400 hrs of flying experience on over 40 types of aircraft, Test Pilot and Qualified instructor and examiner of Indian Air Force. Held important appointments such as Command of No. 1 Squadron (Mirage 2000), Air Officer Commanding of two major fighter bases. Team leader for an aircraft upgrade project in Russia. Commanded the prestigious Aircraft and System Testing Establishment where 4 proto-types were under testing and development at that time. Served as Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Inspections), directly responsible for Operational, Maintenance and Administrative Quality audit of entire Indian Air Force. In the last two years of service, served as Air Officer in Charge Personnel managing the Human Resources of entire IAF.

Up to what level do we invest in military? Bread vs boots issue. Upto what extent do we factor the nuclear arsenal? China is aggressively developing indigenous military industry and pumping large sums? When will DRDO, Defence PSUs, Service HQs and the MoD sit and get their act together? Till when will we keep importing weapons? US invested 5 per cent of GDP every year in last 20 year on defence. China spends 2 per cent and Pakistan 4 per cent. Should India go up to at least 3 per cent from current 2.5 per cent? After all, no other country in the world currently has such security environment. Can we really hasten the defence procurement process further?

great team of renowned people put together a document called Non Alignment 2.0 in an attempt to identify the basic principles that should guide India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. Essentially everything that has been said is somewhat common sense and all is in public domain for years. Who does not know the security scenario around us and the geopolitical situation; that we need to bridge the gap with China; that more needs to be done for health, education, water and sanitation? Is this really a grand strategy document? How long will we bask in India’s self-perceived moral superiority? Could there have been a better heading than Non Alignment 2.0. Are we not essentially talking of the Way Forward for India? Could the document be called India's Grand Strategy 2022? Are we really non-aligned in the real sense? Have we ever been? Is it in our interest? Did the non-alignment movement really achieve anything substantial? We kept opposing the Americans, sometime just to score socialist points, yet went to them when we needed food aid in early sixties? Did we not go to Russians before 1971 war and towed their line in UN? Do we not want Western technology sometimes at any cost? Do we need them for nuclear power? Is LCA possible without Western engine and control actuators? Do we not need Western markets? Can Non-alignment Movements’ charters be achieved by just strengthening the UN General Assembly or reforming the Security Council? Is forming BRIC and IBSA not alliances? Do we not need to create more of these? Have our recent responses to American interventions, sometime even outside Security Council clearances not been very meek and muted? India’s economic success in the recent past has been in spite of the government. Can any government claim responsibility for the success of telecom, pharmaceutical, software or BPO revolution and build-up of Human Capital? Opening the economy two decades after the writing was on the wall and China had shown the way and we were on our debt stained knees, was a fait accompli. We all know that the governments have to get out of the way and act as fair umpires. Yet they tend to put their nose into everything. China is successful because of quick and clear decision-making at executive level. The decisions are driven from top to bottom. In India decisions of late are forced upwards by the people and media. We will have an anti-rape law, RTI, Lokpal only after years of driving / noise by masses / activists. Within the government there are groups pulling down the UID initiative. Of course the government

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

knows what is good for the country. Action is lacking. Are we really a great Democracy? Just being able to hold elections, even if the votes are bought or based on caste and not the merit of the candidate makes us a great democracy? Are we really a power by example? Is that how we run our parliament? With more than half our population living without the very basics do we need to pat our backs? The document rightly says, ‘There is widespread consensus that the main thing that can hold India back is India itself’. Can the political class be bi-partisan on important genuine issues? Should there be an upper age limit to be in Parliament? Can the police be allowed to do its job? Can the goal of all the politicians, bureaucrats and policemen among others be more to serve the masses and less to amass wealth, power and influence? Can a country like ours afford corruption of this magnitude? A large part of black money remains abroad, in lockers and under mattresses and thus outside development. Can the government promote transparency? Internal security is a rising issue. We have allowed the Maoists to grow to Frankenstein proportion. Essentially a politico-socio-economic issue which has remained unattended for many decades. What is the clear plan to solve it? Is it to be through the barrel of the CRPF gun? Do we have a real development model? Does any stakeholder really want to solve the Kashmir and Northeast problem, or are some enjoying being beneficiaries of the loot. What about the separatist leaders whose children are studying abroad and they dictate education norms in the valley. Do we have someone to call a spade a spade?

Are enough universities teaching serious security and international issues? Is it important to squabble over who will control the National Defence University, a military man or the bureaucrat? Where are genuine think tanks? Are they busy logging seminars and lunches? What is their international standing? How come not one figures high up. How much the government engages with them in policy formulation? As a nation have we been able to secure energy and other vital natural resources? Are we too obsessed with securing sea lanes? Is this the period of the Vikings or is Vasco de Gama on the way? Should we invest more in quicker to respond Air Power? Have we taken hard stands to support our workers and communities abroad? When will we develop a long-term decision-making culture after constructive debates? Like the Americans can we take a few ministers in the government from opposition parties? The NAM was an outcome of two big power blocks in the 50s. This century, in spite of rise

well-argued and astute critique of the Non Alignment 2.0 paper. The writer asks “as a nation have we been able to secure energy and other vital natural resources? Are we too obsessed with securing sea lanes? Is this the period of the Vikings or is Vasco de Gama on the way? Should we invest more in quicker to respond Air Power? Have we taken hard stands to support our workers and communities abroad? When will we develop a long-term decision-making culture after constructive debates? Like the Americans can we take a few ministers in the government from opposition parties?

of China, there will be significant other players. Unlike communism now there is no single issue to align or oppose. Issues will be diverse and stands will vary among groups. What are we then talking of Non Alignment?

China is pulling away on Cyber security and is in the process of leaving the Americans behind. We pride ourselves in our soft power? Are we waiting for the cows to come home?

Up to what level do we invest in military? Bread vs boots issue. Upto what extent do we factor the nuclear arsenal? China is aggressively developing indigenous military industry and pumping large sums? When will DRDO, Defence PSUs, Service HQs and the MoD sit and get their act together? Who will put the foot down? Till when will we keep importing weapons? US invested 5 per cent of GDP every year in last 20 year on defence. China spends 2 per cent and Pakistan 4 per cent. Should India go up to at least 3 per cent from current 2.5 per cent? After all, no other country in the world currently has such security environment. Can we really hasten the defence procurement process further?

How long will we be governed by Fatwas and dictates by handful of people from various communities. Will the world continue to see us treating MF Hussains, Rushdies, Kamal Hassans and the Kashmir girls' band through whims of small extra-constitutional groups? India is destined to grow. There is a place for it. It needs leadership. We need an Indian clone of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew or a more understanding version of Indira Gandhi For how long will the world continue to see us as a weak / soft state. Were our responses to Kargil, Kandahar, Parliament attack, Mumbai attack appropriate? With serious territorial issues and hub centre of terrorism on our doorstep can we be helpless watchers? Our reactions to, sometimes planned, pin prick triggers are knee-jerk. Was our border policy of not developing infrastructure in the northeast flawed and also left the area underdeveloped?

Some of the finest join our steel frame, bureaucracy. Will we continue to keep them as generalists or will they be made to specialise and given posting continuity without political interference? How long will the MoD bureaucracy and armed forces call each other ‘We’ and ‘They’. Why can they not be integrated completely? How long will we be governed by Fatwas and dictates by handful of people from various communities. Will the world continue to see us treating MF Hussains, Rushdies, Kamal Hassans and the Kashmir girls' band through whims of small extra-constitutional groups? India is destined to grow. There is a place for it. It needs leadership. We need an Indian clone of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew or a more understanding version of Indira Gandhi. It is time for action. It is time for the nation to move ahead with self-confidence. Time for all of us to put ‘nation-first’. Time for someone to take charge and drive the India cart. Non Alignment 2.0 lists the well-known issues, we need someone to catch the bull by the horn.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

aero India 2013

modernisation drive

ircraft major, Boeing showcased a wide range of aerospace products at the Aero India 2013 show. In our conversation with Boeing officials at the show, we were told that Boeing is showcasing its commercial, defence products and services of interest to India.

9 th International Exhibition on Aerospace, Defence and Civil Aviation

These include P-8 mobile console, a maritime surveillance aircraft console and a virtual maintenance training demo. Following models were on display. Boeing 787 Dreamliner, 777-300ER (Extended Range) and 737 MAX commercial airplanes, as well as the C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifter, P-8I maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, AH-64D Apache attack helicopter, CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift transport helicopter and V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. A C-17 Globemaster III military transport also flew at the show and was on display for visitors.

midst “Defence Budget Cut indications” by Defence Minister, A K Antony, country’s premier aero show 2013 kicked off with fervour on 6th February 2013 at Yelahanka Air Base at Bangalore. India’s Defence Minister A K Antony along with Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne and DRDO Chief KV Saraswat flagged off the show.

While discussing with senior officials we sensed there is still ambiguity whether the mega defence deals between France and India will be inked this year or not. The new French president Francois Hollande arrived in India on February 14 and had wide-ranging discussions with the Prime Minister, Mr Manmohan Singh.

The ninth edition of Aero India 2013, has grown tremendously in step with India’s huge modernisation drive and diversification of its buying to include the US, France and Israel as well as traditional supplier Russia. A total of 78 countries participated with nearly 700 Indian and foreign companies exhibited at the show. Aero India traditionally is the largest air show in Asia, with contemporary military engineering and weapons, as well as combat support systems, on display. The show was attended by renowned defence industry companies, as well as representatives from the armed forces of nearly all the leading nations. India this year also welcomed its first high-level delegation from China after New Delhi extended an invitation to Beijing for the first time in January, months after the Chinese agreed to resume their military cooperation. Air Vice Marshal Zheng Yuanlin headed a five-person Chinese group at the five-day show. Team DSA participated in the show and had good interactions with the senior most memebrs of the participating nations and gained a critical insight on the latest military engineering, weapons and top of the line air combat support systems etc. DSA February 2013 issue focused on “Jointness: Need for a new approach”, fortuitously carrying an exclusive interview with Chairman, COSC, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, was very enthusiastically received by the Aero India participants both Indian and International. Many of them showed keen interest in using DSA platform to foray into the burgeoning Indian market for defence products, services and technologies.

Aero show highlights

e were privileged to have an interview of Dr S Pillai, CEO and Managing Director of BrahMos Aerospace, in our February 2013 issue. Whilst interacting with other BRAHMOS officials at the show, we were told that the Indo-Russian BrahMos missile is advancing well and is slated to begin flight testing later in the year 2013. In his interview to DSA, Dr Shivathnu Pillai confirmed that the missile is scheduled to be fully integrated on the Su-30MKI by the time the enhanced Su-30MKI aircraft is handed over to the Indian Army next year. The missile is already in service with the surface vessels of the Indian Navy and by the Indian Army strategic forces, while the Indian Air Force will get it next year and expect to induct the new aircraft into service in 2015.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

ne of the main attractions of the show was Rafale Jet. Rafale’s manufacturer, Dassault Aviation had come up with three planes. The extensive flying by one of the world’s most sophisticated fighter planes took place at the aero show and enthralled the spectators and officials.

ne of the major attractions at the aero show 2013 was Russian aerobatics groups Russkie vityazi and Strizhi who made their maiden appearances at the Indian air show. They showcased the most complicated aerobatic manoeuvres in Su-27 and MiG-29 combat fighters.

Our attention was drawn at the Russian exhibition hall at Russian anti-missile systems, where we were informed by the officials that these anti-missile systems have no competition in the world. About 40 Russian companies took part in this year’s air show in Bangalore. The largest exposition is presented by “Rosoboronexport”. This company is taking part in the tender which the Indian Air Force is floating in order to purchase multipurpose planes that can be refuelled right in the air. Besides, “Rosoboronexport” presented at this show its military planes and helicopters that have already proved themselves in the world.

During our interaction with a representative of “Rosoboronexport”, he mentioned that they have showcased the training and combat plane Yakovlev-130, the plane Ilyushin-74MK90, which is meant for refuelling other planes right in the air, the multipurpose amphibian plane Be-200 and one of the latest military planes, Ilyushin-76MD-90A. Besides, they are going to show the helicopters Mil-35M and Kamov-31. They also mentioned that “We will also present anti-missile systems that we are offering to India – Antey-2500, Tor-M2E, Buk-M2E and Pantsyr-S-1”.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

aero India 2013

modernisation drive

uring our interaction with Israel Aerospce Industries (IAI), their representatives informed that they are displaying the finest technologies and systems at the aero show 2013. In an opening remark at the Israel booth, Joseph Weiss, President and CEO of Israel Aerospace Industries said, “All Israeli industries operating in the Indian defence market are in stiff competition with global and leading international industries. Despite competition, many Israeli systems successfully operate in all arms of the Indian Forces. Many Israeli companies have entered joint ventures with Indian arms and research institutes. The basis for the special Indian-Israeli relationship is the close professional connection existing between our Ministry of Defence and our defence industries.” “I urge my colleagues in the Israeli industries to make every effort to promote cooperation. Yet when we do compete – I call for dignity and collegiality, I can assure you that we at IAI will do so, he mentioned.”

BDA, a world leader in missiles and missile systems, demonstrated its unique status as the only company with a product catalogue capable of meeting the guided weapons requirements of all three armed services: air, land and sea. MBDA Prominently displayed model of the SR-SAM missile which sees MBDA supporting the DRDO in advancing a solution for the MAITRI short range air defence programme. With the Indian Air Force looking to enhance the operational capabilities of its fleet of Jaguar and Mirage aircraft, combined with its recent selection of the future MMRCA, Aero India offered MBDA the ideal opportunity to showcase its extensive range of air-to-air and air-to-ground guided weapon systems. MBDA can provide the pilot with the necessary equipment to not only ensure air supremacy but also to carry out precision strikes against a wide variety of static and fast moving surface targets.

At the show, IAI exhibited an innovative and advanced Helicopter Rehearsal Autonomous Safety & Training System (‘THRUST’), recently developed by IAI’s MLM Division. Also, IAI displayed its recently expanded ‘EHUD’ Autonomous Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation (AACMI) family that supports Eastern fighter aircraft. Moreover, IAI displayed the Skimmer, an integrated naval helicopter package for future mission requirements that includes sensors and various avionic interfaces.

wedish defence major Saab participated in full strength at Aero India 2013. The Saab displayed series of products covering the land, air, naval and civil security domains.

The Saab stand displayed the RBS 70 NG VSHORAD, BAMSE SRSAM, RBS15, TAURUS, Carl-Gustaf, Camosphere, MCS – Mobile Camouflage System, Saab 340 MSA (models), Skeldar, Gripen (scale mode), Remote Tower, 9LV SAT, 9 Land Soldiers Pad, MBT Crew Trainer, IDAS / CIDAS and the RIGS Head up display among others.

he Mahindra Group showcased its entire might in the aerospace domain with a joint display at Aero India 2013, encompassing Mahindra Aerospace, Mahindra Satyam and Mahindra Defence Systems. These companies came together under the banner of ‘Integrated Defence Solutions for Aerospace’, highlighted the diversity of products and services on offer for the aerospace industry from the Mahindra Group.

Mahindra Aerospace offered a unique portfolio of utility aircraft and metallic aerostructures manufacturing capabilities out of its investments in India and Australia. It is the only Indian utility aircraft player with a portfolio of utility aircraft including the GA8, GA10 and GA18 aircraft in addition to the CNM5. It also produces metallic airframe parts, sub-assemblies and aero structures in India and Australia. Mahindra Aerospace is also developing the GA18 – Z a twin turboprop, 18 seat, utility turboprop aircraft combining field-tested aircraft DNA with modern design upgrades and systems to set a new benchmark for robust affordable utility. To be launched after a comprehensive analysis of market needs spanning a variety of uses worldwide, the GA18 programme will extend the company’s portfolio into an exciting new domain.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

eam DSA witnessed the first flight of the Indian Air Force’s first Pilatus PC-7 Mk II trainer that flew into India on the eve of Aero India 2013. Delivery of the last batch of 75 PC-7s on order will be completed by end-2015. The contract for 75 trainers, signed last year, is worth more than 500 million Swiss francs (US $ 520 million). It also covers an integrated, ground-based training system and a comprehensive logistics support package. Pilatus has entered into a separate offset contract with the Indian government tallying 30 per cent of the trainer contract’s value in accordance with Indian defense procurement policy. The PC-7 is a low-wing, tandem-seat training aircraft, capable of all basic training functions including aerobatics, instrument, tactical and night flying. With the induction of the PC-7 Mk-II aircraft, the IAF will be able to meet the longstanding need of having a basic trainer aircraft.

ockheed Martin completed the delivery of the six aircraft to the Indian Air Force (IAF), and is now looking towards opportunities including JVs and logistics support extension. While interacting with the officials, we were told that Lockheed is looking forward to entering into a long-term support contract with Indian Air Force. A JV between Indian company Tata and Lockheed Martin will see the manufacture of empennage and centre wing components for future C-130Js.

Conclusion Aerobatic display by metal birds, Sarang, the helicopter display team of Indian Air Force, Flying Bulls of Czech Rupublic and valiant ‘Russian Knights’ marked the end of the ninth edition of the biennial event. Despite the budget deficit caused by slow economy and plausible indications of defence budget cut by Defence Minister, India still remains a favourite Aerospace, Defence Destination for foreign players. According to Deloitte, a global consultancy firm, while the global defence industry is expected to shrink, the growth in Indian defence sector is on the surge.”India continues to be one of the promising aerospace and defence (A&D) markets in the world due to the increasing demand in A&D equipment for the armed forces,” the Deloitte report said. We look forward to a bigger and more India centric Air Show in 2015.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

AGENDA IN NATIONAL INTEREST?

Amb Ashok Sajjanhar The writer a postgraduate in Physics from Delhi University and a career diplomat, has served as Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia. He has also held several significant positions in Indian Embassies in Moscow, Tehran, Geneva, Dhaka, Bangkok, Washington and Brussels. He negotiated for India in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. He has been an active participant in many International Seminars organised by UNCTAD and WTO.

The Report does not treat our relations with USA, arguably the most important and transformational partnership for India in the current century, with any prescriptive suggestions or guidance. The fact that both our countries are vibrant democracies with rule of law, free press and media and have an expanding and deepening relationship in all spheres including trade, commerce, strategic aspects, economy, energy, defence, high technology, education etc has been implicitly if not overtly recognised in the Report

The Report rightly emphasises that a window of opportunity beckons India to occupy its rightful place in the comity of nations if it can take the right and appropriate decisions today, both in the context of national policies as well as in terms of managing its external relations

ndia needs to maintain and promote maximum strategic autonomy to pursue its developmental goals and agenda. India is too large, populous and complex a country to have its national interests defined by goals set elsewhere. The Report rightly focuses on India’s relations with China and Pakistan. The Report however fails to give similar detailed treatment to our relations with some of our main partners with whom we have strong and expanding bilateral relations. Non-alignment represents a negative state of mind and represents a lack of confidence. The country is rising and getting a higher profile both because of its growing economy as also on account of its expanding political and strategic strength. It is argued that rather than Non-alignment, the foreign policy of the country should be based on selective and pro-active partnerships with like-minded countries for realisation of our national goals and objectives.

ight highly distinguished and respected minds in the country, known for their integrity and expertise, got together under the banner of the Centre for Policy Research and produced a Report titled ‘’Non Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twentyfirst Century’’ which was released to the public for discussion and analysis in February, 2012. The authors of the Report included such eminent and well-known public figures like Shyam Saran, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Sunil Khilnani, Nandan Nilekani, Lt Gen Prakash Menon (retd) and others who discussed the ideas amongst themselves for 14 months and also interacted with National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon as well as two Deputy NSAs. Over the last one year that the Report has been in public domain, it has been acclaimed, applauded, reviewed critically but also criticised on both substantive as well as for linguistic terminology used. The authors deserve gratitude and appreciation for having applied themselves over a long period and given so readily of their time and intellectual resources to bring out this commendable document. The Report can usefully serve as the basis for discussion and evolution of a comprehensive National Security Policy in the coming months. The document has much to commend itself. The Report rightly emphasises that a window of opportunity beckons India to occupy its rightful place in the comity of nations if it can take the right and appropriate decisions today, both in the context of national policies as well as in terms of managing its external relations. The Report identifies democracy, demography, technology, a highly dynamic entrepreneurial class and the growing aspirations of the Indian population as strengths which the country

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

needs to channelise in the right direction to reap the desired results. It however warns that time is of the essence and choices made today will shape the destiny of the nation for many generations to come. In addition, the country should not shy away from taking tough decisions because the circumstances will never be so propitious as they are today. In fact the political, economic and social space available to policy makers when the Report first saw light of the day was much more benign and favourable as compared to today. This space could continue to shrink with the passage of time.

The Report enjoys the great advantage of staunchly and emphatically focusing on building India's national strength through modernisation and increased dynamism of its economy by virtue of greater globalisation and interdependence, measures to deal effectively with its internal threats as also ways to counter the serious external challenges to its re-emergence as a regional and global economic and political power The underlying theme of the Report is that as in the first years after Independence, India needs to maintain and promote maximum strategic autonomy to pursue its developmental goals and agenda. India is too large, populous and complex a country to have its national interests defined by goals set elsewhere. Moreover the economic and political advances made by the country over the last few decades have provided it with the requisite flexibility and manoeuvrability to take policy decisions necessary to enhance its growth and promote security, integrity and prosperity of its people. The Report confirms that the country will have to suitably deepen its engagements with its international partners

Non alignment or

Issue-based Partnerships:

A Commentary on ''Non Alignment 2.0''

to maximise benefits accruing to it. In this context, the Report focuses on the development and promotion of innovation, knowledge economy, human capital and technology for realising the desired objectives.

The historical record of the United States bears out that powers that form formal alliances with it have tended to see an erosion of their strategic autonomy. Both India and the US may be better served by being friends rather than allies The Report discusses India’s relations with its neighbours particularly China and Pakistan in great detail. The threat from China has been elaborated upon at great length. The challenges that India confronts in its relations with China including the adverse balance of trade, the growing disparity in economic, the political

and military terms, projection of Chinese power in our neighbourhood as well as in the Indian Ocean; the continuing border dispute, the growing and expanding support for Pakistan by China, the insensitivity of China to matters of core concern to us etc find considerable space in the Paper. The Report provides some creative and robust ideas to counter the assertive and at times aggressive and hostile actions by China. It has strongly recommended bringing the issue of Tibet into play in our relations with the Chinese, not so much as to embarrass or pressurise them, but more to develop an understanding on the sensitive issue with the Chinese leadership which could have long-term consequential benefits for our bilateral relationship. The Report is however silent on whether we could intensify our interaction with Taiwan at official and / or non-official levels to create

greater space for us in our discussions with China. This could possibly be termed as our own version of ‘’non-confrontational assertiveness’’. The Report recommends that we respond to Chinese hostile actions and moves on the border with our own similar responses in sectors where we have strengths while making certain that such incursions do not lead to a state of conflict or direct confrontation. The Report also makes a cogent and persuasive case for expanding and strengthening our maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean as well as improving the physical infrastructure in our bordering areas. With Pakistan it focuses on ensuring build-up of our capacity to ensure that no terrorist attack inspired or engineered by our western neighbour can take place in future. It also suggests viable policy options

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

AGENDA IN NATIONAL INTEREST?

to inflict serious costs if attempts are made to coerce or force Indian judgments or actions. These include raising the human rights violations by Pakistani agencies in Balochistan and PoK, being more vocal on our position of Gilgit, Baltistan and Northern Areas being a part of India etc.

The Report strongly articulates the need for promoting indigenisation of defence industry and using the off-set policy for technological upgradation and diversification of production The Report however fails to give similar detailed treatment to our relations with some of our main partners with whom we have strong and expanding bilateral relations. It could have provided greater space, both literally and figuratively, to our growing ties with USA which President Barack Obama has characterised as ‘’the defining partnership of the 21st century”, as also with Russia, Europe, Central Asia and South-East Asia. The Report deals in great detail with threats to internal security and the robust manner in which we need to confront them effectively. It has identified our impressive economic growth as the cornerstone for enhancing our strategic autonomy. The authors have done a commendable job to view internal and external threats to security in a holistic manner which has not been attempted at such length earlier. The Report effectively deals with several challenges confronting India at present including ensuring energy security, rapidly creating physical and social infrastructure including education (surprisingly the Report does not cover the equally important sector of healthcare), promoting human resources and skills, innovation and creativity, transformation of our governance institutions including making them more responsive, inclusive and accountable. It also provides ideas to deal with internal security threats like extremism, Naxalism, problems posed by sub-state regionalism, governance of mega-cities, marginalisation of Adivasis etc. The Report strongly articulates the need for promoting indigenisation of

defence industry and using the off-set policy for technological upgradation and diversification of production. There is little in the Report that one can disagree with. It however needs to be noted that the concepts of strategic autonomy and national interest are somewhat nebulous and amorphous and two individuals while being motivated by the same sentiments could very well arrive at diametrically opposite decisions. Also some issues lend themselves much more readily to exercise of strategic autonomy than others. While strategic autonomy needs to be maintained and promoted in those areas where it is applicable, in other spheres appropriate decisions without the benefit of application of this concept will need to be constructed.

