DSA May 2010 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms…

—Chanakya

DSA is as much yours, as it is ours! On display in the Punjab Archives in Lahore is a sale deed. Under normal circumstances a sale deed barely merits display in archives as important as the ones in Lahore. But this receipt from the middle of the 19th century has a direct impact on the foreign, defence and economic policies of the Government of India in 2010. Any other document of the colonial era would’ve made a better display item, but this sale deed takes centre stage under the dome that once interned a much-coveted body, but now shelters rare documents. The matter of the sale is, after all, at the centre stage of regional politics right down to this day. It is the sale of Jammu and Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh by the East India Company. As is the wont with eager auditors, the sale was recorded, sealed and filed. What was a routine bureaucratic function then, is now the display piece for the dispute that divides the politics and societies of the twins separated at birth. India and Pakistan continue to be torn apart by the politics over Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute has spawned a culture and a counter-culture. It is the state that is supposed to bring the two countries to war and the world to a nuclear holocaust. It is the state that has a day reserved for it in the Pakistani calendar. Where an over eager political class is jostling for its pure opinion to be aired and for its competitive breeding of violence. All in the name of freedom and justice. In a very real sense, Kashmir is the cause of the military coups in Pakistan. Join the dots and arrive at this conclusion. Bizarre, but it is the state that has spawned a security culture in a country desperately keen to sustain democratic institutions. It is the disagreement that has changed the political culture of the state, particularly that of the valley of Kashmir. Violence has emerged as the arbiter of decisions in what was once a fairly good military posting to have, for its life of fishing, a bit of shooting, skiing, trekking and some impromptu golf. Now guns dot the markets and it is a rare day that there is no violence and there are no deaths. And a little rumour is all that it takes to bring ‘spontaneous’ crowds onto the streets, sloganeering death and justice in the same breath. At the same time it is a state that has not seen a Dantewada happen in all the decades it has been fought over. The country has handled violence and political wrangling in Kashmir with certain maturity and not everyone digs cricket pitches. But when it came to getting a grip on what happened in Dantewada and why, the leaders of India have failed the country. Lessons are being brushed under the carpet and if ever there was a case of match fixing it is the unwillingness of the leadership to unite and share the blame, or give where it is due, for Dantewada.

manvendra singh

publisher’s view

“JANANI JANMABHOOMISCHA SWARGADAPI GARIYASI” The Mother and birthplace are much greater than heaven. Volume 1 Issue 8

Jammu and Kashmir - the moment we hear this name our memories transport us to the lush green meadows bedecked with tall, swaying Chinars, enchanting lakes and snow-capped mountains. I still remember my ﬁrst visit to Jammu in the year 1977 as a school student when I visited Mata Vaishno Devi shrine with my family. I remember the name of our Pitthoo - Yakoob Khan, who took our belongings from Katra to the Bhawan. His devotion towards the Goddess and dedication to our entire family through the whole stretch of 13 kms to the shrine was remarkable. He used to chant JAI MATA DI with great fervour along with all the other Hindu devotees while proceeding to the Bhawan.

May 2010

chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief m anvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint m artins co llege o f art & design, university o f arts, lo ndo n corporate communications m o nika kanchan communications sweta sehgal representative J &K salil sharm a (09419185794) correspondent ro hit srivastava correspondent ( europe) do m inika co sic creative vipin cho udhary production dilshad & dab eer admin. and coordination shalini sachdeva photographers subhash, deepak circulation & distribution prem gupta ranjeet, sandeep, vikram systems vikas e-m ail: ( f irst name) @dsalert.org inf o: info @ dsalert.o rg articles: articles@ dsalert.o rg subscri ption: subscriptio n@ dsalert.o rg online edition: o nline@ dsalert.o rg advertisement: advt@ dsalert.o rg editorial & business of f ice 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002,india t: +91-011-23243999,23287999 f : +91-11-23259666 e: inf o@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence And Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

Though he was a Muslim but we found him to be a true devotee of his land, culture and values. He must be a Gujjarr Muslim, must be performing Namazz at least two times a day, if not five, but he was a true Indian as I believe that a person who does not have love and devotion for his Motherland can’t be true to his religion also. RASHTRA R R M NA N H PRA R NA N H means Nation is above one’s life. This sentiment must impregnate the thinking of every Indian from Kashmir to Kanyakumari . We have never seen any communal riots since independence which proves that there is a healthy environment of communal harmony in Jammu and Kashmir. We all have seen how the Muslim brothers extend their best support in the Amarnath Yatra every year. It is only few misguided people who defile the environment of amity and communal harmony which is threatening our national security. And the truth is that everyone is looking only for peace and development in the state whether it is roads, power, education, health or jobs. It is a good omen that Jammu and Kashmir has a democratically elected government working hard to excel in various sectors in the state under the dynamic leadership of young Chief Minister Mr. Omar Abdullah who could be a role model and an icon for the youths of Jammu and Kashmir. I am sure that under his inspiring leadership the people of Jammu and Kashmir and especially the youths will channelise their energies for the all-round development of this geo-politically important state of India. Only a strong willpower and right direction with positive approach is required among the people of Jammu and Kashmir. I believe that to attain this, an effective education system is essential. I am sure the state government must be serious to establish a robust education system in the state to provide the best education to its youths. Most of the parents still prefer to send their children to various parts of the country for higher studies of engineering, medical and management etc. Why not establish more and more engineering, medical and management colleges in the state along with vocational courses for better job-oriented education where more jobs are being created for a prosperous future for each individual after their studies are completed? Education plays a vital role in development whether it is of a person, a state or a country. DSA is expanding its network with the kind support of its dear and valuable readers. Its demand has galloped in the last few issues which proves the acceptability of the mission of DSA not only within the borders but across the borders too. DSA is strengthening its distribution and circulation operations to ensure availability of the magazine in all parts of India and key locations overseas, so that more and more readers join the mission of making India and the World Safe and Secure. At the initiative of our Editor-in-Chieff Mr. Manvendra Singh, with this issue we are starting a series of exclusive interviews with high-profile and key dignitaries, both from India and overseas, who play a vital role in the defence and security arena. This is our special issue on Jammu and Kashmir and we are happy to start with not one but two interviews – one with the Honourable Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Mr. Omar Abdullah and the other with the Honourable Defence Minister of Finland who were both in New Delhi in the last week of April 2010. Team DSA wish and pray for 3Ps for one of our most beautiful and geo-politically important state of Jammu and Kashmir and its people:

PEACE PROGRESS

PROSPERITY!

JAI HIND!

pawan agrawal

contents

Volume 1 Issue 8

MAY

contents

ISSUE

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

2010

May 2010

A R T I C L E S

promising future? Dr. M. Mazammal Hussain

Pakistani fantasies? G. Parthasarathy, IFS

counter militancy review

Brig. (Retd.) Rahul K. Bhonsle

now jehad for water! Dr. Monika Chansoria

Ladakh: brooding sense of neglect Thupstan Chhewang

Exclusive Interview: Mr. Omar Abdullah Honâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ble Chief Minister Jammu and Kashmir

Exclusive Interview: Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal GOC-in-C, Northern Command

The Other View: Prof. Bhim Singh

Exclusive Interview: H.E. Jyri Hakamies Defence Minister of Finland

festering blunders Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Sheru Thapliyal, SM

sopore: strategic failure?

Rohit Singh

Kashmir accession: the real story C. Dasgupta

dantewada massacre: endgame imperatives Col. (Retd.) Rajinder Singh

through a glass, darkly Arundhati Ghose, IFS

legal framework Vakul Sharma

F E A T U R E S

O T H E R S

JOKE N CARTOON

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Dear Ms. Monika Kanchan, I have received the copy of Defence And Security Alert March 2010 issue. Thank you, Shri Pawan Agrawal and Shri Manvendra Singh for bringing out such a comprehensive, in-depth analysis and background information covered so well in the issue. I have enjoyed reading every article. The selection of theme and authors has been very good. Afghanistan has been covered very well. I am happy to note that you intend to publish research based, authentic writings in future. I may suggest that you bring out special issue on Internal Security, Terrorism and Unconventional war in future. With Warm Regards. Lt. Gen. (Dr.) D. B. Shekatkar PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd.) PhD (Management Science) Pune- 411001

4/19 asaf ali road india new delhi-110002,

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir INTERVIEW: CHIEF MINISTER Exclusive interview of the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir on 26.04.2010 by DSA Editor-in-Chief Mr. Manvendra Singh at New Delhi. Editor-in-Chief: We are starting our series of interviews and wanted to start with you. Well, the transition from union government to state government, the cultural transition, transition of politics, functioning, how easy or how difficult has it been? Chief Minister: Well, fortunately for me the transition wasn’t overnight. Possibly if I had gone straight from being a minister in the Government of India to Chief Minister in J&K, the transition would have been very stark and possibly little more difficult to cope with it. But I quit GOI in 2002 and I only assumed the office of Chief Minister in 2009. The interim period was spent as opposition leader in J&K, while continuing to represent the state in parliament, so for me the transition was I think little smoother. But there is a lot that can be said in terms of differences in approach, the differences in work culture, the difference in responsibility. Clearly there can be no comparison between being MoS in Government of India and the Chief Minister of possibly

affected by Indian foreign policy than is Jammu and Kashmir. Foreign policy towards Pakistan and China has an immediate impact over the state. DSA: And defence policy. CM: Yes, defence policy. DSA: Both ways you are affected. CM: Absolutely, anything that the Government of India does has an immediate impact over us. DSA: In your tenure as CM, what would you regard as the high point and what would you regard as the low point? CM: Well the high point, there are quite a few of them, the successful conduct of the last Lok Shabha election, the successful conduct of Amarnath Yatra last year, the restoration of civil governance after the governor’s rule we had, the focus on productive utilisation of the resources that we have, focus that we have put on improving our generation capacity in power. These have been the things that I am particularly pleased about.

Interview

Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir the most difﬁcult state in the country, so I don’t know where to start and where to end.

The challenges have been the aftermath of the Shopian problem last year and the continued effort that has been made to disrupt the environment of the state by provoking law and order disturbances.

DSA: But you do see a completely different culture of politics? CM: There is no politics in being the MoS of Government of India except for some of the most politically sensitive ministries home, external affair, ﬁnance. I was MoS in Commerce and External affairs, so really not much politics involved in that. J&K is all about politics, it’s about politics between the three regions, it’s about politics between New Delhi and state, and it’s about politics between the country and our neighbours. It’s all about politics. DSA: Which is what leads to my next question, as CM of J&K, it can always be assumed you require an international relations degree. CM: You require a degree in so many things, I think you require a degree in patience, you require a degree in politics, you require a degree in international diplomacy, you require a degree in keeping your mouth shut. There are so many things that you need to get a handle on. DSA: Was MEA any help in that? CM: MEA gave me a much better understanding of the way in which diplomacy of our country proceeds, gave me experience in thinking before talking, how every word can be interpreted and possibly misinterpreted as well. And yes this sort of international exposure to other countries and issues, particularly with our neighbours, was something very valuable. No other state is as

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

DSA: I will come back to the Shopian issue later which is an interesting test case in administration and patience. In terms of administration, with your experience with GoI, as an MP and as a minister and now your experience in the state as a CM, do you think the administrative structure requires tweaking at places? Do you think the administrative structure is a 21st century structure? CM: I think work culture requires to be tweaked and in that use of more e-governance models are perhaps something that we need to take a look at. Other than that governance is governance and bureaucracy is the same. Ofﬁcers from the state will come to the centre and from centre will revert to the state. I think, again, J&K is a more difﬁcult model because of last twenty years of the problem that we had. It hasn’t been possible for successive chief ministers to focus on governance. So much of your time and attention is taken in security and law and order issues. DSA: That leads me to my next question. The theoretical understanding of insurgency and violence against the state, in any form, is supposed to be the collapse or because of bad politics and bad administration. As far as J&K is considered how do you analyse the roots of it and where do you think it is heading? CM: See unlike Naxalism and Maoist insurgency and things like that, roots of Jammu and Kashmir insurgency are not in its

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir INTERVIEW: CHIEF MINISTER governance and economy. As Jammu and Kashmir has always been one of the most prosperous states of the country, as levels of poverty are much lower and you don’t have incidences of people starving to death, like they do in other parts of the country. There is no tussle between landowners and tenant farmers, because there is no culture of tenant farming. With the land reforms of early forties and early ﬁfties every one is a landowner in Jammu and Kashmir. Really the root of the problem is politics in J&K, whether mishandling by state and centre, successive governments being dismissed, sort of tinkering around with election results, whether at the level of the state, its politics and the accords they went into and their impact on people’s psyche. The issue of Jammu and Kashmir is largely the product of its politics. You need a political solution to resolve it. You can’t focus just on the military or economic policies. DSA: And political focus with an international touch to it because the issue has become internationalised.

CM: Absolutely. Whether we like it or not Pakistan is a player in CM what happens in Jammu and Kashmir. We should stop living in denial about that, and the sooner we come to terms with the reality and focus on it. DSA: Going back to Shopian I don’t want to prejudge the question, but “spontaneous demonstrations”? Shopian demonstrated fabulously well organised demonstrations. Where does this phenomenon come from? And it is just so pat, so well planned. CM C M: Well I think there is this room towards orchestrating impromptu demonstrations, it’s amazing what technology can do. Texts are so easily sent and there is no effort to verify the contents of the sms’ and on the spur of the moment it triggers off the impromptu demonstrations, so to say. But the truth never stays hidden for long. People who were behind the orchestrations in Shopian are gradually being exposed for what they are. Take for example the doctor who was responsible to take the samples. What she did is now public knowledge and what the Mushavarat committee, the one that was supposed to be the intellectuals and the nonpolitical support base in Shopian, how they tried to manoeuvre the ﬁndings of the doctors, and most recently the Maulvi who ﬂared up the whole thing. I mean he was denied permission by the people to lead the prayer last Friday because of the incidents that are coming to light about him. So now nothing stays hidden.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

It’s not possible that I can take satisfaction from these, you are not going to get that period back. DSA: You lost valuable working days. CM: Yes, we lost an entire season, work season, political season, CM and quite honestly every time you talk about my government, Shopian is not far away from the question that can be asked. So on my ﬁrst term in ofﬁce one of the thing that I am constantly talking about is Shopian. Can’t be helped. DSA: Well it was so obviously manipulated with time it becomes obvious to people within the state and outside as is it now. Are you setting up a mechanism which is administratively preventive? CM: I don’t think you can. The only thing you can do is to bring CM truth out sooner rather than later. And try and think that every time we think that people will think twice before letting their emotions get the better of them. I mean you see this incident

that happened last year in Mysuma area of Srinagar. A boy went missing and they immediately blamed the police. They came out, put vehicles on ﬁre, torched shops, building, etc. Turns out he got killed by his friend over a girl he had met over the internet. You know, how do you preempt something like that, you can’t. I think the only thing you hope is that the better sense will prevail on the people and when there is a political establishment whose only objective is to try and create problems for the government and party in power, you will have to face situation like this. DSA: And the technology is available.

DSA: Manipur? CM C M: I mean large parts want similar changes, I don’t see why there should be any resistance on it. Obviously one can understand that at the defence establishment level they would rather tweak with it, but I think there are other concerns that also need to be factored in it. DSA: When you factor other concerns in terms of improvement in some area, can you somewhere see yourself proposing replacing central forces with state force? CM C M: It’s happening but you really are looking at a situation where you don’t need too many central forces because in no way state forces can replace central forces. DSA: And the training? CM C M: And the training, I mean I can still give them, like if you see the handling of the attack on Lal Chowk, some months ago, which was almost completely handled by the J&K police initially. I think in training we are second to none. I mean my problem is the

quantum of the security forces. I simply don’t have those numbers, nor can I create them. I am working on the assumption if not today then tomorrow J&K will be a peaceful state. What will I do with this massive police establishment? At least for central forces if you are not here you are somewhere else tomorrow. That case doesn’t exist for J&K. DSA: You don’t need that manpower? CM C M: I mean it’s already a huge expenditure for me, the police training establishment, or the other facilities of it, is a huge expenditure.

CM: And you have the technology available for it. CM DSA:: There was a period when you were personally mentioning and politically there was talk, about the Armed Forces Special Power Act. Where do you see that now and what is the status of that? CM: I think the Government of India should have an objective CM look on the AFSP Act and the need to impose it across the state. Possibly the time has come to start reviewing its imposition in some of the more peaceful parts of the state, one. And two, for the parts of the state where it continuously needs to be renewed for its imposition, to look at the more draconian aspects of it. See, if the possibility for revoking some of them or changing some of them is possible not just for Jammu and Kashmir, I mean you have large parts of North-east…

DSA: In terms of development if you talk to a political person you have to talk development, I want to ask you what are your thrust areas. Do we see you doing different things? Is there a possibility to do different things? CM C M: I think it is possible to do same things differently in that you do better. Everybody wants to add to the basic essential. We have identified five - Bijli Sadak, Pani, Sehat, Talim. These are five crucial components, if we add value to it, we will see visible improvement in the quality of life. That’s what we are trying to do. We have given a lot of attention towards the road network in the lesser connected areas. We are focusing on the improvement

erstwhile Doda district. We are going to increase the number of doctors, giving them greater allowance for practicing in difﬁcult areas, similar things in the education sector. On the planning side we have for the ﬁrst time brought in external monitors. We are building more accountability in system. We are trying to add more capacity to the power generation. I have 17,000 megawatts of potential power in my rivers and today I exploit around 2,500 megawatts, so obviously there is scope. Question is, there is absence of resources, balance that with the potential, that exists. DSA: Power brings me to the last question, which is water and water going through J&K is now one of the biggest issues in Pakistan. You know, Kishan Ganga, Baglihar and all the other nefarious designs that seem to have been worked out on this side of the line. What is your take on water? CM C M: Well Pakistan has least to complain about. If anybody should complain it is the people of Jammu and Kashmir, because we have

been robbed of a resource that is ours. I mean the Indus Water Treaty was the most unfair that could have been entered into for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Rivers flowing through Punjab you gave to India, and flowing through Jammu and Kashmir are given to Pakistan. The result of which is we can’t hold water in any of our rivers that flows for power generation. Now how is that fair? We are still screaming for compensation on that account. Indus Water Treaty has a mechanism for dispute resolution , it neither takes the political side of India nor of Pakistan. Baglihar was a test case. Pakistan had a problem with Baglihar. It went to the Indus Water Commission, the dispute settlement mechanism sorted it out and that power project is pumping out electricity. God forbid if they take Kishan Ganga to the commission the same things will happen. It just shows that how unfortunate and how mistreated Jammu and Kashmir has been. That is our own rivers that we are trying for. Look at the flip side to it. Because we have no such agreement with China, they built up a dam on the Brahmaputra in Tibet and there is absolutely nothing you can to do about it. You can scream, shout and yell, tomorrow the dam is going to be a reality and you are going to do nothing about it. Editor-in-Chief: Thank you. Chief Minister: M Pleasure.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir CONFLICT CHRONICLE

Dr. M. Mazammal Hussain

In each recountal something is added for enlightenment and clariĮcaƟon and something subtracted for its inconvenience. There is one constant, however and that is the plight of the people of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control. A Talibanised Pakistan is upbeat at the prospect of an American exit from Afghanistan. Its military establishment, acknowledged progenitor of Islamic fundamentalism, controls all the levers of power. An esƟmated half a million jehadis under its command will need to be gainfully employed. It will be then that the history of this last princely state will be sought to be rewriƩen.

PROMISING FUTURE May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir CONFLICT CHRONICLE

he state of Jammu and Kashmir is situated in the extreme north west corner of India, lying between 32017 and 360-38 north latitude and 370-26 and 800-30 east longitude. It has an area of 2,22,200 sq. km. including areas occupied by China and Pakistan with 10,069,900 population (Census 2001), The state has four types of unique cultural blend that differentiates it from the rest of the country. The socio-cultural and demographic structure of the state is comprised of four distinct parts namely Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and Rajouri-Poonch. First three parts have been constitutionally recognized and designated as three provinces of the state, but on account of the erstwhile backwardness, the fourth region could not get its due space in the state. Kashmir has been the highest learning point of Sanskrit and Persian, Ladakh on the other side has been the highest living centre of Tantrayan Buddhism and Jammu has been the axis of Rajas and Maharajas. On the other hand Rajouri-Poonch has been the principalities, ruled by Muslim Rajputs for centuries representing the actual Indian traditional system.

in the sub-continent ruled by hereditary rulers. The majority of these states acceded to India with the British approval, a few to Pakistan. After independence problem arose in a few states that had princes who were of a different religion than the majority of their subjects. In September 1948 the Indian army invaded and took over Hyderabad ruled by a Muslim ruler. In same year India imposed and won a plebiscite in Junagarh, which had a Hindu majority ruled by a Muslim ruler. Just opposite to Junagarh however, in Kashmir, India did not hold a plebiscite; Pakistan applied its own share of double standards by having divergent positions on Kashmir and Junagarh, insisting on getting both (Bazaz, 1954).

Communal tension The Poonch revolt was deemed an internal revolt against oppressive taxation and imposed direct rule by the Maharaja while

Pakistan’s perception

The Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence sought a foothold to promote pro-Pakistan militant outfits in J&K, exerting pressure on the JKLF to give up its proindependence line and adopt accommodative attitude towards Pakistan. By early 1990 Pakistan sidelined the JKLF and stopped providing funding and materials. On 18 June 1990, Amanullah Khan announced formation of an independent government of J&K which was opposed by pro-Pakistan groups

Unlike Hyderabad, Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu prince of a majority Muslim population (Collins & Lapierre, Mountbatten 1984). Kashmir being located between India and Pakistan, Maharaja did not wish to make an immediate decision, perhaps hoping to be independent. He signed a Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan. From conﬂict perspective, there are two versions constructed by both the antagonistic nations, India and Pakistan. Pakistan advocated that due to the tremendous pressure Indian troops rebelled against Maharaja Hari Singh and got forcible accession of Jammu and Kashmir, with the invasion India occupied a major part of the state, thus according to Pakistan the whole state had its two parts ‘Azad (Liberated) Kashmir’ and ‘Indian-held Kashmir.’ Pakistan never recognised accession of the state to India (Ref Map -I).

Hindu ruler The state was created under the Treaty of Amritsar between the East India Company and Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu who bought Kashmir Valley from the East India Company for Rs.75,00,000 (in 1846) and included it to Jammu and Ladakh that had already been under his rule. The traditional background of Muslim majority state was associated with Suﬁsm (Tavleen 1995). In 1931 the movement started against Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. Dogra dynasty was ruling over a majority Muslim state where Muslim population was lacking adequate representation in the state’s services. In 1932, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah represented the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference for the Kashmir freedom from the Maharaja’s rule. In 1939 All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference converted into National Conference. In April 1932 the Maharaja appointed the ‘Glancy Commission’ to look into the grievances of the Muslim subjects and conceded the recommendations for adequate representation of Muslims in the state’s services, but delayed implementation invited another agitation in 1934. In 1946 National Conference launched Quit Kashmir movement demanding abrogation of the Treaty of Amritsar and restoration of sovereignty, during this movement Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah was arrested (Bazaz, 1954).

Hyderabad paradigm When the British left the Indian subcontinent, Jammu and Kashmir was one of the ‘princely states’ among 565 states

in the History of Kashmir Conflict (Ref Map-II). One of the most chronicled and long standiing conflicts in the world is the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. India covered almost twothirds of Kashmir and Pakistan controlled one-third. China controlled the rest. The conflict continued. In 1947 Sheikh Abdullah endorsed the accession as ad-hoc which was to be decided

replacing his own relative Raja in April 1947. Region was predominantly Muslim populated. Maharaja strengthened the Sikh and Hindu garrisons in the Muslim areas and the Muslims were directed to deposit arms with the police. This partial attitude of Maharaja gave birth to the communal tension in the area. In August 1948 Maharaja’s forces ﬁred upon demonstrators who favoured Kashmir joining Pakistan, killing innocent people. In the last week of August, the situation took an ugly turn of unrest and spasmodic violence turned into an organised rebellion resulting in killings of Hindus and Sikhs and at least 60,000 people took refuge in Jammu by 13 September. The rebellion spread to adjacent Mirpur and Muzaffarabad (Pak occupied Kashmir). The Poonch rebels declared an independent government of “Azad” Kashmir on 24 October 1948 (UN Security Council March 1951).