It could have provided greater space, both literally and figuratively, to our growing ties with USA which President Barack Obama has characterised as ''the defining partnership of the 21st century", as also with Russia, Europe, Central Asia and South-East Asia One of the most strident criticisms the Report has faced over the last one year is the use of the word ‘’Non Alignment’’ in the title. It is maintained by critics that Non-alignment represents a negative state of mind and represents a lack of confidence. The country is rising and getting a higher profile both because of its growing economy as also on account of its expanding political and strategic strength. It is argued that rather than Non-alignment, the foreign policy of the country should be based on selective and pro-active partnerships with like-minded countries for realisation of our national goals and objectives. The country stopped following the policy of Non-alignment, possibly after the demise of Nehru but definitely after the end of cold war and disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Even during its heyday, it is debatable whether the policy of Non-alignment was able to yield significant benefits to us or was effective in advancing

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our interests and position in the international community. Our major successes in pursuit of the policy of Non-alignment were possibly achieved before even the first Summit of the Movement was held in Belgrade in 1961. The Title would give the impression that the policies proposed are a minor tweaking or upgrading of the policies that India was following earlier during the period till the end of the cold war. At this stage when India seeks to engage itself more pro-actively and substantively with the international community, particularly with the Western world, it is rather inappropriate to ride once again on the bandwagon of Non-alignment which was the target of harsh denunciation by Western countries particularly in decades just prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union. It is also highly debatable whether our ‘’leadership’’ of the developing world resulted in any tangible benefits to us either in terms of improving the terms of trade offered to us or providing more sophisticated technology or capital at concessional terms. As India’s former Prime Minister I K Gujral succinctly stated after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, “It is a mantra that we have to keep repeating, but who are you going to be non-aligned against?” Even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, our membership and leadership of the Non-aligned movement did not result in our receiving the support of the Movement when we needed it the most whether it was in our conflicts with Pakistan, during the war with China, on our Kashmir Policy, or even at the time of our peaceful nuclear test in 1974. From some remarks in the Introduction of the Report as also those emanating in public fora from the authors of the document, it would appear that they would be prepared to make changes in the substance and content of the document in view of further reflection and / or after taking into account the comments that they receive on the report from the strategic community, scholars and practitioners. This would be eminently welcome. Moreover, this would be an ideal time to undertake such an exercise since the document first saw the light of the day exactly one year ago.

Possibly the first aspect that the authors could consider is to change the Title of the document. Maybe this is the document’s biggest limitation as it underpins the narrative that follows and also colours the perception of the reader. It is not simply a matter of semantics but has an impact that permeates some of the most critical suggestions made for India to move forward. It would be highly desirable as it would help focus the attention of readers as well as policy and decision-makers on the substance of the policy suggestions / prescriptions proposed by the Group rather than on the label of the bottle.

high technology, education etc has been implicitly if not overtly recognised in the Report.

With Pakistan it focuses on ensuring build-up of our capacity to ensure that no terrorist attack inspired or engineered by our western neighbour can take place in future. It also suggests viable policy options to inflict serious costs if attempts are made to coerce or force Indian judgments or actions. These include raising the human rights violations by Pakistani agencies in Balochistan and PoK, being more vocal on our position of Gilgit, Baltistan and Northern Areas being a part of India etc

132. While there may appear to be attractions for India to exploit its derivative value, the risk is that its relations with the US could become a casualty of any tactical upswing in Sino-American ties. Nor is it entirely clear how the US might actually respond if China posed a threat to India’s interests. The other potential downside is that India could prematurely antagonise China.

On substantive aspects, the document has strongly advocated that we may not align ourselves with any country but maintain our strategic autonomy to take those decisions which are most aptly suited for us and meet the litmus test of advancing our national interest. This is a highly commendable objective but as mentioned above, it needs to be realised that ‘’strategic autonomy’’ like ‘’national interest’’ is a rather indeterminate and ill-defined concept which is many times difficult to apply. The Report does not treat our relations with USA, arguably the most important and transformational partnership for India in the current century, with any prescriptive suggestions or guidance. The fact that both our countries are vibrant democracies with rule of law, free press and media and have an expanding and deepening relationship in all spheres including trade, commerce, strategic aspects, economy, energy, defence,

There appears to be some inconsistency in the Report when it suggests that we follow a policy of equi-distance between USA and China. Paras 131 to 133 read as follows: 131. Given that India has more interests in ‘direct’ competition with China and less with the US, it may be tempting to conclude that the US is a likely alliance partner. But this conclusion would be premature.

133. It is often said that India is well placed to improve its relations with all powers simultaneously and this has also been our experience in the past decade. But such an approach also poses real challenges, given that at least two of these powers have angularities. The US can be too demanding in its friendship and resentful of other attachments India might pursue. The historical record of the United States bears out that powers that form formal alliances with it have tended to see an erosion of their strategic autonomy. Both India and the US may be better served by being friends rather than allies. In Para 131 the authors accept that India has much more in common with the US while it is a direct competitor with China for political influence. Yet it vacillates in suggesting that India have a closer partnership with USA. It is no one’s case that India become an ‘’alliance partner’’ of USA as suggested in the Report. There is however considerable space available without being an ‘’ally’’ for India to have an intense, mutually beneficial and multi-faceted engagement with USA. Para 132 appears to suggest lack of

confidence when it speaks about the adverse impact on India of a tactical upswing in Sino-American ties. India’s strong partnership with USA is not directed against any other country but is dictated by its own merits. Also it would not behove a rising power like India to be overly sensitive about ‘’prematurely antagonising China’’ when its expanding ties with other like-minded countries are not directed against or at the expense of any other country including China. We have stood our ground and been able to protect our interests in the past when situations have so demanded without being steam-rolled by USA. We need not be apprehensive and nervous as mentioned in Para 134 that we might cave in under US pressure and not be able to maintain our positions in case we enter into a strong, strategic partnership with it. These suggestions appear to be somewhat at variance with the general tone, tenor and direction of rest of the Report. They are also in dissonance with the Report’s own analysis carried in rest of the document. It may also be pointed out that pro-active engagements with USA could introduce some sense of realism and sobriety in the manner in which China deals with India rather than it adopting a more bellicose and adversarial posture. To promote its strategic autonomy India needs not to stand alone but to expand and enhance its strategic engagements with other like-minded partners. As an integral element of strategic autonomy, the country today also needs preferential, issue-based partnerships. At its current stage of development and growth, the country should have no hesitation in acknowledging and advancing such relationships. The above differences of opinion notwithstanding, the Report enjoys the great advantage of staunchly and emphatically focusing on building India’s national strength through modernisation and increased dynamism of its economy by virtue of greater globalisation and interdependence, measures to deal effectively with its internal threats as also ways to counter the serious external challenges to its re-emergence as a regional and global economic and political power.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

National Security Strategy generally outlines a normative future towards which we wish to progress. It defines the end states we wish to achieve and the road map to actualise that normative future. That is the primary problem with this strategy paper. It’s flawed baseline assumptions seem to be as under:

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

The great Indian tragedy is the return of pacifism via the Non Alignment 2.0 mindset. Some three decades of the practice of realism by the Indian state, stands virtually overturned today. The nuclearisation of South Asia has led to the revival of the pacifist chorus of the 1962 era – war is just not possible anymore. Once again the military member of this study has categorically ruled out the use of force altogether. All wars will be reduced to nibbles or shallow bites. Even if China or Pakistan attack us in force, India should not use proportional force in retaliations. It runs the risk of being nuked and hence Indian policies must seek to appease the aggressors. Non Alignment 2.0 translates into a policy prescription for surrender

We are heading not for a multipolar world order but a new phase of bipolarity with the USA and China as the two new super powers. India, in this bipolar world order, appears to be a peripheral player that must safeguard itself by being neutral or non-aligned between China and USA. How can India be non-aligned against it’s principal security threat? Non Alignment 2.0 claims to maximise India’s autarky but ends up as a capitulationist exercise designed to kowtow to and appease a rising and truculent China with avowals of neutrality in it’s clash with the USA. A National Strategy Paper must define Alternative end states and the desired end state from which, will emerge the ”ends, ways, means” equations. A multipolar world order in which India emerges as one of the major poles of power, will maximise our autonomy and serve our interests far better than a new Bipolar World Order, where India is forced to remain neutral for the fear of offending any super power. Towards this end – India must establish strong and supportive relationships with mid-tier powers like France, Russia and Japan, to maximise its autonomy and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). The problem today is the attempt of the Non Alignment 2.0 thesis to reimpose a new form of pacifism that rules out the use of force altogether.

ne of the encouraging recent developments has been the attempt to craft an informal National Security Strategy (NSS) in India. This was set in motion by the previous NSA and overseen closely by the current incumbent. A multi-disciplinary team of experienced officials, economists, analysts and corporate leaders, was set up to formulate a draft NSS Document that would spell out India’s Grand Strategic choices for the coming decades. This was led by Mr Shyam Saran, India’s former Foreign Secretary and now the head of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). It also had a military member on board – a Lt Gen who is the Military Advisor to the current NSA. As such the document closely reflected the official thinking and thought process of the current National Security Establishment in India. Hence, despite the denials that this was not an official policy document, it merits very close scrutiny and its contents need to be widely debated and discussed before this informal document becomes national policy by default. There is an urgent and inescapable need for India to formulate a National Security Strategy on a periodic basis (as is done in the USA).

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This will become the base policy document for the formulation of a Defence Strategy and individual service strategies and plans for force structure and equipment. This has been put off for years for no comprehensible reason. That is why there is an urgent need now for the formalisation of an official National Security Strategy document.

Despite this the Congress had deliberately generated a myth that it was Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle that got us our freedom. They have consciously tried to efface the memory of Bose and his INA. Their attempt to create a deliberately pacific narrative of state has had some tragic downstream consequences for the Indian polity

aspects in particular are at great variance with the official views of the Service HQs. The personal opinion of an individual officer cannot be paraded as policy over the heads of the Service Chiefs. His views on the use of force against a nuclear backdrop are unduly pessimistic. There is therefore an urgent need to discuss this paper so that a new one more in consonance with a larger consensus amongst India’s strategic community can be crafted. It must incorporate the views of the Service HQs who are very critical stakeholders in this national security process.

The Non Alignment 2.0 document could have served as the Base paper for such an NSS. It was a laudable and path breaking effort. Unfortunately some of the conclusions it has arrived at are somewhat disconcerting. They definitely do not represent a bi-partisan consensus amongst the Strategic Community in India. The paper’s views on the military

A National security strategy generally outlines a normative future towards which we wish to progress. It defines the end states we wish to achieve and the road map to actualise that normative future. That is the primary problem with this strategy paper. It’s flawed baseline

assumptions seem to be as under: We are heading not for a multipolar world order but a new phase of bipolarity with the USA and China as the two new super powers. India, in this bipolar world order, appears to be a peripheral player that must safeguard itself by being neutral or non-aligned between China and USA. China abuts our country geographically, has attacked us once in the past and is currently engaged in building-up Pakistan as a local nuclear and conventional military counterweight to India. China tacitly enables Pakistan to wage unrestricted asymmetric warfare against India. It seeks to incite all our SAARC neighbours to adopt antagonistic / hostile stances towards us and seeks to contain and surround India

via it’s string of pearls in the Indian ocean region. How can India be non-aligned against it’s principal security threat? Non Alignment 2.0 claims to maximise India’s autarky but ends up as a capitulationist exercise designed to kowtow to appease a rising and truculent China with avowals of neutrality in it’s clash with the USA. Strategic logic and International Relations (IR) theory highlights the need for India to balance the power of a rising China by strong strategic partnerships (not necessarily alliances) with counterveiling powers like the USA, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia among others. Would Non Alignment 2.0 not constrain our choices by forcing us to be non-aligned with states like

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER

USA and even more with Japan and Vietnam which have a strong clash of interests with China? As a normative end state, a new bipolar world order with the USA and China as the two new super powers would severely marginalise India. How can a strategy document start with such a flawed anchor premise? Other scenario generation exercises have deemed this as the worst case scenario for India. A Strategy Paper which assumes the worst case scenario as the basic scenario and start point does not inspire confidence. Alternative end states: A National Strategy Paper must define Alternative end states and the desired end state from which, will emerge the ”ends, ways, means” equations. A multipolar world order in which India emerges as one of the major poles of power, will maximise our autonomy and serve our interests far better than a new Bipolar World Order, where India is forced to remain neutral for the fear of offending any super power. Towards this end – India must establish strong and supportive relationships with mid-tier powers like France, Russia and Japan, to maximise its autonomy and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). It may be recalled that multipolar world orders were in position before World Wars I and II. These were characterised by rapid alignments and realignments between the various poles of power to suit the fast changing and fluid scenarios. The primary purpose was furtherance of national interests and maximisation of autonomy and the ability to influence outcomes. In falling back upon the Non-alignments of the 1950s and 1960s era, this paper becomes regressive and seeks its inspiration from a past that is now wholly irrelevant. Non-alignment hardly survived the trauma of 1962, when a regional power trumped us badly. Non-alignment per se cannot be turned into a dogma. The military humiliation at the hands of China had led to hysterical calls for Western military support and troops deployments. We

got token small arms and snow clothing from the USA and were virtually arm-twisted to hand over Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, if we wanted help against China. Pakistan attacked us in 1965 and Western military aid dried up thereafter. We were forced to turn to the Soviet Union which responded enthusiastically. By 1971, we were in a virtual alliance with the Soviet Union and for very good reasons. Despite this, the fiction of Non-alignment was sustained as a fashionable construct, more out of the force of habit than necessity.

The Nehruvian state propagated the myth that it was Gandhian non-violence and Satyagraha that got her freedom. It laid claims to a new form of exceptionalism. India, it said, was a state not based on hard power but a new evangelical form of soft power based on Ahimsa, non-violence and sheer soul force and personal charisma of its pacifist leadership

The use of force: National narratives and anchor premises of state By labelling itself as a resurrection of the cold war concept of Non-alignment, this paper has unwittingly raised some core issues about the basal outlook of the Indian Nation State per se. Non-alignment sprang from the pronounced and exaggerated pacifism of the Nehruvian state. Non-alignment laid claims to the high moral ground of pacifism. Key issue to be addressed in the context of Non-alignment was the role of force as a means of establishing order in International Relations. Nehru decried the use of force and laid emphasis on the soft power of Ahmisa and Non-violence. He had contempt for the armed forces and expended a lot of the state energies to keep them in their place and out of decision-making loops. He kept them seriously underfunded and under-resourced and out of the decision-making loop. This led to the unmitigated disaster of the 1962 war with China. The importance of the use of force in international relations could not have been more cruelly highlighted to

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India. Nehru’s successors thereafter went back to a Realist Perspective and greatly expanded and modernised the Armed Forces; and used force repeatedly and successfully against Pakistan. The problem today is the attempt of the Non Alignment 2.0 thesis to reimpose a new form of pacifism that rules out the use of force altogether. The Military Member of this study has virtually ruled out the use of force in any meaningful manner because of the nuclear backdrop. All warfare will be reduced to inconsequential nibbles and bites, he pontificates. Even if we are attacked by China or Pakistan in a major way – we should not use Proportional Force in retaliation, for he is extremely worried that we will be nuked. It is strange that India’s nuclear arsenal is deemed so incapable of deterring our adversaries! The Military Member does not want the army to have a Strike Corps for the Himalayas. He wants a thin red line in the mountains. He proposes an army of tribal guerillas in our border areas to terrify the wits out of the PLA. For some inexplicable reasons he does not want the Indian Army (or Airpower) to react to any Chinese attack on land but wants the Indian Navy to attack Chinese SLOCs in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). How this will affect the outcome of major land battles in the Himalayas is not specified. His views are in stark contrast to the views of the Service HQs. The unfortunate fact is that in his extensive lecture circuits around service think tanks in India, he has been parading his personal views as government policy. He talks of political imperatives that will not let us use force to respond to attacks by China or Pakistan. This superseding of the official views of the service HQs is rather disturbing. It reminds us of the Kitchner-Curzon dispute in British India, when the Commander-in-Chief had objected violently to a Military Member (by far his junior), questioning / trying to override his professional judgment. By itself, Non Alignment 2.0 was a purely intellectual and theoretical exercise, it would have been welcomed primarily for the debate it generated. Unfortunately, the authors of this document are known for their proximity to the Current National Security Establishment. The Military Member in particular, has virtually

been parading his proximity to the civilian power centres to override his views of the Service HQs. This amounts to parading purely personal views as policy. When these personal views amount to virtually ruling out the use of force against aggressive neighbours, it amounts to imposing a new form of pacifism on the Indian polity. The last phase of this pacifist outlook had led to serious neglect of our hard power and resulted in the trauma of 1962. We cannot set the stage for a replay of that form of pacifism and exaggerated emphasis on a personalised form of diplomacy to secure the nation.

The Military Member of this study has virtually ruled out the use of force in any meaningful manner because of the nuclear backdrop. All warfare will be reduced to inconsequential nibbles and bites, he pontificates. Even if we are attacked by China or Pakistan in a major way – we should not use Proportional Force in retaliation, for he is extremely worried that we will be nuked. It is strange that India’s nuclear arsenal is deemed so incapable of deterring our adversaries!

Narratives of state The time has come to go to the roots of a basic malady in our strategic culture. The Nehruvian state propagated the myth that it was Gandhian non-violence and Satyagraha that got India freedom. It laid claims to a new form of exceptionalism. India, it said, was a state not based on hard power but a new evangelical form of soft power based on Ahimsa, non-violence and sheer soul force and personal charisma of its pacifist leadership. However sexed up this myth may have been, it is unfortunately a blatant lie. Historically, what got India her freedom was unfortunately not Gandhian non-violence, but the violence of the Indian National Army (INA) of Subhas Chandra Bose. The INA lost the war. But post the Second World War, 2.5 million Indian soldiers were being demobilised. The trial of the INA officers at the Red Fort evoked widespread anger and led to mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy and some Army

units. The British were terrified of this spectre of a widespread revolt by some 2.5 million trained soldiers. This was stated unambiguously by Clement Atlee, the British Prime Minister who had signed the Independence of India Act. When asked in 1948 by Justice Chakraborty as to why, when the Quit India Movement of Mahatma Gandhi had petered out by 1942, did the British leave, he had stated unequivocally – “Subhas Bose and his INA”. When further pressed on what then exactly was the contribution of Mahatma Gandhi and his non-violent struggle to Indian Independence, he had sarcastically spelt out the word “MINIMAL”. That was the view of the then primary decision-maker of the British Empire. Despite this the Congress had deliberately generated a myth that it was Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle that got us our freedom. They have consciously tried to efface the memory of Bose and his INA. Their attempt to create a deliberately pacific narrative of state has had some tragic downstream consequences for the Indian polity. The post independence history therefore needs to be recounted. At the time of independence, India had just emerged from the Second World War. Inter-services synergy was at its peak. The British left behind a very workable apex body in the form of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) which had the Prime Minister, Home and Finance Ministers. The three Service Chiefs and the Defence Secretary attended all meetings. It was a highly efficient apex structure. Sardar Patel was a great realist and had no hesitation in using force. He aggressively used force to stop the raiders in Jammu and Kashmir, to liberate Hyderabad and Junagadh and create a coherent and viable state by making all the Princely states fall in line. He threatened to march in the Indian Army in case they failed to comply. Unfortunately Sardar Patel died early on. Thereafter the pacifist Nehruvian outlook took over the reins of state. The coup in Pakistan in 1956 made it deeply suspicious of the Armed Forces. Thereafter they were totally marginalised and under-resourced and put out of the decision-making loop altogether. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet system fell into total disuse

as decision-making was made highly personalised. Nehru virtually ruled out the use of force and the under-resourced Armed Forces atrophied and sulked on the margins. Their professionalism was destroyed. The Director of the Intelligence Bureau usurped the strategic Advice and Planning role and the marginalisation of the military was complete. Nehru, Menon and Mullik were convinced that war was just not possible. China just would not attack and hence a string of token forward posts would not be overrun. This was the basis of India’s forward policy in 1961. China called our bluff and India was badly humiliated in 1962. Nehru’s soft power balloon was badly punctured. Not a single non-aligned country came forward to support us. India was taught a bitter lesson in realpolitik and the viability of the use of force in international relations. It was a badly needed corrective. The successors of Nehru, turned to realism with a vengeance and the efficacy of the use of force was seen so vividly in the 1965 and even more so in the 1971 wars with Pakistan.

The return of pacifism The great Indian tragedy is the return of pacifism via the Non Alignment 2.0 mindset. Some three decades of the practice of realism by the Indian state, stands virtually overturned today. The nuclearisation of South Asia has led to the revival of the pacifist chorus of the 1962 era – war is just not possible anymore. Once again the military member of this study has categorically ruled out the use of force altogether. All wars will be reduced to nibbles or shallow bites. Even if China or Pakistan attacks us in force, India should not use proportional force in retaliations. It runs the risk of being nuked and hence Indian policies must seek to appease the aggressors. Non Alignment 2.0 translates into a policy prescription for surrender. It revives the basal debate that was started at the time of independence. Is India an exceptional state based on soft power? That was a national narrative based on a deliberate lie. It cost us dearly in 1962. The use of force cannot be ruled out in interstate relations. Such mindsets lead to tragic neglect of hard power capabilities. This nation simply cannot afford another 1962 type debacle.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

REDEFINING THE AGENDA

T Dr Shrikant Paranjpe The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies and Director, YCNISDA, University of Pune, Pune, India.

The debate on the strategic responses to the world today would have to be carried on at different levels. At a systemic level India appears to have demanded a legitimate space for itself amongst the managers of the world order. This is on the understanding that India has arrived on the world scene based on its political stability, economic resurgence and technological capability (as seen in the nuclear, space and electronics fields)

At the structural level it may focus on the need to evolve an international institutional mechanism to conduct both advance planning and react to situations. In a sense India’s search for a place in the UN Security Council is part of this agenda. At the operational level it may lead to articulation of various levels of strategies to deal with regional and global situations. At the South Asian level there needs to be more articulate and cohesive policy on problems of internal security, both of the cross-border terrorism type and the Maoist–Naxal threats. At the regional level the ‘Look East’ policy was one attempt to break the South Asia centric focus of India’s world view. The post-Soviet Indian security policy has sought to address some of these concerns. Where does one locate non-alignment in this context?

he non-aligned world faces a new and a far more daunting task of redefining their agenda if the movement has to remain meaningful in the years to come. One of the key issues to be addressed is the role of force as a means of establishing order in international relations and its relevance in Indian strategic thinking. The tradition of peace approach was central to the Indian world view. Nehruvian liberalism however had received a very rude shock after the Chinese invasion of 1962 and was forced to develop hard power in the wake of the humiliation. What has changed since the Nehru days? At the regional level the locus of threats remains hostile neighbours and their military threats. The debate on the strategic responses to the world today would have to be carried on at different levels. At a systemic level India appears to have demanded a legitimate space for itself amongst the managers of the world order. There is also need for changes at the structural and operational level.

t was sometime in the mid fifties that India’s Minister for External Affairs Krishna Menon, responding to the criticism to India being labelled ‘neutral’ reacted spontaneously to say that ‘We are not neutral, we are non–aligned’. It was a term that Pandit Nehru had not approved of initially. It was, according to Menon, a logical extension of nationalism and of the conflict between nationalism and military blocs. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the age of military alliances brought the debate on the relevance of the Non-aligned Movement on the international agenda of the Third World. The debate on non-alignment came to focus on the need to redefine the approach that had provided a governing image for the nations of the Third World through the years of cold war; recreate a new framework within which these countries can articulate their world views; or, at the other end of the spectrum, dissolve the movement itself.

Governing image Pandit Nehru’s presentation of the Indian position in 1946 revolved around two fundamental features of Indian approach: Independent understanding of world affairs and a peace approach to international relations. These two were to become the basic features of the concept of non-alignment. Nehru’s perception about independent approach rested on two dimensions. One was the colonial dimension of independence that led him to support national liberation struggles in the Third World. The other dimension was in the post war world of cold war where India would ‘stay away from politics of groups aligned against one another’. The concept of peace approach presented the fundamental differences in Western and

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Third World approaches. To the central question ‘how is peace achieved in a society of nations’ the Western approaches would stress on the role of power. Their argument would be based on the use of power for establishment of peace and order in international relations. Alternatively, the Indian approach would focus on the roots of conflict and seek ways for conflict resolution.

It is imperative that the non-aligned world resist these pressures. The non-aligned world faces a new and a far more daunting task of redefining their agenda if the movement has to remain meaningful in the years to come Further, the approach to peace is rooted in the perspective of development that these countries cherish. Approaches to development would involve economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of development. One may mention the differences in approach to arms control and disarmament in this context. Western approach to arms control and disarmament uses the logic of arms race and its effects on stability and the fear of a possible war due to arms race. They call for arms control and disarmament measures to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of war. Unlike this approach, the Indian approach focused on the need for development as the ultimate goal and the need for disarmament was linked to the goal of achieving development by ensuring that scarce resources are used for development. Much later, the Gorbachev line, unlike the earlier Soviet view, accepted this logic of development and disarmament. One of the key issues to be addressed in the context of non-alignment is the role of

force as a means of establishing order in international relations and its relevance in Indian strategic thinking. Given the tradition of peace approach that was central to Indian world view, the newly independent country had to address the issue of military power in its strategic perspectives. Nehru understood the need of a country to maintain military strength to avoid the dangers or go for a war if necessary. Nehru did not expect a person to be a pacifist. He argued that each one must maintain his strength. But as he put it “why shout it out? Why talk about it? Why threaten the other all the time”.

The post-Soviet Indian security policy has sought to address some of these concerns. Where does one locate non-alignment in this context?

Changes What has changed since the Nehru days? At the regional level the locus of threats remains hostile neighbours and their military threats. The nature of these threats has now shifted more to problems of internal security as manifested in the forms of insurgency, low intensity conflict, terrorism etc; growth of fundamentalism and communalism; migration and narco-terrorism. In case of Pakistan, for example, the main concern is the cross-border terrorist and insurgent activities. India is unlikely to have any territorial ambitions about Pakistan. The nature of threats India perceives from China goes beyond the 1962 type of a border confrontation. The level of conflict is likely to take a dual form: a diplomatic offensive that would include attempts to put pressure on India from all

directions and a continuous low intensity conflict carried out in a broad -based manner increasingly through Maoist forces in India. The other area of threat is not of direct nature. This area would include the pressures from the G-8 and the developed world. This threat manifests itself in the issue area of development. The problem of development has two dimensions: the acquisition of new and advanced technology and capital investment. Today much of the advanced technology falls in the category of ‘dual use’ technology and as such is subject to several international restrictions. India faced a nonproliferation regime that sought to restrict the transfer of dual use technology to India. This regime evolved around the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968),

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

REDEFINING THE AGENDA

Responses The debate on the strategic responses to the world today would have to be carried on at different levels. At a systemic level India appears to have demanded a legitimate space for itself amongst the managers of the world order. This is on the understanding that India has arrived on the world scene based on its political stability, economic resurgence and technological capability (as seen in the nuclear, space and electronics fields). At the structural level it may focus on the need to evolve an international institutional mechanism to conduct both advance planning and react to situations. In a sense India’s search for a place in the UN Security Council is part of this agenda. At the operational level it may lead to articulation of various levels of strategies to deal

To the central question ‘how is peace achieved in a society of nations’ the Western approaches would stress on the role of power. Their argument would be based on the use of power for establishment of peace and order in international relations. Alternatively, the Indian approach would focus on the roots of conflict and seek ways for conflict resolution Peace and development are two fundamental preoccupations of NAM today. There is a need to focus on these fundamental principles of non-alignment as a governing image or a world view of a nation state. At one time in history, in the fifties the operative framework was regionalism. Later on in the sixties it became non-alignment with reference to cold war. In the seventies, the economic dimensions of cold war overtook the military aspects of the age of alliances. Non-alignment approaches adapted to this change with a demand for NIEO. The need today is to redefine the fundamental principles of independence and peace within the new emergent framework of the post-Soviet international relations. The non-aligned countries need to address the challenges posed by the post-Soviet international system of globalisation. At the conceptual level, this needs to be done by reviewing the emphasis on revisionism. The anti- status quo policies had for a long time taken the form of anti-imperialism (read USA). NAM now needs to address itself to the changes in the world order and look beyond the ideologically coloured lenses that had dominated the movement for all these years. The economic agenda that continues

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to draw on the philosophy of the G–77 or NIEO may not be relevant today. The era of market economics and the recent economic upheavals in the US and Europe have exposed the vulnerability of the developed world. It is there that groups like G-20 or BRICS that tend to overshadow the G-7 / G-8 agenda. However, there may be divergent views about humanitarian issues in the context of a liberal globalised agenda where NAM may have to assert itself. As regards human rights, the Third World holds that economic development has to precede the full flowering of civil and political rights. There is a greater value placed on family and community harmony than on individual civil and political rights and liberties. Individual states must have the right to interpret human rights in accordance with the history, culture, polity and economy of that country. The focus must be on welfare rights not liberty rights. The other is the problem of convergence in the socio-cultural field. The Third World societies grew in the Western belief that such values like modernisation, westernisation, secularisation; all adopted at the expense of traditional values; would lead to power and prosperity. In reality these societies suffered from poverty, deprivation, haphazard urbanisation and uneven distribution of wealth. The reassertion of traditional values is visible in the use of religion and ethnicity for social justice and a sense of identity.

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with regional and global situations. At the South Asian level there needs to be more articulate and cohesive policy on problems of internal security, both of the cross-border terrorism type and the Maoist–Naxal threats. At the regional level the ‘Look East’ policy was one attempt to break the South Asia centric focus of India’s world view. The post-Soviet Indian security policy has sought to address some of these concerns. Where does one locate non-alignment in this context?

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (proposed) in the nuclear area; and the Nuclear Suppliers Club (formed after the Pokhran Test of 1974), Missile Technology Control Regime (1987) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (1995) in the area of technology transfer. Similarly, foreign investments in the consumer sector far outpace those in the core infrastructural sector. India would be looking for more long-term direct foreign capital investments in the infrastructural sector rather than portfolio investments. At the domestic level, this would entail a restructuring of Indian economy to make investments more attractive. At the international level it would require the diplomatic skills to face the adverse impact of the GATT-WTO system and the emergent trade blocs around the world.

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The non-aligned world appears to be caught up in a trap between the demands of a neo-realist perspective that seeks a continuance of military instruments of power and the liberal approaches to globalisation that seek to shrink the world into a manageable homogenous entity. The loss of the Soviet Union as a balancer has ended the diplomatic leverage of the bipolar age. There is a growing pressure to accept the liberal agenda on nuclear proliferation, MTCR, human rights, environment, trade, intellectual property and patents. It is imperative that the non-aligned world resist these pressures. The non-aligned world faces a new and a far more daunting task of redefining their agenda if the movement has to remain meaningful in the years to come.

Boeing is proud of its longstanding partnership with India. A partnership India can depend upon to meet its developing requirements, from surveillance, strike and mobility platforms to C4ISR, unmanned systems and support services. The most advanced systems and technologies providing the greatest value for India. That’s a partnership of endless possibilities.

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SHORT-CHANGING THE FORCES?

I Lt Gen OP Kaushik (retd) The writer has been the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Army and a Former Vice Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, Haryana.

We must remember, insecure nations cannot develop, nor can they take sustained decisions. Hence, a climate of secured external and internal environment is needed for all-round development and to provide that, well equipped, well officered, well trained and fully contended armed forces are an inescapable necessity

The situation is that while our adversaries, Pakistan and China, are continuosly engaging in modernisation of their defence forces, it appears India’s defence forces would have to fight the next war with the type of weapons and equipment which they possessed during the last one

n the budget, presented to the parliament on 28-02-2013, a sum of Rs 2,03,672 crore has been earmarked as defence budget. Last year India’s defence budget was Rs 1,93,407 crore which, after a mid year review, was reduced to Rs 1,78,504 crore in December 2012. Hence, this year’s allotment is higher by about 14 per cent. However, considering the Rs 10,000 crore cut imposed last year and the factor of inflation, our defence budget has come down in real terms. Last year defence share of the budget was 1.9 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The proposed allotment for the year 2013-2014 will be reduced to 1.79 per cent of the GDP. This year’s budget allocates some Rs 86,741 crore for capital acquisitions. Most of this is committed liabilities. There are no funds for new acquisitions. There are no funds for the dangerous hollowness in the Indian Army’s Tank ammunition, Medium and AD Artillery, Special Forces and Night vision equipment that Gen V K Singh had highlighted last year. What about the Strike Corps for the mountains which alone will cost some Rs 60,000 crore? India’s defence budget has been rising steadily since independence. During the year 1950-51 it was Rs 168 crore. It increased to Rs 19,180 crore in 1993-94. For the first 15 years of the independence, the military needs of the country were ignored by Mr Nehru, resulting in a humiliating defeat in 1962 against China. The defence budget at that time was kept around one per cent of the GDP. Our defeat at the hands of Chinese made it to rise 4 per cent in 1962-1963. It has been rising since then. It was Rs 8,728 crore in 1986-87 and due to the latest weapons Pakistan then obtained from the USA and China, costing approximately Rs 40,000 crore, we were forced to increase our defence budget during the year 1987-88 to Rs 12,512 crore. China’s infrastructural developments in Tibet, enabling her to enhance her operational capabilities four times, as also rapid modernisation of her Armed Forces rang alarming bells in the minds of Indian leadership resulting in defence budget rising to Rs 1,41,703 crore in the year 2009-2010. It was again marginally increased to Rs 1,47,344 crore for the year 2010-2011. The rise was less than 4 per cent in comparison to the previous year. The allocation made during this year’s budget is Rs 2,03,672 which is approximately 14 per cent more than the last year but actually lower if we crank in inflation and the Rs 10,000 crore deducted last year. Many a factor has to be considered while deciding the level of defence budget. First among them is the threats to our security, both external and internal. Rising inflation, declining value of rupee, rapidly rising cost of modern weapons, salaries of men, organisational needs of the defence department and prevailing economic situation also cast an effect on allocation for defence.

To meet this threat we need three times the force than what we have today to defend our northern frontiers against China. Time is now to prepare for it, otherwise, another 1962 may be in the offing. In dollar terms, China had spent US $ 30 billion on defence in the year 2000. This rose to US $ 120 billion in 2010 and was US $ 160 billion last year. Actually China’s defence budget has risen by some 620 per cent from its 1990 spending levels. In sharp contrast, India’s defence budget last year was just US $ 42 billion. Thus China has been spending some 3-4 times more than India on defence Our security environment today is highly critical and to say the least, it is, infact, imbalanced. China, during the last two decades, has enhanced its operational capabilities in Tibet by four times by completing Lhasa rail line, which has now been extended upto Shighatse, completing 58,000 km of roads and five airfields. To meet this threat we need three times the force than what we have today to defend our northern frontiers against China. Time is now to prepare for it, otherwise, another 1962 may be in the offing. In dollar terms, China had spent US $ 30 billion on defence in the year 2000. This rose to US $ 120 billion in 2010 and was US $ 160 billion last year. Actually China’s defence budget has risen by some 620 per cent from its 1990 spending levels. In sharp contrast, India’s defence budget last year was just US $ 42 billion. Thus China has been spending some 3-4 times more than India on defence. Pakistan has been receiving liberal aid from USA on the pretext of fighting terrorism. The US administration, ignoring India’s objections, has been deliberately building-up Pakistan military capability. China has been working overtime to boost Pakistan’s military strength and hardware including their nuclear capability. Recent acquisitions of F-16 nuclear capable aircraft from USA and latest long-range missiles from China give an edge to Pakistan over India. It is because of this military preparedness that Pakistan dares to ignore all warnings from India on account of her indulgence in organising and supporting terrorist activities in India. 70 per cent of the Indian Army is today committed in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency duties in Jammu and Kashmir, North-east and all other parts of the country. We also have to contend with volatile security environment developing on Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh borders as also the recent happenings in West Asia and Maldives. These security developments not only justify

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Defence Outlay

Too Inadequate to Meet Security Needs

sober look at our latest defence budget and how it falls woefully short of the requirements keeping in view that China’s defence budget has been over three times ours now for almost a decade. Pakistan is being aided and equipped not only by the USA but also by China. Last year our defence capital acquisition budget was cut by a whopping Rs 10,000 crore. Can the Indian state afford to be so blissfully out of step with its own security environment?

enhanced defence outlay but also demand an enlarged financial package to build-up our military capabilities to ensure uninterrupted and unhindered economic development. There has been unprecedented rise in the cost of modern weapons. A tank which cost Rs 6 lakh in 1980 now costs Rs 15 crore. The cost of T-90 tank, recently acquired by India is, infact, much higher. The price of a fighter aircraft has risen from

Rs 25 crore in 1980 to Rs 800 crore today and we need to replace our ageing nearly 300 MiG 21 aircraft. In case of navy the situation is much worse. A frigate which cost about Rs 20 crore in sixties is now costing over Rs 3,000 crore. Due to the financial crunch, no new weapon system has been purchased for the Indian Army since 1986. Indigenous production of latest weapons and equipment has been dismally slow and, infact, has let down the

aspirations of the armed forces. Navy’s needs of surface to air guided missiles, induction of refurbished aircraft carrier and replacement of old frigates are miles behind schedule. The air force needs total replacement of their ageing fighter aircraft, better radar and electronics. In my opinion the present outlay for defence is grossly inadequate to prepare the armed forces to face the current and future threats to India’s security.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

defence budget

SHORT-CHANGING THE FORCES?

Manpower costs constitute a very large chunk of defence expenditure. About 62 per cent of revenue expenditure accounts for the salary bill and to say the least, the sixth pay Commission has left armed forces totally dissatisfied and discontended, a factor which a nation can ignore at its peril. Mounting threats to our security have resulted in military strength rising from about 2.3 lakh in 1960 to about 13 lakh today. And yet, as against an authorised strength of 46,615 officers, army alone is short of 11,349 officers. There is no external threat at the moment but unsettled borders with China and continuous hostile attitude adopted by Pakistan, conflict can be imposed upon us much against our will and at a time frame not of our choice. Army is overstretched due to its commitments on the borders, fighting terrorism and insurgencies and in aiding civil authorities in natural disasters and establishing law and order. All these commitments are resulting in stresses and strains on soldiers who get much lesser time to take care of their families. I strongly believe to cater for lurking security dangers in future and to avoid burden of overstretch, the government must sanction, at least 10 more divisions of the Indian Army. The government has sanctioned only two divisions. Foreign aid agencies may demand reduction in our defence expenditure and consequently, the size of the defence forces, nevertheless, we have to be concerned with our security and should decide to abandon such conditional foreign aid. The nation must know that China on our northern borders can employ 35 divisions against us as opposed to 6 it could in 1962. At present, we have only 7 divisions guarding this border. Despite the increase in defence spending, in terms of the percentage of GDP, our defence budget has been one of the lowest in the world. Last year it was 1.9 per cent and the proposed allocation for 2013-2014 will be barely 1.79 per cent. Our two adversaries, China and Pakistan, have been spending a much higher percentage of their GDP on defence. China’s defence budget for the year 2012-2013 was approximately 5,32,250 crore. One estimate suggests that third world countries

are spending US $ 3,000 billion on defence every year. India’s share is only 1 per cent of this amount whereas her population is 25 per cent of the total population of the third world. As declared by the government, the country is to procure 126 multi-role combat aircraft, 197 light helicopters and 145 light howitzers (field guns). This will require additional allotment of defence budget. If because of procedural wrangling this scheme gets delayed, it will harm our defence preparedness grievously. Although during the last three decades, the defence budget has been on the rise, very little could be spared for modernisation and improving our military’s cutting edge. Of the total budget, approximately 48 per cent was utilised for salaries, 39 per cent for housing and other accessories including purchases of equipment, 6 per cent on research and 7 per cent on training. Consequently, very little was allocated for modernisation and it is because of this reason that no new weapon system could be introduced in the army since 1986. In 1993 Mr Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister had made a promise of giving roughly 3 per cent of the GDP for the defence needs, but, unfortunately, to date that figure has not been reached. The three Services chiefs have been crying aloud in demanding 3 per cent of the GDP as share of defence budget but their cry has fallen on deaf ears. The situation is that while our adversaries, Pakistan and China, are continuosly engaging in modernisation of their defence forces, it appears India’s

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

defence forces would have to fight the next war with the type of weapons and equipment which they possessed during the last one. Many crucial demands for new weapons and equipment are pending in the Ministry of Defence on account of procedural and bureaucratic delays which include 126 multi-role combat aircraft, 197 light helicopters and 145 light howitzers (field guns), submarines, new rifles for the infantry and new communication system. On an average roughly Rs 8,000 crore of the defence budget have been surrendered every year during the last 7 years. Impact of continuous surrenders of defence budget, coupled with delay in supplies from our main supplier, Russia and main emphasis of the Indian Army shifting to internal security, the Indian Army has almost lost its edge over Pakistan. Despite our objections, thousands of crores worth of aid is reaching Pakistan from USA and China. Hence, the situation is likely to get worse. Under these circumstances, India has no other option but to provide, at least, 3 per cent of the GDP as a suitable outlay for defence. We must remember, insecure nations cannot develop, nor can they take sustained decisions. Hence, a climate of secured external and internal environment is needed for all-round development and to provide that, well equipped, well officered, well trained and fully contended armed forces are an inescapable necessity.

aero India 2013

shinmaywa debut

ero India 2013 was conducted at Air Force Station Yelahanka, Bengaluru wef 06 Feb 13 to 10 Feb 13. This was ShinMaywa’s maiden participation at the event. During the event, the company showcased some of the products, specifically the US 2i amphibian.The company also showcased the world-class ‘Paxway’ Passenger Boarding Bridges. The aim was to increase awareness about high-technology products with unmatched quality that the company offers to Indian customers.

The US 2 Amphibian aircraft is a Government of Japan project and is manufactured by the ShinMaywa Industries Ltd, Japan. The aircraft belongs to the family of ‘US series’ amphibian aircraft, which has been in service with JMSDF since 1976. The latest version of the aircraft, the US 2, has been in active service with the JMSDF for last 05 years. Uniquely, the US 2i, is the only aircraft in the world that operates in sea state 5 conditions on the high seas as well as on rivers and lakes: carries a sizeable payload of personnel (30 personnel) and stores (03 Ton of load) and has the longest endurance with the shortest take-off and landing distance in the world (only 300 m). The aircraft is presently the only amphibious aircraft fitted the ‘Boundary Layer Control System’ for lift augmentation. This allows the aircraft to operate at very low speeds and consequently reduces the take-off / landing run of the aircraft and allows for safe afloat operations during rough sea conditions. The aircraft not only meets the requirement of an effective oceanic Search and Rescue platform for the nation, it may also be utilised in various other roles like Island support operations, Casualty Evacuation, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, EEZ Surveillance and Fleet Support role for the navy. Being the only Japanese aerospace company participating in Aero India ShinMaywa attracted a lot of attention from the media and general public apart from senior officials of the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence. Many important dignitaries including Lieutenant General Kunisuke Nakashima, Vice Chief of Staff, Japan Air Self Defence Force, Dr Satish B Agnihotri, DG (Acquisition), Mrs Preeti Sudan, JS and AM (MS) of MoD, Air Marshall M Matheshwaran, Deputy Chief (Perspective Planning & Force Development) of Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff, Vice Admiral Pradip K Chatterjee, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Paras Nath, Controller of Logistics, Rear Admiral BS Parhar, Flag Officer Naval Aviation and his staff from Indian Navy, AOC-in-C Maintenance Command of IAF visited the stall. In addition, important business meetings with their prospective partners were conducted during the air show. A lot of interest was also shown by field aircrew from the Indian Armed Forces and the Indian Coast Guard. Several media houses conducted onsite interviews including the NHK media team from Japan. The stall also generated huge interest from the local visitors every day, who were excited to know more about the unique amphibian. ShinMaywa was also the official ‘kit sponsor’ for the delegates of ‘International Seminar on Indian Aerospace Industry’ conducted by FICCI at the venue, where Mr Sujeet Samaddar, Director and CEO was a discussant on leveraging acquisitions for technology infusion.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

STRATEGIC QUANDARY

E Dr Harsh V Pant The writer is Reader in International Relations at King's College London and an affiliate with the King's India Institute.

As economic and military disparities widen between China and India, China’s ability to threaten Indian interests is also growing. India needs serious internal economic and military consolidation. But given the disarray in Indian domestic polity it will be years before New Delhi will be in a position to take on China. As such, India needs new partners in a world that is growing increasingly unsettling with China’s rise. The most significant partner in this regard will be the US for India. Not surprisingly, despite professing its undying faith in the virtues of non-alignment, the Indian government continues to work on enhancing its ties with Washington

As economic and military disparities widen between China and India, China’s ability to threaten Indian interests is also growing. India needs serious internal economic and military consolidation

arlier this year a group of Indian foreign policy experts came out with a report on the nation’s grand strategy titled ‘Non Alignment 2.0’ which offered a vision of “allying with none” as the best foreign policy option for India. Despite the end of the cold war in early 1990 with the virtual disappearance of the former Soviet Union, the idea of non-alignment is alive and well in India and it would be unwise to suggest that non-alignment has gone away.

Iran hosted the 16th summit of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) last year in August which was also the beginning of a three-year turn for Tehran as the group’s Chair. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh went to Tehran with a 250-member delegation but had very little to show for it in the end. The NAM’s meeting in Tehran was the largest international gathering in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iranian regime used it to full effect. At a time when Iran faced international opprobrium and multitude of sanctions, it wanted to establish that it was not as isolated as many might believe. And it succeeded when the 120 odd nations of the NAM in the group’s final declaration expressed their unanimous support for the controversial Iranian nuclear energy programme and berated the US-led Western sanctions regime aimed at throttling the Iranian nuclear ambitions. Yet even as Iran was able to secure the backing of NAM for its nuclear programme, no such support was forthcoming for Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria, Iran’s main ally in West Asia. Rebels backed by major powers in the Middle East, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, were battling the Assad regime, backed by Iran, for control of towns and cities across the country.

India of today has very little in common with the majority of the members of NAM and New Delhi is forced to extol the virtues of NAM primarily for domestic political compulsions. The world has changed, Indian foreign policy priorities have changed and yet some of the best and brightest in the Indian foreign policy establishment want to resurrect non-alignment as Non Alignment 2.0 Egypt’s President, Mohamed Morsi, was categorical in his speech at the NAM meeting in decrying the Syrian government’s attempt to brutally crush the rebellion, thereby reflecting broad Arab support for insurgency in Syria. A majority of NAM members had already voted to condemn the Syrian regime at the United Nations. The United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon also ended up vitiating the climate for Tehran by asking Ayatollah Khamenei to release all political prisoners.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

The NAM summit was merely an attempt by Iran to garner legitimacy for a regime that is getting increasingly unpopular at home and isolated globally. In this context, the Indian performance at the NAM summit was particularly disturbing. The UN Secretary General and the Egyptian President stood up for their convictions but the Indian Prime Minister failed to even articulate a coherent position based on the imperatives of Indian national interest. This was not really surprising as increasingly Indian domestic political demands have been imposing significant costs on the management of India’s external relations. India of today has very little in common with the majority of the members of NAM and New Delhi is forced to extol the virtues of NAM primarily for domestic political compulsions. The world has changed, Indian foreign policy priorities have changed and yet some of the best and brightest in the Indian foreign policy establishment want to resurrect non-alignment as Non Alignment 2.0. Despite what some might suggest, the NAM was only of limited utility to India even during the heydays of the cold war. It became overtly hostile to the West as it lined up to support Moscow on issue after issue during the cold war. For India, this much touted Third World solidarity was of little use during major times of crises. Yet New Delhi persists with its fascination with the NAM even as the leaders of Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Sudan continue to add lustre to the glowing credentials of the NAM. An organisation that was founded to rail against the establishment now finds itself in a unique situation where some of its long-standing members like India are being touted as the ones likely to shape the new global order. It is this contradiction that New Delhi will have to deal with in the coming years. Given its performance in Tehran, it is difficult to be confident about India’s ability to transcend its fascination with non-alignment. And this despite the fact that India’s security environment has been radically altered with the spectacular rise of China and all the attendant negative consequences for Indian interests. India on its own is in no position to manage China’s rise. It is decades behind China in economic growth and defence modernisation. It needs new partners, in particular the US, to balance China. Resurrecting non-alignment as a foreign policy doctrine at this critical juncture will not only alienate like-minded nations willing to cooperate with New Delhi but will pose a grave danger to vital Indian interests. This will ensure that India will neither be able to

The Dangers of Non-alignment I

ncreasingly Indian domestic political demands have been imposing significant costs on the management of India’s external relations. India of today has very little in common with the majority of the members of NAM and New Delhi is forced to extol the virtues of NAM primarily for domestic political compulsions. An organisation that was founded to rail against the establishment now finds itself in a unique situation where some of its long-standing members like India are being touted as the ones likely to shape the new global order. It is this contradiction that New Delhi will have to deal with in the coming years. India’s security environment has been radically altered with the spectacular rise of China and all the attendant negative consequences for Indian interests. India on its own is in no position to manage China’s rise. It is decades behind China in economic growth and defence modernisation. It needs new partners, in particular the US, to balance China. Resurrecting non-alignment as a foreign policy doctrine at this critical juncture will not only alienate like-minded nations willing to cooperate with New Delhi but will pose a grave danger to vital Indian interests. This will ensure that India will neither be able to garner major power support vis-a-vis China nor will it be able to preserve its much-touted ‘strategic autonomy.’ garner major power support vis-a-vis China nor will it be able to preserve its much-touted ‘strategic autonomy.’ “Na Khuda hi mila / Na idhar ke rahe na udhar ke “

I found neither faith, nor union / And now I belong neither here nor there.

visaal-e-sanam with

lover

As such despite the attraction that non-alignment continues to hold for sections of Indian foreign policy establishment, it remains as dangerous for India today as it was in 1962 when notwithstanding its professed posture of a non-aligned nation, India had to go begging to Washington for help against Chinese aggression. As

economic and military disparities widen between China and India, China’s ability to threaten Indian interests is also growing. India needs serious internal economic and military consolidation. But given the disarray in Indian domestic polity it will be years before New Delhi will be in a position to take on China. As such, India needs new partners in a world that is growing increasingly unsettling with China’s rise. The most significant partner in this regard will be the US for India. Not surprisingly, despite professing its undying faith in the virtues of non-alignment, the Indian government continues to work on enhancing its ties with Washington. It must be aware that just as in 1962 non-alignment was not of much help, in the emerging strategic environment, the policy of non-alignment will not help India in advancing its interests.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

MILITARY CHALLENGES

I Maj Gen PK Chakravorty VSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy who was comissioned into the Regiment of Artillery on 31 March 1972. A Silver Gunner who has undergone the Long Gunnery Staff Course, Staff College and is a graduate of the National Defence College. He has commanded a Medium Regiment and a Composite Artillery Brigade. He was Major General Artillery of an operational Command, Commandant of Selection Centre South in Bangalore and Additional Director General Artillery at Army Headquarters. He has also served as the Defence Attache to Vietnam and is a prolific writer on strategic subjects. He is the consulting editor for Brahmand 2012 and is compiling a monograph Firepower-2030 for CLAWS, New Delhi.