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Constitutional provisions On 17 October 1949, the Indian Constituent Assembly adopted Article 370 of the Constitution, granting a special status and internal autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir within Indian jurisdiction. Article 370 ensured Jammu and Kashmir state would have a separate constitution and ﬂag. Till 1965 the state had its own Prime Minister

Indian perception According to Indian version Pakistan forced the Maharaja for accession but when failed, sent armed Pathan tribesmen into Kashmir to forcibly annex it. Maharaja Hari Singh sought assistance from India and on October 26, 1947 Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession. Indian forces entered Kashmir on 27 October and fought to push Pakistani troops from Kashmir. Eventually the United Nations arranged a ceasefire on January 1, 1949 and the ceasefire line still known as the ‘Line of Control’(Instrument of Accession, 1947). Approximately a quarter of the western portion of Jammu and Kashmir was occupied by Pakistan. After that, the conflict was to be worked out by bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan which is called ‘the Shimla agreement’

determination of Kashmiris in 1952. In July 1952, he signed Delhi Agreement on centre-state relationships, providing for autonomy of the state within India, The domination of Kashmir Valley and Abdullah’s land reforms created discontent in Jammu and Ladakh (Bazaz 1978). The governments of India and Pakistan agreed to appoint a Plebiscite Administrator by the end of April 1954. Abdullah had shown deliberate procrastination in conﬁrming the accession of Kashmir to India. In August 1953, Abdullah was dismissed and arrested. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was installed in power, which then got the accession formally ratiﬁed in 1954.

Internationalisation by a plebiscite and was appointed head of the emergency administration. Pakistan objected to the accession (Lamb, 1997). In November 1947, India proposed a precondition for a plebiscite, that Pakistan would withdraw all its troops ﬁrst, Pakistan rejected with the plea that the Kashmiris may not vote freely under the pressure of Indian army and Sheikh Abdullah’s friendship with the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan proposed simultaneous withdrawal of all troops followed by a plebiscite under international auspices, which India rejected (Lamb, 1997).

(Explanation of Article 370). In 1951 the UN passed a resolution to hold the ﬁrst post-independence elections and declared that such elections would not substitute a plebiscite, because a plebiscite offered the option of choosing between India and Pakistan. Sheikh Abdullah won, mostly unopposed. There were widespread allegations of election rigging which continued to plague all the subsequent elections in Jammu and Kashmir (UNICIP Resolution March 1951). Sheikh Abdullah drifted from a position of endorsing accession to India insisting on the self-

Pakistan and US signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in May 1954; Nehru stated that he is concerned about the cold-war alignments and that such an alliance would affect the Kashmir issue. India started resisting plebiscite since then. Kashmiri activists continued to insist on the promises of self-determination (Balraj Puri, 1993). In September 1954, Pakistan joined SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and later CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) in 1955, aligning with US, UK, Turkey and Iran. From 1955, Indo-Soviet relations

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir CONFLICT CHRONICLE became closer with India receiving Soviet military aid, later the Soviet veto, in the 1962 UN Security Council resolution, on Kashmir in favour of India (Lamb, 1991). On 30 October 1956, the state Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution for the state declaring it an integral part of the Indian Union. On 24 January 1957, UN passed another resolution against it. India’s Home Minister, Pandit Govind Ballabh, during his visit to Srinagar, declared the state of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and there can be no question of a plebiscite (UN, Security Council March, 1957). In April 1959, entry permit system to the state was abolished. In October, the state Constitution was amended to extend jurisdiction of Union Election Commission to the state and bring its High Court at par with those in the rest of India.

The ISI facilitated the formation and promotion of various other militant groups by 1992. Prominent groups included the Hizb-ulMujahideen (militant wing of the Islamic organisation (Jamate-Islami), Harkat-ulAnsar and Lashkar-eToiba affiliated to the Pakistani nationalism. Later on innumerable organisations emerged

Infiltration as weapon In May 1965, Sheikh Abdullah was again arrested on his return to India from Mecca on account of his meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister at Algiers. A major protest occured in Kashmir Valley; the Plebiscite Front initiated a satyagraha for Abdullah’s release and many activists were arrested. In August 1965, Pakistan undertook Operation Gibraltar and sent thousands of armed infiltrators across the ceasefire line and incidents of violence increased in Kashmir valley. A full Indo-Pak war broke out which ended in a ceasefire on 23 September. In January 1966, Tashkent Declaration was signed by both countries agreeing to revert to pre-1965 position, under Russian mediation. Pakistan supported guerrilla groups in Kashmir to increase their activities after the ceasefire (Lamb,1991).

Kashmiri nationalists Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Butt formed another Plebiscite Front with an armed wing called the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (NLF) in Pak held Kashmir, with the objective of freeing Kashmir from India. Butt entered the Valley in June 1966 and was arrested and sentenced to death in 1968 but later ﬂed to Pak held Kashmir. (Balraj Puri, 1993). Indian backed troops sent to East Pakistan to defend its secessionist movement against the repression of Pakistani army. Pakistan retaliated from the west including Kashmir. India defeated Pakistan and East Pakistan become independent Bangladesh (Lamb, 1991). In July, 1972 India and Pakistan signed the Shimla Agreement, which has a clause that the ﬁnal settlement of Kashmir will be decided bilaterally in the future and that both the sides shall respect the LoC.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

In November, 1974 Kashmir Accord was signed by G. Parthasarathy for Indira Gandhi and Mirza Afzal Beg for Sheikh Abdullah, who was out of power at that time. The Accord retained Kashmir’s special status, but the state is termed as a ‘constituent unit of the Union of India’. Opposition parties and Pakistan condemned the Accord. Abdullah installed back in power. Later in 1977, he favoured protecting the autonomy and special status of Kashmir (Victoria Schoﬁeld, 2000).

(JKJEI) and Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League (JKPL) who would undertake major offensive operations and the task was adopted by JKLF leaders. Pakistan initially used the experience of the JKLF to motivate the Kashmiri youth for

nationalism. Later on innumerable organisations emerged.

After 1989 militancy increased with bomb blasts. On 8 December, Rubaiya Sayeed,

In 1992, Pakistan forces arrest 500 JKLF marchers led by Amanullah Khan in PoK to prevent bid to cross the border. India also used captured militants. JKLF militancy declined. The JKLF faction led by Yasin Malik announced unilateral ceaseﬁre in

arms training and subversion to secure a toehold. Thereafter it sought a foothold to promote pro-Pakistan militant outﬁts in J&K, exerting pressure on the JKLF to give up its pro-independence line and adopt accommodative attitude towards Pakistan. By early 1990 Pakistan sidelined the JKLF and stopped providing funding and materials. On 18 June 1990, Amanullah Khan announced formation of an independent government of J&K, which was opposed by pro-Pakistan groups (Sreedhar, Saxena, Manish 2003). Between August 1988 and end 1989, JKLF was the only organisation involved in the insurgency. Later, the ISI facilitated the formation and promotion of various other militant groups by 1992. Prominent groups included the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (militant wing of the Islamic organisation (Jamat-e-Islami), Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Toiba afﬁliated to the Pakistani

daughter of the Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed was kidnapped by the JKLF and released on 13 December in exchange of release of ﬁve JKLF leaders.

1994 and pursued political agenda under the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, (APHC) followed by Amanulla Khan’s JKLF faction which adopted a ceaseﬁre in 1997.

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan came to an end. A large number of militants and weapons entered Kashmir through Pakistan and further fuelled the discontent (Human Rights Watch, Arms Pipeline, 1994).

Pro-Pak terrorists

Rubaiya Sayeed ﬁasco

In 1976 Maqbool Butt was arrested on his return to the Valley; Amanullah Khan ﬂed to England and NLF converted into Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). In 1979 The USSR invaded Afghanistan. The US and Pakistan started training, recruiting, arming and unleashing the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. The Mujahedin recruited would take on their own agenda of establishing Islamic rule in Kashmir

from the late 1980’s. In 1984 Indian and Pakistani armies engaged in clashes in Siachen Glacier, a no-man’s land at an altitude of 20,000 ft with snow weather conditions, where the ceaseﬁre line had been left undeﬁned by 1972 Shimla Agreement; Siachen is perceived to be of strategic importance for access to the Northern Areas and the spasmodic clashes continued through later years, costing thousands of lives and billions of dollars (Lamb, 1991).

Pak-inspired insurgency In later 1986, with the return of Amanullah Khan to Pakistan from UK insurgency of JKLF started in Pakistan, especially after January 1987, when Pakistan was dealing with Siachen issue. The launching of the proxy war in Kashmir by Pakistan was started in this period and the ISI was in quest of leader of the J&K Jamat-e-Islami

In January, 1990, Jagmohan was appointed as the Governor. Dr. Farooq Abdullah resigned. On 20 January, an estimated 100 people were killed when a large group of unarmed protesters were ﬁred upon by the Indian troops at the Gawakadal Bridge. With this incident majority of the population strated favouring insurgency (Victoria Schoﬁeld, 2000). In April 1991, Kashmiris held anti-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar following killing of a JKLF area commander by the Hizb.

Since 1995, foreign militant outﬁts with Islamic agenda such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Mujahedin dominated the militancy in Kashmir, besides the indigenous Hizb, all of them under the umbrella of United Jehadi Council (UJC). Other indigenous and foreign militant organisations proliferated (Evans 2000). Renegade militants supported by the Indian security forces were used for extrajudicial executions of militants, besides human right activists, journalists and other civilians (Human Rights Watch 2000). In 1997, the Director General of Police Gurbachan Jagat acknowledged that continued services of the renegades became counter-productive in

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir CONFLICT CHRONICLE view of their excesses. In May 1998, India conducted nuclear tests; Pakistan also responded with nuclear tests. On 21 February 1999, India and Pakistan signed Lahore Declaration, agreeing to ‘intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.’ Soon after his visit to Lahore, the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that ‘Kashmir is an integral part of India and not

In June 2000, the State Autonomy Committee (SAC) Report was discussed and an autonomy resolution was adopted in the J&K Assembly. The SAC Report recommended restoration of Article 370 to pre-1953 status. The Indian Cabinet rejected the autonomy recommendations in July (BBC News Agency 2000). In November 2000, India announced a unilateral ceaseﬁre in Kashmir which

and Girish Saxena was appointed as the new Governor of J&K state. The proxy war has claimed 26,226 lives between 1988 and 2000 in an estimated 43,956 incidents of terrorist violence. Of these casualties 10,575 were civilians, 3,081 were security forces personnel and 12,396 terrorists. From January 2002 to December 2009, 14,033 people have lost their lives which indicates the state is a war zone.

of two young women allegedly by Indian Armed Forces. Pro-freedom leaders arrested and police and paramilitary forces resorted to ﬁring at protesters in several places, including Shopian, Baramulla and Srinagar killing one person and injuring hundreds (BBC News, May 2009).

Government initiatives Several initiatives have been taken by the government to settle the problem. While

indiscriminate ﬁring which resulted in mass protests. In Nowata CRPF killed one youth and crushed another during a protest which led to the curfew for four days on 6 March 2009. On 18 March barely a few hours after the Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram, assured action against troopers found guilty in Bomai killing CRPF troopers shot dead a carpenter, Ghulam Mohiudin Malik, son of Muhammad Akbar Malik, at Khaigam

reaction from the main source of the problem - indigenous and foreign terrorists who have converted the insurgency into a proﬁtable enterprise and the perplexed poor youth of the state worked for their proﬁt at the cost of their lives. There is need to devise an effective methodology upon which trilateral consensus can be made, considering the perceptions and aspirations of the people of J&K, India and Pakistan. REFERENCES: Alexander Evans, (2001). Why Peace Won’t Come to Kashmir, Current History (Vol 100). Balraj Puri, (1993) Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation, New Delhi. Balraj Puri, (1993) Kashmir, Towards Insurgency, New Delhi. Bazaz, Prem Nath (1954), Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, New Delhi. Census 2001 Collins & Lapierre, Mountbatten, (1984), An Independent India, New Delhi pp. 36-37 Dr. Ajaz Hussain, (1998), Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, National Institute of Pakistan Studies. Govt. of India, (1948), White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi. Instrument of Accession of Kashmir, October 1947. Kashmir Study Group, 1947–1997, The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting Paths to Peace, New York.

a single area of Indian soil would be given away’(Victoria Schofield, New York 2000). In May 1999, Kargil war also impacted badly. In March 2000, at the arrival of US President Clinton to India, unidentified gunmen shot down 35 Sikhs at Chitti-singhpora; India blamed foreign militants; Kashmiris blamed renegade militants employed by Indian security forces. A few days later, security forces killed five persons in an “encounter” at Panchalthan village and claimed they were “foreign militants” responsible for the Sikh massacre. Later, in July 2002, DNA testing of the corpses proved that the five persons killed were civilians. No judicial inquiry has been conducted on the Sikh massacre till date (The Hindu, 17 July 2002).

continued through May 2001; APHC welcomed the ceasefire but stated that the ceasefire will not be effective unless it is supplemented with unconditional dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute and an end to human rights violations by the Indian forces. In July 2001, India and Pakistan failed to arrive at a joint agreement at Agra Summit on exchanged accusations (BBC News, 2001). May 21, 2002: Abdul Ghani Lone, a leading and popular moderate Hurriyat leader was assassinated by unidentified gunmen. Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq was assassinated in similar way. About 2,00,000 Kashmiris took to the streets in a funeral procession of the Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq; over 100 were killed in police firing. Jagmohan resigned

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Declining insurgency Violent activities declined in the region in 2004 and there were various reasons: Establishing good relations between India and Pakistan consecutively led to ceaseﬁre between two countries, role of then state government, the fencing of the LOC being carried out by Indian army and some LoC points were opened for public interaction of both the countries. On the other side General Musharraf imposed ban on some militant organisations. Under pressure these militant organisations offered for talks and negotiations with New Delhi which was accepted by India. Since 2009 instances of mismanagement led to sustained agitations. On 31 May 2009 strong protests over rape and murder

the early nineties were marked by an excessive reliance on security forces, few political steps were taken in the later. In a move to initiate the political process in 1994, the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao ordered the release of some militant leaders like Yasin Malik and Shabir Shah. The democratic process was revived ﬁrst in April 1996 when elections where held to the six parliament seats from the state. In September 1996 elections were held to the state assembly where the National Conference formed the government under the chief ministership of Dr. Farooq Abdullah. Several economic initiatives too have been taken by the government. These are aimed at addressing the lack of socio-economic development in the state. The central government declared J&K as a backward state under the new industrial policy in 1995 to encourage new industries and generate employment opportunities. This was followed by the announcement of a Rs. 7,200 crore economic package for the state in February 1997. Thereafter came a series of elections.

Tumultous 2009 On February 21, 2009 at Bomai, Sopore Army killed two devotees in an

Pakherpora in south Kashmir’s Pulwama district. On 18 August 2009 Government agreed to put a figure on the number of those missing and said 3,429 youth had disappeared from their homes from 1990 till date. However local and international rights groups have suggested that over 8,000 people have disappeared in the region. On 9 September 2009 an Indian army major and three militants were killed in an encounter in the Mendhar area of Poonch district. On 2 December 2009, a Kashmir based group, International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice, claimed that it had found 2,600 bodies in unmarked graves during a three year survey 2007-2010. (BBC News reports) Militants attacked a police station in Srinagar on 6 January 2010 resulting in a 20-hour gun battle between Lashkar-e-Toiba militants and CRPF. Two militants, one police officer and one civilian were killed. Rebel attack killed two soldiers in Kashmir on 29 January 2010. It is concluded that the problem of conflict persists in spite of multifarious efforts to mitigate it, either at the national or international level, only intensity of the conflict increases or decreases. The peace initiative did elicit some favourable responses but failed to evoke any positive

Lamb, Alastair, (1991) Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990. Hertingfordbury, Herts, Oxford Books. Lamb Alastair, (1997) Incomplete Partition, Oxford. Hertingfordbury, Herts, Oxford Books. Official Records (6 March 1951), of the United Nations Security Council, Meeting No: 534. Sheikh Abdullah, (1993) Flames of the Chinar, New Delhi. Tavleen Singh, ( 1995), Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, New Delhi. UNICIP Resolutions, 13 August 1948, 5 January, 1949, 30 March 1951. Verma P.S., (1994) J&K at the Political Crossroads, New Delhi. Victoria Schofield, (2000) Kashmir in Conflict, New York. The writer is alumnus of Aligarh Muslim T M University and is currently Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of Higher Education, Government of Jammu H and Kashmir and is posted at the Government Degree College, Ramnagar. T The insurgency has caused him immense personal pain after his elder brother was beheaded by militants. He H was forced to leave his village and take refuge in Jammu.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir INTERVIEW: GOC-IN-C

DSA is honoured and privileged to carry this exclusice interview with Lt. Gen. B.S. JASWAL, AVSM S **, VSM S M, GOC-in-C, Northern Command in our special issue on Jammu and Kashmir. Team DSA thanks the General for facilitating this important interview at such a short notice. DSA: Sir, your responsibility encompasses the most challenging assignments in the Indian Army. How has been your experience heading Northern Command? General Ofﬁcer Commanding-in-Chief: Northern Command is an extremely challenging and a satisfying command. My command is fully deployed beginning from the conventional on the international border (IB), line of control (LC), line of actual control (LAC) and actual ground position line (AGPL) sectors to the counter terrorist (CT) grid as we graduate inwards. We face two borders to address simultaneously and our operational

problems continually being faced by your Command. What are the measures taken to avert their recurrence and to create conﬁdence and trust among the local people? Only two per cent of the allegations have been found to merit serious investigation. Who are the people behind this premeditated campaign and what is their modus operandi? GOC-in-C: The human rights record of the Indian Army, as is well known, is impeccable and despite the constraints and difﬁculties of combating terrorism in urban environment there have been very few violations These violations are viewed very

Jammu and Kashmir PROXY WAR

Pakistani

fantasies?

Nothing that the US does to accommodate Pakistan’s ambiƟons in Afghanistan will save it from what is being seen even in Islamabad as impending doom if the InternaƟonal Monetary Fund does not stop insisƟng that the release of the next tranche of funds is totally dependent on introducƟon of value added tax (VAT) and increase in tariī of electricity. The IMF has said, somewhat trenchantly, that it is not the “economic arm of the US” and would insist on VAT. For Pakistan, it would seem, there is no life beyond the proverbial basket.

G. Parthasarathy, IFS

ne day before he died in a fatal air crash on August 17, 1988, Pakistan’s then military ruler General Zia-ul Haq was in an expansive mood in a meeting with a German journalist, who some years later, recounted to me, what had transpired. Buoyed by the agreement of the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, General Zia spoke of his role in enabling restoration of Islamic dominance across Afghanistan and Central Asia and of the dominant role that Pakistan was destined to play over this entire region. Placing the palm of his hand over a map extending across the sub-continent and Central Asia, an excited General Zia proclaimed: “Soon all this will be ours”. Asked by the journalist if he believed that lands from Lahore to the Fergana Valley would come under Pakistan’s control, General Zia responded: “Not just from Lahore to Fergana, why not from New Delhi to Fergana”?

Mughal inheritors? It is this obsessive belief that the Pakistani military are the logical inheritors of the Mughal Darbar that has prompted the military to assume the role of the guardians of the “Ideological Frontiers” of Pakistan. It is also precisely such a mindset that prompts the Lashkar-e-Toiba to accept responsibility for the attack on the Red Fort in January 2001 and for Haﬁz Mohammed Saeed to proclaim that it is his aim to “unfurl the green ﬂag of Islam in New Delhi, Tel Aviv and Washington”.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir PROXY WAR on designs of a centrifuge plant purloined by scientist A.Q. Khan from URENCO’S uranium centrifuge facility in the Netherlands, together with liberal Chinese assistance. China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme is extensively documented. The Director of the Wisconsin Project of Arms Control Gary Milhollin has commented: “If you subtract China’s help from the Pakistani nuclear programme, there is no Pakistani nuclear programme”.

General Zia’s fantasies led his country to economic ruin. American assistance was withdrawn under the “Pressler Amendment” once the Soviets exited from Afghanistan, because the then Bush Administration was no longer in a position to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. Evidence had evidently emerged that Pakistan had tested a nuclear weapon on Chinese soil in 1991.

Basket case While Pakistan had impressive rates of growth in the 1960s and 1980s, largely because of generous American and western economic assistance, its economic growth rate plummeted to around 2 per cent once American assistance ended in 1991. Given to living beyond their means and with an abysmally low rate of savings of under 15 per cent (most Asian economies have rates of savings above 30 per cent), Pakistan was and still remains an international basket case, dependent of foreign doles for its economic survival. It is the only country in the world which has twice been forced to approach the IMF for an economic bailout in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Miracles do occur and when Pakistan was on the verge of defaulting on its international debts, the Al Qaeda struck in New York and Washington on 9/11 and Pakistan was catapulted into the centre of the “War on Terror,” despite the knowledge that the ISI had supported and maintained close links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Islamic bomb Reinforcing Pakistan’s self-image as a warrior State with an infallible strategic culture was its nuclear programme, built

China’s strategic relationship with Pakistan has not only included supplies and knowhow for enabling Pakistan to build weapons of mass destruction, but also the means of delivery for WMD. The Chinese supplied M 11, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 missiles have ranges varying from 300 to 1500 kilometres, while the Babur Cruise missile reportedly has a range of 500 kilometres. Western commentators have acknowledged that even though the United States was aware of Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme since the 1980s, its strategic relationships with China and Pakistan, led to nuclear proliferation between these “strategic partners” being deliberately ignored. More recently, China is assisting Pakistan with the supply of reactors and reprocessing facilities to manufacture lighter Plutonium warheads. While explaining the rationale for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, its then Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto noted that while the “Christian, Jewish and Hindu” civilisations had nuclear weapons capability it was the “Islamic civilisation” alone that did not possess nuclear weapons. He asserted that he would be remembered as the man who had provided the “Islamic civilisation” with “full nuclear capability”. Bhutto’s views on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons contributing to the capabilities of the “Islamic civilisation” were shared by Pakistan’s nuclear scientist Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood who, along with his colleague Chaudhri Abdul Majeed was detained shortly after the terrorist strikes of 9/11. They were both charged with helping the Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear and biological weapons capabilities. Mehmood openly voiced support for the Taliban and publicly advocated the transfer of nuclear weapons to other Islamic nations. Both Mehmood and Majeed now freely move around Pakistan. All this has only persuaded Pakistan that despite noises about the dangers of proliferation, the international community is now too dependent on it for assistance in Afghanistan, to take any meaningful action

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

against it.

India-centric While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the Head of the Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority told a team of physicists from Italy’s Landon Network that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. According to the report of the Landon team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan or pushes it to political destabilisation. Despite India’s conventional superiority, Pakistan has succeeded in deterring India from responding militarily to terrorist attacks because of apprehensions of nuclear escalation - apprehensions that are, quite evidently, not entirely warranted. The Pakistani military establishment may be adventurist. It is, however, not suicidal!

Sacriﬁcing Afghans? Ever since the Obama Administration came to power, the Pakistan army has used President Obama’s desire for an early “exit strategy” from Afghanistan to compel the Administration to take measures to not only restrict Indian inﬂuence in Afghanistan, but also compel India to take measures to meet its requirements. Barely two weeks before the Manmohan Singh-Obama meeting at the White House on April 11, 2010, the Wall Street Journal revealed that President Obama had issued a Presidential Directive stating: “India must make resolving its tensions with Pakistan a priority for progress to be made on US goals in the region”. It has also been reported the Obama wish list includes a number “dos and don’ts” for India. It has emerged that because the Obama Administration requires Pakistan’s help for facilitating a speedy withdrawal from Afghanistan and getting a deal with the Taliban, India is absolutely forbidden from undertaking any effort to train the Afghan National Army. This is because General Kayani wants to train the Afghans, who in turn, have little trust and even less affection for the Pakistan army and ISI. The new American moves reportedly include demands that India should be “more transparent” and “cooperate more” about developments along its borders with Pakistan. It is also being suggested by the Pentagon that India should reduce the number of troops in Jammu and Kashmir to enable Pakistan to deploy more forces along its western borders. The main issue that India wanted to focus attention in the Washington Summit was on American policies on emerging developments in Afghanistan. India was

keen on getting a clearer picture of future American plans there, including what the United States means by “reconciliation” with the Taliban. Given its experiences during the Kandahar hijacking and with jehadis being trained in Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, India is naturally concerned about the return of any Pakistani controlled Taliban regime to the corridors of power anywhere in Afghanistan. The statement issued by the White House after the Summit meeting notes that President Obama “welcomed the humanitarian and development assistance that India continues to provide Afghanistan”. It is, therefore, evident that while Indian “humanitarian and development assistance” to Afghanistan is welcome, the United States still objects to any military training that India is ready to provide to the Afghan National Army.

Coercing America Should New Delhi quietly accept this American veto at Pakistani behest, on India training the Afghan military? Moreover, will yielding to such American demands, not encourage Pakistan to endeavour to make the Americans more intrusive on issues like Jammu and Kashmir and river waters? Having failed to incite public opinion in Pakistan increasingly against India on Jammu and Kashmir alone, General Kayani has led the charge in fomenting public anger against India, by claiming that India is diverting its share of river waters away from Pakistan. While the US-Pakistan relationship has generally waned whenever Pakistan lost its strategic utility in furthering American interests, China has prided itself as being an “all weather friend” of Pakistan. It continues to strengthen Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. In addition, there are indications that when necessary, the Gwadar port built with Chinese assistance will be made available to the PLA navy by Pakistan though the Pakistanis will have to do a delicate balancing act on this, in order not to incur American displeasure.