India has to be prepared for a two front war as also effectively provide maritime security. She has to guard her assets in outer space and fight against terrorists to maintain internal security. The Armed Forces must have state-of-the-art weaponry, a Strike Corps in the mountains as also a formidable navy to defend our SLOCs from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca. Further there is a need to have strategic relationships with high intensity to improve our strategic balance in our region. Countries like US, Russia, Israel, Vietnam, Japan, UK, France and our neighbours must have deep military interaction to promote better understanding between the Armed Forces. We must have a National Security Strategy to calibrate our response to different situations

ndia was a founding member of the Non-aligned Movement. The organisation was founded in Belgrade in 1961 and was the result of joint efforts of President Tito of erstwhile Yugoslavia, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru our first Prime Minister, President Sukarno of Indonesia, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Geographically this constituted Yugoslavia from Europe and the remaining from Asia and Africa. This was created to follow a middle course during the cold war which ceased with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. While many of the members were closely aligned with the US or the Soviet Union, the movement still maintained its cohesion during the cold war. For India it had to fight wars with Pakistan and China which needed support and possibly the most important treaty was the Indo-Soviet treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on 09 August 1971 between the foreign ministers of the two countries. The treaty enabled strategic cooperation between the two countries and was a precursor to the Bangladesh war fought between India and Pakistan in December 1971. During the war the US President Richard Nixon ordered the Seventh Fleet to move to the Bay of Bengal to undertake operations against India’s Eastern fleet. The Soviet Union countered the manoeuvre by despatching a nuclear flotilla from Vladivostok. This counter stroke enabled India to undertake operations in Bangladesh without outside interference. Forty one years have elapsed since the 1971 war and India has become an important country in the South Asian region with credible military forces undergoing modernisation. Meanwhile the Non-aligned Movement saw the breakup of Yugoslavia, a founding member and currently Belarus is the only member from Europe. The last summit took place in Tehran from 26 to 31 August 2012. The final document emphasised on peace and harmony. The movement does not take any strategic decision and at best focuses on issues related to soft power.

Military challenges to India India’s military challenges originate from the need to protect our land borders, maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), air and outer space. Further we have our problems of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir as also in the North-east. Being a growing economic power we have our offshore assets in the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and oil exploration with Vietnamese friendship in the South China Sea. Further we have to guard our assets in space as also specialise in Cyber warfare. We also have an internal problem of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) which has caused security problems in over 200 districts

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

of the country. This problem is being currently dealt by the Central Police Organisations but the Armed Forces have to be prepared to deal with the issue if the same gets exacerbated. We also have to ensure that our Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) are open and not interfered. Accordingly our Area of Interest lies from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca.

We have to take a pragmatic approach of the existing strategic environment which includes a full spectrum conflict with Pakistan and China. While we are all equipped with nuclear weapons nothing stops a conventional conflict if events swing irrationally Comprehensive National Security also includes apart from military threats to aspects of Security relating to Energy, Food and outbreak of Pandemic diseases. All these issues figure in the non-traditional domain but deeply impact our strategic choices.

Strategic options Viewing our military challenges and our security threats we have many issues to consider. Militarily we have a visualised threat of a two front war with China and Pakistan. Viewing force levels this could be a conventional war with a nuclear over hang. It would be with our current capabilities a difficult operational situation. Countries undertaking operations normally function with support to optimise combat capabilities. In most of our external conflicts we have relied on outside strategic support to resolve issues to a logical conclusion often not to our military advantage. The Tashkent Peace Agreement to resolve the 1962 dispute witnessed the return of Haji Pir pass to Pakistan and during the 1971 War, return of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners did not resolve demarcation of the border with Pakistan. Our weaponry of the Armed Forces is indigenised to about 30 per cent and we are dependent on foreign suppliers for about 70 per cent of our equipment. Our Research and Development authorities are moving heaven and earth to catch up with technologies but they are behind China’s blizzard progress in weaponry and the advanced nations are prepared to sell but are reluctant to hand over technology. Our dependence is extremely heavy in the field of navigation as we do not have our own navigation satellites and rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the GLONASS for precise movement and targeting. As regards energy security we are highly dependent on the Middle East for our sustenance in fuel, oil and lubricants. Our food situation is still dependent on the monsoons and we are unable to optimise our requirements.

STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR INDIA

ndia was a founding member of the Non-aligned Movement. Today, our weaponry of the Armed Forces is indigenised to about 30 per cent and we are dependent on foreign suppliers for about 70 per cent of our equipment. Therefore to stand up to our military challenges we need external support to sustain and replenish our operations. We need not be a part of a structured military alliance but certainly we would need external technical assistance as also replacement and resupply of weapons procured from abroad. Currently we have strategic partnerships with more than 30 countries. However, the intensity of relationship varies based on our mutual interests. Militarily strategic partnerships need to be deepened with US, Russia, Israel, Vietnam, Japan, UK, France, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives. Our imports of fruits and vegetables are about Rs 5,000 crore and currently we are facing a severe shortage of onions. As per reports 29.8 per cent of our population are below the poverty line and currently we are having a fiscal deficit of about 5.1 per cent. Despite being ranked the world’s fourth largest economy with a GDP of four trillion dollars we are dependent on developed countries for technology and state-of-the-art products. Further our energy requirements need to be sustained as currently 75 per cent of our oil requirements have to be imported. A reality check would reveal that to undertake operations we are dependent on weapons, spares, ammunition and other logistical aspects on other countries. Therefore to stand up to our

military. challenges we need external support to sustain and replenish our operations. We need not be a part of a structured military alliance but certainly we would need external technical assistance as also replacement and resupply of weapons procured from abroad. It is pertinent to note that practically all countries who attended the Non-aligned Meet at Tehran were strategically aligned to the United States, Russia, France or some other country. Interestingly Pakistan is Non-aligned though it has strong military equations with China and the US. It is pertinent to note that China has also been attending these conferences as an observer. Obviously any country can theoretically philosophise they are non-aligned whereas while undertaking operations they are pragmatic to calculate their precise requirements.

A reality check would reveal that to undertake operations we are dependent on weapons, spares, ammunition and other logistical aspects on other countries. Therefore to stand up to our military challenges we need external support to sustain and replenish our operations. We need not be a part of a structured military alliance but certainly we would need external technical assistance as also replacement and resupply of weapons procured from abroad In our case we have to take a pragmatic approach of the existing strategic environment which includes a full spectrum conflict with Pakistan and China. While we are all equipped

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

MILITARY CHALLENGES

with nuclear weapons nothing stops a conventional conflict if events swing irrationally. Irrational behaviour has often been exhibited when nations go to war and with improved infrastructure both China and Pakistan are capable of mobilising speedily and launch operations. Our capabilities vis a vis Pakistan provide us a conventional edge but against China currently our force levels are limited to withstand a reported high level threat from China. The document Non Alignment 2.0 is an extremely well prepared document and logically brings out our strategic options. With regard to Pakistan the document states that the hard power strategy adopted will have to cover the spectrum that includes sending a political signal militarily at the lower end to capture of territory considered feasible under nuclear conditions at the higher end. It speaks of a capability to make shallow thrusts that are defensible in as many areas as are possible along the International Border and Line of Control (LoC). Certainly this is a sensible option. However, we should not rule out deeper thrusts in the desert areas where capture of territory is possible combined with surgical strikes in other regions. Limiting our capability to shallow strikes would reduce our capabilities in force structures of only pivot corps who would be primarily involved in defensive duties rather than a proactive strike role.

Militarily we have a visualised threat of a two front war with China and Pakistan. Viewing force levels this could be a conventional war with a nuclear overhang. It would be with our current capabilities a difficult operational situation. Countries undertaking operations normally function with support to optimise combat capabilities. In most of our external conflicts we have relied on outside strategic support to resolve issues to a logical conclusion With regard to China the document speaks of possible land grabs by China and we should retaliate by similar grabs. Further in the case of a major offensive the document advocates initiation of insurgency in areas occupied by Chinese and naval amphibious capabilities in the Indian Ocean to possibly interfere

with Chinese maritime assets. The proposition is difficult as it would be difficult to create these capabilities. As repeatedly reported China is capable of launching a major offensive with a combination of missile attacks, destruction of our reconnaissance satellites, cyber warfare, aerial targeting followed by a land offensive to capture Tawang, portions of Ladakh and threaten remaining Arunachal, Sikkim as also the UP-Tibet border. The appropriate military response is to have a Strike Corps for the mountains and an additional Corps to cover the Line of Actual Control (LAC) effectively.

The Soviet Union countered the manoeuvre by despatching a nuclear flotilla from Vladivostok. This counter stroke enabled India to undertake operations in Bangladesh without outside interference India’s external strategic options emanate from her perceived threat. Presently China poses a threat to India and as correctly stated by the document Non Alignment 2.0 impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space. Ever since the formation of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, China has primarily fought major wars on land. The capture of Paracel Islands in January 1974 and skirmishes with the Vietnamese Navy over the Spratly Islands are the only maritime actions by the Chinese Navy. In all probability India must be prepared for a land offensive from China which may be in collusion with Pakistan. Strategic equations always look at quadratic usage of force. Accordingly India needs additional land forces with surveillance and firepower elements to dissuade China from attacking India. The next issue is our relationships with nations. Non-alignment is an excellent social, cultural and an economic interface between its members. Militarily non-alignment does not give any benefit, as the members do not try to resolve issues even between members. The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict is possibly an example of how no member came to India’s assistance. We have to look for an alternative. India being a plural democracy with multifarious aspirations cannot enter a strategic alliance. Certainly we need to look to strategic partnerships. The

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Director General of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Dr Arvind Gupta and Sarita Azad have in their IDSA Comment on Strategic Partnership dated 17 September 2011 stated that, “A strategic partnership is a long-term interaction between two countries based on political, economic, social and historical factors.” Currently we have strategic partnerships with more than 30 countries. However, the intensity of relationship varies based on our mutual interests. Militarily strategic partnerships need to be deepened with US, Russia, Israel, Vietnam, Japan, UK, France, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives. We need to have deeper sharing of security aspects with these countries. These can happen when we have a National Security Strategy. This document must spell out our objectives and thereby enable us to synergise our thoughts objectively. The Ministry of Defence needs to be praised for approving the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) which lays down the framework for Defence Acquisition up to 2022. It would be appreciated if our government could approve the National Security Strategy to channelise our thoughts correctly for undertaking operations. The way ahead for a regional power like our country is to build strategic partnerships which will strengthen our security.

Conclusion India has to be prepared for a two front war as also effectively provide maritime security. She has to guard her assets in outer space and fight against terrorists to maintain internal security. The Armed Forces must have state-of-the-art weaponry, a Strike Corps in the mountains as also a formidable navy to defend our SLOCs from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca. Further there is a need to have strategic relationships with high intensity to improve our strategic balance in our region. Countries like US, Russia, Israel, Vietnam, Japan, UK, France and our neighbours must have deep military interaction to promote better understanding between the Armed Forces. Last of all we must have a National Security Strategy to calibrate our response to different situations.

Unique. Ahead Ahead of of the the Art. Art. Unique. Unique. Ahead of the Art.

non alignment 2.0

AN ANACHRONISM?

A Rear Admiral (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and was awarded Silver Medal at the Naval Academy, the Telescope and the Sword of Honour for being adjudged the best Naval Officer during initial training. He did his specialisation in Quality Assurance of Naval Armament and adorned various key appointments at Naval Command Headquarters, DRDO establishments, Ordnance Factories and finally rose to become the Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy). He is an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC). He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation.

The discussion brings out the modest development of the Indian Navy into a regional security provider and a catalyst for economic growth. This viewed together with the goals and objectives of both NAM and Non Alignment 2.0 brings out the fact that, in a small way, the Indian Navy has taken the path of fulfilling its designated role in facilitating an equitable economic order as well as towards achieving economic power

The path to a great maritime nation lies in facilitating vibrant bilateral and multilateral trade over the sea by removing policy level impediments, which in turn would give an impetus to merchant marine and the growth of the Indian Navy

very supportive Naval look at the tenets of the Non Alignment 2.0 paper. The Non Alignment 2.0 document, it feels, is India specific, covers a vast arena of national issues and suggests measures which could be undertaken to enable India to take its rightful place in the world. As far as maritime power is concerned it brings out the advantage India holds in Asia and how it can accrue strategic advantage if the maritime strategy is vigorously pursued. It advocates that India should strive for a dominant position in the Indian Ocean, develop bases in offshore island chains and extensive specialised amphibious capabilities. The fundamental theme is thus attaining economic power as one of the pillars for greater National power.

wo events brought Non-alignment into focus in 2012 in India. One was the 16th NAM summit hosted by Iran and the other to a lesser extent was release of a document Non Alignment 2.0 by a diverse group of analysts and policy makers.

Tehran NAM summit The NAM summit demonstrated that with its over 120 members, NAM still holds relevance, even though some of its members have aligned themselves with the United States of America, in the emerging economic and world order. It enabled centrestaging of dialogue on Syria and Israel by President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon respectively. Interestingly it also led to General Martin Dempsey reinforcing US opposition to unilateral military action by Israel against Iran, as he made clear that US military chiefs were equally wary of getting ensnared in Syria.1 Professor Vijay Prasad points out that “NAM is just a name for regionalism now and the future of world politics lies in this regional thinking, not the US State Department.” The solidarity of old may be gone, but in its place is something far more real: power.2 It is evident that NAM has remained significant over decades of its existence irrespective of the changing world order, during and post, cold war. NAM today stands for promoting cause of humanity and economic cooperation. It has been able to influence UN policies to a certain extent due to a large number of its members in the UN. However, it is also true that it has little military or economic clout. NAM members realise

that economic empowerment is essential for political independence, therefore reliance on economic cooperation between countries forms core of the NAM strategy. NAM advocates a three pronged approach to resolve the problems of the world economy; namely reliance on own resources, promoting cooperation between member states and enhancing cooperation with developed states. This alone can lead to self-reliance of NAM members, which in turn would shield their interests from the rapidly advancing technology and economy of the developed world. Thus economic cooperation forms the basis of establishing a just and fair international economic order. With respect to India and the relevance of economic cooperation with countries, it is sufficient to quote Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh at NAM summit in Tehran, 20123 : “Nearly two decades ago, India embarked on a “Look East” policy in an endeavour to learn and benefit from and contribute to the evolution of a new Asian economic community to our East. However, the progress, prosperity, well-being, political stability and plurality of the Asia to our West has always been of equal historical and civilisational significance for us”. Given the fact that the cheapest and the largest volume of trade and energy flow over the oceans and that a large number of NAM members are ocean rim countries, the role of a robust merchant marine is implicit in the objectives of NAM. The role of National Navies lies in shaping and securing the ocean trade environment in their spheres of influence, for convenient and troublefree economic cooperation.

1. Richard Norton-Taylor, 30 August 2012, The Guardian, Israeli attack on Iran 'would not stop nuclear programme' http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/30/israeli-attack-iran-not-stop-nuclear 2. Ishaan Tharoor, September 10, 2012, Back to the Future: Why the Non-Aligned Movement Isn't an Anachronism, Time Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2123279,00.html 3. Statement by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh at the XVI Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, http:// pmindia.gov.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1211

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Non Alignment 2.0 The Non Alignment 2.0 document is India specific, covers a vast arena of national issues and suggests measures which could be undertaken to enable India to take its rightful place in the world. As far as maritime power is concerned it brings out the advantage India holds in Asia and how it can accrue strategic advantage if the maritime strategy is vigorously pursued. It advocates that India should strive for a dominant position in the Indian Ocean, develop bases in offshore island chains and extensive specialised amphibious capabilities.

Major thrust needs to be imparted to development of the EEZ, shipbuilding, port infrastructure etc4. With respect to economy it advocates active participation in bilateral and multilateral forums and economic integration with the countries of South Asia, East Africa, West Asia and South-East Asia. The fundamental theme is thus attaining economic power as one of the pillars for greater National power.

Focus Indian Navy “ … after nearly a millennia of inward and landward focus, we are once again turning our gaze outwards and

seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-establish itself, not simply as a continental power, but even more so as a maritime power and consequently as one that is of significance on the world stage (emphasis added).” – Pranab Mukherjee, June 2007 Over the past two decades Indian Navy has made extensive forays towards fulfilment of objectives of cooperation in the world order as exemplified by an examination of Naval Exercises and Security arrangements in the Indian Ocean.

4. Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen (Retd.) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, Siddharth Varadarajan; NON ALIGNMENT 2.0, A FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY FOR INDIA IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY, http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf

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non alignment 2.0

AN ANACHRONISM?

Naval Exercises. Indian Navy frequently carries out Naval Exercises with foreign navies. The most common being the passage exercise (PASSEX) with navies of the countries being visited by Indian naval ships. Indian naval ships have made port calls in Israel, Turkey, Russia, Greece, Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Tonga, Kenya, China and other countries. Other structured exercises are aimed at enhancing interoperability, cooperative security engagement and regional Human Assistance and Disaster Relief. Some of these exercises are conducted annually for example; Malabar with the US Navy, Indra with Russian Navy, Konkan with the Royal Navy, Varuna with the French Navy, IBSAMAR with the Brazil and South African Navies and Simbex with the Republic of Singapore Navy. The biennial exercise MILAN is conducted with participation of over a dozen navies near Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

India has placed considerable emphasis on developing a security presence in the northeast Indian Ocean. There are several dimensions to this: first, India’s direct security presence in the Andaman Sea, second, its bilateral security relationships in the region and third, its aspirations to gain a security role in the Malacca Strait. While India aspires to play a significant security role in Southeast Asia it has given particular focus to the Malacca Strait, the key maritime choke point between the Indian and Pacific Ocean In addition to these, Indian Navy carries out naval exercises with navies of Oman, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, Philippines, New Zealand, Japan and China. Increased naval cooperation is being sought with Germany, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Indian Navy seeks cooperation and carries out these exercises with navies and maritime security agencies in the Indian Ocean Region with the aim of protection of SLOCs, regional merchant shipping and global shipping in the area.

Security Relationships in Indian Ocean. India has placed considerable emphasis on developing a security presence in the northeast Indian Ocean. There are several dimensions to this: first, India’s direct security presence in the Andaman Sea, second, its bilateral security relationships in the region and third, its aspirations to gain a security role in the Malacca Strait. While India aspires to play a significant security role in Southeast Asia it has given particular focus to the Malacca Strait, the key maritime choke point between the Indian and Pacific Ocean. India’s Andaman and Nicobar islands, which run north-south through the Andaman Sea form a natural base for projecting power into the Strait and beyond into the South China Sea. India has deep links with Singapore, which now acts as India’s primary economic, political and security partner in Southeast Asia. Singapore sees India as having an important security role in the region, acting as a balance to other extra-regional powers, including China, the United States and Japan. India and Singapore have extensive security cooperation, including broad-based security dialogues, joint exercises, intelligence sharing and cooperation in defence technology. India has also been developing its security relationship with Indonesia; a Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2001. There are biannual “coordinated” naval patrols between the Indian and Indonesian Navies in the Six-Degree Channel at the northern entrance to the Malacca Strait to keep extremist groups from using these routes. These patrols comprise Indian and Indonesian vessels and aircraft, co-ordinated out of India’s Joint Operations Command in the Andaman Islands. At the invitation of the United States, India took a security role inside the Malacca Strait through the provision of naval escorts for high value commercial traffic, as part of the US led Operation Enduring Freedom. Since then, India has been careful to position itself as a benign security provider in the Strait and to ensure that any naval presence was seen as “non-intrusive, cooperative and benign”

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by the littoral states. However, the littoral states (and in particular, Malaysia) have resisted giving India a formal security role in the Strait, either on a bilateral basis or in the various cooperative security arrangements that have been put in place.

India has deep links with Singapore, which now acts as India’s primary economic, political and security partner in Southeast Asia. Singapore sees India as having an important security role in the region, acting as a balance to other extra-regional powers, including China, the United States and Japan. India and Singapore have extensive security cooperation, including broad-based security dialogues, joint exercises, intelligence sharing and cooperation in defence technology It is evident that India’s interest in the Strait is primarily motivated by a desire to enhance its role as the leading maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean and potentially control access to the Indian Ocean. In November 2009, Australia and India concluded a joint security declaration, providing a framework for increased cooperation, security issues such as maritime policing (piracy and maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, people trafficking etc), disaster management and anti-terrorism. In August 2009, a security agreement was formalised with Maldives that will significantly enhance India’s capabilities in the central Indian Ocean. India has been granted use of the former British naval and air base on Gan Island, part of the southernmost group of islands in the Maldives (lying around 1,000 km south of India and around 700 km north of Diego Garcia). A system of 26 electronic monitoring facilities across the Maldives archipelago is being built by India. Since 2003, India has entered into several defence agreements with Oman dealing with training, maritime security cooperation and joint exercises. The Indian Air Force uses the Thumrait air base

for transit purposes and Oman has offered the Indian Navy berthing facilities in support of anti-piracy patrols. In 2008 India also entered into a security agreement with Qatar. The agreement, deals among other things with maritime security and intelligence sharing.

At the invitation of the United States, India took a security role inside the Malacca Strait through the provision of naval escorts for high value commercial traffic, as part of the US led Operation Enduring Freedom. Since then, India has been careful to position itself as a benign security provider in the Strait and to ensure that any naval presence was seen as “non-intrusive, cooperative and benign” by the littoral states. However, the littoral states (and in particular, Malaysia) have resisted giving India a formal security role in the Strait, either on a bilateral basis or in the various cooperative security arrangements that have been put in place The south western Indian Ocean forms the gateway between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. India’s security relationships in the region are anchored by its close relationship with Mauritius, the island territory that lies around 900 km to the east of Madagascar. India has long-standing and close political, economic and security associations with Mauritius. Mauritius has acted as the primary gateway (originating from the United States, Europe and elsewhere); largely due to favourable

tax arrangements for international investment into India the Mauritian elite see India in largely benign terms and appear to have accepted India as having a special role in Mauritian security. Since 2003, the Indian Navy has also provided maritime security through periodic patrols of Mauritian waters including anti-piracy patrols in 2010.

This viewed together with the goals and objectives of both NAM and Non Alignment 2.0 brings out the fact that, in a small way, the Indian Navy has taken the path of fulfilling its designated role in facilitating an equitable economic order as well as towards achieving economic power The Indian Navy has assisted Seychelles with maritime security in the EEZ under a 2003 defence cooperation agreement under which it provided anti-piracy patrols in early 2010. In July 2007 the Indian Navy opened an electronic monitoring facility in northern Madagascar at the head of the Mozambique Channel and reportedly has also been granted “limited” berthing rights in Madagascar for Indian naval vessels. The Indian Navy has also acted as a maritime security provider for Mozambique, in 2006, India and Mozambique entered a defence cooperation agreement that envisages joint maritime patrols, supply of military equipment, training and technology transfer in repairing and assembling military vehicles, aircraft and ships. India’s maritime security relationships in

the southwestern Indian Ocean are also reinforced by growing maritime security relations with France and South Africa. Since 2001 the Indian Navy has conducted annual exercises with the French Navy, which operates out of Reunion and Djibouti. India also has a growing presence in Antarctica, with two active research stations and a third one due to open in 2012/13. Indian Navy has thus taken a collaborative approach in developing cooperative relationships, which has been relatively successful. It emphasises its ability to provide maritime policing, anti-piracy, anti-terrorism functions and humanitarian relief functions. It also enhances position of India as a facilitator of economic growth in the region. The above discussion brings out the modest development of the Indian Navy into a regional security provider and a catalyst for economic growth. This viewed together with the goals and objectives of both NAM and Non Alignment 2.0 brings out the fact that, in a small way, the Indian Navy has taken the path of fulfilling its designated role in facilitating an equitable economic order as well as towards achieving economic power. The path to a great maritime nation lies in facilitating vibrant bilateral and multilateral trade over the sea by removing policy level impediments, which in turn would give an impetus to merchant marine and the growth of the Indian Navy.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

NO APPEASEMENT

A Sana Hashmi The writer is associated with Centre for Air Power Studies and her area of interest is China and its neighbourhood.

The central theme of Non Alignment 2.0 is that despite challenges, India has sufficient space along with bag full of opportunities to grow sustainably and anything that could hold India back is India itself

China, in the contemporary time, has emerged as the biggest competitor for India, particularly in Asia

Due to the emerging Indian security dilemma in the context of China vis-à-vis maintaining friendly relations with the US, India is entangled in the awkward circumstances resulting from the Sino-US rivalry in Asia

s anticipated by scores of scholars, twentyfirst century has progressively assayed to be the Asian Century with thriving economies of major Asian countries on the one hand and somewhat undeniably waning economy of the US on the other. The United States’ rejuvenated interest in Asia-Pacific and its Rebalancing in Asia strategy along with China’s increasing assertiveness and Sino-US rivalry for hegemony in new international settings have again landed India into an ambiguous state of affairs. Due to the emerging Indian security dilemma in the context of China vis-à-vis maintaining friendly relations with the US, India is entangled in the awkward circumstances resulting from the Sino-US rivalry in Asia. Nevertheless, this situation has forced the Indian strategic community to rethink its erstwhile Non-alignment policy in order to manage its relations with the two super powers of the world, China and the US. A research report entitled Non Alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twentyfirst Century, released a year back in February 2012, was no more than an attempt to gauge the relevance of Non-alignment, the brainchild policy of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru and to carve a new-fangled and consequential outline of the grand strategy of India. Written by leading Indian academicians and retired government officials of the country, it was released with an objective to put forth the guiding recommendations for India’s foreign policy over the next decade. The document, in a broad manner, laid out certain explored and unexplored opportunities for India in the existing international system. Finally, it identified the key challenges for the country in the long run and also suggested certain approaches for India to enhance its ‘strategic autonomy’ in global circumstances. This document was drafted in a bullet format stating what ought to be done by India with regard to its grand strategy in the near future in order to avail opportunities for better international engagements which, in turn, would be momentous for the internal development of the country. The central theme of Non Alignment 2.0 is that despite challenges, India has sufficient space along with bag full of opportunities to grow sustainably and anything that could hold India back is India itself. While many scholars begged to differ with the findings and recommendations of the document by calling it a backward looking approach rather than a forward looking approach, it indeed caught adequate attention in the strategic community of India.

China’s all-weather friendship with Pakistan, a major deterrence in India-China relations, is certainly posing a two-way threat to India. In all probabilities, China’s role in Pakistan is likely to enlarge in near future which is indeed problematic for India

China: Key element of India’s grand strategy Intriguingly, the report dealt with major issues such as India’s foreign relations with major countries of Asia and paid immense attention to China; simultaneously has overlooked India’s relations with the US. Needless to say that Indian strategic community is increasingly becoming fixated with China and to some extent, has kept its obsession with its old rival, Pakistan at bay. This ever-increasing fascination with China seems to be justified under the context of its rising military and economic might. It is noteworthy that India and China began their journey to be modern nation states almost simultaneously and perhaps, the economic size of India was almost equivalent to China in those initial years. However, today, China has achieved the status of being the second largest economy of the world and it has been speculated that it is going to surpass the US economy to be the next super power in a decade. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook 2012, China was the second largest military spender and the trends show the US, country with largest defence budget, is shrinking its defence expenditure in the coming years, whereas China’s defence expenditure is on the rise.

India needs to revisit and alter its South Asia strategy, particularly to counter China’s economic engagement and infrastructure building in the region. Moreover, Authors suggest that being a lower riparian state, India will have to install an assortment of strategies available to defend its interests as China’s autocratic stances with regard to water resources have the potential to make India water scarce in a few decades It goes without saying that China, in the contemporary time, has emerged as the biggest competitor for India, particularly in Asia. Epitomising China’s economic and strategic

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Non Alignment 2.0:

An Attempt to Pacify China?

he Non Alignment 2.0 Report was released with an objective to put forth the guiding recommendations for India’s foreign policy over the next decade. It suggests that in order to have cordial India-China ties; India should not align with the US. This recommendation seems to have no relevance in the contemporary international system. Indubitably, China poses a larger threat to India’s national interest. So, it is in India’s best interest to partner with the US in order to manage China’s rise and India-US partnership would also result in affluent economic relations which, in turn, would give a fillip to India’s economy. Many scholars begged to differ with the findings and recommendations of the document by calling it a backward looking approach rather than a forward looking approach. foothold in Asia as prominent, authors emphasised on the existing great power competition in the Asian theatre where Asian countries mainly less influential countries, are employing hedging strategies to evade undue reliance on a major power such as China. Owing to the Sino-US rivalry in Asia and for that matter China’s so-called peaceful rise and apprehensions about China’s good neighbourly policy, many countries expect India to assume a larger and decisive role in the region but in the views of the authors, India is still unable to make the full use of opportunities provided by the hedging strategies of the Asian countries.

China perceives India as a ‘swing state’ and India requires to foster closer relations with the powers attempting to countervail China through cooperation and joint naval exercises particularly the US, Japan and Southeast Asian countries China’s all-weather friendship with Pakistan, a major deterrence in India-China relations, is certainly posing a two-way threat to India. In all probabilities, China’s role in Pakistan is likely to enlarge in near future which is indeed problematic for India. The best way to counter two troubled neighbours on the northern front of India,

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

non alignment 2.0

NO APPEASEMENT

according to Non Alignment 2.0 recommendations, is to engage China bilaterally to contain Pakistan’s ambitions of countervailing India with the help of China. However, growing Sino-Pak ties is not the only reason contributing to escalated trust deficit between India and China; protracted land border dispute poses a greater challenge to India-China relations. It won’t be invalid to articulate that India is one of the oldest victims of China’s expansionist policies and the boundary dispute between the two ancient civilisations have been intact since the time of their existence as independent and modern states. Interestingly, India is the only country with which China has not yet resolved its boundary differences. The disagreement over the boundary led to a war between India and China in 1962 and the result of which was the loss of Aksai Chin, an isolated part of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir bordering Pakistan, to China. It has been speculated that India-China border dispute will continue to be a thorn in the flesh in India-China relations and remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India in the near future as well. Authors believe that there is indeed likelihood that there would be low scale border skirmishes initiated by China around north and northeastern sector, but it is in the best interest of India to maintain status quo ante or to adopt the strategy of quid pro quo. Authors confess that India’s border infrastructure is in no comparison with that of China and needs to undergo major development process in order to countervail China in the initiation of any smaller or larger offensive. In such a scenario where land borders are not manageable, report suggests that India needs to ‘hold the line’ in the north on the India-China land frontier with a serious endeavour to improve the border infrastructure and also broaden India’s present periphery in the maritime south which should be India’s strategic objective. Provided that China is preoccupied with its problems in its prescribed core interest maritime areas such as South China Sea, East China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, India has sufficient amount of time to improve its naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region. India needs to rejuvenate its Indian Ocean policy and establish its robust foothold in the region given that the strategic importance of the ocean is enormous and as it has been said in this regard that “whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia”.

The most idiosyncratic characteristic of the report is the asymmetric approach proposed by authors while dealing with China in the event of a war. This approach does not aim at enhancing India’s economic and military capabilities to make them at par with China; instead the strategy calls for working effectively towards building efficient competency and targeting China at its vulnerable points China’s increasing influence in South Asia where India is considered to be as a hegemon and its convenient use of water of Brahmaputra also perceived as problems for India. Given that China is endeavouring to have its vigorous grip in South Asian region which is strategically very important to China, India needs to revisit and alter its South Asia strategy, particularly to counter China’s economic engagement and infrastructure building in the region. Moreover, Authors suggest that being a lower riparian state, India will have to install an assortment of strategies available to defend its interests as China’s autocratic stances with regard to water resources have the potential to make India water scarce in a few decades. Authors also suggest that in order to manage China, India requires maintaining an immense prominence on multilateral forums so that ‘China remains tethered to a fair multilateral system and a rule-bound international order’. With regard to Tibet, the long-lost buffer state between India and China, authors propose that in order to ease tensions between India and China, India’s Tibet policy needs to be reassessed and India should persuade China to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan community in India. On a positive note, authors believe that despite apprehensions, there is enough space for both India and China to cooperate. Since environment and climate change are common challenges, what India needs to do is to cooperate at regional level and provide opportunities to come together to find a viable option.

While Non Alignment 2.0 is regarded by strategists as wishful thinking; all in all, the document is undeniably important to address the issues which were forgotten long time back and are rarely heard in the corridor of powers. However, in the context of suggestions proposed to deal with China, the report is somewhat discrepant and debatable The authors also emphasise on the point that China perceives India as a ‘swing state’ and India requires to foster closer relations with the powers attempting to countervail China through cooperation and joint naval exercises particularly the US, Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Authors also propose to strategically use Chinese economic interest in India’s ever escalating infrastructure market as a point of leverage for trade-offs favourable in other sectors, including political concessions in areas of interest to India. However, the problem remains here is the balance of payment favouring China accompanied with China’s state-owned enterprises’ participation. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that growing economic interdependence might help make the political relationship more manageable and less subject to fluctuations in the relations. The most idiosyncratic characteristic of the report is the asymmetric approach proposed by authors while dealing with China in the event of a war. This approach does not aim at enhancing India’s economic and military capabilities to make them at par with China; instead the strategy calls for working effectively towards building efficient competency and targeting China at its vulnerable points. The asymmetric approach is three-pronged. First element of the report suggests that in the event of war, India should be able to trigger insurgencies in the area

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

occupied by China, particularly Tibet which would by default act as quid pro quo and help India to maintain the status quo. Secondly, India needs to boost communication infrastructure with the mainland at the earliest. Third spine of the approach, as mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, is the necessity for India to improve its naval capabilities in order to establish a strong foothold in the Indian Ocean Region.

Is India still trapped with traditional appeasement policy towards China? While Non Alignment 2.0 is regarded by strategists as wishful thinking; all in all, the document is undeniably important to address the issues which were forgotten long time back and are rarely heard in the corridors of power. However, in the context of suggestions proposed to deal with China, the report is somewhat discrepant and debatable. With regard to China, report continues to follow the legacy of erstwhile non-alignment policy given that most of the proposals are idealist in nature which are certainly not going to yield any constructive results in the current international order. Report makes a somewhat slack suggestion that in order to have cordial India-China ties; India should not align with the US. This recommendation seems to have no relevance in the contemporary international system. Indubitably, as mentioned in the report, China poses a larger threat to India’s national interest. So, it is in India’s best interest to partner with the US in order to manage China’s rise and India-US partnership would also result in affluent economic relations which, in turn, would give a fillip to India’s economy. Hence, the report fails to highlight the importance of India-US strategic partnership which might be collaborated as an option under India’s grand strategy gamut. It won’t be erroneous to say that report’s recommendations seem to be as perplexing as India’s postures towards dealing with China. It is a prerequisite for India to abandon the appeasement policy and adopt novel and ingenious policies vis-à-vis China. Admittedly, as mentioned in the document, it is indispensable for India to be a maritime power in the Indian Ocean Region for ensuring its national interest and sovereignty. However, to be a maritime power won’t be a cake walk for India. While it is true to state that authors have downplayed the importance of China’s naval capabilities and its precedence in Indian Ocean Region, it is equally true to say that authors have overplayed India’s potential to enhance its maritime capabilities in the region provided that it requires major transformation and rise in India’s defence budget. Moreover, recommendation stating that India should persuade China to resume talks with Dalai Lama which would, inturn, improve India-China ties does not seem to be a viable option; since China considers Tibet as an area of its core interest, India’s involvement in the matter would only worsen the relations. What is more appalling is to look at the first recommendation of the asymmetric approach which suggests that in the event of war, India should be able to trigger insurgencies in the area occupied by China, particularly Tibet. This kind of strategy is not advisable when India and China have blooming trade relations and massive economic interdependence. However, the proposals like enhancing the maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region, boosting the border infrastructure along the northeastern border and making full use of Tibet card as bargaining chip are recommendable and best suited to India’s current foreign policy. Maintaining status quo in the event of war is also quite resourceful. Although most of the suggestions with regard to China appear to be an effort to appease the Dragon rather than a genuine attempt to draft an effectual grand strategy for India. Needless to say that China will remain central to India’s foreign policy for decades and idealist filaments of India’s grand strategy would only lead to weaker and vulnerable India. An evenhanded approach towards China is the need of the hour for maintaining stable India-China relations where the report falls short.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

EVOLVING STRATEGIES

U Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria The writer is Associate Professor, Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India.

The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006 represented a shift in the global response. It broadened political support for UN counterterrorism efforts by reflecting the buy-in and consensus of the entire UN membership rather than just the Security Council. It expanded the global framework to include not only tougher law enforcement and other security measures, but also measures to address real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic and political conditions. It also marked the first time that all member states had agreed on a common approach to dealing with the threat

The intervention of the Security Council in the aftermath of ‘9/11’ has proved to be a decisive break-point to a comprehensive regime that binds states to international legal norms against acts of terrorism and increases the obligations to undertake ‘executive action’ against all forms of terrorism

nited Nations is the appropriate forum to deal with global terrorism. Many problems have hindered the international community’s efforts to counter terrorism as a generic phenomenon, leading to an imperfect position where particular acts of terrorism and facilitators of terrorism have been legally proscribed via a network of UN conventions but without a universal definition of terrorism being agreed. United Nations’ response to terrorism was dominated by the UN Security Council, which adopted a number of resolutions imposing a range of counterterrorism-related obligations on all member states.

t is paradoxical that on the one hand we have ‘guided missiles’ but ‘misguided men’ on the other ready to become terrorists. Similarly, we have ‘United Nations’ but not ‘United Notions’. The definitional impasse over terrorism still exists. The major problem as pointed out by many is whether terrorism inflicted by States should be treated as such or not. Global terrorism presents collective action issues for targeted nations. But, combating terrorism requires an International Law approach entirely different from what is needed for humanisation of armed conflicts at the international level.

The UN approach to counter-terrorism and evolving strategies The approach upheld by a cross section of countries and also by the United Nations General Assembly is that counter-terrorism efforts need to be comprehensive, for the causes of terrorism are deep seated and multifarious. Poverty, political, social and economic deprivation, denial or delay in exercise of right to self-determination and foreign occupation lie at the root of terrorism. Moreover, terrorism could emerge as a resistive response to the process of economic modernisation or social change. Critics caution against this ‘root causes’ approach that painting terrorists as ‘passive actors’ prompted by the social, economic and social surroundings could make them ‘apologists’ for terrorist acts. The critics are unconvinced that there is a direct relationship between poverty and terrorism. It has been pointed out by analysts that much of the ‘empirical scholarship on terrorism provides little indication of correlation between socio-economic factors such as poverty, inequality and unemployment and the incidence of terrorism’. Nevertheless, just as contemporary terrorism has to be seen as not one single threat but rather many threats.

Role of United Nations In this respect, the Universal actor or United Nations is the appropriate forum to deal with global terrorism. Many problems have hindered the international community’s efforts to counter terrorism as a generic phenomenon, leading to an imperfect position where particular acts of terrorism and facilitators of terrorism have been legally proscribed via a network of UN conventions but without a universal definition of terrorism being agreed (Secretariat of UN General Assembly, 2002). The post-cold war context provided a facilitative environment for the UN Security Council enabling ad hoc or case-by-case responses to acts of terrorism during the 1990s. The intervention of the Security Council in the aftermath of ‘9/11’ has proved to be a decisive break-point to a comprehensive regime that binds states to international legal norms against acts of terrorism and increases the obligations to undertake ‘executive action’ against all forms of terrorism.

Post ‘9/11’ attacks In the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, both the issues of non-ratification and the lack of an overall convention on terrorism were brought to the fore by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. But, the United Nations’ response to terrorism was dominated by the UN Security Council, which adopted a number of resolutions imposing a range of counterterrorism-related

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Global terrorism, UN and its policies

obligations on all member states. Perhaps the most significant of these is Resolution 1373 (2001), which enumerated a detailed list of obligations, such as criminalising the financing of terrorism, freezing terrorists’ assets, denying terrorists safe haven and bringing terrorists to justice, that all member states must undertake as part of a global counterterrorism campaign, regardless of other, more pressing priorities or the perceived level of the threat. These requirements in turn have generated a host of counter-terrorism responses at the regional, sub-regional and national levels around the globe, through which a number of mandatory decisions were taken on terrorist financing, obligating states to refrain from providing support to terrorists and to take necessary steps to prevent financing of terrorism and deny safe haven to terrorists.

United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006 represented a shift in the global response. It broadened political support for UN counterterrorism efforts by reflecting

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

EVOLVING STRATEGIES

With the capacity shortcomings and vulnerabilities in many countries, nearly every part of the UN system has an important role to play in promoting and supporting efforts to implement the Strategy. The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force was established in 2005 by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to improve coordination and cooperation among the increasing number of UN actors engaged in counterterrorism. Coordinated, strategic and sustained engagement by different parts of the UN system with states and other stakeholders is needed to help countries strengthen their counterterrorism capacities and thus be able to implement the Strategy.

from that meeting, at which 18 victims from around the world were brought together, includes a series of practical recommendations aimed at ensuring that the voices and needs of the victims are heard and addressed and at raising awareness of the powerful voice of the victims in the global fight against terrorism. This successful symposium highlights a largely untapped comparative advantage of the United Nations in countering terrorism: its ability to offer a platform for experts from different regions to share information and experiences on a variety of thematic issues related to addressing today’s terrorist threat.

Achievements

Unrealised potential

As a kingpin among several UN mechanisms addressing different aspects of the menace, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the Security Council signifies robust institutionalisation of the international community’s sensitivity to the imperative of effective collective action to deter the likes of the September 2001 attacks. The CTC strove as a catalyst in international cooperation among all stakeholders.

The UN system’s potential in this area, however, has not been fully realised, partly due to the lack of a broad-based and effective counterterrorism body for discussing the diversity of counterterrorism issues included in the Strategy. For example, the United Nations has never brought together national counterterrorism officials from around the world to share experiences and lessons learned in trying to understand and counter the growing violent radicalisation and extremism that helps fuel much of today’s terrorism.

the buy-in and consensus of the entire UN membership rather than just the Security Council. It expanded the global framework to include not only tougher law enforcement and other security measures, but also measures to address real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic and political conditions. It also marked the first time that all member states had agreed on a common approach to dealing with the threat. It recognises that, to be effective, counterterrorism measures need to respect human rights and promote the rule of law.

No open society can completely protect itself against all acts of terrorism. Security resources are always finite and the potential terrorist targets always infinite. But, the governments surely can do a better job of protecting their citizens by developing a global consensus to deal with Global Terrorism. This is yet to emerge Although the General Assembly has stressed that the primary responsibility for implementing the Strategy rests with the member states, it has recognised the important role “the United Nations plays, in coordination with other international, regional and sub-regional organisations, as appropriate, in facilitating coherence in the implementation of the Strategy at the national, regional and global levels and in providing assistance, especially in the area of capacity-building” and the need to enhance this role.

If we wish for peace, well-being and security for the different states and people, we must at the very outset understand the existential threat of terrorism In the important area of capacity building, these activities include the work of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), which continues to assess each country’s capacity to implement Resolution 1373 through field visits and the use of other tools, with a view to identifying priority needs and making referrals to potential donors. As of March 2009, the CTED, with its 30 New York–based experts, has passed along 84 cases of technical assistance needs. In addition, since the launch of the Global Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism in January 2003, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), through its Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), has delivered various forms of counterterrorism-related assistance aimed at helping countries join and implement the universal instruments against terrorism, which now number 16. This assistance has included legislative drafting aid and the training of criminal justice professionals. Drawing on its Vienna-based staff and network of local consultants and UNODC regional representatives, TPB has provided country-specific assistance to 120 countries and trained 7,700 national criminal justice officials. Whereas the work of individual UN actors has largely remained unchanged as a result of the Strategy’s adoption, the Task Force, through its eight working groups consisting mainly of Task Force members which has launched some important initiatives, including the UN Counter-Terrorism Handbook; and its working groups have organised workshops and produced reports with concrete recommendations aimed at relevant UN actors, member states and other stakeholders in a variety of thematic fields.

In the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, both the issues of non-ratification and the lack of an overall convention on terrorism were brought to the fore by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. But, the United Nations’ response to terrorism was dominated by the UN Security Council, which adopted a number of resolutions imposing a range of counterterrorism-related obligations on all member states. Perhaps the most significant of these is Resolution 1373 (2001), which enumerated a detailed list of obligations, such as criminalising the financing of terrorism, freezing terrorists’ assets, denying terrorists safe haven and bringing terrorists to justice, that all member states must undertake

To be effective, counterterrorism measures need to respect human rights and promote the rule of law With improved coordination of UN counterterrorism activities as the chief mission of the Task Force, the Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism Working Group is of particular importance. It includes representatives from a number of UN entities involved in Strategy-related capacity building and is a step in the right direction as the United Nations seeks to offer “one-stop shopping” for countries interested in receiving UN assistance in implementing the Strategy. It is intended to complement the work of individual Task Force entities and to take into account the needs assessments already undertaken by them. The working group has developed an automated information-exchange system that will compile all information submitted by Task Force members regarding their previous and ongoing work with the country at issue. But, it is an unfinished task. Retrospectively, international cooperation in the suppression of terrorism under the UN has been limited.

Conclusion It should be borne in mind that the efficacy of counter-terrorist laws, structural changes in the security apparatus, role of diplomatic initiatives, political engagement etc are all difficult to determine, at least in a short run. “If we wish for peace, well-being and security for the different states and people, we must at the very outset understand the existential threat of terrorism – emerging or hidden in its various shades and modes”. A culture of peace and collective consciousness requires to be inculcated. States must demonstrate indomitable national will and initiatives to devise effective options for curbing terrorism united under the UN. Coordinated anti-terrorism measures are particularly difficult to achieve when many nations must participate and non-participants can undo the efforts of others. Thus, freezing terrorists’ assets or abiding by a no-negotiation pledge pose difficult collective action problems. These same concerns remain with countering global terrorism under the UN. No open society can completely protect itself against all acts of terrorism. Security resources are always finite and the potential terrorist targets always infinite. But, the governments surely can do a better job of protecting their citizens by developing a global consensus to deal with Global Terrorism. This is yet to emerge.

Perhaps the most significant concrete UN contribution to date to Strategy implementation is in the area of victims of terrorism. Building on the Strategy’s call for ending the dehumanisation of terrorism victims, the Secretary General convened the first-ever global Symposium on Supporting Victims of Terrorism in New York in September 2008. The report

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

PROXY WAR

T Dr PM Kamath The writer is former Professor of Politics in University of Mumbai, currently Hon Director VPM’s Centre for International Studies, Mumbai and Adjunct Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations. While in University of Mumbai, he successfully guided a student on Terrorism as an instrument of Foreign Policy taking the case of Pakistan.

As revenge continues to dominate army’s psyche in Pakistan, army has actively added India’s disintegration as an additional goal underlying their support to terror policy. Military Dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf had said more than once that the main threat to Pakistan’s security comes from India’s size. India’s fragmentation and disintegration are built into Pakistan Army’s defence strategy. Hence, breakup of India into several independent states is security insurance to Pakistan! This is evident from the gradual spread of terrorism not only to practically every major town in India, but also to every major institution charged with protection of Indian national security

Indian groups and men provide Pakistan an advantage of plausible deniability whenever terrorist attacks draw international attention. This was demonstrated by Mumbai terrorist attacks on 26/11/2008. Pakistani President Zardari had boldly proclaimed it as handiwork of non-state actors!

he main thrust of this article is that the threat of politico-terrorism continues even after return of democracy in Pakistan; it will only intensify after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. What distinguishes politico-terrorism, from ordinary terrorism is the absence of option of going to a war despite intensified high political objectives in politico-terrorism. Thus, Pakistan embraced politico-terrorism against India since the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul Haq in the 1970s first used it in Punjab as an experimental laboratory. India has not been able to subdue Pakistan’s promotion of politico-terrorism; rather terror has spread from localised theatres in the beginning like Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, to all over India.

espite the demise of the cold war and India being extremely successful in developing bipolar alignments with the United States (US) and Russia – erstwhile conflicting poles in the cold war bipolarity in global politics – is not free from regional national security threats with global implications. India faces continued threat of politico-terrorism from its source: Pakistan actively aided and abetted by its all-weather friend, Communist China. The main thrust of this article is that the threat of politico-terrorism continues even after return of democracy in Pakistan; it will only intensify after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

During the BJP led NDA government (1998-2004), Pakistan was considered as the epicentre of terrorism by the then Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, LK Advani. Then it was ignored by the sole surviving super power, the US. That was the US attitude even after the first-ever international terrorist attack of 9/11 on it. Now, eleven years later, the US in more than one way, at more than one level of the governance, repeatedly says it. Yet the threat from politico-terrorism continues to be the number one threat to India’s national security.