Saudi connection Apart from China, yet another “all weather friend” of Pakistan has been Saudi Arabia, whose backing for Pakistan is essential for Pakistan to get the support of Islamic countries who are members of the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) on issues pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir and on anti-India propaganda on Indian Muslims. Pakistan had stationed an entire Division of its army in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. Saudi Arabia, in turn, funded the acquisition of F 16s by the PAF in the 1980s and continues to provide oil at concessional terms to Pakistan. There are also indications of possible nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Given Saudi

concerns on Iran’s growing nuclear potential, New Delhi will have to keep a close eye on possibilities of Saudi Arabia and others seeking a nuclear umbrella from their Sunni ally with a track record of nuclear proliferation. Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister Prince Sultan was given unprecedented access to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in Kahuta and the redoubtable Dr. A.Q. Khan has been effusively welcomed in the past in Riyadh.

Proxy war Pakistan’s “strategic overreach” inevitably landed it in trouble, whether it was on military adventurism against India in 1965 or the Kargil misadventure in 1999. The basic problem is that the Pakistani military establishment fails to understand the difference between seeking a relationship of “sovereign equality” with India, which is entirely justifiable and seeking a relationship of “parity” with India, which is unattainable. Seeing that conventional diplomacy cannot fulfil its quest for “parity” with India, the establishment has sought to resort to concepts like “low intensity conflict” against India and a quest for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. This strategic overreach has led the country into a deep economic and political quagmire, destabilising Pakistan internally. In a report entitled “Global Trends 2015” published in 2001, the US National Intelligence Council aptly predicted: “Pakistan will become more fractious, isolated and dependent on international financial institutions. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the face of opposition from entrenched political and Islamic parties. Further, domestic decline would benefit Islamic

When Pakistan was on the verge of defaulting on its international debts, the Al Qaeda struck in New York and Washington on 9/11 and Pakistan was catapulted into the centre of the “War on Terror,” despite the knowledge that the ISI had supported and maintained close links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda

political activists who may signiﬁcantly alter the makeup and cohesion of Pakistan’s military - once Pakistan’s most capable institution. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the Central Government’s control will probably be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi”. The writer was Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. He is presently Visiting Professor in the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir VOX POPULI DSA: What kind of advertising response have you received from this market? What about listener’s response? BIG FM: We have been able to develop and grow the market substantially in the state. Radio is one of the most effective mediums available for the local retailers and advertisers and this is now a well accepted reality. Radio helps in reaching out to the masses and is an excellent tool for taking a BTL activity to the masses and is raking-in a fair share of local advertising spending. The medium has also gained acceptance in the government communication plan. DSA: What according to you is the biggest challenge for BIG FM and FM radio in this market?

At the time of crisis, it is the relevant information which is the most sought after thing. Jammu and Kashmir, where crises arrive, without prior warning and leave people strangled wherever they are. People grope for information, from any source reliable or otherwise. This is where 92.7 BIG FM radio comes handy, providing people with the required authentic information regarding the situations like curfew, strikes and agitations, details of the injured, medical requirements of the injured like blood etc. are aired. Information regarding any calamity like landslide, highway blockades is broadcast keeping people updated and raising their spirits high during testing times through right kind of music and other interesting programmes. Team DSA had wonderful experience interacting with Mr. Siddharth Bhardwaj, V.P. (North) 92.7 BIG FM, Reliance Media World Ltd. We are happy to include this informative interview in our special issue on Jammu and Kashmir.

DSA: First of all, how does BIG FM view the Jammu & Kashmir market for FM stations? How is this market working for BIG FM? BIG FM: In Jammu & Kashmir people are music lovers. They have limited entertainment options and hence, we as a private FM station play a very important role in the lives of the people. Not restricted only to entertainment, radio is almost a way of life there! People are tuned in all the time and the Radio Jockeys of BIG FM are household names. DSA: What are some of the programming and marketing initiatives you have taken in Jammu and Kashmir? BIG FM: Our programming and marketing offerings are a reﬂection of listener preferences and the vibe of the city. We celebrate festivals and special days or take up local issues that impact the local populace. Similarly, both on air and onground activities are planned to ensure that radio becomes a part of the lives of people. For example, we recently celebrated the festival of Lohri where we hosted a folk song contest at Resident Welfare Associations

(RWAs) in various parts of Jammu. The RJ’s were part of it and together we had a blast. Similarly we take up several local CSR initiatives e.g. environmental campaigns. In addition we also host college festivals and government and corporate events. DSA: What kind of music do you play? Which language? And which languages do the RJs use? BIG FM: We serve the listeners of the city with music that they most prefer. Similar to other cities, the music mix and jock-talk is tailored to suit local tastes. The music mix is dominated by Bollywood music, giving listeners a fair share of local music (Kashmiri and Dogri). In Jammu, we play a mix of Bollywood and Dogri music, in Srinagar our RJs interact in Hindi, Urdu, Kashmiri, and the music we play is Hindi and Suﬁ. DSA: Who are your target audience in this market? BIG FM: Our target group falls between 16 to 39 years of age and SEC A, B and C both Male and Female.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

BIG FM: A radio station survives on two sources of revenue i.e. local advertisers and national / regional advertisers. Over the last 3 years we have been successful in making the regional and national advertisers understand the effectiveness of this medium in Jammu and Kashmir. Now because of limited number of local corporate / retail advertisers in the state, the industry depends heavily on the government advertising revenue and we are continuously trying to make radio an integral part of media plans of government advertising. DSA: How do you view competition in Jammu and Kashmir? Do you ﬁnd the need for more FM stations in this market? Why? BIG FM: We are the only private FM player in the region and our reach is way above any advertising medium available in the state. As more players come in, it will only be better for the listeners, which is good for category growth and we are in favour of the same. The J&K markets are unique in the sense that they are turmoil-prone, so they need great commitment on the part of the radio operator to seamlessly serve the listeners of the state with quality content and this is the biggest barrier for any operator to enter the state. We at 92.7 BIG FM, look at it as an excellent opportunity to reach out to a local market with an audience that loves radio and build ourselves as the biggest advertising medium available in the state for local, regional and national advertisers. DSA: What is the campaign theme for this market? BIG FM: At BIG FM, it is our endeavour to live the brand-line Suno Sunao Life Banao in all our offerings as we positively impact lives through everything that we do. We follow the same for the Jammu and Kashmir market as we provide them with music, utilities and infotainment that enhance their lives. We put it like this, “We not only entertain …. In-fact, we make friends!”

Jammu and Kashmir EN ROUTE TO PEACE

counter militancy

Decades of violence in the valley is deceleraƟng. Relentless and determined eīorts by Indian security forces through guns and gestures have brought militancy to its knees. Intelligence, strategy, innovaƟon and public support were employed in achieving this feat. With near normalcy slowly returning in the valley it’s Ɵme to evaluate counter insurgency strategy for the future.

Brig. (Retd.) Rahul K. Bhonsle

review “Only fear God, uphold Dharma and enjoy serving the country.”

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

roxy war in Jammu and Kashmir has been one of the biggest political and security challenges faced by India after Independence. The core issue is of plural identity of the Indian state. Jammu and Kashmir as a Muslim majority province tests the essence of nationhood espoused by the country’s founding fathers as an egalitarian State which promotes equity and equality amongst people of all faiths and creeds. This is the crucible of a modern nation challenged by the dated, “two nation” perspective adopted by Pakistan. This divergence in philosophies of nationhood of the two countries denoted that conﬂict over Kashmir was inevitable. While India successfully amalgamated the state into its larger national identity Pakistan follows a failed policy of excision through force of arms. Starting with 1947, when raiders were let loose in the state, it attempted usurpation by special forces in 1965, while a, “proxy war” option has been adopted as a foil since the 1990s to achieve its nefarious objectives. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have despite large scale sufferings stoically refused to succumb to the call of the gun, an endeavour which has been supported by enlightened policies of the Indian State after the political faux pas of the 1980s. A review of the successful counter militancy cum counter proxy war strategy would therefore be relevant and is being carried out herein.

- The Chief of The Army Staī’s “Ten Commandments”

Proxy war

issued to Indian soldiers in 1993.

The militancy in Jammu and Kashmir is best deﬁned by the term proxy war. Pakistan has been using terrorist groups as non-State actors to usurp control over the state. While ofﬁcially the support

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir EN ROUTE TO PEACE is said to be, “moral and political,” the infrastructure supporting these groups in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and other areas is extensive from ﬁnancing, training camps, arms to inﬁltration support and media management. This has enabled Pakistani intelligence agency the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to sustain militancy in the state a fact that has now been acknowledged by the recent report on assassination of Benazir Bhutto by a UN investigating team.

civic support operations later termed as Operation Sadbhavna. Sustaining support of the people to countering militancy was the key, neutralising inﬁltration and support from across the Line of Control was an important facet with elimination of terrorists by relentless offensive operations the third arm. A detailed review starting with different phases of operations is being carried out in the succeeding paragraphs.

Statistical overview

A long counter militancy struggle spread over two decades or so can be divided into a number of phases based activities and strategies adopted. These phases are as follows:

Phases

A statistical overview based on data from 1988 to 2009 would provide an effective portrayal of contours of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. The data provided by South Asia Terrorism Portal indicates total fatalities during this period to be over 42,500 or 42,657. These include 22,174 terrorists, 14,566 civilians and 5,917 security personnel. For 17 years from 1990 to 2006 the fatalities in the state exceeded 1,000 thus indicating this as a major conﬂict as per standard norms. For 11 years from 1993 to 2003 the fatalities remained above 2,000 while for 3 years from 2000 to 2002 the fatalities were above 3,000. In 2001 the year when the Parliament in New Delhi was attacked the deaths soared to over 4,500 at 4,507. One can see marginal troughs during this period such as in 1997 and 1998 when the fatality level dropped to 2,372 and 2,261 respectively which was also the reason to up the ante through Pakistani military intrusion in Kargil sector. Operation Vijay which saw eviction of the incursion was followed with Operation Parakram in 2001-02 when for eleven months troops were deployed on the International Border and the Line of Control.

1987-1991: The anarchist phase. This phase entailed mobilisation of the population for insurgency, inciting locals, recruiting youth and spurring them towards a “freedom.” The overall aim was to disrupt political and governance activity and was marked by attacks on police stations, elimination of intelligence personnel, kidnappings and bomb blasts.

of the current military leadership which constantly creates alibis on its eastern borders to avoid full scale engagements in the west.

Terrorist groups

ensure that they followed an agenda set by it. To provide a political face to these groups the United Jihad Council (UJC) was created headed by Syed Salahuddin and was based in Muzaffarabad. Salahuddin is largely seen as a stooge of the ISI.

Broadly this would indicate that the 19992003 was the peak period of insurgency in Kashmir. This was also a time of grave Indo-Pakistan tension. Former Pakistan Army Chief Pervez Musharraf took over reins of power deposing the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf initially ordered up-scaling of the proxy war, but having suffered a bloody nose in Kargil in 1999 and during Parakram in 2002 by 2006-07 was advocating peaceful resolution. As is now known several rounds of back channel talks were held during this period.

Terrorist groups which have gradually manifested into non-State actors facilitating deniability of involvement of Pakistan have been the main tool employed in the proxy war by ISI. Given varied ideologies three broad categories of terrorist groups were employed during various phases. The ﬁrst were those seeking self-determination and were largely secular, the second were fundamentalist separatists from the state and the third pro-Pakistani extremists. Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) belonged to the ﬁrst category but soon lost its primacy when Pakistani handlers realised that it was not conducive to aligning itself with Islamabad.

There were two natural sub-divisions between the terrorists per se. Local terrorists (LTs) who have the support of the population and operate from built-up areas and Foreign Terrorists (FTs) mainly from Pakistan. The LTs generally carried out stand-off attacks and IED operations and are less offensive. The LTs exploit local knowledge very effectively and also support the FTs. The FTs have less local support; survive in forest hides, dhoks and outlying villages. FTs are aggressive and adopt offensive tactics as suicide attacks and hit and run raids.

2000-2003 was also the period of security enhancements by India with a Group of Ministers recommending several security sector reforms which beneﬁted Kashmir substantially. Firm plans for controlling the proxy war were drawn up and by 2006 violence fell below the 1,000 level. Today the situation remains largely under control though of concern with 377 fatalities in 2009 and a rise is anticipated in 2010 due to up-gradation of level of inﬁltration and support to terrorist groups by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) given priorities

Concomitant to the decline of JKLF, J&K Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) primarily composed of local militants was propped up which has emerged as the largest grouping and continues to remain so being the armed wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, with pro-Pakistan leanings. In the third category are Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaishe-Mohammad primarily comprising of foreign terrorists mainly Pakistani citizens. These are part of the larger International Islamic Front led by the Al Qaeda. The ISI has rheostated support to these groups to

The overall aim of a counter militancy strategy is to contain the demand for militancy in the population while neutralising the terrorist and his infrastructure. Varied strategies have to be adopted for this purpose. After the initial phase in 1990-1991 when terrorist groups seemed to exercise the initiative, the Indian State adapted to the proxy war and a well evolved security strategy to counter the same was put into place. The three arms of this strategy were counter inﬁltration, counter militancy and

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Counter militancy strategy

Given varied ideologies three broad categories of terrorist groups were employed during various phases. The ﬁrst were those seeking self-determination and were largely secular, the second were fundamentalist separatists from the state and the third proPakistani extremists. Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) belonged to the ﬁrst category but soon lost its primacy when Pakistani handlers realised that it was not conducive to aligning itself with Islamabad

1991-1994: Local militancy. In this phase local youth dominated the militancy. There was a rise in violence denoted by the fatalities which increased from 1,393 in 1991 to almost double to 2,567 in 1993. The reliance in this phase was on JKLF, though by 1994, the HM began to emerge as the mainstay of militancy. A number of foreign militants were infiltrated in the Valley, including many veterans from Afghanistan. The militancy was extended to the south of Pir Panjal. The Army was inducted for counter militancy operations and Rashtriya Rifles as a concept firmed up. 1994-1998: Security forces consolidation. The security forces started gaining an upper hand; successful elections were conducted in 1996 and by 1998 violence was going down with support of the locals to militancy gradually declining. Counter

militancy operations were dominated by the Army with the Rashtriya Rifles expanding its presence. 1999-2000: The Kargil phase. During the Kargil and post-Kargil phase in particular, militancy gained momentum with large number of FTs conducting suicide attacks. A ceasefire was called for by the Hizbul Mujahideen in 2000 but did not last long. The level of fatalities was relatively high during this period, over 2,500 in 1999 and went beyond the 3,000 mark in 2000. 2001-2003: Security forces gain initiative. Relentless operations by the Security Forces saw militancy coming under control especially after influx of troops during Operation Parakram. Line of Control was also effectively managed by construction of fencing with surveillance devices considerably restraining infiltration. The Rashtriya Rifles established full control over counter terrorist operations in the hinterland. 2004-2009: Searching for political solution. There was considerable reduction in violence with effective border management and counter terrorism operations. Jammu and Kashmir State Police and Central Reserve Police Force were encouraged to gradually assume primacy. With control of militancy, this period also saw efforts for political resolution of the Kashmir issue with substantive back-door diplomacy. Various strategies employed during each of these periods are as per succeeding paragraphs.

CI grid Establishment of a counter insurgency / terrorist grid remained one of the core principles of counter insurgency. While initially regular army formations as 8 Mountain Division were part of this grid, gradually with induction of Rashtriya

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir EN ROUTE TO PEACE Orientation training

From 1993 to 2003 the fatalities remained above 2,000 while for 3 years from 2000 to 2002 the fatalities were above 3,000. In 2001 the year when the Parliament in New Delhi was attacked the deaths soared to over 4,500 at 4,507

Pre-induction training was a primary means to orientate from a conventional to a sub-conventional mindset, people centric approach, culture and language training. Training schools were established and units were put through capsules thereby ensuring maximum efﬁciency in minimum time.

Police capacity building Capacity building of the Jammu and Kashmir police was also an important part of this strategy which proved effective as over the years local forces have undertaken the primary counter militancy mission, particularly in populated areas. A number of varied structures such as Special Operations Groups, Special Police Ofﬁcers and Village Defence Guards were created with great success to effectively employ local forces to advantage.

Riﬂes, the same came under Counter Insurgency Force Hqs such as CI Force Kilo and Victor operating in north and south Kashmir respectively. Simultaneously south of Pir Panjal, three force HQs were raised, the D Force looking after the Doda Kishtwar area, Romeo Force in Rajouri and Uniform in the Reasi areas. The essence of the CI grid was company operating bases for area domination, providing a secure pivot for conduct of operations, ensuring security of lines of communication by road opening, generating intelligence, establishing links with the people and conduct of civic actions. This proved a major success in Jammu and Kashmir.

Counter infiltration terrorist groups was and continues to be from Pakistan, counter infiltration assumed importance. Each year from 1992 to 2001, over 3,000 militants were infiltrated in the state to recoup losses as well as to sustain the militancy. A counter infiltration grid was established first to close the traditional routes of infiltration in north and south Kashmir as well as the Rajouri Poonch region. While for almost a decade or so these operations were manpower intensive and invariably a number of terrorist groups could make a breakthrough, in 2003-04 establishment of a fence with electronic surveillance and large scale induction of night vision devices ensured control of infiltration and reduced physical deployment. The success of the counter infiltration strategy was evident with a drop in infiltration to just 500 plus incidents in 2004. However terrorist groups continue to evolve new techniques to cross the fence and winter season when fencing is under heavy snow seems to have emerged as a favoured period now.

Counter operations component of the strategy to neutralise terrorist groups for which varying tactics were adopted. Operations were undertaken in all weather conditions including the winter. A systematic pattern was developed for each season with proactive operations forming main component in the summers which fanned the forests and the hills as

women empowerment. This had a seminal impact providing support of the people for the security forces with spin off of generating intelligence though this was not the primary purpose of such actions. Thus winning hearts and minds or WHAM was seen as a key to survival in an otherwise hostile people environment. well as rural pockets given the freedom of movement afforded. In the winters as terrorists gravitated towards the towns operational focus shifted towards the urban pockets. Operations were invariably based on small teams which were capable of grouping and regrouping based on evolving contingencies while strength and composition of the teams was also ﬂexible. The various types of operations included search and destroy, cordon and search and seeking encounters. Success of the operations would be evident with maximum fatalities in the state accounted for by terrorists killed approximately 50 per cent of the total. The overall ratio of 1:3.7 of security forces is to terrorist killed indicates dominance established over the militant groups.

Intelligence operations Intelligence remains the key to successful counter militancy. As terrorist groups invariably target intelligence operatives in the ﬁrst stage of the campaign reestablishing an intelligence grid assumed importance. Additional personnel were deployed from operative units for intelligence generation as well as analysis and dissemination by creation of Battalion and Brigade intelligence teams and detachments as well as placing specialised intelligence personnel directly under the formation commanders. This led to successful generation of real time intelligence. Electronic interception is also effectively used given that terrorists were overly dependent on radio communications and

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

have now shifted to mobile networks for passage of information as well as command and control. This was primarily effective in the Kashmir Valley due to line of sight constraints in other areas and led to real time targeted operations. Use of pseudo gangs was also made with formation of the Ikhwan under Kukka Parrey. These dissident militants were organised in two groups and were based in Pattan and Anantnag. They operated as counter gangs and most of their cadres are now being absorbed in the Territorial Army (TA).

Development package to deliver governance, overcome grievances and regain conﬁdence of the people was paramount. Thus at the centre and the state a well chalked out development strategy was evolved. A Development Package was announced by then Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee on 23 May 2002 with the aim of generating employment, development of rail and road communications and providing relief and security. Cultural integration by visits of youth to other parts of the country, raising awareness and aspirations was also a part of this strategy. Security forces operating in rural areas in particular undertook extensive civic action under the Operation Sadbhavna paradigm thereby ensuring delivery of grassroots governance in the form of education, health, road communications, bridges and establishment of vocational training centres, computer literacy and

Unified command Synergy in operations was achieved through the Unified Command HQs headed by Chief Minister of the state for joint planning and to coordinate activities of the Army, CPOs and paramilitary forces. Security operations were integrated through the Unified Command in the overall political strategy adopted by the government at the state and the centre thereby providing greater legitimacy. A political head also ensured controlled employment of force, thus while there were some allegations of human rights violations these could be effectively countered despite efforts by separatist groups and militants to make political capital of the same. Given multiplicity of forces employed, unity of approach at the lower levels was also ensured by division of area of responsibility and evolving a well established command and control hierarchy on the Line of Control as well as in the interior areas of operations.

Ceasefire Ceasefire was also used as a strategy in Jammu and Kashmir. The first initiative came from the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) leader Majeed Dar, its commander in the Valley on 24 July 2000. But pressure from the United Jihad Council led to retraction of the offer. The second initiative for ceasefire was taken in November 2000 by then Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee in November 2000 which coincided with the month of Ramzan but continued for a period of seven months till May 2001 and the period was called as non-

initiation of combat operations (NICO). With militant groups under tutelage of Pakistani handlers, these measures failed to culminate in lasting peace.

Safe passage With the larger aim of providing an option for youth from the bane of militancy a well charted Surrender Policy to those who had eschewed the path of violence was also evolved. This categorised militants into hard core, those youth who had strayed across for training and were not involved in any incidents, hardened criminals involved in militancy and so on. A monetary incentive was offered with a ﬁnancial package to the tune of Rs. 1.5 lakh ﬁxed deposit in bank for three years and Rs. 2,000 per month. A policy for granting safe passage to some of the youth still across the Line of Control in Pakistan is under consideration at present.

Human rights Given the nature of operations, strict vigilance over human rights violations was essential. An elaborate Ten Commandments were issued by the Chief of the Army Staff in 1993 which focused on respect for human rights, avoiding torture, rape or molestation and Dharma and Izzat which proved effective in ensuring troops observed basic human rights at the grassroots.

Organisation of force One of the key elements of success in Jammu and Kashmir was effective organisation of the Rashtriya Riﬂes which evolved as a primary counter insurgency force in the state. This was a part of the late Army Chief General Joshi’s vision to reduce the overall load on infantry units which were overstretched in counter insurgency operations in the early 1990s as well as to ensure continuity of contact with the locals by establishing permanent operating bases of Rashtriya Riﬂes units in the state.

Perception management Perception management was an important facet of the overall counter militancy campaign. The focus was as much on action as on information ﬂow through the media. Effective people friendly operations were an important aspect of this exercise which slowly and gradually eroded the credibility of the terrorists while gradually building up conﬁdence of the population in the security forces. While the media particularly the vernacular initially supported militants and separatists a positive shift towards the government was noticeable which was a combined effect of people friendly operations, civic action and information management.

Conclusion Counter insurgency entails an all encompassing strategy which has a small kinetic component and a larger soft one based on intelligence, information, support of the people and effective training of security forces. In the proxy war paradigm this challenge is even greater as the opponent is well trained, motivated by divergent propaganda and supported by another State. Successful combating of proxy war in Kashmir in the past two decades when the level of violence has been marginalised indicates appropriateness of the strategy a brief overview of which has been provided herein. The key lesson that emerges is prolonged nature of counter militancy operations where results evolve in years and decades rather than days or months. Patience therefore remains the key and a people friendly approach the essence. The wrter is an army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt. Ltd., a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, “Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities”.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

announcement

Jammu and Kashmir

A N N O U N C E S JUNE 2010 ISSUE AS

NORTH-EAST SPECIAL Covering : History of insurgency, government counter insurgency operations, socio-political problems, border management, illegal migration, impact of neighbouring countries, ethnic issues, insurgent groups, trans-border trade, infrastructural development etc.

JULY 2010 ISSUE AS

SECURITY SPECIAL

PAK OBDURACY

So much is known about the Pakistani mindset that it is amazing that we are always caught by surprise at every new nuance in its struggle to annex Kashmir. With Pakistan Army Chief of StaÄŤ Ashfaq Kayaniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strong advocacy of a jehad for water we are beginning to come full circle in a farce full of twists and turns. It is Ć&#x;me to demonstrate to the jehadis that the Pakistan Army cannot back up its misadventures with any legiĆ&#x;mate defence. It has not learned any lessons from Kargil.

Dr. Monika Chansoria

now jehad for

Covering : Homeland security, border management, maritime and coastal security, infrastructure and industrial installations security, access control, cyber and communication security, unmanned reconnaissance systems etc.

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milestones... 36

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir PAK OBDURACY

t has been 63 years since India and Pakistan went their separate ways, deciding to chart their own providence and design a new future, except, that all certainly did not go as planned. Among the numerous issues that stand to be resolved between New Delhi and Islamabad, Kashmir irrefutably has become an interminable one.