Politico-terrorism defined What is meant by politico-terrorism? Before I explain politico-terrorism, let us briefly understand the basic concept of terrorism. Yonah Alexander wrote that terrorism is the “use or threat of violence against random or civilian targets in order to intimidate or create generalised pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals.” Mindless use of violence, wrecking lives of innocents, creation of a sense of helplessness amongst the policy makers so as to break their willpower to resist unfair demands of perpetrators of violence is the popular meaning of terrorism. Terrorism has been considered as the weapon of weak against the strong. Hence, it has been Pakistan’s preferred instrument to achieve its goals in its relations with India since its birth. In 1947-1948, it organised covert raids on Jammu and Kashmir. Raiders were tribals but also included soldiers disguised as tribals; this was repeated in 1965 under military dictator, Ayub Khan. But in both these cases, initial terrorism promoted by Pakistan resulted in a regular war with both sides using their armies openly after initially disguised war intentions of Pakistan came into open.

Operation code-named Geronimo to eliminate Osama was planned because the US had totally lost confidence in Pakistan’s loyalty to its commitment to the war against international terrorism. Then CIA director, Panetta had said that “it was decided that any efforts to work with Pakistanis could jeopardise the mission” by alerting the targets, which was done by them in few earlier cases, more than once in the war. The fact that army was sheltering America’s most wanted terrorist, while swearing to fight war against international terrorism on the side of the US, totally discredited Pakistan’s Army On the other hand, in politico-terrorism, state finds that there is no option of going for a war despite political content of goal pursued is much more intense. It is the lack of option of going to a war after initial use of terrorism, is what distinguishes politico-terrorism

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Continuing Threat of Politico-terrorism

from Pakistan to Indian Security

from terrorism; apart from the fact that while terrorism could be used by any group or a state, politico-terrorism is only used by the state – indirectly with the aid of either a preferred terrorist group or groups or directly. Thus, Pakistan embraced politico-terrorism against India since the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul Haq in the 1970s first used it in Punjab as an experimental laboratory. Here, his active but covert help to advocates of creation of Khalistan in Punjab, for the first time mixed politics in promotion of terrorism against India. By the 1980s, Pakistan had covertly acquired nuclear weapons. This was well-known to India and other important actors in international politics. Then let me reiterate that what distinguishes politico-terrorism, from ordinary terrorism is the absence of option of going into a war despite intensified high political objectives in politico-terrorism. In the case of Pakistan again, this situation was reached after Bengali speaking Pakistani majority, separated through a violent Bangladesh War of 1971, from its Punjabi speaking minority. A weakened Pakistan after the end of the cold war acquired nuclear weapons to neutralise Indian superiority in conventional warfare. Similarly, the Kargil Conflict fought in June 1999 is also a case of politico-terrorism and not terrorism. Hence, though India realised that Pakistan had sent its regular soldiers of Northern Light Infantry in disguise and India had sent its regular army to evict intruders, but without crossing into Pakistani territory – though Pakistan started it by crossing into our territory.

Political aims Thus, in twentyfirst century, two crucial developments forced Pakistan to change its approach to terrorism permanently. These are: First, end of the cold war wherein both, India and Pakistan lost their super power props, thus bringing about qualitative support in international environment and second, Indian and Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons. This introduced a qualitative change of support to an idea of all-out war within domestic environment. Thus, though in the beginning, grabbing of Jammu and Kashmir from India to complete historic process of dividing India on religious lines, was a goal underlying Pakistan’s use of politico-terrorism, other political goals vis-a-vis India were added. Thus, Pakistan continues to use politico-terrorism as a national security threat to India. Hence, Pakistan has relegated Jammu and Kashmir as a background-rhetoric now for other more important political aims. Pakistan’s seriousness in acquiring Jammu and Kashmir is secondary to its use of it as an arena to carry out it politico-terrorism goals.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

PROXY WAR

Pakistani civilian government’s authority to act independently is severely limited even after Americans trying to discredit army at least in relation to army’s anti-India policies. The fact that Pakistan promotes politico-terrorism as an instrument of aiming to achieve its goal of destabilising India to lay foundation for another disintegration of India is evident in Indian Home Secretary’s assertion on 18 August last year Then what dominates today is a variety of interrelated goals for which Pakistan uses politico-terrorism. First, an intense urge to revenge its defeat at the hands of Indian Army in Bangladesh War has been a dominant factor in the Pakistani Army’s behaviour. Speaking at a National Seminar held at VPM’s Centre for International Studies on “26/11 and its implication to Indian foreign policy” in Mumbai, Air Marshal Rajkumar said that revenge and “anti-India feelings” run deep in Pakistani Army. That has made Pakistan embrace politico-terror as an instrument to take revenge against Indian Army. It is evident that despite Pakistani Army being smaller than Indian, India has not been able to subdue Pakistan’s promotion of politico-terrorism; rather terror has spread from localised theatres in the beginning like Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, to all over India. Now it is threatening to penetrate into major government institutions involved in maintaining national security, like armed forces, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Territorial Army etc. Second, as revenge continues to dominate army’s psyche in Pakistan, army has actively added India’s disintegration as an additional goal underlying their support to terror policy. Military Dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf had said more than once that the main threat to Pakistan’s security comes from India’s size. India’s fragmentation and disintegration are built into Pakistan Army’s defence strategy. Hence, breakup of India into several independent states is security insurance to Pakistan! This is evident from the gradual spread of terrorism not only to practically every major town in India, but also to every major institution charged with protection of Indian national security. It flows from that goal that Pakistan, encourages Indian terrorist units, created, trained, funded and protected by it, like Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Students Islamic Movement in India (SIMI) as easy tools to spread communal hatred and anti-Indian feelings amongst Indian Muslims. These Indian terrorist groups are also in close collaboration with Pakistan based terrorist outfits particularly nursed by Pakistani Army and its chosen instrument, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to carry out its dirty tricks against India. Notorious today are Lashker-e-Toiba (LeT) led by Hafeez Saeed, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami among others. Indian groups and men provide Pakistan an advantage of plausible deniability whenever terrorist attacks draw international attention. This was demonstrated by Mumbai terrorist attacks on 26/11/2008. Pakistani President Zardari had boldly proclaimed it as handiwork of non-state actors! Finally, economically Pakistan was better off until, India went in a big way to promote itself as a leader in Information Technology (IT) since 1991. This coincided with Pakistan also becoming an IT hub – in its case, IT stands for International Terrorism! Pakistan’s Army has used its IT to subdue Indian growing economic power owing to its IT. Politico-terrorism is used to force a slow down, if not a decline in Indian economic growth. This was indicated by Pakistan’s Army, by covertly organising a total attack against India on 26 November 2008 by using LeT. Now, it is on record that it is the army controlled ISI that created Karachi Project with the involvement of the LeT, to train Indians in the use of bomb blasts. Thus, 26/11 is the regional replica of global terrorism of 9/11 which too had close links with Pakistan! Political aim of Pakistan’s Army becomes clear as by then a political facade led by Zardari had come to power – though effective power over conduct of Pakistani foreign / national security policy towards India remains with army.

Civil-political-democratic facade and army’s continued use of politico-terrorism However, divided rule between army and civil-political leadership again brings out duality in the army’s use of politico-terrorism as an instrument against India within a divided government. This helps army and ISI, to carry out dirty tricks against India either directly or through its chosen instrumentalities like LeT or several other Pakistan based terrorist groups, while elected government either out of ignorance or with intended purpose of plausible deniability denies any role of Pakistan in promotion of politico-terrorism against India! Credit goes to Mumbai Police in capturing Ajmal Kasab; one of the ten Pakistani terrorists who sneaked into India. However, the present elected civilian government has the longest tenure so far in the history of Pakistan’s pseudo-democracy. Zardari government is still struggling to find its roots to get some stability and apparently improve relations with India. Prior to 26/11, he had made right kind of noises to indicate that his government is qualitatively different from the previous military governments. However until the US successfully eliminated on 2 May 2011, Osama bin Laden, leader of global terrorism, the life of civilian government was always kept on short-lease by the army. There was even the talk of General Ashfaq Kayani’s likely take over of the power. All that changed by the US action.

Pakistan’s loyalty to its commitment to the war against international terrorism. Then CIA director, Panetta had said that “it was decided that any efforts to work with Pakistanis could jeopardise the mission” by alerting the targets, which was done by them in few earlier cases, more than once in the war. The fact that army was sheltering America’s most wanted terrorist, while swearing to fight war against international terrorism on the side of the US, totally discredited Pakistan’s Army. Since then, civilian-political establishment has sporadically but weakly and meekly tried to assert itself in its relations with India. Thus, the then Prime Minister, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, just a week before South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit meeting in Maldives, extended India most favoured nation (MFN) status on 2nd November 2011. Until then, despite their being important members of the SAARC, Pakistan had not extended MFN treatment to India in spite of the fact that India unilaterally had extended the same to Pakistan in 1996. Pakistan had linked it to India first resolving Kashmir issue. If the MFN is honestly implemented, bilateral trade is likely to cross current level of US $ 2.6 billion, since trade now going through the devious route of Dubai for over 20, 000 items can go directly with normal duties. However, there is lot to doubt about Pakistan’s ability to implement the offer. Having conferred MFN, the very next day Pakistan at the highest level of Prime Minister, said it was only a note prepared for the consideration of the cabinet; thus introducing an element of doubt in India and at the same time reassuring his detractors in army that no-finality over the decision to extend MFN status to India. Then Prime Minister, Gilani had called Hafiz Saeed to inform him so as to take him into confidence that Pakistan might confer MFN on India. But Saeed is a creation of army’s ISI and as army’s trusted lieutenant, Hafiz Saeed’s Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), acted to sound a warning to civilian-political leadership of Pakistan when its leader, Ameer Hamza told a massive rally in Islamabad on 25 November that his supreme leader, Saeed had told Gilani that “India can never be a most favoured nation for Pakistan.”Another leader of JuD, Abdul Rehman Makki said: “If this decision is not reversed, then those who are responsible for this decision will have to get reversed.” Is Supreme Court of Pakistan dethroning an elected Prime Minister, unrelated to these developments? This shows that Pakistani civilian government’s authority to act independently is severely limited even after Americans trying to discredit army at least in relation to army’s anti-India policies. The fact that Pakistan promotes politico-terrorism as an instrument of aiming to achieve its goal of destabilising India to lay foundation for another disintegration of India is evident in Indian Home Secretary’s assertion on 18 August last year, when he said: Pakistan was behind circulating fake clippings showing atrocities against Muslims in lower Assam to incite Muslim minority in India. He added: Pakistan might “deny it, but we have fairly accurate technical evidence to show that images originated and were circulated from their territory.” Recent behaviour of Pakistan’s Army and its affiliates shows that Pakistan has neither learnt any lessons nor has changed behaviour towards India or forgotten any of its underlying politico-terrorism goals. It has graduated from minor use of terrorism to significantly hard hitting use with global impact of politico-terrorism with national and international ramifications. In consonance with the changing use and impact of politico-terrorism, every changed government in Pakistan, particularly military dictatorships have adopted technique of asking India to forget the past cases of politico-terrorism attacks on Indian targets and pressurise to take only cases which occurred during their tenure! Thus Vajpayee government agreed with Musharraf to drop all mention of Shimla agreement of 1972 or Lahore agreement of 1999 while dealing with Pakistan’s disputes with India. Under these circumstances, present government is only showing its concern to tackle 26/11 case. But there is no guarantee that present democratically elected governments would be re-elected in the elections due this year. Even if they last or another democratic government comes to power, army control on the foreign policy is bound to continue for a long time, leading it to ask India to forget the past and jointly tackle new cases!

Conclusion It is a fair conclusion that as long as Pakistani Army’s political aims remain the use of terror against India, India will continue to face politico-terrorism as a national security threat. Hence, Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh’s efforts to personally pursue, as far as Pakistan is concerned a policy of trying to establish normal relations with that country by ignoring all contrary signals emanating from Islamabad and only seeing with magnifying glasses minute hints of good intentions of civilian-political government is bound to fail. Thus, Manmohan Singh’s hailing, the then PM of Pakistan Gilani as the man of peace in Maldives, turned out to be premature even as it turned out to be false. What Pakistan needs is an Army General who is a man of peace! That is unlikely to happen, is evident in recent act of Pakistani Army’s trespassing into Indian territory by crossing LoC and return after brutally killing two Indian soldiers and as though to spite the dead soldiers, beheading one and mutilating the body of another. A divided government in Pakistan will thus continue to follow a dual policy of speaking to stand for peace and cooperative relations with India while continuing to pursue political-terrorism against India.

Operation code-named Geronimo to eliminate Osama was planned because the US had totally lost confidence in

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

arms acquisition

mbda interview

Exclusive interview with Mr Loic Piedevache, Country Head, MBDA Group, India DSA: MBDA was formed with the merger of key missile producers in France, Italy and Great Britain and subsequent acquisition in Germany. Kindly enlighten us and our readers about this merger and the present status and operations of MBDA. MBDA: It was clear at the time that a fragmented industry would not be able to compete against the major players in the US nor be able to sustain in Europe the sovereign capabilities that are so important in the area of defence technology. The combined Anglo-French requirement for a conventionally armed stand-off cruise missile was the catalyst that saw MBDA created over 10 years ago. This missile, Storm Shadow / SCALP, then others such as the Aster family of air to surface missiles and of course the Meteor BVRAAM weapon have all gone to show how successful this European industrial integration has been. Currently, MBDA is seen as the benchmark for international, industrial integration, one of the very few and probably the only defence sector company capable of coordinating programmes calling for complex multinational cooperation. Actually, this ability to coordinate international programmes is a skill we offer when we talk about developing partnerships within the Indian defence industrial sector. Combined with technology transfer and a longstanding relationship already in place, we think this strategy is highly relevant to MBDA’s future and to India’s future indigenous defence industry capabilities. DSA: MBDA has set a benchmark in terms of international integration within the defence sector and has become a global player. Can you please tell us about the company’s current profile? Where do you position yourself in the global market today? MBDA: MBDA is the only company in the whole sector that is capable of supplying all three of the armed forces – in the air, on land and at sea. This is becoming quite an advantage today as many customers are looking for increased modularity and commonality of stock across their inventories. MBDA also has a number of products that are clearly head and shoulders above those of the competition. Storm Shadow / SCALP and Taurus KEPD 350 are two long-range cruise missiles with unmatched precision, Dual Mode Brimstone has raised eyebrows around the world following its operational use which highlighted not only its super efficiency but also its operational flexibility. Our Meteor Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile is recognised by air force planners as the missile that will provide a step change in capability, a capability far beyond anything currently in existence or even planned. MBDA’s Mistral missile is beyond compare with regard to its better than 96 per cent success rate in all firings. Another example of our products’ market leading capabilities can be found in the helicopter-launched PARS 3 LR, which with its speed, salvo-firing and fire and forget capabilities, is the optimum solution for stopping an advancing column of battle armour dead in tracks. DSA: How many products are there in the MBDA portfolio at the moment? Which are your unique products that give you the competitive edge? MBDA: MBDA has around 45 products in operational service with about 15 others currently under development. For example of a competitive edge we can take ASRAAM which we hope will be arming the above wing pylons of the IAF’s Jaguar fleet. This close range air dominance weapon with its unique and very sleek aerodynamic design and its wider than usual body diameter which gives the missile its extra power and hence speed, is the ideal solution for the Jaguar. Its speed off the rail, its first shot first kill to avoid the hit and miss of a close range dog fight and its shoot up ability make it the ideal choice. Mistral MANPADS combines all that is needed in a VSHORAD weapon in terms of ease of use, portability, precision and most importantly, autonomous fire and forget operation. In the VSHORAD domain, you don’t have the luxury of time to keep a target locked in your sights until impact. You need to be able to shoot, reload and deal with another target or shoot again at the first. To do this, you need Mistral’s fire-and-forget capability. DSA: MBDA has three major aeronautical and defence shareholders – BAE Systems (37.5 per cent), EADS (37.5 per cent) and Finmeccanica (25 per cent) and is the first truly integrated European defence company. Are there any conflicts of interest in MBDA with regard to transfer of sensitive technologies to India? MBDA: Not at all. Herein lies an MBDA advantage in its dealings with India. We have full governmental support when it comes to full transfer of technology. In fact the recent visits of Francois Hollande of France and David Cameron of the UK confirmed this willingness. We have already proven this with Milan for example which is being manufactured under license by BDL in India. If Mistral MANPADS is selected, the missile will also be manufactured under license by India. Our longstanding dealings in support of the DRDO’s much talked about SR-SAM project are all about sensitive, leading edge technology transfer – for this we have the full and openly confirmed backing of the French government. DSA: MBDA is one of the leading manufacturers of missiles in the world. What are the different new products being developed and introduced by MBDA for the Indian market? MBDA: We have a number of products we are discussing with the Indian market. If by “new” you mean those not yet in service, then of course we should mention Meteor, the ramjet-powered Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missile BVRAAM. This is a mature programme which is being carried out by MBDA on behalf of six European nations to provide a next generation

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

BVRAAM capability for the Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and Gripen combat platforms. Meteor’s test firing programme has been successfully completed and the weapon is on course to provide the air forces of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK with a step change in air superiority capability. As I said we are discussing a range of solutions for the Indian market and Meteor features amongst these discussions, particularly as the IAF is now looking to assure that its MMRCA fleet will be the best equipped to meet the demanding challenges it is likely to face. Meteor is simply beyond compare; its speed and agility right up to the end game make it far better than any missile currently available or being planned. DSA: Kindly elaborate on the ground-based air defence missile, air dominance missile and surface to surface missile systems manufactured by MBDA?

Mr Loic Piedevache

MBDA: We have a very extensive range of products covering ground and naval based air defence, air dominance and of course the surface to surface roles. This range enables us to discuss a wide cross section of solutions with our customers to find the best product or products that will meet their specific operational requirements. Without listing all our catalogue, suffice it to say that in each category MBDA can offer the world’s best technologies and capabilities. Aster and Mistral have set worldwide benchmarks in fulfilling the air defence role. With Mica, ASRAAM, Dual Mode Brimstone, Storm Shadow SCALP and Taurus MBDA can provide the most modern of multi-role capabilities for today’s leading air forces. Exocet speaks for itself, deployed by a global customer community, this missile is synonymous with anti-ship operations at the highest level. DSA: How does MDBA see the Indian market from a “strategic” and “long-term partner” point of view? Is there a shift from a usual buyer-seller approach to a deeper relation through a strong co-development programme involving transfer of key technologies? MBDA: This is exactly how MBDA views the Indian market, not simply a customer but as a long-term business partner. India is looking to advance its own defence industry and to develop and master its own sovereign capabilities. However, given the complexities of the technologies involved in developing modern guided weapons, this is not something that will be achieved overnight. Transfer of technology will be key for India and this is indeed what we have long been proposing, importantly we also have governmental support for this strategy. DSA: How do you see MBDA’s partnership with state-owned Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), India’s missile manufacturer? MBDA: MBDA’s partnership with BDL goes back to the 1970s with license production agreements initially for the SS11B1 ATGM (an Aerospatiale product) and continuing up to the present day with the Milan ATGM. So of course this is an extremely important partnership with the Indian defence sector and one that we would certainly like to progress much further. In fact, should India select MBDA’s Mistral MANPADS for its current VSHORAD requirement, then BDL would also manufacture the Mistral missile under license. Given that India has already ordered the same missile to arm its ALH Dhruv helicopters, such an arrangement would have significant advantages for India. Beyond the obvious major advantages regarding inventory management and through life servicing and product enhancements, such an arrangement would also bring with it the benefits of technology transfer. Much has been said about the DRDO’s SR-SAM project which is in the process of being finalised, this will further strengthen the relationship between BDL and MBDA France. DSA: What are your long-term plans for the Indian market? How do you see the potential and the challenges? How different is the Indian market as compared to other markets in the world? MBDA: As already mentioned, we are looking to establish a firm base in India, one that revolves around wide-ranging industrial partnerships with the DPSUs and the private sector as the latter gets the chance to become more involved in defence projects. Our strategy is not aimed at short-term success but rather a long-term relationship based on shared goals and ambitions. We have already taken the first steps and the situation is very promising. Every market we deal with is unique and so our approach is tailored to reflect this. Of course the Indian market is full of potential, not only because it is actively in the process of re-equipping in various areas but also because it is keen to look at new ways of doing business, ways that also have the prospect of adding to the country’s own indigenous industrial capabilities. It is this aspect that MBDA is keen to share in, the growth of India’s own defence industry sector. Given the vibrancy of the Indian market, clearly our competitors are also very present and competition is fierce. This presents a challenge but we are confident that our products speak for themselves in terms of quality and operational capability. We also feel that our openness and determination to share technology give us some clear advantages too.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

arms acquisition

PROBITY PARAMETERS

T Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman

he Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a detailed fact sheet on the AgustaWestland on 14 February 2013. It gives a chronology of the important procedural milestones of the deal. An endeavour has been made here to analyse the MoD fact sheet and carry out a broad procedural audit. The following key aspects need further elucidation:

AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did his MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world ie, the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being 'the most outstanding engineer of the year'. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

By demanding additional systems at CNC stage, MoD made a mockery of its own procurement procedure. It was a patently wrong and gratuitous step. It provided a windfall opportunity to AgustaWestland to quote any price that it wanted to for the add-on systems. It will be interesting to know the basic cost quoted by AgustaWestland in its sealed offer and the increase demanded on account of the new additions

Why were trials not carried out in India as mandated in DPP? Why were additional systems included in the purchase package at CNC stage? Has Sikorsky Aircraft been questioned for knowingly making false claims in its technical proposal and thereby wasting Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s time and resources in infructuous trials? Does the contract include clauses regarding refund of agentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; commission and inspection of books of account of the seller?

efence deals the world over are regularly criticised for lack of transparency. Whereas governments claim to strike a fine balance between open competition and secrecy needs, it is generally alleged that security concerns are overplayed to avoid public scrutiny. Resultantly, aspersions are often cast about the prevalence of corrupt practices and underhand dealings. It is generally suspected that interested participants can skew the whole procurement process by influencing decision-makers by decadent means. India is no exception. Every major deal has got mired in controversies. Questions have been raised with regard to the procurement procedure followed and financial improprieties. Therefore, the case of AgustaWestland has not come as a bolt from the blue for the knowledgeable. It was to be expected. The surprising part is the delay in its exposĂŠ. Media is agog with rumours of middlemen playing a decisive role to swing the deal.

It is not understood as to why the requirement of TCAS-II, EGPWS and Medevac could not be foreseen before the issuance of RFP in September 2006. CNC commenced work in September 2008. What new developments had taken place in the intervening period of two years that necessitated these add-on systems? With a view to silence the vociferous skeptics and clarify matters, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a detailed fact sheet on

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

14 February 2013. It gives a chronology of the important procedural milestones of the deal. MoD certainly deserves credit for not hiding behind the facade of secrecy and putting the facts in public domain.

Orders to reduce flying ceiling to 4,500 meters were totally in order and in national interests. It generated more competition and was a cheaper option as helicopters with higher flying ceiling invariably cost considerably more An endeavour has been made here to analyse the MoD fact sheet and carry out a broad procedural audit to check whether the process followed is beyond reproach. It entails ascertaining compliance of the salient provisions of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and identifying infirmities, if any. Five key issues have been discussed in this article.

1. Change of parameters MoD fact sheet Request for Proposals (RFP) was initially issued in March 2002. Amongst other parameters, it specified that the helicopter must be able to fly up to 6,000 meters. As only a single vendor emerged fully compliant, orders were issued to revisit the parameters and reduce flying ceiling to 4,500 meters as the VVIPs rarely fly over 4,500 meters. The air force was asked to co-opt Home Ministry and the Special Protection Group (SPG) in framing parameters to

Purchase of Helicopters for VVIPs:

A Procedural Appraisal ensure that all operational, security and convenience requirements are duly satisfied.

Observations Parameters are minimum performance attributes that are essential for the equipment to be able to carry out the envisaged functions. They are formulated through a long drawn, evolutionary and consultative process. Parameters keep undergoing changes as newer inputs become available. The concerned Service Headquarters (SHQ) is empowered to change them prior to the issuance of RFP. However, once RFP is issued, they become firm and no change / deviation is allowed.

Parameters are required to be framed to generate maximum competition and not be tailor-made to help a particular vendor. DPP mandates that in the event of a single vendor emerging successful, the case should be aborted. A fresh RFP has to be issued with revised parameters Parameters are required to be framed to generate maximum competition and not be tailor-made to help a particular vendor. DPP mandates that in the event of

a single vendor emerging successful, the case should be aborted. A fresh RFP has to be issued with revised parameters. However, decision-making must be objective. In case parameters are changed either to facilitate entry of a vendor or to eliminate potential competitors, it is a serious act of fraudulent conduct.

The concerned Service Headquarters (SHQ) is empowered to change them prior to the issuance of RFP. However, once RFP is issued, they become firm and no change / deviation is allowed In view of the above, orders to reduce flying ceiling to 4,500 meters were totally in order and in national interests. It generated more competition and was a cheaper option as helicopters with higher flying ceiling invariably cost considerably more.