League gameplan Kashmir’s intricate historical journey can be traced back to the time of the British rule wherein it constituted among one of the 565 princely states. While most of these states ostensibly were independent in so far as they accepted the supremacy of the British Crown during 1857-1947, it was during the year of independence and partition, that the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, proclaimed that the princely states were free to join either India or Pakistan. Nevertheless, Mountbatten also decreed that the ﬁnal decision would rest with the monarch. In the case of Kashmir, the peculiarity stemmed from the fact that it was a state headed by a Hindu monarch with a predominantly Muslim population. Pakistan’s sagacity on the geo-economic and strategic consequence of Kashmir was evident right from the outset. In fact, on numerous occasions it was opined that the

‘k’ in Pakistan actually stood for Kashmir. In late October 1947, the outbreak of a rebellion was witnessed in the southern reaches of the state wherein the rebels or ‘raiders’ undertook a march on Srinagar. As their onrush gathered momentum, it palpably caused Maharaja Hari Singh to appeal to India for assistance. Although India did send in troop assistance swiftly,

but by then, a crucial one-third of the state had been occupied by the ‘raiders.’

Regulars as tribesmen Interestingly, these raiders were provided with critical support of Pakistan Army’s regular troops who disguised themselves as local tribesmen. This was, in fact acknowledged by the person who proclaimed to have planned and strategised the entire invasion of Kashmir in 1947, Major General Akbar Khan in his detailed account: “Raiders in Kashmir”. Expounding the entire version as to how he granted leave to his men so as to organise and train them with weaponry and trucks in order to aid the rebels, Khan not just accepted the term ‘raiders’ but also termed it as a highly developed branch in the art of warfare. While underlining the geo-economic stakes at play in Kashmir, Khan pronounced: “From the economic point of view, the

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

position was equally clear. Our agricultural economy was dependent particularly upon rivers coming out of Kashmir. The Mangla Headworks were actually in Kashmir and the Marala Headworks were within a mile or so of the border. What then would be our position if Kashmir was to be in Indian hands?”

Although the Pakistan Army today makes tall claims to be ‘confronting’ the Taliban militia in the troubled north-west of the country, it should be recalled that it was this very Pakistan Army, hand in glove with the political establishment that all along provided covert as well as overt support to the extremist insurgent groups operating in Kashmir by terming them as mujahideen and jehadis

Accessible evidence speaks volumes regarding the Pakistan Army ﬁghting alongside the ‘raiders’ - something that was acknowledged in front of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Following the Indian Army’s halt of the advancing Pakistani raiders, the state under Maharaja Hari Singh decided to accede to India in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Independence Act 1947 (of the British Parliament). Finally, it was a UN-brokered ceaseﬁre in January 1949 that left Kashmir bitterly divided into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the Northern Territories.

1965, 1971 and 1999. However, the war in 1971 was not as much about Kashmir as was about the larger issue of rising Bengali sub-nationalism and India’s liberation of Bangladesh. Although Islamabad has left no stone unturned so as to garner support for itself by advocating for a call of a plebiscite in Kashmir, India continues to assert that the wishes of the Kashmiri people have been amply evident in the free and fair elections witnessed till date in the state, which crucially have been certiﬁed by international observers. New Delhi has claimed that the conduct of elections, in fact, far supersede the demands of the UN resolutions. Conversely, Pakistan’s tryst with democracy is amply evident and rather dubious, thereby leaving a great deal to be looked-for.

While sidelining the possibility of using Pakistani regular forces against the far superior Indian forces in a classical conventional war set-up, Pakistan’s leadership unsurprisingly chose to resort to irregular warfare. Quintessentially, this ‘covert strategy’ practiced by Pakistan vis-à-vis Kashmir has existed ever-since the dispute arose. While referring to the Kargil fiasco, Pakistan’s former Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Noor Khan gave a statement that was cited in The News in July 1999, which reflected the string of failures vis-à-vis attempts to seize Kashmir. Khan affirmed the debacles by stating, “Pakistan has continued to make similar mistakes (since 1947) and has not learnt any lesson from the blunders that its ruling cliques have been committing”.

Once the issue of Kashmir was sent to the UN Security Council, it in a way got entrenched and laced in sour Cold War politics. In a series of resolutions, the UN called for Pakistan to withdraw its military

Moreover, the fact that Pakistan has supported, ﬁnanced and promulgated cross-border insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir has certainly not gone unnoticed. Islamabad has made every clamorous effort

Jehadi army

(and paramilitary irregular) forces; India to reduce troop levels and match them to maintain law and order accordingly and hold a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

so as to make Kashmir the ‘central issue’ between India and Pakistan. However, according to the 1972 Shimla Agreement, settlement of “all” India-Pakistan differences should be arrived upon through bilateral negotiations.

UN role

Given the density and virulent element of this entire issue, the UN thereafter gradually withdrew from the scene given that Islamabad refuses to vacate Indian Territory that has been invaded and acquired unlawfully through armed aggression.

Expensive standoff There is no debate whatsoever, that Pakistan has played the role of an aggressor in the state of Jammu and Kashmir with more than half-a-century having passed resulting in bloodshed. Kashmir, often described as paradise on earth, has seen four wars being fought over it in 1947-48,

It would be prudent to state that every single generation of Pakistan’s leadership both political and military, has been ﬁxated on the idea that Kashmir is an “unﬁnished agenda of partition.” Therefore, with the core rationale being to wring Kashmir from the rest of India, Pakistan has resorted to conventional and sub-conventional means so as to realise its objectives. This began in 1947, when Islamabad whetted its skills in the use of irregular forces for combat (as an extension of regular forces.) This strategy was re-applied in 1965 and 1999 with a follow-up by regular forces.

While providing a riveting account and radical analysis of Pakistan’s troubles that stem from its very inception, Farzana

There has always been a concern - well assessed by South Asia observer Selig Harrison - who argues regarding the potential reality of a danger that an independent Kashmir, could end up as another permanent sanctuary for radical extremist terrorist organisations, given the jehadi nature of some of these groups

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir PAK OBDURACY Shaikh in a book titled: “Making Sense of Pakistan” underlines the nation’s woes including a history of military rule, corrupt and incompetent political leadership, a failure to confront extremist elements, unending problems of political instability and off late, militant violence. Although the Pakistan Army today makes tall claims to be ‘confronting’ the Taliban militia in the troubled north-west of the country, it should be recalled that it was this very Pakistan Army, hand in glove with the political establishment that all along provided covert as well as overt support to the extremist insurgent groups operating in Kashmir by terming them as mujahideen and jehadis. Based on the extant political realities within Pakistan, it can be stated unambiguously that at some level the leadership in Pakistan has kept the issue of Kashmir relentlessly on the simmer so as to digress focus from its own failings. The fragile internal political dynamics in Pakistan have been key drivers that view Kashmir as a binding factor across an otherwise split polity. Since the time that the line of ceasefire was renamed the LoC under the 1972 Shimla Agreement, it has witnessed an expensive and high-altitude military standoff between India and Pakistan. India has faced a relentless inflow of militants and terrorists from across the LoC more so since the past two decades, as it combated insurgency, militancy and terrorism. The hardliners in Pakistan’s military, political and intelligence leadership seem to comprehend that their offensive strategy that gained significant momentum during the rule of General Zia-ul Haq with a design to achieve ‘Kashmiri secession’ through violent uprisings has failed. With the plan of waging a ‘covert war’ in Kashmir fetching them no dividends,

sponsoring terror to other parts of India so as to test India’s secular credentials and economic might appears to be the latest tool in Pakistan’s long-endured policy to ‘bleed India by a thousand cuts.’

congregation are all too well known. This further illustrated a fact lucidly - carrying on the proxy war against India has suited the interests of the Pakistan Army as well as its political class.

Bigger stakes?

Extremist organisations such as the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), born in the 1980s with an agenda of not just fighting for the Muslims within the Valley, but Muslims all over India, claimed that even if the Kashmir issue was ‘solved’, the organisation shall continue its mission into the rest of India. It was this ideology that soon saw public demands being made for launching a jehad in Kashmir. This sentiment can in fact, be traced back to the time of independence when Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, opined in a speech in November 1947 that Kashmir was part of the larger struggle of Muslims on the subcontinent: “Our heart goes out to them - our brethren in this mortal struggle, for the choices before them now are freedom or death. If the plans of their enemies succeed they will be exterminated, as Muslims in various other parts of India have been exterminated.” The combat arm of the Markaz-e-Dawa-al-Irshad (MDI) namely, Lashkar-e-Toiba, was formed in 1987. Both these groups as well as numerous others operating in the Valley drew recruits primarily from Pakistan. The visit of Pakistani Information Minister, Mushahid Hussain to the camp of the Lashkar-e-Toiba in 1997 coupled with the fact that Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar were guests of the MDI during the Muridke Meet in May 1998 as part of the organisation’s 11th international

Kargil fiasco The Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999 put hostilities back at the forefront wherein Indian forces pushed back Pakistansupported fighters mainly consisting of regular Pakistan Army troops for instance Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI), as they occupied positions along an 80-mile stretch of mountain ridges overlooking a key supply route on the Indian side of the LoC near Kargil. The intruders crossed into the border earlier during spring and captured high altitude positions, which usually are occupied by Indian troops in the summer. As Pakistan suffered yet another crushing defeat at the hands of India with the international community explicitly branding Islamabad as the aggressor, Pakistan came to apprehend that the costs of waging a proxy war in Kashmir apparently were outweighing its benefits. Former Director General of the Islamabadbased Institute for Strategic Studies, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Kamal Matinuddin accepted this notion and was quoted saying, “We should admit that Kargil has been a complete disaster and failure.” His opinion was echoed in a statement cited in The Nation (July 29, 1999) in which, Pakistan’s former Chief of Air Staff,

Even though Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir has remained unaltered with the passage of time, its ensuing strategies have shifted from diplomacy to conventional war to covert proxy operations so as to pursue its ‘claim’ on Kashmir

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Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Retd.) accepted, “In 52 years of its existence Pakistan has fought four wars with India without a clear objective.” The Kargil operation was yet another manifestation of Pakistan’s strategy of proxy war planned at a time when the insurgency was seen to be loosing steam. The post-9/11 situation forced Islamabad to re-think its strategy vis-à-vis Kashmir reﬂected in a statement by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood in 2001 where he acknowledged: “Thanks to the US anti-terrorism campaign, the mujahideen ﬁghting in Kashmir will have to be reined in. The State has to have a monopoly of armed forces. Above all, our possession of nuclear weapons makes this essential, because there is internal instability here, there will be attempts at intense international scrutiny of us.”

Indian patience In spite of these long-drawn provocations, India has demonstrated a great deal of patience and resolve in dealing with Pakistan’s leadership - evident when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee invited Pakistani General and subsequent President, Pervez Musharraf for talks to “pick up the threads again... so that we can put in place a stable structure of cooperation and address all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.” In this line, a slight shift was reﬂected

through President Pervez Musharraf ’s statement when he said that the only way to solve the Kashmir problem was through ﬂexibility from stated positions on both sides. Many Pakistan watchers underscored this statement notably given that the military establishment conventionally has been extremely unyielding on its stand on Kashmir. Musharraf was quick to retort that his stance should certainly not be inferred as accepting the LoC as the border, when in an address to the nation in January 2002 he avowed: “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir… We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge an inch from our principled stand on Kashmir.”

Pak obduracy However, Islamabad has never taken cognizance of India’s initiatives and continues to harp upon the “centrality of the Kashmir issue.” New Delhi on the other hand, justiﬁably claims that the issue of Kashmir cannot be addressed unless and until Pakistan does not tackle cross-border terrorism that is emanating from Pakistani soil. Islamabad will have to recognise that perpetrating terrorism and violence shall only act as a spoiler in the existing predicament.

fundamental to the country’s identity with no leadership ever making a claim of giving up the ‘Kashmir card’ given that any such proposal shall be interpreted as defeat at the hands of India. The overall socio-economic development in South Asia has fallen prey to the intense clash over Kashmir. As the quest for peace and tranquillity in the region remains fragmented, it would take a great deal of ﬂexibility and commitment especially on the part of the Pakistani leadership to give up its long adopted methodology of violence, terror and asymmetric warfare to arrive upon what they term as the supposed ‘settlement of the Kashmir dispute.’ Even though Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir has remained unaltered with the passage of time, its ensuing strategies have shifted from diplomacy to conventional war to covert proxy operations so as to pursue its ‘claim’ on Kashmir. The writer joined the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, as Research Fellow after completion of her Post-Doctorate in International Relations from France in 2008. She received her PhD Degree in International Politics from the American Studies Division of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. She is the author of “Chinese WMD Proliferation in Asia: US Response” and the co-author of “Afghanistan: India’s Strategic Stakes.”

Successive Pakistani governments have envisioned retrieving Kashmir as

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir STRATEGIC OUTPOST

Thupstan Chhewang

Mbebli;! brooding sense of neglect

While there are valid reasons to ensure the preservation of the unitary character of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed on the day of the Accession by the Maharaja to the Indian union there is much to be said for the equitable development of all three regions of the state. The voice from Ladakh carries all the nuances that suggest that much needs to be done to address the grievances chanted over the decades. Allowing the religious factor to take prominence could be an invitation to other known demons.

t is astounding that even after more than six decades of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession with the Union it is not considered a settled issue. Confusion is created deliberately. This is done unfortunately not only by anti-national forces but also by political leaders who keep shifting their positions. Their utterances are designed to deﬁne the Centre-J&K relations in a manner signiﬁcantly different from-the centre-state ties as these are understood in the rest of the country.

of 1952. Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah accord of 1974 (implemented in 1975), “greater autonomy” and “self-rule”. The other states, on the other hand, assert their rights in the light of the dispute resolution mechanisms under the Indian Constitution, Administrative Reforms Commission, Rajamanar Committee, Sarkaria Commission and miscellaneous inter-state consultative bodies like the Inter-State Council and the National Development Council.

Differentness highlighted

It is interesting that our state also participates in most of these joint centrestate forums. However, when it comes to clearly taking a stance about J&K’s relationship with the Union our leaders tend to sound ambiguous. What has been

The New Delhi-J&K ties are sought to be explained in the context of the Instrument of Accession, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, so-called Delhi Agreement

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proved over the decades is that their voices are determined by the fact whether they are in power or not. If they occupy positions of authority they are all praise for New Delhi. If they are in the opposition they go to any extent to create trouble. It is only a matter of record that some of them have not fought shy of talking of secession and accession in the same breath. For them the state’s “special” status in the Union means how effectively they are able to call the shots within the state. In the process they are not averse to settling scores with their opponents on the home turf. Recent developments show that they can go to the extent of wooing even separatist elements while indulging in one-upmanship.

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Jammu and Kashmir STRATEGIC OUTPOST Held to ransom The following examples will prove that the theory of “special” status (under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution or otherwise) is whipped up by our leaders to ﬂaunt their inﬂuence instead of serving wider public interest: 1. Sheikh Abdullah’s threats as the “Prime Minister” (the designation then of the popular head of J&K) to toe an independent line and put his local critics behind the bars. This was before his arrest in 1953. 2. The subversion of democratic process

during Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s tenure as the “Prime Minister” (rejection of nomination papers of candidates belonging to the opposition was a routine in this period). 3. Rampant political and administrative corruption in the absence of jurisdiction of Central institutions like the Election Commission of India. There is no industrial development worth the name. 4. The Resettlement Bill providing for the return of migrants from the state to Pakistan and claim their ancestral property (it has been done without ensuring similar rights to

which dealt with various speciﬁc issues including the concept of political empowerment). 8. Total neglect of Ladakh region (it is considered a region only in geographical sense. Administratively it is part of the Kashmir Division — one of the two divisions in the state, the other being Jammu). It is pertinent to mention that the Justice Wazir Commission had recommended the creation of more districts in Jammu Division so that both Kashmir and Jammu Divisions could have equal number of districts. It had taken into

affinity. With this background in view it should be evident that our leaders are unable to look beyond their nose. They have confined their prime concerns to the Kashmir region which happens to be their electoral constituency. It has been done to the exclusion of genuine hopes and aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh. It is also doubtful whether they have been able to live up to the expectations of ordinary masses of the Valley. Their marginalisation on the home turf since 1988 is self-explanatory. We are too close to the history. But sooner or later it will have to be admitted that their double talk and conflicting statements have confused an entire generation of Kashmiri young persons.

Union Territory status This backdrop is necessary to understand why we have been agitating for a separate Union Territory status for the last 50 years. We in Ladakh feel that our interests will be best served if we are free from the clutches of a puzzled and self-absorbed leadership. We want a direct contact with New Delhi. For us the centre-state relations mean preserving our beliefs, culture and customs within the framework of the Indian Constitution. We do believe that there should be speciﬁc schemes for the welfare of people living in difﬁcult areas as they do in this state. But we don’t think that the way to achieve this is to

Neglect of Jammu and Ladakh regions to the extent of discrimination in all matters (a reference may be made in this context to the report of the Gajendragadkar Commission which dealt with various speciﬁc issues including the concept of political empowerment) 44

6. Large-scale induction of arms and ammunition and massive to-and-fro movement of militants across the Line of Control in the 1980s when an elected government was in ofﬁce in the state.

account the fact that Leh and Kargil districts together constituting Ladakh were part of the Kashmir Division. However, the present Government while raising the number of districts has maintained the numerical primacy of the Kashmir Division. It has thus behaved like the majority of its predecessors. All of them (the solitary exception being the People’s Democratic Party-led coalition government) have revelled in ruling Leh and Kargil through remote control never bothering to integrate them emotionally into the Kashmir Division.

7. Neglect of Jammu and Ladakh regions to the extent of discrimination in all matters (a reference may be made in this context to the report of the Gajendragadkar Commission

9. Injecting communal virus into Ladakh politics. A hideous bid is being made to split Buddhists and Shias of Ladakh by making light of their age-old ethnic and linguistic

the people of the state who have been forced to leave behind their property in prosperous towns like Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, among others). 5. Attempt to deprive the women of the state of their permanent resident status on marrying outsiders.

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have a separate Constitution. We are for autonomy provided it percolates down to the people and is not vested in the hands of those who want to perpetuate their hold over political and administrative dispensation in its disguise. Moreover, it should be accompanied by the will to generate revenue to reduce dependence on the centre. We have always given preference to the country’s overall interests in our state. That is why whenever asked by central leaders beginning with Jawaharlal Nehru we have stopped short of taking our stir for UT to the logical conclusion. We may not agree with their plea that the separation of Ladakh

would affect to some extent the country’s case before the United Nations so far as the state is concerned. But we have seen no reason to suspect their motives. We will not dare do so. Nehru and Indira Gandhi both have taken special care to shower tremendous affection on the people of Ladakh. To our ill luck, however, the situation is only worsening in the recent years. Now and then there are efforts by the state Government to undermine our authority. We had after a sustained struggle won the right to form the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) to manage our affairs in Leh (we can claim with humility that our success has enabled the people of Kargil to see reason and have a similar dispensation though they were initially reluctant. Elsewhere also there are demands for setting up such councils). More tourists — domestic as well as foreign — visit Ladakh now than ever before.

Swept last election The Council in Leh has been able to extensively protect and develop indigenous products. It has literally taken the administration to doorstep. One can notice the amazing enthusiasm that it has generated at grassroots level. The Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF) that controls the Council regards its formation as a step towards realising the goal of UT. Its

reputation is conﬁrmed by its nearly clean sweep in the last elections held in 2005. It had won 24 out of the total 26 seats for which the contests had taken place. What else can prove that there is overwhelming popular sentiment in favour of UT? However, it is being baulked in its drive to ameliorate the lot of ordinary Ladakhis. We cite the following examples in support of our contention: 1. The Council is not being given ﬁnancial and legislative powers even in matters under its charge. We may draw a parallel with Lakshadweep. In size the beautiful group of islands is the same as Ladakh but its population is less than one-third that of

Ladakh. Yet, as UT it has a budget of more than 400 crore rupees a year asagainst less than a hundred crore a year each to the two districts of Ladakh. 2. We don’t get our quota of central funds sanctioned under various schemes especially in social sector. On one occasion the state Government had even transferred the funds sanctioned by the Planning Commission for Leh under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) for some other place. We resisted it and were eventually able to persuade the Planning Commission to tell the state Government to retrace its move. 3. The state Government has just ignored the LAHDC’s plea to let it have a deputy commissioner of its choice. The deputy commissioner by virtue of being the chief executive ofﬁcer of the Council is a key functionary. 4. Likewise the state Government has not even discussed the Council’s plea for sharing four nominated seats. It has gone ahead with appointing its nominees in a brusque manner. 5. There is no consideration of an important factor in planning. Ladakh deserves priority because of its area and not population which is sparse. The schemes have to be tailored according to its typical requirements. We feel that the Government does not

want to act in a rational way. Naturally it has strengthened our resolve to work for achieving UT status sooner than later. We will continue our struggle to this end even while working for the welfare of the people as a party in charge of the LAHDC.

Secular inclusiveness To put it brieﬂy, our demand for UT status is based on the following principles: 1. We have to preserve our unique identity in every sense — ethnic, linguistic and even religious. We are the only region to have grand Buddhist monasteries and eminent schools of Shia philosophy co-existing with each other. 2. We are a trans-Himalayan territory

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Jammu and Kashmir STRATEGIC OUTPOST wrong in doing so? Was it taken as a sign of our weakness?

The Resettlement Bill providing for the return of migrants from the State to Pakistan and claim their ancestral property (it has been done without ensuring similar rights to the people of the state who have been forced to leave behind their property in prosperous towns like Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, among others) that deserves particular attention which is possible only if it is governed directly. 3. We are concerned about our very survival because most of our “leaders” sitting in Srinagar distrust us completely and have made it known through their actions. 4. Our huge natural resources in the form of pashmina and herbal plants, among many others, remain unexploited. The LAHDC has taken some beneﬁcial steps in this regard but a lot more can be done which will be possible only if we have a full-ﬂedged administrative set-up taking care of them. 5. We want due recognition for the Bhoti language. It may be pointed out that the trans-Himalayan MPs’ forum which is active in Parliament has already sought its inclusion in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. 6. There should be more assembly seats in the region. Also, there should be at least two Lok Sabha seats — one each for Leh and Kargil. 7. We want to have a separate university. 8. There should be complete jurisdiction of central institutions like Parliament. We don’t favour any dilution in this regard. There are any number of our “leaders” who have sought and got relief from the Supreme Court and the National Human Rights Commission after being denied the same in the state. 9. We are unequivocal in our commitment to India and don’t want any truck with those who are either unclear or mischievous about their political aims. We don’t want to be led by those who are bereft of conviction and change their tune according to the occasion. It is astounding that even some Communists in the state should exhibit religious biases. 10. We are for a genuinely secular society in

Frankly we were not expecting any justice from regional political parties dominating the state. They have their own political agenda. Much to our pleasant surprise, however, we came across a remarkable sympathetic People’s Democratic Party as the leader of the ruling coalition of which the Congress was a major constituent. Of late, I must say, the National Conference too is at its best behaviour vis-à-vis us. Perhaps their own trials and tribulations have made the two parties conscious of the requirement of addressing regional aspirations of all in a concrete manner. We will have to wait and see.

Congress antipathy What has stunned us is the haughty attitude of the Congress after it became the leader of the ruling alliance in 2005. It has been a period of perpetual harassment for us between 2005 and 2008. We virtually swept which every religion is equally respected. We don’t want discrimination on any ground — religion, gender or region. We seek digniﬁed existence for every individual.

Pak-China factor I wish to point out that almost all remote areas have UTs and I have already referred to Lakshadweep in this regard. We can cite the examples of Dadar, Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu and Nicobar Islands too. One reason that they have been made UTs is their isolation from the mainland heightening the country’s security concerns. In the case of Ladakh as well it is cut off from the mainland for seven months every year. Instead of sea we are separated by the mighty Himalayas. Unlike the Islands, however, we are face to face with hostile neighbours not only directly eyeing but also targeting us. Both Pakistan and China have managed to bag a big chunk of our territory. Our strong point, however, is that we have a powerful democratic dispensation. Our cooperation with the Armed Forces is legendary. This is recognised by one and all. We feel that we can contribute more in this direction in terms of infrastructure if we have a UT. A UT based on the will of the people will be the country’s bulwark in Ladakh. Let it not be delayed any further.

Defending integrity The role of the people of Ladakh in defending the unity and integrity of the country has always been admired. Right from 1947 onwards it has been our proud privilege to have acted as the eyes and ears of the country across the Himalayas. Elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir the citizens face only one hostile neighbour. We have two on hand. We have stood up against both as the members of the armed forces and as citizens rallying behind the brave men in uniform.