2. Trial evaluation MoD fact sheet A fresh RFP for 12 helicopters (instead of 8 planned

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

arms acquisition

PROBITY PARAMETERS

earlier) with revised parameters was issued to six vendors in September 2006. Three vendors, namely M/s Sikorsky, USA (S-92 helicopter), M/s AgustaWestland, UK (EH-101 helicopter) and M/s Rosoboronexport, Russia (Mi-172 helicopter) responded. The techno-commercial proposal of M/s Rosoboronexport was not considered as the company had failed to deposit earnest money and declined to sign the integrity pact.

An endeavour has been made here to analyse the MoD fact sheet and carry out a broad procedural audit to check whether the process followed is beyond reproach. It entails ascertaining compliance of the salient provisions of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and identifying infirmities, if any Technical Equipment Committee carried out paper evaluation of the technical proposals of M/s Sikorsky and M/s AgustaWestland. Finding their helicopters to be compliant with the parameters, it recommended their field evaluation trials. SPG was co-opted in the trials which were carried out in respect of M/s Sikorsky in USA and M/s AgustaWestland in UK during the period January-February 2008. Report was submitted in April 2008, recommending AW-101 AgustaWestland for induction.

Observations MoD was right in eliminating M/s Rosoboronexport as it had declined to fulfil mandatory requirements. As regards field evaluation trials, two aspects are intriguing. One, trials were carried out in foreign lands, in total contravention of DPP which stipulates that these should be conducted by the user in all conditions where the equipment is likely to be deployed. Instead of asking the manufacturers of the shortlisted equipment to send the equipment to India on ‘no-cost no-commitment’ basis, as is the standard norm, SHQ deputed trial teams abroad. It needs to be recalled here that during the same period, evaluation trials in the case of multi-role combat aircraft were being carried out at Leh (high altitude), Jaisalmer (hot weather) and Bangalore (plains).

DPP does not allow any change in the configuration of equipment after the issuance of RFP Conduct of trials in India is an extremely critical prerequisite. India has varied terrain, climatic conditions and topography. These are totally different than those prevailing in the UK and the USA. For example, equipment found suitable for dust-free Europe has been found wanting in Indian environment with rubber parts and seals drying up prematurely. Two, field trials were started in January and the report submitted in April. It must be an all time record of exceptional efficiency. Detailed evaluation of high-tech helicopters including validation of the support system and maintainability aspects was carried out in

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

mere two months; that too for machines on which safety and security of nation’s VVIPs depended. Compare it with the time taken in the trial evaluation of multi-role combat aircraft.

8 helicopters. These additional requirements were considered essential for safe and effective operation of the helicopters in VVIP transportation role.

3. Non-compliance by Sikorsky

CNC recommended conclusion of the contract for Euro 556.262 million. The Cabinet Committee for Security approved the proposal on 18 January 2010 and the contract was signed within 20 days on 08 February 2010.

MoD fact sheet The Staff Evaluation Report of Air HQ concluded that Sikorsky S-92 helicopter was non-compliant with respect to four essential parameters, namely missile approach warning system, service ceiling of 4,500 meters, drift-down altitude and hover out of ground effect. Therefore, the helicopter was not recommended for induction. On the other hand AgustaWestland AW-101 was found to be fully compliant.

Observations The aim of field trials is to validate performance claims made by the vendors in actual terrain and climatic conditions. As stated above, only those vendors are called to participate in field evaluation trials whose technical proposals confirm compliance with all parameters.

Before initiating any action, the government must have conclusive proof of a breach of probity provisions having taken place. Therefore, the case must be investigated thoroughly. In case any misdemeanour is proved, appropriate and rational action should be taken against both the seller and the others involved. Punitive action must always be well considered and commensurate with the degree of transgression. It is apparent that Sikorsky S-92 would not have been invited for trials unless it had claimed that its helicopter could perform as stipulated. Sikorsky Aircraft is one of the leading helicopter manufacturers in the world. It possibly could not be unaware of the inadequacies / limitations of its machine as regards Indian parameters. For example, it knew that it did not possess missile approach warning system. Similarly, why did it claim that its helicopter could fly at 4,500 meters? It is a worrisome matter. Did a company of Sikorsky’s stature lie and make false claims in its technical proposal or were the parameters altered during the trials? DPP explicitly states that parameters not mentioned in RFP are not to be considered for field evaluation.

4. Commercial negotiations MoD fact sheet Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) carried out discussions between September 2008 and January 2009. While the CNC discussions were in progress, Air HQ recommended inclusion of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS-II) and Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) for all 12 helicopters. SPG concurred. In addition, SPG recommended inclusion of Medical Evacuation System (Medevac) for

Observations It is not understood as to why the requirement of TCAS-II, EGPWS and Medevac could not be foreseen before the issuance of RFP in September 2006. CNC commenced work in September 2008. What new developments had taken place in the intervening period of two years that necessitated these add-on systems? The underlying principle of DPP is to follow ‘single-stage two-bid system’. It implies that vendors have to submit their technical and commercial bids at the outset, albeit in separate sealed envelopes. It ensures that that the commercial offers remain competitive in nature and guards against the possibility of the successful vendor increasing his commercial quote at a later stage. That is the reason why DPP does not allow any change in the configuration of equipment after the issuance of RFP. By demanding additional systems at CNC stage, MoD made a mockery of its own procurement procedure. It was a patently wrong and gratuitous step. It provided a windfall opportunity to AgustaWestland to quote any price that it wanted to for the add-on systems. It will be interesting to know the basic cost quoted by AgustaWestland in its sealed offer and the increase demanded on account of the new additions. CNC is required to establish a benchmark for the reasonableness of price prior to the opening of the commercial offer. Once the price quoted by the vendor is found to be within the benchmark, no further price negotiations are considered necessary. It is not known as to what benchmark was established by CNC and whether the quote of AgustaWestland was well within it.

5. Probity aspects MoD fact sheet The contract includes exhaustive probity provisions. Article 22 deals with the use of undue influence and empowers the government to cancel the contract and recover loss arising from such cancellation. Article 23 debars employment of agents. An Integrity Pact has also been signed. As per the pact, in case of any breach, the government can recover sums paid, impose financial penalties and debar the seller from participating in any deal for a minimum period of five years.

Observations There are two aspects that need clarification. As per Clause 19 of the standard contract given in DPP, if it is discovered at any stage that the seller had paid commission to agents, the amount so paid has to be refunded to the government. Secondly and more critically, Clause 20 mandates that an undertaking be obtained from the seller to provide access to his books of account in case the government suspects breach of any probity provisions. The fact sheet issued by MoD is silent on both the above counts.

Conclusion Although MoD has claimed to have followed the laid down procedure, the following key aspects need further elucidation: Why were trials not carried out in India as mandated in DPP? Why were additional systems included in the purchase package at CNC stage? Has Sikorsky Aircraft been questioned for knowingly making false claims in its technical proposal and thereby wasting India’s time and resources in infructuous trials? Does the contract include clauses regarding refund of agents’ commission and inspection of books of account of the seller? A word of caution will be in order here. Before initiating any action, the government must have conclusive proof of a breach of probity provisions having taken place. Therefore, the case must be investigated thoroughly. In case any misdemeanour is proved, appropriate and rational action should be taken against both the seller and the others involved. Punitive action must always be well considered and commensurate with the degree of transgression. It does not have to be blacklisting at the outset.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

REALITY CHECK

he current global security threat scenario is accentuated. World over terrorists are not only becoming more aggressive in their activities but also adopting new modalities, techniques, technologies and strategies to maintain the ‘surprise’ element in their operations. Today they have increased opportunities and capabilities to launch terrorism on a trajectory towards higher levels of lethality, mass destruction and mass killing.

Terrorist’s attacks are becoming more lethal, brutal and ruthless Dr Rakesh Kumar Sharma The writer is Scientist 'G', Additional Director and Head, Division of CBRN Defence, Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS), Delhi.

Over the past couple of years, the government of India has brought about a paradigm shift in thinking and focus from the erstwhile reactive disaster response and relief centric approach to a proactive and prevention, mitigation and preparedness centric comprehensive mindset based on a multidisciplinary, multisectoral, holistic and integrated approach

INMAS has been working in the area of medical management and training of defence forces in the field of CBRN Defence. Till date it has organised nearly 50 such courses for QRT / QRMT of armed forces and other paramilitary and elite forces. Due to its active contribution in development of national disaster management guidelines issued by National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) on management of CBRN Emergencies and related issues, mock exercises, training and awareness generation campaign, DRDO has been tasked to develop a Centre of Excellence in the field of CBRN Mitigation, Training and Research

The steadily emerging new trends, seem to portend increase in lethality and ruthlessness in death and destruction. Last few years have seen Militants in Pakistan attack many POL (Petrol, Oil, Lubricants) fuel convoys that were taking fuel to coalition forces. Gunmen first opened small arms fire on these tankers, then set them on fire. Militants said the attacks were in response to incursions into Pakistani territory by US and NATO forces. On 22 May 2011, heavily-armed terrorists mounted simultaneous attacks on the PNS Mehran base (a heavily-guarded Pakistan Navy installation located in a Pakistan Air Force base) from the Main Gate (Faisal Gate), the Museum Gate or the rear gate and another vulnerable spot from the Shah Faisal Colony side. The fact that this was the fourth such attack in four weeks on PNS Mehran base housing Marine surveillance aircraft (the US-made P3C-Orion), makes it noteworthy. A team of nine militants from North Waziristan (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and their allies, including al-Qaida and other foreign fighters), armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades attacked Kamra Airbase (a Pakistani Air Force base with possible links to the country’s nuclear programme and being home to Pakistan’s most prized aviation asset Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Saab 2000 (costing US $ 300 million each) on 16th August 2012. Recently, on 15th December 2012, TTP terrorists attacked Peshawar airport using automatic weapons, grenades, mortars and rockets, resulting in 5 deaths and 36 injured. All these targeted attacks are clearly pointing towards emergence of a new trend in terrorism. Rather than attacking the common man, which entails greater condemnation, they have now started attacking the people or institutions that are supposed to protect the people or are part of the terrorism annihilation activities. A new breed of terrorist-groups appears more likely than the terrorists of the past to commit acts of extreme violence. Their aims are to cause the maximum possible amount of carnage and disruption. The nature of the terrorist threat has certainly changed in the light of thinking about how rogue elements might deploy a non-conventional agent. The potential upshot of any unconventional attack and its disrupting prospective is undoubtedly a sobering thought.

Weapons of mass destruction WMDs have been a source of concern for the international community since World War I and II. On 24 January 1946 the very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the issue of WMD pushed for ‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’. Since then there has been a wide range of resolutions from the Security Council on issues related to proliferation of WMDs and also on the issue of fighting acts of terrorism. However, one of the first UN Security Council resolutions acknowledging the threat of convergence between WMDs and terrorism was in resolution of 28 September 2001, as a response to the 9/11 attacks in the US.

There is a real dearth of CBRN trained human resources as against the increasing demand. There is a plethora of military, paramilitary and other elite security agencies besides civilian stakeholders, but their nominal ability to coordinate the multi-agency response needed towards responding to these threats in an effective manner, needs to be significantly improved. In the present threat scenario there is an urgent need for raising awareness and readiness of the public, civil response organisations and paramilitary forces rather than only of the Defence Forces Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons are inherently terrifying. NBC disasters can be extremely lethal due to their destructive potential of morbidity, coupled with irreparable long-term damage of the environment and their tremendous psychological impact on the masses. They may also be caused accidentally or by the acts of terrorism. The overriding religious belief in Armageddon (or catastrophically destructive battle) establishes a strong motive for some cults to use the NBC weapons. ‘Religiously motivated terrorists’ might decide to use WMDs, particularly biological agents, in the belief that they were emulating God. Importantly, unlike nuclear weapons, the materials and tools required to create biological warfare agents are easily accessible and cheap, which is why this kind of weapon is often referred to as the poor man’s nuclear bomb. Notably,

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

DRDO’s Endeavours for CBRN Challenges in Homeland Security A

n exhaustive update on CBRN attacks by terrorists to create mass casualty attacks. Some chemical weapons have used toxic industrial compounds (TICs); others are deployed agents specifically developed for chemical warfare (CWA). Chlorine gas, a TIC, was used during the First World War to kill or debilitate troops. Insurgents in Al Anbar province in Iraq started using chlorine gas in conjunction with conventional vehicle-borne explosive devices from October 2006. Radiological material can be combined with explosives to produce a radiological dispersion device (RDD), sometimes called as ‘dirty bomb’. Biological weapons may be used to attack people or infrastructure (eg food and water supplies). The article lists the preventive / prophylactic measures being taken by DRDO and NDMA in India.

CBRN Security MoU DRDO has entered into an MoU on CBRN Security with the Office of Security and Counterterrorism, Home Office, UK on 19th February 2013. many religious cults are capable of purchasing or funding the research and development of NBC weapons, because of great wealth that they acquire from their membership. Terrorists could use NBC weapons to draw attention to their cause, to wreak havoc and to terrorise civilians. The rogue states also possess these weapons. The terrorists might be able to acquire chemical and biological agents from rogue states favourable to their cause. The NBC weapons suit the terrorists’ strategy to inflict large numbers of indiscriminate casualties and mass panic.

CBRN materials Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials are extensively being used for various legitimate purposes, for example, in chemical and pharmaceutical industry, agriculture, nuclear energy, medical science and biotechnology. The safety and security of existing stockpiles of CBRN materials in and around civil / military CBRN facilities especially during processing, storage and transit, remain tentative in many areas of the world. A reported increase in illicit trafficking of CBRN agents globally and the role played by rogue countries in clandestinely propagating CBRN Technologies enhances the criticality of their security and safety issue in this age of rapid industrialisation and militarisation. Chemicals, combined with explosives, may be used as small-scale (assassination or poisonings) or large-scale (mass casualty) weapons. Some chemical weapons have used toxic industrial compounds (TICs); others are deployed agents specifically developed for chemical warfare (CWA).

Aide-mémoire of major CBRN incidents and ‘near misses’ Chlorine gas, a TIC, was used during the First World War to kill or debilitate troops. Insurgents in Al Anbar province in Iraq started using chlorine gas in conjunction with conventional vehicle-borne explosive devices from October 2006. Deployment of CWA (such as Sarin, Tabun, VX and mustard gas) by the Iraqi government forces at the Kurdish town of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan during March 1988, towards the closing days of the Iran-Iraq War had a devastating impact. A coordinated series of gassings (Sarin Attack @ Matsumoto, Japan on June 27/ 28, 1994 followed by Subway Sarin Incident at Tokyo, Japan on March 20, 1995), were some of the deadliest Chemical terrorist attacks in history.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

REALITY CHECK

Biological weapons may be used to attack people or infrastructure (eg food and water supplies). ‘Umbrella Assassination’ of a Bulgarian dissident, Georgi Markov on 7 September 1978 was designed to infect the target with a toxic pellet of Ricin, obtained from Castor beans. Aum Shinrikyo cult deployed botulin toxin aerosol 3 times during 1990-1995. Anthrax was developed and tested in the First World War as a means to contaminate animal feed but it can also be used to attack humans. The accidental release of anthrax spores from a military research laboratory in the former Soviet Union in 1979 is believed to have killed over 60 people. Anthrax attacks occurred over several weeks beginning on September 18, 2001 in the USA, killed 5 and infected 17. In these attacks, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and two Democratic US Senators. Contamination makes recovery from such attack significantly more challenging than recovery from other terrorist atrocities as the clean-up process may be protracted with substantial cost. During 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult experimented with anthrax spores and also visited Zaire to obtain Ebola virus.

There are credible indications that many leading terrorist organisations have acquired CBRN technologies and intend to employ them for malicious purposes in covert attacks Radiological material can be combined with explosives to produce a radiological dispersion device (RDD), sometimes called as ‘dirty bomb’. In 1995 Chechen rebels buried radioactive cesium-filled package in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park. A container containing radioactive materials attached to a landmine was found by a railway line in Chechnya in 1998. In 2003, the Director General of MI5 (UK’s counter-intelligence agency) indicated that a crude attack against a major Western city was “only a matter of time”. A collage of dirty bomb plans was discovered in Herat, Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s Taliban regime helped al-Qaeda build the device by providing radioactive sources from medical devices. British intelligence agents and weapons researchers conclude that al-Qaeda has succeeded in constructing a small dirty bomb. Furthermore, Abu Zubaydah, the captured al-Qaeda lieutenant now in American custody, told interrogators that such a device existed. In 2006, Dhiren Barot, an al-Qaeda operative was jailed in UK for a terrorist plot (plans to use a dirty bomb) in UK and USA. On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb, code-named ‘Little Boy’, was dropped over Hiroshima, Japan. It exploded about 2,000 ft above the city and had a blast equivalent to 13 kilotons of TNT. Within a minute 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured. Another bomb ‘Fat Man’, was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 that caused 39,000 deaths instantly and nearly 25,000 injuries. The worst nuclear accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine on April 26, 1986. Toxic plume drifted over large areas of Belarus and Russia parts of the Soviet Union and Europe. Roughly 2,00,000 people were evacuated and resettled. Around 200 people were hospitalised immediately, of whom 31 died from acute radiation exposure. A triple disaster occurred in Japan on 11th March 2011. According to Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) the dose equivalent on the edge of compound of the Fukushima Power Plant was 8.22 mSv on 1st April 2011. Nuclear or fissile material may be used to develop an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), creating a nuclear explosion. An IND remains the most devastating of all CBRN devices. Two human-induced radiological accidents involving ‘Orphan’ medical sources (that lack adequate regulatory control, sufficient accountability and proper disposal), were reported in Goiania, Brazil and Mayapuri, Delhi, India in September 1987 and April 2010 respectively. Radio targeted stealth assassination of Alexander Valterovich Litvinenko (a former KGB officer turned Kremlin critic who received political asylum in the United Kingdom) in November 2006, is termed as ‘FIRST’ confirmed victim of lethal Polonium-210 (Po-210) induced Acute Radiation Sickness. Recently, Al Jazeera news channel reported that the Tests carried out in early 2012 by the Institut de Radiophysique (IRA) in Lausanne, Switzerland found unusually high levels of the Po-210 on Yasser Arafat, the former Palestinian leader’s clothes and toothbrush, including his trademark keffiyeh headdress. Yasser Arafat who died on 11 November 2004, was allegedly the first victim of Radiotargeted stealth assassination as claimed by Suha, his Tunisian wife. On 27 November 2012, Arafat’s body was exhumed and samples were taken by Swiss, French and Russian experts to establish that ‘the polonium is not associated with a natural occurring radioactive source,’ – perhaps by looking for other accompanying natural sources, such as lead-210, lead-214 or bismuth-214, which are part of the natural polonium-210 decay chain.

Shifting of CBRN threat from battlefields to our backyards – a stern reality An alarming trend in terrorism has been the efforts to acquire sophisticated and lethal weapons, like the NBC weapons. Contemporary Terrorist organisations aspire to use CBRN agents in view of the easy availability of information about them in public domain, technology of their production, storage and ultimate use and the availability of CBRN materials through, outright purchase, theft and smuggling. There are credible indications that many leading terrorist organisations have acquired CBRN technologies and intend to employ them for malicious purposes in covert attacks. Terrorists’ capabilities have also increased due to the widespread availability of and easy access to ‘dual-use’ technologies. In recent years terrorists have been acquiring crude chemical and biological agents and some have plotted or threatened to use them. However, the recent terrorist’s record indicates that the possibility of using Biological and Chemical weapons is more than the Nuclear weapons. The reason being the technological problems associated with the nuclear weapons manufacturing. It was widely believed till 1990s that terrorists would steer clear of using CBRN agents due to their perceived obsession with controlling events that they start. But the confluence of religiously inspired terrorism and technological diffusion is impelling terrorists to overcome technical, organisational and logistical obstacles

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

to WMD use. According to the threat assessment released by US intelligence agencies in February 2010, if al-Qaeda can develop CBRN capabilities it is believed that it intends to use them to attack their target countries. The historical record cautions against axiomatically suggesting that the al-Qaeda movement, Aum Shinrikyo cult or any other terrorist group will inevitably successfully use CBRN weapons in a catastrophic attack. The terms ‘CBRN terrorism’ and ‘WMD terrorism’ are sometimes used interchangeably. This is misleading. Not all CBRN devices are weapons of mass destruction; indeed, many are not. But they do have the capability to cause significant disruption and loss of life.

Vulnerability assessment Phenomenon of terrorism is ubiquitous in India. The world is under persistent threat from a variety of toxic chemicals, microorganisms and radioactive materials that can be used as weapons of mass destruction / disruption. Events involving TICs, Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs), Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs), Toxic Biological Material (TBMs) and Toxic Radiological Material (TRMs) etc, are ‘quite a low probability’ but the consequences of a strike could have devastating implications (medium to high impact). There is an enhanced possibility of a low probability event happening anytime, anywhere. Attacks by terrorist groups with CBRN materials would have major consequences for people, property and the environment, requiring a coordinated and multi-disciplinary response by the public authorities. The fact is that one can lose a critical piece of infrastructure or an important capability for a long period of time as a result of a CBRN attack. Malevolent use of CBRN materials, thus, poses serious life endangering threat to unaware and unprotected community. Thus, CBRN terrorism threat has assumed a significant operational dimension. We are surrounded by many unstable nations and have an active presence of many non-state entities from the sub-continent. CBRN weapons threat from non-state actors within the country as well as those in our neighbourhood is a grim reality. At the same time, threat of CBRN weapons falling in hands of non-state actors is becoming a serious concern. Non-proliferation challenges posed by Pakistan and Iran, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Syria are other issues of concern.

Issues in preparedness for response for CBRN emergencies The need to prevent many potential CBRN terrorist acts, to create awareness, to be prepared to deal with acts of CBRN terror, to meet situations created by CBRN emergencies, is much more today than ever before. Appropriate institutional mechanisms have been put in place to effectively tackle rare unfortunate cases of their occurrence so as to minimise risks to health, life and environment. We need to augment our ability to systematically and categorically deal with increasing threat of CBRN terrorism and related disruptive activities.

Nuclear or fissile material may be used to develop an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), creating a nuclear explosion. An IND remains the most devastating of all CBRN devices Over the past couple of years, the government of India has brought about a paradigm shift in thinking and focus from the erstwhile reactive disaster response and relief centric approach to a proactive and prevention, mitigation and preparedness centric comprehensive mindset based on a multidisciplinary, multisectoral, holistic and integrated approach. Since the enactment of Disaster Management Act, 2005, India has initiated work on development of a rigorous CBRN Crisis and Response framework to prevent occurrence of such emergencies at the first instance. CBRN terrorism needs to be prevented by combination of Physical Security, Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, Deterrence, Surveillance and Environmental Monitoring, CBRN Security and Early Warning System (EWS) and Prevention of Illegal Trafficking of Hazardous CBRN agents including Waste, strengthening of laws, international cooperation etc, at the first instance. National Policy on Disaster Management emanates from the belief that investments in mitigation are much more cost effective than expenditure on relief and rehabilitation. Another major cornerstone of the approach is that mitigation has to be multidisciplinary spanning across all sectors of development. These efforts are aimed to conserve developmental gains and also to minimise losses of lives, livelihood and property. India can vouch on satisfactory management of recent CBRN emergency situations like Mayapuri radiation exposure incident, Delhi, Chlorine leak at Sewri yard, Mumbai, H5N1 / H1N1 flu outbreak and taking preventive and preparedness measures in the wake of fear of Fukushima Nuclear power plant contamination reaching India. Commonwealth Games 2010 also provided India a first-hand opportunity / experience on preparing towards CBRN emergency management for mega sporting events. CBRN incidents are responded to under the assumption that they are deliberate, malicious acts with the intention to kill, sicken and / or disrupt society. Basic Emergency Response measures include protection of health and ensuring safety by essential material logistics, equipment and medicines; provision of emergency relief to minimise loss of lives and economic assets and restoration of normalcy of lifestyle and activities as soon as possible. Effective response plans need to be essentially developed to manage such attacks, if and when they occur. Does the focus on emergency management encompass a goal of helping individuals develop the knowledge base, skill sets, aptitude and refinement of capabilities needed to assume and more effectively carry out their role and responsibility relating to an all-hazards approach to emergency management? There is a real dearth of CBRN trained human resources as against the increasing demand. There is a plethora of military, paramilitary and other elite security agencies besides civilian stakeholders, but their nominal ability to coordinate the

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

REALITY CHECK

multi-agency response needed towards responding to these threats in an effective manner, needs to be significantly improved. In the present threat scenario there is an urgent need for raising awareness and readiness of the public, civil response organisations and paramilitary forces rather than only of the Defence Forces. Central Paramilitary Organisations, Elite Forces and all stakeholders in civilian set up including community should be trained, educated and made aware of the reality of the CBRN threat in a subtle manner. This will make sure that each one of them has requisite resources and education or training to protect them as a first response, until the arrival of Specialised Forces at the scene to deal with such situations. Gearing up in this field requires regular improvements in imparting of specialised training and evolvement of dedicated devices, equipment, strategies and protocols. It is not a one time process and we need to continuously strive for improvements.