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did not exist at all. There was a conspiracy to engineer defections in our Council with a view to cause instability. It did not succeed because despite tremendous strain we managed to hold together. During this turbulence I as a Lok Sabha member from Ladakh desperately invited the attention of the Prime Minister and Union Home Minister to the strangulation of democracy in our region. I also took up the matter with Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, Congress President and Chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance. I also voted for the Congress at every critical moment whether it was the Presidential election or the conﬁdence motion. I did so in the hope that the party with which I personally and my family for a long time had a close association would see reason. All my hopes have been belied. I was promised that there would be a close look at the affairs of Ladakh. Nothing of the sort happened. In fact, one election after

Its Chief Minister seemed to specialise in the game of causing disaffection. He spared no effort to corner us by treating us with an iron rod. Little did he realise that we were made of sterner stuff. Our patriotism would not allow him to drive us out of the national mainstream. We refuse to equate a person or a party in power with the state itself. What do we do, however, when the state itself simply overlooks the wrong-doings of that person or party while they are wielding power? I derive no vicarious pleasure but it is a matter of record that the Congress Chief Minister had to eventually go out in ignominy. He left the state in limbo with both Kashmir and Jammu regions burning - something which we in Ladakh were already doing because of him. I have a poser, therefore, for you. We in a remote corner of the country - incidentally on the other side of the Himalayas - are routinely ignored in matters of

It is our humble contribution. It is also demonstrative of our will to have a strong nation. I resist the temptation of mentioning our exploits in detail. Let me say, however, that a nation in turn can simply be as strong as its people. What do the people do, however, when they are told time and again that although part of the same state they are second-class citizens? Before I proceed further I would like to bring to your notice a few relevant facts: Ever since the accession of the state with India we have been waging a political struggle for a direct relationship with New Delhi. To that end we have been seeking a Union Territory status. We have no hesitation in admitting that at the peak of our agitations many times we have moved backwards as and when asked by the national leadership to do so in the interest of the state and the country. In return we have for long been compensated by both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi especially by devoting their personal attention towards our welfare. We have never given up our eventual goal, however. Yes, we have responded to the national leaders whenever they told us about their battles of wits on international forums against a recalcitrant neighbour. Yes, we have responded again and chosen to keep quiet when we were informed that our agitation was diverting attention from the primary task of tackling terrorism in the Kashmir region. For our part we also realised that an enemy was out to wage a proxy war against us. It needed to be stopped in every possible manner. We did not allow it to create any mischief in our vast region. It was again a conscientious decision by us to extend total support to the nationalist forces. Were we

the elections to the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC-Leh) defeating the Congress conclusively. Having failed to enlist the popular support it hit back in a manner it perhaps knew the best. It harassed our workers, beat them up, jailed them on trumped-up charges, ﬁled false cases and denied the Chairman and Chief Executive Councillor of our elected Council the honour to unfurl the national ﬂag. It was a period during which we were constantly at the receiving end. Our plight was made worse with the media turning a blind eye towards us. Except for a small vigilant section it ignored us as if we

the other, we were up against the Congress’s fabled money and muscle power. Our support at the national level was clearly taken for granted. Now the Congress has dumped its own Buddhist nominee in the last Lok Sabha elections. I tend to believe that it is a natural corollary to its drive against us.

Political dilemma We should have perhaps realised that it is the same party which is responsible for the mess in the Kashmir Valley. For decades it ruled in the name of the National Conference alienating the Kashmiri people.

development. There then comes a regime which simply guns for us, ignores our long record of peace and commitment and tries to subjugate us in every possible manner just because we exercise our democratic right to differ. What do we do if we are repeatedly told that we don’t matter at all just because we have a small population? Who holds the key to the national unity if not the ordinary citizens? The writer was Chairman, Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council from 1995-2004. He was elected to 14th Lok Sabha in 2004. He was member of the Parlimentary Standing Committee on Defence.

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Jammu and Kashmir SELF GOALS

Festering BLUNDERS T

he absence of a strategic culture in India, is largely responsible for a lack of strategic vision and a failure to integrate military power into the state policy as one of its instruments. This has been the bane of our foreign policy. Nowhere it is manifested more than in our J and K posture. So this festering sore is slowly bleeding us with no solution in sight.

Error of judgment Our leadership tended to see the princely state of J and K as just one of 565 princely states of India. They were not much concerned if at the time of independence, J and K state opted for Pakistan. They failed to see its strategic location and consequently

At every retelling the baldfaced conspiracy becomes re-etched in memory of the Major Brown who hoisted the flag of Pakistan over Gilgit. Before him Lord Mountbatten re-enacted the Irish experiment in India and helped germinate the two-nation theory based on religion â&#x20AC;&#x201C; of Catholics for a Republican Ireland and imported Protestants for association with Britain. As in Ireland, the sore festers on with honest brokers and Track-II travellers trying to buy an illusive peace with a Pakistan that knows in full measure the utter falsehood of the two-nation theory of its creation.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Sheru Thapliyal, SM

its strategic importance. The result was that a series of mistakes were made prior to and after independence which turned J and K problem into such a long running saga. The state would have acceded to India long before the tribal invasion from Pakistan if Nehru had not insisted that the Maharaja release Sheikh Abdulla from jail and install him as the Chief Minister before he acceded to India. He failed to realise that national interest must not be held hostage to an individual. Similarly agreeing to a Britisher - Lord Mountbatten - becoming the head of state of independent India proved to be an act of misplaced friendship. This went on to the extent that Mountbatten started presiding over the

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir SELF GOALS far as I am concerned, you can disband the Army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs” Nehru had an innate distrust of the Armed Forces and he was brought up in the atmosphere of Ahimsa by the Father of the nation. Neglect of the Armed Forces cost him and the nation dear in 1962 war against China. Sadly, distrust of Armed Forces continues and they are excluded from decision making loop even today.

British subterfuge The British effort at all times was to make sure Indian forces did not prevail over the Pakistani invaders and since the C-in-C Indian Army was a Britisher who was in daily touch with his counterpart, it was easily done. The Indian leadership with no knowledge of war ﬁghting did not understand the implication of orders being passed to Indian Army. Two examples will sufﬁce. Once the raiders were routed at Shalateng on 07 November 1947 and Uri recaptured on 13 November 1947, 161 Infantry Brigade was riding the crest of success and was all set to advance upto Muzaffarabad. This had to be stopped somehow. So the axis of advance of 161 Infantry Brigade was changed and they were told to link up with Poonch over the Haji Pir Pass. This halted their momentum and raiders and Pak Army were able to regroup. Similarly during 1948 summer offensive, urgent pleas by Maj. Gen. Thimayya the force commander for reinforcements were ignored with the result a stalemate came about which continues till date. The point being made is that India has had to pay dearly for putting their trust in a British Viceroy and a British C-in-C. How could we be so naïve?

The invasion of meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet instead of Nehru, who, as prime J and K was planned minister was the head of the government. by GHQ Pakistan Misplaced trust whose C-in-C kept his There cannot be a better example of abdication of responsibility and misplaced Indian counterpart trust. Similarly accepting British generals as UN blunder C-in-C India and also C-in-C India-Pakistan The British having ensured that the fully informed was another mistake. The invasion of J and Pakistani forces are not driven out of J and K K was planned by GHQ Pakistan whose and consequently then played their master card, Mountbatten C-in-C kept his Indian counterpart fully persuaded Nehru that the issue needs to be informed and consequently Mountbatten Mountbatten knew referred to the UN. This was the biggest knew exactly what was going on. And mistake made by the Indian leadership. let us not forget that it was Mountbatten exactly what was A bilateral issue was therefore allowed to who inserted the mischievous clause become a world problem. In the UN, the going on. And let of plebiscite in his reply to the signed British ensured that India gets equated with Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Pakistan, the aggressor, legality of J and K us not forget that it Singh. British were playing their game of accession to India was completely ignored. divide and rule to perfection. was Mountbatten Troop withdrawals Military as bastion who inserted the The August 13, 1948 resolution of the Indian leaders never understood that a UN Commission for India and Pakistan mischievous clause nation is not respected for its moral stance (UNCIP) had three parts. Part I asked but the might of its armed forces. But for both nations to observe ceaseﬁre, Part II of plebiscite in Pak invasion of J and K, Nehru would have asked Pakistan to remove its irregular and gladly disbanded the Armed Forces. Indeed his reply to the regular forces from J and K and Part III laid he said so to the C-in-C India, General Sir down that once that happens and normalcy Robert Lockhart. When the C-in-C went to signed Instrument returns, plebiscite should be conducted. The the Prime Minister to get a defence paper resolution was accepted by both countries. approved, Nehru glanced through the paper of Accession by Now it should be obvious to even a moron and retorted “Rubbish, total rubbish. We plebiscite could only be held when Maharaja Hari Singh don’t need a defence policy. Our policy is that Pakistan withdrew its forces. We should Ahimsa. We foresee no military threats. As

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It should be obvious to even a moron that plebiscite could only be held when Pakistan withdrew its forces. We should have been concentrating on asking Pak to vacate J and K in its entirety. We have not done it till date have been concentrating on asking Pakistan to vacate J and K in its entirety. We have not done it till date. There was no reason to go on the defensive about plebiscite. Instead after some time we started trashing the Resolution and claiming that since elections have been held in J and K, UN Resolution is null and void. No one in the world was willing to listen to this. We should have been harping on Part II of the Resolution day in and day out like Pakistan who only harps on Part III and never mentions Part II. This has been the biggest policy blunder on part of India and it is yet to be corrected.

Subsequent mistakes Having blundered our way as far as UN Resolution was concerned, more were on the way. Having categorically stated that J and K problem was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, at the end of 1965 war, we accepted Russian mediation thus weakening our own case. No wonder Pakistan insists on some mediation – whether by UN, US or anybody else. Thereafter whenever J and K is discussed with Pak, instead of asking Pakistan categorically to vacate PoK and Northern Areas, we allow it to set the agenda. Why should there be talks on Siachen separately for example. It is a part of J and K and if we say that J and K is part of India, we only need to tell Pakistan to take a walk. By agreeing to talks on Siachen, we are weakening our own case.

Realities The other issue is of treating J and K problem as real, we tend to bury our heads in the sand and say that it is not a problem. If Pakistan says J and K is a problem between India and Pakistan, we should say it is one created by Pakistan and there is only one solution and that is to comply with UN Resolution of 13 August 1948, agreed to by Pakistan. Instead we become coy and refuse to be upfront about it. In other words we lack a pro-active policy. The result is that we have not been able to convince the world of our genuine case on J and K. Most of it believes that we are there by force.

Internal policy Our internal policy on J and K, if indeed there is one lacks focus, coherence and clarity. We have failed to convey to people, its political parties and separatists our strong resolve that the entire J and K state including PoK and Northern Areas is a part of India. Giving Special status to J and K by Article 370 has been a blunder. That makes J and K feel that it is yet to be integrated into India, besides giving Pakistan an impression that India is not serious about J and K being a part of India like other states. Instead of dealing with them ﬁrmly we invite separatists like the Hurriyat Conference for talks thereby giving them legitimacy. There is no resolve to end crossborder terrorism by Pakistan. The option of taking out known camps in PoK by surgical air strikes is not considered even during Kargil war, instead we imposed the condition on Army and Air Force not to cross the Line of Control.

Terror epicentre We want to set up a joint terror mechanism with Pakistan, the very country which is the epicenter of terrorism the world over. We keep giving 26/11 dossiers to Pakistan so that they can tie up their Standard Operating Procedures and next time make sure there is no linkage of terrorists with Pakistan. Our bright foreign ofﬁce mandarins include Indian involvement in Baluchistan in the joint statement at Shram-el-Sheikh and no one is held accountable. An Indian head of government boards a bus and lands in Pakistan without invitation and suffers gladly the insult of Pak Service Chiefs not being there in the reception party. We run

to USA whenever there is a terror strike. No nation which has aspirations to become an Asian, and later a global power can do this. We have to deal with the problem ourselves. We lost a golden opportunity to solve the J and K problem after 1971 war when we held all the areas. A supposedly tough Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was duped by Bhutto that the Line of Control will become the international border. That never happened and is the only practical way to resolve the problem.

Crystal gazing Going by our past record and present blundering, it does not need a genius to predict that J and K problem is unlikely to be resolved in our lifetime. Instead of trashing Pakistan as a failed state, we need to learn something from them as far as focus and perseverance is concerned. Their terror factory continues irrespective of which government is in power and their resolve to Balkanise India stands fast. If a failed state can cause us so much of grief, what would have happened if Pakistan were not a failed state? But for the Armed Forces, J and K would have long become Pakistani territory and the same Armed Forces are treated with contempt by the successive governments. How can things improve? The writer is working for a multinational information technology company after his retirement. He is PhD in Sino-Indian Relations and contributes regularly to magazines, periodicals and newspapers on Strategy, Security and Defence related issues.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir SPURT IN TERRORISM

Rohit Singh

The failure to stop large-scale inĮltraƟon at the Line of Control itself and relieving the pressure of area dominaƟon by the security forces has led to the current spurt of terrorism. A retracing of steps like troop withdrawal and relocaƟon of strategic outposts may well become necessary if the expected spate in terrorist violence is to be tackled with some degree of success. The poliƟcal eīect of employees’ agitaƟon for release of the Sixth Pay Commission arrears could be exploited by the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence just as it did the Amarnath agitaƟon.

strategic failure?

he recent spurt in terrorism inside Kashmir Valley is owed to militants’ success in re-establishing themselves in Sopore. There were reports of heavy inﬁltration by militants from the Gurez and Machhal sectors in NovemberDecember 2009.

Change of ISI tack The preceding year had seen a lull in terrorist activities inside J&K and the Indian heartland, too, remained incident free, not because of lack of intentions on the part of the jihadi ‘foot soldier’, but because the terror calibrators were in a state of ﬂux and uncertainty following the formation of a civilian government inside Pakistan in the year 2008. The ISI has since then reversed General Pervez Musharraf ’s support for the moderate All Parties Hurriyet Conference (A) and the former’s espousal of the four point formula to arrive at a J&K settlement. The ISI favours the hard line approach of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (Geelani), manifestations of which have been markedly visible inside the Valley in the past few months leading to ﬁerce encounters inside Sopore and Tral resulting in substantial Army casualties.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

A careful analysis of the Sopore encounter on 23 February reveals that the terrorists have mutated into a very determined, ﬁerce lot with superior levels of training and ﬁre power, harking back to the heydays of terrorism in J&K, as also the post Kargil

adjoining belt was substantially cleared of militants with the army’s effective area domination and elimination of top commanders in surgical operations. Inability to operate ﬁrmly from Sopore proved costly to the terrorists as they were denied this transit belt from north Kashmir into other parts of the valley. Incidents of terror came down substantially all over north Kashmir.

Through a well crafted strategy, the ISI had earlier activated the stone pelters to carry out agitations to get the government to order the Army to vacate Bomai post. This happened in February 2009. What followed later was waiting to happen.

Bloody encounter Just before the crack of dawn on 23 February, an army Special Forces squad led by a young Captain zeroed in on a house in a densely populated locality in Sopore. The operation in Chinkipora, astride the Sopore-Bandipora road in north Kashmir’s Baramulla district was launched on receipt of specific information about the presence of two LeT terrorists in the locality. However, as it turned out the squad was met with a hail of bullets and grenades from more than five terrorists holed up in the house. In the exchange of fire that followed, one trooper was dead and two injured. The Captain was reportedly captured in an injured state and held inside the house. The terrorists refused to hand over the officer in exchange of safe passage and shot him. As day broke out the army launched an operation to flush out the terrorists. It had to exercise caution and proceed deliberately as the body of the slain officer had to be recovered from the house where the terrorists had positioned themselves. The densely populated locality had to be cordoned off and civilians evacuated. Two terrorists were eliminated after a 13 hour long gun battle. Four army troopers including the Captain were martyred in the operation. What is disturbing is the

fact that more than ﬁve terrorists could entrench themselves in an urban locality and operate from there. So how did this situation come about?

period, when a number of ﬁdayeen squads had inﬁltrated inside J&K. When that happened there were a series of incidents inside the Indian heartland viz. attacks on Red Fort, Kaluchak, Akshardham and the assault on our Parliament.

Genesis The current state of affairs leading to hardened terrorists getting entrenched in Sopore and resultant spurt in terrorism would not have come about but for a weak kneed state government succumbing to separatist pressures and its inability to discern the camouflaged separatist-terrorist nexus. Sopore, it may be recalled, has been a traditional hotbed of militancy ever since the outbreak of insurgency in J&K. Home to firebrand separatist leaders such as Sayed Ali Shah Geelani, it has had the lowest voting turnout in any election since 1989. In the 1990s, an army brigade had to be inducted to clear the town of militants who had claimed to have ‘liberated’ it. After the advent of fidayeen terrorism in the valley in 1999, the town has witnessed several such attacks on security force camps and civilian targets. The Sopore-Bandipora belt has been a preferred operating base of top terrorist leaders of all tanzeems active in J&K. However, since 2007, Sopore town and its

As the summer progresses, freshly arrived terrorists link up with those already holed-up in these areas and then position themselves to launch attacks in towns and Srinagar city perations in these belts would keep the militants disorganised and on the move Amarnath fallout Through the separatists, the terrorists then adopted a new tactic to revive terror in the apple town. A substantial number of people took to the streets during the Amarnath land row agitations in the summer of 2008. Since then, separatist forces egged on by their terrorist handlers have organised several demonstrations in Sopore following any allegation of human rights abuse by the security forces. They

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir SPURT IN TERRORISM re-group in its traditional stronghold and is being aided by the LeT. Some attempts at local recruitment have also been made in this region. Already, two attempts at inﬁltration have been made in the Keran sector of north Kashmir still under snow cover. 10 militants were killed in these attempts. Sixty-nine militants, 22 Security Force personnel and 11 civilians have been killed in militancy-related incidents inside J&K in 2010 (till 11 April 2010) and the security forces are anticipating a hot summer ahead. Overall though the counter-insurgency situation in J&K remains under control with terrorists largely unable to launch direct attacks. The increase in security force casualty has been due to a qualitative improvement in terrorist training and shift in tactics whereby they attempt to break the cordon in the preliminary stage itself, shooting at close range on the approaching troops. Security forces also exercise caution to avoid collateral damage.

Entrenched terrorists got their opportunity on 21 February 2009, when the local Rashtriya Rifles unit opened fire on a procession of devotees at Bomai village, north of Sopore town. Two civilians were killed in this incident which led to a massive uproar across the valley. The strategic army post at Bomai in the heart of the Zaingeer belt which links Sopore with Lolab was re-located alongside a CRPF camp on the Sopore-Kupwara road. This led to the weakening of the army’s dominance of the rural belt of Sopore leaving the field open to militants. Since then, militants from the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Hizbul Mujahideen managed to regroup and have started operating from there with impunity. Since the relocation of Bomai post last year, 13 security personnel and 11 civilians have lost their lives. The first fidayeen attack in three years which took place in Srinagar on 6 January 2010 was launched by terrorists holed up in Sopore. The attack on the Sopore Police Station on 15 January where militants fired for at least 25 minutes was reminiscent of incidents in the 1990s when militants regularly carried out such stand-off attacks firing on paramilitary bunkers in the town.

Grave error Removal of the Bomai Post has opened up floodgates of terrorism inside the Valley who are now oozing in confidence having taken on the elite Para Commandos. Intercepts indicate that top terrorist leaders have located themselves in Sopore synchronising and pooling their resources from there. Significantly, Syed Ali Shah Geelani belongs to village Doru, a mere

ﬁve kms from Bomai. There are reports of Geelani having orchestrated the ‘Intifada’ style stone pelting mobs to keep the Army out of Bomai. With Geelani having once again become the favoured ‘child’ of the ISI, the vacation of Bomai post, orchestrated through ‘stone pelters’, is a master stroke leading to terrorists getting entrenched in Sopore and consequent spurt of terrorism in the valley.

ISI resurgence The Military-Intelligence complex in Pakistan buoyed with the United States’ perceived withdrawal is once again positioning itself to play a major role in Afghanistan’s affairs and has turned the terror tap once again in J&K. This was evident in the increased number of infiltration attempts since January 2010. Several such attempts were scuttled in the Jammu region. Pakistani troops also resorted to cease-fire violations to push in the ultras on some occassions. Two groups of around 40 Pakistani militants belonging to the LeT infiltrated in the last week of March from the Sunderbani and Nowshera sectors of Rajouri, 16 of them were eliminated in a series of encounters in Rajouri. Five army soldiers also laid down their lives in these operations. This was an attempt by Pakistan to re-invigorate the dying insurgency in the Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu division. It has already lost local support in this region. Some of the hardened terrorists were headed towards south Kashmir after crossing the Pir Panjal. South Kashmir has also seen stepped up militant activity, especially in Pulwama and Shopian. The Hizbul Mujahideen is attempting to

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

The army is well poised to tackle an increase in inﬁltration by determined and desperate terrorists. But, it will have to seek those already holed up inside forest hideouts such as Rajwar, Lolab, SoporeBandipora and Tral. As the summer progresses, freshly arrived terrorists link up with those already holed-up in these areas and then position themselves to launch attacks in towns and Srinagar city. Operations in these belts would keep the militants disorganised and on the move. One army jawan was killed and another injured in one such operation in the Rajwar forest belt of Handwara on April 8. Politically, the state government would do well to resolve the grievance of its employees who are demanding a better wage and are constantly undertaking strikes and indulge in violent clashes with the police in Jammu and Srinagar, lest they are tapped by the ISI and militants in once again giving vent to anti-India sentiments. If this process is not nipped in the bud the wheel of insurgency will turn full circle to the heydays of the late 1980s and 1990s where the state administration was subverted, sowing the seeds of insurgency. It should also resolve the difference arriving out of the Inter-District Bill and undertake development and civil works in the rural areas regained from two decades of militant sway. A further reduction of troops from J&K at this stage will not be congenial in preserving peace in the state.

The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. His areas of interest include the strategic, geopolitical and sub-conventional warfare ﬁelds. He has previously worked with Times Now and reported on various defence related news.

Jammu and Kashmir

THE OTHER VIEW

JAMMU: STEPBROTHER? In a candid interview with DSA, Prof. Bhim Singh, President of Panthers Party, spoke at length about the different aspects of myriad problems of Jammu and Kashmir, many known and few unknown, to our correspondent Rohit Srivastava. We met him at his ofﬁce in New Delhi. Here are some signiﬁcant excerpts from his long and revealing interview.

DSA – Sir, please deﬁne Kashmiriyat for us? Prof. Bhim Singh – Kashmir is not Kashmir valley alone. It has four distinct regions with their own separate identity. Three of them are in India Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh regions, whereas Gilgit falls in Pakistan. Gilgit which was annexed by Pakistan in 1947, was recently declared a province of Pakistan. It has distinct culture with Balti as main language. Azad Kashmir, part of POK, has dominant Dogra culture, with Dogri as language. Prior to annexation by Pakistan in 1948 it was part of Jammu region. Jammu region has Dogra and Pahari culture with Dogri as dominant language, which was included in eighth schedule of Indian Constitution during NDA regime. Kashmir valley also has a distinct culture, with Kashmiri language, which is also in eighth schedule. Similarly Ladakh region has completely different culture closer to Tibetan, Buddhi as main language, similar to Balti and Tibetan. All four regions have geographical, cultural, linguistic and religious differences, thus Kashmiriyat is a misnomer.

“

A man from Jammu will never be safe and secure to do justice to his job if posted in Kashmir interiors

”

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir THE OTHER VIEW DSA – Jammu has been complaining about discrimination and apathy, what are the factors responsible for it?

except voting rights. This population has now grown to around eighty ﬁve thousand families.

involved in any form of militancy.

BS – This is again a misnomer. Regional discrimination is not only against Jammu, but also against Ladakh and Kargil. We all put blame on Kashmiris. Kashmiri rulers have never ruled alone. Dogra kings had Kashmiri bureaucrats. I put equal blame on Jammu and Kashmiri ruling class that came up after 1947. Jammu leaders are to be blamed too.

Around ﬁve lakh Kashmiri Pundits, Hindus from different parts of Jammu region have no refugee status, no relief. This population needs to be settled, which is around ﬁfteen lakh. The government of Jammu and Kashmir is more communal than the people.

BS – In 1842 General Zorawar Singh, annexed Ladakh and Gilgit area and reached till Kashghar ( China ). Jammu has distinct identity. Delhi has always looked at Kashmir. We do not have any importance in Centre’s eyes. Kashmir shouts against India and is awarded by all means.