CBRN defence In India, the Ministry of Defence and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) have been playing a leading role in preparing the nation to protect, prevent, deter and respond to events involving hazardous or toxic CBRN materials. Since its very inception, DRDO is engaged in raising preparedness of defence forces for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare by developing protection, detection, resuscitation, decontamination and medical management technologies and devices etc. Till date DRDO has developed more than 65 NBC Technologies which are being successfully inducted in Defence Services. At present it is running an NBC programme to develop various strategies and technologies to mitigate the NBC emergencies. DRDO has recently formulated a programme on Biothreat Mitigation Technologies under which many laboratories of DRDO will work together for the development of detection, protection and decontamination technologies for preparedness against potential biothreat agents. Various laboratories of DRDO played important role in this national endeavour. DRDO has been an important stakeholder technical organisation for disaster management set up of the country in preparing various policies, guidelines, action plans and for equipping responders and imparting necessary training as a capacity development measure. As the nodal centre for CBRN training, numerous training initiatives were undertaken by the Division of CBRN Defence, Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS) for preparedness of both health and non-health responders of military, paramilitary, elite and civilian stakeholders. INMAS has been working in the area of medical management and training of defence forces in the field of CBRN Defence. Till date it has organised nearly 50 such courses for QRT / QRMT of armed forces and other paramilitary and elite forces. Due to its active contribution in development of national disaster management guidelines issued by National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) on management of CBRN Emergencies and related issues, mock exercises, training and awareness generation campaign, DRDO has been tasked to develop a Centre of Excellence in the field of CBRN Mitigation, Training and Research. Way back in November 2009, the then Vice Chairman, NDMA requested DRDO to develop such national capacity to harness and augment capacity build-up per se for military, paramilitary and civilian responders. On the basis of the situational analysis carried out by national experts while development of various national guidelines on CBRN, the long felt need of raising of a National level Institute catering to various requirements of CBRN Defence was recommended to the government of India. On the suggestion of the NDMA and on the strong recommendation of DRDO, the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri approved the same in principle in December 2009. The proposed Centre of Excellence will work under the following broad objectives: To design and establish comprehensive infrastructure and facilities for holistic CBRN Mitigation and Training to develop competence and capabilities. To develop facilities for CBRN field training, simulation based training and mock exercises. To initiate e-learning activities and create a knowledge grid working in 24X7 mode. To carry out applied R&D activities for CBRN mitigation using innovation / incubation concept. To become the Centre of Excellence in global scenario, the Centre will establish national and international linkages with authorities like Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, UK and Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, Home Office, UK; Defence Threat Reduction Agency, USA; Czeck Republic and other International Partners through Directorate of International Collaboration, DRDO in the areas of CBRN Training and Mitigation. Networking of various training institutions identified under different mandates towards effective CBRN emergency management, is also planned. This network will also link with all Military and Paramilitary CBRN Training Centres with State ATIs developing capacities in the subject field concerned. The Centre shall also have linkages with existing Ministry of Defence Institutions like Faculty of NBC Protection, College of Military Engineering, Pune; NBCD School, Lonavala;

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

Air Force Institute of NBC Protection, Delhi; SSS, Vizag; OTC, Lucknow besides National Institute of Disaster Management and ATIs of state governments. A Knowledge Grid will be established with the following Ministries / Departments of government of India for respective components of CBRN Defence: Chemical defence: MoE&F and Ministry of Home, NACWC etc, are nodal ministries / departments. The Centre shall act as nodal centre for networking of assistance and protection as regional centres in Asian sub-continent. Biological defence: NCDC, MoHF&W, State Health Departments, National programme of Integrated Disease Surveillance, BSL 3+/4 laboratories network and CDFD (for DNA fingerprinting) etc, shall be linked strategically alongwith other ICMR, ICAR, DBT laboratories for managing biothreats. Nuclear and radiological defence: BARC, DAE, its nodal ERC’s have already been linked with INMAS under an MoU wherein INMAS is identified as a nodal EMRC, however, its proper implementation requires realisation of such institution at ground level. Civil Defence Interface concept will be developed in Chemical security and safety to ensure that adequate ‘training and mitigation technologies’ are in place. Under (MHA), Police Modernisation is required to be integrated to ensure proper training and equipment for Homeland Security and CBRN Training. In the second phase it is proposed to establish 6 regional centres for CBRN Mitigation, Traing and Research and merge it with Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) programme of DRDO to address the issue of CBRN challenges in Homeland Security in a holistic way.

Institutional readiness in homeland security with special reference to CBRN defence 1993 Serial Bomb explosions in the then Bombay, was one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the history of India. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington have not only intensified the debate about new emerging trends in the international terrorism, but also added a new dimension in the operative tactics of the terrorists. 9/11 evoked ‘Homeland Security’ (HLS) concept all over the world as a focal point in defending towards internal security, protection to critical infrastructure and personnel, territory (inclusive of borders during peacetime) and community against symmetric / asymmetric, external / internal threats and aggressions. HLS is increasingly perceived as being critical to the overall security of any country. Coordinated bombings against the commuter train system of Madrid, Spain (11 March 2004) that affected 1,800 people; London suicide bombings (7 July 2005) that targeted the public transport system; and Mumbai, India attacks (26 November 2008) have forced the governments to further raise their preparedness for such events. 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks were first of its kind in the world and illustrated explicitly the lack of training and preparedness amongst our security apparatus. We still don’t have a full fledged HLS structure backed by appropriate training and research to deal with and mitigate asymmetric attacks. Defence Forces have their specialised training institutes in all their wings for NBC training. The government of India is focusing on the creation of a policy-level framework, modernisation and upgradation of Homeland Security infrastructure targeting institutional set up including long-term development of CBRN Defence to develop advanced mitigation technologies by sharing awareness tools, knowledge, experience, aptitude and skills besides Good Practices and lessons learnt so far. The US National Strategy for Homeland Security had warned that the “expertise, technology and material needed to build the most deadly weapons known to mankind – including CBRN weapons – are spreading inexorably.” The basic information about CBRN ‘resources’ (the agents, knowledge on their means of delivery and on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), is easily available from open sources. With the changing threat perceptions within the country and neighbourhood, management of CBRN related incidents has assumed a critical importance. CBRN threats are a stern reality and the decision-makers should not ignore them too long. We should not wait for any ‘Wake up’ attack / incident to prompt us to raise our preparedness at the national level and requirement of enhancing skills of all responders for a unified and coordinated synergised response from multiple agencies in a timely and synchronised manner. The need of the hour is synergy in thought and action amongst all stakeholders. Preparing the nation to address the threat of CBRN terrorism is a formidable challenge because anticipating such attacks and dealing with the devastating consequences of the CBRN agents involved are difficult and complex propositions. It may be impossible to prevent the fanatic from acting on impulse, but we have to have the people and resources to make it as hard as possible for evil to be carried out against the common men. Effective response plans need to be essentially developed to manage such attacks, if and when they occur. Thus, DRDO plans to play a pivotal role in raising preparedness of the country for CBRN challenges in Homeland Security.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

SPREADING TENTACLES

ince al-Qaeda’s formation in 1998, their objective was to be executed in two phases. The first phase was the formation of an Islamic Caliphate in Egypt and to expel Western forces from the Middle East area. The second phase was to use the newly established political entity to launch a “jihad” against the West.1

Papadopoulos Ilias The writer holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and Strategy, with a specialisation in intelligence. His main research interests are intelligence and counterterrorism / counterinsurgency. He has served in the Greek Special Forces and in Greek NATO base and also participated in a series of seminars and lectures concerning political violence and international affairs.

This establishment of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-friendly regimes in the region would have two immediate repercussions. The first is the increase in immigration flows towards safer lands, namely Europe, due to war and / or persecution in their lands. Indicative of that is that in Mali since the start of the crisis, 382 thousand people have fled their homes and are seeking refuge.12 If left unchecked these people could have destabilisation effects in the greater region, so actions have to be taken for them to remain in their homes

To that end the ability to rally muslim populations around the globe in the radical islamic cause, is crucial to al-Qaeda’s plan. Africa in specific, besides a vast conscription pool, also provides access to rare earths and thus a substantial financial income, while the organisation can also capitalise in the harsh conditions and poor public administration of the continent to rally people to their cause. Following is the study of individual cases of al-Qaeda strongholds in Africa and what impact these strongholds might have in international stability.

The case of Somalia A very well known case of al-Qaeda stronghold is that of Somalia under terrorist organisation al-Shabaab (The Youth). The origins of the organisation can be traced back in the chaos of the Barre government collapse in 1991 and the subsequent formation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2004. ICU was a de facto body that served at the same time as executive and judicial branch and by strength of arms managed to restore some measure of order in the country. At the same time in the country formed a de jure government under the auspices of Ethiopia called Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG had little power outside its seat of power in Baioda and was deeply hostile against ICU.2 Back then we firstly encounter al-Shabaab as a radical wahabi faction within ICU. ICU’s success allowed it to encircle Baioda with its military forces pending an assault in the city and also endorse a hate oratory against Christian Ethiopia calling for a jihad against their neighbour. Eventually these developments led to an Ethiopian intervention in Somalia which disintegrated ICU. With ICU’s forces in flight, it was only al-Shabaab’s forces that stood their ground and fought. That fact served as a rally

point for Somali nationalism which sought to drive the Ethiopians from their country. al-Shabaab retreated to the south of Somalia and transformed itself into a guerilla army, as well as a parallel state that provided welfare and security to the Somalis under their aegis. As of 2008, two major events took place. The first was that Ethiopian troops retreated from the country and were replaced by African Union troops. The second was that al-Shabaab’s leader Aden Hashi Agro died and new leader became Sheikh Ahmad Abdi Godane, also known as “Abu Zubair”. The new leader pledged his allegiance to al-Qaeda and incorporated al-Qaeda’s officers in the organisation. At that time the tactics of al-Shabaab changed, with it conducting suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, while in 2010 it conducted a terrorist attack in Uganda.3 The gradual increase of the threat of al-Shabaab to its neighbours, eventually led to operation “Lind Nchi” (Protect the Country) in October 2011, conducted by the armed forces of the AU, TFG, Kenya and Ethiopia. The objectives of the operation were the total annihilation of al-Shabaab.4 Militarily the operation was a success and crippled the conventional military infrastructure of al-Shabaab. To this situation al-Shabaab responded by terrorist attacks in churches and nightclubs in Nairobi.

The presence of foreign troops as a de facto occupation force is expected to sharpen the pro-insurgents sentiment. Also the basis of al-Shabaab’s fighters remains largely intact and they can be expected to recruit new troops to their cause and renew their efforts, just as it was the case with ICU in 2006 The presence of foreign troops as a de facto occupation force is expected to sharpen the pro-insurgents sentiment. Also the basis of al-Shabaab’s fighters remains largely intact and they can be expected to recruit new troops to their cause and renew their efforts, just as it was the case with ICU in 2006.5 Furthermore splinters of al-Shabaab will seek refuge in other African countries and when there, they will train new recruits to their cause.*

1. More on the grand strategy of al-Qaeda see David J Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p 167-169. 2. More on the origins of al-Shabaab see Rob Wise, “Al-Shabaab”, published at AQAM Futures Project - Case Studies Series, Center of Strategic and International Studies, Case Study No 2, July 2011. 3. More on al-Qaeda’s influence in al-Shabaab’s methods and ideology, see David Shinn, “al-Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia”, published at Elsevier Ltd, Spring 2011. 4. More on the operation, see International Crisis Group, “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia”, published at Africa Report, No 184, February 2012. 5. See Katherine Zimmerman, “al-Shabaab after Kismayo”, published at Critical Threats, October 2012. * This has been the case in Nigeria where Boko Haram’s militants claim to have received training from al-Shabaab.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

The al-Qaeda Presence in Africa T

he al-Qaeda presen ce has increased in point that it threat ens regional stabil the aftermath of the Arab Spring to northern Africa co ity. This article stud the ncerning its histor ie s th e ph en om ical roots and the in en have if left unchec ternational impact on in ke it could region would result d. A potential permanent establis hment of al-Qaeda in the creation of a sa in Afghanistan prior to 2001. This would fe haven for terrorist activities equiva the institute a grave st le for two reasons. St rategic danger for th nt to rategically North A e West, frica is situated in and thus would su the dd second is that reve enly be faced with a hostile actor in direct south of Europe nu its neighbourhood. Indicative of that ar e from natural resources would flo The w into al-Qaeda’s e the petrol produc coffers. tion capabilities of resources fall in al Liby -Q a worldwide crisis aeda controlled hands, they would ha a and Nigeria. If these . ve the potential to create The case of Nigeria Nigeria is by African standards a rich nation with oil producing capabilities. However its population is divided between the Christian populated south and the Muslim populated north. This division is the key factor to be acknowledged when studying the case of Nigerian terrorism. The southerners enjoy a higher status of life, with lower unemployment rates, higher wages etc, while

the northerners are practically impoverished. Furthermore in the north the state is unable to provide substantial government services such as welfare and security.6 The above led to the formation of the terrorist organisation “Boko Haram” (Western education is sin) in 2002, a radical Islamic organisation calling for the implementation of Sharia law in all Nigeria.7 Since its formation, the organisation’s methods have evolved and

6. See Jennifer G Cooke, “Boko Haram – Emerging Threat to the US Homeland”, published by Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 2011. 7. More on the roots of Boko Haram, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Growing New Headache”, IISS Strategic Comments, volume 17, November 2011.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

global terrorism

SPREADING TENTACLES

since 2011 include IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), suicide bombings and attacks in Christian and moderate Muslim establishments. While these methods of operation are typical for al-Qaeda, we cannot establish the degree of connection between the two entities. For example while al-Qaeda has regional aspirations, Boko Haram has never conducted strikes outside Nigeria. On the other hand the Nigerian group uses the al-Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM) network “Al-Andalus”, a fact that signifies a connection between the two entities. Furthermore there have been claims for a connection between Boko Haram and Somali al-Shabaab.8

Since al-Qaeda’s formation in 1998, their objective was to be executed in two phases. The first phase was the formation of an Islamic Caliphate in Egypt and to expel Western forces from the Middle East area. The second phase was to use the newly established political entity to launch a “jihad” against the West Regardless of how close that tie is, we can ascertain that there are ties between Boko Haram and AQIM. The greater area has historically turned to violence to fend off grievances, real or perceived, caused by the Westerners. In the 21st century this violence has found the roof of radical Islam and the further endorsement of al-Qaeda. This two-way exploitation allows AQIM to further its regional objectives; those are the formation of a Caliphate and the radicalisation of the greater area.

The case of Mali Conflict in Mali is not a novelty, since the 1950s a Tuareg minority wages a war of variable intensity against the Malian state calling for its independence.9 Tuareg paramilitary forces took part in the Libyan civil war and as soon as Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown, these forces returned to their homelands in Sahel. Particularly the Tuareg of Mali began a new insurgency against the Malian state and eventually were successful in occupying a large region in the north of the country. This in turn caused unrest in the Malian military, which escalated to a coup in March 2012. While the Malian military in the South was in disarray, the Tuareg in the North could hardly impose order in the region they had occupied. That allowed the three terrorist organisations to come and fill the power vacuum in the region, AQIM, Ansar al-Din and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). All of the above three organisations were radically Islamic and followed the tenets of Salafism. These groups managed to displace the Tuareg leadership and assume control in the region.10 With the Malian military forces largely incapable

The al-Qaeda as a destabilisation factor While al-Qaeda does not see Africa as its prime area of operations, it has succeeded in capitalising local resentment to export the group’s franchise. The phenomenon became greater in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, where a series of Islamic administrations came to power.• While the events are still unfolding, we can ascertain for the reasons mentioned above that the northern part of Africa is moving in a more radical way. The group that capitalises in that radicalisation is al-Qaeda since it has the necessary expertise to support and organise these movements. This establishment of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-friendly regimes in the region would have two immediate repercussions. The first is the increase in immigration flows towards safer lands, namely Europe, due to war and / or persecution in their lands. Indicative of that is that in Mali since the start of the crisis, 382 thousand people have fled their homes and are seeking refuge.12 If left unchecked these people could have destabilisation effects in the greater region, so actions have to be taken for them to remain in their homes. The second is that a potential permanent establishment of al-Qaeda in the region would result in the creation of a safe haven for terrorist activities equivalent to Afghanistan prior to 2001. This would institute a grave strategic danger for the West, for two reasons. The first is that strategically North Africa is situated in the direct south of Europe and thus would suddenly be faced with a hostile actor in its neighbourhood. The second is that revenue from natural resources would flow into al-Qaeda’s coffers. Indicative of that are the petrol production capabilities of Libya and Nigeria. If these resources fall in al-Qaeda controlled hands, they would have the potential to create a worldwide crisis.

Conclusion While al-Qaeda clearly makes a push to control the region in question, the outcome of that push is still undecided, with the population far from supportive to the terrorist organisation. That doesn’t mean that there is no danger for the stability of the region. On the contrary as we stated above, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring there has been ascension of Islamic political forces, with secularism in decline. The main actor that will be impacted by these occurrences would be the EU. This is the reason why EU forces are deploying in countries such as Mali, with the US merely backing the endeavour.

* Namely the Ennahda Movement rise to power in Tunisia, the Libyan elections that resulted in a strong victory of Islamic parties and finally the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in Egyptian elections.

March 2013 Defence AND security alert

INDIGENISATION THE KEY

of combating the threat, they sued for the help of the French government. President Hollande supported Mali by sending in January 2013, 3,300 French troops in the country to stabilise it.11

8. More on the international connections of Boko Haram, see Peter J Pham, “Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat”, published in Africa Security Brief, No 20, April 2012. 9. More on the Tuareg insurgency see Keita, Kalifa, Conflict Resolution in Sahel: the Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, Strategic Studies Institute, Pennsylvania, 1998. 10. See “Extremism Spreads in West Africa and the Sahel”, IISS Strategic Comments, volume 18, October 2012. 11. See Alexis Arief, “Crisis in Mali”, Congressional Research Service Report, January 2013. 12. See as above.

arms acquisition

THE A G U S TA W E S T L A N D HELICOPTER SCAM? DSA Research Team

he Arms Acquisition Process in India has been slowed to a crawl due to a series of scams. The basic fact is that by 1990, the entire Indian arms inventory obtained from the former Soviet Union had become due for turnover. That is the time that the USSR collapsed and the Indian economy itself came close to collapse. As such, the armed forces were clearly told to wait till the Indian economy revived. The recapitalisation of the armed forces’ capital stocks was put off by over two decades. This severely constrained India’s response options to Pakistan’s Proxy War in Jammu and Kashmir and India was forced to fight reactively in its own territory. By the start of 21st century, the liberalised Indian Economy gained traction. However, the recapitalisation of the capital military stock remained confined to a crawl as the political leadership moved excruciatingly slowly on defence deals, ostensibly to obviate corruption. As a result, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) squadron strength today is falling rapidly as the MiGs are well past their service life; and no Rafales or Light Combat Aircrafts (LCA) seem to be visible on the horizon. Our submarine strength is rapidly declining as the Kilos retire but the Scorpenes are not available. After the Bofors Scam in 1987, the Indian Army has been without its mainstay of firepower – Medium Guns. Its Air Defence (AD) Artillery is of the 1960s and 70s vintage. Its light helicopter fleet, is also from the same era and is about to fall out of the skies. Its tank fleet is night blind and sans ammunition. The previous Army Chief’s letter had raised an outcry by listing these voids last year but public memory is woefully short. The AgustaWestland scam could not have therefore come at a worse time. It is amazing that despite the Defence Minister’s strongly articulated antipathy to corruption in defence deals, these scams continue to surface after virtually every defence purchase. The resultant media outcry usually leads to the deal cancellations and blacklisting of the firms concerned. In the process the only ones to really suffer are the Armed Forces. The acquisition of badly needed weapon systems gets delayed by decades with huge attendant cost overruns to the national exchequer. The pity is, for all these setbacks to the defence of the country, no culprits have ever been caught so far and given exemplary punishment. The ministry bureaucrats who negotiate the actual deal seem teflon coated, take no responsibility and go scot free. The Bofors was an excellent gun. 450 were purchased outright and a 1,000 were to be manufactured in the country before the scam surfaced. The real losers were the Indian Army. The AgustaWestland deal was worth € 560 million. Of this, € 51 million was paid as kickbacks. Of this some € 30 million were disbursed in India and € 10 million given to Italian politicians to secure Giuseppe Orsi’s promotion in Finmeccanica. This amounts to a kickback of virtually 10 per cent of the deal amount, which is huge. Generally international bribes / commissions amount to 2-3 per cent of the overall cost of the deal. The initial media outcry was focused on the former Air Chief. It was alleged that he had tweaked the helicopters altitude requirements from 18,000 ft to 15,000 ft to accommodate Agusta. It later came to light that this decision had been taken some two years before the commencement of his tenure by the then NSA of the NDA government to rightly avoid a single vendor situation.

The best outcome of the whole sordid deal would be if we were finally pushed into creating a viable Defence Industrial Base in India that involves our vibrant Private sector in a major way. The FDI cap in Defence collaborations should be raised to 49 per cent to start with and India’s major multinationals must be involved in a big way

arms acquisition

Deals should not routinely be cancelled. Emphasis should shift to following the money trail and punishing the bribe takers. We cannot afford a piquant situation where we blacklist half the defence firms of the world and needlessly delay the induction of quality and proven equipment

The Bofors was an excellent gun. 450 were purchased outright and a 1,000 were to be manufactured in the country before the scam surfaced. The real losers were the Indian Army

INDIGENISATION THE KEY

The trial evaluations were carried out after the said Air Chief retired and the contract was signed only in 2010. As such, logically it is difficult to establish a quid pro quo with the former Air Chief. The entire spin doctoring exercise in hindsight appeared to be probably aimed at diverting attention from the primary bribe takers amongst the politico-bureaucratic nexus, defaming the Indian Armed Forces and setting up a convenient fall guy. Those who know the mechanics of the Indian arms acquisition process are aware that the Service Chiefs and Headquarters play at best a limited role. They cannot by themselves change any GSQRs, once the RFP is issued. Subsequent media reports have mentioned the role of Abhishek Verma – who reportedly has close links with the ruling establishment and is one of the main commission agents for most arms deals in the capital.

However, the AgustaWestland deal, in particular, merits cancellation. The Finance Ministry has imposed a cut in the Defence Capital Acquisition process of Rs 10,000 crore. To avoid cutting funds for combat equipment, we could do away preferentially with this luxury copter deal for our VVIPs. Having failed to get the armed forces their basic weapon systems they can afford to fly cattle class for some time! Generally, it would be a waste of time to look for any infirmities in the process of the deal. Usually there are none. In fact, this acquisition process is deliberately dragged out so that the authorised rent collectors can collect their commissions at each stage – simply for letting the process go through. These rent collectors seem to be very well known to the arms dealers in Delhi, have excellent political links and powerful patrons who save and shield them from all enquiries and harm. In the AgustaWestland case unfortunately, as per the fact sheet put out by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) itself, there are some startling infirmities in the process, namely: Why were the trials not carried out in India under actual operating conditions? These trials were hurriedly completed in just two months in Italy and the USA, which is somewhat of a record. The normal practice is to get the equipment to India under a no cost-no commitment clause.

Why were additional systems like Traffic Avoidance System, Enhanced Ground Proximity System and Medical Evacuation system added at the Contract Negotiation State? As per the DPP this should have been in the RFP. Inserting them subsequently was illegal and enabled the vendor to make huge profits. There is something about the speed with which this VVIP deal was concluded that raised suspicion. The involvement of the SPG added its share of ambiguity and the then SPG Chief himself went to Italy. On the whole this is a disturbing state of affairs. This vitiated arms acquisition process has caused a huge setback to our defence preparedness and further slowed down the arms acquisition process. Huge windows of vulnerability have been created, which could now last beyond 2020. An ill-informed Indian public simply does not comprehend the great dangers that this political rent collection in our arms deals is posing to our National Security.

What then, should we do? The best outcome of the whole sordid deal would be if we were finally pushed into creating a viable Defence Industrial Base in India that involves our vibrant Private sector in a major way. The FDI cap in Defence collaborations should be raised to 49 per cent to start with and India’s major multinationals must be involved in a big way. Deals should not routinely be cancelled. Emphasis should shift to following the money trail and punishing the bribe takers. We cannot afford a piquant situation where we blacklist half the defence firms of the world and needlessly delay the induction of quality and proven equipment. However, the AgustaWestland deal, in particular, merits cancellation. The Finance Ministry has imposed a cut in the Defence Capital Acquisition process of Rs 10,000 crore. To avoid cutting funds for combat equipment, we could do away preferentially with this luxury copter deal for our VVIPs. Having failed to get the armed forces their basic weapon systems they can afford to fly cattle class for some time! The Mi-17 fleet has stood us well in the past and could suffice for future VVIP duties. This will at least spare funds for combat equipment and send the right message to all vendors. India has to begin somewhere to cleanse this rotten system and a good place to start would be right here and now.

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