DSA – Valley has been dominating Jammu, even when demographically both regions are almost equal. Why? BS – Census is a fraud. In 2001 after the census Kashmir population was two lakh more than Jammu, but when census was published in 2003 the difference increased by 11 lakh. My documentation had proved this. I have shown this to every important person in Delhi, they all agreed but expressed their inability to do anything in this regard. Jammu city had 5-6 per cent non-Hindu population but it has reached 30-35 per cent. They can’t be from Jammu city alone, 90 per cent of these are Kashmiris. Kashmiri Muslims are feeling insecure in valley. This demographic change is dangerous for security as Jammu is very close to international border. Delimitation was not carried out here after census as was done across the country. I would like to reiterate that Jammu leaders who sold themselves for political power are to be equally blamed along with the Kashmiris. DSA – What are the main demands of Jammu? BS - It’s not so simple. Kashmir became part of Jammu in 1846, by Amritsar Treaty signed between Maharaja Gulab Singh and East India Company. After partition around ten lakh (non-Muslim) refugees came to Jammu from POK. They never got refugee status and still need to be settled, even after sixty years. Similarly around thirty ﬁve thousand families came to Jammu from Pakistan through the international border. They also do not have any status in the state

DSA – Where does Jammu stand in Centre- Jammu and Kashmir relations?

The area of Jammu region is double of valley, terrain is more difﬁcult. This region has 36 assembly seats and Kashmir has 47 seats, whereas population is almost equal. Jammu has two parliamentary constituencies whereas Kashmir has three. This picture will change if delimitation is implemented, which is not favoured by Kashmiri leadership.

DSA – What is the status of development in Jammu region? Are the people of Jammu satisﬁed? BS – Jammu has been meted out third grade treatment, in jobs, ﬁnances and governance. We are not important to Delhi. Few industries have begun of late in Jammu primarily because environment in Kashmir is no longer conducive for industrialisation. There hasn’t been any formidable approach for industrialisation and development. Not even 30 per cent of electricity produced in Jammu is allocated to Jammu region.

10-11 per cent of secretariat employees are from Jammu out of 1800. Rest all are Kashmiris. DSA – Political Islam has taken its roots in Jammu and Kashmir, what are the challenges it is posing to other communities?

DSA – What are your views on Inter District Recruitment Bill?

BS – This is not relevant any more, with advent of IT, there is no religious sect which can dominate the people. This is also a misnomer. Jammu and Kashmir has suffered because of Centre’s apathy. Article 370 doesn’t allow Parliament to make laws for Jammu and Kashmir. Parliament is more dangerous to my existence than Islam. Unless more power is given to people of Jammu and Kashmir democratically, things will not improve. Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was drafted by National Conference and Congress in such a way as to facilitate their rule forever. There are no fundamental rights and secularism in our Constitution. Article 370 has imposed a ban on Parliament from making laws applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. The people of our state are treated like sheep. There are no sincere and committed leaders at Delhi who will espouse the cause of Jammu and Kashmir. DSA – Jammu region has been facing militancy for years, which are the elements that support militants in this region?

BS – Earlier people of Kashmir could be employed in any district of the state like the rest of India, but with this bill only Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe candidates will be allowed to have this privilege. The bill is applicable only to the third and fourth grade government jobs. There is a rationale behind it.

BS – Infiltration in Jammu is from international border. To fight terrorism people’s support is required. In democracy you have to involve people. In our state there is no contact between people and government. We can’t fight militancy without people’s support and political appraisal. In Kashmir the fight is for power and money. Hurriyat, National Conference, Jammat-e-Islami, are in fact same, but with different political culture. Their plan is to exploit India and Pakistan for money and power.

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution (1) Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution(a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to-(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify. Explanation.- For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948; (c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

DSA – How do you analyse the changing face of militancy in the valley? BS – Militancy is a way to achieve political power through violence. Political power is employed to earn money. Corrupt and criminal minded politicians fund and arm people for militancy. Patrons of violence have to ﬁnd fault lines in society. Systematic picking and arming of youth by foreign players is the only way by which militancy begins and is sustained. DSA – You have been the voice of marginalised groups in the valley. Who

is responsible for the marginalisation? Has there been any change in the attitude towards them? BS – As I said earlier the marginalisation can’t be blamed on Kashmiris only. There are four main groups - Gujjars, Bakarwals, Ladakhis and Paharis. Except Paharis all have scheduled tribe status and these groups have never been involved in militancy. These groups need to be taken into conﬁdence and brought into political mainstream. Shias are another group who are marginalised and have never been

Our state has a very difﬁcult terrain and the cultural differences make it very hard for outsiders to settle among local communities. A man from Jammu will never be safe and secure to do justice to his job if posted in Kashmir interiors. One more rationale for the bill is the difference in the standard of education between developed parts like Jammu, Srinagar and other districts. In any competition people from these two districts have advantage over others. Keeping these factors in mind we offered our support to this bill.

(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify. Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of subclause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State. Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government. (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to subclause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon. (3) Not withstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir

ADVANTAGE PEACE

n last eighteen years, as a conglomeration of more than twenty small political parties and nongovernment organisations, created by the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence for building mass political support for the secession of Jammu and Kashmir from Union of India the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, has done its job remarkably well. Its political movement has added another dimension to the violent methods of militants in Kashmir valley.

Pak-type aazadi Hurriyat means ‘Independence.’ It considers Kashmir as the ‘unﬁnished agenda of partition’ like Pakistan and doesn’t support Indian rule of J and K. The strength of Hurriyat lies in its capacity to create a political support for the independence of J and K. Militancy in Kashmir in its early days of 1988-93, was predominantly independence movement led by Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, a militant group of local youth, supported by Pakistan, who’s motto was to have an independent J and K. During the same time Hizbul Mujahideen, a militant group the cadres of which were drawn from both Kashmir and Pakistan came up. HM draws its cadre predominantly from the Jamaat-e-Islami. HM has a one point agenda of merger of J&K into Pakistan and Islamisation of the state.

People’s movement? It is said that HM was created to counter the JKLF which wanted to have an independent Kashmir. The APHC and HM both draw their cadres from the Jamaat. The end of JKLF brought the hardcore Islamic militancy in the valley as sole militant ideology. On March 9, 1993 APHC was formed by ISI to internationalise the Kashmir issue, when militancy could not gather enough support from international community. Indian military’s counter insurgency and anti-terrorism strategy started bearing

Abdul ani one supported the dialogue and even went to Sharjah to meet then ISI chief t en Ehsanul-Ha and re uested both factions to accept dialogue ater he was killed allegedly by ashkar-e-Toiba

fruits and it was realised in Pakistan that it needs to have another front which would galvanise people’s support to anti-India movement along with the militancy. The people’s protest has given justiﬁcation to the militancy in the international arena.

is being done to settle non- Kashmiri Hindus in Kashmir, to make demographic change in Kashmir valley even though the terrain in that area doesn’t allow large scale settlement.

APHC has constantly supported the militancy and has opposed military action. One of the biggest opponents of Armed Forces Special Powers Act and accuser of human rights violation by army. Its constituents have always lent support to every form of opposition against government of India. Hurriyat split in 2003 where two factions emerged, one hardliner led by Jaamat-e-Islami leader Syed Geelani and one moderate led by Mirwaiz Omar Farooq. The latter believes in tripartite dialogue between India, Pakistan and people of the state for the permanent solution of Kashmir issue.

Since 2002, many a times Hurriyat has been asked by government of India to enter into dialogue and democracy. On dialogue Geelani group has forwarded three terms – accept J and K as disputed; right of self-determination and tripartite talks.These terms were outrightly rejected by government of India. In the same year Abdul Gani Lone supported the dialogue and even went to Sharjah to meet then ISI chief Lt. Gen Ehsan-ul-Haq and requested both factions to accept dialogue. Later he was killed allegedly by Lashkar-e-Toiba.

Poll boycotts Hurriyat has boycotted democratic forces even when some of its leaders are former legislators, like Geelani. One of the main reasons for split was the difference of opinion between two groups over the expulsion of Peoples Conference for its alleged proxy participation in 2002 assembly election. The most glaring fact is the continuous support of people of the state to democracy which Hurriyat opposes and also claims to be the sole representative of people of the state. This claim is only accepted by Pakistan. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) has given APHC observer status. Till 2005 it was Geelani who was representing Hurriyat in OIC but thereafter Mirwaiz has been attending.

“Moderate” gambit This change happened as Pakistan shifted its support to moderates, in covert change of heart. During the same time General Parvez Musharraf, then President of Pakistan was working out a plan to come to a permanent solution of Kashmir. Secret talks were held between India and Pakistan where number of proposals were discussed and it was evident to Pakistan that any hardliner would not be an effective pawn in this gambit, thus support was moved to the moderates. Hurriyat leaders have been playing spoilsport in many ways in the valley particularly. Most of the anti-military agitations are organised by them and allegations of atrocities and excess by the forces are generally made at the behest of Hurriyat. In many a case it has been found that the allegations were either baseless or distorted. In 2008 Hurriyat played very signiﬁcant role in the events of protest against the allocation of Amaranth Shrine Board land transfer case. Hurriyat instigated the fear that the land transfer

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Geopolitics of murder

hurriyat:

on its last legs? Rohit Srivastava

Similarly in 2006, Hurriyat backed off from dialogue following the threat from HM. In the same year Mirwaiz made his famous statement that, ﬁght on military, political and diplomatic front has achieved nothing accept graveyards. Hurriyat leaders began to see dialogue process as a way to gain some power during 2007 but with the situation in Pakistan going out of hand of Musharraf, things began to change for them. The dialogue stalled and it was realised, post-Amaranath agitations that they need to go back to their old demand of self-determination. But in the subsequent year when fresh elections for assembly were announced and people rejected the call of Geelani to boycott election leaders like Sajjad Lone fought election from Baramullah and lost in last parliamentary elections exposing the shallow support base of Hurriyat. The absence of people’s support has marginalised Hurriyat in the political game in a big way. But the situation is still not totally out of their control especially in down-town Srinagar where every day stone pelters clash with forces for no reason. Even today Geelani’s call for protest against forces, for any civilian death in crossﬁre puts the valley in disarray. Today Hurriyat enjoys a modicum of support in the urban centres only.

Urban angst Like all Islamist forces across the globe this phenomenon in Kashmir is also limited to urban, semi-urban and nearby areas. The noisy supporter does make them look larger than they actually are but with time people have begun to see what is real and what is illusionary. There is a need for serious effort from centre and the state to initiate programmes to approach Hurriyat’s grassroot supporters and engage them in dialogue through social and political programmes. For a peaceful Kashmir valley the base of Hurriyat needs to be cultivated and common people should be taken into conﬁdence.

An independent Jammu and Kashmir is not part of Pakistan’s convoluted agenda. AmalgamaƟon is the “unĮnished business of parƟƟon” because that may lend legiƟmacy to a moth-eaten “Two-naƟon Theory” the main claim to fame of which is unremiƫng bloodshed as is illustrated wherever it has been applied – Ireland, India and New Guinea. The All ParƟes Hurriyat Conference already knows the eīecƟveness of a bullet from a hidden gun for any deviaƟon from the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence gameplan. The so-called “moderate” Mirwaiz’s father was the vicƟm, one of 70,000 Kashmiris sacriĮced on the altar of Pakistan’s ambiƟons by such front organisaƟons. May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Jammu and Kashmir STARTLING REVELATIONS

Kashmir accession: the real story

History of Kashmir is one of the greyest areas in the annals of Indian History, shrouded in mystery, deceit and lies. Heaven on earth has bled enough and it is Ɵme we unravel the hidden truths. One such eīort has brought to light many facts which have changed our percepƟon about the role of key players forever.

Extracts from the book “War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48”, by C. Dasgupta

n August 1947 India and Pakistan emerged as independent states but they had yet to gain full control over that essential instrument of sovereignty, the armed forces. In both countries the armed forces were led by British officers. In India, moreover, a British naval officer, Lord Mountbatten, presided over the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. It was quite natural and proper that these British officers owed their primary loyalty to their King rather than to the South Asian governments in whose service they were employed. British policy shaped the military advice they gave to their respective governments, as well as the manner in which they carried out – or failed to carry out – government directives… When India and Pakistan gained independence, secret orders were issued to senior British military officers in both countries to ‘Stand Down’ in the unprecedented event of an imminent inter-dominion war. Thus when tension arose over Junagadh, Mountbatten and the Commander-in-Chief, General Lockhart, did their best to restrain India from taking recourse to military action. Mountbatten took the position that Junagadh had become Pakistani territory by virtue of the Nawab’s accession, even though the accession was clearly indefensible on moral grounds. In September, apprehending a clash with the Nawab, the service chiefs addressed a joint letter to the Defence Minister urging a negotiated settlement and declaring their inability to participate in any way in operations which were likely to precipitate an inter-dominion war. Minister reacted sharply to this ‘invasion of the political domain’ and the offending letter was withdrawn. The service chiefs, however, restated their position with greater circumspection and the ‘Stand Down’ instructions remained in place. At the inception of the Kashmir crisis in October, the position adopted by Mountbatten and the British generals was essentially a mirror image of their position on Junagadh. Accession was the touchstone of their policy. Military intervention in a princely state, or even military aid to its ruler, was viewed as legitimate only if the state had already acceded to the dominion concerned and thus become part of its territory. The danger of an inter-dominion war would not arise if both countries could be made to respect this principle. Thus, in early October, General Lockhart refrained on Auchinleck’s advice from implementing the Indian government’s order to send military supplies to the Maharaja. Likewise, he decided not to share with his government the indications he had received from Messervy and Cunningham about the movement of armed Pakistani tribesmen towards Kashmir. When news of the threat to Srinagar finally reached the Indian government, Mountbatten insisted that military intervention was impermissible in the absence of accession. It was only after he had been accommodated on the question of accession that he agreed to an air-lift. Even at this stage, the Governor-General and the service chiefs sought to dissuade the government by emphasising the military risks and difficulties of the operation. The problems were indeed real but innovative solutions were required and these were suggested not by the Commander-in-Chief but by the Prime Minister himself. It must be said to the credit of the service chiefs, however, that once the government had decided on the airborne operation, it was carried out with exemplary efficiency. The final act in the first stage of the conflict was General Gracey’s refusal to carry out Jinnah’s order to send the regular Pakistani army into Kashmir. Gracey acted in conformity with the ‘Stand Down’ instructions and Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander for India and Pakistan,

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Jammu and Kashmir STARTLING REVELATIONS flew to Lahore to inform Jinnah that all British officers would be withdrawn if the Pakistani army was sent into territory which now belonged to the Indian Union by virtue of the Maharaja’s accession. Thus in the first week of the conflict, British policy was largely elaborated by the men on the spot – Mountbatten, Auchinleck and the British generals commanding the forces of India and Pakistan. Their actions conformed to the ‘Stand Down’ instructions and the legal implications of accession. In Kashmir as in Junagadh, they sought to avert an inter-dominion war by strictly respecting the legal consequences of an act of accession. By the beginning of November, British policy entered a new phase. The initiative passed from the men on the spot to the mandarins in Whitehall. Britain began to move away from a position based on legality and impartiality to a policy based on immediate political and strategic considerations. Though London congratulated Auchinleck and

Gracey on their initiative, it soon had second thoughts. British political and strategic interests dictated a tilt in favour of Pakistan. The Foreign Office feared that antagonising Pakistan might ‘align the whole of Islam against us’, jeopardising British interests in the Middle East. Pakistan was a potential ally and her proximity to the Gulf gave her great geopolitical importance. Finally, Britain feared that Pakistan’s very survival would be challenged if India were to gain control over the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir. An Indian presence along the borders of the princely state with Pakistan would encourage separatist forces in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, bring the Mangla irrigation headworks under Indian control and place the Indian army within striking distance of Pakistan’s military heartland centred around Rawalpindi… Mountbatten played a dual role in this new phase of British policy. In the first place, he assumed the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan. This must be the only case in the annals of diplomacy where the holder of the highest office in a country has attempted mediation between

that country and another! Though he was personally unconvinced about Jinnah’s inability to call off the raiders, Mountbatten adhered loyally to the new line taken by London and made it a feature of his mediatory initiative. Second, he left no stone unturned to dissuade or thwart the Indian government from extending military operations right upto Jammu and Kashmir’s border with Pakistan. Joining hands with the Commander-inChief, he strongly opposed operations in the western areas of Mirpur and Poonch. In collusion with Lockhart, he effectively sabotaged plans for air operations against the raiders along the border. By mid-December, Mountbatten’s mediatory exercise had failed, despite concessions on the part of India. Nor did Lockhart’s military plans hold out any prospect of an early solution. The Commander-in-Chief ruled out the possibility of expelling the raiders before the next spring. Nehru therefore came to the conclusion that a radically different military approach was required. He

envisaged a strike across the border against the invader’s bases and lines of communication in Pakistan. ‘From a military point of view, this would be the most effective step’, he wrote, pointing out that this was the only approach that offered a speedy solution. Mountbatten threw his full weight against the proposal in the Defence Committee. He pressed for a reference to the UN which, he said disingenuously, would promptly direct Pakistan to withdraw the raiders. The Committee agreed, as a compromise, to proceed on both lines simultaneously. A reference would be made to the UN in a last attempt to obtain a peaceful settlement, even though the Prime Minister expected it to be a fruitless exercise. At the same time, the service chiefs were instructed to draw up contingency plans for a military strike against the raiders based in Pakistan. In collusion with the service chiefs, Mountbatten ensured that nothing came of the government’s decision for preparations to be made for a crossborder operation. Meanwhile, he alerted Attlee about India’s intentions, passing on full details of his exchanges with Nehru,

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through the UK High Commissioner. Mountbatten was able to vindicate his boast that his presence in India as Governor-General was the ‘best insurance’ against a full-scale inter-dominion war... At the end of December Britain’s ﬁrst priority was to dissuade India from launching a counter-strike across the border and from thereby precipitating a full-scale was with Pakistan. Attlee warned Nehru that such a move would invite UN censure. At London’s request, the US charge d’affaires in New Delhi made a pointed enquiry about India’s policy and Nehru had to assure him that he had no intention of causing the situation to deteriorate further. Even though India asserted her right to launch a counter-attack across Pakistan territory, she accepted the British-inspired Security Council resolution of 17 January urging the two countries to refrain from any step which might aggravate the situation and to immediately inform the Council about any material change in the situation. At this stage Mountbatten was able to persuade Nehru that there was no current need to pursue the question of an operation across the Pakistan border. Since secrecy and surprise were absent, international intervention had preempted exercise of the option... In early May, with the spring offensive approaching, Mountbatten asked Bucher to instill in the government the notion that India was ‘militarily impotent’ in order to reduce the risk of an all-out war after his departure from India in June. The Commander-in-Chief obliged by advising the government that the army was in no position to expel the invaders from the Poonch and Mirpur areas or even from Muzaffarabad. His assessment contrasted sharply with that offered by his counterpart to the Pakistan government. General Gracey was convinced that the raiders stood no chance of holding out against a full-ﬂedged Indian offensive. Gracey advised Karachi that India’s spring offensive could not be halted unless the Pakistani army moved into Kashmir, operating behind a screen of irregulars. The evidence also suggests that Noel-Baker – without consulting the Cabinet – gave the nod for the Pakistani move into Kashmir. Gracey stated categorically that London was aware of the plan. In October Gracey had refused to obey Jinnah’s order to march into Kashmir; yet a few months later he advocated a similar move. His behaviour is inexplicable unless he had reason to believe that London had cleared the move… By sending in her regular forces, Pakistan blunted the Indian offensive in May-June. The UNCIP’s arrival in the sub-continent in July also imposed a diplomatic constraint on the level of military activity. In other respects, however, the Commission’s arrival produced favourable results from India’s point of view. Since the UNCIP had no British member, London had no direct say in its proceedings. The Commission

was therefore able to formulate a set of balanced recommendations calling for a truce on the basis of the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces, regulars and irregulars, from Kashmir and retention of minimal Indian forces for maintaining law and order in areas under Indian control. The question of conditions for a reference to the will of the people was left for later consultations. The UNCIP’s departure in September reduced political constraints on a new military offensive. Indian Generals in the field called for vigorous measures. Nehru instructed the Commander-in-Chief in early October to prepare a military appreciation of an offensive to drive out the invaders from Jammu and Kashmir. Anxious to thwart such moves, Bucher sent a secret message to London urging that a ceasefire be imposed through the Security Council. In response to the Prime Minister’s instructions, the Commanderin-Chief advised the government that the army was in a position to undertake only some minor operations and that, from an overall point of view, a military stalemate was unavoidable. In light of this assessment, the Indian government approved a limited plan of operations. The Commander-in-Chief immediately reported the details to the new British High Commissioner, General Sir Archibald Nye, who had replaced Mountbatten as Bucher’s guide and mentor. Unwilling to accept the UNCIP truce terms and unprepared to face an Indian onslaught, Pakistan sought an escape through high diplomacy. Liaquat Ali Khan sent the deputy chief of the army, General Cawthorn, on a top secret mission to London with a proposal for a military alliance. Though the proposal did not see immediate fruition, it created a very favourable impression in London and inspired British ministers to fresh exertions on behalf of Pakistan. Britain launched a new initiative to impose an unconditional ceasefire through the Security Council – a proposal mooted earlier by General Bucher… Secret assurances were also given to Pakistan by a British minister that, in the event of an Indian incursion into Pakistan, the Security Council would impose sanctions against India and London would not ask British officers in Pakistan to ‘Stand Down’. On the basis of these secret assurances, Pakistan decided to take the risk of denuding her defences in West Punjab in order to reinforce her positions in the Poonch-Mirpur sector, where she feared an Indian offensive. ... The British archives throw a fascinating light on the ways in which the British generals and diplomats in India and Pakistan coordinated their moves to contain the war and ensure that an Indian advance stopped well short of the Pakistani border. India’s Commander-in-Chief, General Bucher, kept his colleagues in Pakistan informed about his military plans, giving them an assurance that he would not advance beyond specified positions. He

even offered to send a secret signal to this counterpart in Rawalpindi in case the Indian government ‘double-crossed’ him by changing his plans! Bucher’s assurances were gratefully received but they did not fully remove Pakistan’s apprehensions. The generals in Pakistan did not question Bucher’s intentions but they doubted his ability to restrain his Indian subordinates – Cariappa, in particular – from launching militarily unexceptionable forward actions... . In December, as Gracey had feared, Bucher was unable to prevent Indian commanders from taking forward actions in the Kotli area. The Indian army occupied the Salhotri ridge, dominating the main road from Mendhar to Kotli.

Moreover, the Indian airforce bombed the Pakistani position at Palak, behind Kotli. Gracey maintained that the attack on Palak violated Bucher’s assurance. Though these were local actions, Pakistan reacted with alarm, launching a heavy artillery attack on the vital Beri Pattan bridge on the Naoshera road. Indian generals wanted to respond by driving back the Pakistanis across the border and Nehru informed Attlee that India considered herself free to take appropriate action ‘wherever necessary’. However, the situation was quickly brought under control by British diplomats and generals in the subcontinent. Advised by High Commissioner Nye, Bucher instructed Cariappa and Shrinagesh to pull back Indian forces in the Mendhar area. Questioned by Nye about the Palak incident, the Commander-in-Chief explained that his assurance to Gracey only covered actions by the army, not the airforce. The High Commissioner pulled up Elmhirst for not stopping a ‘foolish, unnecessary and provocative action’. Finally Bucher telephoned the Pakistani Chief of Staff and arranged to halt the artillery attack, on the understanding that India would not launch a counter-attack against the Pakistani gun positions. London commended the two

Commanders-in-Chief for their roles in ending what proved to be the last major class in the war. Since the end of October, Nehru’s thinking had increasingly turned towards a ceasefire. He had been foiled in his attempt to prepare contingency plans for a counterattack across the Pakistani border and this no longer appeared to be a feasible option in view of the part played by the Security Council. General Bucher ruled out the possibility of a speedy military decision. On the other hand, the UNCIP proposals held out the prospect of a ceasefire which met India’s minimum political terms. As for Pakistan, the only alternative she had to acceptance of the UNCIP proposals was a long drawn out conflict in which India would inevitably have the upper hand. Thus by the last week of December the UNCIP succeeded in laying the basis of a ceasefire agreement. For High Commissioner Nye the only cloud in the horizon was Bucher’s impending retirement and the appointment of General Cariappa as the first Indian Commanderin-Chief. At Nye’s instance, Bucher approached Nehru with a suggestion for an immediate ceasefire in anticipation of the formal adoption of the UNCIP resolution. With the Prime Minister’s approval, Bucher conveyed the offer to Gracey, who promptly accepted on behalf of Pakistan. Thus ended the first Indo-Pakistan war. In the last days of war Nehru once again drew the Commander-in-Chief ’s attention to the importance of being prepared to launch a counter-attack across the border in case of need. He had urged such preparations a year earlier but had been foiled by Mountbatten. In wars in the third world, secrecy, surprise and speed are essential political requirements for a decisive campaign. In the absence of these factors, an offensive runs the risk of being aborted by external intervention in the shape of a Security Council resolution or simply by a warning from one or more of the great powers. Unless a benign superpower is prepared to hold the ring – by exercising its veto against a Security Council resolution or deterring intervention by other powers – secrecy, surprise and speed are of fundamental importance from a diplomatic as well as military point of view. These conditions were unattainable in a situation where Britons presided over the Defence Committee as well as all the three services. It was only after the Indianisation of the military leadership that contingency planning could be undertaken for a counter-attack across the Pakistani border. Thus in August 1952, Nehru was in a position to inform parliament that ‘any further aggression or attack or military operations in regard to Kashmir, if such takes place by the other side, that would mean all-out war not in Kashmir only, but elsewhere too’. This was the policy implemented in 1965. Extracts from the writer’s book “War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48”, published by SAGE GE Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2001 / 240 Pages / Paper: Rs. 450 (978-0-7619-9589-0)

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Finland INTERVIEW: DEFENCE MINISTER DSA S : Welcome, to India Sir. We are sure you would have a fruitful visit. How do you see the bilateral relations between the two nations? His Excllency Defence Minister: This is my ﬁrst visit to India. I am enjoying it. We both have a long history in UN peacekeeping missions. We both have a close relation with Russia. We feel that there is a possibility of future cooperation in business and in defence industry. We both are not members of any military alliance. DSA S : You had a meeting with your Indian counterpart, kindly tell us about the various issues discussed.

Team DSA met with His Excellency Mr. Jyri Hakamies, Minister of Defence, Finland, at New Delhi on 27.04.2010, for an exclusive interview. He spoke at length with our Editor-in-Chief Mr. Manvendra Singh and Correspondent Mr. Rohit Srivastava.

H.E.: We discussed crisis management under UN ﬂag across the globe. Currently India has deployed 8,000 peacekeepers and we have around 600. We have decided to withdraw all our forces from these missions. We discussed the situation in Afghanistan, and India’s role in it. Possibility of co-operation between the two nations in defence industry was also discussed. The idea of MoU on defence has received positive feedback from India.

India has a role in civil administration, development, which many countries want to follow. But for civil management security is required.

DSA S : Finland like its sister Scandinavian countries, is a peacekeeping super power, how do you see the current peacekeeping forces across the globe? H.E.: Many changes have occurred in peacekeeping. The UN’s role in war or conflict was to secure peace. Today it is very difficult to identify the enemy. Today’s peace missions are becoming dangerous and expensive. During recession you have to see the money part, although money has never been the first criteria. We value peace, security, and human life. We are a small nation, we can offer 500-600 peacekeepers only, but other nations can afford more. Today more money is spent on protection and logistics. For instance, in Chad we spent one million dollar only on logistics to enter into it. DSA S : In Afghanistan your country is playing a significant role in civil and military affairs. What is your analysis of the current situation? H.E.: India has a role in civil administration, development, which many countries want to follow. But for civil management security is required. At present we see ISAF and Afghan National Army are having good relations. Every country wants resolution of Afghanistan problem within next few years. The ISAF is facing IED attacks every day. The increase in the troop strength of ISAF is going to generate more heat. We want to support the Afghan Army but the situation is very dangerous. DSA S : Kindly tell us your views on the US withdrawal plan?

First of all the background is that India has a growing role in the defence sector and your defence budget is growing. And we have felt that there is a possibility to offer from countries like Finland. 66

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

H.E.: With more troops there will be more heat, two years timeline for withdrawal is challenging. ANA should be well in place before withdrawal. The international community is very frustrated with corruption in Afghanistan. It is difﬁcult to convince our people for staying when there is so much corruption. DSA S : How do you see the role of extended and immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan in providing solution of its problems? H.E.: This is a very good question. We can’t solve Afghanistan problem without Pakistan. They have a key role to play. The Saudis have mediated between the Karzai government and the Taliban. India and Russia have strong interests in Afghanistan. Russia is worried about the Islamists and drug trafﬁcking. China is involved for resources like copper and precious stones. The international

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Finland

INTERVIEW: DEFENCE MINISTER

red terror FINAL ASSAULT

buy must fulﬁll both requirements. Which means when we go out it should have equipment and tools with which we can go over to other countries. This goes because we have very close cooperation between other Nordic countries. And we have to have same goods when we talk about say, maritime or air awareness, there should be a base and base comes from the NATO. DSA: In the new sort of security environment that is post 2001 you also ﬁnd emerging powers and with that there is the proliferation of missiles and new technologies. And Finland is a base for high technology R&D. How does Finland see this opportunity, or threat in the same situation? You have the technology which could be widely applicable

Col. (Retd.) Rajinder Singh

H.E.: You are talking about the nuclear technology? DSA: No, not only nuclear missiles, conventional missile and your technology is of the high end of the spectrum. So proliferation and emergence of regional powers is a challenge and an opportunity. H.E.: Like I said we proposed the idea of a Memorandum of Understanding and rules for them. When you go deeper into defence cooperation then there are agreements, and trust. So these are perhaps the key questions. community is of course very worried about the situation there. DSA: A business delegation from the Finnish defence industry is also accompanying you. What sort of agenda do you have? What is the USP of the industry, how do you sell that idea or products to India? H.E.: First of all the background is that India has a growing role in the defence sector and your defence budget is growing. And we have felt that there is a possibility to offer from countries like Finland. In Finland we have good co-operation historically between the public and business sector, and this is business as normal. At the same time we proposed the idea of an industrial seminar and invited these companies with us. There are different kinds of companies but what we have discussed is that both countries value research and development and today we raised the idea of signing MoU on this with my counterpart. DSA: Well the common thing about India and Finland is that these are the only countries that use both western and Russian equipment. Are you bringing that expertise with you here, is that something where we can see co-operation between India and Finland? H.E.: Yes we have that kind of history, especially land forces, we have good experiences but let’s say in last ten-ﬁfteen years, our policy has been that all the material we procure, must have NATO compliance for interoperability. So that means from now onwards the possibilities are limited based on these requirements. DSA: So you mean, to sort of narrow the purchase base. You want to keep the material simpler, is that what you are saying?

DSA: Last question, Finland has a history of nuclear energy and use of nuclear energy and proliferation is a big global concern. We just had the nuclear summit, and India is the largest possible emerging market for equipment. Do you find Finland has an opportunity here, any hurdles in terms of domestic law and international obligations? H.E.: We are talking about the nuclear energy. Private companies have been doing business. But of course when we talk about this kind of business government and the parliament give the license. Last week the Government proposed licenses for two new plants and when you are tackling climate change and want to reduce the emissions at the moment, it is difficult or almost impossible to do it without nuclear power. I am aware that there are many big plans in India and we have companies which are interested to go abroad but it’s not our business to say to go there or not to go there. But as a whole I remember when I was a member of parliament we gave the last license to built new nuclear plant in 2000 / 2001. Those who were against said that Finland is the last country in Europe to build the nuclear power plants. And we said no we’re the first because it was the first turn moment then came the Britain, Belgium and now they are talking Germany. Even though it’s very challenging and there are of course risks that you have to take. That’s the way it goes. As a start we are of course not involved in this. But we are talking about super powers, the Russian and United States agreement, which for us of course, it’s a good sign. We are thinking of these issues and we can’t predict the future, even Obama has a very challenging goal.

H.E.: Can’t say it is simpler.

DSA: But business from Finland in nuclear energy sector, for them to invest in India there is no government restriction in your domestic law?

DSA: No the level of technology is higher but in terms of base of purchase you want them to be narrower.

H.E.: No.

H.E.: What do you mean by that?

DSA: No restrictions as long as…

DSA: No for my answer in terms of having multiple purchase points makes it logistically very complex. H.E.: There are a couple of principles. We don’t buy things for missions and for national defence separately. All materials that we

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Dantewada massacre: endgame imperatives

Indian security establishments have no excuses to feign ignorance of the nuances of jungle warfare in the context of the Dantewada and anti-Maoist operations. We have been fighting in the jungles of the north-east since the attainment of independence. It is time to collate all these experiences (including that of Salwa Judum in the Chattisgarh-Jharkhand salient) and set about neutralising what could be, as indicated by a Chinese website, to be a gameplan to break India into 20-30 pieces.

H.E.: Of course they have to fulﬁll the criteria as there and follow business by law but we don’t force them to go or not to go but of course more or less the main market is the Scandinavian market. Like I said, this energy sector is growing and we have to know how the technology works at the individual and also at the company level.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

red terror FINAL ASSAULT

t is a truism that in India the gravity of a situation is realised only after a monumental tragedy hits in the face. So is the case with the handling of the ‘Maoists’ insurgency. The warning signals of ‘Dantewada tragedy’ had been coming for long from the massacre of villagers in Bihar through beheading of a police officer in Jharkhand, kidnapping of a police officer in West Bengal, hijacking of Guwahati bound ‘Rajdhani’ train and many such incidents. These incidents were the clear indicators of ‘Maoists’ designs and intentions. They were flexing their muscles because they felt they were fully ready to take on the might of the Union of India.

Emboldened The ﬁrst inkling of the rising military clout

Government of India to allow its pilots to ﬁre in self-defence. It is evident from the above incidents that there were glaring inadequacies in the government’s approach and strategy to handle Maoist insurgency. The police, whether central or state government, lacked required leadership, capabilities and professional competence to deal with this menace. The attitude of the police can be gauged from an incident quoted by Major General Pushpendra Singh (retired) in his article, “Strategy to counter Naxalism”, published in The Tribune, on April 13. He cited that in October 2006, Jaswinder Singh, DIG anti-Naxal operations, Orissa, was killed in a blast caused by Naxalites. Immediately, the state government nominated a successor, who equally

or ‘election duty’ or show of strength by ‘ﬂag marching’ in an urbanized area but to ﬁght a ‘war’ with an ‘internal enemy’. This is the ‘War by Other Means’ (WOM), aided and supported by inimical forces outside the country.

Kargil report It must be manifestly apparent that on account of its basic orientation in training and mental-tuning towards ‘policing jobs’, the CRPF was woefully unsuited to ﬁght this war. K. Subrahmanyam, top defence and security analyst of India, observes in his article, “Where-does-the-buck-stop” that the inadequacy of police, state and central both, to handle internal security was highlighted ten years back in the Kargil Committee report. He points out

Warfare School, the CRPF and the police personnel were not following the basic rules of jungle warfare. He has been quoted so by Man Mohan, roving editor of a Chandigarh daily, The Tribune, in his article, “CRPF not sticking to jungle warfare basics’, published in the same Newspaper on April 10, 2010. This comes from the man who has been entrusted with the job to train these policemen of the centre and the state to take on the Maoists. It is by profession, definitely not in the psyche of a ‘policeman’ to attain the attributes of a ‘soldier’. This is where the basic flaw lies. This is why Kargil Committee had recommended seconding of army men to paramilitary and central police forces after seven years colour service in the army. It would have served twin purpose of keeping the army profile young and also be a conduit for trained, disciplined, motivated and a mentally-tuned manpower for police and paramilitary forces.

promptly reported sick. The next nominee also evaded his posting and it carried on.

Unsuited force Despite such glaring deﬁciencies in the leadership and professionalism of the police, what did authorities do in response to these daring acts of provocation by Maoists? With great fanfare, a so-called “Operation Green Hunt” was launched with most unsuited and untrained force. Whoever thought of using CRPF as a bulwark against the well-trained Maoists cadres had forgotten that the job being entrusted to CRPF was not of ‘riot-control’

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

that the Kargil Committee report had recommended adopting an integrated manpower policy for the armed forces, paramilitary forces and the central police forces. Reﬂecting upon the Dantewada incident of April 6, 2010, he attributed it to poor training of jawans, inadequate leadership and improper command and control structure. His assessment is right on the target.

Ignored basics According to another expert, Brigadier B.K. Ponwar (retired) Director of Chhattisgarh State Counter Terrorism and Jungle

Holistic security

The ‘Dantewada’ massacre proved that police, whether central cadre or of a state cadre, was most unsuited to ﬁght this war unless trained, equipped and organised on the pattern of the army. It is not the ﬁrst time it has happened with police. There have been innumerable cases in Bihar, Punjab and Assam in the past when police suffered heavy causalties at the hands of

But there is also a different reason for treating Maoist menace as merely a ‘law and order’ problem. It is distressing to note that security of India has been ‘compartmentalised’. There is no cohesive or ‘holistic’ approach. Security is being viewed in ‘external’ and ‘internal’ dimensions. Obviously, this compartmentalisation leads to further widening of the gap which climaxes into disconcerted efforts. The issues related to security of India are handled in the water tight compartments of ‘Defence Ministry’ and ‘Ministry of Home Affairs’. Attempt is often made to deﬂect blame for lapses rather than doing a rational reappraisal. It is due to such prevalent doctrines, almost dogmatised, that we fail to coordinate our efforts and a lot of

militants and insurgents. It is not their fault because they are not trained to do so. It is a different matter that such tasks were thrust upon them because of the indifferent approach of the governments at the centre and states, who invariably treat such situations as only law and order problems.

damage is done before a corrective action is taken. Whether it is Mumbai 26/11 or ‘Dantewada tragedy of 7/4’, the script of our response is the same. We ought to draw our lessons from this and take corrective actions without loss of any more time and precious lives.

Reorientation

The point on ‘compartmentalised security’ ought to be viewed keeping in mind the changing concept and philosophy of war in ‘nuclearised environment’. Though I do not rule out ‘absolute war’ at some future date yet I do not see ‘1971-Bangladesh’ kind of war in the next 3-4 decades in the Indian sub-continent, primarily due

Not law and order

of Maoists came on July 12, 2009, when they killed 40 policemen of MP, including a senior superintendent of police, Mr. Vinod Kumar Choubey, in the Rajanandgaon district of Chhattisgarh. Then, on February 15, 2010, Naxalites / Maoists raided an Eastern Frontier Riﬂe (EFR) camp at Silda, West Bengal, killed 24 out of the 51 jawans mercilessly and looted all the arms and ammunition. They had been so emboldened by these daring acts that they had also ﬁred upon Indian Air Force helicopters, engaged in general election duty in 2009, compelling the Indian Air Force to project a requirement to the

conjunction with army. On its own, it is incapable of taking on the insurgents and militants who are well versed in the art of military tactics and procedures, when they ﬁght a ‘self-declared war’. Thus, the use of CRPF against Maoists was akin to using a ‘wooden hammer’ to break the ‘rock’. If it is ever done, then only the ‘wooden hammer’ would break. So, it did, which resulted in the loss of 76 precious lives because somebody, including the top brass of CRPF, had failed to correctly assess the Maoist insurgency. It seems it was taken very lightly.

In so doing, policemen become sitting ducks for highly motivated and better oriented ‘irregular soldiers’ of insurgency, WOM or even ‘proxy war’. Police is no match for them unless it is reoriented, speciﬁcally trained and yet operates in

to ‘nuclearised environment’. In the face of worst provocations; be it Kargil-1999, Parliament attack in 2001 and Mumbai 26/11, we did not cross the border because of the danger of its escalation into a ‘nuclear conﬂagration’. This will continue to hang over our heads like a Damocles’ sword in future, too. Therefore, the ‘external threat’ is just a myopic vision which is seriously affecting our capacity to deal with ‘internal threat’.

Military-civil disconnect National security is the job of defence services. One fails to understand the reluctance being shown by the army to take on the Maoists on the plea that it would affect its primary task of safeguarding the territorial integrity from ‘external threat’. It was really shocking to note, as reported in the media, that the top brass of army considered ‘Maoist menace’ to be a ‘law and order’ problem. If so, there could be nothing more blasphemous to national security than this. Vice Admiral Premvir Das (retired), former director general of Defence Planning Staff, under Ministry of Defence, has opined that the paradigm of national security has undergone a change, which required that the theme of ‘army-for-only-externalaggression’ needed to be re-examined. He had said so in his article, “Challenge of internal security” in the Chandigarh based daily, The Tribune, published on

There is an urgent need to carry out police reforms to be effective It won’t be out of context here to say that army service of - years be made compulsory for anyone who wants to join central or state police organisations

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red terror FINAL ASSAULT April 12. He elaborates his point by asking that assuming the Maoist insurgency strengthens, would it not jeopardise India’s integrity? He further points out that main threat to India’s integrity and sovereignty are from within and not from without. A logical conclusion, therefore, is that ‘threat from within’ ought to be viewed as the duty and responsibility of the army.

Constitutional responsibility Military leadership should be clear about the oath taken by them to protect the Indian Constitution and national sanctity at the time of being commissioned as ofﬁcers. Which ‘other war’ the defence forces of India would like to be preserved for, if India loses this Maoists war? What would the army do if India is splintered into 20-30 states, as desired by China and also Pakistan? This is what “Kayani Doctrine” is all about. This is what General Kayani of Pakistan army has tasked his “Karachi Project’ to not only bleed and attrite India from north to south and east to west but also dismember it by encouraging internal conﬂicts such as Maoist insurgency; ULFA militancy; J&K disturbance and Nagaland separatist movement. This is the WOM they have launched on India. Defence services cannot look the other way by saying that it was an impregnable ‘Laxman Rekha’

for them to cross.

What went wrong? Let us now analyse and evaluate as to what could have gone wrong at Dantewada. It is a logical inference that untrained and illoriented manpower of CRPF, in the instant case, behaved typically like any other non-military group, when subjected to a sudden volley of fire from all directions. The resulting shock effect would have not only physically immobilised them but also mentally. It is not their fault. They are trained and oriented to carry out VIP escort, ‘flag-marches’, ‘riot control’ and patrolling in the disturbed areas to deter the miscreants and criminals, who would rarely challenge the police. Thus, ‘show of strength’ by moving in single file through

riot torn areas is the primary tactics of CRPF training. Laments Brigadier B. K. Ponwar that despite hammering into them as to not to travel by road and use it only as navigation tool while performing such missions, yet they make use of road. He ﬁnds them not fully oriented towards the task they were sought to perform. ‘Area domination by moving on higher ground’ and ‘breaking ambushes’ does not come to them naturally. Even if it was done, it was a cosmetic exercise. The schools set up at Silchar (Assam) and Shivpuri (MP) are not fully staffed and geared to train CRPF men to ﬁght an ‘internal war’.

Ambushed Therefore it is fair to assume that the poor CRPF jawans of 62 Battalion might have walked in a single file through a defile or a narrow passage, whose both shoulders would have been occupied by the ambush party of Maoist cadres. It is doubtful if the ambush party was more than 80-100 people. (This, too, if one errs on the higher side. The story of 1000 Maoist cadres ambushing this party is an exaggeration.) And when the patrol party of CRPF, some 80 odd men, came into the middle of the ambush, they must have been mowed down by a stream of ‘enfilade fire’ from the

ambush party on both shoulders of the hillock. Not knowing what to do, most men would have been shocked and they would have taken to ground. It was then the trained Maoist cadres would have taken pot shots at them. This is why heavy causalties have taken place. If there were trained soldiers, they would have taken counter measures before, during and after the ambush. Before walking into the ambush site, they would have ensured clearance of the two shoulders by sending area dominating patrols on the two sides. In case they were ambushed, immediate action would have been to break the ambush by charging through it. Anyway this is a platoon level tactic and one need not further elaborate. The aim was to bring out the difference between the trained

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and untrained persons. Even then one is not ruling out the casualties, but, in all probability, it would not have been more than 15-20 persons.

Remove the causes Before laying down the roadmap from ‘Dantewada’ for the future conduct of operations in the Maoists / Naxalites infected areas, it would be appropriate to grasp certain mandatory pre-requisites. They are listed below: s ,ET US ALL ACKNOWLEDGE ONCE FOR ALL THAT the tribal problems were genuine. There is a crying need to seek an early solution to defeat the Maoists. As long as the causes remain, no force on earth can wipe out Maoist insurgency. Also, it is time to stop crying as to what has happened in the past and who was to be blamed for this. Let us see the problem, in its all dimensions, as it exists in the year 2010. s )T ALSO MUST BE RECOGNISED IF TRIBALS were exploited by businessmen-contractorpoliticians-government employee nexus in the past due to economic reasons; they are now being exploited by Maoists / Naxalites for their self seeking political agenda. The tribals are, therefore caught between ‘devil’ and the ‘deep blue sea’. Decide which is a

bigger evil.

Double standards s 4HERE IS A NEED TO UNDERSTAND THE difference between ‘tribal population’ and acclaimed ‘Maoists’. Yes, tribals are ‘our own people’ and ought to be treated as such but Maoists / Naxalites are not. It won’t be unfair to equate the Maoists / Naxalites as ‘Jai Chands and Mir Jafars.’ In close concert with China and ISI of Pakistan they have taken up arms against the Union of India; they want to overthrow the government through armed conﬂict; they therefore, make dangerous enemy of India. They are not ‘our own people’. They have killed innocent people in Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and MP like you harvest the wheat crop. They have no mercy, they deserve no mercy.

Full might of the State must be used to crush the Maoists and nip the evil in the bud. Till a specialised force comes up, there should be no hesitation in using army. Maoists are ﬁfth columnists and traitors, who are doing the work of India’s enemies and as such they ought to be treated for treason. It is incomprehensible as to why people were against the use of armed forces? Didn’t tanks roll into Golden Temple in 1984? Aren’t guns booming in J&K and Nagaland? Aren’t helicopters in service in Nagaland, J&K and other insurgency prone areas? What is so special in the jungles of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and MP, that they should not be used? Wasn’t the army used in Punjab, Assam, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland and J&K? Why should there be double standards? s &INALLY THE LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC planners must realise that this is a war, the ‘War by Other Means (WOM)’, unleashed by Maoists at the behest of their foreign masters. This is the new concept of war. Our political leadership all over has to recognise

it. No one should undermine this ﬁght for short-sighted political gains by being sympathetic towards ‘our misguided boys’ and ‘our own people’. Let it be clear once for all: Fight to the ﬁnish or be prepared to see disintegration of India into teeny-weeny blobs on the world map, as has been worked out by Maoists and their Chinese handlers. It is going to be a prolonged affair. When using full might of the nation, a collateral damage would certainly take place. Accept it as an evil necessity and not as a deliberate phenomenon.

Future strategy Having said this, it is pertinent to lay the road map for future action to produce desired results. One can only lay down the outline contours of a road map from the

Dantewada onwards. Here are some key points: s 5SE OF 0OLICE AND #20& Counter insurgency or fighting an ‘internal security conflict’ is not the job of police or CRPF. They are neither equipped nor trained and not even mentally tuned to fight such ‘war-like conflicts’. In case police is to be used it ought to be reoriented and trained for such tasks. There was a need to carry out police reforms as suggested in the Kargil Committee report. Time has come to redefine, ‘law and order’ problems and militancy / terrorism in a more realistic manner. It is also time to consider whether such jobs should be entirely left to the state authorities with vested local political interests. Police and paramilitary forces, without reforms, reorientation and reorganisation, are good enough only for crime-busting, riot-control, election duty and urbanised jobs such as VIP escort or guarding an installation. ‘Dantewadas’ would continue to happen if the profile of the security forces is not changed from

CRPF to specialised force or the Army in the interregnum. s 3PECIALISED &ORCE A specialised trained force is required to fight this army of “irregular internal soldiers”, called Maoists / Naxalites. It is understood that the said force cannot be created overnight. The state armed police could provide the basic infrastructure and induction of army men at officer and lower levels would provide the cutting edge to this force. In the interregnum, it is suggested that the Infantry of the army should be put on this task till an adequately trained ‘refurbished police’ or ‘specialised force’ is ready to take on this job. In any case, in a nuclear kind of battlefield environment, infantry’s role has been drastically reduced. One does not expect old type of wars either on northern or western

borders except some small skirmishes on the border. We are going to be haunted more by WOM or ‘sub-conventional conflicts’ which would exploit adversary’s internal vulnerabilities like the Maoist movement. s #OUNTER -ILITANCY 'RID There is a need to establish a well coordinated ‘Counter Militancy Grid’ (CMG) in all 233 affected districts. CMG must be made of sectors and sub-sectors. In fact, it is food for thought as to why the CMG hub should not be created in each of the 600 districts of India? Militancy / insurgency / terrorism in India, indigenous or sponsored from outside is definitely going to spread its tentacles in future too. Kindly note, only war we would fight over next 2-3 decades is WOM sponsored by Pakistan and China. Make no mistake about it. s 5NIlED #OMMAND CMG must be placed under Unified Command, preferably under the army for better results. Unified Command is essential to coordinate and

‘Area domination by moving on higher ground’ and ‘breaking ambushes’ does not come to them naturally Even if it was done, it was a cosmetic exercise The schools set up at Silchar Assam and Shivpuri P are not fully staffed and geared to train CRPF men to fight an ‘internal war’

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red terror FINAL ASSAULT control anti-Maoist operations in all affected areas. Besides, it would also task the various intelligence agencies to gather relevant and ‘actionable’ intelligence. s @-OLES AND )NTELLIGENCE Emphasis ought to be laid on operations based on intelligence - pinpointed intelligence, provided by ‘moles’. Intelligence activity has to be coordinated at strategic, tactical and execution level. Use of unmanned pilotless vehicles PTV or drones would serve a good purpose. It was reported in the media, a few days back that IIT had developed a pocketbook sized PTV, which could come quite handy for surveillance and ‘search and destroy attacks’ on Maoist camps. s 4ARGET BASED /PERATIONS Tactics should be of small scale and target based operations. No large scale operations to be carried out. Troops must have the ability to quickly concentrate on getting ‘actionable intelligence’ and disperse. Target must be defined for each commander by name and he should be trailing and collating information only on this. s %FFECTIVE 2ADIO #OMMUNICATIONS This requires effective means of communications right up to the last sepoy / jawan / constable. Latest hand held radio sets must be procured and handed over. s /UTLINE "ROAD 3TRATEGY The strategy must be based on the philosophy of: Identification of targets: Each CMG locality / sub-sector / sector / theatre must be very clear about their assigned targets. Specific information must be gathered on the leaders, cadres and the sympathisers. Each team and sub team must know the profile of its assigned target with exactitude. Isolation of leaders: Cut off leaders from their cadres and colleagues. Make them run for their lives. Most often security forces go for arresting the leaders. It does not pay much dividends. Instead, it increases administrative liabilities. It is better to let them off the hook and make them feel unsafe and insecure. Tire them out in this game. Arrest must be the last resort. Breaking communications: Having isolated the leaders, there is then a requirement to break communications between leaders and the cadres so as to induce chaos and confusion in their ranks. Aim must be to disrupt their efforts to connect, coordinate and concentrate. Similarly, the cadres must be shooed away from their local sympathisers by establishing series of strong ‘floating localities’ in the population centers. The best way to do so is to relocate the tribals in the non-forested areas. Re-location of populace: The shifting of tribal population from the forests to non-forested areas with easy access is desired to smash the support base of Maoists and deny them ‘coerced recruitment’. ‘Strong points nodes’ in

the midst of Maoists / Naxalites infected areas ought to be established to break the links. These ‘strong points’ be served by compact but effective ‘floating localities’. These localities would facilitate contacts with ‘moles’ and revitalise the flow of actionable intelligence. It would also serve to obliterate the ‘Robin Hood’ image of Maoists which makes them win over the sympathies of tribals. The regrouping and re-location of villages was a rudimentary need if the government honestly and really wants to tackle this menace. There will be a lot of hue and cry both internally and internationally. But it has to be done. All that talk of disrupting the cultural and traditional life of the tribals is nonsensical. They have to be brought into the mainstream of modern life. Roads, hospitals, school / colleges, shopping centres and modern means of living ought to be equally accessed by the tribals. If jobs and all the above amenities are to be created for the tribals, then forests have to be cleared in a planned manner. Unorthodox operations: No large scale operations must be carried out. Avoid cordon and searches; roadblocks and also uneven hour raids on the houses. If you have the information, track them and nab them when they have moved out of the hide. The large scale operations cause inconvenience to the local population and lead to unpopularity among the masses. Most of the operations must be target based. Area domination patrols or ambush parties must be always active. Generally one third of the force should be kept away from the floating locality but within the 15 minutes striking distance of the locality. Neutralisation of leaders: Militants and terrorists often follow the dictum kill 10 and terrorise 100 people into inaction. Exactly, in a similar manner if security forces neutralise one leader of the militants, all others would run fearing for their lives, particularly if the message goes that the targeted leader’s neutralisation owed itself to an insider job. A sense of fear then overpowers them. It is an established truth that the so called ‘merchants of death’ behaved like ‘scared crows’ once their own life seems to be in danger. Most of their time, energy and resource are wasted in ensuring personal security. If this condition is enforced, half the battle of security forces is won. The successful conduct of anti-militancy operations against the almost invincible LTTE in Sri Lanka, owes itself to this condition brought about by the Sri Lankan security forces. It is a notable fact that ‘Col. Karuna’ and his men played the ‘insider’s role’ very effectively. Same thing could be said about Punjab militancy. Nowinfamous ‘cat squads’ had played their role very well. Once leaders are on the run or neutralised, the cadres automatically disappear.

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joke n cartoon LAUGH N RELAX! Deny the use of media: Publicity is the oxygen that sustains militancy. Media is their major weapon. Its use must be effectively denied. The planted interviews and alleged cases of rape and murder blunt the operations of security forces and at times demoralise them. Give free hand to security forces: Genuine lapses must be punished but unwanted legal harassment must be stopped. Sensationalisation of lapses or alleged atrocities by the media must be prevented. There should be immunity from prosecution due to some human errors. Counter Insurgency and Counter Militancy College: There is need to open a central ‘Counter Insurgency and Counter Militancy College’ under the aegis of MHA so as to train officers, men and units for counter militancy role in a proper manner. This college must be manned, staffed and operated by army or be run under army’s supervision. Finally, it is time to get serious about threat posed by Maoists / Naxalites. Their cadres might not know but the leaders are definitely in league with China. Ever since Maoists in Nepal forged a victory there by deposing the king, the confidence of Indian Maoists surged sky high. Motivated by success of Maoists in Nepal, Indian Maoists have launched a war on India. They very well know what they are doing. To call them ‘misguided’ and ‘own people’ is to wish away the evil and prolong India’s ordeal and perhaps endanger its integrity. There is nothing misguided about them; they are focused and determined to achieve their objectives. In so doing, they have established links with foreign militant groups. On October 02, 2009, one of Maoist commanders, called Srinivasan, spoke to the anchor of LEMON TV Channel live and admitted in public that Chinese and Nepalese trainers have been coming to India to impart training to their cadres. Similarly, in the last week of October 2009, Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal revealed that Maoists of Nepal were the link for providing arms to Indian Maoists. Equipped, trained and armed by their Chinese masters, the Indian Maoists say that it was war they were fighting with India. Why should the Indian leadership be debating and dilly dallying a war-like action against them? Use a hammer made of ‘hardened steel’ to smash these adversaries of the nationState. The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy and commissioned into 3 Bihar battalion in June 1971. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College, Wellington and Army War College, Mhow. He has vast experience of handling militancy, terrorism and insurgency intimately for over 20 years in Nagaland, Assam, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

national security FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

In trying to fashion a foreign policy framework that will protect its security interests India is going to come up hard against the US tendency to pander to the Pakistan military establishment. China appears to hold all the aces and is not averse to using surrogates to trump India. In the midst of all this dissonance New Delhi must chart a course of equilibrium between a US in a state of withdrawal and an ascending and assertive China.

through a glass, Arundhati Ghose, IFS

oon after the appointment of Shiv Shankar Menon as India’s National Security Adviser - and even before - there has been a debate on the most desirable structure of the national security establishment. Less attention has been paid to whether and if so, where, changes were needed in the approach to external security issues, internal security having been, more or less and in effect, already appropriated by the Home Ministry. In the latter case, it is also assumed that some issues of external and internal security will inevitably overlap and earlier practices of hiving off speciﬁc areas , the “turf ” or “silo” structure, will no longer work. It has been recognized that more and not less coordination would be necessary. The prospects, however, remain obscured, in the absence of any clear enunciation of policy in this regard.

Coordination template More critically, the lines between issues of foreign policy and national security are more blurred. Indeed, a major component of any country’s foreign policy is, inevitably, its security concerns; conversely, foreign policy remains a tool to obtain a country’s security objectives. Other countries have seen, sometimes to the detriment of the overall national interest and depending on the personalities involved, one or the other institution dominating the discourse. While one can expect that with his own recent background and his unquestioned poise and ﬁnesse, Menon will avoid the all too evident pitfalls, it is necessary, especially at this point in time, to view the challenges that lie ahead - both for the country’s foreign policy and for its security interests.

Global instability

Timewarp?

Over the past year or so, international relations have witnessed rapid and in some cases, unforeseen shifts. The global scene is today characterised by instability and turmoil, with perceptions of global issues and challenges no longer distinct and clear. The great economic meltdown has weakened traditional sources of power and inﬂuence as countries in the West either turn inwards or attempt to do so by drawing in their earlier extended interests. The greatest changes have been in two countries of immediate and vital interest to India, the US and China.

While this impacts the world as a whole, as the US continues to remain the technological and military super power, the economic weakness and the focus on domestic issues is diluting US inﬂuence across the world. This comes, unfortunately for India, at a time when after decades of estrangement, India and the US had started to establish more normal and in fact, friendly relations. The recent adjustment of US policy on Af-Pak, the continuous talk of an ‘exit strategy’ when India supported a policy of ‘endurance’, the acceptance of the Pakistani view that the Taliban should be ‘integrated’ and ‘reconciled’ and the reluctance to ‘offend’ Pakistan by taking into account India’s legitimate security concerns, is a striking example of this disjunction.

War-weary US The Obama Administration started its term on a high, with, perhaps unrealistic expectations from the global community; today, the state of the US economy, on which much of the world economy depends, appears to have overwhelmed the ambitions of those early months, certainly as far as foreign policy is concerned. Domestic issues and compulsions seem to occupy the US President, with foreign policy issues being handled on the basis of lines of least resistance. It is not just the rise of protectionist impulses, but where the earlier Administration debated on whether the single super power should get involved in ‘nation-building’ abroad, President Obama, speaking almost as a middle power would and perhaps reﬂecting the domestic weariness with the wars in AfghanistanPakistan and Iraq, said that the only nation he was interested in building was the United States. Without over-exaggerating the trends, the US today appears to have entered a phase of navel-gazing.

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DARKLY

There is no doubt that Britain’s assiduous propagation of this view helped the Americans to choose what looks like an easy way out; in spite of the knowledge that the Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan are widely different to those of the US. Following the recently concluded strategic dialogue between the US and Pakistan, it would appear that the former is ready to enter into (once again) a ‘dependence relationship’ with the latter to ease the exit from a troublesome area. To diverge somewhat from US policy trends, it is important to restate why Afghanistan is important to India. The Pakistan-obsession of much of the Indian media seems to support the Pakistani view that Afghanistan is a theatre of Indo-Pak rivalry. However, it should be obvious that any hostile regime in Afghanistan, with or without Pakistani help, would effectively box India south of the Himalayas, cut off from an area that is of both strategic

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national security FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES and economic interest to India. The return of the Taliban, in whatever form, to Afghanistan, is bound to lead to ethnic turmoil in that beleaguered country, if not to a return to civil war. This instability will spill over into Pakistan, given the linkages of history, ethnic and military, of Afghanistan, with that politically fragile country. The impact on India, and not only with increasing threats of terrorism from the ensuing lawlessness, then would divert attention and resources from the strenuous efforts being made to deal with India’s own economic and social development. A stable and friendly Afghanistan is in India’s vital interests. It is as important as is the stability and prosperity of the countries sharing borders with India.

‘crisis’ situations, demand that the Indian responses be calibrated to ensure that our core interests, both on the security front and our desire for high technology to meet our developmental goals, are carefully managed. The management of India’s relations with the United States will be one of the biggest challenges to Indian diplomacy, impacting as that country does, through its decisions and actions, not only on our vital security interests but on our domestic polity. This becomes a more complex task with recent reports of a directive from President Obama to ‘pressure’ India on her relations with Pakistan, based on the closeness of relations between the US and the Pakistani military. The other major change has been in the emergence of China.

India-US disconnect

Dragon prowl

case, the apparent lack of interest in nurturing a relationship with India by a US trammelled with its domestic issues, notwithstanding some high level visits and the preoccupation of the US with other

It is not just a border problem that India faces with China. Today, China is no longer a ‘rising’ country - it has already emerged as a major global power, if not as a ‘super power’ as the BBC and some other British media would have it. The

economic crisis of the last two years and China’s almost triumphant survival has placed it in a position where its decisions and actions are seen to affect issues of global importance - its ‘locked-at-the-hip’ economy with unprecedented growth rates is seen to be vital to the recovery or continuing stagnation of the US and other Western economies. The emergence of China as the world’s largest exporter and the world’s greatest polluter, have made it a crucially important country in multilateral negotiations on trade and climate change. The rapid transformation of its military strength and its single-minded drive towards technological development, have induced both fear and respect; reactions have tended to be confused and sometimes, ill-thought. China itself has been ﬂexing its muscles so far only verbally, and positions taken by it internationally reﬂect a greater degree of assertiveness than before. It is not only the West that is growing more uncomfortable with the suddenness of China’s emergence; its neighbours - India, Japan and Vietnam have been looking for ways by which they can manage their relations with the behemoth.

Proxies India’s reactions at the ofﬁcial level have so far been measured. Public commentary, in the media and from parts of the strategic community have tended to veer from one extreme to another, from preparing for military hostilities to break out to choosing between hegemons in Asia, if not globally. It is almost a truism that nuclear weapon States are unlikely to start military hostilities between each other; but that assumes a degree of rationality on both sides.

The recent adjustment of S policy on Af-Pak, the continuous talk of an ‘exit strategy’ when India supported a policy of ‘endurance’, the acceptance of the Pakistani view that the Taliban should be ‘integrated’ and ‘reconciled’ and the reluctance to ‘offend’ Pakistan by taking into account India’s legitimate security concerns, is a striking example of disjunction

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

With China’s prosperity growing its vulnerability to pain has also increased and it is unlikely, at the present time, to permit military tensions with any of its neighbours to distract it from its continued focus on its own economic development. On the other hand, nothing would stop it from using surrogates to achieve its goals; if ‘messages’ need to be sent, for example to India, in the event it considered India as challenging any of its core interests, Pakistan and perhaps other countries could be used for the purpose. While China itself may not pose a direct military threat to India’s security, India’s foreign policy will have to manage this relationship more carefully than perhaps any other. Sino-Indian relations at the ofﬁcial level seem to have undergone a slight shift towards peaceful co-existence; the co-operation during the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit, the celebration of 60 years of diplomatic relations, growing trade links and soothing words from leaders in both countries appear to have, at least for the moment, dampened the heated atmosphere of 2009. The basic problems, however, remain and it would require deft diplomacy to ensure that tranquillity in our relations with our largest neighbour is maintained while being prepared for any unexpected and unwelcome developments.

Pak-centricity India’s other neighbours are also seeing major changes and remain vital to India’s security and well-being. While India appears to be working on what would appear to be an outline of a strategy to establish mutually stable relations with most, the most intractable relationship

with major implications for India’s security remains that with Pakistan. For all the conﬂicting reports about developments in that country, it has been recognised that Pakistan is undergoing a period of political instability and economic crises, making it dependent on external sources for its budgetary requirements and social turbulence, not least because of the rise of religious nationalism and to an extent, the consequent attacks on ordinary civilians by myriad groups - sectarian, regional and terrorist. The last, has today become a major challenge to India, diverting attention from her focus on her economic and social development at home and carrying with it the inevitability of hostilities breaking out between both countries in the event of another serious terrorist attack on an Indian city, notwithstanding assertions that ‘war cannot be an option’.

Dialogue plus There have been voices in India emphasising the importance of ‘dialogue’ with Pakistan, dialogue which should be ‘uninterruptable’. If dialogue were to prevent terrorist depredations and the consequent outbreak of hostilities, or if dialogue should be maintained after such hostilities, the question would remain as to what the dialogue should be about. In the ﬁnal analysis, a dialogue, composite or not, cannot be an end in itself; it has to be held with a purpose which would address the security concerns of the participants. Finding a way through the mineﬁeld of these relations, could be one of the most complex challenges that India would have to face. India’s basic demands from Pakistan are simple: that she stop terrorist

activities aimed at India from her soil. In the relationship, it is Pakistan that is the demandeur; India would be satisﬁed with the emergence of a stable Pakistan. In dealing with the, in some ways, predictable country, innovative thinking is a necessity. India will need to calibrate her security and her foreign policy thrust through delicate yet concrete steps to deal with this challenge. The outlines of policy in dealing with India’s foreign and security policies are not yet clear. There is an urgent need for the country to be made aware of the strategies that are intended to be followed to meet these crucial challenges.

The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963 and served in various capacities in the Ministry of External A Affairs and in Indian missions abroad.Was in charge of economic relations when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in Calcutta during the birthpangs of that nation-State. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea and as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Ofﬁces in Geneva. As Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva she etched in indelible words the sovereign resolve of the Indian nation never to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Her words reverberate in Indian hearts to this day. She told the world in measured, authoritative tones that India would never sign the CTBT. “Not now! Not ever!”.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

cyberspace SAFEGUARDS

LEGAL

Vakul Sharma

F RAME WOR K If the Ministry of Defence has not notified its cyberspace under the e amended Act which was passed in 2008 there is cause to blow a whistle. Cribbing about China hacking into the Ministry of Externall Aﬀairs and other computer networks is indefensible. If you leave the stable door open the horses will be stolen by rustlers and the barn will become home for creatures (viruses) of the worst kind. “Knowledge, power, oppression and resistance always circulate around one another, alternatively feeding off and nourishing one another.”

-Foucault

e live in a dangerous world. Acts of terror have moved beyond the physical world. The computer, computer system and networks are being engaged to bring well-coordinated attacks against nation-States. Even in cyberspace, nation-States have started drawing imaginary lines of control and indulging in proxy wars using proxy servers! Cyber security has moved from the days of securing personal computers and networks to securing national critical information infrastructure. With each passing day, cyber threats to a nation-State are multiplying. It is time that there should be some concerted action to have a National Plan on Cyber Security. A beginning has already been made by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008. This Amendment Act has provided the much-needed legal framework. Now the ball is in the court of policy makers to create policy framework for cyber security issues.

Cyber law Interestingly, it was in year 2000 when for

the ﬁrst time, the concept of ‘Protected System1’ was introduced in the Information Technology Act. This Act empowered both the central and state governments to declare any computer, computer system or computer network as protected by issuing a notiﬁcation to that effect. Alas! in the last ten years, except the state government of Kerala, which way back in 2003 declared its computer resources, no other agencies or departments of either the central or state governments have declared their respective computer resources as protected, meaning thereby that on this day Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), Commodity Exchanges, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Networks of Indian Railways, aviation sector, power grids. NICs etc. have not been ‘declared’ protected under the Act. Believe it or not, even the networks of armed forces have not been declared as protected under the Act. Better believe it! The question is – why this inertia? The Parliament has willed its intent in the form of the information technology legislation. It is now for us to implement the spirit of the said legislation.

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Secure system The Act gives a very balanced view2 while determining what constitutes a reasonably secure system. One has to determine its own level of secure system one, by reasonably securing it from unauthorized access and misuse, two by providing a reasonable level of reliability and correct operations, three by being reasonably suited to performing the intended functions and four by adhering to generally accepted security procedures. The Act has adopted a very pragmatic deﬁnition in view of ever increasing risks and threats. It accepts the fact that there is nothing like ‘absolute’ secure system. But this does not mean that one should not strive for creating, operating or managing secure systems. Also, the Act introduces the term “cyber security3” which means protecting information, equipment, devices, computer, computer resource, communication device and information stored therein from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modiﬁcation or destruction and “cyber security incidents4” as “any real

or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicitly or implicitly applicable security policy resulting in unauthorised access, denial of service / disruption, unauthorised use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorisation.” Interestingly, the new Amendments to the Act,5 have introduced the concept of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII), which means the computer resource, the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety. The new Amendments now provide that the appropriate government may

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

cyberspace SAFEGUARDS declare any computer resource, which directly or indirectly affects the facility of Critical Information Infrastructure, to be a protected system6. The list of such protected systems may include defence, stock exchanges / commodity exchanges, railways, airlines, banks, hospitals / disease management systems, power grids, reďŹ neries, transportation / logistics, telecommunications, corporate networks, software vendors, etc. It further provides that any person who secures access or attempts to secure access to a protected system shall be punished with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to ďŹ ne. And suppose the department / agency of the government has not notiďŹ ed its computer resources as protected though they constitute CII, then under the circumstances any accused would be charged under a minor section7. The new Amendments in the Act have introduced section 66F, which penalises all acts of cyber terrorism. Essential ingredients of cyber terrorism are: 1. An intention to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror, and 2. Causing or likely to cause (i) death or injuries to persons8, or (ii) damage or destruction of property, or (iii) damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or (iv) disruption of or affecting the critical information infrastructure, as speciďŹ ed in section 70, by any of the following acts: (a) denying or causing the denial of access to any person authorised to access computer resource; or (b) attempting to penetrate or accessing a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access; or (c) introducing or causing to introduce any Computer Contaminant. Section 66F further provides, whoever commits or conspires to commit cyber terrorism shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life. SigniďŹ cantly, the Act also takes into consideration the cross border cyber terror activities, if an offence or contravention is committed outside India by any person, if the act or conduct constituting the offence or contravention involves a computer, computer system or computer network located in India9. This would imply that the

perpetrators of 26/11 attacks could also be charged under section 66F of the Act for the acts of cyber terrorism!

relating to information security practices, procedures, prevention, response and reporting of cyber incidents;

Critical clauses

(f) Such other functions relating to cyber security as may be prescribed.

The new Amendments have also introduced three provisions to further strengthen the cyber security environment in India. These are:

Further CERT-IN may call for information and give direction to the service providers, intermediaries, data centres, body corporate and any other person regarding aforesaid components; and any service provider, intermediaries, data centres, body corporate or person who fails to provide such information called for or comply with the direction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term upto one year or with ďŹ ne which may extend to one lakh rupees or with both.

s 3ECTION n 0OWER TO ISSUE DIRECTIONS for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer resource. s 3ECTION ! n 0OWER TO ISSUE directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource. s 3ECTION " n 0OWER TO AUTHORISE to monitor and collect trafďŹ c data or information through any computer resource for cyber security. "Y INTRODUCING THE AFORESAID SECTION THE 0ARLIAMENT HAS RECOGNISED THE FACT THAT THE free ďŹ&#x201A;ow of information over the Internet has the capability to even affect a Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s both internal and external security, which may include itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sovereignty, integrity, defence, security, public order etc.10. These sections create a regulatory framework to intercept, monitor all sorts of data or information ďŹ&#x201A;owing through the computer resources located in India. This is in fact a kind of proactive piece of legislation.

Role of CERT-IN 3ECTION " OF THE !CT EMPOWERS )NDIAN Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN)11 as â&#x20AC;&#x153;a national focal pointâ&#x20AC;? for gathering information on threats and facilitating the central governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response to computer-based incidents. The role of CERT-IN is to institutionalise â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;cyber securityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and insulate India from any such â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;cyber incidentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. Under the Act, the role of CERT-IN is in the area of cyber security, which may include following components: (a) Collection, analysis and dissemination of information on cyber incidents; (b) Forecast and alerts of cyber security incidents; (c) Emergency measures for handling cyber security incidents; (d) Coordination of cyber incidents response activities; (e) Issue guidelines, advisories, vulnerability notes and white papers

What next? It is evident from aforesaid discussion that cyber security is one of the key elements to national security. The law on cyber security is here, but what is required its implementation of its key provisions, namely: (a) IdentiďŹ cation of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). B .OTIlCATION OF SUCH #)) AS 0ROTECTED System under the Act. C %FFECTIVE USAGE OF SECTION & n CYBER terrorism in terror-linked cases.

(e) Training of judicial ofďŹ cers, law enforcement agencies, defence personnel, service providers, corporates, etc. on cyber security provisions. F 0REPARATION OF A .ATIONAL 0LAN ON Cyber Security12

The writer is a practicing Advocate in the Supreme Court of India and the High Court(s). Member of the Expert Committee, appointed by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, government of India to amend the IT Act, 2000, which is now in the form of IT (Amendment) Act, 2008. Adviser to the central government and various statutory bodies on Information Technology laws and practices.

(2) Section 2(1)(ze)

(3) Section 2(1)(nb)

(6) Section 70(1)

(7) Section 66 [Computer related offences ](9) of the Act, wherein the imprisonment term

is of 3 years. Offences under section 66 are cognisable, but bailable. Offences under section 70 are cognisable and non-bailable.

(4) Rule 2(f) of Section 69B (8) Cyber terror acts may include

ausing disruption to nuclear reactors, power grids, dams, aviation, railways etc., which may result into death or injuries to a large number of people.

(10) Sharma, Vakul (2010): Information Technology â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Law & Practice (3rd Edn.), Universal Law Publishing

May 2010 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

We invite

you to send the synopsis of your esteemed works for book publication related to defence and security.

We intend

to publish research based, authentic, interesting and thought-provoking writings, exclusive photographs and art-works on defence and security issues in India and abroad.

These are selected excerpts from the writerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s soon-to-be published book on Cyber Security.

(5) Effective from October 27, 2009

activities and functions. It is one of the most informative website(s) on cyber security issues.

and authors to write for DSA for a safe and secure India and world.

Let us not forget that ignorance of law is no defence!

(1) Section 70 of the Information Technology Act, 2000

(11) Visit: www.cert-in.org.in to know more about CERT-IN

We request all academicians, thinkers, policy makers

(d) Knowledge about the key aspects of interception, monitoring of computer resources, as articulated under sections 69, ! AND "

Notes:

(9) Section 75

request